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THESIS

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL FEASIBILITY OF A PEACETIME DRAFT

by

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December 1988

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An Assessment of the Political and Social
Feasibility of a Peacetime Draft

by

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requirements for the degree of

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ii

ABSTRACT

What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? Throughout this nation's history, the military manning debate has focused upon two separate schools of thought. On the one hand, there are those who believe that a "professional" force, comprised of experienced, career military personnel, is needed for national defense. At the same time, others have argued that a force composed of armed citizens is the best expression of democratic, "citizen-soldier" ideals. A return to conscription has been proposed as the best means of remedying the deficiencies resulting from a market-based recruiting system. However, the fact is that Americans are quite satisfied with the current system (according to a 1984 survey). This thesis seeks to place the draft revival question within the framework of the philosophical and historical issues that have helped to shape the nation's attitudes toward military service. A major conclusion of the study is that *political acceptability of a peacetime draft in the United States is highly questionable.*

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

> As soon as public service ceases to be the main business of the citizens, and they prefer to serve with their pocket-books rather than with their persons, the State is already close to ruin. [Ref. 1:p. 17]
>
> Rousseau

Nations depend upon armed force to ensure their security. Yet, in a liberal, pluralistic society such as the United States, the requirements for military service greatly tax a political system that must both safeguard individual liberties *and* provide the manpower necessary to support an effective system of defense. As the All-Volunteer Force (AVF) celebrates its fifteenth anniversary, it remains the focus of controversy, highlighting this country's persistent failure to devise a form of peacetime military service that is universally popular. [Ref. 1:p. 15]

A. PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF A PEACETIME DRAFT

What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? A return to conscription has been proposed as the best means of remedying the deficiencies resulting from a market-based recruiting system [Ref. 2:p. 3]. However, the social and budgetary implications of a new draft remain unclear. Despite the legitimate political concerns associated with an all-volunteer military, the fact is that Americans are quite satisfied with the current system (according to a 1984 survey) [Ref. 2:pp. 4, 10].

Achieving a popular consensus on the subject of a peacetime draft is increasingly difficult because the modern view of military duty is formed by a variety of issues, both philosophical and empirical. To produce a *politically*

and *socially* acceptable system, policy makers must have a grasp of the practical as well as ideological issues that color society's perceptions of military service. This chapter offers a brief synopsis of the various issues that have influenced America's approach to manning the military. A more in-depth discussion of the topic is presented in the subsequent chapters.

B. THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER DEBATE

Throughout this nation's history, the military manning debate has focused upon two separate schools of thought. On the one hand, there are those who believe that a "professional" force, comprised of experienced career, military personnel, is needed for national defense. At the same time, others have argued that a force composed of armed citizens is the best expression of democratic, "citizen-soldier" ideals.

The ongoing debate in this country can be traced to colonial times. Alexander Hamilton and George Washington admired the highly-trained professionalism of Prussian soldiers, and thus lobbied for a standing military presence [Ref. 1:pp. 4-7]. In fact, Washington's distaste for the armed masses, the citizen-soldiers, was so great he voiced his hope "that no reliance, except such as may arise from necessity, should ever be had in them again" [Ref. 3:p. 5]. The political realities of the period would force Washington to temper his views. He eventually came to recognize the country's deep-seated fear of a permanent military and the inability of the young nation to support a standing force [Ref. 3:p. 11].

The majority of post-revolutionary statesmen, the most notable being Thomas Jefferson, drew upon their recent colonial experiences, as well as the ideals of Enlightenment thinkers, to form a rigid distrust of standing armies.

These individuals preferred the use of armed citizens to fulfill defense needs. In fact, some writers and statesmen of the period feared that large standing Armies composed of professional soldiers posed a threat to democracy. Interestingly, this aversion to a powerful military remains with this country today. [Ref. 2:p. 17]

C. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Even the jackal does not hire someone to defend its young.

George S. Patton [Ref. 2:p. 125]

The social and political concerns framing the current military service debate are essentially the same ones that preoccupied this country's forefathers. What follows is a discussion of the major issues that shape current discussion of the all-volunteer military's social "acceptability." Each issue reflects a question that has puzzled American governments since colonial times: how should a democracy most equitably distribute among its citizens the burdens of national defense?

With the introduction of the AVF in 1973, many individuals believed the United States had finally produced a long-term solution to the controversy of military service. The current force was born out of the anti-draft negativism caused by the Vietnam War, yet it was the product of a positive ideal [Ref. 4:pp. 248-249]. A voluntary force would blend the higher purpose of the citizen-soldier with the effectiveness of a professional force. Ideally, the All-Volunteer Force would use the "invisible hand" of the nation's economy, rather than the iron hand of the draft board to draw citizens to serve their country.

In many ways, the AVF is a success. In terms of qualitative measures, such as educational level and mental aptitude, the current military may be better than any force ever assembled under the draft. Indeed,

> DoD officials maintain that today's volunteer force is the most capable in our nation's history in terms of aptitude and education and that recent research indicates a comparably effective draft force would cost more than today's volunteer force. [Ref. 3:p. 4]

Yet, to some, the current force is an ideological failure that has squandered this nation's store of patriotism and civic virtue. This line of thinking is captured in the "institution" versus "occupation" model developed by Charles C. Moskos. He observes that a conscripted force appeals to the "traditional" values of civic duty and citizen responsibility; whereas the AVF depends heavily upon economic incentives to draw and retain personnel. As a result, the AVF has turned military service into "just another job" rather than a national responsibility and a way of life. [Ref. 5:p. 137]

Others maintain that the policy of voluntary, money-based service may jeopardize the "political legitimacy" of the nation's armed forces, proving there are times

> ...when the public interest is not served simply by letting individuals act in free markets [Ref. 6:p. 287].

The "type" of person attracted by the AVF has also been a focus of criticism. To some,

> the all-volunteer force has purchased the...economically marginal man rather than acquiring people who are broadly representative of the country's citizens [Ref. 6:p. 290].

4

That is to say, the current market-based system of military manning has hired individuals who choose military service mainly because it is an "employer of last resort" or the best option in a world of limited economic choices. Much of the discussion surrounding the "broad cross section of citizens" issue is captured in the concept of social representation.

1. Social Representation

Military representation issues can be grouped into three broad categories:

- political legitimacy
- military effectiveness
- social equity [Ref. 7:p. 403].

These issues are explored in detail in the sections that follow.

a. Political Legitimacy

Embedded in the notion of a "politically legitimate" force is the belief that the military should be filled with "citizen-soldiers who can recreate the social fabric of American life." [Ref. 8:p. I-7] In an ideal sense, citizen-soldiers provide the best hope for a democracy's defense because individuals who possess the greatest stake in a country's survival will prove to be its most vigorous defenders.

(1) Soldiering and Citizenship

Historically, the United States, borrowing from European experience, has identified the requirement to bear arms with the notion of citizenship. This belief has served to ease the social dislocation caused by a demand for military service because citizens viewed military duty as payment for the benefits of citizenship [Ref. 4:p. 73]. In the wake of Vietnam, the

concept of a citizen's responsibility to bear peacetime arms has lost its allure. This erosion is evidenced by the failure of the volunteer force "to attract a sufficient number of youth from the middle and upper classes into the enlisted ranks" [Ref. 2:p. 14] Indeed, this lack of participation has prompted some scholars to question society's commitment to the principle of military service as payment for citizenship.

(2) Broad Representation

In the eyes of some manpower analysts, the lack of broad class participation has produced a force that is "not socially or racially representative of the country" [Ref. 2:p. 14]. In 1987, blacks represented greater than 23 percent of enlisted army recruits as compared to a civilian youth population figure of nearly 15 percent [Ref. 8:p. II-37]. It is the overrepresentation of blacks that prompted Morris Janowitz, a prominent sociologist, to challenge the legitimacy of the force and raise the question of whether

> ...a political democracy [can] expect a legitimate form of government if its military is not broadly representative of society? [Ref. 4:p. 284].

Race and social class are the most often cited measures of an army's legitimacy, yet representation issues extend beyond "numbers and ratios and statistical summaries." [Ref. 7:p. XIV] Perhaps staffing a military force does make a statement about this country's fundamental beliefs and the devotion of its people to the responsibilities of citizen service. If this is the case, legitimacy cannot be calculated by simple comparing statistics to the general population. As John Kester points out, "the issue is not one of price but of principle." [Ref. 6:p. 290]

(3) "Perfect Representation"

Certainly, the achievement of a "perfectly" representative military *is* an illusion. Maintenance of a "perfectly" representative force would require the recruitment of all segments of society: the aged, the infirm, the unstable, those of lesser intellect. Such a "representative" force would obviously impair military effectiveness, raising the question of whether the perfectly represented, politically legitimate force would be able to defend the absolutely "legitimate" body politic. [Ref. 9:p. 243] The issue of social representation *is* complicated and difficult to define; yet, some individuals maintain it must be addressed. This is because they believe the Armed Forces are more than just a means of defense. As one military manpower specialist observes,

> The Military has...become a symbol of the society, a manifestation of equality; and as a public institution, the composition of the military is seen to symbolically reflect social justice or social injustice. [Ref. 7:p. 106]

b. *Military Effectiveness*

The ultimate mission of any military organization is deterring and fighting a war. This fact prompts some individuals to cast aside social and political considerations and focus only on defense requirements. One participant at a recent Hoover Institute Conference on the draft summarized this viewpoint when he stated: "The object of creating an army is not to be fair, it is not to be economical. It is to fight a war." [Ref. 10:p. 148] Perhaps, this view is shared by the Department of Defense (DoD). Currently, "the military services do not attempt to regulate the demographic characteristics of new recruits" but rather, seeks "to recruit 'most of the best' young men and

women available each year." [Ref. 7:pp. IV-2, IV-3] Selected recruits are labeled "the best" on the basis of particular qualities such as education, aptitude, and physical fitness. As long as *qualified* candidates are granted equal access to *all* positions without reference to demographic qualities, issues of equity are not addressed. [Ref. 7:p. IX]

The issue of military effectiveness complicates the representation issue. It is true that without effective forces political legitimacy and social equity can neither be protected nor maintained. This fact must be somehow balanced with the more philosophical view that "without equity or legitimacy there is nothing worth protecting." [Ref. 9:p. 406]

c. *Social Equity*

An equitable system of military service ensures that the "benefits and burdens (or rights and responsibilities) of national defense are distributed proportionately throughout society." [Ref. 7:p. I-4] The overrepresentation of minorities in the enlisted ranks brings into question the current military's fulfillment of this objective.

Many individuals question why citizens who share the smallest portion of this nation's resources should have to shoulder more than their share of national defense. In the eyes of some analysts, the world's guardian of democracy is fast becoming a society in which underprivileged members are forced to defend everyone else. [Ref. 5:p. 298]

Others discount the need for burden sharing and point to the "benefits" gained by those who select military service. Military service has always been viewed as a path of social mobility for all individuals, perhaps to an even greater extent for lower socioeconomic groups. Indeed, those who

choose to serve have access to many benefits not otherwise found in civilian life. In fact, studies have shown military training better prepares minority candidates for civilian jobs, "enabling them in the long term to earn more than their peers who did not serve." [Ref. 11:p. 39]

Discussions of equity give rise to still another "draft versus AVF" issue: the "tax" associated with military service.

2. The Draft and the Conscription Tax

Basically, the conscription "tax" represents "the difference between the wage that would induce an inductee or draft-motivated enlistee to volunteer and the actual draft wage." [Ref. 12:p. 81] The conscription tax has a significant effect on the concept of equitable military service. The tax not only redistributes income from those that serve to those that do not serve (foregone civilian wages), but it also lowers the military wage. [Ref. 12:pp. 87-89] Mandatory military service allows the government to pay a below-market wage, thus shifting the burden of payment for military service *away* from the taxpayer *to* the inductee. This payment affects different socioeconomic groups in different ways.

Individuals who have higher-paying civilian job opportunities "pay" the conscription tax in the form of forfeited civilian wages. This form of tax becomes an especially volatile social issue since not all draft-eligible individuals are required to serve. When the possibility of legally escaping service exists, individuals who possess the most lucrative job opportunities would be expected "to spend more to avoid payment of the conscript tax." [Ref. 12:p. 87]

As stated above, conscription enables the government to pay a reduced military wage. This below-market wage places a hardship upon the

disadvantaged draftee to whom a military career may represent the best hope for a well-paying job. Indeed, by paying individuals less than they would accept if they could voluntarily serve, lower income groups also pay a "tax." [Ref. 12:p. 89]

The introduction of the AVF shifted emphasis away from the conscription tax to a different sort of equity issue: "economic conscription."

3. The AVF and Economic Conscription

Draft-era deferments caused the nation's lower classes to assume a large portion of the conscription burden. It has been said that today's all-volunteer military perpetuates the problem by "economically conscripting" those who are less-skilled and have minimum employment prospects. [Ref. 9:p. 143]

The phenomenon of economic conscription can produce unsettling results. It is accepted that most young people will not select the military as a first choice of employment. It follows, then, that individuals with more job alternatives will opt to shun the military and let the defense burden fall upon those who have narrower job choices. [Ref. 13:p. 81] According to John Kester, this has resulted in a manning policy that displays class-based discrimination [Ref. 6:p. 299]. A perception of class-based discrimination resulting from economic conscription can contribute to the problem of social imbalance. If the AVF becomes viewed as an employer of last resort for the poor and disadvantaged, white middle-class youths may forego the armed forces as a legitimate and realistic job alternative. [Ref. 7:p. 143]

Additionally, some scholars have raised the issue of the "tipping effect." This is a situation in which the percentage of minorities becomes so

high that whites are no longer willing to enter military service. In effect, "the more the armed forces become disproportionately composed of the poor and minorities, the greater is the likelihood they will stay that way." [Ref. 7:p. 144]

D. WILL AMERICANS SUPPORT A PEACETIME DRAFT?

In a democracy, the survival of public policy depends on popular acceptance. As a result, *any* plan for returning to a peacetime draft must be developed within the framework of political and societal perceptions—perceptions that are deeply rooted in the past.

The next three chapters expand upon the ideas presented here. Chapter II examines the European military experience, because many of American military beliefs have their beginnings in Europe. Chapter III begins with a discussion of the major philosophical influences that have helped to shape this country's civil-military relations. The European experiences discussed in Chapter II are then used to trace the American military tradition from the seventeenth to the twentieth-century.

Chapter IV shifts the focus from the past to the present and discusses some of the current issues that affect the political feasibility of a return to a draft.

II. EUROPEAN MILITARY INFLUENCE

The modern professional armies of Western Europe emerged from the post feudal institutions created in the eighteenth-century by the absolute monarchies. The military institutions of the United States were deeply influenced by these developments. [Ref. 7:p. 71]

It has been said that today's events are constrained by the customs formed in the past [Ref. 14:p. XX]. This fact, combined with the role Europe played in creating and populating this nation, makes the study of the European military experience highly instructive. This chapter begins with an overview of the evolution of the citizen-soldier concept in Europe from the fifteenth-century through the French Revolution. The chapter then examines the writings of two famous military theorists who have influenced American military thought.

A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER

...military institutions have been of central importance in fashioning the type of nation-states that emerged in Western Europe and the United States. The role of the military is linked to nationalism; in fact, the armed forces of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries epitomize modern nationalism [Ref. 7:p. 74].

This chapter addresses three questions:

- What are the ways that the compositions of early European societies are reflected in the organization of their armed forces?

- What are the roles of nationalism and of citizenship in the evolution of the citizen-soldier concept and, ultimately, in the formation of political democracies?

- How have the writings of Jomini and Clausewitz shaped the "American" approach toward military service?

Studies of nationalism often begin with the French Revolution of 1789. Observers view this "people's revolution" as the beginning of the fusion of a government and its people, and the emergence of modern nation states as we know them. It is this unity that serves as the very essence of nationalism. To appreciate the scope of political change caused by the French Revolution, however, it is necessary to be aware of the military-citizenship connection preceding the conflict.

1. Feudal Armies

Prior to the French Revolution, war was primarily a struggle between rulers rather than a contest between peoples [Ref. 15:p. 91-92]. The organization of armies reflected this separation between rulers and their subjects. Military duty was restricted to a narrow class of landholding knights who regarded military service as the price to be paid for accepting land from their overlord [Ref. 16:p. 15]. The harnessing of broad social energy, which was to prove pivotal to the success of future European and American armies, was not present in the feudal military systems. Subjects (as opposed to citizens) did not have a stake in the success or failure of their social organization, and thus were not called upon to defend it.

During this period, a strict value system and legal standard bound soldiers together [Ref. 16:p. 13]. This strict code of honor would change with the rise of the moneyed economy, a change which heralded the end of the feudal order and permanently altered systems of military service.

2. Sixteenth-Century Florence

a. *The Moneyed Economy*

Beginning in sixteenth-century Europe, governments began accepting money payments in lieu of actual military service. The use of dollars rather than "duty" as a means of inducing service gave rise to a new type of soldier: the mercenary. The use of financial incentives to encourage military service broadened the recruiting base. Monetary incentives also changed the "type" of soldier by attracting men who were not tied to the feudal military traditions [Ref. 16:p. 14]. Armies were now manned by "adventurers and ruffians who wanted wealth and plunder." [Ref. 16:p. 14] The soldiers of this period were not representative of society; in fact, "in the most civilized parts of Europe, such as Italy, people looked with contempt on soldiers and soldiering." [Ref. 16:p. 15]

Concurrent with the growth of the mercenary defense force was the rise of the middle class. It is the development of the moneyed class that forever extinguished feudal life and served as the beginning of the military service-citizenship connection. For it is with the rise of the middle class that the notion of citizenship began to develop. Slowly, individuals began to connect their personal well-being with the prosperity of the state.

b. *The Beginnings of a Modern Political-Military Bond*

The writings of Machiavelli, Florence's great statesman and political philosopher, characterize the revolutionary social, political, and military changes that occurred during the sixteenth-century. Machiavelli espoused the "close connection and interrelationship between political and military institutions" [Ref. 16:p. 27], and was one of the first individuals to

recognize the tie between "the changes that occurred in military organizations and the revolutionary developments that took place in the social and political sphere." [Ref. 16:p. 11]

Recognizing the political-military link, Machiavelli attempted to connect more closely the political and military institutions of his time. He advocated conscription in an attempt to eliminate Florence's dependance on hired soldiers. Machiavelli also led the organizations of militia.

One of Machiavelli's most important insights was derived from his study of the ancient Romans and Greeks. He asserted that "the defense of a state [is] the task not of a special privileged group but should be the concern of all those who live in the same society." [Ref. 16:p. 29] Perhaps, it was this sixteenth-century philosopher who was the first to conceptualize "representation" as a measure of an army's political legitimacy.

3. The "Ancien Regime"

a. *The Dynastic State*

Although Florentine armies showed the beginnings of the rise of the political-militar · connection, the eighteenth-century armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia remained limited by their dynastic form of government. Because the aristocratic class held great power, rulers of this period could never fully harness the productive energies of their states. The military power of the privileged class was evidenced by its almost exclusive control over officer commissions. [Ref. 15:p. 92] This influence severely limited the recruitment base. In fact, during this period, "Officers...[had] to come from a hereditary class that rarely exceeded two percent of the population." [Ref. 15:p. 92] The societies of the"Ancien Regime" were characterized by a split between the

government and its people. Indeed, "between populations as a whole and their governments little feelings existed." [Ref. 15:p. 92] According to R. R. Palmer, a noted historian, the government's expectations of their people (as opposed to citizens) reflected this lack of unity. The peasants were expected to pay taxes and display a measure of loyalty to their rulers. The masses were *not* expected to display "unity as a nation...or to put forth a supreme effort in war." [Ref. 15:p. 92] The government was expected to leave the masses to their own devices, be it a time of peace or war. [Ref. 15:p. 92]

The armies of this period mirrored the class-conscious societies they protected. The military was organized according to social status. Officers identified with their noble heritage and sought "honor...glory or ambition" rather than military effectiveness. [Ref. 15:p. 92] The social status of rank-and-file soldiers and soldiering was reflected in recruiting tactics, which focused upon drawing men from the lowest sectors of the nation. Basically, soldiers were looked upon with contempt and were thought incapable of believing in or fighting for something bigger than themselves. [Ref. 15:p. 92]

b. *Prussia*

The eighteenth-century saw Frederick the Great rise to power. It also witnessed the birth of a Prussian state as a great power in Europe. Prussia is of particular interest because its very existence depended upon military strength [Ref. 15:p. 97].

The extensive writings of Frederick the Great offer the opportunity for an in-depth analysis of the Prussian military-political regime. His work is especially relevant, because, in addition to being the *best* army of

the"ancien regime," the Prussian military is thought to best exemplify the social characteristics of the time [Ref. 1:p. 46].

Study of Prussia's armed forces demonstrates how an army can mirror the nation's social order. Indeed, it shows how, given the social constraints of the time, "long service by conscripted or volunteer peasants, foreigners, and adventurers [and] leadership by a cast of Nobels—[makes] sense." [Ref. 1:p. 49]

As with other dynastic regimes, the Prussian state was characterized by a political schism between the ruling and working classes. Soldiers felt no great identification with the state and had to be controlled by regimentation and exacting discipline. This highly regimented fighting force required years of training, making long periods of service (ten to twelve years) a military necessity. [Ref. 1:pp. 46, 49]

This lack of unity between a state and its people had an influence on the Prussian strategy for fighting wars. Frederick realized his troops did not possess a higher sense of purpose that would carry them through a war of attrition. As a result, it was felt that protracted combat had to be avoided at all cost. [Ref. 15:p. 102]

Staffing of the Prussian army reflects a combination of the economic and political realities of the time. As with other armies serving dynastic governments, the Prussian military was characterized by a rigid class structure. The Officer Corps was composed of the aristocratic class because "peasants were clearly too ignorant to become officers." [Ref. 15:p. 97] It was also believed that, unlike lower classes, men of privilege could be trusted to protect the ruling order [Ref. 1:p. 50].

17

In eighteenth-century Prussia the middle class was usually exempted from military duty. In fact, "merchants, artisans and manufacturers" [Ref. 1:p. 46] were specifically excluded from service. Frederick realized the importance of a strong economy to the success of a military state and believed the talents of the middle class could best be exploited by their contributions to national wealth. Since Frederick believed only one percent of the population could be drawn into military duty without hurting the economy, he was forced to look to other sources for his military manpower. [Ref. 1:p. 120]

Frederick's choice of foreign mercenaries as his manpower resource further cemented the separation between the soldier and the government. By 1786, the proportion of foreign soldiers filling Prussian ranks had risen to more than 40 percent of the force [Ref. 1:p. 45]. It would be unrealistic to expect this type of force to fight out of political will or civic pride. When the patriotic fire of the French revolutionary force is compared to a mercenary force, it becomes easy to appreciate the true "revolution" in warfare introduced by the French in 1789.

4. The French Revolution

The modern concept of the citizen-soldier was made a reality with the French Revolution. To the French political philosophers of the time, "the theme of the citizen army was a common doctrine;" and "as a safeguard against tyranny, the citizens of a country must be trained to arms." [Ref. 15:p. 107] The "people's war" exemplifies the powers of nationalism, the joining of the political wills of a government and its people. It is this act of unity that allows political institutions to legitimately demand the services of the nation's citizen-soldiers and thus harness the tremendous energy of a people

18

committed to their country. This energy was captured in revolutionary France with the introduction in 1793 of the *levee en masse*, "which provided for the conscription of all unmarried men age 18 to 25, without exception or substitution." [Ref. 1:p. 50] The *levee en masse* ensured broad-based participation in the new military and sent a clear message to the world about the strong political will of the French republic.

The *levee en masse* of 1793 revealed the beginnings of a modern citizen-soldier. Now a soldier's

> ...interests could be expressed in national rather than dynastic terms [it is with this] willingness to accept huge casualties, and the freedom and enthusiasm of the individual soldier...[that]...the state was able as never before to exploit the energies of society for war. [Ref. 17:p. 32]

Palmer underscores the significance of the French Revolution by stating that "the military revolution was at bottom a political revolution." [Ref. 15:p. 119] According to Palmer, the strong identity of a people with their nation was the power behind the war's success. Since the government was formed by the citizenry, the political leadership had a tremendous license, unlike dynastic rulers, to fully exploit *all* of the country's resources. In Palmer's eyes, with the French Revolution, "the wars of kings were over" and "the wars of peoples had begun." [Ref. 15:p. 119]

The modern concept of the citizen-soldier was born with the French Revolution. The modern concept of the *study* of war was born of two nineteenth-century military men, Karl von Clausewitz and Henri, Baron de Jomini.

B. JOMINI AND CLAUSEWITZ

The writings of Jomini and Clausewitz, still influence modern-day military thought. As a result, a review of their work will help to understand the current American perceptions of military service.

1. Jomini

Jomini's military theories have exercised great influence upon the formation of the American attitude toward war and strategy. For, "it was Jomini not Clausewitz, that American soldiers of the nineteenth-century read as the foremost interpreter of war." [Ref. 3:p. 57]

Although Jomini does not specifically address military manning issues, his thoughts on war in general are pertinent to studies of military manning policy. It is widely known that the method of fighting a war often dictates the type and amount of required manpower.

Jomini's basic premise was "that strategy is the key to warfare; that all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles." [Ref. 19:p. 146] With his dependance upon clinical, carefully planned military strategy, Jomini removed political and social considerations from the military arena. In Jomini's view, the "new" way of fighting, displayed by the power of the French Revolution, was diminished in deference to the scientifically-superior notion of strategy. [Ref. 18:p. 145]

The Jominian approach to civil-military relations was appealing to American professional soldiers. In total contrast to Clausewitz (discussed below), Jomini advocated a separation between political and military leadership. Jomini provided "good arguments against strict [military] subordination

20

to political authority." [Ref. 18:p. 161] In Jomini's view, war-fighting *and* planning should be left to soldiers, not to politicians [Ref. 18:p. 161].

2. Clausewitz

The Clausewitzian approach to war stands in complete contrast to that of Jomini. Where Jomini viewed the study of war as a quantifiable science, Clausewitz likened its abstractness "with the study of painting; both concern activities that demand specific technical expertise, but whose processes and outcome are not predictable." [Ref. 17:p. 187]

War, according to Clausewitz, went far beyond strategy to encompass violence and the passion of the people, military talent and determination, and, finally, politics. In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz did not advocate the transfer of political leadership to military professionals in time of war. Rather, Clausewitz tasked the government with capturing the political will of the people and the army with carrying out that political will [Ref. 17:p. 201]. Clausewitz's famous statement that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means," [Ref. 17:p. 197] typifies his view that war is essentially a political rather than a military act. [Ref. 17:p. 206]

Clausewitz's assertion that "the passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people" [Ref. 17:p. 395] helps to explain the ideological component of the current draft-revival issue. Some scholars fear that the AVF may not represent a broad cross-section of the country's social and political "passion," and they consequently question its ability to fight a war. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk addresses this point in his assessment of the Vietnam experience.

We never made an effort to create a war psychology in the United States during the Vietnam affair....We tried to do in cold blood perhaps what can only be done in hot blood, when sacrifices of this order are involved. [Ref. 1:p 107]

Critics of the AVF worry that a voluntary system of military service cannot effectively tap the "hot blood" of the citizenry and thus continue their efforts to revive compulsory service.

C. SUMMARY

This chapter explains the evolution of European armies from the fifteenth-century to the French Revolution. An understanding of the evolutionary process is important because this nation's forefathers were greatly influenced by Europe's military experiences. The next chapter traces the philosophical component and the history of the"American" military experience. The study is conducted in an effort to better understand the current social forces that will influence public acceptance or rejection of a peacetime draft.

III. THE AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE

A. WILL "TRADITION" PROMPT ACCEPTANCE OF A DRAFT?

Political leadership can often turn to the concept of "tradition" when seeking to solve a difficult social problem. Unfortunately, policy makers do not have the luxury of calling on "tradition" to settle issues of military service. This is because study of an American military experience ultimately reveals that this country doesn't have one. In fact the *only* tradition of military service this country does possess is a legacy of controversy. This controversy is described by Russell Weigley, the respected military historian, as follows:

> The great structural question throughout most of the history of American military policy was that of the proper form of military organization in a democratic society, approached through the running debate over the proper weights to give to citizen-soldiers and military professionals in the armed forces of the United States. [Ref. 14:p. XX]

B. BACKGROUND

The United States has always remained loyal to the notion of the "minuteman," a citizen ready to bear arms in a time of crisis. In fact, the American and French revolutions are credited with introducing the concept of "participation in armed conflict [as] an integral aspect of the normative definition of citizenship." [Ref. 4:p. 75] Historically, Americans have honored that military-citizenship connection during wartime. In fact, democracies, with their political fervor, are said to excel best in the fighting of an all-out war [Ref. 1:p. 114]. It is the absence of a clear warfighting objective that leads many Americans to question the need for compulsory service.

This chapter now turns to the ideological considerations that have shaped our views of military service. Major episodes in American military history are then discussed in an effort to understand how Americans have traditionally reconciled these conflicting ideological positions with the concept of military service.

C. LIBERALISM

The fact that "liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States" [Ref. 19:p. 143] has complicated America's views towards military service. Liberalism, which is characterized by devotion to individual liberties, civil control of the military, and aversion to standing armies, does not offer ideological guidance for the creation of a strong defense policy. [Ref. 12:p. 57]

Typically, Americans have been able to temper their natural tendencies towards liberalism with a realistic stance on national defense. This realism is exemplified by the country's persistent attempts to strike a balance between the professional and citizen-soldier concepts. [Ref. 14:p. 134]

American political and social practicality, combined with its uniquely Anglo-Saxon affinity for volunteerism, have helped offset liberalism and provide tools with which to develop military policy [Ref. 1:p. 139]. This practically is manifested by the willingness to strike a political compromise and, in times of crisis, to sacrifice personal needs and liberties for the preservation of the nation. [Ref. 12:p. 57]

Perhaps, as scholars have observed, Americans have reconciled the ideals of liberalism with the needs for a strong *wartime* military. Yet, the controversy surrounding efforts to reinstate a peacetime draft, demonstrate

24

the fundamental incompatibility of liberal politics with compulsory service [Ref. 1:p. 134]

1. The Legacy of Liberalism

Samuel Huntington, in his famous work, *The Soldier and the State*, explains the durability of liberalism by asserting its persistence "was the product not of inheritance [from the British], but of economic expansion and international isolation." [Ref. 19:p. 145] Unlike this nation's European counterparts, the United States has not had to confront radical political theories brought on by class struggle. The United States has been able to achieve social peace, not by military force, but by allowing its citizens to gain from an ever-growing economy. As a result of economic expansion, the United States has rarely had to grapple with the proper role of a military force in a democratic society. In addition, people believed geographic isolation shielded the nation from foreign intervention and thus eliminated the need for a strong army. [Ref. 19:pp. 144-145]

Liberalism's inability to understand the military function has resulted in a historical neglect of a coherent military strategy. Prior to 1950, with the exception of the naval strategies of Alfred Thayer Mahan, American strategic writers tended to focus upon the proper role of the citizen and professional soldier and ignored questions concerning the army's overall purpose. [Ref. 14:pp. XIV, XX]

2. Conscription's Reconciliation With Liberalism

Traditionally, advocates of conscription have attempted to reconcile the liberal concept of individual choice with the requirements for mandatory service in a number of ways. One view draws an analogy between compulsory

military service and a citizen's obligation to pay taxes or to attend school. However, opponents to this point of view argue that paying taxes and attending school are far different from serving in the military, since they do not involve the risk of one's life. [Ref. 1:p. 139]

Advocates of the draft also claim that political leadership has an inherent right to force citizens to serve in the military, whenever it sees the need for such service. According to this argument, since the leaders of a country represent the interests of *all* citizens in a democracy, a political decision to require military service is legitimate and does not violate the ideological constraints of a liberal society. [Ref. 11:p. 69]

As Huntington observes, America's devotion to liberalism heightens the controversy surrounding military duty. [Ref. 19:p. 143] The remainder of the chapter traces this country's military experiences to determine how the United States has typically addressed conflicting views of military service.

D. THE EARLY AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERIENCE

1. The Limits of European Influence

Chapter II outlined the social and political factors that shaped the organization of European military forces. These experiences were drawn upon, as this nation's earliest leaders tried to fashion military policy. Although the lessons learned from the development of Western European armies were instructive, they were *not* the only influence on the American approach to war. From the beginning, America's war for survival dictated different military objectives [Ref. 14:p. 19]. This is in contrast with prevailing European methods, designed to preserve the existing social order. As previously observed, seventeenth-century Europe was characterized by dynastic

26

rulers who maintained a rigid social structure. Leaders of this period were bound by honor and tradition to maintain the social and political order created by their ancestors. Wars were waged by these rulers not so much to destroy their opponents, but to gain a particular advantage. The extent to which resources were used in combat were constrained by a desire to maintain the current political and social system. As a result, European warfare in the century prior to the French Revolution is characterized as *limited*. [Ref. 14:p. 18]

The determination to maintain an aristocratic social system differentiates the European techniques for warfighting from the American approach during this period. While European dynastic rulers sought to preserve their aristocratic existence, seventeenth-century American Indian fighters were attempting to control new lands and carve out a new way of life. The Indian wars were "total," since they truly were wars of survival. Indeed, "in King Philip's War of 1675-1676, the Indians came fearfully close to obliterating the New England settlements." [Ref. 14:p. 19]

2. The Armed Citizenry

The seventeenth-century Indian wars played an important role in shaping the early American approach to military service. Achieving victory in a war of this type required the arming of all able citizens. One of the most enduring of American military traditions was born: the concept of an armed citizenry, or "citizen-soldiers."

The early successes enjoyed by these armed citizen-soldiers resulted in a feeling of invincibility. The might of the armed citizenry became almost mythical, and Americans became convinced "their country needed no

professional army, because American citizens could whip any professional soldiers on earth." [Ref. 3:p. 8] This perception of the absolute invincibility of an armed citizenry complicated Washington's efforts to form a professional force, and it continues to affect public attitudes toward defense needs to this day.

E. THE REVOLUTIONARY YEARS

Popular legend depicts the American Revolution as a war fought and won with a patriotic, armed citizenry. In reality, the war was won with disciplined regulars, professional soldiers trained in European drill and tactics. This trained fighting force was the result of early decisions of

> ...Washington and the cautious men who shared military leadership with him [placing] their principle military reliance not on a mass rising but on the hope of building a professional army comparable to the armies of Great Britain and France. [Ref. 3:p. 4]

Weigley suggests that traditional military forces were used because the American Revolution was in most ways a "traditional" type of war. He points out that, unlike the French Revolution which was to follow, the colonists' fight for freedom was not a war seeking to tear down a political way of life. The American Revolution "desired only independence and self-government, not an upheaval toppling established patters of lift." [Ref. 3:p. 4]

Washington sought to wage a "traditional" war by creating a "European-style" army. His army was different from the usual European professional force, however, in that it sought to capitalize on the political energies of future revolutionary armies. Officers were trained in the traditional military

methods; but they were also drawn from the same social strata as the rank and file, thus promoting positive morale.

F. BEYOND THE REVOLUTION

1. The Debate Begins

With the war for Independence won, the young country began to debate identical issues of military organization that are still being discussed today: what should be the proper balance that a democratic government should strike between a professional and citizen-supported fighting force?

The discussion was influenced by two conflicting military legacies drawn from the Revolution. The war had been fought and won with two different military strategies: a traditional, conservative approach and a radical, revolutionary method. The conservative approach resulted in the formation of trained, professional soldiers. At the same time, the revolutionary tact called for the arming of the citizenry and the creation of a nation-in-arms. *Both* strategies contributed to the overall success of the war, a fact that has often been overlooked by post-war debaters. [Ref. 3:p. 8-9] More often than not, little common ground could be drawn between the advocates of either view, because "those two favored one method often saw little merit in the other." [Ref. 3:p. 9]

2. A Proper Balance

George Washington and the Professional Force

General Washington had served as the professional soldier's strongest advocate during the American Revolution. However, following the war, political and social realities forced Washington to temper his views and "endorse a popular militia and the principle of a nation in arms." [Ref. 3:p. 11]

Washington realized that the challenges of maintaining a standing army after the revolution were enormous. Achieving freedom had severely taxed the military sentiments of a population now intent on preserving their hard-won independence. The government's funds, as well as its political influence, were extremely limited, making a professional force highly impractical. More important, the sentiments against a standing force remained extremely high. [Ref. 14:p. 41] To many Americans, fielding a force of professional soldiers was too "British." In addition, many individuals questioned the wisdom of suffering through a revolution only to recreate a climate of military domination [Ref. 3:p. 17].

A widespread feeling of military invincibility strengthened the commitment of America's founding fathers to an armed citizenry instead of a standing army. In the eyes of these Americans, the notion of bearing arms was a matter of duty not of privilege. Furthermore, they believed an armed populace was the best defense against tyrannical government as well as foreign intervention. For these reasons, Americans chose to overlook Washington's criticisms of an untrained militia. Rather, they elected to believe that an army of average citizens had defeated the world's most powerful nation. [Ref. 3:p. 18]

Washington still sought to create a small standing army of 2,631 officers and enlisted men, supplemented by a militia of citizen-soldiers. He did not believe such a military could compete with the more professional European forces. Instead, Washington planned to draw upon the energy of the citizenry in a time of national crisis. According to Washington:

It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defence of it. [Ref. 3:p. 12]

Supporters of conscription often called upon Washington's words to demonstrate that America's forefathers were devoted to a citizen-soldier fighting force. In reality, Washington would later qualify his views regarding the merits of a militia, stating that he

...glided almost insensibly into what I thought *would*, rather than what I conceived *ought* to be a proper peace Establishment for this Country. [Ref. 3:p. 13]

3. Alexander Hamilton

Edward Meed Earle writes that Alexander Hamilton "probably did more than any other single person to formulate the early national policies of the United States." [Ref. 20:p. 231] Much of Hamilton's life was spent lobbying for a professional fighting force. Hamilton's devotion to a standing army was based on his recognition of the connection between "commercial, financial and industrial strength on the one hand, and political and military strength on the other." [Ref. 20:p. 217] In his *Report on Manufacturers*, printed in 1791, Hamilton offers his views on a wide range of political, economic, and military topics. Hamilton believed that economic power was the key to the country's success and would serve to cement the country's diverse regional interests. A strong economy, in Hamilton's view, would be able to supply a strong military. A strong military would, in turn, allow the country to "choose peace or war as our interest guided by justice shall dictate." [Ref. 20:p. 238]

4. Universal Liability to Service

The passage of the Militia Act of 1792 codified the government's decision to use an "armed citizenry" instead of a professional military. The act called for universal military service by all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 60. At first glance, it appeared that the concept of universal service would apply to all sectors of early American society. In reality, class privilege came into play, even at this early point in the country's history. Failure to drill at muster resulted in a monetary fine. A fine, as it turned out, that only the more affluent could afford to pay [Ref. 3:p. 38].

5. The Military as a Necessity for National Defense

The passage of the Militia Act actually provided an opportunity for Washington and Alexander Hamilton to launch a counterattack. In their efforts to renew interest in a professional force, these two men would change the fundamental manner in which Congress viewed the use of armed force. [Ref. 14:p. 22] Prior to the French Revolution, American political leadership viewed the military as a police force, organized to control border conflicts with Indian fighters. The increase in France's military power and political adventurism following the 1789 revolution began to reshape the American view. Increasingly, France became viewed as a threat to the new world. Alexander Hamilton took stock of world events and convinced Congress that the United States' military was no match for the well-disciplined French force. As a result of his efforts, Congress began to view the army as a necessity for defense against foreign invaders. Hamilton took advantage of this new outlook by proposing the use of a standing army, supported by an easily expandable force of militiamen. [Ref. 3:p. 23]

6. The Citizen-Soldier

Thomas Jefferson's plan for the nation's military reflected his strong belief in the importance of the citizen-soldier. In his eyes, "a well-disciplined militia [is] our best reliance in peace, and for the first moments of war." [Ref. 3:p. 27] It is important to note that Jefferson intended to create a nation of soldiers rather than an unarmed state. "Every citizen a soldier" [Ref. 19:p. 4] is a Jeffersonian concept. Although Jefferson opposed a large standing army, he still believed the young country should have a well-trained force. Under the Jefferson administration, the United States Military Academy (West Point), was created.

7. West Point

West Point during the 1880's reflected the general view that an officer should be well-schooled in scientific principles. Borrowing heavily from Jomini, West Point stressed technical and scientific skills in war. Rather than being identified as a military school, West Point became recognized as one of the foremost civil engineering schools in the country. Weigley observes that West Point had to turn to engineering excellence as a means of self-defense:

> In a country not immediately imperiled by foreign enemies and jealous of standing armies, the academy had to justify itself by preparing officers who could do useful work in peace, so it became largely a school of civil engineering. [Ref. 14:p. 8]

Other scholars offer other reasons for the engineering focus. Military strategy at this time demanded the construction of coastal forts to ensure seaboard defense.

E. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

1. The War of 1812

The war of 1812 is considered by some to have been nothing more than an attempt by the United States to expand its revolution and acquire control of Canada and the Floridas [Ref. 12:p. 48]. Regardless of the intent of the conflict, it served to foreshadow the government's future difficulties with conscription and also demonstrated the problems that can be encountered when a nation's political goals do not match its military organization [Ref. 14:p. 46].

The proponents of a citizen-soldier militia were committed to an economical, defense-oriented military structure. Indeed, this system, more than any other, guaranteed economy and civil control. What the system did *not* provide was a means of effectively waging an offensive conflict, such as the war of 1812. In fact, the separation of civil-military control during this period resulted in the political leadership's failure to communicate the government's military objectives to the military leadership. [Ref. 14:pp. 46-47]

President Madison's request for the authority to draft 400,000 men marked the United States' first attempt to use conscription. The request was never formally answered because the war ended while the bill was still being debated in Congress. [Ref. 12:p. 48]

2. The Pre-Civil War Years

In the years preceding the Civil War, government policy toward the military was characterized by indifference. There was no identifiable threat to the country, and the nation's principal defenders, the militia, were allowed to degenerate into little more than social clubs. [Ref. 19:p. 202] As a result of

the apparent federal disinterest, the small cadre of professional officers began to distance itself from the civilian sector. This withdrawal produced an officer corps that was unprepared for the tremendous demands of the Civil War. West Pointers of this period were highly trained in the narrow technical aspects of artillery and fortification, but were unfamiliar with the requirements for leading an armed citizenry (a type of soldiering they viewed with contempt). [Ref. 3:p. 76]

a. Southern Military Tradition

Although most sectors of the nation viewed the military with apathy and indifference, the Southern states did develop a strong military tradition of service. This was the result of the South's unique need for defense against the Indians as well as the prevalent fear of slave revolts. In addition, the South's interest in military tradition reflected the conservative leanings of its residents. [Ref. 19:pp. 211-212]

3. The Civil War

The enormous difference between the approaches of the North and South to civil-military relations became obvious in the early days of the Civil War. While the North chose to draw its military leadership from the civilian sector, Southern states turned to the military professional. In fact, 64 percent of regular Southern army officers became generals, compared with 30 percent of Northern army officers. [Ref. 19:p. 213]

The Civil War propelled the Northern and Southern armies into a new type of conflict; that being a war whose purpose was the total destruction of the enemy. As Grant's "semi-official biographer" [Ref. 14:p. 150] observed:

It was indispensable to annihilate armies, and resources; to place every rebel force where it had no alternative but destruction or submission. [Ref. 14:p. 128]

Such a war would require the United States to call upon, for the first time, the concepts of a mass army and nationalism that were born of the French Revolution. [Ref. 14:pp. XXI, 132]

By definition, a mass army must field many soldiers. Initially, the North depended upon the strong, voluntary ethic that is part of the liberal outlook to provide the necessary manpower. For, although "liberal states find military compulsion repugnant..., at the same time they elevate the virtues of military volunteerism." [Ref. 12:p. 137] At the beginning of the war, volunteerism did provide the required amount of manpower. As the war continued, however, desertion, disease, and casualties prompted a reluctant President Lincoln to initiate the nation's first draft law, the Enrollment Act of 1863. [Ref. 12:p. 49]

4. Lincoln and Conscription

Lincoln made no effort to attach any cloak of justice to the draft. He deemed it "involuntary servitude," and said:

> You who do not wish to be soldiers, do not like this law. This is natural; nor does it imply want of patriotism. [Ref. 1:pp. 138-139]

Lincoln's distaste for the draft is evidenced by his views on substitution and commutation. He believed that the basic principles of commutation (where a fee is paid to the government) and substitution (where a draftee can hire a replacement) were a "good thing," [Ref. 1:p. 143] even though they resulted in four-fifths of draftees avoiding service. [Ref. 1:p. 143] Public dissatisfaction with the draft resulted in serious rioting and violence in several

cities. The strength of public resistance eventually required the imprisonment of dissenters and the subsequent removal of the right of habeas corpus. Clearly, the nation was yet to determine a socially-acceptable means of fielding a mass army. [Ref. 12:p. 49]

5. "Business Pacifism"

The years following the Civil War were characterized by "the complete, unrelenting hostility of virtually all of the American community toward virtually all things military." [Ref. 19:p. 227] Some historians characterize this period as the lowest period in this country's military history, while others say it is a period in which America's professional corps came into being [Ref. 19:p. 229].

The social philosophy of the period was dominated by the concept of "business pacifism," which viewed a military institution as its natural enemy. Huntington calls it the "only explicit theory of civil-military relations produced by American liberalism." [Ref. 19:p. 222] Business pacifists were strongly committed to capitalism as the cure to world problems. In their eyes, countries were being so closely joined by economic interests that the thought of jeopardizing these interests by armed conflict was unthinkable. To these individuals, war was evil and, even worse, wasteful. Moreover, war fighters destroyed the fruits of capitalism and then lived off the labors of society when the war was over. [Ref. 19:pp. 220-224]

6. Emory Upton

In response to the civil community's animosity, the army withdrew to develop its own brand of military professionalism. Emory Upton became one of the principal champions of the military professional's cause. Upton's

book, *The Military Policy of the United States*, was published during this post-war period and is still considered a classic study of American military history [Ref. 3:p. 109]. The basic premise of the book voiced "the feelings of many professionals that the regular army must be the center of American military planning." [Ref. 3:p. 109] Upton sought to base the structure of the armed forces on the concept of an expendable army, first articulated by Alexander Hamilton. The program, which called for a large regular force to be augmented by conscripts in wartime, never gained popular acceptance.

The reasons why Upton's plan failed to gain broad political support are still relevant. As Weigley observes, Upton attempted to fit American society into a particular mold of military service, rather than reshaping the armed forces to fit prevailing social beliefs [Ref. 3:p. 110]. Weigley concludes:

> Apparently [Upton] did not reflect that the best means of establishing an effective American military policy might be to study American society at large and to fashion *military institutions within its framework*. [Ref. 3:p. 110]

7. Altered Military-Civil Relations

This military leadership's withdrawal signaled yet another fundamental change in the country's civil-military relations. Prior to the Civil War, the values of the nation and its officers were mainly the same. Although the military did tend to lean toward a conservative ideology, the beliefs of its members were championed by the South, which also shared in the army's conservative outlook. With the demise of the South and the rise of pacifism, the army became even more conservative and isolated as society chose to follow a more liberal path. [Ref. 19:p. 257]

F. THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY

1. World War I

World War I marked the end of the government's reliance on volunteerism to provide wartime manpower. With the passage of the 1917 Selective Service Act, conscription became the official policy for manning the armed forced. Passage of the act was accompanied by significant public debate. Opponents of conscription said it was "not democratic, it is autocratic....it is despotic [it is] involuntary servitude." [Ref. 12:p. 50] Advocates countered by stating that "volunteering is haphazard, inefficient, disruptive of industrial and economic stability, wasteful, and operatively unequal in spreading the obligations of citizenship." [Ref. 12:p 51]

It is curious that the method in which World War I draftees were classified could be considered a more *equal* sharing of the military obligation. Male registrants were classified Category I through V, depending upon their worth (usually economic) to the civilian sector. Category I individuals were the least valued, so they were drafted first. Such a system, by its very composition, favored the more affluent members of society or those with more opportunity to be of greater "value" to society. It is not surprising, therefore, that the World War I draft system was overrepresentative of the poor and blacks. Indeed, while 9.6 percent of draft registrants were black, the induction figure stood at 13 percent. [Ref. 12:p. 51]

2. World War II

World War II had a major impact on American civil-military relations. During this conflict, massive mobilization of the population caused an intermingling of professional military and civilian factions. In the process,

military leaders were required to take on more of a national, political outlook, and join the country's ideological mainstream. [Ref. 19:p. 315]

Many liberals held a fundamental aversion to war; yet, during this national crisis, they chose to place the responsibilities of combat with the experts. National energies and resources were fully engaged to win the war. For the moment, the goals of the military and civilian community were one. [Ref. 19:p. 317]

a. Conscription

The legislation required to reinstate the selective service system was supported by the same arguments made to promote the World War I draft. While draft supporters sought to draw from the previous war's manpower mistakes and devise a coordinated plan to service both military and production needs, the opponents of conscription replayed the usual stance towards military service. The opinion of those opposed to conscription is captured in the words of Senator Robert Taft of Ohio:

> The draft...is absolutely opposed to the principles of individual liberty which have always been considered a part of American democracy. [Ref. 12:p. 53]

Taft's remarks were made in 1940, and were soon forgotten with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. One week after the Japanese attack, the ages for draft eligibility were extended from 18-31 years to 18-44 years. In 1943, to better control direct defense and industrial needs, volunteers were not longer accepted. This action institutionalized conscription, for the time being, as an American way of life. [Ref. 12:p. 54]

Except for a short period immediately following World War II, conscription remained in effect until it was replaced by the All-Volunteer Force in 1973. Although draft supporters continually stress conscription's appeal to traditional values, the Civil War, World War I, World War II and the 29 years or so that followed are the *only* episodes in which this country has maintained a conscripted force.

3. Post-War Military-Civil Relations

The United States emerged from World War II with a fundamentally changed view of the world. The Cold War forced civilian leaders to recognize "military requirements [as] a fundamental ingredient of foreign policy." [Ref. 11:p. 345] This realistic view of the world did not end the controversy surrounding the military's "proper" place in society, but rather "heightened...peacetime tension between military imperatives and American liberal society." [Ref. 11:p. 345] Post-World War II Americans may have accepted a peacetime military as "necessary," but they were not yet ready to consider it desirable.

4. Executive Order 9981

The post-World War II period also produced a fundamental change in the government's position on equal opportunity in the armed forces. In 1948 President Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The act stated:

> ...that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. [Ref. 11:p. 86]

The act had a far-reaching effect on the military as well as the nation. In fact, racial representation issues are still being addressed.

5. The Korean War

Unlike World War II, this country entered the Korean war with a draft system in place. The first part of the Korean war was fought with reservists, however, because, although draft registration was required, no one had been drafted since 1949. By 1952 draftees were shouldering the burden of the war.

Public dismay with the Korean war was equal to that evidenced during the Vietnam war, but it lacked the social resistance that characterized the later conflict. Public acceptance, however reluctant, was buttressed by the Cold War, the nature of the conflict, and by "the general acceptance of the draft...." [Ref. 1:p. 195] This "general acceptance" disintegrated with Vietnam.

6. Vietnam

Scholars are still attempting to assess the full impact of the Vietnam war on the United States and its people. Despite the continuing controversy, two points do arise from the war's legacy:

- the war completely altered the popular perception of military service [Ref. 10:pp. 50-57]

- conscripts may not be well suited for the fighting of limited, political wars [Ref. 1:p. 115].

a. Military Service

It has been said that the concept of civic virtue, the willingness of citizens to bear arms for the state, was "mindlessly, mendaciously, unforgivably squandered in Vietnam." [Ref. 10:p. 50] Whether the patriotism defining a citizen-soldier has been irreparably damaged remains to be seen. However, it can be said that widespread dissatisfaction with the conduct of

the war and its draft contributed to the demise of the Selective Service system and the creation of the All-Volunteer military. [Ref. 4:pp. 248-249]

b. *Conscripts and Political Wars*

Modern democracies are ill-suited for the fighting of political wars that have limited scope. This is due to the post-World War II erosion of nationalism. As a result of this erosion, men in democratic nations have increasingly based their willingness to fight on the moral purposes of the conflict. [Ref. 4:p. 243] The fighting of such conflicts are better left to a small cadre of professional soldiers who can weather a limited war's lengthy duration. France recognized this fact when fighting in Indochina; our experiences in Vietnam suggest that America has not. [Ref. 10:p. 5]

G. SUMMARY

This chapter shows liberalism, the dominant American political philosophy, is resistant to the ideal of compulsory peacetime military service. This chapter also indicates the United States has struggled with the "proper" system of military service since revolutionary times. It appears that drawing upon earlier military experiences will not predict present-day reaction to the idea of a new draft. Chapter IV will survey modern issues in an effort to answer the draft acceptability question.

IV. THE MODERN DEBATE

We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts [Ref. 12:p. 106]

President's Commission on
An All-Volunteer Force, 1970

An all-volunteer army would do serious injury to our national character because it would restrict service to those who make a career of the Army. One of the intangible things that makes citizenship understandable is that a multitude of Americans serve a short time in our military forces and then return to civilian life. This dual role places military and civilian responsibilities in a balanced perspective in our national life. [Ref. 7:p. 257]

Senator Sam J. Erwin, Jr., 1971

Throughout its history, the United States has struggled to balance its political and social needs and still maintain an effective system for filling the military's ranks. As Huntington observes, the basic issue remains:

How can a liberal society provide for its military security when this requires the maintenance of professional military forces and institutions fundamentally at odds with liberalism? [Ref. 19:p. 356]

A. THE CONTROVERSY OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Quantitatively-based analytical techniques have dominated both the creation and the subsequent monitoring of the AVF. This statement is supported by the most often cited criticism of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (or "Gates Commission"), the group tasked

with determining the feasibility of ending the draft. Specifically, the accusation is that "the Commission focused almost solely on pay and economics, to the exclusion of other, equally important considerations." [Ref. 12:p. 106] Commission supporters are quick to point out that the main objective was to assess the economic considerations of establishing all-voluntary recruiting [Ref. 12:p. 107]. As a result, according to Cooper (author of the influential, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*), "The social scientists did not play a particularly significant role in the debate or in the solution of the draft issue." [Ref. 12:p. 38]

In 1986 John Kester, writing in support of a return to the draft, observed that "what makes sense in narrow economic terms sometimes is not consistent with overall national security." [Ref. 6:p. 289] This thought, together with Senator Ervin's comments regarding citizen responsibility, illustrates some of the ideological concerns held by the critics of the AVF. What follows is an outline of the major issues that dominate current discussion of the citizen versus professional soldier debate.

1. The Fusion of a Government and Its People

Clausewitz points to the fusion of the government, the army, and the people as the key to defense effectiveness. It is this joining of the people's will with the army's might and the government's purpose that provides defense strength and military power. Thoughtful observers might question whether an army composed of only a narrow sector of society is properly harnessing the potential energy described in Clausewitz's triad.

The declining number of Congressmen who have served in the armed forces runs counter to the Clausewitzian view of closely knit civil-military relations. Thirty years ago almost all Congressmen (as a result of World War II) were veterans. More recently, the figures are 45 percent for the House and 69 percent in the Senate; and all indications are that the proportions will continue to decline. [Ref. 6:p. 304] Supporters of a draft are troubled by this decline in military experience because, as some scholars have observed, a leadership elite (like the Congress), lacking military experience will contribute to the isolation of the armed forces from society [Ref. 9:p. 245].

2. Society's Call to Serve

Open political systems typically are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand they attempt to ensure that individuals are allowed freedom of choice; at the same time, they must preserve this freedom of choice with a strong military presence that may require a call to arms. Philosophers have sanctioned society's right to compromise individual choice for the purpose of national defense in different ways.

a. *John Locke*

John Locke, writing nearly three-hundred years ago, introduced the concept of the social contract. According to Locke, there exists a political contract that ties a government and its people. Individual citizens ratify the contract by remaining a member of the political community and accepting the benefits of that community. Support for the government is demonstrated by obeying the government's laws. [Ref. 10:pp. 34-35] Believers in the military-citizenship connection claim that a natural extension of Locke's concept is the idea that

...military service flows naturally from residence, from acceptance of benefits, and from obedience to the laws, including those laws which determine who shall serve, for how long, where, when, and why. [Ref. 10:p. 35]

b. *Thomas Hobbes*

Thomas Hobbes, a contemporary of Locke's, took a different approach. According to Hobbes, societies are created out of mans need for self-preservation [Ref. 10:p. 42] In his view, the sole purpose of society is protection. As a result, *no* society can subject its citizens to fear or risk of life *except* in the case of military service. Military duty is considered different because

...when the defense of the Commonwealth requires at once the help of all that are able to bear arms, everyone is obliged; because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth, which they have not the purpose, or the courage to protect was in vain. [Ref. 10:p. 42]

c. *William Blackstone*

The British legal philosopher, William Blackstone, offered a succinct summary of society's right to demand military dues. Blackstone's support for the citizen-soldier concept was based on the view that a person does not stop being a citizen when he (or she) becomes a soldier but becomes a soldier *because* he is a citizen [Ref. 1:p. 123].

3. The Erosion of Popular Acceptance of a Call to Arms

a. *The Military Claim*

How can a democracy sanction a government program that effectively denies individuals the right to choose, even if only for a short, pre-determined period, their place of residence, their occupation, their working relationships, their manner of dress, their leisure pursuits, and their level of pay? Gold provides the answer by writing that the military claim is

...the legal demand which a democratic state, acting as the agent of its citizenry, may make upon that citizenry for service under arms in war and peace. [Ref. 10:p. 4]

For the most part, Americans have traditionally viewed this military claim as a just claim. The view has served to ease the social fallout created by the call to military service. However, in this century, popular acceptance has faltered to such a degree that

...for a generation now, the military claim has been commonly viewed as the essentially amoral...demand which the state makes upon an indifferent, alienated, or antagonistic citizenry. [Ref. 10:p. 4]

b. Nationalism

Linking ones personal well-being with the government's survival is the basis of nationalism. Janowitz uses the concept of nationalism to explain public acceptance of a call to arms. He also observes that nationalism, as "a rationale for universal military service, has suffered an important erosion." [Ref. 4:p. 245] He attributes this erosion to a number of factors. Today's military-eligible population is far removed from the military achievements of World War II (the last indisputably victorious war). Instead of focusing on the "good" that resulted from America's winning war effort, young people tend to focus on the utter destruction caused by the conflict [Ref. 4:p. 245]. As a result, war and nationalism (its social base) are increasingly viewed as evil. The growth in literacy, the rise in unemployment compensation and social security programs, increased exposure of college students to "radical" ideas, and the "hedonism and the importance of self-expression" [Ref. 4:p. 245] have also served to weaken the call to military service. [Ref. 4:p. 245]

c. *Channelling*

The channelling policy used during the Vietnam era draft also contributed to the erosion of the "military claim." Between 1955 and 1975, the number of military-eligible young men *more than doubled* [Ref. 12:p. 40]. Even with the demands of the Vietnam war, only 40 percent of the Vietnam-era, draft-eligible young men ever served [Ref. 1:p. 163]. (Contrast this figure with 70 percent of men who had served in 1958.) [Ref. 1:p. 163] To cope with the great *excess* of available manpower during this period, the Selective Service System began granting deferments and instituted the policy of "channelling." The Director of the Selective Service System defined channelling as

> That process through which registrants are influenced to enter and remain in study, critical occupations, and in other activities in the national health, safety, and interest by deferment or prospect for deferment from military service. [Ref. 1:p. 163]

This policy favored individuals who were able to attend college, shifting the burden of military service to the less fortunate. Channelling compromised the moral legitimacy of military service because it became viewed by government officials as "a useful threat rather than as an appeal to honor and duty." [Ref. 1:p. 164] Channelling, with its related deferments, would come to be viewed as highly unfair. Indeed, according to Cooper, "the equity issue...became the single most important factor in the move to end the draft." [Ref. 12:p. 40] These factors, combined with the elimination of the draft, help explain why certain segments of American society are opting to ignore the military and shun the "military claim."

4. The All-Volunteer Force

The quantitative approach to the organization of the armed forces changed the way government policies addressed military service. The Gates Commission observed that "conscription is a form of taxation, the power to conscript is the power to tax." [Ref. 1:p. 167] Thus, manpower became viewed as another resource for the military, another investment to be purchased along with tanks and battleships [Ref. 1:p. 168]. One scholar observes that the Commission projects the appearance of the view that "there is nothing elevated about military service, or indeed any kind of national service." [Ref. 1:p. 168] With the "economic" approach, manpower issues were driven by the level of pay needed to attract the necessary numbers of qualified "volunteers" as opposed to the values of civic duty and responsibility.

a. Institution Versus Occupation

The use of a market-based recruiting system further compromises the concept of citizen responsibility. Unlike the deeply-rooted appeal to the traditional values of civic duty, the AVF depends heavily upon monetary incentives to attract and retain personnel. Currently, the armed forces, rather than being viewed as a traditional "rite of passage," have evolved into another career option—just one of many job opportunities. This view is captured in the "institution versus occupation model" developed by Charles C. Moskos. [Ref. 5:p. 131]

5. Representation

The representation issue is based on the belief that, in a democratic society, government agencies should reflect the values and opinions of the people [Ref. 8:p. I-2]. Also basic is the belief that, in a society not requiring

military service by everyone, equity is achieved only when those who *do* serve represent a broad cross section of the eligible pool [Ref. 8:p. I-3]. In addition, it is felt that all citizens must shoulder an equal share of the country's defense requirements [Ref. 7:p. 27].

The United States military has never been a statistically representative, demographic image of the country [Ref. 8:p. IV-2]. To this day, a clear policy does not exist as to what constitutes "desirable" broad-based representation.

6. Defense Effectiveness

The lack of representation policy is evidenced by the Defense Department's recruiting objectives. The military services seek to organize *the most effective* fighting force. This is accomplished by recruiting the *most* qualified individuals without reference to "representative" demographic qualities. Admittedly, this type of recruiting does not lead to broad-based representation. What it does achieve, however, is a military force composed of the best applicants from the available pool, something most "analysts agree is beneficial to the Nation's defense." [Ref. 8:p. IV-3]

7. The Military as a Social Institution

This "best force possible" concept is countered by the unique status of the American peacetime military. One scholar observes, "as a public agency, the military cannot ignore overall societal responsibilities as long as these activities are not contrary to the defense mission." [Ref. 7:p. 59] In fact, in peacetime, the armed forces are often viewed more as a political, rather than a military institution. For this reason, individuals are willing to "accept

51

penalties in military efficiency in order to preserve military obligation as an integral part of citizenship." [Ref. 1:p. 68]

8.   Benefit Versus Burdens

Building a statistical representation plan is difficult, if not impossible, because of differing interpretations of military service. Statistical data is often brought out to show that one group or another is either underrepresented or overrepresented in today's force [see, for example, Ref. 8]. Nevertheless, opinions concerning the *need* for representation often hinge upon whether military duty is described as a "benefit" or a "burden." For example, individuals viewing military service primarily as an undesirable "burden," claim that overrepresented groups are forced to shoulder more than their "fair share" of defense responsibilities. At the same time, others may look at the "technical training, education, social development,...mobility [and] job experience" [Ref. 8:p. IV-3] offered by the military. In this light, military service constitutes a "benefit," an opportunity for personal development and economic progress. Individuals who believe in the "benefit" view question why this path to upward mobility should be denied to *any* qualified applicant based on demographic statistics.

9.   A Cross-Section of Citizens

a.   *Minorities*

Minority group membership is one of the most widely used measures of social representation; and overrepresentation of blacks is often cited as proof that the AVF has failed to draw from diverse segments of society [Ref. 12:p. 209]. Indeed, as some writers have suggested, "the AVF is not remotely representative of the United States." [Ref. 6:p. 297] This is

ironic, since the AVF was created to correct "the historically unrepresentative nature of the draft" [Ref. 12:p. 204].

Basically, the feeling is that the United States is a society that has left "...its dirtiest fighting [to be] done by some of its least privileged members." [Ref. 6:p. 298] If military service is considered a burden, the argument may have some merit. A recent government study indicates that racial/ethnic minorities constitute about 28.1 percent of new recruits, compared with 18 percent of the youth population. [Ref. 8:p. I-7]

10. Representation – A Dead Issue?

Recent public opinion polls indicate that Americans "are not generally concerned about the social composition of the current military." [Ref. 8:p. IV-5] In fact, as observed in Chapter I, 80 percent of Americans claim to be completely satisfied with the current voluntary recruiting system. Perhaps, in peacetime, those who ascribe to liberalism can accept a force that is not entirely "representative" of the population as long as maintenance of such a force does not jeopardize individual rights.

B. SUMMARY

This chapter demonstrates the variety and complexity of the issues that form the contemporary "American" view of military service. The wide-range of discussion raises the question whether *any* form of military service will achieve universal popular support.

V. CONCLUSION

Perhaps the worst system of military service is that which changes constantly....The difficult task, therefore is to devise a system that is not merely fair and effective, but durable as well.

Elliott C. Cohen [Ref. 1:p. 189]

A. THE MAJOR QUESTION

Chapter I asks: What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? This work has sought to place this question within the framework of the philosophical and historical issues that have helped to shape the nation's attitudes towards military service. This chapter answers the question of peacetime compulsory service, raises additional questions regarding military service, and then discusses a possible solution to one of the major criticisms of the AVF.

A major conclusion of the study is that *political acceptability of a peacetime draft in the United States is highly questionable*. This finding is based upon a variety of factors summarized below.

B. LIBERALISM

As discussed in Chapter III, the philosophy of liberalism has dominated this nation's political thought since the American Revolution. Liberalism *will* support the call to arms in time of crisis; but it remains generally devoted to the ideal of individual choice in peacetime. The current voluntary system of military manning preserves liberalism's tradition of individual choice. As a result, the revival of a draft will most likely provoke unrestrained hostility

among many in the country, especially the young and those who have a fading memory of the draft that preceded the war in Vietnam.

1. Vietnam

The Vietnam experience made challenges to the post-World War II draft socially acceptable, and perhaps, even socially desirable. Chapter III cites Philip Gold's assessment of the Vietnam war's impact on public acceptance of the draft. Gold states the conflict destroyed America's dedication to the notion of a citizen's unspoken responsibility to serve in the armed forces. Gold's claim may be somewhat overstated. The Vietnam war did not eliminate the patriotic desire to serve, but on another level the war did reinforce the public's resistance to conscription.

2. Public Satisfaction With the AVF

It has been noted time and again that the American public is pleased with the current system of military manning. Clearly, a peacetime society, dominated by liberalism and registering a high level of satisfaction with the current system will be reluctant to pursue other, less voluntary options.

C. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

The bulk of controversy surrounding the All-Volunteer system is based upon differing perceptions and value judgments. This situation obviously avoids easy solutions. The following questions address some of the major points that have dominated much of the AVF debate.

1. A Citizen's Duty to Serve

What are the limits of a citizen's responsibility to defend his or her country? Conscription advocates often respond to this question by referring to the military-citizenship link.

a. *Military-Citizenship Link*

Chapter II traces the development of the military-citizenship link. Machiavelli's view that a country's defense is the responsibility of *all* citizens embodies the notion that military service is one of the requirements of citizenship. Conscription advocates point to this service-citizenship tie; yet, as discussed in Chapter IV, the government's call to military service is increasingly viewed by the public as immoral and illegitimate. [Ref. 10:p.4]

(1) Discussion

Service to one's country is based upon an ideal of patriotism. Draft supporters have seized this concept and interpreted it narrowly by identifying the concept with a willingness to serve in the armed forces. While military service is indeed a noble expression of patriotic virtue, there are other ways of serving one's country. There are many socially beneficial public service jobs that are characterized by low pay, long hours, and high level of personal sacrifice. The belief that patriotism is manifested solely by military service cheapens the contributions made by those who have served their country in a civilian capacity.

The realities of a shrinking labor pool may also challenge the military-citizenship link. In an economy struggling to remain competitive in world markets, is military duty the most socially ideal option for *all*

individuals? Perhaps individuals who opt out of military duty to seek civilian opportunities are more valuable in that non-military capacity.

As mentioned in Chapter III, the Selective Service system was employed in both World Wars to ensure a steady flow of manpower to both the defense and manufacturing sector. Thus, even in a total war concept, policy makers realized the imprudence of requiring *all* individuals to serve. Would anyone question the patriotism of those who are charged with laboring in the production sector of the economy?

Thoughtful observers must also challenge the need for government leaders to possess military experience. At the highest levels of government, officials competently address a myriad of social issues of which they lack personal experience. Perhaps, in the purest of social systems, governmental military experience *is* desirable. This nation exists in a less than perfect world, however; so the question becomes whether this government should compel people to serve to fulfill an unnecessary but somewhat desirable social requirement.

2. Representation

Does the ideal of broad representation remain an important issue? Discussions of representation issues are quite complicated because the very concept of representation carries so many different meanings. To some observers, the issue is dominated by the ideal of political legitimacy.

a. A Legitimate Force

Chapter I introduces the concept of "political legitimacy." Proponents of this philosophy believe that a force must be broadly representative of society if the armed forces are to be considered a legitimate extension of the

government. Individuals from this school point to the current force's racial imbalance, and question its legitimacy as well as its reliability. To these individuals, a truly effective and reliable force should draw from a much wider cross-section of individuals who have a stake in the nation's survival.

b. *Clausewitz*

Some scholars have referred to the teachings of Clausewitz to address the representation issue. Chapter II discusses Clausewitz's belief in the people's "passion" as a powerful strategic weapon. Opponents of a voluntary military fear that the AVF, which has yet to prove itself under combat conditions, will be unable to effectively harness the country's political fervor.

c. *Minorities*

Race or ethnic background (as discussed in Chapter IV) is one of the *most* widely cited representation measures. Many measures indicate that the current force structure is "unrepresentative." The focus of discussion concerns whether this imbalance should be allowed to continue.

(1) Discussion

The overrepresentation of minority groups at the expense of white college-bound males, as discussed in Chapter I, brings into question the ideological leanings of the AVF. It would *appear* that a force comprised of the lower socioeconomic groups *would* have a different cultural frame of reference than would the more affluent members of society. The thought of a military system staffed by discontented soldiers *is* a sobering concept. As discussed in Chapter II, the political and military energy resulting from the fusion of a government, a military, and its people is a precious and reliable weapon. The questions of the need for ideological representation and whether

the current force structure satisfies that need remain to be answered. Yet, it would appear that the best system of military service would attract a broadly representative cross-section of the country's citizens.

D. SILENCING CRITICISM OF THE AVF

The United States has spend over two-hundred years attempting to devise a workable system of military service. In 1973, the All-Volunteer Force was heralded as *the* answer to the problem of armed forces manning. With minor changes, the voluntary force structure may very well be *the* answer.

The all-volunteer system depends upon market-based incentives to attract recruits. Manpower analysts must once again turn to the forces of the marketplace to attract the "right" kind of recruit. A definition of the "right" type of recruit is a political decision and will not be defined here except to state that, in a democracy, recruiting goals should strive to attract a socially representative cross-section of the nation's youth.

Moskos and Faris [Ref. 5] reflect the views of many scholars in their belief that educational benefits should be drastically upgraded to attract college-bound youths. In an age of soaring college tuition, a generous educational assistance program could serve to pull quality recruits into military service for limited periods. Enticing underrepresented youths into enlisting achieves the goal of "proportional participation" without the negativism attached to compulsory service.

Opponents of such a plan claim that short-service tours jeopardize the career force, which is the backbone of defense. Moskos and Faris, address this problem with their proposal of a dual path career track. [Ref. 5:pp. 143-146] Under this plan, citizen-soldiers serve in low-level jobs for shorter periods at a

reduced level of pay. This is done in exchange for generous educational benefits at the completion of military service. Professional soldiers, on the other hand, are channelled into "career" positions at a higher pay level.

E. SUMMARY

> ...the laws governing military recruitment are political institutions.
>
> Elliott C. Cohen [Ref. 1:p. 189]

This work began with a question: What is the political feasibility of a peacetime draft? The answer was determined by examining society's political and social institutions. Indeed the problems encountered by Emory Upton (Chapter III) demonstrate the futility of attempting to develop public policy outside of these institutions.

It seems highly likely that many American people will challenge the revival of compulsory service. Perhaps this challenge is legitimate, because with minor changes the current system can fulfill most of the ideals sought by proponents of conscripted "citizen-soldiers."

It appears that the AVF was developed within the framework of American political and social custom. Perhaps, this is one reason the government has finally been able to field what is widely considered the most effective defense system in this nation's history. And it was accomplished without threatening liberalism's devotion to the concept of individual choice. From a political and social viewpoint, the current force manning policy makes sense.

The AVF, like any other public institution, cannot be expected to represent the perfect solution or one that will silence all critics. What it *does* represent is an effective recruiting scheme for our time that can thrive in a

liberal society. Fine tuning the current recruiting system to attract the college-bound recruit will solidify society's support of the recruiting system, because it will ensure a broad cross-section of Americans share a stake in its continued success. Ideally, drawing individuals from *all* sectors of society will tap the country's political will and allow ready access to the reservoir of political fervor that is unique to citizen armies.

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