## RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ARMY ANALYSIS EFFORTS





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Volume IV

KEY QUESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ANALYSIS EFFORTS ON EXPLAINING THE ARMY AND SUPPORTING THE SOLDIER

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The Contractor, <u>NEW PERSPECTIVES CORPORATION</u>, hereby certifies that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, the technical data delivered herewith under Contract No. <u>MDA 903-87-C-0756</u> is complete, accurate, and complies with all requirements of the contract.

14 April 1488 Date

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We wish to express our appreciation to the Department of the Army for sponsoring the research reported in this document and inviting us to perform it. It represents additional progress in developing and implementing a process to engage the Army's senior leadership in spotlighting policy issues warranting current attention and analysis efforts to address those issues. As individuals, we have participated in these activities, known as the Issue Assessment Process (IAP), since its inception in 1983. We are gratified to have been part of an activity that already has helped shape the Army's study and analysis program.

We also wish to express our appreciation to those with whom we worked closely on these activities from the outset, Joann Langston and Eugene Visco, Directors of the Study Program Management Agency (SPMA). We are especially appreciative of the substantive and administrative inputs and support by the COR, LTC Gary Cochard. We found his participation to be extremely knowledgeable, competent and helpful; much more so than most of the CORs with whom we have worked for so many years.

New Perspectives

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This volume is one of four, the subtitles of the other volumes are:

- I Results of Workshops with Senior Army Leadership and Managers
- II Priorities and Key Questions for Critical Policy Issues and Recommendations for Future Analysis Efforts on Conventional Capability and Interoperability
- III Key Questions and Recommendations for Future Analysis Efforts on Sustainability

A. Background

The material presented here summarizes the activities of a workshop on 24-25 Feb 1988 to develop recommendations for future Army analysis efforts directed at the issues of Explaining the Army and Supporting the Soldier. For the workshop, the issues were defined as:

> Explaining the Army; explaining the Army's contribution to National Defense to a variety of audiences.

Supporting the Soldier: providing appropriate facilities, support services and financial compensation to the soldier and his/her family to address their physical, mental and economic needs and, thus, maintain a loyal, motivated force.

These issues are two of five spotlighted as currently being critical to Army policy. The issues were developed over the last several months with inputs from several sources including the Chief of Staff (General Vuono), the CINCs and the Commander's Conference. The other issues are:

- ➤ Coventional Capability,
- Interoperability
- Sustainability, Care and Mary a saturation

On 6-7 January 1988, at the National Defense University (the same location for the workshops reported here) a session for top management and workshops on the first two of the above issues were held. The report of the meeting is presented in New Perspectives report NP88-1A, "Workshop After Action Report: Priorities and Key Questions for Critical Policy Issues and Recommendations for Future Analysis Efforts on Conventional Capability and Interoperability", 21 January 1988. The third workshop on Sustainability was held on 3-4 February, also at NDU, and is reported in New Perspectives report NP88-2, February 11, 1988 (with the same basic title). A final session is scheduled for 30 March 1988 for top management to review the results of the vorkshops on all five issues and provide its guidance for future analysis efforts directed at understanding and developing actions to address each issue.

Thus, the workshops, reported on here were two of a series directed at reviewing the status of analysis related to the above

five critical policy issues and developing recommendations for the Army's future analysis efforts. The participants in the workshops developing the recommendations included staff functional/action officers and persons from appropriate analytical agencies.

B. Objectives

The objectives were to:

- Review the status of analysis on topics related to the issues of Explaining the Army and Supporting the Soldier.

- Develop recommendations from the participants for future analysis efforts to answer key questions associated with the issues.

#### C. Workshop Design

The agenda for the workshops is shown in Appendix A. The workshops consisted of several sections. They began with a brief introduction and background by the Director, SPMA (E. Visco) on the Issue Assessment Process (IAP) and on the mission of the Study Program Management Agency (SPMA) and its organizational relationships. This included the history, past accomplishments and future steps of the IAP. Mr. Visco then briefly reviewed the elements of and relationships among the Army's various analytic agencies.

The contractor for the workshops (New Perspectives Corp. (NPC), Mr. Becker) then reviewed the agenda for the two days, including the intent of the presentations by the analytical community and of the workshops; i.e., development of recommendations for analysis.

In their invitations to the analytical community, the DUSA-OR (Mr. Hollis) and Mr. Visco requested a review of the status of analysis on topics germane to the two issues covering:

- Topics/key questions addressed
- Major findings
- Impact of actions to date or planned, and remaining gaps

The status reviews were preceded by several presentations: OCPA (BG Hennies) on its activities, DACS-ZAA (LTC Allard) on activities in the office of the Chief of Staff related to Explaining the Army, ODCSPER (LTC Sullivan) on the Army's marketing and advertising efforts, OCLL (LTC Bounty) on congressional and legislative liaison activities, and CFSC (LTC Tharrington) on the Center's activities regarding Supporting the Soldier. These were followed by presentations from ARI, TRAC-FBHN and USAREC. The participants in one or both days of the meeting are shown in Appendix B. Highlights of their comments and of the ensuing discussions during the first day, i.e., during the status presentations, are shown in Apendix C. The day concluded with a brief review of the day's activities and an overview of expected workshop activities for the second day by NPC/Becker.

Day two began with a brief reiteration by Mr. Becker of the planned activities for each workshop and the review to be presented by each group in the two workshops. The participants were then assigned by LTC Cochard to individual workshops for each issue. Participant assignments are listed in Appendix D. Each workshop was assigned four to six questions to address in developing its recommendations for future analysis efforts. The groups were asked to recommend for each question:

- Elements of analysis/topical areas
- Date results needed
- Performer(s)
- Sponsor (s)

A total of thirty nine (39) questions had been obtained for their consideration; Nineteen (19) related to Explaining the Army and twenty (20) to Supporting the Soldier. These came from the management session on 6 January 1988 and from top management on the Secretariat and Staff in response to requests from Mr. Visco and LTC Cochard prior to the meeting. As a result, LTC Cochard was able to share almost all these questions with the participants prior to the meeting.

It should be noted that an earlier version of Supporting the Soldier had been used in these requests for key questions. That version described the issue as embracing items related to: Maintaining a Quality Force in Light of Adverse Demographics, Budget Constraints, Political Pressures and social attitudes. When the questions, submitted in response to the above request, were being reviewed prior to the meeting, it became clear that this broad definition of the issue invited questions highly similar to, or the same as, those already addressed under previous issues. For example, many questions related to Sustainability items. Furthermore, many of the questions submitted for each of the two issues were essentially the same because they came from several persons. As a result of these inputs, the duplicate questions were removed by combining them and the list also was shortened to include only those related to the definition of Supporting the Soldier presented at the outset of this section. Hence, twelve (12) questions were divided among the groups addressing Explaining the Army and nine (9) among those addressing Supporting the Soldier.

In addition to addressing these questions, the groups were asked to add others they believed to be of equal or greater importance if the Army is to understand and formulate actions to address properly the two issues. To assist them in this process, NPC prepared a list of potential topical areas for analyzing each issue. These lists are presented in Appendix E, in a format known as a "relevance tree". All the questions, along with the recommendations from the workshops, are presented in the next section.

Finally, some brief material drawn from the previous workshop on Sustainability was given to the participants to show how their recommendations would be summarized in the categories mentioned above. This was done in the hope that it also would assist them, e.g., in substantive content and format. This exemplary material is shown in Appendix F.

The morning of the second day was devoted to the individual group workshops. In the afternoon, a presenter was chosen by each group to summarize the group's recommendations. Their recommendations, and highlights of discussions among the participants, are presented in the next section.

### II RECOMMENDATIONS FROM WORKSHOPS

#### A. Overview

The following material was drawn from the presentations by each workshop group. Each of the questions addressed by the group, including new ones the individual groups offered, is shown. Each question is followed by a listing of the group's Recommended Elements of Analysis, or topical areas, it believed should be treated in future analysis efforts.

Suggestions about the date when results are needed, the performer(s) and the sponsor(s) also are shown when they were provided by the group.

Comments and observations made by participants during the group's presentation of its recommendations also are included. We kept these items as close as possible to the way in which they were offered (i.e., as we noted them during the discussions). We believe the comments and observations shown here help explain reasons underlying the recommendations. In certain instances the discussion among the participants on a question or set of recommendations includes important differences of opinion. These comments and observations from the participants should help those who ultimately will provide guidance about the validity and relative priority among the items recommended for future analysis.

B. Explaining the Army

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#### QUESTION:

- Should the Army emulate the Navy and the Air Force in its marketing, public affairs and dealing with "pork barrel" constituencies (regarding its strategic role, use/application of high technology, etc.) and, if so, how?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Ways the Navy and Air Force conduct marketing and public affairs and deal with "pork barrel" constituencies, including	6-12 Mos.	Contract	SA

organizational authorities, materials used, etc.

- Effectiveness/performance of 6-12 Contract SA Army efforts in marketing, Mos. public affairs and dealing with "pork barrel" constituencies

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- "Contracts" often are shown under the Performer because the Army really needs honest brokers. For example, contractors having experience with the Navy, Air Force and even with the Army could provide honest opinions.

- The Navy is taking great pains to tell how the 600 ship Navy would contribute to each of its constituencies, i.e., the people out there.

- There is an avful lot of research already, rather than hard-core analysis.

- To assess performance of the Army we should look at where we are and assess how effective our efforts have and could be.

. . . . . .

## QUESTION:

Army's role

- Should the Army develop a theme and take actions to establish a national consensus regarding its role?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

ITEM	DATE RESULTS NEEDED PERFORMER SPONSOR
<ul> <li>Relationship between the Army product/paradigm and those of the Navy and Air Force (i.e., the current Army posture and ways to improve it)</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Post-INF national strategy and the Army's role in it</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>Identity of critical target audiences and ways to develop a national perception of the</li> </ul>	18-24 Contract CPA Mos.

- We view the public not as a single public. It is segmented and there are many different constituencies.

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## QUESTION:

- Who should be in charge of controlling the Army's communications with various constituencies (i.e., with public and governmental affairs)?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Measures of effectiveness for the Army's communications with various constituencies	12 Mos.	Contract	
-	Effectiveness of the Army's communications with various constituencies	18-24 Mos.	Contract	SA
-	Role of the officer, enlisted soldier and civilian in the Army's communications with various constituencies	6-12 Mos.	?	CPA
-	Role of the CINC in the Army's communications with various constituencies	6-12 Mos.	?	CSA
-	Regulatory and legislative constraints on the military for communicating with various constituencies	6-12 Mos.		
-	Ways the private sector and the other services communicate with their various constituencies	6-12 Mos.	Contract	CPA

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- Yesterday's comments from Public Affairs/General Hennies concerning his recommendations for organizing Public Affairs and Legislative Liaison could necessarily hamper a good organization. There are many constraints, General Hennies also said that the Army cannot advertise. We contend we cannot lobby. But there is a fine line. For example, there is participation in cocktail parties and other types of events. (General Hennies had previously recommended an organization headed by a three-star, with a two-star deputy, handling both public affairs and government relations. A one-star position would handle Public Affairs and another one-star would have Legislative Liaison.)

- Maybe the Army should think of the other services as the "outside" contractors. (This was a recommendation suggested during the discussion.) No, that would not be politically acceptable. (This was a response.)

\* \* \* \* \* \*

#### QUESTION:

- What kinds of guidelines can be developed in Explaining the Army such that improper politicization or in-service lobbying is prevented?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

#### ITEM

DATE RESULTS NEEDED PERFORMER SPONSOR

- (Not appropriate for analysis)

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- This question is not really appropriate for analysis. The group's discussion evolved into ideas as to how decisions are currently made and how politics play a role. The group could not define "improper". What is proper today changes with time. During its deliberations, the group talked of the resignation (which occurred the week of the workshop) of Secretary of the Navy Webb. Maybe he should have stayed. The outcome was that the group had many problems penetrating this question/problem.

- Rather then using the term "improper", it may be more appropriate to use the word "disfunctional". It's a very difficult, psychological item to tackle.

- We would be establishing guidelines for senior managers. How do we know they will follow them?

- The topic may be like the Ethics in Government Act, for example, as it related to employment of retired officers. Thus, maybe it should be treated with legislation. Perhaps we should formulate that approach before someone else does it and we then would not like the results. But, if its really a problem, maybe we do need legislation.

- How bad is the problem? That is, how much has the Army's ability to provide deterrence been influenced by this item. If it has not, we should really forget it.

- General Hennies said that Army officers don't like to go over to the Hill. But when he does go there he sees many Navy and Air Force people on the Hill.

- If we are crippling our abilities, we should address this problem.

- The courts have not defined what lobbying is. Secretary of the Navy Webb stands on the Mall steps saying he'll jump on his sword if he doesn't get 600 ships. Is that lobbying? Sure it is. We simply don't have enough people/general officers out there speaking for the Army.

- We should make the decision as to what is best for the Army. To do that we have to develop and use an understanding of the political system. We should determine the political risks and then decide what is pragmatic and/or honorable.

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#### QUESTION:

- What is the most important role for the Army in a peacetime American society?

## RECOMMENDED\_ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

American society to the public

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Description of the Army's <u>most</u> important role in a peacetime American society (e.g., deterring war by training and preparing for it)	6-12 Mos.	SSI	DCSOPS
-	Ways and means to explain the Army's role in a peacetime	6-12 Mos.	Contract	CPA

 Other (non military) roles for 6-12 Contract NDU/ the Army in a peacetime American Mos. SSI society, e.g., social
 Degree to which the Army's 6-12 Contract NDU/ perception of its role agrees Mos. SSI with society's perception

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- (None Noted)

. . . . . .

## QUESTION:

- How can the Army create an image that will result in America giving it "the best and brightest people", vis-a-vis the public's perception of a reduced threat?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	The amount of information (e.g., about the threat) that can be provided to the American people without compromising security	18-24 Mos.		I CSI
-	Ways to most effectively communicate with the American people about the threat			CPA
-	The public's (i.e., various constituent group's) perceptions of the threat			CPA
-	Other factors than its role vs. the threat that the Army can use to attract attention			
-	Needs/desires of the best and			

brightest young people in America

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

(The group modified the original question which stated "How can the Army advertise to create an image that will result in America giving it the best and brightest people, particularly under a reduced public perception of the threat?")

- These considerations should include the Total Army family, i.e., the Active forces, the Reserves, civilians, families, etc.

- It should not be referred to as "public" perception. It should be the "public's" perception.

- What other ways than advertising would be appropriate? Also, we should find the carrot, not just the stick implied by the threat.

- It should be emphasized that it is the perception that the threat is reduced not that the threat itself has been reduced. The public has a tendency to become numb to this agreement.

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## NEW QUESTION FROM GROUP:

- How does the Army's recruiting advertising affect its image?

RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	The public's (i.e., various constituent groups') per- ception of the Army	18-24 Mos.		Advert. PC
-	Components/elements of the Army's image that affect perception of the Army and that are most important to foster with various constituent groups	18-24 Mos.		Advert. PC
-	Factors that influence the com- ponents/elements of the Army's image	18-24 Mos.		Advert. PC
-	Components/elements of the Army's image that it can influence with advertising	18-24 Mos.		Advert. PC

- Ways other than advertising than can be used to impact the public's/various constituent groups' perception of the Army

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

(As noted on the previous question, the group broke out a part of the question to center on recruiting advertising.)

- Recruiting advertising is a highly targeted message. We get confused into believing that USAREC is a blanket for the Total Army. It is not intended to be that, but it does have an Army wide impact.

- As a civilian employee in the Army for twenty years, I see that advertising has changed considerably and I get a different message today then I used to get. The advertising messages have transitioned from depicting the Army as comprised of soldiers who are ground pounders to a highly sophisticated organization comprised of many different types of individual.

\* \* \* \* \* \*

(A series of six questions related to Explaining the Army were assigned to one group. As the presenter for the group noted, "We thrashed, bashed and did a whole bunch of different things and came up with a blank page. We tried question by question, chaining the questions, etc. and we were not satisfied. We came up with something more esoteric than the analytical community probably can address. But when we looked at all the questions it really comes down to "what's the Army story and how can we tell it?" When we look at the questions and consider their and reflect on the original management background. session/two-star meeting, all the questions seem concerned about how can we better relate to Congress and take smaller budget cuts. \*

Thus, the group did not present a series of specific recommended elements of analysis for each question assigned to it. It did, however, provide observations about each of the questions, which are presented below. These observations precipitated a spirited discussion among all the participants. Highlights of those remarks are listed following the group's observations or conclusions about the six questions assigned to it.)

18-24

Mos.

Advert.

PC

# QUESTIONS:

(The group believed that the following two questions were really the same.)

- How important is it that the Army's various outside audiences be aware of the contribution to National Defense made by Army civilians in technological, logistical, overseas basing and other critical functions that support the Army mission?

- How can the Army articulate its resource needs with an easy-to-grasp, easy-to-identify-with goal similar to the Navy's "600 ships"?

(The later question was viewed by the group as being key and really relating to perceptions of management.)

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#### QUESTION:

- How can the Army better explain itself to its family, i.e., components, units, soldiers and their families?

(The group did not address this question. It simply stated that it should be in the purview of CSFC, and is really the commanders' information.)

\* \* \* \* \* \*

#### QUESTION:

- How can the Army better explain its story to our allies and, thus, gain understanding and acceptance of our positions on issues outside of respective alliances (e.g., NATO support on policies dealing with Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq)?

(The group believed this was a form of the first and third questions noted above.)

\* \* \* \* \* \*

#### QUESTION:

- What approaches can be used to increase the involvement of the Army team in public/governmental affairs, including educating Army leadership about the importance of their participation, increasing the emphasis on public speaking at all levels of military education, etc.? (The group recommended that the type of involvement noted should be considered as an element of performance rating for personnel. The group believed that this would require action on the part of the CSA and should be an element of emphasis on command and training.)

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## QUESTION:

- What is the impact of the Army's historic approach to its role on its ability to be proactive?

(The group did not understand the question.)

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## NEW QUESTION FROM GROUP:

- What is, what should be, and how best can we tell the Army's story?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER SPONSOR
<ul> <li>Development of a simple, clear cut, explainable message that transcends fads</li> </ul>	ASAP	Blue Ribbon Committee (Army four- stars, SA, friends in Congress, the media, etc)
<ul> <li>Ways to speak with one voice, approaches for individual training, and assigning and developing responsibility for such training and for telling the Army story.</li> </ul>	ASAP	Blue Ribbon Committee (Army four- stars, SA, friends in Congress, the media, etc)

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

(The following observations include those from the group and from the other participants in response to the group's observations in addressing the six questions assigned to it.)

- The bottom line is we do not know what we are all about. We don't know where we are going. We need to have a blue ribbon panel come together to define the basic mission, strategy, and what ever else is appropriate for the Army.

- As a Naval Reservist for seventeen years, I'knew what the Navy mission was. It was a consistent message, whether I was a reservist, based in the mid-west, or on a tin-can out in the Pacific.

- The Army has a continual parade of themes. We have the "year of the next Army theme", so that everyone gets a lick. This almost makes me wretch. Here we are into the "year of training" and we are just beginning to publicize last year's theme (leadership).

- The response of the Secretary of the Army, however, is that we never forget the earlier themes. No, he doesn't, but we do. (Response from another participant.)

- What is really required is for the Army to speak with one voice. When Lehman became Secretary of the Navy, he sat down with his people and said: "We are going to have a 600 ship Navy, and everyone is to sign up. If you don't want to sign up, then leave."

- One of the questions talked about impact of the Army's historic approach to its role. This includes the independence of fourstars and other factors that affect the Army's ability to be proactive.

- General Hennies said that he spoke to commanders about Public Affairs for 90 minutes out of their thirty years of service. This may prove to be not only be the first time, but also the last time they hear this message. Such infrequent communication on this subject is not enough.

- Perceptions are very important. During a press conference yesterday, when he was asked, the President said he was still supporting a 600 ship Navy. There actually are 1200 commissioned ships. So you see, it's still one story.

- One question centered on how the Army can tell its story to our Allies. Well, what's the story?

- If we had to go into Nicaragua to solve, for example, a "10n" problem, we don't know what the Army's needs really would be. We should be able to describe our needs versus the nature of involvement. For example, if we talk about "n" brigades, that's a simple, clear message.

- We (the workshop group assigned questions in this area) talked of various strategies (national deterrence, etc.). In that regard, the Navy has objectives which lead to a paradigm, which in turn leads to detailed objectives, etc. Deveopment of information in this (hierarchical) fashion gives the Navy the ability to specify number of ships, support personnel, etc.. The Air Force has a similar structure. It talks about air power objectives, a supporting aerospace strategy, which in-term leads to specification of needs for force structure, e.g., forty tactical fighter wings. The Army talks of land power. But our ability to provide land power depends upon the other services. In other words, our objective of land power requires joint operations, i.e., we cannot meet our objectives by ourselves.

- Jointness is a fad. What will we say next year -- a war and one-half?

- Low intensity conflict of "n" magnitude can be translated into a certain number of brigades, and we can deal with that. We can correlate the number of brigades with an entire spectrum of conflict.

- If we don't take and hold ground, the Air Force will not have airstrips to land on and the Navy will not have ports to drop anything off in.

- We cannot give even our boss a single story and get an answer from him.

- Some of us felt that there is an advantage to putting down a number (e.g., 28 divisions). But the problem is getting the message across. Also, people don't know what brigades, divisions, etc. are.

- When someone says "ship" to the man in the street, it is usually easy for him to envision a ship, although different people will envision different ships. When the Air Force talks of an aircraft, the man in the street can picture an airplane, although different people will think of different airplanes. But the man in the street cannot picture a brigade, division or corps. The Army may thus have a basic difficulty in being able to describe its equipment needs to the public. - Maybe we should focus on people rather than equipment. What really is the correct way to develop a means to communicate with others? For example, if the brigade is the talking or communication structure, what is the characteristic of the threat? In other words, our needs could be linked to the nature of the threat so that we could describe the functions, and then the components, we need. What we need to do is focus down on a single message.

- All of these considerations are preceded by the budget cuts that have been going on for several months, and will be going on for the next several years.

- The Navy says: If you want a carrier battle group, this is what it costs, this is what the entire package looks like to provide a given capability and to provide a secure maritime posture. In other words, they link it to the basic objective or paradigm/strategy they have sold. The Army cannot do that. We have air-land battle, deep attack, AZI, LID, LIC, etc.. Obviously, this is something one cannot address or solve in one afternoon. People have been saying the Army should speak in one voice. But no one said what that one voice/message should be. Maybe we need a Commanders' Conference, led by OCPA, to debate and pick that one message.

- We can have the one goal. But its how we articulate the goal that makes it sell. The mechanisms are there to tell the story, but there is no story to tell.

- At the general officer and executive level, participating in telling the story may be a good way to measure individual performance. Also, we really don't operate as a "corporate office". For example, when the crash occurred in Gander, all the personnel in ODCSPER flew off and there was no one left in the building to look after the store.

- The national leadership does not know what it wants the Army to be. For example, it is being equivocal regarding NATO and that is where the Army is. Where did the 600 ships come from? That story came from the Navy. The Navy picked it and sold it.

- Are we saying that the one voice should be a joint one voice?.

- We talk about a brigade and individuals ask what's a brigade? Individuals we address have a full slate of problems and choices. Maybe we need one DOD voice. The public's attention span is not very long. - There also is the impact of our one-person one-vote process that elects/sends people back to Congress and influences decisions there. Anytime we want to change Congress, we must return to Congress. But they are influenced by the public.

- When the Navy sends a carrier group out to sea we/the public say that's enough. When we send air craft to Libya, we/the public say that's enough. How many soldiers are enough?

- The media is comprised of people who are younger than before, have not been in service, often are women, etc.. As a result, they don't understand the Army. We could come from Mars. Yes, maybe we should focus on and talk in terms of the individual soldier. Americans and the media understand him and trust the individual.

C. Supporting the Soldier

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#### QUESTION:

- What is the impact of family member employment programs on recruiting/maintaining a quality (military-civilian) force?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Continue extensive studies being conducted by ARI			
-	Ways to disseminate results in OBC/OAC/PCC/ANCOC	12 Mos.	TRADOC	DCSOPS
-	Examination of OER/EER Process	12 Mos.	TAPA	DCSPER
-	Ways and implications to families of mobilizing critical civilians	6-12 Mos.	TAPA	DCSPER

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- Although it was noted yesterday that ARI is doing/looking into most of these areas, the group believes there are additional things needed.

- How many times have we seen an OER that addresses whether an officer is caring for families in his command? It's not a "ticket item". No one really cares.

- Under a mobilization of critical civilians, especially in an overseas context, we should ask about when and where the spouse goes, and what the impact is.

- I disagree (from a participant) on the second and third recommended analysis topics. Those two items should take care of themselves. If we keep things on the front burner, they would take care of themselves. We simply need the leadership to say it is important and it will show up in OERs. Therefore, the first and fourth recommended topics are most important. If fact, the second and third items are a fall-out of the first item.

- We (the workshop group that was assigned these questions) read the issue as including economic/financial considerations, self satisfaction, etc.. Hooking those considerations directly to readiness is a sticky problem.

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#### QUESTION:

- Wherever possible, why can't we infuse civilian operated and owned, profit-driven firms into support functions on installations, i.e., McDonalds or Burger King for snack shops, Marriott for messing/billeting facilities, etc.?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Consolidation of the various functions currently being analyzed and managed by the Army covering soldier and family support functions at Army installations (e.g., functions in LOGCEN, DCSPER (CFSC))	6-12 Mos.	Contract	ASA
-	Impact on morale of services provided by a familiar, commercial firm vs. a government run establishment for soldier and family support functions at Army installations	Mos.	ARI	

- Potential for wider employment 12 ARI opportunities for soldiers' Mos. families through civilian operated and owned firms providing support functions at Army installations

- Guidelines/specifications for soldier and family support functions at Army installations that could be provided by civilian operated and owned firms

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- Much is already being looked at. Consolidation of the effort at the ASA (I&L) level seems to make sense to bring order out of the existing chaos. Activities are in several peoples' area and several peoples' turf is included. Maybe the Secretary of the Army needs to take it up and set policy.

- The issue is not whether a grand, national contractor is selected or whether one if considered for each location. Actually, franchizing is a nonissue.

- Many retired military personnel would be good suppliers. Such persons may be able to provide the best hamburger for the kids. But they would not have the clout of a large/national organization. We already have an example of services by retired military personnel in those providing moving services for household goods.

- There are questions about whether ARI is the appropriate performer for these study topics.

- When we put in privatization, we should monitor the resulting effect on the soldier and his family. In other words, we should track and see if the services are really providing proper support to the soldier and his family.

- When we went to the private sector, we pursued an approach to spread the wealth, and the provider did not perform. We went one way and the Navy went another way in its approach.

- When industry is put under contract and allowed to provide services to the soldier and his family, this should probably be done in light of some specifications and performance requirements that the Army/DOD has established. And the performance of the firm providing these services should be monitored as time passes to assure the services are really being provided and that the supplier does not view his position at being permanent, thus allowing the services to degrade. - I have trouble saying we should have one contractor for a nation wide contract.

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## QUESTIONS:

(The group combined the following questions in preparing its recommendations.)

- What is the appropriate incentive/compensation package to retain an acceptable quality of the force?

- To what extent can the Army cut back on monetary incentives and still have a quality force?

(These questions were combined into the following question.)

-What is the incentive package needed to recruit/retain a quality force?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Marginal benefit of various dollar amounts for bonuses, education, etc.		ARI	DCSPER
-	Nonmonetary incentives (e.g., conveniences)	24-36 Mos.	?	DCSPER/ DCSLOG/ COE
-		12-18 Mos.	Contract	OSD
-	······································	18-24 Mos.	ARI	DCSPER

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- In the two questions assigned to us, one is simply the inverse of the other.

- There is appropriate non-monetary compensation that can be offered. For example, it could include child care, medical service, transportation on post.

- We should review the CAA study of 1984 that treated these subjects and update that work.

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- We have never been able to determine the marginal payoff of additional or greater amounts (e.g., \$1,000 or \$2,000) of bonuses, the Army scholarship fund, etc.. Maybe providing education in certain subjects is better than handing out funds. The approach that is most appropriate depends on the market. Not everyone wants or needs the same thing. This area needs work.

- There is an extensive review underway by DCSPER to provide Congress a position on pay-for-performance. The suspense date is 1 June 1988. But an extensive review cannot be accomplished by that time. It seems the issue was that the Army Authority 1 level agreed to pay less then we have been paying for certain positions/grades. Congress is asking how much quality is enough?

- If the idea is to recruit and <u>retain</u> personnel, then a college fund may be counterproductive. Perhaps it would be better to offer bonuses that would allow them to participate in college on a part-time basis.

- Young people have recently stated that they are now concerned about retirement because of the recent unemployment experienced by their fathers. In other words, there seems to be greater interest in remaining in the Army and making it a longer term career.

- We need a menu from which a person can draw.

- Only when a person reenlists do we offer a bonus/financial incentive. Maybe such incentives also should be offered up front.

- Conditions change. Therefore, there is no fixed answer for all time. The environment is not static, it's a dynamic problem. This package of incentives needs to be a flexible response.

- Maybe the soldier does not want to go to college. Maybe he wants his children to go.

- The Department of Education literally gives away many dollars. The Department of Labor provides certain education programs. Maybe the Army can obtain some preferred position or otherwise participate in those programs and, thus, not have to carry all the costs.

- We also need to offer different lines for the various alternatives. For example, there could be high and low level bonuses/financial incentives along with different commitments on the part of the soldier. - We should consider establishing pay scales on the basis of specialty or skill and not just grade. Skills in high demand and low supply should probably command higher pay, as is the case in the private sector. Alternatively, MANPRINT can be used to reduce MOS requirements.

- We really need to reconsider relationships among skill, grade and pay scale. That notion strikes at the culture of the Army. But given the Army's desire to compete under changing demographics and other factors to maintain a quality force, we should look into profiency incentives again. It may be the dumbest idea -- but let's look.

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#### QUESTION:

of services

- What community support services should be provided to the soldier of the future (e.g., Army or local community sponsored, on-post or off-post)?

## RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS NEEDED	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Health care under peacetime and wartime, including well and sick child care, and overhead costs to carry wartime needs in peace- time	18-24 Mos.	Contract	DCSPER
-	Care for children and elderly dependents under mobilization and deployment, including transportation services	12 Mos.	CFSC	DCSPER
-	Impact on the soldier and his/ her family of computerization	18-24	Contract	ASA

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- We don't really know what the soldier of the future will be. He/she probably will have little or no relation to the soldier of the present or past. - Health care offered/provided in peacetime is probably entirely different than that in wartime. The surge in wartime will require significant facilities. But do we need a Fitzimons, Walter Reed, etc. as the system is currently structured?. We pay a lot of overhead in peacetime for what we expect in wartime. Is that the best way to do it?

- Child care should include sick child care considerations, especially for dual-military families. Some of the privatization opportunities considered may apply here.

- Care for children under mobilization and deployment should also be considered. When mom and dad go to war, who takes care of the kids? Who provides transportation, and who should be concerned about elderly dependents?

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#### QUESTIONS:

(The group combined the following questions in preparing its reommendations)

- What realignment/reconfiguration will be required to provide incentives to sustain a quality force?

- What additional enhancements, other than pay and promotion, can the Army offer to successfully compete with private industry for its share of the declining manpower pool (such as educational partnerships with industry and day care)?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Effect of predictable hours, and the leadership component on unit stability	Nov	CAL	TRADOC
-	Effect of the up-or-out policy on stability, especially in light of the declining pool of available personnel	Nov	ΤΑΡΑ	DCSPER
-	Impact of relocation policy on the family and its long term considerations	Nov	TAPA? (Unconstre RAND?)	DCSPER

-	Impact of the budget process on stability	Nov	Comptroller	SA, SEC DEF
-	Ways to insulate the soldier from transients, concerns and spot policy changes of upper level management	Nov	Contract (e.g., RAND)	DCSPER
-	The leadership component of retention at <u>all</u> levels (i.e., CSA, STAFF. MACOM,)	Nov	DAIG	SA
-	Impact on/view by personnel of education, training, promotion and other perks as incentives (i.e., reward vs. drudgery)	Nov	TAPA	DCSPER
-	Current incentives that have a negative impact on readiness, e.g., betweer single vs. married personnel	Nov	ТАРА	DCSPER

- Effect of Army leave policies Now ARI DSCPER (e.g., counting non-duty days, cash-in options, etc.) on family formation

## COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- The sponsors and performers we recommend should be viewed as general guidelines.

- We (the workshop group to which the questions were assigned) combined these questions, and they also should be fused with those of the other group that addressed questions on Supporting the Soldier. All the questions really are quality-of-life issues.

- We currently are preparing an inventory for a report to Congress about what is currently going on in terms of recruitment. But we are not looking at what deficiencies exist, especially what we can do in light of a declining budget.

- Regarding retention, our concern centers on retaining the quality people.

- We now have PCS constraints that affect different commands in different ways. PCS dollar constraints are important.

- We need to consider ways to insulate the soldier from the transients, concerns and spot policy decisions that impact things within the unit and are generated by the upper levels.

- Leadership should be considered to include those from the Chief of Staff down to the platoon and even squad leader level. And what is the role of leadership, especially as it contributes to stability?.

- By perks, we didn't mean someone coming over and mowing the yard. Offering education as a perk may be a disincentive because of the pressures generated by the requirements of schooling/education. The Army perks work us to death e.g., efforts to attend and perform in the staff college.

- These policy's must consider the single person versus the married couple. By getting married, the PFC gets out of the barracks and gets separate rations. That may prove to be detrimental in the long run.

- We can't talk about perks in the Army. It's a dirty word. We need to change that mentality.

- We need to determine whether Army policies drive the way families constitute themselves.

- Should Christmas vacation be counted against leave?

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#### QUESTIONS:

(The group combined the following questions in preparing its recommendations.)

- Are we spending "Quality of Life" dollars on the right problems; e.g., commissary operating hours, dining facility improvements? In other words, do they truly enhance the Army's warfighting capability and improve recruitment and retention, or are they "nice to have"?

- What criteria should be used to determine resourcing levels of various types of compensation (for example, what is the relative importance of the quality-of-life services/programs that can be offered to the soldier)?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS NEEDED	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Programs with the greatest effect on the soldier's quality of life		CFSC (Research Community	(CSFC)
-	Relationship between the quality of life and readiness and retention			DCSPER
-	Comparison of quality of life programs for the soldier and their impact, with those of the civilian community and the other services			DCSPER
-	Reassessment of centralized control of MWR activities			DCSPER
-	Appropriate MWR doctrine			DCSPER
-	Role of the club system in peace and war		Contract	DCSPER

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- All of the studies/analyses on quality-of-life and family support, come under the DCSPER function, i.e., DCSPER should be the sponsor for all of them.

- We need to understand the relationships among quality of life and readiness. We may be able to learn things from the civilian community in this regard. Priorities should be identified in anticipation of budget cuts.

- Centralized control of MWR was shot down. It was held that local commanders should run those activities.

- The time lines associated with analyzing and taking actions on these items must be addressed, because of the declining market in light of demographic changes. By 1994, all of the programs have to be in place if the Army is to meet its current manning plans. There is the design, the programming, the budgeting, etc., items that need to be done.

- We need to find out what we are doing now to spotlight the analyses that are needed. In fact, the analysis spotted by

pursuing the process, and the process itself, are probably needed more now in a declining budget environment and in light of a contracting market.

- Maybe we don't need 17 to 21 year olds. In World War II, we took forty year olds and marched them around with a rifle.

- Maybe, by including all these family considerations, we are encouraging a host of future problems. For example, in the past we were concerned with the soldier. Today we are concerned about soldier, the spouse, the children, the elderly dependents, etc.. Is the Army being viewed as a cradle to grave womb to address all of the problems of the individual and his direct and extended family, and what are the implications on budget requests, readiness, etc.?

- The role of women in the Army is an important factor in these areas.

- When the U.S. sits down in September 1988 to discuss conventional weapons, decisions there could have a major impact on soldier morale. For example, agreements on conventional weapons could effect the number of divisions and thus family support. In other words, the things we have been discussing here must be examined in light of approaches to future conventional capability.

- If these meetings had been held and all of this been done a few months earlier, it really would have helped, for example, in developing 5-5 guidance.

# APPENDICES

# - A -

# AGENDA

1

WORKSHOP ON ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL POLICY ISSUES - EXPLAINING THE ARMY & SUPPORTING THE SOLDIER 24-25 FEB 1988 Hill Conference Center National Defense University

## DAY 1: 24 FEB 1988

	OPEN	ING SESSION	(0900-09)	30)
1.	Introduction & Background		(Mr. Visc	:0)
2.	Workshop Objectives & Age	nda	(LTC Cochard/Mr. Beck	⊋r)
з.	Priority Areas for Analys Important Subtopics/Quest		(LTC Cochard/Mr. Becke	er)
4.	Presentation by OCPA		(BG Hennies - 0930-103	30)
		BREAK	(1030-104	45)
5.	Presentation by DACS-ZAA		(LTC Allard - 1045-11)	30)
6.	Presentations by ODCSPER: Marketing & Advertising	Office	(1130-120	00>
		LUNCH	(1200-130	00)
	Community & Family Supp	ort Center	(1300-133	30)
7.	Status of Current Researc Army Research Institute		(1330-140	00
8.	Status of Current Analysi -Presentations by the Ana Community - (TRAC-FBH	lysis	(<30 min ead (1400-15)	
9.	Wrap-Up - Summary - Activities for Day 2	(1530-1600:	LTC Cochard/Mr. Becke	<u>9</u> r)
		ADJOURN	(1600	))

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### DAY 2: 25 FEB 1988

#### CONVENE 0900

- 10. Kickoff (0900-0915: LTC Cochard/Mr. Becker)
   - Review of Previous Day
   - Workshop Assignments (Topics/Teams)
  - workshop Assignments (Topics/Teams/
- 11. Development of Recommended (0915-1200) Analysis Efforts

(Group Workshops)

# LUNCH

(1200-1300)

 Recommendations by each Group (1300-1545)
 Wrap-Up (1545-1600: Mr. Visco/Mr. Becker) - Summary of Workshop

- Next Steps/Follow-Up Coordination

ADJOURN 1600

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# ATTENDEES

# EXPLAINING THE ARMY & SUPPORTING THE SOLDIER WORKSHOP ATTENDEES

AGENCY	NAME	PHONE
SFUS-SPM		697-0026 697-0027 Perspectives Corp.) Perspectives Corp.)
ASA (M&RA)	COL Harry Thie	697-8201
ASA(I&L)	COL Franklin Cochran	695-5225
DISC4	LTC Paul Schuessler	695-8005
DACS-ZAA	LTC Ken Allard	697-8555
DCSLOG	Mr. Don Feeney	694-6509
	LTC Dave Haas	694-6611
DCSOPS		695-2715
	MAJ Cliff Ripperger	695-2084
DCSPER		695-0516
	LTC Ed Sullivan	695-1144
	LTC John Helmick Ms. Susan Funes	695-4121
	Mr. Monte Russell	673-4121
	LTC Dick Vail	695-0986
	MAJ Jerry Warner	694-2777
TAPA	LTC Gary Conklin COL Carrol Williams	325-7100
	Mr. Ron Canada	
C&FSC	LTC Michael Tharrington	325-6994/6793
USAREC	Col Bernard Lawless	
		459-2405
	CPT Don Patchell	
OCPA	BG Clyde Hennies	697-4482
	M^ Jerry Harke	695-4462
OCLL	LTC Jim LaBounty	
OTSG	LTC John T. Read	756-8162
CHAP	LTC William Hufham	695-1409

TJAG	MAJ Jerry St. Amand		695-1353
NGB	LTC Dennis McKnight		694-3399
OCAR	COL E.M. Brisach Mr. Joe Hanley		694-7326 697-7369
AMC	Mr. Bob Fahy Mr. John Lazaruk		274-3575 274-8037
CAA	LTC Bob Deters		295-1611
SSC-FBHN	Dr. Jerry Klopp	av	699-6899
SSI	Dr. Alan Sabrosky	av	242-3234
ESC	Ms. Jill Davis		355-2127
ARI	Dr. Kent Eaton Dr. Paul Gade		274-8844 274-8119

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INTRODUCTORY/BACKGROUND PRESENTATIONS: STATUS OF ANALYSIS

IAP Workshops on Explaining the Army and Supporting the Soldier 24 Feb 1988 - Analysis Status Reports

#### OCPA: B G Hennies

- One, if not the most important, job of Public Affairs is to keep morale high. The brunt of all the activities regarding Explaining the Army rests with this office. And in working on Explaining the Army, many people are spectacularly uninformed, including those involved in these activities.

- Information about activities of OCPA is presented in precommand courses. Many areas of activity are included and many interfaces are involved.

- Certain activities and relationships are institutionalized. Others are less formal. Institutionalized relationships include, for example, the so called military versus the press relationships. These have long historic precedents and a Constitutional basis. The office tries to pursue relations with the media in the most professional way possible.

- Relations with the media are highly varied. The media range from being allies to adversaries. The Grenada operation is an example of where the military could have done a better job of taking the Press to war. And there is (the relationship General Hennies has dubbed) the "Doberman" factor. It refers to the different type of canines and how they can be used to characterize the Army's relationships with various constituencies, such as the media. The Press often considers itself to be attack dogs rather than watch dogs on the military, where as the military would like them to be its lap dog.

- It's is very difficult to define "news". And we would not like to attempt to do that.

- Press reporting of Army activities can often be characterized by its typical response to the Army's participation with the Canadians in tank exercises/competitions. These competitions (e.g., over the last six years) involved highly trained Canadian teams that had operated together for long periods as contrasted to the American teams. When the U.S. Army team finally won a competition, the Press said it was about time, especially in light of all the funds, high technology equipment, etc. that the Army poured into the effort.

- Cultivation of relationships with the media and other constituencies is important. It should be referred to as the "Big C". It is one of, if not the most important consideration on which we should focus. Remember, reporters are few and not many have served in the Army. - Many in the military feel things are cast in concrete in our environment. That clearly is not the case -- things change. The truth, i.e., what appears to be the truth, changes. If change occurs tomorrow, we should not have trouble defending the fact that it has.

- The Army takes much longer than the other services to act. We must remember that the Press is in competition and has deadlines to meet.

- Classification/OPSEC is a reality, and PA has to deal with that. It is a fact that the military tends to over classify informaton.

- We are not in the public relations business. We are in the business, and have a constitutional obligation, to provide factual information about the Army and its \$78 billion budget.

- Our ability to communicate properly with various constituencies is limited relative to the other services. In the case of the Army, we have 0.31 percent (340 spaces) of our total officer complement assigned to PA. The Air Force has 0.52 percent (559 spaces) assigned. We are really not resourced to do as much as we could or should to be pro-active.

- Bad news does not get better with time. It simply smells worse.

- We should find the ten items that are most important and we should spend time on/hawk those things. Training is our theme this year.

- Being reactive connotes "badness". That is not necessarily the case. For example, someone may simply be asking for information. The main thing is whether or not we are in there, being active and playing to score.

- The business is very complicated and many interactions are involved. But the media has a Constitutional authority to watch all the other players. The Army has no control over all the components or those involved in the interactions.

- What we really would like to achieve is to convey to the public the impression that the Army is a competent and trustworthy organization; an Army of Excellence.

- If we are doing a bad job, we would see it in our budgets. But we must be doing a good job because we are not taking such a bad cut in terms of the recent budget reductions/adjustments. - Public Affairs functions include providing public affairs advice to Army leaders, telling the Army story to itself and to outside constituencies and supporting community relations. The office informs and motivates.

- OSD has a similar organization to the Army's OCPA. We (the military) do not deal directly with the Press. We provide information and suggested releases to the OSD which reviews, filters out and then releases information directly to the Press. In other words, all information is released by the OSD over its "blue line".

- An important question is whether we are really reaching America out there. In other terms, how do we measure success? We do that by measuring effort, not feedback. We are not resourced to measure/acquire feedback. It is pleasing to know, however, that the demand for stories usually exceeds the supply.

- Many Army activities/groups are included in our full scope of PA activities. These include the U.S. Army field Band, the U.S. Army Hometown News, Army Broadcast, the Lcs Angeles Branch, the New York Branch, Soldiers Magazine, Electronic Media Branch, etc..

- My experience, e.g., from three tours in Vietnam, is not the Vietnam I have seen in the media/movies. It's very fashionable now to tell a good story of the military. For example, the producer of Platoon (an antiwar film) is involved with production of the scon-to-be-released Wings of Apache.

- We kept the drug thing out of the Press, and that's good.

- We have many high technology ways of telling the story, e.g., we can go immediately uplink on satellite systems.

- The Golden Knights are much less expensive than the Air Force's Blue Angles and they are a tremendous ambassador for us. They even perform on facilities of the other services, e.g., on Air Force bases, and they can land right among the spectators.

- Our organization is civilian heavy -- thank heaven. Ninety percent of the group that goes to war comes out of the civilian component.

- Public relations is a lot of advertising to support recruiting and telling the troops what a good job they are doing. And I don't have time to do that. The closest thing to that type of activity is USAREC and Personnel activities. Remember, our job is providing timely, factual information. - If we develop ten themes to hawk, as was noted earlier, is that not really PR? (Raised by one of the participants.) No, not really. But we are trying to get a branch sourced to address the subject of strategy. COL Alcala (in the office of the Chief of Staff) is committed to the area of strategy now. And LTC Allard, the next speaker, works for him.

- Public Affairs efforts are to convey an impression of the Army, and public relations is to influence/change impressions.

- The other services really feel we have out done them, hands down. For example, the DCSPER of the Navy said we have done a great job in describing the operation of a tank, an activity that he thinks is miserable. But he says we have made it look thrilling.

- We have enjoyed great success since the early 1980's with restructuring the Army and getting excellent people. But one thrust does not do it all.

- There is a fine line between lobbying and public affairs. For example, we cannot advertise that we need the LHX. To do that would be illegal. We must talk about the type of technology and capabilities we need. We have the opportunity to tell what we need, but we cannot advertise. Even OCLL is prohibited from lobbying. The trick is to request systems that will be developed in all 50 states.

- The problem is not with the media, it's with Army leadership. At great personal risk, we are cajoling the leadership to better understand and be more active in public affairs activities. The problem is getting the senior leadership to want to get out there and hawk. Everyone in uniform is in public affairs. We literally are all on parade. We all should be concerned. We each should shoulder our responsibilities and not shuck it off on others.

- The financial packages we are offering to young people are performing well and helping us. The young talk about these various financial incentives.

- I don't travel in uniform anymore because I can't get any of my own work done when I'm traveling in uniform. People simply want to talk because of their high interest in the military these days. Recent surveys show that we are at the top of the list, along with the clergy, in terms of respect by the public. As a further example, there are professional athletes who want to talk openly about how much they enjoyed being in the military (e.g., the guard of the Pittsburgh Steelers about his service in the Airborne). - There is also an internal set of elements that really is active in public affairs. Generally they are controllable. But we now have the CINCs who can go directly to Congress. And they waste a lot of good opportunities. They come back and they compete directly for funds. They and we are well connected; the question is -- how well do we do it?

- The Army has its own wire service, ARNEWS. It is not the Army's information vehicle. But other wire services/ publications are now tapping into ARNEWS.

- Community relations around the country are good. We take kids in helicopter rides and he/she will never forget that. We are even encouraging people to go back to their high school and talk about their Army experiences.

- Commanders have not been educated in public affairs. They depend on RAGU, running a good unit.

- As to questions about developing an Army theme, is it really necessary? The Congress looks after this. It's really fuzzy wuzzy -- an item that we can not get a handle on.

- When it comes to increasing the involvement of the Army team in public/governmental affairs, its really the "big four" (i.e., the top management) that needs to be involved.

- In terms of creating an Army image, we have to create one to insure that we get the best and brightest personnel. Indeed, we have to get into that as it is an important part of Explaining the Army.

- It is difficult to understand questions indicating that the Army has a cavalier attitude toward explaining/defending its mission. Having not read Carl Builder's RAND paper on "the Army in the Strategic Planning Process: Who Shall Bell the Cat", it is not possible to address this subject or questions that relate to that paper.

- Our theme is a Total Army of 28 divisions. What will the Navy do now that it will not have 600 ships. What will the Air Force do when it will not have the aircraft it says it needs?

- The attitude that the Army can fomulate and promote a single approach/major impact on national strategy for itself is nonsense. Beware of abandoning the TRIAD. The one who talks joint operations will come out on top.

- There is a great disparity between what PA has to do and the size of our work force. We have to be careful about what we look at and what we actually do. And there are many things that we would like to do, but we are not resourced sufficiently. - There is a lot going on in Europe as a result of INF. New training exercises, including higher firing frequencies, may be required. That could impact community relations in England and Germany. Community relations in Germany are great. But communities/citizens ask why we have had to fire off rounds 365 days a year, fly helicopters every week, etc. The Army is noisy and there are a whole range of environmental concerns by such groups as the Greens, etc. We must remember Germany will not allow any propaganda as a result of the "Goebbels experience".

- The situation in Korea, relative to community relations, is significantly different then in Europe/Germany.

- Even when we presumably are not supposed to be involved in community relations, we still are. For example, the Pershing was deployed in Germany under NATO auspices. When the German public raised questions/concerns, the Germans said go talk to the U.S. Army.

- There is no uniform public opinion about image of the soldier and of the Army leadership. Pockets of opinion exist. In one case Army leadership is viewed as being trustworthy and professional. In other cases the opposite view is held. On balance, the soldier is viewed as "one of us", i.e., an upstanding young American devoted to his/her country. Participants during the discussion noted that there is even a mistrust of Army leadership among Army officers.

- The influential parts of our society are spectacularly uninformed about the Army. An example is the case of a Congressman who recently said the Army wasted \$100 million on the price of certain engineering equipment. When OCLL was approached about taking the Congressman to task, it was noted that he was a freshman and well placed politically. Furthermore, it was suggested that his observations could have been a test balloon. Apparently no attempts were made to clarify the situation. And, about one-half billion dollars of equipment is bought off-the-shelf, often dictated by Congress as to what items shall be purchased.

- An organizational suggestion was offered to insure that the Army speaks with a single voice about, and coordinates activities concerning, public affairs and government relations. It was suggested that a three-star, with a two-star deputy, head up an organization including public affairs and legislative liaison. Each of the latter activities would then be headed by a one-star.

#### DACS-ZAA: LTC Allard

- Those who know the pressure of the building/Pentagon, know the pressure of the "in-box". The office is trying to take a longer

view (e.g., in LTC Allard's activities). There is no obvious solution, however, on how to take the long view. Everyone deals in their own universe, with a specific set of problems. At the level of the Chief of Staff, one must pull many things together.

- Experience on the Hill really influences the understanding of what works and what does not work. There are fewer and fewer persons on the Hill who have direct military experience. We are seeing the impact of the demographic curves and the post-Vietnam era regarding people in Congress and on their staffs. When one wants to understand what will be, one should talk to the staffers. These people currently are young (i.e., in their twenty's) and typically have no military experience.

- OCLL is absolutely prohibited by Congress from lobbying. There are no constraints on providing information, however, and that is what OCLL and OCPA do.

- Academic literature is a valuable source of insight and has much relevance to the Army.

- The military operates at several levels including the tactical, operational, strategic and even the political. There are questions as to how well the Army articulates its message in the political arena, especially in terms of the impact on how budgets ultimately get placed. This gets back to what works and what does not work on the Hill/political side.

- The Navy is under precisely the same constraints as the Army. It does not lobby. It provides information. But that information is extremely effective and has been in the past (e.g., over the last ten to fifteen years) in describing its situation and its desires. The Navy describes its objectives, its strategic paradigm on the basis of those objectives, its programs in light of the foregoing and, thus, its personnel needs (both military and civilian).

- When the Soviet fleets started to grow, the literature began to focus on the Navy's situation and lead to the Navy's ability to articulate its objectives, paradigm, etc.

- In the information it provides, the Navy presents the impacts on a state by state basis and even goes down to a district by district description of what its activities and proposals would mean to the people/voter. When its budget requests are questioned, responses are made in terms of threats to U.S. strategic sea power. For example, when faced with arguments to reduce the planned fleet from 600 ships, it argues that such moves would attack the sea power the U.S. and, hence, the Navy strategy. - As noted in the previous presentation, the perfect weapon system is the one built in all fifty states. That is how the B-1 bomber got built. The Air Force paradigm is Air Power.

- The Army does not have Air Force support because the Air Force argues that, if a problem really exists and gets serious, it alone will take care of the situation -- that the bombers will always get through.

- The Army does not have an over-arching paradigm. General Hennies is correct in stating we will not get far if we talk of the Army being the lead power because each paradigm is in conflict with the others -- and the environment is changing. If we did not spot that, it showed we were not interested. But political effectiveness is made of ideas. The Navy's idea was "what is in it for us".

- The INF Treaty provides a new environment. We have a whole host of new thinkers/academics. They are about 40 years old and are exploring conventional forces and the potential impacts on government operations. As an example, we should take a look at contingency plans and insure they can support conventional capability and sustainability. The items that are joint, and the service that is supporting joint operations, will succeed on the Hill. And we cannot do anything without the other services. The Goldwater/Nichols Act and the Packard Commission addressed and set the stage for this.

- The recent events have created the Army's new and natural constituencies. Questions that center on who the natural constituencies are is exactly the right question. Currently they are in academia. Will we be wise enough to spot and deal with them?

- The joint strategic paradigm is the way to go. The Army is the linchpin of joint operations in a declared national strategy.

- A recent issue of Business Week talks of the area of the Pacific Rim as the coming area, and it talks of a maritime environment in that regard. But the Pacific Rim is a natural Army constituency.

- There is no shortage if ideas. But there is a lack of understanding in academia, the military, etc. of what the military situation is and what the opportunities are.

- Democracy is the clash of ideas and we must participate and learn to use ideas in the Army's behalf. Remember, ideas have consequences. Avoid intellectual disarmament. There are no constraints here. - In response to a question about whether the new Army Chief of Staff is more active then his predecessors in selling the Army, it was noted that the advent of the Reagan Administration brought a Navy viewpoint to Washington, especially with people who were well placed in OSD.

- The new Chief of Staff has been in office only about 7 months and he will soon be on the Hill to defend his first budget.

- The Secretary of the Army's job is to explain the Army to the American people. And every time I (LTC Allard) have seen it, the Secretary has done a good job.

- (From various participants) One of the things that has been causing us problems, and is reflected in the questions submitted in response to these issues, is the subject of strategy. We hear different stories from the Army depending on who is talking. The Navy and Air Force speak with one voice. There is nothing more important then speaking with one voice. As General Hennies noted, we are currently putting together an issues book from the posture statement.

- We powerdive into the weeds. We talk of so many Battalions, this or that tank, etc. But the Navy talks of 600 ships, 600 ships, 600 ships.... We must keep our message simple. Do not confuse the listener.

- The Army has the largest command, level-for-level. This gives it a problem in integrating and enforcing discipline.

- Don't we do a disservice by having three groups (i.e., three services) all trying to get the most from a fixed pot. It results in a grappling, grovelling, throat cutting activity.

- The people who came out with Goldwater/Nichols felt they had a political mandate to make changes in light of opposition from the Pentagon.

- We should argue jointness in the context of the Army's contribution to it. Secretary Marsh has a brilliant slide that says the one thing that is common to all levels of conflict is the Army.

- Low intensity conflict is a matter of political decisions in many regards. The State Department is included as an important participant in those decisions. Military policy is just a part -- and the Army doesn't deal effectively with that. The relationships that exist under, and the characteristics of, low intensity conflict have a direct influence on resources.

#### ODCSPER: LTC Sullivan

- The Marketing and Advertising Office is the DCSPER proponent for strategic marketing activities. Advertising in this area supports recruiting. The office does not train its own personnel. Rather, it obtains "education" from industry on approaches to marketing and advertising. The office coordinates all marketing programs for personnel acquisition and provides strategic direction and implementation of market research. It is the point of contact in DCSPER for PAA (i.e., the office coordinates with PA/General Hennies) and it provides support to the Reserve Components.

- A master advertising planning calendar is prepared to inform internal people about the office's planned activities, the agencies involved and the various parts of the process. The plan also includes steps to develop funding needed to accomplish the various efforts and build marketing and advertising products.

- The Advertising Policy Council coordinates all the efforts in this area regarding strategies and actions taken. The Policy Council includes all those with an interest: ASA(M&RA), DCSPER, CAR, CPA, DIR ARNG, ROTCCC, USAREC.

- Recent studies show that the Nation's current youth have different images of the Army than in the past. Advertising undertaken by the Army has made a significant change in the image of the modern/current Army.

- Army advertising is budgeted at \$100 million per year. Many OSD, Army and JCS groups are involved. In other words, greater numbers are involved than in the Advertising Policy Council, which is a subset of all the various involvements. But there is really not much discussion in these activities about which service should lead in terms of military advertising/recruiting. In other words, who gets prime position in advertising is not a top of the world discussion.

- When the office was first established under General Elton, it was focused largely on advertising. General Elton felt the advertising had to be better packaged and provided then had previously been the case. There was a need to create a mind set on what people feel about the Army and not just attempt to dispense raw data. Rather, there should be an attempt to tell people how and why things are. One can create an image of the glass being either half empty or half full, depending upon how its done. When we come to work we are concerned about how we look. When we dress we are concerned about the appearance of our uniform. Marketing is concerned about how you look and the image you leave. - The office uses the traditional tools of marketing and approaches to packaging and distributing information. In other words, it is concerned about what it wants the information to do and how well it will do those things.

- The office often ran things up the chain of command but did not really think of how to get agreement of top leaders in the military and OSD, or of the response of Congress. It is now doing more of that type of thinking, i.e., considering the viewpoints of such other interests before bringing material forward.

- We get messed up when we try to talk of strategy. Earlier we talked of/used the term "strategy" a number of different ways. Mingled in those earlier discussions was talk of a positioning strategy, that is, what we should say about the Army. For example, what is the paradigm (the word used earlier) that the Chief of Staff will use when he is up on the Hill? In other words, what are the words he will use? Ways to allow you to get into the minds of those people you want or should get to is really a positioning strategy. One should always address the resource provider, such as OSD or Congress, and be consistent.

- The real current and past problem with our leadership is communication. The disconnect is that the leadership is uncomfortable in getting out it front. The current Chief of Staff (General Vuono) is comfortable but others are not. They are comfortable in the field with the soldier because they know that communication is important there. But they are not comfortable with others. They don't see it as part of leadership. We should change this and make sure it's recognized and accepted as part of the activities of top leadership.

- The annual theme changes every year and makes it difficult for us to establish an Army paradigm. It is counter productive.

- We don't plan well in the Army. We respond to the POM process. And that is a budget and dollar driven activity. In other words, it becomes a dollar driven set of objectives.

- There have been real successes and failures, even in industry regarding setting strategy and in positioning. We have experiences of the New versus the Old Coke, of Avis committing itself to being Number Two, etc.. All of those were deliberate decisions. The "be all you can be" theme just happened. Someone said it and it was picked up and used.

- Leadership turnover is harmful since telling the Army story is a function of personalities. And style and substance change with people. Each new leadership came in and created a new way of speaking to the various publics. OCLL: LTC LaBounty

- We have two groups doing legislative liaison on the Hill, one associated with authorizations and the other with appropriations. But since the appropriation liaison goes through a comptroller cell in the budget process, the activities are not mergable.

- We take personnel out of the field and out of command and send them to the Hill to win the budget battle there. Those involved in appropriations do the same thing. Our job is to win 100 percent of the President's budget request.

- We have heard in all these meetings, including in the meeting with the senior leaders at the beginning of the process, that we don't know what the Army is all about. How can we tell a story if the senior leaders don't know?

- It terms of a paradigm, grand strategy, etc., we have had one since World War II. It is forward defense within NATO and the support of NATO (especially regarding a heavy land war with the Soviets). It is the light divisions, special forces and all the other things that have muddied the water and caused problems.

- When we try to explain all the complex things, it's very hard. There is a good deal of complexity in our activities. And there are many people on the Hill who do not really understand the Army systems and its technology.

- The view that the Army doesn't do well on the Hill is a myth. That is just not the case. We have and continue to do well.

- In our leadership (in one-, two- and three-stars) we have a lack of desire to go to the Hill. When our people go to Korea, the first thing they do is walk the battlefield. From an O4 on up we have a lot of officers who do not walk the battlefield on the Hill. We have young educated staffers, for example, with political science degrees and backgrounds. They often know much more of the Army than we do. Furthermore, people literally feel they get lost in the building.

- There is a reluctance on the part of people on the Hill to talk to us because we wear a different suit. When people find out that we have commanded, that we are on the promotion list, etc. the attitudes change.

- In recent years we have had an Army that has changed markedly. It has been getting many dollars to procure and modernize. But now we don't have the budgets we have had. Just getting across that situation to our people is important. Readiness and O&M will now be important. - It is more important for us to concentrate on the other four issues (being treated in this current IAP Process) than on Explaining the Army. When the other issues are in place, we will have the story we can tell on the Hill.

- It is more difficult to referee and coordinate things now that the CINCs are going to the Hill. Those discussions are controlled primarily by OSD because they involve four stars and people from the other services.

- The degree of joint coordination varies from very good to very bad. There is a new program to educate officers on "jointness", a concept very well received in the Senate.

- When we go to the House of Representatives, we will never really get above the "low road". Congressmen want to know what the impact is on employment and, thus, on the votes in their district.

#### C&FSC: LTC Tharrington

- The Center's activities focus on the issue of Supporting the Soldier. Activities center on presenting information and explaining things to the soldier and the soldier's family.

- The Center is a research user not a research performer or supplier. It looks continually at retention and readiness. Its providers of information are ARI, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, and RAND/Arroyo. These groups work on how the family's situation and decisions affect retention and how well the Army supports the soldier's family.

- Typical topics include retention, family member employment, women in the Army, private sector franchises and family support.

- The first or leading question is whether the family affects retention and, if so, what the Army should do. The family does influence intention to reenlist. But what affects the family? Spouse satisfaction, including spouse employment, is critical to soldier retention. And Army unit and family relationships also directly affect soldier retention.

- The troubled soldier is more likely to be a battlefield casualty and families affect combat morale.

- Soldiers are now likely to be younger at marriage, and at birth of their children, than their civilian counterparts. Therefore, an important question is whether soldiers have higher stress than civilians. An important implication in this regard is the need to provide the soldier predictable duty times. - Army leadership is not well informed and, therefore, is not doing a good job dealing with the soldier's family situation. Part of taking care of the soldier is taking care of the family.

- Different problems exist between officers and enlisted personnel, regarding spouse employment. Officers' spouses select employment for their career; enlisted's spouses, for survival. Spouse labor force participation rate nearly doubled in the last ten years. Spouse unemployment among Army families is three times that of civilian spouses. This is significant since about thirty percent of family income is provided by employed Army spouses. And spouses with good jobs are more satisfied with the military way of life -- if the soldier's job does not interfere with the spouse's.

- The percentage unemployment among wives of the soldier is growing. This growth in unemployment of wives stems from the fact that Army wives have a harder time getting jobs, especially the younger ones, than civilians in our economy. This may be due to their age and their husband's changes in duty station. Some believe this unemployment situation among young wives is the same as in the civilian/private sector. The Center's information indicates it's more severe in the military.

- The most dissatisfied spouses are those with a military spouse who's job or relocation interferes with or undermines the spouses job.

- Child care is also an important factor in supporting the family. Corporate America feels that child care is important, regarding morale and retention. In working with the private sector, the Center has found that the Army is further ahead in doing research on and providing child care services than are civilian/private sector corporations.

- In 1979, nine (9) percent of women in the Army were mothers. In 1985 thiry six (36) percent were. The divorce rate doubled over that time and wives are more likely to retain child custody. Furthermore, they are much less likely to remarry.

- Private sector franchising (e.g., a Burger King on post) now brings in about \$1 million per month to the family support coffers. It began in 1984 and has returned \$21 million to date. There is much input from Congress, e.g., it believes franchises are great on a site by site basis, but a single franchiser should not be selected world wide. Another difficulty with franchising is that the contractor wants guarantees, e.g., they want assurances that the Army will not leave. - The Center is trying to become more involved in determining what the market needs and how the Army can provide it; that is determining what the programs should be and how to generate income via those programs.

- In its basic research program, ARI is trying to understand what happens in the family unit regarding career decisions, etc. and, therefore, what the Army should do.

### ARI: Dr. Gade

- The key question centers on how the Army attracts, recruits, selects and classifies, and retains quality personnel in what promises to be an increasingly competitive market place.

- Guidance is provided by representatives of DCSPER and all Army components. A major research gap is in the determination of Army requirements for quality. One must examine the soldier's life cycle to determine those requirements.

- Advertising is one of the efforts and includes the Army Communications Objectives Measurement System and new recruit surveys. ARI is finding that parents have different opinions/views of recruiting ads than do new recruits.

- Recruiting efforts include geodemographic segmentation, enlistment decision making, recruiters' productivity, and recruiting management.

- Selection and classification activities are now using computer adaptive screening techniques on the JOIN system at the recruiting station, that would be especially helpful in an emergency/mobilization. And other information developed under Army auspices in this area could be of benefit to the entire nation/various constituencies. In other words, this information is exemplary of research done by the Army that could provide important insights and be of value to various sectors of our economy, and be part of the Army story.

- The Army can do a better job on classification then it is doing now, for example, to reduce attrition, improve discipline and job performance and measure NCO potential. These improvements would include items ranging from \$10 million to \$100 million dollars. Some of these improvements, are being implemented now, such as Project A to revamp classifications to better correlate with performance in the field.

- ARI has really not done much regarding Reserve and Guard activities. And nothing is really going on with Guard and Reserve activities. There is a big gap in that regard.

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- Studies regarding women in the Army were followed by field changes in the sex distribution of units, for example, 15 to 35 percent more females in CS/CSS units. There was no degradation in unit performance. In fact, units with a higher percentage of women got better over time than those without. Other activities are looking into leadership, family unit considerations and other areas regarding women.

- The role of women in the Army is not one related to (dependent on) research studies. It is a social and political issue. The degradation originally anticipated with increased women's participation did not really occur. Women say the subject has been studied enough and that the Army should simply get on with it.

- From time to time data are shared among the services. For example, information and training were obtained from the Navy regarding certain testing techniques. But this interservice cooperation varies and is largest where formalized activities exist.

- Although quality is currently defined by AFQT category, questions remain as to its definition. One must also screen for high school graduates. Current quality is now so high, the Army must be prepared for great culture shock in the event of a general mobilization.

### TRADOC/SSC-FBHN: Dr. Klopp

- Personnel service support in their activities includes personnel administration services, finance and resource management services, chaplaincy activities, public affairs services, legal service support and various other services.

- MANPRINT is an important part of the activity. A major question centers on how man-machine interfaces can be improved to achieve greater warfighting capability. Various tools are used in the analyses, for example, HARDMAN. Attempts are being made to take more of a systems look at personnel problems/issues, using training analysis, systems analysis, manpower requirements analysis, impact analysis and trade-off studies.

- Data are gathered, and data bases constructed and, as appropriate, reference data are modified. With these data, specific issues are explored. When systems are developed, TRADOC then has to train the trainers.

- In the combat arms, initial replacements will come from Active personnel returning to duty, although the Active forces may be experiencing a slow-down due to attrition. The Reserves are scheduled to deploy 90 to 120 days after M-day.

- Now that certain functions have been removed from the unit, they have been continued in a functional sense. For example, units maintain "shadow" clerks.

- In many regards the information presented here is really germane to the Sustainability issue. The question is how long we can sustain a 14 hour per day combat activity in a "come-as-you-are" war.

- Recent studies have made many recommendations for action and further analyses, for example, regarding wartime combat and combat support replacement. An important question centers on what the Army is going to do with soldiers that cannot be returned to combat. Such personnel will effect what the Army does with women, for example, in CS/CSS. This must be analyzed by MOS and grade.

- Under mobilization, the Army will not be as selective as it is now regarding the best/highest quality people. Thus, how will this effect the situation?

- Deferments and other ways we exclude people will have to be looked at very hard under a draft. For example, current DOD regulations preclude 26% of the eligible population from being inducted, i.e., the lower 26% in intelligence. Field manuals may now be too difficult for prospective draftees

#### USAREC: COL. Lawless

- We have a different Army today than in 1980. Therefore, a problem exists when pre-1980 data on cohorts are used. Post-1980 cohort data really should be used.

- Each year about 200,000 people are recruited/enlisted in the regular Army and the Army reserve. As of September 1987, a little over 16,000 women were recruited out of a total of 132,000 recruits.

- The AFQT for the Army was lowest in 1980 at about 40. In 1987 it was about 54. But the Army is still below the other services, with the Air Force now showing an AFQT of 62.

- The Army has eliminated a high proportion of people who actually want to join the Army. In 1980, 54% of recruits were high school graduates and by 1987, 91% were. And nonprior service accessions rose from 25% to 67% respectively in those years.

- Quality marks for USAR last year were better than for Active personnel. But, quality is really uniform, i.e., we have one Army.

- General Stroup at TRADOC has as a task force looking at quality versus readiness, which is still a question. Quality soldiers demonstrate less problems, for example, in crime, being AWOL, desertion, drug abuse, and court marshall -- and hence, are more cost effective and perform better. Currently we must remain aware of bright recruits being led by less bright Noncoms. Noncoms now have a tendency to abdicate responsibility to PFCs.

- In 1985, we found it was really a dual recruiting market. One category of recruits had an interest in job security and in learning a trade. Other recruits had interest in ultimately going to college. Recruits from the first market stay in service longer. Those in the latter market want to amass funds for college. Also, college bound young people are often interested in taking a break before returning to school while collecting funds to do that. Thus, they remain in service for a shorter time than those in the former group. A significant increase in retentions will, of course, result in an aging of the force.

- In our shrinking market, due to the declining numbers of young people (as a result of the country's demographic trends), the Army will have to make greater inroads into a market that is interested in going to college. For example, the numbers of young people available will decline from about 800,000 in 1987 to about 550,000 in 1991. And that number includes those available to all services. Furthermore, there is the continuing competition with industry.

- Budget constraints and other factors are causing the Army to move toward longer terms and lower cost incentives to save recruiting and training resources.

- D -

# PARTICIPANTS IN INDIVIDUAL WORKSHOPS

Explaining the Army

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
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- E -

RELEVANCE TREES FOR EXPLAINING THE ARMY AND SUPPORTING THE SOLDIER



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	1.2 FOREIGN 1.2.1 GOVERNMENT 1.2.2 CITIZENRY 1.2.3 INDUSTRY	
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	DOMESTIC 1.1.1 GOVERNMENT 1.1.2 THE FUBLIC 1.1.3 INDUSTRY 1.1.4 THE MEDIA 1.1.5 ACEDEMIA	
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1.0 INTEREST GROUPS

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1.1 COMESTIC

1.1.3 INDUSTRY	1.1.3.1 CONSTRUCTION	1.1.3.2 MRAUFACTURING (DEF/NONDEF)	1.1.3.3 TRANSPORT.	1.1.3.4 COMMUN.	1.1.3.5 BRAKING/FIN.	1.1.3.6 NOWFROFIT & RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS	1.1.5 ACADEMIA	1.1.5.1 K-12	1.1.5.2 COLLEGE/UNIVERSITY
1.1.2 THE PUBLIC	1.1.2.1 HOUSEHOLDS/ FAMILIEC	MILITARY NONMILITARY	1.1.2.2 SPECIAL INTEREST			F	1.1.4 THE MEDIA 1.1.5	1.1.4.1 TV 1.1	1.1.4.2 RADIO
I.I.I GOVERNMENT	1.1.1.1 FEDERAL.	THE WHITEHOUSE DEPT. OF DEFENSE SECRETADIATES	MILITARY SERVICES	DEPT. OF COMMERCE CONGRESS	1.1.1.2 STATE	Executive/Governor Economic development Agencies Legislature	1.1.4	1.1.4	1.1.4

1.1.4.3 PRINT

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1.0 INTEREST GROUPS

1.2 FOREIGN

1.2.4 THE MEDIR	1.2.4.1 TV	1.2.4.2 RADIO	1.2.4.3 PRINT
1.2.	1.5		1.2
1.2.3 INDUSTRY	1.2.3.1 DEFENSE	1.2.3.2 NONDEFENSE	
1.2.2 CITIZENRY	1.2.2.1 GENERAL POPULACE	1.2.2.2 SPECIAL INTERST GROUPS	
L. 2.1 GOVERNMENT	1.2.1.1 NATIONAL ADMIN.	1.2.1.2 LEGISLATURE	1.2.1.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

1.2.1.4 MILITARY GROUPS

2.0 THE RRMY MISSION

2.1 DETERENCE

2.1.1 CREDIBLE U.S. POSTURE

2.1.1.1 EQUIPMENT

2.1.1.2 PERSONNEL

2.1.1.3 FORMARD CIEPLCYMENT

2.1.1.4 INTEROPERABILITY

2.1.2 FILLIFINCE BUILDING

2.1.2.1 MILITARY AID

2.1.2.2 NONVILITHRY/CIVIL HORKS

2.2.2.1 HIGH INTENSITY 2.2.1 BRSIC NHTIONAL POLICY 2.2.2.2 LOW INTENSITY 2.2.1.1 MIN/DESTROY 2.2.2.3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 2.2.2 LEVEL OF CONFLICT 2.2.1.2 CONTRIN 2.2 COMBAT/WARFIGHTING 2.2.3 LOCALE

2.2.3.1 WESTERN EUROPE 2.2.3.2 LATIN AMERICA

2.2.3.i (OTHER)

2.2.3.4 RSTH

2.2.3.3 MIDCILE EAST

3.0 THE THREAT

3.3 DOCTRINE & STRATEGY	3.3.1 MILITARY	3.3.2 POLITICAL	3.3.3 ECONOMIC
3.2 FORWARD DEPLOYMENT	3.2.1 LOCATION	3.2.2 STRIKE TIME	<b>3.2.3 SUSTRINABILITY</b>
3.1 FORCE STRUCTURE	3.1.1 ANGUNT/NUMBERS	3.1.2 DESTRUCTIVE PONER	3.1.3 READINESS

3.5 PERCEPTION OF THE U.S.	3.5.1 MILITARY
3.4 USE OF SURROGATES	3.4.1 NATION STATES

3.5.1 MILITARY

3.5.2 ECONCIMIC

3.5.3 POLITICAL

3.4.4 TERRORISTS

3.4.3 MERCENARIES

3.4.2 INSURGENTS

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4.0 FIELDING EQUIPMENT

4.4 FIELD DEFLOYMENT	4.4.1 LOGISTICS	4.4.2 STAFFING	4.4.3 MAINTAINING/ REFAIRING	4.4.4 REPLACING/ UPERADING
4.3 MANUFFICTURING/ PRODUCTION	4.3.1 THE INDUST. BASE	4.3.2 PRICE STRUCTURE/ COSTS	4.3.3 GA/RELIAB.	
4.2 RDT & E (ENGINEERING)	4.2.1 PERSONNEL	4.2.2 FACILITIES & 4.3.2 PRICE EQUIPMENT STRUCT COSTS	4.2.3 ACCEPTANCE/ APPROVAL	4.2.4 BUDGETS
4.1 NEW CONCEPTS GENERATION (SCIENCE)	4.1.1 POFULATION	4.1.2 FACILITIES & EQUIPMENT	4.1.3 ACCEPTANCE/ APPROVAL	4.1.4 BUFIGETS

5.0 RECRUITING, RETRINING & SUPPORTING PERSONNEL

5.4 FUNDING/ BUDGETING	5.4.1 PRY SCALES	5.4.2 SUPPORT SYSTEMS	Z	
5.3 REPLACING 5.	5.3.1 RECOVERY	5.3.2 MEDICAL TREATMENT	5.3.3 REHABILITATION	5.3.4 REST & RECREATION
5.2 TRAINING	5.2.1 LEADERSHIP	5.2.2 READINESS	DAMA	ICAL, ETC. )
5.1 MANNING	5.1.1 RECRUITING	5.1.2 KETRINING	5.1.3 SUPPORTING (FRMILY PDDC	LEGFIL, MEDICAL, ETC. )

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5.3.5 REASSIGNMENT

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	6.3 DOD STRUCTURE	6.3.1 CIVILIFIN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS	6.3.2 INTERSERVICE RIVALRY	6.3.3 ARMY PROCEDURES			
6.0 THE PLANNING & BUDGETING PROCESS	6.2 CONSTITUENT'S INPUTS	6.2.1 CONGRESS	6.2.2 INDUSTRY	6.2.3 SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS	6.2.4 ALLIES & FRIENDS	6.2.5 THE MEDIA	
	6.1 CYCLE TIME	6.1.1 CONCEPT APPROVAL	6.1.2 BUDGETS	6.1.3 CONTRACTING			

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	7.3 INDUSTRIRL RELATIONS	7. a. I INSTRILLATION	7.3.2 SHARED					
7.0 FOREIGN RELATIONS	7.2 COMMUNITY RELATIONS	7.2.1 CITIZENS	7.2.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT	7.2.3 MEDIA	7.2.4 WORKERS/EMPLOYEES			
	7.1 AIC	7.1.1 MILITARY	7.1.2 NONMILITARY/CIVIL	7.1.3 SCHOOLING/TRAINING				

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
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0.0 COMMUNICATIONS

8. 3 TIMING (HHEN)	B. J. I ELECTION CYCLES	B. J. 2 ECONOMIC CYCLES	8.3.3 TECHNOLOGY CYCLES	8.3.4 CURRENT EVENTS	B.3.5 SOCIAL VALUES/ RTTITUGES CYCLES
8.2 THE FORUM (MHERE)	8.2.1 HOME	0.2.2 OFFICE/HORK	6.2.3 SCHOOLS	8.2.4 ANAY FROM HOME/ RECORDATION	TRENSPORTHTION
8.1 MEFINS/THE MEDIUM (HGW)	6.1.1 PRINT	6.1.2 ELECTRONIC			

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1.0 PHYSICAL WELL BEING

1.1 HOUSING

1.1.1 POST

1.1.1.1 BARRACKS

1.1.1.2 FAMILY HOUSING

1.1.2 GFFP0ST

1.1.2.1 FOR LEASE

1.1.2.2 FOR PURCHASE

1.2 MEDICAL CARE
1.2.1 COMBAT RELATED
1.2.1.1 EVACUATION
1.2.1.2 TREATMENT
1.2.1.3 REHABILITATION

1.2.2 NONCOMBAT RELATED

1.2.2.1 CNP05T

1.2.2.2 OFFPOST

1.2.3 BURIAL SERVICES

1.2.3.1 RETRIEVAL

1.2.3.2 INTERMENT

1.2.3.3 CEMETRRY PLOT

2.0 MENTRI, WELL BEING

2.4 CAREER POTENTIAL 2.3 RELIGION 2.2 RECREATION 2.1 EDUCATION

2.4.1 DURL MILITARY SPOUSES 2.3.1 COMBAT/ BATTLEFIELD 2.2.1 PARTICIPHNT 2.1.1 CLRSS ROOM

2.4.2 ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2.3.2 POST CHAPEL SERVICES 2.2.2 SPECTRTOR 2.1.2 CORRESPONDENCE

2.3.3 FRMILY COUNSELING

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Э.С	3.0 ECCNOMIC WELL BEING		
3.1 COMPENSATION	3.2 SUBSIDIES	3.3 RETIREMENT	
3.1.1 FRY SCALES	3.2.1 HOUSING	3.3.1 PENSIONS	ŗ
3.1.2 PROMOTION PROSPECTS	3.2.1.1 MORTGAGES	3.3.2 CONTINUING	
3.1.3 LERVE	3.2.1.2 RENTS	MILITARY PRIVILEGES	
9.1.9.1 PAID	3.2.2 DURABLE & NON- DURABLE 6:0005		
JIHAND J.J.S.	3.2.2.1 POST EXCHANGE		
	3.2.2.2 COMMISSFIRY		
	3.2.3 MEDICHL CHRE		- 1
	3.2.3.1 MEDICAL FEES	Ŷ	15
	3.2.3.2 DRUGS & MEDICINES		-
	3.2.4 EDUCRTICN		
	3.2.4.1 TUITION		
	3.2.4.2 SUPPLIES, BOOKS, TRAVEL		
	3.2.5 TRAVEL		
	3.2.5.1 MILITHRY		
	3.2.5.2 COMMERCIAL		

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3.0 ECONOMIC WELL BEING (CONT.)

3.6 COUNSELING & ADVISORY	SERVICES	3.6.1 LEGAL	<b>3.6.2 FINANCIAL</b>	3.6.3 FANILY		3.6.4 CAREER PLANNING
9.5 DEATH BENEFITS	3. S. 1 SURVIVCR SURDADT / MACUDANCE					ų
3.4 DEPENDENT CARE	3.4.1 CHILC CARE	3.4.1.1 POST FACILITIES	3.4.1.2 CFFPOST	3.4.2 ELDERLY CARE	3.4.2.1 HOME CARE	3.4.2.2 CONJALESCENT HOME

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EXAMPLES OF MATERIAL DRAWN FROM WORKSHOP ON SUSTAINABILITY

### QUESTION:

- Do current provisions for mobilizing and deploying the Army CS/CSS individual manpower and units provide adequate sustainment capability for deployed and deploying combat forces under a prolonged conventional (single or multi-theater) conflict?

#### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Adequacy of CSS/CS forces to sustain current combat force levels	6-12 Mos.	CAA	DCSOPS
-	Degree to which TPFDL provides adequate and continuous support	12-18 Mos.	Contract	DCSOPS
-	The way, timing and place to show the magnitude of shortfalls in CSS/CS and war reserves to the decisionmaker(s)	12 Mos.	LEA	DCSLOG
-	Desirability of having dual (primary and secondary) MOS for Active and Reserve forces (e.g., support MOS for combat soldiers and combat MOS for support soldiers)	18 Mos.	CAC	TRADOC

# COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- If you look at the CS/CSS capabilities in some of the Guard and Reserve units you find it's a horror story.

- People coming out of medical units to combat units may not be able to perform in combat. Maybe we need to cross train/establish dual MCSs. However, one would probably suffer. But at least the soldier would possibly be up to speed and we could bring him fully up with little training. The basic problem is what to do under the budgets we have.

- When you look at the soldiers manual, you find he doesn't have enough time to do everything he is suppose to do.

- Do we really know where warfighting and deterrence capability diverge? The force that best deters may not be the best for warfighting.

## QUESTION:

(The following two questions were treated jointly by the group since it felt they were the same question stated in different words.)

- Given the proposed personnel cuts, what are the major manpower and personnel shortcomings that will impact on the Army's ability to sustain combat operations?

- How do we maintain/sustain combat forces at the proper level of readiness in all of the theaters where a conflict might arise when we are faced with severe budget and personnel draw-downs?

### RECOMMENDED ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS/TOPICAL AREAS:

	ITEM	DATE RESULTS <u>NEEDED</u>	PERFORMER	SPONSOR
-	Trade-offs that can be provided robotics	ASAP	CAA	DCSPER
-	Sustainability at each level to maintain services and contain costs within constraints	ASAP	CAA	DCSPER

#### COMMENTS FROM WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS:

- If the combat force is fixed, cuts will have to come from CSS/TDA.

- We have been trying to address this problem for quite some time and someone needs to get moving.

- It is difficult to come up with measures and a common language so we can actually accomplish the studies and do the required trade-offs.

- Another problem is associated with stepping on MACOM commanders. They often do not want to accept a model/study output. If a MACOM commander disagrees or is unhappy with results he will go directly to the Chief of Staff.

- Maybe a revision in the fixed force would make sense. The Air Force and Navy use that approach. For example, when the Navy gets a cut they say, o.k. lets mothball some ships.

- When someone gives me another job, maybe I should say I can't

- Modeling is one of the easiest parts of the problem. One of the most difficult parts is conveying the results properly and to the right people -- getting our message across.