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
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"NOT TO PROMOTE WAR, BUT TO PRESERVE PEACE..."

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What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?

JOHN R. GALVIN

We need strategists. In the Army and throughout the services. At all levels. We need senior generals and admirals who can provide solid military advice to our political leadership, and we need young officers who can provide solid military advice—options, details, the results of analysis—to the generals and admirals. We need military strategists, officers, all up and down the line, because it takes a junior strategist to implement what the senior strategist wants done, and it (usually) takes the input of juniors to help a senior strategist arrive at his conclusions. Our current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Bill Crowe, recently said that what we need are people who can deal with “thorny problems—people in uniform who are expert in their warfighting specialties and also able to assist the National Command Authorities in matters of strategy, policy, resource allocation, and operations.”¹ These officers, he said, need to be tested leaders and skilled military technicians, open-minded and adaptable, knowledgeable of military history and the role of armed force in the world, and versed in the complexities of bureaucratic decisionmaking and the international interests of the United States and its allies.

This seems all too obvious, but if so, where *are* these strategists?

We can find plenty to read and study on the subject of leadership; in fact, there is a veritable mountain of studies, essays, and books explaining how to build leaders. Not so if one wants to build (or become) a strategist. Here the field of instructive works becomes thin. Of course, in some quarters the very idea of soldiers expounding on strategy is viewed with concern. Yet, the interest in strategy and the great strategists is as intense as it has ever been. On the other hand, the *creating* (a better word might be *developing*) of strategists is a matter that gets far less attention. The wealth of literature on strategy makes the lack of discussion on how we beget strategists all the more puzzling, for surely the development of military strategists is a vitally important issue which

should be subject to the interchange of ideas and constructive critiques, just like that of strategy itself. Strange that it is not.

We owe it to those who follow us to educate them and prepare them to assume the heavy responsibility of providing military leadership and military advice in the service of the state; in other words, to make them (some of them, the best of them) military strategists. And if this is true, we need to ruminate a bit on what it is we are seeking.

A military strategist is an individual uniquely qualified by aptitude, experience, and education in the formulation and articulation of military strategy (*making* strategy and *articulating* strategy are equally important).² He understands our national strategy and the international environment, and he appreciates the constraints on the use of force and the limits on national resources committed to defense. He also knows the processes by which the United States and its allies and potential adversaries formulate their strategies. He has (and to say the least it is hard to work strategic issues without this) a fundamental knowledge of the structure, functions, and capabilities of the military organizations of friend and foe.

There are many stepping-stones on the way to this knowledge. The budding soldier-strategist gains early a firm grasp of tactics and how organizations and equipment function synergistically in war. He grows to understand how units move and how they "live," because he knows he is not just moving chess pieces but real organizations with real possibilities and constraints. He builds himself a sound foundation, first in the tactical and then in the operational level of warfare. In the process, he becomes aware of the intricacies of staff functions and procedures so that he understands how units will handle themselves and the operational requirements they are given. After a while he knows what things are possible, what units can and cannot do, and what happens to them under various conditions of battle. This includes a good knowledge of logistics because logistics (including the ever-changing military technology) can profoundly shape what is strategically possible.

General John R. Galvin is the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command. He was an enlisted man in the Massachusetts National Guard before entering the US Military Academy, from which he graduated in 1954. General Galvin later earned an M.A. degree from Columbia University and was a Fellow at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His assignments have included infantry unit duty in Puerto Rico; a Ranger instructorship in Colombia; an English instructorship at West Point; Military Assistantships to SACEURs General Goodpaster and General Haig; two tours in Vietnam, including command of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry; command of US VII Corps; and, prior to his present assignment, command of US Southern Command in Panama. General Galvin is a prolific author, whose publishing credits include the books *The Minute Men* (1967), *Air Assault: The Development of Airmobile Warfare* (1969), and *Three Men of Boston* (1976). *The Minute Men* is being reissued in 1989, by Pergamon-Brassey's, and featured as an AUSA Institute of Land Warfare book.

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The military strategist comprehends all that can be summed up as the human dimension, the human element; he understands people and knows how to motivate them. He knows what it means to commit people—in the form of military units—to action in war. The soldier-strategist knows how human beings react to the stresses, agonies, and horrors of war, not only at the lowest reaches, but at the highest levels of government as well. If he is good, he knows his own side intimately and the mind of his adversary as well.

The strategist in uniform provides advice to political authorities in the development of national policy (what is to be achieved) and national strategy (how to achieve it). He has a role in forming national strategy and policy by explaining military capabilities, the limits of armed force, and how military power can be used as an element of national power. He conveys to his political leaders his sensing of what is achievable and what is not achievable by military means.

He also translates political policy into military plans and actions. Developing an effective military strategy requires thoughtful analysis, creative ideas, and a sense of perspective. It is unlikely that the demands of strategy will become any less complex in the future. Furthermore, the process of building strategy is never really complete. All strategy has to be reviewed often with a critical eye to determine whether it will still accomplish the objective for which it was designed.

Fine. But the question remains whether we have the officers with the necessary skills in the right places in the right numbers to do all this. How many military strategists do we need? The wag may say "None," and some may feel that the answer could be "One." You may need only one Alexander, they say, or one Napoleon, or one George Marshall. But perhaps the question really is, "How do we get as broad a leavening of strategic thinkers as possible?" For each accomplished strategist we produce, how many must begin the long period of winnowing and development? How do we produce enough officers to achieve the proper formulation of military strategy? Is there some minimum number for a given organization? How do we create a network of intelligent, experienced original thinkers who can conceive and implement the many facets of a military strategy?

We can never predict who will be in the key positions of strategy formulation and execution in a time of crisis, and we cannot expect to be able to create "instant military strategists" in time of war. In order to have the ability to expand, we need a structure—or better a matrix—in which at any one time there are officers at all levels experiencing a maturation of their talents as strategists. We need young strategists because we need senior strategists, and we need a lot because when the time comes we need *enough*.

Given the many differences in the backgrounds, environments, personalities, and careers of successful military strategists, how can we expect to create new ones out of whole cloth? Frederick the Great grew up with the

advantages and education associated with the life of nobility. He not only led brilliantly in the field, he showed a unique ability to articulate his strategic concepts. Clausewitz had little formal education, never served in command, but knew battle from many perspectives. Liddell Hart left the service early, as a captain, while J. F. C. Fuller's military career took him to generalship. What message is there in this, what common thread?

Each military strategist reaches his level of skill by absorbing and ordering the unique experiences of his own life—from wartime battles and peacetime training, from his own study of books, from daily life in military units, from the counsels of his leaders and the conversations of his colleagues, from his studies and his teachers in military schools—and from trial and error in the school of hard knocks.

Strategic thinkers do not owe their success to the ability to master certain principles or maxims. War has been fought on shifting sands: battle can differ enormously from century to century and now even from decade to decade. The way to learn about the enemy (reconnaissance), to move against him (maneuver), or to bring power to bear (mass), is very different down through history. The common thread is an ability to assimilate military thinking (and not necessarily from personal combat experience), to derive from this assimilation a set of ideas, and to fit these ideas to the occasion.

So much for generalizations on the theme. Assuming you are convinced (or always were) that we absolutely must get our priorities right and build more good military strategists, you will agree that the need is for an agenda of action. Our approach should employ three elements: formal schooling, in-unit education and experience, and self-development.

First, schools.

Perhaps it is too obvious, but at each level, the schools should seek to broaden the officer's horizon. For example, the command and staff colleges should focus on the operational level of war, stress joint operations, and introduce strategy, while the war colleges should concentrate on the study of strategy. In the past the Army War College focused on developing an awareness of the force development process. It stressed how to work the issues, such as the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, to help the Army compete for resources with the other services. Force development is not unimportant, but it was often taught to the neglect of serious study of the use of armed forces in war. Happily, this situation appears to have changed.¹

The schools also need a first-rate faculty, especially at the senior service colleges. The faculty at the latter should include a mix of civilian and military professors to provide varying perspectives. This should help prevent the institution from being dominated by a single viewpoint or a single line of reasoning in dealing with strategic issues. The faculty should be composed of recognized experts in strategic studies and military history, professors who

know their subjects in depth and can help the students grapple with all aspects of a strategic question. There should be low faculty turnover and long-term instructors. Last year's graduates have no business being on this year's faculty. By the same token, the faculty need not be dominated by people who have been successful commanders in units, but rather by people who can teach.

A good instructor is a special kind of person. The individuals who stick in our memories as good instructors share certain characteristics. They invariably have a sound knowledge of their subject. They also know how to kindle the student's interest, how to get the student to challenge his own assumptions, and how to look at the subject in a new light. It takes uncommon skill to foster understanding and to motivate and intellectually challenge students. In short, we must exercise care in selecting a quality faculty for the schools. And we must create incentives to keep the best teachers for extended tenures. Service as an instructor should be a prized assignment. It is interesting that we have first-rate tenured faculties to teach our youngsters at the service academies, but we do not have the same kind of tenure for people teaching our senior officers.

In addition, the schools should emphasize education rather than training. They should minimize lectures and stress extensive reading, research, written analysis, and discussion in seminars. Without a solid grasp of practical and theoretical knowledge, it is impossible to take the crucial step—the combining of existing facts in new ways to provide strategic insights. Written analysis is required as well. Writing is an excellent way to build communication skills, and it also provides a vehicle for sharing knowledge. Writing is not easy because it requires structured thinking—something that takes effort and discipline. But that is also one of its virtues: writing requires us to think logically. The schools must avoid overloading the students with lectures and briefings given by high-ranking VIPs, generals, and flag officers. The treadmill of senior speakers is not as productive and inspiring as it looks, and there is an unfortunate somnolent atmosphere in most of the large, dim auditoriums. It would be better to bring in experts or retired officers with experience in strategic planning (and not constrained by the current “party line”) to talk to smaller groups about strategic issues. Selected television tapes from such seminars might be thought-provoking for the collected student body. The object is to get students to think strategically, not to parrot the “correct strategy.”

Next, the relationship between military and civil schooling should be strengthened. We need to make better use in the military schools of the civilian education we provide to selected officers. For example, we might follow a year or more of study by an officer at a first-rate civilian university with a year as a student at the War College to allow that officer to share his expertise with other students in the class. We must not ignore civilian education. It provides a broadening experience and a cross-fertilization which are essential to keeping the military open to new ideas.

We need young strategists because we need senior strategists, and we need a lot because when the time comes we need enough.

Lastly, the military schools should be in contact with their graduates at all times, helping to form them into a professional society. A school's job is not complete at graduation. At each level, the school should follow its graduates until they enter the next higher school. Schools should keep the officers up-to-date with new developments and advise them of what is going on in the curriculum, of articles or books worth reading, of courses that can be taken, and of other ways the school can be helpful. This will cost time and resources, but it is important if we believe that developing strategists is a steady, continuous, long-term process.

Second, let's think about in-unit strategic preparation.

While the schools can provide formal guidance, basic knowledge, and practice in critical thinking to the emerging military strategist, experience and education in units are necessary to broaden the officer's knowledge and provide awareness of the real problems and capabilities of military forces. Rarely can the strategist in uniform gain a complete understanding of military force in some theoretical way; an officer absorbs much of what he knows in the practical, daily world of military units. The "field," in other words, is more important than the field manual. The budding military strategist takes what he learns in units and connects it to abstract concepts. We may gain our conceptual ideas by thinking, but we learn by doing. But it does not follow that only one category of development is taking place at any given time in the career of an aspiring strategist. It is precisely when the officer is in the unit milieu that we need to encourage personal study and critical thinking. In-unit education is essential, and we do not have enough of it.

There are ways of accomplishing this education in units if we are willing to devote the energy and time to it. Commanders and other leaders can hold periodic training sessions for subordinates. At these sessions, new doctrine can be discussed, historical readings critiqued, or past and future campaigns analyzed. Commanders can call on historians to speak to their groups, hold seminars with civilian and military experts on a variety of issues, and walk battlefields. More and more unit commanders are providing these kinds of training opportunities, and the Army has taken a small step in this direction by establishing a required reading program for lieutenants,⁴ but more can be done.

An in-depth understanding of armed forces is a prerequisite for the military strategist. He should be fully cognizant of the capabilities and limitations of military force in general and various types of military units in particular. In the present environment, this cannot be limited to his own service. Today's military map is not a flat piece of paper; it has three dimensions—land, sea, and air. Frederick the Great could concentrate wholly on a land strategy and Admiral Nelson on sea power. But the time is long since past when strategists could focus solely on single-service operations. Furthermore, as US wars of this century have demonstrated, the time has passed when we Americans could rely exclusively on unilateral national strategies.

Therefore, in addition to his proficiency in his own service, the military strategist must be competent in joint and combined operations. But a person who understands joint operations is not necessarily a strategist. In training people in joint operations, we often concentrate on procedures. At lower levels of command and staff this is appropriate, since the details of service integration are of great importance. But at the higher level the focus should be on the broader use of air, land, and sea force capabilities. "Gaining a joint perspective" is just a way-station on the road to becoming a strategist.

Today's military is a large organization with practically unavoidable elements of bureaucracy, and the military strategist must recognize this fact. Modern warfare is more complex than ancient warfare, although the principles often may be quite the same. The greater capabilities of command, control, communications, and intelligence, of armaments, and of logistics have demanded organizational changes, as have the speed, intensity, and three-dimensional character of modern war. This means much larger staffs, many headquarters, and special elements devoted to tasks that a short time ago were nonexistent or rudimentary (electronic warfare, air defense, airspace management, fire control). This creates bureaucratic tendencies on the battlefield—which become part of war's realities and have to be dealt with.

Third, and finally, what about self-development?

Schools must teach well the elements that build strategists, but leaders in units must understand better than they do today that the units they command are the homes of officers, that part of training is officer development, and that the tactical, technological, and organizational bases for the development of strategists must be given sustainment. But above all, whether in units or in schools or in assignments elsewhere, whether lieutenants or generals, officers must—absolutely must—realize that the development of capabilities as a strategist is a matter of *continuing personal application* more than anything else. Alexander the Great learned about war at the side of his father, Philip of Macedon. He received no formal military education, yet few have matched his insight into combining effective military power with statecraft. Napoleon did receive some formal technical training, but it was his enormous and voracious appetite for knowledge of military operations—a knowledge that he gained

almost entirely on his own—that made him great. A look at history will show that *highly motivated self-development* is the key to producing the best strategists. We must foster and nurture this.

While we teach military history in schools and can emphasize its study in units, the individual must continuously delve deeply into the past on his own. It is fundamental that a military strategist needs a strong and comprehensive knowledge of military history. The collective experience of military forces is the raw material from which he gains insights into the process of successfully applying military force. An officer who aspires to be a strategist must be sustained and nourished by the confidence that he *knows* the history of warfare. He knows how campaigns unfold, how various types of units interact, and how technological progress affects fighting capabilities. Military history is the basis of communication among strategists, the coin of the realm.

But the strategist in uniform must go beyond history and the purely military sphere; he requires a much broader base from which to operate. He must also work to develop an understanding of politics and the political process, for the objectives of strategy and the environments in which it is formulated are political. Politics and culture impose a variety of constraints on strategy. These include limitations on the resources committed to defense as well as strictures on the use of military force. He also has to divine his opponents' strategy and the factors influencing it as well, since strategy is not a single-actor game.

Senior leaders have a particularly important role in the process of developing military strategists. They are the ones who determine the environment, provide the guidance, and establish the structure for our emerging strategists. We need to reach a consensus that strategists in uniform are needed and must be cultivated—in other words, to agree that this is something important to accomplish, something requiring a high priority. Once we agree to that, we should make sure that our officers get the time throughout their careers to develop as strategists. This requires that we put emphasis upon strategic thinking, or other things will usurp the time. In the typical assignment at present, long days are filled up just trying to complete the usual quotidian tasks. We must break out of the pattern in which our officers spend their time in mundane activities with little chance to think, followed by stints in school where they also may not do much conceptual thinking. Senior officers must ensure that there is time in the units for the officer to reflect and absorb the lessons the unit has to offer, so that during subsequent schooling he can develop his thoughts from a strong and practical base of experience and training.

We need to agree that strategy is not an “elective” of the later years of an officer's career—that work in this field has to begin early. The lieutenant does not have to be a strategist, but he must be aware that what he is absorbing will contribute to a knowledge of tactics and operational art constituting

milestones on the way to ability in the field of strategy. We need consensus concerning the value of motivating and rewarding self-development at all stages. At the same time, we must afford the promising strategist the opportunity, through such avenues as civilian education or fellowships, to expand his horizons and connect the knowledge he gains in units to the wider world. We must also make sure that teaching in our schools is deemed a worthwhile assignment.

Our task would be simplified if we had a better grasp of what jobs require strategists, what individuals appear to have the makings of a good strategist, and a way to match the two. While beginning to develop the military strategist at the lowest levels, we need to identify where we need the strategist in the organization and make sure he gets the assignment he needs to grow in his understanding of strategy.

There may be a lesson for us in the interwar period. The officers who served then faced infinitely greater resource constraints than anything we now experience. The Army of the 1920s and 1930s was short of everything—money, people, equipment, ammunition. Yet a significant number of leaders who emerged during that period proved to be exceptionally capable when tested by the Second World War. Some of their education was the result of military schooling—the experience of Fort Leavenworth, for example, was a turning point in the careers of many of the officers of the period. But much of their education came through unit programs and, even more, via self-development—through reading and study on their own, and through discussions with fellow officers. The memoirs and biographies of Generals of the Army Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley present a rich picture of professional study typical of that taking place in the officer corps which was to shape the strategy of America during World War II. The way the officers of that era devoted themselves to mastering their profession should serve as a model for all of us in the years ahead.

NOTES

This article is adapted from the author's opening statement to the House Armed Services Committee Panel on Professional Military Education, 17 June 1988.

1. William J. Crowe, Jr., "Senior Officer Education, Today and Tomorrow," *Parameters*, 17 (Spring 1987), 4.

2. Let's establish some common definitions. National strategy is "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives." Military strategy is "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force." These definitions have the value of being simple and acceptable for general use. Agreeing on these frees us to range afield in the variables of what makes a military strategist. Both definitions are from US Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JCS Pub 1 (Washington: GPO, 1 June 1987).

3. Howard D. Graves, "The US Army War College: Gearing Up for the 21st Century," *Parameters*, 18 (December 1988), 2-12.

4. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Military Qualification Standards System, Commander's and Supervisor's Guide*, STP-II-MQS (Washington: GPO, 1987), ch. 3.

Doing What's Right: Shaping the Army's Professional Environment

LEWIS SORLEY

Professional studies often include exposure to the ideas of the classical philosophers, and that is all to the good. It is important to know the ethical touchstones that have guided the great civilizations, the great societies, of the past. It is important to know that men have agreed upon standards of conduct, have established mores and sanctions to encourage observance of those standards and to punish transgressions against them, and have thus sought to determine the ethical character of their lives.

It is perhaps more important, with those studies as background, to think hard and seriously about the ethical standards that soldiers choose to guide their lives, both personal and professional. This is because there cannot be a lack of congruence between personal and professional standards, between the private man and the public man in value terms, without devastating harm to one's ability to perform professionally.

This essay concentrates on one further essential step—beyond understanding the great value systems that have guided men over the generations, and beyond establishing a commitment to a value system that will guide one's actions. It deals with the final, difficult, and all-important tasks of translating those values into guidelines for day-to-day activities and then, after adapting them and manifesting them in our own lives, teaching them to those *who are entrusted to our leadership*, and gaining their willing acceptance and ultimately their own wholehearted commitment to those same values.

This last step is at the heart of professional leadership. Such leadership is, in its essence, the task of establishing and transmitting values. Certainly there are many other desirable attributes of leadership. Technical competence, energy, physical bravery and moral courage, intellectual capacity, commitment—all these and more are undoubtedly desirable attributes

of the successful leader. None of the great leaders, of course, has manifested all these in equal parts. Men are, after all, both fallible and infinitely diverse.

But these attributes, however important, are secondary to the capacity to set and impart values. Professionalism is, after all, the hewing to a set of values postulated as the ideal of performance in the profession at hand. It is important to remember, in thinking about these matters, that they all take place within a given cultural and societal context. Thus what constitute the canons of ideal professional behavior for the leaders of American soldiers in the 20th century may vary substantially, even radically, from the imperatives to which other leaders, at other times, were expected to respond.

Thus I argue that the essence of professionalism is character. Character may be defined as the commitment to an admirable set of values, and the courage to manifest those values in one's life, no matter the cost in terms of personal success or popularity. One writer referred to "those hard outcroppings of character that determine a life." And it is no accident that one of the key phrases in the prayer taught to cadets at West Point concerns the need to "choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong."

Now "those hard outcroppings of character," as I understand them, refer to those key situations—ethical crises, we might say—in which we have the opportunity to stand up and be counted, to weigh in on the side we believe to be right, regardless of the consequences. Such crises, fortunately for us all, only seldom confront us. But that does not mean that we are only rarely faced with the necessity to manifest values in our daily actions. Quite the contrary, as I see it. Virtually everything we do has a value component to it, and—whether we like it or not, whether we realize it or not—we are revealing our values, and teaching our values to others, in an almost constant stream of words and deeds throughout each day.

This realization is both daunting and encouraging. It means that we carry an enormous responsibility as leaders, perhaps greater than we ordinarily realize (and here I am not speaking of the self-evident heavy burden of those who lead troops in combat). It means that we are constantly being observed, and our actions are constantly being assessed, by those we lead (and, of course, by our seniors and our peers as well). The dean of George Washington University's business school once observed, tellingly, that "management is one of the performing arts." He was quite right, and the corollary is that the leader, or manager, is never off stage. But while that is a heavy responsibility,

Dr. Lewis Sorley graduated from the US Military Academy in 1956, later earning an MA from the University of Pennsylvania, an MPA from Penn State, and a Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins. He is also a graduate of the Army War College. He retired from the Army in 1976, joining the CIA, and is now retired from that organization. A prolific author, Dr. Sorley is presently completing a biography of General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.

Whether we like it or not, we are teaching our values to others in an almost constant stream of words and deeds each day.

it is also a magnificent opportunity. It means that literally hundreds of times a day the leader has an opportunity to touch the people he comes into contact with, and to shape their approach to duty and responsibility.

One of our finest soldiers, Lieutenant General Arthur S. Collins, Jr., wrote a superb book called *Common Sense Training*.¹ In it he pointed out how virtually everything a unit does in the course of a day may be used for training by a wise commander. And it was not just training in specific techniques or tasks he had in mind, but indoctrination in such fundamental attributes as discipline, patriotism, responsiveness to command, initiative, and unit cohesion. General Collins held that training is all-encompassing, with the result that "individual training is designed to improve the whole person." "Improve the whole person"—think of it, and what that says about the trainer (the leader) and his responsibility to set and impart values.

A shared commitment to professional values, and to service, transcends the individual and constitutes the basis for our Army's corporate persona, its central values. We teach these values to our young leaders, who in turn inherit a responsibility to see that they are preserved and passed on. In this way we maintain the continuity and solidarity of our profession.

When new officers leave their basic schools and training centers and enter the Army at large, they have a major adjustment to make. Things are different, and radically so, in this larger world, where practice takes over from theory. They must be prepared to go out and deal with the problems which those differences can cause, differences which have the capacity to undermine the very essence of the Army—its ability to carry out its mission. An important part of being prepared to deal with such differences is understanding just how much influence a leader can have.

Most men, it seems to me, are inherently neither good nor evil. Each has within himself the capacity for actions that are admirable or reprehensible. What brings out the best or worst in us is often the organizational climate in which we find ourselves. In the Army there are units and posts that, at particular times and under particular commanders, come close to living up

***What brings out the best or worst in us
is often the organizational climate
in which we find ourselves.***

to the ideal standards to which we aspire. There are others which fall lamentably short.

It is not that the one post or unit happened to have assigned to it a high proportion of principled soldiers, while another had many of lesser quality. Rather it is that in one case the leaders were able to build an environment supportive of the kind of behavior (in ethical terms) they professed to want, while others elsewhere failed to do so (and perhaps even failed to understand their responsibility for doing so). The late General Bruce C. Clarke, a renowned Army commander in Europe in the early days of the Cold War, told his commanders that "the outstanding officer is the one who gets superior results from average soldiers." There is much wisdom in that. There are units in the Army which, because of the high priority of their mission or other factors, get more than a fair share of the talent and assets the Army has to pass around. But most units get a representative cross-section of talent, and do a better or worse job of making use of it.

What this brings us down to is building an environment in which people (soldiers) are encouraged and enabled to live up to the highest standards of professionalism. The Army's declaratory policy on ethical standards has always been of the highest order. Its operational policy, unfortunately, has not always matched those high declaratory standards. Perhaps the best example is the distortions of the body count as a measure of operational success in Vietnam, a measure widely acknowledged even by senior commanders to be both corrupt and corrupting. In that case our operational standards failed to come up to our declaratory ones, and the integrity of the whole enterprise suffered as a result.

Many similar problems come up in the course of professional service. But there are many practical things the individual leader can do to enhance the climate for professionalism. Some of the most important are these:

- First, and by all odds the most important, is to set the example in terms of personal and professional conduct by demonstrating commitment to

the highest standards of professionalism and diligent efforts to live up to those standards.

- Second is communicating to all subordinates what your standards are, and that you expect them to live up to those standards as well. Be sure that they understand what you mean, and what you expect; then help them appreciate how that translates into day-to-day behavior.

- Third is ensuring that the professional environment (to the extent you have any control over it) is supportive of ethical behavior, and not supportive of behavior that is ethically flawed. This entails ensuring that in all aspects of your leadership (evaluation of subordinates, competition with other units, methods of motivating subordinates, etc.) you operate in a way that encourages and rewards ethical behavior on the part of your subordinates, and discourages unethical behavior (by not rewarding and, where necessary, punishing it).

- Fourth is recognizing that you have more control over the professional environment than you may realize. If you communicate your commitment to high standards to your fellow officers, they will be more likely to respect those standards in their dealings with you. If you form alliances with like-minded peers, the solidarity of your joint commitment to high standards can improve the organization's professionalism. If you detect unethical practices, and devise other—more acceptable—ways to get the mission accomplished, you can change undesirable patterns of behavior. If you are generous in recognizing highly professional performance, even (or especially) on the part of those with whom you are in professional competition, you can build new bonds of shared commitment to high standards. And if, when it may become necessary, you stand up to be counted in refusing to compromise your standards, you set an example that seniors, peers, and subordinates alike can take counsel from.

Undeniably, there are risks in such a course of action, especially if the command of which you are a part is not at the moment distinguishing itself in terms of professional behavior. No one could possibly argue that adherence to ethical standards, and the responsibility to leaven the officer corps in terms of its ethical norms, is free of risk, or even easy. It is just essential.

It is as simple as that. Doing what is right yourself, teaching what is right to your troops, and encouraging all with whom you come in contact (including peers and seniors) to do what is right—that is what we are training officers to do, what the Army needs them to do, and what the nation relies on them to do. On this all else depends.

NOTE

1. Arthur S. Collins, Jr., *Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1978). General Collins retired from the Army in 1974 and died in 1984.

Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction in the Operational Art

PRICE T. BINGHAM

To attain strategic goals in a theater of war, a commander exercises operational art through his design, organization, and conduct of campaigns.¹ Unfortunately, engagements and battles generally seem to have received more attention than campaigns. This could be because it is easier to understand engagements and battles. Compared to campaigns, engagements and battles are much more confined in time and space and involve many fewer variables interacting with each other. Their comparative simplicity also makes them more susceptible to modeling, especially in models that focus on numerical attrition. As a result, there are those who seem to assume that a campaign can be described as merely the addition of attrition totals resulting from multiple tactical events.² Such a tactically oriented perspective seriously distorts reality because it ignores a theater commander's ability to exercise operational art, influencing time and space considerations in a way that creates conditions *leading to* attrition (when this is the best means of achieving a campaign's objectives). This failure to appreciate the potential of operational art may explain why some have tended to discount the value of air interdiction.

The Importance of Movement in a Successful Campaign

To appreciate the value of air interdiction, we need to understand how moving rapidly relative to the enemy contributes to a successful campaign. As Napoleon saw it, "Marches are war Aptitude for war is aptitude for movement Victory is to the armies which maneuver."³ By moving quickly relative to the enemy, Napoleon's forces gained the advantages of surprise, concentration, and position needed to provide the best chance of winning key engagements and battles.⁴ Even more important, rapid relative movement enabled his forces to *exploit* the outcomes of engagements and battles—perhaps by a penetration, envelopment, or pursuit—making it possible for his campaigns to achieve far more than a sum of their tactical components would suggest.

The importance of rapid relative movement to a successful campaign explains why some inventions have had such a profound effect on the conduct of war. Yet, as valuable as the railroad, telegraph, truck, tank, and wireless radio have been in waging war, these inventions have been constrained in their effect because they allowed a commander to directly influence the movement of only his own forces. As a result, even a skilled commander could find it difficult to attain success because usually his enemy also had the ability to move quickly and thus could counter his plan. To a large extent the ability of the enemy to move unimpeded beyond the range of artillery explains why a stalemate occurred on the Western Front of World War I and then endured for so long.

All this began to change with the invention of the aircraft. Soon commanders were using aircraft to perform air interdiction, at last achieving the ability to complement and reinforce their ground maneuver by attacking enemy maneuver. Since then using air power to perform air interdiction has often, though not always, made an important contribution to the success of a campaign.

Much of the reason air interdiction has not always been effective is explainable by the failure of many commanders and staff officers to understand *how* or *why* air interdiction contributes to a campaign's success. Many believe that the value of air interdiction lies in its ability to isolate the battlefield, denying the enemy reinforcements and supplies needed to win engagements and battles. Others measure air interdiction's contribution by the amount of destruction it causes. While both of these traditional views contain some truth, neither truly grasps the essence of air interdiction's value to a campaign.

How and Why Air Interdiction Contributes to a Successful Campaign

Air interdiction does, indeed, make its contribution by either destroying enemy forces or delaying and disrupting their movement; however, in order for either effect to contribute fully to the successful outcome of a campaign, air interdiction and ground maneuver must be *synchronized* so that each complements and reinforces the other.⁵ Synchronization is important because it can create a dilemma for the enemy that has *no satisfactory answer*. His dilemma is this: if he attempts to counter ground maneuver by moving rapidly, he exposes himself to unacceptable losses from air interdiction; yet if he employs

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measures that are effective at reducing losses caused by air interdiction, he then cannot maneuver fast enough to counter the ground component of the campaign. Thus, regardless of the action the enemy chooses to take, he faces defeat.

The reason why ground maneuver and air interdiction must be synchronized is found in the way the effectiveness of each is influenced by the complex nature of land.⁶ Land, unlike a fluid medium such as the ocean or atmosphere, has infinite variations in gradient and strength. Moreover, its strength varies depending on location, weather, and traffic.⁷ Vegetation and man-made structures also add to its complexity. All of these features influence ground maneuver. Depending on the type of units involved (i.e. their degree of mechanization), land's nature determines how large a ground force can be moved, where it can be moved, and, perhaps most important, how quickly it can be moved.

These same aspects of land's nature also influence air interdiction by determining how easy it is for aircrews to find enemy ground forces. Obviously the search for the enemy is important to effective air interdiction because aircrews delivering direct-attack munitions first must find the enemy in order to destroy him. But that is not the only reason. Although air interdiction can delay and disrupt an enemy's movement by destroying his forces, it can also have the same effect *if the enemy does not dare to move quickly for fear of being found.*

Today, as in the past, aircrews performing air interdiction against ground forces must find the enemy by making a visual search. This requirement to search visually for mobile ground units is due to the way land's complexity influences the usefulness of technologies such as radar. Even the availability of the joint surveillance and target attack system (JSTARS) will not change this reality if aircrews still need to see a target before they can hit it with their munitions.⁸ The LANTIRN system (low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared system for night) does not change this either, as LANTIRN is basically just a means for helping aircrews see, despite darkness and haze.

The effectiveness of an aircrew's visual search depends, to a large extent, on enemy actions. By far the most effective way an enemy can influence an aircrew's visual search is by preventing the search from taking place. This explains why air superiority is a prerequisite for effective air interdiction. (Air superiority also makes a key contribution by hindering or even preventing the enemy's air force from observing or interdicting our own ground maneuver.)

If an enemy is unable to achieve air superiority and prevent a visual search, he can use concealment, camouflage, deception, and dispersal to make the search more difficult.⁹ Another way an enemy can make visual search more difficult is by taking advantage of environmental factors, maneuvering his forces through complex terrain or during darkness and periods when weather restricts visibility.¹⁰ Finally, an enemy can use his air defenses, both airborne

and ground-based, to threaten and harass flight operations in a way that degrades an aircrew's ability to make an effective search.¹¹ Predicting which measures an enemy will use, or their effectiveness, is of course extremely difficult. The bottom line, though, is that *most air interdiction simulations (and even some real-world planning) tend to make assumptions that seriously underestimate the problems aircrews face in finding mobile targets.*

An enemy's ability to make an aircrew's visual search more difficult depends greatly on whether ground maneuver *or the potential* for ground maneuver is influencing the type of ground forces he is employing and how quickly he wants to move them. For example, an enemy's concealment, camouflage, deception, and dispersal measures are likely to be less effective if he is employing mechanized forces as opposed to dismounted infantry. Similarly, the need to move quickly allows him less time to make such measures effective and may force him to move even when environmental conditions do not handicap an aircrew's visual search. Finally, rapid movement is likely to decrease the effectiveness of ground-based air defenses, making it more difficult to degrade the search for targets.¹²

World War II, Italy

Campaigns in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War are worth examining because they show the importance of employing ground maneuver and air interdiction in a way that creates an irresolvable dilemma for the enemy. In World War II, the experience in Italy provides an especially useful contrast between what can be achieved by air interdiction alone and when combined with ground maneuver. In early 1944 the Allies possessed air superiority, and their armies, exhausted by three attempts to break the Gustav Line, needed little direct air support. Taking advantage of this situation, Allied airmen issued a definitive directive on 19 March for a unilateral air interdiction campaign named Operation Strangle. Its purpose was "to reduce the enemy's flow of supplies to a level which will make it impractical for him to maintain and operate his forces in central Italy."¹³ The directive made no mention of the role of Allied ground forces because the airmen expected that air interdiction *alone*, by simultaneously cutting all lines of communication leading south from the Po Valley, would cause the Germans to withdraw.¹⁴ After an intense effort it slowly became apparent to Allied air leaders that their original objective was unduly optimistic. As a result, on 25 April 1944 they issued a new objective, to make it impossible for the Germans to maintain their forces in the face of a *combined air and ground* Allied offensive called Diadem.¹⁵ Soon after Diadem began on 11 May 1944, the combination of air interdiction and ground attacks presented German commanders with a new and more difficult problem.

Allied deception caused Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German commander, to delay committing his reserves to the battle on the

Gustav Line. Meanwhile, General Frido von Senger und Etterlin, commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, was forced to depend on his own forces to hold the western end of the line.¹⁶ General von Senger's ability to do this, however, was severely handicapped by air interdiction. Damage to the rail system caused by air interdiction had forced the Germans to devote more and more of their scarce motor transport to moving supplies normally transported by rail.¹⁷ Only by this and other adaptations were the Germans able to maintain a satisfactory supply situation, although there were some distribution problems.¹⁸ At the same time, these adaptations required much of the available motor transport and fuel supply, severely degrading the tactical mobility of German combat units.

The problem facing General von Senger and other commanders, therefore, was how to conduct a flexible defense, rapidly shifting ground forces laterally along the line in the face of Allied air interdiction. The effectiveness of this air interdiction was increased by the fact that German troop movement required six to eight times more road capacity than did resupply.¹⁹ Moreover, German dependence on daytime use of motor transport to make timely tactical moves made it easier for the pilots of roving fighter-bombers performing air interdiction close beyond the front to find targets. Thus, German commanders faced the dilemma: if they attempted the rapid ground maneuver needed to contain Allied ground attacks, they made it more likely that they would lose ground forces and scarce transport to air attack.

Heavy losses soon caused most German commanders to choose to reduce the risk of air attack by not moving during the daytime, despite the critical nature of the ground battle. Their decision added to the delays caused by detours resulting from air interdiction. Under these conditions German defenses were unable to hold against Allied ground attacks, and the combination of Allied air interdiction and rapid ground pursuit soon turned the resulting withdrawal into a near rout.²⁰ That the dilemma created by Allied ground maneuver and air interdiction played a key role in the German defeat becomes clearly apparent in General von Senger's postwar remarks:

The enemy's mastery of the air space immediately behind the front under attack was a major source of worry to the defender, for it prevented all daylight movements, especially the bringing up of reserves. We were accustomed to making all necessary movements by night, but in the event of a real breakthrough this was not good enough. In a battle of movement a commander who can only make the tactically essential moves by night resembles a chess player who for three of his opponent's moves has the right to only one.²¹

World War II, Normandy

At the same time these events were unfolding in Italy, a similar situation was occurring in France. As in Italy, air superiority ensured that Allied air power could be devoted to air interdiction. Initially, the air interdiction

focus on the enemy rail system was similar to that in Italy, but instead of preventing supplies from reaching the front, the objective was to ensure that "enemy forces attacking the bridgehead did not increase at a more rapid rate than the Allied forces defending and extending it."²² When attacks on rail yards proved less effective than desired, reports from Italy on the feasibility of bridge attacks resulted in the focus shifting to bridges, especially those across the Seine River.²³

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, who had responsibility for defending the coast from Brittany to the Netherlands, fully appreciated the threat to mobility posed by air interdiction. Profiting from his experience with Allied air power in North Africa, he recommended dispersing the German mobile reserves near the coast where they could move quickly against any landing, despite the threat posed by Allied air interdiction. The Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal von Runstedt, lacking similar experience with the problems Allied air interdiction could create, disagreed. He believed placing reserves inland would make it easier to concentrate them once the main landing was identified. His tank commander, General Geyr von Schweppenburg, calculated it would take only 24 to 48 hours to move armored divisions into position.²⁴

As it turned out, Rommel was right. Allied deception combined with air interdiction to critically delay the movement of German reserves to Normandy. One way air interdiction created delays was by destroying the rail system west of Paris and the bridges across the Seine, forcing German units to make long road marches with many detours.

Destruction caused by roving fighter-bombers led to the second significant way air interdiction delayed the movement of German forces to Normandy. To avoid air attacks such as those that cost the Panzer Lehr division 85 armored vehicles (including five tanks) and 123 trucks, 80 of which were gasoline tenders, German commanders attempted to reduce the probability of detection by abandoning daylight movement and emphasizing concealment and camouflage measures.²⁵ Although these measures reduced losses, they also produced significant delays made worse because movement was confined to the short, six-hour summer nights. These measures help explain why it took units like the Ninth and Tenth SS Panzer divisions coming from Poland as much time to road march the last 200 miles as they needed to make the 1300-mile rail journey to Paris.²⁶ Summing up the impact of air interdiction Rommel reported on 10 June 1944,

During the day, practically our entire traffic—on roads, trucks and in open country—is pinned down by powerful fighter-bomber and bomber formations, with the result that the movement of our troops on the battlefield is almost completely paralyzed, while the enemy can maneuver freely. Every traffic defile in the rear areas is under continual attack and it is very difficult to get essential supplies of ammunition and petrol up to the troops.²⁷

Besides being a key factor in the ability of the Allies to achieve a lodgment in Normandy, air interdiction made a significant contribution to the Allies' successful breakout. Through Operation Goodwood on 18 July 1944 and Operation Bluecoat on 30 July, the British fixed German attention and most Panzer divisions on the left side of the Allied line, establishing ideal conditions for Cobra, the US attack on the right flank, which began on 25 July. By 31 July the German High Command was becoming aware of the threat posed by Cobra, causing Hitler to order a counterattack at Mortain toward Avranches to cut off Patton's advance. Yet even before this counterattack had begun, Allied air interdiction severely constrained it by forcing the Germans to begin it at night and with only four of the six divisions their plan called for. Meanwhile, during the breakout a few Allied leaders demonstrated that they understood how rapid movement contributed to a successful campaign by searching for ways to outflank and bypass German units so they could quickly move deep into the German rear area. Unfortunately, other Allied leaders failed to exploit fully their tactical successes and the superior ground mobility gained through the delays and disruption air interdiction was inflicting on German maneuverability. As a result, the Allies missed opportunities to envelop and destroy large portions of the German army at Falaise, on the Seine, and later on the Beveland Isthmus.

Even with these missed opportunities, the speed of the Allied ground pursuit complemented and reinforced air interdiction, causing the Germans immense losses in both men and equipment. The rapid Allied advance often forced the Germans to move during the day to avoid being cut off, while simultaneously reducing the number of routes available to the retreating Germans. Besides creating great confusion and congestion on the remaining routes, these actions also made it easier for Allied aircrews performing air interdiction to find and destroy large numbers of German vehicles. This destruction, in turn, caused the Germans to abandon many other vehicles, including almost all their remaining heavy weapons, which weakened German resistance and slowed their retreat, making our ground pursuit even more effective.

World War II, The Battle of the Bulge

The German offensive in the Ardennes, *Wacht am Rhein*, that began early on 16 December 1944 showed that being on the defensive did not prevent Allied ground maneuver and air interdiction from combining to create a dilemma for the *Wehrmacht*. Attempting to avoid this dilemma, Hitler's plan called for German forces, led by the Sixth SS Panzer Army, to exploit the element of surprise by attacking when weather conditions would keep Allied air power from finding German forces. Hitler hoped these conditions would enable his forces to make a rapid breakthrough and advance quickly across the Meuse to Antwerp. Seizing Antwerp would isolate 25 to 30 divisions of the US First

Army and British 21st Army Group from their supplies, leading to their destruction as well as the capture of vast quantities of war materiel.²⁸

Unfortunately for the Germans, poor weather and hilly Ardennes terrain made it very difficult for their armored forces to move quickly cross-country. This created a significant handicap for the often-cautious Germans, hindering their ability to maintain a high-tempo advance and preventing them from bypassing stubborn US resistance at numerous roadblocks and particularly at the road hubs of St. Vith and Bastogne.²⁹

Although initially the poor weather was a serious handicap to Allied air power, as the Germans had hoped, air interdiction still was able to make some significant contributions. On 18 December, for example, a squadron of American fighter-bombers found and attacked the lead units of *Kampfgruppe Peiper* as it crossed the Ambleve at Cheneux. While this attack destroyed only a dozen vehicles, including two tanks, it created a precious two-hour delay that gave US ground forces the time they needed to prevent the Germans from reaching a better road at Werbomont.³⁰



Elements of the US 4th Armored Division near Piney, France, in August 1944 roll past the rubble of a German column that was strafed and bombed by Allied air forces.

Finally, on 23 December the weather cleared, enabling Ninth Air Force, augmented with a division of heavy bombers, and Eighth Air Force to begin heavy air attacks. By 29 December, Ultra intercepts revealed that air interdiction had closed many routes, critically delaying the delivery of fuel and ammunition that the German forces needed to advance.³¹ According to the commander of the Fifth Panzer Army's artillery, "The attacks from the air by the opponent were so powerful that even single vehicles for the transport of personnel and motorcycles could get through only by going from cover to cover."³²

Contained and defeated by Allied ground forces that possessed vastly superior relative mobility, the Germans were forced to withdraw.³³ During their withdrawal the rugged terrain and wet weather continued to create conditions that made it easier for Allied fighter-bombers to find lucrative targets and inflict immense destruction. One especially noteworthy example occurred when air interdiction destroyed a bridge over the Our River at Dasburg on 22 January 1945, allowing Allied fighter-bombers to destroy almost 3000 vehicles the Germans could ill afford to lose.³⁴

After World War II, airmen were convinced of the value of air interdiction. Unfortunately, many still did not see any need to synchronize it with ground maneuver. Instead, according to an exuberant prize editorial published in the Spring 1951 issue of the *Air University Quarterly Review*, air interdiction was simply a means for "isolating the battlefield so the enemy can neither get out in retreat nor get supplies in to help him fight. This is done by blasting bridges, railheads, and supply dumps. An enemy that has been successfully interdicted is a doomed enemy, for he can neither retreat nor advance—all he can do is dig in and watch his supplies run out."³⁵

Korea, Operation Strangle

The cost of not understanding the importance of synchronizing ground maneuver and air interdiction in a way that creates a dilemma for the enemy became apparent in the Korean War's Operation Strangle. Besides having the same name as the Italian air interdiction operation, there were other similarities. When the plan was conceived in 1951, the ground war involved little movement. As had been the case in Italy, airmen in Fifth Air Force believed air interdiction *alone* could inflict enough destruction on the enemy's supply system to force his withdrawal.³⁶ To achieve this objective they put similar emphasis on the destruction of railroads and bridges.³⁷

Unfortunately, Operation Strangle in Korea was as disappointing as its namesake had been in Italy. As in Italy, the static nature of ground operations meant that the enemy did not have to move large units rapidly. Static conditions also reduced the amount of supplies the enemy needed, as well as giving him enough time to make the repairs and transshipments needed to move supplies, despite the damage caused by air interdiction. In addition, as had been the case

in Italy, the enemy made effective use of darkness, poor weather, camouflage, concealment, and dispersal to prevent airmen from finding lucrative targets.³⁸ Yet despite the failure of Strangle, Korea also provides several examples of air interdiction and ground maneuver complementing and reinforcing each other in a way that posed a Hobson's choice for the enemy commander.

Korea, Invasion by the North

The first example occurred during the North Korean invasion. North Korea's strategy depended on using rapid ground maneuver led by armored forces to win quickly, before outside intervention could be effective.³⁹ Since South Korean forces possessed no antiarmor capability, they were soon overrun. Task Force Smith, the first US ground element to reach Korea, suffered the same fate for the same reasons. The United Nations desperately needed time to move strong ground forces to Korea.

Fortunately, air interdiction provided much of this respite, and it was able to do so because its effectiveness was enhanced by the North Korean army's need for rapid movement. Moving by road in columns, the North Koreans made it relatively easy for aircrews to find them. In one effective attack on 30 June 1950, airmen found North Korean vehicles jammed bumper to bumper waiting to cross the Seoul railroad bridges.⁴⁰ Such opportunities evoked from one airman the remark that the North Koreans "were not too well indoctrinated in what air power could do. Either that or they had a lot of guts, because we would time and time again find convoys of trucks that were bumper to bumper against a bridge that had been knocked out, and we'd go in to strafe them, and every man in the truck would stand up where he was and start firing his rifle at us. I don't think that I would have done that with the power that we were putting on them."⁴¹

Eventually the great destruction caused by air interdiction posed a painful dilemma for North Korean commanders. Like the Germans in World War II, the North Koreans chose to reduce their losses by using darkness, dispersal, and concealment to make it more difficult for airmen to find and attack their forces. The problem for the North Koreans was that this decision seriously delayed their advance and, around Pusan, impeded the tactical mobility they needed to break through the United Nations' defenses.⁴²

Korea, Pusan Breakout

The ability of ground maneuver and air interdiction to complement and reinforce each other also contributed to the destruction of the North Korean army when the United Nations went on the offensive. With North Korean forces fixed by fighting on the Pusan perimeter, General Douglas MacArthur used his superior operational-level mobility to make an amphibious landing in the North Korean rear at Inchon. This landing, combined with air and ground

pressure around Pusan, forced the weakened North Koreans to begin a withdrawal from Pusan on 22 September 1950. Soon their withdrawal turned into a rout that ended with the disintegration of the North Korean army.

This disintegration was the result of the dilemma air interdiction and ground maneuver created for enemy commanders. The North Koreans had to move quickly to avoid envelopment and destruction by the pursuing Eighth Army; however, speed required daylight movement, making it easier for aircrews performing air interdiction to find and attack North Korean units. Forced to choose between destruction by air or by ground forces, many North Korean units broke up or surrendered, allowing United Nations ground forces to advance deep into North Korea.⁴³

Korea, the Chinese Intervention

China's intervention eventually led to a third example of effective air interdiction, but only after near disaster. By foot movement at night through the hills, hiding during the day, the Chinese were able to avoid detection by airmen as they infiltrated 300,000 troops into Korea to positions around advancing road-bound United Nations forces.⁴⁴ It may be that General MacArthur was not aware of how conditions affecting the ability of airmen to find targets during October and November 1950 differed from conditions in the Pacific during World War II and earlier in Korea when air interdiction was so effective. In any case, General MacArthur was shaken by the magnitude and seriousness of the attacks that began on 26 November 1950 when Chinese infantry swarmed down from their hidden locations in the hills. That UN ground forces were able to avoid destruction was due in large part to the way ground maneuver and air interdiction complemented and reinforced each other.

Possessing air superiority, retreating UN ground forces could move quickly, even during daylight hours, without fear of air attack. In contrast, Chinese units attempting rapid pursuit to deliver a knockout blow often found themselves under intense air attack (from both air interdiction and close air support) as they moved along roads during the day or with their lights on during the night.⁴⁵ By the middle of December the Chinese decided they could no longer afford the heavy losses caused by air attack and broke off their pursuit.⁴⁶ Following this decision and the failure of the Chinese January 1951 offensive, the war became less fluid, making it much more difficult for aircrews to find targets, thus setting the stage for Strangle.

Southeast Asia, Rolling Thunder and Linebacker I

Despite the poor results achieved by supply-oriented interdiction efforts in World War II and Korea, there was still a tendency during the Vietnam War for commanders to measure the effectiveness of air interdiction in terms of the quantity of supplies destroyed.⁴⁷ This orientation could be the

reason Rolling Thunder (March 1965-November 1968) is often judged a failure.⁴⁸ In contrast, many see Linebacker I (March-October 1972) as a success. Examining the difference between the two efforts provides more evidence that ground maneuver and air interdiction need to be synchronized.

In contrast to Rolling Thunder, which was designed to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration routes into the South, Linebacker I was directed against North Vietnamese forces which were using tanks and artillery in a surprise, fast-moving offensive that took advantage of poor weather.⁴⁹ When the weather began to improve, however, aircrews found many lucrative targets and began inflicting immense damage.⁵⁰ Before long the North Vietnamese were forced to reduce their losses by slowing their offensive's tempo, giving the South Vietnamese the time they needed to prepare defenses that could hold. Learning from their failure, the North Vietnamese waited until they could be certain US air power would not be able to intervene before they launched their next major offensive.⁵¹

The European Scenario

Seeing how many past military successes were the result of the dilemma created by the often unintentional synchronization of ground maneuver and air interdiction, we need to determine whether synchronization can be useful in the future, especially if defending against a Soviet offensive. Such an offensive, according to Soviet doctrine, must achieve its objectives quickly, before we could employ nuclear weapons or before internal strains could develop within the Soviet bloc.⁵² This is why Soviet forces are organized, trained, and equipped for a campaign that would use surprise and intense firepower to help tank-oriented mobile forces quickly advance deep into our rear area.

Although the Soviets see highly mechanized ground forces as essential to winning a campaign quickly, they do not ignore air power—either their own or ours. Instead, they believe that success depends on the *combined* efforts of air and ground forces, stressing that air superiority is vital to the success of their offensive. Besides protecting advancing ground units from air attack, the Soviets need air superiority so their air power can provide the reconnaissance, transportation, and fire support needed by their ground forces to maintain a high-tempo advance.⁵³

The nature of Soviet capabilities (force size and emphasis on surprise, shock, initiative, coordination, and depth) makes it quite unlike any threat we have faced in the past. Our ground forces, with their relatively constrained force structure and poor position (especially if the Soviets achieve surprise), would face a situation much worse than that in the Ardennes in 1944.

The air power situation is just as serious. Unlike that in 1944, a much smaller portion of our already constrained aircraft force structure is likely to be available to perform air interdiction because of the critical importance of

battling the Soviets for air superiority. Moreover, because of this struggle for air superiority, it is likely that many of our aircraft tasked to perform air interdiction would be operating, at least initially, from bases that had been or still were under attack by Soviet missiles, aircraft, special-purpose troops, and perhaps even airborne forces. Besides this handicap, which would reduce the number and timeliness of our air interdiction sorties, our ability to exercise control over these sorties would likely be degraded by attacks on our command centers and communications facilities. In addition, during the early stages of a Soviet offensive, the best we could do probably would be to gain temporary local air superiority over a relatively shallow area beyond the forward line of our troops. Even here, Soviet ground-based air defenses would likely force airmen to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, seriously degrading their ability to find advancing Soviet forces, as well as reducing aircraft range and payload.⁵⁴ The speed of the Soviet advance and their use of camouflage, concealment, and deception would magnify the problems aircrews would face in finding mobile targets.⁵⁵

Preparing for the Future

Past campaigns have often achieved success even though few commanders seemed to understand how or why ground maneuver and air interdiction complemented and reinforced each other, let alone the importance of their synchronization. Instead, favorable circumstances, including air superiority and often overwhelming air resources, generated dubious choices for the enemy more by accident than by design. Unhappily, this is not likely to be the case if we are faced with a Soviet offensive. As this assessment should make clear, not only do we need to quickly gain and then maintain air superiority, we must also synchronize ground maneuver and air interdiction. Otherwise, we ourselves could be facing an agonizing dilemma: whether to fight conventionally and lose, or resort to nuclear weapons to stave off defeat with the risk of cataclysmic escalation. This dilemma makes it vital that we explore ways to improve the employment of ground maneuver and air interdiction.

The best place to start is with doctrine, both joint and service. We need to ensure that doctrine emphasizes the importance of campaigns, rather than engagements and battles, and explains the vital role maneuver can play in achieving success.⁵⁶ In doing this, doctrine should clarify the unique advantages that result when air interdiction and ground maneuver are planned and controlled so that they combine to influence time and space considerations in a way that presents the enemy with choices allowing no escape.

Next we need to examine organizations charged with planning and controlling ground maneuver and air interdiction to see whether modifications would make it easier to achieve synchronization. For example, given the critical role played by the visual search for the enemy's mobile forces and ground maneuver's ability to influence this search, it should be apparent that ground

maneuver plans (timing and location) should be made only after carefully considering how they will complement and reinforce air interdiction in achieving the campaign's objectives. At the same time, air interdiction must be planned and controlled to be responsive to the dynamics of ground maneuver. Thus, campaign success is likely to depend on the ability to closely integrate the development of ground maneuver and air interdiction plans, as well as on quickly adjusting the execution of both to exploit fleeting opportunities.

Still another aspect deserving examination is the method (and therefore the munitions) we use to perform air interdiction. With current munitions, aircrews must be able to find the enemy's mobile forces. Unfortunately, the fight for air superiority (including developments in Soviet air defenses) will make it very difficult for us to achieve the degree of unimpeded presence aircrews need to find the enemy. Soviet development of directed-energy weapons, such as lasers that could blind aircrews searching for targets, further complicates this problem. As a result, the future effectiveness of air interdiction could be in doubt unless we can reduce the need for aircrews to search visually for enemy mobile forces. This is a main reason why we should give more attention to munitions such as smart, stand-off, air-scattered mines.⁵⁷ Mines would complement the use of direct-attack air interdiction munitions by helping to establish and maintain an air power presence even when aircrews cannot be continuously overhead.

Conclusion

Using air power to perform air interdiction has had a telling effect on the outcome of many campaigns. Yet, like most developments in war, it has taken time to understand how and why air interdiction makes an important contribution to success. To a certain extent this delay could be the result of a tendency to treat war in the air and on the ground as separate endeavors, rather than as intimately related parts of a unified whole. It could also be the result of an emphasis on tactical events, instead of the campaign. Whatever the reason, in the past we usually were able to succeed. Recent and possible future Soviet developments, however, bring success into question if we do not understand how and why ground maneuver and air interdiction must be synchronized to confront the enemy with an intractable operational dilemma. To help avoid future defeat, it is now more important than ever that we prepare for tomorrow by reexamining where we have been.

NOTES

1. See US Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, 5 May 1986), p. 10; and Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987) pp. 91-112.

2. For example, see Barry R. Posen, "Is NATO Decisively Outnumbered?" *International Security*, 12 (Spring 1988), 186-202. Posen attempts to perform an admittedly abbreviated "campaign analysis," while totally ignoring

how air power in the form of air interdiction might influence ground force ratios. The only mention of air power in his "campaign" analysis is in a footnote where he states that due to space constraints he has omitted "certain important issues, such as NATO and Pact attack helicopters and close air support aircraft."

3. Le Comte de Dervieu, *The Transformations of War*, cited by J. F. C. Fuller, *The Conduct of War, 1789-1961* (New York: Minerva Press, 1968), p. 50.

4. Robert McQuie, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of Defeat," *Army* (November 1987), pp. 30-34. Historical evidence indicates that casualties are not usually the reason battles are lost. Instead, defeat results largely when resolve is shaken by other considerations. Maneuver can have such an impact because it causes a defeated force to "look toward the future and an enemy's potential capabilities rather than toward the past and the casualties he has inflicted."

5. Field Manual 100-5, p. 17. Synchronization is defined as "the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point." When addressing ground maneuver and air interdiction from a campaign perspective, this definition would be more accurate if the word "battlefield" is deleted.

6. For an excellent discussion of land's nature, see Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift* (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), pp. 57-77.

7. This complexity, where even minor details have a significant effect on combat capability, explains why modeling the role of ground in war, even at the lowest tactical level, has proved to be so difficult.

8. In contrast, as early as World War II, radar made it relatively easy for aircrews to find and attack enemy ships and aircraft.

9. Target factors that influence an aircrew's ability to find enemy ground forces visually include its size, shape, contrast, motion, number, and pattern.

10. A complex environment makes it necessary for aircrews to search many objects to determine which is a valid target, while simultaneously making this search more difficult. An environment's illumination makes searching easier by influencing a target's contrast. Attenuating or scattering light is still another way the environment affects the search for targets.

11. A good example of this occurs when enemy defenses force aircrews to adopt the tactic of flying at high speeds and low altitudes.

12. Rapid movement degrades ground-based air defenses in a variety of ways. Mobile systems must be more rugged, which tends to reduce performance. Rapid movement limits the time available to get into suitable overwatch positions, restricting coverage. It makes command, control, and logistics more difficult. Most important, rapid movement increases dependence on the reconnaissance, resupply, and firepower provided by air power, presenting air defenses with a significant identification problem. Unfortunately, studies of ground-based air defense effectiveness often fail to address this problem of airspace control, which is one of the most important ways time and space considerations create dilemmas for a commander.

13. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, eds., *The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume Three, Europe: Argument to V-E Day January 1944 to May 1945* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 373.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 374.

15. John Slessor, *The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections* (London: Cassell and Company, 1956), p. 579.

16. G. A. Shepperd, *The Italian Campaign, 1943-45* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 252.

17. Craven and Cate, p. 383.

18. F. M. Sallagar, *Operation "STRANGLE" (Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study of Tactical Air Interdiction* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, February 1972), pp. 44-59.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

20. Shepperd, pp. 263-84.

21. Frido von Senger und Etterlin, *Neither Fear Nor Hope* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1964), p. 224; cited by Sallagar, p. 66.

22. E. J. Kingston McCloughry, *The Direction of War* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 85, cited by William W. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars* (Washington: GPO, 1978), p. 165.

23. Craven and Cate, pp. 158-61, and W. W. Rostow, *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of March 25, 1944* (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 39-41.

24. Dieter Ose, "Rommel and Rundstedt: The 1944 Panzer Controversy," *Military Affairs*, 50 (January 1986), 7-11.

25. David Irving, *The Trail of the Fox* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1977), p. 375.

26. Craven and Cate, p. 220.

27. B. H. Liddell Hart, ed., *The Rommel Papers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), pp. 476-77.

28. Seymour Freiden and William Richardson, eds., *The Fatal Decisions* (New York: Berkley, 1968), p. 241.

29. See Jean-Paul Pallud, *Ardennes 1944: Peiper and Skorzeny* (London: Osprey, 1987), pp. 15-16; and Russell F. Weigley, *Eisenhower's Lieutenants* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1981), pp. 478-80, 483-84, and 530-31. The sector chosen for the Sixth SS Panzer Army's attack was unsuitable for a rapid

breakthrough, especially if opposed by a stubborn defense, because the steep slopes of the narrow valleys and the saturation of the soil from November and December rains greatly hindered and often prevented off-road vehicular movement.

30. Pallud, p. 32.
31. Ralph Bennett, *Ultra in the West the Normandy Campaign, 1944-45* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1979), pp. 217-18.
32. Craven and Cate, p. 695.
33. Weigley, p. 575.
34. William B. Reed et al., eds., *Condensed Analysis of the Ninth Air Force in the European Theater of Operations* (Washington, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, 1946, rpt. Office of Air Force History, 1984), p. 43.
35. R. C. Weller, "Some Truth About Air Support," *Air University Quarterly Review*, 4 (Spring 1951), 3.
36. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force In Korea, 1950-1953* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 433-74; and Edmund Dews and Felix Kozaczka, *Air Interdiction: Lessons From Past Campaigns* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, September 1981), pp. 15-18, 22, 40, 46-62.
37. Dews and Kozaczka, pp. 59-62.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
39. Robert Leckie, *Conflict: The History of the Korean War* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), pp. 42-58.
40. Futrell, p. 33.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 171-75; and Dews and Kozaczka, pp. 59-61. It is important to recall that during the Korean War air attacks inside the bomblines, but beyond artillery range, were called close air support. Today these attacks would often be called battlefield air interdiction.
43. Futrell, pp. 163-75, 207-14; and Leckie, pp. 144-47.
44. Leckie, p. 195.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
46. Futrell, pp. 261-64.
47. Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), pp. 383, 390.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
49. Dave Richard Palmer, *Summons of the Trumpet* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 244-51.
50. It was, in the words of one veteran F-4 pilot, "unbelievable . . . I've never seen anything like it—columns of tanks, columns of trucks, even men marching along the road." W. Scott Thompson and Donald D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 160.
51. Lewy, pp. 198-202, 210.
52. C. N. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group," *International Defense Review*, 15 (No. 9, 1982), 1177-86, and *Heirs of Clausewitz: Change and Continuity in the Soviet War Machine* (London: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1985), pp. 20-27.
53. See John Erickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, *Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986); and Phillip A. Petersen and John R. Clark, "Soviet Air and Anti-Air Operations," *Air University Review*, 36 (March-April 1985), 36-54.
54. The problem finding vehicles, such as tanks, can be appreciated by realizing that at 3.3 nautical miles a tank will subtend (i.e. occupy) the same angle as a pin-head from nine feet away (J. R. Walker, "Air-to-Surface Weapons," *Weapons and Warfare*, ed. K. Perkins [London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1987], p. 36). For a discussion of how the distance between a base and the target affects aircraft performance, see my article "Operational Art and Aircraft Runway Requirements," *Airpower Journal*, 2 (Fall 1988), 52-69.
55. William P. Baxter, *Soviet AirLand Battle Tactics* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1986), pp. 129-30; and Mark J. Reardon, "Countering Soviet Smoke," *Armor*, 95 (May-June 1986), 36-39.
56. The late military theorist Richard Simpkin believed movement is the key to the fundamental difference between most Western armies (including the US) and the Soviet army (also the German and Israeli armies). In his opinion, "The Anglo-Saxon moves between fights, the Russian fights between moves For Soviet mobile forces, fighting is not an end in itself or, except in the narrowest sense, a means of imposing one's will on the enemy. It is a means to the continuation of purposeful movement." Simpkin, *Red Armor* (London: Brassey's International Defence Publishers, 1984), p. 89.
57. Thanks to recent developments in sensors, as well as power supplies and kill mechanisms, it should be possible for us to develop a stand-off, smart, air-scattered mine that can damage or destroy soft-skin or light-armored vehicles moving on roads, even if the mine is located as far as 100 meters from the road. Because of its stand-off capability, such a mine would be extremely difficult to detect or clear quickly, making it difficult for an enemy commander to estimate whether he could afford the losses that would result from attempting to move quickly along an uncleared road. For one design approach to such a munition, see my article "NATO Needs a New Air Interdiction Approach," *Armed Forces Journal International*, 124 (October 1986), 112. Also see C. E. E. Sloan, *Mine Warfare On Land* (New York: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1986), pp. 3-8 and 123-31.

Logistical Art

CLAYTON R. NEWELL

A prince or general," wrote Clausewitz, "can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources, doing neither too much nor too little."¹ This same thought can also be expressed in terms of ends, ways, and means—the ends and means equating to Clausewitz's objectives and resources, the ways constituting "managing the campaign." When commanders in today's Army try to balance the ends, ways, and means of their campaigns at the operational level of war, they will frequently find logistics to be the means, or resources in Clausewitz's terms, which most affect that balance.

The United States has fought its recent wars by dominating its enemies with overwhelming logistical support and relieving commanders at the operational level from worrying too awfully much about logistics. In today's resource-constrained environment, however, the shoe may be on the other foot. In Western Europe, for example, the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact may well have the advantage in bringing brute force logistics to bear, while the US Army will find itself counting virtually every round of ammunition as it looks over its shoulder to see if the lines of communication remain open. The barrier of the Atlantic Ocean, a shortage of NATO and American strategic transport, and the relatively low priority of ammunition in budgetary trade-offs all contribute to an apparent Soviet edge in logistics.² The success of American military strategy in Europe, or anywhere else in the world for that matter, may depend on how well the US Army's logistics philosophy adapts to new realities.

The Army can no longer afford a logistics philosophy which allows its commanders to assume an endless supply of everything. As war becomes more dependent on science and technology, commanders tend to rely more heavily on their logisticians to keep the machinery of war operating. Logisticians, in turn, have increased their reliance on science to calculate the requirements of war. Of course, logistics has always involved calculations. In

fact the word logistics originates from the Greek word for the science of calculating. Yet, there is an art to logistics.

Unfortunately, in their desire to use science to best advantage, today's logisticians concentrate overmuch on calculations, or science, and neglect their art. The Joint Chiefs of Staff highlight this emphasis on science to the exclusion of art in defining logistics as "the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces."³ (Interestingly, the JCS do include the phrase "art and science" in their definition of strategy.⁴)

Historically, logisticians have been the unsung handmaidens of war. There are many strategists who bear the title of greatness, but there is virtually no recognition of great logisticians. One reason is that the great captains themselves have been logistically sensitive and involved; they understood that there is an art to logistics in addition to the science. James Huston, in his study of American military logistics, echoes Clausewitz in drawing the conclusion that good logistics depends on the commander who can "take into account all available resources, at home, in the theater, or wherever they are found, and to balance his requirements and his mission so that his objective may be gained with the least possible time with the least possible loss of men and supplies."⁵ While commanders want, and indeed need, logisticians who can use to best advantage the science of logistics, it is up to those same commanders to understand that there is an art to logistics, an art for which they, not the logisticians, bear primary responsibility.

The art of logistics may easily get lost in the often bewildering plethora of numbers so necessary to modern logistics planning. The numbers tend to sweep away average commanders, but the extraordinary commanders can operate in spite of numbers because such men possess an integrating instinct—an art—that transcends numbers. Martin van Creveld, in his analysis of logistics in war, ultimately concluded that his efforts "to avoid 'vague speculations' and concentrate on 'concrete figures and calculations'" produced only an incomplete picture. The human intellect alone, he concluded, cannot account for everything in war.⁶ It requires a higher faculty.

Commanders at all levels of war must employ logistical art in their planning. Although logistics is important at each of the three levels of war, tactical, operational, and strategic, it has a slightly different flavor at each level. At the tactical level logistics concentrates on fueling, arming, and maintaining

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troops and machines. Tactical commanders must receive adequate logistical support to accomplish their assigned missions. The responsibility for providing that support to tactical commanders lies with the operational commander.

At the operational level, logistics governs what can and, perhaps even more importantly, what cannot be accomplished. Operational art and logistical art are inextricably intertwined. The operational commander must base his campaign plan on the logistics immediately available in the theater of operations. If there is inadequate support to accomplish the assigned strategic aim, then the operational commander must develop a campaign plan wherein intermediate objectives, achievable with the available logistics support, become the initial goal of the campaign. While the campaign plan will be phased so as to provide for the eventual accomplishment of all the assigned strategic objectives, individual phases can be executed only when the necessary logistical means become available in the theater of operations. In balancing the ends, ways, and means of campaign planning, operational commanders will discover that logistics will most often be the constraining means. Finding ways to achieve the desired ends requires commanders at the operational level of war to be as familiar with the ways of logistical art as they are with operational art.

Logistics at the strategic level of war is an inseparable component of military strategy. Logistical planning at the strategic level concentrates on the development of materiel and manpower and deploying them to the theater of war in support of the Army's vision of being "able to fight and win in joint and combined operations across the spectrum of conflict, throughout the world."⁷

Fighting throughout the world requires substantial logistics resources; to get a credible force into the far-flung theaters of operations and war isn't easy. Simply moving the Army's so-called light divisions requires some 400 sorties of the C-141 cargo plane. Deployment planning is both strategic and logistic. In contrast to the logistical art so essential at the operational level, strategic logistics fits almost too neatly into the scientific method of planning, with its seemingly endless time-phased deployment lists.

The science of logistics is not new to warfare, but it came to its ultimate fruition during World War II when scientists and soldiers joined forces to apply the scientific method to the conduct of war. A systematic planning process resulted from the union of scientists and soldiers during that war, which saw a dramatic increase in the use of machines on, over, and around the battlefield. Mechanization revolutionized logistics as much as it did warfare itself.

Industrialization had of course changed the face of war during the 19th century, but it was not until the development of the truck that armies were able to wage effective large-scale maneuver warfare at the operational level with modern weapons. Prior to the 20th century, armies were unable to sustain themselves unless they kept moving to literally eat off the land. Halting to conduct a deliberate attack or lay siege to a stubborn fortress meant that the

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
army rapidly lost its ability to fight. The longer an army stayed in one place, the more of its manpower had to be used for foraging, which depleted the forces available to actually conduct the battle.

Railroads in the latter half of the 19th century helped armies solve their transportation problems at the strategic level, but only when the tracks went where the war was. In 1914 elaborate rail movement schedules, tied tightly to mobilization plans, transported large armies in western Europe into position to confront one another for four years. The railroad made rapid mobilization at the beginning of World War I possible, and the fixed front lines of the western front allowed both sides to use railroads for strategic transportation. The railroads provided adequate strategic logistical transportation for the static trench warfare, but they were not flexible enough to allow a war of movement at the lower levels of war.

At the tactical level, materiel and troops still had to be transported from the railhead to the battle, a process that remained primarily a matter of walking for the troops and horse-drawn wagons and caissons for the materiel. Although they did not have their full impact until World War II, both the truck and the tank first saw combat in World War I. By the same token, however, the horse started World War II still very much a transportation mainstay of both the German and Russian logistics systems.

Between the World Wars both tanks and trucks were introduced into armies on a mass scale. During World War II at the tactical and operational levels, the truck became to logistics what the tank became to battle. The tank may have prevented World War II from stagnating into opposing siege lines as had happened in World War I, but it was the petrol truck which gave the tank its freedom of movement.

The tank-truck team revolutionized warfare and logistics, and as logistics became more technical it tended to become regarded more as a science and less as an art. But the art of logistics was not lost on all military planners. There were those commanders who successfully combined logistical and operational art in World War II. It is probably not simply a coincidence that one of the more successful innovators and practitioners of the operational art in the German army, Heinz Guderian, spent much of the period between World War I and World War II as a transportation officer dealing "with the



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An M-60 tank backs off the vehicle cargo/rapid response ship USNS *Algol* in Antwerp, Belgium, during a Reforger exercise.

problem of troop transportation by lorry." Today, as US military planners attempt to deter World War III through a holding strategy in Europe predicated upon rapid reinforcement from the States, transportation again takes center stage. Indeed, transportation is arguably the very essence of US Army logistics and certainly its limiting factor.⁸

During World War II, the blossoming science of logistics developed the capability to make very precise forecasts of virtually any commodity needed in battle based upon experientially determined usage factors. Commanders prepared battle plans and logisticians developed the requirements to support the battle. It was sometimes difficult to determine which had the greater influence. By 1944 Allied logistics planning reached its zenith with Operation Overlord, the campaign that began with the Allies' invasion of France and ended with their armies in the very heart of Germany. Logisticians labored for years preparing meticulous plans to support that effort, while the American arsenal of democracy supplied the vast quantities of war materiel that would be needed to crush the Nazi war machine. In the event, however, it was not so much the logistics planning that measured the success of the Allied invasion of Europe, but the initiative and imagination of commanders in ignoring, adapting, and improvising logistics plans and systems as the campaign progressed.⁹

A disadvantage of detailed logistics planning is that it can devolve to an exercise in rigidity and conservatism. Left to themselves, logisticians would probably prefer a plan that can be executed in a predictable manner, immune to changing circumstances, so they can insure that they have enough of anything anybody might want. While this aim may appear to be desirable during preparations for war, it is not realistic in the fog and friction of war itself.

Determining adequate logistics support for a campaign before it begins is the essence of logistical art. It is not simply a matter of multiplying the distance to the objective by the fuel consumption rate by the number of vehicles to determine the required amount of fuel. That is a technical problem performed admirably by logisticians and is certainly an important factor in campaign planning. However, when calculating requirements logisticians tend to be conservative. Allied logistics planners preparing for Overlord in 1944, for example, grossly overestimated what would be needed when they calculated that an Allied division would consume 650 tons of supplies per day. As it turned out, divisions in the pursuit actually consumed only 300-350 tons of supplies per day.¹⁰ But the Allies were ultimately successful, not as a result of clinging slavishly to a rigid support plan for their advance across Europe, but by taking risks and improvising when the Channel ports were not opened according to the pre-invasion schedule.¹¹

Supply affects more than just the amount of materiel; it affects the amount of transportation to move that materiel. One of the biggest problems in the Allied advance across France in World War II was not lack of supplies, it was getting those supplies into the hands of the troops who needed them to continue the fight.¹² The transportation and distribution of supplies can be a problem at all levels of war. At the strategic level the problem is to get necessary materiel and troops from the United States to the theater of war. The next step is distribution within the theater of war to the theaters of operations and finally to the fighting units at the tactical level.

Obviously the more materiel requested, the higher the transportation requirements. If commanders simply request more of everything with little or no prioritization, allocation will by default fall to the logisticians who, if they have no other guidance, will simply prioritize according to their capability to transport. Commanders practicing good supply discipline with confidence that they will be supported by a responsive logistics system can reduce requirements to that essential for the conduct of the campaign.

A different kind of logistical miscalculation is seen in the Vietnam War, where the logistics system was so centralized that logistical headquarters actually lost track of what was available. The centralization of logistics planning at MACV—the theater of operations—made accurate forecasting virtually impossible for commanders at the tactical level. At the operational level, logisticians concentrated on their science while commanders virtually ignored the art of logistics. Tactical commanders who should have been provided with

necessary support found themselves sending folks all over the theater of operations to scrounge up what they needed, despite the plethora of supplies available in the theater as a whole.¹³

Vietnam was not entirely devoid of examples of the art of logistics: floating aircraft maintenance facilities, De Long piers, and floating power barges have been cited as “innovative solutions to major obstacles.” All of these devices, however, were designed to provide more and more logistics in support of the American buildup of overwhelming brute force.¹⁴

Certainly there are times when the emphasis should be on developing and maintaining an abundance of support forces in a theater of operations, especially in a low-intensity environment where US forces are supporting a beleaguered ally. The point is, however, that commanders at the operational level must understand their real requirements and tailor their support structure to those requirements. Logistics requirements will vary according to much the same factors as combat operations, the factors of METT: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and time available. Logistics can easily become an exercise in empire-building if commanders assume that all theaters of war and operations are equal.

The elder von Moltke’s observation that no plan survives the first shot of the war applies equally to logistics planning. Logistics planners in peacetime, preparing for war, have the luxury of designing elaborate force structures for potential theaters of war, and they can pre-position war reserve stocks based on theoretical projections of consumption. A difficulty in predicting requirements is that there is an enemy who, as Winston Churchill once noted, must occasionally be taken into consideration. A goal of the enemy will be to disrupt one’s logistics, and it is inevitable that he will meet with at least some success. Thus the successful conduct of war requires planning that is sufficiently flexible to accommodate unanticipated changes occasioned by circumstances and the enemy. Logistical art implies the ability to accommodate to the unanticipatable.

Preparations certainly must be made prior to the war, and even then there are times when commanders must be cognizant of the art of logistics. According to General Louis Wagner, who heads the Army Materiel Command (the Army’s logistician), AMC uses a peacetime version of what could be considered logistical art to prepare the Army for war. By maintaining close

***Logistical art implies the ability
to accommodate to the unanticipatable.***

contact with operational commanders, AMC develops "innovative, state-of-the-art solutions to today's field army needs."¹⁵

Hopefully this relationship between the Army's logistician and the army in the field will avoid problems of the recent past wherein the acquisition of new materiel apparently did not always take logistics factors into consideration. Such a situation developed in the 1960s when the Army modernized its jeep fleet and made the new vehicles two inches wider. This was a seemingly trivial addition until it came time to transport the jeeps in the Air Force's C-141 cargo plane. The additional two inches meant that only one row of jeeps could fit into the plane rather than the two rows possible with the narrower jeep. A similar problem exists today with the Bradley fighting vehicle, which must be partially disassembled before it can be transported by air. Factoring in strategic transportation during the developmental process for new materiel is one aspect of logistical art applicable to preparing for war.¹⁶

Just as Clausewitz divided war into two parts, preparation and conduct, the US Unified Command Plan is based upon the same principle. In the Unified Command Plan, the service departments support the CINCs. The services prepare for war, but the CINCs conduct the war. The CINC informs the services, by way of the JCS, of his requirements for forces and materiel. The services then prepare and provide that support through the component commanders in the theaters of operations and war.¹⁷

This clear separation of preparation for war and conduct of war occurs primarily at the strategic level. The operational commander uses strategic logistics preparation as a means of determining how he will accomplish his desired ends during his initial conduct of the war. While at the strategic level national goals well beyond immediate logistics capabilities may knowingly be established to provide planning parameters for a long-term logistics mobilization or buildup, operational commanders as we observed earlier must tailor their objectives to match the available logistics support. A campaign cannot begin without a reasonable assurance of adequate logistic support to accomplish at least the first phase. The determination of adequacy, however, may be more art than science.

During the conduct of war operational and tactical commanders must know what their logistics requirements really are if they are to have any hope of successfully practicing the art of logistics. This is not always easy. Tactical commanders actually fighting the battle, being accustomed to the abundance of support available in the American logistics system, may tend to demand simply more of everything rather than applying supply discipline. Commanders, not logisticians alone, must determine what and how much they need to accomplish assigned missions. Simply adding and multiplying predictions based on the last war fought somewhere else may be useful in the preparation for war, but commanders must maintain a grasp on their current situation in the conduct of war. Supply discipline must be the rule in the conduct of war if we hope to

accomplish our desired ends, given the potential constraints on our available means. The complex equipment on today's battlefields means that there is just not going to be an inexhaustible supply of materiel available. Lack of supply discipline will be a problem until commanders at all levels of war can rid themselves of the traditional American "philosophy of importing into the combat environment a US peacetime living standard for the committed forces."¹⁸

The US Army has an excellent logistics system, probably the best of any army in the world. Its scientific methods of determining requirements are extensive. It provides more nice-to-have luxuries to the American soldier overseas than soldiers of other nations have at home. Its shortcoming may be neglect of logistical art by commanders who do not fully understand their role in logistics. It cannot be left solely to logisticians to guess what commanders need to conduct their campaigns. Commanders must know what they want and logisticians must be able to tell them whether or not they can provide it. If they cannot provide it, then the true test of the commander's logistical art is at hand—the art of improvising, the art of economizing, the art of making do. As Clausewitz noted, it is through "managing a campaign exactly" that the general can best demonstrate his genius. Although Clausewitz devoted relatively little space to discussion of logistics, it is nonetheless an essential aspect of managing the campaign. Continued neglect of the logistical art is potentially more dangerous than our earlier neglect of the operational art.

NOTES

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Of Smoke and Mirrors: Grand Strategy by Commission

ALAN NED SABROSKY

A Review Essay on: **Discriminate Deterrence**. Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Range Strategy. 70 pages. US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., January 1988.

Few enterprises are as demanding as that of attempting to craft an appropriate strategy for a power such as the United States in an ever more complicated world. Earlier endeavors include the classic *NSC-68* written in 1950 and the so-called "Nixon Doctrine" prepared two decades later. The most recent attempt is *Discriminate Deterrence*, compiled under the auspices of a prestigious commission co-chaired by Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter and supported by a professional staff. The objective of *Discriminate Deterrence* is to devise an integrated strategy "designed for the long term, to guide force development, weapons procurement, and arms negotiations." How well it has done in its pursuit of that objective, and why, is the subject of this review.

An Overview of the Effort

The basic document consists of a summary and eight substantive chapters, with a dozen working papers and topical reports to be published separately. The chapter titles themselves provide an indication of the scope of this effort. Sequentially, they are: "The Changing Security Environment," "Third World Conflicts and US Interests," "Wars on the Soviet Periphery," "The Extreme Threats," "Influencing Soviet Arms Policy," "Managing Technology," "Managing the Defense Budget," and "Connecting the Elements of the Strategy." Each undertakes to identify relevant issues, assess the prevailing state of affairs, and then prescribe how the subject of that chapter should

be handled by the United States in the years to come. The result "is meant to guide our defense planning for many years into the future—at least twenty."

While the document needs to be read in its entirety to be understood properly, the essential architecture can be outlined briefly to provide an appreciation of the thrust of the effort. The strategy of "discriminate deterrence" proposed by the commission is intended to revise rather than to replace what it describes as the durable and largely successful "grand strategy of extraordinary global sweep" that has guided American defense planners for approximately four decades. This is necessitated by the commission's view that there are both continuities and changes in the security environment confronting the United States. Thus, it is asserted that "for the foreseeable future, the United States will have to compete militarily with the Soviet Union," a continuing challenge that is complicated considerably by factors such as the emergence of Japan and China as powers of consequence, the diffusion of advanced military technology into the Third World, and the emergence of a diverse set of actual or potential conflict situations in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere at the lower end of the conflict spectrum.

Dealing with this more complicated security environment, it is suggested, requires a strategy of "discriminate deterrence." Continuities include the global containment of the Soviet Union; retention of a survivable strategic nuclear retaliatory capability; collective defense; forward-deployed US forces backed by an adequate reinforcing capability from the continental United States; and an emphasis on quality rather than on quantity in both technology and personnel. Among the principal changes recommended by the commission are a diversification in both the contingencies the United States should be prepared to meet and the range of possible military responses to those contingencies; greater sophistication in our dealings with the Third World in general; the development of appropriate defensive as well as offensive nuclear and conventional systems; and the consistent and sustained exploitation of emerging technologies, including those that would facilitate the control of space in wartime. Of particular interest is a six-point strategy for US involvement in Third World conflicts, including the assertion that "US forces will not in general be combatants" and a call for the United States to cultivate what the commission labels "cooperative forces" (i.e. proxies) capable of doing for the United States what the Cubans and others do for the Soviet Union.

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"Discriminate Deterrence" Reconsidered

There can be little quarrel with the importance of taking a hard look at the strategic requirements of the United States in the light of the changes taking place in the world. There can be even less doubt about the value of having in one's conceptual repertoire an integrated long-term strategy. And there is no doubt whatsoever that *Discriminate Deterrence* is the culmination of the combined efforts of a number of excellent individuals dedicated to the proposition that the United States can and will approach the future armored against adversity with such a strategy.

As with any such endeavor, there is, as the saying goes, both good news and bad news. The *good* news is that there are a number of well-taken points in this document, particularly of a descriptive and (to a lesser extent) an analytical nature. The authors of *Discriminate Deterrence* acknowledge both the fact and the possible consequences of the changes taking place in the world arena. Indeed, one is struck by the extent to which the "drivers" of NSC-68—the concentration of power in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union, the presumed existence of a "new fanatic faith" in the latter, and Moscow's dismissal of any obstacle to its ambitions other than the United States—no longer command center stage. There is a fair assessment of developments in the global and regional military balances. The prospects for nuclear proliferation are understood to be very real. The growing sophistication of the "arsenals of the lesser powers" increases the risks and the costs of superpower intervention anywhere. And improvements in US conventional capabilities in Europe and in strategic lift capacity are countered in some respects by a "diminishing ability to gain agreement for timely access, including bases and overflight rights."

Discriminate Deterrence also quite properly argues that there is a need for US defense planners to escape from a preoccupation with two "extreme contingencies"—a "massive conventional attack against NATO by the Warsaw Pact" and "an unrestrained Soviet nuclear attack on US strategic forces and other military targets in the West." Without rejecting the need to "plan for the extreme contingencies," the commission concludes that "an emphasis on massive Soviet attacks leads to tunnel vision among defense planners." This makes it difficult to respond adequately to challenges to US interests and allies in the Third World, where "nearly all the armed conflicts of the past forty years have occurred," and which are the potential source of either more destructive wars or significant changes in the overall "correlation of forces." There is therefore an urgent need for the United States "to be better prepared to deal with conflicts in the Third World" in the years to come, especially in the realm of what is now called "low intensity conflict."

Finally, there are a number of useful observations on subjects ranging from the requirements for deterrence to the limitations on technology that commend themselves to the reader. One is that "a strategy that depends

on . . . [a] 'nuclear exchange' has serious limitations," with effective deterrence resting on a potential attacker's belief in our willingness as well as our capability plausibly to respond if challenged. Another is the recognition that defensive systems are appropriate "at any level of conflict," and that "defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles" are essential elements of any reasonable defense posture. A third is that arms control agreements may be very useful in some circumstances, but they can also be "a recipe for disaster" if they are pursued "mainly for the international good will they are expected to generate, and only secondarily for their effects on arms." A fourth is that "security assistance programs are of great importance . . . [and encumbered by] endless [congressional] restrictions placed on the dwindling amounts of available funds," inhibiting "the President's flexibility to deal with conflicts that threaten US interests." And finally, while "developments in military technology . . . could require major revisions in military doctrines and force structures, . . . high tech is not an American monopoly"; our "technology today is less superior than it used to be," the Soviet Union has made substantial gains that "might be extended," and global "weapons production will be much more widely diffused in the years to come."

All of these factors need to be taken into account by strategic planners. It is therefore most unfortunate that the potential reflected in parts of *Discriminate Deterrence* is undermined by some *bad* news that must perforce be reported also.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem is that the architects of *Discriminate Deterrence* simply have not produced the type of integrated strategy that would both "compel trade-offs" and define the type of choices that ought to be made in the changing security environment they portray reasonably well. There is something here for everyone—NATO for the Army and Third World contingencies for LIC enthusiasts, offensive and defensive strategic nuclear force modernization as well as arms control, calls for steady increases in defense spending along with a cautionary note about constrained resources—and nothing that will offend violently any important constituency. Both the "analysis" and the "prescriptions" are laden with placebos and banalities. It is certainly true, for example, that "we must provide the resources needed to maintain the training, morale, and excellence in leadership of the men and women in the armed forces," and that "we will need an acquisition process that fosters cohesion, speed, and incentive for innovation." Without some indication of precisely how these laudable goals are to be achieved, what one has is less a "strategy" than an expression of wishful thinking whose realization is hostage to what "should," "could," or "might" be done.

Compounding, and perhaps contributing to, the lack of strategic choice is an ambivalence about the Soviet Union that permeates the document. Both the changes in the security environment identified in *Discriminate Deterrence* and the avowed need for "more mobile and versatile forces . . . that can

Without some indication of how these laudable goals are to be achieved, what one has is less a "strategy" than an expression of wishful thinking.

deter aggression by their ability to respond rapidly and discriminately to a wide range of attacks" argue for a pronounced shift in emphasis in defense planning (at least for conventional forces) away from the Soviet Union. Yet only by continuing to focus on a Soviet threat is it possible to justify much of the current US force structure and many of the major procurement decisions made by all of the services in recent decades. The inconsistency this produces inhibits escape from that "tunnel vision among defense planners" so detrimental to strategic planning. The result is that the Soviet Union is portrayed throughout this document as a state whose urge to attack almost everywhere is deterred only with difficulty. There is all too little recognition of the reality that all threats in the world do not originate in Moscow; that a genuinely multipolar world would confront Soviet strategic planners with more problems than their American counterparts would face; and that the USSR, for reasons of history and ideology, may have internally legitimate concerns about the United States and its allies (especially West Germany) very different from the view held in the West.

A third difficulty concerns the commission's ambivalent view of the role of deterrence in general, and of nuclear deterrence in particular. It must be acknowledged that we really do not know what truly deters in the realm of nuclear affairs, as the evidential base involving even conventional wars between two nuclear powers is—fortunately—nonexistent. In *Discriminate Deterrence*, it is conceded that "in the nuclear age, no conventional war involving combat between US and Soviet forces would be unaffected by nuclear weapons"; that "over the past forty years, the Soviet regime has shown no signs of gravitating toward all-or-nothing gambles"; and that "Soviet military planners have shown an awareness that if the Politburo uses military force, it has a strong incentive to do so selectively and keep the force under political control." Having made these points, the commission then proceeds to discuss possible Soviet military actions and (for example) "NATO's ability to respond with controlled and effective nuclear strikes" as if its own arguments had never been made. There is no assessment of what Soviet *political* goals would be served by war with the United States in Europe or elsewhere that would be worth the risk of any level of nuclear war. There is no explanation of the circumstances that would induce the Soviet Union first to go to war with the United States over a Europe both consider to be a vital interest,

and then to accept defeat and the sacrifice of that vital interest rather than escalate the fighting as necessary. And there is no resolution of the contradiction between the recognition that "it does not take much nuclear force to destroy a civil society," and the rather odd notion that somehow a capability "to respond discriminately" can keep a nuclear war "within bounds . . . ensuring that it does not rapidly deteriorate into an apocalypse."

Fourth, there is far too little on the *means* required to execute this putative strategy. Indeed, it says a great deal about the commission report to note that there are separate chapters on both technology and the defense budget, but only passing references to the vital issues of personnel and force structure. Budgets and technology are important, to be sure, but are rather sterile in the absence of any solid appreciation of the human dimension of a military establishment and the force structure trade-offs required to execute any strategy. Similarly, there is not a hint that we have a very expensive defense establishment with enormous duplication of effort among the services that has its roots in interservice rivalry and bureaucratic inertia, lacking even a fig leaf of strategic justification. Any strategy worthy of the name would come to terms with these issues—although it must be conceded that any *document* on strategy prepared by this (or any similar) commission that attempted to do so would never appear in print.

Fifth, *Discriminate Deterrence* is woefully deficient when it comes to addressing economic issues, broadly defined. There is no comprehensive assessment of the total cost of the many new initiatives proposed in this report, or of what specifically would be the funding priorities in the likely event that enough monies for everything are not forthcoming. There is some talk about "Soviet economic difficulties," but not about those of the United States, except to note that defense budget constraints are likely to be imposed "by concern over the national debt and pressures for social spending." There is scarcely a hint about the consequences of being the world's largest debtor nation, with an annual debt service larger than that of the annual defense expenditures of the rest of NATO combined. And it is difficult to appreciate fully "the dynamism of the private sector" upon which so much depends, in the face of governmental malpractice that has made a travesty of the budget process.

Last, but certainly not least, the analytical reservations about technology in parts of the report fall by the wayside in its prescriptions: when searching for solutions, technology is the court of first and last resort. The architects of this document consistently fall back on technological solutions to strategic problems, whether the issue is the Soviet-American military balance, conflict in the Third World, alternatives to basing and access problems, or arms control. Let there be no mistake: technology *is* important, but it is neither a substitute nor a surrogate for strategic thought. It has been said that "history . . . knows many cases where an unskilled military leader led his technically equipped troops to defeat by the shortest path." The same can be said

for unskilled strategists and their countries—a point that seems to have eluded those who have prepared this report.

Pathology

There are three principal reasons, in my opinion, for the existence of so many fundamental problems in *Discriminate Deterrence*. The most obvious reason is the reliance on the medium of a commission, rather than the efforts of one or two key individuals. A commission in the US government serves as a form of bureaucratic valium, searching for a least common denominator of consensus, and avoiding or couching in obscure language truly contentious issues. So it is with this document, whose whole is far less than either its potential or the sum of its various parts. Most, if not all, of the members could have done far better on their own, as many have demonstrated in the past. As it stands, however, *Discriminate Deterrence* has the clinical tone of the committee report it is, with all of the punch and decisiveness of JCS position papers. Relative to both NSC-68 and the “Nixon Doctrine,” it reflects a decline in the quality of strategic discourse in the United States, a growth in governmental unwillingness to confront strategic and budgetary realities, and a paradoxical preference to do more with less—admirable in the abstract, perhaps, but hardly a contribution to strategic thought.

A second, and more respectable, reason is that the magnitude of the strategic problem confronting the United States is truly awesome. The fact that the traditional strategy has endured may be a sign of its strength. But it may also be a sign of institutional rigidity, or a harbinger of something very unpleasant waiting in the wings. The world has changed in ways that we do not fully appreciate. We know that technological change and the advent of nuclear weapons mean that geography no longer insulates us from danger. We know that we no longer possess the economic and military superiority of the early years of the Cold War that gave us a considerable margin for error. We know that our governmental system responds clumsily to the requirements for the exercise of power in world politics. And we simply do not know what to do about it all. As a consequence, we avoid the truly hard questions: How can we retain a preoccupation with a Soviet threat and still find the resources to

The architects of this document consistently fall back on technological solutions to strategic problems But technology is not a substitute for strategic thought.

do more elsewhere in an era of constrained or declining defense budgets? What could possibly motivate any Soviet leadership not bent on suicide to initiate a war against the United States or its key allies? How can we use what we have "on the shelf" to safeguard our interests in order to avoid incessant appeals to a technological salvation that may be unattainable? Absent answers to these and similar thorny questions, hard strategic analysis will be in exceedingly short supply.

The third and probably most intractable reason concerns our institutional inability to respond effectively to challenges. There is more than a measure of truth to the somewhat cynical observation that "when faced with a twenty-year threat, government responds with a fifteen-year program in the Five-Year Defense Plan, managed by three-year personnel, funded with single-year appropriations which are typically three to six months late." Put bluntly, the design and execution of any strategy requires both long-range planning and long-term resourcing, without which even the most sophisticated strategy will fail. Neither that planning nor that resourcing is possible in a system beset by an annual (or even a biennial) budget process as complicated as that of the United States, compounded by a biennial election onslaught when strategic sense falls victim with regularity to a lemming-like quest for political office. Much depends on the Congress, as the drafters of this report make all too clear. Yet it is equally clear that congressional intervention in the defense policy process is inevitable, frequently incompatible with the support of US national interests, and unlikely to change to an appreciable degree.

Looking Ahead

In some respects, the architects of this report have done better than might have been expected, given the enormous constraints under which they necessarily labored. That they were unable to craft a document that plausibly defined a strategy relevant to the world in which the United States must function, while retaining the anti-Soviet emphasis necessary to preserve force structure and budget, is really not surprising. Indeed, *Discriminate Deterrence* has many of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States as a player in world politics. It has a solid moral foundation, a genuine commitment to peace and prosperity, a sense of mission, and some understanding of international security affairs. But it lacks a proper appreciation of power, a sense of limitations as well as of opportunities, and an understanding of the interplay of diplomacy and force in strategy, and it is encumbered by an utterly unattainable desire to have the best of all worlds. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Iklé-Wohlstetter Commission relied largely on rhetorical "smoke and mirrors" to create an American Potemkin Village and call it a strategy. The Bush Administration will have its own opportunity to do better; perhaps it will have some success in that endeavor. □

The Cuban Missile Affair and the American Style of Crisis Management

DAN CALDWELL

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During the last several years, the already voluminous historical record of the Cuban missile crisis has been supplemented by the release of a number of significant, formerly classified documents, including CIA intelligence reports, State and Defense Department papers, and even the secretly taped transcripts of meetings of the Executive Committee (ExCom) of the National Security Council and Soviet accounts of the crisis.¹ Many of these materials shed new light on the issues, participants, and decisionmaking of the crisis. For example, in his book *Thirteen Days* Robert Kennedy portrayed himself as consistently supporting the quarantine option during the ExCom discussions. In Arthur Schlesinger's biography, *Robert Kennedy and His Times*, Schlesinger characterized his subject as the principal opponent of a military attack on Cuba and said he "was a dove from the start."² Despite these accounts, the transcript of the 16 October evening meeting of the ExCom indicates that Robert Kennedy in fact advocated forceful measures, including possibly sinking Soviet ships and engineering a pretext for going to war with Cuba, even mentioning as a precedent the sinking of the *Maine*, which catalyzed US involvement in the Spanish-American war.³ In this and many other instances, the newly released documents are opening the door to clearer interpretations of the events of the Cuban missile crisis. As a result, previous analyses of the crisis and the lessons derived therefrom need to be reassessed on the basis of the newly disclosed information.

Following the crisis, analysts characterized President Kennedy's behavior during the event as a paragon of crisis management. The President had asserted his control over military options, coordinated military action with political action, given Khrushchev time to think about and respond to US

initiatives, avoided actions that would motivate the Soviets to escalate, and avoided giving the Soviet leaders the impression that the United States was going to resort to large-scale warfare.⁴ The Cuban missile crisis, more than any other single episode in the history of post-World War II American foreign policy, contributed to the development of an American style of crisis management. The objectives for this article are to describe and then evaluate the principal elements of this style.

The American Style of Crisis Management

I suggest that there are seven elements of the American style of crisis management, and will discuss each in turn.

*1. Crises are assumed to be manageable.*⁵

In contrast to decisionmakers in a number of other cultures, American policymakers have consistently believed that they can assert control over particular events and situations. Part of this belief derives from Americans' dual faith in the positive attributes of the development of technology and in their own ability to exploit technological developments. Beyond this general cultural belief, American decisionmakers have portrayed foreign leaders as "rational actors." According to Robert Kennedy, his brother "believed from the start that the Soviet Chairman [Khrushchev] was a rational, intelligent man who, if given sufficient time and shown our determination, would alter his position."⁶ If Khrushchev was "like us" in being able to rationally calculate costs and benefits, then American policymakers assumed crises could be managed and "played." This belief was underscored by the widespread acceptance among analysts and policymakers of game theory and elaborate models based on this approach.

2. As soon as crises begin, there is a strong tendency for previous plans and expectations to be ignored.

Before the spring of 1950, few people thought that the United States would defend South Korea; however, following the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, President Truman and his advisors quickly reversed this position with almost no discussion of their action. During the Cuban missile crisis, a number of contingency plans were suspended by the ExCom. For

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example, President Kennedy would not permit the execution of the plan calling for retaliatory attack on Cuba if an American plane were shot down.

3. During crises, presidents convene ad hoc decisionmaking groups with a limited number of members to advise them.

Following the North Korean attack on South Korea, President Truman asked Dean Acheson to convene a small group of advisors to meet with him at Blair House.⁷ This group then advised the President throughout the early weeks of the Korean War. This pattern was repeated during the Indo-China crisis of 1954 and throughout the years of American involvement in Vietnam (e.g. President Johnson's Tuesday Lunch Group). The use (and success) of the ExCom in the Cuban missile crisis underscored the value of a small, ad hoc group of advisors to American policymakers.

President Reagan continued the tradition of appointing small groups to advise him during crises. He created a special NSC committee called the Special Situation Group, headed by Vice President George Bush, with the announced purpose of managing crises. Contrary to some reports, however, this group did not play a central role in the management of serious crises. That role was played by the National Security Planning Group, chaired by President Reagan. In keeping with the tradition of limiting the membership of crisis management groups, the members of this group were the President, Vice President, White House Counselor, White House Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Advisor, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.⁸

4. During crises, spokesmen with unpopular ideas are often excluded from the group making the important decisions.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Adlai Stevenson, who was the US representative to the United Nations, suggested to the ExCom that the United States should consider withdrawing its military forces from Guantanamo and removing 15 Jupiter missiles from Turkey in exchange for the Soviets' removal of their missiles from Cuba. Stevenson's recommendation was rejected outright. Not only that, but President Kennedy asked both Arthur Schlesinger and a long-time, hard-line advisor to US presidents, John McCloy, to accompany Stevenson to the UN to make sure that he would accurately represent the Administration's position and not present his own ideas for resolving the crisis. Schlesinger later reported that Robert Kennedy took him aside as he was leaving for the United Nations and told him, "We're counting on you to watch things in New York That fellow [Stevenson] is ready to give everything away. We will have to make a deal in the end; but we must stand firm now. Our concessions must come at the end of negotiation, not at the start."⁹ Following the crisis, Stevenson's suggestions were leaked to journalists Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, and Stevenson was widely criticized for his dovish position.¹⁰ Ironically, it is now clear from a 1987 disclosure by Dean Rusk that President Kennedy had directed Rusk to prepare to have UN

Secretary General U Thant propose a trade of the missiles in Turkey for those in Cuba.¹¹

During the Vietnam War, President Johnson's advisors who did not strongly support the Administration's war policies were criticized and isolated. After George Ball opposed the bombing of North Vietnam, President Johnson would greet him as "Mr. Stop-the-Bombing." Irving Janis has described the dysfunctional aspects of small-group decisionmaking; to counter the phenomenon of groupthink, Alexander George has proposed that policymakers routinely consider multiple positions before selecting a course of action.¹²

5. During crises, presidents assert direct control over the tactical operations of military units.

During the 18th and 19th centuries, ambassadors had a great deal of freedom to negotiate on behalf of the particular country they represented. However, with the invention of the telegraph and telephone, this freedom was drastically reduced. The further development of communications technology has had a similar effect on military commanders. By 1962, President Kennedy had the capability to communicate with and issue orders to local military commanders. General David Burchinal, Director of Plans of the Air Staff in 1962, described how the quarantine was implemented:

So about that time . . . we decided to impose a blockade, and we put our naval vessels out on picket—no more ships coming into Cuba. They would be challenged on the high seas regardless of flag, and they'd be searched, and if they had anything that falls under war material they will be turned around or they will be sunk. So, we set it up. And, there was control in detail, so there was a phone from the Secretary of Defense's office right to the deck of the damn destroyer on patrol in this blockade. So, the first ship comes up to the blockade line. He's a Swede. They give him the signal "heave-to." "Standby, what is your cargo?" And he said, "Go to hell!" Full steam ahead and right through the damn blockade and right on into Havana. Nobody stopped him. He just said, "The hell with you—nobody tells me what to do on the high seas with my ship." So, they just looked at each other, these people who were now learning to "manage crises" and run wars. "That didn't work very well. What do we do now?" And so our signal caller had said, "Don't shoot," and the destroyer had said, "I'm ready to stop him." "No, no, let him go. Let him go." So the next ship comes along and he's Lebanese—he's flying a Lebanese flag. So, they challenge him. And he said, "Oh, I'm very happy to comply. I'll stop, come aboard, here I am. I'm just a poor Lebanese out here running my ship into Cuba." So they went aboard and opened up his hatches, and he's got a bunch of military electronic gear, and they shut the hatches down, pretended it wasn't there, and said, "Pass friend." And he steamed merrily into Havana. That was our naval blockade. And that's the way it was being run under the kind of civilian control we had.¹³

Direct presidential control over military operations was clearly exercised in the Cuban missile crisis. It was also exercised during the Vietnam

War, and the practice has persisted. President Johnson had a scale model of Khe Sanh built in the basement of the White House and followed the battle on this model. President Ford gave long-distance orders to military commanders on the scene during the 1975 *Mayaguez* crisis. And during the 1976 evacuation of Americans from Beirut, according to an account by Ned Lebow, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld from the Pentagon personally supervised the movement of a boat sent to shore to pick up a number of Americans:

Off in a corner, [an unseen] major, who had served in Lebanon, was desperately trying to attract the attention of someone on center stage. Finally he blurted out, "You can't do that!" Rumsfeld looked up from his microphone and all eyes turned toward the major who explained that he knew this particular harbor like the back of his hand and that the course Rumsfeld had directed the launch to follow was very dangerous at low tide. The major was invited to come up front and join the secretary, who parroted the major's instructions to the bosun nominally in command of the launch.¹⁴

Interestingly, perhaps in reaction to the micro-management that previous presidents had exercised over tactical military operations, President Carter refused to interfere with operational military decisions during the attempted rescue of the American hostages in Iran.¹⁵ This example, however, is an exception to the general presidential practice since the Cuban missile crisis.

6. US decisionmaking during crises is characterized by imperfect information and overloaded communication channels.

During the Cuban crisis, a wide variety of communication channels was used—from secret government-to-government communications to openly broadcast messages. One of the most unusual Soviet messages during the crisis—an offer to remove the missiles in Cuba in exchange for an American promise not to invade Cuba—was relayed from the KGB station chief in Washington to the ABC White House correspondent, John Scali.

Communications within a government will of course intensify during crises, and, as Henry Kissinger has pointed out, "You have to remember that when any crisis occurs, there is total confusion even in the White House. Though most people would expect that intelligence information puts one ahead of the information curve, you can generally assume that in the middle of a crisis

"You can generally assume that in the middle of a crisis the newspaper reports may be slightly ahead of the intelligence information."

—Henry Kissinger

the newspaper reports may be slightly ahead of the intelligence information."¹⁶ Gary Sick, who was the principal National Security Council staff person working on Iran during the Iranian hostage crisis, has noted that the NSC staff often depended heavily on newspaper reports for information on the crisis.¹⁷

It is no wonder that communication channels become overloaded. The Department of Defense has reported that it transmitted 56.7 million messages in 1984, a total that excludes transmissions by voice and data processing systems.¹⁸ That is equal to more than 155,000 messages per day.

During crises imperfect information and overloaded communication channels tend to result in either little or no communication between the adversaries. Additionally, communication is often attempted through extraordinary channels, such as the Soviet offer given to John Scali. During the negotiations to obtain the release of American hostages in Iran, the United States adopted the unusual channel of intermediaries in France.

7. During certain crises, the United States has increased the alert levels of its nuclear forces as a means of communicating the seriousness of crises.

The United States has five levels of alert or Defense Conditions (DEFCONs) for its military forces, as follows:¹⁹

- DEFCON 5—Normal peacetime level
- DEFCON 4—Normal peacetime level (used in some theaters to permit direct shift to DEFCON 3)
- DEFCON 3—Forces on standby to await further orders
- DEFCON 2—Forces ready for combat
- DEFCON 1—Forces deployed for combat

On 22 October when President Kennedy delivered his televised speech publicly announcing the discovery of the missiles and the imposition of the quarantine, the DEFCON was shifted from level 4 to level 3. The United States went to DEFCON 3 again in 1973 during the Arab-Israeli October War. Interestingly, the Soviet Union has never alerted its nuclear forces.²⁰

Criticisms of the American Style of Crisis Management

While one or more of the elements above characterize the crisis behavior of other states, when taken together they describe the behavior of the United States alone. And as noted, the Cuban missile crisis was influential, if not critical, in establishing these elements as the earmarks of the American style of crisis management. But what do recent disclosures tell us about this style? And are these elements appropriate for managing contemporary crises?

Consider the first assumption of the American style of crisis management: that crises are manageable. The ExCom was able to resolve the Cuban missile crisis, but it is now clear that the crisis imposed extreme mental and physical demands on the participants. At the height of the crisis, one ExCom

member had an automobile accident at 4 a.m. as he was going home to sleep for several hours. Robert Kennedy told Arthur Schlesinger in 1965 that he believed Dean Rusk "had a virtually complete breakdown mentally and physically."²¹ Given the tremendous inherent stresses and pressures of the moment, crises simply may not always be humanly manageable.²²

In addition, unforeseen events may make crises unmanageable. An event during the Cuban missile crisis involving Soviet army Colonel Oleg Penkovsky illustrates the point. From April 1961 through September 1962, Penkovsky had sent a large quantity of significant military information to the United States and Great Britain.²³ Western intelligence had provided Penkovsky with several telephonic codes that were to be used in the event of a number of different occurrences. One code indicated that Penkovsky was about to be arrested. On 22 October, Penkovsky was arrested; however, before he was taken into custody, he sent his last coded message: "War is imminent!"²⁴ If President Kennedy and his advisors had taken this seriously, the results of the Cuban missile crisis might have been far different.

What of the presidential use of ad hoc decisionmaking groups with a small number of advisors for counsel? Crises obviously involve the issue of war or peace. The Constitution grants the power to declare war to the Congress. Interestingly, however, there were no members of Congress on the ExCom, and none were consulted on a systematic basis during the Vietnam War. This lack of consultation led to congressional frustration and eventual passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 over President Nixon's veto. Since its passage, the act has been invoked by Congress only once, authorizing US troops in Lebanon in 1983. During the summer of 1987, there was substantial debate over whether to invoke the War Powers Resolution in connection with the US reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers. The Senate avoided a direct confrontation with the White House by passing a separate resolution requiring the President to report on the operation and deferring further congressional action.²⁵ In May 1988, a group of influential senators introduced legislation to overhaul the War Powers Resolution. The new legislation would result in two prominent revisions. First, the act proposes the establishment of a special consultative body of 18 congressional leaders and key committee chairmen. Second, American troops would be allowed to remain in hostile areas unless a majority of Congress voted specifically to recall them.²⁶

Presidential control over tactical military operations is another of the rudimentary elements of the American style of crisis management, and in the Cuban missile crisis President Kennedy and his advisors exercised such control. Both the President and the Secretary of Defense issued orders to the ships participating in the quarantine. But there were other instances in which military units, without the knowledge of the President and the ExCom, engaged in activities that could easily have resulted in serious escalation of the crisis. On 27 October, for example, a U-2 on a routine air-sampling mission to detect nuclear

test explosions in the USSR strayed off course due to a navigational error and flew over Soviet territory. President Kennedy dismissed the incident by saying, "There's always some so-and-so who doesn't get the word."²⁷ Khrushchev's reaction was stronger; the next day, in a letter to President Kennedy, he wrote:


A . . . dangerous case occurred . . . when one of your reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this: A provocation? . . . Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step?²⁸

Early in their discussions, the members of the ExCom had agreed that the United States would retaliate militarily if an American reconnaissance plane were shot down over Cuba. On 27 October, such an event in fact occurred, and the pilot of the U-2, Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., was killed. Because the crisis was at its height and because Khrushchev's first letter proposing a resolution of the crisis had arrived on the morning of the same day (indeed, the President and the ExCom were informed of the letter and the shoot-down of the U-2 within the mere space of 15 minutes), President Kennedy ordered the military not to retaliate as had been planned earlier. In a recent book, however, Raymond Garthoff notes: "The president's decision became known at the operating level in the Pentagon barely in time to prevent a planned air strike on the probable offending air defense missile site that was about to be made in accordance with earlier-approved contingency plans."²⁹ In contrast to the traditional view, then, President Kennedy's control of tactical military operations was incomplete and therefore precarious.

Regarding the US proclivity for employing alerts to send political signals, President Kennedy, as already noted, ordered military forces to go to DEFCON 3 on 22 October. Two days later, Strategic Air Command forces went to the DEFCON 2 alert level, placing more B-52 bombers on airborne alert and more ICBM silos on alert, and putting to sea any Polaris submarines that had been in port. In short, the United States made preparations for nuclear war. Unknown to members of the ExCom until 1987—a quarter century after the event—was the fact that the SAC DEFCON 2 alert was conducted "in the clear" with no codes used to send the messages, which the Soviets could therefore easily pick up. Astonishingly, the decision to send the alert message in the clear was made by the Commander-in-Chief of SAC, General Thomas Powers, without the authorization of the President, Secretary of Defense, or the ExCom.³⁰

Some observers (most notably General Maxwell Taylor) have argued that the Cuban missile crisis was a conventional crisis and that a nuclear confrontation was not involved.³¹ While it is true that neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted the crisis to escalate, both leaders ordered actions that made escalation to the nuclear level more likely. Khrushchev's shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba catalyzed the crisis, and Kennedy's increased alert

Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr., shot down while flying a U-2 reconnaissance mission over Cuba, was the only casualty of the missile crisis. His death prompted President Kennedy to remark in sorrow that it is always the brave and the best who die.



Dick Wolf Media Research Center

levels heightened the seriousness of the crisis. These actions underscore the dilemma facing decisionmakers during crises: actions ordered to achieve military objectives may increase the probability of escalation and decrease the probability of achieving (or maintaining) certain political-military goals such as avoiding nuclear war. In contrast to General Taylor, President Kennedy believed that the possibility of a Soviet-American war resulting from the Cuban missile crisis was between one out of three and even.³²

A number of observers have noted that shortly before the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy had read Barbara Tuchman's *The Guns of August*, which recounts the period immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I. According to Tuchman, neither Kaiser Wilhelm nor his cousin Tsar Nicholas wanted war between their two countries, but the military leaders of each country pressed their political leaders to proceed with preparations for war (such as shipping war materiel to the front on trains) so that they would be prepared if war broke out. The action-reaction spiral of escalation contributed to the outbreak of World War I. According to traditional accounts of the Cuban missile crisis, Tuchman's book had made Kennedy acutely aware of this danger, and he took effective action to prevent such a succession of events in 1962. It now appears that even though he was aware of the danger of escalation resulting from increased alert levels, he was not able to control all the important aspects of implementing the alert. This underscores the possible loss of presidential control of decisions and events during crises.

Conclusions

The Cuban missile crisis was the most serious Soviet-American confrontation in the post-World War II era. Because of the seriousness of the crisis and because it was resolved relatively peacefully (Major Anderson being the only casualty), most participants, journalists, historians, and political scientists have considered it to be the paragon of crisis management. But recent disclosures call into question many of the lessons of the crisis based on earlier, less-complete, and biased information. What lessons, then, can be drawn from the crisis today?

First, perhaps due primarily to the Cuban missile crisis, American analysts and policymakers have focused almost exclusively on crisis *management* and have all but ignored crisis *prevention*. According to Alexander George, "Crisis prevention may well be considered the orphan of strategic studies."³³ George and his colleagues have produced several works that fill significant gaps in this previously neglected subject area.³⁴ Raymond Garthoff has noted that while Americans have emphasized crisis management, the Soviets have emphasized crisis prevention. "Curiously reversing the usual stereotypes, the Americans have been sober, pessimistic realists, assuming that, regrettably, crises will occur and must be safely managed, while the Soviets have appeared to be more optimistic, if not hopelessly idealistic, in arguing that crises can and must be prevented by political collaboration."³⁵

A second lesson challenges the fundamental assumption of crisis management, i.e. that crises can in fact be effectively managed. New disclosures reveal that President Kennedy's control over events in the Cuban missile crisis was far more precarious and incomplete than previously had been assumed. Following the publication of Robert Kennedy's account of the crisis, Dean Acheson, who had participated in some of the ExCom discussions, wrote a critique of Kennedy's account, subtitled "Homage to Plain Dumb Luck."³⁶ At the time Acheson's article was published, it appeared that Acheson was bitter that the hawkish advice he and others had offered President Kennedy (Acheson had favored the air-strike option) had been rejected. However, in retrospect and with the benefit of information now available, it appears that Acheson was right: The Cuban missile crisis was managed, but it required a great deal of "plain dumb luck." Based on information disclosed at a meeting at Harvard in October 1987, two of the participants concluded: "We now have reason to believe that on October 24, 1962, the world may have been only minutes from a superpower naval war at the quarantine line the Americans had placed around Cuba."³⁷ Khrushchev initially wanted to attempt to run the blockade, and apparently it was only because of last-minute "frantic maneuvering within the Kremlin" that the Soviets rescinded an earlier order to their naval commanders to ignore the American "quarantine."³⁸

Resolution of the Cuban missile crisis thus required, among other things: that the ExCom ignore Penkovsky's warning that war was imminent:

that the Soviets discount the significance of the DEFCON 2 alert broadcast by the SAC commander in the clear; that the Soviets assume a US plane over Soviet territory at the height of the crisis was not the vanguard of an American attack; and that Soviet leaders order their naval commanders not to run the blockade.

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy and Khrushchev moved to reduce the threat of nuclear war by concluding the Hot Line Agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Thus the most serious US-Soviet foreign policy crisis of the postwar era had the paradoxical result of ushering in a new period of detente between the two superpowers. It is difficult, if not impossible, to answer "what if" questions in history. This caveat aside, what if President Kennedy had not insisted on the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba? It is very likely that had President Kennedy accepted the missiles or even explicitly traded the US missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the result would have been an increased risk of nuclear war. Had the missiles remained in Cuba, American nuclear forces likely would have been placed at a higher stage of alert and Congress likely would have demanded a greater military buildup. Thus, a less confrontational solution to the immediate crisis could have resulted in a more dangerous world.

Quite clearly, crises are manageable only to a degree, and many have dramatic unintended and unforeseen consequences.

NOTES

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Warriors and Politics: The Bitter Lesson of Stilwell in China

JOHN E. SHEPHARD, JR.

One of the Army's most bitter battles in World War II was waged not between American GIs and the Axis Powers, but between two renowned American fighters: General Joseph W. (Vinegar Joe) Stilwell and General Claire L. (Old Leatherface) Chennault. The scrap was over which policy the United States would pursue in the war's most frustrating arena, the China-Burma-India theater. The referee was no less a figure than the President of the United States. And, each contestant had some important allies: in Stilwell's corner were General George C. Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimson; in Chennault's corner were presidential assistant Harry Hopkins, journalist Joseph Alsop (the President's cousin), the formidable Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and her husband, the Generalissimo.

The story of this policy conflict is fascinating for several reasons. For example, it illustrates President Roosevelt's famous "competitive management style" as applied to one important area of wartime foreign and military policy. Rarely one to abide by a strict chain of command, Roosevelt often provoked, mediated, shaped, and influenced conflict among his subordinates to maintain leverage and to protect his own power and options. Many admired the President's unique ability to inspire new ideas and create successful policy out of this chaotic decisionmaking "system," pointing to the great achievements in wartime domestic policy such as economic and industrial mobilization. Others, however, were appalled by the disorder it engendered.¹

Perhaps of even greater interest, however, is this story's illustration of the extent to which war is a political enterprise in which it is increasingly difficult to separate what is "military" from what is "political." In forming America's wartime China policy, senior leaders, both civilian and military, failed to understand fully the interaction of political, social, economic, and

diplomatic elements of national power with the military element of power. The result was failure, frustration, and bitterness.

A Tale of Two Tactics

The battle that raged over China policy was neither a contest over political objectives nor over strategy, but rather over political and military tactics. The objective was clear: to make China a "great power" so that she could fulfill a strong postwar role as a principal stabilizing factor in the Far East.² President Roosevelt envisioned China as one of the postwar world's "Four Policemen," along with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union. This objective required a strategy that would both promote effective cooperation between the United States and China and reinforce China's position so that she could emerge from the war able to assume her enlarged role.

The President decided, therefore, that the United States would pursue a political strategy of supporting and strengthening Chiang Kai-shek's regime so as to keep China in the war against Japan and fully mobilize China's economic and military strength. In practical terms, this meant giving China the apparent status of a major power during the war, providing direct military and economic assistance to China and its armed forces, strengthening Sino-American military cooperation, and invigorating Chinese efforts to fight the Japanese.

The great policy disputes were over what political and military tactics would best carry out this strategy, and the *Commander-in-Chief's* competitive administrative style exacerbated heated conflicts among his subordinates. At the core of the debate was the problem of how to deal with Chiang Kai-shek. Dealing with the importunate Generalissimo was no easy task. Even to Roosevelt, famous for his ability to make a quick study and discern people's motivations, the Chinese leader was an enigma.³

Chiang's refusal to employ his best-equipped armies against the Japanese (using them instead to contain the Chinese Communist forces) and his reluctance to commit forces to offensive action were continuing sources of frustration for Roosevelt and the War Department.⁴ Also, Chiang's frequent demands for increased aid and his occasional paroxysms of indignation (because China was not being treated as a "worthy ally"⁵) placed pressures and forced deadlines on the President's decisionmaking process. Chiang's persistent

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Vinegar Joe found the Burmese mud preferable to the muck of politics in Washington and Chungking. He confided in his diary: "I don't trust politicians."

threatening claims that sinking Chinese morale might force his government to come to separate terms with Japan increased these pressures.

Roosevelt's initial policy approach toward Chiang had been championed by Lauchlin Currie, a White House assistant who handled lend-lease matters for China and who had developed a rapport with Madame Chiang and other key Chinese officials during a trip to China in 1941. Currie favored a liberal policy of freely conferred aid, with no strings attached. This approach emphasized noninterference in Chinese domestic affairs and was sensitive to any charges of infringement on Chinese sovereignty. Economic aid, materiel aid, advice, and persuasion were expected to encourage Chinese military performance and assure cooperation with American strategic designs.

Soon, however, considerations of military strategy involved field commanders in matters of political policy. The central figure was General Stilwell, who, as chief of the American military mission and Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, wielded considerable control over the implementation of America's China policy. Very important was his control over distribution of the lend-lease aid that arrived in China. He dealt face-to-face with the Generalissimo, while Stilwell's office, rather than the Ambassador's, was often the conduit through which presidential messages reached China's leader.

Marshall had hand-picked his friend Stilwell for the mission to China. Stilwell spoke Chinese fluently and had extensive experience in that country. However, his contempt for Chiang, whom he called "Peanut," was widely known.⁶ Nor was he a fan of President Roosevelt, whom he called "Old Softy."⁷ Considering himself a professional military man with only soldierly concerns, Vinegar Joe found the Burmese mud preferable to the muck of politics in Washington and Chungking. He confided in his diary: "I don't trust politicians."⁸ But his position placed him unavoidably in a role of importance in Chinese domestic politics as well as in American foreign policy toward China.

General Stilwell's frustration with Chiang and the Chinese army in the first Burma campaign in the spring of 1942 convinced him that considerable reform and reorganization of the Chinese army were essential.

According to Stilwell, this was for Chiang's own benefit, but the Chinese leader unfortunately suffered from "nonrecognition of enlightened self-interest."⁹ It is most likely, though, that Chiang believed such reforms would threaten the delicate political relationships and balance of power that ensured his paramount position in the Chinese army and government. Stilwell was certainly as aware as anybody of China's need for vastly increased aid—and he constantly pressed for it—but he was convinced that the only way to deal with Chiang was to demand a quid pro quo in return for American aid. Lend-lease and American military activities in the China theater could serve as levers to budge Chiang in the direction of necessary political and military reforms and force Chinese military action against the Japanese. In Washington, General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson, concerned primarily with facilitating military victory, sympathized with Stilwell's problems and supported this hard-line approach.

President Roosevelt, however, agreed with Lauchlin Currie's objection to such a hard line and steadfastly refused to establish a quid pro quo. It is important to note that Marshall at this time had not yet fully gained ready access to the President and the extensive influence he would later wield. In rejecting a harsh War Department draft which asked Chiang for a reorganization of the Chinese army in return for lend-lease aid, the President wrote to Marshall: "I wish you would talk the proposed reply [to the Generalissimo] over with Currie. Perhaps you can tone it down."¹⁰

Because of the fundamental differences in their tactical approaches toward relations with the Chinese leader, Currie was among the strongest of Stilwell's critics. After a trip to China in the summer of 1942, during which Chiang expressed his displeasure with the feisty American general, Currie recommended to the President that Stilwell be sacked. Roosevelt, optimistically assuming that the problems with China depended "largely on the problem of personalities,"¹¹ agreed. He sent Currie to Marshall to suggest Stilwell's relief, but the White House staffer met a cold response from the Army Chief of Staff.¹² The President persisted and wrote to Marshall on 3 October: "What is the situation in regard to Stilwell in China? Apparently the matter is so involved between him and the Generalissimo that I suppose Stilwell could be more effective in some other field."¹³

Marshall and Stimson were annoyed by Currie's interference and persuaded the President that no suitable successor could be found to replace Stilwell. The Army Chief wrote to Roosevelt that, in order to carry out military operations planned for the CBI theater, Stilwell's post called for "a troop leader rather than a negotiator or supply man who would only serve to promote harmony in Chungking." Thus he focused on perhaps the major difference between the Currie and Stilwell approaches. Currie's plan might serve better to "promote harmony" between Washington and Chungking, but it would be less effective in carrying out the military objectives which were, naturally, the



Lieutenant General Stilwell with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek in Maymyo, Burma, on 9 April 1942.

overwhelming concern of the War Department. General Marshall questioned Currie's judgment: "I know that Mr. Currie feels that Stilwell should be relieved, but I do not believe Mr. Currie realizes what this is going to mean towards the accomplishment of our military objective in Burma."¹⁴

While Roosevelt acquiesced on the relief matter, he was wary of humiliating China's head of government and therefore persisted in rejecting Stilwell's hard-line tactics. In a forceful letter to General Marshall, the President wrote:

Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang [T]he Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people—an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders [Chiang] finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.¹⁵

The President thus continued to heed the soft-line approach that Currie advocated, but the War Department had won a key victory in keeping

Stilwell on board. The battle between Currie and the War Department continued during 1942, but, as military crises and strategy took up more and more of the President's time, Currie found himself being edged out.

Even as Currie's influence in the White House waned, the President continued to resist War Department entreaties to try Stilwell's quid-pro-quo approach. However, a new option emerged in the fall of 1942 from a controversy that had started to rage in China between Stilwell and General Claire L. Chennault. The President's administrative style played a key role in bringing the controversy from the field to Washington, where the bitter clashes between Stilwell and Chennault in China were paralleled by those between George Marshall and Harry Hopkins.

Chennault's Alternative Plan—And Palace Intrigues

General Chennault, commander of the 14th Air Force, enjoyed a close relationship with Generalissimo and Madame Chiang and was an ardent supporter of vastly increased aid to the China theater. Having won brilliant tactical victories over the Japanese with his volunteer air group, the "Flying Tigers," during a time when most victories were being chalked up by the Axis Powers, he was an important hero with a strong following among the American public. He was respected for his tactical genius within the War Department, but his maverick methods, his lack of appreciation for complex logistical operations, his vocal criticism of Stilwell and American strategy, his having worked as a private citizen for Chiang, and his bucking of official command channels caused much resentment among high-level War Department officials, including Marshall and General "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force.

Chennault's grandiose plan envisioned the defeat of the Japanese through an increased air effort against Japanese supply lines, shipping, and air forces. Since supplies carried over the mountainous "Hump" from India to China were scarce, this plan called for a reallocation of aid from Stilwell's program of rebuilding and reforming the Chinese army to provide equipment, planes, and fuel for Chennault's air arm. The Generalissimo strongly supported Chennault's plan—most likely because, unlike Stilwell's plan, it would avoid the necessity of reforming the Chinese army (which might threaten Chiang's hold on power), and it allowed Americans to do most of the fighting.

Stilwell and Marshall strongly opposed the Chennault plan primarily for military and strategic reasons. They felt that airpower alone could not defeat the Japanese and that, as soon as the Japanese started incurring heavy losses from Chennault's attacks, they would respond with a ground offensive against American air bases in eastern China. Such offensives could only be stopped by a strengthened and aggressive Chinese ground army.

Furthermore, reallocating supplies to Chennault's air force at the expense of Stilwell's army restructuring program would forestall the very action

required to make China an aggressive partner against Japan. What was urgent, according to Stilwell and Marshall, was a continued effort to reform the Chinese army, to reestablish a land logistical route capable of vastly increasing the flow of supplies to China through northern Burma, and to force a resistant Chiang to take the steps necessary to achieve these objectives.

Chennault was officially subordinate to Stilwell and Marshall in the military hierarchy. His access to the President was remarkable for a tactical commander but was characteristic of Roosevelt's competitive administrative style. Journalist Joseph Alsop played a major role in assisting Chennault's efforts to capture the President's attention. In addition to being the President's cousin, he was a personal friend of Harry Hopkins. Alsop attained an officer's commission with the President's help and procured a position on Chennault's staff in China.¹⁶ He idolized his heroic boss and served as the general's personal propagandist in the American press. He persistently lobbied both Roosevelt and Hopkins in support of Chennault's quests for independent command (a move designed to remove Chennault from the control of Stilwell's staff) and for adoption of the air offensive plan.

In a series of personal letters remarkable for both their fawning admiration of Chennault and their vitriolic attacks on Stilwell, Alsop pressed Chennault's case directly on the White House—sometimes on Hopkins, often on the President himself. He persuaded Chennault to write also. The President welcomed the letters and even solicited further reports. This practice spanned two years starting in the fall of 1942. Letters were accompanied by precise instructions for the President's personal secretary, Grace Tully, whom Alsop knew well. "Dear Gracie," wrote Alsop in one such letter which touted Chennault's plan and expressed contempt for Stilwell's lack of "political astuteness."

General [Chennault] feels that he should make another report to the President, which I therefore enclose. . . . I hope that you can again arrange to have this report, like its predecessors, treated as being for the President's eyes alone. For I judge it will infuriate without educating the rather ineducable War Department, and while every word the General says is true, the purpose of the letter is merely to bring the President personally up to date. . . . The President has asked [Chennault] to report direct from time to time.¹⁷

Hopkins, persuaded by Alsop, Chennault, and T. V. Soong (the Generalissimo's brother-in-law, who befriended Hopkins while representing China on lend-lease matters), became the chief White House proponent of the Chennault plan. His differences with Marshall over China policy became so severe that they no longer spoke to each other about the subject.¹⁸

The President was receptive to these exhortations on behalf of Chennault's plan despite the strong misgivings of Marshall, Stimson, and Arnold.¹⁹ Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek—dramatically warning of a possible collapse in Chinese morale—was pressing strongly for it and asked the President to call

Chennault back to Washington to discuss his ideas in person. This attempt to maneuver over Stilwell's head infuriated Marshall, who, in order to insure that Stilwell's arguments were also consulted, warned Roosevelt that a dangerous precedent could be set if an ally was allowed to interfere with the American chain of command.²⁰ Roosevelt therefore agreed to hear both men and, in April 1943—just prior to the Churchill-Roosevelt conference in Washington on Allied strategy (Trident)—summoned Stilwell and Chennault to the White House.

Marshall and Stimson instructed Stilwell to inform the President of the arguments against the Chennault plan. Stilwell prepared a memorandum outlining his position, but his attitude and manner of presentation were unimpressive and inarticulate—to Marshall's chagrin—and prompted the President to ask if he was ill.²¹ Chennault, on the other hand, displayed a forceful and impressive confidence in outlining his own plan.

Roosevelt, under pressure from Chiang and on the brink of the Trident Conference with the British, overruled the War Department and sided with Chennault. Several factors influenced this decision. Among these were the realization that Churchill opposed a major ground effort in Burma and that preparing to open a second front in Europe precluded adequately supporting large-scale ground operations in the CBI theater for the time being. Furthermore, Chennault promised an easier and immediately doable alternative that would appease pro-China critics who complained about the low priority given the China theater.

While the War Department was entering the realm of foreign policy in recommending pressure tactics against the Chinese government, it was arguing primarily from a military and strategic viewpoint. However, Barbara Tuchman has pointed out that Roosevelt continued to resist Stilwell's quid-pro-quo policy largely because he felt a political obligation to support Chiang unconditionally:

What motivated the President in his decision was policy not strategy. He was not concerned with making some historic choice between air and ground action but with pursuing his concept of China's status as a great power. Support for Chennault was what China's Chief Executive wanted, whereas Stilwell's insistence on reforming the Chinese Army detracted from the great power image Roosevelt did not want to insist on mobilizing China's forces against the will of China's leader.²²

Roosevelt's support for the Chennault plan continued throughout most of 1943, clearly angering Marshall.²³ To the Chief of Staff, Chennault's plan was "nonsense."²⁴ Stilwell confided his own views in a private memoir:

Continued concessions have confirmed Chiang in the opinion that all he needs to do is yell and we'll cave in. As we are doing. . . . But what's the use when the World's Greatest Strategist is against you [a clear dig at Roosevelt].²⁵

The President's promises to Chiang for support of Chennault's air offensive were given so freely that they could not be kept—which led to further protests from the Chinese leader. The War Department, strapped with high-priority commitments elsewhere, fell short of the promised aircraft and 10,000 tons of supplies a month over the Hump.

Through his informal channels of communication, the President continued to be bombarded by messages from Chennault, Alsop, and T. V. Soong seeking more aid for the air war and complaining that the War Department was not delivering promised equipment. They accused Stilwell of failing to support the President's decision and of seriously damaging Sino-American relations with his thinly disguised contempt for Chiang. Stilwell's critics continued to press for his relief. One of Alsop's letters to Hopkins, particularly vicious in its attacks on both Stilwell and the War Department, suggested continuing *direct communications between Chennault and the White House* "since I doubt if anything like the true picture can reach you, as they say, through channels."²⁶

Hopkins, no doubt recognizing that knowledge of Alsop's end run would further infuriate Marshall, gave it to Roosevelt with the following memorandum attached:

Dear Mr. President: Here is a very interesting private letter from Joe Alsop to me. I hope you will not give it to anybody, because it would make an ungodly amount of trouble for Joe, to say nothing of Chennault.²⁷

Marshall continued to stress the need to open the Burma Road to increase the flow of materiel into China and to end the Hump route's drain on transport aircraft needed in Europe. He argued that Stilwell was indispensable for this task and that Stilwell's quid-pro-quo approach was the only way to induce Chiang Kai-shek to make needed reforms and employ his forces aggressively.

A Turn to Stilwell—And More Frustration

After the Cairo Conference in November-December 1943, the President started gradually to adopt Stilwell's hard-line approach. A series of piecemeal decisions revealed the shift in Roosevelt's attitude. Several reasons may have contributed to this shift. First, Chiang Kai-shek's continued refusals to take the offensive, his exorbitant demands, and his hinted threats of a separate peace may have finally frustrated the President. Second, Stalin's promise at Teheran to enter the war with Japan after Germany's defeat and the successes of MacArthur's Pacific island-hopping campaign vastly decreased the military importance of China for defeating Japan. Third, the Chennault air offensive was falling far short of promised results, while Stilwell's campaign in Burma appeared to be achieving tactical success.²⁸

Specific indications of the shift toward pressure tactics included a refusal to provide a billion-dollar loan demanded by Chiang in January 1944 or to accept a vastly inflated exchange rate in financing American military activities; a decision to press Chiang to support Stilwell's offensive in Burma; and a decision, ultimately abandoned, to press Chiang in the summer of 1944 to appoint Stilwell as commander of the Chinese army.²⁹

It was Chiang's refusal to take the offensive at a critical point in Stilwell's Burma campaign that gave Marshall ammunition to urge the President toward a harder line. In a harshly worded radio message to Chiang on 3 April, Roosevelt used the same condescending tone for which he had previously criticized Stilwell:

It is inconceivable to me that your Yoke forces with their American equipment would be unable to advance against the Japanese 56th Division in its present depleted strength. . . . If they are not to be used in the common cause our most strenuous and extensive efforts to fly in equipment and furnish instructional personnel have not been justified. . . . I do hope you can act.³⁰

Shortly thereafter, Marshall instructed Stilwell to inform the Chinese government that if the designated forces did not take the offensive, lend-lease supplies to them would be cut off.³¹ Whether this first use of the quid-pro-quo policy had the President's prior blessing is not clear, but Marshall never received instructions to rescind the order. On 14 April the Chinese forces were ordered by Chungking to advance.

No doubt the President was uncomfortable with using outright pressure tactics. Hopkins continued criticizing both Stilwell and the quid-pro-quo policy, and letters came pouring in from Chennault and Alsop questioning the wisdom of the Burma campaign, promoting Chennault's plan, and attacking Stilwell and the War Department for a lack of vision, tact, and political judgment.³² "The Generalissimo will need American encouragement and support," Chennault wrote the President. "Close coordination of Chinese and American activities . . . can hardly be obtained in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and contempt."³³ Roosevelt vacillated, again adopting a softer line that replaced a tone of frustration with one of approbation. In June he wrote Chiang that "China's achievements in the face of tremendous obstacles inspire faith and hope in free men of all countries."³⁴

Roosevelt sent Vice President Henry Wallace to Chungking in June. Wallace spent eight days in China, meeting with Chiang, Chennault, and Alsop but not with Stilwell, who was preoccupied with the fighting in Burma. Chiang requested through Wallace that a personal emissary from the President be assigned, through whom he could gain direct access to Roosevelt without having to go through the State or War Departments. Chiang also expressed his "lack of confidence" in Stilwell's judgment.³⁵ Wallace promptly recommended

Stilwell's relief in a telegram to the President which the ubiquitous Alsop claimed to have composed.³⁶

But Marshall's influence was very strong by this time. Operation Overlord and the successes that followed in Europe added to his already considerable prestige and to the President's confidence in his judgment. He stood steadfastly by Stilwell. Moreover, while the softer, generous, cajoling approaches toward Chiang advocated by Currie and Chennault had appealed more to the President's manner, they did not seem to curb Chiang's threats and demands. On the other hand, the hard-line approach, in the few instances in which it had been used, at least seemed to get immediate results.

Furthermore, the Chennault air offensive was not only falling way short of its promised destruction of Japanese shipping and supply lines, but it had indeed provoked the massive Japanese offensive against American air bases that Marshall had predicted in 1943. The Chinese armies, which Chiang had claimed could protect the bases, seemed to disintegrate under Japanese pressure and were denied reinforcements and supplies by Chiang (who did not want to risk losing more).³⁷ This Japanese offensive threatened the China-based B-29 bases which were then critical to the Very Long Range Bomber project against Japan.

Marshall proposed forcing Chiang to place Stilwell in unfettered command of the Chinese army. This, as everyone knew, was precisely the opposite of what Chiang wanted—which was to be rid of the general who was the principal advocate for exacting a quid pro quo. To strengthen his case, Marshall secured the concurrence of all the Joint Chiefs and brusquely summarized for the President the ill effects of having pursued the Chennault plan. Supporting Chennault, he said, had been a "poorly directed and possibly completely wasteful procedure."³⁸

Marshall also drafted a stiff cable to Chiang, suggesting that Stilwell be placed in command and implying that Chiang was not competent to command himself. The frustrated President signed it without revision. The blunt message, sent on 6 July, clearly marks a complete reversal of Roosevelt's earlier tactics:

I think I am fully aware of your feelings regarding General Stilwell, nevertheless . . . I know of no other man who has the ability, the force and the determination to offset the disaster which now threatens China . . . I recommend for your most urgent consideration that you . . . charge him with full responsibility and authority for the coordination and direction of the operations required to stem the tide of the enemy's advance. . . . I assure you there is no intent on my part to dictate to you in matters concerning China; however, the future of all Asia is at stake . . . Please have in mind that it has clearly been demonstrated in Italy, in France, and in the Pacific that air power alone cannot stop a determined enemy.³⁹

This message—which Chiang did not answer—was followed by several months of highly strained relations between the United States and China. The tone of the message would have generated resentment from any national leader, and it produced a serious clash of political wills, for which President Roosevelt was apparently unprepared.

Chiang requested an intermediary, and, despite Marshall's disapproval, the President complied. General Patrick Hurley was dispatched as a special envoy "to promote efficient and harmonious relations between the Generalissimo and General Stilwell."⁴⁰ But when Chiang, in September, still had not appointed Stilwell to command and further threatened to pull his troops out of Burma—just when it was appearing that the Burma Road might soon be opened—the President again opted for the hard-line approach. The quick decision was made in the middle of a session involving Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the second Quebec Conference on 16 September. Marshall, joined by the other American military chiefs, came in and handed the President the text of a tough reply to the Generalissimo. Roosevelt signed the message then and there.

Stilwell, who gloated about the experience in his diary, happily delivered the President's message word for word to Chiang Kai-shek, despite Hurley's advice to soften it. The message warned Chiang:

I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action [T]he only thing you can now do . . . is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in our decision . . . to maintain and increase our aid to you. . . . It appears plainly evident to all of us here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.⁴¹

But the President evidently had not thought through the implications of his ultimatum. He had been frustrated by the results of following the soft-line approaches and had moved toward Stilwell's pressure tactics against his earlier instincts and the advice of Hopkins, Alsop, and Chennault. Now US-Chinese relations had deteriorated perhaps beyond repair. In the midst of the crisis, when Chiang refused the President's ultimatum and demanded Stilwell's relief, Roosevelt backed down and rejected a Marshall-drafted rejoinder to Chiang. The "Stilwell Option," like those that preceded it, was abandoned. Hurley had warned the President that "if you sustain Stilwell in this controversy you will lose Chiang Kai-shek and possibly you will lose China with him."⁴² Although the prospect of "losing China" in this way was unlikely, the President, having chosen to invest support in Chiang Kai-shek—to whom at the time no alternative leader or group of leaders was apparent—was not prepared to take the risk. While Marshall was inspecting the front in France in

early October 1944, the President decided to recall Stilwell. Marshall was so informed upon his return.

Drawing Lessons from the Tangle

The dynamics of decisionmaking about China policy from December 1941 to October 1944 provide a curious case for study. The President allowed ambiguous jurisdiction of authority, gathered information informally, solicited the views of lower-level officials, fostered a clash of wills among his key advisors, bypassed important officials and instrumental agencies such as the State Department, and kept himself in the position of final arbiter and court of appeals. Clearly this is an example of the competitive management style often attributed to Roosevelt.

But whereas this competitive process brought Roosevelt considerable success in the realm of domestic policy, wartime policy toward China was a shambles. The President's China policy was vacillating and unsure. Policy options advocated by various individuals were attempted piecemeal and each was subsequently abandoned. During 1941-1942, the President preferred the "Currie Option." For most of 1943, particularly after the Trident Conference, he preferred the "Chennault Option." After the Cairo Conference in late 1943, he showed an increasing tendency to follow Stilwell's quid-pro-quo approach, but he abandoned this too when Chiang called his bluff. While officially the objective of making China a great power remained in force, after Stilwell's recall Roosevelt maintained grave doubts as to China's prospects.⁴³ With the death of Roosevelt, the end of the war with Japan, and the increasing threat from Mao's forces, there would be new battles over China policy during the Truman Administration. They, too, would end in disaster.

Beyond its historical interest, one can draw from this story many conclusions about wartime decisionmaking. Some officers might react, as did Stilwell, with disgust over the infusion of "purely political" objectives and tactics into strategic and operational decisions. It has been argued forcefully that, had Stilwell's plan been pursued sooner and more consistently, the failure that followed President Roosevelt's vacillating policies might have been avoided.⁴⁴ Also, it is clear that Stilwell had a vastly greater understanding of China and its weaknesses than any of the presidential envoys (e.g. Currie, Wallace, Hurley) dispatched by Roosevelt. Therefore, one might pardon the reaction of some military professionals who would lay blame for failure in this case entirely at the feet of politicians whose constant meddling and failure to support the senior American field commander made his job extraordinarily difficult. There is more than a little justification for such a view.

But it is unrealistic to expect that military policy at this level could have been divorced from either short-term or long-term political objectives. Chiang would not have allowed that, even if Roosevelt had. Despite Stilwell's

Despite Stilwell's disdain for politics and politicians, he was up to his neck in high-level political battles requiring negotiation, compromise, and coalition-building.

disdain for politics and politicians (which is amply and bitterly expressed on many pages of his diary), he was up to his neck—and, eventually, over his head—in high-level political battles requiring negotiation, compromise, and coalition-building. He was ill-suited to this task, which ultimately caused his relief. Had he been more adept at operating in a political environment, perhaps he could have enjoyed more success in pursuing the military objectives he sought. Instead, he returned home as perhaps the most frustrated general on the winning side of the war.

It is indeed a reality of modern national security affairs that, like it or not, senior military officers operate in a political environment. Despite the views of some who cling righteously and naively to the idea that “warrior leaders” ought not to sully their professionalism by descending into the political arena, a sophisticated awareness of political, social, economic, and diplomatic factors that affect and are affected by military policy is essential for today’s senior uniformed decisionmakers. Perhaps General Stilwell’s fascinating diary should be required reading at the war colleges.

NOTES

1. Excellent discussions of Roosevelt’s management style can be found in Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decision-making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980), pp. 148-51; and James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 351.

2. State Department Memorandum, 3 April 1945, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 (China)* (Washington: GPO, 1969), p. 82.

3. Edgar Snow, “Fragments from FDR,” *Monthly Review*, 8 (January 1957), 397.

4. This frustration is reflected in many of Stilwell’s dispatches to Marshall, as well as in diplomatic correspondence from China. See, for example, Memorandum, Cordell Hull to FDR, 2 December 1943, President’s Secretary’s File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/China 1943 folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.

5. Correspondence which reached the President from the regime in Chungking reflects this as a constant theme. For example, see President’s Secretary’s File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/China/“Lauchlin Currie Cables” folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.

6. The best illustration of the vital but bitter relationship between Stilwell and Chiang is found in Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45* (New York: MacMillan, 1971), passim.

7. Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), p. 339.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
9. Stilwell, quoted in Tuchman, p. 307.
10. Memorandum, FDR to Marshall, 15 September 1942, President's Secretary's File (Departmental Correspondence)/War Department/Marshall folder/Container #106, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
11. Memorandum, FDR to Currie, 12 September 1942, Official File 150/"China 1942" folder, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
12. Tuchman, p. 324.
13. Memorandum, FDR to Marshall, 3 October 1942, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/China folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
14. Memorandum, Marshall to FDR, 6 October 1942, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/China folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
15. Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Mission to China* (Washington, Department of the Army, 1953), p. 279.
16. Letter, Alsop to FDR, 6 April 1944, President's Secretary's File (Subject)/Alsop folder/Container #115, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
17. Letter, Chennault to FDR (with cover letter by Alsop), 27 June 1944, President's Secretary's File (Departmental Correspondence)/War Department/Chennault folder/Container #105, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
18. Tuchman, p. 370.
19. Arnold felt that Chennault and Chiang did not appreciate the difficulties of logistics, particularly in maintaining airfields and supplying fuel. H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper, 1949), pp. 407, 409, 413, 417-27.
20. Tuchman, p. 366.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 367.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 360-61.
23. Interview, Marshall with Romanus and Sunderland, 13 July 1949, in *Two Interviews with General Marshall*, unpublished document on file at the Office of the Chief of Military History.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Stilwell, pp. 204-06.
26. Letter, Alsop to Hopkins, 14 January 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
27. Memorandum, Hopkins to FDR, 7 February 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
28. Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China 1941-1950* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 109-10.
29. *Ibid.*
30. Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1956), p. 310.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 312-14.
32. See, e.g., letter from Chennault to FDR, 27 June 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Message, FDR to Chiang, 10 June 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
35. Tuchman, pp. 464-65.
36. Cable, Wallace to FDR, 28 June 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York. See also Tuchman, p. 465.
37. See Riley Sunderland, "The Secret Embargo," *Pacific Historical Review*, 29 (February 1960), pp. 75-80.
38. Tuchman, p. 469.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 470.
40. Letter, FDR to Hurley, 18 August 1944, President's Secretary's File (Subject)/Hurley, Patrick J. folder/Container #153, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
41. Tuchman, pp. 492-93.
42. Cable, Hurley to FDR, 13 October 1944, President's Secretary's File (Diplomatic Correspondence)/"China 1944" folder/Container #38, FDR Library, Hyde Park, New York.
43. Tsou, p. 86.
44. See Tsou, *passim*, and Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: FDR, His Lieutenants, and Their War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 509-78.

Military-Media Relations Come of Age

BARRY E. WILLEY

On 27 October 1983, two days after D-Day, the first group of journalists—a media pool to be precise—landed on the island of Grenada to cover what combat actions remained. These 15 journalists were understandably perturbed for having been excluded from the first two days of action. They were anxious to learn and report firsthand what was happening on that heretofore unremarked “isle of spice.”

No plans had been made to include the media in Operation Urgent Fury. When the decision was made at the highest levels of the US government to allow a pool from the nearly 400 journalists waiting on the island of Barbados to fly to Grenada, it fell to the Public Affairs Team of the 82d Airborne Division to coordinate support for the pool and arrange for as much access as possible within operational security constraints. As more journalists arrived and the area of operations gradually opened to all media, reporting of military operations on Grenada became widespread and, for the most part, accurate. Not all the action was over when the journalists arrived. The first group witnessed portions of a major Ranger airmobile assault on the Calivigny Barracks complex, including a massive artillery preparation of the objective. Another pool on 29 October drew sniper fire during a tour of the Frequent warehouse area, where stacks of arms and ammunition were being stored.¹

Much has happened since Operation Urgent Fury regarding media coverage of US military actions, and military-media relations have improved significantly in terms of cooperation and understanding. It has taken long months of work, planning, and interaction between the media and the military to achieve such improvement. Most significant in this evolution was the formation of the Sidle Panel following Grenada to review military-media relations and determine the feasibility of institutionalizing media participation in future training and contingency deployments of US forces. In response to the panel's recommendations, the military created the Department of Defense national media pool program. A pool has been deployed on eight occasions to

cover training deployments of US forces around the country and the world, including the March 1988 "show of force" to Honduras.

In July of 1987, after the tragic Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark* in the Persian Gulf and the decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers with the Stars and Stripes, the Department of Defense deployed the media pool to cover the use of US forces, which involved the escorting of the first reflagged Kuwaiti tankers through the Strait of Hormuz, into the Persian Gulf, all the way to Kuwait. Though the passage through Hormuz and into the Gulf was relatively uneventful, the 10-member media pool and their military escorts from the Department of Defense and US Central Command witnessed the ominous and widely reported mine strike near the end of the transit by the supertanker *Bridgeton* on the 24th of July.

The plan for that pool deployment, including elaborate ground rules, was established by the Pentagon and the US Central Command—the unified command responsible for US forces deployed in the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, and the surrounding region. The ground rules were understood and accepted by all pool members before embarking on any US Navy vessel. They included the need for a security review of all pool material at the source before release of news products to any interested media. The public affairs escorts would conduct the security reviews and expedite the dispatch of pool products (audio, video, print, still photos) from the ships by all feasible means. Two print reporters in that pool—Mark Thompson, Knight-Ridder Newspapers, and Tim Ahern, Associated Press—wrote accounts of their experiences in the *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December 1987) and the *Washington Journalism Review* (October 1987), respectively. They expressed concerns about delays in transmission of pool reports, censorship of pool products, and difficulties in getting pool products ashore in a timely manner, among others. In fact, all pool products were reviewed for security and changes were recommended, if warranted. Premature release of operational information puts US lives at risk. There was concern by military escorts about the propriety of a potentially embarrassing reference within a pool print report, but it had nothing to do with security and was left in the story. Every attempt was made to get pool products ashore quickly. In one case, as AP's Ahern

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mentions in his article, one of the US warships delayed its scheduled movement while waiting to rendezvous with a vessel sent to pick up media reportage.

The pool deployment was not devoid of problems, but despite the complaints by members of the pool and some of their editors and bureau chiefs in Washington, the pool deployment was a success. Ahern said, "As far as I'm concerned, the pool's chief test came Friday, after the *Bridgeton* hit the mine. The story I filed was the first word released at the Pentagon."² Knight-Ridder's Thompson commented: "First and foremost, [the pool] had been a success inasmuch as our audiences were better served for our having been there, rather than at our Washington desks, and for having covered the escort operations, albeit under unusual conditions."³

Because of continued interest in Gulf operations, the Pentagon and US Central Command activated a DOD "regional" media pool, which rotated media representatives every three to four weeks from a base in a gulf littoral country for rapid recall and access to US military operations in the region. This pool was smaller (five or six) due to the limited number and capacity of escort vessels. Primarily, it pulled correspondents from bureaus in the Gulf region. Its purpose was to continue covering transits of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers and any other significant events that might occur in the region involving US forces.

But was this type of pool really feasible for the long haul and was it capable of covering hostilities, should they occur? The answer is yes. During the nine months between the first embarkation in July 1987 to the dramatic US reprisals against Iranian oil platforms on 18 April 1988—47 transits and 28 media pool activations later—there was a markedly successful evolution. To better understand the media's role in the US-Iranian hostilities by that date, some background leading to that event is necessary.

Early on the morning of 14 April of last year, during what was planned to be a routine embarkation of the regional media pool (consisting of AP Middle East correspondent Richard Pyle, CNN correspondent Taylor Henry, camera crew husband-wife team Steve and Anne Cocklin, and UPI photographer Tom Salyer) to cover a transit of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, the pool boarded the *USS O'Brien* from the *USS Jack Williams*. The *O'Brien* was scheduled to escort the next northbound convoy, which would include, ironically, the supertanker *Bridgeton*.

While on the *O'Brien*, waiting to rendezvous with the Kuwaiti reflagged tankers, the pool received word by radio that the *USS Samuel B. Roberts* had struck a mine in waters of the central Persian Gulf. The pool and its escorts had visited that frigate just two weeks before, so the somber report of fires, flooding, and ten injured crewmen was hard to accept. In the short time the pool was aboard the "Sammie B.," it had become part of the ship's "family."

Based on the facts as then known, the pool's public affairs escorts drafted a statement concerning the *Samuel B. Roberts'* mine strike and

provided that to the media pool. Two hours later a message arrived from the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, with nearly identical information, thus validating the statement given the pool earlier. (The lesson here is that public affairs officers in the absence of official pronouncements should use available information—properly qualified!—to keep the media and the public apprised. Corrections, if indicated, can be issued later.)

The next 24-hour period was a whirlwind of logistical activity which saw the pool transferred from the *O'Brien* to the USS *Merrill* and then on to the USS *Wainwright*. The pool transfers were accomplished by a ship-based surveillance helicopter with room for only one or two extra passengers, necessitating the prioritization of personnel, baggage, and equipment. This plan ensured that the two pool photographers (still and video) were ready to go by another helicopter to the newly discovered mine danger area and photograph the recently laid mines and their subsequent destruction. The rapidity and efficiency with which pool members were transported to the scene of the action greatly impressed the media pool, inexperienced and veterans alike.

On 16 April, the pool observed and reported on the *Samuel B. Roberts* under tow by a contract tug and escorted by the *Wainwright* after the mine strike. Good still photos and video footage were obtained, but no interviews with crew from the *Roberts* were possible at that time. Transfer of media products was accomplished in an unprecedented link-up with an NBC helicopter based in the region which hovered over the *Wainwright's* deck, allowing same-day coverage in the United States via satellite. All concerned were impressed with the flow of information, access to fast-breaking news, and the support by the Navy. At this point in the operation, pool deactivation and return to shore appeared likely, but all members sensed that something else was in the offing.

By the morning of 17 April the pool had transferred back to the USS *Jack Williams* and the media escort officers received preliminary information about action to be taken by US forces as a measured response to the Iranian mines laid in international waters, one of which was struck by the *Roberts*. On the morning of the 17th, the pool was briefed in general terms by the Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22, also aboard the *Jack Williams*, on the forthcoming operation, dubbed "Operation Praying Mantis." The media's mission was to remain aboard the *Jack Williams* to cover the operation from the scene. Pool members and escorts then conducted a reconnaissance of the ship. Good camera angles were scouted and a preliminary setup was accomplished. Pool members were obviously psyched for the coming experience, and seemed to feel that this would be the ultimate test for the media pool. It was also viewed by some pool members as a recoupment for the missed opportunity in October 1987 when the media pool was not deployed for the naval shelling of the Rashadat oil platform.

Early on 18 April, D-Day, the pool was briefed "on background" with the understanding that an official announcement from Washington would be

forthcoming. Three surface action groups were formed, one each to destroy two Iranian oil platforms (which were being used to direct and coordinate Iranian military operations in the Gulf) and one to sink the Iranian frigate *Sabalan*. The pool was with the latter group—Surface Action Group D—aboard the *Jack Williams*. This group's mission was not revealed to the media initially, as it might not be executed and would therefore remain classified for possible future action. (The mission was later divulged by the Pentagon.)

H-hour had come and gone for the Sirri and Sassan platform operations. As reports came in on those attacks, the mission of Surface Action Group D, find and sink the *Sabalan*, appeared unlikely to occur. The pool accompanying was frustrated and felt left out of the action. As the pool waited, it took special note of the other action groups' activities. Of particular interest was the dramatic audio heard over bridge-to-bridge radio of the *Wainwright's* warning to an Iranian missile patrol boat interfering with the Sirri platform attack—"This is a warning. Stop and abandon ship. I intend to sink you." As information about the initial engagements of the platforms began to come in—first slowly, then in rapid succession—the "news" became almost overwhelming. The print and television correspondents were drafting their stories with moment-by-moment, real-time updates.

Meanwhile, Surface Action Group D had sailed into the Strait of Hormuz, with no contact or sighting of an Iranian warship to that point. As the group turned and headed back into the gulf, it received a report that the *Sabalan's* sister ship, the *Sahand*, was moving out of port and heading toward



Captain William M. Mathis, commander of the guided missile cruiser *USS Fox*, answers questions during an interview by pool reporters. The *Fox* was escorting the reflagged Kuwaiti supertankers *Gas Prince* and *Bridgeton* during the first transit in July 1987.

the group with obvious hostile intent. The Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, called the Commander, Destroyer Squadron 22, on the *Jack Williams* and passed on this elegantly simple order: "The *Sahand* is in your area. Take her." Action Group D maneuvered and awaited her arrival. US Navy A-6 Intruder aircraft from the USS *Enterprise* Battle Group in the Gulf of Oman, under the control of the *Jack Williams*, flew over the *Sahand* to reconnoiter, received fire, and returned it effectively with bombs and missiles.

The USS *Joseph Strauss*, a destroyer in Action Group D, also engaged the *Sahand* with a Harpoon surface-to-surface missile. The pool soon heard that the *Sahand* lay dead in the water; it would eventually sink. This missile firing was the first action that the media pool could observe, as the *Joseph Strauss* lay just ahead. Though almost 20 miles away and out of visual range of the *Sahand*, the pool could easily hear and feel primary and secondary explosions and shock waves from the stricken enemy vessel. The pool wanted to move in on the *Sahand* wreckage and get close-ups. That was not to be.

Instead, Action Group D had to respond to reports that the *Sabalan* was steaming just south of Larak Island in the Strait of Hormuz heading toward the group. The *Sabalan*, the group's original target at the outset of the operation, fired a missile at an A-6E aircraft, which missed but prompted the A-6E to engage it with laser-guided bombs. *Sabalan* was hit and heavily damaged.

While the ongoing actions were newsworthy events for the pool, they often did not provide good visual opportunities for the still photographer and television crew. This is an age of over-the-horizon naval engagements, and the pool got a taste of what it's like to cover high-tech combat involving long-range missiles, radar intercepts, and high-altitude aircraft sorties. The visual media representatives had to be content with what they could actually see from the decks of the *Jack Williams*.

About this time the first indications of some sort of incoming missiles were noted and passed to all on board the *Jack Williams*. The call of "Silkworm inbound" could be heard loud and clear several times over the next two hours. Iranian aircraft, including a four-engine C-130 cargo aircraft possibly directing the Silkworm strikes, reportedly flew near Action Group D. The ships responded quickly and effectively. Clearly evident to the media pool were the ships' defensive maneuverings, chaff-dispensing (designed to deflect incoming missiles), and surface-to-air missile engagements by the *Jack Williams* and the other ships in the group. (Of particular interest is that the initial ship's report indicated the missiles were Silkworms; the media accounts accurately reflected what the ship had reported. The Pentagon has since stated that there is no evidence that Silkworms were fired at the action group.)

The video and still cameras and crews, with military escort, maintained a position on the O-3 level, the very highest observation platform on the ship. Lieutenant Commander Mark Van Dyke, staff public affairs officer for the Commander, Joint Task Force Middle East, remained on the bridge

with the wire and TV correspondents. These locations proved to be optimal in view of the audio, visual, and command and control aspects of the operation that were readily observable. Also evident were the fear and confusion that can be expected in any hostile environment. But the crew and pool members took it in stride. All did their jobs coolly and professionally under intense pressure. Print stories were filed continuously from the *Jack Williams*, while television and still photographic products were prepared for transfer ashore at the earliest possible opportunity.

The eventful day of 18 April 1988 ended as the *Jack Williams* was directed to remain in the area to patrol, observe, and assist in the search for a Marine helicopter reported missing that evening with two crewmen aboard.³ These two were the only US casualties that day. Later, the Commander-in-Chief, US Central Command, upon discovery of the wreckage, stated that there was no indication the helicopter had been hit by hostile fire. Efforts soon began to move the pool to other vessels or back ashore, pending further hard-news opportunities. The pool's experience on the *Jack Williams* had been cordial, cooperative, and unforgettable, but it was time to move on. Pool members and escorts transferred to the USS *Lynde McCormick* on the evening of 21 April. Here was an excellent opportunity to get a new perspective on other activities of 18 April, as the *Lynde McCormick* had participated in the attack on the Sassan platform. Several more stories and video tapes resulted from this short but valuable visit.

Finally ashore the evening of 22 April, pool members rested and reflected on the previous 11 days—the longest media pool deployment since its formation. Pool accomplishments during this activation included over 2000 miles traveled, ten ships embarked, six helicopter transfers, four small-boat transfers, 14 print reports, six television scripts filed, 600 minutes of videotape, 18 rolls of still film, and three ship-to-shore transfers of pool material. Pool members described the experience as "awesome." This deployment clearly demonstrated the essential value of the pool and the military's ability to coordinate challenging pool logistical requirements without significant impact upon operations or security.

A key to the success of this pool deployment was the continuing close interaction between the pool members and their military escorts. Answering questions in a timely manner and ensuring that each pool member was kept abreast of activities, even when new information was not available, helped considerably in assuring pool members that the military was looking out for their interests, both professionally and personally. Additionally, timely information and support from the public affairs staffs of the Joint Task Force Middle East, US Central Command, and the Department of Defense were invaluable.

If there was any chronic problem encountered during the deployment of the pool, it was getting print reports and photographic products—video and

still—off the ship in a timely manner. As has been mentioned, video and still products were flown off by civilian news helicopters for further transfer via satellite or mail to all interested media. The helicopter linkup was a practice that had not been authorized to this point, but soon became an approved and accepted means of transfer once it was successfully tried. Operational requirements precluded quick transfer of products immediately following the 18 April action, but that was understood and accepted by all media pool members. The soonest a video and still product transfer could be made was on 20 April, again by news helicopter.

Print reports from the wire reporter were filed by the standard method used since the first pool deployment—immediate precedence military message to both the Pentagon and US Central Command, who in turn distributed it immediately to all media. Delays come from the fact that a ship's operational message traffic goes out by the same system. Thus when news breaks and stories are filed, generally operational messages are also going out and take priority. Again, when all was said and done, the pool members understood and accepted the system. The command/control vessel *Jack Williams*, even with so much important operational message traffic to be sent, was willing to dedicate a word processor and operator solely to media pool print reports, shortening the waiting time for reports to be typed and coded into message format. The bottom line—print reports got off the ship as soon as operationally feasible.

The end result of this whole experience for the pool was wide and accurate reporting of events as they occurred. The fog of war is always present in hostile actions, and events tend to become clear only incrementally, as more information is received from different sources, but the pool was constantly updated and accurate follow-up stories resulted. As evidence of the close pool interaction with the ship, when the *Jack Williams*' skipper expressed concern that he was unable to communicate frankly with his crew over the intercom without risk of being quoted, the pool agreed that no one would report anything the CO said over the intercom and did not want reported. This is probably unprecedented in media-military relations, at least since World War II, but reflects the compromises that often occur in order to get the job done. That it happened is a credit to the professionals in the pool.

But what about future media involvement in ground operations with Army or Marine forces? Aren't those types of media deployments very different and more difficult to control than maritime operations, where a media pool can be held incommunicado aboard a ship, with their reportage virtually hostage to the ship's captain and his mission? Yes. Certainly there are different concerns in working with media pools in different scenarios. Those must be planned for and dealt with case by case. But even in Grenada, with only frantic last-minute planning to accommodate the media, accurate coverage resulted. Most significant, however, has been the deployment of national media pools on the eight occasions previously mentioned, allowing development, testing,

and refinement of procedures in supporting and controlling media pool coverage under a variety of circumstances with different types of forces.

We have now run the gamut—from a hasty, makeshift pool, organized to cover the latter part of the Grenada rescue operation; through training deployments and the activation of the DOD national media pool for the first transit of reflagged Kuwaiti tankers; to the first employment of the DOD media pool during hostile action by US forces, a thoroughly planned contingency that involved public affairs from the beginning as an integral part of the operation. Regional pool activities ceased in the Gulf in July of last year. In its place, a program of unilateral embarkations began to accommodate the many requests received from news organizations asking for the opportunity to send representatives to ships in the Persian Gulf. Of course, the Department of Defense and US Central Command retain the option of reactivating the pool, should that become necessary.

The military's planning, coordination, and execution of the media pool deployments to cover operations in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere have set the standard for future media pool operations. The evolution of pool deployments to cover both ground-based force deployments during training and contingency operations and sea-based deployments in the Persian Gulf involving all services has clearly addressed the Sidle Panel's statement of principle—"US news media [should] cover US military operations to the maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of US forces."¹

The procedure is not perfect. We can always improve. Few military plans ever work exactly as they are designed to work. They inevitably require modifications based on changing circumstances and the needs of the participants, and constant review. That is happening now at all levels within the military. Every media pool deployment in the Persian Gulf—35 in all—provided some new perspective on military-media relations. But the proof is in the execution. It has worked for routine deployments and for hostilities experienced thus far. The media pool has come of age and military-media relations are as good as they have been since World War II. There is no reason why they can't get even better.

NOTES

1. For excellent background on military-media relations, particularly those during the Grenada operation, see Peter Braestrup, "Background Paper," in *Battle Lines: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Military and the Media* (New York: Priority Press, 1985), pp. 19-160.

2. Tim Ahern, "White Smoke in the Persian Gulf," *Washington Journalism Review*, 9 (October 1987), 18.

3. Mark Thompson, "With the Press Pool in the Persian Gulf," *Columbia Journalism Review* (November/December 1987), p. 46.

4. For an interesting perspective on the events surrounding 18 April 1988 by pool member Richard Pyle of the Associated Press, see his "Covering a Mini-War: Sometimes the Pool Works," *Washington Journalism Review*, 10 (July/August 1988), 14-17.

5. *Battle Lines*, p. 165.

The Loose Marble — and the Origins of Operational Art

JAMES J. SCHNEIDER

Sometimes the simplest and most obvious metaphors give rise to some of the most penetrating insights, and often the most commonplace analogies in our everyday experience drive home to us the depths of our ignorance. A student once remarked that there was a “loose marble” rattling around in the doctrinal box that contains our knowledge of operational art.¹ The sense that student sought to convey was that at the core of our professional knowledge, our doctrine, there was something that no longer fit or belonged. As it turns out, this “loose marble” is the hard residue of the Napoleonic heritage of our classical style of military art. It is a conceptual vestige that in some ways is irrelevant and tends to cloud the true nature of modern operational art.

When we teach and write about operational art, we are essentially providing an interpretation that bears the encrustation of all of our classical military “prejudices and enthusiasms.”² Particularly, we are attempting to explain modern operational art in terms of its antecedent, classical military strategy. These two styles of military art—operational art and classical strategy—are qualitatively different and distinct in fundamental ways. To try to explain one in terms of the other is like trying to explain the “appleness” of an orange, or the “inchness” of an ounce. Unless we understand as a profession the distinction between classical military strategy—particularly its terminal Napoleonic variety—and operational art, “loose marbles,” like the Napoleonic concept of the center of gravity, will continue to rattle down our doctrinal corridors. Failing this, we will lose much of the richness and value that writers like Clausewitz, *properly reinterpreted*, have to offer, as well as obscure the essence of operational art.

The purpose of this paper, then, is to determine those unique and essential characteristics of operational art that distinguish it from classical military strategy and to establish roughly that point in history—the American

Civil War—when the sum of these operational characteristics coalesced to give rise to this qualitatively distinct style of military art.

The Strategy of a Single Point

Napoleon stands Janus-like on a high summit in military history. Faced to the rear, Napoleon gazes back across 2000 years of warfare to predecessors who had all believed that the crowning achievement of a successful campaign was the decisive battle of annihilation. Faced to the front, Napoleon's vision of the employment of several corps in distributed maneuver anticipates a revolution in warfare that ultimately would lead to operational art. In the final analysis, however, Napoleon must be viewed as the last great practitioner of a style of warfare that would become virtually outmoded within a generation of his death. This style of warfare has been aptly termed the "strategy of a single point."

In 1937 the Soviet military theorist G. S. Isserson revised his historical overview of the evolution of operational art. He characterized the style of warfare practiced throughout history to the middle of the 19th century as the "strategy of a single point."³ Isserson's insight is still important because it establishes the baseline characteristic of warfare prior to its evolution to the operational form. From this baseline we can better see operational art in its historically evolving and contrasting style.

For over 2000 years armies had maneuvered in single dense masses. These densely packed armies presented very little linear extension or depth.⁴ When the opposing forces collided in battle, the area of the battlefield—seldom greater than a few square miles—resembled a mere "point" relative to the size of the theater of operations. It was this characteristic of warfare that led to Isserson's descriptive terminology. This style of warfare varied little throughout its long history. In the first place the art of maneuver was rather prosaic. With only one force to maneuver, it was virtually impossible to develop the complex combinations of maneuver characteristic of modern operational art. In the second place the compression of forces in space and time on a concentrated battlefield meant that the outcome had a more profound and immediate effect. The fate of empires was often decided in an afternoon. The third characteristic of the concentrated style of warfare was that battles

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were incredibly lethal. It was the emphasis upon mass and concentration that particularly characterized the core of this style of warfare.

In particular the singular quality of mass had a special influence on such writers as Carl von Clausewitz when he wrote his interpretation of Napoleon's style of war. Clausewitz observed that there was an inherent tension between distributing forces throughout a theater of operations and concentrating them. He wrote that in war "basically, there are two conflicting interests: one, *possession of the country*, tends to disperse the fighting forces; the other, *a stroke at the center of gravity of the enemy's forces*, tends, in some degree, to keep them concentrated." As we have noted, this latter consideration had predominated in the thinking of most commanders throughout history. If a defender chose to disperse, so much the better for the attacker. The attacker would concentrate since "the larger the force with which the blow is struck, the surer its effect will be." It was this aspect of warfare that led Clausewitz to develop his analogy of the center of gravity: "A center of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the center of gravity."⁵ The other great interpreter of Napoleon's style of war, Antoine-Henri Jomini, had championed concentration as the "fundamental principle of war."⁶

By 1815 it was apparent that the Napoleonic method of achieving concentration prior to the decisive battle had become the accepted military standard of conducting a campaign by virtually all major European armies. Eventually the Napoleonic paradigm would dominate much of Western military thinking down to the opening days of World War I. Yet the seed of operational art was already contained within the Napoleonic style of warfare. This seed was the corps system.

The Lateral Distribution of Forces

The hallmark of operational art is the integration of temporally and spatially distributed operations into one coherent whole. Before the evolution of operational art, movement of field forces in single dense masses obviated coordinating the operations of other forces. The undistributed, pre-operational army had only to integrate actions with itself. At the same time the decisive battle of annihilation was the culmination of all activity in the theater of operations. All planning and execution ended with the decisive battle. The idea of simultaneous and successive operations was therefore alien to the Napoleonic style of warfare and to its predecessors. These two particular characteristics—simultaneous and successive operations—are in fact the heart of operational art. The first characteristic was the lateral distribution of forces across a generally continuous front in the theater of operations. This led to the need to *synchronize* the simultaneous but distributed actions of forces across the

breadth of a theater. The second characteristic of operational art, evolving virtually concurrently with the first one, was the deepening of the theater of operations. This led to the conduct of *successive* operations through the depth of the entire theater of operations. Thus, the expansion of the concentrated forces in a theater, in length and in depth, meant that the campaign could no longer be decided by one decisive action. Because of the tremendous burden placed upon staff planning, resources, and logistics, for the first time campaigns had to be conducted in discrete "chunks" of activity called *operations*. It fell to the post-Napoleonic commander to exercise a new style of military art that would enable him to integrate these operations, separated in space and time, into one coherent whole. Thus operational art and the operational campaign were born.

Unfortunately for our discussion, this whole evolutionary process did not proceed according to some form of strict apostolic succession. We can say, however, that the beginning of the end of the classical style of warfare started with the development of the division system. This formation provided the command and control mechanism for the early lateral distribution of forces in the theater of operations.

Although anticipated by Marshal of France Maurice de Saxe, the divisional system was formally established by Marshal Victor-Francois de Broglie in 1760. In that year the Marshal issued his famous campaign "Instruction for the Army of the King." The divisional system was developed to counter the battlefield agility of the Prussian army by speeding up the French army's tactical deployment. Robert Quimby put the point nicely in noting that the divisional "system grew out of the . . . great difficulty in handling unitary [concentrated] armies of the size which was usual by [mid-18th century]." Previous to Broglie's "Instruction," most armies marched in one or two dense columns. Arriving upon the field of battle the armies then had to deploy laterally into line of battle from line of march. Superior Prussian tactical drill gave them the advantage in rate of deployment. The French sought to negate this advantage by establishing their order of march in six pre-deployment packages or *divisions*. Since these divisions marched laterally dispersed from each other, they arrived on the battlefield virtually deployed in line of battle. The division system also ensured that orderly command and control was maintained during the march and during divisional deployment.

Another contributor to the evolution of the divisional system was General Pierre de Bourcet. Bourcet's legacy, dating from the 1780s, was twofold. First, he developed a rigorous doctrine for the employment of divisions. Second, and perhaps most important, he was the first to develop a formal structure to control divisions. This was Bourcet's model of the general staff. Often regarded as the father of the general staff, Bourcet was one of the first to recognize that the lateral distribution of troops in theater would put a great burden on an army's staff.

In 1764, while director of the staff school at Grenoble, Bourcet began writing his *Principles of Mountain Warfare*. Although this work was not formally published until 1788, the document was regarded as a confidential student text and circulated among officers of the French army. The title is misleading since the book dealt with more than merely mountain warfare, but the problem that confronted Bourcet initially concerned the control of an army in mountainous terrain. Clearly an army in such terrain would have to advance in columns laterally distributed across several routes. Where Broglie had used the divisions to solve a tactical problem, Bourcet used that formation to resolve the terrain issue.⁸

Toward the end of the 18th century, an interesting but ultimately abortive glimmering of operational art was seen in an attempt to fashion a permanent system of laterally distributed forces. Known as the cordon system, the early generals of the French Revolution used the divisional unit to distribute forces across the expanse of their frontiers. The system ultimately broke down into a series of uncoordinated division actions because no proper command, control, and communications system existed to support such widely distributed forces. The great demolisher of this abortive foreshadowing of operational art was Napoleon himself. According to Quimby, Napoleon "saw the balance between dispersion and concentration, and understood how to bring all his forces to bear upon the decisive point. When this method was opposed to the cordon system, the results could not fail to be successful." The key to Napoleon's success against the cordon system was the division. Napoleon "took full advantage of the divisional organization to maneuver extensively and prepare a surprise, *but the divisions were not allowed to act independently upon their own initiative and spread out over a wide area*, for although they were given room enough at first to make their evolutions easily, they were directed by a single will which *converged them upon a single point*" (emphasis added).⁹ Thus while Napoleon may have indeed created a revolution in warfare by overthrowing the cordon system, it is clear that his achievement was still within the broad context of the classical paradigm of war: the "strategy of a single point."

During his reform of the French army from 1802 to 1804, Napoleon permanently established the corps system. Some theorists, including B. H. Liddell Hart, have misinterpreted the significance of this innovation.¹⁰ The corps system was simply the next logical step in the evolution of the division. The employment of the corps was still subordinated to the aim of achieving convergent concentration at a decisive point more rapidly than the opponent. This is evident from Napoleon's conduct of the battle. Napoleon's watchword always had been: march dispersed, fight united. There was still a major transitional pause once the corps had concentrated for battle. The corps provided the means not only to control the army during the march, but also to array the army immediately before battle. The corps were never intended for use as

independent "chess pieces." Battles like Jena-Auerstadt, where Davout's corps fought an independent action, were rare. Once the battle plan had been determined, the corps were primarily used to control the engagements of the massed infantry, artillery, and cavalry formations.

By 1815 the Napoleonic variant of the classical paradigm of military art was firmly established throughout Europe. Forty-six years later the dead hand of Napoleon would guide the initial clash of Federal and Confederate armies on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. It was during the American Civil War that the first seeds of operational art were sown and took root.

The American Experiment in Operational Art

The American Civil War marks a great conjunction in time between two fundamental styles of military art, one old and one new. Here we begin to see at least the vaguest glimpse of those characteristics that would eventually define operational art in its uniquely distinct form.

Strictly speaking it would, of course, be anachronistic to apply the term "operational art" to the style of warfare conducted by certain commanders during the Civil War. The evidence strongly suggests, however, that from a functional standpoint, the style of military art practiced was different in both kind and degree from the classical style. This quasi-operational art can be clearly distinguished from the earlier style by several chief discriminating characteristics. These characteristics closely parallel those of modern operational art. Briefly the emergent characteristics are:

- The employment of several independent field armies distributed in the same theater of operations;
 - The employment of quasi-army group headquarters to control them;
 - A logistical structure to support distributed operations;
 - The integrated design of a distributed campaign plan;
 - The conduct of distributed operations;
 - The strategic employment of cavalry;
 - The deep strike;
 - The conduct of joint operations;
 - The execution of distributed free maneuver;
 - The continuous front;
 - The distributed battlefield;
 - The exercise of field command by officers of "operational" vision.
- Let us discuss each in turn.

Field Armies. Today the field army (or the forward-deployed corps) is the primary instrument of operational execution. The first key factor that contributed to the development of an embryonic form of operational art during the American Civil War was the employment of field armies permanently distributed throughout the theater of operations. Although Napoleon had used

field armies during his Russian campaign of 1812, these were temporary formations thrown together to control the great number of troops scattered throughout the vast expanses of Russia. The initial deployment of Confederate and Federal field forces into departments ensured, quite by chance, that armies would be distributed across the theaters. At the beginning of the Civil War there were as many as 53 administrative territorial departments distributed around the country.¹¹ Many of these departments fielded their own army. Command of the field army devolved upon the department commander, who, under the Federal system, was responsible to Washington. The employment of these forces in a concentrated fashion was thus made difficult by an unwillingness or inability to develop a single unifying campaign plan and by the absence of a single field command headquarters to integrate the separate army operations and link them with the General in Chief in Washington.

Army Groups. The disunity discussed above was overcome in a radical new way by the employment of army groups, a second characteristic of operational art. Today a chief element of campaign design and execution is the army group. This formation has its origins in the American Civil War. The Confederates were the first to recognize that without a superior integrating headquarters to control subordinate army operations, the same defect inherent in the cordon system would wreck any hope of coordinating distributed operations. On 24 November 1862 a territorial division was established under Joseph E. Johnston to coordinate the operations of Braxton Bragg's Army of Tennessee, E. Kirby Smith's Army of Kentucky, and John C. Pemberton's Army of Mississippi.¹² Recognizing the same problem, the Federal army on 16 October 1863 promulgated General Order 337 creating the Military Division of the Mississippi. This quasi-army group was placed under the command of Ulysses S. Grant and embraced the Army of the Tennessee under William T. Sherman, the Army of the Cumberland under George H. Thomas, and, later, the Army of the Ohio under John M. Schofield.

Distributed Logistics. A third factor contributing to an experimental development of operational art during the Civil War was a new style of logistics. During the first year of the war it was evident that the methods of the Napoleonic period could no longer be applied successfully to American conditions.¹³ During Napoleon's time scavenging was still extensively supplemented by a system of magazines and depots.¹⁴ The use of the magazine system served Napoleon's army as a logistical "slingshot." During the Civil War there were no neutral or friendly nations accessible in which to prestock military stores before the start of a campaign. Confederate and Federal armies had to carry their stores with them on pack animals and wagons. This of course greatly retarded the mobility of the field army. More significant from an operational standpoint was the fact that logistics could no longer sustain dense concentrations of troops. This reinforced the trend toward the distribution of field armies in a theater. By 1863 the Federal army was earnestly seeking a

solution to this problem. The solution was provided by the French colonial school of warfare.

In 1840 the French, particularly Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, recognized that because the Arab insurgents in North Africa had a tremendous mobility advantage over the French colonial forces, the classic style of warfare would not be effective there. To increase the mobility of his forces, Bugeaud created "flying columns" (highly mobile independent detachments) by greatly lightening the logistical structure of his forces.¹⁵ Around 1860 a study of Bugeaud's logistical methods was written by Alexis Godillot. On 2 January 1862 the Federal army's Quartermaster General, Montgomery Meigs, ordered that a translation of Godillot's pamphlet be distributed throughout the army. By 1864 Bugeaud's method of flying columns formed the core of Federal army logistical planning. In 1864, the success of this new logistical doctrine over the old classical system was demonstrated decisively in Grant's invasions of the South, perhaps the first operational campaign in military history.

The Distributed Campaign. The fourth characteristic of operational art is the design and execution of a distributed campaign. In this regard design and execution of Grant's plan of campaign for 1864 is crucial in demonstrating a brief manifestation of operational art during the Civil War period. If one were to hazard a precise date as to the birth of operational art, it would have to be 4 April 1864. On that date, in a letter to Sherman, Grant set forth a campaign design that was "to work all parts of the [entire Federal] army together, and . . . toward a common center." At a stroke Grant had exposed and rectified the main defect of the cordon system. Grant would unite all military activities east of the Mississippi into an integrated chain of operations. The campaign consisted of two major operations. In the west Sherman's quasi-army group would strike along a main axis with three armies toward the great railroad network at Atlanta. At the same time he was to fix Johnston's army, "break it up, and get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as [possible], inflicting all the damage [Sherman could] against their resources." Sherman's maneuver was ultimately aimed at Lee's rear area. Nathaniel P. Banks was to conduct a supporting operation from Mobile to Atlanta. For his part Grant would assume the role of an ad hoc army group commander in the east. Grant's quasi-army group would operate on a main axis directed toward Richmond, with its object to fix and destroy Lee's army. Because of the greater distribution of Grant's forces, the attack on Richmond and Lee's army would, in its turn, consist of three separate but linked army operations. Franz Sigel's Army of West Virginia was to advance south through the Shenandoah Valley and seize Lynchburg, thus cutting the Petersburg-Lynchburg railroad. George A. Meade's Army of the Potomac would advance south and try to fix Lee's army and bring it to battle. Benjamin F. Butler's Army of the James would advance northwest along the James River and seize Richmond by the back door. On 10 April, Sherman wrote Grant with his own concept of operations for the advance on Atlanta. In

his opening lines Sherman observed: "That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common center, looks like enlightened war."¹⁶

Distributed Operations. Within this one campaign we see a glimmer of many of the other elements that characterize modern operational art. One of these characteristics concerns a delicate tension between concentration and linear distribution of forces to prevent envelopment. The classical style of warfare was typically characterized by the concentration of forces immediately before battle. With the employment of distributed field armies, premature concentration meant envelopment and annihilation. The elder Moltke demonstrated this in dramatic fashion against the Austrians at the battle of Sadowa in 1866. During the 1864 campaign both Johnston and Lee chose to maintain a lateral deployment rather than concentrate and risk envelopment.

We have already seen how the cordon system, coupled with lateral distribution to prevent envelopment, had foretold of a requirement to integrate a series of simultaneous distributed operations. This characteristic of laterally distributed operations was complemented by the conduct of operations distributed in depth as well. The refusal to concentrate and risk envelopment meant that the defender could always withdraw his forces to a subsequent position. Because his forces were laterally distributed, he could, moreover, withdraw rapidly to the rear along multiple axes, while the attacker had to redeploy his forces and pursue the defender. The problem thus forced upon the attacker was twofold: he had now to plan for operations distributed in length as well as in depth, and he had to achieve "operational" containment. Fundamentally a campaign consisting of a series of distributed operations led to a decline in the strategy of annihilation and a rise in the strategy of exhaustion. The conduct of distributed operations thus comprises the fifth characteristic of operational art.

Strategic Cavalry. A sixth characteristic of modern operational art is the employment of deep pursuit and exploitation forces to pave the way for succeeding operations. Before the Civil War cavalry had been used strictly in tactical formations, often in a pursuit role. In the American experience, cavalry was employed for the first time beyond the battlefield in a quasi-operational role to support the actions of the main army. Perhaps the most successful employment of cavalry in the role of operational containment was the use of Philip Sheridan's cavalry corps to seal Lee's retreat at Appomattox. Cavalry was also used in independent deep-strike operations. The Confederate cavalry under J. E. B. Stuart developed deep-strike techniques that were imitated and later refined by Federal cavalry commanders. Typically these "strategic raids," as the contemporary authors called them, were directed at deep objectives such as lines of communications and bases of operations.¹⁷ The evolution of the deep strike during the Civil War culminated in the famous coup by James H. Wilson. To divert attention from his invasion of South Carolina, Sherman launched a cavalry corps under Wilson against Confederate forces

in Alabama and Georgia. The corps consisted of 13,480 troops organized in three cavalry divisions and a mounted infantry brigade. In less than two months Wilson's troopers had driven 525 miles into the heartland of the enemy. Wilson's strike would stand as the largest single cavalry operation until well into World War I.¹⁸

The Deep Strike. The deep strike was a technique not necessarily limited to cavalry. Today the deep strike constitutes a seventh characteristic of operational art. Sherman's so-called "march through Georgia" was a deep strike conducted primarily with infantry. In November 1864 after Hood cut Sherman's lines of communications to Chattanooga, Sherman made the bold decision to abandon his lines and drive on to Savannah. Here Sherman established a new base of operations and continued his drive north into South Carolina. Sherman accomplished his deep operation with significant help from the Federal navy.

The Joint Operation. The union of two or more armed services in a joint operation comprises an eighth element of operational art. In this instance the intervention of the Federal navy was unique in that the fleet formed a supporting link between two land operations: Sherman's strike from Georgia and his subsequent operation into South Carolina. Grant's successive operations around Lee's right flank also had the support of the Federal fleet.¹⁹

Distributed Maneuver. Distributed free maneuver is the ninth characteristic of modern operational art.²⁰ During the Civil War it was a logical consequence of the great distribution of forces in such a large theater of operations. Distributed maneuver meant that maneuver could be sought as an end in itself. It was no longer necessary to crown maneuver with a battle of annihilation as in the Napoleonic period. Forces could maneuver opponents out of position through the depths of a theater of operations just as Sherman did against Johnston's Army of Tennessee. The danger of distributed maneuver is that freedom of action can be lost if the maneuver is not rapid enough to lead to decisive results. Typically the failure of distributed maneuver leads to battles of attrition. Meade's failed maneuvers against Lee led to the grinding attritional battles in the Wilderness, at Cold Harbor, and at Petersburg. In the summer of 1914 unsuccessful distributed maneuvers to gain the open flank at the English Channel led to a similar tactical clinch.

The Continuous Front. In socioeconomic terms, perhaps the most pronounced dividing line between classical strategy and operational art is the Industrial Revolution. From about 1840 to 1890 the Industrial Revolution spawned innovations in technology that swept away nearly 2500 years of classical military art. At the emergent operational level two technological innovations led to the manifestation of the tenth characteristic of operational art: the continuous front.

The first of these innovations was the development of the railroad. Larry H. Addington called railroads the "bones of strategy."²¹ It was the

railroad that ensured that modern warfare would have a uniquely distributed structure. On the eve of the American Civil War, the United States had laid more rail than any other country in the world. The railroad determined the whole manner in which the United States would go to war. Within each of the chief military departments was a primary railroad junction. This became the focal point of departmental mobilization. Staging and concentration of forces occurred at some distance from the junction, but along a major rail line. The forces then deployed from these concentration areas into the theater of operations. The distribution of the departmental railroad junctions throughout the United States in 1861 determined the distributed character of the subsequent operations. The army and quasi-army group headquarters provided the organizational mechanism to conduct these dispersed operations.

The second technological innovation of this period was the telegraph. Following Addington's metaphor, we might term this invention the "nerves of strategy." The great difficulty in integrating distributed operations lies in the fact that communications among higher headquarters and subordinate units must be virtually continuous or, if not continuous, then virtually instantaneous. The telegraph provided the missing element in a workable distributed command and control system. Although Grant's and Sherman's quasi-army groups were, for instance, nearly 600 miles apart, these commanders could communicate at the speed of the telegraph signal.


The distributed nature of rail lines, coupled with a distributed administrative device found in the departmental system, led to the lateral introduction of field armies into theaters of operation. Often these formations became engaged separately before they could achieve tactical concentration on a battlefield. The employment of the telegraph, the use of a quasi-army group control means, and supporting logistics all contributed to support the permanent lateral distribution of forces in a theater of operations. During the American Civil War we begin to see the gradual emergence of a continuous front of operations across the entire theater of war.

The Distributed Battlefield. Technology had a great impact on the conduct of war at the tactical level as well. More important, however, was the manner in which the tactical consequences of technology redounded on the conduct of operations. This came as a result of the expansion of the battlefield, the eleventh characteristic of operational art.²² This expansion or "emptying" of the battlefield occurred at virtually the same time as the expansion of the theater of operations. At both the tactical and the emergent operational levels of war, therefore, the ratio of troops to space began to decrease dramatically.

The tactical innovation that contributed most profoundly to the distribution of forces on the battlefield was the rifled musket. The ballistic properties of the new musket made it at least ten times more lethal than its Napoleonic counterpart. This was achieved through an increase in range, accuracy, and penetration. On the battlefield this meant that initial engagement

ranges were driven farther apart. In order to advance across this increased beaten zone, armies could no longer advance in dense battalion columns. Smaller and more dispersed formations were required. But even with the employment of less vulnerable formations, the attacker could not cross the beaten zone in one rush. He was forced to dig in and advance in a series of rushes. This brought reliance upon a much older invention—the spade. Because armies in the advance were forced to dig in methodically during an assault, the tempo of the attack was greatly reduced. Thus, as the battle was increasing in space, its duration was increasing in time. In this fashion the deep distributed battle emerged. The defense, the strongest form of war, became even stronger as the defender now had time to develop extensive fortifications. He also found that entrenched troops with the new rifled musket could defend a greater linear frontage than during the Napoleonic period.

At the same time, the great arms of tactical rupture and penetration, the cavalry and artillery, were rendered impotent. The rifled musket outranged the smoothbore cannon and so drove artillery from the battlefield. Only after 1896 when methods of indirect fire were developed would artillery return, and then with a vengeance. The cavalry was hamstrung in a similar manner. The glory of Napoleonic warfare, borne by the thundering charge of massed heavy cavalry, was struck down by the rifled musket. Yet the belief in the massed cavalry charge died hard, languishing until the early stages of World War I. It was a signal professional achievement, however, that on the eve of the American Civil War most officers recognized that battlefield circumstances would



Confederate defensive fortifications at Spotsylvania.

dictate new methods for the employment of cavalry. This recognition led directly to the use of massed dismountable cavalry in a quasi-operational role.

The chief significance of the distributed battlefield was its creation of an essential tension at the operational level that ensured the continued distribution of forces within a theater of operations. As noted earlier the Clausewitzian dilemma confronting the classical commander was whether to distribute his army and defend the whole country or concentrate it in anticipation of battle and defend only a portion. Historically the dilemma was resolved in favor of concentration because the attacker himself advanced in a unitary mass. In the first great fulmination of operational art, the defender had to weigh the merits of distributing his forces across a linear front, or concentrate them and risk envelopment. In the Civil War the defender began to choose distribution over concentration, thus supplanting the classical solution with the operational.

The distributed solution to the dilemma, however, was by no means optimal nor final. What was to prevent the attacker from stringing out his opponent laterally and then rapidly concentrating his forces to achieve rupture at some decisive point? Grant tried this repeatedly from the Wilderness to Petersburg. But with the development of the rifled musket (and its later improvement by the invention of an effective breech-loading system, a vertical magazine, and a smokeless cartridge) coupled with the strengthening of entrenchment through the use of barbed wire, penetration of the defense became impossible. To maintain a prolonged concentration of force while attempting to effect a penetration simply invited an enveloping attack from the defender. The attacker was thus forced to maintain a general linear distribution of forces to coincide with the defender's deployment. More and more the attacker would hope to achieve multiple local penetrations or rely on the concentration of artillery *fires* to achieve a decisive breakthrough.

The end result of all this was to lock the contending forces in a continuous front and slowly move it to and fro across the theater of operations, thus adding the dimension of depth to the linear chain of simultaneous battles. With the development of armored forces and close air support—in the 20th century, of course—the oscillation of the continuous front occurred at a much more rapid pace.

Operational Vision. The final characteristic of operational art evident in the Civil War was the presence of commanders with operational vision. Surely Grant, the "father of operational art," was foremost among them. Before J. F. C. Fuller began his study of Grant, he accepted the conventional view that Grant was a "butcher and Lee one of the greatest generals this world has ever seen." But after he completed his comparative study of the two he concluded: "Few generals-in-chief have suffered greater injustice than Grant. The reason for this misunderstanding is obvious. . . . the 1864-1865 campaign . . . was the first of the modern campaigns; it initiated a[n] epoch, and did not even resemble the wars ten years before its date." Grant arrived at his operational

vision through the "gift of an historic imagination," enabling him to "take in at a glance the whole field of the war, to form a correct opinion of every suggested and possible . . . campaign, their *logical order and sequence, their relative value, and the interdependence of the one upon the other*" (emphasis added).²³ Ultimately the comparison, like apples and oranges, is perhaps more irrelevant than unfair. Lee, past president of West Point's Napoleon Club and perhaps shackled by the grip of the great French leader, saw the military world through an entirely different lens. Lee fought only as he knew how to fight, and as he had to. Would Napoleon have fared any better, given the North's manpower and materiel superiorities, which facilitated its relentless design of successive offensive operations in depth throughout a gargantuan theater of war? Napoleon's failure in 1812 leads us to consider a negative response.

In any event this earliest manifestation of the practice of operational art was lost in the mists of time. The great operational formations of the Union army were disassembled and strewn as companies and battalions across the Great Plains during the Indian Wars. The United States would never field another corps until 1898; nor another field army until 1917. Not until the great maneuvers of field armies during World War II would the operational art rise again and come to its fullest fruition.

By the end of the 19th century the great concentrated army, a dominating force for over 2000 years of military history, had clearly ceased to exist. With the shattering of the Napoleonic icon, classical military strategy became a historic artifact, to be supplanted over time by *operational art*.

NOTES

1. The student was Lieutenant Colonel Ed Thurman, USA, while in attendance at the School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC.

2. The phrase of Herbert Butterfield, quoted in W. Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 135.

3. G. S. Isserson, *Evolutsiia operativnogo iskusstva [The Evolution of Operational Art]*, excerpts reprinted in A. B. Kadishev, *Voprosy strategii i operativnogo iskusstva v sovetskikh voennykh trudakh (1917-1940 gg.) [Questions of Strategy and Operational Art in Soviet Military Writings from 1917 to 1940]* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), p. 418.

4. A possible exception might be the military art practiced by the Mongols c. 1200 A.D.

5. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 485-86.

6. A. H. Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1862), p. 63.

7. Robert S. Quimby, *The Background of Napoleonic Warfare* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 94-96, 175.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 176-84.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

10. B. H. Liddell Hart, *T. E. Lawrence* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), p. 440, and *The Ghost of Napoleon* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1928), p. 27. For an argument that Napoleon's use of corps anticipated certain features of the operational art, see Robert M. Epstein, "The Three Levels of War in the Napoleonic Period—Austerlitz and Friedland," unpublished manuscript, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.

11. Russell F. Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), p. 228.

12. This formation was officially designated a department, but in reality it functioned as a geographic division. Johnston's formation was disbanded after the Confederate defeats at Vicksburg and Chattanooga.

It was resurrected on 17 October 1864 under P. G. T. Beauregard with the formal designation of Military Division of the West.

13. John G. Moore, "Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War," *Military Affairs*, 24 (Summer 1960), 68-77. See also Edward Hagerman, "The Reorganization of Field Transportation and Field Supply in the Army of the Potomac, 1863," *Military Affairs*, 44 (December 1980), 182-86. Hagerman wrote: "In logistics, as in other areas of military theory and doctrine, Civil War experience forced American military culture to reassess its eighteenth-century world view and acknowledge the realities of modern warfare. . . . McClellan and, for the most part, Meigs attempted to improvise within the Napoleonic standard, while Ingalls began to anticipate actual needs" (emphasis added).

14. Martin van Creveld, *Supplying War* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 40-74.

15. Douglas Porch, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: the Development of French Colonial Warfare," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 376-87.

16. William T. Sherman, *Memoirs, II* (New York: DaCapo Press reprint, 1984), pp. 26-27. For a discussion of the origins of Grant's campaign plan see Bruce Catton, *Grant Takes Command* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), pp. 124-78; J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1929), pp. 211-26; and James L. McDonough and James P. Lee, *War So Terrible* (New York: Norton, 1987), pp. 3-45.

17. James A. Schaefer, "The Tactical and Strategic Evolution of Cavalry During the American Civil War," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Toledo, 1983, pp. 196-259.

18. James P. Jones, *Yankee Blitzkrieg* (Athens: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1987), p. 185.

19. Maritime operations in support of Grant's and Sherman's land forces had a profound impact on the subsequent development of the US Navy. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote that the founding of the Naval War College by Admiral Stephan B. Luce was a direct result of Luce's experience as a member of the naval forces supporting Sherman's seizure of Savannah in December 1864. Luce related his encounter with Sherman as follows: "On reporting at headquarters, General Sherman indicated in a few, short, pithy sentences, and by the aid of a map, his plan of campaign from Savannah to the north. . . . After hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the military situation the scales seemed to fall from my eyes. 'Here,' I said to myself, 'is a soldier who knows his business!' It dawned on me that there were certain fundamental principles underlying military operations which it were well to look into; principles of general application, whether the operations were conducted on land or at sea." Cited in A. T. Mahan, *Naval Strategy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1911), pp. 14-15.

20. Today the concept of "relational maneuver" is frequently claimed to be the defining essence—the sine qua non—of operational art. This is unfortunate for two reasons. In the first place the term is redundant. If we accept the commonly held view that maneuver is movement to achieve positional advantage over an opponent, then all maneuver is necessarily relational. Second, if the nature of operational art is to be reduced to a single characteristic, such a reductionist approach would still yield a different candidate than the commonly proffered one of relational maneuver. Writing in *Tactical Strategic Principles of the Present*, Sigismund von Schlichting recognized that as early as 1870 an "army's [distribution] should be considered its normal state." For a discussion of Schlichting's revolutionary ideas see Lieutenant General von Caemmerer, *The Development of Strategic Science*, trans. Karl von Donat (London: Hugh Rees, 1905; US Army War College rpt., December 1983), pp. 94-105. See also Edward N. Luttwak, "The Operational Level of War," *International Security*, 5 (Winter 1980/81), 61-79. Here Luttwak for the first time connects relational maneuver with operational art. He does so by creating an unfortunate false dichotomy between attrition on the one hand and relational maneuver on the other. To give Luttwak his due, his insistence on the qualifier "relational" in connection with maneuver may reflect nothing more than a pro forma acknowledgment in this age of Einsteinian relativity that no body can be considered to move except in relation to another. But such reasoning is to confuse maneuver with mere movement.

21. Larry H. Addington, *Background to War in the Nineteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1984), p. 44.

22. James J. Schneider, "The Theory of the Empty Battlefield," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, 132 (September 1987), 37-44. The reader is invited to read Michael Shaara's *The Killer Angels* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975) alongside Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *August 1914* (New York: Bantam Books, 1974) to get a graphic appreciation of the effect the expanding battlefield had on the conduct of operations. Solzhenitsyn wrote in his novel: "How disastrously the conditions of warfare had changed, making the commander as impotent as a rag doll! Where now was the battlefield that was no wider than one man's field of vision, across which he could gallop over to a faltering commander and summon him to his side? The extent of the battlefield had started to grow unmanageably . . . and now the situation was far worse. For a distance of forty-five miles, across enemy country, under threat of bullets or capture those trusting Cossacks had ridden for twelve hours carrying . . . this document. . . . And so to cover those forty-five miles—which in Kutuzov's time [c. 1812] had been a mere three miles—the only means remained the same horses' hooves, whose stride had not increased by an inch since Kutuzov's day" (pp. 330-31).

23. J. F. C. Fuller, *Lee and Grant* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 248-49, 245.

START and US Strategic Forces

DENNIS McDOWELL

Recent commentary on provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty entailing a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms has included doubts about the prospective accord's impact on US strategic forces. The deep reductions that are now agreed to in principle by the United States and the Soviet Union will undoubtedly require careful adjustment of the US strategic force posture, as well as continued strategic force modernization, in order to preserve a robust and survivable strategic offensive deterrent. The purpose of the START negotiations is to achieve this objective at lower, and equal, overall force levels that will strengthen strategic stability in the long term.

Some of the debate about START has revolved around the prospective pact's degrading effects on US strategic force survivability which, in the view of certain analysts, belie the stabilizing nature of the proposed reductions.¹ However, when all relevant facts are considered, these alleged flaws are not of major strategic significance, and the costs are far outweighed by the benefits to US security. START's value will ultimately be weighed in the broader context of East-West relations to include, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement on 7 December 1988 that Soviet armed forces would be unilaterally reduced by 500,000 men over a two-year period, including the withdrawal and disbandment of six tank divisions now stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.² This development is positive, especially if it represents new Soviet willingness to negotiate further reduction of Soviet force advantages. However, the START treaty must first stand on its own merits for it to deserve ratification. In order to evaluate START objectively, a brief review of the status of the draft treaty is necessary.

A Framework for Evaluation

The basic outlines of the evolving treaty include the following agreed elements:

- The two sides—the United States and the Soviets—will be limited to 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles each.³ This means that the sum of each side's deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 1600.

- Each side is limited to 6000 *accountable* warheads on their delivery vehicles (some warheads may not be accountable—more on that later).

- Within the limit of 6000 accountable warheads on each side, not more than 4900 of them can be placed on ballistic missiles.

- With respect to the Soviet SS-18 heavy ballistic missiles, not more than 1540 warheads can be placed on 154 of them. These particular 1540 would count against the total Soviet warhead limit of 4900.

- Each side is limited in its total ballistic missile throw-weight to an amount 50 percent below the Soviets' current level (a missile's throw-weight is the weight it can deliver on target at operational ranges).

Other proposed elements that are key to determining the final shape of the treaty remain unagreed. For example, the United States proposes an additional ICBM warhead sublimit of 3000 to 3300. This would provide the necessary predictability to Soviet force structure and provide a cap specifically on the total warheads on ICBMs, which are *prompt and very accurate* delivery systems. The Soviet Union, aiming to constrain US strengths, has conditioned its acceptance of an ICBM warhead sublimit on the United States' limiting its total submarine-launched ballistic missile warheads to the same number, and has proposed a sublimit of 1100 weapons on heavy bombers. Such a restriction on delivery vehicles that are relatively stabilizing retaliatory systems is a proposition that no prudent US negotiator would accept.

The Soviets also have proposed to permit agreed levels of mobile ICBM launchers and their warheads (they currently have deployed well over 100 such systems), and have outlined concepts for verification. The United States, which will not be in a position to deploy any mobile ICBMs until the 1990s, proposed in 1985 that these systems be banned unless agreement could

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be reached on effective verification measures that would make mobile ICBM deployments less destabilizing, and that would reduce to a minimum the military significance of any covert illegal mobile missiles.

Additionally, the sides have been unable to agree on satisfactory verification means for limits on long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles. This and the other difficult issues outlined above were the main obstacles impeding the progress needed to complete a treaty in 1988, and they will be paramount in determining the shape of a final accord or direction of any future negotiation under the Bush Administration.

Beyond these unresolved numerical limits have been several secondary but still-important issues that have remained unagreed through the late stage of the negotiations. For example, disagreement persists over accountability, within the 6000 warhead limit, of air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers and of reentry vehicles on future types of ballistic missiles, as well as over the specific method for defining and calculating accountable throw-weight. A US proposal for limiting modernization of existing heavy ICBMs remains to be agreed. Other critical details of verification, including the inspection regime, remain to be completed. These technical issues, some of which involve the fine print in the treaty, are significant enough such that a definitive evaluation of the real impact of the START treaty is premature until they are resolved and the ink, even in the fine print, is dry.

Will the Window of Vulnerability Widen?

The prospect that significant reductions in strategic arms could increase, rather than decrease, the threat to the US silo-based missile force and therefore undermine stability is a serious consideration. ICBM vulnerability has been a driving factor in strategic arms negotiations and strategic modernization programs for 20 years. More than any other issue, it has served as the fulcrum for debate and the primary measure of meaningful arms control and a credible deterrent. Therefore, recent estimates that the ratio of Soviet hard-target killing warheads to US silos could increase under START from about 3:1 to 4:1 must be addressed—but kept in perspective. Although such a changed force relationship would be possible under hypothetical START force structures, it does not necessarily follow that US land-based missiles will be more vulnerable.

US missile silos have been theoretically vulnerable for a decade. The growing vulnerability of silos, whether US or Soviet, has been the result of technological advance, specifically as a function of missile accuracy improvements. No practical arms control solution for vulnerable silos exists short of eliminating MIRVed ICBMs—an idea that is attractive in theory but impractical for prudent military planners. In any event, an increased ratio to 4:1 is simply not militarily significant; effective destruction of US silos requires

only a two-on-one attack, given the current accuracies of Soviet ICBMs. With further increases in accuracies and missile reliability, perhaps a ratio of less than 2:1 will be sufficient in the future. Attempting to adjust this force ratio through arms control was a relevant exercise in the 1960s and early 1970s, but it is much less so today because the inevitable, and irreversible, vulnerability of existing silo-based ICBMs has long since occurred. Therefore, the inference that START is not in the US interest because it will not result in a reduction in the vulnerability of US silos is mistaken.

Arms control agreements cannot reverse quickly or eliminate strategic problems stemming from technological trends or past strategic neglect. Although there are no quick technological fixes to missile silo vulnerability, certain programs such as mobile basing and limited defenses could prolong the viability of the land-based missile force.⁴ In any event, a more meaningful evaluation of START can be found in its longer-term stabilizing benefits.

The US Objectives in START

The arms control situation that the United States faced at the beginning of this decade was one of negotiated agreements that only capped the growth in strategic weapons and which, in fact, permitted and codified growing destabilizing asymmetries in the strategic balance. One of those asymmetries was the growth in Soviet hard-target kill capability, the primary reason for the threat to US silo-based missiles today.

The underlying concept in the US proposals advanced during the START negotiations has been a long-term process of tailoring reductions and future force structures on both sides so as to reduce those asymmetries and to constrain future threats to the overall survivability of remaining strategic forces. In this regard, the US-proposed START sublimits of 4900 and 3000, the agreed 50-percent cut in heavy ICBMs, and the severe throw-weight limit do address important long-term threats to stability and deterrence.

The 3000 and 4900 warhead sublimits will constrain, respectively, the potential growth in Soviet prompt hard-target kill capability residing with land-based ICBMs, and the longer-term growth in total ballistic missile hard-target kill capability in an era when submarine-launched ballistic missiles (hereinafter referred to as SLBMs) as well as ICBMs will become more accurate. The 50-percent cuts in heavy ICBMs and overall throw-weight will ensure that prompt hard-target kill capability cannot be overly concentrated in large MIRVed ICBMs, which have the greatest first-strike potential.

What these benefits mean in reality is a limit on the total number of ballistic missile warheads that can be targeted promptly for various counterforce missions. For example, because of the warhead limit of 4900, the Soviet Union's capability to conduct a barrage attack against US bombers during take-off or against US ICBMs and SLBMs during launch will be constrained.

Should mobile ICBMs become an important component of US forces in the future, the US-proposed warhead constraints would reinforce the inherent survivability of such mobile systems. The agreed throw-weight limit also would contribute significantly to limiting barrage attack against mobile ICBM deployment areas.

The US-proposed ban on mobile ICBMs has been viewed by some commentators as a contradictory US position. The United States has maintained a preference for banning mobiles because of the extreme verification problems (which for a long time were not addressed seriously by the Soviet side in the negotiation) and the military risks posed if a side were to cheat successfully in a significant way. What is important is that the US approach would substantially enhance the survivability of mobile ICBMs should the verification problems be solved. With respect to the latter consideration, US and Soviet delegations in Geneva were actively engaged in a dialogue on mobile ICBM verification for much of the past year based upon elements of common ground identified at the Moscow Summit in June 1988.

In the absence of a treaty, the United States will be in a position to move in the future to more survivable ICBM basing modes. During the 1980s research and development on a small, mobile ICBM has proceeded, and more recently priority development of a railway-garrison basing concept for the MX missile was initiated by the Reagan Administration which aims to meet fully the requirement for a survivable and stabilizing land-based system.

Additional research under the rubric of the Strategic Defense Initiative has also placed the United States in a better position to unilaterally address the problem of silo vulnerability. SDI research could provide the basis for a future decision to deploy limited defenses to protect silos against attack, regardless of the final feasibility of 100-percent-effective territorial defense. Limited defenses based on advanced technologies could bolster deterrence by making it more difficult for the Soviets to successfully attack US ICBM silos.

Although the United States will continue to grapple with the problem of silo vulnerability, it should not be equated with overall strategic force vulnerability. In addition to ICBMs, the US strategic Triad finds its strength in

***The problem of silo vulnerability
should not be equated with overall
strategic force vulnerability.***

the long-lasting, inherent survivability of the submarine-based ballistic missile force, flexible US strategic bomber forces whose pre-launch survivability and penetrability continue to improve, and the mutually reinforcing nature of the Triad that complicates Soviet targeting and militates against a successful first strike against the United States.

Preserving the Sea-Based Leg—the Bulwark Deterrent

Another concern about the prospective START agreement is that because of the high warhead counts on US SLBMs and the large number of launch tubes (24) on the residual force of Trident submarines, the size of the US force of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (called SSBNs) will be constrained to a number insufficient to ensure force survivability and capability. It is no surprise that under a 50-percent-reductions agreement, the United States will have to relinquish a significant number of SLBM launchers in order to maintain a balanced Triad following reductions. Further, the total number of operational SSBNs following reductions will be fewer than the current number of 36, perhaps down to 20 (which would carry a total of 3840 warheads). However, there are significant operational factors and system capabilities that soften the adverse impact of a reduced size of the SSBN force.

For example, the average at-sea, on-patrol time of an all-Trident force, even in reduced numbers, will be greater than the average at-sea, on-patrol time of the current US submarine force. The Trident submarine is quieter and thus more survivable than older SSBNs. The average warhead load per SSBN in an all-Trident submarine force will be greater than today's force, even with only the eight reentry vehicles per Trident I (C-4) missile and Trident II (D-5) missile that were agreed to at the Washington Summit in December 1987. The inference of SSBN force insufficiency under START is thus not correct. An all-Trident II SLBM force, planned for the turn of this century, will have a significant hard-target kill capability to offset, and largely equalize, that of Soviet ICBMs, and will be more capable than the current US SSBN force by an order of magnitude. It will be a more credible sea-based deterrent capable of holding at risk hardened Soviet military targets, as opposed to the current US SLBM force which poses an assured destruction capability only against countervalue (soft) targets.

The question of future SSBN force survivability cannot be taken lightly, of course, as this leg of the Triad is, and will continue for the indefinite future, to be the most invulnerable. Even if there are somewhat fewer submarines on patrol at any single point in time, the argument that the ratio of Soviet attack submarines (SSNs) to US SSBNs will increase, and thus make US SSBNs more vulnerable, is fallacious. It is well known that the primary mission of Soviet SSNs is the protection of Soviet SSBNs near Soviet waters and thus far away from US SSBN patrol areas. Further, in the most likely scenario for a

US-Soviet nuclear conflict—that arising from a serious crisis or conventional conflict—a US forward-deployed maritime strategy, if ever adopted and implemented, would make it more difficult for Soviet SSNs to seek out US SSBNs in their patrol areas, far from Soviet SSBN bastions where Soviet SSNs must focus their efforts to protect their SSBN force in the event of war.

Moreover, the offense-defense antisubmarine warfare competition involves many more factors than simply the number of submarines. For example, because of the greater range of Trident C-4/D-5 missiles, and the greater endurance of the Trident submarine, US SSBN patrol areas will steadily increase in size and distance from the Soviet Union, thus further enhancing the invulnerability of the force. In addition, extensive US investment in antisubmarine warfare research, development, and deployment programs, including continuous SSBN survivability improvements, suggests that the US SSBN force will remain comfortably survivable after reductions, despite significant increases in Soviet submarine capabilities and investment in anti-submarine warfare research.

The argument that START limits are in the US interest only if the United States restructures its SSBN force toward smaller and more numerous SSBNs is not supported by the facts. Indeed, in the late 1970s, alternative submarine designs of smaller subs than Trident were studied, but were determined to be uneconomical despite the hypothetical advantages they might have offered. In retrospect, early termination of the Trident building program, the most successful US strategic program in recent times, would have been folly.

The Air-Breathing Leg and the START "Fine Print"

With respect to the third leg of the Triad, another mistaken conclusion about START is that the reductions will result in an unacceptably low number of US heavy bombers, owing to restrictive air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) counting rules and a sublimit of 1100 on bomber weapons which was proposed by the Soviet Union. Such a sublimit, if it were accepted, would be just cause for concern. Unfortunately, there is a popular misconception that there will be such a sublimit in the final treaty, based perhaps on a misleading arithmetic calculation (6000 accountable warheads minus 4900 accountable ballistic missile warheads equal 1100 bomber weapons). However, a more important reason for this misconception could be the failure to reconcile the theoretical limit on accountable ALCMs of 1100 (i.e. in the event the United States chose to have both 4900 deployed ballistic missile warheads and an all-ALCM-carrying heavy bomber force) with the heavy bomber weapon counting rule (agreed to by the United States and USSR during the Reykjavik mini-summit in 1986), which indirectly limits other heavy bomber weapons.

Let us note initially that the Soviet proposal for a sublimit of 1100 on bomber weapons is inconsistent with the agreed Reykjavik counting rule.

which stipulates that each heavy bomber, regardless of the number of gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) it actually carries, will count as only *one warhead* in the 6000-warhead limit. The consequence of this agreed rule is that the United States would be permitted the sum of ALCMs and bomb/SRAM-carrying heavy bombers equal to 6000 minus the total deployed ballistic missile warheads. Thus, if the United States chose to structure its forces such that it retained all 4900 of its maximum-allowed ballistic missile warheads, then the United States could, if it chose, retain ALCM-carrying heavy bombers with 1100 accountable ALCMs for a total of 6000 accountable warheads. Obviously, this configuration would leave no room for heavy bombers with gravity bombs or SRAMs.

This calculation, however, involves a US force structure decision that is quite different from establishing a firm 1100 limit on all individual bomber weapons. As a practical matter, under a 6000-warhead limit the United States will be permitted to retain a significant number of non-ALCM heavy bombers that carry bombs and short-range attack missiles on the condition either that accountable ALCMs are kept at a level below 1100 or that deployed ballistic missile warheads are kept below 4900. For example, either the United States or the Soviet Union could have perhaps an additional thousand bomber weapons on about a hundred non-ALCM heavy bombers and still retain a force of 1000 accountable ALCMs. Further, the United States could choose to deploy more than 1100 accountable ALCMs and additional non-ALCM heavy bombers at the expense of reducing deployed ballistic missile warheads by the same number.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that given the current US force structure emphasizing MIRVed SLBMs and the likely retention of a significant number of them as a proportion of the 6000 aggregate, it will be difficult for the United States to deploy its proposed treaty limit of 1600 delivery vehicles. What this means is that if the United States decided in the future that it was in its interest to shift the balance of its Triad forces significantly to bomber forces, it could easily do it by building additional non-ALCM carrying penetrating bombers such as the stealth B-2. Each such bomber (which will presumably be capable of carrying several bombs and short-range attack missiles) would count as only one unit in the 6000 limit. The practical consequence of this liberal counting rule for non-ALCM heavy bombers is that, after reductions to agreed levels, if the US dismantled one Minuteman III missile (which has three warheads), it could as compensation build three penetrating bombers that could carry several times that number of weapons. This is an example of a US advantage that would not be so apparent without seeing the *fine print of the draft treaty*.

US bomber forces are further protected by the ALCM counting rule that the United States proposes—ten per heavy bomber—which represents a realistic average bomber loading. There has been a tendency on the part of

START critics to apply ALCM counting rules from SALT II to an evaluation of START, which leads to the erroneous conclusion that the US bomber force would be excessively constrained. Under the US approach, the number ten is simply an arbitrary attribution rule, and not an actual loading limit; thus, the United States could have ALCM-carrying bombers which would each count as carrying ten ALCMs within the 6000 limit but which could in fact carry *more* than ten ALCMs. This favorable ALCM counting rule, in terms of its operational impact on the US bomber force, is consistent with the long-standing US position in strategic arms negotiations that the asymmetry resulting from Soviet air defenses and the US lack of the same should be taken into account in any formula for limiting heavy bomber weapons.

It should be clear that the US framework for START is fashioned so as to enhance strategic stability by permitting either side, and hopefully encouraging both sides, to shift from reliance on hyper-velocity ballistic missiles to greater reliance on slower-flying and recallable bomber forces, which are less provocative in times of crisis.

US Strategic Triad Preserved

The prospective reductions in strategic offensive arms provided by the START treaty will permit sufficient US forces and force flexibility to retain a viable, robust Triad that is survivable and capable of carrying out its mission of deterrence based on the threat of offensive retaliation. Strategic modernization will continue to be necessary, but the problems facing the United States in maintaining an effective and stable deterrent should be eased after 50-percent reductions. The prospective START treaty embracing all elements of the US proposal, if concluded early in the Bush Administration, could serve as a benchmark for planning and modernizing US strategic forces, thus making a significant contribution to future US security.

NOTES

1. Some recent prominent articles critical of START include: Henry Kissinger, "START: A Dangerous Rush to Agreement," *The Washington Post*, 24 April 1988; and James L. George, "The Two Track Dilemma in START Negotiations," *Strategic Review*, 16 (Winter 1988), 35.

2. See Michael Dobbs, "Gorbachev Announces Troop Cut of 500,000," *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1988, pp. A1, A30.

3. Henceforth in this article, the term "delivery vehicles" refers to "strategic nuclear delivery vehicles."

4. Other steps that could be taken to marginally reduce land-based ICBM force vulnerability are: (1) "downloading" of existing silo-based ICBMs (e.g. removing a warhead from each Minuteman III ICBM and redeploying it elsewhere so that the same number of total warheads could be distributed over a larger number of delivery vehicles); or (2) deploying new silo-based ICBMs with less "fractionation" (i.e. fewer reentry vehicles per missile) to achieve the same purpose. In both cases the objective is to raise the ratio of aimpoints to attacking warheads and thus raise the costs of any attack against the US land-based missile force. Similar options exist for SLBMs.

View From the Fourth Estate

Look Who's Sinking Our Navy— And Our Army

TOM CLANCY

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While in England not long ago, I visited with two good friends, both captains in the Royal Navy, and both now in their early forties. Both have commanded diesel-powered submarines and nuclear-powered fast attack submarines, and both have gone on to command missile-armed frigates. When I visited one's ship, I discovered that an American midshipman was aboard. The young man was looking forward to his final year at the Naval Academy, and I happened to corner him on the train platform before I returned to London. What do you think of the skipper? I asked.

"Hell," the youngster replied, "I wish he was in our Navy!"

Unfortunately, the earnest young midshipman was wrong: My British friend is better off in the Royal Navy. The reason is that the United States Navy does not utilize its officer corps with anything like the efficiency achieved by the British. . . .

Navy personnel policy does not always provide the necessary training, experience, and support for the type of people and the type of actions that serve either to prevent a war or to win one. This is a problem not limited to the Navy.

At the time I visited his ship, my British friend was already into the second year of his third command tour. That is, before turning 40, he was into his sixth or seventh year of command at sea; his American counterpart would probably still be in Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) School, or at best in his first year of command of an American warship.

The career track for a British submarine officer is far different from that of his American ally. For example, my friend once recalled that when as a sub skipper he met with an American, all the "Yank" wanted to talk about was his sub's reactor plant, instead of tactics. While American submarine officers must learn all there is to know about their engine plants, those who aspire to command a submarine in the small Royal Navy begin on Day One with navigation and tactics, beginning also a winnowing process far more ruthless than the American approach. . . .

The point of maintaining a military is the ability to go to war effectively. Yet it is not possible to turn out a well-trained generalist officer, that is, one who knows all aspects of his profession equally well, by age 33 (the command age for a Royal Navy nuclear sub), much less by age 27 (when they get their diesel boats). Those

aspiring to command, therefore, are trained to do one thing: operate the submarine and kill targets. The Royal Navy's engineers are not allowed to command; though their career track can lead to flag rank, they must knowingly volunteer for second-class citizenship.

What does such rigor get the Royal Navy? Ask a Brit skipper, and he'll tell you: Man for man it gets them better COs. It's not hard to get American submarine commanders to say the same thing—in private. "The Brits? They're my heroes," one of our best sub commanders told me over dinner. "I wish I could get away with the things they do." Agreement within the submarine community—in private—is almost universal. . . .

America has given the world more than its share of outstanding naval officers, as a few RN captains learned the hard way. There's nothing wrong with our people; the problem is with our system. The American system requires that a submarine officer spend too much time in the engine room. A submarine is not an excuse to build a nuclear reactor. A submarine is a weapon of war whose only purpose is the destruction of her country's enemies. . . .

This American fixation with engineering has had numerous ramifications, including our ship-design philosophy and even our national strategy. It results from the importance we give to safety concerns; only a few major reactor incidents on US submarines, it is true, would have dire consequences. Fear of such an incident has led the US Navy to adopt the most conservative design philosophy in its history: We are now building a single class of attack submarine, the *Los Angeles*, whose design history dates back to my sophomore year in college. In other words, had I attended the Naval Academy 19 years ago, I would just now be contemplating command of the boat whose design began when I was recovering from my plebe year. Something is wrong here. . . .

What we have gotten from the current system is a community of officers so molded by their training that risk-taking is not rewarded and therefore often avoided; and it shows in a submarine-design process in which the usefulness of risk-taking is scarcely considered. Taking risks means that mistakes are certain. But you learn from mistakes; in fact you learn more from mistakes than from success. In the tactical arena, failure to run risks makes for predictable tactics—which can spell death. In the strategic arena, it spells national defeat. Commander Holloway Frost, one of the Navy's leading intellectuals in the interwar period, wrote that the one unforgivable failure in war is the failure to run risks.

In each issue, Parameters features a "View From the Fourth Estate" consisting of a stimulating and often controversial article on military affairs previously appearing in the civilian printed media. Members of the military community may or may not like what is said in the civilian press of their activities, but in a democratic society they must remain abreast of what the citizen is reading and thinking if they are to approach and execute their missions successfully.

This is merely a simple illustration of a serious problem which is not limited to the Navy. In the Army, a captain in his middle twenties will command a company for a brief 18 months. Do we really expect a young man to learn and master the job of leading more than a hundred men in combat in a mere year and a half? Worse, after that, he will not have another operational command for more than 10 years, when, if he's fortunate, he gets a battalion for two years or so.

Our military plans to fight a violent, rapid war of maneuver but may not be providing its commanders with the necessary training to deal with it. Throughout the military there are too many officers chasing too few commands. What results is an artificially and unrealistically old group of commanders who shuffle in and out of command billets too rapidly. Command is supposed to be what the career is all about, but it has become a mere adjunct to career advancement—and therefore a place of passage, a place to play safe and make no mistakes. The current system militates towards homogenized mediocrity. That we have any excellent commanders at all—and we do have quite a few—is testimony to the quality of the people who choose this way of life, not to the system that is supposed to support them.

The military was meant to be neither a jobs program nor another federal bureaucracy, though it has become something of both. Its real purpose is not to provide fulfilling careers for people who wish to serve our country. Its purpose is the preservation, protection, and defense of American freedom—by the application of structured violence. The historical paradox, of course, is that readiness to do that grim job is the best protection against being forced into it. Readiness requires that the commanders know their profession. Readiness means every day.

The whole public debate on military appropriations misses the point. The majority of military costs are manpower costs. We speak of our military as though it were a collection of weapons. But people, not weapons, fight wars, and the foremost "force multiplier" on the battlefield will always be an intelligent commander. It is mainly a question, therefore, of having the right people in place, and getting the wrong people out of the way. There is ample slack in the system to accomplish that, but doing so means a return to fundamentals.

The military needs to restore the warrior ethic. Not all officers are or can be warriors, but only those who deserve to command at any level. The military must change its programs to identify them, to nurture them, to select only the best from their ranks, and then to give them the support and experience they need to fulfill their wartime missions at every level of command responsibility. That will give us the force which will win in war; and recognition of this will go far towards preventing one.

—Tom Clancy is the author of The Hunt for Red October, Red Storm Rising, Patriot Games, and The Cardinal of the Kremlin. His fifth novel, The Clear and Present Danger, will be published later this year. The present article is an abridged version of the original, which appeared in The Washington Post, 25 December 1988 (pp. B1, B4) under the title "Look Who's Sinking Our Navy."

Commentary & Reply

THE NICARAGUA SCENARIO—ONCE MORE, WITH FEELING!

To the Editor:

William A. Rusher's portrait of a pathetic US president in his article "The Media and Our Next Intervention: Scenario" (September 1988) should not pass unremarked.

First, a president who ordered an invasion of Nicaragua without obtaining a declaration of war from Congress would probably violate the Constitution; it gives Congress, not the president, the authority to go to war. An invasion intended to overthrow a government is not an intervention on the order of the incursion into Grenada to rescue students or the bombing of Libya to deter terror, but a deliberate act of war. An invasion of that sort would not even have the veneer of a defensive police action under the flag of the United Nations, as in Korea, nor the congressional support given in a Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, as in Vietnam. For the president to order such an attack without congressional approval might even be an impeachable offense. A military officer acquiescing in such an order could be violating his oath of office, which pledges allegiance to the Constitution, not to the president. In sum, a president who launched such an assault would be acting like an 18th-century European monarch. Americans broke with George III 212 years ago because they refused to live under that kind of rule.

Second, a president who ordered an invasion on Saturday, 15 February 1989, which would be less than a month after taking office, would be guilty of political naïveté at least and political lunacy at worst. (He would also need a new calendar—15 February 1989 falls on Wednesday.) After Congress had repeatedly voted down piddling amounts of aid to the Contras, as in Mr. Rusher's scenario, the legislators could hardly be expected to stand by idly when the president sent American troops into combat. Given the polls of recent years showing a minimum of public support for American military action in Central America, the president could hardly expect public acclaim for an attack mounted without any political preparation of the citizenry. Mr. Rusher's president would thus appear not to have learned one of the salient lessons of Vietnam, which is that no administration can long sustain a military operation without the consent of a large majority of the voters and taxpayers, and their elected representatives in Congress.

Third, a Joint Chiefs of Staff that employed an initial invasion force of only 50,000 troops ought to be fired for professional incompetence. Given the strength of the Nicaraguan armed forces, about which we have heard so much in recent years, dispatching an American force that small would be a formula for another Bay of Pigs. Some US military planners have said privately that an initial invasion force of upwards of 100,000 soldiers and Marines, plus air, naval, and logistics support, would be required. There is also the question of occupying Nicaragua and fending off an expected guerrilla campaign fought by the Sandinistas in their homeland. As an American battalion commander, a veteran of Vietnam, once said: "It's not getting into Nicaragua that bothers me, it's getting out."

Fourth, the most pathetic aspect of Mr. Rusher's portrait is a president who, having blundered into a quagmire in Nicaragua, now pleads with the press to extract him. When the press refuses to be his patsy, Mr. Rusher's president threatens censorship, forgetting that censorship and related guidelines on coverage of military operations throughout American history have been intended to protect operational security, not to cover up political and military mistakes. In doing so, Mr. Rusher's president reveals a fundamental contempt for the American public: surely the shrewd, street-smart citizens of this republic, much as they may dislike the news the press brings them, would see the president's censorship as an admission of his failure to persuade them that his policy merited support. The experience of Grenada is instructive: when the press was shut out at first, many citizens applauded. But after the dust settled and it became apparent that official press releases left something to be desired, public opinion swung around to question the ban on the press.

Lastly, Mr. Rusher conveniently cuts off his scenario before it gets to a critical issue, which is argument before the Supreme Court. Let us assume the president suspends the First Amendment, gags the press, and forces television to go dark. A lawsuit would follow as surely as night follows day, and, while no one should presume to predict how the Supreme Court would decide, there have been ample rulings to show that the Court has carefully defined the role of the press in wartime. In *Schenck v. U.S.*, *Near v. Minnesota*, and the case of the Pentagon Papers, the court has ruled that the government must prove a clear and present danger to a military operation before publication can be prohibited. That danger, moreover, must come from the external enemies of the United States. In our robust, vibrant democracy, a disagreement with the policies and decisions of a president on the part of the American Congress and citizenry does not constitute a clear and present danger to the republic, no matter how subversive he may perceive it.

Altogether, Mr. Rusher's pathetic president would most likely have been guilty of violating the Constitution, of political folly, of military ignorance, and of legal ineptitude. Most of all, he would have been guilty of a failure in basic leadership, as almost any lieutenant of infantry could have told him.

Richard Halloran
Military Correspondent, *The New York Times*
Washington, D.C.

The Author Replies:

If Richard Halloran doesn't like my scenario, he can invent his own. The only important point is for him to face up to the real and serious problem presented by the ability of the media to shape American public opinion in regard to military operations of which they happen to disapprove.

Instead, Mr. Halloran simply carps about the plausibility of the scenario I depicted. Even there, however, his criticisms lack force.

It would certainly come as news to Grenada's Bernard Coard, or Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, that the American attacks on those two countries were not "a deliberate act of war."

In any case, a useful pretext for military action is never hard to find—as Mr. Halloran concedes when he describes the invasion and occupation of Grenada as an

"incursion into Grenada to rescue students." In any event, my own scenario explicitly assumed that, in its opening stages, the operation against Nicaragua would have the support of "a majority of members of the House and Senate, on both sides of the aisle."

That is far from saying, however, that they would necessarily be willing to declare war on Nicaragua. A Congress controlled by the party opposed to the president would probably prefer to withhold a declaration but let the operation proceed until the media had done their dirty work and the president's scalp was available for easy taking.

As for Mr. Halloran's objection to the date of the hypothetical invasion, I can hardly imagine anything mattering less. My only purpose was to push the imagined events into a new administration (party unspecified), to avoid entangling the issue in the readers' attitude toward a real (i.e. Reagan) administration.

On the subject of the military plausibility of the invasion I envisioned, I took the precaution of consulting military authorities almost as towering as Mr. Halloran. But, once again, the quibble is pointless.

Finally, it is no doubt true, as Mr. Halloran argues, that "a disagreement with the policies and decisions of a president on the part of the American Congress and citizenry does not constitute a clear and present danger to the republic." But it is far from clear that the deliberate destruction of civilian morale by the tendentious reportage of an arrogant minority in control of the major media, resulting in the enfeeblement of an American military response to an external enemy, would leave an American commander in chief without any constitutional recourse whatever.

That, in any case, is the ultimate question, and Mr. Halloran simply fails to address it.

William A. Rusher
Publisher, *National Review*

MORE ON THE GUARDIAN OF THE GUARD

To the Editor:

With regard to Major Samuel J. Newland's article "The National Guard: Whose Guard Anyway?" in the June 1988 issue of *Parameters*, I have served as both enlisted man and officer in the Guard, USAR, and the Regular Army and thus feel qualified to take issue with Major Newland's thesis that the National Guard is nothing more than the Army Reserve with a different name.

In the first place, Major Newland is wrong when he equates the *Guard to the militia* as described in the Second Amendment to the Constitution. As one can see in 10 USC 311, the Guard is one part of the militia. Surprisingly, considering the date of the act, the Army Reserve is not mentioned at all.

Point two is the freedom of the Guard from the Posse Comitatus Act, which does affect both the active component and USAR. When the Guard has been federalized, it too is subject to the act. What certain politicians might like to see is direct federal control over troops exempt from the act, so that they can pay lip service to the law.

The third item is the one that confuses me the most, since Major Newland is described as a *Guard officer*. Governors, and states, need control over the Guard if

it is to be a state asset. When I was in the Nevada Guard, the governor forbade the deployment of troops outside the state during fire season, and Guardsmen spent many days on the fire lines either fighting fires or in support of firemen. Florida, I believe, has a state law that prohibits deployment of the Florida Guard outside the state without the consent of the governor. Both of these restrictions far predate Overseas Deployment Training missions in general and those to Central America in particular. The restrictions were political in their intent, but have sound foundations. Major Newland ignores the fact that states support the Guard with recruiting and retention incentives that often outweigh what the federal government offers. If the Guard is to become USAR with another name, why not drop all pretense and just disband the Guard? Why support the Guard Bureau, Adjutants General, active-duty Guard officers, and the bloated Property and Fiscal Officer system that the Guard has to work with?

I have no doubt that certain politicians want to play politics with the Guard. So does Major Newland. Personally, I would rather see the politics played at a local level. Governors may tend to be liberal, but Guardsmen tend to be centrist to conservative, or they wouldn't be in the Guard. If the President wants the Guard, all he has to do is federalize it. That is what President Eisenhower did in Little Rock in 1957, and it presented no problems to anyone, except in Major Newland's imagination.

I believe that there are differences between the ARNG and USAR, and that the differences are important. Neither system is perfect; neither one should be scrapped. Let's work together, and improve both.

Michael M. Smith
Fayetteville, N.C.

The Author Replies:

Michael Smith's comments on my article are, I'm sure, well-intentioned, but I'm afraid he has missed the article's point, if not that of the whole governor's training controversy.

I am well aware that legally there are two militias, the organized and unorganized (10 USC 311). My article discussed in some detail the inability of the nation to depend on the unorganized militia that was provided for by the 1792 Militia Act. The article sought to emphasize that beginning at the turn of the century, a number of US political leaders, recognizing the need to mold the state-based militia into a strong Reserve force, initiated a series of reforms (1903-1933) which have resulted in today's National Guard—the organized militia. While an unorganized militia technically exists today, it has been dormant in this century, and I know of no move to resurrect it.

I also recognize the need for the state to have control over its nonfederalized National Guard, since that is an important part of the constitutional formula for the control of the Guard militia. My *Parameters* article did not seek to promote anything else. The point of my article is that some governors are disturbing the constitutional formula. Like so many powers within the Constitution, some are given to the states, others are reserved for the federal government. The power to train National Guard personnel is delegated to the states, but the discipline or the training regimen is a national, a congressional, power. The federally established training regimen has called for overseas training for some units, and by refusing to permit

Guard units to train in Latin America governors are interposing their authority between the federal government and Guard units. Two US District Court decisions and one US Appeals Court decision have agreed with this viewpoint. A recent contradictory opinion in Minnesota means that ultimately the Supreme Court will decide the issue.

Mr. Smith should also note that the state power for the governor to veto two-week annual training was a congressionally granted power, through the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, rather than a constitutional power. Since it was a congressionally granted power, it can also be withdrawn or modified by subsequent acts of Congress. The Montgomery Amendment to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act has, in fact, modified the states' veto privilege since, in the opinion of many policymakers, it was being abused by certain governors.

Like Mr. Smith, I am supportive of working together to improve the Guard; but when governors unilaterally block scheduled training missions because of their opposition to the President's policies in Latin America, I object. I object as a Guardsman because we are being deprived of scheduled and needed training. I object as a citizen who knows that governors do not have the authority to set or engage in foreign policy. Finally, I object as a scholar, knowing that such actions could unravel almost 100 years of progress in forming the National Guard into an important part of the Total Army.

While I am charged with "playing politics on this issue," Mr. Smith should read the Federal District Court decision on the suit to block Latin American training filed by Governor Dukakis. It is very clear who the courts say is playing politics with this issue.

Major Samuel J. Newland
Kansas National Guard

Annual subscriptions to *Parameters* are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. The current subscription cost is \$7.00 for domestic or APO addresses, \$8.75 for foreign addresses. Single copies are also available at a cost of \$4.50 for domestic addresses, \$5.63 for foreign addresses. Checks should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents. Credit card orders may be placed by calling GPO at (202) 783-3238 during business hours.

Book Reviews

Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era. By James M. McPherson. 904 pages. Oxford University Press, New York, 1988. \$35.00. Reviewed by Stephen W. Sears, author of *George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon*.

This latest volume in the Oxford History of the United States reflects the high standards of that series. "No period of American history makes greater demands on the historian than that of the Civil War," writes C. Vann Woodward, the series editor, and so successfully has James M. McPherson met those demands that *Battle Cry of Freedom* is quite simply the best one-volume history of the Civil War ever written.

McPherson, who teaches history at Princeton, has said that in writing *Battle Cry of Freedom* his first priority was to make it interesting, and his second was to deal with the interpretive problems of the era. He succeeds admirably in both. This is narrative history rather than topical, brought to life by a style that stresses clarity and the interaction of people and events. It begins with the celebration in Mexico City in 1847 of that city's surrender to General Winfield Scott and ends with Lee's surrender at Appomattox in 1865. There is nothing easy about building a complex work like this on a strictly chronological framework, but there is no evidence of strain and no ill-fitting seams in the narrative flow.

A good example of McPherson's narrative skill is his chapter titled "We Are Going To Be Wiped Off the Earth" (a phrase taken from Mary Chesnut's diary) that interweaves a wide range of events crowding the stage in the fall of 1864. There is Sherman's capture of Atlanta, McClellan's presidential campaign against Lincoln, Sheridan's operations in the Shenandoah Valley, clandestine Confederate efforts to mobilize the copperhead element in the North, partisan warfare in the border areas, and the issue of POW camps and prisoner exchange. Each of these disparate elements gets its due, yet the impact of each on the whole is always clearly apparent.

Equally apparent is McPherson's dedication to confronting the issues. "The multiple meanings of slavery and freedom, and how they dissolved and re-formed into new patterns in the crucible of war, constitute a central theme of this book," he writes. He is well prepared for this particular theme, having written such studies as *The Struggle for Equality* and *The Negro's Civil War*. Another central theme is politics. "The Civil War was preeminently a *political* war, a war of peoples rather than of professional armies," he observes. "Therefore political leadership and public opinion weighed heavily in the formation of strategy." He emphasizes that if the Confederacy was without parties it was not without politics, and Jefferson Davis's political trials as well as Lincoln's are detailed here.

To be sure, McPherson never loses sight of "those weary men in blue and gray who fought it out during four years of ferocity unmatched in the Western world between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I." Campaigns and battles dominate the foreground of *Battle Cry of Freedom*. I especially admire his stress on the dimension of contingency in analyzing why the South lost and the North won. The great turning points of the war, he notes, occurred without exception on the battlefields, and he

captures the distinctive nature of each contest he describes. To take just one instance, it would be hard to find a better capsule summary of Lee's mastery over Hooker at Chancellorsville than this: "Like a rabbit mesmerized by the gray fox, Hooker was frozen into immobility and did not use half his power at any time in the battle." *Battle Cry of Freedom* is good military history as well as good social history and good political history, and that is a combination as unique as it is rewarding.

Swords Around a Throne: Napoleon's Grande Armée. By John R. Elting. 769 pages. The Free Press, New York, 1988. \$35.00. *Reviewed by Professor David G. Chandler, editor of Napoleon's Marshals and Head of the Department of War Studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; with Mary Ann Northen, Chairholder, Virginia Military Institute.*

There is a well-known saying, "It was not the Roman army that crossed the Rubicon; it was Caesar." As so often with the catchy phrase, this is at best a half-truth. True, it was Julius Caesar who took the bold decision that was to lead to dramatic results for the Roman Republic, but had he not been accompanied by his loyal, dusty, foot-weary, and (no doubt) swearing legionnaires, his passage over the frontier river in question would have had no more impact on ancient history than a casual holiday excursion.

As with Caesar—so let it be with Napoleon. *Le petit tondu's* military achievements between 1796 and 1815 owed much to his phenomenal drive and determination, his strategic and operational skills based upon exploitation of alternative plans, his ability to size up the battle potential of a given area of ground in a single coup d'oeil, and perhaps above all his gift for inspiring, encouraging, and driving his officers and men. But he was, as every other general throughout history, totally dependent on his martial instrument, be it the Army of the French Republic, that of the Consulate, or, from 1804, *la Grande Armée*. In the final analysis everything depended upon the individual *fantassins, sabreurs, canonniers*, and members of *la genie*, and the intermediate leadership at all its levels between the Emperor and the FEBA. Napoleon probably possessed (even in 1814 when the chips were very much down on the table) the finest army since the onset of the Age of Gunpowder—or to the present day for that matter—and certainly the most famous.

La Grande Armée has often been written about, either in overall terms as in Philip Haythonthwaite's interesting *Napoleon's Military Machine* (also 1988), or in more specific detail as in the relevant volumes of the Osprey Press's extensive *Ment-at-Arms* series—to cite but two modern and generally reputable sources of information. But a truly authoritative, scholarly, single-volume, comprehensive description and analysis of Napoleon's military instrument has long been awaited.

Such a treasure, in Elting's *Swords Around a Throne*, we have at last been granted. The fruit of at least a quarter-century of reflection and intermittent work, this labor-of-love and scholarship crowns the work—to date—of a notable soldier-scholar whose well-known *Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars* (coauthored in 1964 with the late Brigadier General Vincent J. Esposito at West Point) set new standards for the cartographical approach to the period. He has also written widely on the American Revolutionary and more modern periods, and is a charter fellow of the Company of American Military Historians. His latest *magnum opus* should stand for at least a generation as the best English-language work on its subject. It may even

become what German scholars refer to as a *Jahrhunderthuch*—but this only the growth of a scholarly consensus over a long period will decide.

I personally got off to a bad start with John Elting in 1966, when I failed to spot the misspelling of the Colonel's name in the preface to my *Campaigns of Napoleon*. Elting's notice in the *American Historical Review* was understandably acerbic after that faux pas, particularly in taking my book to task for its disappointing portrayal of the French general staff. After reading Elting's version, I still fail to see a major difference in our portrayals of the *Grand Quartier-Général*, apart from the role of the Auditors of the Council of State. I do not wholly agree with the author's denigrating characterization of Jomini—Berthier's victim in 1813—as "spiteful." This difficult Swiss staff officer was "more sinned against than sinning" in my view, but then I am more of a Jominian than a Clausewitzian. The Israeli scholar, Martin van Creveld, in *Command in War* (1985), has provided what is still probably the best available analysis of the *Grand Quartier-Général*, despite certain linguistic confusions. In the chapter titled "Strategy and Tactics," Elting certainly reduces consideration of strategy "to its bare bones," devoting just six lines to his description of Napoleon's strategic concepts in their practical aspect (the tactical viewpoint is more generously portrayed)—but then he is not purporting to present a view of Napoleon as commander, a point the reader should fully appreciate. If he wishes to read about the French army, he should certainly read and re-read this book. But if he wishes to read about Napoleon, he should look elsewhere.

There are certain other comments that must be made. The full significance of the transformation of the French *Grande Armée* of 1805-07 into the multinational amalgam of 1808 onwards (it really began in Spain) needs greater emphasis than he gives it, although there is a useful chapter titled "Allies and Auxiliaries." Perhaps, too, greater attention could have been paid to the Peninsular War, during which, after the Emperor's departure from the local scene in early 1809, the dependence of the army upon his propinquity if it were to function properly was most certainly brought out. The book is well-endowed with notes and reasoned chapter bibliographies (although there are a number of strange omissions in certain areas), but a general bibliography would have been of assistance. As the notes contain many pithy comments relevant to the printed page, it might have been preferable to place them at the foot of each page or at the end of each chapter for the greater convenience of readers rather than at the end of the book. And—counsel of perfection—it was a pity that the superb Knötel uniform plates were not printed in color (the jacket illustration apart). But one cannot have everything.

The strengths of the book far outweigh its occasional weaknesses. Quite rightly, the author pays attention not only to the French armies of the Revolution but also to those of Louis XVI. It is not always appreciated how many reforms were already in hand following the disasters of the Seven Years' War which were later incorporated (if often in amended forms) into what became the *Grande Armée*. The volume deals authoritatively with almost every aspect of Napoleon's forces, their uniforms, weaponry, equipment, and daily life—in campaign and out—and finds space for some generally well-aimed swipes at France's foes into the bargain. But is the English—British surely?—genius really "erratic, eccentric, and indirect"? Ask the Argentinians for an opinion! Perhaps so, perhaps not, but never underestimate the fighting prowess of "perfidious Albion." Napoleon and Galtieri arguably did so—to both men's ultimate cost.

Elting writes in an easy-to-read, even at times chatty style, and his pages sparkle with shafts of humor as well as new insights and interpretations. He goes as close to analyzing the French character—that strange amalgam of patriotic elitism, courage, cynical pessimism, and touchiness—as any recent author I know, and this is no unimportant bonus for officers striving to fathom France's attitude to the NATO alliance. If "know thy foes" is an accepted adage, so should be "know thy confederates."

But this is to digress. To conclude, it can be said that Elting has triumphantly achieved his aim—namely, to provide the large number of readers fascinated with the Napoleonic martial saga with a full, authoritative account and analysis of the Emperor's most important instrument—his army. This book is a masterpiece: quite simply John Elting's fine book is the best I have ever read on this challenging subject.

Secret Armies: Inside the American, Soviet, and European Special Forces. By James Adams. 440 pages. Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 1988. \$19.95. Reviewed by General Robert C. Kingston, USA Ret., former Commander in Chief, US Central Command.

James Adams is the defense correspondent for *The Sunday Times* of London. His work would no doubt get an "A" from an English teacher but only a "B" from a soldier. This is to say that his observations are not all bad. The title needs interpretation. The book is not about *armies*. It's about special forces within armies. While they are not armies, special forces contribute if well-led to the aim of an army: destruction of the enemy. Further, there are no real secrets about the existence of special forces, though most do operate secretly. Surprise is their forte. US Army Special Forces are well-named—they are *special*, and they are an elite force. Such a force can be sudden, savage, daring, and devastating.

Adams' depiction of the US Desert One misfortune in Iran stings—like iodine in an open wound—by comparison to his favorable treatment of the Soviets' success with the Kabul assault which kicked off their involvement in Afghanistan. But taken the way intended, it's good medicine. So are the treatments of Churchill's Leopards, the Israelis at Entebbe, the British at Goose Green, the West Germans at Mogadishu, and, among others, the Americans in Grenada. Adams also describes how the Soviets use their special forces (the *Spetsnaz*) to spearhead campaigns.

But with Vietnam, true to the tradition of the average reporter, Adams is dizzyingly off-base. He writes: "The Vietnam war had clearly shown how the skillful use of guerrilla forces can overwhelm an apparently more powerful adversary." Not so! The Vietnam War proved the contrary. Following the successful British "Expanding Oil Spot" method in Malaysia, which involved setting up safe strategic hamlets protected by the Ruff-Puffs (the name of the local militia), the allies frustrated and beat the Viet Cong. In desperation, and with grand illusions of peasant support, the Viet Cong in conjunction with the North Vietnamese army launched their Tet Offensive of 1968, attacking the cities. As a consequence the Viet Cong were all but annihilated. Eventually, the conflict was transformed into conventional warfare conducted by the North Vietnamese army, fully capitalizing on advanced technology (tanks and rockets) and characterized by large-scale attacks such as those in Giap's three-pronged Easter offensive of 1972. In 1975, without US Army conventional ground, US air, and US naval forces to contend with, Giap's second main offensive culminated in the final all-

out assault by North Vietnamese main-force units. Without basic US logistic support, the Republic of Vietnam armed forces went from privation to starvation to expiration. Lacking what it takes to shoot, move, and communicate, the South capitulated.

Adams does what he accuses the US military of doing: selectively choosing statistics to prove his case. He writes that in 1963 when President Johnson elected "to fight an unconventional war by conventional means—a policy that has never proven successful in the history of warfare . . . [North] Vietnam recruitment of Viet Cong guerrillas [increased] from 40,000 to between 105,900 to 135,900, clear evidence that the hearts-and-minds-campaign had been lost." How so? Adams doesn't mention the South Vietnam pick-up of over 100,000 enemy prisoners who had had enough of the fighting, nor the thousands of Chieu Hoi who converted their allegiance from the North. What's more, with the battle skill that accompanies a thorough knowledge of one's enemy, the Chieu Hoi became greatly feared by the Viet Cong.

As a force-multiplier acting with conventional forces "in a wide range of areas," British Special Forces achieved tactical surprise when strategic surprise was impossible. This capability in the Falklands war was well portrayed by Adams, as were the logistical mistakes resulting when politicians, ignoring the advice of field commanders, directed breaking out from the beaches without logistical support in train.

The author correctly discusses the origin, sources, and exploits of special operations forces and how they fared in war and peace in their respective countries. America's special operations forces were usually formed after the war began. Special operations forces in various countries were greatly reduced, neglected, or disbanded in peacetime, mainly because the military and political decisionmakers were of conventional mind-sets. They did not understand special operations forces, what their real missions were and should be, nor the contribution they made during wartime at such low costs.

The US Army's 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam never exceeded 2300 men in country at one time. The personnel assigned to the group won 17 Medals of Honor, and the attached Australians won three Victoria Crosses. The British military experience with their Special Air Service during and immediately after World War II provides an example of how special operations forces were treated mostly in democratic countries. Founded out of wartime necessity by that great soldier and entrepreneur, David Stirling (whom I am pleased to say is a friend of mine), they were disbanded after the war, only to be reactivated during subsequent emergencies. In July 1957, the Special Air Service was given a permanent place in the order of battle of the British army. "For the next twenty years," according to Adams, "the SAS were repeatedly to prove their worth." They continue to do that today.

Secret Armies is a highly informative and easily readable work. There are a few errors and inconsistencies which any author could easily make when depending upon secondary sources for much of his information. However, the book does contain information from interviews with principals, plus representatives of several government agencies and departments. Because he could relate only those unclassified versions of the events he so professionally presents, there are some distortions.

In June 1987 during a business trip to London, I was fortunate to have breakfast with James Adams. He impressed me with his sense of history, past and present, and how it affects current political and military leaders. I was so interested in our conversation that I went out and purchased one of his earlier books, *The Financing of*

Terror. I found it contained much detailed information based upon extensive research on a very timely subject. Further, it is a highly professional work and I recommend it, as I also recommend his current book—*Secret Armies*.

Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures 1987. Edited by Henry S. Bausum. 226 pages. The VMI Foundation, Inc., Lexington, Va., 1987. \$10.00. *Reviewed by Colonel Howard T. Prince II, USA, Head of the Department of Behavioral Science and Leadership, US Military Academy.*

Henry Bausum and others of the Virginia Military Institute have conceived a three-volume series on the subjects of military leadership and command. They are motivated by the awareness that leadership is a complex phenomenon. They also sense that we are living in an era when the realities of social, political, and organizational life have made effective leadership at once more critical and more difficult to practice. The books are based on a series of lectures given at their institution beginning in 1986. This is the second of the planned three volumes. The lecturers are indeed a distinguished group of scholars and, in some cases, experienced leaders in their own right. They include such well-known figures as Martin Blumenson, Norman Graebner, Peter Paret, and Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, USA Ret.

An issue that deeply divides serious students of leadership is whether it is possible to glean the essential attributes, qualities, or experiences of good leaders by studying historically significant leaders. Biographers and historians find themselves in one camp while psychologists and other behavioral scientists occupy another. However, this split is not clearly reflected in the chapters of the present volume since most of the essays are the work of biographers and historians. Only one article, by General Ulmer, represents the camp for which the study of leadership should be a matter of scientific inquiry. But as the editor correctly points out, "It is risky to make any single leader a sole model of leadership." He also notes that while "each leader's characteristic style adds to the overall essence of leadership, at the same time each environment adds its distinguishing attributes—in time and place, and within specific social and psychological contexts."

General Ulmer quickly summarizes many of the current controversies concerning the study of leadership in the first essay in this collection. He also reports some interesting and important findings about what makes leaders effective in contemporary leadership positions as well as what causes leaders to fail. The remaining essays, for the most part, are good studies of a number of well-known historical figures, including Oliver Cromwell, William T. Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, the Von Moltkes, George C. Marshall, George S. Patton, and Matthew Ridgway. In most cases they reinforce or enrich our knowledge of these great military and political figures. John Gates reviews the phenomenon of leadership in the US armed forces in Vietnam from several organizational levels in another essay. He credits small-unit leaders in Vietnam as having been, for the most part, effective at the face-to-face level of leadership inherent in daily fighting, but he is less charitable in reviewing the higher levels of command, both in the war theater and in Washington. Finally, the editor has included a prize-winning essay by a VMI student who attempts more directly than any of the other writers to build a theoretical framework that would somehow find unity in the diverse examples presented elsewhere in this volume.

Whether this collection of essays will be of value to readers depends very much on where they stand on how best to comprehend the idea of leadership. For those who see value in the study of great lives there are a number of well-written case studies that may enlighten and inspire. Because there is only one essay representing a scientific approach, those who seek to understand leadership and leaders from that perspective may be disappointed.

Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-51. By Russell Spurr. 335 pages. Newmarket Press, New York, 1988. \$22.95. *Reviewed by Roy E. Appleman, author of East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950.*

Russell Spurr is an English journalist and author, now living in Australia. For a period in World War II he was a member of the Scots Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. In 1952 he became the Far East correspondent for the London *Daily Express*, and his beat included the Korean War during the 14 months prior to the signing of the armistice on 27 July 1953. Mr. Spurr has spent most of his life in the Far East, from Burma to China and Korea, in journalistic and television work. He claims five years in researching and writing this book. The research apparently included more than 40 interviews of Chinese war participants during some 20 trips to China. Chinese Marshal Peng Dehuai, Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, is at the center of the story. Spurr's stated purpose was to give the Chinese point of view—to describe what the war looked like to them. He names four books in English that he used to balance his Chinese sources, and from these he extracted most of the factual data on the war.

There is not a single footnote in the entire book giving the precise source for any statement. Yet the book is full of dialogue by Chinese characters, describing numerous aspects of the war as if they were as green in their memory as the day they happened. That Spurr is talented in this phase of creative writing there can be little doubt. But the book is written more in the genre of a novel than that of history. The reader is asked to take everything attributed to the Chinese on trust, with no questions asked, and no answers needed.

Much of the military action described in the book is "seen deliberately through the eyes of correspondents. I felt it essential to point up the part played by the media in a highly ideological war." Thus in one instance he gives *New York Herald-Tribune* correspondent Marguerite Higgins' exciting account of how the North Korean 6th Division was finally stopped in its flanking drive around the west side of Korea to the port of Pusan, rather than presenting a more factual report of what happened.

Spurr spends considerable time in describing what the Chinese leaders thought, especially after the American entry, about entering the war in Korea. He focuses on Peng Dehuai's version of the Chinese thinking on this momentous question, and yet he seems never to have seen Peng's memoirs, which were published in China in an English translation in 1984. In his memoirs, Peng, a direct participant in the deliberations, describes the Chinese decision to enter the war:

At noon on October 4, 1950, three days after National Day, an airplane arrived in Xi'an City. I was told to leave for a meeting in Beijing without the slightest delay. The Party Central Committee was holding a meeting to discuss the

dispatch of troops to aid Korea when I arrived at Zhongnanhai [part of the former imperial palace used as the premises of the Party Central Committee and the State Council] at 4 p.m. . . . The Central Committee meeting resumed in the Yiniantang Hall . . . the next afternoon (5 October). After listening to other comrades, I said, "It is necessary to dispatch troops to aid Korea. If China is devastated by war, it only means that the Liberation War will last a few years longer. The US will find a pretext at any time to invade China if its troops are poised on the bank of the Yalu River and in Taiwan."

On the evening of 18 October 1950, as we learn from the memoirs, Peng crossed the Yalu River with lead elements of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The first troops of the CPV had already crossed as early as 13 or 14 October. Peng remained the commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers in Korea until after the signing of the armistice.

Spurr also apparently did not consult the July-August 1984 issue of *Kunlun Magazine*, a Chinese Liberation Army bimonthly, which published an excerpt (titled it "Chief Peng") from Chinese writer Wei Wei's historical novel *East*. This excerpt goes into great detail on various activities of Peng during the war. If Spurr had been familiar with this material, his book would have had a different character.

There are numerous factual errors in the material Spurr adapted from his American sources. Only a few can be noted here. He described the battle of Taejon as one of five days of house-to-house fighting. Actually, there was no house-to-house fighting in Taejon, and the battle lasted only parts of two days. He says General Ridgway assumed command of Eighth Army in Korea on 23 December 1950. It was on 26 December. The Chongchon River is made into the Chungchon River. The map of the Chosin Reservoir action, page 258, omits any reference to the road and railroad up the east side of the reservoir from Hagaru-ri and the role of the US Army's 31st RCT, 7th Division, in the reservoir action. The Turks at Wawon are disposed of in a brief paragraph, and not accurately. Spurr says no one gave General Keiser of the US 2d Division a specific order on his route of withdrawal from Kunu-ri. General Coulter, IX Corps commander, gave it to him in a telephone conversation. Colonel Paul Freeman, commander of the 23rd Regiment, the rear guard of the 2d Division at Kunu-ri, did not, as alleged, change his route of withdrawal without first getting approval of assistant division commander Sladen Bradley. The CCF 80th Division did not overwhelm the 31st RCT on the second night, 28 November, and kill Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith at that time. Both these events happened on 1 December. Ridgway did not remove Colonel John A. Dabney "on the spot" over a matter of policy. The discussion of the Chinese breaking the bridge "over Funchilin Pass" shows an ignorance of the nature of the terrain of the pass. The bridge was over a gulch where the water flumes for the power station came down the north side of the canyon walls at a point midway in the miles-long pass.

Near the end of the book, Spurr includes a series of short vignettes of scattered places in Korea describing what the Chinese did or saw at those places on a particular day. He ends the book suddenly in mid-January 1951, before the big Chinese 4th and 5th Phase offensives in which they suffered very heavy casualties. In all, Spurr covers about seven months of the war, and only in a broken, haphazard way. He does not succeed in telling a credible story of the Korean War from the Chinese viewpoint.

Containing the Soviet Union: A Critique of U.S. Policy. Edited by Terry L. Deibel and John Lewis Gaddis. 251 pages. Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, 1987. \$19.95. *Reviewed by Colonel (P) Wesley K. Clark, USA, Director of the Battle Command Training Program, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*

With the possible exception of deterrence, it is difficult to conceive of any concept more central to our post-World War II relationship with the Soviet Union than containment. It has been a silent—and sometimes not so silent—sentinel during recent summits between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, and it has undergirded our commitments worldwide over a span of 40 years. It has been used to justify military intervention, covert action, diplomatic suasion, alliances, and even human rights. Containment has become a theme of policy, provided an explanation of the American purpose, and even offered a rationale for its own morality and duration. In this brief collection of essays, Terry Deibel and John Gaddis have provided a masterly review of this continuing thrust of US national strategy.

Gathered from a late 1985 National Defense University symposium honoring George Kennan, containment's originator, these essays present the insights of 14 of our nation's most prominent scholars in the fields of foreign policy and US-Soviet relations. George Quester, Richard Ullman, James Billington, Dimitri Simes, and Norman Podhoretz are among the contributors, as well as Terry Deibel and John Gaddis. Not the least of the contributors is George Kennan himself, who offers his own current views on the topic he addressed so powerfully in the famous Mr. X article of 1947.

At the outset, it should be recognized that any such short anthology faces three risks: that the discourse of learned men on what is in some measure a finite topic will become redundant; that a number of short essays will simply lack the details to provide persuasive argumentation; and that the discussion by the participants will grow dated very quickly.

Happily, the editors have avoided all three risks. The range of issues and opinions within the confines of containment provide sufficient scope for a book several times this one's length. Yet, the authors amply develop their lines of thought and provide sufficient detail to thoroughly enmesh the reader. Finally, even with the current rapid pace of change in the Soviet Union and in its relations with the United States, there are more than enough continuities and enduring issues to make these articles as timely today—or more so—than when they were first generated two years ago.

John Gaddis's article on the evolution of containment sets the stage for those to follow. This is a clear, concise discussion of containment itself, and the intrinsic issues that have come to the fore over the years. These are, indeed, all the issues of postwar American policy—what constitutes our national interests, who or what is to be contained, by what means, at what costs, and why. The perspective presented is Gaddis's, but also Kennan's to a large extent, for Gaddis is careful to relate the issues emerging from containment to Kennan's former and current views of the matter. It is a well-balanced article and a worthy introduction to the topic and the man behind it.

If there is a single aspect of the discussion not open to serious debate, it is the manifest importance of public opinion. With substantial data and expert development, Ole R. Holsti takes the reader through the evolution of public opinion on issues pertaining to containment and considers the implications. It is nicely done, for it

brings into the open, at the outset, precisely the problem that lies somberly at the root of much of the disagreement in US policy today: "that general public support for international activism has diminished." Angela Stent follows with a superb piece on economic containment which further boxes in the reader, for she concludes that economic incentives, restraints, and warfare offer no substitute for the traditional avenues of politics and diplomacy.

And so the reader is taken into the heart of the subject matter. The articles are balanced across the spectrum, from Earl Ravenal's appeals for disengagement to Dimitri Simes's urging of greater US support for resistance movements in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and elsewhere so as to raise the costs of Soviet expansionism. And there are other noteworthy articles, such as Alton Frye's well-reasoned development of new approaches to the US-USSR relationship and Jerry Hough's illumination of current sources of Soviet conduct, to name just two.

For those of us who have served as soldiers of containment, there is a bit of pain in the book. It is not always pleasant to review the origins of one's own beliefs and perspectives—many of us grew up with Kennan's Mr. X article as the guiding rationale behind not only our country's policy but our military's purpose—and find that their principal architect and many of our most respected academicians now have deep reservations concerning them. These are arguable points. To be reminded that Dean Acheson admitted to including "more than the truth" in describing the Soviet threat, and that the importance of South Vietnam to our national well-being was, in retrospect, overstated is not to settle the questions of those times nor pass judgments easily on the policymakers involved, as Gaddis himself recognizes.

For sure, some themes and conclusions emerge from such a broad spectrum as these articles represent. First, that for all its misinterpretations, the broad purpose of containment appears to have been met. Second, that there are indeed serious internal contradictions in Soviet society, as Kennan predicted, and those contradictions are emerging. And third, that, as De Tocqueville noted long ago, the conduct of foreign affairs by democracies is difficult because patience is not a characteristic of popular institutions. Nevertheless, containment has endured over 40 years, and remains today an important component of US policy in dealing with our principal adversary. Not bad, for popular government.

But it is in the finer details and the competing lines of analysis that this collection of articles offers so much. It is well worth the time and investment for both the well-informed and the occasional students of international relations and our country's future.

Off the Press . . .

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From the Archives

Ernest Hemingway on World War II

[The present writer,] who took part and was wounded in the last war to end war, hates war and hates all the politicians whose mismanagement, gullibility, cupidity, selfishness, and ambition brought on this present war and made it inevitable. But once we have a war there is only one thing to do. It must be won. For defeat brings worse things than any that can ever happen in a war

When you go to war as a boy you have a great illusion of immortality. Other people get killed; not you. It can happen to other people; but not you. Then when you are badly wounded the first time you lose that illusion and you know it can happen to you. After being severely wounded two weeks before my nineteenth birthday I had a bad time until I figured it out that nothing could happen to me that had not happened to all men before me. Whatever I had to do men had always done. If they had done it then I could do it too and the best thing was not to worry about it.

I was very ignorant at nineteen and had read little and I remember the sudden happiness and the feeling of having a permanent protecting talisman when a young British officer I met in the hospital first wrote out for me, so that I could remember them, these lines [of Shakespeare]: "By my troth, I care not. A man can die but once. We owe God a death . . . and let it go which way it will, he that dies this year is quit for the next." . . .

I have seen much war in my lifetime and I hate it profoundly. But there are worse things than war; and all of them come with defeat. The more you hate war, the more you know that once you are forced into it, for whatever reason it may be, you have to win it. You have to win it and get rid of the people that made it and see that, this time, it never comes to us again. We who took part in the last war to end wars are not going to be fooled again. This war is going to be fought until that objective is achieved, if it takes a hundred years . . . , and no matter whom we have to fight to gain that objective in the end.

We will also fight this war to enjoy the rights and privileges conveyed to us by the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Bill of Rights, and woe to anyone who has any plans for taking those rights and privileges away from us under any guise or for any reason whatsoever

Source: From Ernest Hemingway, "Introduction," *Men at War*, ed. Ernest Hemingway (New York: Crown Publishers 1942), pp. xi, xiii-xiv, xxx-xxxi. The Shakespearean quotation is from *Henry IV, Part Two*, III, ii, 242-47.