AD-A194 741 INSIGHTS GARNERED AND GAINED: MILITARY THEORY AND OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE(U) ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOO.. M P HERTLING 1/1

UNCLASSIFIED 25 APR 88 F/G 15/6 NL




1.0
1.1
1.25
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.8
3.2
3.6
4.0

AD-A194 741

INSIGHTS GARNERED AND GAINED: MILITARY THEORY AND OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE

by

Major Mark Phillip Hertling
Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

25 APRIL 1988

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 05 1988
S
D
E

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION: School of Advanced Military Studies; 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable): ATZL-SWV	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code): SAMS, Ft Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION; 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS: PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)

Insights Garnered and Gained: Military Theory and OPN Peace for Galilee

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Hertling, Mark P. MAJOR, USA

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15. PAGE COUNT
Monograph	FROM _____ TO _____	1988, April 25	49

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	Peace for Galilee, PLO, Syrian, Beirut, Israeli Defense Forces, Center of Gravity, Operational Art, Invasion of Lebanon, Operation "Pine Tree"

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

During the fall and winter of 198[illegible] the Israeli government used military force in an Operation which they believed would achieve certain immediate political goals. Israel invaded Lebanon with an announced goal of clearing PLO terrorists from an area which threatened the the northern section of Israel. This monograph analyzes the background of all belligerents involved in order to ascertain the political and strategic goals which guided the participants and the superpowers. The plans for the operation are presented and the actual conduct of the invasion is described. Two aspects of classical theory--identification of centers of gravity and the relationship between military means and political ends--are assessed in the light of the success and failure of the nations involved in the conflict. The monograph concludes that there was a glaring military means-political ends mismatch and that the Israeli planners failed in identifying the PLO center of gravity. The indications are that modern nation-states must be prepared to understand and fight any type of warfare on the conflict spectrum. Understanding of military theory and history assists the planner in these demands.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS	Unclassified
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL: Hertling, Mark P. MAJOR, USA	22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code): (913)-684-2963 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL: ATZL-SWV

DD Form 1473, JUN 86 *Previous editions are obsolete.*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

Unclassified

INSIGHTS GARNERED AND GAINED: MILITARY THEORY AND OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE

by

Major Mark Phillip Hertling
Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

25 APRIL 1988

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

88-2746

School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Name of Student: Major Mark Phillip Hertling
Title of Monograph: Insights Garnered and Gained: Military Theory and Operation Peace for Galilee

Approved by:

Douglas H Craft
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Craft, M.B.A. — Monograph Director

L. D. Holder
Colonel L.D. Holder, M.A. — Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brookes
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. — Director, Graduate Degree Program

Accepted this 2nd day of May 1988.

ABSTRACT

INSIGHTS GARNERED AND GAINED: MILITARY THEORY AND OPERATION PEACE FOR GALILEE by Major Mark Phillip Hertling, USA, 49 pages.

During the summer and fall of 1982 the Israeli government used military force in an operation which they believed would achieve certain immediate political goals. Israel invaded Lebanon with an announced goal of clearing PLO terrorists from an area which threatened the northern section of Israel known as Galilee. While military forces initially committed to the operation were equal to the announced political goal, changes in policy which occurred during the operation created tensions in the campaign plan conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces.

This monograph first analyzes the background of all active and supporting belligerents in order to ascertain the political and strategic goals which guided the participants. The plans for the operation are presented and the actual conduct of the invasion is described. Two aspects of classical theory--the identification of centers of gravity and the relationship between military means and political ends--are assessed in the light of the success and failure of the nations involved in the conflict.

The monograph concludes that there was a glaring military means-political ends mismatch and that the Israeli planners failed in identifying the PLO center of gravity. The indications are that modern nation-states must be prepared to understand and fight any type of warfare on the conflict spectrum. Understanding of military theory and history assists the planner in these demands.

Accession For
NTIS GRA&I
DTIC TAB
Unannounced
Justification
By
Distribution/
Availability Codes
Dist | Avail and/or Special
A-1

DTIC COPY INSPECTED

Table of Contents

		Page
Section I--40 Kilometer		1
Section II--Background of the Belligerents		3
	Israel	3
	Syria	6
	PLO	10
	The Superpowers	13
Section III--Conduct of the Operation		16
	The Variants	16
	The Vote for War	20
	The Operations	22
	The Final Withdrawal	28
Section IV--The Insights		30
	Centers of Gravity	30
	Political Ends	33
	Conclusions	39
Endnotes		43
Bibliography		47
Illustrations:	Order of Battle	18a
	Lebanon	20a
	The Operations	23a

Section I

40 Kilometers

For more than a year Palestinian forces had shelled Israel from artillery positions in southern Lebanon. In response the Israeli Defense Minister developed contingency plans to deal with the PLO threat in the north and even publicized these plans in an attempt to gain superpower backing for Israel's anticipated actions. When their historic ally, the United States, warned them against committing ground forces into a Lebanon already under seige by two occupying armies--the Syrians and PLO--Israel patiently waited for an event which would allow *them* to invade. That provocation came in the form of terrorism in Great Britain.

The Israeli casus belli occurred in London on 3 June 1982 when Arabs shot and grievously wounded Ambassador Schlomo Argov outside the Dorchester Hotel. Armed with Polish machine-pistols and fragmentation grenades, Argov's assassins were carrying a list of targets that included diplomats from moderate Arab nations and a plan for attacking the London Jewish School for the Blind.<1>

The day after the attempted assassination the Israeli Air Force (IAF) bombed the sports stadium in Beirut, destroying an ammunition dump hidden under the grandstands. The PLO responded by firing Katyusha rockets and artillery into

northern Israel and Galilee. On 5 June, while the IAF "surgically" bombed PLO positions in southern Lebanon, the Israeli cabinet debated action and finally approved the invasion of Lebanon. Prime Minister Menachem Begin called the operation "Peace for Galilee" and told the world that the objective was to drive the PLO back 40 kilometers from the Israeli border so that "all the civilians in the region of Galilee will be set free of the permanent threat to their lives."<2> Before it approved the commitment of the IDF, the cabinet was told the operation would last three or four days.

Studying the use of military force during Operation Peace for Galilee provides valuable insight into the practice of operational art in modern war. Analyzing the background of the belligerents, this study ascertains the political and strategic goals which guided the Israelis, the PLO and the Syrians in the deployment and use of their military forces. The plans for the operation are enumerated and the actual conduct of the invasion is described. Finally, this study assesses two aspects of classical theory: the relationship between military means and political ends, and the search for centers of gravity. The facts will show these concepts of classical theory are still applicable in modern operations.

Section II

Background of the Belligerents

Understanding the committal of military force for conflict resolution necessitates an understanding of the politics and strategies of the nations committing those forces. During the conduct of Operation Peace for Galilee two conventional forces, one guerrilla force, and one Lebanese militia force--the Christian Phalangists--participated in combat. Additionally, the United States and the Soviet Union influenced the political objectives of the belligerents and therefore affected combat operations. This study will enumerate the strategic concerns of three of the belligerents and the two superpowers--Israel, Syria, PLO, USSR and US--in order to gain an understanding of the military objectives of Israel, Syria and the Palestinians.

ISRAEL

Like most nation-states Israel has as its strategic priority the survival of its culture and way of life. For the state of Israel, surrounded by the unique Middle-Eastern geography and a bevy of hostile neighbors, this strategic goal has translated almost exclusively into military considerations. Writing Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1981, Prime Minister Begin said that he wished to be known to history as the man who established secure borders for the state of Israel for all time.<3> Begin echoes the thoughts of most Jews.

Israeli sovereignty--security within the Israeli borders--is not an abstract idea but is something which rests on the shoulders of a valiant Jewish army. That army provides strategic depth, security for the society, a means for political settlement with their enemies, and the capacity for short, intense, offensive wars. Elaborating on these issues gives insight into the Israeli psyche.

Israel's strategy reflects the nation's lack of strategic depth. Established in 1948, the borders of Israel are so drawn that at one place the country is barely nine miles wide. Considering the range of weapons and artillery in existence since World War II, it is obvious that many of the population centers and military bases are within range of potentially hostile fire. The majority of Israel's military organization serve in the reserves. Surrendering any territory would severely limit the mobilization capacity of the IDF and place the defense of the nation in jeopardy. The IDF is responsible for securing or expanding the borders of Israel.

Any conflict has a devastating effect on the small population of Israel. "We do not worry about victory, we worry about casualties," Begin told Haig months prior to the commencement of the operation in Lebanon.<4> In the first week of Peace for Galilee the IDF lost 170 killed and 700 wounded. On the basis of comparison with the United States this would have been the equivalent of 10,000 dead and 40,000 wounded. While the toll in humanity and suffering of any war is

devastating, the government of Israel had already experienced in four previous wars the social, economic, and political impact of such a slaughter. Since the majority of the army comes from reserve mobilization, the loss of soldiers in the IDF increases emigration, destablizes the political parties in power, and, when the war is over, has a ruinous effect on the peacetime economy.<5> Prior to mobilization the military and political leadership of Israel must insure the nation's strategy balances the preservation of Israeli society with the relatively "safe" commitment of the armed forces.

Because Israel is surrounded by hostile neighbors, the IDF can never totally defeat its combined Arab opponents. The economic riches of the various Arab states makes the Arab a formidable foe. Israel realizes her Arab enemies cannot be totally annihilated, so she has always directed the IDF toward gaining enemy territory which can in turn be traded for political concession.<6>

Finally, Israel knows her survival and security depend on the capability to wage war in a quick and decisive manner. Israel's small population and lack of strategic depth certainly influence this policy, but Israel also believes the superpowers will exert pressure to bring any Mid East conflict to a rapid halt.<7> While arguments may be entertained debating <u>why</u> the Israelis have adopted a fast-war doctrine, the fact remains that the nation of Israel cannot afford to sustain a war footing for extended periods of time. Israel lacks the

resources in men, material and national will to fight long wars with high casualties.<8>

After nearly 40 years as an independent nation Israel is still seeking acceptance in the region and in the world.<9> Israel wishes to avoid international isolation; in order to do so she must first establish herself as a secure nation in a hostile region. In the summer of 1982, Israel's relationship with her historic ally, the United States, was at a low ebb. Israel's internal security, and her borders, were threatened. As in the past, there was a perceived need to use the Army in overcoming the threats to Israeli society.

SYRIA

If Israel was concerned about the security and expansion of its borders in 1982, then the government within Damascus--that oldest continuously inhabited city in the world--was concerned about the shrinking state of Syria as well as its shrinking leadership in the Arab world. The Syrians lost the Golan Heights to the Israelis in 1967 and failed to regain it in 1973; the Syrians did not want to risk further incursions by the Israelis onto their soil. Since 1976, Syrian regulars and militia had been attempting to limit the control of the PLO in Lebanon. Syria views Lebanon as an integral part of the nation of Syria--"one country and one people"--and believes that eventually Lebanon will be reunited with Syria.<10> Syrian forces were in Lebanon to prevent outside influence, be it Israeli or PLO, from annexing parts of the

Lebanese state or gaining a strategic advantage for any attack pointed toward Damascus. In short, Syria's strategic concerns included, but were not limited to, an interest in preventing the PLO leadership from controlling Lebanon, retaining Syrian influence in Lebanon, and defending against Israeli territorial gains in either Lebanon or Syria. Understanding Syria's role in "Peace for Galilee" necessitates a look at these aspects of Syrian history.

In September of 1970 King Hussein of Jordan took drastic action and expelled the PLO forces operating from his country. The world was aware of the problems the PLO had caused Hussein While most Arab nations supported the Palestinian cause, none of the Arab leadership wanted the problems with sheltering the organization on their soil. Before they were dismissed from Jordan the PLO began forming small alternate bases in Lebanon. After "Black September" Yasir Arafat transferred his headquarters into Beirut, much to the chagrin of President Assad of Syria. Fighting between Christians and Palestinian-supported Muslims was frequent in the early seventies and eventually led to the Lebanese Civil War in 1975. In early 1976, the Maronite faction of the government of Lebanon requested Syrian support to overcome the expected victory of the Palestinian-Muslim coalition in the Civil War. Syria intervened and the Christians survived; then Syria changed sides, seized control of the coalition and turned against the Christian establishment. President Assad's

masterful stroke of "divide and rule" within Lebanon had prevented a PLO takeover of that nation but had also returned Lebanon to its previous confessional status quo. Damascus maintained forces in Lebanon after the Civil War, insuring the delicate balance between Christians and Muslims-Palestinians remained. Syria would still support the PLO with arms for use against Israel, but they continued to prevent the PLO from getting too strong.

Damascus had another reason for keeping forces in Lebanon--the Syrian government foresaw an eventual annexation of all or part of Lebanon for the establishment of a greater Syria. In 1926, the French created the modern state of Lebanon; by 1943, Lebanon had gained its independence. The political structure of elected representatives in Lebanon was created along confessional (religious sectarian) lines based on a 1932 census. That census gave the Christians a slight six to five advantage over the Muslims in proportional representation.<11> When the Palestinians began arriving in Lebanon the ratio of Christian to Muslim changed and the corresponding social, economic, political and religious problems within Lebanon were exacerbated.

The Syrians faced a confusing situation in Lebanon. They did not want a strong PLO governing faction in Lebanon for a variety of reasons. At the same time Syria could not support a Christian monopoly of what they considered to be an Arab, therefore Muslim, nation. The Civil War gave Syria the

opportunity for influencing politics in Beirut and setting the preconditions for an eventual reunification with all of Lebanon. In the meantime Syria would ignore the eastern border of Lebanon and treat the Bekaa Valley region as their own.<12>

The people in the Bekaa region were strong supporters of President Assad. Syrian money was used in the area, street signs conformed to Syrian, not Lebanese, regulations, and pictures of Assad hung in most towns.<13> While contributing to the feeling of the populace that this part of Lebanon would someday be a part of greater Syria, control of the Bekaa Valley was also of great operational and tactical concern. Since the Six Day War, Syria was aware that an attack on their capital was within the capabilities of the Israelis. They believed any attack on Damascus could come on one of two avenues: directly through Jordan, which Syria believed highly unlikely for political reasons, or through the Bekaa. By placing a strong military force in the Bekaa--centered on Mount Hermon--the Syrians could influence the Lebanese population as well as defend the only invasion route into their country.

Syria was a paranoid nation in 1982. She had been totally defeated in their last two wars against the Israelis and still feared the possibilities of yet another invasion. While seeing the possibilities for increased participation in Lebanese politics, the Syrians knew they first had to overcome the troublesome influence of the PLO leadership in Lebanon. Prior to the beginning of Peace for Galilee the Syrians were prepared

for a stategic defense against the Israelis and a limited strategic offense against the PLO in Lebanon.

PLO

As the symbolic embodiment of Palestinian nationalism, the Palestine Liberation Organization is an umbrella organization composed of both official and unofficial component groups. The goals and strategic interests of the PLO are very different from those of Israel and Syria. The major concern of this organization in 1982 was "to keep the ball in play." The issue of a Palestinian homeland must be kept open in diplomatic circles, the world community must be constantly reminded of the Palestine issue, and, when possible, Israel must be discredited in the eyes of the world.<14>

In order to "keep the ball in play," the operations of the PLO had changed dramatically. At one time, the PLO used international terrorism against any nation which dealt favorably with the state of Israel. Arafat announced in 1974 that the PLO would downplay the use of international terror. While major factions still were using terrorist tactics, the majority of the organization was turning to other means of discrediting Israel and keeping the question of a Palestinian homeland on the world scene. Arafat had adopted a new strategy of promoting a Palestinian homeland by gaining credence in the international political arena.<15> Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in 1974, the first representative without a country to do so, and the UN responded by granting him observer

status in November of that year. Arafat liked this method of bringing the PLO cause to the world scene; the PLO and its Arab supporters influenced the General Assembly of the UN into passing numerous resolutions supporting their cause and condemning the actions of the Israelis. The crowning achievement was a vote supported and passed in 1975 in which the UN labeled Zionism a "form of racism."

Since 1975, Arafat had garnered one success after another on the international scene. While the PLO had always enjoyed good relationships with Eastern European countries, and had achieved diplomatic status from the Soviet Union, Hungary and East Germany, they now began seeing gains in status with the west as well. The European Economic Community called for direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel in 1980, and Arafat began regular visits to Austria and Greece in 1981.

Palestinian stature was also growing in the US. During the hostage crisis with Iran in 1979 the US used the offices of the PLO in its efforts to secure the release of the American held captive; the PLO then enhanced the security of US embassies in other Arab nations during that time frame.<16> Lobbying by US Senator James Abourezk to grant diplomatic status to the PLO was gaining popular support, and statements at the funeral of Anwar Sadat by ex-presidents Ford and Carter concerning the recognition of the PLO also implied US support. The world was obviously becoming aware of the Palestinian

issue, for by 1982 the PLO was recognized diplomatically by more nations than Israel.<17>

When the Palestinian Liberation Organization first came together, its ultimate objective was the achievement of a Palestinian state and the complete destruction of Israel. Yasir Arafat and the majority of the Palestinian leaders were beginning to see that objective as being impossible to achieve. The new objective became the creation of the conditions for "cutting as good a deal as possible."<18> Combining the successes on the international front with a visible propaganda campaign, the new strategy attempted to whittle away at the support afforded Israel by many of her allies. PLO leadership realized they could no longer totally destroy the Israeli nation so they made efforts to pave the way for eventual coexistence.

The PLO had made tremendous gains on the international scene by 1982. The issue of a Palestinian homeland was known throughout the world and was receiving at least implicit backing from most nations. Yasir Arafat was considered a shrewd spokesman for his cause rather than an international terrorist. The Israelis, through their own actions and the propaganda campaigns of the PLO, were beginning to look like the bad boys of the Middle East. The Palestinians were rapidly achieving many of their strategic objectives.

THE SUPERPOWERS

While they cannot be defined as true belligerents in any Middle East war, the actions and support of the two superpowers prior to and during the conduct of operations cannot be ignored. Always wanting to become a "player" in the area, the Soviets made their presence felt by shipping arms to Syria. When war began, the Soviets surprised Syria and the US by being much more passive than they had even been before. On the other hand, the US was in the throes of difficulty with the Begin government and was attempting some new initiatives which would strengthen the nation of Lebanon. The actions by the Soviet Union and the United States would greatly influence the conduct of the operations.

In a book written after the termination of his presidency, Richard Nixon said that while Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Palestinian issue in the Middle East are important issues, in the long term the real problem in the area is the Soviet Union.<19> Any imbalance of power in the Middle Eastern region threatens the strategic position of the west. The Soviet presence in the Middle East enables them to control the link between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.<20> The USSR had actively sought that presence by being the premier arms dealer to the Arabs in the sixties and seventies. In the eighties, however, that changed.

Syria remained one of the few nations in the area still receiving military aid from the Soviets. The Syrians, in turn,

passed some of those weapons to elements of the PLO. While the Syrians and the PLO wishfully believed arms linkage would constitute eventual support from the USSR in the event of conflict with the Israelis, the Soviets were beginning to feel they were becoming over-extended in a third world area becoming less amenable to Soviet influence.<21> As Peace for Galilee wore on, the Soviets became "quieter and repeated their rather new strategy of appealing to the UN."<22> This would become a major surprise to Syria, the PLO, and the US. This lack of Soviet action would limit, but not eliminate, the pressure the US placed on Israel.

When Ronald Reagan became President in 1980 the Begin government believed a new era in American-Israeli relationship was about to begin. The US policy in the region was clear: Avoid an Israeli-Arab war which would embroil the superpowers and continue the peace process started during the Camp David Accords. But over the next two years Begin would take liberties--such as a zealous protest against the US sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia--which infuriated some of the most strident supporters of the Israeli cause. This began changing the way the Reagan administration dealt with Israel.

The State Department knew of Israeli plans to act against PLO forces in southern Lebanon a year prior to the operation. The New York Times had even published a detailed account of the plan months before Israel attacked.<24> Secretary Haig felt the best way to diffuse the crisis in Lebanon and continue the

peace process in the area was by backing a Lebanese government strong enough to settle that nation's internal struggles and restore the rule of law. In order for that to occur the Lebanese presidential election, scheduled for the fall of 1982, had to take place. Until then the US would call for a withdrawal of Syrian forces in Lebanon, a disarming of Syrian missile sites in the Bekaa, and a strengthening of cease-fire agreements between Israel and the PLO in southern Lebanon by imposing more UN peacekeeping forces. During the months preceeding "Peace for Galilee" the US would attempt to gain their strategic objectives in the Middle East by supporting Lebanon, asking for a withdrawal of Syrian forces, and quelling Israeli war plans. None of these actions came to fruition.

The motives of all the belligerents involved in Peace for Galilee were "powerful and inspiring," and it would become obvious in the months following June of 1982 that war became a "continuation of political intercourse."<25> The strategies of the major actors involved influenced the decision for war, but it is not clear whether the means employed were consistent with the ends desired. Before deciding the operation must be dissected.

Section III

Conduct of the Operations

Preparations for "Pine Tree," the code name for the invasion of Lebanon, began almost 18 months prior to the actual commitment of troops in the operation which became known as "Peace for Galilee." IDF planners had envisioned three variants to "Pine Tree." These plans, and their various branches and potential sequels, were all completed six months prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Force packages were coordinated with the various assigned missions. As in all past IDF operations, brilliant maneuver was seen as the key to victory. No matter which plan was accepted, an intense, fast-paced operation would smite Israeli's enemies. But this time something would go wrong.

The Variants

The three war plans were circulated among various military and political leaders months before the outbreak of hostilities. Each plan sought a rapid advance into Lebanon and a push of the PLO 40 kilometers from Israel's northern border--the maximum range of the Palestinians largest artillery piece. The three plans, however, each measured the 40 kilometers from a different border town. While the announcement of the "40-kilometer" objective by Prime Minister Begin conjured images of pushing PLO beyond artillery distances to give Israel breathing room, in fact the mission eventually

given to the IDF was to smash all PLO infrastructure and operating bases in Lebanon.<26>

The first plan called for a direct attack against the PLO artillery and operating bases in the south. The 40 kilometers were measured from the town of Rosh Hanikra. This plan was actually an expanded version of the Litani River Operation which the Israelis conducted, much to the chagrin of the Carter Administration, in 1978. The push would avoid contact with Syrian forces and would end with the IDF occupying positions just north of the town of Damour.

The second plan, which also avoided war with Syria, began its 40 kilometer push from the town of Metulla (Israel's northernmost town in the Galilee finger). Envisioning a linkup with Christian Phalangist allies outside Beirut, the plan called for the Phalangists to enter the city and wipe out what remained of the PLO infrastructure. This plan foresaw a final deployment of Israeli troops on a line just south of the Lebanese capital where they could possibly support an eventual takeover of the city by the Phalangists, perhaps under the leadership of Major Sa'ad Haddad of the Free Lebanon movement, an ally of Israel.<27>

Plan three, known as the "Big Plan," was the most aggressive. In this plan the IDF would fight the PLO and the Syrians and would advance with limited forces into Beirut. There the Phalangist would bear the brunt of the urban fighting.

The success of each of the three plans depended on the initial advances. The Israelis intended to hit the PLO before they could fully mobilize and then rapidly capture supplies and ammunition known to be stored in various towns along the coast. Based on past experiences the Israeli General Staff felt they must use a mechanized force which would enable the IDF to reach and take the principle terrain objectives quickly. The Israeli Chief of Staff, LTG Rafael Eitan, gave the command of the operation to MG Amir Drori and his IDF Northern Command. The mission statement read:

> In order to prevent artillery fire and terrorists [meaning the PLO] incursion across the border, Northern Command will attack the terrorist and destroy their infrastructure in South Lebanon. Northern Command is prepared to destroy the Syrian Army in Lebanon, should the Syrians attack the IDF.<28>

Upon receiving his mission from Eitan, MG Drori decided to advance along three axis: a western axis, which followed the two lane road (the only road, in fact, between the foothills of the Lebanon Mountains and the sea) from the Israeli border through Tyre and Sidon and on to Beirut if necessary; the central axis, which crossed the ridges of the Lebanon Mountain range over what is called the "central spine" (giving an indication of the terrain difficulties which would be encountered); and the eastern axis, along the western slopes of Mount Hermon and toward the Bekaa. The entire force under Drori's command would total 78,000 soldiers assigned to nine divisions.


WEST (Coastal)
MG Drori
22,000 troops
220 tanks
XX
Mordecai
X
Geva
XX
Yaron
X
Yarom
CENTER
MG Simchoni
18,000 troops
220 tanks
XX
Kanalani
XX
Einan
EAST (BPG)
MG Ben-Gal
38,000 troops
800 tanks
XX
Sakei
XX
Lev
XX
Tamir
XX
Vardi
XX
Peled

The forces in the west remained under the direct command and control of MG Drori. Drori's coastal advance would be led by BG Yitzhak Mordecai's 91st Division, spearheaded by a separate brigade under the command of Colonel Eli Geva. Their mission would be to bypass Tyre, pinning as many PLO in the city as possible, and to move up the coast to Damour. One battalion of Mordecai's force would turn east at Tyre and link up with a force from the center at the town of Jouaiya. Additionally, one division, under the command of BG Amos Yaron, would land north of Sidon in an amphibious assault. The goal of these three maneuvers would be to capture the supply caches and to catch the majority of the PLO in a strong vice south of Sidon.

The action in the center was under the control of Drori's deputy, MG Uri Simchoni. Two divisions, commanded by BG Avigdor Kahalani and BG Menachem Einan, had the mission of supporting the attack in the west. Kahalani was to cross the Litani River and capture the key road junction of Nabitiya, where a castle had served as a PLO stronghold since 1978. Parts of that division would then linkup with the force from Mordecai's division in the east. Einan's force would head straight for Jezzine, and from there along the right flank of the Syrians in the Bekaa, preventing a Syrian linkup with forces from Beirut on the Beirut-Damascus highway.

Consisting of 38,000 troops and 800 tanks, the largest force was in the east and was under the command of MG Avigdor "Yanush" Ben Gal, the IDF legend who had stopped the Syrian

invasion of the Golan Heights in 1973. This corps-sized force, the first in IDF history, was known as the Bekaa Force Group (BFG). Its mission was to prevent the Syrians from shifting forces to influence action along the coastal road. Within the strong BFG was a special maneuver combined force of approximately two mixed antitank brigades under the command of BG Yossi Peled. This force had the mission of preventing Syrian reinforcements from entering the Bekaa should Syria decide to enter the fight.

Each of the three plans and the mission statement suggest the IDF intended to avoid, at least initially, fighting the Syrian Army. Knowing the Syrian relationship with the PLO, the interest Damascus had in the determination of Lebanon sovereignty and Syria's anticipation of eventual Israeli attacks in the Bekaa, Israeli military planners knew that any movement by the IDF against the PLO would force the Syrians into battle. MG Drori took these political factors into consideration when designing his campaign plan. While these planned actions probably pleased Prime Minister Begin, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and the hawks in the Knesset, the military planning did not correspond to the eventual end state addressed when the civilian leadership voted on 5 June.

The Vote for War

American Secretary of State Haig received a message from Prime Minister Begin on 7 May. That message stated that it might be "imperative and inevitable" for Israel to remove the threat against them which was coming from southern Lebanon.<29>


JOUNIE
BEIRUT
ZAHLE
CHAMDOUN
AIRPORT
AJEY
TO DAMASCUS
ZHALTA
BEKAA VALLEY
DAMOUR
BEIT ED DEIN
MOUNT LEBANON
JOUB JANNINE
SIDON
JEZZINE
QARDUN
HOUNE
RACHAYA
MT HERMON
SYRIA
NABATIYE
MARJAYOUN
HASBAIYA
LITANI RIVER
BEAUFORT
TYRE
JOUAIYA
METULLA
QANA
ISRAEL
ROSH HANIKRA

During the period of May 9 through 3 June the IDF counted 28 different PLO attacks against Israel or Israeli interests abroad.<30> While none of these attacks justified massive Israeli retaliation, the assassination attempt on Ambassador Argov on 3 June did. Early on the morning of 4 June the Israeli Cabinet met and approved the retaliatory air strikes, knowing this would certainly provoke more PLO artillery attacks in Galilee. After the air attack on PLO headquarters and training camps in and around Beirut, the PLO shelled some 23 Israeli towns and settlements with artillery and rocket fire.

The Sabbath fell on 5 June. The Knesset knew they would be approving one of the plans for invasion by the end of this holy day. After discussing the military objectives of the attack they gave their approval; however, it wasn't until 1600 hours on 6 June, five hours after the attack began, that the cabinet announced its decision. The early identification of the 40-kilometer line implies that the cabinet chose either plan one or some variant of plan two. The Cabinet's later insistence that they believed the war would last only three or four days suggests they approved one of these two plans.<31> Defense Minister Sharon could not persuade the Cabinet to approve an all-encompassing war against Syria and the PLO. As the designer of the three variants Sharon knew that the forty-kilometer line in the east could not be gained without fighting the Syrians, who occupied positions less than 20 kilometers from Metulla. "Having lost the battle in the cabinet to implement a larger version of the war, Sharon

allowed the government to believe the war would be fought as they had agreed...it would not be difficult to orchestrate it differently once battle was joined."<32> Since Sharon's predetermined end state would not be the one the military would be fighting, the repercussions of the defense minister's deception had devastating effects.

The Operations

Operation "Peace for Galilee" eventually became a three-phased operation. From 6 to 8 June the IDF concentrated on surprising and surrounding the PLO elements located in western and southern Lebanon. Beginning on 8 June, after US envoy Phillip Habib's mission to secure a Syrian withdrawal from the Bekaa region had failed, the IDF turned their attention to conventional air and tank battles with Syrian forces in the east. The third phase, which proved to be the most difficult for the IDF, was the action against a combined Syrian-PLO force in and around the city of Beirut.

At 1100 hours on 6 June the IDF began their advance. Although it was preceded by massive artillery and air preparations, the main attack in the west quickly fell behind schedule. Any advance along the coast of Lebanon is roadbound: from Rosh Hanikra to Sidon off-road maneuver is limited on both sides by thick citrus groves. On the left of the road the groves are planted almost to the sea; on the right, the groves go until they reach the foothills of the Lebanese mountains. The mountains are close to the road at points, making it perfect country for tank ambushes. The PLO thought the IDF

would be reluctant to enter the city of Tyre because of IDF casualties that would inevitably result. The PLO plan called for "strongpointing" the city and harassing the IDF from ambush positions as it approached Tyre, eventually pulling PLO forces into the city where they might exact greater casualties when the IDF entered.<33> PLO harassing fires were very effective and battlefield friction was compounded when the Israeli Air Force mistakenly hit the lead column on the road north. One battalion of Mordecai's force attempted to move off the road into the citrus groves, lost sight of other elements, and was ambushed when it became isolated at a road junction within the city it was supposed to bypass. Combat elements eventually bypassed Tyre, headed toward Sidon, and allowed follow-on elements to fix and liquidate the PLO forces in Tyre through the use of air, artillery and tank bombardment of the city.

The center divisions quickly obtained all of their objectives with the exception of Beaufort Castle. The fighting for this decisive point, from which the PLO could call artillery, mortar and rocket fire against Israeli and Southern Lebanese towns, lasted for six hours, slowed the advance in the center, and cost the IDF six killed and eighteen wounded.

In the east Yanoosh's forces were more familiar and comfortable with maneuvering on the floor of the Bekaa Valley. The forces had passed Mt. Hermon and Ben Gal was already turning the flank of the Syrians. The Syrians were not offering any resistance on the ground nor did they threaten the IAF with the SAM missiles already in position.



(From "The Battle of Beirut, 1982")

On 7 June, while fixing forces continued what they termed "salami" tactics against the PLO in Tyre (slicing off one part of the town, neutralizing it through artillery and tank fire, and then continuing to another part of the town) the rest of Northern Command was successfully reaching their objectives. The amphibious force had landed and stores of PLO weapons and supplies were being uncovered. The forces in the west found difficulty in their attack against Sidon, but again Geva's Brigade bypassed the city and continued to push north. BG Einan in the center found PLO and Syrian forces in the city of Jezzine, his main objective, and elected to bypass and leave Colonel Cohen's 460th Brigade to fix those forces. Sharon was spending a considerable amount of time in the eastern command post of Ben Gal watching the Syrian forces being enveloped on two sides.<34>

The IDF passed the 40 kilometer line in the west on 8 June. Forces were on their way to Damour, but what would become a six-day seige of the Ein Hilwe refugee camp in Sidon had begun. In the center elements of Cohen's Brigade ran into a sister unit from the Vardi Division and a number of soldiers were killed during a battle between friendly forces which lasted nearly two hours.<35> IDF and Syrian units were only yards apart in the east. While the IAF had flown over Syrian SAM sites all day no planes had been fired upon.

After talking with Begin on the 8th, Phillip Habib left for Damascus with a message for Assad to avoid conflict with the IDF and to request that Syrian troops restrain their PLO

allies.<36> Before he could deliver the message on the 9th, the IAF struck at the Syrian missile sites in the Bekaa and destroyed 17 of the 19 batteries protecting Syria. At about the same time BG Einan continued toward Ain Zhalta in the center. The Syrians knew if IDF forces were allowed to take that town, which controlled the Beirut-Damascus highway, they would be at an extreme disadvantage. Einan's force was ambushed by Syrian units some 12 kilometers south of the town; the ambush was so successful that Einan could not continue his advance without reinforcements.<37>

The Israeli's asserted to the world that they had not intended to go into battle with Syria until provoked by ground and air action on the 8th. The maneuver of the BFG and the air actions over Syrian positions indicates otherwise. It remains unclear whether IDF actions against SAM batteries and the Syrian force near Zhalta was a result of a command decision by Drori or on direct orders from Defense Minister Sharon without the approval of Begin. The evidence seems to indicate that Sharon acted alone.<38>

Much has been made of the technological use of RPVs and the Israeli Air Force in the quick defeat of the Syrian air assets and air defense missile sites. The skill in planning and execution needed for this type of action provides many tactical and operational lessons. For this study, however, the importance of rapidly destroying the Syrian Air Force and the SAM sites meant Israeli air superiority in the Bekaa; this translated to a rapid IDF ground force advance to the

designated objectives and the eventual defeat of the Syrian forces in Bekaa region. With Peled controlling the heights of Jabaal Barouk and preventing Syrian reinforcements, Ben Gal's corps easily maneuvered on the valley floor.

The Israelis quickly gained tactical advantages throughout the area. However, as the IDF moved through the Bekaa they were surprised at what appeared to be an improved Syrian combat capability. The Syrians ambushed many IDF vehicles with their French HOT missiles mounted on Gazelle helicopters, and the orderly retreat into Syria was dramatically different from the rout the Syrians experienced in 1973. This fight in the east gained the Syrians renewed respect from the IDF.<39> In the center Zhalta had fallen and the IDF was on the verge of controlling the Beirut-Damascus highway. In the west Geva's force bypassed Damour and was meeting resistance from a combined PLO-Syrian force in southern Beirut. On 10 June President Reagan sent Prime Minister Begin a harsh note demanding a cease fire. Begin replied he could not accept until Assad removed PLO and Syrian forces from Lebanon.

After more US diplomatic pressure, the cease fire between Syria and Israel finally went into effect on 11 June. Another cease fire included the PLO on the following day. During the period 12-22 June violations continually erupted, but, more importantly, the IDF was able to surround Beirut and linkup with their Phalangist allies. Washington was being pressed by various Arab states (and the Soviet Union through the UN) to muzzle the Israelis. Begin visited Washington during this

period and was treated coldly by Reagan and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.<40>

On 22 June the Israelis launched a major attack eastward to clear the Beirut-Damascus highway, pushing the Syrian forces back to Chtaura and preventing them from breaking the siege which had settled around Beirut. During three days of heavy fighting with the Syrians in the east the IDF launched air and artillery attacks into Beirut. Using propaganda to his advantage, Arafat declared he would make the city into a "modern-day Stalingrad."<41> The total number of Israeli casualties in the first three weeks of the operations had reached 260 killed, 1270 wounded.

The siege of Beirut began on 25 June and would last through the fall. During all of July the IDF tried numerous tactics to force the PLO to surrender or evacuate: the city was bombed almost daily (after the heavy bombing of 15 July, the US suspended the delivery of cluster bombs to Jerusalem), artillery fire was directed into the outskirts of the city, and the water and power was turned off for several days. Meanwhile, Phillip Habib was performing yeoman's work in the pursuit of peace. One cease fire after another was declared, then broken. The Phalangists, who had played such a major role in Sharon's planning assumptions, refused to enter the city.

In the city were 14,000 Arab combatants: 10,000 PLO fighters and leaders who had escaped from the south, a Syrian-supported PLA Brigade of about 2,000 men, and a 2300-man Syrian Brigade. These troops were determined to fight and were

quite willing to use the 350,000 civilians in the city as their shield.<42> The IDF was feeling the strain. Support from the homefront for a war which was not supposed to go this far, last this long, or kill innocent civilians was rapidly fading.

Sharon made one last attempt at getting the PLO out of Beirut on 11 and 12 August. In the most intensive air effort of the war the IAF attacked PLO camps and high-rise buildings in town without much result. After this attack Reagan sent Begin the most sharply worded message of the war. Begin accepted Reagan's demands and the Israeli cabinet rescinded the authority of Sharon to conduct the war.<43> The IDF had stalled. The question of "what next" would remain unanswered.

The Final Withdrawal

For all practical purposes the military action of the IDF against the PLO and Syrians in Lebanon ended on 12 August. Further events--the arrival of French and American peace-keeping forces, the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, the use of Phalangists to clear the PLO camps and the related massacres at Sabra and Shatila, the demonstrations against the war in Tel Aviv, the investigation and dismissal of Ariel Sharon, the resignation of officers such as Colonel Eli Geva, MG Amram Mitzna, LTG Avraham Burg and others, and the Pope s reception of Yasir Arafat--are all postscripts to the events of the war. But they are important postscripts, for they indicate the true "end state" achieved by Operation "Peace for Galilee."

"Peace for Galilee" was the first time the IDF attempted a large scale maneuver against a guerrilla force. It was also

the first time the IDF emphasised gaining territory rather than defeating an enemy force. What initially appeared to be another daring, smashing Israeli maneuver ground to a halt outside the city limits of Beirut. What went wrong? The answer may be found by investigating the corresponding centers of gravity and the announced end state of the operation.

Section IV

The Insights

Only on occasion have conventional and unconventional forces clashed in a setting as unique as the one surrounding "Peace for Galilee." While the conflict between Israel, the PLO and Syria provides many excellent opportunities for studying the various aspects of the operational art, this analysis will focus on only two theoretical concepts: the need for identifying the center of gravity within the opposing forces and the requirement of matching military means to political ends.

CENTERS OF GRAVITY

In his editorial commentaries concerning Clausewitz s On War, Peter Paret suggests that we assess theory in light of its cognitive, utilitarian and pedagogic roles. Analyzing the theoretical concept of "Center of Gravity" as it applies in Operation "Peace for Galilee" gives insight into the actions of the opposing forces and the operational performance of the Israelis. Considering the diverse and multiple means afforded commanders on the modern battlefield, the process of identifying the "hub of power" of the opposing force is usually more important than actually attacking it. Through the identification of the center of gravity, commanders are able to determine decisive points, protect their own cohesion and unity, develop operational plans, and anticipate branches and sequels. In four previous wars the operational commanders of

the IDF had always correctly identified and indirectly attacked what could be called their enemy's center of gravity. "Peace for Galilee," however, presented the IDF with a unique and heretofore undiscovered type of warfare. While adequately identifying and attacking the Syrian center of gravity, the IDF faced new challenges and missed the target in their encounter with the PLO guerrilla force.

Though they did not use the term "center of gravity" when describing their actions in earlier wars, the IDF had a penchant for properly using operational maneuver to attack their enemy's source of power.<44> In preparing for "Peace for Galilee," Sharon and his generals debated one question: "How could the conventional Syrian army influence operations in Lebanon?" While Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) might hinder IDF combined arms operations in the Bekaa, these SAMs would certainly not bring the IDF maneuever to a halt. When the air defense network was destroyed, the Israelis would still need to fight the Syrian 1st Tank Division; when this unit was destroyed, the IDF would face reinforcements from Damascus. Proper sequencing of battles demanded the following effects: 1) eliminate the 19 SAM batteries; 2) destroy or surround the 1st Tank Division--that division which possessed 300 T-72 tanks and 150 Soviet artillery pieces; 3) interdict the route from Damascus, preventing the Syrian 3d Tank Division from reinforcing the 1st Tank, and 4) cut the Beirut-Damascus road, preventing even minimal reinforcement from the few Syrian troops in Beirut and the possible escape of PLO fighters to

Syria. The Syrian hub of power in the region was the 1st Armored Division. The Bekaa Force Group properly sequenced battles and executed the indirect approach in eliminating the conventional Syrian army. The IDF was familiar with this type of action. Against the PLO, however, the results would be quite different.

Clausewitz argues that in all armies the elements of cohesion, physical force, will and unity combine to form a singular entity which must be attacked and defeated to gain victory. Many theoreticians and historians postulate that this force manifests such physical power that it is the key to victory. In its attack on the PLO fighters and bases in Lebanon, Israel mistakenly assumed that a military component of the PLO was the source of its power and strength. The PLO was, and is, primarily a political organization which uses terror as one of its elements of power. It is not an army. By its very nature a guerrilla force cannot combine those elements described by Clausewitz into one physically powerful entity that may be classified as a "center of gravity."

Defense Minister Sharon and Chief of Staff Eitan had as their primary objective the destruction of the military capacity and political effectiveness of the PLO.<45> Since guerrilla forces usually do not have a military center of gravity, any attack using conventional military means is doomed to failure. Three former Israeli Chiefs of Staff--Rabin, Gur, and Bar Lev--had all previously testified before the Knesset that the Palestinian problem could not be solved by

conventional military means.<46> The Chief of Military Intelligence during the operation, MG Schlomo Gazit, had argued that the PLO was a political phenomenom which could be controlled but not destroyed.

All of this advice was ignored by Begin, Sharon and Eitan. They did not realize that guerrilla organizations compress the tactical, operational and strategic aspects of war and politics into an amorphous body. In a guerrilla war, operational art expands and encompasses those aspects of political intercourse usually reserved for the strategic sphere. The situation demanded political, economic, social, military, police and media cooperation. The PLO could "switch" their "hub of power" between any of these elements. Since Israel could not counter with the proper means, their failure was assured. Warned that this was the situation, Sharon and Eitan still committed a tank-heavy force with insufficient infantry support into mountainous and urban areas for which they had not been trained. The result was not only operational failure but tactical slaughter.

POLITICAL ENDS

Strategically, the political outcome of "Peace for Galilee" for the state of Israel was a complete failure. The government leaders of Israel deployed the much-touted Israeli Defense Force against an uncoordinated array of PLO fighters and exhausted itself in the effort. Why did this happen? The disaster was due to an ineffectual linkage between the political ends and the military means. The stated political

objectives of the war were very different from the actions directed by Defense Minister Sharon. Unfortunately, forces were allocated and maneuver was designed to execute what the cabinet believed to be the military plan. This disconnect between announced political ends and designated military means was to be the downfall of the Israeli strategy.

The stated political goal of the Israeli cabinet--establish a cordon sanitaire so that PLO artillery fire could not reach the settlements in Galilee--was on the verge of being achieved when Israeli forces reached the outskirts of Damour. So why did Begin and Sharon give orders for the IDF to continue north toward Beirut and east against Syrian forces? Perhaps a strategic "hidden agenda" was in the minds of some of the politicians.

Begin, Sharon, Foreign Minister Shamir and many of the hawks in the Knesset all shared one goal for achieving Israeli security: Retain the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli control.<47> The first phase of the Camp David Accords--return of the Sinai--had been accomplished in April of 1982. Begin did not want the other aspect of the plan--autonomy for the 1.3 million Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza--to be realized under the framework of Camp David. A successful attack into Lebanon would gain territory which Israel could trade for political concessions and which might force the Palestinians on the West Bank into accepting Begin's narrow definition of autonomy.<48> If the attack went well the army might drive the PLO out of Lebanon entirely, establishing a

"new order" in Lebanon and encouraging Palestinians to return to the East Bank. A plan reviewing these actions was outlined by Sharon in Washington in March of 1982.<49> If military action went very well the PLO would be totally destroyed. It seems this was the political objective sought by Defense Minister Sharon. The elimination of the PLO by the IDF would delete the growing diplomatic strength of the Palestinians, assist Israel in establishing the "new order" with Major Haddad in Lebanon (this, combined with the diplomatic effort resulting from Camp David, would give Israel peaceful neighbors to their north and south), and eliminate the need for further autonomy talks concerning the Gaza or West Bank. If, as Clausewitz says, "the political object is the goal," then "Peace for Galilee" was flawed. The announced political object--establishing a 40-Kilometer buffer--was different from Sharon's military objective.

If this was Sharon's agenda, and it seems it was, there was no attempt by the Defense Minister to synchronize military means with political ends. Faced with the mission of initially blocking and eventually defeating a conventional Syrian army, a large, well-trained Israeli combined arms force was allocated to eastern Lebanon. Fighting the type of battles for which the IDF was famous, Ben Gal was successful in encircling, pre-empting, and eventually defeating the Syrian army. The BFG planned the deception effort, the air strikes and the maneuver which focused the corps against the Syrian center of gravity.

The effort against the PLO on the other two avenues was not as well coordinated.

"The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking."<50> In western and central Lebanon the IDF faced a guerrilla force which had the advantage of terrain and which was embedded in the social fabric of a nation. The Palestinian fighters were part of an organization which relied on an active propaganda campaign publicizing their cause around the world. Against this force the Israelis attempted to use sophisticated hammer and anvil tactics, employing combined-arm forces, amphibious assaults, air raids and artillery bombardments.

Israeli commanders had never participated in guerrilla actions and had not considered the challenges this type of war would present. The IDF was not prepared for battles which lacked maneuver or which were hampered by civilians who mixed with combatants. Soldiers were not trained for the type of engagements which they would face and commanders had not considered the implications of mixing politics, diplomacy and military action to gain a victory. Adding to the defeat, the media recorded every event for the world.

The ultimate objective in a guerrilla war is control of the people.<51> Fighting an interstate war without the support of a "nation" they could depend upon, PLO guerrillas were actually fighting for the "control" of three groups of "people": the coherence of their own organization (which would

only be achieved by victories over the Israeli enemy); the support of the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese "population" from which they gained support; and the empathy, through international media and propaganda, of the people around the world. Defeating the PLO in this environment would necessitate separating the support of these three "populations" from the guerrilla's actions.<52> To achieve complete submission or extermination of the PLO the IDF needed to scale down their military operations and address the social, economic, diplomatic and media propaganda aspects of such a large scale operation. In and of itself, military force is incapable of dealing with most guerrilla campaigns. The IDF had never fought a war against a guerrilla enemy; Israel would learn the lessons of unconventional war on the battlefield.

Separating a population's support for guerrilla movement requires monumental intelligence assets and information processing network. Israel had the capability of isolating the entire PLO infrastructure within Lebanon by using the Mosad (the Israeli equivalent of the CIA) and the Shin Bet (the FBI equivalent). Prior to conducting the conventional operations, counterterrorism forces and secret police from these two organizations might have isolated the PLO cells within forward operating bases in Lebanon. These security agencies might have been used to eradicate the leadership of the PLO prior to the military operation against the PLO fighters. While the Shin Bet and Mosad had been operating in Lebanon since 1975, they were not used as either intelligence gathering sources or for a

pre-invasion role in conjunction with the IDF during Peace for Galilee.<53> In counter-guerrilla campaigns and most "low intensity" actions, the operational art sometimes require the use of strategic assets. The Israeli commanders had not considered the usefulness of the Mosad and the Shin Bet to their operation so they suffered the consequences.

Clausewitz emphatically states that, when used, military means must always be used to achieve a political strategy. In "Peace for Galilee", Ariel Sharon developed a military strategy that he believed could deliver political results. Sharon did not match his means with the ends he hoped to achieve and the results were disasterous. The PLO was displaced, weakened and left without much of its logistical support for a period of time, but it was hardly destroyed. The situation in Lebanon still threatens Israel's security. Jerusalem's relations with Washington remains strained over the Palestinian issue. The peace with Egypt that resulted from the Camp David Accords was placed in jeopardy as President Mubarek withdrew his ambassador from Jerusalem as "Peace for Galilee" began. The Soviets have resupplied the Syrians and have even supplemented new SAM-5 sites with 8000 Soviet personnel; the dependence of Damascus on Moscow has increased dramatically. Instead of using imaginative military means with political reinforcements to reach a predetermined political objective against an unconventional enemy, Sharon attempted to coordinate anticipated conventional military victories into a beneficial

political outcome. The result was "a senseless thing without an object." Clausewitz would have predicted it.

CONCLUSIONS

Operation "Peace for Galilee" is an excellent example of the dynamics of modern combat. Some researchers have shown the significance of this operation to current aspects of military thinking, technology and tactics.<54> While important, these issues shrink in comparison to the insights gained as a result of interpretation of classical theory.

During the summer and fall of 1982 the Israeli government used military force in an operation they believed would achieve certain immediate political goals. During the campaign the IDF experienced both victory and defeat. In conventional battles which corresponded to the way they trained, thought, and prepared, the IDF integrated tactics into an operations which defeated a tank-heavy Syrian army. Interpretation of theory in this instance was correct; military means were properly coordinated into an effective Israeli operation against an enemy from Syria.

Unfortunately, in a counter-guerrilla operation for which they had no prior intelligence, experience, pre-combat training or coordination with political, economic and diplomatic resources, the IDF suffered heavy casualties in tactical stalemates and lost much of its well-earned reputation. Theory was not applied correctly; the means used were not equal to the expected operational return.

In this campaign against two distinctly different enemies, the total summation of one operational victory and one operational defeat equalled strategic defeat, for the war cost Israel financially, socially, and morally. The Israeli Defense Force easily maneuvered through southern Lebanon, seizing one terrain objective after another. The possession of terrain did not matter, for the attainment of military objectives was not tied to unified political strategy. Linkage--the essence of operational art--was lacking. As Clausewitz suggests, ineffectual linkage between military means and political ends will spell catastrophe for the state. In this disaster there must be lessons. Could Israel have used theory to avoid defeat?

The Israelis have always learned from their previous wars, and have usually adopted new methods and doctrine based on the lessons of combat. In some instances these lessons have led to catastrophe. The IDF gleened combat experience and the need for a fast, tank maneuver doctrine from their actions in the 1967 Six Day War. Israel was prepared to re-fight the '67 War in 1973 and would have suffered defeat had it not been for rapid doctrinal changes and excellent leadership during the course of the Yom Kippur War. In 1976, Israel successfully dealt with terrorists by storming a jet-liner taken hostage and held at the Entebbe Airport in Uganda. During Operation "Peace for Galilee" the IDF prepared to fight a conventional army as they did in 1973 and a terrorist organization as they did in 1976. As has been shown, this operation brought disaster. A

nation which had always adapted to changing situations failed to see a change in the threat which they now faced. The Israeli operational artist did not realize they were facing guerrillas who would not be intimidated by brilliant conventional maneuvers.

The most dangerous threat facing Israel is from the conventional armies of her Arab neighbors. While being the most dangerous, it is also the least likely. The most likely threat to the nation of Israel is that posed everyday by the continued actions of terrorists and guerrillas from the PLO. With limited reserves, equipment and armed manpower, can Israel afford to prepare for a conventional war against armored, combined-arms equipped enemies and still counter the threat posed by an unconventional force? The better question might be: Can Israel afford not to?

The IDF has shown itself adept at fighting conventional operations. Unconventional campaigns, however, necessitate closer coordination and more balanced action between the military, diplomatic and political arenas. Unconventional warfare requires adaptation by the operational and strategic commander to a new form of conflict, with expanded "centers of gravity" and compressed "linkages." Israeli political and military leaders did not adapt, for they did not see this coordinated and balanced action as critical to Israel's security. Israel did not prepare for the eventualities of unconventional warfare. The soldiers of the IDF and the nation of Israel paid dearly for this lack of adaptation. Our

mission, and indeed the major lesson from "Peace for Galilee," is that we must prepare for similar eventualities. Only by doing so do we truly learn from theory and history.

ENDNOTES

1. Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), p. 336.

2. Ibid., p. 337.

3. Ibid., p. 336.

4. Ibid., p. 341.

5. Richard Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984), p. 15.

6. Ibid.

7. Supporters of the Israeli Defense Force contend Israel is capable of defeating a combined Arab force; knowing the superpowers will eventually intervene dictates the IDF achieve their objectives quickly before being stopped by the US. Rational thought, however, indicates Israel has too much to lose if they try to wage war over long periods of time.

8. M. Thomas Davis, 40 Kilometers into Lebanon (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1987), p. 46.

9. Ibid., p. 44.

10. Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul Martell, Flawed Victory: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon (Fairfax: Hero Books, 1986), p. 33.

11. James C. Judkins, "The Expanding Role of the Shi'a in Lebanon," MMAS Thesis, USACGSC, 1983, p. 22.

12. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., p. 64.

13. Ibid.

14. Davis, loc. cit.

15. Ibid., p. 47.

16. Talcott Selye, "Can the PLO Be Brought to the Negotiating Table?" Arab-American Affairs, 1, (1982), pp. 75-80.

17. Sunah K. Farsoun, "The Palestinians, the PLO and US Foreign Policy," Arab-American Affairs, 1, (1982), pp. 81-94.

18. Davis, op. cit., p. 46.

19. Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p. 94. Nixon outlines the dangers of increased Soviet presence in the region from 1974 until the publication of the book. Of course, some of the strategic aims of the Soviet Union had changed slightly by 1982.

20. Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars (New York: Vintage Books, 1984), p. 215.

21. James Budeit, "The Long-Term Implications of the Hostilities in Lebanon for the US-Soviet Relationships," Dissertation, National Defense University, April 1983, p. 4.

22. Ibid., p. 7.

23. Larry Fabian, "The Middle East: War Dangers and Receding Peace Prospects," Foreign Affairs, 63, no. 3, p. 632.

24. Haig, op. cit., p. 333.

25. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 87.

26. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., p. 91.

27. Davis, loc. cit. The "legend" of Major Haddad is contradicted in many works, and exactly what his goals were as a "Lebanese Freedom Fighter" are in need of further research and publication. Some works (Davis, Odeh s Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict) paint Haddad as an Israeli pawn: others (Flawed Victory, pp. 52-56) describe him as a man truly interested in the self-determination of his homeland, disdaining Arab or Israeli influence. Dying in 1984 of cancer, Major Haddad's dream of a free Lebanon has yet to come to fruition.

28. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., p. 92.

29. Haig, op. cit., p. 330.

30. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., p. 94.

31. Gabriel, op. cit., p. 62. Gabriel continues by saying that the 40 kilometer announcement may have been a deception effort to place the Syrians off guard and delay repercussions from the US. Given the heated debate in the Knesset, this does not seem to be a feasible option except in the minds of Sharon, Begin and the cabinet hawks.

32. Ibid.

33. R. D. McLaurin, "The Battle of Tyre," Internal Report for the U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen, Maryland, 1986. p. 16.

34. Davis, op. cit., p. 87.

35. Gabriel, op. cit., p. 94. For obvious reasons, the number of soldiers killed in this event between a battalion from the tank commander's school (NCO's) and the armor officer's school (2LT-equivalent) remains classified.

36. Davis, op. cit., p. 90.

37. Gabriel, op. cit., p. 94.

38. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., p. 114.

39. Gabriel, op. cit., p. 102.

40. Davis, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

41. Ibid.

42. Dupuy and Martell, op. cit., 148.

43. Davis, op. cit., p. 100.

44. Lawrence Izzo, "The Center of Gravity is Not an Achille's Heel," Military Review, Number 1, January 1988, p. 76.

45. Dupuy, op. cit., p 151.

46. Davis, op. cit., p 113.

47. Ibid, p. 108.

48. Ibid., p. 109.

49. Haig, op. cit., p. 332. The maneuvering by Sharon to maintain Israeli control over the West Bank is a fascinating study. Haig paints a vivid picture of Sharon consistently pressing the boundaries of the Camp David Accords, attempting to gain US blessing for continued Israeli settlements in the two fertile regions of the Gaza and the West Bank. Additionally, there are accounts in Davis's work (op. cit., pp. 32-33) which suggests Sharon performed these same acrobatics within the Knesset.

50. Clausewitz, op. cit., p. 88.

51. Patrick O'Sullivan and Jesse Miller, The Geography of Warfare, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1983), p. 115.

52. Ibid.

53. Gabriel, op. cit., p 117.

54. Articles by McLaurin and Jureidim ("The Battle of Beirut, 1982"), McLaurin ("The Battle of Tyre"), Clark et al ("The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon: Implications for Modern Combat") and Budeit ("The Long-Term Implications of the Hostilities in Lebanon for US-Soviet Relations") give indications of the significance of Peace for Galilee to modern tactics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Davis, M. Thomas. 40 Km into Lebanon. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987.

Dupuy, Trevor N. and Paul Martell. Flawed Victory: The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon. Fairfax, Virginia: Hero Books, 1986.

Gabriel, Richard A. Operation Peace for Galilee. New York: Hill and Wang, 1984.

Haig, Alexander M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984.

Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. New York: Vintage Books, 1984.

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982.

Nixon, Richard M. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978.

Nixon, Richard M. The Real War. New York: Warner Books, Incorporated, 1980.

Odeh, B.J. Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict. London: Zed Books, Incorporated, 1985.

O'Sullivan, Patrick and Miller, Jesse W. The Geography of Warfare. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.

Paret, Peter. Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Sahliyeh, Emile F. The PLO After the Lebanon War. London: Westview Press, 1986.

Timerman, Jacobo. The Longest War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982.

OTHER SOURCES:

Budeit, James A. "The Long-Term implications of the Hostilities in Lebanon for the U.S.-Soviet Relationship." A paper submitted in fulfillment of the research requirement, National War College, The National Defense University, April, 1983.

Clarke, Gordon M., George Wilkins, Donald E. Christy, Lance P. Woodburn, Richard Moore, Glenn A. Profitt, Thomas Gibbs, Larry Henry, Travis E. Harrell, and Thomas J. Lennon. "The 1982 Israeli War in Lebanon: Implications for Modern Conventional Warfare." A paper submitted in fulfillment of the research requirement, National War College, The National Defense University, April 1983.

Fabian, Larry L. "The Middle East: War Dangers and Receding Peace Prospects." Foreign Affairs. Volume 62, Number 3. pp. 632-658.

Fastabend, David. "Theory of Conflict and Operational Art." Unpublished Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

Farsoun, Sanuh K. "The Palestinians, the PLO and US Foreign Policy." Arab-American Affairs. Summer, 1982, Number 1. pp. 81-94.

Griswold, Myron. "Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1986.

Hudson, Michael C. "The Palestinians After Lebanon." Current History. January, 1985. pp. 16-20.

Izzo, Lawrence L. "The Center of Gravity is Not an Achille's Heel." Military Review. January 1988, Number 1. pp. 72-78.

Judkins, James C. "The Expanding Role of the Shi'a in Lebanon." Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, 1983.

Mallison, Sally V. and W. Thomas Mallison. "Israel in Lebanon: Aggression or Self-Defense?" American-Arab Affairs. Summer, 1983, Number 5. pp. 39-50.

McLaurin, R.D. and Paul A. Jureidini. "The Battle of Beirut, 1982." U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. DTIC Report # AD-B102395. January, 1986.

McLaurin, R.D. "The Battle of Tyre." U.S. Army Human Engineering Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. DTIC Report # AD-A185243.

Mixon, Robert W. "A Dramatic Challenge to Operational Theory: The Sinai Campaign, October 1973." School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, 10 May 1987.

Press Profiles: June/July 1982. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Part 1. New York: Claremont Research and Publication, August, 1984.

Press Profile: August 1982-May 1983. The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon: Part II. New York: Claremont Research and Publications, March, 1983.

Selye, Talcott. "Can the PLO Be Brought to the Negotiating Table?" Arab-American Affairs. Summer, 1982, Number 1. pp 75-80.

Schneider, James J. "Theoretical Paper Number 3: The Theory of Operational Art." School of Advanced Military Studies, Comprehensive Exam Special. 1 March 1988.

US Army. FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 5 May 1986.

END

DATE

FILMED

8-88

DTIC