

AD-A196 037

A Clausewitzian Victory . . . The 1973 Ramadan War

by

Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Washington

Air Defense

Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship

School of Advanced Military Studies  
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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

25 March 1988

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for Public Release; Distribution unlimited.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION School of Advanced Military Studies, USAC&CSG	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ATZL-SWV	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)  A Clausewitzian Victory...The 1973 Ramadan War (U)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC Alvin Washington, USA			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Monograph	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 88/3/25	15. PAGE COUNT 50
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
			1973 Yom Kippur War
			End State
			Strategic Goals, Operational Art, S&T
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)  This monograph analyzes the 1973 Yom Kippur War in light of the interrelationship between successful military actions and the attainment of political objectives. The major proposition that evolves from this analysis is instructive in the study of the strategic level of war. The central relationship of means, ways and ends form the foundation of this study. Both the Israelis and the Egyptians discovered the importance of this relationship at various times during the campaign. The Arab use of political pressure and the "oil weapon" caused the Israeli long-term definition of victory to be something very different from what was initially sought. The Egyptians employed military actions in an attempt to achieve limited political objectives. Keynotes:			
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL LTC ALVIN WASHINGTON		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (913) 684-3437	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL ATZL-SWV

DD Form 1473, JUN 86

Previous editions are obsolete.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

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
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School of Advanced Operational Studies  
Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship Program  
Monograph Approval

Name of Fellow: Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Washington

Title of Monograph: A Clausewitzian . . . The 1973 Ramadan War

Approved By:

  
LTC John A. Mills, M.A.


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DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
Distribution/Availability Codes	
Avail and/or Special	
A-1	

Accepted this 18 day of May 1988

A Clausewitzian Victory . . . The 1973 Ramadan War by  
Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Washington, USA, 50 pages.

The events of the Yom Kippur War captured the attention of the entire world. It was the beginning of a new era of warfare. This was the military debut for the new technology of combat missiles. Various types were employed to include surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-surface and sea-to-sea. This new weaponry proved to be extremely effective and lethal. Man-portable antitank weapons played a tremendous part in shaping the outcome of events on the battlefield. During the course of this campaign, history's first naval missile battles were fought. As a result of Yom Kippur War, the entire science of military strategy and doctrine must be reevaluated in the light of lessons learned. This monograph is a critique of the formulation and consistency of Israel and Egypt's pursuit of their national goals through the application of military force. Analysis is made to determine whether victory on the modern battlefield guarantees the victor the object of war as defined by Carl von Clausewitz. It investigates whether the end state of these two countries were in agreement with their military strategy and capabilities. Additionally it assesses the degree of success achieved in the attainment of strategic political objectives through the application of all sources of national power and persuasion.

Table of Contents

Section I.	Introduction. . . . .	1
Section II.	Assumptions and Definitions . . . . .	4
Section III.	Historical Overview . . . . .	6
Section IV.	Analysis. . . . .	23
Section V.	Conclusion. . . . .	33

Figures:

1.	Territories Occupied by Israel in 1948, 1949 and 1967 . . . . .	41
2.	Yom Kippur War: Egyptian Front. . . . .	42
3.	Yom Kippur War: Syrian Front. . . . .	43
4.	Israeli Withdrawal From Sinai. . . . .	44
Endnotes . . . . .		45
Bibliography . . . . .		48

## A Clausewitzian Victory . . . The 1973 Ramadan War

### Section I: Introduction

The situation in the Middle East is an extremely complicated and volatile one due to a number of entangled and conflicting issues. These include the diversity of political objectives, social and cultural differences, territorial expansionism, terrorist activities, refugee issues, intrastate rivalry and mistrust, boundary disputes, conflicting religious ideology, and many others. Further complications occur due to the extensive superpower intervention and surrogate state/superpower linkage as well as global interest in the region's strategic oil reserves. Thus, there exists a situation characterized by a constant state of tension, military upheaval and political instability. Yet it is in the best interest of all the major powers and industrialized nations of the world that peace and stability be preserved in this strategically important region.

Over the course of 40 years Israel has proven itself to be the overwhelmingly dominant military force in the region. Its military successes have been many, the most recent being an unquestionable military victory in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. During this war the combatants used weapon systems of unparalleled lethality in unprecedented numbers. These weapon systems were employed on battlefields which were ideally suited for military operations characterized by high maneuverability, offensive actions, and combined arms forces. Despite all of these ideal conditions for battle, this war (like the preceding instances of armed conflict) in the region does not appear to

have produced any clear-cut, immediate resolutions of the problems facing the region.(1)

Throughout military history, the general rule of warfare allowed the victor on the battlefield to prescribe the conditions of peace. Yet in spite of tremendous success on the battlefield, there appear to be instances in history where the military victor is denied the very object of war. Clausewitz states that "the object of war is to impose our will on the enemy. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare."(2)

Army Field Manual 100-5 states that "all military operations pursue and are governed by political objectives. Today, the translation of success in battle to desired political outcomes is more complicated than ever before."(3) Other national instruments of power and persuasion (diplomatic, economic, political, psychological, social and military) appear to have ever increasing impact and influence in the determination of the results of a military campaign.

War is a multidimensional phenomenon, and thus victory is multifaceted and may be defined in terms of something short of total destruction of the enemy's army. Despite the quantum advances in technologies and the increased lethality of weapons, total annihilation of the enemy force may not be realistic or it may prove to be too costly. Therefore nation should not commit forces into combat without it first being clear what it intends to achieve (the end state) and how it plans



to reach it (the ways). The former is its political purpose; the latter is its operational objective. Therefore, prior to committing forces into battle the nation's political leaders must always strive to answer the following question: What is the end state that we hope to achieve and to what extent are we willing to pursue its attainment?

Conversely military success on the battlefield may not automatically produce the desired political objectives or "end state".(4) Victory must be defined in terms of an end state prior to entering armed conflict, or at least, soon thereafter, or the results at the conclusion of war may be very different from what was envisioned or sought at the beginning. Since war is a dynamic process, the definition of victory may be absolute and fixed, and remain constant throughout the course of the war. In other cases, as the dynamic process of war evolves reconsiderations may require shifts and changes in the national strategy and the definition of the end state. Through consideration of all the options in the different combinations of ways, means, and end; the national leaders may completely reshape the desired end state during the course of the conflict and pursue a dramatically altered or totally different definition of victory to what was initially sought. The national leaders may also completely change their view of what victory will look like at the end of hostilities. It is therefore imperative that the government leaders articulate their definition of victory clearly, as early as possible, and continuously update the military leaders on revisions. The nation's definition of victory has enormous impact on all levels of warfare. A key hypothesis is that the

probability of achieving the desired end state depends on the proper application of ways and means.

The purpose of this investigative study is to examine the proposition of whether military success on the battlefield is the sole determinant of victory in modern warfare. The focus of this investigation is to analyze how operational and tactical military events contribute toward a nation achieving strategic objectives and a given "definition of victory." An examination is made to determine the degree of success achieved in the attainment of strategic political objectives through the application of national sources of power and persuasion. The vehicle used to conduct this analysis is the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973. Due to course constraints, the scope of this paper will focus only on an Israeli/Egyptian analysis.

## Section II: Assumptions and Definitions

Clausewitz defines war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." He further states that war is designed either to destroy the enemy totally or to prescribe peace terms to him.(5)

FM 100-5 describes war as "a national undertaking which must be coordinated from the highest levels of policy-making to the basic levels of execution."(6) The broad areas of war are military strategy, operational art, and tactics. For the purpose of clarity and consistency of definition within the scope of this investigation, each term will briefly be discussed.

In War and Politics Bernard Brodie defines strategy as "a field where truth is sought in pursuit of viable solutions."(7) Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines strategy as "the science and art of employing the political, economic, psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum support to adopted policies in place of war."(8) FM 100-5 defines military strategy as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force."(9) Successful strategy achieves these national and alliance political objectives at the lowest level possible. Military strategy establishes the goals for theaters of war and theaters of operations.

"Operational art is the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or a theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."(10) It involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight the enemy and whether to accept or decline battle. The essence of operational art is the identification of the enemy's operational center-of-gravity, which Clausewitz defined as the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."(11) Upon identifying the enemy's center-of-gravity, the commander must then concentrate superior combat power against that point to achieve a decisive victory. Combat power is a unit's ability to fight.

"Tactics is the art by which corps and smaller unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engage-

ments."(12) Militarily, sound tactics is the employment of all available forces on the battlefield where they will make the optimum contribution to victory.

This investigation is of military significance because it addresses the correlation between the application of military force to the achievement of strategic and political aims and objectives. Our Viet Nam experience showed that this arena was not clearly understood by either U.S. civilian or military communities.(13) History provides us with many examples which illustrate military action failing to complement and support the nation state's policies and objectives.

### Section III: Historical Overview

At the close of the Six-Day War, Israel occupied the position of absolute victor. Starting with a daring pre-emptive air attack, Israel had in six days successfully defeated a numerically superior Arab coalition. As a result, Israel's borders were still secure and safe, and in the course of the fighting Israel had gained control of tremendous areas of Arab land which was considered to be in its long term interest. Israel had unquestionably proven to be the dominant military force in the Middle East. All national goals were achieved as a result of this tremendous military victory. Israel had clearly imposed its will by force upon the Arab nations.

The Arab forces, on the other hand, were militarily shattered, demoralized and humiliated. However, Arab leaders, despite their resounding military defeat, still refused to make peace with Israel. In an attempt to deal with the consequences of their defeat, Arab leaders held a summit at Khartoum, Sudan in August 1967. The summit concluded with unanimous agreement among the Arab states that there would be no recognition of Israel; no peace negotiations with Israel; and no peace with Israel.(14) This summit negated all hopes for a United States-Soviet Union settlement of the Middle East situation because all initiatives thus far were directed toward the proposal for complete Israeli withdrawal from captured territory in return for peace in the Middle East.

During this period Egypt directed all efforts toward massive reconstruction of her military forces. Several major decisions were made to improve Egyptian military performance. First of all a disciplinarian, Mohammed Fauzi, was appointed Minister of War in hopes of bringing about better coordination and cooperation between the Air Force and Army. Major logistical improvements were made in storage and supply facilities in order to increase force sustainment capabilities. The decision was made to draft greater numbers of university graduates into military service in an effort to increase the quality of its officers corps. All military training and exercises were focused specifically on the recapture of the Suez Canal.(15)

Other decisions concerning military training and operations in preparation for Egypt's attempt to recapture the Canal involved devel-

oping an operational strategy which exploited superior Arab numbers on the longest possible front, thus forcing Israel to fight out numbered and with extremely long lines of communication. Egypt sought to neutralize Israel's superior air force by employing a dense wall of Soviet supplied surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems and conducting all ground operations under the cover of this air defense umbrella. Lastly Egypt developed an operational approach which avoided high speed armored maneuver engagements at which Israeli forces were far superior.(16)

Though Israel attempted to draw lessons learned from the Six-Day War, these attempts were soon overshadowed by the intense negotiations with the Arab states. Israeli focus was directed largely toward dealing with Arab demands for the return of captured territory and countering growing public opinion against Arab territory occupation. Israel suggested that all talks be accomplished through direct negotiations, however this suggestion was refused by Egypt's Foreign Minister Raid. Israel's primary concern became one of holding onto captured territory. On 3 October 1967, Israel repudiated the 1949 armistice treaty and declared that a new treaty must be negotiated. In the following months Israel also announced plans for construction and settlement within the occupied territories.(17)

On November 22, 1967 the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Security Council Resolution 242 aimed at bringing an end to the Six-Day War. The provisions of this resolution document called for:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. (See Figure 1)
2. An end to the state of armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states.
3. Acknowledgment of and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every nation in the area.
4. The establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries."
5. A guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area.
6. A just settlement of the refugee problem.(18)

Despite their resounding military defeat, the Egyptians continuously tried new military strategies to achieve their national goals. They divided the period from the end of the Six-Day War to the beginning of hostilities in October 1973 into four major military phases:

Defiance	June 1967 - August 1968
Active Defense	September 1968 - February 1969
War of Attrition	March 1969 - August 1970
No Peace, No War	August 1970 - October 1973(19)

The main objective of the Egyptian military forces during the Defiance phase was to establish and maintain a sense of calm and order in the country, to proceed quickly with cleanup and reconstruction ef-

forts, and prepare for the defense of the canal front. Sporadic, small scale fighting continued throughout this phase.(20)

During the Active Defense phase, hostilities were characterized by protracted and intense military actions. Through artillery barrages, Egypt experienced substantial success in destroying Israeli missile and artillery positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Because of the heavy losses of this period, the Israelis decided made to construct a line of strong defensive fortifications along the east bank of the canal. These fortifications were called the Bar Lev Line, named after Chaim Bar-Lev, the Israeli military chief of staff. Israel's new military strategy called for the rapid reinforcement of the Bar Lev Line at the outbreak of hostilities. There were two opposing schools of thought among Israeli officers regarding the purpose of these fortifications. One group considered them as an early warning system while the other group believed them to constitute a bonafied line of defense. Regardless, these fortifications provided excellent protection for Israeli soldiers against Soviet-supplied heavy artillery bombardment by Egyptian forces.(21)

Once the Bar Lev Line was completed, a third phase (the War of Attrition) of military operations began in the Middle East. Rather than risk another all-out war against Israel, Egypt's President Gamal Nasser decided to conduct a war of attrition along the cease-fire line bordering the Suez Canal. The Egyptians conducted numerous assaults across the canal, only to be driven back. President Nasser's objective during



the War of Attrition was to regain control of the Sinai by hammering at Israeli border forces until they pulled back from the canal. However, this was not the case and Israeli forces dug in and held their positions.(22)

Arab solidarity forced the Israelis to fight the War of Attrition along three borders. Military confrontations were intense in the north Jordan valley area against both Jordanian forces and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) units operating from Jordanian territory. Frequent military action also took place along the Syrian border. However, the major theater of operations was along the Suez Canal against Egyptian forces. During the War of Attrition the Bar Lev Line proved to be a formidable defense as it held time and again against Egyptian attacks.

During the War of Attrition phase, Israel changed her military strategy from that of attrition and counterattack warfare, to total deterrence by threatening to retaliate massively against any enemy combat initiative. In retaliation for Egyptian assaults across the canal, Israel initiated air interdiction missions against deep, heavily populated areas. This proved to be highly successful and inflicted tremendous damage and high casualty counts. Egypt was forced to reconsider the War of Attrition and refrained from further attacks. Egypt had failed to force Israel to withdraw from any of the territory it had occupied at the end of the Six-Day War. Israel, through military force had denied to Egypt that which she wanted most: her lost territory.

Israel continued to dictate the terms of negotiation to the Arab states.

United Nations and United States-Soviet Union negotiations to obtain a peace agreement were in progress. The focus of these negotiations was a peace proposal drafted by United States American Secretary of State William Rogers. The Rogers Plan outlined a peace treaty between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan which provided for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, thus leaving only the questions of the Gaza Strip and Sharm El-Sheikh unresolved. Acceptance of this plan required an agreement for a three month cease-fire.(23)

President Nasser announced acceptance of the Rogers Plan. Jordan followed suit immediately thereafter. Nasser believed that he could use the three-month cease-fire to further his long-term military objectives of recapture of the Sinai. On 31 July 1970, Israel accepted the provisions of the Rogers cease-fire initiative, and midnight 8 August 1970 was set as the effective date of implementation.(24)

Dr. Henry Kissinger, in view of latter facts, believed that Nasser and the Soviets may have intended from the very beginning to use the cease-fire offer as a cover for locating a more substantial missile defense complex well forward with minimum risk. This SAM employment would give the Egyptians a distinct advantage during any future hostilities. It was later confirmed that during the period between the date of Nasser's acceptance of the cease-fire and the date of

implementation, the Egyptians and Soviet advisors completed a large-scale movement of anti-aircraft missile sites well forward on the west bank of the canal.(25)

Nasser used the three-month cease-fire period very effectively to consolidate his ground forces and establish an air defense system over the Suez Canal which would provide air cover for Egyptian ground forces. This would render the Israeli air force ineffective. However, President Nasser was not to witness the Egyptian execution of the military plan to regain the canal. On 28 September 1970, President Nasser died. Egypt chose Anwar el Sadat to succeed Nasser.

Anwar Sadat succeeded as the President of Egypt because he was first vice-president at the time of Nasser's death. He was not considered to be a strong politician, and was viewed as only an interim leader of Egypt. However, President Sadat astutely developed his power base and firmly assumed the position at the head of Egypt's government.(26)

Sadat promulgated three key political goals: to establish himself as Egypt's president and to emerge from the shadow of his charismatic predecessor; to regain the Sinai Peninsula from Israel; and to resolve the urgent economic situation in Egypt and improve the standard of living for its people. All of these goals were interrelated.(27)

The period from the signing of the cease-fire agreement of the June 1967 war, to the outbreak of hostilities in October 1973 marks the final military phase. This phase was called, "No Peace, No War". Military action during this phase had very few defensive aspects. Throughout this phase, the Egyptians attempted to wear down the Israelis through the employment of harrassing tactics launched from Arab sanctuaries against Israeli fortified positions and force territorial withdrawal. In every case Israel retaliated with massive punitive actions. During this phase, Arab objectives were threefold:

1. To halt or impede military installation construction in Israeli occupied Sinai territory.
2. Using harrassing, intimidate Israel into mobilization alerts; thus placing a tremendous drain on her defense budget and causing a loss of face for her leaders.
3. To lull the Israelis into a false sense of security while the Arab states quietly prepared to attack.(28)

Israel continued to strengthen its fortified military positions along the Suez Canal. Egyptian military actions were not able to stop Israeli construction of these fortifications. The cost of these additional fortifications to the Bar-Lev Line was over \$100 million. These structures were built to enhance Israel's ability to counter a ground attack without the customary support of a dominant air force.(29)

The Arab coalition understood the criticality of having strategic surprise on their side. They developed and executed an effective deception plan which further led to a feeling of security by Israel, causing a reduction in security consciousness. A major part of the deception plan was strict Arab compliance with cease-fire provisions. Hostilities virtually ceased. Additionally, major troop developments and maneuvers were staged along the borders with Israel. These actions forced Israel to execute costly mobilizations of her reserve forces. When no Arab attack occurred, Israel was lulled into viewing all such Arab deployments and maneuvers as instances of moving to the brink and nothing happening.

Egypt executed a campaign of misinformation to further convince Israel that all her assumptions regarding the likelihood of armed confrontation were correct. Egypt leaked false information through several media sources regarding its lack of military preparedness, sub-standard state of equipment maintenance and poor soldier performance skills and level of training. These efforts further supported Israel's assessment of Egypt's inability to initiate war. Even the selection of the date for the start of hostilities; on Yom Kippur, the holiest of Israeli's holidays and during the month of Arab Ramadan fasting; were chosen to increase the chances to gain strategic surprise.(30)

Israel's intelligence organization had skillfully demonstrated its reliability on numerous occasions and Israel relied heavily upon the accuracy of its information. Despite massive Arab troop buildup along

her borders, Israel's government and military leaders continually accepted the intelligence assessments which stated that Arab attack was not imminent and that at least 48-hour notification would be provided prior to hostilities. Israel's almost absolute acceptance of this intelligence assessment later proved to be costly.(31)

Israel was further convinced that there was not danger of war because of a result of the June 1967 war. In its preemptive attack, Israel had almost completely destroyed the entire Egyptian air force while it was still on the runways. Israel was convinced that Egypt would not be able to train pilots and replace lost aircraft, in sufficient numbers, until the summer of 1975. Thus Israel firmly believed that before reconstruction of Egypt's air force, war would not occur.(32)

The situation in the Middle East remained highly volatile and scattered border clashes continued. Diplomatic maneuvering and peace negotiations had been ongoing throughout this phase. On 25 January 1970, President Nixon reaffirmed U.S. support for Israel's insistence on direct peace negotiations with Arab leaders. A few days later, President Nixon stated that the U.S. was neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israel, that the U.S. was pro-peace. In June 1970, Secretary of State Rogers proposed yet another peace initiative and called for a resumption of United Nations mediation efforts aimed at implementing the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242.(33)

However, hopes for a peace settlement were short-lived when on 7 September 1970 Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir announced withdrawal from all Arab-Israeli peace talks. This action was precipitated by strong Israeli opposition to a proposed 90-day cease-fire beginning 8 August. Israeli public sentiment was so strong against the cease-fire that six members of the Gahal minority party resigned from the Cabinet when Prime Minister Meir announced the government's acceptance of the peace proposal.(34)

Another reason for Israel's refusal to participate in any further peace efforts was in protest to her repeated charges that Soviet surface-to-air missile systems had been placed in the canal cease-fire zone in direct violation to the terms of the cease-fire agreement. These charges were in fact later verified, and these missile systems were instrumental in the Egyptian military forces crossing the Suez Canal in October 1973.(35)

With Israel's refusal to participate in negotiation talks, President Sadat saw little chance of regaining the Suez Canal through political means. To him the world seemed to yawn and turn its eyes away from the unresolved issues of the region. In light of harshly critical Egyptian public opinion, Sadat clearly understood that he could not allow this period of stalemate in negotiations to continue indefinitely and that the "no war, no peace" situation was not in Egypt's long range interests. Egypt's mobilized state, with the country's manpower and economy devoted entirely to a war without

battles made no sense.(36) President Sadat stepped up efforts to develop plans for a surprise assault across the Suez Canal, which he believed to be the only way to break the political deadlock between Egypt and Israel.

Each type of military action used by Egypt during the period between the June 1967 and October 1973 wars had failed to produce the desired end state which Egypt desperately sought. Despite significant Arab coalition success, Israel still maintained control and occupied territory gained in the Six-Day War. Arab military action had failed to even threaten Israel so that a cease-fire agreement might be sought and thus Arab national objectives might be achieved through political means.(37)

Israel had effectively responded to each phase of Arab military strategy and denied the achievement of desired Arab national objectives. Each type of military action employed by Israel proved to be highly successful. Israel was moving closer toward the end state which it sought. That end state was military dominance over the Arab states and retention of the captured territory which provided excellent buffer zones. Therefore the decision was made by President Sadat to once again use military means in an attempt to achieve political ends.

The military objective was to recapture territory lost in 1967. The strategic political objective was to use the "fourth round" of hos-



ilities was to force superpower involvement in the resolution of the Middle East situation.

In order to ensure freedom of action after going to war, on 18 July 1972 President Sadat expelled all 20,000 Soviet military advisors from Egypt. To lose the largest and most powerful Arab state severely damaged Soviet influence in the region. However, Sadat was quick to mend fences with the Soviets in order to assure their continued support as a major arms supplies.(38) In an interview with Newsweek in April 1973, President Sadat stated that "everyone has fallen asleep over the Mideast crisis. The time has come for a shock."(39)

On 6 October 1973, full scale war once again erupted in the Middle East when Egyptian and Syrian troops launched a surprise two-pronged attack on Israeli borders. As proof of Arab solidarity, Jordan agreed to conduct a buildup of troops along her cease-fire borders. This action required Israel to focus attention on three fronts and prevented her from concentrating forces on one front then another as had been done in the Israeli victory on 1967.

The Arab coalition which faced Israel was a coordinated military action supported almost unanimously by all the Arab states through actual supplying of combat troops, military equipment or financial support. Israel had long appreciated the great challenge of going into combat against such a formidable foe, however, not until now had the Arab nations been able to form a viable coalition. Bickering and com-

peting interests had always prevented the Arabs from unifying themselves against Israel.

Initially Egypt and Syria realized significant military successes. By seizing the initiative, the Arab forces with new sophisticated Soviet weapons, were able temporarily to dictate the conditions of battle. Israel was forced to fight a set battle rather than one of rapid maneuver and speed, which she favored. The Egyptians were able to accomplish a major penetration of the Bar-Lev Line and captured or destroyed the majority of these positions. The Syrians were able to break through the northern Israeli defenses in the Golan Heights (see Figure 2 and 3). But these successes were only temporary.

Losses on both sides were tremendous in both manpower and equipment. By the third day of fighting the Soviets had already began replacement of Arab equipment losses. On 19 October 1973, President Nixon called on Congress to approve \$2.2 billion in military aid to Israel in order "to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union." (40) This U.S. aid was obviously of vital importance militarily to Israel, but it was perhaps even more significant politically. Its unequivocal nature was undoubtedly a major factor in bringing about a cease-fire. (41)

Israeli forces ground the Arab advances to a halt, then quickly shifted to the offense. The Syrians were driven beyond the 1967 fron-

tiers with Israel advancing to within 20 miles of Damascus. The Egyptians were forced back across the canal. Israel chose to stop her military advance short of crossing the canal because she realized its strategic importance to the Soviet Union and did not want to provoke Soviet retaliation.

Superpower intervention denied Israel the chance to exploit the offensive posture she had achieved and produce a decisive victory. Israel was persuaded by U.S. pressure to withdraw from its positions deep in Egyptian and Syrian territory. Syrian President Assad announced on 29 October his acceptance of a cease-fire agreement with Israel.

On 11 November 1973 Israel and Egypt signed a cease-fire accord. The plan called for: "(1) both sides to observe the cease-fire; (2) immediate discussions on the return to the 22 October cease-fire lines; (3) immediate food and medical supplies for Suez city; (4) access for nonmilitary supplies to the stranded Egyptian III Corps on the East Bank of the Suez Canal; (5) replacement of Israeli troops along the Suez by U.N. forces and (6) exchange of all prisoners of war."(42)

In the past, the Arab states had attempted to join forces and to use their oil reserves as a political weapon in order to achieve desired goals. However, each time they had failed to produce significant results. Following the October War, the Arabs successfully united the force of their oil production in a common interest. On 18 November 1973 the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)

cancelled a 5 percent output cut on oil production scheduled for December in a conciliatory gesture to most European countries. Because of their pro-Israeli positions, the Netherlands and the United States were exempted. Later that week (22 November) Saudi Arabia warned that it would cut oil production by 80 percent if the United States retaliated for Arab oil cuts or embargo.(43)

On 9 December nine Arab oil ministers met in Kuwait. They agreed to order a new oil cutback of 750,000 barrels a day, a 5 percent reduction, effective 1 January 1974. This oil reduction was agreed to remain in effect until Israel began withdrawal from lands occupied during the 1967 war.

The period between the cease-fire and mid-1975 is characterized by numerous violent terrorist acts. These acts of violence were done by the Arabs in an effort to maintain pressure on Israel for the return of captured land. Israel's response was massive retaliation for any Arab acts of terrorism directed against it.(44)

On 1 September 1975 in separate ceremonies in Jerusalem and Alexandria, Israeli and Egyptian leaders signed a Sinai peace pact. Israel yielded to Egypt's demands that it withdraw from the mountain passes in the Sinai and return the Abu Rudeis oilfields. Israel received modest political concessions. On 4 September Israel and Egypt signed the agreement in Geneva.(45)

#### Section IV: Analysis

"War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means, simply the continuation of policy with the admixture of other means."(46)

History supports the idea that no military success can be judged in isolation. Michael Howard, Requis Professor of History at Oxford University, states that "the most splendid of victories was thus nothing in itself unless it was also the means to the attainment of a political end; whether that end was the total destruction of the enemy state or the laying down of whatever peace terms policy might require."(47) Clausewitz supports this central idea. He states that "the object of war is (a) to impose our will on the enemy, to do which (b) we use the means of maximum available force, with (c) the aim of rendering him powerless."(48) In strategic terms, it is important that tactical success is not necessarily political or strategic success, and tactical failure is not necessarily strategic or political failure. Also in the strategic sense, battlefield victories only have significance to the degree that they contribute to the ultimate political objective and national goal.

National leaders must define and articulate early on the "end state" they hope to achieve through the application of military force. The end state is the national goal or objective that is being pursued. A national goal is "a future state of affairs considered desirable by a

nation, promoted by the government, and calling forth the efforts of the population in order to achieve it."(49) One must determine if the national goal is immediate or long-range. A nation's support of a national goal may range from solid, absolute support to open disagreement and wide differences. The degree of national unity directly affects a nation's ability to achieve that national goal. Additionally, it is important to determine whether the achievement of a national goal requires a change or whether it involves perpetuation of the status quo.

On 14 May 1948, the Yishuv (the Jewish settlement in Palestine) declared its independence and the state of Israel was created. Due to intense and determined Arab opposition Israel has been forced to fight for its sheer survival. This constant threat to its right to exist as a sovereign nation state has been a primary factor of consideration in forming Israel's national goals. Her foremost national goal has been the safety and security of her territory and borders. To support this aim Israel has relied upon the military preparedness of her small standing armed forces and rapid mobilization of her efficient civilian reserves. Because of the small size of its territory and the numerical superiority of the Arab states surrounding its borders, there has always existed in Israel a school of thought which viewed the Israeli borders to be highly vulnerable and insecure. Disaster was believed to be certain in the event of a consolidated Arab attack. This school has always been in favor of increasing Israel's territory to provide a greater margin of strategic security. On 12 October 1955, Menachem

Begin stated to the Knesset, "I deeply believe in launching preventive war against Arab states without further hesitation. By doing so, we will achieve two targets: firstly, the annihilation of the Arab power, and secondly, the expansion of our territory."(50)

At the outbreak of the October 1973 war, Israel's national goals were to safeguard the security of her territory and borders, expansion of land to further promote her security, and the annihilation of Arab military might.(51) Because of her small population, Israel is extremely sensitive to taking war casualties and strongly favored a quick war with minimal losses as to a long protracted war. This was Israel's vision of what victory would look like at the end of the war--the end state. They were well defined, clearly understood and promulgated by government and military leaders throughout Israel's existence. On 14 October, Defense Minister Dayan in an interview in the Sinai stated: "Our aim is to destroy, beat and defeat their forces."(52) Their realization would have dramatic favorable consequences on both immediate and long-range interests of Israel. The populace agreed with pursuing these goals and staunchly supported achieving them. The people showed unwavering confidence in their chosen leaders and their ability to produce the final results. These national goals were realistic and Israel had the means to produce the desired ends. This had been decisively demonstrated in the Six-Day War. To achieve these national goals required changes to occur within the Middle East. These changes occurred as a result of the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack upon Israel.

Despite a tenuous beginning, Israel once again demonstrated her military prowess by stopping the two-pronged Arab attack and conducting an effective counterattack. Thus Israel restored its borders and was able to carry the war deep into Egyptian and Syrian territory. Even in light of the Arab attack being a surprise, Israel's battlefield successes were still most impressive. Israel was able to soundly, though not as dramatically as in 1967, defeat an Arab coalition of forces.

In the initial stage of this confrontation, both Egypt and Syria were able to accomplish what Israel had always feared most. They had both succeeded in breaching Israel's boundaries. However, Israel quickly drove the Arab forces from her territories and restored her borders. Nevertheless, this Arab feat tremendously altered Israeli strategy and military thought regarding its security.

Israel was not able to achieve annihilation of the Arab military forces. By the close of war, Israel had achieved favorable operational advantage and position on the Egyptian front. Israeli forces had completely encircled the Third Egyptian Army. United States and Soviet intervention prevented the destruction of this Arab force. Israel had once again successfully employed its armed forces in the defense of its national security in this "fourth round" of Arab-Israeli confrontation. She had achieved much greater success at the operational and tactical levels than her opponents. Yet strategic success had been denied. The October War produced significant impact that had not been considered and/or anticipated.



Israel had long been considered the superior military force in the Middle East. This had clearly been proven in all the instances of armed confrontation in the past. But at the conclusion of this war, based on the much improved performance of the Arabs and their ability to achieve strategic surprise, Israel had lost her position as the dominant military force in the region. For the first time in its history, the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) ability to protect the state was questioned. The war took a tremendous toll upon the entire country and left Israel in a state of sober reflection. Israel readily realized the inadequacies of her military doctrine and defense preparations. The complete strategy for defending against the Arab threat was found to have gross shortcomings and required complete reevaluation. The Bar Lev Line, thought to be impregnable by some, proved to be ineffective. Additionally, Israel was faced with the realization of her inability to sustain and fight a protracted war against a united Arab front.

United States support and sympathy for Israel motivated the Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to impose the 1973-1974 oil embargo. The impact was massive, resulting shortages of oil and quadrupling of oil prices around the world. The heavily industrialized countries of Europe and Japan were severely hurt by the embargo. The impact of the oil embargo was so great that it caused the European Economic Community (EEC) to rethink its strategy concerning the Middle East completely. On 9 November 1973, EEC representatives

met to discuss a joint European strategy. This conference resulted in an EEC Policy of Declaration which recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The oil embargo proved to be an extremely effective political weapon.

By far the worst consequence of the war for Israel was the diplomatic isolation that she experienced afterward. Israel had labored very hard to establish friendly relations with the countries of Africa. Many of the African nations had objected to Israeli occupation of the Sinai because it had belonged to Egypt, a fellow African country. After the 1973 war, objections were even more vocal and severe. Forty-two African countries maintained embassies in Israel. Following the war all but three of the countries broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. In the international arena Israel found herself in almost total isolation.(53)

The psychological effect of the war forced Israel to reconsider the immediacy of the Arab threat. Limited Arab military success brought the threat closer to the average Israeli citizen than ever before. Physical geography of the region had not changed but the immediacy of the threat in the minds of the Israelis had greatly increased. Everyone's perception of the salience of the threat was changed. Therefore, the sense of security and confidence of the Israeli people was significantly reduced.

The overall military and diplomatic consequences of the Yom Kippur War presented Israel with a whole host of problems which directly affected future national security considerations. In the short-term Israel needed to correct the mistakes and shortcomings revealed by the war. The IDF had to ensure the review and extraction of appropriate lessons regarding fighting doctrine, tactics, performance, optimal use of weapons, and so on. With regard to long-range objectives, Israel needed to assess its political-strategic standing, redefine the specific political ends to be pursued, and devise a proper military strategy to support and achieve those ends.

President Sadat had decided as early as November 1972 to employ military means to achieve his political objectives. Despite making this decision, he did not believe that Egypt had reached tactical or technical military parity with Israel. Therefore the decision to go to war was made realizing that there was a strong possibility of another Israeli victory. Sadat, however, believed that Israel was satisfied with the circumstances of the present situation in the region, and thus would make no effort to move toward any acceptable resolution without pressure from the superpowers. He was desperate to implement some type of strategy which would cause an end to the period of stalemate. The only option for moving toward a Middle East settlement seemed to be to initiate a crisis situation that would demand that world attention be focused on the region.(54)

Throughout the War of Attrition and the period of "No Peace, No War," Egypt remained focused on what had been defined as her national goals. First of all, Egypt was totally committed to reclaiming territory lost in 1967. Second, was the unresolved issue of a just settlement for the Palestinian question. Because of long-lived hostilities and deeply rooted mistrust of Israel, Egypt believed that the only way to resolve the present issues of Arab-Israeli conflict was to create a dilemma that would force intervention by one or both major powers.

Egypt's national goals appear to have been realistic and their achievement based upon rational thought and reasoning. Despite military defeats in the past, Sadat felt relatively confident that through a large scale military effort, Egypt could create the desired scenario which would enable the achievement of its national goals. It was unquestionably in the best interest of Egypt to pursue these national goals. Egypt had suffered greatly from Israel's occupation of the Sinai. Each day of occupation denied Egypt the badly needed national revenues from oilfields in the area and from the operation of the Suez Canal. So despite high military risks associated with the political decision to use military means to accomplish defined aims, the potential gains were also high.

Based on the outcome of hostilities, several factors should be considered in determining what the Arab coalition actually accomplished. First of all, Egypt's military forces were able to cross the Suez Canal, establish several bridgeheads, and advance onward to pen-

strate the fortified positions of the Bar Lev Line. After this penetration the advance was halted and Egypt held on until the implementation of a cease-fire. Though limited as this success was, the Arabs destroyed the long-standing myth of Israeli military dominance in the Middle East. This limited success provided a tremendous boost for morale and self-esteem throughout the Arab world. By forming the Arab coalition, the Arab states proved themselves able to coordinate and join forces in pursuit of a common goal. Israel had always counted very heavily on the Arab's inability to settle their differences and to unite against her. Sadat called the October War "the first Arab victory in 500 years."<sup>(55)</sup> Through this newly found unity, the Arab countries were able to stand firmly together against the world and impose the 1973 oil embargo. They had attempted to use oil as a political weapon before, but had never achieved any measurable success. At the end of the war, Israeli Defense Minister, Mosha Dayan stated, "This time (in 1973) they marshalled all their resources, including oil, to achieve their purpose."<sup>(56)</sup> Extremely favorable results were achieved from limited military success.

The Arab coalition wanted to break the stalemated negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict that had existed since the implementation of the cease-fire in accordance to the Rogers Plan of 1969. The Arabs more than succeeded in achieving this aim. International attention was focused on this Middle East crisis and the subsequent oil embargo. Many nations of the world were persuaded to reassess their view of the situation in this region, and many openly expressed support

for the Arab cause. By forcing world attention on the Middle East situation, this eventually led to the Egyptians reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula.

The Arab military performance in the Yom Kippur War regained for them the ability of political maneuverability which they lost in 1967. The Arab nations had suffered an humiliating defeat, in their eyes and in the eyes of the world in the Six-Day War. In the past they were afforded little attention. In the United Nations Arab attempts to gain attention for their appeals for assistance in resolving the situation in the region had gone unheard. They were reduced to almost complete political ineffectiveness. Based upon their greatly improved military performance and limited success in the Yom Kippur War the Arab nations regained their self-respect and were looked upon more favorably by other nations. Additionally the Arab nations realized the gain of a much greater degree of prestige and clout in the international arena. Thus enabling them greater ability to achieve their desired national objectives within a political environment.

#### Section V: Conclusion

"The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purposes." (57)

Clausewitz believed that before a person could have a practical theory for the conduct of war, he had to first understand the relationship between ends and means; in particular the political end of war and the military means used to attain it.(58) Both Israel and Egypt understood the relationship between seeking the achievement of political ends through the use of military means. Israel had been at war since its birth and had been successful in previous instances in the application of its practical theory for the conduct of war. It had realized extensive political gains as a result of military means. Its population was acutely aware of the constant danger presented by the Arabs to its existence.

Egypt also understood this relationship and had determined that it had to take the political initiative (the aim for which war is initiated) and make the decision to conduct a military offensive against Israel in an attempt to achieve its political objective. This political objective was therefore the original motive for the war and was the primary factor in determining both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort devoted to that end.(59) This clearly supports Clausewitz's premise that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means."(60)

Clausewitz further states that "war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it. . . . It must adapt itself to its chosen means, a process which can radically change it;

yet the political aim remains the first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations and, in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them."(61) President Sadat determined that the political purpose of this war was to break the stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations and force super-power intervention in hopes of regaining territories lost in the Six-Day War. The Arabs had no illusions about their ability to recover lost land by defeating Israel; but they judged that, unless the super-powers were brought face to face with the danger of renewed fighting which would threaten their own interests, they would not exert themselves to obtain a settlement. Despite the high risks associated with going to war with Israel, this national objective was considered to be worth the gamble and in Egypt's best long term interest. A military capability was developed (through forming alliances, training, strategy formulation, and equipment procurement) which Egypt thought would enable the achievement of her desired national objectives.

In the initial stages of the war, Israel was the victim of total surprise and in a military posture ill-prepared to fight. The Arab attack was executed under the best possible strategic and operational circumstances. Despite these almost fatal errors and the initial tactical successes by the Arabs on both fronts, the question of military victory must clearly be decided in favor of Israel. The Israel Defense Forces were extremely successful in achieving its strategic military objective, which was to deny the enemy any military advantage to be used in peace negotiations. On the northern front, Syrian



forces were driven out of the Golan Heights and Israeli forces advanced to a position of threat to Damascus. On the southern front the Israeli forces had recaptured almost the entire Sinai Peninsula and had crossed the Suez Canal and established a substantial bridgehead on the west bank. In doing this, they had succeeded in completely surrounding and isolating the Egyptian Third Army. President Sadat immediately realized the gravity of the situation and partitioned for a cease-fire. Israel was in total control of the military situation. Yet the military victor failed to reap the political spoils of the war.

Israel failed to develop its political objectives in concert with an accurate assessment of its military capabilities. Instead Israel developed its political objectives based on inaccurately derived military capabilities. Israel's political objective was to maintain the status quo in the region and to continue occupation of territories captured in 1967. Analysis of the period between June 1967 and October 1973 shows that Israel considered war to be against its national interests. Israel realized that if war developed in the Middle East it would constitute an Arab political advantage. It was considered essential that Israel prevent the Arabs from gaining any meaningful military advantage. Israel's predicted reaction to any armed confrontation was to destroy as much of the Arab forces and infrastructure as possible so that a significant advantage would be gained. Thus, Israel's military aims were to avoid war through deterrence; to destroy

the Arab forces (should deterrence fail); and to capture territory to be used for political bargaining power at the conclusion of hostilities.(62)

In developing its strategy for the Sinai front, Israel allowed its thinking to be severely tainted by the War of Attrition. It was this type of military operation which their war planners visualized for the next Arab-Israeli confrontation. This incorrect assessment was made based on the assumption that the Egyptians would not consider the military option until they achieved air superiority in the Sinai. Intelligence estimates predicted this not possible until 1975. Herein lay one of the fundamental inaccuracies of Israeli evaluation of Arab military strategy. Israel failed to appreciate that the Egyptians would decide on a limited military solution to their problem based on a missile umbrella air defense concept, and would pursue a limited political strategy.(63)

Based upon Israel's confidence in its military forces' ability to accomplish these aims, it felt safe in maintaining a very dogmatic approach with the Arab states in all negotiations, even to the point of demanding complete acceptance of its terms of negotiations. This political position was adopted based upon the incorrect perception of Israel's ability to successfully accomplish its military aims and deter the Arabs from resorting to military action. Had Israel realized its military inadequacies beforehand, it would have either altered its political goals or changed its military strategy to one based on some-

thing other than deterrence through military superiority. Israel certainly would not have sought to maintain status quo, which resulted in the hopeless stalemate. In order for a deterrence strategy to be effective you must have the capability of convincing the opposing side that war will be too costly and not an acceptable option. The negative risks will be unrealistic when compared to possible gains.

Israel did not possess the superior force (manpower, equipment, or technology) yet achievement of its political objectives was significantly linked to a military strategy based on deterrence. In 1973 deterrence proved to be completely inconsistent with attaining Israel's national objectives. Upon realizing their inability to effectively employ deterrence, Israel could have realigned its military means and capabilities to be in closer accord with its national objectives.

Despite the enormous military forces used by Egypt and Syria against Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the strategic objectives of both countries were comparatively limited. The Arabs directed their military efforts toward the achievement of political gains. The political purpose of Egypt was to break the deadlocked negotiations of the Arab-Israeli equation. The Arab states felt that without military action, the stalemate in the Middle East would continue indefinitely at their expense.(64)

The Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel succeeded in breaking the political stalemate. President Sadat proceeded to develop his po-

litical strategy. This political strategy first led to an interim agreement in the Sinai, and ultimately to a peace treaty with Israel, which returned to Egypt the valuable oilfields and the entire Sinai Peninsula. Two-thirds of the Sinai returned to the Egyptians in 1980 and the remaining third was returned in April 1982. (See Figure 4).

After the cease-fire agreement, the political objectives were further achieved through the intervention of the Arab oil-producing states and the entire context of the confrontation between the Arab states and Israel was decisively changed. The Arabs effectively used new weapons and demonstrated that since 1967 they had significantly narrowed the technological gap between themselves and Israel. By doing so, they dispelled the fallacy on which Israeli strategy had been based since the Six-Day War. Israel's security strategy was based upon controlling wide buffer zones (territories occupied since 1967), together with military supremacy of which they were confident that they possessed. Based upon this miscalculation Israel believed it was immune to Arab attack. This assumption had encouraged in the Israeli leaders the dangerous conviction that since they were in no danger from the Arabs they could afford to disregard the mounting pressure of world opinion calling for an Israeli withdrawal as the essential condition of negotiated settlement with the Arabs.

The obstinate, hard-line approach by both sides only perpetuated the stalemate. Israel incorrectly determined this condition of inactivity to support its national objectives of (1) continued occupation

of captured territory, and (2) non-resolution of the Palestine issue.(65) Therefore Israel did not feel compelled to seek an acceptable resolution to the Middle East problem aggressively.

As a result of this incorrectly deduced strategy, despite absolute defeat of its enemies on the battlefield, Israel was forced to return captured territory for peace. The October War exposed Israel's absolute dependence upon the United States for military support. This revelation had a tremendous negative effect on how the world and especially the Arab countries viewed Israel and its military superiority. Israel also found itself diplomatically isolated in the political world.

The overall military and diplomatic consequences of the Yom Kippur War had far-reaching global effects. Most of all Israel was faced with a whole array of problems affecting its national security. Israel must assess its political- strategic standing, redefine the specific political ends to be pursued, and devise a proper military strategy to serve those ends. Only through the proper application of military ways and means can a nation fully achieve its desired political objectives.

As initially stated war is multidimensional, employing all of the resources of the state; military, economic, and political. The 1982 version of FM 100-5, Operations states that "defeating enemy forces in battle will not always ensure victory. Other national instruments of power and persuasion will influence or even determine the

results of wars."(66) Military success in isolation does not guarantee the achievement of strategic goals.

Through this instance of "continuation of policy by other means," the Arabs sought to bring every form of power to bear upon Israel in order to achieve its political objectives. Clausewitz states that "Everything is governed by a supreme law. The decision by force of arms."(67) Prior to entering war, a nation's leaders must define and dictate the use of all power parameters; economic, strategic, political, and military; to ensure the proper application of these means. For the strategist's effectiveness is ultimately to be judged not in military but in political terms. Solely defeating the enemy's army will not always guarantee the desired degree of strategic success. Military success on the battlefield is not the sole determinant of victory at the strategic level of warfare.




FIGURE 1

Territories occupied by Israel in 1948, 1949, and 1967 (From Europa Publications, *The Middle East and North Africa 1984-85*, p. 67)




FIGURE 2

Overview for Yom Kippur War: Egyptian Front (From Safran, Israel - The Embattled Ally, p. 290)






FIGURE 3

Overview for Yom Kippur War: Syrian Front (From Safran, *Israel - The Embattled Ally*, p. 295)




FIGURE 4

Israeli withdrawal from Sinai under the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty (From Europa Publications, The Middle East and North Africa 1984-85, p. 77)

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