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THESIS

IMPLEMENTATION OF A PARALLEL
MULTILEVEL SECURE PROCESS

by

David R. Pratt

June 1988

Thesis Advisor:

Joseph S. Stewart

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Implementation of a Parallel
Multilevel Secure Process

by

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requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis demonstrates an implementation of a parallel multilevel secure process. This is done within the framework of an electronic mail system. Security is implemented GEMSOS, the operating system of the Gemini Trusted Computer Base. A brief history of computer secrecy is followed by a discussion of security kernels. Eventcounts and sequences are used to provide concurrency control and are covered in detail. The specifications for the system are based upon the requirements for a Headquarters of a hypothetical Marine Battalion in garrison.




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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself as a critically sick patient who has just checked into a large Eastern Medical Center. Right before undergoing surgery, your doctor sits down and logs onto the computer to review your record. The only problem is that your record is nowhere to be found, and there is no trace of what happened to it. A computer "virus" has attacked the system. After rebuilding your medical record, getting the medical care that you needed and recovering, you finally return to work around Christmas time. As you log on to the computer to check the messages that have piled up, you notice that the system is severely overloaded. A type of computer chain-letter has taken over the system in only a couple of hours. Both of these events actually have happened. [Marb88]

One of the problems with the use of computers is the lack of security built into them. It is fairly easy to control the flow of classified paper, but how is the classified computer data safeguarded? To the Department of Defense (DoD), this presents a real problem, and one that is drawing increasingly close scrutiny.

Traditionally, computer security has been an afterthought to system designers whose main concerns are the efficiency of operation and the budget. This attitude has

degraded the performance of systems, caused increased costs, and systems to be delivered late when the security module had to be added. If the designers of the systems had considered the security requirements in the beginning, most of these problems could have been avoided. [Tayl88]

A. THE ENVIRONMENT

Computer security is the art of compromise. The only truly secure computer is one that is turned off and in a locked and shielded room. The computer which is easiest to use places no limits on the activities of a user, authorized or not. The most efficient computer, in terms of throughput, does no checking for authorization to do an operation, it just does it. It is the system designer's job to hammer out a compromise between security, usability and efficiency.

The security policy of an organization determines how much security is compromised in order to achieve more efficient operation of the system. The security policy is determined by the security requirements of the organization. If the principle function of the organization is to count sheets and pillow cases, usability and throughput are more important than security. At an intelligence center the opposite will be true. While these are the two extremes (therefore easily lending themselves to a particular security policy implementation), what about the average military installation? It is harder to develop and maintain

a coherent computer security policy when the users and the designers of the system themselves do not have a firm grasp on the security requirements of the organization. It is those systems that are provided to indecisive and often unenlightened users that give computer security a bad name. The reason is that very often security has been an afterthought and usually, therefore, inefficient, cumbersome, resented, and widely ignored.

The security goal of all computer systems is to provide access to authorized users while denying access to unauthorized users. A secure system is only secure with respect to the security policy of the organization. DoD defines a secure system as one that:

...will control, through use of specific security features, access to information such that only properly authorized individuals, or processes operating on their behalf, will have access to read, write, create, or delete information. [DoDs85]

While this definition gives us an idea what a secure system is, it does not say how one is to be implemented. A more rigorous definition of a secure computer will be developed in the next chapter.

B. GOAL

It is the goal of this thesis to combine the security aspect of computers with the growing field of parallel processing; having two or more programs running at the same time and communicating among themselves. The security will have to allow for a multilevel secure process. A multilevel

secure process is a program that interacts with the security policy at different levels and does not violate it. Since security was a prime consideration from the beginning of the development process, the parallel multilevel secure process is both easy to use and efficient. Each of the processes is a simulated electronic mail network node. The system will simulate a network running on a trusted computer base. This served to investigate the use of interprocess communications and trusted computers in a multilevel secure environment.

C. ORGANIZATION

Chapter II presents a brief rational for the consideration of the systems approach to security of a system. The first section of the chapter is a brief history of computer security. Also in the second chapter the concepts of "Secure Computer" and "Security Kernel" are introduced. The next section is an overview of the Gemini trusted computer base and GEMSOS, its operating system. This section is a condensation of the "System Overview" published by Gemini computers. The final section of the chapter contains some information on other secure systems, both implemented and theoretical.

Chapter III deals with eventcounts and sequences. These provide a means for processes to communicate with each other during execution. The Gemini computer implements these in a secure environment which is a little more complex than normal.

Chapter IV provides a description of the model and implementation of the secure mail system. A complete description of the modules is provided, along with justification for some of the implementation choices that were made during development.

The final chapter, Chapter V, list the conclusions and provides recommendations for further study and research.

II. INTRODUCTION TO SECURE COMPUTERS

A. HISTORY

When Charles Babbage first developed his mechanical analytical engine in the early nineteenth century, it was a single user--single process machine. Security meant simply keeping it locked up away from physical harm. One person could run only one process at a time and that person had to be in the same physical location as the computer to use it, so physical protection was all that was required.

As technology advanced, the data processed on computers became more sensitive and the cost of the machines increased, the means of physical protection became more elaborate. The fact remained, however, that the only protection needed to enforce computer security was physical. Very little thought went into having to place a security device within the computer itself. To this day the primary emphasis in security remains physical; that is, if you cannot get to the computer, you can not do any harm to the machine or the information stored in it. This eliminates most of the security threats from outsiders. The threat from insiders, people who are authorized access to the computer, remains.

Computers were developed which were able to do more than one process at a time, multiprocessing allowed the user to

have several processes loaded on the system, although only one process was executing at any given moment. The advent of multiprocessing meant that several users could gain access to the system and run different programs at the same time. This fact, combined with the use of remote peripherals (which allowed users who were not in the same physical location as the computer to use it), created the need for a new means of access control. These two developments took the computer out of the exclusive control, both physically and operationally, of a few trusted operators and gave rise to the need for additional security measures. It was no longer sufficient to provide physical security; a form of logical security was needed. Changes had to be made in operating system design to include a means of verifying the person logging on had authorization to access the system.

The user name and password mechanism was designed to allow only certain people, i.e., the "authorized users," access to the system. When a user wants to gain access to the machine, he has to first input his user identification (userid) and a secret password that is known only to himself and the System Security Manager (SSM). These two entries are verified in a table of authorized users. If they are found and are correct, access is granted; if not, access is denied.

The userid and password system can be extended to include not only the computer, but also to certain sets of programs and data files within the computer. This system limits direct access by the user to only those items to which he has been granted access authorization by the SSM. These systems are not fool-proof, however. There is a set of utilities, such as text editors and file managers, to which all users have access. One of these programs could be modified such that when it executed, it would copy a legally accessed, protected data file into an unauthorized and unprotected data file. This type of modification to a program creates what is known as a "Trojan Horse" program. In addition to its intended function, such a program performs unauthorized hidden functions, usually undetected. [Beob85]

A classic Trojan Horse program was written around 1976 at Heriot-Watt University, United Kingdom. A student wrote a program that simulated a system crash followed by a login sequence. He then left the program out on the system for other users to try and run. When the unsuspecting user ran the program the system appeared to crash and the user then signed on. The program recorded the userid and password in a disk file for later use by the author. [Norm83]

A derivation of the Trojan Horse is the "virus" program. This program functions such that every time the user executes the program in which the virus is embedded, the

virus is able to embed itself in yet another program until the entire system is infected [Beob85]. An example of this phenomenon would be a program that appends itself to the end of another program and in turn deletes the program in which it is embedded. Eventually, all of the programs will have been infected and deleted.

The user identification and password system can do nothing to stop these two problems. Since the "authorized user" is the one running the infected program, his actions are entirely legal--the results of his actions, even though they may be unintentional and unknown to him, are not legal or authorized. To combat the use of "Trojan Horses" and "viruses," a new method of computer resource security had to be developed. [Beob85]

The concept of multitasking of the computer created a special kind of problem, namely, "How to separate two processes that require different levels of security?" For the most part, this was handled by limiting the system to one classification at a time, the so called "single level" security. Whenever the classification of the jobs changes the machine has to be purged of all data to ensure there is no residual classified information left on the machine. One of the major drawbacks to this system is that one user processing a classified job will cause all unclassified jobs to wait until the classified job is done and the system has

been sanitized. This was clearly a waste of computer resources.

As part of the research to deal with these security issues, the concept of a "Security Kernel" (hereafter referred to as just kernel), was developed. This concept is the main focus of this thesis. As the DoD becomes more and more computerized, emphasis must be placed on the security aspects of computer systems during the entire system life cycle. Computer security cannot simply be added as an afterthought software package.

B. COVERT CHANNELS

The Trojan Horse programs require a means to transfer information from the authorized user to the perpetrator's desired destination. Most of these information paths can be closed, or reduced, by the use of the reference monitor [Ames73]. However, there are ways to transfer information from one process to another that do not use normal data transfer means. This leakage of data between programs that use data paths not intended for information transfer are called covert channels [Lamp73]. All computer systems have an abundance of covert channels, it is only the secure systems that are concerned with eliminating them.

The damage done by the channel is a function of its bandwidth. The bandwidth is the measure of bits per unit time that are passed through the channel per unit time. The

higher the bandwidth, the more damaging the channel is to the security policy of the system.

While there are many different specific types of covert channels, they can be grouped into two general classes, storage and timing channels. A storage channel is one that causes an object to be written and another process can observe some aspect of that action. A timing channel uses a timing mechanism to observe the effect on the system by some process. [Gass88]

Storage channels can be grouped into three subclasses. The first class is the object's existence. This simply tells the user if an object exists or not. An example would be an attempted access to a file and the message "permission denied" is returned by the system. In this manner we can tell the file exists. The second type, object attributes, can give us even more specific data on the object. This can be done by reading an object's header and reading the attributes. The value of attributes that are stored in the header may be real or placed there by a Trojan Horse and used for communication. The final type of storage channel is the shared resource channel. This channel communicate more on the status of the system rather than on one particular process. A printer spooler that has a finite number of jobs can be monitored as a covert channel; this would indicate the status of the print queue at any given moment. [Gass88]

The other general type of covert channel is the timing channel. This type of channel requires access to a timer in order to operate. The clock can be provided by the system, i.e., a real time clock, or by the program, i.e., a timing loop. From the passage of time it is possible for the program to determine the passage between two events. An example of this is the request for access to a file and denial of access. The programmer knows that it takes X amount of time for the system to determine that it does not exist and Y to determine that access is denied. [Gass88]

Of the two types of channels, the timing channel is harder to control. There are no formal techniques for finding them and they are very difficult to detect and correct. The storage channel's bandwidth can be reduced by strictly enforcing the security models and the elimination of shared resources. [Gass88]

C. SECURITY KERNELS

As the problem of covert channels was brought to light, a method to deal with them had to be developed. The most elementary solution was to provide a separate machine for every level, or security classification, of processing. This was also one of the most expensive solutions since the computer was not being used to the fullest extent possible and it was difficult to share the data between machines. This idea evolved into the concept of having the machine

appear to each user as though it were dedicated to his particular level of processing.

This concept required the establishment of several different security levels within the machine itself. Providing these various levels of security were extensions of the password and userid system. The user had his access authorization checked at a finer level, thereby adding an extra layer of security to the system. An example of this is requiring the user to specify a password to access an object. This method of access control proved to have the same drawbacks as the login password--it created an environment, although smaller, in which the user access could be exploited. As was shown in a preceding section, access control of the environment can be circumvented by the Trojan horse or virus.

The environment created by use of access controls provides only a means to check the user's authorization to access the data, which is insufficient to stop the Trojan horse attack. We must also examine his authorization to modify, delete and write to the data storage location. In order to reduce the bandwidth of the covert channels, the authorization to write and the destination of the data must be validated each time the user writes his data. Simply put, every reference to any information must be checked and authorized. This is the basic concept behind the idea of a reference monitor as shown in Figure 1 [Ames73].




Figure 1. The Reference Monitor

Before we go any further, some terms have to be defined that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. All active processes, be they users, executing jobs, or anything else which makes a reference to data, are termed subjects. An object is a passive element, such as a data file, program file, terminal device, or storage device, which contains the data elements of the system. When a program is called, it transitions from an object--a passive program file, to a subject--an active process in the system.

Nondiscretionary security is the mandatory security that is enforced on all users. It is based strictly on the individual's security clearance. Discretionary security is the policy that limits access to those who have the need to know. A security policy is the organization's guiding principle when it comes to accessing information. This can be discretionary--relying strictly on the subject's need to know--or nondiscretionary--based on the subject's level of

trust, which is his security clearance. Most organizations, like the U.S. military, have a policy that is a combination of both of these. A clearance and a need to know are both required to gain access to objects. With reference to this security policy, we can classify computers as trusted or not. A trusted computer is one which can be relied on to enforce the organization's security policy.

When a subject references an object, the reference monitor must approve the transaction. This includes not only reading the data in a file, but writing the data out as well. Note that this reduces the effectiveness of the storage covert channels by controlling all access to the data. The Trojan Horse program is detected when it tries to write the data into an unauthorized file, and the virus is diagnosed when it attempts to embed itself where it is not allowed.

Some of the more successful implementations of a trusted computer use the security kernel [Land73]. The security kernel is defined as the hardware and software required to carry out the reference monitor concept. The kernel assumes control over a small subset of the functions which are normally part of the operating system. [Ames73]

The kernel is placed between the operating system and the hardware. The implementation of the kernel is of vital concern to the design of the system. Since every data reference must be validated, a significant amount of

computer time is spent in the kernel. If the kernel is implemented in software the performance will suffer, but the system will be flexible. A hardware kernel will run fast but it will be very difficult to modify. As stated in the introduction, security is the art of compromise. As a result, the kernel should be implemented partially in both. Figure 2 shows a normal system configuration and Figure 3 shows a system which has a security kernel.




Figure 2. A Standard Operating System

A trusted process, as shown in Figure 3, is one that can circumvent the security built into the kernel. While it can sidestep the built in security, it is trusted not to violate the organization's security policy. This type of process is




Figure 3. An Operating System using a Security Kernel

critical to the efficient operation of the system. A typical trusted process allows the SSM to down-grade a classified file.

Implementing the kernel as a subset of the operating system solves the problem of size and complexity associated with large programs. This implementation concept is integral to the three design criteria of secure computers (completeness, isolation, and verifiability). The size of the kernel has a direct impact on the designer's ability to prove that each of the design criteria hold.

The first of these, completeness of the reference monitor--requires that all access to the objects be made through the kernel. The second concept, the isolation of the kernel, ensures that the monitor is tamper-proof. Isolation of the kernel is usually achieved by implementing the monitor in a mixture of hardware and inaccessible system software. The third concept is that of verifiability of the reference monitor. This requirement states that the designer of the system must be able to prove that the monitor enforces the security policy for which it was designed.

The completeness and verifiability of the reference monitor can be attributed to small size of the kernel. Due to the small size, it is possible to do exhaustive testing and proof of correctness to prove the correctness of the kernel. An example of the small size of the kernel would be one of the first security kernels developed by The Mitre Corporation in 1974. It consisted of less than 20 primitive subroutines and was written in fewer than 1000 high level language statements. [Ames73]

The work in security kernels was based mostly on the development of the Bell and LaPadula model [Ames73]. This model is the most widely accepted of the systems that have been built thus far for use within DoD. The model is based on the "simple security condition" in which a subject at a given security level has the ability to access only objects

at an equal or lower security level. Objects of a higher classification would be inaccessible; in other words, no "read up" is possible.

The *-property (pronounced "star-property"), is just the opposite of the simple security condition. Subjects can only write to objects that are higher or equal classification, no "write down" is allowed. Figure 4 contains a graphical representation of the Bell and LaPadula model.




Figure 4. The Bell and LaPadula Model

An exception to the two properties is a trusted process, in which subjects are authorized to cross some of the security boundaries of the system provided that the security policy of the system is not violated.

D. SECURE COMPUTERS

The DoD realized there must be some standardization in the definitions and criteria of secure computers. As a result of this the DoD Computer Security Center (DoDSCS) published the DoD Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, CSC-STD-001-83, otherwise known as the "Orange Book" (the color of its cover) [DoDs85]. This document sets forth six fundamental requirements that a trusted, or secure, computer must provide. In addition to the requirements, four divisions and several subclasses are defined to provide a standard bench mark for the evaluation and rating of the systems. [DoDs85]

The six requirements are broken down into two categories. The first, which contains the first two requirements, deals with the policy that is being implemented. The remaining four requirements cover what the system must furnish to ensure controlled access to data. The following is a summary of the requirements:

Policy Requirements

Requirement One. Security Policy--there must be an explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the system.

Requirement Two. Marking--Access Control Labels must be associated with objects.

Accountability Requirements

Requirement three. Identification--Individual subjects must be identified.

Requirement Four. Accountability--Audit information must be selectively kept and protected so that actions affecting security can be traced to the responsible party.

Requirement Five. Assurance--the computer system must contain hardware/software mechanisms that can be independently evaluated to provide sufficient assurance that the system enforces requirements one through four above.

Requirement Six. Continuous Protection--the trusted mechanisms that enforce these basic requirements must be continuously protected against tampering and/or unauthorized changes. [DoDS85]

These six basic requirements provide the foundation of the four security divisions. The divisions are labeled alphabetically, in decreasing order of assurance of the security enforcement, D being the least credible and A providing the most complete security mechanisms. Each class includes all of the requirements for the lower classes.

Division D has only one class. A division D machine is one that has been tested but has failed to meet any the requirements of a higher class. Minimal protection is provided by this class.

Discretionary protection is provided by both class C1 and C2. The users, processes and other active entities are held accountable for the actions by required audit capabilities. A C1 system must control access between named users and named objects. The users of the system shall be able to specify and control the access to an object. Before a user gains access to the system he must identify himself and authenticate his identity. All functions of the TCB must be protected from tampering and be able to be

periodically validated to ensure correct operation. The C1 system shall be documented and tested to ensure that the documentation agrees with the implementation. A C1 system should only be used when all users are processing the same level of data.

A class C2 system has a finer granularity on the discretionary access control than C1, because it holds the individual responsible for his actions by means of login procedures, auditing of security-relevant events and the isolation of resources. When a system assigns a storage resources it must first verify that the unauthorized data has been purged. The testing process for a class C2 system must include a search for obvious security related flaws in the system.

Division B, mandatory protection, has the largest number (three) of classes. Division B enforces a set of mandatory access controls through the use of sensitivity labels that are associated with the data in the system. The security labels include both machine and human readable formats. The developer of the system must be able to provide the specification of the system and prove that the TCB implements the reference monitor concept. A TCB that has been rated as class B1 must provide an informal statement of security policy model, data labeling, and mandatory access control over named entities in the system. Any change to the security labels or overrides of the system must be

auditable and done by an accountable individual. Any known bugs in the system must be removed before certification of the system. Documentation must be provided that includes the maintenance and user changes to the TCB.

A B2 system requires that the security policy be formalized and extended to include both discretionary and nondiscretionary controls over all entities of the system. The system must provide a trusted path from the user to the TCB for user login and authentication. All physical devices on a B2 system must have a minimum and maximum security level. The process isolation requirement for class B2 requires that each process contains its own address space under TCB control. A detailed search for covert channels is mandated in a B2 system and the bandwidth of the channel must be computed. The TCB must be structured in such a way as to provide protection critical and nonprotection critical elements in the system. A configuration management system must be put in place to ensure consistency between the TCB and the documentation. The developer of a B2 system must ensure that the formal model used and defined in the descriptive top-level specification is consistent with the TCB.

A system that has achieved a B3 classification makes use of security domains to aid in its high resistance to penetration. The B3 rated TCB must completely implement the reference monitor concept, be tamperproof and small enough

to be thoroughly analyzed and tested. A logically isolated and distinguishable trusted path must be provided between the user and the TCB which can be activated by the user or the TCB. In the event of system failure, a means to provide a trusted recovery, one that does not compromise the security of the system, must be in place. The coding of a B3 TCB must be done using modern software engineering techniques. The testing of the TCB must find no design flaws, show that few correctable implementation flaws exist and that there is cause to believe that few flaws remain.

Current technology allows for only one class within the A division, A1. While the system may be functionally the same as a class B3 system, the amount of analysis, formal design specifications, and verification methods result in a high degree of credibility that the TCB is correctly implemented and that the hardware implements the formal specification. The formal specification must contain a top level specification of each of the modules in the model, a formal model of the security policy, and a mathematical proof proving its correctness. The existence of covert channels must be identified, analyzed, and their existence justified by formal means.

The purpose of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria is to provide guidance to both the user and the vendor. It is a service to the user by aiding in the acquisition process. By having a reference document, the

user can specify a class of protection that he needs, thereby eliminating the need for the development of his own security classification system. The document provides a service to the vendor by listing those requirements the government views as important. It also gives the vendor the evaluation criteria so that he can design and build systems that will have a market.

E. THE GEMINI COMPUTER AND GEMSOS

This section serves as a brief overview of the Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base, hereafter referred to as the computer, TCB or system. This is essentially a synopsis of the salient points contained in [Gemi84], which is available from Gemini computers.

The system was designed from the ground up to be certified as a B3 class machine with the possibility of eventual A1 rating. In order to accomplish this, the system uses some of the latest microprocessor and software technology. Some of the major features of the system include:

1. Use of the Intel IEEE standard 796 Multibus allowing for third party expansion boards.
2. Up to eight iAPX286 (80286) microprocessors with up to two megabytes of local memory.
3. Global shared memory of up to eight megabytes.
4. Nonvolatile memory used to store passwords, encryption keys and other security related data.
5. Up to 48 RS-232 serial communication ports.


6. A mix of four disk drives to include Winchester hard disks and floppy disk drives.
7. Real time calendar clock.
8. Self-hosting software development environment.
9. Data encryption using the NBS standard DES algorithm. [Gemi85]

A graphic representation of the system's architecture is contained in Figure 5. The design of the computer provides for a flexible and expandable system capable of growth and customization to the desired application.

1. Resource Management

One of the major functions of any computer's operating system is that of resource management. The Gemini Secure Operating System (GEMSOS) is no exception to this rule. GEMSOS is structured as a kernelized operating system, and as such the system calls are made as procedural calls to the kernel. By providing a conceptually simpler operating system, the resource management calls have been divided into three major areas: segments, process and device management. The specifics of the individual calls can be found in the GEMSOS interface routines provided by Gemini Computers with each compiler; we will deal only in a high level of abstraction.

GEMSOS does not use files as thought of in a conventional sense, but rather makes use of a uniquely identified logical object called a segment. All code and data are contained in a separate segment. By separating



* Indicates the minimum and maximum number of devices or expansion boards of this type

Figure 5. The Gemini TCB Architecture

the code from the data segments it is possible to ensure the static nature of the code by making the code segment read only. A pair of functions allows the system to assign a

local temporary identification to a segment and then to release it. Through the use of the "swap-in" and "swap-out" kernel calls, it is possible to bring a segment into memory where the data can be accessed. Secondary storage (disk drives) is divided into a series of volumes. Each of the volumes can be thought of as a collection of segments. The volumes, just like the segments, contain security labels that reflect the security classification of the data stored in them. The database of segments is managed by a segment manager which keeps track of all segments known to a process through the use of a "Known Segment Table." It is this segment manager that acts as the reference monitor by controlling data access. More specifics about the kernel calls used in this thesis can be found in [Gemi86b].

Process management is the second major area of concern. Most modern computer systems are capable of supporting multiprogramming (having more than one job in memory at a time on a single CPU) and multiprocessing (executing more than one process at the same time on multiple CPUs); the Gemini system is no exception. GEMSOS requires that the processes are run on the same physical CPU that they are created on at run time. This forces the process to share the CPU with other executing processes. To minimize bus contention, each process's code, stack, and data segments are loaded in the processor's local memory thereby improving the system throughput. In order for two

asynchronous processes to communicate with each other, Reed and Kanodia's eventcounts and sequencers [Reed79] are used (this will be covered in more detail in the next chapter). The time sharing of the CPU uses a very simple algorithm: a process runs until it blocks, at which time it is swapped out and the next pending process is swapped in. In order to keep the kernel code as simple as possible, no effort is made to determine if deadlock exists.

The desire to keep the kernel code as small as possible led to the philosophy for device management that Gemini used in designing the system. This approach is to handle each I/O function at the application level by the application programmer, thereby making use of part of the segment and process manager subsystems. While this approach makes the verification of the security system easier, it makes the development of application programs considerably more difficult than in a "normal" programming environment. The device management system is based on the requirement that each of the I/O peripheral controllers are themselves processes. These processes are activated by a procedural call at the application level and accomplish the required I/O synchronization and transfer at a lower level. The involvement of the kernel with I/O is minimal. It is limited to the attachment and detachment of the device to the process, which makes it possible to reduce the amount of

involvement of the kernel in the process, thereby increasing throughput.

The resource management within GEMSOS is highly dependent on the hardware of the system. This follows directly from the fact the system was designed from the ground up to be a secure system.

2. GEMSOS Architecture

GEMSOS uses a ring-based protection system, similar to the Multics operating system [Corb65]. The rings are referred to as Ring 0, the most privileged, through Ring 3, the least privileged. Rings 0 and 1 implement the Bell-LaPadula model. Ring 0 contains the distributed kernel that implements the nondiscretionary part of the model. Ring 1 contains the supervisor that provides the discretionary part of the model. These first two rings make up the reference monitor. Rings 2 and 3 are outside the security perimeter of the system and are used for nonsecure processes. GEMSOS provides a series of kernel calls to allow a process to communicate across different rings.

Each entity within GEMSOS is assigned a security label. From this label it is possible to determine the level of compromise and integrity properties of the subject or object. Figure 6 contains a brief statement of these two properties as contained in [Gemi84]. When entity A's access class is a superset of entity B's access class, A's access class is said to dominate B's access class.

Compromise Properties:

1) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the compromise access component of the subject must dominate the compromise access component of the object.

2) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the compromise access component of the object must dominate the compromise access component of the subject.

Integrity Properties:

1) If a subject has "modify" access to an object, the integrity access component of the subject must dominate the integrity access component of the object.

2) If a subject has "observe" access to an object, the integrity access component of the object must dominate the integrity access component of the subject.

Figure 6. Compromise and Integrity Properties

The access class of the entities determines what type of device they can interact with. This is made more complex by the fact the GEMSOS allows single and multilevel subjects. These are subjects that can access objects over a contiguous range of security levels. This is similar to a multilevel device, one that can be attached to different level subjects. GEMSOS also supports single level devices. Figure 7 list the properties of single and multilevel devices.

3. Application Development

This section contains some of the background and procedures required for a programmer to develop applications within GEMSOS. The steps taken apply to all programming

Single Level Devices:

- 1) To receive ("read") information:
Process maximum compromise \geq Device minimum compromise
Device maximum integrity \geq Process minimum integrity
- 2) To send ("write") information:
Device maximum compromise \geq Process minimum compromise
Process maximum integrity \geq Device minimum integrity

Multilevel Devices:

- 1) To receive ("read") information:
Process maximum compromise \geq Device maximum compromise
Device minimum integrity \geq Process minimum integrity
 - 2) To send ("write") information:
Device minimum compromise \geq Process minimum compromise
Process maximum integrity \geq Device maximum integrity
-

Figure 7. Properties of Single/Multi Level Devices

languages supported by the Gemini computer. For further guidance the reader should refer to [Gemi86b] and [Gemi86c].

GEMSOS is capable of hosting an operating system (having another operating system run between GEMSOS and the applications). Currently this is limited to CP/M-86, but discussions with Gemini personnel indicate that GEMSOS might soon be able to host the UNIX operating system as well [Tao88]. The ability to have a hosted, widely-used operating system is critical to the application development process, allowing users to run some of the commercially available programming languages such as Pascal MT+,

JANUS/ADA, PL/1, C, and Fortran. This reduces the amount of code required to be included within GEMSOS by having the hosted operating system handle the development process. There are special routines that are provided by Gemini computers to create the operating system and kernel calls to GEMSOS for the compiled code. These special routines allow the user to write programs which do not require the hosted operating system but can place service calls directly to GEMSOS. These service calls are similar to normal procedural calls for the language in which the application is written.

One of the advantages of having CP/M as a hosted operating system is that GEMSOS allows concurrent processing without depending on concurrent programming languages. The programs can be developed under CP/M and then run in GEMSOS as concurrent programs. For example, PASCAL MT+ does not have the ability to effect interprocess communication but, with functions provided by GEMSOS, it is possible to use the eventcounts and sequencers to achieve the communication.

The coding, compilation, and linking of an application is done in a manner similar to what is done in a standard CP/M environment. The coding is a little more complex because of the security constraints involved. The debugging of the system is radically different in that the system must be sysgened (defined later) and then booted

under GEMSOS. This by itself adds a tremendous amount of time to the application development process.

One of the most difficult concepts that the application developer faces is the structure of the GEMSOS hierarchical storage system. As stated previously, GEMSOS does not support a file and directory structure, but rather a hierarchical segment ordering where each of the segments has a unique name, its access path. The segment naming process follows a strict hierarchical method that is shown in Figure 8. The segment numbers are assigned in a CP/M submit file. This file is then used as the source input for the sysgen process, which builds the structure on the desired volume. The sysgen process is covered in detail in [Gemi85a].

4. Summary

The Gemini Trusted Multiple Microcomputer Base provides a flexible, cutting edge of technology computer system to be used in an environment where security is a key consideration. While the system is very capable, it is still a first generation TCB, and like many other products on the leading edge it is not user friendly. If the application that is being developed does not require the security controls provided by the system, use another machine.




Figure 8. Gemini's Hierarchical Storage Structure

F. OTHER SECURE SYSTEMS

The Gemini TCB was designed from the start to be a secure computer. [Land73] provides a good overview of some other systems that have been completed and some that are still under development. Many of these systems are extensions to existing software or hardware.

Two operating systems seem to be the favorites for the software implementation of the security models, Multics and Unix. Multics [Corb65] is a logical choice for the conversion since its design is based upon the ring privilege concept, the inner rings are more privileged than the outer rings. By establishing a few well-defined gates it is possible to control the flow of information between the rings. The use of segmented memory, where each file is a segment, allows the inclusion of a header to keep track of the ring parameters. Each segment has read, write and execute bits that act in conjunction with the ring parameters to aid in the enforcement of the security policy.

The other popular operating system to enhance is Unix [Ritc74]. In native, or unenhanced Unix the protection system is based on the file system and the user domains. Each of the files has read, write and execute bits for the owner, group, and world. This provides a basic data access security. One of the better known modifications was the UCLA data secure Unix. In this implementation, the Bell-LaPadula model is enforced by a module running outside

the kernel. The resulting system was implemented on a PDP-11 and ran very slowly [Land73].

A different approach was taken by Honeywell for development of the Honeywell Secure Communications Processor (SCOMP) [Hone84]. To build this system, a standard minicomputer, the Honeywell DPS 6, was modified by the replacement of the central processor unit, the memory management unit and the addition of a security protection module. SCOMP uses a kernelized operating system based on Multics. This system has been certified by DoDSCS to meet all the requirements for the A1 level.

Computer security, especially security kernels, was a major research area in academia during the early eighties. As the research started to yield implementable systems, fewer papers were published to avoid giving away trade secrets and benefiting competitors in the security market place.

III. EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS

Whenever a computer system has more than one process executing concurrently, a process management system is required. When the processes are independent of each other, the operating system's scheduler and process swapping mechanism provides the required control. In a computer system that allows the processes to communicate, share code, or share data during execution, a means to achieve process synchronization and communication is required.

There are several means to achieve the synchronization necessary for the correct process execution. Some of the more common methods (semaphores and monitors) are primarily designed to provide mutual exclusion to a critical section of code (only one process can execute at a time) or the access to a data structure. This chapter will explore a different form of synchronizing mechanism that is used by GEMSOS, eventcounts and sequencers. This mechanism to control the sequencing of processes was developed by Reed and Kanodia [Reed79].

A. EVENTCOUNTS

An eventcount is an increasing unbounded integer that keeps track of the number of events that have occurred so far in the system. This concept is very similar to Lamport's "logical clock" [Lamp78]. It is up to the

programmer to determine what constitutes an event; it could be the completion of a procedure, the availability of a computed result, or an error condition. [Reed79]

The eventcount can only be modified by placing a call to the advance(EVC) procedure, where EVC is the eventcount in use. This has the result of increasing the value of EVC by one. By doing this it is possible to signal the system of the occurrence of an event.

The value of an eventcount can be read by the read(EVC) function. This function returns the current value of the eventcount, with the value being the number of advance(EVC) calls that have been placed before the call. Since mutual exclusion is not guaranteed, it is possible that the value of the EVC can be changed during the read operation. This equates to the read function returning the minimum value of the eventcount at any given moment.

Constant reading of an eventcount provides a way to monitor the occurrence of an event. The busy wait loop can be avoided by the use of the await(EVC,x) primitive. The use of this primitive causes the calling process to suspend until the value of EVC is equal to or greater than that of x. If the value of x is less than or equal to the value of the eventcount at the time of the call, the process is not suspended. [Reed79]

B. SEQUENCERS

One of the drawbacks of the use of pure eventcounts is the lack of mediation between concurrent processes that must be synchronized. An example of this is two processes that are trying to update a file at the same time. There has to be some mechanism to guarantee that one request is processed before the other to ensure consistency of the data. Reed and Kanodia [Reed79] describe an additional object called a sequencer, which provides the ability to differentiate between two processes that act independently. It does this by using a ticket(SEQ) primitive, where SEQ is the sequencer.

The ticket(SEQ) function, much like the read(EVC) operation, returns the current value of the sequencer. However, the ticket function has the side effect of incrementing the value of the sequencer by one. This, combined with the use of mutual exclusion for the ticket section of the operating system, which guarantees that only one ticket request will be processed at a time, ensures that for each call, the ticket function will return a unique value. From the value that was returned from the ticket operation it is possible to determine which process requested a ticket first.

To aid in understanding the use of a sequencer in conjunction with an associated eventcount, the bakery ticket machine is often used as an example. In this example the

customer walks up to the machine and takes a ticket. Since only one customer can take a ticket at a time, each ticket value is unique. This is the ticket operation with the ticket machine acting as the sequencer. The customer then sits down and waits until the turn indicator on the wall, the eventcount, reaches his ticket value, the await operation. After the baker finishes with a customer he increments the turn indicator, the advance primitive, and calls for the next customer.

C. RELATION TO SEMAPHORES

An interesting side light is the claim in [Reed79] that semaphores can be built out of eventcounts and sequencers. This is from the view that eventcounts and sequencers are lower level than semaphores. The paper shows how to construct P and V, and even a simultaneous P operation out of eventcounts and sequencers. [Reed79]

The Concurrent Computer Corporation chose eventcounts and sequencers to implement some of the primitives required for a new operating system. In [Rosk86] it shows that it is not always possible to construct semaphores out of eventcount and sequencer, because of the lack of a conditional ticket operation. If a ticket is taken it must be used, or a dummy process must take the place of the original process and advance the eventcount.

D. SECURITY OF EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS

Of special interest is the suitability of the primitives to the secure computing environment. The advance operation can be classified as a pure write. In a pure write no information about the value of the eventcount, either current or previous, is transmitted back to the calling process. This property makes it possible to advance an eventcount that has a security classification at the same or higher level of the calling process, the modify domain.

The read and await primitives can be thought of as pure reads, because no information is modified when the values are returned. There is no primitive to determine if other processes are waiting for the eventcount, making it impossible for one process to determine the status of other processes. Thus, the read and await primitives can be used on eventcounts of equal or lower security classification than the calling process, the observe domain.

The ticket operation on the sequencer is both a read/write operation. Since the ticket operation returns and changes the value of the sequencer, the ticket operation can only be used in the intersection of the modify and observe domains. Thus the sequencer must be at the same security level as the calling process.

Using eventcounts, it is possible to introduce a "secure readers-writers problem." The underlying idea is that the readers do not have the ability to modify any of the data in

the data base or to signal any of the writers or other readers. [Reed79] provides implementation to solve this problem in its purest sense. Of interest to this thesis is a modification to this problem, the "multilevel secure readers-writers problem." The problem is constructed by adding multilevel security to the "secure readers-writers problem."

F. IMPLEMENTATION OF EVENTCOUNTS AND SEQUENCERS IN GEMSOS

To provide the required process synchronization Gemini Computers chose eventcounts and sequencers. The shared main memory of the Gemini Computer provided the required architecture for the execution of the synchronization mechanism. The built-in security aspects of operations made them the ideal choice for a secure system. The pure read and writes of the primitive operations are considerably simpler to verify than some of the traditional synchronization mechanisms.

One of the goals in designing a security kernel was to keep the kernel as small as possible. In order to do this, GEMSOS views each eventcount and sequencer as an integral part of a segment. The naming and the security classification of the eventcount and sequencer is the same as that of the owning segment. By having common names, the kernel has fewer entities to keep track of for security purposes. While there is wasted space created by unused eventcounts and sequencers, it is more than compensated for

by the reduced kernel size and complexity in the naming of
the objects. [Gemi84]

IV. RESEARCH MODEL AND IMPLEMENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

A software system was created to explore the multilevel secure process and to demonstrate success of the proposed concept.

The system was developed in the framework of an electronic mail system where each user represents a process. This allows for the creation of multilevel secure data which is sent to and used by a multilevel secure process. The system was first be developed to run with two users of the same level and then was extended to different levels and to more users. The implementation was done primarily in Pascal MT+ and on the Gemini Trusted Microcomputer.

B. DESIGN LIMITATIONS

The overriding limitation in the design of this system was the availability of the Gemini TCB. The availability of the hardware forces the design decision later in the development process. As a result of the availability of support documentation and software available from Gemini Computers the Pascal MT+ language was chosen for this implementation.

C. DESCRIPTION OF NEED

An electronic mail network was chosen to model the parallel multilevel secure processes. The electronic mail system was chosen for its inherent parallelism. It is assumed that multiple users might be active at any given moment. The mail system was made multilevel secure to fully exercise the capabilities of the TCB. The implementation of this system is done to prove that, given that combination of hardware and software support and an integrated security design, a multilevel secure process can operate without severe performance degradation.

1. Environment of Employment

For the purpose of illustration a fictitious United States Marine Corps Infantry Battalion headquarters will be used. Figure 9 shows an organizational diagram. For simplicity, assume that the battalion is in garrison and will not take this system to the field.




Figure 9. Marine Infantry Battalion's Headquarters

The Commanding Officer (CO) would task the Executive Officer (XO) with gathering all the required information on data usage and security requirements to present to the Divisional Information Systems Management Officer (ISMO). The ISMO will then develop the technical specification of the system. The XO and ISMO will then oversee the contracting and installation of the system.

In the battalion the individual sections each have a security requirement based upon the type of data that they deal with in execution of their duties. The Personnel section (S-1) deals with CONFIDENTIAL data which deals with the status of forces and privacy act information. The Intelligence section (S-2) has all the information on battle plans, both friend and foe, which are classified at the TOP SECRET level. The Operations section (S-3) has the TOP SECRET mobilization and deployment plans as well as the schemes of maneuver and weapons data. All of the SECRET data which deals with the status of the supplies and logistics is kept by the Logistics section (S-4). The Chaplain is not authorized access to any of the battalion's classified data, but does need to access unclassified data on the system. Both the CO and XO have to be able to access all data within the battalion, and as such are classified as TOP SECRET users. All of the battalion's sections are cleared only up to and including the level of the data being processed by that section.

2. Conventional Solution

Based upon the data and security requirements of the battalion, two different approaches are possible for the implementation of an electronic mail network. The first is the use of four separate electronic mail networks. Each one of the networks would operate at a single level of security, yielding a single level system. Figures 10(a) through (d) show how the sections would be connected to the different networks. In this solution four separate network servers are required. This approach requires that the TOP SECRET users have four terminals, one for each network available to them. SECRET users will have three, CONFIDENTIAL would have two, and the Chaplain will have only one terminal on his desk. This system would require a total of 22 terminals, four servers, and multiple cable runs. To check all of the incoming messages the CO would have to login to the four different networks. Clearly, there has to be a more efficient way of implementing the network.

3. Multilevel Secure Solution

A much more efficient use of resources would be to combine the four different levels of security on one machine. This approach is not unique [NRLR82; Wyat84]. The implementation of this system requires the use of a Trusted Computer Base (TCB) to act as the central message server and one terminal at each of the nodes, seven total. The resulting reduction in the amount of hardware required will




Figure 10. Single Level Networks

result in a system that will be easier for the user to employ. The coding of the system will be more complex and the individual pieces of hardware will be more expensive.

D. REQUIREMENTS

The requirements of the model have been broken down into two general categories; user interface and computational. The separation of the two requirement areas allows the division of the Secure Mail System (SMS) into two main logical divisions. The user interface corresponds to the unsecure section, and the computational requirement is fulfilled in the security relevant sections.

1. User Interface Requirements

The user interface of the SMS was designed to provide a simple interactive single screen text processor that the user could master in relatively few sessions. Thus, WordStar-like editing commands were chosen for the basic editing functions. The selection of an option is done from menus or boolean (yes/no response) questions.

After the user has logged onto the system he will be presented with a menu of options and a listing of the current messages. The actions from the main menu will be able to create, edit, delete, read, or send a message. From this menu the user will be able to terminate his current mail session.

The user will be able to select from a menu of up to nine pending messages to edit, delete or send. A similar

list of up to nine incoming messages will be available to read or delete.

The following is a summary listing of the minimal requirements for the SMS message editor:

1. Single screen (22 lines by 80 characters).
2. Heading to indicate destination, classification, and Date and time created on top line of the screen.
3. Full Cursor control movement within the text area.
4. A means to toggle text insert on and off.
5. Line wrap. (When you reach the end of the line the cursor goes to the first position of the next line.)
6. The return key works as expected; position the cursor on the first character of the next line.
7. Must provide a unique key to end the editing of the message.
8. Save/No save option after all creation and editing.
9. Ability to delete the current character, the one the cursor is under.
10. The ability to edit a previously created, but unsent, message.
11. Recall a previously created message for modification, transmission and/or retransmission.

2. Computational Requirements

The computational requirements have been separated from the user requirements to decrease the amount of security relevant code. The security system has been divided into three major subareas; system configuration, user authentication and data access.

System configuration is done by the System Security Manager (SSM) at boot time. This process involves selecting

the terminal ports and the security levels for the selected ports. The selected security level is the maximum security level of data for the terminal, the minimum is set to UNCLASSIFIED by default. The system supports four classification levels, UNCLASSIFIED through TOP SECRET, without any compartments. Once the SSM makes these selections they remain static until the system is rebooted and reconfigured.

User authentication is accomplished by GEMSOS when the system is booted by the SSM and within the SMS when a user tries to log on to the terminal. The login process verifies the user by a login and password combination. It next prompts the user for a desired security level for the session. The user's request is then checked against the user's and terminal's upper security bounds. If the requested classification is out of bounds, the login/password are incorrect, or the user is not authorized access to the system and access is denied without divulging the reason.

Once the user has been admitted to the system GEMSOS handles most of the data access authentication. The exception is when a user desires to send a message to another user. At this point the SMS must verify the receiver has access to data at that security level before passing the write request to GEMSOS for execution.

E. OVERVIEW OF THE SECURE MAIL SYSTEM DESIGN

In this section an overview of the SMS will be presented at the module level. A more detailed description of the procedures can be found in Appendixes B through D which contain the SMS Code. The segment storage structure that is generated by the system generation process (sysgening the system) can be found in Figure 11. The loader and operator login processes used in the system are the standard processes provided by Gemini Computers. Since these two modules are covered in [Gemi86c], they will not be covered in this thesis. The logical relationship between the two SMS processes is shown in Figure 12.

1. Data Structures

To gain a firm grasp on the structure of the SMS, knowledge of the system's data structures is required. It is how these structures are stored and accessed by the machine that affects the security credibility of the system. As with all data that is stored by GEMSOS, each of the data structures, has a security level label associated with the segment that contains the data. As stated earlier, each of the segments contains an eventcount and sequencer that is maintained by GEMSOS. Through the use of these two mechanisms it is possible to control access to the segments.

The first data structure that is of concern is the user array. This is one of two data structures that is passed from the System Configuration Module to the




Figure 11. SMS Segment Storage Structure




Figure 12. SMS Process Relationships

individual node processes (the other being the process definition structure that is required by GEMSOS to initialize a child process). The purpose of this is to provide all of the node processes a listing of all users of the system with the maximum access class, password and user number. This is used by the message sending module to verify that a user can receive mail at the desired security classification level. The user login module reads this array to ensure that a person trying to log into the system is an authorized user. This array is created prior to sysgening the system and remains static during the operation of the system. This allows the SMS to service users that do not have access to GEMSOS directly. The structure definition is contained in Figure 13.

User_rec is a record of:

<u>Field Name</u>	<u>Data Type</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Active	Boolean	To determine if record is in use
Name	String[12]	User's login name
Pswd	String[12]	User's password
Max_class	Access Class	Maximum security class
Min_class	Access Class	Minimum security class

User_array is an array index 0 to Max_user of User_rec

Figure 13. Definition of the User Array

The structure of the message headers is given in Figure 14. Each user has two message header arrays, one for pending and the other for received message headers, for all of his messages, regardless of the classification level.

Messheading is a record of:

<u>Field Name</u>	<u>Data Type</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Charclass	Character	Human readable security classification
Class	Access class	GEMSOS readable security classification
From	String[8]	Message originator
Reci	String[8]	Message Receiver
Time	String[4]	Last edit time
Date	String[6]	Last edit date

Figure 14. Structure of the Message Header

This requires the read and write processes to be multilevel trusted processes. The design decision to use a multilevel header array was made early in the design process to ensure ease of use by the user. By having multilevel headers it is possible that a user could view a single screen containing the headers and find what message he had awaiting action regardless of the security class under which he is operating. The message headers are grouped into a record containing two arrays of nine elements, one array for incoming and one for outgoing messages, as shown in Figure 15. Each user's message header array is stored in a separate segment which is indexed by his user number.

Theaderarray is an array 1..9 of messheading

Userhead is a record of:

Field Name	Data Type	Purpose
Income	Theaderarray	Array of incoming messages
Outgo	Theaderarray	Array of outgoing messages

Figure 15. Structure of the Message Header Storage Structure

The final major data structure is the message itself as shown in Figure 16. The heading of the message is the same as that of the corresponding entry in the message heading array. The size of the body of the message was

Messtext is a record of:

<u>Field Name</u>	<u>Data Type</u>	<u>Purpose</u>
Heading	Messheading	Message header for the message
Body	Array of 2..23, 1..80 of Character	Message text

Figure 16. Structure of a Message

determined by the requirement for a single screen editor. The array's index range corresponds to the line numbers on the screen display. This was done to facilitate the mapping of characters from the array to the screen. The messages are stored, by user, as segments with 18 messages of the same security classification per segment. The first nine messages are incoming messages and the remainder are the outgoing messages. This storage method creates at least 54 unused message spaces per user spread out over four segments. This method allows the different security classification to be stored as separate segments, allowing for single level segments with GEMSOS providing the security enforcement. Each of the messages can be uniquely identified by the security classification (which major branch), user number (which segment), and message number (location within the segment). The separation of security

levels and the ease of access offsets the wasted space in the storage of messages.

2. System Configuration Module

The system configuration module is the first process executed once the control of the machine has been passed to the application programs from the login process. The SSM can configure the Gemini TCB's terminal ports, within the security constraints stored in the system security memory. The maximum number of terminals that can be configured is determined at compile time of the System Configuration Module by a named constant embedded in the code. The maximum number of users must be known at sysgen time to construct the sufficient number of code and message segments. Once all of the desired terminals have been configured, the system configuration process then spawns all of the SMS node processes.

3. SMS User Control Menu Module

The SMS user control module acts as a master process for the individual users. It attaches the terminal to the process and then passes control to the user login module. When a user successfully gains access to the system he is then presented with a menu of options for him to select as shown in Figure 17. When the user selects a valid option, control is then passed to the appropriate module. Upon completion of an action, control is passed back to the SMS user control module and the menu is redisplayed. When the

Security class: Unclassified
SECURE MAIL SYSTEM

- C. Create a message
- E. Edit a message
- R. Read message
- S. Send a message
- D. Delete a message
- Q. Quit message editor

You have the following Messages:

	Class	From	Time	Date
1.	U	stewart	0721	880607
2.	*			
3.	*			
4.	*			
5.	*			
6.	*			
7.	*			
8.	*			
9.	*			

The Following messages are pending:

	Class	To	Time	Date
1.	U	west	0715	880607
2.	U	stewart	0716	880607
3.	U	lengenfe	0717	880607
4.	U	adams	0718	880607
5.	*			
6.	*			
7.	*			
8.	*			
9.	*			

Figure 17. SMS Main Menu

user exits the system, control is passed to the user login process.

4. User Login Module

This module is called by the user control module to verify the access authorization of the user. This process reads the user array segment to verify the login, password, and access level. Since this module reads a classified segment, it falls within the security perimeter and must be proved correct. After each login attempt the process detaches and then reattaches the terminal before passing control back to the calling procedure.

5. Create Message Module

This module creates a blank message form in memory after obtaining a message identification number from the header array if one is available. The system provides the security classification for the message (the current level at which the user is logged in), date and time of creation, and originator. The user provides the recipient's identifier. At this time the message is then passed to part of the edit module for the input of the text. After the user has completed editing the message he is given the option of saving the message or deleting it.

6. Read Message Module

This module allows the user to read a pending message, either incoming or outgoing without doing any modifications. One of the functions of this module is displaying a message on the screen as shown in Figure 18. The message display routine is used by the create and edit modules to display the message on the screen for further action.

7. Edit Message Module

This module allows the user to select any of the outgoing messages for editing. A subset of WordStar commands are used for the editing features. Appendix D contains the specific commands and their functions. None of the message header information can be changed by the user in this module. If the message was of lower security classification

Select one of the following Messages:

	Class	From	To	Time	Date
1.	U	pratt	west	0715	880607
2.	U	pratt	stewart	0716	880607
3.	U	pratt	lengenfe	0717	880607
4.	U	pratt	adams	0718	880607
5.	*				
6.	*				
7.	*				
8.	*				
9.	*				
0.	No action				

Figure 18. Message Selection Menu

than the current session, the security classification is changed to reflect the reclassification as a result of the modification. This prevents a user from circumventing the security classification system for the messages.

8. Send Message Module

The send module provides the user a means of transmitting a message to another user. The send message process is set up to allow the user to send a message that is classified at the current operating security level. The message header is displayed and the user is able to change the recipient of the message at this time. When the message is sent the system then updates the message header with the current data and time. A table look up is done on the user array to ensure that the recipient's name matches a user of the system. If no match is found the user is given the option of specifying a new name or aborting the message

sending process. The system verifies that the recipient has access to the security classification of the message and an empty slot in the receive message header array. If the message is unable to be delivered that user is notified as such, without being given a reason. The message is not deleted from the message sender's message space by this module. This feature makes it possible to send a single message to multiple user without rekeying the message.

9. Delete Message Module

This module deletes the selected entry in the message header array and the message text. Both the message header array and the message text segments can be considered pooled resources. As such the data storage area must be overwritten by the delete process before the message can be considered deleted and the space reused. Since the delete option is a write operation, the user can only delete messages at the same security level where currently operating.

10. Message Header Array Access Module

This module is comprised of two major low level routines, the read and write header routines. These are trusted processes since the system maintains one header file for all of a user's messages regardless of the security level at which individual message were created. When a user enters the system at a classification lower then some of his pending messages, the header array will show the presence of

the messages by displaying the security classification of the message, but not the time, date, destination, or origin information that is contained in the header. This is done to allow the user to be alerted to the fact that he has the message but keeping the amount of information disclosed about the message to a minimum. This display of the security classification can be considered a covert storage channel in the system since the user can find out information concerning data of a higher security classification. Covert channels in the system will be discussed in a later section. This module is within the security perimeter, and has such the code has to be validated. The section on concurrency controls details how the read and write operations are accomplished.

11. Message Text Access Module

As in the message header access module, there are two major routines that comprise this module; read and write message operations. By placing a call to the read operation the user is able to read any of his messages that are at his current security level or a lower level. The write operation is strictly a single level operation. This is due to the use of the ticket primitive to ensure consistency of the data, as outlined in the chapter on eventcounts and sequencers. Both of the routines use the security features implemented in GEMSOS to ensure there are no unauthorized

data accesses. This module is within the security perimeter.

12. Terminal Control Module

This module is made up of two routines that are dependent on the type of terminal connected to the system. For this implementation, the DEC VT100 control set was chosen due to equipment availability. One of the routines provides the ability to clear the screen using the terminal control sequences. A direct cursor addressing procedure has been implemented. The direct cursor addressing is required by the message editor's cursor movement functions and the menus throughout the system. All of the procedures in this module write directly to the write device, rather than returning strings to the calling process.

F. CONCURRENCY CONTROL

Collectively the data segments can be thought of as a hierarchical database. The different security classes of message texts and the message headers form separate major branches. The message header branch then branches off in individual leaves for each user's message header. Each user has a leaf on each of the security branches if he has access to that security level. The leaves in turn are made up of the user's message texts for that security level. With this data base structure, the SMS is a database management process where multiple users are accessing the same data

base and their actions must be coordinated to ensure data consistency and verified to ensure the access is authorized.

The SMS will have a separate process running for each user node. Each process will be making updates to a multilevel security message database. This is the "multilevel secure readers-writers problem" that was presented in the previous chapter. To solve this problem, two modes of concurrency control are required; data access and process scheduling.

1. Data Access Control

In the "multilevel secure readers-writers problem" we have the constraints that a process can read lower level data, write higher level data, and modify data at the same level. GEMSOS provides the required security checks on the eventcounts and sequencers as an integral part of the data segments. This eliminates the need for any explicit checking of access authorization for the security classes in the code.

The use of eventcounts and sequencers is limited to the synchronizing of access to data. Read operations, which can be done by more than one process concurrently with no loss of consistency in the system, use only eventcounts to ensure that the data is in a consistent state. By using only eventcounts it is possible to read any data from the same or lower security classes. The eventcount is read at two points in the system read process, once before the data

is read and once after. If the two values of the eventcount are the same, there were no writes during the read process. If the values are different the read aborts and restarts. This ensures that the data is read in a consistent state. Figure 19 contains the pseudocode for the algorithm.

```
Make security branch mentor known
Make message segment known
Swapin message segment
Make pointer to the segment
REPEAT
    Read Segment's Eventcount
    Move selected data to desired data structure
    Read segment's eventcount
UNTIL the two eventcount values are equal
Terminate message segment
Terminate security branch mentor
```

Figure 19. Sample Read Operation

The writing process must provide a means for the writer to gain exclusive control (only one write operation at a time) of the data to ensure consistency of the data. To do this, the ticket operation is used; it is the only mechanism that provides mutual exclusion. The single level security limitation of the ticket operation prohibits writing data at any security level except the current security level. After every write operation, the appropriate eventcount is advanced to ensure the data is in

a consistent state. A pseudocode implementation of the write process can be found in Figure 20.

```
Make security branch mentor known
Make message segment known
Swapin message segment
Obtain a TICKET from the segment
AWAIT the value of the ticket
Make pointer to the segment
Move data from the data structure into the segment
ADVANCE the segment's eventcount
Terminate message segment
Terminate security branch mentor
```

Figure 20. Sample Write Operation

2. Process Scheduling

As outlined in Chapter II, GEMSOS is capable of multiprogramming and multiprocessing. Due to the structure of the SMS, with one master process creating the node processes, all processes are run on a single processor, the multiprocessing feature is not used by the SMS. This makes use of the multiprogramming scheduling algorithm in GEMSOS. The "run to block" algorithm is used by the system. Each of the processes will run until a request is placed for a service that can not be immediately provided, at which time

it will block and a ready process will be allowed to commence execution.

G. COVERT CHANNELS

As with most secure systems, covert channels exist in the SMS. In this section the channels found during a search of the system and code will be discussed, rationalized and an estimated bandwidth given. A channel naming system that was presented in [Gass88] is used to identify the type of channel. The author has not had formal training in the evaluation of secure systems and as such more, covert channels may exist and the computed bandwidth may be incorrect. The bandwidths computed in this section tend to be overly pessimistic in that it would be impossible for a user to sustain the channels at the computed bandwidths.

1. Storage Channels

The message header array is an object attribute channel. When the array is displayed on the terminal it is possible to find out the security class of all the user's messages. Given that there are a maximum of nine messages and four possible security classes for each message the most information that can be leaked is 36 bits. Assuming that no more than one screen display per second is possible, the maximum band width is 32 bits per second. The actual bandwidth will be considerably smaller since much of the header array will remain static for a length of time. This covert channel, while it has a large potential bandwidth, is

not deemed serious. The justification for this is that a user is authorized access to the data that is being leaked to him by the channel.

The message header also presents the opportunity to use an object existence channel. By sending a user repeated messages it is possible to compute the number of messages that were pending prior to the attack. From the total of nine messages, four bits are required to identify explicitly the number of messages. In the worst case one attempt is required to determine that the recipient has nine messages. This action will take about one second for a bandwidth of four bits per second. This channel is created by the static nature of the header array. A variable length header array, such as a linked list, would not have this channel.

It is possible for a user to create an object existence channel to determine the maximum security class of each user on the system. This can be done by attempting to send highly classified mail to a known user downgrading each successive message until a message is received. With the four security classes, four bits of data are leaked out in each attempt. These four bits times the number of users equals the maximum amount of information that can be gained by this channel. Assuming all users are at the highest classification level tried, at best case it would take four to five seconds per attempt. The resulting bandwidth would be about one bit per second. The justification for allowing

the existence of this channel is that most users know each others security clearances in advance since such information is readily available.

2. Timing Channels

Knowing that the Gemini Computer uses a run to block scheduling algorithm, it is possible for a knowledgeable user to make a rough determination of the system load by the delay in the services provided by the system. Write access to the data segments is controlled by the ticket mechanism, which allows one user at a time to access the data. This delay would make it possible for a user to determine if other users were trying to access the same data segment. These two timing channels can be defeated by installing a random length delay loop in the sections of code that reads and writes the data to the segments. The channels' existence can be rationalized by the fact that the perpetrator cannot compute the correct number of users on the system--just a rough idea of that number.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

It was the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate that it is possible to design a parallel multilevel secure process that is simple for a user to operate. The result was a menu driven electronic mail system that allows up to 12 users and four levels of security classification. This system demonstrates that the goal of the thesis is attainable.

Programming in a secure and parallel environment requires a different "mind set" than conventional unsecure single process programming. For a secure environment the programmers must know the classification of the data and which sections of code can access particular data. In a parallel environment the system's designers must impose controls on data access to ensure all reads and writes are atomic (no other process can alter the data during the transaction) and no data is left in an inconsistent state.

Security can be built into a system with minimum overhead and additional expense. This is true if the system designers consider security as an integral part of the system.

Eventcounts and sequencers are an efficient and simple way to control access to shared data by parallel processes.

The fact that reading and writing of eventcounts can be separated make them ideal for use in a secure environment.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The author severely underestimated the skill level and expertise needed to program in a secure environment. For this reason, if the Gemini computers owned by the Naval Postgraduate School are to be used, an ongoing research program must be developed. This will allow experience to be passed from one thesis student to the next in a series of follow on theses.

The Gemini TCB is capable of supporting up to 48 terminals, whereas, SMS currently limits the number of terminals and users to 12. The data structures of the system can be modified to allow the SMS to support more than 12 users.

The message storage formats used by the SMS waste considerable amount of space. A more efficient means of storage would be to create a new segment for every message under a mentor segment unique to each security class and user pair.

The use of secure computers warrants considerable study. A secure computer is a special purpose computer, and as such should be used for specific applications. Programming a secure computer is considerably more difficult than a normal computer. The increased difficulty is offset by the benefits of a secure system for certain applications. If

the system has an overriding security requirement then a secure computer should be considered.

The Naval Postgraduate School has the resources available to develop a comprehensive program to explore the uses of secure computers. Such a program should include the development of applications for, and the management of, secure computers. This program should be under a larger and more general Automated Data Processing (ADP) security program.

C. FINAL COMMENT

Computers can be made only as secure as the least trusted individual who has access to them. To paraphrase a common cliché, "Computers don't leak information, people do."

APPENDIX A

USER MANUAL FOR THE SECURE MAIL SYSTEM

A. INTRODUCTION

The Secure Mail System (SMS) is a multilevel secure electronic mail system. It can support up to 12 users on 12 active terminals. Four separate security classifications of messages are used by the system to segregate the messages.

The system has been divided into two logical areas. System initialization is done by the System Security Manager (SSM) at boot time. This process then spawns the node process in which all user interaction takes place.

B. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION

During the system initialization process the SSM configures the system by specifying the active terminals and the security classification for the selected terminals. A menu is presented to select the terminal from a list of terminals that are connected to the system. Once the SSM selects a terminal he is then prompted for a security class. After the node parameters have been selected, the configuration process spawns the node process. This is repeated until all terminals have been configured. At this time the configuration process blocks.

C. NODE PROCESS

The node process runs on each terminal and provides the user interaction. The user is required to verify his identity by of a username/password login sequence. At this point the session security class is selected. If the user does not provide a correct login sequence within three tries, the terminal process blocks. The SSM must then restart the system.

Upon successful login into the system the user is presented with a menu of options and a listing of incoming and outgoing messages. The options include edit, create, read, delete, send and quit. The after selecting the edit option the user is then prompted to make a selection from a list of messages. Once the menu has been selected the user is presented with the text that had been previously entered into the message. From here any of the commands listed in Table A-1 can be used. When the user exits the editing mode the date, time and the security classification are updated to reflect the current system parameters.

By selecting the create option the user indicates that he desires to create a new message form. This can only be done when there is an empty space in the message header array. The user is prompted for the destination of the message, the rest of the header is filled in by the system. The system then goes into the edit mode to allow the user to fill in the text of the message. After completion of

TABLE A-1
EDIT MODE COMMANDS

<u>Key</u>	<u>Function</u>
^e	Cursor up
^x	Cursor down
^s	Cursor left
Bksp	Cursor left
^d	Cursor right
^m	Go to first position of the next line
Return	Go to first position of the next line
^a	Go to start of current line
^f	Go to end of current line
^r	Go to top of message text
^c	Go to bottom of message text
^i	Tab, move cursor 5 spaces right
^v	Turn insert mode on, any control character turn insert mode off
^g	Delete a character
^y	Delete a line
^z	Exit edit mode

editing the user is asked if they would like to save the message and for the destination of the message.

The read option allows the user to view a message without the ability to edit it. This is useful when he desires to consult a lower level security message.

Upon selecting the delete option the user is queried to find out if he desires to delete an incoming or outgoing message. Once that selection has been made a list of the messages is displayed. From this menu the user selects the

message number for deletion. Both the header and the message text are overwritten in this process.

When the user desires to send a message he is presented with a list of messages available for transmission. When he selects one of the messages the security class is checked and upgraded if it is lower than the current session security level. The user is prompted for the destination of the message. The data and time are updated before the message is sent. This process does not delete the message, thereby allowing the same message to be sent to multiple users without rekeying.

The quit option logs the user out and allows a new user to login to the system at a new security class.

D. SUMMARY

The SMS was designed to be a simple user friendly secure electronic mail system. Commercially available unsecure electronic mail systems offer many more features but do not offer the security that is built into this system.

APPENDIX B

SMS CONFIGURATION MODULE CODE

The source code for this module contains routines that are proprietary to Gemini Computers. In order to allow unlimited distribution, the code has not been included in this thesis. Code for this module is available from the WAR lab custodian at the following address:

Superintendent, Code 55wg
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943

APPENDIX C

SMDISS CODE

```
1 {This code was written in Pascal MT+ version 3.0. It is
2 linked using the following command line for the Linkmt
3 program:
4
5 Linkmt sms = f:r1-init,sms,f:lf30/s,rllib/s,paslib/s/p:80
6
7 The code is shared among all node processes, each node has a
8 separate stack and data segment.)
9 {$e-}
10 {$K0} {$K1} {$K2} {$K3} {$K5} {$K6} {$K7}
11 {$K8} {$K9} {$K10} {$K12} {$K13}
12
13 module sms;
14
15 const
16     {$i f:gate-con.zli}
17     {$i f:r1-con.zli}
18     {$i f:user-con.zli}
19     (* {$i f:cd-con.zli} *)
20     {program specific constants}
21     userseg = 11;
22     headerseg = 2;
23     useg = 3;
24     cseg = 4;
25     sseg = 5;
26     tsseg = 6;
27 type
28     {$i f:gate-typ.zli}
29     {$i f:lib-typ.zli}
30     {$i f:kst-typ.zli}
31     {$i f:rlp-typ.zli}
32     {$i f:user-typ.zli}
33     {program specific types}
34     {$i sms.typ}
35
36 (* External Declarations *)
37
38 {$i f:lib.zli}
39 {$i f:io-str.zli}
40 {$i f:gate.zli}
41 {$i f:loadregs.zli}
42 {$i include.dec}
43
```

```

44 {$e+}
45 {r+}
46 *-----
47 |               main
48 |   This is the node process
49 *-----*)
50 procedure main(var init: rl_process_def);
51
52 var
53     success,result : integer;
54     user : string;
55     minclass,maxclass,userclass :access_class;
56     choice : char;
57     innotout : boolean;
58     trycntr : integer;
59     portno : integer;
60
61 procedure sendmess(user:string8;userclass:access_class);
62
63 var
64     messnum,result,destno,sendnum : integer;
65     choice,yesno : char;
66     headerarray : theaderarray;
67     message : messtext;
68
69 begin
70     clrscr;
71     Selectfile (user,userclass,FALSE,choice);
72     if choice <> '0' then
73     begin
74         messnum := ord(choice) - 48;
75         readheader(user,FALSE,userclass,headerarray,result);
76         readfile(FALSE,userclass,messnum,headerarray[messnum],
77                 message,result);
78         disp2(message);
79         repeat
80             putstr(w_dev,'Is this the correct message? (Y/N) ');
81             getchar(r_dev,yesno);
82             putln(w_dev,' ');
83         until yesno in ['y','n','Y','N'];
84         if yesno in ['y','Y'] then
85             begin
86                 repeat
87                     putstr(w_dev,'Is the destination of the message');
88                     putstr(w_dev,' correct? (Y/N) ');
89                     getchar(r_dev,yesno);
90                     putln(w_dev,' ');
91                 until yesno in ['y','n','Y','N'];
92                 if yesno in ['N','n'] then
93                     begin
94                         putstr(w_dev,'What is the new destination? ');

```

```

95         getln(r_dev,message.heading.reci);
96     end;
97     getusenum(message.heading.reci,sendnum,result);
98     if result = 0 then
99     begin
100         findheaderslot(message.heading.reci,userclass,
101                         TRUE,destno);
102         if destno <> 0 then
103         begin
104             {send the message}
105             writeheader(message.heading.reci,TRUE,userclass,
106                         message.heading.destno,result);
107             writefile(TRUE,userclass,destno,message.heading,
108                       message,result);
109             {update user's version}
110             writeheader(user,FALSE,userclass,message.heading,
111                         messnum,result);
112             writefile(FALSE,userclass,messnum,message.heading,
113                       message,result);
114             putln(w_dev,'The message has been sent');
115         end
116     else
117     begin
118         putln(w_dev, 'Unable to deliver the message');
119         putstr(w_dev, 'Check destination's username');
120         putln(w_dev, ' and security class');
121     end
122     end
123     else
124     begin
125         putln(w_dev, 'Unable to deliver the message');
126         putstr(w_dev, 'Check destination's username');
127         putln(w_dev, ' and security class');
128     end;
129     get_return;
130 end;
131 end;
132 end;
133
134 (*)
135 PROCEDURE hookup_console(portno: integer;wrt_dev : integer;
136                          rd_dev : integer);
137 var
138     success : integer;
139
140 begin
141     repeat
142         attach(portno, wrt_dev, false, success );
143     until (success = no_error);
144     repeat
145         attach(portno, rd_dev, true, success );
146     until (success = no_error);

```



```

147 end; (hookup_console)
148
149 (*)
150 PROCEDURE userlogin(VAR user:string8; Var userclass:access_class;
151                     maxclass:access_class;portno:integer;Var result:integer);
152 var
153     password : string8;
154     userin : char;
155     usernum : integer;
156 begin
157     result := 0;
158     userin := 'U';
159     userclass := maxclass;
160     hookup_console(portno,w_dev, r_dev);
161     clrscr;
162     putstr(w_dev,'Login: ');
163     getln(r_dev,user);
164     putstr(w_dev,'Password (will not echo): ');
165     noecho_getln(r_dev,password);
166     putln(w_dev,' ');
167     repeat
168         putstr(w_dev,'Desired access class (U/C/S/T): ');
169         getchar(r_dev,userin);
170         putln(w_dev,' ');
171     until userin in ['U','C','S','T','u','c','s','t'];
172     if ord(userin) > 96 then
173         userin := chr(ord(userin) -32);
174     case userin of
175         'U' : userclass.compromise[0] := unclass_level;
176         'C' : userclass.compromise[0] := conf_level;
177         'S' : userclass.compromise[0] := secret_level;
178         'T' : userclass.compromise[0] := t_secret_level;
179     end;
180 { detach(w_dev);
181   detach(r_dev); }
182 (* do look up for username, password, access class *)
183     lookupuser(user,password,userclass,usernum,result);
184     if (userclass.compromise[0] > maxclass.compromise[0])
185         and (result = 0) then result := 4;
186 {     hookup_console(portno,w_dev,r_dev); }
187
188 end;
189
190 (*)
191 PROCEDURE lookupuser(user,password:string8;userclass:access_class;
192                     var usernum:integer;var result:integer);
193 var
194     arrayptr : userptr;
195     seg_number,size,cntr : integer;
196     mclass : access_class;
197 begin

```

```

198 (*putln(w_dev,'in the look up user proc');*)
199   mclass := init.resources.max_class;
200   seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2],Userseg,seg_number,
201               r_w,size,mclass,result);
202   swapin_segment(seg_number,result);
203   arrayptr := lib_mk_ptr(ltd_table,seg_number,1);
204   cntr := 0;
205   while (cntr < max_user) and
206         not (arrayptr^[cntr].name = user) do
207   begin
208       cntr := cntr + 1;
209   end;
210   if arrayptr^[cntr].name = user then
211   begin
212       usernum := cntr;
213       if password = arrayptr^[usernum].pswd then
214       begin
215           if (userclass.compromise[0] <=
216               arrayptr^[usernum].max_class.compromise[0]) then
217               result := 0;
218       end
219       else
220           result := 2;
221   end
222   else
223       result := 1;
224   seg_terminate(seg_number,cntr);
225 end;
226
227 (*)
228 PROCEDURE getusernum(user:string8;Var usernum,result:integer);
229 var
230     arrayptr : userptr;
231     seg_number,cntr,size : integer;
232     mclass : access_class;
233 begin
234     mclass := init.resources.max_class;
235     seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2],Userseg,seg_number,
236                 r_w,size,mclass,result);
237     show_err('get usernum makeknown result = ',result);
238     swapin_segment(seg_number,result);
239     show_err('get usernum swapin result = ',result);
240
241     arrayptr := lib_mk_ptr(ltd_table,seg_number,1);
242     cntr := 0;
243     while (cntr < max_user) and (arrayptr^[cntr].name <> user) do
244     begin
245         cntr := cntr + 1;
246     end;
247     if (userclass.compromise[0] <=
248         arrayptr^[cntr].max_class.compromise[0])

```

```

249     and (arrayptr^[cntr].name = user) then
250     begin
251         result := 0;
252         usernum := cntr;
253     end
254     else
255         result := 1;
256     seg_terminate(seg_number,cntr);
257     show_err('set usernum set_terminate result = ',cntr );
258 end;
259
260 (*)
261 PROCEDURE writefile(innotout:boolean;sec_class:access_class;
262                     messnum:integer;mhead:messheading;
263                     Var message:messtext;VAR result:integer);
264
265 var
266     usernum : integer;
267     size,seg1,seg2,evc1,evc2,cntr : integer;
268     arrayptr : messptr;
269     user :string8;
270     branch : integer;
271     temp_ptr : var_pointer;
272     messptr : ^messtext;
273 begin
274     {ensure no write down is allowed}
275     if sec_class.compromise[0] >= mhead.class.compromise[0] then
276     begin
277         if innotout then
278             user := mhead.reci
279         else
280             user := mhead.from;
281         case mhead.class.compromise[0] of
282             unclass_level : branch := useg;
283             conf_level : branch := cseg;
284             secret_level : branch := sseg;
285             t_secret_level : branch := tsseg;
286             else result := 2;
287         end; {case}
288
289
290         getusernum(user,usernum,result);
291         seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2],branch,seg1,
292                     r_w,size,sec_class,result);
293         show_err('write file make known result 1 = ',result);
294
295         seg_makeknown(seg1,usernum,seg2,
296                     r_w,size,sec_class,result);
297         show_err('write file make known result 2 = ',result);
298
299         swapin_segment(seg2,result);
300         show_err('write file swapin result = ',result);

```

```

301
302     ticket(seg2,evcl,result);
303     show_err('write file ticket result = ',result);
304     await(seg2,evcl,result);
305     show_err('write file await result = ',result);
306
307     temptr.seg := lib_mk_sel(ldt_table,seg2,1);
308     if innotout then
309         temptr.off := (messnum - 1) * sizeof(messtext)
310     else
311         temptr.off := (messnum + 8) * sizeof(messtext);
312     messptr := temptr.p;
313     messptr^ := message;
314
315     advance(seg2,result);
316     show_err('write file advance result = ',result);
317
318     seg_terminate(seg2,result);
319
320     seg_terminate(seg1,result);
321 end
322 else
323     result := 1;
324 end;
325
326 (*)
327 PROCEDURE readfile(innotout:boolean;sec_class:access_class;
328                   messnum:integer;mhead:messheading;
329                   Var message:messtext;VAR result:integer);
330
331 var
332     usernum : integer;
333     size,seg1,seg2,evcl,evc2,cntr : integer;
334     arrayptr : messptr;
335     user :string8;
336     branch : integer;
337     mclass : access_class;
338
339 begin
340     result := 0;
341     (ensure no read up is allowed)
342     if sec_class.compromise[0] >= mhead.class.compromise[0] then
343     begin
344         if innotout then
345             user := mhead.reci
346         else
347             user := mhead.from;
348         case mhead.class.compromise[0] of
349             unclass_level : branch := useg;
350             conf_level : branch := cseg;
351             secret_level : branch := sseg;
352             t_secret_level : branch := tsseg;

```

```

353         else                result := 2;
354     end; (case)
355     if result = 0 then
356     begin
357
358         getusernum(user, usernum, result);
359         mclass := init.resources.max_class;
360         seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2], branch, seg1,
361             r_w, size, sec_class, result);
362         show_err('read file make known result 1 = ', result);
363
364         seg_makeknown(seg1, usernum, seg2,
365             r_w, size, mclass, result);
366         show_err('read file make known result 2 = ', result);
367
368         swapin_segment(seg2, result);
369         show_err('read file swapin result = ', result);
370
371         repeat
372             read_evc(seg2, evc1, result);
373             arrayptr := lib_mk_ptr(ldt_table, seg2, 1);
374             if innotout then
375                 message := arrayptr^[messnum]
376             else
377                 message := arrayptr^[messnum + 9];
378             read_evc(seg2, evc2, result);
379         until evc1 = evc2;
380
381         seg_terminate(seg2, result);
382
383         seg_terminate(seg1, result);
384     end;
385     end
386     else
387         result := 1;
388 end;
389
390 (*)
391 PROCEDURE readheader(user:string8; innotout:boolean;
392     access:access_class; VAR headerarray:theadarray;
393     Var result:integer);
394 var
395     seg1, seg2, evc1, evc2, cntr, size : integer;
396     arrayptr : headptr;
397     mclass : access_class;
398     usernum : integer;
399
400 begin
401
402     (*putln(w_dev, 'accessing the header array list');*)
403     getusernum(user, usernum, result);
404     mclass := init.resources.max_class;

```

```

405     seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2],headerseg,seg1,
406                   r_w,size,mclass,result);
407     show_err('read header make known result 1 = ',result);
408     seg_makeknown(seg1,usenum,seg2,
409                   r_w,size,mclass,result);
410     show_err('read header make known result 2 = ',result);
411     swapin_segment(seg2,result);
412     show_err('read header swapin result = ',result);
413     repeat
414         read_evc(seg2,evc1,result);
415         arrayptr := lib_mk_ptr(ldt_table,seg2,1);
416         if innotout then
417             headerarray := arrayptr^.income
418         else
419             headerarray := arrayptr^.outgo;
420         read_evc(seg2,evc2,result);
421     until evc1 = evc2;
422
423     seg_terminate(seg2,result);
424     seg_terminate(seg1,result);
425     for cntr := 1 to 9 do
426         if access.compromise[0] <
427             headerarray[cntr].class.compromise[0] then
428             with headerarray[cntr] do
429                 begin
430                     from := '      ';
431                     reci := '      ';
432                     time := '      ';
433                     date := '      ';
434                 end;
435     end;
436
437     (*}
438     PROCEDURE writeheader(user:string8; innotout:boolean;
439         access:access_class; header:messheading;messnum:integer;
440         Var result:integer);
441     var
442         size,usenum : integer;
443         seg1,seg2,cntr,evc1 : integer;
444         arrayptr : headptr;
445         mclass : access_class;
446     begin
447
448     (*putln(w_dev,'accessing the header array list');*)
449         getusenum(user,usenum,result);
450         mclass := init.resources.max_class;
451         seg_makeknown(init.initial_seg[2],headerseg,seg1,
452                       r_w,size,mclass,result);
453         show_err('write header make known result 1 = ',result);
454
455         seg_makeknown(seg1,usenum,seg2,

```

```

456             r_w,size,mclass,result);
457     show_err('write header make known result 2 = ',result);
458
459     swapin_segment(seg2,result);
460     show_err('write header swapin result = ',result);
461
462     ticket(seg2,evcl,result);
463     show_err('write header ticket result = ',result);
464     await(seg2,evcl,result);
465     show_err('write header await result = ',result);
466     arrayptr := lib_mk_ptr(ldt_table,seg2,1);
467     header.class := access;
468     if innout then
469         arrayptr^.income[messnum] := header
470     else
471         arrayptr^.outgo[messnum] := header;
472     advance(seg2,result);
473     show_err('write header advance result = ',result);
474
475     seg_terminate(seg2,result);
476
477     seg_terminate(seg1,result);
478
479 end;
480
481 (*)
482 PROCEDURE get_return;
483
484 var
485     tempstr : string;
486
487 begin
488     putstr(w_dev, '<ret> to continue');
489     getln(r_dev, tempstr)
490 end;
491
492 (*)
493 PROCEDURE write_comp( class : access_class; var str : string);
494
495 begin
496     case class.compromise[0] of
497         unclass_level : str := 'Unclassified';
498         conf_level    : str := 'Confidential';
499         secret_level  : str := 'Secret';
500         t_secret_level : str := 'Top Secret';
501     end;
502 end;
503
504
505 (*)
506 PROCEDURE gotoxy(col,row:integer);
507 var

```

```

508     vstr : string;
509     strlen : integer;
510 begin
511     if ((0 < col) and (col <= 80) and
512         (1 <= row) and (row <= 24)) then
513         begin
514             vstr[1] := chr(27);
515             vstr[2] := '[';
516             strlen := 3;
517             if row > 9 then
518                 begin
519                     vstr[strlen] := chr(48 + (row div 10));
520                     strlen := 4;
521                 end;
522             vstr[strlen] := chr(48 + (row mod 10));
523             strlen := strlen + 1;
524             vstr[strlen] := ',';
525             strlen := strlen + 1;
526             if col > 9 then
527                 begin
528                     vstr[strlen] := chr(48 + (col div 10));
529                     strlen := strlen + 1;
530                 end;
531             vstr[strlen] := chr(48 + (col mod 10));
532             strlen := strlen + 1;
533             vstr[strlen] := 'H';
534             vstr[0] := chr(strlen);
535         end
536     else
537         begin
538             vstr[0] := chr(1);
539             vstr[1] := chr(7);
540         end;
541     putstr(w_dev,vstr);
542 end;
543
544 (*)
545 PROCEDURE clrscr;
546 var
547     vstr : string;
548     cntr : integer;
549 begin
550
551     for cntr := 1 to 25 do
552         putln(w_dev,'');
553
554         vstr[0] := chr(4);
555         vstr[1] := chr(27);
556         vstr[2] := '[';
557         vstr[3] := '2';
558         vstr[4] := 'J';
559         putstr(w_dev,vstr)

```



```

560 end;
561
562 (*)
563 PROCEDURE mainscreen(sec_class:access_class;
564                      user:string8;var choice:char);
565
566 { main menu screen }
567 var
568     headerarray : theaderarray;
569     innotout : boolean;
570     class_str: string;
571     cntr,result :integer;
572
573 begin
574     innotout := TRUE;
575     clrscr;
576     putstr(w_dev,'          Security class: ');
577     write_comp( sec_class,class_str);
578     putln(w_dev,class_str);
579     putstr(w_dev,'                                     ');
580     putln(w_dev,'SECURE MAIL SYSTEM');
581     putln(w_dev,'');
582     putln(w_dev,'                                     C. Create a message');
583     putln(w_dev,'                                     E. Edit a message');
584     putstr(w_dev,'                                     R. Read a ');
585     putln(w_dev,'recieved message');
586     putln(w_dev,'                                     S. Send a message');
587     putln(w_dev,'                                     D. Delete a message');
588     putstr(w_dev,'                                     Q. Quit message ');
589     putln(w_dev,'editor');
590     putln(w_dev,' ');
591     putln(w_dev,' ');
592     putstr(w_dev,'You have the following Messages:');
593     putln(w_dev,'          The Following messages are pending:');
594     putln(w_dev,' ');
595     putstr(w_dev,' Class From      Time      Date');
596     putln(w_dev,'          Class To        Time      Date');
597     putln(w_dev,' ');
598     putln(w_dev,'1. ');
599     putln(w_dev,'2. ');
600     putln(w_dev,'3. ');
601     putln(w_dev,'4. ');
602     putln(w_dev,'5. ');
603     putln(w_dev,'6. ');
604     putln(w_dev,'7. ');
605     putln(w_dev,'8. ');
606     putstr(w_dev,'9. ');
607
608
609 {incoming messages}

```

```

610     innotout := true;
611     Readheader(user, innotout, sec_class, headerarray, result);
612
613     for cntr := 1 to 9 do
614     begin
615         gotoxy(5, cntr + 15);
616         putchar(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].charclass);
617         gotoxy(8, cntr + 15);
618         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].from);
619         gotoxy(18, cntr + 15);
620         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].time);
621         gotoxy(25, cntr + 15);
622         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].date);
623     end;
624
625 {pending messages}
626     innotout := false;
627     Readheader(user, innotout, sec_class, headerarray, result);
628
629     for cntr := 1 to 9 do
630     begin
631         gotoxy(46, cntr + 15);
632         putchar(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].charclass);
633         gotoxy(51, cntr + 15);
634         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].reci);
635         gotoxy(62, cntr + 15);
636         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].time);
637         gotoxy(70, cntr + 15);
638         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].date);
639     end;
640
641 { stay in the loop until a valid key is pressed}
642     repeat
643         gotoxy(28, 10);
644         getchar(r_dev, choice);
645         if ord(choice) > 96 then
646             choice := chr(ord(choice) - 32);
647         until (choice = 'C') or (choice = 'E') or
648             (choice = 'R') or (choice = 'S') or (choice = 'D')
649             or (choice = 'Q');
650
651 end;
652
653 {*}
654 PROCEDURE Selectfile (user:string8;sec_class:access_class;
655     innotout:boolean;VAR choice:char);
656 {from here the user selects on of the available of files}
657 var
658     headerarray : theaderarray;
659     cntr,result : integer;
660     fileflag : boolean;
661 begin

```

```

662     clrscr;
663     putln(w_dev, ' ');
664     putln(w_dev, ' ');
665     putln(w_dev, ' ');
666     putstr(w_dev, '                Select one of the ');
667     putln(w_dev, 'following Messages:');
668     putln(w_dev, '                Class        From        To');
669     putln(w_dev, '                Time        Date');
670     putln(w_dev, '                1. ');
671     putln(w_dev, '                2. ');
672     putln(w_dev, '                3. ');
673     putln(w_dev, '                4. ');
674     putln(w_dev, '                5. ');
675     putln(w_dev, '                6. ');
676     putln(w_dev, '                7. ');
677     putln(w_dev, '                8. ');
678     putln(w_dev, '                9. ');
679     putln(w_dev, '                0. No action');
680
681 {read in the header file}
682     Readheader(user, innotout, sec_class, headerarray, result);
683
684     for cntr := 1 to 9 do
685     begin
686         gotoxy(19, cntr + 5);
687         putchar(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].charclass);
688         gotoxy(27, cntr + 5);
689         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].from);
690         gotoxy(38, cntr + 5);
691         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].reci);
692         gotoxy(48, cntr + 5);
693         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].time);
694         gotoxy(59, cntr + 5);
695         putstr(w_dev, headerarray[cntr].date);
696     end;
697     gotoxy(10, 16);
698 {make sure the user selects a valid file or no action}
699     repeat
700         getchar(r_dev, choice);
701         if (choice >= '1') and (choice <= '9') then
702             fileflag :=
703                 headerarray[ord(choice) - 48].charclass <> '*';
704         if choice = '0' then
705             fileflag := TRUE;
706     until (choice >= '0') and (choice <= '9') and Fileflag;
707     clrscr;
708 end;
709
710
711 (*)
712 PROCEDURE int2str(num:byte;var str:string);
713

```

```

714 begin
715     str[1] := '0';
716     if num >= 10 then
717         str[1] := chr(48 + (num div 10));
718     str[2] := chr(48 + (num mod 10));
719     str[0] := '2';
720 end;
721
722 (*)
723 PROCEDURE gettime(var time:string4;var date:string6);
724 const
725     clockslot = 5;
726 var
727     str :string;
728     result : integer;
729     clockbuff : cd_tim_buff;
730 begin
731     cd_r_attach(clockslot,result);
732     cd_r_dev(clockslot,clockbuff,result);
733     int2str(clockbuff[2],str);
734     time[0] := chr(4);
735     time[1] := str[1];
736     time[2] := str[2];
737     int2str(clockbuff[3],str);
738     time[3] := str[1];
739     time[4] := str[2];
740     int2str(clockbuff[7],str);
741     date[0] := chr(6);
742     date[1] := str[1];
743     date[2] := str[2];
744     int2str(clockbuff[5],str);
745     date[3] := str[1];
746     date[4] := str[2];
747     int2str(clockbuff[6],str);
748     date[5] := str[1];
749     date[6] := str[2];
750     detach(clockslot);
751 end;
752
753 (*)
754 PROCEDURE deleteheader(user:string;sec class:Access_class;
755     availslot:integer;innotout:boolean;Var result:integer);
756 var
757     header : messheading;
758 begin
759     header.charclass := '*';
760     header.class.compromise[0] := 0;
761     header.from := ' ';
762     header.reci := ' ';
763     header.time := ' ';
764     header.date := ' ';
765     writeheader(user,innotout,sec_class,header,availslot,result);

```

```

766 end;
767
768 (*)
769 PROCEDURE delmessage(user:string8;sec_class:access_class;
770                     choice:integer;innotout:boolean;
771                     result:integer);
772 var
773     message : messtext;
774     cntrl,cntr2: integer;
775 begin
776     with message.heading do
777         begin
778             charclass := '*';
779             class.compromise[0] := 0;
780             if innotout then
781                 begin
782                     reci := user;
783                     from := '      ';
784                 end
785             else
786                 begin
787                     from := user;
788                     reci := '      ';
789                 end;
790             time := '      ';
791             date := '      ';
792         end;
793         for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
794             for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
795                 message.body[cntrl,cntr2] := ' ';
796             writefile(innotout,sec_class,choice,message.heading,
797                     message,result);
798         end;
799
800
801 (*)
802 PROCEDURE deletemess(user:string8;sec_class:access_class);
803 var
804     innotout : boolean;
805     choice,yesno : char;
806     headerarray : theaderarray;
807     messnum,result : integer;
808     message : messtext;
809 begin
810     clrscr;
811     repeat
812         putstr(w_dev,'Do you want to delete an ');
813         putstr(w_dev,'incoming message? (Y/N) ');
814         getchar(r_dev,yesno);
815         putln(w_dev,' ');
816     until yesno in ['y','n','Y','N'];
817     innotout := (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y');

```

```

818   Selectfile (user,sec_class,innout,choice);
819   if choice <> '0' then
820   begin
821     messnum := ord(choice) - 48;
822     readheader(user,innout,sec_class,headerarray,result);
823     readfile(innotout,sec_class,messnum,headerarray[messnum],
824             message,result);
825     disp2(message);
826     repeat
827       putstr(w_dev,'Is this the correct message? (Y/N) ');
828       getchar(r_dev,yesno);
829       putln(w_dev,' ');
830     until yesno in ['y','n','Y','N'];
831     if yesno in ['y','Y'] then
832     begin
833       deleteheader(user,sec_class,messnum,innout,result);
834       delmessage(user,sec_class,messnum,innout,result);
835     end;
836   end;
837 end;
838
839
840 (*)
841 PROCEDURE findheadslot(user:string8;sec_class:access_class;
842                       innout:boolean;
843                       Var availslot: integer);
844 var
845   cntr : integer;
846   headerarray :theadarray;
847   result : integer;
848 begin
849   readheader(user,innout,sec_class, headerarray,result);
850   availslot := 1;
851   while (availslot < 9) and
852         (headerarray[availslot].charclass <> '*') do
853     availslot := availslot + 1;
854   if headerarray[availslot].charclass <> '*' then
855     availslot := 0
856   else
857   begin
858     with headerarray[availslot] do
859     begin
860       class := sec_class;
861       case class.compromise[0] of
862         unclass_level : charclass := 'U';
863         conf_level    : charclass := 'C';
864         secret_level  : charclass := 'S';
865         t secret_level : charclass := 'T';
866       else charclass := '*';
867     end;
868     from := user;
869     gettime(time,date)

```

```

870         end;
871         writeheader(user,innotout,sec_class,
872                     headerarray[availslot],availslot,result);
873     end;
874 end;
875
876 (*)
877 PROCEDURE createmess(user : string8;sec_class:access_class);
878 var
879     cntrl,cntr2,availslot : integer;
880     innotout : boolean;
881     message : messtext;
882     yesno : char;
883     result : integer;
884
885 begin
886     clrscr;
887     innotout := FALSE;
888     findheadslot(user,sec_class,innotout,availslot);
889     if availslot = 0 then
890     begin
891         putstr(w_dev,'There is no room in the header array for ');
892         putln(w_dev,'any more messages');
893         putstr(w_dev,'You must delete and/or send some
894             putln(w_dev,'of them before');
895         putln(w_dev,' you can create any more');
896     end
897     else
898     begin
899         updateheader(user,sec_class,message.heading,result);
900         for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
901             for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
902                 message.body[cntrl,cntr2] := ' ';
903             dispmessage(message);
904             edit(message);
905             clrscr;
906             repeat
907                 putstr(w_dev,'Do you want to save the message? (Y/N)');
908                 getchar(r_dev,yesno);
909                 putln(w_dev,' ');
910             until yesno in ['Y','N','y','n'];
911             if (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y') then
912             begin
913                 updateheader(user,sec_class,message.heading,result);
914                 writeheader(user,innotout,sec_class, message.heading,
915                             availslot,result);
916                 writefile(innotout,sec_class,availslot,
917                           message.heading,message,result);
918             end
919             else
920                 deleteheader(user,sec_class,availslot,innotout,result);

```

```

921     end;
922 end;
923
924 (*)
925 PROCEDURE dispmessage(messin:Messtext);
926 var
927     cntrl,cntr2:integer;
928     secstring : string;
929     message : messtext;
930
931 begin
932     message := messin;
933
934     clrscr;
935     write_comp(message.heading.class,secstring);
936     putstr(w_dev,secstring);
937     gotoxy(25,1);
938     putstr(w_dev,message.heading.from);
939     gotoxy(35,1);
940     putstr(w_dev,message.heading.reci);
941     gotoxy(45,1);
942     putstr(w_dev,message.heading.time);
943     gotoxy(55,1);
944     putln(w_dev,message.heading.date);
945     gotoxy(1,2);
946     for cntrl := 2 to 23 do
947     begin
948         for cntr2 := 1 to 79 do
949             putchar(w_dev,message.body[cntrl,cntr2]);
950             putln(w_dev,message.body[cntrl,80]);
951         end;
952         gotoxy(60,24);
953         write_comp(message.heading.class,secstring);
954     end;
955
956 (*)
957 PROCEDURE disp2(messin:messtext);
958 var
959     secstring : string;
960 begin
961
962     write_comp(messin.heading.class,secstring);
963     putstr(w_dev,secstring);
964     gotoxy(25,1);
965     putstr(w_dev,messin.heading.from);
966     gotoxy(35,1);
967     putstr(w_dev,messin.heading.reci);
968     gotoxy(45,1);
969     putstr(w_dev,messin.heading.time);
970     gotoxy(55,1);
971     putln(w_dev,messin.heading.date);
972     gotoxy(1,2);

```



```

973 end;
974
975 (*)
976 PROCEDURE readmess(user:string8;sec_class:access_class);
977 const
978     innotout = TRUE;
979 var
980     choice : char;
981     headerarray : theaderarray;
982     messnum,result : integer;
983     message : messtext;
984 begin
985     Selectfile (user,sec_class,innotout,choice);
986     if choice <> '0' then
987         begin
988             messnum := ord(choice) - 48;
989             readheader(user,innotout,sec_class,headerarray,result);
990             readfile(innotout,sec_class,messnum,headerarray[messnum],
991                 message,result);
992             if result <> 0 then
993                 begin
994                     clrscr;
995                     putln(w_dev,'Error reading the message');
996                     get_return;
997                 end
998             else
999                 begin
1000                     dispmessage(message);
1001                     get_return;
1002                 end;
1003             end;
1004         end;
1005
1006 (*)
1007 PROCEDURE updateheader(user:string8;sec_class:access_class;
1008     var headerrec:messheading;var result:integer);
1009 var
1010     tempstr : string;
1011     cntr : integer;
1012     clockbuff : od_tim_buff;
1013 begin
1014     with headerrec do
1015         begin
1016             class := sec_class;
1017             case class.compromise[0] of
1018                 unclass_level : charclass := 'U';
1019                 conf_level : charclass := 'C';
1020                 secret_level : charclass := 'S';
1021                 t_secret_level : charclass := 'T';
1022                 else charclass := '*';
1023             end;
1024             from := user;

```

```

1025     gettime(time,date);
1026     putstr(w_dev, 'Name of person to send message to ? ');
1027     getln(r_dev,reci);
1028     end;
1029 end;
1030
1031 (*)
1032 PROCEDURE edit(var message : messtext);
1033 var
1034     inchar : char;
1035     cntr,cntr2,charnum,colcntr,linecntr : integer;
1036
1037 begin
1038     gotoxy(1,2);
1039     linecntr := 2;
1040     colcntr := 1;
1041     repeat
1042         getchar(r_dev,inchar);
1043         charnum := ord(inchar);
1044         if charnum in [32..126] then
1045             (Normal Charcaters)
1046             begin
1047                 if (linecntr = 23) and (colcntr = 80) then
1048                     putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1049                 else
1050                     if (colcntr = 80) then
1051                         begin
1052                             putchar(w_dev,inchar);
1053                             message.body[linecntr,colcntr] := inchar;
1054                             linecntr := linecntr + 1;
1055                             colcntr := 1;
1056                             gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1057                         end
1058                     else
1059                         begin
1060                             putchar(w_dev,inchar);
1061                             message.body[linecntr,colcntr] := inchar;
1062                             colcntr := colcntr + 1;
1063                         end;
1064                     end
1065                 else
1066                     case charnum of
1067                         {Cursor Movement}
1068                         (up "^E")
1069                         5 : begin
1070                             if linecntr = 2 then
1071                                 putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1072                             else
1073                                 begin
1074                                     linecntr := linecntr - 1;
1075                                     gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1076                                 end;

```

```

1077      end;
1078 {down "^X"}
1079      24 : begin
1080          if linecntr = 23 then
1081              putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1082          else
1083              begin
1084                  linecntr := linecntr + 1;
1085                  gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1086              end;
1087      end;
1088 {left "^S"}
1089      19,8 : begin
1090          if (linecntr = 2) and (colcntr = 1) then
1091              putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1092          else
1093              if (colcntr = 1) then
1094                  begin
1095                      linecntr := linecntr - 1;
1096                      colcntr := 80;
1097                      gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1098                  end
1099              else
1100                  begin
1101                      colcntr := colcntr - 1;
1102                      gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1103                  end;
1104      end;
1105 {right "^D"}
1106      4 : begin
1107          if (linecntr = 23) and (colcntr = 80) then
1108              putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1109          else
1110              if (colcntr = 80) then
1111                  begin
1112                      linecntr := linecntr + 1;
1113                      colcntr := 1;
1114                      gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1115                  end
1116              else
1117                  begin
1118                      colcntr := colcntr + 1;
1119                      gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1120                  end;
1121      end;
1122 {Carrage return "^M", or the "return" key}
1123      13 : begin
1124          if linecntr = 23 then
1125              putchar(w_dev,chr(7))
1126          else
1127              begin
1128                  linecntr := linecntr + 1;

```

```

1129             colcntr := 1;
1130             gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1131         end;
1132     end;
1133 {Start of line "^A"}
1134     1 : begin
1135         colcntr := 1;
1136         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1137     end;
1138 {End of line "^F"}
1139     6 : begin
1140         colcntr := 80;
1141         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1142     end;
1143 {Top of page "^R"}
1144     18 : begin
1145         linecntr := 2;
1146         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1147     end;
1148 {Bottom of Page "^C"}
1149     3 : begin
1150         linecntr := 23;
1151         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1152     end;
1153 {Tab, five spaces "^I", or the "tab" key}
1154     9 : begin
1155         if colcntr < 75 then
1156             begin
1157                 colcntr := colcntr + 5;
1158                 gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1159             end;
1160         end;
1161     end;
1162 {insert "^V"}
1163     22 : begin
1164         gotoxy(70,1);
1165         putstr(w_dev,'INSERT ON');
1166         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1167         getchar(r_dev,inchar);
1168         charnum := ord(inchar);
1169         while charnum in [32..126] do
1170             begin
1171                 if (colcntr < 80) then
1172                     begin
1173                         for cntr := 79 downto colcntr do
1174                             message.body[linecntr,cntr + 1] :=
1175                                 message.body[linecntr,cntr];
1176                         message.body[linecntr,colcntr] := inchar;
1177                         for cntr := colcntr to 80 do
1178                             putchar(w_dev,
1179                                 message.body[linecntr,cntr]);

```

```

1180         colcntr := colcntr + 1;
1181         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1182     end
1183     else
1184     begin
1185         putchar(w_dev,inchar);
1186         message.body[linecntr,colcntr] := inchar;
1187         inchar := chr(27); (exit)
1188     end;
1189     getchar(r_dev,inchar);
1190     charnum := ord(inchar);
1191 end;
1192 gotoxy(70,1);
1193 putstr(w_dev,' ');
1194 gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1195     end;
1196
1197 (Delete single character "^G")
1198     7 : begin
1199         for cntr := colcntr to 79 do
1200         begin
1201             message.body[linecntr,cntr] :=
1202                 message.body[linecntr,cntr + 1];
1203             putchar(w_dev,message.body[linecntr,cntr]);
1204         end;
1205         message.body[linecntr,80] := ' ';
1206         putstr(w_dev,' ');
1207         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1208     end;
1209 (Delete Line "^Y")
1210     25 : begin
1211         colcntr := 1;
1212         gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1213         for cntr := linecntr to 22 do
1214         begin
1215             message.body[cntr] := message.body[cntr+1];
1216             for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
1217                 putchar(w_dev,message.body[cntr,cntr2]);
1218             end;
1219             for cntr2 := 1 to 80 do
1220             begin
1221                 message.body[23,cntr2] := ' ';
1222                 putstr(w_dev,' ');
1223             end;
1224             gotoxy(colcntr,linecntr);
1225         end;
1226
1227 (Exit edit mode "^Z")
1228     26 : (exit);
1229 (Invalid key error, sound bell)
1230     else

```

```

1231         putchar(w_dev,chr(7));
1232     end;
1233
1234     until charnum = 26;
1235 end;
1236
1237 (*)
1238 PROCEDURE editmessage(user:string8;sec_class:access_class);
1239 const
1240     innotout = FALSE;
1241 var
1242     choice,yesno : char;
1243     headerarray : theaderarray;
1244     messnum,result : integer;
1245     message : messtext;
1246 begin
1247     Selectfile (user,sec_class,innotout,choice);
1248     if choice <> '0' then
1249     begin
1250         messnum := ord(choice) - 48;
1251         readheader(user,innotout,sec_class,headerarray,result);
1252         readfile(innotout,sec_class,messnum,
1253             headerarray[messnum],message,result);
1254         if result <> 0 then
1255         begin
1256             clrscr;
1257             putln(w_dev,'Error reading the message');
1258             get_return;
1259         end
1260         else
1261         begin
1262             dispmessage(message);
1263             edit(message);
1264             clrscr;
1265             repeat
1266                 putstr(w_dev,'Do you want to save the changes? (Y/N)');
1267                 getchar(r_dev,yesno);
1268             until yesno in ['Y','N','y','n'];
1269             if (yesno = 'Y') or (yesno = 'y') then
1270             begin
1271                 updateheader(user,sec_class,
1272                     headerarray[messnum],result);
1273                 writeheader(user,innotout,sec_class,
1274                     headerarray[messnum],
1275                     messnum,result);
1276                 writefile(innotout,sec_class,messnum,
1277                     headerarray[messnum],message,result);
1278             end;
1279         end;
1280     end;
1281 end;
1282

```

```

1283 (*)
1284 PROCEDURE show_err(str:string; code:integer);
1285 begin (show_err)
1286     if code <> no_error then
1287         begin
1288             putstr(w_dev,str);
1289             putstr(w_dev,' ');
1290             putdec(w_dev,code);
1291             putln(w_dev,' ');
1292         end;
1293 end; (show_err)
1294
1295 begin (***** MAIN *****)
1296 (* the port number is passed in from the SMSMAIN program*)
1297 portno := init.reserved[0];
1298 minclass := init.resources.min_class;
1299 maxclass := init.resources.max_class;
1300 trycntr := 0;
1301 while trycntr < 3 do
1302     begin
1303         userclass := maxclass;
1304         clrscr;
1305         userlogin(user,userclass,maxclass,portno,result);
1306         if result = 0 then
1307             begin
1308                 trycntr := 0;
1309                 choice := ' ';
1310                 innotout := True;
1311                 while choice <> 'Q' do
1312                     begin
1313                         mainscreen(userclass,user,choice);
1314                         case choice of
1315                             'C' : begin
1316                                 createmess(user,userclass);
1317                             end;
1318                             'R' : begin
1319                                 readmess(user,userclass);
1320                             end;
1321                             'E' : begin
1322                                 editmessage(user,userclass);
1323                             end;
1324                             'S' : begin
1325                                 sendmess(user,userclass);
1326                             end;
1327                             'D' : begin
1328                                 deletemess(user,userclass);
1329                             end;
1330                             'Q' : begin
1331                                 (Quit branch of case statement, No operation)
1332                                 clrscr;
1333                                 detach(w_dev);
1334                                 detach(r_dev);

```

```

1335             end;
1336         end;
1337     end;
1338 end
1339 else
1340     begin
1341         show_err('bombed out error = ',result);
1342         detach(w_dev);
1343         detach(r_dev);
1344         trycntr := trycntr + 1;
1345     end;
1346 end;
1347 clrscr;
1348 putln(w_dev,'This terminal has been locked out due to too ');
1349 putln(w_dev,'many wrong login/password attemps');
1350 putln(w_dev,'Notify the system manager for reactivation');
1351 putln(w_dev,'Termination of Secure Mail System');
1352 detach( w_dev );
1353 detach( r_dev );
1354 self_delete(init.initial_seg[0], success);
1355 repeat until (false);
1356
1357 end;
1358
1359 modend.
1360

```


APPENDIX D

SMS TYPE INCLUDE FILE

This file contains the type declarations that are covered in Chapter IV.

```
string4 = string[4];
string6 = string[6];
string8 = string[8];

messheading = record
    charclass : char;
    class : access_class;
    from : string8;
    reci : string8;
    time : string4;
    date : string6;
end;

messtext = record
    heading : messheading;
    body : array [2..23,1..80] of char;
end;

theaderrarray = array[1..9] of messheading;

messarray = array[1..9] of messtext;

userhead = record
    income : theaderrarray;
    outgo : theaderrarray;
end;

usermess = array [1..18] of messtext;

userptr = ^user_array;
messptr = ^usermess;
headptr = ^userhead;
```

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