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
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
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
# Cuba a country study

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




# Cuba

## a country study

Foreign Area Studies  
The American University  
Edited by  
James D. Rudolph  
Research completed  
March 1985



On the cover: Representation of portion of Spanish colonial

Morro Castle, Havana

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## Foreword

This volume is one of a continuing series of books prepared by Foreign Area Studies, The American University, under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program. The last page of this book provides a listing of other published studies. Each book in the series deals with a particular foreign country, describing and analyzing its economic, national security, political, and social systems and institutions and examining the interrelationships of those systems and institutions and the ways that they are shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic insight and understanding of the society under observation, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal of it. The study focuses on historical antecedents and on the cultural, political, and socioeconomic characteristics that contribute to cohesion and cleavage within the society. Particular attention is given to the origins and traditions of the people who make up the society, their dominant beliefs and values, their community of interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their involvement with the national institutions, and their attitudes toward each other and toward the social system and political order within which they live.

The contents of the book represent the views, opinions, and findings of Foreign Area Studies and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Such corrections, additions, and suggestions for factual or other changes that readers may have will be welcomed for use in future new editions.

Director, Foreign Area Studies  
The American University  
Washington, D.C. 20016

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## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
<b>Foreword</b> .....	iii
<b>Acknowledgments</b> .....	v
<b>Preface</b> .....	xi
<b>Country Profile</b> .....	xiii
<b>Introduction</b> .....	xix
<b>Chapter 1. Historical Setting</b> .....	1

*Elizabeth de Lima-Dantas*

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY—Pre-Columbian Cuba—Discovery and Occupation—THE COLONIAL PERIOD—Encomienda and Repartimiento—Colonial Administration—Economic Structures—Colonial Society—THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE—The Age of Reforms—The Dawn of Independence—The Ten Years' War, La Guerra Chiquita, and the Abolition of Slavery—United States Economic Presence—The War of Independence—CUBA BETWEEN EMPIRES—The Spanish-Cuban-American War—United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment—THE REPUBLIC—Fragile Independence and Fragile Republic—The Machado Dictatorship—The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath—PRE-REVOLUTIONARY CUBA—The Failure of Democracy—Batista's Dictatorship—Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista—REVOLUTIONARY CUBA—The End of Pre-revolutionary Institutions, 1959-60—Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62—Radicalization of the System, 1963-66—Sino-Guevarism, 1966-70—Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970-76—Cuba in the Late 1970s

<b>Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment</b> .....	63
---	----

*Jorge P. Osterling*

PHYSICAL SETTING—Topography and Drainage—Climate—POPULATION—THE NEW REVOLUTIONARY MAN—Cuban Society Prior to the Revolution—Hombre Nuevo—EDUCATION—Structure of the School System—Study and Productive Work—THE ROLE OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF SOCIALIZATION—Organization of Neighborhoods—Organization of Women—Organization of Small Farmers—Organizations of Youth and Students—HEALTH AND WELFARE—RELIGION—Crisis in Church-State Relations—Gestures Toward a Rapprochement—SOCIAL STRATIFICA-

TION—Income Distribution—Moral and Material Incentives—  
Mechanisms for Social Mobility

**Chapter 3. The Economy ..... 109**

*Robert S. Noth*

GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY—ROLE  
OF THE GOVERNMENT—LABOR—INDUSTRY—Mining—  
Manufacturing—AGRICULTURE—Crops—Livestock—  
Fishing—FISCAL AND MONETARY SYSTEM—FOREIGN  
ECONOMIC RELATIONS—Trade—Energy—Foreign Assist-  
ance—External Debt

**Chapter 4. Government and Politics ..... 157**

*Craig H. Robinson*

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND—THE STATE STRUC-  
TURE—National Assembly of People's Power—Council of  
State—Council of Ministers—Judicial System—Local Govern-  
ment—Elections—THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA—  
History—Organization—Membership—Role in Government—  
MASS ORGANIZATIONS—Committees for the Defense of the  
Revolution—Federation of Cuban Women—Confederation of  
Cuban Workers—National Association of Small Farmers—  
MASS MEDIA—THE POLITICS OF A CONSULTIVE OLI-  
GARCHY—National-level Politics—Cuba and the Soviet  
Union—FOREIGN RELATIONS—History and General Princ-  
ples—Proletarian Internationalism—Foreign Policy Decision-  
making—Relations with the United States

**Chapter 5. National Security..... 225**

*Phyllis Greene Walker*

BACKGROUND AND TRADITIONS OF THE REVOLUTION-  
ARY ARMED FORCES—The Colonial Era—The Ten Years'  
War—The War of Independence, 1895-98—Cuba and the  
United States, 1902-33—Development of the Cuban Military  
under Batista—The Origins of the Revolutionary Armed  
Forces—CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND TREATY  
OBLIGATIONS—THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES  
AND THE GOVERNMENT—THE MINISTRY OF THE REV-  
OLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES—The Revolutionary Army—  
The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force—The  
Revolutionary Navy—Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary  
Armed Forces—Conscription and Military Manpower Re-  
sources—Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces—The Mo-  
bilized Population—Professional Military Training—Rank, In-  
signia, and Uniforms—The Cuban Military Abroad—THE MIN-  
ISTRY OF INTERIOR—CRIME AND PUNISHMENT—Crime  
in Cuba—The Penal Code—Sentencing and Appeals—Political  
Prisoners

<b>Appendix. Tables .....</b>	<b>293</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>Glossary .....</b>	<b>353</b>
<b>Index .....</b>	<b>355</b>
<b>List of Figures</b>	
1 Administrative Divisions, 1985..... Follows	xviii
2 Terrain and Drainage..... Follows	66
3 Distribution of Age-Groups by Sex, 1985 .....	71
4 Transportation System .....	Follows
5 Share of Total Trade by Major Area, Selected Years, 1957-83 .....	118
6 Central Administration, 1985 .....	140
7 Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1985 .....	167
8 Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba Within the Revolutionary Armed Forces.....	Follows
9 Organization of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1984 .....	179
10 Rank Insignia of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Officer Corps and United States Equivalents, 1985 .....	249
	251
	276

## Preface


The reversal of processes of liberalization within the Cuban regime and of relaxation of long-standing tensions between Cuba and the United States became apparent in the mid-1980s. This necessitated a replacement for the 1976 *Area Handbook for Cuba*, which was reprinted in 1985 as *Cuba: A Country Study*. Like its predecessor, the current edition of *Cuba: A Country Study* is an attempt to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant social, political, economic, and national security aspects of contemporary Cuban society. Sources of information included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and domestic newspapers, numerous periodicals and newsletters, and interviews with individuals who have special competence in Cuban and Latin American affairs. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief comments on some of the more valuable sources appear at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in the metric system, and a conversion table is provided to assist those readers who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1, Appendix). A Glossary follows the Bibliography.

Although there are many variations, Spanish surnames most often consist of two parts: a patrilineal name followed by a matrilineal name. In the instance of Fidel Castro Ruz, Castro is his father's name and Ruz is his mother's maiden name. In nonformal use Cubans very often drop the matrilineal name. Thus, after the first mention the president is referred to simply as Castro. (His brother is referred to as Raúl Castro on second mention in order to avoid confusion.) The patrilineal name is listed in the Index and the Bibliography for filing purposes.

Some literature on Cuba refers to the Cuban Revolution as the guerrilla struggle that culminated in the fall of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar during the last days of 1958 and the first days of 1959. In this book the Cuban Revolution refers to a historical process that began on January 1, 1959, and continues into the present. This definition, as well as the practice of capitalizing "Revolution" in this context, conforms with official Cuban government practice and with much scholarly literature.



## Country Profile



### Country



**Formal Name:** Cuba (República de Cuba).

**Short Form:** Cuba.

**Term for Citizens:** Cubans.

**Capital:** Havana (called La Habana in Cuba).

**Flag:** Vertical bands of blue and white; red triangle with white star on staff side.

## **Geography**

**Size:** Formation of some 3,715 islands, islets, and keys comprising combined area of 110,860 square kilometers.

**Topography:** Least mountainous of Greater Antilles. Three mountainous zones isolated and separated by extensive plains and flatlands that cover almost two-thirds of main island surface.

**Climate:** Annual mean temperature 25.5°C; little variation between January, coldest month, and August, warmest month. Different kinds of storms, especially hurricanes, from June to November.

## **Society**

**Population:** Mid-1985 estimated population 10.1 million. Annual growth rate 1.1 percent.

**Education and Literacy:** Education free at all levels. In 1985 official literacy rate 98 percent.

**Health and Welfare:** In 1985 Cuba one of Western Hemisphere nations best served by health care and general welfare services and facilities. Health system free. In 1984 life expectancy 74. Infant mortality 16 deaths per 1,000 live births. Leading causes of death accidents, cardiovascular diseases, cancer, and diabetes.

**Language:** Spanish, official language, spoken by all. No local dialects.

**Ethnic Groups:** White society with large, fully integrated black community. Mixture of Hispanic (white), African (black), and mulatto (mixed race). Indigenous population decimated in colonial period (mainly by disease).

**Religion:** Predominantly nonreligious country. Roman Catholicism professed by 32 percent of population; other Christian denominations, 10 percent.

## **Economy**

**Global Social Product (GSP):** In 1983 equivalent to US \$27.9 billion (in constant 1981 prices), approximately US\$2,825 per capita. Growth of economy linked closely to production and export of sugar and to world market price for sugar, which fell from 1981 to 1985.

**Agriculture:** Contributed 14 percent of GSP in 1983. Main crops for domestic consumption: corn, beans, rice, potatoes, and

cassava. Leading agricultural exports: sugar, citrus fruits, tobacco, and coffee.

**Industry:** Contributed 42 percent of GSP in 1983. Major industries: sugar milling, nickel milling, electric power, petroleum refining, food processing, cement, light consumer products, and industrial products.

**Exports:** US\$6.4 billion in 1983. Main exports: sugar, nickel, citrus fruits, shellfish, and tobacco.

**Imports:** US\$7.2 billion in 1983. Main imports: petroleum, capital equipment, industrial raw materials, and foodstuffs.

**Major trade partners:** Principal export markets: Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Canada, Japan, and Spain. Principal import markets: Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China, Canada, Spain, Japan, France, and Argentina.

**Currency:** Peso, divided into 100 centavos, is unit of currency; symbol is dollar sign.

**Exchange Rate:** From 1914 to 1971 peso exchanged at parity with United States dollar. Since early 1960s peso not freely exchanged in international market. Value of peso tied to Soviet ruble. Value of ruble and peso raised in early 1970s as dollar was devalued. Since 1980 value of ruble and peso lowered as dollar appreciated. Official exchange rate set at US\$1.40 per peso in 1980; US\$1.28 in 1981; US\$1.20 in 1982; US\$1.16 in 1983; and US\$1.13 in 1984.

## **Government and Politics**

**Government:** 1976 Constitution in force in 1985. Unitary system with municipal and provincial governments subordinate to national government in all matters. At national level, formally a parliamentary system with members of Council of State and Council of Ministers; People's Supreme Court elected by relatively weak National Assembly of People's Power. Judiciary subject to jurisdiction of Council of Ministers. Provincial and municipal governments constructed similar to national government. Central government power concentrated in Council of State and Executive Committee of Council of Ministers.

**Politics:** Authoritarian system governed by some 22 individuals occupying multiple positions on policymaking bodies. Major figure Fidel Castro Ruz, president of Council of State and Council of Ministers and commander in chief of Revolutionary Armed Forces. Major political organization Communist Party of Cuba. Large

number of mass organizations provide major mechanism for popular participation in policy implementation. Elections held at regular intervals. Municipal assemblies elected directly; provincial assemblies and National Assembly elected indirectly. No legal opposition organizations.

**Foreign Relations:** Close ally of Soviet Union, but exercises limited independence within basic alliance. Active military and development aid programs with many countries in Africa and Caribbean Basin. Major attention devoted to United States; diplomatic relations severed in 1961. Interest sections established in Washington and Havana in 1977.

**International Agreements and Memberships:** Member of United Nations and specialized agencies, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), and Nonaligned Movement, Organization of American States participation suspended in 1962. Numerous economic and cultural agreements with Soviet Union and East European countries.

### **National Security**

**Armed Forces:** Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces had total strength in 1985 of between 151,000 and 163,500 regular, active-duty personnel: Revolutionary Army, 125,000 to 130,000; Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force 16,000 to 20,000; and Revolutionary Navy, 10,000 to 13,500. Reserve forces, able to be mobilized on two to four hours' notice, numbered between 135,000 and 190,000. Paramilitary Youth Labor Army numbered approximately 100,000. Civilians in Territorial Troops Militia and Civil Defense numbered 1.2 million and 100,000, respectively.

**Military Units:** Personnel in Revolutionary Army divided among three regional armies, each assigned varying numbers of army corps. Each army corps composed of three infantry divisions. Each regional army had one armored division and one mechanized division. Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force personnel, under separate command, divided among three regional air zones. Air force included fighter-ground attack squadrons, interceptor squadrons, fighter-bomber squadrons, transport squadrons, helicopter squadrons, and a helicopter gunship squadron. Revolutionary Navy personnel also under separate command and divided among three territorial flotillas. Seagoing units included a submarine division, a missile boat flotilla, a torpedo boat flotilla, a submarine chaser flotilla, and a minesweeper division.

**Internal Security:** Key positions in Ministry of Interior—government body responsible for internal security—filled by military officers in 1985. National Revolutionary Police, Department of State Security, and General Directorate of Intelligence under Ministry of Interior. Border Guard Troops and Special Troops were military forces only nominally controlled by ministry.





Figure 1. Administrative Divisions, 1985



## Introduction

CUBA—THE LARGEST ISLAND NATION of the Greater Antilles archipelago, strategically located at the northwestern limit of the Caribbean Sea and the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico—was inhabited by some 10 million persons in 1985. One could go little further in a description of Cuba without reference to its socialist revolution, the most thorough and radical in twentieth-century Latin America, which had profoundly altered nearly every aspect of life on the island during the 26 years since its triumph on January 1, 1959.

At that time few persons had expected the ragtag revolutionaries led by Fidel Castro Ruz to pursue such a thoroughgoing overhaul of the nation's social, economic, and political structures. Castro had been known to favor social reform, but his 26th of July Movement had detailed neither a policy program nor an ideological affinity other than a vague left-of-center nationalism. During its first three years in power, however, the revolutionary government nationalized all the island's major industrial and commercial enterprises, as well as its largest landholdings, thus ending the preponderant roles long played by local elites and United States-based private concerns in the Cuban economy. Also by the end of 1961, diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union had blossomed, and Castro had declared the socialist nature of the Cuban Revolution and his own adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Nor was it expected during those early years that the revolutionary experiment would be allowed to survive and mature into a middle-aged, institutionalized system of governance. Its antecedents in Cuban history—the nationalism of José Martí and the rest of the generation of 1895 and the radicalism of the generation of 1933—had been short-lived owing in large part to repeated United States intervention in Cuban political affairs during the first third of the twentieth century (see *Cuba Between Empires; The Republic*, ch. 1). Between 1960 and 1965 the United States, indeed, made numerous attempts to subvert, both economically and militarily, Cuba's revolutionary experiment. These modern versions of



intervention failed, however. Their unintended effect was to contribute to the consolidation of power by the revolutionary leadership and to increase its ability to mobilize the island's population in defense of the Revolution, which over the years became increasingly identified with the fatherland itself. By 1985 the existence of a Marxist-Leninist state in the Western Hemisphere, less than 150 kilometers from the southern tip of Florida, was an established fact that was highly unlikely to be reversed short of a major war of possibly cataclysmic proportions. The status quo ante was unknown to the majority of Cubans—those born since 1959—and was an ever more faded memory to the island's older inhabitants.

In 1985 Fidel Castro was 58 years old and had ruled longer than any Latin American chief of state except Paraguay's Alfredo Stroessner. Whether revered or vilified, Castro had gained legendary stature throughout the Western Hemisphere, where he had to be placed among the most influential leaders of the second half of the twentieth century. Within Cuba his political legitimacy stemmed from his leadership of the military struggle against Fulgencio Batista in the 1950s, from his personal charisma, and from his embodiment of the ideals and accomplishments of the Revolution, which were sources of immense national pride. The wide scope of Castro's leadership was evident in his numerous official titles, which included president of both the Council of Ministers and the Council of State, commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias—FAR), and first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC).

Of course, public debate over the legitimacy of Castro's leadership role and other fundamental aspects of the revolutionary process was forbidden within a political system that allowed no organized opposition to the PCC, gave the government absolute control over the mass media, and jailed and/or exiled dissidents. Although the 1976 Constitution institutionalized a system of government in which authority is dispersed among a large number of governing bodies, real political power was highly concentrated in Castro and a handful of his subordinates. After a large-scale purge in late 1979 and early 1980 in response to political and economic difficulties, this political elite consisted of 22 individuals, almost all of whom were veterans of the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, who held multiple key decisionmaking positions within the government and the PCC. Second in command and clearly Cas-

tro's heir apparent was his brother Raúl, who was first vice president of the Council of Ministers and the Council of State, Minister of the FAR, and second secretary of the PCC (see National-level Politics, ch. 4).

Popular participation in the governmental process was institutionalized in the 1976 Constitution through the creation of the Organs for People's Power, which were elected directly at the local level and indirectly at the provincial and national levels. Public policy was debated, and citizen's complaints were registered within these bodies, as well as within the various mass organizations, thus giving a large percentage of the Cuban citizenry a voice in issues that affect their daily lives. But while these quasi-representative bodies often brought about changes in legislative details, they had virtually no power to change the way in which the system itself functioned.

The institutionalization of the Revolution, which permeated Cuban politics in the 1970s, had a profound effect on two of the nation's most powerful institutional bodies: the FAR and the PCC. Founded in 1965, the modern-day PCC finally held its first party congress in 1975. Its membership grew from only 55,000 in 1969 to 434,000 in 1980 and no doubt would be much higher by the time of the party's third congress initially scheduled for December 1985 but postponed until February 1986. The armed forces grew much more slowly but, more important, were reorganized in 1973 and thereafter underwent a professionalization along Soviet lines while dropping a number of their former nonmilitary roles. Throughout this period of impressive institution building, however, there was very little circulation of political and military elites; the tiny revolutionary family—the generation of the 1950s led by Fidel Castro—retained firm control of both the armed forces and the PCC. Hence, while the trappings of an institutionalized Marxist-Leninist system of government were in place in 1985, beneath the surface lay what, in many respects, was a classic case of a traditional Latin American regime: rule by an entrenched oligarchy led by a president-for-life who has dictatorial powers.

The revolutionary regime's greatest boast—after the longevity of its survival—was its provision of social services. It held a conscious bias in favor of the provision of services to rural residents, both to rectify their relative deprivation in prerevolutionary days and to discourage further migration into overcrowded urban areas. Indicators of Cuban standards

in health and education had been quite high prior to the Revolution, but the revolutionary government was faced early with the emigration of many of the island's skilled professionals in these fields. Large-scale efforts to build facilities and train new health and education personnel were subsequently undertaken, however, and by the early 1980s Cuba's standards in these areas far surpassed those of the 1950s.

The Cuban government measured literacy at 98 percent in 1985, although its standard for this measurement was considered by many foreign observers to be below the United Nations standard accepted by most nations. The number of students in postsecondary (or higher) education increased dramatically to some 200,000 by the mid-1980s. Critics argued, however, that the emphasis placed on technical training and on Marxist ideological content detracted from the accomplishments of the Revolution in the areas of education (see Education, ch. 2).

With respect to measurements of the health of Cuban society, infant mortality (16 per 1,000 live births) was among the lowest in Latin America; and life expectancy (73 years) was the highest in the region. These gains were largely the result of government programs in health care and other areas, such as subsidized food, clothing, and housing, that were designed to meet the basic needs of the poorest members of society. Although social stratification still existed in Cuba, it was far less pronounced than previously. Dire poverty, pervasive in prerevolutionary times, had been eliminated (see Health and Welfare, ch. 2).

Cuba's relatively homogeneous social structure was also owing in part to the emigration of many of the island's upper- and middle-class inhabitants that began in 1959. The 125,000 Cubans who took part in the 1980 exodus from the port of Mariel, however, were much more representative, both socioeconomically and racially, of Cuban society as a whole than were previous emigrants. After the Mariel boatlift it was estimated that a total of some 1 million Cubans had left the island permanently since 1959. As many as 800,000 of these had made the United States their new home. Although the departure of fully one-tenth of the island's population over a 22-year period was a profound embarrassment to the revolutionary regime, emigration also contributed to a blessedly low rate of population growth and, more important, provided the regime a safety valve for the exportation of its political opposition.

The Revolution's achievements in health and education were in stark contrast to the failure of the state-owned economy either to register sustained patterns of growth over time or to overcome historical patterns of dependency (see *Growth and Structure of the Economy*, ch. 3). In 1985 Cuba was still a poor country, subject to the vagaries of a persistent monoculture in sugar, which accounted for about 80 percent (the same percentage as in prerevolutionary days) of its export earnings and was still dependent on one trading partner (the Soviet Union rather than the United States) for the vast majority of its foreign commerce. Although Cuba had witnessed some success in diversifying its economic life away from the production of sugarcane, the exportation of sugar remained the backbone of the national economy. Two-thirds of sugar exports were committed to fellow members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary) under long-term contracts. The one-third sold on the world market provided Cuba with about half its total earnings of hard currency, which were necessary to obtain vital imports (see *Trade*, ch. 3).

The importance of sugar sales to non-Comecon nations was evidenced by the fact that only during a period of extraordinarily high world market prices for sugar—the early 1970s—was Cuba able to sustain high rates of growth. As sugar prices fell from a high of about US\$0.30 per pound in 1974 to less than US\$0.04 per pound in early 1985, Cuba's economic growth became uneven, its dependency on the Soviet Union deepened, and it grew ever more in debt to foreign creditors. By 1985 it was estimated that Cuba owed US\$3.5 billion to Western creditors and the equivalent of US\$9 billion to the Soviet Union. The foreign currency "squeeze" created by these huge debts led the government to undertake an austerity campaign in 1985 aimed at increasing exports at the cost of domestic consumption.

There was a bright side to developments within Cuba's sugar industry. The mechanization of nearly two-thirds of the sugarcane harvest by the early 1980s was itself revolutionary, saving Cuban *guajiros* (sugar workers) untold millions of hours of backbreaking labor. In addition, Cuba's receipt from Comecon of what the government liked to call a "fair price" for its sugar (a floor price of US\$0.30 per pound had been in effect since 1976) amounted to a sizable subsidy at a time when world market prices for sugar were expected to remain low. Without this subsidy, which together with Soviet devel-

opmental aid and funds gained from Cuba's resale of the unused portion of its quota of oil imports from the Soviet Union was estimated to total over US\$4 billion in 1984, the Cuban economy would have experienced a far more serious crisis.

Nevertheless, Cuba's growing dependency in its foreign trade on Comecon nations (accounting for 87 percent of Cuba's total trade in 1984 as opposed to 60 percent in the early 1970s) left it vulnerable to a variety of pressures. The deep-seated economic problems that became evident in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as a result, did not augur well for Cuba. In 1984 and 1985, by some accounts, the Soviet Union denied Cuban requests to increase its level of aid and instead insisted that its Caribbean client work harder to meet its export obligations within Comecon. Although the level of Soviet aid had increased markedly over the previous decade, it appeared in the mid-1980s that Cuba may have reached the limit of Soviet largess.

Another factor behind Cuba's economic difficulties was low labor productivity, a problem that was endemic to a socialist economy in which a job was virtually guaranteed and little incentive to work hard was provided (see Labor, ch. 3). The government undertook a number of measures during the late 1970s and early 1980s to combat the problem of productivity. Among these were an increase in wage differentials, new laws that made it easier to fire substandard workers, the encouragement of self-employed moonlighting by those with highly valued service skills, the establishment of "free markets" for the sale of agricultural surpluses, and an increased availability of a variety of consumer goods at prices well above those for rationed basic commodities. The government argued that these constituted pragmatic solutions to labor productivity problems that were not inconsistent with its ongoing commitment to the development of a socialist economy. Among their consequences, however, were an increase in social stratification and the emergence of unemployment on the island.

The greatest impact of the Cuban Revolution was in the arena of foreign affairs. By playing a key role in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, building a formidable military force, and undertaking a messianic mission to champion revolutionary causes in the Third World, Cuba became an important actor on the world stage and had an influence disproportionate to the size of its terri-

tory, population, and economy. Cuba's dogged pursuit of "proletarian internationalism" (a policy mandated in the 1976 Constitution) whereby thousands of Cuban personnel—both civilian and military—were sent to assist friendly nations overseas and thousands of students from these nations studied in Cuba was a policy suitable for a big power, not a Caribbean island of 10 million persons. Cuba's military power, including its 160,000-strong professional army and 1.2 million-member armed civilian militia, both projected its influence overseas and played a primary role in fulfilling the regime's principal foreign policy objective—survival against external attack. Although it was not a member of the Warsaw Pact or party to a mutual defense treaty with the Soviet Union, Cuba developed a close military and economic relationship with the Soviets that enabled it to pursue policies, in violation of the logic of both history and geography, that were fundamentally contrary to the interests of the United States.

Relations between revolutionary Cuba and the United States have been characterized by varying degrees of hostility (see Relations with the United States, ch. 4). Hopes of a rapprochement during the mid-1970s were dashed by large-scale Cuban military interventions in support of revolutionary governments in Angola and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, interest sections, which opened lines of communications, though not diplomatic relations (closed since 1961), were established in one another's capitals in 1977. The 1980s dawned ominously as the Mariel boatlift dramatically increased Cuban-United States tensions, and Cuba was vehemently denounced during the United States presidential campaign as the prime instigator of the widening Central American revolution.

Tensions rose to a near-fever pitch during 1981 and 1982 as the newly inaugurated administration of Ronald Reagan, determined to douse Central American revolutionary fire and convinced that Cuba was providing the matches, threatened on numerous occasions to take actions against Cuba if it did not halt its flow of arms to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala. Frequent United States military exercises in Central America and the Caribbean and the October 1983 United States military action in Grenada, during which United States and revolutionary Cuban troops fought one another for the first time ever, demonstrated that the Reagan administration was willing to back up its threats with the use of its military

firepower in order to reverse Cuba's expanding role in the Caribbean Basin.

Grenada was only the most spectacular of a number of setbacks in Cuba's relations with Latin American countries during the early 1980s. In the wake of Mariel its relations had soured with Peru, Venezuela, Costa Rica, and Ecuador over incidents involving right of asylum and with Colombia over the issue of Cuban support for guerrilla forces in the country. Three of Castro's closest friends had either been defeated electorally (Jamaica's Michael Manley in October 1980), had died suddenly (Panama's Omar Torrijos in July 1981), or had been overthrown and executed (Grenada's Maurice Bishop in October 1983). In the wake of the United States intervention in Grenada, Suriname downgraded its relations with Cuba and sent home more than 100 Cuban advisers and diplomats.

This growing isolation in the hemisphere was offset, however, by Cuba's staunch support of Argentina during the South Atlantic War of 1982. Argentina soon surpassed Mexico as Cuba's largest regional trading partner, and Cuban relations with other South American countries, notably Ecuador and Bolivia, improved dramatically. In mid-1985 Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil were also said to be close to reestablishing diplomatic relations with Cuba after long hiatuses. United States officials expressed concern with these developments in light of the fundamental disparity of Cuban and United States interests in the region. As if to underscore this disparity, Castro issued a call in early 1985 for the creation of a multilateral debtors' cartel among the financially strapped Latin American debtor nations. A sizable portion of their debt burden—totaling some US\$350 billion at that time—was owed to private United States banks.

Cuba and the United States were also at odds in Africa, where Cuba's "internationalist" policies were at their most active. The major source of dispute was the continued presence of 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola a decade after their initial arrival in 1975 (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, ch. 5). During the early 1980s there was apparent progress made in discussions among officials of the United States, South Africa, and Angola (which has requested the Cuban troops to help it defend against South African incursions) that were designed to lead to a gradual withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Cuban military personnel south of the thirteenth parallel. Progress was halted, at least temporarily,

after the interception of a squad of South African soldiers in Angola's northern Cabinda Province in May 1985, barely a month after South Africa had pledged that all its troops had been withdrawn from Angola. Castro subsequently declared the United States unfit as a mediator and pledged to maintain or increase Cuba's military presence in Angola.

The inauguration of the United States Information Agency-sponsored Radio Martí, also in May 1985, likewise halted progress in another area of United States-Cuban relations. The Spanish-language broadcasts that were beamed daily from Florida to Cuba offended the Cuban government less for the mildly anti-Castro programming, officials said, than for the use of Cuba's most revered patriot in the name of the radio station. Castro immediately suspended a December 1984 bilateral agreement that had allowed the return to Cuba of nearly 3,000 "undesirables" from the Mariel boat-lift, the emigration of some of 3,000 Cubans—ex-political prisoners and their families—to the United States, and the resumption of regular emigration of up to 20,000 Cubans annually to the United States. Soon afterward the United States stopped processing Cuban visa applications.

Although the United States objected to Cuba's support of revolutionaries in Latin America and to its military role in Africa, it was Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union that it found most objectionable. Although the Cubans and the Soviets had often been at odds during the early years of the Revolution (particularly over the 1962 Cuban missile crisis), Cuba's endorsement of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia marked the beginning of a period, which continued into the mid-1980s, of much closer Cuban-Soviet cooperation. There was substantial evidence, nevertheless, that Cuba did not merely become a surrogate of the Soviet Union. It was particularly in Latin American and African affairs that Cuba often initiated what only later became Soviet policy (see Cuba and the Soviet Union, ch. 4).

Occasionally, Cuban disagreements with Soviet foreign policy were apparent, for example, over the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the failure of the Soviets to assist Cuban forces on Grenada in October 1983, and what Cuba viewed as the Soviets' weak response to Reagan administration pressures on Nicaragua. Disagreements were not voiced publicly but were inferred by foreign observers who noted such things as the absence of Castro at the June 1984 Comecon summit



in Moscow and at the March 1985 funeral of Soviet president Konstantin Chernenko.

As distasteful as it was to the United States, the Cuban-Soviet relationship remained essentially a solid one that, despite occasional disagreements, was based on mutual need. The Cuban regime needed ongoing Soviet economic and military aid for its very survival. The Soviets, in turn, needed Cuba as a vital link with Africa and the Caribbean Basin. Perhaps what was most threatening to the United States was that Cuba provided the Soviets with a powerful political message that a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist regime, even in a tiny nation with close geographic and historical ties to the United States, can endure over time and, even if only partially successful, can fulfill many of the historical aspirations and material needs of its citizens.

July 5, 1985

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The third party congress of the PCC, held in Havana February 4-7, 1986, marked significant, if not unexpected, changes in the personnel within the party leadership. Although Fidel and Raúl Castro were confirmed as the first and second secretaries of the PCC, respectively, four of the 14 full members and eight of the 10 alternate members of the Political Bureau were replaced. The new full members were Abelardo Colomé, one of Raúl's main deputies within the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces; Vilma Espín Guillois, Raúl's wife and head of the Federation of Cuban Women; Esteban Lazo, a black man and secretary of the PCC in Matanzas Province; and Roberto Veiga Menéndez, the secretary general of the Federation of Cuban Workers. They replaced four long-time party activists: Guillermo García Frías, Ramiro Valdés Menéndez (who had also lost his post as minister of interior to his deputy, José Abrahantes Fernández, in December 1985), Sergio del Valle Jiménez, and Blas Roca (Francisco Calderío). Fully one-third of the 221-member Central Committee was also replaced.

Although these changes were officially explained as a "necessary renovation" intended to bring more youth, women, and blacks into the top party leadership, foreign observers saw them as a clear effort to consolidate Raúl Cas-

tro's position as eventual successor to his brother by removing potential rivals and installing his allies into the party's most important organ. A new five-year plan was also launched at the party congress, and once again Fidel Castro (who appeared to lack his usual boundless vigor according to some observers) attacked the inefficiencies in the Cuban economy and bureaucracy, while calling for a diversification away from the export of sugar and a reduction of imports in order to improve the nation's external accounts.

James D. Rudolph

March 3, 1986

## Chapter 1. Historical Setting



*José Martí*

THE NEW WORLD was discovered as a result of the great scientific achievements and the expansionist drive of late fifteenth-century Europe. The conquest and settlement of the new domains were the work of zealous missionaries and Europeans searching for wealth and prestige.

Cuba's historical development stemmed from its geographical location in the Caribbean, and the island became Europe's jumping-off point to the New World. During the Age of Discovery, Cuba was a way station for the preparation of the expeditions to the mainland, and later it became a resupply and marshaling port for the great transatlantic fleets carrying gold and silver bullion back to Spain. During the colonial period it became the prey of enemy pirates and as Havana grew up as a port city, it suffered several destructive attacks by pirates. Cuba developed in response to the needs of Spain and was considered the crown's prize possession.

Changes in the world's balance of power were reflected in Cuba. Spain's perception of Cuba's strategic importance was later shared by the United States. Cuba's location in the Caribbean, some 150 kilometers south of Florida's Key West, first attracted the attention of the chief naval power in the Western Hemisphere in the late nineteenth century. The United States regarded the island as a vantage point from which to monitor its growing interests in the Caribbean Basin, and in 1903 it established a permanent naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

Good soil was a determining factor in Cuba's economic development. Tobacco was indigenous to Cuba, and in time it became widely popular in European society. Sugarcane, another tropical crop, became the mainstay of the island's economy in the nineteenth century and continued to pervade all aspects of Cuban life into the 1980s. Sugar determined the land tenure system of large plantations, the class structure, and the racial composition of Cuban society. It also created a dependent economy that rested upon the vagaries of the international sugar market.

The major cleavages within Cuban society were inherited from the colonial period. Colonial society was broken down between *peninsulares* (Spanish-born whites) and *criollos* (Cuban born whites). Cubans had to accept being governed by foreigners and being second-class citizens in their own land. Spanish domination lasted longer in Cuba than in any of Spain's other overseas possessions. When independence was finally achieved in 1902, it was tempered by the often-exercised power of intervention by the United States under the terms of the Platt Amendment until it was abrogated in 1934. After the victory of the Cuban Revolution of 1959, the

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Soviet Union replaced the United States as the dominant foreign influence.

During the twentieth century Cuba's attempts at self-government failed because of the lack of democratic institutions and the prevailing colonial mentality of Cuban politicians. The politico-economic life of Cuba was forever dependent on a powerful planter class and on foreign support, thus generating a lopsided society of privileges. However, a strong nationalist sentiment developed over the years of United States intervention in 1906-09, 1912, and 1917. The inspiration for this wave of nationalism came from José Julian Martí y Pérez, the nineteenth-century "Apostle of Cuban Independence," whose ideas were to have a lasting impact on Cuban revolutionaries. By 1933 Cubans were ready for revolutionary changes after eight years of Gerardo Machado y Morales' dictatorship. But the revolution of 1933 was curtailed by the conservatives, the foreign interest groups, and a shrewd army sergeant, Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, who aborted the democratic process in Cuba.

For 25 years of Batista's effective rule, Cuba was a paradise for foreigners and their business interests. However, economic prosperity was not sufficient to placate revolutionary ideals, which were exacerbated by the unfulfilled political expectations of a large sector of Cuban society. The country was fertile ground for political activism despite Batista's repressive politico-military machinery. Opposition to Batista was widespread, especially in Havana. Students centered at the University of Havana were among the most vocal groups against Batista; Fidel Castro Ruz was among them.

Batista's regime began to collapse after the unsuccessful revolutionary attempt of 1956, when Castro and his fellow revolutionaries landed in the province of Oriente at the southeastern tip of the islands. For then on, the dictatorship kept losing ground to the opposition, and finally, on New Year's Day 1959 Batista fled into exile. The revolutionaries came down from the Sierra Maestra and began a complete restructuring of Cuban society.

Since 1959 the revolutionary government has committed itself to the improvement of life for all Cubans. Education, health, and social welfare were among the first priorities of the Revolution, which created opportunities for all Cubans. In 1961 a national campaign claimed to have reduced illiteracy to 3.9 percent. At about the same time, the government set out to control infectious diseases and to improve the overall quality of medical services in the country. In this period education continued to be an integral part of the revolutionary program that aimed at providing technical training and ideological orthodoxy to the Cuban masses. In the

### *Historical Setting*

1980s Cuba ranked among the top Latin American countries in terms of health services dispensed to the population. In other areas, such as housing and income distribution, Cuba still strived to fulfill its goals.

Cuba in the 1980s was an example of a society still struggling for self-determination. After more than 26 years of revolutionary government, Cuba faced problems common to a monoculture export economy, despite the preferential trade conditions assured by the Soviet Union. Although control of its economic life still followed the pattern of foreign dependence established during colonial times, Cuban politics was the realm of the Cuban revolutionary elite led by Castro. In spite of the inherent pressures of such dependency, Cuba maintained an independent political stance in regard to the Soviet Union, unlike many other Soviet allies. Cuba's political independence, however, had not produced a more representative pattern of political freedom at home.

The presence of the United States across the sea from western Cuba has remained a constant reminder of past intervention. In the 1980s it continued to permeate the psychology of the Cuban leadership, and the threat of another United States attempt to draw Cubans like a magnet to Castro, ready to defend the fatherland at all costs.

### **The Age of Discovery**

The year 1492 marked the end of the Wars of Reconquest in the Iberian Peninsula. After almost eight centuries of Moorish occupation, the fall of Granada represented the beginning of an era of Iberian expansion into new frontiers. The men of the Age of Discovery wanted to circumvent the Ottoman Empire and to establish new trade routes to the Far East. In this spirit Christopher Columbus (whose Italian name was Cristoforo Colombo, also known as Cristóbal Colón in Spanish) set sail to the West on a voyage that would bring about the conquest of new domains for the Spanish crown. When Columbus reached the island of Hispaniola in that same year of 1492, he believed he had landed somewhere in Asia (Indies); because of that initial mistake, the new lands became known as the Indies, and its inhabitants as Indians. Spiritual and material aspirations lured the early sixteenth-century explorers, who sought to promote the conversion of all peoples to the Catholic faith, to conquer new domains for the Spanish monarchs, and to acquire wealth and prestige for themselves.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

The dominant note in Spanish society at the time of the Reconquest and during the Age of Discovery was religion. The Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish crown supported each other; in Spanish America the church was under the direct control of the crown, except in religious matters. Papal concessions in the early sixteenth century made the king the virtual head of the church in the New World through the Patronato Real (Royal Patronage), which gave the crown control over the appointment of clerics and the establishment of religious houses for charity and instruction. The secular clergy and the religious orders (Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits) went to the New World as another branch of the royal administration and as such maintained an extreme royalist stance for most of the colonial period.

### **Pre-Columbian Cuba**

Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, Cuba had been inhabited by three native groups: the Cyboneys, the Guanahacabibes, and the Taínos. The first two were nomadic societies of hunters and gatherers who used natural materials, such as unpolished stones, seashells, and fish bones, for tools. The third group, the Taínos, inhabited the islands of Cuba and Hispaniola. They were more advanced than the other two native societies but still could not be compared with the high civilizations of the Mayas, Incas, and Aztecs on the mainland of the New World.

The Taínos had a more sedentary social organization. Besides performing the traditional activities of fishermen and hunters, they introduced agriculture to the island. They cultivated several staples, including maize, beans, squash, peanuts, yucca, and tobacco, and they used polished stones and carved wooden artifacts for tools. Their houses called *bohíos*, were made out of cane or bamboo and were grouped in villages. They were ruled by caciques or *behiques*, whose functions comprised those of priests, doctors, and chiefs. Tobacco was used for religious, medicinal, and ceremonial purposes (see Mechanisms for Social Mobility, ch. 2).

### **Discovery and Occupation**

The discovery of the Americas and of the island of Cuba were closely related. During his first voyage to the New World, and while exploring the Bahamas, Columbus heard of a great island the natives called Cuba, and on October 29, 1492; he landed there (see fig. 1). Still convinced that he had arrived at the Asian shores, Co-

### *Historical Setting*

Columbus believed that Cuba was a misnomer for Cipango, as Japan was sometimes known. He named the land Juana after Prince Juan, heir to the Spanish throne. After Juan's death it was renamed Fernandina, but the native designation of Cuba persisted.

Upon arrival Columbus sent Spanish scouts to contact the people in the area, and on their return the scouts described the natives as very peaceful. The Europeans departed and left the islanders undisturbed. By 1510 Spain decided to investigate the possibility of exploring for gold on the island, and the governor general of Hispaniola, Diego Columbus (son of the discoverer) commissioned Diego Velásquez, a wealthy planter in Hispaniola, to outfit an expedition. In 1511 Velásquez sailed from Hispaniola to conquer and colonize Cuba. Among the adventurers in that expedition was Hernán Cortés, who later conquered Mexico.

Velásquez' expeditionary force consisted of three or four ships and about 300 men-at-arms who brought with them some horses and dogs. When he arrived in Cuba, Velásquez founded the island's first Spanish settlement, at Baracoa. Meanwhile, reports from the Indians of Hispaniola reached Cuba. Hatuey, a Taíno chief and a refugee, organized a resistance against the white men who had already inflicted much suffering on his people in Hispaniola. Hatuey's strategy against the Spaniards was to attack and then disperse to the hills, where the Indians would regroup for the next attack. In spite of this, Spanish military superiority was much too strong, and in the end the Indians capitulated. According to legend, Hatuey was punished by the Spaniards and sent to be burned at the stake. At that moment a priest offered him spiritual comfort, but Hatuey refused to have anything to do with a god that protected cruelty against the Indians. Hatuey's valiant stance against the invaders of his adopted land procured for him a special place in history as the first martyr in the struggle for Cuban independence.

Following pacification of the island in 1513, Velásquez started the effective colonization of Cuba. By 1515 seven settlements had been established; Baracoa (the center of colonial administration), Bayamo, Santiago de Cuba, Puerto Príncipe (present-day Camagüey), Sancti Spiritus, Trinidad, and La Habana (hereafter called Havana). The next step was to organize the remaining Indians into a labor force to work the mines, cultivate the soil, tend the cattle, and perform other tasks as servants and porters for the Spaniards.



## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **The Colonial Period**

#### **Encomienda and Repartimiento**

Once the Indians had capitulated, Velásquez set out to organize both the labor force and the available land. Grants of land and labor were distributed among Velásquez' men according to their rank and valor during the conquest through a system of *encomiendas* (literally, to place in trust) and *repartimientos* (allotments). The *encomienda* system derived from Spanish feudal institutions of Roman origin, and in the New World it established a series of rights and obligations between the *encomendero* (grantee) and the Indians "granted" to be under his care. The Indians were required to provide tribute and free labor to the *encomendero*, while he was responsible for their welfare, their assimilation into Spanish culture, and their Christianization. The *repartimiento* was a permit given by the crown to individuals that enabled them to task Indian labor for specific purposes, such as work in the mines, on public works, and on farms.

Both the *encomienda* and the *repartimiento* became sources of abuse, although several measures attempted to curtail the excessive powers of *encomenderos* and *repartidores de indios* (licensed contractors of Indian labor). Finally, in 1542-43 the New Laws were promulgated in response to pressures by Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas (1474-1566), known as the "Protector of the Indians" and the "Apostle of the Indies." As a young Spanish priest, Las Casas was sent to Cuba to assist Velásquez in the conquest, pacification, and settlement of the island. His firsthand observations of the destitution and misery of the natives prompted him to plead their cause to the Spanish crown. He challenged the racist overtones of the Spanish expansion and called upon the ideas of the thirteenth-century theologian St. Thomas Aquinas on the dignity of man. The New Laws emphasized humanitarian ideals toward the Indians, regulated tributes, abolished inheritance rights for the *encomiendas*, and prohibited their being held by religious and royal officials. The laws had little effect, however, and by the mid-sixteenth century, the Indian population had dropped to a few thousand as a result of disease and exploitation.

#### **Colonial Administration**

The Spanish government in the New World was structured, in the words of historian Hubert Herring, to provide the means "to

### Historical Setting

fortify royal power in America, curb anarchic forces, and buttress the political unity of the scattered kingdoms." The most important instruments of royal control were its appointed officials, viceroys, and captains general and the *cabildos* or *ayuntamientos* (city councils), and *audiencias* (high courts).

Diego Velázquez was the first governor of Cuba, the highest ranking official on the island, from 1511 to 1524. Later in that century, the governors of Cuba received the additional title of captain general, which carried greater military responsibilities. Governors were subject to the judicial powers of the *audiencia* and the political authority of the governor of the Indies in Hispaniola. They were also accountable to the king and to the Council of the Indies. The Casa de Contratación (Board of Trade) in Seville was the highest authority on commerce and financial matters in Spanish America. After the establishment of the viceroyalty of New Spain in Mexico in 1535, royal control over Cuba was transferred there from Hispaniola. Spain also exercised other means of control through *visitadores* (royal inspectors). *Visitas* (inspections) either followed charges against colonial officials or were a matter of simple routine, and a *residencia* (a hearing or a trial) was conducted at the end of an official's term in office. These and other control mechanisms were more effective on paper than in reality because corruption and deception were rampant in the colonies. Authority was delegated to the local level through the *cabildos* of the *municipios* (counties), which corresponded to the seven initial settlements on the island and were responsible for the legal arrangement of all matters relating to the welfare and interests of the colonists.

### Economic Structures

The 1530s brought changes to the lives of the Cuban settlers. Greater potential wealth in Mexico and Peru attracted a large number of them, thus leaving Cuba depopulated. However, Havana was soon transformed into an important port city, a supply station for the fleets carrying bullion between the New World and Spain. The island of Cuba became a favorite prey of pirates, often operating under the authority of one European power or another. In 1554 Peg-Leg Leclerc seized Santiago de Cuba; in 1555 Jacques de Sores burned Havana, a city that had also been occupied by a French fleet in 1538. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the whole Caribbean was plagued by pirates. Only after the end of the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97) between

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

France and a coalition of European powers and the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 were their incursions outlawed.

To counteract enemy attacks, Havana was fortified and outfitted to provide goods and amenities for the fleets. Its importance grew rapidly, and in 1589 Havana became the capital of Cuba. Havana maintained its position as the chief port of Spain's overseas empire for 200 years, until the end of the fleet system. But aside from Havana, Cuba was of little interest to the mother country throughout the seventeenth century. Corrupt and incompetent administrators turned Cuba into a haven for bandits, smugglers, and prostitutes.

By the mid-sixteenth century all gold deposits had been exhausted, but copper exploration continued. Despite Cuba's potential as a producer of sugar and tobacco, the main activity was centered on extensive cattle raising, and herds roamed wild throughout the island. Cultivation of yucca, used to make cassava flour, was another important economic activity, because it was essential to the production of both dried meat and bread taken on expeditions to the mainland. A royal decree in 1588 granted the Cuban sugar mills the same rights formerly enjoyed by those in Hispaniola, which exempted them from attachment for debts. For the first 200 years, however, Cuba was primarily a transit station for the expeditions and fleets between Europe and the New World and, according to historian Philip Foner, "not [considered] as a colony to be developed on its own."

The eighteenth century was to bring about important changes in the economic life of Cuba. The end of the European wars and the treaties that followed opened new avenues for the development of the island. After the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 between Britain and France and the rise of Philip V to the Spanish throne, British vessels were allowed to carry African slaves to Cuba as well as an annual cargo of British goods. By providing a cover, the legal importation of slaves and goods furthered the already thriving illegal contraband. The sugar industry benefited from the importation of slaves but still did not surpass the importance of tobacco, for which Europeans had acquired a taste. Realizing the economic potential of tobacco, the Spanish crown placed Cuban tobacco production under government monopoly in 1717 and established a purchasing agency for the control of all aspects of its production and trade. The tobacco growers revolted in protest several times in the 1720s, but they effectively bypassed the crown's restrictions through contraband practices. The monopoly of tobacco lasted until a successful uprising of the tobacco growers took place in 1812. By 1740 the Royal Company of Commerce was estab-

### *Historical Setting*

lished as a monopoly agency on all trade to and from Cuba. During its 20 years of existence, the company controlled all commercial transactions in Cuba; it bought goods from Cuban producers at very low prices and sold imported items to them at exorbitant prices.

The British occupied Havana between August 1762 and February 1763, a short period that was to have far-reaching effects on the lives of Cubans. It opened the city to free trade with all nations and fostered the importation of goods and slaves at low prices. This period of British occupation, important for the development of the sugar industry, was also marked by the introduction of religious tolerance and Freemasonry to island society. However, this climate of religious freedom was not easily shared with the Spanish crown.

Cuba indirectly benefited from events abroad, such as the American and the French revolutions in the late eighteenth century. The independence of the United States opened new consumer markets for Cuban products, and the French Revolution provoked political turmoil in the overseas colonies, leading to the Haitian Revolution in 1796. Slave revolts, widespread killing of white planters, and burning of cane fields led to the destruction of the Haitian sugar industry. An estimated 300,000 French refugees fled to Cuba and brought with them their skilled mulatto laborers as well as their more advanced sugar technology and managerial skills. The decline of Cuba's major competitor in the European sugar markets was providential for the establishment of Cuba as the leading exporter of sugar in the Spanish overseas empire. The new prospects for the sugar industry prompted the crown by a royal decree of 1791, to allow the importation of slaves free of duty for six years. Trade was further liberalized by another royal decree in 1818.

By the end of the eighteenth century, Cuba had been transformed into an economically viable Spanish possession with "king sugar" as the major booster of the island's development. The availability of new markets and the arrival of more slaves caused agricultural production to thrive. Coffee, another Haitian export crop, had been introduced to Cuba in the last quarter of the eighteenth century and now began to be exploited fully. Tobacco continued to be a major item in the shipments to Europe, while cattle raising became a more rational undertaking.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **Colonial Society**

Cuban society was organized along color and class lines. There were two racially distinct groups, each comprising very specific differentiations. Whites were divided according to origin: *peninsulares* and creoles, or criollos. The blacks were either free or slave. By the latter part of the eighteenth century, according to the census of 1774, Cuba had a total population of 172,620 inhabitants: 96,440 whites, 31,847 free blacks, and 44,333 black slaves.

Rivalries between *peninsulares* and creoles derived from the preferential treatment given to the former for positions in both civil and religious administrative jobs in the colony. As the wealth of the island increased in the eighteenth century, money and prestige were attached to high posts in colonial administration for which creoles did not qualify. However, creole society had been built on the ownership of Cuban land and the performance of economic roles, such as cattle raisers, tobacco and sugar planters, teachers, lawyers, priests, and journalists. Creole society had generated the wealth that was appropriated by the *peninsulares*. Educated creoles were influenced by the writings of Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Paine and by such documents as the United States Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man. By the late eighteenth century, creoles were demanding an end not only to economic restrictions on colonial development but also to political and human rights.

Religious orders were among the most prestigious groups in Spanish America. Their influence derived from the educational, doctrinal, and economic roles they performed throughout the Spanish empire. The Jesuits had virtual control over education in the colonies, and they became large plantation owners as well as urban landlords. Their prestige, influence, and wealth in Spanish America were seen as a threat to royal control of the colonies prompting the expulsion of all Jesuits from the Spanish domains in 1767. The Jesuits were reestablished as a religious order in 1814.

### **The Road to Independence**

#### **The Age of Reforms**

The period of the Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815, brought prosperity to Cuba despite the ongoing restrictions and obstacles placed on the island's economic life by the crown. Demand for sugar, tobacco, and coffee increased, and more capital was injected into

### *Historical Setting*

crop production. More slaves were introduced, more land was brought under cultivation, and a new class of wealthy planters emerged within the creole society. Trade between Cuba and the United States increased during the war years. By that time the Cubans had turned most of the available land to sugar and coffee cultivation and therefore had to import basic foodstuffs and other provisions from the United States. Trade flourished between the United States and Cuba under both legal and illegal trade conditions.

Cleavages existing within Cuban society became more pronounced over time because of the obscurantism of the colonial administration. The Haitian Revolution and the resulting establishment of a black republic in the Caribbean worked to Spain's advantage, however. Free Cubans from all walks of life, fearing a similar situation at home, sought reform. Some reformists were willing to continue under a revised form of Spanish rule, but others sought annexation by the United States. More radical elements longed for independent status.

In the 1790s a wealthy planter, economist, and statesman, Francisco de Arango y Parreño, and the island's governor, Luis de Las Casas, came to play leading roles in Cuban politics. Under their influence a royal decree was issued that established the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, the Society for Progress, and the Royal Consulate of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce. These were semipolitical associations, founded to upgrade economic and educational life in Cuba, which functioned as auxiliary bodies of consultants to the island's government. The Economic Society of Friends of the Country was created in 1793 and promoted the establishment of schools and other educational programs. The Cuban reformist school of thought was represented by the economic society, the royal consulate, and the municipality of Havana. They advocated freedom of trade, continuation of slavery and slave trade, and either assimilation of Cuba into the Spanish kingdom or its annexation by the United States. The program led by Arango y Parreño exemplified the major political currents in Cuban society as the nineteenth century unfolded. In general, creole society was completely indifferent to the slave issue. One exception was Father Félix Varela, an educator and reformist who advocated independence for Cuba and the abolition of slavery. In 1823 Varela started publishing a periodical in New York called *El Habañero*, in which he defended his version of the reformist program.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **The Dawn of Independence**

Although many in continental Spanish America were seeking political freedom from the mother country, the wealthy Cuban landowning class supported the crown's policies against independence, for which it was rewarded with some trade relaxation. These concessions included the end of the tobacco monopoly in 1817, freedom from trade with all nations beginning in 1818, and private ownership the following year of Cuban lands already occupied or at least cultivated by an individual. In the second decade of the nineteenth century, Cuba experienced increases in population and wealth. Between 1815 and 1819 the value of Cuban exports rose to over 56 million pesos while the crown's revenues from sugar rose to unprecedented levels. The island's prosperity helped finance Spanish undertakings against the independence movement throughout the continent. However, the picture of the "ever-faithful isle" was to change in the 1820s; that decade witnessed several unsuccessful revolts for Cuban independence.

By 1824 Spain had lost all its American possessions save Cuba and Puerto Rico, which remained colonies as a result of widespread local opposition to independence. Another blow to the aspirations of Cuban nationalists had come from United States president James Monroe, whose message to the United States Congress in December 1823 enunciated the doctrine that bears his name. The Monroe Doctrine stated United States support of the political status quo throughout the New World. It defended the rights of the newly independent republics against foreign interference at the same time that it maintained the rights of Spanish domination over Cuba.

Cuba's slaveholding society lived in constant fear of losing its preeminence and even more, it feared a repetition of the Haitian situation. Spontaneous slave uprisings took place in Cuba in 1832, 1835, 1837, and 1838 that heralded a rise in antislavery sentiment. In 1843 royalist battalions brutally crushed three slave revolts. The following year a slave conspiracy was discovered in Matanzas. The planned uprising became known as *la escalera* (the staircase), a designation taken from one of the tortures used to extract confessions from the insurrectionists; they would be tied to a ladder and lashed until they furnished information to their captors. But violence went beyond punishment of the rebels. It reached the Cuban freemen, subjecting many innocents to the repression that followed.

The alternative to independence was annexation by the United States. This idea had support both in Cuba and in the American

### *Historical Setting*

slaveholding South. Cuban annexationists could count on the slave-owners, but their allegiance to the cause depended on actual threats to slavery on the island. Three separate efforts at annexation between 1848 and 1851 failed. In the United States, aside from the Southerners, there was no support for the annexation cause. Both the United States abolitionists and the Northerners fought vigorously against the addition of another slaveholding society to the Union.

By the mid-nineteenth century, competition from European beet-sugar producers forced the Cuban sugar industry to adopt more efficient production techniques, including the use of skilled white wage laborers in the sugar mills. A further sign of slavery's growing decadence was evident when small planters began renting slaves to large plantations at harvest time. A new labor force of slave, free, and contract workers entered the sugar industry and thereby changed the structure of sugar production. It was then only a small step to the abolition of slavery in Cuba.

### **The Ten Years' War, La Guerra Chiquita, and the Abolition of Slavery**

On October 10, 1868, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes and a group of planters from the province of Oriente proclaimed the independence of Cuba in the historic Grito de Yara (Cry of Yara). Initially, there was no mention of the social question of slavery, but as the military campaign went on, it became clear that revolutionary success depended upon uniting all Cubans against Spanish rule. Men like Antonio Maceo, a mulatto from Santiago de Cuba, and Maximo Gómez, a black Dominican exile, contributed to the revolutionary effort. The Cuban masses changed the character of the revolution into a democratic one that sponsored abolition. After a few military victories, the nationalist forces controlled half the island of Cuba. However, the Spanish government was not about to lose its prize possession in the Caribbean. Royalist forces launched a "total war" of destruction, inflicting terrible losses throughout the island.

Even though the Spanish armies were being supplied by the United States, the Cubans remained confident that people in the United States supported them morally and would eventually influence their government to render the Cubans much needed assistance. After 10 years of bloodshed and the loss of an estimated 50,000 Cuban and 208,000 Spanish lives, the war was over. Under the 1878 Pact of Zanjón the crown agreed to enact reforms.



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

However, the end of the war represented only the beginning of a truce between Spain and the Cuban revolutionaries. Men like Maceo and Gómez had become experts in guerrilla fighting and led the Cuban nationalists during the following years of the independence movement.

The next rebellion was organized in New York by a group of veterans of the Ten Year's War under Calixto García, one of the few revolutionary leaders who had not signed the Pact of Zanjón. In 1878 he organized the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in New York and issued a manifesto against Spanish despotism. A positive response came from several revolutionary leaders and *La Guerra Chiquita* (The Little War) started in Cuba on August 26, 1879. Once again, the ill-prepared revolutionaries met with strong resistance, and the war was over by September 1880. Even though this defeat had a tremendous impact upon the exiled revolutionaries and plans for a future uprising came to a halt, the idea of fighting for Cuban independence was not completely abandoned.

The 15 years that preceded the war of 1895 were politically uneventful, and the Spanish promises of reform remained unfulfilled. In 1881 the Spanish constitution of 1876 was extended to Cuba, but it was of little practical effect. Even though Cubans were entitled to send representatives to the Spanish Cortes, or parliament, Cuban deputies represented the more conservative segments of society. In 1880 the Cortes approved the abolition law, which provided for a period of eight years of *patronato* (tutelage) for all slaves liberated according to the law. This system amounted to indentured servitude, because under the *patronato*, slaves were required to spend those eight years working for their masters at no charge. On October 7, 1886, slavery was abolished in Cuba by a royal decree that also made illegal the *patronato*.

### **United States Economic Presence**

After 1878 the Cuban sugar industry had to face strong competition from the European beet-sugar producers. They had been so successful that Europe did not need imports to satisfy consumption on the continent. Cuba thus became even more dependent upon the United States market, which was controlled by a single company, the American Sugar Refining Company. This company controlled 19 refineries in Cuba and supplied 70 to 90 percent of the sugar consumed in the United States, and it set prices at will. Once again, to compensate for low prices, production had to become more efficient. A complete reorganization took place in the Cuban

### *Historical Setting*

*José Martí*  
Courtesy Organization  
of American States



sugar industry. Small mills were absorbed into *centrales* (large sugar mills), and less efficient plantations became suppliers of cane to the *centrales*. Despite the increased productivity and the minimization of capital losses, this restructuring of the sugar industry in Cuba created a greater dependence on the United States-based monopoly. Furthermore, the abolition of slavery, combined with the European beet sugar competition, generated the need for more imported machinery from the United States.

Private investors from the United States entered all sectors of the Cuban economy, iron-ore exploration, cattle raising, fruit and tobacco plantations, and public utility companies. Some estimates place the total investments by United States private enterprises in 1895 at about US\$50 million. However, in early 1895 international trade conditions and Spanish commercial restrictions on the Cuba economy provoked serious discontent. The main complaints against the crown were excessive taxation, a huge Cuban foreign debt, discrimination against Cubans for government positions, royal

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

absolutism, and lack of the basic freedoms of speech and press and the right of assembly.

### **The War of Independence**

The inspirator and organizer of the War of Independence was José Martí (1835-95). Martí was a lawyer who also excelled as a poet and journalist. His dedication to the cause of independence inspired his fellow revolutionaries in their struggle for freedom from Spanish rule. Martí's skills went beyond his literary writings to the practical organization of forces both in Cuba and in the United States. He believed that together they would deal the final blow to Spanish domination of the island.

Born in Havana, Martí spent his youth in Spain with his parents. Upon his return to Cuba, still a young boy, he expressed shock upon seeing the treatment of black slaves on Cuban plantations. As a secondary school student, Martí was imprisoned in Havana for anti-Spanish political activity in 1869-70. After being later sentenced to six years in a military prison, his sentence was commuted to one year of exile in Spain, where he entered the university. Martí traveled all over Europe and the New World and taught in Guatemala in 1877. The following year he returned to Cuba. Accused of conspiring against the Spanish crown, he was deported again to Europe. From Spain, Martí went to France and from there to the United States in 1880. Upon his arrival in New York, he started to organize the Cuban exiles. Martí's journalistic works were widely read and helped shape Cuban political attitudes. In 1890 he helped organize an educational center for black Cuban exiles called La Liga (The League), where he began teaching again. In 1892, at a meeting with several Cuban exile leaders, Martí presented the "Fundamentals and Secret Guidelines of the Cuban Revolutionary Party." This program underlined the goals of the revolution: freedom from foreign political and economic domination, equality among Cubans regardless of class or color, and establishment of democratic processes. In March 1892 the revolutionaries started publishing *Patria* (Fatherland), which publicized the ideas and aspirations of the group under the leadership of Martí.

Between 1892 and 1895 Martí devoted himself to the cause of liberation and received both political and financial support from Cuban exiles from all walks of life. During these early years of preparation, Martí left the military leadership out of his plans until the revolutionaries were fully organized. In 1893 Martí recommended Máximo Gómez as his choice for military leader, and the

### *Historical Setting*

revolutionaries approved his selection. Maceo was also invited to participate in the revolutionary effort, and together with Martí, Gómez, and other veterans of the Ten Years' War, he set out to coordinate operations in Cuba. Local military leaders appointed on the island included Guillermo Moncada in Santiago de Cuba, Bartolomé Masó in Manzanillo, Julio Sanguily in Havana, Pedro E. Betancourt in Matanzas, Manuel Garcia Ponce in Havana, and Francisco Carrillo in Las Villas. The conspirators appointed Juan Gualberto Gómez to be military coordinator between the invading armies and the islanders. Martí's organization qualities and leadership were responsible for the future success of the independence movement.

The order to begin the war was signed on January 29, 1895. In Cuba, Juan Gualberto Gómez set February 24, 1895, as the date to start military operations. The insurrection began with the Grato de Baire (Cry of Baire), named for the village near Santiago de Cuba where it was proclaimed. That same day the forces in the western part of the island were defeated by the Spaniards, and Sanguily, chief commander of the armies of the west, was imprisoned. Meanwhile, the supreme chiefs of the revolution had not yet arrived in Cuba. Máximo Gómez and Martí were still in Santo Domingo working out the details of the invasion, and Maceo was in Costa Rica. On March 25, 1895, Martí presented the *Manifiesto de Montecristi* (Proclamation of Montecristi) and outlined the policy of the war: the war of independence was to be waged by blacks and whites alike; participation of all blacks was crucial for victory; Spaniards who did not object to the war effort should be spared, private rural properties should not be damaged; and the revolution should bring new economic life to Cuba.

On March 29 Maceo and his followers landed in eastern Cuba, and on April 11 they were joined nearby by Máximo Gómez and Martí at Playitas. On April 16 Martí was named major general of the Armies of Liberation. In an article written for the *New York Herald*, Martí defined the goals of the war, stating "Cuba wishes to be free in order that here Man may fully realize his destiny, that everyone may work here, and that her hidden riches may be sold in the natural markets of America . . . The Cubans ask no more of the world than the recognition of and respect for their sacrifices." On May 19 Martí fell at Dos Rios in his first encounter with the Spanish royalist army. He was buried in Havana on May 27, 1895.

Martí had emphasized the need to free Cuba from any foreign power, be it Spain or the United States. The "Apostle of Independence" left a great responsibility to the Cuban people, that of creat-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ing a truly sovereign nation. Martí had also wanted to end the role played by Cuba throughout the colonial period as a bridgehead for further conquests in Latin America. Martí's ideals and example remained a source of inspiration to scores of Cuban patriots in the twentieth century, including Castro.

Martí's death did not stop the independence movement. In September 1895 representatives from the five branches of the Army of Liberation proclaimed the Republic in Arms, and they appointed Salvador Cisneros Betancourt its president and Masó vice president. Gómez was given the title of *general en jefe* (general commander), and Maceo was made his vice commander of the Army of Liberation. Tomás Estrada Palma was appointed diplomatic agent abroad. Meanwhile, the United States government refused to recognize the legitimacy of the revolutionary government.

In early 1895 Gómez and Maceo sent orders to end all economic activity in the island that might be advantageous to the royalists. The population supported the rebellion, despite its economic consequences. A new offensive by royalist forces under the command of Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau succeeded in containing the revolutionaries. Máximo Gómez was isolated in Camaguey and Oriente, and Maceo was killed in Pinar del Rio. The royalist army inflicted widespread destruction of life and property. Weyler's tactics, publicized by revolutionary propaganda in New York, helped arouse public opinion in the United States and even in Spain. Weyler was finally replaced, and a more conciliatory Spanish policy was adopted on January 1, 1898.

The Cubans were not willing to compromise after so many years of sacrifice and the loss of so many lives to the cause of independence. Riots broke out in Havana, and the United States representatives in Cuba requested protection from their home government. On February 15, 1898, a United States battleship, the U.S.S. *Maine*, which had been sent to the Havana harbor to protect United States citizens, exploded and sank; 266 lives were lost. Investigations were made by both parties, and the United States conclusion was that the explosion had been perpetrated from outside the ship. Public opinion pressured the United States government to demand as reparation that Spain grant independence to Cuba. No agreement was reached, and the United States declared war against Spain. By the provision of the so-called Teller Amendment, however, the United States acknowledged that it would make no attempt to establish control over the island.

## **Cuba Between Empires**

### **The Spanish-Cuban-American War**

On April 25, 1898, the United States Congress voted to declare war against Spain. Although the Cuban revolutionaries had wanted only political recognition and material aid from the United States, they accepted military intervention and offered their assistance to the foreign expeditionary forces in order to win. The United States entered the war without recognizing the Republic of Cuba, even though the revolutionaries assumed that the Teller Amendment was sufficient protection for Cuban sovereignty. Thus, despite the early warnings of Martí against allowing Cuba to be used as a bridgehead for foreign penetration of the New World republics, the Cuban revolutionaries greeted the arrival of United States troops.

The war was short. In June, 17,000 United States troops landed at Siboney and Daiquirí, east of Santiago de Cuba. On July 3 the Spanish fleet was destroyed, and a few United States land victories prompted the final surrender of Spanish troops on August 12. The terms of the armistice represented the end of the Spanish overseas empire. Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine islands, and other islands in the Pacific and in the West Indies to the United States. The quick victory over Spain was attributed only to the United States, but such reports failed to recognize that the Cuban struggle for independence had been weakening the crown's resources for several decades. Spain had become impoverished and worn out. In Cuba the Army of Liberation forced Spain to concentrate its troops in urban areas. The countryside was controlled by the revolutionaries, which made it impossible for the royalist army to retreat, once attacked by the United States. The naval blockade of the island prevented reinforcements from reaching the Spanish garrisons. These factors were extremely important to the final victory. In reality, the war was fought between Cuban revolutionaries, Spanish royalists, and United States interventionist forces. According to the terms of the armistice, a peace commission met in Paris on October 1, 1898, and prepared the text of the Treaty of Paris, which was signed by representatives of the United States and Spain.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment**

On January 1, 1899, the Spanish administration retired from Cuba, and that same day General John R. Brooke installed a military government on the island. This was the beginning of the United States occupation of Cuba. However, the United States government was bound by the Teller Amendment, which placed Cuba in a category different from the other areas previously controlled by Spain. Furthermore, the strong annexationist drive had waned in the United States; the realities of Cuba as economically destroyed by the war and having a large black population were responsible for the change in United States attitudes toward the island.

Brooke's administration restored some services while controlling customs, postal services, sanitation; and health agencies. In December 1899 General Leonard Wood initiated the second period of United States administration in Cuba. Wood was a very energetic man who led the most impressive United States-administered reconstruction programs in Cuba. As a former United States surgeon general, Wood undertook a campaign for the eradication of malaria and yellow fever in Cuba. Dr. Walter Reed, an army surgeon, worked on epidemiology and tropical parasitical diseases projects using research results obtained previously by Dr. Carlos Juan Finlay of Cuba. A census taken in 1900 gave a bleak picture of the island's population of 1.5 million (200,000 less than in 1895), in both economic and educational terms. Schools were built, students were enrolled, special training was provided for teachers, and the University of Havana was restructured. Several public works programs were also established for the improvement of railroads, roads, and bridges.

The road to Cuban self-determination was prepared under United States guidance. In 1900 a new electoral law was passed that established a limited franchise for Cubans to elect officials at the municipal level. A constituent assembly convened and drafted a constitution that provided for universal suffrage, a directly elected president, a bicameral legislature, and the separation of church and state. The United States conditioned its approval of the constitution on the acceptance of a series of clauses that would preserve its upper hand in future dealings with "independent" Cuba. These clauses, which were to be appended to the draft of the constitution, were prepared by United States secretary of war Elihu Root and attached to the arms appropriation bill of 1901; they became known as the Platt Amendment. It provided that Cuba should not sign any treaties that could impair its sovereignty or contract any

### *Historical Setting*

debts that could not be repaid by normal revenues. In addition, Cuba had to accept the legitimacy of all acts of the military government, permit the United States to purchase or lease lands for coaling and naval stations, and give the United States special privileges to intervene at any time to preserve Cuban independence or to support a government capable of protecting life, property, and individual liberties.

The Platt Amendment represented a permanent restriction upon Cuban self-determination. Cuba's constituent assembly modified the terms of the amendment and presented it to the United States only to be turned down. The United States-imposed amendment was a tremendous humiliation to all Cubans, whose political life would be plagued by continual debates over the issue until its repeal in 1934. On June 12, 1901, Cuba ratified the amendment as a permanent addendum to the Cuban constitution of 1901 and the only alternative to permanent military occupation by the United States. Nevertheless, the United States acquired rights in perpetuity to lease a naval coaling station at Guantanamo Bay, which remained in the hands of the United States as the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay into the 1980s, under the terms of the May 1903 Treaty of Relations (also known as the Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903) and the Lease Agreement of July 1903.

Under the tutelage of the United States, the political life of Cuba prior to 1933 followed a certain pattern. Incumbent presidents would attempt reelection, but if they were unable to secure their own party's nomination, they would shift their support to the opposition candidate. The incumbent president's candidate would inevitably win at the polls, either legally or fraudulently. The losing party would usually dispute the final results, claim that they were fraudulent, and rise in revolt. The United States would send an arbiter, sometimes backed by United States troops. The mediator would then call for new elections, but the incumbent president's opposition would not accept the arrangement and would boycott the polls. Thus the presidential nominee would win by default. This did not happen every time, however. In 1906 Estrada Palma refused to accept the United States compromise plan, which in fact favored him; and in 1924 there was no electoral boycott or rebellion.



## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **The Republic**

#### **Fragile Independence and Fragile Republic**

After the ratification of the Platt Amendment, United States occupation forces remained on the island for almost a year to complete the reconstruction program and to supervise the first presidential elections in Cuba. Estrada Palma, a longtime resident of the United States and a revolutionary delegate abroad in previous years, received the support of most revolutionaries and was elected to the presidency. On May 20, 1902, General Wood transferred power to the new president, formally ending the military occupation of Cuba. Universal good feeling spread over the island, and appreciation was publicly expressed to Wood. At long last, Cuba had become an independent nation, even though subjected to the restriction of the amendment. There was a certain feeling of relief both in Cuba and in the United States, where groups against intervention, annexation, and imperialism were partially appeased by developments on the island. Cuba remained in the hands of politicians friendly to the United States until 1933. The Treaty of Relations signed in May 1903 also guaranteed a 20-percent lower tariff for Cuban sugar exports to the United States and gave preferential treatment to United States exports to Cuba.

Estrada's first administration corresponded to a period of growth in the Cuban sugar industry. By 1906 United States investments in the sugar, tobacco, and cattle-raising industries had risen to US\$200 million. Cuban development attracted an influx of immigrants, which in 1906 included 10,000 Spaniards. Improvements reached all areas of the country's life, and 25 percent of the national budget was channeled to education. Cuban finances were handled with such care that taxes were low, and there was still a surplus cash flow. However, corruption was still very much alive. Cuban politicians were divided over the Platt Amendment: the National Liberal Party was more outspoken against the restrictions imposed upon Cuban sovereignty, while the Conservative Republican Party was more lenient to foreign demands. As the elections of 1905 approached, Estrada identified himself with the Conservatives and became their candidate for reelection. The Liberals abstained from participation, and Estrada Palma won his second term despite opposition. Unable to control the ensuing Liberal revolt, which became known as the Little War of August, the president requested United States intervention under the terms of the Platt Amendment and resigned the presidency. The administration in

### *Historical Setting*

Washington vacillated, but the threats to United States interests in the island prompted intervention.

To restore peace and stability, the United States sent then secretary of war William Howard Taft to Havana. He arrived on September 9, 1906, and found the country in disarray and few government troops scattered through the island. Taft blamed the recent presidential elections for all the commotion, and decided that the elections had been fraudulent because the Liberals were supported by most Cubans. Taft then commissioned 2,000 United States Marines and 5,600 other United States troops to the island and proclaimed a provisional government on September 29. Taft remained as acting governor until October 13, 1906, when he was replaced by Charles E. Magoon, a lawyer from Nebraska, who gained popularity during his stay in Havana.

Magoon's administration was fairly successful. He sponsored the drafting of the organic laws regulating the functioning of the judiciary, provincial and municipal governments, the civil service, and the electoral system. He also encouraged public works to curtail unemployment and built 600 kilometers of roads. However, Cubans remember Magoon for the free-spending policies of his government, which used up the budgetary surplus inherited from Estrada Palma and the graft that accompanied the public works program. The 1908 elections were sponsored by Magoon. Liberal candidates José Miguel Gómez and Alfredo Zayas won the presidency and vice presidency, respectively. Magoon left Cuba on January 28, 1909, thus ending the United States occupation.

The presidency of Gómez was marked by overall growth and modernization in Cuba. United States investment declined, but European capital poured into the island. Services were improved through the construction of railroads, port facilities, drainage projects, and the construction of public buildings. Gómez created rural schools, a national museum, and several academies of arts and letters and history, and he also sponsored some prolabor legislation. In 1912, in response to uprisings led by the outlawed Independent Colored Union (which claimed that racism had prevented blacks from holding political jobs), the United States Marines returned to Cuba. Despite this display of power at a time of imminent crisis, Gómez was not able to secure reelection for himself. Vice President Zayas, the Liberal candidate for the next elections, was defeated by the Conservative ticket. Mario García Menocal and Enrique José Varona were elected president and vice president, respectively, serving from 1913 to 1916.

To guarantee himself a second term, Menocal rigged the 1916 elections. The Liberal protest was upheld by the Cuban Supreme

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Court, and the United States instructed Menocal to hold new elections in the disputed districts. The Liberals boycotted the new elections and revolted under the leadership of former president Gómez. United States Marines were again ready to intervene, but the forces of Menocal were able to win without outside help. Gómez then won the Liberal nomination in 1920, and Menocal secured the Conservative nomination for Zayas, who had formed his own Popular Party. Menocal was accused of having rigged the elections a second time. General Enoch Crowder, later to become United States ambassador to Cuba, was then its envoy and a member of a Cuban independent consulting board; it was in this latter capacity that he intervened. Again the Liberals boycotted the elections, and Zayas won. The Liberals complained that United States intervention had twice taken the electoral victory away from them.

President Zayas (1920-24) had to contend with Crowder, who became the overseer of Cuba's political life. The postwar depression and problems inherited from the previous administration had to be confronted. Crowder's mission was to help stabilize the political situation and to ease the financial crisis. As an adviser to the Cuban government, Crowder could apply considerable pressure on the Cubans. The Marines, who had been in Camagüey since the war, went home, and Zayas negotiated a treaty with the United States whereby Cuba received permanent title to the disputed Isle of Pines (subsequently known as Isle of Youth or Isla de la Juventud). The country was divided between interventionists, who welcomed the presence of the United States adviser, and noninterventionists, who were critics of the Platt Amendment. In 1922 Crowder helped to set up an "honest cabinet," which did away with many of the abuses from the previous administration. The sugar boom of the war years, 1914-18, created by good crop and market conditions, suffered a major setback in the summer of 1920. By then the international sugar market started on a downward spiral, and prices fell from US\$0.23 to US\$0.04 a pound in less than six months; in addition, a higher sugar tariff was imposed, leading to a crisis in the Cuban sugar industry. To ease the situation, Crowder arranged a loan of US\$50 million from the United States to Cuba, leaving the island nation with a huge foreign debt. In 1923 Crowder was appointed United States ambassador to Cuba, and in this capacity he had to refrain from further interference in the country's internal affairs. A couple of months later the "honest cabinet" was dismissed, and a whole network of nepotism and graft became the rule in Cuba. By the end of his term in office, Zayas was being publicly accused of tax fraud, nepotism, embezzlement, corruption, use of military for political pur-

### *Historical Setting*

poses, neglect of education and sanitation, and allowing an increase in prostitution and in indolence in general. Such a public record gave him little hope of being nominated for reelection. The Conservatives named Menocal for the presidency, and Zayas threw his support to the Liberal Gerardo Machado y Morales, whose program centered on government moralization. Machado won, and Menocal admitted defeat.

During the financial debacle, many Cuban sugar concerns were foreclosed by United States banks. These enterprises were expanded and modernized after they passed into foreign hands. By 1924 United States investments in Cuba had risen to US\$1.2 billion. They controlled half of the sugar industry and began investing in public utilities, such as telephones, electricity, and transportation. Good harvests and good sugar prices overshadowed the growing economic presence of the United States, which had become the most important market for Cuban exports in addition to supplying 75 percent of Cuba's imports. Crowder's interference, the increase in the sugar tariff, and the control of the sugar industry by United States banks contributed to development of an anti-United States feeling in the early 1920s.

### **The Machado Dictatorship**

After the death of José Miguel Gómez in 1921, Carlos Mendieta, a veteran of the War of Independence, and Machado, who in 1908-12 had served as secretary of government under Gómez, rose to become the two potential candidates for leadership of the National Liberal Party. Machado had the organizational qualities and skills of a politician, which Cuban voters realized their country desperately needed at a time when the country had to reconcile a certain degree of economic nationalism with the powerful United States interests.

Machado's inauguration on May 20, 1925, was the beginning of a new stage in the political life of Cuba. An anti-corruption campaign and strict control of the government bureaucracy soon became an instrument of tyranny. Machado realized that economic diversification had to be promoted. In 1927 he sponsored a law that gave tariff protection to Cuban industries and encouraged farmers to cultivate crops other than sugar. In spite of competition from other producers, by 1929 Cuba supplied 45 percent of the world's sugar and 50 percent of United States sugar imports. Increased revenues and better administration made possible a series of public works, including building and maintaining roads, public



*United States troops were a common sight  
in early twentieth-century Havana*  
Courtesy Organization of American States

### *Historical Setting*

buildings, schools, laboratories, and hospitals. Machado's successful government pleased Ambassador Crowder and the foreign interests. However, this was done at the expense of the Cuban labor movement, whose leaders were harassed and/or deported. The police also made indiscriminate use of violence and brutality in the cities and in the countryside. Under Machado Cuba was a paradise for foreigners; by 1929 United States investors had acquired US\$1.5 billion worth of property in Cuba.

In 1925 the Cuban Chamber of Representatives enacted a law—backed by members of the existing parties—preventing the organization or reorganization of political parties. Although severe restrictions existed, new parties could be assembled under extraordinary circumstances. In the first half of 1927, the Machado-dominated Chamber of Representatives passed a set of resolutions calling for constitutional amendments to extend the terms of office for the president, senators, and representatives to May 1933. In spite of these obstacles, a new opposition party entered the Cuban political arena in 1927; the Nationalist Union, led by Mendieta, became the only effective opposition to Machado's policies. The extension reform was passed on May 10, 1928. It abolished the vice presidency and established that Machado's term would not be extended but that he could run for an additional six-year term to end on May 20, 1935. As a result of Machado's control of the Cuban political machinery and the support of United States business interests, he was reelected in 1928.

Machado's grandiose plans started to be fulfilled with his 1929 inauguration. However, the Wall Street crash of that October created unfavorable economic conditions in Cuba; within a year foreign trade dropped to one-tenth of the 1929 level, and United States bankers retreated from any major undertakings. In the general populace, there was suddenly widespread misery; defaults and bankruptcies were common, leading to a rise in unemployment. When the crisis set in, Machado resorted to heavy foreign borrowing while cutting imports. The depression deeply affected Cuba and released repressed political and social forces against the regime. The opposition wanted to reassess the reasons for Cuba's social injustices and its dependence on United States business interests. By 1930 the island was ready to explode. Student protests in Havana led to widespread repression and the closing of the University of Havana and many other educational institutions. A terrorist group of Cuban intellectuals, called ABC, counterattacked the repression with bombings. Machado's gunmen became a common sight in the streets of Havana, while the countryside was abandoned to lawlessness. Several uprisings were attempted but were harshly crushed.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Hatred against Machado kept growing, and even United States support of the regime began to fade.

The United States abstained from interfering in Cuban politics despite the special powers it was provided in the Platt Amendment. However, shortly after President Franklin D. Roosevelt's inauguration in 1933, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles was appointed ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Cuba. Welles arrived in April, and in June he offered to mediate between Machado and the growing opposition. Cuban public opinion split between pro-and anti-interventionist groups. A general strike was called to force Machado's resignation, and the military withdrew its support for the regime. The opposition grew stronger, and realizing that the battle was over, Machado fled to Nassau on August 12, 1933. Welles and the revolutionary leaders appointed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada, the son of the leading revolutionary during the Ten Years War, provisional president. The country was in a state of chaos, mainly owing to the economic crisis, which had been compounded by bad harvests and falling sugar prices. Furthermore, Céspedes nomination had not been well received because of his good relations with both the United States and the Machado administration, in which he had served as a cabinet member and diplomat.

#### **The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath**

On September 4, 1933, at an army base in Havana called Camp Columbia, noncommissioned officers unexpectedly arrested their superiors and took over command of the island's military forces. The "Sergeants' Revolt" had been skillfully organized by Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, the son of poor cane cutters from Oriente of mixed racial ancestry, who in time would become the caudillo of all Cuba. He had become acquainted with the civilian opposition during the trials held by the Machado regime. Sergeant Batista was the best stenographer in the army and had transcribed many of these trials. As soon as the students learned of the revolt, leaders of the Student Directorate (a student-faculty group from the University of Havana that was created to oppose Machado's reelection) joined the sergeants and suggested a broadening of its base of support, thus turning a military revolt into a full blown revolution. Batista invited the student leaders to nominate what was called a pentarchy, or five-man government, and the following day Céspedes was informed of the rebellion and of his deposition (see Development of the Cuban Military under Batista, ch. 5).

### *Historical Setting*

Ambassador Welles was surprised by this turn of events. He requested the intervention of United States troops, but to no avail. On September 10 the pentarchy was dissolved, and one of its members, Ramón Grau San Martín, became the revolutionary provisional president. Grau was popular among the students for his political stance while at the university, where he had defended nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism as the basic tenets of the revolutionary program. As provisional president, he abrogated the constitution of 1901 and declared that a social revolution had been launched. Grau enacted a number of labor reforms: he instituted an eight-hour workday; declared illegal the importation of workers from the Caribbean; required that all enterprises employ a work force 50 percent of which were Cuban; requested that all professionals join their professional organizations; and created a Department of Labor. He also denounced the Platt Amendment, purged Machado's followers from the government, dissolved the old political party machine, and gave autonomy to the university. In protest, the United States denied recognition to Grau's government. United States enterprises and their employees in Cuba feared for the future and, though United States warships sent to Cuban waters stayed on alert, they did not intervene. The pentarchy had given Batista the rank of colonel and the position of chief military commander of the Cuban armed forces. As such, he began promoting enlisted men into the officer corps.

Grau's government aroused discontent from several groups for different reasons. The ABC organized strikes, and even the military personnel of Camp Columbia demonstrated against the government. Batista was able to control all factions, and he finally forced Grau out of office on January 15, 1934. The revolution continued under the direct leadership of Batista, who began by nominating Carlos Hevia provisional president. Lacking support, however, Hevia resigned in two days. He was then replaced by another Batista appointee, Mendieta, a respected member of the old National Liberal Party who led the Nationalist Union and was an experienced politician of moderate views. United States recognition of his government was almost immediate.

Mendieta issued a provisional constitution and reorganized the government. However, strikes and other disturbances undermined his administration. In May 1934 Mendieta signed the Treaty of Relations which modified the terms of the treaty of May 1903 and also abrogated the Platt Amendment, even though it allowed the United States to continue to lease its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. In August of that same year, the two countries signed the commercial Treaty of Reciprocity, which gave preferential treat-



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ment to United States exports to Cuba and guaranteed Cuba 22 percent of the United States sugar market—a figure that would rise to 49 percent by 1949—at a special low duty. The sugar industry started to recover, which was demonstrated by increased production and a rise in prices. Economic conditions changed rapidly, and so did labor expectations, thus leading to a wave of strikes. In March 1935, seeing that economic recovery was at stake, Batista crushed the rebellion.

Mendieta resigned in December 1935 and was replaced by José A. Barnet. In January 1936 Miguel M. Gómez (son of former president José Miguel Gómez) won the presidential election, in which women were allowed to vote for the first time. In a maneuver engineered by Batista, the president was impeached in December 1936 for having vetoed a bill to create rural schools under army control. Vice President Federico Laredo Bru served the concluding years of Gómez' term.

Laredo Bru's government enacted a series of reforms. Under a three-year plan, he pushed through passage of the Law of Sugar Coordination in 1937, which organized small farmers into cooperatives and unionized agricultural workers. In 1938 Laredo Bru created a powerful national union, the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC). He also outlawed debt peonage and guaranteed tenant farmers a share of their crops and protection against seizure of their lands. Later on, social security benefits were extended to rural workers, and state lands were divided among small growers. Political groups opposing the United States, from fascist to communist, were allowed to operate in Cuba. A Constitutional Assembly was elected in 1939, and it met for the first time in February 1940, under the presidency of Grau. At the end of 1939 Batista resigned his post as commander of the armed forces and ran for the presidency, under a coalition supported by the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) and the Revolutionary Union Party (Partido Unión Revolucionario—PUR); the two were merged to form the Communist Revolutionary Union (Unión Revolucionario Comunista—URC). In 1944 the party's name was changed to the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP). Batista then defeated Grau, who ran as the candidate of the Cuban Revolutionary Party (commonly known as the Auténticos), in the 1940 elections. Batista was a strong president who was able both to neutralize the opposition and to promote social welfare measures, wage increases, and economic growth.

Cuba declared war on the Axis powers soon after the United States entered World War II. The climate of friendly relations with

*Historical Setting*



*Fulgencio Batista*  
Courtesy Organization  
of American States

the United States was important for the country's development at the time. Cuban sugar production rose with the war effort, and from 1942 to 1947 the United States purchased all Cuban sugar at a relatively high price (almost US\$0.03 per pound) and imposed low duties (US\$0.008 per pound). Batista's presidency was marked by the support of sugar interests, and he felt confident enough to court the Cuban left. In 1943 he established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, Batista's longtime opponent, Grau won the 1944 presidential elections through a coalition of his own party, the Conservative Republican Party, and the communists. Acknowledging his defeat, Batista went into political retirement in the United States.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **Prerevolutionary Cuba**

#### **The Failure of Democracy**

Grau, highly regarded in Cuba, won the 1944 election against the Batista candidate, Carlos Saladrigas. He inherited a wartime economic boom and a competent bureaucracy. During his term in office, however, Cuba became a haven for corruption, graft, black marketeers, and vice. The country also became fertile ground for political activism, which was carried on mostly by the students and the communists, whose numbers had increased because of a mass exodus from Mexico following the end of Lázaro Cárdenas administration in 1940. The opposition had been schooled in the fight against the Machado regime. Their effectiveness had been further increased by the autonomy of the university, which was off-limits to police. Even though the communists had supported Grau's nomination, it was the onset of the Cold War, the shift in Soviet relations with the democratic left, and the spread of anticommunist ideology that led the president to break his ties with them in 1947 (see *The Communist Party of Cuba*, ch. 4).

Carlos Prío Socarrás won the 1948 elections as Grau's candidate from the Auténticos. A new opposition party, the Ortodoxos, had been created before the elections, however. Sometimes known as the Cuban People's Party, the Ortodoxos had been organized in 1946 by Eduardo (Eddie) Chibás. Like the Auténticos, the Ortodoxos defended the principles of progressive social and economic betterment, but they added an emphasis on administrative decency. Prió's term in office was directed against violence and the presence of communists in the administration, although excessive labor privileges provoked the flight of business and capital from Cuba. In 1949 United States sailors desecrated a monument in Havana honoring José Martí, thus creating a certain amount of friction between the two countries. The two Auténtico presidents had been a disappointment, and corruption became rampant at all levels of government. The Cuban people hoped for a change in the elections of 1952.

#### **Batista's Dictatorship**

The elections of 1952 were centered on the elimination of corruption in Cuba's government, and three factions nominated candidates for the presidency. The Ortodoxos had a very good chance of carrying the electorate on a platform promising decency in govern-

### *Historical Setting*

ment, accompanied by a campaign against corruption. However, they lost their hero in August 1951, when Chibás shot himself at the end of one of his broadcasts. The loss of Chibás created a vacuum in the opposition, but Professor Roberto Agramonte was nominated as the new Ortodoxo candidate. The Auténticos wanted a man above suspicion to run against the Ortodoxos. They chose Carlos Hevia, who had been provisional president in 1934, because he was an honest man, though lacking in charisma. The third candidate was Batista, who had been elected in absentia to the Senate in 1948 and had recently returned to Cuba.

The contest between Hevia and Agramonte was favorable to the Auténtico candidate, and Batista realized he had no chance of changing the odds. On March 10, 1952, three months before the elections, Batista took power in a bloodless coup d'état with the help of his military friends at Camp Columbia. He suppressed the electoral process and appointed himself provisional ruler. Within a couple of hours, President Prío and his cabinet went into exile. Twenty years of political development in Cuba had suddenly come to a halt, and it was quickly evident that the next phase would be dominated by a military dictatorship. In short order Batista's men occupied the most important military posts, and Batista justified his actions by accusing Prío of having planned to establish a dictatorship in Cuba. Because of Batista's past record with international interest, he quickly gained recognition for his government by non-communist nations throughout the world. Batista suspended the constitution, dissolved all political parties, and created the Council of State to replace the Cuban Congress. Political dissidents were not immediately harassed, however, and students continued to demonstrate.

Cubans inherently did not trust Batista, however, and they expected to see him piling up more wealth through gambling payoffs. In 1952 sugar production reached 7.2 million tons, and to prevent falling prices, Batista decided to cut production by 2 million tons a year. Public works and small enterprises were favored by the dictator's policies. Overall, his six years in government were characterized by prosperity in exchange for freedom. Resistance kept growing, however, and the dictatorship applied repression even more often and cruelly. By the end of Batista's term, repression had reached unprecedented levels.

Fidel Castro was the son of Spanish sugar planters from the province of Oriente. He studied under the Jesuits and, as a law student at the university, became an Ortodoxo and a follower of Chibás. He was very active in student politics, both at home and abroad, which quite often took violent forms. In 1947 he partici-

*Cuba: A Country Study*

pated in a failed expedition to assassinate the Dominican dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina. As a representative of Cuban students, he attended a preliminary conference for the organization of a Latin American students' union conducted under the auspices of Argentine president Juan Domingo Perón in Bogotá in 1948. While in Colombia, Castro allegedly participated in riots known as the "Bogotazo," which followed the assassination of presidential candidate Eliécer Gaitán. Castro graduated from law school in 1950 and was invited to run as an Ortodoxo candidate to the Chamber of Representatives in the elections of 1952, which were preempted by Batista. After the coup the campaign went on for a short time, during which the daring Castro circulated a petition to depose the Batista government on the grounds of its illegitimacy. The court ruled against his motion that revolutions, in contrast, create their own legitimacy. One of the judges, Manuel Urrutia Lléo, did not comply with the majority, and Castro would not forget his independent and revolutionary stance.

On July 26, 1953, Castro led a revolt in which 165 men attacked the Moncada army barracks near Santiago de Cuba. The attack was a failure, but it planted the seed of future revolutionary fervor. Castro was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. At the end of the trial, on October 16, 1953, the 26-year-old revolutionary delivered a historic statement that ended with the phrase "*la historia me absolverá*" (history will absolve me).

The Moncada attack prompted Batista to proclaim a 90-day state of siege to prevent public protests. By early 1954 the economy was booming, everything seemed to be under control, and he decided to hold the scheduled presidential elections in November. Batista nominated himself as the candidate of his newly formed Progressive Action Party to run against his former opponent, Grau. Grau withdrew his candidacy before the elections, however, on the grounds that the elections were likely to be fixed. A high rate of abstention by the opposition gave Batista the opportunity to inaugurate himself as constitutional president on February 1955.

The Moncada incident would have soon been forgotten but for the repressive measures undertaken by Batista against its participants and other Cuban dissidents. Several groups, among them lawyers, priests, lay Catholics, and students, began to defend the victims of Batista's repression. In May, in response to these pressures and as a measure of his self-confidence, Batista declared a general amnesty that allowed the return of exiled members of the opposition and freed most political prisoners, including Castro and his followers from Moncada. On July 7 Castro left Cuba for exile in Mexico.

### *Historical Setting*

In spite of opposition organized and funded by Prío and voiced in the press, times were good. Lower sugar production kept prices from falling, and industrial growth and tourism increased both revenues and the country's reserves of foreign currency. The way in which Cuba checked population growth and inflation was an example to the rest of Latin America. However, corruption and nepotism, which enriched some groups while allowing the rest of the population to grow poorer, were important ingredients in the island's prosperity. Several segments of society opposed Batista: the poor, the neglected labor force (whom Batista had favored in the past), the communists, and the old political and intellectual opposition. To the latter Batista was a profit seeker who had halted the development of democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, in Mexico the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio—M-26-7), named after the date of the Moncada attack, was organizing Cuban exiles. Military training, fund-raising activities, study groups, and clandestine politics were growing in numbers and participants. Ernesto (Che) Guevara, an Argentine doctor, joined the group. The conspirators in Mexico began to contact the Cuban opposition back home and in mid-1956 they issued the Pact of Mexico and later in the year created the Revolutionary Student Directorate (Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario—DER), whose activities included urban terrorism and sabotage against the government. M-26-7 outfitted an expedition from Mexico, and on board the yacht *Granma* (bought with funds provided by Prío), 81 men set sail for Cuba under Castro's leadership and landed in the province of Oriente on December 2, 1956. A combination of factors preordained their initial failure. Poor communications between the expeditionaries and the Cuban underground, bad weather, and government knowledge of their arrival prompted a counterattack by Batista's forces. The revolutionaries dispersed, but the vast majority were killed or captured. The two Castro brothers, Fidel and Raúl, Guevara, and a handful of others fled to the Sierra Maestra with the help of friendly peasants.

### **Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista**

Batista's regime began to crumble after the landing of the *Granma*. One factor that contributed to the steady decline of Batista's leadership capability was an interview given by Castro to *New York Times* reporter Herbert Matthews in February 1957, after two months of government claims that the revolutionary leader had been killed. After a five-year period of calm, urban terrorism once

*Cuba: A Country Study*

again became common. While Batista was being publicly criticized at home and abroad, Castro became a folk hero to the underprivileged masses of Latin America.

In the Sierra Maestra, the revolutionaries were training for their next attack. On March 13, 1957, the DER stormed into the Presidential Palace in a frustrated attempt to assassinate the president. Batista's forces increased their repression, and censorship became very rigid. But the guerrilla fighters were not losing any ground either, though they were surrounded by Batista's well-armed forces in Oriente. If they could not advance outside the sierra, neither could Batista's men penetrate the island's western mountains. Supplies to the revolutionaries kept arriving, mainly from the United States. The *zafra* (sugarcane harvest) of early 1958 marked a period of great violence and police brutality. In April Castro called for a general strike, but it did not materialize because of opposition by the PSP-controlled CTC labor confederation.

Batista's apparent victory over the strikers was a boost to his regime, and he went ahead with plans for elections in November 1958. Batista's candidate, Andrés Rivero Agüero, was named victor over Grau, an Auténtico, and Carlos Márques Sterling, an Ortodoxo, in the fraudulent elections of November 3. United States support had already been withdrawn from the Cuban government in early 1958, when an arms shipment to Cuba had been cancelled. After the rigged elections, it became even more clear that Cuba was being denied a free democratic process. By the end of the year, the revolutionaries had burst out of the Sierra Maestra. With his army deserting in droves, Batista fled into exile on New Year's Day 1959. The following day Guevara took Havana with the help of 600 revolutionaries.

The breakdown of Cuba's authoritarian regime was prompted by a combination of factors, including its political illegitimacy, disrespect for the people's legitimate expectations, and indiscriminate use of repression against political dissidents. Batista's dictatorship had alienated the middle classes. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, the traditional popular forces had been neutralized, and there was no other political group capable of offering the necessary leadership to all Cubans. Coercion was the only path open to the dictatorship in dealing with the revolutionary forces of the opposition, who were able to embody popular aspirations and turn the revolution into a truly popular one. Clientelism had prevented the development of a democratic process in Cuba prior to 1959, and its breakdown created new hopes for change.

## **Revolutionary Cuba**

### **The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959-60**

The fall of Batista left a political vacuum in Cuba, even though the revolutionary elite represented by Castro and his followers acquired control of the decisionmaking process. Castro was committed to political democracy and social reforms as defended by José Martí. The first revolutionary government was a facade, with Urrutia in the presidency. Urrutia was the judge who had voted in favor of the revolutionaries in the wake of the aborted 1952 elections. On February 16, 1959, Castro became prime minister, but because of conflicts between himself and the president, Castro resigned his post on July 17. The conflict was related to Urrutia's anticommunism, but Castro was initially unable to dismiss him because Urrutia was a patriot and considered an honest man. Castro had provided the Cuban populace with enough reason for withdrawing support from the president, however, and the general clamor reached such proportions that Urrutia had to take refuge in the Venezuelan embassy. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a distinguished lawyer and aristocrat from Cienfuegos who was Castro's choice to replace Urrutia, became president on July 18. A loyal friend of Castro, the brilliant Dorticós announced to a cheering crowd on July 26 that, pressed by popular demand, Castro had agreed to resume his post as prime minister.

The first stage of the Cuban Revolution was characterized by the liquidation of the old power groups (the military, political parties, labor unions, and agricultural and professional associations) and their replacement by new revolutionary bodies, such as the Rebel Army, the militia, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs). Few political organizations established during the prerevolutionary days were allowed to continue to operate, except the M-26-7, the DER, and the PSP. But their effectiveness was limited by the revolutionary elite, who controlled all aspects of the decisionmaking process. In the early days the elite's decisions were legitimized by popular acclamation at mass rallies. The confiscation of sugar lands began in mid-1960, and the collectivization of the means of production was coupled with economic management by the revolutionary elite.

Early revolutionary policies were formulated in response to the expectations of the middle sectors of Cuban society, which had backed the struggle against Batista. These included land reform, improvement of salary and benefits to workers, diversification of



*Cuba: A Country Study*

agriculture—less dependence on sugar—industrialization, regulation of foreign enterprises, and administrative reform. Wealth and income were redistributed to the middle and lower sectors of society. Services improved and were extended to the whole population through social services and lower utility rates, taxes, and rents. In May 1959 the Law of Agrarian Reform created the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria—INRA) to assist rural workers. In order to eliminate the traditional *minifundium* (small landholding) and *latifundium* (large landholding), it established a minimum size of agricultural properties at 27 hectares for individuals and placed upward limits of 400 hectares on holdings by agro-industries. The country was divided into 28 zones under the administration of INRA, which also had the responsibility of providing health and educational services to the population. By 1961 land reform policies had already redistributed over 1 million hectares of land, 167,000 sugar workers had joined cooperatives, and about 50,000 still worked for wages at private farms. That same year saw the creation of the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—ANAP). The revolutionary government had kept its promises to the underprivileged masses that rallied behind the new regime, while antagonizing the traditional propertied classes.

Dependence upon a single crop was an obstacle to development, and it made the Cuban economy vulnerable to fluctuations in production and in sugar prices in the international markets (particularly in the United States). To diminish dependence on sugar, the revolutionaries felt that Cuba had to industrialize through import substitution. Industrial development, it was felt, would free Cuba from its internal dependence on sugar, create new jobs, reduce imports, and diversify exports. Agrarian reform gave the government the necessary power to restructure the agricultural sector, making sugar the most important item in the agenda. On July 5, 1960, however, the United States canceled Cuba's quota for sugar exports to the United States. Cuba then nationalized United States enterprises operating in the country, including 36 *centrales*, the Cuban Telegraph and Telephone Company, the Cuban Electric Company, and all oil refineries. Three hundred eighty-two other large enterprises, all Cuban, and most foreign banks were nationalized on October 13. Only the Canadian institutions received compensation from the revolutionary government. Finally, on October 17 the remaining United States banking institutions were nationalized. These steps enabled Cuba to quicken the pace of socialization of the means of production.

*Fidel Castro as a  
young guerrilla fighter,  
flanked by Raúl Castro and  
Camilo Cienfuegos*  
Courtesy Library of Congress



*Castro, with Ernesto (Che) Guevara and Anastas Mikoyan,  
first deputy premier of the Soviet Union, in 1963.*  
Courtesy Organization of American States

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

As time went on, the revolutionary process grew more radical. The CDRs became the right arm of the Revolution, reaching down into the neighborhoods in constant vigilance against possible enemies of the Revolution. Lacking a democratic electoral process, the Revolution became the sole political arbiter. Dissidents were scorned and linked to United States interests. The main opposition to the regime came from both the People's Revolutionary Movement and the Revolutionary Movement of Redemption, whose objective was to destabilize the consolidation of the leftist government. There was also marked dissension within the M-26-7 and between Castroites, whose loyalty to Castro was unconditional, and the former communists, who felt closer to Guevara and Raúl Castro. The nonradical groups lost, while greater power was shared among the Castroites (also known as *fidelistas*), *guevaristas* (followers of Guevara), and *raulistas* (followers of Raúl Castro). Above all factions stood Fidel Castro, who relied upon his charisma to justify his actions through magnificent oratory (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, ch. 2; *Mass Organizations*, ch. 4).

Relations between Cuba and the United States during the first period of the Revolution went from mutual uncertainty all the way to the rupture of relations and military action. In 1959 the Cuban communists from the PSP began applying pressure on Moscow in order to secure Soviet assistance and protection. The Kremlin and the White House, however, were in a process of negotiation that had begun with a meeting between President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Premier Nikita Khrushchev in September 1959. At this time Moscow's engagement in Cuba would have hampered these bilateral efforts.

In February 1960, however, First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan of the Soviet Union visited Havana and signed an agreement for credits of US\$100 million for the purchase of industrial equipment and technical assistance. The Soviet Union also agreed to purchase almost 400,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and another 4 million tons by 1964. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on May 8, 1960, three days after the Soviets announced the shooting down of a United States U2 reconnaissance plane over its airspace. In March, following the Cuban-Soviet economic agreement, the United States had already decided to recruit, train, and outfit a Cuban exile force. This decision would lead to the fateful events of 1961.

**Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62**

The year 1961 was dedicated to upgrading the Cuban educational system, especially the literacy campaign. Education became compulsory and state controlled. In the spring of 1961 all but a few private schools had been taken over by the government. The major setback was the lack of qualified teachers as well as other professionals, such as doctors and scientists, who fled the country beginning in 1959. However, what the revolutionaries lacked in specific skills they compensated for with dedication. Estimates made at the end of the year claimed that 80 percent of all school-age children had been given the opportunity to enroll in the schools and that the rate of illiteracy had dropped to 3.9 percent. Even though the emphasis of the revolutionary educational program was on technical training and ideological indoctrination, the revolutionary leadership also promoted the arts, created the Cuban Film Institute, and began operating all available publishing houses in an effort to generate new values for the Cuban masses (see Education, ch. 2).

The Cuban revolutionary government also showed concern for health care, and it started building a network of rural health clinics staffed with at least a doctor, a midwife, a laboratory technician, and visiting nurse. The clinics were responsible for educating the rural communities on matters of health, and they relied on local cooperation to carry out their program in tropical and social medicine. By 1963 there were 122 rural centers in operation, and medical graduates had to perform a year of rural service. This program was under the umbrella of the INRA, which provided the centers with the necessary facilities and equipment (see Health and Welfare, ch. 2).

In April 1961 Castro stated the socialist character of the Cuban Revolution, and the following December he declared himself a Marxist-Leninist. Analysts claimed that these were clear attempts to gain economic and military support from the Soviet Union and its allies. At that point a new revolutionary phase unfolded for Cuba under the auspices of the Soviet Union. There was a shift from the "trial and error" style of the first two years of the Revolution toward an attempt to apply efficiently a Soviet-style system of politico-economic organization and development planning. Centralization was one of the basic tenets of the effort. In July 1961 the revolutionary organizations came together under the umbrella known as Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI), with members of the PSP, the DER, and the M-26-7 under the leadership of Aníbal Escalante of

*Cuba: A Country Study*

the PSP. On March 26, 1962, Escalante was ousted by Castro on the grounds that he had attempted to exercise excessive control over the ORI by packing it with PSP veterans. Several months later the ORI was dissolved by Castro and replaced by the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista—PURS), under the control of Castro and his inner group. However, the void left by the withdrawal of United States economic and technical aid was replaced by a centralized system of planning and technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union. Under this new orientation, Cubans were to be prepared to hold managerial positions, and the union movement was to be used as a channel for the central administration. Economic growth and industrialization would be generated through lower consumption and higher rates of investments.

On January 3, 1961, Eisenhower broke diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba in response to Castro's demand that the United States reduce its embassy staff in Havana to fewer than 20 persons. On February 2 recently inaugurated president John F. Kennedy approved previously laid plans for an invasion of Cuba, with April 17 chosen as the date for the invasion. President Kennedy's support was conditioned on their being no direct involvement of United States forces in the invasion itself, even though various United States agencies participated heavily in training and providing support to the exile force. To comply with Kennedy's specifications, the invasion was to be small and covert.

The first air strike by airplanes flying from Nicaragua on April 14 was ineffective, destroying only five of the 30 airplanes in the Cuban air force. The air attack provoked a protest at the United Nations, and a second such attempt was canceled. On April 17 a landing expedition of 1,297 disembarked at Playa Girón, on the Bay of Pigs. The operation was doomed from the start. President Kennedy had reduced the landing's air protection and had forbidden the use of United States aircraft. The exiles were poorly organized and their military support by the Cuban underground opposition elsewhere on the island failed to materialize. Castro, who commanded the forces that met the invasion, knew the area around the Bay of Pigs well and easily suppressed the exile invasion. The invading forces surrendered on April 19. Their casualties were between 85 and 150, and the survivors were taken as prisoners in Havana. Castro established a ransom of approximately US\$62 million in medical supplies for their release. Even before the arrival of the ransom, however, the prisoners were freed to return to the United States in time for Christmas in 1962.

### *Historical Setting*

The victory of Castro's forces at the Bay of Pigs had important consequences for the consolidation of Castro's regime, for the disbanding of opposition groups on the island, and for the fueling of propaganda on "imperialist aggression." Castro doubted that the invasion would be the last attempt to overthrow his government and he set out to build one of the largest armed forces in Latin America. In the United States, despite the debacle, Kennedy gained popularity for his strong stance against communism.

The Cuban government then turned its attention to the island's economic problems. There had been a sharp decline in sugar production, which hampered the provision of financial resources to developing industries. In spite of innovations in economic planning, the country was still heavily dependent on sugar. Guevara was the architect of a four-year plan designed by the Central Planning Board, which called for agricultural diversification and industrialization. However, by 1962 the results were far from encouraging. Between 1961 and 1963 sugar output dropped first from 6.8 to 4.8 million tons and then to a low of 3.8 million tons. Thus, in three years production was cut almost in half. To compensate for the loss of export earnings, consumption was restricted, and a system of rationing was introduced to Cuba in 1962.

In January 1962 the Organization of American States (OAS) voted to exclude Cuba from participating in the OAS system. The sanctions resulted from Venezuela's well-documented charges against Cuba that its support of Venezuelan insurgents constituted foreign intervention in Venezuela's internal affairs. Sanctions were fully supported by the United States. It reinforced this decision in 1964 when it recommended that member states abstain from trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. United States pressure resulted in the withdrawal of all except the Mexican diplomatic corps from Cuba.

Castro's acquiescence to Soviet wishes to install nuclear missiles in Cuba proved near-disastrous, as the Soviet Union and Castro himself brought the whole world to the edge of a nuclear war. The United States government had grown alarmed at the rapid and heavy Soviet military buildup and installation of surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile bases in Cuba, and on September 13, 1962, Kennedy requested that Congress give him emergency powers to call up reserve troops. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union began on October 22, 1962, when the United States announced a naval quarantine of Cuba that was to remain in effect until all rockets, Soviet military technicians, and troops for manning the missiles and guarding the sites were removed from Cuban soil.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

After six days of nuclear brinkmanship between the superpowers, Khrushchev accepted the conditions imposed by the United States on October 28 without asking for Castro's consent. Nevertheless, the settlement between Kennedy and Khrushchev is thought to have brought about some important assurances for Cuba: the alleged secret agreement prescribed that Cuba would have immunity against military aggression by the United States as long as it did not become a base for Soviet offensive weapons. Cuban-Soviet relations were seriously strained by the missile crisis, however, because the Soviets had initiated and resolved the situation with little regard for Cuba's interests or its national sovereignty. After the 1962 missile crisis, relations between Cuba and the United States remained frozen. Furthermore, throughout the 1960s—a period when Cuba was committed to exporting revolution—observers recorded a number of covert operations against the Cuban regime, allegedly undertaken by United States intelligence agencies.

#### **Radicalization of the System, 1963-66**

The policies of the mid-1960s were marked by a major reshaping of the country's political and economic life. The period witnessed massive mobilization, new attempts at different ideological models, economic dislocation, and social radicalism. Major changes took place in the productive system, in land-tenure arrangements, and in the distribution process. Institutions such as the army and the communist party went through internal transformations. The political leadership in Cuba became imbued with the idea that society's material base was responsible for shaping its nonmaterial side, e.g., culture, morals, and the political framework. The leadership, in short, became more idealistic. Militancy and revolutionary consciousness were encouraged in politics, culture, and relations between the state and the labor force as well as in party development. Coercion was used as a weapon against dissidents and counterrevolutionaries.

Failures in planning and development strategies, initially modeled on those of the Soviet Union, led Cubans to reassess the effectiveness of the Soviet system as applied to the traditional Cuban economy. The estrangement in the Soviet-Cuban relations over the missile crisis led to closer relations with China, whose revolutionary strategies were closer to Cuba's. In 1963 Cuba followed the Chinese in refusing to sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The new directions of Cuban economic development were left under the

### *Historical Setting*

leadership of Guevara, whose idealistic approach was influenced by Mao Zedong's ideology at the time of China's "Great Leap Forward." There were three main objectives: total elimination of the market of "commodity production," creation of a "new man," and export of the revolutionary model to other Latin American nations (see *The New Revolutionary Man*, ch. 2).

Elimination of the commodity-production market was to be achieved by collectivization of the means of production. Efficiency was to be increased through a highly centralized and automated planning system coupled with government financing of all state enterprises and the elimination of material incentives. The idealistic "new man" was to be an unselfish, self-sacrificing, frugal, socialized, and egalitarian human being whose training would be achieved through education, mobilization, voluntary labor, and moral incentives. The combination of these would then lead to capital accumulation and the economic development of society as a whole. It was hoped that the last objective, the spreading of the revolutionary model to other countries in Latin America, would guarantee the survival of socialism in Cuba. This was to be achieved through the creation of rural guerrilla cells, such as those that had existed in the Sierra Maestra.

This was a period of intense ideological questioning of economic policy and of the viability of the Soviet economic model for Cuban society. The leadership was divided between radical *guevaristas* and a more pragmatic group of cautious bureaucrats led by economist Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. The *guevaristas* were extremely critical of the Soviet Union's domestic and international policies on the ground that they did not represent real socialism. They defended the principle of a continuous social revolution, criticized institutionalization, appeared to have no process, and were against unionization. As a result, the government de-emphasized the CTC and created the Advanced Workers Movement. The group under Rodríguez, who represented the old Soviet-line communists, supported the view of central planning through computerization and advocated self-financing for one-third of all government enterprises, whereby loans given by the central bank had to be paid back with interest and enterprises were allowed to retain part of the profits for reinvestment. Economic efficiency would be attained through institutionalization, with the help of a skillful bureaucracy, and high labor productivity, based on a system of work quotas and material incentives. (In the Soviet Union, economic goals were established by a quota system, and productivity above and beyond such goals represented material benefits to workers, such as better pay and housing.) As expected, Rodríguez' group defended the need for a



*Cuba: A Country Study*

strong Communist Party, rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and closer ties with the rest of Latin America (see National-level Politics, ch. 4).

During the second phase of the revolutionary process, the second Law of Agrarian Reform, decreed in October 1963, eliminated 10,000 middle-sized farms. Castro promised that this would be the end of expropriations for as long as people kept cultivating their land under the control of ANAP. The newly available lands were transformed into *granjas del pueblo* (people's farms). The new organization of land tenure proved disastrous to middle-sized cattle and dairy farms, but once more, political considerations took precedence over the economy. To make matters worse, Hurricane Flora hit Cuba and caused great destruction to the island. According to Herbert Matthews, "It was one of those years which proved that the Cuban Revolution did not stand or fall on its economic performance."

By mid-1963 economic experimentation had already failed. Castro's trip to the Soviet Union and the trade agreement that followed had given him enough incentive to change the policies of the previous phase. The Soviet Union promised to purchase 24 million tons of sugar between 1965 and 1970. Prospects for economic assistance and a market for Cuban products were better, so Castro decided to accept the Soviet recommendation to increase sugar production and postpone further industrialization. Back in Cuba, he announced that by 1970 the country would produce a record 10 million tons of sugar and that the effort to reach the goal would lay the cornerstone for Cuba's future economic development. Results of the emphasis on sugar proved discouraging, however. After experiencing a 9-percent growth rate in 1964, economic growth fell to 1.5 percent in 1965 and plunged to rock bottom at -3.7 percent in 1966.

An important development of the period was the reorganization of the PURS to form the PCC in October 1965. The party's mission was to orient and carry out government policies, but not to govern. The structure of the new PCC consisted of the eight-man Political Bureau; as the highest decisionmaking body in the party, it included Fidel Castro as first secretary, Raúl Castro as second secretary, and President Dorticós, Armando Hart Dávalos, and four other *fidelistas* as members. The Central Committee consisted of 100 members, a majority of them *fidelistas*. Above the party structure and all government organizations stood Fidel Castro, who had his inner circle of devoted *fidelistas* to interpret his wishes and carry out policies accordingly. Despite the apparent *fidelistas* domination during the mid-1960s, a major power struggle pitted the fi-



Photo by Phillips Bourns



*Old Havana, which is undergoing restoration  
with funds provided by the United States*  
Photo by Philip Brenner

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

*delistas*, who were aligned with the *guevaristas*, against the old communists and the technocrats. The special breed of Cuban-style socialism was exemplified by Castro himself, who stated in a July 1966 speech that "we do not pretend to be the most perfect interpreters of Marxist ideas; we have our way of interpreting Marxism-Leninism, our way of interpreting Communism." The newspaper *Granma* served as the official organ of the PCC.

Cuban-Chinese relations had been in good standing for several years. Initially, China provided Cuba with generous credits and economic aids. Relations seriously deteriorated, however, when the Chinese announced that they could not honor their trade agreement for the year 1966. The two countries had agreed to exchange 250,000 tons of rice for 850,000 tons of sugar, but the Chinese could send only 135,000 tons of rice to Cuba, prompting a further rationing of rice in Cuba.

#### **Sino-Guevarism, 1966-70**

During the 1963-66 radicalism phase, Castro distanced himself from the ideological controversy that characterized the early 1960s, controlling both groups by occasionally dismissing or sending their members abroad. In mid-1966 he endorsed Sino-Guevarism (Guevara's interpretation of the Chinese model of socialism) and adopting the ideas of the "new man," he embarked the country on a cultural and economic revolution. Those who advocated economic policies above the development of pure socialism were subjected to criticism. However, Castro's policies already represented a new brand of Sino-Guevarism. Policies were generated by Castro and his inner circle, who emphasized capital accumulation, mass mobilization, egalitarianism, and abolition of the need for money. The existence of informal personal mechanisms of control diminished the party's effectiveness as the Cuban army grew in number and influence (see *Role of the Government*, ch. 3).

After his adoption of the new model, Castro set out to mobilize great numbers of people to reach the goal of 10 million tons in the sugar harvest of 1970. The previous attempt to industrialize the country had been a failure, and Cuba desperately needed to reverse its negative trade balance, which was heavily oriented toward imports of food, manufactured goods, and machinery. The "10 million tons" battle depended on an efficient strategy capable of maximizing output while minimizing costs. Guevara's idea was to promote a budgetary financing system based on moral, instead of material, incentives. To carry out this ambitious plan, it was

### *Historical Setting*

necessary to induce the creation of a different kind of society in which men and women would put their own aspirations aside for the common good. A complex network of social institutions, including schools, neighborhood associations, and the CDRs, would provide the necessary mechanisms for the creation of the "new man". Dissidents would risk losing their memberships in those groups.

Another key factor of this effort was the centralization of unions, peasant organizations, and individual enterprises. Central planning provided for the decline of popular participation in the decisionmaking process, which came under the leadership of a small revolutionary elite led by Castro. To assist the leadership, Castro requested the aid of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR) in the recruitment, organization, and command of the labor force during the harvest effort. Even though the military had little or no experience in the diverse aspects of the sugar industry, its contribution to the harvest was considered very important. In a country where the economy was in a state of chaos as a result of ill planning, managerial incompetence, and improvisation (especially by Castro) in setting production targets, such an undertaking was doomed to failure. One problem facing Cuba at that time was the overglorification of labor participation in any given task. Although the leadership expected positive responses to moral incentives and hoped to inspire dedication from the labor force, absenteeism was rampant by the end of the 1960s.

Guevara's followers defended the idea that to promote socialism at home, it was necessary to create favorable conditions for the spread of socialism abroad. Thus, Cuba embarked on the dissemination of guerrilla rural *focos* (cells), a strategy that had been effective in the Sierra Maestra, by effectively aiding revolutionary groups throughout Latin America. After accepting the defeat of his economic plan for industrialization, Guevara left for Africa and from there went to the highlands of Bolivia, where he was killed in 1967.

In 1964 Escalante returned to Cuba after two years in exile. Upon arrival he began organizing the old PSP veterans, whose ideological preferences rested on a more purely Soviet-oriented model. Escalante's "microfaction," as it became known, started a campaign to discredit Castro's government among communist leaders abroad. The operations of the "microfaction" were not secret, and the government started to prepare a dossier about its activities. In January 1968 Raúl Castro presented the PCC's Central Committee with enough information so that measures could be taken to curtail any threats to the regime. The committee recommended that the

*Cuba: A Country Study*

participants in the "microfaction" be expelled from the party and that legal measures also be taken against them. The resulting neutralization of the Escalante faction was an important step in putting an end to dissident groups within the party apparatus.

On March 13, 1968, Castro launched the "revolutionary offensive," a campaign against bourgeois institutions, ideas, relationships, and privileges, that led to the nationalization of all 55,600 small, privately owned and operated urban enterprises, i.e., barber-shops, restaurants, artisan manufacturers, etc. Under the "revolutionary offensive," the remainder of the private sector was nationalized, mobilization was accentuated, and capital accumulation reached record levels at the cost of consumption. As stated by Raúl Castro in his 1968 May Day speech, "we don't want a small-merchant mentality for our people." In a country that was experiencing great economic difficulties and shortages of everything, there was more than a little irony in a revolutionary elite's being proud that it had wiped out a small, productive sector of society. However, this attitude was perfectly in accordance with the politico-economic model of sacrificing economic gains for revolutionary advancement.

In August 1968 the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia. Under Soviet economic pressure, Castro supported the invasion and thus began a new phase in Soviet-Cuban relations. Because revolutionary goals were fading both at home (as a consequence of the chaotic economy) and abroad (as a consequence of Guevara's death in Bolivia), Castro was prescient enough to take advantage of this opportunity to reemphasize Cuba's alliance with the Soviet Union. It was a compromise solution based upon a reconsideration of previous policies and the realization that the exportation of revolution was a hopelessly idealistic approach to Latin America.

In early 1970 it was clear that the great mobilization effort of more than 300,000 volunteers and over 70,000 FAR members would not fulfill the goal of the "revolutionary offensive" for the "harvest of the century." The campaign had political, moral, and economic dimensions and was also a testing ground for the Cuban "new man", but the odds were against the unrealistic goal of producing a 10 million-ton harvest. In 1952 Cuba had produced a record 7.2 million tons of sugar. However, by the mid-1960s production averaged between 4 and 5 million tons, and the revolutionary goal of producing twice that amount in 1970 was close to impossible (see Batista's Dictatorship, this ch.).

In the end Cuba broke its own 1952 record by reaching a total of 8.5 million tons of sugar in 1970. The country paid a heavy price for the all-out sugar drive in depleted resources from

### *Historical Setting*

other sectors of the economy. Agriculture suffered increasing declines in the production of basic crops, not only prior to 1970, when lands were transferred from subsistence farming to sugar production, but also in the following years. Sugarcane cultivation depleted the soil quickly, and it took time for the land to recover. The sugar industry itself felt the results of excessive use of old machinery and the lack of spare parts because of the United States trade embargo. In 1959 there were 161 sugar mills, a number that declined to 152 by 1969. Four sugar mills went out of operation in 1970, and more breakdowns occurred the following year. By 1972 only 115 mills were in operation.

The transportation sector also suffered the consequences of the sugar drive, because all available vehicles were mobilized for the transport of labor and sugarcane. Labor was shifted from the manufacture of spare parts to the sugar industry, provoking the collapse of the former. Overuse and misuse of vehicles made them more prone to breakdown without the possibility of being repaired. Meanwhile, the military involvement in agriculture proved to be plagued by the very factors they were supposed to circumvent, such as lack of organizational skills and discipline.

In his speech of July 26, 1970, Castro acknowledged the defeat of the revolutionary drive, stating, "Our enemies say we have problems, and in this our enemies are right . . . They say there is discontent, and in reality our enemies are right. They say there is irritation, and in reality our enemies are right." He praised the dedication of so many Cubans to the revolutionary goal, even though he realized that dedication could not take the place of competence and skillfulness. Castro's charisma suffered a tremendous blow because he was not capable of delivering another miracle to the Cubans. In the past he had defeated Batista, he had defeated the United States at the Bay of Pigs, and he had confronted the Soviet Union in his attempt to construct a different kind of socialism in Cuba. In 1970 Castro had to bow to the Soviet Union and accept its policy toward the Cuban Revolution.

### **Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970-76**

Although the excessively authoritarian and arbitrary leadership of Castro during the previous decade provoked a gradual alienation of the masses in Cuba, the "revolutionary offensive" and its failure led to questions about the viability of the regime. After 1970 the revolutionary process took a different course. From a pattern of radical, though unsuccessful, ideological and practical ex-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

perimentation, the Revolution moved into a phase of restructuring both the economy and the decisionmaking process. The idealistic approach of Sino-Guevarism was replaced by an increasing pragmatism and a rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

The new policies of the 1970s were the result of pressures placed upon the regime by the economic debacle, the need to increase popular participation within the politico-economic system, the need to institutionalize the leadership, and additional Soviet demands for more orthodox politics. The new rationale demanded a planned economy led by skillful technocrats who were capable of implementing the Soviet development model and who could secure much needed Soviet aid in the future. In 1972 Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—also known as Comecon). The enormous foreign debt with the Soviet Union was postponed, and the interest was canceled until 1986. Other actions reinforced Cuba's dependency on the socialist economic system and provided a financial respite from burdensome debt repayments. The new policies de-emphasized moral incentives, encouraged central planning, and was oriented toward efficient kinds of production and an objective assessment of Cuba's economic future (see *Foreign Economic Relations*, ch. 3).

Cuba's highly mobilized population was channeled through memberships in the CDRs, the Union of Young Communists, the Federation of Cuban Women, ANAP, and the labor unions under the control of the CTC. The CTC objectives, as defined in the 1970s, were to support the government, participate in the defense of the country, promote improved managerial efficiency, stress labor discipline, and create labor consciousness. These mass organizations were highly controlled by the state. Unions had no right to strike and were also prevented from actively participating in decisions that affected their membership (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, ch. 2, *Mass Organizations*, ch. 4).

In terms of institutionalization, in 1972 the regime's top leadership, i.e., Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and President Dorticós, delegated command to trusted associates, who undertook greater responsibilities as vice premiers, ministers, and heads of state agencies. The judicial system underwent a major reorganization the following year, when the People's Supreme Court, people's provincial courts, and people's basic courts were created. The court system became part of the administration under the Council of Ministers headed by Castro. In 1975 and early 1976 two important events took place in Cuba: a new Cuban Constitution was drafted and ap-

### *Historical Setting*

proved, and the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba was held.

To further the regime's legal institutionalization, a new constitution was drafted in 1975 that was based on the Soviet Constitution of 1936. The new Constitution was widely discussed at CDR meetings, at labor and local assemblies, and in the media. The final draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba was approved in February 1976. It describes Cuba as a socialist state, legitimizes the PCC as the official party, and creates several institutional bodies, such as the National Assembly of People's Power and the Council of State (see *The State Structure*, ch. 4). The assembly is empowered with constituent and legislative responsibilities. It is a popular "representative" assembly whose main function is that of ratifying the leadership's policies and appointments. The Council of State is a permanent body that comprises the Executive Committee of the National Assembly and functions as the dominant governmental institution in Cuba. It has discretionary powers, and in 1985 it was headed by Castro. In reality, institutionalization legitimized Castro's regime without curtailing his personal powers (see *Role in Government*, ch. 4).

According to the Constitution, the PCC represents the Marxist-Leninist political vanguard in the country. The First Congress of the PCC was held in December 1975. It concluded that Cuba was living in the first of four stages that would eventually lead to communism, a stance that represented a major ideological departure from previous years. Party membership had increased from about 55,000 in 1969 to 170,000 in 1973 to 212,000 in 1975. However, the party continued to be a selective group that retained full control of admission to its ranks (see *The Communist Party of Cuba*, ch. 4).

Another important body in the state machinery has been the military, whose functions are described in the 1976 Constitution. It is primarily responsible for defense against attacks by foreign powers. The FAR had been the most institutionalized branch of the Cuban government for some time and became even more so after reorganizations were carried out in 1973 and 1976. Estimates placed the size of the military in 1976 at approximately 280,000 men. The second most important function of the military apparatus is a diplomatic one, contributing to Cuba's internationalist commitment to assist movements of national liberation abroad under the aegis of socialist solidarity. Non-FAR personnel also have contributed to Cuba's internationalist efforts. Medical brigades have already served in over 20 countries, and state enterprises have en-



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

gaged in engineering contracts in Africa, the Caribbean area, and the Middle East.

Castro's "Report of the Central Committee of the PCC to the First Congress" emphasized the commitment of all Cubans to implementing the Party's program. Efficiency was a major target to be carried out through the Economic Direction System, which was based on the training of economic cadres to serve as technical advisers at all levels of the decisionmaking process. The report predicted an annual economic growth of at least 6 percent over the period 1975-80 as part of the overall five-year plan. The push was toward industrialization, at the same time promoting agricultural development. The plan called for more rational use of land and labor in the cultivation of sugarcane, rice, tobacco, and basic food-stuffs, as well as in the production of milk, beef, poultry, and eggs. The report underlined the need to improve the technical aspects of agriculture, such as seed quality, veterinary efficiency, plant protection, soil studies, and agrochemical laboratories. Among the industries to receive special attention were sugar and molasses production, electricity, oil refining, fertilizers, glass containers, paper, tires, nickel and nonferrous metals, iron and steel, farm machinery, buses, televisions and radios, cement, textiles, and furniture (see *Growth and Structure of the Economy*, ch. 3).

The First Congress of the PCC and the ratification of the 1976 Constitution marked the beginning of a period of institutionalization of the regime under the political and economic aegis of the Soviet Union. Cuban policies became more pragmatic. New management and planning systems generated more decentralization, which fostered an output mentality as the basis for decision-making. The private sector was given more opportunities for participation in agriculture and in service industries, and material rewards were distributed in response to greater outputs and the acquisition of needed skills.

Developments in the first half of the 1970s created the grounds for better understanding between the United States and Cuba. Both sides established preconditions for resuming diplomatic and trade relations. On the one hand, the United States required that Cuba curtail its military ties to the Soviet Union and ends its support for Latin American revolutionaries. On the other hand, Cuba requested an end to the Vietnam Conflict and to the United States intervention in Latin America, the lifting of its trade embargo against Cuba, and the withdrawal of all United States military installations from the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. By the mid-1970s the United States had established relations with China, agreements had been signed between the United States

### *Historical Setting*

and the Soviet Union, and the war in Vietnam had ended. Cuba had withdrawn from exporting revolution to other Latin American countries and had developed a better understanding toward other systems of government in the area. Even though many conditions of rapprochement had been met, a normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States continued to be hampered by Cuba's close ties to the Soviet Union and the growth of its military presence in Angola and Ethiopia.

#### **Cuba in the Late 1970s**

Political stability characterized Cuba's regime after the mid-1970s. Economic difficulties, Soviet pressures, and the need to crystallize the Revolution around the PCC led the revolutionary elite hierarchy to choose a more stable path through institutionalization, ideological uniformity, and efficient leadership. Revolutionary fervor was sacrificed for political maturity, and the creation of government institutions provided for a certain degree of political mobility outside the *fidelista* inner circle. The leadership in the late 1970s wanted to reconcile communist loyalty with economic efficiency. The Second Congress of the PCC was held in December 1980. The most important features of Castro's report this time dealt with the increase in party membership from a previous total of 212,000 in 1975 to 434,000 in 1980. The national government institutions had expanded the number of its members, but leadership of the country remained a *fidelista* patrimony.

Relations with the United States were marked by mutual restraint during the early 1970s. The relaxation of the United States trade embargo, sanctioned by the OAS in the summer of 1975, created new avenues for exchange between the two countries. Subsidiaries of United States enterprises were allowed to trade with Cuba, and visits by members of the United States Congress as well as by business people, scholars, and journalists seemed to point to future normalization of relations. In 1975 Cuba sponsored a Latin American conference on Puerto Rican independence. Cuba's long-standing position in favor of Puerto Rican independence antagonized the administration of President Gerald R. Ford, who by early 1976 declared that he "would have nothing to do with the Cuba of Fidel Castro." Two other incidents furthered hostilities. In 1976 a Cuban fishing vessel was attacked by Cuban exiles, and several fishermen were killed. In October of that year a Cubana de Aviación airplane exploded in midair after a bomb was planted by Cuban exiles. Accusations on both sides were interrupted by the election of Jimmy

*Cuba: A Country Study*

Carter in November. In the meantime, Cuba became deeply involved in Africa, providing military and technical assistance to revolutionaries in Algeria, Angola, Zaïre, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Madagascar, and Mozambique. Cuba also extended its assistance in Asia to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and in Latin America to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Grenada, and Suriname. By the mid-1980s Cuban internationalists were forced out of Grenada and Suriname, but an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 troops and military advisers remained in Angola. The Cuban commitment on behalf of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola was further enhanced by the assistance provided to the Angolans by other Soviet allies (see *Relations with the United States*, ch. 4, *Proletarian Internationalism*, ch. 4; *The Cuban Military Abroad*, ch. 5).

The inauguration of President Jimmy Carter brought great expectations for normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States. Carter believed that United States foreign policy could not be dominated by unjustified fears of communism and that its approach to Cuba had to be updated. During Carter's administration visas were granted to a few Cuban citizens to visit the United States, and United States citizens were allowed to travel to Cuba. Charter flights were permitted to operate between the two countries, United States reconnaissance flights over Cuba were cut back, and an agreement was reached on the subject of sea boundaries and fishing rights. In response to these United States overtures, Cuba freed several United States political prisoners and allowed United States citizens still on the island to return home with their families. In 1977 small diplomatic posts, known as interest sections, began to operate in Washington and Havana, the United States interest section was attached to the Swiss embassy, and that of Cuba was within the Czechoslovakian embassy. An influential part of the Cuban exile community, centered in Miami, opposed any normalization of relations with Castro's regime, however, and it applied political pressure on Carter through a variety of channels.

In 1979 the public disclosure of a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba led Carter publicly to condemn Cuba for breaking the United States-Soviet agreement that followed the 1962 missile crisis. As a result, increased defense arrangements were announced that would lead to the establishment of a permanent Caribbean Task Force at Key West, Florida, and military maneuvers in the area and economic assistance to friendly Caribbean nations were increased. The crisis built up to great proportions and only ended with assurances

### *Historical Setting*

from the Soviet Union that the forces in Cuba had no intention or capability of attacking the United States.

In mid-1980 the massive exodus of some 125,000 Cubans constituted another crisis in United States-Cuban relations and for the Cuban regime itself. After more than 10,000 disaffected Cubans stormed into the Peruvian embassy in Havana in search of political asylum and safe conduct out of Cuba, Castro announced that all who wished to leave were free to assemble at the port of Mariel. He did not anticipate, however, the large number of "Marielitos" that were to leave on the "freedom flotilla" organized by Miami-based Cuban exiles. This new wave of exiles followed the several hundred thousand Cubans who had fled the island in previous years, including the approximately 260,000 refugees who were officially airlifted from Cuba during the United States-Cuban Freedom Flights program of 1965-71 (see History and General Principles, ch. 4).

Castro circumvented the political embarrassment of such a large number of dissidents by using the opportunity to purge Cuba of a variety of individuals, such as criminals, the mentally ill, and other so-called antisocial elements, who were sent along with the initial group of "Marielitos." Analysts estimated that if Mariel had remained open longer, as many as 1 million Cubans would have exited to Florida. The incident provoked further resentment in the United States, and by the end of the Carter administration, there was little room for improvement in relations between the two countries.


The administration of President Ronald Reagan, which took office in January 1981, perceived the Castro regime as a proxy of the Soviet Union and the source of much of the unrest that had plagued Central America in recent years. Determined to exact a price from Cuba for its international behavior, Reagan reversed a number of the policies that had brought a temporary relaxation of tension during the early Carter years. The Mariel incident, together with the hostile rhetoric of the Reagan administration, provided Castro with the incentive to increase the already high level of popular mobilization on the island.

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The study of Cuban history from colonial times to the present has produced a wealth of scholarly works both in Cuba and abroad. The developments following the Revolution of 1959 led to an increased interest in reassessing Cuba's past to further the understanding of contemporary developments since 1959. Useful



*Havana skyline across Havana harbor*  
Photo by Donna Rich



*Morro Castle and lighthouse, Havana harbor*  
Photo by Phillips Bourns

### Historical Setting

sources include Willis Fletcher Johnson's *The History of Cuba* (five volumes), Herminio Portell Vila's *Historia de Cuba en sus relaciones con los Estados Unidos y España* (four volumes); and Philip Sheldon Foner's *A History of Cuba and Its Relations with the United States* (two volumes) and *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902* (two volumes).

Cuban colonial history prior to 1800 is included in many histories of Latin America. Works such as Clarence Henry Haring's *The Spanish Empire in America*, Hubert Herring's *A History of Latin America*, and James Lockhart and Stuart Schwartz' *Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil* were valuable in the elaboration of this chapter. For the study of the sugar industry in colonial Cuba, Manuel Moreno Fraginals' *The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba, 1760-1860* is very useful, as is Fernando Fernandez Ortiz *Cuban Counterpoint: Tobacco and Sugar*. On the subject of slavery, there are Franklin W. Knight's *Slave Society in Cuba During the Nineteenth Century* and Herbert S. Klein's *Slavery in the Americas: A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba*. For analysis of the early twentieth century, some important works are Louis A. Pérez, Jr.'s *Cuba Between Empires, 1878-1902*, Alonso Aguilar's *Pan-Americanism from Monroe to the Present: A View from the Other Side*; Robert F. Smith's *The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960*; and William P. Glade's *The Latin American Economies: A Study of Their Institutional Evolution*.

There is an enormous amount of literature on the period from the 1933 revolution to the present. Among the most useful in the preparation of this chapter were Luis E. Aguilar's *Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution*; *Les Années Trente à Cuba*; Edward Gonzalez *Cuba under Castro: The Limits of Charisma*; Ramon Eduardo Ruiz' *Cuba: The Making of a Revolution*; Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy's *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*; Hugh S. Thomas' *The Cuban Revolution*; Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith's *Modern Latin America*; Carmelo Mesa-Lago's *Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Institutionalization and Revolutionary Change in Cuba*; Juan del Aguila's *Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution*; the numerous articles, including those of Julio Le Riverend and Sergio Aguirre et al., in the October-December 1968 issue of *Universidad de La Habana*; François Chevalier's *L'Amérique Latine de l'indépendance à nos jours*; and Herbert L. Matthews' *Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding* and *Fidel Castro*. A number of journal articles were also used, most of them appearing in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* and in *Current History*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

## Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment



CUBAN SOCIETY IN EARLY 1985 reflected the years of efforts by the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba to build a classless society based on state ownership of most means and instruments of production. The government was the nation's major employer and controlled all social services and facilities, including the educational and health systems. Work identification cards containing labor and political data were required to be carried at all times. Food was rationed, housing was scarce, and geographical mobility was restricted.

Cuba continued to uphold a long-standing tradition of high standards in the fields of education and health. By the 1980s illiteracy had almost disappeared, and most of the adult population had reached an educational level equivalent to the sixth grade. The school system was highly politicized, and only supporters of the regime were able to obtain higher education. Health standards were high, and Cuba's infant mortality rate was among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere. A network of government-sponsored urban and rural medical services and facilities was developed, and most of the nation's municipalities in all 14 provinces were adequately served.

Although considerable advances in health, education, and narrowing of income differences had taken place, Cuba was not the truly classless, egalitarian society the regime claimed it to be. A new power elite consisting of the Party faithful had come into being, replacing the prerevolutionary oligarchy. Far from being the grassroots-based "people's" society painted in Fidel Castro Ruz' speeches, Cuban society operated from the top down through a system of comprehensive mechanisms of social control. People were, in effect, classified as either supporters or enemies of the Revolution and were rewarded or punished through a wide variety of means at the government's disposal, ranging from access to jobs, education, and housing to the right to obtain scarce consumer goods. Although most Cubans enjoyed better standards of health and education than many people elsewhere in the hemisphere, the price was high both in terms of the drain on Cuba's economy and the national treasury and in terms of a wide range of effective restrictions on personal freedom.

### **Physical Setting**

The Republic of Cuba comprises the Cuban archipelago, a formation of some 3,715 islands, islets, and keys with a combined area of 110,860 square kilometers. The archipelago is situated in



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

the Atlantic Ocean, just south of the Tropic of Cancer, at the entrance of both the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico and forms an important element of the Greater Antilles islands chain. Cuba, the largest island, lies very close to various strategic searoutes, and is situated some 150 kilometers south of the Florida keys and 210 kilometers to the east of Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula. The island of Cuba is also flanked by the island of Jamaica, some 140 kilometers to the south; by the island of Hispaniola, across the Windward Passage, some 77 kilometers to the southeast; and by the Bahamas in the northeast (see fig. 2).

Composed of a total area of 104,945 square kilometers, the island of Cuba is the largest in the archipelago. It runs from northwest to southeast and is 1,250 kilometers long and only 191 kilometers across at its widest point and 31 kilometers at its narrowest point. Its shape resembles an irregular crescent convex to the north.

The Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth; formerly known as the Isle of Pines, or Isla de Pinos), covering a total area of 2,200 square kilometers in the Golfo de Batabanó, is the second largest island in the archipelago, rising to the southwest of Cuba itself. Other islands and shoal groups include the Archipiélago de los Colorados to the northwest; the Archipiélago de Sabana and the Archipiélago de Camagüey, both off the north-central coast; the Jardines de la Reina off the south-central coast; and the Archipiélago de los Canarreos (technically including the Isla de la Juventud) off the southwest coast. The total area of these islands is 3,715 square kilometers.

Cuba's coastline measures 6,073 kilometers, of which 5,746 kilometers corresponds to the coastline of the island of Cuba and 327 kilometers to the coast of the Isla de la Juventud. The islands' irregular coastlines are characterized by the many bays, rugged cliffs, coral reefs, swamps, and mangroves.

Many of Cuba's bays, which have narrow entrances but ample inner areas, make some of the world's best harbors. Among the most important on the northern coast—from west to east—are Bahía Honda in the province of Pinar del Río; Bahía Cabañas and Bahía del Mariel in the province of La Habana; Bahía de La Habana in the province of Ciudad de La Habana; Bahía de Matanzas in the province of Matanzas; Bahía de Nuevitas in the province of Camagüey; Bahía de Puerto Padre in the province of Las Tunas; and Puerto Gibara and Bahía de Nipe in the province of Holguín. Major harbors on the southern coast are located at Guantanamo Bay, Santiago de Cuba, and Cienfuegos.





Figure 2. Terrain and Drainage



### **Topography and Drainage**

The least mountainous of the Greater Antilles, the island of Cuba has an estimated median elevation of less than 100 meters above sea level. Its three principal mountainous zones—locally known as the *alturas* (literally, altitudes)—are isolated and separated by extensive plains and flatlands that cover almost two-thirds of the island's surface.

The *alturas* are zones of moderate elevation. The first, the Cordillera de Guaniguanico, is in the western province of Pinar del Río and comprises the Sierra de los Órganos and the Sierra del Rosario. El Pan de Guajabón mountain, which has an altitude of 692 meters, is its highest point. The second, known as the Sierra de Escambray, is found in the southern areas of the provinces of Cienfuegos and Sancti Spíritus. This mountainous region includes the Sierra de Trinidad, peaking with the 1,156-meter Pico San Juan (also known as La Cuca) and the Sierra de Sancti Spíritus to the east. A third mountainous zone, and the highest, is found in the eastern provinces of Guantánamo, Santiago de Cuba, and Granma. It includes the Sierra Maestra, Sierra de Nipe, Sierra de Nicaro, Sierra del Cristal, and Cuchillas de Toa among its ranges.

The Sierra Maestra, the steepest of the Cuban ranges, is historically significant because from December 1956 until January 1959 it sheltered the revolutionary forces of Castro (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Bastista, ch. 1). The Sierra Maestra rises abruptly from the southeast coast west of Guantanamo Bay, except where it is broken into a small lowland depression where Santiago de Cuba, the nation's second largest city, is located. It contains the island's highest mountains; Pico Real del Turquino, with an altitude of 1,872 meters, is the nation's highest.

Cuba has over 500 watercourses classified as rivers, most of which are short and have meager volume. The island's heaviest rainfall, as well as its largest rivers, is in the southeast, where the Río Cauto (370 kilometers long) and its tributaries, notably the Río Salado, drain the Sierra Maestra and the uplands to the north into the Golfo de Guacanayabo. River levels rise significantly during the rainy season, when 80 percent of the flow occurs, and seasonal flooding is common.

The coastal basins of Guantánamo and Santiago de Cuba that lie in the eastern part of the island continue westward, becoming a great central valley with rich limestone soils, usually with high clay content. The rich flatlands and rolling plains that make up almost two-thirds of the land have facilitated the cultivation of a wide variety of crops, especially sugarcane, tobacco, rice, and coffee, as

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

well as livestock raising. The fairly large areas of sandy soils found in southern Pinar del Río, southerwestern Matanzas, and Camagüey provinces, however, are covered with poor grass and scrub. In some inundated areas of the southern coast, mangrove swamps are found.

### **Climate**

Cuba lies in the torrid zone; the Tropic of Cancer, which demarcates the northern edge of the tropics, lies a few kilometers north of the archipelago. Cuba is also located on the southwestern periphery of the North Atlantic high atmospheric pressure zone and thus is influenced by the northeast trade winds in winter and east-northeast winds in summer. The warm ocean currents of the Gulf Stream are a year-round ameliorating influence along the coasts.

The annual mean temperature is 25.5°C, with little variation between January, the coldest month, having an average temperature of 22.5°C, and August, the warmest month, having an average temperature of 27.8°C. During 1982 the maximum and minimum temperatures registered throughout the archipelago were 31.9°C and 16.3°C, respectively; both temperatures were recorded in the southeastern province of Santiago de Cuba.

Most of the country experiences a rainy season from May through October. In 1982 the average total rainfall for the archipelago was 1,142 millimeters; the western province of Pinar del Río received the most rainfall (1,796 millimeters) and the eastern province of Guantánamo the least (664 millimeters). The month of June was the rainiest, having an average rainfall of 200 millimeters, and the month of December the driest, with an average of 16 millimeters.

Because of its tropical location, Cuba has been hit periodically by different kinds of storms, especially hurricanes, some with winds over 200 kilometers an hour and heavy rains of up to 300 millimeters in a 24-hour period. Hurricane season is from June to November; September and October are the months of the most frequent storms.

### **Population**

The United States Bureau of the Census projected the mid-1985 population of Cuba at 10.1 million. This constituted a growth

### *The Society and Its Environment*

of 110,000 from its mid-1984 projection, representing an average annual growth rate of 1.1 percent. Seventy-one percent of the population was urban; however, the bureau cautioned that a very lax definition of urban settlement was used by official Cuban sources. (Urban areas were defined as having 2,000 or more inhabitants or those having fewer inhabitants but providing electricity, paved streets, and other services.)

The official Cuban government population estimate was almost the same; it gave a growth rate of 0.98 percent in mid-1984 and a national density of 88.4 people per square kilometer. Major differences in population distribution existed. Population was most heavily concentrated in Ciudad de La Habana province, where it reached a high density of 2,672 people per square kilometer, and least in the Isla de la Juventud, where the density was 27 people per square kilometer. Nine provinces had density rates lower than the national average, and six were most densely populated (see table 2, Appendix).

In 1985 only 2 percent of the population was under age one, while 27 percent was under age 15. These low figures were the result of a dramatic decline in fertility resulting in fertility rates (the average number of children born to each woman in her reproductive years, ages 14 to 49) lower than the number necessary to replace the population. Sixty-five percent of the population was considered to be of working age, that is, from 15 to 64 years; 8 percent was over 65 years. In 1976 the baby boom generation of the early 1960s began to enter the labor force, seeking jobs for the first time (see Labor, ch. 3).

International migration has played an important role in Cuba's history. The wave of immigration in the nineteenth century was directly related to the expansion of the sugar industry. Hundreds of thousands of African slaves, Chinese indentured servants, Spaniards, and other Europeans came to Cuba. In the early twentieth century almost 700,000 foreigners came to the island, mostly from Spain and neighboring countries, including the United States. Immigration continued until the Great Depression hit Cuba in the early 1930s, a period when some foreigners chose to return to their countries of origin (see The Republic, ch. 1).

Although data vary, it is clear that international emigration increased significantly following the implementation of the revolutionary policies adopted by Castro's government. A United States National Research Council report edited by Paula E. Hollerbach and Sergio Díaz-Briquets indicated that between January 1, 1959, and September 30, 1980, an estimated 1 million people left Cuba.

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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
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
### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Almost 800,000 of these settled in the United States, while most of the remainder emigrated to Mexico, Spain, or Venezuela.

The course of the demographic transition of twentieth-century Cuba contrasts sharply with the rapid population growth experienced by other developing countries. Cuba, along with Uruguay and Argentina, was among the first Latin American nations to experience a decline in mortality and fertility. By 1958, the last year of the government of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, the birth rate (yearly registered births per 1,000 inhabitants) had declined to 26.6 and the total fertility rate (the average number of children born to each woman) to 3.8. By 1984 the Washington-based Population Reference Bureau reported that Cuba had a crude birth rate (yearly registered births per 1,000 inhabitants) of 16; a crude death rate (yearly registered deaths per 1,000 inhabitants) of six; an annual population increase of almost 1 percent; an infant mortality rate (deaths of infants of one year of age or less per 1,000 live births) of 17.3; a life expectancy of 74 years; and a fertility rate of 1.8. As a whole, those demographic data were similar to data released by the government of Cuba, various United States government agencies, and other international organizations. For example, in 1984 the government of Cuba reported that its birth rate had declined to 14, its fertility rate to 1.8, its infant mortality rate to 16, and its annual growth rate to 1.1 percent—figures that were all among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere.

Infant mortality also began to decrease in the early twentieth century. During the 1970s and early 1980s the average annual rate began to decline rapidly, reaching 16.8 deaths per 1,000 children in 1983 and 16 by the end of 1984—one of the lowest infant mortality rates in the Western Hemisphere (the United States rate was around 12) (see *Health and Welfare*, this ch.).

Population growth has also been diminishing throughout the twentieth century, from estimated growth rates of 3.3 percent in 1907 to 1.1 percent in 1985. A simultaneous rise in the average life expectancy reflected the eradication of a number of diseases and the contribution of the national health system to the well-being of the population. Life expectancy was 33.2 years in 1900. By 1960 it had increased to 64, and by late 1984 to 73.5 years, similar to that of the United States. Cuba's irregular age distribution in 1985 was the result of a combination of demographic factors, such as the baby boom in the early 1960s, striking reductions in both fertility and infant mortality, and sizable waves of emigration (see fig. 3).



Source: Based on information from Kenneth Hill. "Population Projections." Washington, 1983.

*Figure 3. Distribution of Age-Groups by Sex, 1985.*

### **The New Revolutionary Man**

In January 1959, after Batista fled Cuba, Castro assumed control of the leadership and began to implement a social revolution that he claimed would greatly transform Cuban society on behalf of the poor. Throughout his initial months in power he adopted a series of radical reforms and nationalization of property while gradually moving in the direction of Marxist socialism. In December 1961, when Castro publicly proclaimed himself a Marxist-Leninist, he declared that his objective was to transform Cuba into an egalitarian society in which the relationship between work and reward would be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." At the top of his agenda by the mid-1960s were his efforts to create a selfless, revolutionary "new man"

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

(*hombre nuevo*) through the implementation of ambitious, expensive, and elaborate programs for improving health care and expanding educational facilities. In the mid-1970s, however, the concept of the new man began to be de-emphasized as a result of a major reformulation of government policies. Material incentives were again emphasized in the nation's economy as official dogma was modified from the previous notion that Cuba was socialist and in the process of constructing communism to one in which Cuba was still in the stage of constructing socialism. The previous slogan was changed to "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

### **Cuban Society Prior to the Revolution**

A great controversy as to what Cuba was like prior to the year 1959 still raged in 1985. Cuba was an underdeveloped Third World nation with most of the socioeconomic problems that characterized those societies. However, while some authors emphasized that Batista's Cuba had been in a much better position than its Caribbean neighbors, other sources suggested that only after Castro came to power did Cuban society achieve its high standards.

Some statistical accounts of the 1950s appear to demonstrate that Cuba was in many ways ahead of its Latin American neighbors as a result of modernization efforts that had begun during the latter part of the nineteenth century and continued into the twentieth century. Cuba's educational and health standards rose substantially throughout this period. It was a Cuban epidemiologist, Dr. Carlos Juan Finlay, who was the first to theorize in 1881 that yellow fever was transmitted by the *stegomyia* mosquito; his theory helped physicians throughout the world to conquer this tropical disease. In the field of education the high academic standards of the University of Havana, founded in 1728, were unquestioned. However, major differences existed not only in the availability of health and educational services throughout Cuba but also in the quality of the services rendered. Havana, where in 1953 almost 20 percent of the national population lived, had the nation's best jobs, schools, and health facilities. During the 1950s Cuba's capital city was prosperous, expanding, sophisticated, and cultured, a city where per capita income was lower than only one nation—Venezuela—in Latin America and where its citizens enjoyed most of the services and facilities that existed in the United States. Havana also had a number of slums, however, where poor rural dwellers moved to escape grinding poverty. Other important cities, such as

### *The Society and Its Environment*

Santiago de Cuba, with 3 percent of the national population, and Camagüey, with 2 percent, lacked the grandeur of the nation's capital.

The standard of living of rural dwellers in prerevolutionary Cuba was very low. In 1953 nearly 43 percent of the national population lived in rural areas. A very high percentage of the rural population was dependent upon the sugarcane industry, where work was available to them only four months per year; during the other eight months they were unemployed. Unemployment, especially during this *tiempo muerto* (dead season), was almost universal in rural areas, affecting 36 percent of the national population. Some sources reported that illiteracy in the hinterlands was as high as 40 percent and that rural medical care was nonexistent.

Except for the very high medical standards of a privileged minority, national health standards were relatively low. For example, Howard Handelman, a political scientist at the University of Wisconsin, quoting specialists, wrote that during the 1950s an average of 30 to 40 percent of Cuba's urban population and over 60 percent of its rural population was malnourished. According to the 1953 census, nearly 24 percent of the population of Cuba could neither read nor write, and in 1959 only 35 percent of the total school-age population received instruction.

### **Hombre Nuevo**

One of the goals of the Cuban Revolution was the building of a communist society that would enable Cuba to abandon the capitalist system in favor of socialism. The Argentine-born physician and revolutionary theorist Ernesto (Che) Guevara said in 1965 that "to build communism, a new man must be created simultaneously with [the development of] a material base." This new man was to be devoted to the revolutionary cause and was to have a deeply rooted socialist consciousness.

Following the principle that human nature is not fixed but is a product of social relations, the "new man" idea rapidly became a doctrine of Cuba in the mid-1960s, and educators were encouraged to train and mold students toward self-sacrifice, to struggle against injustice and exploitation, to raise productivity, and to defend the Revolution and the Castro regime. After Guevara's death in 1967, he became the nation's official role model for the new man. He came to symbolize the doctrine of courage and self-sacrifice, and the motto *Seremos como Che* (We will be like Che) became the official slogan of the government-sponsored Organization of José Martí

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

Pioneers (Organización de Pioneros José Martí—OPJM), the nation's largest mass youth organization (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, this ch.). *Seremos como Che* meant that the youth committed themselves to imitating Guevara's principal virtues and sharing his conviction that the Revolution was an enduring global conflict between the world's downtrodden masses and United States imperialism.

During the mid-1980s the ideals of building a society based on the new man continued in force; the goal, according to Castro, was to achieve "a socialist Revolution where the masses would identify with their country and its interests and confirm them, react and respond," and where society would cultivate "the highest of human values, with feelings of solidarity, internationalism, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism." The expression "new man," however, was no longer used as official parlance in reference to these ideals.

## **Education**

Official sources reported that during the 1983-84 academic year, Cuba had 3.1 million registered students (48 percent female) enrolled at 15,075 academic institutions at all levels under the guidance of 258,000 teachers and professors. An estimated 583,639 students received some kind of financial assistance, and 423,873 studied at various kinds of boarding schools. Ninety-eight percent of the population of 10- to 49-year-olds was literate by Cuban government standards (the population age 50 and over was excluded from these statistics, which were based on a survey concentrating on the population of childbearing age rather than a full census); however, the functional literacy rate was unknown. Following Cuba's internationalist policy, in 1984 an estimated 3,600 teachers and professors were working overseas in more than 20 countries. That same year 8,000 Cuban students were reported to be studying abroad, mostly in Eastern European countries. Over 20,000 Latin American and African students had studied in various Cuban provinces as guests of the Cuban government during the previous decade.

The Cuban educational system was profoundly changed as a result of the revolutionary measures adopted by the Castro government. Since 1959, and especially during 1961, which was officially proclaimed the "Year of Education," the government set goals to develop programs aimed at eliminating past class and regional differences in access to basic social services. The eradication of illiter-

### *The Society and Its Environment*

acy, widespread in rural areas, received high priority. Rural education programs that were geared to the education of the formerly isolated peasant population were established with the additional objective of incorporating the rural poor into the political and economic mainstream.

On January 1, 1961, the government began the National Campaign Against Illiteracy. By December 22 it claimed that throughout that year more than 300,000 Cubans had taught more than 707,000 men and women how to read and write, reducing the illiteracy rate from an estimated 21 percent to 3.9 percent. However, Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a Cuban scholar at the University of Pittsburgh, questioned this claim, suggesting that the illiteracy rate was reduced to 13 percent by 1970 and possibly to 7 or 8 percent in 1979.

On July 6, 1961, the government promulgated the Law on the Nationalization of Education, by which all private education was nationalized (ostensibly as a result of the conflict with the Roman Catholic Church), and all schools were placed under the control of the Ministry of Education. During the first five years of the revolutionary government, an estimated 200,000 Cubans, many of them members of the intellectual and technical elites, emigrated and thus deprived Cuba of many of its most highly educated citizens. At the same time, this emigration allowed Castro to place his supporters, the majority of whom had ranked lower in the social, economic, and political hierarchy, into vacated positions at the top of government.

The 1976 Constitution proclaims that all citizens, regardless of age, have the right to attend school. According to Article 8, no child should be left without schooling nor any young person be left without the opportunity to study. Nor should any citizen be left without access to studies, culture, and sports. Students are to be educated in the spirit of socialism, and study and productive work should be combined throughout the educational system.

In the mid-1980s education was free at all levels and was equally accessible to males and females. Ideological criteria were reported as playing an important role, however, in determining admission to technical and higher educational institutions. Education was the exclusive prerogative of the state, and the school system followed the guidelines set forth by Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the government. All educational programs were supplemented by scholarships that covered living expenses and medical assistance. Rural villages and urban centers had their own schools with teachers in residence, and the proportion of students graduating from urban and rural schools was almost identical. The govern-



Courtesy Prensa Latina



*Schoolchildren*  
Photo by John Finan

## *The Society and Its Environment*

ment's priorities were to support a new model of rural education based on the study and work principle, which emphasized the teachings of practical and work-oriented skills required for national development. Another national educational goal was to provide all Cubans with an educational level equivalent to the ninth grade. By 1984 the national budget for the educational sector was over 1,500 million pesos (for value of the peso—see Glossary), representing an estimated 15 percent of the gross national product.

### **Structure of the School System**

The Cuban school system was composed of six distinct subsystems: general education, consisting of preschool followed by 12 or 13 grades (six grades of primary education, three grades of basic high school, and an additional three or four grades of intermediate education in the form of preuniversity, vocational, or upper secondary education); technical education, parallel to high school; adult education, including language instruction, to facilitate the continuing education of working people; youth education, specially designed for problem students; special education for handicapped students; and higher, or university, education. The whole system was under the direct authority of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, and other national institutes (see table 3, Appendix).

General education was provided at a preschool level at day nurseries for children beginning at the age of 45 days and for children ages four to six at preschool centers under the direction of the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación Mujeres Cubanas—FMC) (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, this ch.). In 1984 it was reported that 835 preschool day-care centers existed and served an estimated 100,000 children. Primary education was compulsory from age six and was provided in both regular and boarding schools. In the spring of 1984 some 231,000 students graduated from sixth grade.

Upon graduation, students were encouraged to continue through high school, which was divided into two steps, each of which offered three- to four-year courses of study. At the first of these steps, students had three options: to attend a basic high school, to go to a technical school, or to attend a teachers college specializing in elementary education. In the spring of 1984 some 170,000 students completed this first stage. Upon completion of basic high school, a student could enroll at the intermediate level at either a university preparatory school for an additional three



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

years of courses that would lead to higher education; an intermediate-level training center such as a technical and language institute; one of a variety of teachers colleges; an arts school; or a school for athletes. Those who chose a technical high school could continue their education at the nation's various institutes of technology. In the spring of 1984 the Cuban government reported that it had more than 400,000 intermediate-level students.

Adult education (also known as the "parallel political system") offered language courses and remedial education to a broad range of people from all educational levels, including peasants and blue-collar workers. The government divided this category into three sublevels: the peasant's and worker's training program, which included literacy classes up to the sixth grade; the secondary peasants' and workers' training program, which was similar to junior high school; and the peasants' and workers' college, which enabled them to continue through high school and eventually enter a university.

Youth education offered special remedial programs to students ages 13 to 16 with severe learning problems while also giving them an opportunity to learn a trade. Special education was geared toward the training of mentally or physically handicapped children as well as those ill-adjusted to a school or society.

Higher education included specialized programs for the training of professionals in all fields as well as postgraduate education. Since mid-1976 a majority of colleges and universities have been under the authority of the Ministry of Higher Education; however, a few others have been administered by the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, or the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. In the mid-1980s higher education was provided at 43 facilities, including five universities, six university centers, military schools, and other institutes of higher education that trained students in 98 different specialties. These facilities were located in all 14 provinces, each of which had a school of medicine. In the 1983-84 academic year enrollment reached 200,000 students, 38 percent of whom were enrolled in regular (full-time) day courses closely monitored by the government because of their relevance to the nation's economy or service. The remaining 62 percent were enrolled in so-called directed study courses, defined as those in which the students' desire to further their knowledge was not directly related to the nation's economy or services. These received lower priority in the allocation of resources. Of the 200,000 enrolled students, 35 percent were studying in teaching-related areas; 14 percent, technical programs; 9 percent, medical schools; 8 percent, economics; 8 percent, agricultural sciences; 4 percent, natural

### *The Society and Its Environment*

sciences and mathematics; and 22 percent in other programs. In the spring of 1984 Castro reported that a total of 2,080 students graduated from the University of Havana, including 1,400 regular day students.

Any student who had completed the 12 years of primary school and high school with a good academic record, had passed an entrance examination, and had undergone a personal interview to ascertain whether certain political and ideological requirements had been met (which included being a Marxist-Leninist) was eligible for higher education. Upon admission to a university or college, a student was expected to take courses for a period that varied from four to six years, at the end of which a professional title would be received. All students, regardless of their field, had to study Marxist-Leninist philosophy and economics; there was an explicit attempt to politicize all students in their fields of study in support of the Revolution. Those eligible for further studies could enroll for an additional two to six years of advanced graduate studies and original research, depending upon the specific career as well as the time required; upon completion of this work the student would receive the degree of candidate for the doctor of sciences. Upon filing a dissertation, the student was awarded a doctor of science degree.

### **Study and Productive Work**

Among the general premises that guided the Cuban educational system at all levels was the principle that study and manual productive work should be combined. The application of this principle in the mid-1960s led the government to send the entire faculty, students, and staff of urban high schools at all levels to live and do "voluntary" work in rural areas for six weeks as part of the School Goes to the Countryside Program. This program was later supplemented by the Schools in the Countryside Program under which state-operated, coeducational, boarding, basic high schools (grades seven to 10) began to operate in rural areas and combined classes with agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing work. Every day half the student body was expected to attend classes in the morning while the other half worked at nearby agricultural areas or at assembly plants or manufacturing plants situated in the vicinity. The program was intended not only to integrate young students into productive work but also to break down traditional barriers between rural and urban society and to emphasize the principle that while students studied they should contribute to the national econo-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

my by helping to cover their educational expenses. Students were therefore removed from family life and placed in new living and learning environments where they received "correct" ideological training and where their behavior could be closely observed and strongly influenced.

In the mid-1980s rural education appeared to be an important means of achieving socialist revolutionary objectives in economic production, ideological training, and educational preparation. In 1984 the government reported that the principle of combining work and study was being implemented at all levels of the educational system. At the primary educational level, for example, many rural school students worked two hours a day in agricultural production. At the basic high school level an estimated 800 schools in the countryside were reported to accommodate a total of 400,000 students in grades seven to 10 throughout the academic year in specially constructed facilities that included classrooms, dormitories, laboratories, and workshops.

The work study principle also was applied at higher educational levels. For example, law students were required to work during the mornings at the Ministry of Justice and, during their fourth year, to serve as technical advisers in the people's courts. Many university programs required their graduates in most professional fields to work two years in rural service. All university students were also required to be members of the Territorial Troops Militia, to spend at least half of their two-month vacation doing agricultural work, and to perform unpaid volunteer work on weekends (see *The Mobilized Population*, ch. 5).

### **The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization**

Mass organizations played a very important role throughout the process of education and socialization in Cuba. They were designed by the government in the early 1960s as mutual-aid, self-help, and representative organizations of different age and interest groups. The government claimed that the main purpose of these organizations was to facilitate the participation of all Cubans in the most important social, political, economic and defense decisions. Theoretically, these mass organizations were the result of a historical process during which a segment of the national population had "voluntarily" organized itself outside the state apparatus to fulfill its members' collective aspirations. Any social group was, in theory, entitled to organize as a new mass organization.

*The Society and Its Environment*



*Village scene near Santiago de Cuba*  
Photo by Philip Brenner

Article 7 of the 1976 Constitution recognizes, protects, and promotes the establishment of these mass organizations. In practice, however, Article 61 of Cuba's Constitution severely curtails the actions of the various mass organizations by explicitly stating that "none of the freedoms which are recognized for citizens may be exercised contrary to what is established in the Constitution and the law, or contrary to the existence and objectives of the socialist state, or contrary to the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Violation of this principle is punishable by law." In the mid-1980s the largest and most important of these organizations were the Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC), the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs), the FMC, the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—ANAP), the Federation of University Students (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria—

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

FEU), the Federation of Intermediate Level Students (Federación de Estudiantes de Enseñanza Media—FEEM), and the OPJM.

During the mid-1980s participation in all the mass organizations was very high; usually over 80 percent of all those eligible were members. However, as *The Situation of Human Rights in Cuba*, published in October 1983 by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (OAS) indicated, membership in the various mass organizations was practically a prerequisite for many routine activities. Membership affected such rights as admission to universities, promotions, access to certain kinds of vacation or recreational activities, and access to nonperishable products, which required CTC local chapter certification that the buyer was selected as an "advanced worker" by his workers' assembly. Those who did not participate in a mass organization became, for all practical purposes, social outcasts. Therefore, in assessing the size of these organizations it was difficult to determine when the decision to join was an indication of support and agreement with the policies of the government and of the PCC and when it was a pragmatic compromise that gave access to the system's material benefits. Surveys found that most emigrants of the 1980 Mariel boatlift were not members of any mass organization.

In practice, mass organizations played an important role in the Organs of People's Power and coordinated their major activities with the PCC (see *The State Structure*, ch. 4). All mass organizations were state controlled. The heads of the CTC, CDRs, ANAP, and FMC, in addition to their responsibilities in their mass organizations, each held four posts in the PCC and the state bureaucracy: alternate member of the PCC Political Bureau, member of the Central Committee of the PCC, deputy to the National Assembly of People's Power, and member of the Council of State. They were therefore among the most powerful people in Cuba. The heads of the OPJM and FEU, that is, the children's and university students' organizations, also held important posts in the Union of Young Communists (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas—UJC), a PCC affiliate organization, in addition to their responsibilities to the mass organizations (see *Mass Organizations*, ch. 4).

Only a single mass organization existed to represent the interests of a specific group of people, and the organizational structure of each was rigid and highly centralized, consisting of a large national headquarters, large provincial offices, and over 164 municipal and local branch offices. The most important programs and activities of mass organizations included the indoctrination of members to the principles of socialism, the relaying of government and PCC messages from national headquarters to local branches and

back, and the military training of the population to resist any attack or invasion (see *The Mobilized Population*, ch. 5).

### **Organization of Neighborhoods**

The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs) were created on September 28, 1960, as neighborhood mass organizations; one unit was to exist in each square block throughout all urban areas, and equivalent counterparts were located in rural areas. During the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the CDRs in 1980, Castro claimed that Cuba had almost 81,000 CDRs organized in 10,000 zone committees representing a total of 5.4 million members; in early 1985 their numbers were estimated at 6.1 million. He also explicitly listed the CDR's main responsibilities, claiming that the defense of the Revolution "was, is, and will always be—and I repeat, was, is, and will always be—the first and foremost task, the first duty of the CDRs." In addition, CDRs were expected to assist the government in the process of politicizing and mobilizing their neighborhoods. In the field of public health they were to assist the government in both preventive and curative medical campaigns, including vaccination programs and blood donation drives. In the field of production, CDRs were expected to participate "voluntarily" in various kinds of agricultural work, including the sugar harvest. And, finally, in everyday life CDRs were expected to police their areas for purposes of both internal security and public sanitation. In addition to these responsibilities, as sociologist Nelson Victoria has claimed, the CDRs were also expected to conduct surveys for the rationing of food, distribution of homes, organization of volunteer work, elimination of the black market, and prevention of "counterrevolutionary" activities.

Evaluating the activities of the CDRs over the past 25 years, the previously mentioned OAS human rights report questioned whether the CDRs have permitted effective participation in the decisionmaking process. The report concluded that, on the contrary, the CDRs appear to be essentially an instrument of control, of "vigilance" against the enemies of the regime, a task that requires the sending of periodic reports to the Ministry of Interior. This argument was supported by the United States under secretary of state for human rights, Elliott Abrams, who claimed in 1984 that "no aspect of an ordinary Cuban's private life is free from government surveillance . . . one's comings and goings are monitored 24 hours-a-day by block wardens in the neighborhood CDRs. Meet-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ings, parties, and other activities are subject to particularly intense scrutiny. Listening to foreign radio and television broadcasts is dangerous because of the surveillance by CDR members." Various sources reported that any outsider who wished to meet with a local CDR member required the previous clearance of the provincial or national CDR coordinator; violators could be arrested according to the drastic stipulations of the so-called *peligrosidad* (dangerousness) law.

### **Organization of Women**

The Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC) was created on August 23, 1960, as a mass organization with the task of uniting, organizing, and enabling all women over age 14 to participate in the revolutionary process. Vilma Espín Guillois, a Rebel Army coordinator during the 1950s, wife of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Raúl Castro Ruz, and the highest-ranking woman in the Cuban government, was the organizer, founder, and the first president of the FMC. In mid-1985 she still held that post in addition to her other high government responsibilities (see Mass Organizations, ch. 4).

In 1980 it was reported that 2.3 million women over age 14, an estimated 80 percent of all Cuban women in that age-group, were *federadas*, that is, members of the FMC. By early 1985 this estimate had grown to 2.7 million. Describing the FMC's objectives, Espín suggested that Cuban women needed to unify and mobilize so that they could "defend, support and fight for the Revolution, which had . . . defined its populist and anti-imperialist character." In order to distance themselves from United States women's movements, FMC members insisted that their federation was a "feminine," not a "feminist," organization.

Among the stated purposes of creating the FMC was the freeing of women from such traditional prerevolutionary, sex-defined roles as prostitutes and live-in maids common in Havana in the 1950s. This was to be achieved by raising women's educational standards, enacting special legislation to emancipate women from their traditional roles, and providing them with a wide range of work alternatives. An example of these measures was the enactment on February 14, 1975, of Law No. 1289, the Family Code, which granted women new rights and opportunities in both the nuclear family and the labor force, thus protecting them from various forms of sex discrimination. The promulgation of this code was fol-

### *The Society and Its Environment*

lowed by a massive attempt to incorporate women into the labor force (see Labor, ch. 3).

The FMC has played a very important role in raising both the educational and health standards, not only of women but also of Cuban society as a whole. Beginning in 1961 FMC members played a pivotal role as teachers in Castro's campaign against illiteracy (see Education, this ch.). Later the FMC designed various kinds of educational programs that included literacy courses, follow-up adult education programs, specially tailored courses to prepare women to enter the labor force, teacher training programs, and other courses intended to advance women in cultural and technical fields. In 1980 the FMC claimed that 1.5 million of its members had participated in the "militant mothers for education brigades," a volunteer program whose stated goal was "to bring up new men and women capable of furthering the construction of socialism."

The FMC has also played important roles in public health and national defense issues. The nation's health standards were improved through courses in health care and personal hygiene periodically given by the FMC's local cadres. Women's "health brigades" supported various maternal and child health programs of the Ministry of Public Health. The FMC defense programs included the integration of women into the FAR and the organizations of women in their workplaces (see Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5).

Evaluating the results of 25 years of FMC activities, various sources claimed that the FMC had succeeded in increasing the political awareness of Cuban women and had partially succeeded in replacing the traditional female roles by more modern and liberal ones. Cuban women of the 1980s participated more actively at the intermediate and lower levels of Cuban society; only a handful of women held senior government and management posts, however. A severe breakdown of the traditional family had resulted from some of these revolutionary measures. The number of legal abortions and divorces had soared (some sources claimed more than tenfold) owing to, among other reasons, the breakdown of the nuclear family, more liberal sexual mores, inadequate supervision at coeducational rural boarding schools, and earlier marriages.

### **Organization of Small Farmers**

The National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—ANAP) was organized in May



*Cuba: A Country Study*

1961 as the mass organization to represent and protect the interests of Cuba's small farmers. Farmers having units over 67 hectares were excluded. Authoritative sources suggested that ANAP was organized as the government's ally against what was then described as the "rural bourgeois sector, enemy of the Revolution," that is, the owners of agricultural units of between 67 and 400 hectares.

Since the passage of Cuba's 1959 and 1963 agrarian reform laws, the state has been the dominant factor in agricultural production. Between 1959 and 1984 some 79 percent of the nation's private land passed into state control. The remaining 21 percent stayed under the control of an estimated 100,000 families of self-employed small-scale farmers with limited means of production who were prohibited from hiring farm laborers. Although their holdings were under 67 hectares, they produced most of the nation's tobacco, coffee, vegetables, root crops, and fruits. Sugarcane was cultivated mostly on state farms. Private farmers, however, were forced to sell a prescribed quota of their production to a government agency at state-controlled prices. ANAP soon became the only entity through which the government channeled farm credit, agricultural inputs, and technical know-how to private farmers.

During the 1960s and 1970s the Cuban government undertook, with the assistance of ANAP, efforts to integrate subtly the nation's remaining private farmers into the revolutionary framework by incorporating them into collective units. Farmers were offered incentives to turn over their plots to the state, either during their active life or upon retirement. They were also encouraged to become active members of the new government-sponsored agricultural production, credit, and service cooperatives. Some sources, however, claimed that ANAP consistently sought to reduce government control over its members. An example of this was found in the small growth of the cooperatives despite strong pressure from the government.

Article 20 of the 1976 Constitution recognizes "the right of small farmers to own their lands and other means and implements of production"; the expression "private ownership of the land," however, is never used in Cuban legal codes. The 1983 OAS human rights report concluded that, under Cuban law, small farm property was only quasi-private, because owners did not fully enjoy the right of alienability. For example, small farmers could not sell their property without prior authorization from the state, which always reserved a preferential right in the purchase of agricultural land. Farms could only be inherited by relatives who worked them personally. Farms could not be rented, mortgaged, or worked by

## *The Society and Its Environment*

sharecroppers. Finally, small farmers had to register with the Ministry of Agriculture and, for all practical purposes, become active members of ANAP.

During the mid-1980s ANAP continued to be influential in organizing small farmers into cooperatives and in influencing the selection of crops so that output would coincide with the nation's production plans. An undetermined number of farmers were reported to be cultivating the land illegally, either as sharecroppers or simply as tenants, and were not registered in the Ministry of Agriculture and did not belong to the ANAP. In 1982 the government began a campaign to identify them and, presumably, to change their tenancy.

At the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1959 Law of Agrarian Reform on May 17, 1984, Castro reported that there were 1,457 cooperatives that covered about 1 million hectares, or 56 percent of the small farmers' land. One of the incentives for joining a cooperative was the availability of government loans to purchase construction materials for housing. A second incentive was a social security system for cooperative farmers that was created in 1983.

## **The Organization of Youth and Students**

The Organization of José Martí Pioneers (Organización de Pioneros José Martí—OPJM) was the children's mass organization, similar to the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of the United States. At the twentieth anniversary of the OPJM in April 1981, the government claimed that 2.2 million children, or 99.5 percent of the nation's primary and basic high school student body were active members of the OPJM.

In 1983 the *Miami Herald* reported that in Cuba correct school behavior included belonging to the OPJM and, upon graduation, aspiring to join the UJC. It quoted Minister of Education José Ramón Fernández Álvarez, after claiming that all students received 240 hours of instruction in Marxism-Leninism by the end of the twelfth grade, as stating that "we teach what we believe."

On various occasions Castro has highlighted the important role Pioneers play in contemporary Cuban society. The OPJM was described by Castro as the first necessary step in the upbringing of Cuban children, a step that would help future generations discover the need to undergo military training. In his July 1983 speech, Castro said that "many Pioneers must be trained to become cadres or combatants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, or of the militia

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

... because, as you know, our nation and our Revolution are not only defended by soldiers, they are defended by all the people, by our reserve troops, by the members of the Territorial Troop Militia."

The promotion of OPJM activities throughout Cuba received high priority during the mid-1980s. As a result, the government sponsored the development of different kinds of training and recreational facilities that included Pioneer Scouting Camps, Pioneer Camps, Pioneers in the Countryside Camps, and Pioneer Palaces. These facilities were used, in the words of the official PCC newspaper *Granma Weekly Review*, "to create positive, social habits while simultaneously providing for the integral development of [pioneers'] personality as members of our socialist society." Camps also served to reward deserving Pioneers. An estimated 250 of these facilities were reported to exist by 1984.

During the mid-1980s Cuba had two mass student organizations: the Federation of Intermediate Level Students (Federación Estudiantes de Enseñanza Media—FEEM) and the Federation of University of Students (Federación Estudiantil Universitaria—FEU). The government claimed that the goal of both of these organizations was to raise the educational standards of the Cuban student body, especially of those enrolled at intermediate and university levels, and to improve their political and ideological education. An important goal of the whole educational process was the creation of a "new man" willing to support and fulfill the needs of the Revolution, to live the principles of proletarian internationalism, and to defend the country. The fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism were taught to all federation members, and students received directives from the UJC through their federations. The president of the FEU was also a member of the National Committee of the UJC.

### **Health and Welfare**

Health care and general welfare activities were the responsibility of the state through its Ministry of Public Health. Only 53 of a national total of 20,545 physicians were reported to have private practices in 1984. The rest worked under the authority of the ministry. The health system was eventually administered from Havana through a large network of urban and rural hospitals, polyclinics, and related health facilities located in all 14 provinces. Mass organizations played an important role in supporting all preventive health care programs and in assisting medical and paramedical personnel in rendering their services. In 1985 it was estimated that



*Pioneers, Havana*  
Photo by Phillips Bourns

almost 100 percent of the national population was served by medical and health and health-related institutions.

At that time Cuba was one of the Western Hemisphere nations best served by health care and general welfare services and facilities. Cuba has enjoyed very high medical standards since the late nineteenth century. This tradition was continued by the Castro regime despite difficulties during the early 1960s that were generated by the exodus of more than 3,000 physicians and the temporary reduction in the supply of medical equipment and medicines. The 1960s and early 1970s were difficult years, when some health indicators deteriorated in comparison with prerevolutionary levels. However, health standards recovered and, in some cases, surpassed prerevolutionary levels because state budget allocations for health increased during the first 25 years of the revolution from 21 mil-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

lion to 668 million pesos, massive vaccination campaigns were organized, and crash programs to educate medical personnel were launched. A national network of rural, regional, provincial, and national hospitals and polyclinics was built to provide universal free or low-cost medical coverage that included the dispensing of medication. Health care was reoriented from cure to prevention. Efforts were made to eradicate disease vectors, such as various kinds of mosquitoes, and also to upgrade the sanitary standards of previously neglected rural and urban areas. As a result, social and regional differentials in death and disease rates were reduced.

In 1983 the Ministry of Public Health reported it was operating a total of 273 hospitals, which included 92 general hospitals, 21 maternity hospitals, 29 maternal-infant hospitals, and 27 pediatric hospitals. In addition, it operated 396 polyclinics, 158 primary care units in rural areas, 85 homes for expectant mothers, 143 dental clinics, 65 homes for the elderly, and 14 homes for the disabled, which together were equipped with a total of 55,000 hospital beds. An estimated total of 20,545 physicians, more than 4,000 dentists, 35,000 nurses, and 34,000 mid-level paramedical technicians worked in these medical and dental facilities. Polyclinics were the cornerstone of the Cuban health system. They were outpatient clinics equipped with up to 30 beds, and each was staffed by a professional team that usually included a specialist in general medicine, a pediatrician, a gynecologist, one or two internists, a few nurses, and other support personnel. Preventive medicine through periodic vaccination campaigns against communicable diseases and campaigns to improve local sanitary conditions received the highest priority in these polyclinics.

The Ministry of Public Health was also responsible for training medical and paramedical personnel. In 1984 it was in charge of 18 medical schools, one or two in each province, which had reportedly graduated a total of 16,017 physicians in the 1960-81 period; 64 paramedical schools, which had reportedly trained almost 85,000 mid-level technicians, including almost 19,000 nurses; and 13 research institutes. It was also announced at the time that the standards of all local, municipal, and provincial hospitals were soon to be raised to enable all hospitals in the country to become teaching hospitals. In December 1982 the government inaugurated Cuba's largest and most sophisticated hospital, the Hermanos Amerijeiras Hospital, located in a 24-story building in downtown Havana, which was equipped with a computerized axial tomography (CAT scan) machine and 950 beds in 300 patient rooms. The hospital was to become the nation's major medical re-

### *The Society and Its Environment*

search and postdoctoral training center, serving also as a referral center for all urban and rural hospitals.

In 1982 Cuban had 1,400 physicians, 52 dentists, 560 nurses, 469 technicians, and 32 other health workers in 26 Third World countries, including Nicaragua, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). This number included 106 physicians who had finished their course work while in Nicaragua and eight who had done so while in the Western Sahara (formerly the Spanish Sahara).

Because of the lack of nongovernment sources of information during the mid-1980s, it was difficult to ascertain the standards that characterized the entire Cuban health system. Foreign scholars visiting Cuba lacked the independence to undertake freely any kind of empirical research, and they were usually escorted by government officials or by the local CDRs throughout their visits. Statistical information was readily available, but little was said about basic equipment at each medical facility, training center, or research institute. It was not clear what criteria were used to distinguish among a hospital, polyclinic, primary care unit, and infirmary, or between the Higher Institute of Medical Sciences, a provincial medical school, and a teaching ward within a hospital. Little information could be obtained regarding the availability of state-of-the-art laboratories, professional equipment, textbooks, reference books, professional journals, and other publications in each of the nation's 18 reported medical schools, nor was the status of the pharmaceutical industry clear. From reviewing the nation's health indicators, however, it appears that medical standards were generally high, at least at some facilities.

Cuba's 1984 infant mortality rate of 16 per 1,000 was among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere after Canada, the United States, Dominica, Grenada, and Martinique. The government claimed that this was the result of its efforts to reduce risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth by providing pregnant women with comprehensive prenatal medical care by opening a national network of maternity homes near hospitals, where mothers spent the last days of their pregnancies, and by guaranteeing professional maternal and child care to all. As a result, 98.4 percent of the deliveries took place in hospitals, and the maternal mortality rate (deaths resulting from complications of pregnancy and delivery per 10,000 live births) was reduced from 11.8 in 1960 to 3.2 in 1984. Infant mortality was reduced from 43.6 in 1962 to 16 in 1984.

In 1981 contagious and parasitic diseases accounted for 2.2 percent of all deaths in contrast to 13.3 percent in 1962. No cases of malaria, whooping cough, diphtheria, poliomyelitis, measles, tu-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

berculosis, or neonatal tetanus were officially registered since 1980, and only isolated cases were reported during the 1970s. The major causes of death during the 1980s had shifted from infectious, parasitic, and communicable diseases to degenerative diseases.

In 1984 it was reported that the major causes of death for children age one to 14 were accidents and violence, cancer, congenital abnormalities, influenza, pneumonia, and meningeal infections. Suicide was among the major causes of death in the age-group of 15 to 49; its rate rose from 17.2 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1975 to 21.3 in 1980. Accidents, cardiovascular diseases (high blood pressure, arteriosclerosis, heart attacks, and strokes), cancer, and diabetes were Cuba's leading causes of death during the mid-1980s. These diseases, the government claimed, were the result of higher medical standards that had practically eradicated traditional causes of death, vastly increasing life expectancy to age 73.5 for men and age 75 for women and minimizing the incidence of preventable diseases.

The government continued trying to reduce the incidence of all disease by improving the nation's hygiene and related living habits. Mass organizations played a pivotal role in these efforts. In June 1984 the Cuban deputy minister of public health officially reported that Cuba had reached the primary health care goals set by the United Nations World Health Organization for its "Health for All by the Year 2000" program.

In 1982 the government reported that Cuba had 17,306 medical and 2,371 dental students. An additional 540 students were reportedly earning higher university degrees in nursing. Over 4,100 students were in their first year of medical school, while 2,124 were reported to be in their sixth, or last, year. Sixth-year students pursued internships that were followed by two years of rural work and, finally, specialization.

In February 1984 the Cuban government reported the beginning of a public health campaign called "One doctor for every 120 families," also known as the community or family doctor program. The program aimed to expand the range of health services by assigning one physician and a team of paramedics to serve an average of 120 families, or the equivalent of one city block. The experiment began in the Lawton neighborhood of Havana, where the Ministry of Public Health assigned 10 physicians to work full-time, offering routine and preventive medical care, home visits, counseling, patient referral to local hospitals, and related service to approximately 1,200 families living in 10 adjacent blocks. Physicians were to live in the community, hold office hours in the mornings,


### *The Society and Its Environment*

and make home visits in the afternoons. Lawton's local CDRs were assigned the responsibility of providing 10 facilities, each within the jurisdiction of a single CDR, where the physicians would render their services. At the opening session of Cuba's October 1984 Pediatrics Congress, when Castro announced the campaign, he reported that 230 physicians were already participating in programs in neighborhoods as well as in factories and schools.

The Cuban government claimed the nation's overall health standards had also been raised through measures that improved the nutritional levels of social groups that were disadvantaged before 1959. During the early 1960s the government introduced a system of food rationing, still in effect during the mid-1980s, that allocated between 2,100 and 2,650 calories per day to each inhabitant. Rationed items included beans, rice, beef, cooking oil and lard, bread, dairy products, and other items. Other products were available outside the rationing system. There was controversy over how much the nutritional status of the population had improved. Some authors, such as Florida State University biochemist Antonio M. Gordon, claimed in 1983 that "Cuban nutritional data [were] subject to the whims of political committees which may control data collection, impose censorship, and . . . advise on the interpretation of political phenomena." Other sources, which included political scientist Howard Handelman and demographer Sergio Díaz-Briquets, reported the results of nutritional surveys undertaken during the late 1970s, which suggested that caloric intakes were adequate, although certain vitamin deficiencies existed, and claimed that the correlation between income and nutritional level had been greatly reduced despite lingering differences among the nation's various regions in ration-book allocations and food intake.

During the mid-1980s the social security system was the responsibility of the State Committee for Labor and Social Security and was funded from the national budget. No deductions were made from worker's salaries. Prior to 1959 about 52 distinct retirement funds covered less than 50 percent of the labor force. In 1963 these funds were merged, unified, and standardized into a single social security system that covered all workers. The average pension declined steadily in the 1960s, but it slowly increased after 1969, and by 1976 it was 11 percent higher than in 1959. Pensions were more equally distributed than before; for example, the ratio between the highest and lowest pension was four to one in 1978, as compared with 13 to one in 1958. Coverage for old-age, disability, and life (survivors') insurance increased from 63 percent in 1958 (the second highest in Latin America) to practically 100 percent in the late 1960s.





*Rural hospital*  
Courtesy Prensa Latina



*Working inside psychiatric hospital, Havana*  
Photo by Philip Brenner

## *The Society and Its Environment*

In 1980 the system was subdivided into two branches: a new social security system and the social assistance system. The new social security system was to cover all workers and their families, while the social assistance system recognized the right of the population to request various kinds of financial and social aid, based only on need, from the municipal assemblies of people's power (see *The State Structure*, ch. 4). Free health and dental services, including hospitalization, rehabilitation, and maternity expenses, were universal. The right of working women to a total of 18 weeks of maternity leave with full salary, which included a 12-week post-birth, and the prohibition against working after the thirty-fourth week of pregnancy were prescribed by a 1974 law. Various kinds of financial and service benefits were also established in the 1980 law, which prescribed various kinds of disability, retirement, and survivors' pensions. In 1984 a special social security system for agriculture and livestock cooperatives was also established.

## **Religion**

Cuba was predominantly a nonreligious country. According to estimates made by the *World Christian Encyclopedia*, an estimated 49 percent of its population was agnostic and 6 percent atheist. Christianity, in the form of Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Cuban indigenous churches, was professed by 42 percent of the national population. Afro-Cuban cults accounted for 1.6 percent of the national population. Other non-Christian religions, such as Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, and various forms of organized high spiritualism, constituted only 1.4 percent of the population.

The Cuban government officially recognized and guaranteed the right of its citizens to profess a religious faith. This policy has been tempered in a number of ways. For example, during the First National Congress of Education and Culture held in Havana in 1971, it was concluded that the "religious phenomenon" should be considered secondary in the construction of a socialist society. Further protection of the Revolution from "obscurantist and counterrevolutionary sects" was also recommended at the time.

The right to religious freedom and worship in Cuba was clearly reinforced, however, in the 1976 Constitution. Article 54 recognizes and guarantees freedom of conscience and the right of everyone to profess and practice any religious belief. Any attempt to oppose the Revolution, education, work, or military service on religious grounds would be considered illegal and punishable by law. In practice, the official Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Cuban

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

regime precluded open expressions of religious faith and restricted membership in the PCC and in the UJC to nonbelievers. Consequently, believers were in effect excluded from most public sector posts as well as from higher education.

#### **Crisis in Church-State Relations**

Church-state relations in the Cuba of the mid-1980s reflected a long process of deterioration within Cuban religious institutions that dates back to at least the early twentieth century. According to historian Margaret E. Crahan of Occidental College, religious practice in prerevolutionary Cuba was relatively weak. Among the reasons were the nominal nature of the religious commitment of Roman Catholics, the small number of Protestants and Jews, the noninstitutional nature of the Afro-Cuban syncretic cults, the institutional dependence of the various Cuban churches on their counterparts in Spain and in the United States, the concentration of church personnel and institutions in urban areas, and the emphasis given to institution building and elite education rather than pastoral duties. Crahan summarized major criticisms of the churches in pre-1959 Cuba by various world religious authorities, who pointed to their "elitism, lack of concern with socioeconomic justice, autocracy, preoccupation with financial matters, using charitable gestures to avoid confronting the structural bases of poverty and exploitations, cowardice in the face of political repression and corruption, overdependence on foreign and domestic political and economic elites, and failure to assume a prophetic role in a highly unequalitarian society. In addition, the churches were scorned for racism, pietism, pacifism, triumphalism, enclavism, puritanism, paternalism, individualism, and escapism."

A graduate of the highly respected Jesuit-run Belén High School in Havana, Castro acknowledged during his first weeks in power the assistance that he had received from the Roman Catholic Church in his struggle against the Batista government. He is often quoted as having said in January 1959 that "the Catholics of Cuba have provided decisive collaboration with the cause of freedom." The church's relations with the government deteriorated rapidly, however, as a result of various confrontations. These began with the promulgation of the first Law of Agrarian Reform on May 17, 1959, and continued with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on May 8, 1960. The confrontations intensified when priests and members of the Havana-based Agrupación Católica participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and

### *The Society and Its Environment*

after the 1961 Law on the Nationalization of Education was promulgated. This trend culminated in September 1961, when a religious procession of several thousand protested against the regime, and the government reacted rapidly. Among its measures were the prohibition of religious processions, the deportation of over 100 clergy, the elimination of religious holidays, the introduction of athletic and indoctrination classes on Sundays, and the placement of severe restrictions on use of the mass communications media by all church groups. Some of these measures were still being enforced during the mid 1980s.

#### **Gestures Toward a Rapprochement**

In the mid-1980s the period of open conflict between churches and the state seemed to have ended, and the government tolerated some church activities. This change resulted from the hard work of various religious authorities, including the president of the Protestant Evangelical Theological Seminary in Matanzas, Sergio Arce Méndez, and Archbishop Césaire Zacchi, who had served as papal nuncio to Cuba from 1963 to 1975.

According to Arce Méndez, the future of Christian churches in Cuba "will depend greatly on whether we are able to have widespread biblical-theological education and create serious Cuban theology that is adequate to our specific situation." He was of the opinion the Cuban churches must first tend to their own sins, past and present, before railing against the sins of the revolutionary government. Thanks to him, since the mid-1970s Cuban churches have no longer criticized the government and have been encouraging their congregations to participate in various government-sponsored development programs, such as "voluntary" agricultural work. Zacchi similarly suggested during the late 1960s that Catholics should integrate themselves into the Revolution by participating in mass organizations in order to ease Christian-Marxist communication and introduce Catholic ideals into the Revolution.

The Cuban churches of the mid-1980s were qualitatively and quantitatively very different from those of the 1950s and 1960s. From a theological point of view, various church authorities seemed to have adopted new guidelines that encouraged Christians to seek the kingdom of God on earth by struggling for socioeconomic justice and by supporting movements and organizations that attempted to achieve it. Stress was laid on Christian commitment to the development of an egalitarian society. From an administrative point of view, most of the senior church authorities were native

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Cubans who had been promoted to their current positions after 1959.

In December 1984 the PCC incorporated into the Secretariat the senior government official responsible for the office on religious matters. In late January 1985, for the first time since the worsening of church-state relations in the early 1960s, Castro received a delegation of Cuban Roman Catholic bishops and discussed with them various issues. Further implications of this new rapprochement were not initially clear.

By the mid-1980s the number of clergy of all faiths had declined, but those remaining were generally highly dedicated. Likewise, church members were also fewer in number but more committed. However, it was clear that Cuban Christians had to survive in a society in which government policies and the official ideology limited their activities.

### **Social Stratification**

A major goal of the Cuban Revolution has been to close the vast socioeconomic, racial, and geographic cleavages of pre-1959 Cuban society. During the 1960s the government committed itself to full employment of all eligible Cubans in both urban and rural areas; open unemployment was rapidly eliminated, but the phenomenon of "disguised unemployment" (people employed full-time in marginally productive work) became a national problem that translated into a sharp fall in labor productivity. In 1980 an estimated 4 percent of the labor force was unemployed, 59 percent of whom were women. This low figure might have been the result of several factors: the export of surplus manpower to work in Third World countries, the renewed expansion of the armed forces, the 1980 exodus of more than 125,000 people from the port of Mariel, authorization for free contracting of labor, and new government policies implemented in 1976 authorizing the private practice of some trades and professions. After 1982 the government, nevertheless, strongly attacked private sector practices.

Since the early 1960s nearly all income earned in Cuba has come from the government in the form of wages, the single largest exception being the small private sector in agriculture. Nonstate employment, concentrated in agriculture, represented 35.4 percent of total employment in 1962 but had been reduced to 6.6 percent by 1979. One purpose of the 1976 Constitution, according to Raúl Castro, was to "consolidate the socioeconomic system based on social ownership of the means of production, the end of exploita-

tion and the gradual disappearance of class differences." The 1983 OAS human rights report, nevertheless, suggested the persistence of "various forms of discrimination in hiring on the basis of ideology or for related reasons."

### **Income Distribution**

In 1963 the revolutionary government introduced a Soviet-style wage-scale system in an attempt to standardize all wages and to offer equal pay for equal work regardless of the enterprise's productivity and profitability. Four labor categories were created, each with its own basic wage scale: farm workers; blue-collar workers; general service and government workers; and technical, executive, and senior personnel. In addition to the basic wage, the government considered rationing, subsidizing consumption, and free social services important elements of an individual's income. The ratio of Cuba's lowest to highest basic wage was made one to six, but basic wages could be increased by such means as overtime, extra payments for work performed under abnormal conditions, bonuses for exceeding work quotas, the "historical wage" (whereby some workers would receive the difference between the old prerevolutionary wage and the new wage), and other fringe benefits. As a supplement to their basic wages, senior government officials also had such fringe benefits as access to scarce consumer goods, use of automobiles, travel abroad, and access to housing.

During the mid-1980s most of the available published data on income distribution were estimates made by outside observers during the 1970s. Neither the Cuban government nor international agencies had published more recent information.

A 1981 study by economist Claes Brundenius included a study on the structure of income distribution based on various hypothetical estimates. Working with different hypotheses, Brundenius presented two estimates of real income distribution for 1978 and suggested that the real income distribution in 1978 lay somewhere between the two (see table 4, Appendix). The author noted, however, that although his data did not include bonuses, overtime pay, and other fringe benefits that were only introduced in the early 1980s—such as seniority pay and compensation for abnormal conditions, for night work, and for having to live away from home—these applied equally to all sectors of society and therefore did not drastically alter his conclusions. In 1984 the CTC reported that the number of workers whose pay was linked to the fulfill-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ment of quotas had doubled since the early 1980s and that over 10 percent of the workers received various kinds of compensations.

According to Brundenius, in 1978 the wealthiest 5 percent of the population received between 9.5 and 11 percent of the total national income. This category included senior government officials, foreign service officers, some professionals who enjoyed the privilege of having a private practice, acclaimed artists, and other groups with access to foreign currency. The poorest 10 percent received between 3.4 and 5.1 percent of the total national income. This category included poor peasants and shantytown dwellers in urban areas. Although poor, such people did not suffer from hunger, nor were they deprived of health care.

According to Brundenius, one of the main characteristics of the Cuban Revolution was the massive redistribution of income, "with the major transfer of income to the bottom quintiles during the first years after 1959 and with more moderate transfers during the latter part of the 1960s and 1970s." The incidence of poverty diminished, and income inequalities between rural and urban dwellers were substantially reduced. Although in the 1950s the average annual income of an agricultural worker was 92 pesos and that of a big landlord was over 40,000 pesos, during the early 1980s annual basic wages ranged from 984 pesos for the lowest-paid agricultural workers to 5,400 pesos earned by the most senior executives. During the early 1980s it was reported that there were very few Cubans earning less than 1,000 pesos per year and that there appeared to be a further narrowing in the gap between the highest- and the lowest-paid wages.

In 1984 the average wage was 176 pesos per month and, according to the Cuban government, an average individual spent 38 percent of his or her income on food, 11 percent on clothing, 11 percent on cigarettes, cigars, or alcoholic beverages, and the remainder on housing and miscellaneous expenses. Monthly rents ranged from 6 to 10 percent of total family wages, up to a high of 50 pesos, for a state-owned house.

#### **Moral and Material Incentives**

During the early 1960s the Cuban government debated the best way to increase productivity. Two positions were clearly identified. The first, supported by Che Guevara, held that productivity and economic growth depended mainly on the heightened political consciousness of the "new man" and on central planning (see The



Photo by John Finan



*Housing varies greatly in both rural and urban areas*  
Photo by John Finan





Photo by John Finan



Photo by Philip Brenner

### *The Society and Its Environment*

New Revolutionary Man, this ch.). The second, taken by Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and by the French economic adviser Charles Bettelheim, held that material incentives combined with the encouragement of capitalist market mechanisms and decentralization of planning would motivate people to work harder. Guevara's position predominated by 1964, and thereafter Cuba was operated as a single centralized government corporation that had a centralized budget and lacked cost accounting in each of its branch enterprises. Workers were rewarded with titles and decorations rather than promotions and salary increases. This was the result of a philosophy that assumed that workers would excel in response to higher levels of political motivation rather than to economic or material motivation. Financial and material incentives were to become things of the prerevolutionary past. Moral incentives, such as the honor of helping to build a socialist society, would spark the development of Cuba by raising the productivity of all the sectors (see *Radicalization of the System, 1963-66*, ch. 1).

Guevara's position proved to be a failure, however, and during the 1970s the government reversed its economic policies, gradually reinstating material incentives by linking wages with productivity. New production norms were established only after careful study of individual workplaces. These various measures led to much higher productivity (see *Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970-76*, ch. 1).

A national identity card still in use during the mid-1980s was introduced by the government in 1962 as part of its centralized planning policies. This card was essential to obtain or change employment and had to be on one's person at all times; it contained an employment record of its bearer as well as a record of the cardholder's "merits" and "demerits," such as his participation in work programs, comments on his political conscience, or criticisms resulting from his failure to meet production goals.

Socialist emulation, a quasi-formal government program intended to facilitate the implementation of the moral incentives, was also institutionalized in 1962 and still existed during the mid-1980s. Each government unit, from the most senior positions at a ministry level to the most junior sections of a factory or sugarcane plantation, was to compete with similar units in order to achieve higher working standards or quotas. The government acknowledged the outstanding production of these units by giving them pompous titles such as *brigada millonaria* (literally, millionaire brigade) for outstanding cane-cutting units. Also within each unit, competition was stimulated among workers through the periodic naming of the most productive member; the government rewarded these individ-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

uals, sometimes with trips to Europe and other times with highly cherished consumer goods, such as electric appliances or private automobiles.

During the 1980s a new system of enterprise management was being implemented to reduce inefficiency and misallocation of resources. New government measures included the authorization in April 1980 of new "free peasant markets" where prices were often seven to ten times higher than in state stores. By 1984 bonuses, overtime, and other material fringe benefits were reportedly an important element of labor policies.

#### **Mechanisms for Social Mobility**

During the 1980s the government claimed that Cuban society was becoming a classless society; little further reference was made to changes in social class or to mobility within the social strata. The income gap between agricultural and other workers and the gaps between urban and rural services and facilities had diminished. Social services had expanded more rapidly in the countryside than in the cities. As a result, educational and health facilities existed throughout the nation's 14 provinces, rendering services to virtually the entire population. Income differences tended to be less significant because the state employed more than 90 percent of the population, and the purchasing power of the population was severely restricted either by rationing or by the availability of products.

Cuban emigrants in the United States reported that social stratum existed that was closely related to membership in the PCC, to the position one occupied within the bureaucracy, and to access to scarce goods and information. A so-called *nueva clase* (literally, new class) consisting of senior PCC members replaced the old Cuban oligarchy in positions of social, economic, and political power. A closed group, its members were the same persons who took power in 1959, and they enjoyed most of the privileges that the Revolution had allegedly fought against. Members of this stratum tended to live in the mansions situated in Havana's posh Miramar neighborhood that were left behind by the exiles of the early 1960s. Scarcity of food staples and household appliances was almost nonexistent among the members of this group, and they were also exempted from rationing quotas and from waiting in line at the state-operated stores. Their children also enjoyed better, higher educational opportunities than those of the larger segments of the national population.

### *The Society and Its Environment*

Social mobility was possible but was subject to certain government constraints. Opportunities did exist, especially to move from the lower levels of government up to middle levels, but depended not only on one's professional qualifications but also on whether an individual had proper revolutionary credentials. Revolutionary zeal expressed by participation in local militias, "internationalist" development programs, and on house-building teams called "micro-brigades" was essential in order to obtain higher education, better jobs, better housing, and access to scarce goods (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, this ch).

Geographical mobility, however, was severely restricted as a result of the comprehensive system of identification cards, food ration coupons, and designated shopping centers. Together with the urban housing shortage and the government monopoly of the job market, these measures constrained Cubans to remain at their habitual place of residence. As a result, those who attempted to change their place of residence found themselves unable to obtain a new job, house, food ration coupons, and designated stores. Geographic mobility, therefore, was only possible under government supervision.

The rural poor enjoyed a higher standard of living than did their Latin American equivalents. Cuban peasants, better known as *guajiros*, continued living in *bohios* (traditional dwellings originally dating back to pre-Columbian times), that is, in thatched roof huts built either of palm trunk boards or of palm bark. Their major source of income continued to be the land but, in contrast to the situation before 1959, the government guaranteed steady jobs throughout all 12 months and provided all rural areas with a sufficient number of schools and medical centers. Hunger and temporary unemployment had disappeared, and if their children took proper advantage of the system, they could easily rise on the nation's sociopolitical scale.

Nonsupporters of the revolutionary government became the new outcasts. Disdainfully called *cuadrados* ("squares"), *parásitos* (parasites), or *bitongos* (dandies), these people were supervised around the clock by their local CDRs and in many ways were treated as enemies of the Revolution. As a result, they experienced severe problems in obtaining jobs, food supplies, and adequate housing, and they continued to encounter difficulties throughout their intermediate and higher education. Their children also suffered discrimination at school and were usually not accepted in the local Pioneer scout troop. In a worse situation were former political prisoners, especially those who had been sentenced and served in prison on the grounds of having committed so-called counterrevolu-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

tionary crimes. In addition to the restrictions and difficulties described, their identification cards had a stamp indicating their low status.

\* \* \*

A reasonable number of English- and Spanish-language publications on Cuban society are available; however, they reflect the distinct view of those who support the current system and of those who strongly criticize it. Unsupervised empirical research by independent foreign scholars was not possible in Cuba in mid-1985. Since 1961 the University of Pittsburgh's Center for Latin American Studies has been publishing biannually *Cuban Studies*, the most comprehensive, specialized professional journal on Cuban affairs. Since the mid-1960s Irving Lewis Horowitz' various editions of *Cuban Communism*, a collection of writings by authors representing various disciplines and points of view, have also offered one of the most comprehensive sources on Cuban society.

The government of Cuba periodically publishes in English various books, journals, and newspapers, many of which are available at United States libraries. Castro's lengthy speeches about various aspects of Cuban society and culture, illustrated by comprehensive statistics, are official policy statements and are one means by which the government releases current socioeconomic information. *Granma*, the official organ of the Central Committee of the PCC, has an international weekly edition in English—*Granma Weekly Review*—that is available in the United States. Its articles cover many diverse aspects of Cuban society.


Socioeconomic statistical information has been systematically published by the Cuban government's Comité Estatal de Estadísticas. The good quality of the data has been acknowledged by both the United States Bureau of the Census and the National Research Council. Non-Cuban sources of information include Patricia M. Rowe and Susan J. O'Connor's *Detailed Statistics on the Urban and Rural Population of Cuba: 1950 to 2010*; Paula E. Hollerbach and Sergio Díaz-Briquets' *Fertility Determinants in Cuba*; and Claes Brundenius' *Economic Growth, Basic Needs, and Income Distribution in Revolutionary Cuba*.

Other recommended sources of information include the daily edition of the *Christian Science Monitor*, *Miami Herald*, *New York Times*, and *Washington Post*, as well as the monthly or bimonthly *Caribbean Review*, *Cuba Times*, and *U.S.-Cuba Bulletin*. Periodical-

*The Society and Its Environment*

ly, these newspapers and magazines publish special reports on Cuban society. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

### Chapter 3. The Economy



*Sugar workers on truck with slogan "Not a single stalk of cane should  
be left on the ground."*



IN THE MID-1980S CUBA possessed a highly planned and centrally directed economy. The government largely controlled the means of production and was almost the sole employer in the country. Basic public services were provided by the government, either free of charge or at minimal cost.

The viability of the Cuban economy continued to be tied to the output of sugar, which alone generated 75 to 80 percent of the country's export earnings, mostly in "soft" currency. Recent efforts to expand the output of sugar showed signs of limited success, and the government remained committed to ambitious production goals of 10 million tons in 1985 and 12 million tons by 1990. In 1984 over 60 percent of the sugarcane was harvested by mechanized harvesters, and almost 98 percent of the crop was loaded by mechanical grapples. Citrus fruits and tobacco were Cuba's next leading agricultural exports. In 1984 Cuba was accepted as a member in the International Coffee Organization. Fishing for domestic consumption and export became increasingly important. The production of foodstuffs did not fare as well, however, and substantial imports of rice, wheat, flour, corn, beans, lard, and milk continued to be required.

Cuba ranked as the world's fifth leading producer of nickel, and its third nickel plant was scheduled to begin operation in 1985. In 1984 the production of crude oil had increased by more than two and one-half times over 1980 levels, and work began on the construction of the country's first nuclear power plant. In addition, revenues from tourism increased more than eightfold between 1978 and 1984.

Between 1980 and 1982 the government added a semblance of pragmatism and flexibility to the formulation of economic policy. The government introduced economic reform measures that included a general wage increase and the adjustment of retail prices, permitted state enterprises to directly hire and dismiss labor, allowed so-called free peasant markets to open, promoted decentralization and self-financing for state enterprises, and invited foreign firms to form joint ventures with Cuban enterprises.

In spite of these achievements, however, the economy continued to be affected by certain structural rigidities and exogenous variables. In mid-1985 the revolutionary government's goal of making the economy independent of foreign powers remained as distant as ever. In 1983 over 87 percent of the value of Cuba's trade was with socialist countries, while only 13 percent was with market economies. Imported crude oil and oil products from the Soviet Union provided about 97 percent of Cuba's total oil requirements. In 1983 the level of Soviet economic assistance was esti-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

mated to have totaled US\$4.2 billion, which was equivalent to US\$11.5 million per day and corresponded to 30 percent of Cuba's real output.

In 1983 sugar accounted for 81 percent of Cuba's total exports, compared with an average of 84 percent during the 1950s. Until the sharp fall in the world markets price for sugar in 1981, sugar had accounted for almost one-half of Cuba's hard currency export earnings. Cuban sugar exports during 1984 and 1985 confronted a world sugar glut, depressed world market prices that fell as low as US\$0.03 per pound, and a buyers' market that arose from the failure of producer countries to have reached a new international sugar agreement in 1984. Moreover, in world markets sugar was steadily losing ground to artificial sweeteners, corn syrup, and beet sugar. Nonetheless, in 1985 Cuba devoted huge resources toward meeting its sugar output target of 10 million tons.

The cyclical downswing in the price of sugar from 1981 to 1985, plunging hard currency exports earnings, high interest rates, and foreign credit cutbacks combined to precipitate a financial and economic crisis in Cuba during the early 1980s. The resulting lack of hard currency propelled Cuba to ask for a rescheduling of its US\$1.2 billion of principal payments that were due to Western bank and government creditors between September 1982 and the end of 1985. In 1983 and 1984 Cuba successfully rescheduled the portion of its foreign debt due in those years. In 1984 the Soviet Union also agreed to reschedule Cuba's estimated US\$8 billion foreign debt that was due between 1986 and 1990. The impact of the crisis and the subsequent austerity measures severely constrained domestic economic activity. Although industrial output increased somewhat, investment plans were deferred, and consumer goods shortages worsened. Concurrently, imports of Western machinery and spare parts required as inputs for domestic industry were curtailed. In addition, by 1985 Cuba had not been successful in attracting foreign investors to participate in joint ventures with domestic enterprises.

Although a semblance of reforms designed to decentralize economic decisionmaking were introduced during the 1980-82 period, observers believed that these were only implemented to resolve short-term constraints and that the prospect for further liberalization measures in the future was unlikely. The Cuban leadership was believed to fear that additional "reforms" would dilute the state's capacity to set and ascribe priorities to economic goals and objectives. Moreover, the political power of the state and its capacity to mobilize and transform society would be severely curtailed.

## **Growth and Structure of the Economy**

After 1959 Cuba did not use the concept of gross national product (GNP) or other Western national accounts measures for the total value of goods and services produced in the country. Instead, Cuba employed the Soviet-style concepts of global social product (GSP—see Glossary) and gross material product (GMP), neither of which was in accord with United Nations standards for measuring national accounts. The GSP was the most frequently cited growth measure and the only macroeconomic series published regularly. The GSP was divided into the material product and the nonmaterial product. The material product measured the output value of goods for agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining, industry, and construction. The nonmaterial product measured the value of transportation, trade, and communication services that contributed to the output of the material product. GSP did not include the value of such services as finance, public health, education, housing, sports and recreation, public administration, defense, and household services, which were classified in Cuban methodology as consumption. The GSP was smaller than the GNP because the value of services included in consumption are excluded. The GMP included the material product but excluded the nonmaterial product and consumption.

The process of aggregation in the calculation of GSP does not use the concept of value added, by which the additional value contributed in each stage of production and in the distribution of an item are recorded. Thus a considerable amount of double counting in the valuation of goods occurred in Cuba's national accounts. Moreover, the methodologies with which the data were calculated changed several times, and the government did not supply sufficient detail to connect the historical series. An additional complication was that the government system of controlled prices distorted the true value of goods and hence prohibited the computation of the rate of inflation. As a result, the value of industrial output in the GSP was greatly overestimated, and thus Cuban macroeconomic indicators were not considered to be very reliable. Nonetheless, official GSP figures were used as indicators of trends in the sectoral growth of the economy.

Between 1971 and 1975 the GSP increased at an average annual rate of 13.7 percent, partly as a result of recuperation from the low rates of growth in the preceding five-year period. Over the 1976–80 period GSP grew by only 4 percent annually owing to the




Photo by John Finan



Courtesy Prensa Latina

*The Economy*



*Mechanical sugarcane harvesting (top left). Sugar loading dock at port of Guayabal (bottom left) and sugar mill in province of Pinar del Rio. Courtesy Prensa Latina*

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

difficulty of maintaining the high rates that had prevailed in 1971-75.

Cuba's 1981-85 five-year economic plan projected an annual growth rate of 5.1 percent for the period. According to Cuban sources, the growth in GSP was 3.1 percent in 1980, then jumped to 15.6 percent in 1981, slowed to only 2.6 percent in 1982, increased to 5.2 percent in 1983, and climbed to over 7 percent in 1984. Reportedly, the GSP grew by a total of 28 percent between 1978 and 1983, but in 1980 and 1982 the economy fell short of planned growth targets as a result of adverse weather, crop disease infestations, a decline in construction in 1980, and the severe constraints engendered by the lack of hard currency (see table 5, Appendix).

Agriculture's share of the GSP increased from 14 percent in 1970 to 16 percent in 1980, then fell to 14.1 percent in 1983. Agricultural GSP was largely stagnant in 1980 and 1983 owing to plant diseases and severe weather conditions in 1980 and adverse weather in 1983. In 1982 growth declined by 2.5 percent in response to production shortages in several food crops. In 1981 agricultural output increased by 13 percent because of successful replantings of sugarcane and tobacco that were damaged from disease in 1980 and because of excellent weather. Livestock declined from 4.5 percent in 1981 to a low of 1.6 percent in 1982 and then increased by 5.8 percent in 1983. Government efforts increased the value of fish output by 18 percent over the period. The annual growth rate descended, however, from 28 percent in 1980 to 3.3 percent in 1983.

The share of industry (a category that included electrical energy, manufacturing, and mining) in the GSP increased from 4.8 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 1980, then edged up to 42 percent in 1983. The electrical energy sector accounted for 2 percent of the GSP during the 1980-83 period, in comparison with 1.5 percent in 1970. The electrical energy sector expanded by over 15 percent in 1980 and 1981, then rose by 8.2 percent in 1982 and 3 percent in 1983. The generation of electricity expanded by 17 percent between 1980 and 1983, while the consumption of electricity increased by 10 percent. Approximately 84 percent of the electricity was generated by public electricity plants, 9 percent by sugar mills, and 7 percent by nickel plants and other local plants that were not tapped into the nationwide system (see Energy, this ch.). Industry consumed 45 percent of the electricity in 1983; sugar mills, 1.5 percent; commercial establishments, 23 percent; residential units, 28.5 percent; and other users, 1.4 percent.

During the 1980-83 period mining accounted for about 1 percent of the GSP. The output value of mining increased by 10.4 percent in 1981 over 1980, rose by only 2 percent in 1982, and increased by 9.6 percent in 1983 (see Mining, this ch.). The manufacturing share of the GSP decreased from 46 percent in 1970 to 38.4 percent in 1980, then increased to 39 percent by 1983 (see Manufacturing, this ch.). The share of construction in the GSP increased from 5.2 percent in 1970 to 8.3 percent in 1983. Construction activity declined by 2.2 percent in 1980, stagnated in 1982, and increased by 20 and 10.7 percent in 1981 and 1983, respectively. Increased construction activity in 1983 occurred partly because the output of construction materials, such as cement, bricks, tiles, glass windows, roofing materials, wood products, and plumbing pipes, increased after having declined in 1982. During 1983 the government constructed over 26,000 buildings and assisted in the repair of housing stock in the city of Havana. Nevertheless, there continued to be a severe housing shortage as new construction lagged far behind rising demand and construction efforts were concentrated in productive areas. In 1983 the housing shortage was estimated to have totaled 1.2 million units. An express railroad line connecting Havana and Santiago de Cuba was nearing completion in 1984. The new railroad would enable trains to travel at a speed of 140 kilometers per hour. Damage was also repaired on part of the railroad track in the sugarcane regions. Construction of a new railroad complex in Santiago de Cuba was expected to be completed in 1985 and connected to the national railroad system shortly thereafter. New railroad stations were also being built or refurbished. In 1984 work began on a new airport to be built between the cities of Varadero and Matanzas, as well as on a road linking the two cities.

During the 1980-83 period all the services in the nonmaterial sector had positive growth rates, except for transportation in 1982. Overall, Cuba had 10 main ports, of which Havana, Cienfuegos, and Mariel were the most important. The port of Havana handled over 60 percent of the nation's cargo. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the government added bulk cargo facilities to load sugar at the ports of Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Guayabal, Mariel, Boquerón, and Manzanillo. The Cuban national airline, Cubana de Aviación, Czechoslovak National Airline, and the Soviet airline, Aeroflot, flew cargo and passengers between Cuba and points in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Commercial airlines from Canada, Mexico, Spain, and a few other West European countries provided air service to Cuba. The government planned to purchase 16 new commercial airplanes between 1981 and 1985 and to improve the

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

José Martí Airport, Cuba's major international airport, located in Havana. About 6,000 tons of cargo were transported on international air carriers in 1982, and approximately 4,000 tons were transported domestically. Moreover, about 895,000 passengers traveled by air in 1982, of which around 72 percent traveled to domestic destinations and 28 percent traveled abroad. Cuba was estimated to have about 12,000 kilometers of standard-gauge railroads and over 3,000 kilometers of secondary lines serving the sugar regions. Approximately 23 million passengers used the railroad system in 1982, and 18.2 million tons of cargo were transported. Historically, buses have been the leading mode of transportation. In the late 1970s only 80,000 passenger cars were estimated to be on the island. About 79.6 million tons of freight were transported by motor vehicles. The highway system was quite well developed and adequately maintained (see fig. 4).

### **Role of the Government**

During the 1970s the government realized the impracticality of its earlier development strategy and embarked on a more mature and pragmatic approach to the formulation of economic policy (see Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970-76, ch. 1). In 1976 the government introduced the Soviet-style System of Economic Management and Planning (Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economía—SDPE), which was expected to be fully operational by the mid-1980s. The SDPE sought to maximize the efficiency of the economic system by improving the allocation and use of material, financial, and human resources. In order to accomplish these tasks the economic system reintroduced such market control instruments as prices, profits, taxes, credit, budgets, monetary guidelines, and interest rates. At the same time, a greater measure of decentralization, managerial discretion, material incentives, and limited market forces of supply and demand were adopted.

In 1980 the government restructured the Council of Ministers and dismissed several ministers. Four government ministries and two state committees were abolished, including those overseeing chemicals, construction and construction materials, the electric power industries, the mines and geology, and science and technology. In addition, the government created the Ministry of Basic Industry. Twelve ministers were replaced, including those responsible for foreign trade, agriculture, the sugar industry, the fishing indus-







Figure 4. Transportation System



try, the steelworking industry, light industry, transportation, and labor and social security (see National-level Politics, ch. 4).

In February 1980 the government introduced a new accounting system that required all state enterprises, with the exception of those needing subsidies, to function under a system of cost-account projections whereby each productive unit was to account for a margin of profit after having covered its own expenditures from self-generated revenues. Failure to abide by this system would result in dismissals. In addition, enterprises were empowered to request loans and make autonomous investment decisions.

On March 25, 1980, in order to foster labor productivity, the government introduced a general wage reform that tied wages and benefits more closely to workers' qualifications and performance on the job, and bonuses were provided for surpassing normal output standards. The minimum wage was increased by 3 percent in 1980, 15 percent in 1981, 4 percent in 1982, and only 1.7 percent in 1983. In order to increase efficiency and output, the government's program of guaranteed job security was ended in November 1980 (see Income Distribution, ch. 2).

In 1980 state enterprises were permitted both to hire artisans and the self-employed and to dismiss substandard workers. At the same time, the government established so-called free peasant markets throughout the country that allowed individual farmers and cooperatives to sell their surplus output directly to the public at prices determined by supply and demand. In 1983 the government opened state-operated parallel markets that competed directly with the free peasant markets. Government plans called for the replacement of free peasant markets by government-controlled markets because private farming was scheduled to be completely collectivized into cooperatives and state farms by 1988.

In 1981 an extensive reform of retail prices was enacted. For the first time since 1963, the prices for 1,500 items sold in the retail market were increased by 10 to 12 percent. The intent of the price increases and free peasant markets was to eradicate "socialist inflation," or the amount of money in circulation, by curtailing demand through higher prices and by increasing the supply of foodstuffs through the markets.

The cabinet-level organization responsible for preparing the five-year economic development plans was the Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN). The National Bank of Cuba was responsible for supervising the plan (see Fiscal and Monetary System, this ch.). The 1981-85 five-year economic plan modified a few of the previous and overly ambitious goals, interjected a greater sense of realism into what was considered

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

achievable, and concentrated on completing existing projects. The government also acknowledged the important role that sugar played as the principal earner of hard currency, as well as the fact that the country's plans to diversify the economy were intimately linked to the success of sugar sales. This five-year economic plan emphasized the expansion of exports and the production of domestic substitutes for goods that had previously been imported. Sugar was to be expanded by 20 to 25 percent; electricity, 50 percent; fuel output, 10 to 15 percent; textiles, 50 to 60 percent; various chemical products, 30 to 50 percent; and fishing, 10 percent. Nickel extraction and refining, steel output, construction of housing, development of nuclear and thermal electrical capacity, and output of consumer goods were also targeted for expansion. Moreover, the level of Soviet scientific and technical assistance was scheduled to double during the period.

### **Labor**

Total labor force and unemployment data were not regularly published by the Cuban government; available Cuban statistics were based solely on state civilian and private employment, omitting the armed forces, police, and security personnel. Consequently, data on the labor force represented estimates of a reconstructed labor force composed of state, civilian, military, and private employees and the unemployed (see table 6, Appendix).

In 1984 the labor force was estimated to number 3.9 million, of which about 88 percent were employed in the state and private sectors, 8 percent were in the military, and 4 percent were unemployed. In addition, voluntary labor was used in the sugarcane harvest and in construction, but its net productivity had to be proved beforehand. The labor force participation rate (labor force as a proportion of the total population) stood at 39 percent. Over the 1970-80 period it had increased from 31 to 36 percent. The rapid increase in the participation rate resulted from the doubling of the number of young women who joined the labor force after completing primary or secondary education and the incorporation of new entrants into the labor market from the baby-boom generation of the early 1960s.

During the 1970s total employment increased at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, outstripping the 1.5 percent growth rate of the population. Concurrently, the number of men in the labor force increased at an annual rate of 1 percent, in comparison with 8 percent for women. The proportion of women increased from 18 per-

cent of total employment in 1970 to 30 percent by 1980. The 1981-85 economic plan sought to maintain a similar proportion of women in the labor force, and their incorporation expanded in response to the government's introduction of the Family Code in 1975, which increased the accessibility to contraception, equalized pay scales, reversed discrimination against promotions, provided maternity leave, and gave employed women preferential access to goods and services. In addition, free and compulsory primary- and secondary-school education, boarding schools, scholarships, and day-care centers shifted some of the child care tasks from the parents to the state.

Approximately 3.2 million civilian members of the labor force were employed in 1984, of which the state and private sectors accounted for 95 and 5 percent, respectively. The wave of nationalizations during the 1960s transferred a significant proportion of industries, small businesses, and private agricultural holdings to the state sector (see *The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959-60*, ch. 1). Thus, by 1970 state employment had increased to 86 percent of civilian employment. The gradual reduction of private agriculture during the 1970s further expanded state employment levels to about 93 percent by 1980. Private employment was largely confined to agriculture. Small numbers of private sector workers were also found in fishing, transportation, commerce, and services. Part-time employment in the private sector was practically eliminated in 1971 by the passage of the "antiloafing law", which made full-time employment compulsory for adult males. Under this law the minimum age of employment was 17 for men and women, and the retirement age was set at 55 for women and 60 for men. All male citizens between the ages of 17 and 60 who were fit to work and were not enrolled in school were required to obtain employment or join the armed forces by the age of 17 (see *Social Stratification*, ch. 2).

Although no data were available on the number of self-employed workers, their participation in the labor force increased rapidly in the second half of the 1970s. In 1976 the government reversed an earlier ban on private economic activities and encouraged self-employment in services. Self-employment was legalized for hairdressers, manicurists, gardeners, taxi drivers, photographers, electricians, carpenters, auto mechanics, laundresses, tailors, seamstresses, shoeshine boys, and certain professional positions, such as dentists and physicians. Moonlighting after work hours and on weekends was permitted for state employees in occupations where manpower was in short supply. Others worked full-time in the private sector. Job applicants were required to register, obtain

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

a license, and pay a monthly self-employment tax on their income. In 1980 the system of free labor contracting was introduced, permitting the hiring of artisans and the self-employed. State enterprises were authorized to fire redundant or troublesome workers, to enter into contracts with persons having needed labor skills, and to be provided material inputs in exchange for 30 percent of the profit. The government recommended that the self-employed form cooperatives in order to facilitate the collection of taxes and ensure administrative control.

In 1983 productive and nonproductive activities were estimated to have contributed about 70 and 30 percent of total state civilian employment, respectively. Over the 1971-80 period the share of employment engaged in the direct production of goods declined slightly from 73 to 72 percent. The most significant change in the sectoral distribution of productive employment occurred in agriculture. During the 1970s the government policy of technological improvement and the mechanization of sugarcane cultivation was largely responsible for the reduction of 20,000 workers in the agriculture sector. Although industry (including mining, energy, and manufacturing) declined slightly from 21 to 20 percent of total employment, 107,000 new industrial jobs were created. Employment in construction actually increased from 6 to 10 percent of total employment. Commerce demonstrated a dynamic increase in employment from 8 to 11 percent. Transportation and communication declined from 8.5 to 7 percent. The productive sector accounted for a net increase of almost 450,000 jobs between 1971 and 1980. The largest employer in the nonproductive sector was social services, which included education, culture, and art. The second largest employer was in the category that included public health, social assistance, sports, and tourism.

Similar trends in employment occurred in the productive and nonproductive sectors between 1980 and 1983. During that period about 132,000 jobs were created in the productive sector and 55,000 in the nonproductive sector. Although forestry accounted for less than 1 percent of employment in 1983, the number of workers had increased by 35 percent since 1980. Employment in industry declined by 9 percent in 1983 after having increased by 26 percent between 1980 and 1982. Construction regained its dynamism in 1983 following the loss of employment for 12,000 workers during 1981 and 1982.

Although no recent information was available on sectoral employment by sex, it was apparent that during the 1970s women were concentrated in such traditional social service occupations as education, culture and art, public health, social security, sports and

tourism, and commerce. Men dominated agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining, and transportation and communication.

In 1983 the unemployment rate was estimated at about 4 percent of the labor force. In the early 1970s the government's priority on full employment was supplemented by a goal to increase labor productivity. In 1971 the Soviet system of work quotas was reintroduced, and material incentives were substituted for the earlier concept of the "new man" based on moral incentives (see *The New Revolutionary Man*, ch. 2). At the same time that the emphasis on productivity precipitated the release of thousands of redundant workers, the government also reduced the size of the armed forces and of social services. Consequently, the low unemployment rate of 1.3 percent in 1970 increased to 3.4 percent by 1973. The problem was compounded by the increased number of young women who entered the labor market and by a rapid decline in emigration.

The government subsequently attempted to mitigate the problem of an expanded number of the unemployed by the adoption of several measures to reduce the size of the labor force. Retirement was made more flexible in 1971, certain service occupations that had been reserved for women were opened to men in 1973, and the number of jobs that had been restricted to men because of health or safety reasons was expanded in 1976. Furthermore, new industrial and construction projects were concentrated in the city of Havana and other urban localities during 1976-80, and work quotas were relaxed in agriculture and in other productive spheres, while underemployment continued to be widespread in the sugar agro-industrial sector. In addition, subsidies were paid to laid-off workers until a new job was obtained that was equivalent to 70 percent of their wages, the practice of hiring artisans and the self-employed in the private sector and state enterprises was legalized between 1976 and 1980, and the size of the armed forces was increased for military activities in Africa. Finally, the size of the labor force was reduced when laborers and professionals in abundant supply—such as construction workers, technical advisers, teachers, and physicians, dentists, and other public health personnel—were sent abroad to assist developing countries and to generate income transfers to Cuba.

In spite of these measures, however, the ranks of the unemployed increased to about 188,000, or 5.4 percent of the labor force, in 1979. The emigration of 125,000 persons from the port of Mariel in 1980 was believed to have reduced the unemployment rate to about 4 percent. Nevertheless, the future increase in the

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

labor force and the continued emphasis on labor productivity would continue to generate a labor surplus for the near future.

### **Industry**

#### **Mining**

Cuba's nonfuel mineral resources included hydraulic cement, chromite, cobalt, copper, gypsum, iron and crude steel, lime, and nickel (see table 7, Appendix). In 1983 Cuba was the fifth largest producer of nickel in the world. Nickel reserves were estimated at approximately 19 million tons of ore with less than 1 to 1.4 percent of nickel content, representing about 10 percent of the world total. Nickel extraction, however, proved difficult because it was usually mixed with other metals such as iron, chrome, and cobalt. Nickel was produced in the form of oxide and sinter at the Nicaro and Pedro Sotto Alba nickel plants in the eastern province of Holguín. Nickel output during 1980-83 ranged from 38,000 to 39,000 tons annually.

After numerous delays, the new Punta Gorda nickel plant was reported to be about half completed in 1983. Upon completion, projected to be in 1985, the plant was expected to have an annual capacity for processing 30,000 tons of nickel oxides. The Nicaro plant was being modernized and was expected to have a final capacity for processing 22,500 tons of nickel-cobalt oxides annually. The Pedro Sotto Alba plant had a capacity of about 24,000 tons per year for processing nickel-cobalt sulfide. Construction of Cuba's fourth nickel plant, Las Camariocas, began in 1982. Construction was delayed, however, as resources were shifted toward completing the Punta Gorda plant. Las Camariocas was planned to be completed by 1990 and to have an operational capacity of 30,000 tons.

Nickel accounted for about 96 to 98 percent of all mineral exports during 1980-83. At the end of 1984 the Cuban government announced its intention to expand the output of nickel to about 100,000 tons annually by 1995 as increased supplies from the Punta Gorda and Las Camariocas nickel plants came on line. At the same time, the government indicated that it would be willing to export half of the output from the Punta Gorda plant to the West and the remainder to its Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—also known as Comecon) trading partners. Nonetheless, during 1980-85 Cuba experienced difficulties in marketing its nickel to Western countries because of United States restrictions



that prohibited imports containing Cuban nickel. Almost 10 percent of the country's nickel earnings in 1983 were reportedly in hard currency from sales to Western countries.

Iron ore reserves were estimated to be as high as 7 billion tons of laterite and 100 million tons of magnetite. Output of iron and crude steel amounted to an average of 322,000 tons during 1980-83. Iron output was used most often on a small scale at local foundries. The José Martí steel plant was being refurbished to increase the annual output capacity of crude steel to 675,000 tons. Cuba's Comecon partners were considering the possibility of building a plant to produce stainless steel in Cuba. Nonetheless, the island was forced to rely on increased amounts of foreign steel. Steel imports from Japan climbed from 578 tons in 1980 to almost 2,200 tons in 1984. Reportedly, Cuban imports of Japanese steel had risen to almost 2,000 tons between January and April 1985.

Cuba produced copper at the Matahambre mines in Pinar del Río province for over 70 years. Matahambre produced about 2,500 tons annually of ore containing 18- to 30-percent copper concentrate. According to the 1981-85 national economic development plan, Cuba's newer copper mines, at Júcaro and Grande, were expected to produce about 4,000 tons annually.

In 1983 Comecon reported discoveries of Cuban deposits that contained lead, zinc, copper, molybdenum, chromite, and phosphoric ores. Neither the size of the deposits nor their locations were announced.

### **Manufacturing**

During the early 1980s industrial expansion was constrained by the need to import vital inputs of fuel, raw material, and capital goods. In order to finance imports the government was forced to rely either on earnings from foreign trade or on increased foreign borrowings. Manufacturing activity reflected the overall economic contraction that began in 1981 after the sharp fall in the world market price for sugar. Between 1980 and 1982 imports from the West declined by 40 percent. In 1983 total hard currency imports from the West increased by only 6 percent, and intermediate goods imports increased by 25 percent, while imports of machinery and spare parts declined by 31 percent. These imports enabled some idle industrial capacity to renew operations, but not sufficiently to run at full capacity.

Manufacturing's share of GSP grew by only 1.6 percent in 1980, jumped by nearly 18 percent in 1981, rose by only 2.8 per-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

cent in 1982, and increased by 4.8 percent in 1983. The share of manufacturing in the total industrial product diminished from 45.5 percent in 1970 to 38.4 in 1980 and inched up to 39 percent in 1983 (see table 8, Appendix).


Within the manufacturing sector, consumer durables and capital goods demonstrated the best performance between 1980 and 1983. Growth in this subsector was led by the manufacture of non-electrical machinery, which included the production of almost 2,000 sugarcane harvesters of the KTP series during the period. In 1983 the output of buses recovered after having fallen by 35 percent in the previous three years. Production of electrotechnical and electronic goods increased rapidly in 1981 and 1983 but fell in 1980 and 1982. Within this group of products the number of radios expanded by 1,000 units between 1980 and 1983; television sets increased by 93 and 80 percent in 1981 and 1983, respectively, and declined by 23 and 35 percent in 1980 and 1982, respectively; and the output of refrigerators increased only in 1981.

Among nondurable consumer goods, the production of foodstuffs maintained the highest output levels. Wheat flour made the greatest contribution to output. Approximately 1.4 million tons of flour were produced during 1980-83. Fruit and vegetable products expanded by 26,000 tons over the same period, partly as a result of the completion of two fruit-juice bottling plants having a combined capacity of 40 tons per hour and the Jagüey citrus plant, which had the capacity to produce 28,000 tons of juice and concentrates. Canned meat products increased from 35,000 tons in 1980 to 58,000 tons in 1983, and the output of fish increased by 12,000 tons between 1980 and 1983. The production of sugar and sugar by-products fell in 1980 and 1983 but grew by 16 percent in 1981 and only 3.2 percent in 1982. In addition, the milling capacity for sugar increased as three new mills became operational in the provinces of Camagüey, Granma, and Cienfuegos in 1983, as the modernization of the Amanico Rodríguez mill was completed, and as the Ecuador sugar complex was refurbished. Other nondurable items whose production grew notably were alcoholic beverages, which grew 45 percent between 1980 and 1983, and clothing, which increased from 44 million pieces in 1980 to 52 million in 1983.

Among intermediate goods, the production of textiles was expected to increase by 70 percent between 1981 and 1985 over the output of about 250 million square meters between 1976 and 1980. Cement production in 1983 was 3.1 million tons, compared with 3.2 million tons in 1982 and 3.3 million tons in 1981. The 1985 target of 4.5 million tons of cement was unlikely to be



*Agricultural implements factory, Holguín*  
 Photo by Philip Brenner



*KTP cane cutter,  
 manufactured in Holguín*  
 Courtesy Prensa Latina

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

achieved even if the nation's largest cement plant comes on line in the mid-1980s. The production of fertilizers was 1.08 million tons in 1983 in comparison with 1.06 million tons in 1980. Development plans called for the rebuilding of Cuba's largest fertilizer plant in Cienfuegos Province. The completion of this plant was crucial in reducing the costly importation of fertilizers required by the sugarcane crop. Sulfuric acid output declined from 402,000 tons in 1980 to 370,000 tons in 1983. Ammonia nitrate declined from 312,000 tons in 1980 to 175,000 tons in 1983. The production of urea increased from 16,000 tons in 1980 to 32,000 tons in 1983.

## **Agriculture**

### **Crops**

In the early 1980s sugarcane was the principal agricultural crop, but numerous other items were also cultivated (see table 9, Appendix). In 1982 almost 70 percent of 2,373,300 hectares of cropland were devoted to the cultivation of sugarcane. Although sugarcane was grown in all provinces, the five leading producers were Camagüey, Matanzas, Villa Clara, Ciego de Avila, and Holguín. Approximately 82 percent of the crop was cultivated by the state sector and 18 percent by the nonstate sector.

Since the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest to meet the output target of 10 million tons, the government has scaled down the size of annual production goals. Nonetheless, subsequent output targets often fell short. The output target for 1980 had been set at 8.7 million tons, but an infestation of sugarcane rust severely damaged the crop, and only 6.6 million tons of sugar were produced. In 1981 output grew to 7.3 million tons but fell short of the official target of 8.6 million tons owing to the need to replace the diseased variety of sugarcane at the end of the 1980 harvest. The 1982 harvest of 8.2 million tons was the second largest on record and surpassed Cuban expectations by almost 1 million tons. In 1983 the sugarcane harvest fell to 7.1 million tons as the crop was adversely affected by torrential rains and winds. In 1984 Cuba had to revise its original sugar output target of 9 million tons downward to 8.2 million after poor weather made it unlikely that the goal could be reached. In July 1984 Castro announced that sugar output had reached 8.4 million tons. Unofficial estimates, however, ranged from 7.3 to 8 million tons. Cuban officials insisted that its ambitious 1985 output goal of 10 million tons was achievable.

The likelihood of meeting the 1985 target was complicated by problems associated with the extension of the 1984 harvest beyond the usual April cutoff date. Torrential rains between January and April 1984 prevented mechanized cane harvesters from operating in the muddy fields, and manual cane cutters had to be employed to make up a shortfall of about 1 million tons of sugarcane. Normally, weeding, fertilizing, and planting take place during May and June in order to ensure a bountiful harvest in the succeeding year. At the end of June, however, only 77 percent of the sugarcane area had been planted. Moreover, effective weeding of the fields was hindered by inadequate quantities of imported herbicides owing to hard currency constraints.

Nevertheless, Cuba's efforts to increase the production of sugar over the 1980-85 period were impressive. Despite torrential rains that idled the fleet of KTP-1 mechanical harvesters and reduced yields, Cuba achieved an expansion of sugar output. In addition, Cuba strove to develop the sugar sector in a more deliberate fashion during the early 1980s. During the 1984 harvest almost 62 percent of the sugarcane was cut by mechanical harvesters, and about 98 percent of the cane was loaded by mechanical grapplers. At the same time, only 80,000 persons were employed to cut the cane in comparison with 350,000 in 1970. In the early 1980s an improved version of the KTP-1 mechanical harvester was being tested, and about 65 of the new KTP-2 harvesters were expected to be used during the 1985 harvest. Moreover, 26 of Cuba's 152 sugar mills were being modernized, and four new ones were being built. Sugarcane by-products were also being used increasingly as animal feed supplements, as fuel, and as part of the production of syrups, yeast, alcohol, and paper.

Tobacco was Cuba's second largest agricultural export. In 1979 the tobacco crop was ravaged by the blue mold fungus that had the potential of destroying a tobacco plantation in only 72 hours. By March 1980 practically all of Cuba's tobacco crop had been destroyed, and only 8,000 tons were produced in that year. Tobacco recovered faster than expected, and in 1981 about 53,000 tons were produced. Output fell to 45,000 tons in 1982 owing to drought and flood damage. In 1983 severe weather decimated the crop, and production fell to 30,000 tons. Emergency replantings enabled the 1984 output level to rise to 45,000 tons. Approximately 71 percent of the tobacco crop was cultivated by nonstate sector farmers between 1980 and 1982.

Rice was an important staple of the Cuban diet. In 1968 the government launched a program to make the country self-sufficient in rice. By the mid-1980s rice output had increased by 35 percent

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

since the start of that program, but substantial amounts still had to be imported. The production of rice increased from 478,000 tons in 1980 to 518,000 tons in 1983. Over 92 percent of the rice crop was cultivated by the state sector. In addition, the country owned 87 plants for drying the rice crop and about 30 mills having the capacity to handle about 20,000 tons of rice per day. From 1980 to 1983 an annual average of 210,000 tons of rice had to be imported.

In keeping with the government's goal to diversify exports, Cuba sought to develop its citrus fruit. The government established an output target of 1.3 million tons by 1985 and planned to export half of the total. Matanzas Province was the leading producer, cultivating over 80,000 hectares. Almost 83 percent of the citrus fields were cultivated by the state sector. Citrus output increased from 444,000 tons in 1980 to 631,000 tons in 1983. Output in 1984 was expected to reach 650,000 tons, about two-thirds of which was destined for export. Cuban production plans called for an increase to 2.5 million tons by 1990, of which 60 percent would be exported to Comecon member countries. Oranges accounted for 63 percent of the citrus crop in 1983 and grapefruit for 26 percent.

During the early 1980s coffee became an increasingly important crop. The production of coffee increased from 19,000 tons in 1980 to a record of 29,000 tons in 1982 and declined to 26,000 tons in 1983. The government established an output target of 46,000 tons of coffee by 1990. Approximately 52 percent of the coffee crop was produced by nonstate farmers between 1980 and 1983. In 1984 Cuba gained membership in the International Coffee Organization.

Beans and corn were also important staples of the population. Between 1980 and 1983 corn output increased by 30 percent to 30,000 tons. At the same time, beans increased by 44 percent. Nevertheless, Cuba could not produce sufficient quantities of corn and was forced to import over 1.6 million tons during the 1980-82 period. The production of root crops declined by 8 percent over the period, and vegetable production rose by 75 percent between 1980 and 1981, then declined by 22 percent in 1982.

#### **Livestock**

During the 1980-82 period there was an annual average of 5.1 million head of cattle in Cuba. Of that total, the state sector accounted for 3.7 million and the private sector for 1.3 million head of cattle. Despite efforts to expand the herd during that



*Tobacco and dairy farming*  
Courtesy Prensa Latina

*Cuba: A Country Study*

period, its size largely remained below the annual number recorded in the previous 20 years. Cows accounted for 3.4 million head of cattle, or 67 percent of the total. The state and private sectors held approximately 76 and 24 percent, respectively, of the total cow stock. About 17 percent of the total cow stock were calves, 23 percent were heifers, 47 percent were mature cows, and 13 percent were older cows. The remaining 1.7 million head of cattle included oxen and bulls for various uses. Although cattle were raised throughout the country, the largest producers were the provinces of Camagüey, La Habana, Villa Clara, Granma, and Pinar del Río.

There were many state cattle ranches where intensive stock raising was practiced. The methods included rotation of pasture, artificial insemination, crossbreeding, and supplemental feeding. In the second half of the 1960s the government attempted to develop a new breed of cattle by crossbreeding native zebu cattle with imported Holstein and Brown Swiss to improve the output of milk. The result was two new breeds called F-1 and F-2. In 1982 there were 122,100 F-1 and 215,600 F-2 cows that were the offspring of zebu and Holsteins and 40,800 F-1 and 67,800 F-2 cows that were the result of crossbreeding zebu with Brown Swiss. These breeds represented approximately 70 percent of the state sector's 636,000 dairy cows in Cuba. Although there were no historical series to compare milk yields of the various breeds, it was apparent that the zebu-Holstein progeny had a higher yield than did the zebu-Brown Swiss. Overall, an average of 417,000 cows produced milk in 1982, or almost 5 percent more than in 1980. These cows yielded an average daily output of 6.1 kilograms of milk each, totaling 929,000 tons annually. Provisional data indicated that milk output in 1983 had increased to 948,000 tons, or 6 percent more than in 1980. The domestic production of milk only supplied about 30 percent of national milk consumption, however, and the remaining 70 percent was obtained through imports of powdered milk.

An annual average of 900,000 head of cattle were slaughtered for consumption during the 1980-82 period. Approximately 44 percent of the cattle sent to slaughter were cows and heifers, 39 percent were bulls, and 17 percent were in a miscellaneous category. The slaughter weight of the first group averaged 330 kilograms over the period, and the second group weighed 350 kilograms at slaughter. The average slaughter weight for both groups increased by only 2.8 percent between 1978 and 1982.

From 1980 to 1982 approximately 300,000 tons of meat were supplied by the slaughterhouses. Of that total, about 284,000 tons were destined to meat-packing plants, 5,100 tons were sold to the public, 300 tons were distributed to various organizations, and



10,300 tons were consumed or distributed by persons at the slaughter sites.

In 1983 there were 867,000 hogs held by the state sector in comparison to 765,000 in 1980. An average of almost 1.2 million piglets were born each year over the period. The mortality rate per 100 hog births declined from 11 percent in 1980 to 9 percent in 1982. The number of hogs slaughtered for consumption was 747,000 in 1980 and 934,800 in 1982. The average slaughter weight was about 78 kilograms, which was similar to the weight that prevailed in the second half of the 1970s. The higher slaughter rates enabled the consumption of pork to rise from 58 tons in 1980 to 72 tons in 1983.

Significant improvements were noted in poultry and egg production between 1980 and 1982. The number of chickens ranged from a high of 24.6 million in 1980 to a low of 23 million in 1982. Of that total, approximately 8.3 million were layers selected for their reproductive capacity, 5.5 million were layers that were to serve as replacements, and 7 million chickens were raised for eventual consumption. The production of poultry meat declined from 91,000 tons in 1980 to 80,000 tons in 1983. The number of eggs, however, increased from 2.3 million in 1980 to 2.5 million in 1983.

### **Fishing**

The fishing industry expanded considerably from 1959 to the mid-1980s. The annual fish catch increased from about 25,500 tons in 1958 to 251,000 tons in 1983. Production increased by 168,000 tons between 1958 and 1974 before declining by 13 percent to 143,000 tons in 1975. Output fluctuated yearly during the second half of the 1970s. The fish catch increased by 35 percent in 1976, declined by 5 percent in 1977, increased by 15 percent in 1978, declined by over 26 percent in 1979, and increased by 20 percent in 1980. Although the fish catch improved slightly in 1980, it was 7 million tons below the level of 193,000 tons recorded in 1976. Moreover, the 1980 catch was 47 percent below the government target of 350,000 tons that had been set for that year. Overall, the fish catch grew by more than 100 percent in 1971-75 over the previous five years. In 1976-80 output grew by only 29 percent. Although the catch rose to 200,000 tons in both 1983 and 1984, it was unlikely that the government goal of reaching 300,000 tons by 1985 would be attained.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Several factors accounted for the fluctuations of the fish catch in the second half of the 1970s. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the fish catch declined in 1979 as a result of the implementation of the universal 200-nautical-mile territorial limit that precluded the option of fishing in traditional waters and caused Cuba to search farther afield for new fishing grounds. According to Cuban scholar Carmelo Mesa-Largo, fishing declined when the fishing fleet was probably used to transport Cuban troops to Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977. Other reasons for the decline included the Peruvian abrogation of a lucrative fishing agreement with Cuba in 1979, the destruction of the largest fish nursery, in San Antonio, by a spill from an oil tanker that sank in the vicinity, and the 1980 cancellation of the United States-Cuban fishing agreement that had informally been adhered to for two years.

Cuba possessed two long-range fishing fleets that included about 67 vessels and two medium-range fleets of 298 vessels. The fleet was supplemented by a small inshore fleet of almost 2,000 boats. The Ministry of Fishing Industry was responsible for the operation of four canning factories, nine freezing facilities, 15 ice production machines, 30 centers for the deposit and distribution of fish, and a large transportation network for the delivery of fish. The fishing industry canned primarily lobster and tuna; shellfish was chiefly frozen for domestic consumption. The supply of fish to the domestic market increased by 4.4 percent annually between 1976 and 1983, reaching a total of 58,000 tons in 1983. Consequently the fish consumption per capita increased from 4.4 kilograms in 1973 to 5.9 kilograms in 1983.

### **Fiscal and Monetary System**

Since 1966 Cuba's financial apparatus has undergone a significant reorganization. In that year the Ministry of Finance was abolished, and the National Bank of Cuba (Banco Nacional de Cuba—BNC) assumed responsibility for the financial management of the economy. During the 1966–70 phase of the Sino-Guevarist model of economic development, such market instruments as profit, credit, interest, prices, savings, budgets, taxes, cost analysis, and monetary controls were discontinued or used in a haphazard fashion. Standardized accounting practices also fell into disuse, and the national budget was discarded during 1968–77. In the late 1970s the System of Economic Management and Planning (Sistema de Dirección y Planificación de la Economía—SDPE) introduced

measures to rebuild gradually an institutional framework capable of controlling and directing the economy. The SDPE restored the primacy of market instruments and, among other things, reintroduced the national budget in 1978. In 1980 the budgetary process was extended to the provincial and municipal levels. The budgetary process was complex and tentative, and its disparate components were still being fine-tuned in the early 1980s.

The budgetary process was structured vertically to fully integrate state and service enterprises at the municipal, regional, and national levels into the centralized planning apparatus. Each state and service enterprise submitted annual estimates of its financial requirements to JUCEPLAN in order to ensure that the requests conformed to the objectives of the national development plan. The budget drafts were submitted in turn to the municipal directors of finance, the executive committees of the municipal assemblies of people's power, and the provincial directors of finance for their approval or modification. The local budget proposals were then consolidated into the central budget by the BNC and submitted to the Council of Ministers for final approval. The president of the BNC presided over trimestral meetings of provincial and municipal representatives to review the execution of the budget. In accordance with Law No. 19 the BNC was required to provide the Council of Ministers with an expense and recovery report on the budget at every trimester throughout the fiscal year (which coincided with the calendar year). If expenditures exceeded the budgetary allocations, corrective realignment measures were implemented that sometimes included financial or administrative penalties.

The main sources of government revenue were profits from the state and service enterprises, taxes, and nontributary revenues. Profit from state and service enterprises under local supervision were allocated to the municipal and provincial budgets. The kind of payments that were considered revenues of the central budget included such regulatory taxes as production taxes; sales taxes on lodging, restaurant, and recreational services; and taxes on consumer goods, surface transport, property transfers, documents, forestry, and capital invested abroad. In addition, an income tax was levied on the self-employed and on private farmers. Social security contributions and payments on the differential between prices charged for imported and exported goods were additional sources of government revenue. The retention rate, or the proportion of taxes that were allotted to the provincial and municipal levels, was determined at the national level. In certain cases a few provinces received a subsidy in the form of a 100-percent retention rate. Provinces and municipalities received approximately 93 percent of

*Cuba: A Country Study*

their revenue from the state sector, 4 percent from nontributary revenue, and 3 percent from the private sector.

For the first time in five years, the state budget recorded a surplus of US\$447 million in 1983 (see table 10, Appendix). The surplus was achieved as a result of a 14-percent growth in revenues and only an 8-percent growth in expenditures. Almost 99 percent of total revenues were obtained from the state sector, slightly more than 1 percent from taxes and 0.2 percent from the nonstate sector. For the second consecutive year actual revenues exceeded the amount that had been budgeted by 6 and 8 percent in 1982 and 1983, respectively. The growth of revenues resulted from the implementation of improved fiscal controls, greater efforts to increase mercantile funds, development of the parallel market, and increased prices. The last two factors were estimated to have contributed about US\$465 million to state sector revenues in 1983. In 1980 and 1981 state revenues had failed to meet the budgetary targets. Nonetheless, revenues increased by 5 percent in 1980 and 15 percent in 1981. The jump in fiscal revenues in 1981 occurred in response to the vigorous growth of the economy after having grown very slowly in 1980.

Investment in the accumulation of capital was largely financed by the state budget. Since the mid-1970s approximately 27 percent of national income was channeled into investment. Concurrently, investment in the nonproductive sector declined as the government placed a greater emphasis on the development of the productive sector. From 1980 to 1982 the largest growth in productive investment occurred in commerce, transportation, and industry. In the nonproductive sector the most notable decline occurred in education. The high rate of investment resources devoted to the formation of capital in the productive sector implied that society was subjected to a forced savings by forgoing present consumption in favor of adding to future production possibilities.

In 1983 productive activities in agriculture and industry accounted for 38 percent of total government expenditures. Although allocations for productive activities increased by almost 10 percent in 1983, the amount was less than that spent in 1980 and 1981. In 1983 funds were channeled to the agriculture sector to assist in the recovery of crop losses that had resulted from flooding. At the same time, investment financing and operating capital flows were expanded. In 1980 and 1981 financial outlays to bolster expanded production objectives had risen by 7 and 26 percent, respectively. Thus, wages and commodity prices paid to small farmers increased. In addition, wholesale prices rose in 1981. This action caused production costs to rise, and additional financial assistance in the form

of subsidies was required. In 1982 expenditures were cut back in all sectors owing to constraints that arose from a lack of foreign exchange and high interest rates on the external debt. In spite of a more austere budget, however, additional subsidized aid was required to combat flooding at harvesttime, and spending on material incentives surpassed budgetary limits because of a greater-than-expected response from workers.

Spending on housing and community services rose to its highest level on record in 1983. Education and public health was the second largest budget item, composing a 21-percent share of the total. Spending for education and public health increased by 27 percent during the 1980-83 period, compared with the budget proposal that had forecast a growth of 20 percent. The third largest expenditure item was other social, cultural, and scientific activities, which had increased by 24 percent in 1980-83. The share of the budget spent on defense and internal security increased by 47 percent between 1980 and 1983. In 1982 this item exceeded the budgeted amount by 17 percent, according to Cuban officials, as a result of heightened tensions with the United States.

During the 1980-83 period provincial budgets accounted for about 27 percent of total government expenditures. Approximately 4 to 5 percent of central budget funds were allocated to the provinces as subsidies. Apart from locally collected revenue, subsidies represented almost 20 percent of provincial revenues in 1980 and 6 percent in 1983. The decline of about 63 percent in subsidized aid to the provinces during that interim was part of the government's goal of reducing costly subsidies. In the early 1980s the government provided considerable incentives to the provinces to reduce expenditures below budgeted targets. Since 1981 about 25 to 50 percent of the unspent portion of current revenues at the provincial level was put at the disposal of local authorities. Since 1982 additional revenues earned outside the confines of the development plan could be retained by the provinces.

The 1984 budget proposal estimated a surplus of US\$247 million on revenues of US\$12.7 billion and expenditures of US\$12.5 billion. The 1984 budget proposed increasing revenues by 1 percent and expenditures by almost 3 percent above 1983 levels. Spending on education and public health was projected to increase by 5 and 14 percent, respectively; science and technology by almost 16 percent; culture and art by 9 percent; and sports by 11 percent. Spending on social services was also slated to increase.

In the 1980s the BNC was the sole banking authority in the country. It was responsible for issuing currency, providing short- and long-term credits, financing capital investments, controlling

*Cuba: A Country Study*

payments and receipts, administering gold and foreign exchange reserves, fixing the exchange rate, obtaining and granting credits abroad, and managing fiscal and monetary policy.

During the 1960s and 1970s the diminished role of the private sector, loss of monetary value, and the disappearance of market instruments relegated the use of monetary policy to a minor role in the management of the economy (see *Radicalization of the System 1963-66*, ch. 1). In the early 1980s the BNC assumed a more vigorous role in the formulation and control of monetary policy. Improved fiscal controls on budgetary allocations enabled a tighter rein to be kept on monetary flows. At the same time, wage, price, credit, and savings account reforms were implemented to valorize and influence the supply of money in the possession of the public.

According to Cuban sources, the wage reforms that were implemented in 1981 increased the liquidity of the public by approximately US\$790 million during the 1981-83 period. Consequently, retail prices that had largely remained constant for 18 years were adjusted upward in 1981 and 1982. This action reduced the excess liquidity by US\$570 million in 1981, US\$140 million in 1982, and US\$80 million in 1983.

In 1983 the BNC announced that, for the first time since 1968, interest would be paid on personal savings accounts. Concurrently, Law No. 69 created the Public Savings Bank to assist the BNC in stimulating personal savings. An interest rate of 2 percent was paid on savings of 2,000 to 5,000 pesos, and deposits in excess of 5,000 pesos (for value of the peso—see Glossary) collected an interest of 0.5 percent.

Between 1980 and 1983 the number of personal credit loans increased by 51 percent. The value of personal credit increased from US\$146 million in 1980 to US\$187 million in 1983. About 80 percent of personal loans were for household appliances, followed by loans for automobiles, construction materials, and household repairs. Since 1978 interest rates have been paid on credit loans that ranged from 4 to 12 percent. Long-term loans for automobiles carried an interest rate of 9.5 percent; loans for household repairs carried an interest rate of only 4 percent. Moreover, interest rates were usually about 2 percentage points less on certain items if they were purchased in the market of rationed goods rather than in the government-run parallel market.

In order to improve the distribution of banking services throughout the country, the BNC expanded the number of banking agencies, branches, savings banks, and regional offices from 74 in 1979 to 421 in 1983. The coverage of banking institutions was

increased from 25 to 143 of the 169 municipalities in the country between 1979 and 1983. In 1983 each banking institution served an average of about 24,000 persons, and the government hoped to reduce the ratio of inhabitants per bank to 10,000 by the end of the 1980s.

## **Foreign Economic Relations**


### **Trade**

One of the overriding goals of the Cuban Revolution was to make the economy independent of foreign powers. In mid-1985 this objective was as distant as ever. Approximately 70 percent of Cuba's prerevolutionary trade was with the United States. In 1984 Cuban trade with the Soviet Union accounted for approximately the same proportion (see fig. 5). Moreover, the economy remained heavily dependent on sugar monoculture and on the exportation of sugar to obtain a wide range of goods not produced domestically. Almost all of Cuba's exports consisted of raw materials, although cigar and cigarette exports were manufactured by using preindustrial techniques (see table 11, Appendix). Imports consisted largely of industrial capital goods, raw materials, and consumer products. Fuels and lubricants accounted for the largest portion of imports, but foodstuffs also continued to be imported in significant quantities (see table 12, Appendix). This trade mix left the economy extremely vulnerable to price fluctuations in the world market, as evidenced by the impact of falling sugar and nickel prices on the national economy during the 1981-85 period.

Cuba produced about 7 percent of the world sugar supply in 1984. Sugar was its principal source of foreign exchange; earnings from sugar declined from 83 percent of total export revenues in 1980 to 74 percent in 1983. The second leading export earner was nickel. Nickel earnings ranged from 4.6 to 7.4 percent between 1980 and 1983. In 1980 and 1981 the next leading export earners were seafood, citrus fruits, and tobacco products. Although export data were not available for coffee, it was increasingly important as an earner of foreign exchange. In April 1984 Cuba joined the International Coffee Organization and had a quota of 150,000 bags per annum.

In 1962 Cuba gained all the benefits of membership in Comecon except formal integration, and in 1972 Cuba became a full-fledged member. The bulk of Cuban import and export trade, as well as the level of Soviet financial assistance, was determined

*Cuba: A Country Study*



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 26.

*Figure 5. Share of Total Trade by Major Area, Selected Years, 1957-83.*



### *The Economy*

during annual and five-year bilateral trade negotiations. Thus, membership in Comecon provided Cuba with an assured export market at predetermined prices. Integration into Comecon, however, imposed several structural constraints on Cuba's foreign trade options. Because the majority of economic activity centered on the production of sugar and the predominant export of a single commodity, the island's latitude for diversifying production and its export mix were restricted. Inter-Comecon trade was based on predetermined barter commitments that restricted Cuba's ability to generate hard currency earnings to purchase needed goods in the West. Moreover, reports indicated that Cuba was often disappointed with the quantity, quality, and supply record of its Comecon trading partners.

The value of Cuban exports to the Soviet Union increased from 57 to 70 percent of the total between 1980 and 1983 (see table 13, Appendix). At the same time, imports from the Soviets rose from 62 to 68 percent of the total value. Although Cuba maintained a trade deficit with the Soviet Union during the 1980-83 period, the size of the deficit would have been about 350 percent greater without generous subsidies on Soviet petroleum exports to Cuba and on Cuban sugar and nickel exports to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, reciprocal trade flows were highly imbalanced. The Soviets supplied Cuba with goods that fell under more than 200 separate classifications, including 97 percent of its oil and oil products, most of its grain and lumber supplies, and industrial, agricultural, and transportation equipment. Cuba in turn exported about one-half of its sugar crop; the bulk of its nickel and citrus production; and some liqueurs, rum, tobacco products, printed materials, and stamps to the Soviet Union.

From 1980 to 1983 the Soviet Union purchased about one-half of all the sugar exported by Cuba and provided an average of 67 percent of its total sugar earnings (see table 14, Appendix). Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union increased from 2.7 to 4.4 million tons between 1980 and 1982 and declined to 3.3 million in 1983. Owing to shortfalls in the production of sugar in 1983 and 1984, Cuba was forced to purchase sugar in the world market to meet its commitments to the Soviets. Other Comecon member countries bought between 11 and 15 percent of Cuban sugar exports. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) purchased the bulk of those sugar exports. Although China was not a member of Comecon, its purchases ranged from 8 to 12 percent of total sugar exports. Non-communist countries bought 35 percent of Cuba's sugar exports in 1980, 20 percent in 1982 and 24 percent in 1983. In 1983 Japan

*Cuba: A Country Study*

was the most important of these sugar buyers, followed by Egypt, Canada, Iraq, and Syria (see table 15, Appendix).

In June 1984 the negotiations for a new International Sugar Agreement collapsed owing to the failure of Cuba, Australia, Brazil, and the European Economic Community to agree on a new export quota system to stabilize prices. Cuba's previous annual export quotas for sugar, ranging from 2.4 to 2.6 million tons, were no longer enforced. Consequently, the lack of restrictions on the export of sugar by the major suppliers made it impossible to sustain the world market price at an adequate level in 1985. Cuba, however, had an advantage over other producers because of its export agreement for the annual sale of 4 million tons at subsidized prices to Comecon nations from 1981 to 1985.

In order to accelerate industrialization, Cuba was persistent in trying to expand its trade with noncommunist countries during 1980-83. This effort did not prove successful, however, owing to the severity of the Cuban economic slump, hard currency constraints, and ballooning foreign debt repayments to Western bank and government creditors between 1981 and 1984 (see External Debt, this ch.).

From 1980 to 1983 Cuba's leading export markets in the West were Japan, the Netherlands, France, Spain, and Canada (see table 16, Appendix). Cuba's largest trading partner within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was Japan, although the value of Cuban exports to Japan declined by more than 50 percent over the period. Cuba primarily exported raw sugar, seafood, coffee, and nickel in return for imports of machinery for construction and mining, vehicles, iron and steel, and foodstuffs (see Mining, this ch.).

Outside Comecon, the top five suppliers of goods to Cuba included Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Japan, and Britain. Canada was Cuba's leading supplier from 1980 to 1983. Wheat and flour accounted for the largest proportion of Cuban imports from Canada (see Foreign Assistance, this ch.). Other imports included vegetables, industrial chemicals, sulfur, pesticides, asbestos fibers, lubricating oil, railroad cars and parts, rubber belts, fabricated materials, and lumber products. In addition to these products, Cuba's other leading suppliers provided dyes, medicines, pharmaceutical products, textiles, telecommunications equipment, electrical machinery and equipment motors, technical and scientific instruments, photographic and optical articles, and other consumer items.

Argentina and Mexico were Cuba's largest trade partners in Latin America. In March 1984 Argentina signed a trade agreement

with Cuba that provided for Argentine exports to rise from US\$120 million in 1983 to US\$300 million annually in the future. In order to facilitate this level of trade with Cuba, Argentina followed up the trade agreement with a US\$600 million credit line to be drawn in annual increments of US\$200 million through 1987. In May 1984 Cuba signed an industrial cooperation agreement worth US\$400 million with Mexico. In exchange for Cuba's raw material exports, Mexico agreed to provide Cuba with minerals, industrial equipment for steel production, and machinery and parts for the railroad system and the sugar industry.

Since the United States imposed a trade embargo against Cuba in February 1962, all economic relations with Cuba have been prohibited. In 1964 the members of the OAS also imposed an economic embargo in response to Castro's efforts to export revolution to the other countries in the hemisphere. Between 1980 and 1985 the United States trade embargo against Cuba was further tightened. In 1981 the United States Congress recodified laws that prohibited the export or reexport of materials, goods, or technical information of United States origin to Cuba; United States importation of goods that were produced in Cuba or transshipped through Cuba; and goods that contained Cuban parts or materials. The law also prohibited the transfer of property in which Cuba or one of its nationals had an interest to a person subject to United States jurisdiction. The transfer of credit or foreign currency transactions on behalf of any Cuban national by those under United States jurisdiction was also prohibited.

In 1982 tourist and business travel to Cuba by United States citizens was restricted. Certain United States foodstuffs and medicines for humanitarian purposes were still allowed to be exported to Cuba. Almost US\$1.4 million worth of medicine and pharmaceutical products were exported to Cuba between 1980 and 1983. In addition, privately donated apparel amounted to US\$130 million, and donated commodities totaled about US\$155 million.

### **Energy**

Cuba was heavily dependent on imports of petroleum and refined petroleum products from the Soviet Union. Barring the discovery of major offshore oil deposits, there was little potential for self-sufficiency in the production of energy. The island did not have any coal, the use of hydroelectricity was limited by the lack of large rivers or streams with year-round water flows, and the known reserves of oil and natural gas were very small. Although

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

the potential for expanding the output of biomass energy was great, the conversion of sugarcane into ethyl alcohol was not actively pursued. Geothermal and solar energy presented alternative potential sources of energy, but the dearth of technology and investment capital made their development prohibitive. The burning of sugarcane bagasse, i.e., sugarcane pulp, was used as a fuel to power the sugar mills at harvesttime. In spite of a 15-percent increase in the use of bagasse from 1980 to 1982, the annual use of fuel oil was still required as a catalyst to obtain the necessary energy. In 1980 the International Atomic Energy Agency approved the design for a nuclear power plant that was to be built with Soviet and Bulgarian assistance in the province of Cienfuegos. In 1984 work began on the construction of the first two of four water-cooled reactors. One of the reactors was expected to begin generating electricity by the end of 1985; all four were scheduled to come on line by the end of the 1980s. Each of the four generators will produce a maximum of 417 megawatts of electrical energy. Estimates indicated that the additional output of electricity from the plant would generate an annual savings of US\$500 million, or the equivalent of about one-third of the cost for Soviet oil imports. Nevertheless, Cuba would be dependent on the importation of enriched uranium from the Soviet Union.

In the 1980-83 period Cuba was moderately successful in raising the domestic production of oil. Oil output declined by 7.4 percent in 1981 from the 1980 level of 5,491 barrels per day (bpd), then increased by 114 percent in 1982 and rose an additional 34 percent in 1983. In 1981 Mexico's parastatal oil company, the Mexican Petroleum Company (Petróleos Mexicanos—PEMEX), signed an agreement with Cuba for the exploration of oil and natural gas deposits. In that year there were unconfirmed reports that PEMEX had discovered oil deposits off Cuba's northern coast near Havana. Cuban authorities believed that the prospects for further gains in production were likely because the potential offshore areas were still in the process of being delineated. Western oil industry sources generally maintained that the prospects for the existence of significant offshore oil resources were marginal at best. Comecon member countries did not possess the requisite technology to explore or exploit potential oil-bearing deposits at the offshore depths surrounding Cuba. Moreover, the combination of low world oil prices and the austerity measures in effect in Mexico during the mid-1980s made it difficult for PEMEX to allocate sufficient resources to explore adequately for oil near Cuba.

Cuban oil production accounted for less than 4 percent of total energy consumption in 1982. The burning of bagasse contrib-

uted about 21 percent, and hydroelectric, natural gas, ethyl alcohol, fuelwood, and charcoal accounted for 3 percent. Oil and refined product imports provided almost three-quarters of Cuba's total energy needs (see table 17, Appendix).

Between 1980 and 1983 oil imported from the Soviet Union provided about 97 percent of total oil requirements; domestic output supplied the residual 3 percent. In 1983 total oil imports included about 125,000 bpd of crude oil and almost 80,000 bpd of refined oil products. In the early 1980s Cuba imported from 11 to 13 percent of the Soviet Union's total oil exports to Comecon countries. The Soviets increased the supply of oil to Cuba by 10 to 15 percent, or by 2 to 3 percent annually, between 1981 and 1985. According to Castro, the Soviet Union also guaranteed the delivery of 97 percent of Cuba's oil supply through 1990.

Soviet oil shipments to Cuba were subsidized at preferential rates determined by an intra-Comecon mechanism by which oil export prices were based on a moving five-year average of world market prices. The 1981-85 Cuban-Soviet trade agreement allegedly indexed the sugar-for-oil price under a formula that maintained Cuba's purchasing power in 1974-75, when world sugar prices were at record high levels and oil averaged only US\$11 per barrel. Under this pricing formula, every US\$1 increase that the Soviets charged Cuba for each barrel of its 200,000 bpd of oil imports was matched by a US\$0.01 per pound increase in what it paid Cuba for its annual 3.5 million tons of sugar imports. The oil subsidy reflected the difference between the value of oil purchased from the Soviet Union and the value of imports at world market prices. In 1982, for example, Cuba paid only three-quarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) benchmark price of US\$34 per barrel, for a savings of more than US\$1 billion. In 1983 the Soviet Union's price was increased to US\$24 per barrel, in comparison with the OPEC price of US\$29 per barrel, for an estimated savings of US\$300 million. From 1980 to 1983 the highly advantageous pricing mechanism saved Cuba a total of more than US\$4.4 billion in hard currency over what it would have spent to purchase oil at world market prices (see table 18, Appendix).

Cuba's hard currency constraints were further alleviated by a special arrangement whereby any oil that was conserved from the 1981-85 allocation of oil imports from the Soviet Union could be sold in the international market. In 1983 the resale of Soviet oil imports played a pivotal role in the successful rescheduling of Cuba's debt with Western creditors. In that year alone Cuba earned US\$570 million from the resale of oil on the spot market.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

which made up for the shortfall of 800,000 tons of sugar and accounted for more than two-fifths of total hard currency export earnings. Originally, Cuba expected to earn only about US\$200 million on oil resales between 1983 and 1985, but the combination of domestic conservation measures and the moderate rise of domestic oil output saved more than 10,000 bpd of oil for resale in 1983. Thus the value of Cuba's resale oil rose by 82 percent in comparison with 1982, demonstrating that the benefits from the oil-for-sugar swap agreement were greater than originally believed. Between 1980 and 1983 Cuba earned US\$1.2 billion in the resale of oil. The importance of hard currency earned by economizing on oil was reflected in the 1984 budget, which sought to reduce further fuel consumption by 4 to 5 percent. In 1985 Castro claimed that the country had saved more than 14,000 bpd of oil in 1984 without substantially damaging the economy. In 1985 a systematic government campaign was launched to conserve oil and other raw materials.

Oil was initially delivered to Cuba by hundreds of Soviet oil tankers that traversed over 10,000 kilometers of ocean from ports in the Black Sea. In order to cut the number of tanker trips and thus reduce the cost of freight to Cuba, the Soviets arranged an oil swap agreement with Venezuela. The original agreement was negotiated in 1974 and then was allowed to lapse between 1981 and 1983. In August 1983 Venezuela resumed the shipment of 20,000 bpd of oil to Cuba. Under the agreement, Venezuela supplied oil to Cuba at market rates in exchange for the Soviet delivery of oil to Venezuela's customers in Western Europe. The Soviet Union reimbursed Cuba for the price differential between subsidized and market rates for oil. Mexico also supplied a portion of Cuba's oil products, and the Soviet Union explored the potential for establishing a similar swap exchange between Mexico and Cuba.

In 1984 work began on a new supertanker terminal near the port of Matanzas. The port was being constructed with Soviet assistance and was scheduled to include three primary moorings. One of the moorings was for tankers that had a maximum displacement of 150,000 tons. The second mooring was for medium- and smaller-sized tankers, and the third provided auxiliary moorings for additional vessels. The port was expected to be equipped with more than 20 oil storage tanks having a total volume of 1 million cubic meters and pipelines to convey the oil to refineries in Cienfuegos and Havana. In 1984 Cuba had three refineries with a total annual capacity of 120,000 bpd. Refineries in Santiago de Cuba and Havana were also being upgraded to increase refining capacity by 30,000 bpd.



*Fully laden Soviet oil tanker arriving in Cuba*  
Photo by John Finan

#### **Foreign Assistance**

The complexity of Cuba's economic relations with Comecon member countries was not evident solely from an examination of trade flows. The Soviet Union supplied Cuba with repayable loans (see External Debt, this ch.), nonrepayable grants to finance the annual Soviet-Cuban balance of payments deficit, subsidized imports and exports, free military equipment, and loans of project aid credits on highly concessional terms. The total amount of Soviet economic assistance—excluding military assistance—was over US\$33 billion between 1960 and 1983 (see Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5). About 84 percent of the aid had been disbursed since 1974. The bulk of this aid was crucial for running the economy. More importantly, it provided the financial latitude to develop the costly social service programs.

The Soviet Union provided approximately US\$23 billion in grants in the form of subsidies during 1961–83 to facilitate Cuban-Soviet trade. The Soviet Union paid artificially high prices for Cuban exports of sugar and nickel and priced its petroleum exports

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

to Cuba below world market levels (see Energy, this ch.). These subsidies represented the difference between Cuban-Soviet trading prices and world market prices. From 1980 to 1983 the Soviet Union provided subsidy aid that enabled Cuba to reduce its trade deficit by US\$12.3 billion. Without such subsidy aid, Cuba's actual 1980-83 trade deficit of US\$3.4 billion would have reached US\$15.8 billion.

The 1981-85 Soviet-Cuban trade agreement established the pricing mechanism by which the Soviet price for Cuban sugar was indexed to a five-year moving average of world market prices. Under this formula Cuban sugar exports to the Soviet Union were modified in proportion to changes in the price of such Soviet exports as steel, oil, foodstuffs, and machinery. The pricing formula provided constant terms of trade for Cuban sugar exports. The world market price for sugar exceeded the Soviet offered price only in 1963, 1972, and 1974. From 1980 to 1983 world market sugar prices declined from US\$0.286 to US\$0.085 per pound, while the Soviet price declined from US\$0.486 in 1980 to US\$0.352 in 1981, rose to US\$0.358 in 1982, and reached a high of about US\$0.49 in 1983. In 1984 world market sugar prices plunged to a low of about US\$0.04 to \$0.06 per pound, and the Soviet price was about US\$0.49 or \$0.50 per pound. Market prices for sugar were expected to remain low throughout 1985, but the pricing formula for sugar partly insulated Cuba from the economic effects of the low prices.

Nearly all of Cuban-Soviet trade was conducted in soft currency, but occasionally the Soviets made extraprotocol purchases of Cuban sugar for hard currency. These purchases totaled US\$475 million between 1981 and 1983 (see table 19, Appendix).

Other Comecon countries also purchased Cuban sugar at prices above the world market rates but often below the Soviet offered price. From 1980 to 1982 the other Comecon countries paid a price that averaged US\$0.263 per pound. A majority of the sugar subsidies were provided by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. These subsidies amounted to a total of US\$893 million between 1980 and 1983 (see table 18, Appendix).

The Soviets also subsidized the price of Cuba's second largest export item—nickel. Approximately US\$574 million in Soviet subsidies was paid for Cuban nickel over the 1961-83 period. In 1980 the Soviet Union paid US\$12 million less than the world market price for nickel; from 1981 to 1983 it paid US\$329 million above world prices.

Overall development assistance in the form of project aid and trade deficit financing totaled almost US\$10 billion between 1961



and 1983. Through its participation in Comecon and directly from the Soviet Union, Cuba received materials, equipment, advisers, and credits on highly concessional terms for development projects related to export development and import substitution industrialization. This aid was used, for example, to construct and modernize industrial plants, explore for oil and minerals, modernize and expand the nickel industry, and mechanize and modernize the sugar industry. Since 1959 factories that were constructed and refurbished with Soviet aid accounted for 100 percent of the output of sheet metal, 95 percent of steel, 50 percent of fertilizers, and 40 percent of electricity. During Cuba's first five-year economic plan (1976-80) the Soviets spent US\$1.7 billion on the construction and modernization of over 200 industrial enterprises. Project credits were extended on a long-term basis of 25 years with grace periods of up to 10 years and interest rates that did not exceed 4 percent. Cuba also received credits on favorable terms to finance its annual ruble currency trade deficits with the Soviet Union. The amount of those allocations was determined during annual and five-year bilateral trade negotiations. The aid was scheduled to be repaid over 15 to 17 years (with a grace period of five years) and was interest-free. From 1980 to 1983 the Soviets provided Cuba with US\$4.2 billion in project aid and trade deficit financing, or almost 45 percent of the nearly US\$10 billion that had been disbursed since 1960.

About US\$3.4 billion in project aid and trade deficit financing that accrued between 1959 and 1973 was rescheduled by the Soviet Union in December 1972. Under the terms of the agreement, the initial payments were postponed until 1986, and the interest charges were canceled. Noninterest-bearing amortization would then begin to be repaid annually over a 25-year period. In October 1984 the Soviets agreed to reschedule all Cuban debt repayments that were due before 1990. The terms of the rescheduling, however, were not disclosed at that time.

Comecon member countries also delivered sizable amounts of economic aid in soft currencies. Cuban sources indicated that Comecon provided almost US\$600 million in project aid and trade deficit financing between 1976 and 1980 and nearly US\$1 billion from 1980 to 1983.

In addition to these forms of economic assistance, the Soviet Union mitigated Cuba's financial burden with the West by purchasing over 1 million tons of grain annually from Canada for hard currency. Cuba received the grain and paid the Soviets in soft currency. This intermediation saved Cuba between US\$200 and US\$300 million annually between 1980 and 1983. Overall, Cuba

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

saved more than US\$2.8 billion in hard currency between 1961 and 1983 from this form of aid.

Official development assistance to Cuba in hard currency loans from Western nations and organizations was another important source of aid, but the magnitude of this aid was far smaller than that from Comecon. Individual member countries in the OECD and OPEC, as well as multilateral organizations, provided about US\$62 million in official development assistance to Cuba from 1980 to 1982, which was about 22 percent of the total amount extended since 1971. Approximately half of all official development aid was allocated through bilateral programs. Overall, Sweden and the Netherlands were the largest contributors. Projects that were funded through bilateral aid included training for the tourism industry, equipment for the sugar industry, and laboratory equipment for medical research. About 75 percent of the aid extended between 1980 and 1982 was disbursed by agencies of the United Nations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the United Nations Development Program. Projects that were financed through multilateral channels included educational development, construction and technical assistance for an experimental paper factory using bagasse and the renovation of Old Havana.

Despite the large amount of economic assistance received by Cuba, its hard currency debt increased by about 140 percent between 1976 and 1980. In 1982 some US\$1.2 billion out of a total of about US\$3.3 billion in hard currency debt was due to be paid by 1986 (see External Debt, this ch.). Government-guaranteed credits represented an important source of external financing. This form of economic assistance accounted for about 80 percent of Cuba's bilateral public debt and about 30 percent of its total external debt between 1979 and 1983. A majority of these official credits were extended for the purchase of Western goods and were backed by Cuban government guarantees. The principal countries that extended trade credits included France, Canada, Japan, Britain, Spain, Sweden, West Germany, Mexico, and Argentina.

#### **External Debt**

In 1983 Cuba's external debt to the Soviet Union was estimated at about US\$8 billion, and an additional US\$3.3 billion was owed to Western bankers and governments. Cuba's outstanding hard currency debt to Western creditors began to mushroom during the 1970s until a combination of internal market and financial con-

ditions forced the country to request a rescheduling of its medium- and long-term debt in August 1982.

The rapid economic growth that Cuba experienced during the first half of the 1970s improved its creditworthiness, and international banks in the West provided credit on favorable terms. In the latter half of the 1970s, however, Cuba resorted increasingly to larger loans from Western banks and official export credit organizations to cover widening hard currency current account imbalances. As a result, Cuba's hard currency debt quadrupled to over US\$3 billion by the early 1980s.

At the end of 1980 Cuba's economy entered a downswing as the price of sugar began to fall. Between 1980 and 1982 the price of sugar on the world market declined by 70 percent. Cuba was unable to increase its exports in order to offset the effects of the plummeting price for sugar because of previous export obligations to soft currency customers in Comecon, a reduced sugar harvest, and restrictions on sugar exports imposed by the International Sugar Organization. Moreover, the gap was not filled by expanded hard currency assistance from the Soviet Union and China, from export earnings for nickel, fish, and tobacco, or from revenue from tourism.

At the same time, Western lenders turned down Cuba's request for new credit lines as they grew wary over the contraction of export earnings, the consequent economic slump, rising principal payments, and interest payments on outstanding debt that increased by more than 50 percent between 1979 and 1982. In addition, international banks were concerned about loan overexposures in the Third World and rising East-West tensions. As a result, the banks withdrew over US\$550 million of their short-term deposits in Cuban banks.

In order to counteract these financial constraints, Cuba cut its imports from the West by approximately 40 percent between 1980 and 1982 and reduced unnecessary hard currency expenses where possible. The reduction of imports of necessary inputs for steel plants, construction, and other basic industries was largely responsible for the fall in the economic growth rate from 5.4 percent in 1981 to an estimated 1.4 percent in 1982. These measures proved to be inadequate, and Cuba was forced to reduce its foreign exchange reserves by 75 percent between 1981 and the middle of 1982 to meet pressing financial obligations.

In September 1982, in response to the severe liquidity crisis that beset the economy, Cuba requested that its medium- and long-term debt in hard currency be rescheduled. Cuba concurrently stopped the payment of principal on the debt and agreed to

*Cuba: A Country Study*

continue paying all interest. Specifically, Cuba asked its creditors to defer for up to 10 years all repayments of some US\$1.2 billion out of a total of US\$3.3 billion in principal that were due between September 1982 and the end of 1985, and for a grace period of three years. Cuban officials blamed the situation on falling sugar prices, the drying up of new credit lines, the world economic crisis, and the problems caused by the United States trade embargo on Cuba.

In reviewing Cuba's request, the banks temporized because of the paucity of reliable information on the country's economic performance. They were also concerned because Cuba was not a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and therefore not subject to its provision requiring country borrowers to sign letters of intent to follow certain economic guidelines in return for financial aid. International banks usually provided rescheduling relief only to countries that had signed a letter of intent with the IMF. Thus the banks insisted that a multilateral organization, like the Club of Paris (see Glossary), ensure that Cuba would adhere to established rescheduling principles. This was considered of paramount importance by the Western banking community in light of the major drain that the repayment, beginning in 1986, of an estimated US\$8 billion debt to the Soviet Union would have on the Cuban economy.

In response to these concerns, Cuba issued a report to Western creditors that outlined the country's outstanding debt structure that it hoped to reschedule between September 1982 and the end of 1985. Accordingly, Cuba's total medium- and long-term principal payments peaked in 1983 and declined thereafter. It revealed that the payments that were due during the last four months of 1982 totaled US\$153.5 million, rose to US\$457 million in 1983, fell to US\$373.5 million in 1984, and bottomed out at US\$282.2 million in 1985. Of that total, around one-third of the repayments were for syndicated and bilateral loans and about two-thirds for insured export credits for the purchase of capital goods.

In March 1983 Cuba reached an agreement with the Club of Paris countries on rescheduling US\$413 million worth of official debt to foreign governments that was due between September 1982 and the end of 1983. Under the terms of the agreement, Cuba was required to repay 95 percent of the principal in 10 installments between 1986 and 1991, the other 5 percent to be repaid at the end of 1984 and 1985. Cuba had to settle for a shorter repayment period than the 10 years that it had requested. In addition, an agreement on economic targets that was similar to an IMF letter of intent was signed as a precondition to rescheduling the US\$250



*Hotel Nacional, one of a number of tourist hotels in Havana*  
Photo by Phillips Bourns

million due in 1984. The agreement stipulated that hard currency imports were not to exceed US\$700 million, and the debt service to hard currency income ratio was to be held under 25 percent.

In December 1983 Western banks agreed to reschedule almost US\$200 million of medium- and long-term commercial debt that fell due between 1982 and the end of 1983. The terms were not as favorable as Cuba would have hoped: repayments were

*Cuba: A Country Study*

spread over seven years, there was a 30-month grace period, and the interest rate was set at 2.25 percent above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). Maturities of over US\$130 million that were due in 1984 were made contingent on Cuba's economic performance and on whether the Club of Paris agreed to reschedule Cuba's US\$250 million debt due to foreign government creditors in 1984.

Cuba and Western bank creditors, under the chairmanship of Cr dit Lyonnais, originally had begun discussions on the renegotiation of the 1982-83 commercial debt in March 1983. Part of the reason for the nine-month delay in reaching an agreement was that the banks believed that the Soviets would stand behind Cuba's foreign debt. When it became evident that the strength of the Soviet umbilical cord did not extend to the coverage of Cuba's external debt to the West, the banks agreed to reschedule rather than risk a Cuban default.

Despite the payments relief provided by the December 1983 debt rescheduling, Cuba's economic prospects remained dim in 1983-84. Inefficiency, mismanagement, and adverse weather caused extensive damage to sugar, tobacco, and several vegetable crops. Sugar prices were depressed, and marketing problems caused key sugar and nickel exports to plummet. Cuba made up the shortfall in export earnings and successfully met the terms of the 1983 rescheduling agreement through the increased resale of oil imported from the Soviet Union (see Energy, this ch.).

In July 1984 terms were finally reached on rescheduling US\$250 million owed to Western governments and US\$100 million owed to commercial banks during 1984. The terms under the agreement included an interest margin of either 1.875 percent over LIBOR Eurodeposit rates of 12.75 percent or 1.625 percent above each bank's equivalent domestic rate. Repayments were scheduled to begin after a five-year grace period, and Cuba was charged a renegotiation fee of 0.875 percent. The Western banks also agreed to an additional one-year extension on US\$380 million of outstanding short-term debt under terms that called for an interest rate of 1.25 percent above LIBOR and a 0.25 percent renegotiation fee. Continued low world market sugar prices and the diminution of hard currency earnings from nickel, seafood, and tobacco exports in 1984 forced Cuba to request a rescheduling of another US\$280 million worth of maturities that were due in 1985.

In 1986 the grace period on approximately US\$8 billion of Soviet loans that had been rescheduled in 1972 was set to expire. At the same time, around US\$400 million in hard currency repayments were due to be paid to Western creditors. Of that total,

about US\$100 million represented repayments on the debt rescheduled in 1983. In order to prevent the Cuban repayments to the Soviet Union from bunching on top of the amount that was due to the West, in October 1984 the Soviet Union was reported to have rescheduled all of Cuba's repayments that were to fall due before 1990.

\* \* \*

All economic research on Cuba should begin with Carmelo Mesa-Lago's *The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal*. The comprehensive scope of this book surpasses his earlier works on the topic, as well as those of other authors in the field. *Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenges of Economic Growth with Equity* by Claes Brundenius addresses the methodological inconsistencies in Cuba's macroeconomic indicators and provides a useful interpretative contribution to the economic and social development of Cuba. Numerous authors have made significant contributions that span the interpretative spectrum in the University of Pittsburgh's *Cuban Studies*, published by the Center for Latin American Studies, and to Irving Louis Horowitz numerous editions of *Cuban Communism*.

The *Anuario estadístico de Cuba*, published by the government's Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, provides a massive compilation of statistical information, although there are notable gaps. This publication is usually available for distribution with a two-year time lag. *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, published by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, relies on the *Anuario estadístico de Cuba*, but certain gaps are filled by the inclusion of data from the Banco Nacional de Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other sources. The United Nations Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL) annually publishes the *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba* which is a useful complement to the *Anuario estadístico de Cuba*. A review of current Cuban socioeconomic events is often cited in the official daily newspaper, *Granma*, or in the weekly edition in English, *Granma Weekly Review*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)





*Fidel Castro addressing crowd*

IN 1985 Cuba had an authoritarian political system that combined a highly restricted structure of policymaking authority in which some 22 individuals participated regularly in setting national policy and a decentralized system of policy implementation that involved substantial popular participation at the local level. After several years of devolving administrative responsibilities to middle-level managers, a 1981 administrative reorganization reconcentrated authority at the highest levels of the system.

Continued poor economic performance caused dissatisfaction with government policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In response, the government exported many of its opponents during the Mariel exodus of 1980, mobilized its bases of support through the mass organizations, and tightened controls over the judiciary.

Fidel Castro Ruz remained the center of the political system in early 1985. He was the only individual whose name appeared in the 1976 Constitution and was not only the chief of state and the chief of government but also the commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces and first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba. He also had the authority to assume personal management of any government ministry or other administrative organization. After losing some of his power during the 1970s, he successfully reasserted his personal authority after 1980, removing many officials of the Communist Party of Cuba and packing the highest decisionmaking bodies with his supporters. Much of his power derived from his charisma and the popular view that he embodied the Revolution.

In early 1985 Cuba continued to pursue an activist foreign policy, maintaining a substantial military presence in Angola and Ethiopia, supporting guerrilla movements and leftist governments in Central America and the Caribbean, and seeking to act as a representative for the concerns of the Third World through Castro's role as head of the Nonaligned Movement from 1979 to 1983. Cuba deepened its alliance with the Soviet Union during the early 1980s but also sought to improve its relations with the United States, leading to an agreement on immigration matters.

### **Constitutional Background**

The first constitution of the independent Republic of Cuba was promulgated in 1901 by the island's United States military governor during the first United States occupation. The influence of the United States in the creation of this document was evident in its emphasis on the separation of executive, legislative, and judi-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

cial powers; its provisions guaranteeing individual rights and freedoms; and its establishment of an independent judiciary with the power of judicial review.

The most controversial provision of the 1901 constitution was the Platt Amendment, which many Cubans considered an infringement on and derogation of Cuban sovereignty. In this amendment, imposed by the United States as a condition for its acceptance of the constitution, Cuba recognized that "the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, [and] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty." Article VII of the amendment also obliged Cuba to "sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States." In effect, this amendment gave the United States the legal authority to regulate the form and content of the actions of the Cuban government, which it did on numerous occasions between 1901 and 1934, when it was abrogated by the United States. The Platt Amendment, together with the 1898 Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States ending the Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Permanent Reciprocity Treaty of 1903 between Cuba and the United States, made Cuba effectively a protectorate of the United States, even though the country became legally independent in 1902 (see United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment, ch. 1).

Following the 1933 revolution, delegates from all the major political forces in the country, including the Moscow-oriented Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP), drafted a new constitution, which was promulgated in 1940. The 1940 constitution retained most of the provisions of the bill of rights from the 1901 constitution but completely changed the structure of the government into a semiparliamentary system with a president, elected by universal suffrage, who was assisted by a cabinet that was led by a prime minister. The cabinet was directly responsible to the Congress, which could remove any minister or the entire cabinet by a vote of no confidence. The Supreme Court had the power to declare law unconstitutional.

The 1940 constitution also required the nation to "employ the resources within its reach to furnish employment to everyone who lacks it" and to assure workers of "the economic conditions necessary to a fitting existence." It also recognized the right of workers to unionize, bargain collectively, and strike. The entire labor code, including minimum wage rules, maximum weekly working hours, maternity leave for women, and workmen's accident insurance, was

incorporated into the document. The state's powers in national development, public administration, and fiscal and monetary matters were greatly enlarged. Although many of its far-reaching provisions were never implemented, the document served as a codification of Cuban aspirations for economic and social development and remained a rallying point for the opposition throughout the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar. Its reenactment was the stated goal of Castro's revolutionary movement and remained the goal of Cuban exiles living in the United States in early 1985 (see *The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath*, ch. 1).

In February 1959 the revolutionary government promulgated the Fundamental Law of the Revolution. This document, which the government claimed was merely a revision of the constitution of 1940, served as the country's basic law until it was superseded by a new constitution in 1976. The Fundamental Law retained most of the sections of the constitution of 1940 concerning social and economic matters but made substantial alterations in the structure of government. Legislative, executive, administrative, and constitutional powers were concentrated in the Council of Ministers, again led by a prime minister. The president of the republic was retained as head of state, but his position was changed into a largely ceremonial one. The Senate and Chamber of Representatives were eliminated, their legislative duties becoming functions of the Council of Ministers, and the Supreme Court was made accountable to the council.

The Council of Ministers enjoyed unrestricted authority under the Fundamental Law. It issued laws that were nominally subject to judicial review, but because it also had the power to amend the Fundamental Law by a two-thirds majority vote, it simply did so whenever the judiciary invalidated its actions. This procedure was particularly common in the early years of the Revolution, when the Fundamental Law was modified 19 times between May 1959 and December 1962.

Members of the Council of Ministers were appointed and removed at the discretion of the president (a provision retained from the constitution in 1940). In practice, the president followed the wishes of the prime minister in this matter, making the prime minister the central figure of the government. Castro served as prime minister until the office was eliminated on February 24, 1976.

The constant need to amend the Fundamental Law as the Revolution progressed created a general dissatisfaction with the document on the part of the government. A constitutional commission was established within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) in 1965,

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

but it failed in its effort to draft a new document. In October 1974 another commission—led by Blas Roca (Francisco Calderío) and consisting of 20 lawyers and representatives of the government, the PCC, and the mass organizations—was appointed, and in February 1975 it submitted a draft constitution. The draft was distributed throughout the country to all the cells of the PCC and the mass organizations for discussion and feedback. Some 5.7 million people participated in these discussions. All comments and suggestions were tabulated in July 1975, and many were incorporated in the draft.

The draft constitution was adopted by the PCC at its First Congress, held in December 1975, and was ratified by 97.7 percent of the voters in a national referendum on February 15, 1976. The new Constitution went into effect on February 24, 1976.

The 1976 Constitution is based largely on the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union. It declares Cuba to be a socialist republic in which "all power belongs to the working people." The doctrines of the "unity of power" and "democratic centralism" are identified as the underpinnings of the state. The former is seen to preclude the separation of powers but not the division of functions among the state organs. Democratic centralism governs the division of legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial functions. Its key principles are election to all organs of state power, accountability of elected officials to their electors, strict control by superior state organs over subordinate bodies, and increased participation by local units in the administration of local affairs. "Socialist legality" is recognized as the judicial and legal foundation of the country, replacing the earlier emphasis on revolutionary fervor under which organizations and individuals commonly exceeded their legal authority.

Among the official functions performed by the state are the "construction of socialism," the defense of the country, the guaranteeing of the liberty and rights of citizens and the "fulfillment of their duties and personality," the "consolidation of a collective ideology by the people," the protection of the nation's property, and the planning and administering of its economy. The state is also responsible for providing employment and access to education, culture, and sports for all, as well as for the care of children and the sick and disabled.

The 1976 Constitution establishes a unicameral, semiparliamentary form of government at both the national and the local levels. The highest state organ is the National Assembly of People's Power, in which the constituent and legislative powers are vested. The Constitution also provides for a Council of State em-

powered to act in the name of the National Assembly when it is not in session, a Council of Ministers to head the executive branch, a People's Supreme Court to direct the judiciary, and assemblies of people's power to govern the provinces and *municipios* (similar to counties).

In contrast with most socialist constitutions, Cuba's does not prevent one from holding administrative and governmental positions simultaneously. This is most pronounced in the articles referring to Castro, who is named as president of the Council of State, president of the Council of Ministers, and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR). By virtue of these offices, according to Articles 91, he represents the state and government and in that capacity controls the activities of the Council of State as well as the Council of Ministers and all its subordinate agencies. As head of state he receives the credentials of heads of foreign diplomatic missions and signs decree-laws and resolutions issued by the Council of State between the sessions of the National Assembly. He may also, without any constitutional limits, "assume leadership of any ministry or central agency of the administration." Other individuals may also hold several offices simultaneously, but Castro is the only one mentioned specifically in the 1976 Constitution (see National-level Politics, this ch.).

## **The State Structure**

### **National Assembly of People's Power**

The National Assembly is the only national body invested with representative and legislative authority. The 1976 Constitution describes it as the "Supreme Organ of State Power" with the power to declare war and to discuss and approve the state budget, the plans for national economic and social development, monetary and credit policies, and the general outlines of foreign and domestic policy. In addition to its legislative function, the Assembly is responsible for overseeing the actions of the other organs of state power and for electing the membership of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, as well as the president, the vice president, and the judges of the People's Supreme Court. Decisions regarding the constitutionality of laws are the function of the National Assembly, which may also call national referenda for the purpose of amending the Constitution.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

The delegates to the National Assembly are elected or appointed to five-year terms by the municipal assemblies, although membership in those assemblies is not required. There is one delegate for every 20,000 citizens or fraction greater than 10,000. During the 1976-81 period the Assembly consisted of 481 delegates, of whom 55.5 percent were elected from municipal assemblies; the rest were government and party officials nominated by the PCC and appointed by the assemblies. The 1981-86 National Assembly consisted of 499 delegates elected and appointed in roughly similar proportions.

The National Assembly determined its own internal organization. In 1983 it was organized into 20 working commissions dealing with such issues as child care and women's rights; culture and art; defense and internal order; constitutional and legal affairs; work, social security, and social welfare; young people and children; construction and construction materials; and complaints and suggestions. These commissions played an active role in the Assembly's deliberations and were charged with examining drafts of legislation and proposing modifications, as well as following and reporting on the particular issues for which they were responsible. Whereas the National Assembly met for only two days in each of two sessions per year, the commissions met periodically throughout the year in various locations around the country to prepare legislation for consideration by the Assembly. In accomplishing their tasks, the commissions, as well as the Assembly as a whole, relied greatly on their "auxiliary apparatus." Made up of career civil servants, the "apparatus" was organized into five divisions: the Department of Work with the Commissions, the channel through which the Assembly's president communicated with the working commissions and vice versa; the Department of Work with the Local Organs of People's Power, the liaison between the national and local assemblies; the Administrative Department, which held a tight check on the expenses of the National Assembly; the Department of International Relations; and the Department of Judicial Affairs, which prepared arguments concerning the constitutionality of laws.

Delegates to the National Assembly served on a part-time basis, retaining their regular employment while serving. The delegates were required to maintain frequent contact with local assemblies and individual citizens within their constituencies to explain state policies and periodically render accounts to them of the results of their activities. They were subject to recall at any time by the municipal assembly that elected them (see Local Government, this ch.).

## *Government and Politics*

Although the National Assembly was legally preeminent in the political system, it failed to exercise policymaking authority through 1984. Observers reported that the Assembly spent the bulk of its time ratifying actions that had been taken previously by the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Although the Assembly could initiate legislation, it seldom did, preferring to respond to initiatives from the government. It did not routinely approve all the legislation presented to it, however. Debate was vigorous, ministers were often questioned closely on the performance of their ministries, and on occasion bills were withdrawn following objections by the Assembly. Analysts noted that there was a marked political stratification in the Assembly, those members who also held important government and party positions participating actively in debates and those from local areas tending to react to the views of the elite. Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University reported that the National Assembly had "little discernible impact on foreign policy, military policy, or economic planning and budgeting." These areas remained the prerogative of elites in the Council of State, the Political Bureau of the PCC, and the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Other issues were debated in depth, however, provided that the delegates involved had either appropriate organizational rank or recognized expertise. Those who had neither ordinarily played minor roles in the Assembly.

### **Council of State**

The Council of State consisted of 31 members elected by the National Assembly; its president was the head of state and head of government. When that body was not in session, the Council of State exercised almost all of the powers of the National Assembly through decree-laws, which were valid unless rescinded by the Assembly. Moreover, the council exercised the Assembly's power to nullify actions of the organs of national and local government that were deemed contrary to existing laws, and it could replace members of the Council of Ministers. The Council of State could also declare war if the National Assembly "cannot be called to session with the necessary security and urgency." The Assembly's power to amend the constitution did not, however, devolve on the Council of State, nor was the council constitutionally empowered to replace supreme court judges or the attorneys general.

Through 1984 the Council of State was the major decision-making body of the government. Since 1979, decree-laws issued by



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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
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### *Cuba: A Country Study*

the council have been equal in standing and judicial validity with the laws approved by the Assembly, thus making the council co-equal with the Assembly in making policy. The fact that the Assembly met only four days per year while the council met frequently, together with the council's power to call the Assembly into session, however, made the council the predominant institution. For example, on January 10, 1980, only a few weeks after the National Assembly had adjourned, the Council of State decreed a major overhaul of the central administrative agencies. Analysts noted that this sweeping reorganization had probably been discussed in the Council of State for some time and could have been introduced into the National Assembly debates of December 1979. The fact that it was *not* indicated that the Council of State, rather than the National Assembly itself, determined the agenda of the Assembly.

The president of the Council of State, who under the Constitution is also the president of the Council of Ministers, is the chief of state. The major powers of this position derived from the Council of State and not from the Council of Ministers. Thus, in the event of absence, illness, or death of the president, the first vice president of the Council of State—not the first vice president of the Council of Ministers—assumes the president's duties, although this had not occurred through 1984. Analysts noted that Castro, the president of the Council of State, by virtue of his joint authority as head of both bodies, has more constitutional power than any other leader of a socialist state.

The membership of the Council of State in 1984 was elected by the National Assembly and consisted of individuals who were also members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the PCC. The electoral system did not require that the members of the Council of State also be members of the National Assembly, although most were.

#### **Council of Ministers**

The Council of Ministers (the government of the republic) was the highest-ranking executive and administrative organ. The Constitution empowers it to issue administrative regulations to implement the laws and to conduct foreign policy. It submits a draft state budget and other bills for consideration by the Council of State and the National Assembly. It is also responsible for "organizing and conducting the political, economic, cultural, scientific, social, and defense activities of the state as outlined by the National Assembly." In carrying out these responsibilities, the Council of

### *Government and Politics*

Ministers oversee the functioning of the various ministries, state committees and institutes, and the administrative agencies of the Organs of People's Power (as the municipal, provincial, and national assemblies were collectively known) at all levels.

Sessions of the council required the attendance of more than one-half of its members for a quorum, and decisionmaking was by majority vote. Its members were elected by the National Assembly and could be removed by the president of the Council of State if the Assembly was not in session. In 1984 there was no legal provision for the removal of the entire council by a vote of the National Assembly. The practice was for the Assembly simply to approve the composition of the Council of Ministers at the beginning of its five-year term. Castro, as president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, retained the right to create new ministries.

The central administration under the Council of Ministers consisted of ministries, state committees, and national institutes (see fig. 6). Ministries dealt with the armed forces, internal security, services, and various economic sectors and were responsible for the direction and management of the state's activities in their respective areas. State committees dealt with broader problems involving more than one economic sector and were responsible for coordinating the state's activities across sectors. National institutes were defined as agencies of the central administration, but their presidents were not normally members of the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Central Planning Board and the Academy of Sciences were also considered part of the central administration.

The Council of Ministers was responsible to the National Assembly and the Council of State for its actions in carrying out the policies of those bodies. Real decisionmaking authority, however, resided not in the Council of Ministers as a whole but in its Executive Committee. The Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers consisted of 14 members who were responsible for the activities of ministries and state committees grouped according to function. Thus, ministers who were not members of the Executive Committee answered to the member of the Executive Committee responsible for their area. The Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers was thus the highest decisionmaking organ of the state administration.

In early 1985 Castro was clearly the most powerful member of the Executive Committee. Significantly, his responsibilities within the Executive Committee included the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—MINFAR) and the Ministry of Interior (Ministerio de Interior—MININT), despite the fact that the ministers responsible

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

for these ministries, Raúl Castro Ruz and Ramiro Valdes Menendez, respectively, were also members of the Executive Committee. Both of these ministries represented potential power bases—the armed forces and the internal security apparatus—from which threats to Castro's position could emerge. The only other member of the Executive Committee who was not the minister or president of at least one of the ministries or state committees for which he was responsible was Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who was responsible for a cluster of ministries dealing with foreign relations and fiscal policies (see National-level Politics, this ch.).

#### **Judicial System**

The judiciary was organized into three tiers corresponding to the administrative divisions of the country. At the apex of the system was the People's Supreme Court, which consisted of a president, a vice president, and the members of the court's five chambers: criminal, civil and administrative, labor, crimes against state security, and military. Each chamber consisted of a president, two other professional judges, and two lay judges. When the court sat in plenary session, it was joined by the attorney general (*fiscal general*), a full voting member of the plenum, and by the minister of justice, who participated in the deliberations of the court but did not have a vote. In addition, the president of the Supreme Court, its vice president, secretary, the presidents of the five chambers, the attorney general, and the minister of justice formed the Governing Council of the People's Supreme Court. The Governing Council ensured uniform interpretation of the law by issuing binding instructions to the lower courts and served as a liaison between the Supreme Court and the Council of Ministers.

Justices of the Supreme Court were elected by the National Assembly. Its president and vice president were nominated by the president of the Council of State and were ratified by the Assembly. The 26 professional judges served two-and-one-half-year terms but could be recalled by the Assembly. The 126 lay judges served for two months per year over the two-and-one-half-year term of the court and retained their regular employment while serving on the court. They served as judges only in cases in which the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction, i.e., they did not participate in the appeals process. In criminal cases they voted on the issue of guilt or innocence but not on the sentence.

The Supreme Court served as the court of final appeal and had original jurisdiction over high state officials and crimes against

# Cuba: A Country Study






Figure 6. Central Administration, 1985.

**Executive Committee\***



\* Organization of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers

Member	Responsibility
Fidel Castro Ruz	Ministry of Culture Ministry of Interior Ministry of Public Health Ministry of Revolutionary Armed Forces
Raul Castro Ruz	Ministry of Light Industry Ministry of Domestic Trade Ministry of Fishing Industry Ministry of Basic Industry Ministry of Steelworking Industry
Antonio Espinosa Yebra	Ministry of Education Ministry of Higher Education National Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation Cuban Institute of Radio and Television Academy of Sciences
Pedro Mirat Fresno	Ministry of Communications Ministry of Transportation Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Food Industry Ministry of Foreign Relations Ministry of Foreign Trade State Committee for Economic Cooperation National Bank of Cuba
Jose Ramon Fernandez Alvarez	Ministry of Sugar Industry Ministry of Construction Central Planning Board State Committee for Prices National Institute of Automated Systems and Computer Technology State Committee for Finance State Committee for Labor and Social Security State Committee for Material and Technical Supply National Institute of Tourism
Guillermo Garcia Erias	National Energy Commission
Adolfo Diaz Suarez	Ministry of Interior
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez	
Dionis Torralba Gonzalez	
Jose Lopez Moreno	
Humberto Perez Gonzalez	
Osmari Cuenchegues Gorrion	
Joel Domenech Benitez	
Ramiro Valdes Menendez	

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## *Government and Politics*

state security. Its decisions were subject to reversal by the Council of State, however, which could issue binding instructions on the interpretation of law to the judiciary. The 1976 Constitution does not specify the circumstances under which this power of the council can be used.

Directly below the Supreme Court were 14 people's provincial courts corresponding to the country's 14 provinces. Justices of the provincial courts were elected by their respective provincial assemblies after nomination by the Ministry of Justice. They also served two-and-one-half-year terms. The provincial courts were organized into the same five chambers as the Supreme Court; each also had a plenum organized in the same way as the Supreme Court except that the provincial attorney general did not vote. Chambers of the provincial courts consisted of one professional and two lay judges who participated in the same manner as in the Supreme Court. Unlike the Supreme Court, however, the lay judges could outvote the professional on the question of guilt or innocence. Provincial courts had original jurisdiction over offenses defined as "serious" and appellate jurisdiction over other matters.

Below the provincial courts were the 169 municipal courts corresponding to the country's 169 *municipios*. Judges of the municipal courts were elected by their respective municipal assembly after nomination by the Ministry of Justice. Municipal courts were not organized into formal chambers but could be divided into specialized sessions if circumstances warranted it. As in the provincial courts, lay judges outnumbered the professional judges and could only vote on the question of guilt or innocence. Municipal courts were usually the tribunals of first instance; they had no jurisdiction over crimes against state security, however.

At the local level there was also a system of labor courts established in every workplace having more than 25 workers. In workplaces of fewer than 25 employees the workers elected a delegate to the nearest labor court. Members of the courts were elected by workers' assemblies organized in workplaces and served three-year terms but could be recalled at any time (see *Confederation of Cuban Workers*, this ch.). Labor courts adjudicated disputes between management and individual workers, and their decisions had to be ratified by the workers' assembly. If a labor court decided against management, that decision was sent for action to the municipal assembly, to which management was responsible.

The judicial system was assisted in its operations by the office of the attorney general, which was organized vertically, its municipal and provincial officers subordinate to the national office. Local officers were chosen by the attorney general, who was elected by



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

the National Assembly on the recommendation of the president of the Council of State. Its constitutional mandate was to "control socialist legality by seeing to it that the law and other provisions are obeyed by state agencies, economic and social institutions, and citizens." The office typically used informal persuasion to correct illegal activity but could bring criminal action against offending organizations and individuals. It also indicted and prosecuted in all cases of criminal actions and intervened as the representative of the public interest in civil, administrative, and other proceedings. It had no independent means of enforcing its decisions, however, relying on the officials within the offending organization and the assemblies for enforcement.

The judicial system was not an independent branch of government. All judges in the system were accountable to their respective assemblies of people's power. Judges were required to submit an annual account of their own work to the assembly that elected them and could be recalled at any time. In addition, the judiciary did not have the power of judicial review; the interpretation of the Constitution was the prerogative of the National Assembly. In practice, the Council of State exercised judicial review and communicated its decision on judicial matters to the Governing Council of the Supreme Court.

#### **Local Government**

As a result of actions taken at the First Congress of the PCC in 1975, the country was divided into 14 provinces, replacing the previous six-province structure that had been in existence since 1878. This change also created regions within each province and *municipios* within the regions. Each *municipio* was further divided into no fewer than 30 and no more than 200 circumscriptions, or electoral districts. The regions were later eliminated, but the other local divisions were retained through 1984. Cuba did not have a federal system; the local divisions were subordinate in all matters to the National Assembly. According to the 1976 Constitution, the country is divided into subunits for "politico-administrative purposes." The National Assembly retained the right to change their number, boundaries, and names at any time. In 1984 there were 169 *municipios*, which were responsible to provinces, except the Municipio of the Isle of Youth, which was directly responsible to the central government.

Each province and *municipio* was governed by a local Assembly of People's Power. The 10,743 delegates to the municipal as-

semblies nationwide were elected directly by the citizens of each *municipio*. They in turn elected the delegates to the provincial assemblies—one delegate for every 10,000 citizens and an additional delegate for any fraction greater than 5,000. Delegates to both assemblies served two-and-one-half-year terms unless recalled by the jurisdiction that elected them. Delegates retained their regular employment, for assemblies were only part-time positions.

Both the provincial and the municipal assemblies were the highest state authorities in their jurisdictions and combined both legislative and executive functions. They established commissions responsible for the supervision and control of the productive and service units directly responsible to the *municipio* or province and appointed and recalled judges in provincial and municipal courts. In all, the assemblies spent approximately 20 percent of the state budget, though they lacked independent revenue-raising capabilities. In most matters municipal assemblies were subordinate to their respective provincial assemblies. The exceptions were in electing and recalling delegates to the National Assembly.

Many of the state administration's activities were decentralized as a result of the creation of the *Organs of People's Power* in 1976. The activities of the Ministry of Education, the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Justice were decentralized. Their activities within the boundaries of a *municipio* fell under the jurisdiction of the local Municipal Assembly; those involving more than one *municipio* fell under the jurisdiction of the appropriate Provincial Assembly. Decentralized units of the state administration had dual accountability; they were responsible both to their superiors within their agency and to the local assembly. In practice, the units of local government sought to ensure that the local administrative units were carrying out the directives of the central government. They also processed citizens' complaints concerning government service.

The most important mechanism for maintaining contact with constituencies was the Assembly for Rendering Accounts. During these public meetings, held in each *municipio* every four months, delegates reported on their activities and those of the assembly and solicited constituents complaints and suggestions that were recorded, submitted to a vote, and presented to the municipal or provincial assembly. At the next public meeting delegates reported back to their constituents on the action taken regarding all issues raised at the previous meeting. Delegates whose performance was unsatisfactory were subject to recall. Observers reported that the right to

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

recall was exercised fairly frequently. One hundred eight of the 10,725 members of municipal assemblies were recalled between 1976 and 1979, failure to stay in contact with electors being the most frequent grounds for recall, according to Blas Roca. In the 1979 elections 50 percent of municipal delegates were not reelected.

Between sessions of the local assemblies, their functions were performed by executive committees elected from their membership. These local executive committees were accountable both to their assembly and to the executive committee at the next administrative level. Although there were no legal requirements regarding who could be elected to serve on the executive committees, the local organ of the PCC had the right to approve their membership.

#### **Elections**

Cuba had three kinds of elections: general elections held every five years to select the deputies of the National Assembly and all the delegates of the provincial and municipal assemblies; partial elections held every two and one-half years to renew the mandate of the delegates; and special elections to cover vacancies occurring during interelectoral periods. The same procedures were followed in all three kinds of elections. Citizens over 16 years of age, including military personnel, were eligible to vote, except those who suffered from mental illness, had committed a crime, or had asked for permission to emigrate. Voting was not mandatory. All eligible voters were also eligible for all public offices (although delegates to the National Assembly had to be 18 years of age).

Elections at the municipal level were direct. *Municipios* were divided into electoral districts, each of which sent one delegate to the municipal assemblies. Electoral districts were further subdivided into neighborhoods, each of which ran one candidate for the delegate seat of its electoral district. Mass meetings of all eligible voters, chaired by a local resident selected at a previous neighborhood meeting, were held in each neighborhood for the purpose of nominating that neighborhood's candidate. Nominations were made from the floor, and any number of people could be nominated as long as there were at least two candidates. Nominees did not have to be residents of the neighborhood or even of the electoral district, and self-nomination was prohibited. Voting was by show of hands. The nominee receiving a simple majority became that neighborhood's candidate for delegate to the Municipal Assembly from that election district.

## *Government and Politics*

Biographies and photographs of the nominees were circulated throughout the election district for one month preceding the election. No other form of campaigning was permitted. Elections took place by secret ballot in enclosed voting booths. The winner was determined by a simple majority or, if necessary, by run-off elections.

Participation in elections was high. The first general election took place in 1976, when some 30,000 candidates contested 10,725 municipal assembly seats. Voter turnout was reported to have been 95.2 percent. In the 1979 general election 24,361 candidates contested 10,656 seats. Voter turnout was reported to have been 96.9 percent. In 1981 a reported 6,097,639 citizens (97 percent of the eligible voters) elected 10,735 delegates (out of 22,726 nominees) to the municipal assemblies.

Analysts commented that elections did not serve as vehicles for the proposal of policy alternatives or the participation of an organized opposition. The prohibition on campaigning and the effective control of the nominating process for higher office by the PCC and the mass organizations ensured that only those thought to be politically trustworthy were elected. However, citizens did have a substantial voice in naming their local government officials.

## **The Communist Party of Cuba**

### **History**

The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC) did not play a leading role in the seizure of power by Castro and his followers. In fact, the party opposed Castro until the last few months before Batista fled the island in the early hours of January 1, 1959 (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista, ch. 1).

The PCC was first organized in Havana in 1925 by Julio Antonio Mella and 10 other university students. In its early years the party adhered closely to the directives of the Communist International (also known as the Comintern or Third International), which was organized and led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. An underground party through the 1920s, it was staunchly antireformist and antiterrorist and condemned any revolutionary movements that were not aligned with it, opposing the 1933 revolution as “reformist” and also opposing the coup that ended it (see The Machado Dictatorship, ch. 1).



*Pioneers, Havana*  
Photo by Phillips Bourns

In 1937, following the “popular front” strategy announced at the Comintern’s Seventh Congress in 1935, the party supported Batista as constitutional president. In exchange for their support, Batista legalized the communists’ front party, the Revolutionary Union Party (Partido Unión Revolucionario—PUR), in 1937 and gave it control of the Confederation of Workers of Cuba (Confeder-

ación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC). In 1939 the PCC and the PUR merged to form the Communist Revolutionary Union (Unión Revolucionaria Comunista—URC), which ran in coalition with Batista in the 1940 elections, after which two of its leaders, Juan Marinello and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, served as ministers without portfolio in Batista's government (see *The Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath*, ch. 1).

In 1944 the party's name was changed to the Popular Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Popular—PSP) in an effort to broaden its popular base. In the 1944 elections it supported Batista's candidate, Carlos Saladrigas, but switched its support to the winner, Ramón Grau San Martín, which allowed it to retain control of the CTC. The PSP ran on its own in the 1948 elections but received only 7 percent of the vote. Under the administration of Carlos Prío Socorrás (1948–52), the party lost control of the CTC to the Cuban Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Cubano, commonly known as the Auténticos) and assumed a passive role in domestic affairs.

After his 1952 coup Batista declared the PSP illegal. Most of its leadership was either imprisoned or went into exile, but the party continued to function clandestinely. In the fraudulent 1954 elections the PSP exhorted its members to support Grau and the Auténticos. The PSP condemned Castro's attack on the Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, as "adventurist" and "putschist." Only in the summer of 1958, when Castro's victory seemed imminent, did the PSP send Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to the Sierra Maestra to make contact with him (see *Batista's Dictatorship*, ch. 1).

After the fall of Batista in January 1959, the PSP openly supported the new regime. Until the latter part of 1961 it provided key support for the revolutionary government, along with the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio—M-26-7) and the Revolutionary Student Directorate (*Directorio Estudiantil Revolucionario*—DER). M-26-7 was founded by Castro in July 1955 following his release from prison. The program of M-26-7 was avowedly reformist, ostensibly seeking a return to the constitution of 1940 and the implementation of social reforms. M-26-7 represented those who fought the guerrilla war against Batista and thus was widely supported after 1959. The DER was formed independently of M-26-7 in December 1956, drawing mostly on members of the Federation of University Students (*Federación Estudiantil Universitaria*—FEU) for its support. Strongly influenced by Roman Catholicism, it articulated democratic and middle-class values and was explicitly anticommunist. Its revolutionary credentials were based on the attack it launched on the presidential palace on March 13,

*Cuba: A Country Study*

1957, its resistance to Batista in urban areas, and its having sent a group to fight in the Sierra de Escambray of central Cuba in January 1958 (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista, ch. 1).

In July 1961 the PSP, M-26-7, and the DER were merged to form the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (*Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas—ORI*). The purpose of the ORI was to coordinate the activities of the mass organizations of students, women, workers, and neighborhood committees that were being formed and also to provide a means to bring the PSP into open participation in the government. The government conceived of the ORI as a vehicle for the creation of a mass party and placed Aníbal Escalante of the PSP in charge of organizing that effort. In 1962, after having staffed most of the important positions within the ORI with PSP stalwarts, Escalante was removed from his post at the instigation of Castro, who realized that he was using the ORI as a means of elevating members of the old PSP above members of Castro's M-26-7. Escalante went into exile in Eastern Europe, and the ORI was subsequently dismantled (see *Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62*, ch. 1).

Later in 1962 Castro announced the formation of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (*Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista—PURS*). Cadres personally selected by Castro were sent to work centers throughout the country to recruit membership. Unlike the ORI, the PURS had no discernible influence on government policy. In mid-1963 it concentrated on stimulating productivity and mobilizing work brigades. With the completion of the mass membership drive in October 1965, Castro announced the formation of the new PCC with 50,000 members and candidate members. The 100 members of the Central Committee were selected by Castro personally, as were the eight members of the Political Bureau and the six members of the Secretariat. There were only 15 members of the old PSP on the Central Committee (see *National-level Politics*, this ch.).

The First Congress of the PCC, attended by 3,116 delegates, was held in December 1975. The Political Bureau was enlarged to include three former PSP leaders (Arnaldo Milian, Blas Roca, and Carlos Rafael Rodríguez), a symbolic move that formalized the restoration of the old communists of the PSP into revolutionary legitimacy. The First Congress approved the draft of the 1976 Constitution, the first five-year economic plan, a new system of economic management, the division of the country into 14 provinces, and a temporary party platform. The Second Congress was held in December 1980 and approved the definitive party program outlining objectives and strategies for the "construction of socialism" in

Cuba and the second five-year economic plan. The platform described the PCC's basic goal as guiding the "construction of socialism" and progress toward a communist society. In contrast to its claim in 1968 that Cuba was embarking on the simultaneous construction of socialism and communism, the PCC platform accepted the thesis of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that a four-stage process in the development of communism was necessary: the transition to, and building of, socialism; socialism; constructing communism; and communism. The PCC platform also emphasized that Cuba was still in the first stage of the process. Although its relations with other organizations have been severely strained at times, in 1985 it was the dominant institution in the political system.

### **Organization**

The highest authority of the PCC was the party congress, which met once every five years to decide "on all of the most important matters of policy, organization and activity of the Party in general." Delegates to the party congress were elected by local party organizations throughout the country.

The party congress elected the members of the Central Committee, which, according to party statutes, was the highest body of the PCC when the party congress was not in session. It was required to meet at least once a year and had the important function of determining the rules by which delegates to the party congress were selected. Until 1980 the Central Committee seldom met and tended to ratify unanimously decisions taken previously by the Political Bureau and the Secretariat. After 1980, however, the Central Committee met every six months and became more of a deliberative body. Reportedly the primary duty of the Central Committee was to act as the principal forum through which the top party leadership established and disseminated PCC policy to the second-level leadership, who, in turn, directed the subnational party apparatus and other political institutions, thus strengthening intra-elite communication and coordination.

Internally, the Central Committee was divided into 22 functionally defined departments charged with monitoring and guiding government activities in those areas (see fig. 7). The Central Committee's membership—145 members and 76 alternates in 1984—was broadly representative, although those occupying principal posts in the PCC bureaucracy or the Union of Young Communists (*Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas*—UJC) and those on active duty in



*Cuba: A Country Study*


the military were predominant. In 1980 the primary occupations of its members and alternates were politics (21.3 percent); state bureaucracy (17.3 percent); military (27.1 percent); foreign relations (6.2 percent); mass organizations (15.6 percent); education, science, and culture (5.8 percent); and other (6.7 percent).

The highest organ of the PCC when the Central Committee was not in session was the Political Bureau, which consisted of 14 members and 10 alternates in 1985. Professor Juan del Aguila of Emory University in Atlanta described its members as "the elite of the elite" within the political system. The position of alternate was created in 1980 to provide representation within the top party elite for various organizations. Full members of the Political Bureau were generalists occupying positions in both the PCC and the government, and most were also members of the Council of Ministers. The alternates, in contrast, were organizational specialists, none of whom were members of the Council of Ministers in 1980, although five were members of the Council of State.

A third top organ of the PCC was the Secretariat, consisting of 10 members in early 1985 who were nominated by the Political Bureau and elected by the Central Committee. Information concerning its activities was scarce and was seldom disclosed by the government or the Party. However, del Aguila, extrapolating from the activities of communist party secretariats in other countries, suggested that the Secretariat was responsible for personnel matters at all levels and that it might have enforcement capabilities, both for disciplining members and for policy guidance. The departments of the Central Committee were divided among its members.

Below these national organs there were 14 provincial committees and 169 municipal committees of the PCC, each headed by an *executive committee* and each having a secretariat. Acting as the major transmission belt of information, they conveyed policy directives from the top leadership down to the rank and file while keeping the leaders informed of the situation on the ground. They were also responsible for organizing and directing the activities of subordinate party organizations, as well as monitoring the performance of the local assemblies of people's power and the local activities of the decentralized ministries. Performance was an important criterion for promotion at the local level. Five of the 14 provincial first secretaries (who chaired the executive committees of the provincial party committees) were replaced between 1975 and 1980, having been held responsible either for poor political performance or for the low performance of economic units in their provinces.

The base PCC unit was the party cell consisting of eight to 10 members organized at work centers and educational institutions.



Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference Aid*, Washington, June 1984, 7-18.

**Figure 7. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba, 1985.**

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

The functions of the cells were divided into two categories: membership services and economic oversight. The cells were the principal point of contact with individuals and were primarily responsible for the recruitment of new members and the continuous ideological guidance of both members and nonmembers. Implementing the principle of democratic centralism, they ensured compliance with party directives and disciplined violators. The cells also performed economic oversight functions at the factory level, monitoring the performance of managers and stimulating production by encouraging workers to exceed work norms.

#### **Membership**

As a vanguard party the PCC, together with its affiliates, restricted its membership to a small minority of the population. In 1969 it had only 55,000 members, or about 0.7 percent of the population. The next smallest ruling communist party at that time, in Albania, included 3 percent of the population. In 1976, after a decade of rapid expansion, PCC membership had risen to over 200,000 members, or about 2.2 percent of the population. By 1980 the Party claimed 434,143 members, including candidates, or about 4.4 percent of the population.

The PCC cells recruited candidate members who underwent a six-month period of scrutiny during which their ideological commitment, loyalty, and intellectual development were tested. In 1981 it was reported that the legal requirement that all Party members "must have at least eight years of school to improve their professional and cultural level" was still the PCC's "basic goal," thus indicating that problems of competency continued to plague the Party. Full membership in the Party required acceptance by two-thirds of members of a cell and the approval of the secretariat at the next highest level of the PCC.

The most common route for eventual Party membership was through the PCC's youth organizations. The Organization of José Martí Pioneers (Organización de Pioneros José Martí—OPJM) admitted children from ages five to 14. Reportedly modeled on the Boy Scouts of America, it was formed in 1961 to provide recreation and education for children and to teach them the norms of socialism. Originally, membership was selective, but after 1966 it operated as a mass organization, seeking to enroll as many members as possible. In 1983 *Granma*, the official newspaper of the Central Committee of the PCC, reported that some 4 million children had passed through the ranks of the UPC.

## *Government and Politics*

The PCC also operated the UJC as a training ground for prospective Party members aged 14 to 27, after which they became eligible for PCC membership. Its primary activities were social work, instruction in ideology, volunteer labor, military training, scientific and cultural activities, and participation in Party activities. A more restrictive organization than the OPJM, the UJC's membership was reported to be only 422,000 in June 1982. Former members of the UJC were not, however, guaranteed acceptance into the PCC. Between 1972 and 1976, for example, some 33 percent of all applicants from the UJC were rejected as lacking the qualifications for membership.

A second method of recruitment into the Party, selection as an "exemplary worker" by a workers' assembly, was less common. Military officers on active duty tended to be overrepresented in Party membership statistics because of the initial emphasis on the security organizations as the core of the Party. From the early 1970s, however, the Party broadened its base to include all sectors of the society. In 1979 some 44.6 percent of members were workers in material production and services, 26.2 percent were administrative leaders, 13.5 percent were small farmers, and 9.6 percent were administrative, professional, and technical workers. According to figures disclosed by Castro in 1981 some 47 percent of members were workers, and 17.5 percent were women. The government did not release figures concerning the race of Party members. The membership of the Central Committee was less representative of the population or the Party membership as a whole. A majority were high-level government and military officials. Seven members of the Central Committee in 1980 were workers who had been selected as "exemplary"; women accounted for 12.2 percent of the full members of the 1980 Central Committee and for 14.3 percent of its alternates.

### **Role in Government**

The Constitution of 1976 describes the PCC as the "organized Marxist-Leninist vanguard of the working class" and as "the highest leading force of the society and the state." The PCC, however, was conceived as an institution that was separate from the state, defined as "the institutional expression of the people." The Party's role, in other words, was to determine the direction in which the society was to move while the state provided the mechanism for moving it in that direction. However, according to Castro, the PCC was not to seek to impose its will on the state. Rather, it was to

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

guide the state through persuasion and example. The potential conflict between the Party and the state was obviated by the overlap of the Party and the state leaderships at the highest levels: in 1984, all the members of the Council of State were also members of the Central Committee of the PCC.

Critical decisions on national policy, such as the decision to dispatch combat troops to Ethiopia in 1978, were thought to be made by the PCC's Political Bureau. Less urgent but no less important decisions, such as the national economic plan and the state budget, were reviewed by the Political Bureau and then approved by the Central Committee before being taken up by the National Assembly. More routine proposals were reviewed by the Political Bureau, then forwarded directly to the National Assembly for action.

The Party also played a major role in leadership selection at the provincial and municipal levels. Although the members of the provincial and municipal assemblies were popularly elected, their executive committees were selected from a list prepared by a commission presided over by a representative of the Party's local organ and consisting of representatives of the local leadership of the UJC, the CTC, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs), and the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC).

The local organs of the PCC were also charged with ensuring that the local Organs of People's Power functioned effectively, particularly with respect to the provisions regarding the accountability and recall of delegates. However, PCC directives were binding only for Party members, not for non-Party people or for non-Party institutions such as the Organs of People's Power. According to Castro, the PCC could neither "hand down decisions" to state organs nor undertake "any manner of reprisals" against non-Party officials who disagreed with PCC recommendations. Such statements indicated that the Party has at times exceeded its authority in its relations with the Organs of People's Power, prompting Castro to rebuke its members.

### **Mass Organizations**

Cuba had a variety of mass organizations that grouped people on the basis of common characteristics, such as age, occupation, and gender. The largest and most important mass organization in early 1985 were the CDRs, the FMC, the National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—

ANAP), and the CTC. These four organizations constituted the most important mechanisms through which the majority of Cubans participated in politics. The mass organizations were specifically recognized in the Constitution as vehicles to "represent the specific interests" of their members and to "incorporate them in the tasks of the construction, consolidation and defense of the socialist society."

During the early years of the Revolution, before the PCC had been organized, the mass organizations performed many of the functions of a party. Through their efforts members were socialized into the norms of the emerging political system, and cultural changes were instituted. They symbolized the revolutionary struggle, rallying the entire population in support of the Revolution while also providing social services for their members. Although they lacked substantial decisionmaking authority, the mass organizations organized the labor force in an ambitious national development effort. By the late 1970s this lack of autonomy led to passivity and frustration among the leadership of the mass organizations, a problem that was partially rectified by the administrative decentralization that accompanied the creation of the Organs of People's Power in 1976.

In 1985 the mass organizations, guided by PCC officials, discussed local affairs, provided volunteer labor, and participated in officially organized mass demonstrations. Party and state officials at the local level were expected to maintain close contacts with the mass organizations in their jurisdictions, and the organizations in turn represented the interests of their members in discussions with delegates to the assemblies and with Party officials. Drafts of important legislation were discussed in the mass organizations at the local level; suggestions for changes were solicited and communicated to the Council of Ministers for use in drawing up the final text of the law. According to Castro, the mass discussions of draft legislation were typically attended by some 60 to 80 percent of the mass organizations' membership.

Mass organizations elected their own leadership autonomously, but their duty was the mobilization of the population in support of the Revolution. Thus, dissident behavior, either by individuals or by organizations, was proscribed. Participation in the activities of the mass organizations was seen as a measure of commitment to the Revolution. Although such participation was high, it was not entirely voluntary. Various social and economic benefits accrued to those having good records of activity in the mass organizations, and nonmembers lived on the margins of social life. A majority of emigrants in the Mariel exodus of 1980 were not members of a

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

mass organization. Based on interviews with refugees who left the island in 1980, analysts suggested that the marginals consisted overwhelmingly of younger people who had grown up under the Revolution and were dissatisfied with the lack of consumer goods and poor prospects for improvements in their standard of living. In one survey almost 40 percent of those refugees who reported that they had been in prison stated that they were imprisoned because of illegal economic activities (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization; Mechanisms for Social Mobility*, ch. 2).

#### **Committees for the Defense of the Revolution**

The Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución—CDRs) were originally formed in September 1960, when the Revolution was under attack from both internal and external enemies. Organized in neighborhood committees, they were charged with maintaining internal “vigilance” (security), local government, public health, and organizational growth. In 1967 “vigilance” was dropped from the list of functions and was transferred to MINFAR and MININT. In September 1968, however, Castro indicated his extreme displeasure at the change, and shortly thereafter the national office of the CDRs restored “vigilance” as the organization’s first duty. There was considerable resistance to this reorientation, and the direct intervention of Minister of the FAR Raúl Castro was required in October 1968 and January 1969 to ensure that the new policies were implemented.

In 1984 the neighborhood committees organized mass discussions of major legislation and organized community health campaigns, such as blood donations, immunization and sanitation drives, pollution control, prenatal care, and health education. They cooperated with teachers, students, parents, and municipal governments in maintaining the schools and organized cultural, sporting, and educational activities. Volunteer work projects were organized under the auspices of the CDRs, as were efforts to police the system for distributing goods and services at the neighborhood level and the transmission of complaints and suggestions to the municipal assemblies.

The activities of the CDRs also served a number of less tangible purposes. Unlike other organizations, there were no prerequisites for joining the CDRs other than support for the Revolution. As a result, they enabled a vast majority of the population to demonstrate their support for the Revolution by helping to provide es-

sential services to their communities. The organizations' goal was to eventually incorporate the entire population. In 1980 the CDRs had 5.4 million members (roughly 80 percent of the population) in 81,000 neighborhood committees. Through their participation, whether voluntary or coerced, members learned the attitudes and habits of self-sacrifice encouraged by the government. In keeping with their internal security function, the CDRs attempted to control deviant behavior or beliefs. Usually, informal mechanisms such as ostracism and public denunciation were used. However, formal reports to MININT's security forces on the activities of neighbors were not uncommon. In 1983 it was reported that the CDRs sent a daily average of 123 such reports.

#### **Federation of Cuban Women**

The Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC) was founded in 1960 to integrate women more fully into both the Revolution and the society in general. It provided one of the major supports for the Revolution by mobilizing women to provide voluntary labor for such activities as the literacy campaign of the early 1960s and the 1970 sugar harvest. The FMC provided a number of services for women, including vaccinations and Pap smears, day-care systems for the children of women who worked outside the home, vocational training, and rehabilitation programs for female prisoners.

As a political organization, the FMC sought to broaden the participation of women in all aspects of politics and society. It was not, however, an independent articulator of the demands of all women or of its membership (some 2.3 million in 1980). Rather, it supported those social policies that had an impact on women's lives, while seeking to influence the content of those policies through lobbying tactics and through increasing the weight of women in the decisionmaking process in general.

The FMC had a mixed record of achievement. It succeeded in inserting a plank in the PCC platform that supported the full equality of women and helped write the Family Code that made child rearing and the care of the home the equal responsibility of both men and women. The social impact of these legal strictures was limited, however (see *The Role of Mass Organizations in the Process of Socialization*, ch. 2). It was less successful in expanding the number of women in political leadership positions. Women constituted only 6 percent of the national and provincial PCC leadership in 1982 and only 2 percent at the municipal level. Within the





Photo by John Finan



*Meeting and headquarters of a local Committee  
for the Defense of the Revolution*  
Photo by Donna Rich

CDRs they composed 7 percent of national executive positions, 15 percent of provincial positions, and 24 percent of municipal positions.

#### **Confederation of Cuban Workers**

The Confederation of Cuban Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba—CTC) was founded in 1938 as an affiliate of the PSP and quickly absorbed the preexisting unions into its ranks. During the early 1940s the PSP and the Auténticos competed for dominance within the CTC, culminating in a split in the organization in 1947. During the presidency of Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948–52) the government favored the Auténticos within the CTC, and the PSP lost influence with the leadership but retained a substantial following among the rank and file. Under Batista the CTC supported the government, in part because the bulk of its membership benefited from the regime and in part because of corruption in its national leadership. It did not play a role in the guerrilla war, although there were sporadic strikes beginning in 1957.

In the early months of 1959 M-26-7 gained control of the CTC, winning elections in 29 of 33 federations. Through 1961 the government encouraged unionization, and the CTC expanded to include over 1 million members (some 60 percent of the labor force). That same year it became the only legal union, incorporating all other unions and functioning under the leadership of the ORI.

During the late 1960s the government de-emphasized the CTC, preferring to create the Advanced Workers Movement, a cadre organization of the most productive workers in each work center that had the sole function of stimulating production. Following the disastrous 1970 sugar harvest, however, the government decided to revitalize the CTC. Elections were held in all work centers, and the organization was rebuilt, culminating in the CTC's Thirteenth Congress in 1973.

The Thirteenth Congress approved a change in the role of the CTC in relation to the government and to management. The role of the union became to approve and help enforce quotas, known as "collective labor commitments," to meet and surpass labor standards, conserve raw materials and energy, contribute voluntary labor, and enforce labor discipline. In 1984 its stated objectives were to support the government, participate in vigilance and defense activities, help to improve managerial efficiency, maintain labor discipline, and raise workers' political consciousness. It was

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

organized into 18 national federations and incorporated some 97 percent of the labor force in 1978.

There were three kinds of workers' assemblies in each workplace. Production assemblies, encompassing a plant's entire work force, discussed production quotas, individual work norms, overtime, working hours, and voluntary labor mobilizations. The proposals of production assemblies were not binding on management, but rejections of such proposals had to be justified at the next production assembly. Production assemblies were held at least every two months, and observers reported 80 to 100 percent attendance. Management councils were made up of the plant administrator, the administrator's top assistants, elected representatives of the CTC local, representatives of the FMC, and representatives of the PCC. A management council did not have the power to overrule the plant manager, but all administrative matters had to be brought before it for discussion. Work councils (delegations of workers' representatives) handled all labor grievances, and their decisions were not subject to review by the plant management (see Labor, ch. 3).

However, there were problems in the functioning of production assemblies, which were supposed to discuss economic plans. According to Domínguez, 34 percent of all enterprises failed to discuss the 1979 economic plan of the central government with the workers; an additional 58 percent brought the 1979 plan before the workers but paid no attention to suggestions made. Only 8 percent of the enterprises compiled the suggestions of workers and modified the plan as a result. There were improvements in the discussion of the 1980 plan, 58.8 percent of enterprises holding meetings and modifying the plan in response to suggestions from the workers, but the remainder of the enterprises failed to carry out their responsibility to encourage participation.

#### **National Association of Small Farmers**

The National Association of Small Farmers (Asociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños—ANAP) was founded in 1961 to represent the owners of small, private farms and peasants incorporated into cooperatives. ANAP operated as a liaison between its members and state agencies that were charged with agricultural planning, dispensing agricultural credits, technical assistance, seeds, fertilizer, and other agricultural supplies.

Throughout its history ANAP sought to lessen government controls over the economic activities of its members. Early in

1980, in response to the economic crisis, the government legalized the "free peasant market." After commitments to state agencies had been met, all those who raised crops could sell any remaining surplus in the free peasant market at any price that the market would bear. Although ANAP had pressed for this reform for many years, it was generally agreed that it had more to do with food shortages than with ANAP's political influence.

The bulk of ANAP members (some 193,000 in 1983) were independent farmers. In 1982 only about 35 percent of privately held land was owned by cooperatives. Under an agreement reached with the government in 1977, ANAP urged peasants to join cooperatives, but it met with considerable resistance. Although the number of cooperative members increased to some 38,000 by the end of 1981, the 1981-85 economic plan was blunt in criticizing the slow growth in their numbers, citing a lack of "an effective economic, ideological effort to bring this task to the level that is required."

### **Mass Media**

The mass media were essential channels for mass mobilization and control, as well as the management of local political conflict. Their primary function was the transmission, explanation, and interpretation of the actions of the government to the population. Lengthy verbatim transcripts of Castro's speeches were the common fare, along with government decrees and PCC policy papers. The media not only explained government policy but also justified it, giving considerable attention to social problems and the "success" of the government in dealing with them.

The mass media also played an important role in education. They were the primary instruments for the ideological education of Party workers and disseminated information about technological innovations and managerial techniques by focusing on the experiences of selected workers in agricultural and industrial enterprises. Thus, the media served as both a popular press and a technical journal.

The media also provided the major vehicle for "self-criticism" of the Revolution, although difficulties were experienced in performing this function. Editors, government, and party leaders frequently mentioned the need for more self-criticism, a regular letters-to-the-editor column, and other forms of substantive citizen feedback. In an address to the Fourth Congress of the Union of Cuban Journalists in March 1980, Raúl Castro delivered a strongly

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

worded speech calling for more press criticism. The monotonous and generally obsequious nature of reporting was strongly criticized at the Second Congress of the PCC in December 1980. The quality of reporting did not improve appreciably through early 1985, however, although there were more frequent publications of citizens' complaints than previously, at least on occasion.

Formal government censorship was rare. Analysts commented that it was unnecessary, because a vast majority of journalists were ideologically aligned with the goals of the government. In 1982 it was estimated that 71 percent of editors and other top media policymakers also held leadership positions in either the PCC or the government. In addition, some 40 percent of all journalists were members of the PCC or the UJC. Finally, all journalists were required to join the Union of Cuban Journalists, which established and enforced standards that governed the behavior of all its members.

The broadcast media were owned and operated by the government. All radio and television stations were administered by the Cuban Institute of Radio and Television, which was directly supervised by the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. In 1980 there were two national and 20 local television channels, as well as 40 radio stations. An estimated 78 percent of Cuban homes had a radio and 56 percent had a television.

The print media were not centrally administered. More than 100 newspapers, magazines, and specialized journals were published by most mass organizations and divisions of the Party or the government. The major newspapers were the daily *Granma*, published by the Central Committee of the PCC with a circulation of 600,000; the daily *Juventud Rebelde*, published by the UJC with a circulation of 200,000; and *Los Trabajadores*, published three times a week by the CTC with a circulation of 300,000. The major magazines were *Verde Olivo*, published by the FAR; *Mujeres*, published by the FMC; and *Bohemia*, a general interest, mass circulation magazine that did not represent any particular government division or social sector and that had a circulation of 300,000. There were also 10 provincial dailies published by provincial committees of the PCC, which had a combined circulation of approximately 122,000.

There were three major vehicles for the international dissemination of news about Cuba. Radio Havana broadcast internationally in eight languages on several shortwave frequencies for approximately 45 hours per week. The *Granma Weekly Review*, which published reprints from the Cuban press, was distributed to approximately 100,000 readers in Spanish, English, Portuguese, and French editions. Prensa Latina, Cuba's world news service, distrib-

uted an estimated 250 to 300 articles of news and analysis daily. It operated 37 offices throughout the world and had access to two satellite communications channels to Moscow.

### **The Politics of a Consultive Oligarchy**

Even though its leadership employed the rhetoric of democracy and encouraged broad participation by citizens, Cuba had an authoritarian political system. Decisionmaking was highly centralized, the structure of political power was stratified and hierarchical, and the mass of the population lacked the means to remove the top and middle leadership of the Party, the state, or the Organs of People's Power. The PCC was the only legal political party, and all mass media were controlled by state and Party organs or by official organizations. Citizen participation, however, was high and was channeled through state-sponsored organizations whose primary function was to ensure the implementation of policies decided at the highest levels rather than to influence the content of those decisions. In setting policy, the tendency was for the top political elite to consult with middle-level leaders, many of whom represented the various constituent organizations of the state. Such consultation, however, carried with it no obligation to adhere to the opinions expressed. Generally, the consultation process produced improvements in policy with respect to details but no modification of the policy itself or changes in the political leadership. Domínguez thus characterized the political system as a "consultive oligarchy."

### **National-level Politics**

#### ***Factional Politics***

Through early 1985 the government did not publish information concerning policy disagreements and political alignments within the top leadership. Officially, all individuals were united in support of the government and its policies. Some observers, however, analyzed politics within the top leadership in terms of "factions" or tendencies based on prerevolutionary affiliations or based on logical inferences concerning the most likely tendencies of individuals given the organizational and governmental positions they held. Although not definitive, the political alignments within the leadership described by these observers, particularly by Edward

*Fidel Castro Ruz*  
Courtesy Ministry of  
Foreign Relations



Gonzalez of the Rand Corporation, were generally accepted among analysts.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, the dominant pattern among the political elite was based on personalistic factions. Three factions were identified: *fidelistas*, those who had been under the personal command of Castro during the guerrilla war; *raulistas*, those who had been under the personal command of Raúl Castro during the guerrilla war; and "old communists," those who had been members of the PSP prior to 1959.

The *fidelistas* emphasized guerrilla radicalism throughout the 1960s and, even after the adoption of Marxism-Leninism as the formal ideology of the government, continued to derive their legitimacy from the legacy of the anti-Batista struggle. They emphasized moral over material incentives to raise labor productivity, claimed to be constructing socialism and communism simultaneously, and even claimed that Cuba would attain the stage of "true communism" before the Soviet Union. They also emphasized support for revolutionary movements in other countries, even when those movements were not supported by the communist parties of those

countries, and sought to maintain operational independence from the Soviet Union.

Closely aligned with the *fidelistas* were the *raulistas*, who were thought to be concentrated in the Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior. They adopted a position somewhat closer to Soviet Marxist orthodoxy, believing that close relations with the Soviet Union were essential if the Revolution was to survive in the face of hostility from the United States, and were willing to make concessions in ideology and domestic policy in order to retain Soviet support.

The old communists, clearly of secondary importance during the 1960s, supported closer relations with the Soviet Union and looked to the Soviet experience as their basic guide in domestic policy. After the creation of the PCC in 1965, there were no old communists on the Political Bureau and only 22 on the 100-member Central Committee. Their relatively weak position was attributed to their failure to support the guerrilla insurgency until the very end of the war. Doubts concerning their loyalty increased after Escalante returned to Cuba from Eastern Europe and began assembling a network of PSP veterans who were critical of Cuban foreign policy (known as the "microfaction"). He was finally imprisoned in 1968.

During the 1960s Castro was the dominant actor, mobilizing personal support within the elite and keeping the population loyal to him personally through his charisma and his position as leader of the Revolution. Within the elite the relative power positions of individuals were determined by their closeness to Castro or, secondarily, to his brother Raúl; (see Cuba and the Soviet Union, this ch.; Radicalization of the System, 1963-66, ch. 1).

A realignment occurred within the elite after the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest and the subsequent "institutionalization of the Revolution." The system of government was depersonalized, and Castro played a less prominent role in day-to-day political management and policymaking, becoming more of an arbiter among competing tendencies within the elite. The old communists strengthened their position, attaining three seats on the expanded Political Bureau in 1975 and increasing their presence in other positions within the government and the PCC. This was partially offset by a transfer of nine senior-level *fidelista* and *raulista* officers from the MINFAR to positions in the expanded Secretariat of the PCC, in the newly created Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and at the top of several ministries (see Institutionalization and Return to the Soviet Model, 1970-76, ch. 1).



*Cuba: A Country Study*

The process of creating stable political institutions, however, led to what analysts described as a more bureaucratic pattern of political alignments in the late 1970s. Five actors were identified: the FAR, the PCC bureaucracy, technocratic economists, the state bureaucracy, and low- and intermediate-level managers of work centers.

The FAR were thought to favor the professionalization of the military and the maintenance of close relations with the Soviet Union and were suspicious of attempts to improve relations with the United States. Some analysts equated their influence with the *raulistas*, noting that Raúl Castro was the minister of the FAR, first vice president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, second secretary of the PCC, and a member of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat. Others, observing that Raúl Castro was subordinate to his brother in all these positions and that the balance between *fidelista* and *raulista* officers within the armed forces was stable, argued that the military's interests lay more in the enhancement of their role in society and foreign policy than in an increase in Raúl Castro's personal influence.

The PCC bureaucracy was thought to favor an increase in its institutional influence, largely at the expense of the armed forces. After the expansion of membership after 1975, the increased attention to the competence of Party cadres, and an emphasis on ideological instruction in Marxism-Leninism in Party schools, some observers suggested that the Party was developing its own institutional views concerning the proper management of the Revolution, despite the dominance of *fidelistas* and *raulistas* at its highest levels.

A technocratic tendency was identified with Carlos Rafael Rodríguez. This grouping was composed of a new generation of planning and economic specialists to be found in agencies such as the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation and those concerned with state planning. It was thought to favor the adoption of Soviet planning methods, managerial controls, and labor incentives. Domestically, it emphasized economic production over societal transformation and the reduction of economic inequalities. In foreign policy it favored the resumption of political and economic relations with the states of the Western Hemisphere, including, it was thought, a restoration of economic and trade ties with the United States. It also favored the maintenance of close ties to the Soviet Union, especially the continuation of high levels of Soviet economic and technical assistance. The technocratic grouping was thought to be, numerically, perhaps the smallest of the five actors and to have no mass base of

support. Its primary support was thought to come from the Soviet Union (see Cuba and the Soviet Union, this ch.).

State bureaucrats were closely identified with Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado until his suicide in 1983. Dorticós had long been associated with the state bureaucracy in a number of different posts before and after 1959 and was at least partially responsible for the movement toward codifying administrative procedures as part of the institutionalization of the Revolution. State bureaucrats benefited from institutionalization by becoming more secure in their positions and by having their responsibilities and lines of authority clearly delineated. Consequently, they were thought to favor its continuation, as well as policies of economic rationality, broader ties with Latin America, and some form of rapprochement with the United States as a means of reducing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Finally, some analysts identified a common interest emerging among low- and intermediate-level managers of economic units. In 1982 managers began to meet to discuss management issues, and their views appeared to be represented by officials in charge of implementation within the planning and economic management system. Presumably, they favored enterprise autonomy and economic decentralization.

These two patterns of alignment within the top elite—personal and bureaucratic—appeared to have different effects within the political system. The divisions based on personal factions did not appear to determine political disputes or policy formation. Rather, they appeared to make a major impact on the overall stability of the system. After the intense interfactional rivalries of the 1960s, the top elite was broadened to include all three factions, thus unifying the elite. This elite unity was preserved through the 1970s; all factions were represented in policymaking, and it was thought that this representation, in time, would depoliticize the factions. Incumbency came to be based less on faction than on performance. The factional balance was preserved, however, most probably to prevent renewed politicization.

The bureaucratic pattern of political alignment appeared to have the greatest impact on day-to-day policymaking. Particularly between 1975 and 1979 there was a marked broadening of the top elite, the managerial and technocratic elites ascending to high positions, and a devolution of policymaking authority to middle-level officials in the ministries and the local Organs of People's Power. In this more open system, disagreements over policy were even more manifest than they had been in the past, and bureaucratic interests seemed to make the greatest impact on the policy posi-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

tions of the elite. Castro played a balancing role in the system, accommodating the various policy interests as much as possible and at the same time keeping all of them loyal to him. Beginning in late 1979, however, there was a marked reconcentration of policy-making authority. Several of the prominent technocratic and managerial elites were displaced, and veteran *fidelistas* assumed greater control of the Council of Ministers. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the PCC named in 1980 had a far greater concentration of *fidelistas* and *raulistas* than previously.

#### ***The Revolutionary Armed Forces as a Political Force***

Many analysts, noting the preeminent position of the veterans of the guerrilla war in the highest decisionmaking bodies of the Council of State, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Political Bureau of the PCC—as well as the large number of nondefense duties that the FAR performed since 1959 and the considerable proportion of the population incorporated into organizations performing security functions—considered the military the preeminent institution in the society and the political system. A study by Hugh S. Thomas, Georges A. Fauriol, and Juan Carlos Weiss conducted under the auspices of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies concluded in 1984 that Cuba was a “garrison state” marked by a top leadership made up of military or former military personnel and an increasing militarization of society.

Other analysts, however, while agreeing that the political elite at the highest levels continued to consist primarily of veterans of the guerrilla war and that the FAR played a major nondefense role, argued that the situation was considerably more complex than it seemed if only these aspects of the system were considered. Political scientists William M. LeoGrande, Max Azicri, Archibald R. M. Ritter, and others argued that, particularly during the 1970s, the country experienced a process of demilitarization as the military surrendered many of its nondefense duties to civilians and new political institutions were created that integrated the populace into the political system.

The FAR was created in October 1959, and veterans of the guerrilla army—many of whom were also leaders of the new regime—were its core. In the face of United States hostility, attacks by exiles, and an anti-Castro guerrilla insurgency in the early 1960s, a strong military was essential, and the FAR became the primary institution of the Revolution. During this period virtually the entire population was mobilized to “defend the Revolution”

through the FAR, the militias, and the CDRs. The consequent militarization of the society was based on the image of the "heroic guerrilla fighter," who shifted between military and civilian duties as circumstances required.

Many guerrilla veterans pursued careers in the state bureaucracy and the mass organizations while retaining their military ranks. During this period of organizational fluidity, some alternated positions in the FAR and in the other organizations or served in more than one post simultaneously; others never returned to active duty with the FAR. Many of those who left the FAR, including many *fidelistas* and followers of Ernesto (Che) Guevara, staffed the state bureaucracy and the mass organizations. They, together with the old communists of the PSP, formed the nucleus of the ORI after its founding in July 1961.

The purge of Escalante and the old communists from the ORI and its subsequent dismantling left the political field dominated by the factions among the guerrilla veterans. Throughout the 1960s the intense ideological disputes among them, resulting in several reorganizations of the state apparatus, shifting economic policies, and a fairly high turnover in officials, decimated both these contending groups and their associated bureaucratic institutions. The FAR alone was shielded from these disputes and from Castro's direct personal intervention in its internal operations because of the unique influence of its commander, Raúl Castro, as well as the undeniable need to maintain the military's fighting capacity. Consequently, the FAR evolved into an institution with a stable and efficient command structure.

As the only organization left intact during this period, the FAR constituted the most efficient and stable available political base. This was reflected in the makeup of the PCC Central Committee in 1965. Forty-six of the 100 members of the Central Committee held posts in MINFAR or MININT. An additional 21 held military rank but had not held a military post since the guerrilla war. Thus, in the institutional political situation in 1965, the FAR was a minority, but it was an organized minority in the midst of a splintered civilian majority—including 15 old communists, 21 non-FAR guerrilla veterans and 18 non-veterans, which was riven by personal factions, varying ideological orientations, and different policy prescriptions.

Nevertheless, FAR influence declined, particularly during 1966, as Guevara became the most important member of the leadership after Castro, and the leadership concentrated on popular mobilization, expanded recruitment into the PCC, and experiments with moral incentives and worker participation in economic man-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

agement. In 1967-68, however, the situation was reversed. Guevara left Cuba—and later died—in 1967, the same year that the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in 1970 began. Within a year it was clear that the civilian economic managers had failed in their mobilization drive, and the campaign fell into disarray. The decision was made to give the task to the FAR and, beginning in 1968, FAR officers were placed in command of sugar mills, troops were used to harvest sugar, and the FAR took over the construction of the required economic infrastructure. In all, some 70,000 FAR personnel were diverted to the 1970 harvest.

As the FAR expanded its role from defense to include economic management, the PCC was shattered by the purge of the Escalante microfaction in 1968. Castro relied on the support of the FAR and the non-FAR guerrilla veterans as he systematically purged the PCC bureaucracy of those suspected of disloyalty. In all, 43 persons were arrested, nine persons were expelled from the PCC and imprisoned, 26 others were imprisoned, and two members of the Central Committee resigned under pressure, including the national head of the CDRs.

The failure of the 1970 harvest to reach its goal of 10 million tons caused a major reevaluation of the institutional arrangements of the regime and within two years led to the beginnings of the campaign to institutionalize the Revolution. In the process a marked reallocation of functions between military officers and civilians began. Officers continued to predominate in MINFAR and MININT, but there was a considerable reduction in the number of them serving as officials in other ministries. The Joint Cuba-Soviet Governmental Commission was established in December 1970 to direct the expenditure of Soviet development assistance. The Central Planning Board (Junta Central de Planificación—JUCEPLAN), Cuba's central planning organization, was strengthened, and in July 1972 it joined the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA—also known as Comecon). Beginning in 1976 JUCEPLAN and the Soviet Union's State Planning Committee (Gosudarstvennyy Planovyy Komitet—GOSPLAN) began joint planning. These moves strengthened the technical skills of civilian economic managers as a result of their association with their Soviet counterparts. Because the Soviet Union was now their external ally, their political influence was markedly enhanced as well.

In 1973 the FAR was reorganized under Soviet guidance, emphasizing military professionalism and downplaying their political or economic role. As a result, the use of military symbolism in the production process disappeared, the flow of military officers into civilian posts receded, the use of military methods of economic ad-

ministration was greatly reduced, and the use of regular troops as an agricultural labor reserve was halted. This process of military retraction continued through 1985. The size of the PCC Central Committee increased substantially, especially in 1980, while the total number of FAR representatives, both full and alternate members, remained stable; their proportional representation of the Central Committee declined steadily (see table A).

These data indicate a long-term trend of declining FAR representation on the policymaking bodies of the PCC as well as within the nonmilitary ministries. The decline was also reflected in the makeup of the Organs of People's Power, where officers constituted only seven of the 85 members of provincial assembly executive committees and only 31 of the 499 delegates to the National Assembly in 1984. The declining military share on the PCC Central Committee indicated to some, including LeoGrande, an increase in the weight of civilian PCC cadres, strengthened by the professionalization of the Party bureaucracy. He noted that even among the military representatives on the Central Committee there was a trend toward using FAR political officers, i.e., officers who served under the administrative command of MINFAR's Central Political Directorate, which was responsible for political indoctrination within the FAR. In 1979 there were five more political officers on the Central Committee than there had been in 1975 (see *The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government*, ch. 5).

By the late 1970s a new political situation had certainly developed in which the FAR was increasingly competing with civilians for state positions (thus reducing the opportunities for promotion among FAR officers) and with other interests in the political system over the allocation of resources to military or nonmilitary functions. During the administration of United States president Jimmy Carter, the perceived threat of external attack declined, leading the FAR to seek additional duties that would justify the continuation of its high percentage of the budget and its drafting of the brightest among the population for military service. It also sought to enhance its prestige in the society as a whole and its influence within the government. The deployment of troops to Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977, together with its favorable military performance in both countries, appeared to strengthen the FAR in internal policy debates. It did not, however, arrest its declining share of positions within the PCC and the nonmilitary ministries. The worsening of relations with the United States after the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 seemed to strengthen the FAR by raising concern within the Cuban leadership about the possibility of a United States invasion. By 1984 the apparent result

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

of this concern, however, was a reemphasis on popular mobilization, a reconcentration of decisionmaking authority, and a strengthening of non-FAR *fidelista* guerrilla veterans.

#### ***Political Opening and the Reconcentration of Power***

In many respects the process of the "institutionalization of the Revolution" constituted a political opening. The top leadership was broadened to include new managerial and technical elites, bureaucratic organizations were rationalized and stabilized, administrative responsibilities were decentralized, the actions of the government were made subject to "socialist legality," and controls over economic activity were reduced. These trends were reversed, however, after 1979.

Beginning in 1976 the economy registered zero real growth of aggregate product per capita every year. Part of this poor performance was attributable to falling sugar prices in world markets and to several crop diseases that damaged tobacco and citrus production, but much of it was caused by inefficiency and low productivity. Despite official claims to the contrary, it was reported that in 1983 the country actually produced less than it had in 1982. The Soviet Union continued to make up the shortfall. In 1983 the delivery of Soviet goods increased by 19 percent over 1982, and trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to 70 percent of the country's total trade. Beyond these problems, however, there were persistent reports of declines in the standard of living, shortages of food and housing and, for the first time since 1959, rising unemployment.

The effects of these economic problems were exacerbated in 1979 by a visit to the country by some 100,000 United States residents of Cuban descent. The visits were part of an effort by the government to woo the exile community and to bolster its hard currency reserves. But the visitors' gifts of consumer goods to their relatives and their descriptions of the higher standard of living they enjoyed in the United States created considerable social tensions on the island, leading to widespread discontent over the prolonged economic austerity.

Table A. Military Participation in Major Decisionmaking Bodies, Selected Years, 1965-84 <sup>1</sup>

	1965	1976	1979	1980	1982	1984
<b>PCC</b> <sup>2</sup>						
<i>Central Committee</i>						
Full members.....	100	110	111	148	153	145
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR <sup>3</sup> .....	46	(46.0)	36	(28.8)	39	(25.5)
Alternate members.....	—	12	13	77	82	76
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	—	3	(25.0)	25	(32.5)	27
Total membership.....	100	122	124	225	235	221
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	46	(46.0)	39	(28.5)	61	(27.1)
<i>Political Bureau</i>						
Full members.....	8	13	13	17	17	15
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	5	(62.5)	2	(23.1)	2	(13.3)
Alternate members.....	—	—	—	12	12	11
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	—	—	—	2	(16.7)	3
Total membership.....	8	13	13	29	29	26
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	5	(62.5)	2	(23.1)	5	(19.2)
<i>Secretariat</i>						
Members.....	6	9	10	9	9	10
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	1	(16.7)	2	(20.0)	2	(30.0)
<i>Provincial First Secretaries</i>						
Members.....	6	14	14	14	14	14
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	0	(0.0)	1	(7.1)	2	(14.3)
<i>Provincial Second Secretaries</i>						
Members.....	—	n.a.	14	14	14	14
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	—	n.a.	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
<i>Provincial Committees</i> <sup>4</sup>						
Members.....	n.a.	90	272	453	496	427
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	n.a.	5	(6.0)	19	(4.2)	17



Table A. Military Participation in Major Decisionmaking Bodies, Selected Years, 1965-84<sup>1</sup>—Continued

	1965	1976	1979	1980	1982	1984
<b>STATE</b>						
<i>Council of State</i>						
Members.....	—	31	31	29	31	31
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	—	5	5	4	4	4
			(16.1)	(16.1)	(12.9)	(12.9)
<i>Council of Ministers</i>						
Members.....	18	34	34	34	31	32
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	4	2	3	3	4	5
	(22.2)	(5.9)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(12.9)	(15.9)
<i>Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers</i>						
Members.....	—	9	10	9	13	15
Commissioned officers on active duty—FAR.....	—	2	2	2	2	3
		(22.2)	(20.0)	(22.2)	(15.4)	(20.0)
<i>Commissioned officers</i>						
on active duty—FAR—in ministries other than MINFAR and						
MININT (other than minister) <sup>5</sup> .....	n.a.	n.a.	6	14	17	24

n.a.—not available.

—means position did not exist at time.

<sup>1</sup>Percentage of total in parentheses.<sup>2</sup>Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba).<sup>3</sup>FAR—Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces).<sup>4</sup>Figures for 1976 are estimates.<sup>5</sup>MINFAR—Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces); MININT—Ministerio del Interior (Ministry of Interior).

In addition to feelings of deprivation, a number of other factors led to the development of an incipient opposition to the government's policies. There were reports of opposition to the continued presence of large numbers of troops in Africa, both among economic managers—who saw their most productive and skilled workers drafted into the military and who found themselves increasingly losing the political battle over scarce resources to the military budget—and among the general populace, whose sons went abroad to serve in the military. There were also reports of opposition to the draft among students. Finally, the incidence of economic crimes was reported to have increased as individuals sought to improve their standard of living through various kinds of “black market” activities. Although these opposition elements were thought to encompass a minority of the population, they were taken very seriously by the government.

The leadership responded to these problems in three ways: a shrinkage of the top elite; an administrative reorganization that re-concentrated decisionmaking authority at the highest levels, reversing the broadening trends of the mid-1970s; and a crackdown on internal opposition. The number of individuals in leadership positions dramatically diminished as a minority assumed multiple posts on both Party and state policymaking bodies. Thus, 11 of the 16 members of the Political Bureau of the PCC were also members of the Council of Ministers; 14 of the members of the Political Bureau also served on the Council of State, where they held a majority. In addition, eight of the 14 members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers were also members of the PCC's Political Bureau, and all 14 were also members of the PCC's Central Committee. All told, the reconcentrated elite in 1980 consisted of 22 people, the overwhelming majority of whom were either *fidelistas* or *raulistas*.

In December 1979 and January 1980 the largest single overhaul in the history of the state apparatus occurred. Ministries and state committees of construction, construction materials, the chemical industry, the electric power industry, mines and geology, and science and technology were abolished as independent agencies and were subordinated to other government structures. Ministers or state committee presidents for foreign trade, labor, transportation, agriculture, the sugar industry, education, light industry, the fishing industry, the iron and steel machinery industry, public health, justice and interior, as well as the attorney general, were replaced. Although some of those dismissed were named to other ministerial posts, most were dropped from the Council of Ministers. Many of the eliminated ministries were consolidated and placed under the

*Cuba: A Country Study*

direct control of members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. A total of some 25 percent of all state bodies were eliminated, and some 100 officials were dismissed, appointed to other jobs, or given expanded duties. Significantly, this massive reorganization was ratified by the Council of State and was never submitted to the National Assembly. A similar organizational concentration occurred within the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the PCC.

Furthermore, there was a crackdown on internal dissidence that involved a shake-up of the leadership of agencies dealing with internal order, law, and the courts. In 1978 some 37 percent of criminal cases had been dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence or because the guilty party could not be determined. Beginning in 1979 the courts were criticized for their enforcement of procedural safeguards that set free people accused of crimes. In January 1980 the ministers of the interior and justice, the attorney general, and the president of the Supreme Court were all removed. The CDRs were mobilized to organize "assemblies of repudiation" at which members could express their reproof of neighbors who wished to leave the country, and the University of Havana was made the target of a campaign of "ideological deepening" under which a number of students and faculty were demoted, placed on probation, or dismissed for insufficient ideological zeal.

Much of this opposition was exported in the Mariel exodus of 1980. Between late April and September 1980, some 129,000 people left the island, the bulk of them going to the United States. This represented the third wave of emigration since 1959. The first, between 1960 and 1962, was unrepresentative of the population, composed primarily of white, urban, upper-middle-class and upper-class professional and managerial families. The second, which had begun late in 1965 and lasted into the early 1970s, was more representative, including many skilled industrial workers. The Mariel exodus was even more representative, including for the first time blacks as well as whites in proportions comparable to their numbers in urban Cuba. Analysts noted, however, that the bulk of the migrants came from urban areas. It was unclear whether this reflected a concentration of opposition within urban areas or whether it merely reflected the comparative ease of emigration for urban dwellers in comparison with their rural counterparts (see Cuba in the Late 1970s, ch. 1).

The leadership simultaneously moved to remobilize its support. Beginning in 1981 periodic "Marches of the Combative People" were organized by the CDRs, participants numbering in the millions. The mass organizations exhorted their membership to

demonstrate their support of the Revolution by working harder to accomplish its goals and by increasing their vigilance over suspected "counterrevolutionaries." Reports to the police on the activities of citizens by the CDRs were reported to have increased to some 180,000 between 1977 and 1981.

Both the remobilization drive and the narrowing of the elite strengthened *fidelista* tendencies within the leadership. Beginning in 1981 state policy once again moved in the direction of previously abandoned *fidelista* utopian practices. Antimarket tendencies reappeared in the curtailment of selling commodity surpluses (over planning targets) by private farmers. Individual private farms were converted into agricultural cooperatives at a record pace. In May 1982 Castro asserted that the completion of agricultural collectivization would signal the replacement of the free peasant markets by government-controlled markets. Education officials were again directed to make political and ideological factors important criteria in determining university admissions. Castro also began to question publicly the value of material incentives to raise labor productivity in late 1982, stating that "we have to insure that socialist formulas do not jeopardize Communist consciousness," an ideological position that contradicted current Soviet managerial theory.

Beginning in November 1984, meetings were held throughout the island to reevaluate the decentralized economic decisionmaking system. According to press reports, some planners felt that the economic decentralization had gone too far, making planning difficult and creating shortages. Many low-and middle-level PCC officials, in contrast, were reported to believe that managers still had too little autonomy. The official Cuban press carried complaints concerning economic shortages and the poor quality of goods. In addition, opposition to continued economic austerity appeared to continue, as evidenced by reports that 33 workers had been either jailed or accused of sabotage—including burning crops, work centers, and transportation vehicles, and setting fires in Havana.

The PCC's Third Congress, scheduled for late 1985, was expected to debate vigorously the problems of economic planning. The public aspect of this debate indicated to some analysts that the government had eased up on ideological restrictions after the crackdown of 1981-82. Through 1984, however, there had been no change in the reconcentrated decisionmaking system. In February 1985 there was a shake-up in the PCC leadership. Antonio Pérez Herrero, who had been a member of the PCC Secretariat responsible for education and revolutionary orientation, was removed from that position. He remained a member of the Central Commit-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

tee. Several prominent provincial PCC officials were also removed from their posts.

#### **Cuba and the Soviet Union**

Beginning in 1959, as relations with the United States worsened, relations with the Soviet Union improved. Observers disagreed over whether Castro was pushed toward the Soviets by a belligerent United States or whether he led Cuba into close relations with the Soviet Union on his own initiative as a means of centralizing his control. Virtually all analysts agreed, however, that the Soviet Union had not played a role in the guerrilla war that brought Castro to power. Further, many argued that the Soviet Union played a largely reactive role in the breakdown of relations with the United States and that Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union were driven and shaped by Cuba-United States hostility.

In the first few years after 1959 the relationship grew gradually, beginning with an April 1959 agreement by the Soviet Union to buy 170,000 tons of sugar and proceeding through a February 1960 agreement by which the Soviet Union provided a US\$100 million credit to purchase industrial equipment. Formal diplomatic relations were established between the two countries in May 1960. The Soviet Union moved cautiously with regard to Cuba during this period, hesitating to commit its prestige and resources to support a government whose survival it saw as very much in doubt, given its proximity to a hostile United States and the difficulties posed by Cuba's great distance from the Soviet Union (see *The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959-60*, ch. 1).

In July 1960 Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev declared that Soviet missiles would defend Cuba "in a figurative sense," and a subsequent agreement between the two countries, although not mentioning nuclear weapons, pledged the Soviet Union to "use all means at its disposal to prevent an armed United States intervention against Cuba." After that date the Soviet military commitment gradually increased until the missile crisis of October 1962. After the resolution of that crisis by agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (without Cuban participation), Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union became strained. Differences concerned the appropriate policy each country should adopt toward communist parties in Latin America, support for guerrilla movements, the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, and Soviet interference in domestic Cuban affairs (see *Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62*, ch. 1).

Relations between the two countries improved markedly after 1970. In July 1971 negotiations toward a Cuban-Soviet trade agreement began. Later that fall, after a visit to Havana by Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin, the two governments announced their "complete mutual understanding" on a range of international and domestic Cuban issues. In July 1972 Cuba became linked with the Soviet-dominated Comecon, and in December 1972 a bilateral trade agreement was signed that tied Cuba, both economically and politically, to the Soviet Union. Under the terms of the agreement, the Cuban economy remained dependent on the export of sugar and the import of Soviet petroleum and became dependent on the Soviet Union as its principal market. The Cuban economy was further integrated with the Soviet economy through the efforts of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation and by the provisions of both the 1976-80 and 1981-85 Cuban five-year economic plans. Seventy percent of Cuba's trade was with the Soviet Union in 1984.

The integration of Cuba into the Soviet alliance system resulted in the provision of large amounts of Soviet aid. Although Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, it did send observers to Warsaw Pact military maneuvers. The total value of arms transfers from the Soviet Union to Cuba from 1976 to 1980 was estimated at US\$1.1 billion. According to the United States Department of State, the Soviet Union delivered some 60,000 tons of military equipment to Cuba in 1981 (see *The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces*, ch. 5).

The Soviet Union also provided substantial economic aid. Total cumulative economic assistance, including nonrepayable aid and trade subsidies, was estimated at US\$29.2 billion from 1961 to 1982. Under a 1972 agreement, Cuban payments on its debt to the Soviet Union incurred from 1961 to 1976 were postponed until after 1986. An economic cooperation agreement signed in late 1984 committed the Soviets to provide an estimated US\$4 billion per year in subsidized trade, oil, and cash through 1990.

The Soviet Union derived considerable benefit from its subsidization of Cuba. Militarily, the Soviets used Cuba as a base for refueling reconnaissance aircraft, submarines, and naval flotillas and maintained a large electronic monitoring complex at Lourdes, west of Havana. Most analysts agreed, however, that the primary benefit to the Soviet Union was political. The establishment, successful defense, and consolidation of the first socialist government in the Western Hemisphere (anti-United States and pro-Soviet) were accomplished in one of the countries geographically closest to and historically most influenced by the United States. Thus Cuba



*Banners of revolutionary  
figures at the Plaza  
of the Revolution, Havana*  
Photos by John Finan

was constant proof that Soviet-style socialism was viable in Latin America and that a small nation could successfully withstand the hostility of the United States. In addition, Cuba became a principal spokesman for socialism among nonaligned countries, advocating the view that nonalignment did not mean neutrality toward imperialism and that the Soviet Union was the Third World's principal ally.

Soviet influence was limited, however, by the island's geographic distance from the Soviet Union, as well as by the internal dynamics of Cuban politics. The distance from the Soviet Union precluded its use of troops to enforce its will on Cuba, as it did in Eastern Europe. Cuba's proximity to the United States made the large-scale deployment of Soviet troops to the island a difficult prospect that could be expected to elicit a response from the United States. Thus, Soviet influence was subject to the rhythms of Cuban politics. Many members of the political elite were thought to favor limiting Soviet influence. At times Castro moved against members of the elite thought to be too close to the Soviet Union.

Cuba's dependence on the Soviet Union gave the latter considerable leverage over the activities of the Cuban government, not only in foreign affairs but also in domestic policy. In 1980 Cuba's debt to the Soviet Union stood at an estimated US\$8 billion. In 1976 some 3,000 Soviet civilian advisers and technicians were reported to be in Cuba, overseeing or assisting in various aspects of administration. In addition to direct government-to-government ties, particularly in the area of economic planning, the PCC and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had close official relations. Finally, the FAR depended on the Soviet Union for training and matériel, and the General Directorate of Intelligence within MININT, which had responsibility for overseas intelligence operations, was reported to be controlled by the Soviets.

Soviet influence was exercised via three conduits. In the early years of the Revolution the primary vehicle of Soviet influence was the PSP. The old communists of the PSP, who had spent their careers in service to the Party, favored close relations with the Soviet Union. Their weakness during the 1960s limited Soviet influence, leading the Soviet Union to pressure for their elevation and a general strengthening of the PCC. Some analysts asserted that the decision by Castro to form a mass party was taken largely because of Soviet insistence. These efforts suffered a serious setback after the second fall of Escalante, in 1968. When Cuba protested against the international support that the "microfaction" had received, the Soviet Union slowed down the level of petroleum deliveries to Cuba in answer to Cuban requests for increased amounts. After the



*Cuba: A Country Study*

"rehabilitation" of the old communists at the First Congress of the PCC in 1975, Soviet influence increased, limited, however, by the relatively small number of old communists in the top leadership of the Party and the state, as well as by the advanced age of many of them.

Following the failure of the 1970 sugar harvest, Soviet influence was channeled through the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation. Created in December 1970, this commission sought to improve Cuba's economic planning and to coordinate its economy with the Soviet economy. Its efforts led to Cuba's joining Comecon in July 1972. In early 1974 the commission's president, Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, announced that beginning with the 1976-80 Five-Year Economic Plan, Cuba's plan would be coordinated with that of the Soviet Union. Since 1976 Cuba's JUCEPLAN and the Soviet Union's GOSPLAN have participated in a joint planning effort. In addition, the Intergovernmental Commission directed the activities of Soviet civilian advisers in Cuba, selected the economic projects that received Soviet aid, and supervised the implementation of the projects.

The final channel of Soviet influence was the FAR. The FAR depended on the Soviet Union for weapons, training, and logistical support. Its most prestigious officers were those who received military training in the Soviet Union. Thus, the continuation of close relations with the Soviet Union was thought to be a primary goal of the FAR. This dependence on, and admiration for, the Soviet Union created another channel of influence for the Soviet Union, although the extent to which it was used in Cuban domestic policy was unknown.

The major goals of the Soviet Union in domestic policy were the strengthening of the PCC, the improvement of the capabilities of the bureaucracy, and the efficient management of the economy. The Soviet Union was known to have pressured the Cubans to form the PCC and to have favored an increased role for it in policy formation. In addition, the Soviet Union supported the "institutionalization of the Revolution" and provided the model of government institutions that the Cubans adopted. Finally, the Soviet Union favored the concentration of the Cuban economy on the production of sugar and opposed economic diversification efforts during the 1960s. It also favored the use of material incentives and the operation of the free peasant markets as means to increase productivity.

## **Foreign Relations**

Beginning in 1959 Cuba pursued an active foreign policy on a worldwide scale, expanding its influence with countries throughout the world to a greater extent than had any other Latin American country. Analysts noted that by 1984 the country's behavior and power influenced virtually all other countries in the international system to some degree.

## **History and General Principles**

From the time it was granted legal sovereignty in 1902 through January 1959, Cuba was a member of the inter-American system and thus an ally of the United States. It was admitted to the Pan American Union in 1902 and was a signatory of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) in 1947, as well as a founding member of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948.

Beginning in 1959, however, Cuba's relations with its neighbors in the hemisphere deteriorated. As its relations with the Soviet Union improved, its relations with the United States became increasingly acrimonious, leading to open hostility in 1960-61. From January 1959 to February 1960, Cuba's foreign policy was based on an attempt to rally support among its neighbors. To accomplish this end, it sought to encourage like-minded political forces in several neighboring countries by having its diplomatic personnel distribute literature, set up pro-Cuban lobbies, and contact opposition political groups. It also sought to take advantage of what it saw as existing revolutionary situations in some countries by encouraging political exiles who found safe haven in Cuba to plot the overthrow of dictators in their native countries. In particular, Cuba aided exiles in attempts to overthrow the governments of Luis Somoza Debayle of Nicaragua and Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina of the Dominican Republic in 1959. Attempts by exiles to overthrow governments in Haiti and Panama were also launched from Cuba. Cuba sought the aid of the Rómulo Betancourt Gallegos government in Venezuela in these efforts but was unsuccessful, leading to a deterioration in relations with that country.

After Anastas Mikoyan, the first deputy premier of the Soviet Union, visited Cuba in February 1960, Cuban foreign policy underwent a fundamental change. The provision of Soviet aid that resulted from the visit enabled Cuba to embark on a more active attempt to create revolutionary situations in neighboring countries.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

To that end it fomented guerrilla wars in Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, aiding domestic opposition forces and providing limited training in Cuba in guerrilla warfare. Estimates of the size of these efforts varied. During the early 1960s the United States government estimated that between 1,000 and 2,500 radicals trained in Cuba per month. In 1971, however, congressional testimony from the United States Defense Intelligence Agency indicated that only an estimated 2,500 Latin American leftists were trained in Cuba during the entire period from 1961 to 1969. Outside Latin America, beginning in 1960, Cuba provided military and medical supplies to Algeria's National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale—FLN) and maintained a military mission in Algeria from independence in 1962 until the overthrow of Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965. In the Algerian-Moroccan border conflict of 1963, a battalion of Cuban troops fought alongside the Algerians. Cuba also maintained a military mission to Ghana from 1961 until the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. In 1961 Cuba joined the Nonaligned Movement in an attempt to gain the support of other countries in its worsening disputes with the United States.

After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which was resolved by the United States and the Soviet Union without Cuban participation, the Cuban government, believing Soviet support to be problematic, intensified its efforts to bring compatible governments to power in neighboring countries. It therefore increased its aid to guerrilla movements, even when these movements were not supported by the Moscow-oriented communist parties of those countries. This policy not only severely strained relations with the Soviet Union but also caused the breakdown in relations with a number of Latin American countries, leading to a suspension of its participation in the OAS in 1962 and approval of an OAS resolution introduced by Venezuela in 1964 that required member states to sever diplomatic, economic, and transportation links with Cuba.

Between late 1963 and January 1966, Cuba moderated its position on armed struggle and improved its relations with the communist parties of other countries. It also moderated the tone of its rhetoric against the United States, suggesting that, in return for the restoration of trade links, it might be willing to consider compensation for United States companies whose property had been nationalized. In November 1964 it hosted a conference of 22 Latin American communist parties that produced a communiqué not only supporting guerrilla warfare in countries where communist support had not previously been forthcoming, such as Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, Paraguay, and Haiti, but also emphasizing the right of each national communist party to determine its own "correct

line." The so-called Havana Compromise of 1964 effectively restricted Cuban aid to guerrilla warfare in Latin America only to those countries where it was already underway. Nevertheless, the guerrilla strategy remained the cornerstone of Cuban policy. In February 1965 Castro announced that Cuba was ready to send troops abroad to aid liberation movements wherever they were fighting. In April Guevara resigned his posts in the Cuban government and joined Congolese guerrillas fighting the government of Moïse Tshombe in Zaïre. In July 1965 Cuba provided 200 fighters for this effort.

In January 1966 Cuba hosted the First Conference of Solidarity of the People of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (known as the Tricontinental Conference). This conference brought together leaders of communist parties and guerrilla movements throughout the world in an attempt to form a worldwide network of revolutionaries. Because the Soviet Union was preoccupied with its growing dispute with China, Cuba dominated the conference. The Tricontinental Conference recognized the necessity of armed struggle, expelled several communist parties, criticized the Soviet Union for not sending aid to Vietnam, and agreed to form a permanent organization, the Organization for Latin American Solidarity (OLAS). After the conference Cuba dramatically increased its material support to virtually all guerrilla movements in Latin America. As publicly stated, this policy was designed to come to the aid of Vietnam, then at war with the United States, by creating "many Vietnams" in Latin America, which would severely strain the resources of the United States.

In August 1967 the OLAS held its only meeting in Havana under the slogan "The Duty of a Revolutionary Is to Make Revolution." Two of the resolutions of the conference were significant statements of Cuban foreign policy. The first, which criticized the Communist Party of Venezuela for abandoning revolutionary armed struggle the previous spring, indicated Cuba's abandonment of the Havana Compromise of 1964. The second criticized "certain socialist countries" for maintaining economic relations with "counterrevolutionary" governments in Latin America. In his closing speech, Castro indicated that this resolution was directed at the Soviet Union's moves to reestablish diplomatic and trade relations with Venezuela.

The year 1968 was officially known in Cuba as the "Year of the Heroic Guerrilla Fighter." However, even by the time of the OLAS conference in 1967, it had become clear to many that the guerrilla strategy was a failure. The movements in Peru and Argentina had been defeated, and those in Venezuela, Colombia, and

*Cuba: A Country Study*

Guatemala were wracked by internal conflict and were under attack from increasingly strong counterinsurgency forces trained and equipped by the United States. In 1967 Guevara was killed fighting in Bolivia, marking the end of that effort.

The Soviet Union moved to bring Cuba into line with its own foreign policy and prescriptions for economic planning in 1968. In January Castro announced that the Soviet Union "apparently" was not going to meet Cuba's increasing petroleum needs. The reduction in the supply of Soviet oil nearly paralyzed the economy, forcing gas rationing and a loss of critical oil reserves. Castro's initial reaction was to take the offensive. In February, in announcing the existence of the Escalante "microfaction," which was linked to the Soviet Union and several East European countries and had allegedly been plotting his overthrow, Castro moved to purge the Party. By August, however, he signaled a rapprochement with the Soviet Union by publicly supporting the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

After 1968 Cuban policy entered a more moderate phase. The government concentrated on internal problems, such as the drive to harvest 10 million tons of sugar in 1970, followed by the drive to institutionalize the Revolution. In foreign policy Castro paid a state visit to President Salvador Allende Gossens of Chile in 1971, and Cuba reestablished diplomatic relations with reformist governments in Latin America, including Peru in 1972, Argentina in 1973, Venezuela in 1974, and Colombia in 1975. After the OAS lifted its proscription on member states' interaction with Cuba in 1975, Cuba established diplomatic relations with several newly independent countries in the Caribbean and developed close relations with Jamaica, Guyana, and Barbados, as well as with Trinidad and Tobago. Although diplomatic relations were not restored, Cuba established economic links with the Dominican Republic, Honduras, and Haiti. Cuba also sought a diplomatic rapprochement with the United States and the reopening of trade links. Throughout this period, however, Cuba continued its activist foreign policy outside the Western Hemisphere. It continued aid to guerrilla movements in Portuguese Africa and sent several hundred advisers to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) and Oman in 1973. Reportedly, Cuban troops also fought with Syria during the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War.

After 1975 Cuba increased its activism outside the Western Hemisphere, deploying some 3,500 to 5,000 combat troops in Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) in September. Relations with the Soviet Union were also strength-

ened. That same year Cuba hosted the Conference of Communist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean at which Castro declared his support for Soviet foreign policy, noting that "those who criticize the Soviet Union are like dogs barking at the moon." Finally, the First Congress of the PCC declared that Cuban foreign policy was subordinate to Soviet foreign policy (see Cuba and the Soviet Union; Proletarian Internationalism, this ch.).

Cuban activism continued through the early 1980s. In 1977 Cuba again deployed troops in Africa, this time in support of Ethiopia, which had been invaded by Somalia. In 1979 Castro became president of the Nonaligned Movement. Beginning in 1978 Cuba also turned its attention again to revolutionary movements in Latin America, arming and training the guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional—FSLN) during their struggle against the government of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua. After the FSLN victory, Cuba provided substantial aid to the new government, including a significant number of military advisers and some 4,000 teachers, medical specialists, and agrarian advisers by 1983. Cuba also developed close relations with Grenada following Maurice Bishop's seizure of power in 1979, as well as with Dominica and Saint Lucia in the Windward Islands (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, ch. 5).

After the defeat of Jamaican prime minister Michael Manley by Edward Seaga in the 1980 elections, however, relations with Jamaica deteriorated. Jamaica accused the Cuban ambassador of interfering in Jamaica's internal affairs, and diplomatic relations were severed in October 1981. In addition, when Cuban dissidents forcibly entered the grounds of the Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Costa Rican embassies in Havana in April 1980, relations with those countries became strained as Cuba opposed those countries' granting diplomatic asylum to the dissidents. In February 1981 Ecuador recalled its ambassador over the storming of its embassy by Cuban security forces, and in March Colombia broke off diplomatic relations, charging that some 80 guerrillas, captured after landing on the Colombian coast, had been trained and armed in Cuba. Relations with Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela improved, however, when Cuba joined them in supporting Argentina during the South Atlantic War of 1982. As a result, relations with all four countries improved, and a commercial protocol with Argentina was ratified in June 1983, followed by discussions in Buenos Aires on economic cooperation and bilateral trade in August.

Analysts suggested that since 1959 Cuban foreign policy has been guided by a series of basic objectives. The primary objective




Photo by Phillips Bourns



Two billboards that publicize Cuba's foreign policy.  
 Top—facing United States interest section in Havana  
 —“Mr. Imperialists: We are absolutely unafraid of you.”  
 Bottom—“Our friendship with the Soviet Union is unbreakable.”  
 Photo by John Finan

was the survival of the Revolution, the pursuit of which led to the alliance with the Soviet Union and the attempts to foster other sympathetic regimes in Latin America. Secondly, economic development was a basic goal that was made possible by the alliance with the Soviet Union. Below these two goals, Cuba sought to influence other governments but particularly to enhance its position as self-proclaimed leader of Third World revolutionary movements, claiming a unique sensitivity to the problems of developing nations. This effort entailed frequent competition with China, on occasion with the Soviet Union, for influence. To a large extent Cuba succeeded through 1984 in making itself the interlocutor between the Soviet Union and the countries of the Caribbean Basin. Its efforts to become the recognized representative for the developing nations in the so-called North-South dialogue with the developed nations was less successful.

Despite shifts of emphasis and changes of direction, most analysts agreed that the long-term pattern of Cuban foreign policy remained stable through 1984 and that it was motivated more by national self-interest as defined by Castro than it was by Marxist-Leninist ideology. Even the policy of aiding revolutionaries in other countries was seen in this light, most analysts emphasizing the importance of Cuban attempts to end its international isolation by fostering and coming to the aid of sympathetic regimes over ideologically motivated support for world revolution.

#### **Proletarian Internationalism**

Almost from the beginning of the Revolution, the government supported revolutionary movements and progressive governments not only rhetorically but also with direct aid. Realizing that the survival of its own Revolution was possible only because of the aid received from the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe, commitment to "internationalist solidarity" was a dominant theme in Cuban foreign policy and domestic affairs. Cubans were asked to read, think, and act in ways consistent with the support of revolutionary friends abroad. During the 1960s Cuba expressed internationalist solidarity primarily through support for guerrilla movements in various African and Latin American countries. Beginning in 1970, however, when it sent medical and construction brigades to Peru following an earthquake, Cuban overseas programs also began to provide economic and social development aid as well as military aid. By the late 1980s Cuban overseas programs included the supply of teachers, doctors, construction workers, military ad-



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

visers, technicians and, in some cases, combat troops. The provision of aid not only furthered the cause of international revolution but it also had the concrete result of winning friends for Cuba in countries that received such aid. Of the countries that had received Cuban aid as of 1978, only three (Cambodia, Chile, and Somalia) had subsequently broken sharply with Cuba.

In the early 1980s Cuba's foreign aid program involved a large number of countries in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. In 1982 Castro reported that 120,000 service personnel had served outside the country, together with an additional 30,000 doctors, teachers, engineers, and technicians. Three years later he indicated that 200,000 Cubans had served in Angola alone. Foreign analysts suggested that this high figure probably reflected the frequent rotation of the 25,000 to 30,000 Cuban troops estimated to be in that West African nation. In 1979 Cuba provided education and training for 7,200 Africans on the Isla de la Juventud, hundreds more attended trade schools of the Ministry of Construction, and 400 foreign students were in Cuban medical and dental schools, owing to Cuban government scholarships (see table 20. Appendix; *The Cuban Military Abroad*, ch. 5).

### **Foreign Policy Decisionmaking**

Decisionmaking in foreign policy was the preserve of the members of the Political Bureau of the PCC, the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, and the Council of State. The minister of foreign relations from 1976 through 1984, Isidoro Octavio Malmierca Peoli, although a member of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the PCC, was not included in the membership of any of the top three organs. Likewise, Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, minister of foreign trade from 1980 through 1984, was a member only of the Council of Ministers, both these areas were the responsibility of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, who was also a member of the Political Bureau and the Council of State.

Within the top elite, Castro clearly predominated in foreign policy matters. Although advised by his associates in the top decisionmaking bodies, he determined Cuba's foreign policy. There was no public indication of significant opposition to his foreign policy decisions after the purge of the "microfaction" in 1968.

The members of the foreign policy elite were united on the basic goals of Cuban foreign policy, although analysts identified certain "tendencies" within that basic consensus that coincided, to a large extent, with those identified with domestic policymaking.


The "revolutionary political tendency" was associated with Castro himself and backed by *fidelista* veterans. It sought to advance Cuban interests through the promotion of opposition to the United States, particularly among Third World countries. It supported revolutionary movements and what it defined as "progressive governments."

The "military mission tendency" was identified with Raúl Castro and supported by veteran *raulistas* and other high-ranking officers in the MINFAR. It sought to advance Cuban interests via the external role of the armed forces, not only its overseas combat role in Africa during the 1970s and early 1980s but also its maintenance of military missions in countries with which Cuba had diplomatic relations.

The "pragmatic economic tendency" was identified with Rodríguez and supported by a number of specialists in charge of agencies dealing with technical, financial, and economic matters. This tendency was generally supported by old communists. It emphasized economic relations in foreign policy, seeking to promote rapid and sustained economic development through rational planning, cost accounting, and financing at home and through greater trade and technological ties with both socialist and capitalist industrialized countries. In particular, it favored a resumption of trade with the United States in order to reduce Cuban dependency on the Soviet Union and provide the foreign exchange necessary to finance imports from Western countries and pay an estimated US\$3.2 billion debt to lenders in capitalist countries.

#### **Relations with the United States**

Relations between Cuba and the United States deteriorated rapidly after 1959. On October 19, 1960, the United States instituted an economic blockade, banning all exports from the United States except food and medicines. On November 10 all United States ships were prohibited from carrying cargo to or from Cuba. In January 1961 diplomatic relations were severed, and later in the year the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 20, authorized the president to establish and maintain a complete commercial embargo of Cuba. On December 16 the United States instituted a ban on all remaining exports to Cuba. A complete commercial embargo followed in February 1962. In March 1962 the embargo was extended to cover all products that in whole or in part contained any material originating in Cuba, even if manufactured in another country. In August 1962, urged by the United States, the OAS



*Cuba hosting Sixth Summit of the Nonaligned Movement in 1979*  
Photo by Philip Brenner

passed a resolution asking its member to cease economic and diplomatic relations with Cuba. All members complied, save Mexico. In October 1962 the United States announced that it would refuse assistance to any country that permitted its ships to carry cargo to or from Cuba. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations, announced in July 1963, forbade United States citizens to have commercial or financial relations with Cuba (see *The End of Prerevolutionary Institutions, 1959-60*, ch. 1).

Tensions between the two countries were relaxed somewhat after the beginning of informal government contacts in the early 1970s. An antihijacking agreement was reached in February 1973. In November 1974 informal discussions concerning the trade embargo, compensation for US\$1.8 billion in United States property expropriated by Cuba after 1959, release of US\$30 million in Cuban assets frozen by the United States, release of political pris-

oners in Cuba, reunion of Cuban families, and the status of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay began. In March 1975 United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger indicated that the United States was prepared to "move in a new direction" in its policy toward Cuba, and the following August the United States relaxed the provisions of the trade embargo. As part of this relaxation, licenses were granted to allow commerce between the subsidiaries of United States firms and Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods. Nations whose ships and aircraft carried cargo to Cuba were no longer penalized by the withholding of United States assistance, and such ships and aircraft were allowed to refuel in the United States. Talks between the two governments were suspended, however, after Cuba deployed troops to Angola in 1975. Nevertheless, the United States voted in favor of lifting OAS sanctions against Cuba in 1975.

Beginning in 1976 there was a marked improvement in relations. The United States granted visas to selected Cuban citizens for visits to the United States, lifted the ban on travel to Cuba, permitted the resumption of charter flights between the two countries, cut back reconnaissance flights over the island, and concluded a bilateral agreement on maritime boundaries and fishing rights. Cuba released several United States citizens living in Cuba to depart along with their families. Interest sections opened in Havana and Washington, operating out of the Swiss and Czechoslovak embassies, respectively, in 1977. A dialogue between United States residents of Cuban origin and the Cuban government began, leading to the release of some 3,600 political prisoners in Cuba.

This relaxation of tensions between the two governments ended after Cuba's deployment of troops to Ethiopia in 1977 and the alleged involvement of Cuban troops stationed in Angola in an invasion of Shaba Province in Zaïre by Katangan exiles. Relations deteriorated further after the arrival of Soviet MiG-23s in Cuba and the public disclosure in the United States of the existence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba in 1979. A coup in Grenada in March 1979 and the coming to power of the Cuban-supported Sandinista government in Nicaragua further heightened tensions. The United States renewed reconnaissance flights over Cuba, established a Joint Caribbean Task Force at Key West, and held military maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay and throughout the Caribbean.

Beginning in 1981 the United States, seeking to limit Cuban influence, increased its economic and military aid to countries in the Caribbean Basin. The Joint Caribbean Task Force was upgraded, and a series of large-scale military maneuvers began. The United States moved to tighten the economic embargo, sharply re-

*Cuba: A Country Study*

ducing travel between the United States and Cuba and investigating the operations of firms located in other countries suspected of buying United States goods and shipping them to Cuba. The United States blamed Cuba for the turmoil in Central America, accusing it of supplying arms to antigovernment guerrillas in El Salvador. Nevertheless, the United States held at least two informal talks with officials of the Cuban government aimed at resolving regional differences. In November 1981 United States secretary of state Alexander M. Haig met with Cuba's Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Mexico City. In March 1982 United States ambassador-at-large Vernon Walters met with Castro in Havana. These discussions did not appear to have resolved their disagreements.

In April 1982, during a meeting with 10 United States academics and journalists, Cuban officials reportedly indicated an interest in reducing tensions with the United States. According to professors Seweryn Bialer and Alfred Stepan of Columbia University, who participated in the meeting, Cuban officials indicated that Cuba was prepared to seek a "relative accommodation" and to practice "mutual restraint." Indeed, Cuban officials stated that they had begun to use restraint by refraining from shipping arms to El Salvador during the previous 14 months. They were also willing to enter into broad negotiations with the United States on such multilateral issues as southern Africa and Central America, including the creation of an international peacekeeping force in El Salvador. Finally, according to Bialer and Stepan, Cuba would no longer insist on the lifting of the United States trade embargo as a condition for negotiations.

Soon thereafter, negotiations over immigration matters began, leading to an agreement in December 1984 on the return to Cuba of refugees in the United States found "excludable" under United States immigration law. In early 1985 Castro, in a series of interviews with journalists from the United States, indicated that he was interested in pursuing further negotiations on other matters. The United States remained concerned, however, about Cuban involvement in Central America and the Caribbean, its activities in southern Africa, and its deepening military alliance with the Soviet Union. Further, United States officials indicated that an improvement in relations depended on Cuban deeds rather than on Cuban words. For its part Cuba continued to fear hostile United States military actions, particularly in light of the 1983 United States military intervention in Grenada and the ongoing United States military exercises in Central America.

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Generally, the literature on the Cuban political system suffers from a lack of detailed information concerning political events on the island. The Cuban government is responsible for this, for it does not publish information concerning internal policy debates, but the United States government also shares some of the blame, often restricting travel to the island. Authors thus rely on what official Cuban information is available, supplemented by the observations of those who are able to visit the country, drawing logical inferences concerning what is probably true. Unfortunately, this results in a high degree of polemical writing, both pro and con, about the country than might otherwise be the case.

The best English-language overview of Cuban politics available in early 1985 was Juan M. del Aguila's *Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution*. The best analysis of political developments through the mid-1970s is Jorge I. Domínguez' *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. His "Revolutionary Politics: The New Demands for Orderliness" updates events through 1981 and provides a useful analysis of political stratification. Further information on contemporary events is available in the articles on Cuba contained in the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* and the *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record*.

Particular aspects of Cuban politics are discussed in articles in scholarly journals and edited volumes. The best analysis of the 1976 Constitution is William T. D'Zurilla's "Cuba's 1976 Socialist Constitution and the *Fidelista* Interpretation of Cuban Constitutional History." Government institutions are analyzed in Max Azicri's "The Institutionalization of the Cuban State: A Political Perspective." Political participation is discussed in Archibald R. M. Ritter's "The Authenticity of Participatory Democracy in Cuba," as well as in "Mass Political Participation in Socialist Cuba" and "Participation in Cuban Municipal Government," both by William M. LeoGrande. Intra-elite politics is analyzed by Edward Gonzalez in "Political Succession in Cuba" and "Institutionalization, Political Elites, and Foreign Policies." Further information concerning intra-elite politics is available in the United States Central Intelligence Agency's *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba*.

The literature on Cuba's foreign relations is voluminous. A useful contemporary overview is Carla Anne Robins' *The Cuban Threat*. Scholarly analysis is available in *Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena*, edited by Martin Weinstein and in *Cuba in the World*, edited by Cole Blasier and Carmelo Mesa-Lago. Cuban policy in

*Cuba: A Country Study*

Africa is discussed in *Cuba in Africa*, edited by Mesa-Lago and June S. Belkin. The best discussion of Cuba's activities in Central America is Domínguez' "Cuba's Relations with Caribbean and Central American Countries." (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

## Chapter 5. National Security





*Patriots armed in defense of the Revolution*

AT THE END OF THE FIRST 26 years following the 1959 victory of the Cuban Revolution, led by Fidel Castro Ruz, Cuban armed forces and national security concerns played a major, if not decisive, role in the functioning of the Cuban state. This pervasive influence was evident in the organization of both the economy and the society.

During the early 1980s, in response to what it perceived as mounting strategic and economic challenges, the Cuban leadership placed renewed emphasis on production, mobilization, and the defense preparedness of the entire society. Labor, especially during sugar harvests, continued to be organized in a military fashion; workers were divided into brigades and assigned production quotas to fulfill. Plans were again laid, as during the early years of the Revolution, for the continuation of the production process in the event of a national crisis. In addition, a new civilian militia and other civilian defense organizations were created in which nearly all Cubans, both young and old, participated to help prepare for national defense in the event of invasion.

In terms of sheer military might, the Cuban armed forces in early 1985 represented the second or third most powerful military force after the United States and, possibly, Brazil, in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba continued to spend more money per capita on its armed forces than any other Latin American nation. The country remained at the forefront of Latin America with respect to military manpower; it had the largest standing army in proportion to its population of any country in the hemisphere. The armed forces were equipped with the most technologically sophisticated weapons that its superpower ally, the Soviet Union, was willing to export, including MiG-23 supersonic fighters and Mi-24 attack helicopters. By 1985 Cuban relations with the Soviet Union were at the highest level of development in the history of the Revolution.

## **Background and Traditions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces**

### **The Colonial Era**

Cuba's tradition of violent revolutionary activity long predates the struggle that brought Castro to power in 1959. The earliest recorded guerrilla warfare in the Western Hemisphere was carried out by native Taíno Indians resisting the Spanish colonial forces in Cuba in the early sixteenth century. Under the leadership of an Indian cacique from the neighboring island of Hispaniola, the

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Cuban natives resisted colonial domination. Repeated ambushes and attacks on the 300 troops under the conquistador Diego Velázquez, followed by the Indians' quick retreat to the security of the mountains, hindered the speedy conquest of the island anticipated by the Spaniards. Instead, the Spanish forces remained on the defensive at their fort in Baracoa, the first permanent colonial settlement on the island, for nearly three months.

Although the capture and execution of the Indian leader in early 1512 ended this first organized resistance, a second major movement based in the island's eastern mountains, the Sierra Maestra, continued to challenge Spanish dominion between 1529 and 1532. As in other territories conquered in the name of the Spanish crown, the Cuban natives' superior numbers and their familiarity with the terrain proved no match for the superiority of the Spaniards' firepower. By the middle of the sixteenth century the native population had been practically exterminated—through deaths in battle and cruelties imposed by the Spaniards, as well as by disease. In 1557 only approximately 2,000 Indians remained from a population estimated as high as 3 million before the conquest (see *Discovery and Occupation; Encomienda and Repartimiento*, ch. 1).

Throughout the Spanish colonial era, Cuba served as the operational base for Spanish forces in their conquest and settlement of the New World (see *Economic Structures*, ch. 1). Although Cuba's lack of mineral wealth made its development less critical than that of regions rich in gold or silver, the island's strategic location in the Caribbean Sea and the protection from hurricanes and pirates offered by Havana's natural harbor contributed to its growing importance. Assigned its own permanent garrison of Spanish troops, Havana was developed as a military port and served as the temporary home port for the 4,000 to 5,000 sailors of the Spanish grand fleet that waited to escort returning ore-laden ships to Spain.

As in other Spanish colonies in the Western Hemisphere, an independence movement arose in Cuba during the early nineteenth century. Support for Cuban independence was provided by sympathizers in Colombia and Mexico, who viewed the elimination of Spanish rule throughout the hemisphere as inextricably linked with their own independence. The concerns of the Colombians and Mexicans were also based on Cuba's continued use as a Spanish operational base during the independence era, this time for coordinating Spain's efforts to suppress revolts and regain control of its colonies (see *The Dawn of Independence*, ch. 1).

The decade from 1820 to 1830 marked the beginning of efforts by Cuban-born Spaniards, known as *criollos*, to achieve inde-

pendence from Spain. Of the many secret organizations and societies created in the early 1820s to support the cause of Cuban independence, the most prominent was led by José Francisco Lemus, a Havana native who attained the rank of colonel in the Colombian Army of Independence before returning to liberate his homeland.

The membership of Lemus' organization, the Suns and Rays of Bolívar (named for South American independence leader Simón Bolívar), was composed mainly of students and poorer creoles and was organized on a cell basis throughout the country by Freemasons. Although each member was required to carry a knife, only a few had pistols; none wore uniforms. Lemus believed he could rely on the colonial militia for his forces' weapons. When the time for insurrection came, he reasoned, group members who had infiltrated the militia would distribute arms and ammunition to rebel supporters. Colombia and Mexico were expected to provide supplies and matériel to the revolutionaries as well. While Lemus prepared various proclamations declaring the establishment of the Republic of Cubanacán, Spanish loyalist spies infiltrated the group. Only days before the planned uprising in 1823, colonial forces seized the organization's leaders, including Lemus, and sent them to prison.

By 1825 the continued activities of other pro-independence groups led to the crown's decision to implement drastic measures to eliminate the revolutionary movement on the island. Among the regulations, which established martial law, were the suppression of civil liberties; the granting of all-embracing authority to the Spanish captain general, who was the commander of the island's colonial forces; and the establishment of the Permanent Executive Military Commission, a military tribunal that superseded the court system and was empowered to detain anyone even suspected of conspiracy. The measures imposed, which were unparalleled in their harshness elsewhere in the hemisphere, remained in effect for the next 50 years. An additional 40,000 colonial troops were sent to police the island.

The years between 1830 and the mid-1860s were marked by agitation for independence or, at the very least, reforms that included limiting the dictatorial powers granted the captain general. Support for the abolition of slavery broadened, yet the wealthy creole planters who depended on the cheap labor for their livelihood refused to support abolition of the institution. The imposition of new taxes by the crown during a severe economic depression and the creoles' own long-frustrated political desires finally provoked the comparatively poor planters of eastern Cuba to rise in rebellion against the Spanish.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### **The Ten Years' War**

The modern Cuban military officially traces its traditions back to the Ten Years' War (1868-78) and the struggle waged by the *mambises*, as the independence fighters were called, to free themselves from Spanish colonial rule. The *mambises* were led by such heroic guerrilla leaders as Antonio Maceo and Máximo Gómez, a former Spanish army commander who trained and fought with the rebels (see The Ten Years' War, La Guerra Chiquita, and the Abolition of Slavery, ch. 1)

On October 10, 1868, the Ten Years' War began when Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a creole planter from eastern Cuba, issued the Grito de Yara (Cry of Yara), calling for Cuban independence. Having established himself as general in chief of the patriots, his original force of 147, which included 30 of his own freed slaves, reportedly grew to 4,000 men within two days' time. By the end of October Céspedes' army had more than doubled in size to 9,700; by early November it was 12,000 strong.

A group of seasoned independence fighters arrived from the Dominican Republic and, led by Máximo Gómez, trained the rebels in military strategy and tactics. Through the final two months of 1868, the *mambi* fighters controlled major portions of eastern Cuba, including Bayamo, a city with a population of 10,000 that was the seat of government for the newly proclaimed Republic of Cuba.

Spanish regular forces on the island at the time of the Yara uprising numbered only 7,000, the majority of whom were concentrated in the western, sugar-producing end of the island. By early January 1869, however, the enlistment in the Volunteer Corps—a powerful paramilitary body created to fight the *mambises*—of an additional 20,000 infantrymen and 13,500 cavalry troops helped the Spanish hold sway. One account noted that as many as 73,000 Volunteers enlisted between October 1868 and January 1869 and were armed with some 90,000 Remington rifles purchased by Spain in the United States.

During the three-month period the Volunteer Corps, supported by an uncompromising, conservative captain general, quickly established a ruthless reputation. Even after the January 1869 appointment of a more liberal captain general who implemented long-demanded reforms and dissolved the infamous Military Commission, the corps continued its campaign of terror by imprisoning or shooting suspected rebel sympathizers.

In the ensuing years of the war, as Spanish forces became better organized, the rebels resorted to guerrilla warfare. By divid-

ing themselves into small, mobile, self-sufficient units, they were able to compensate somewhat for their small numbers and poor weapons. In early 1870 the new commander in chief of the rebel forces, General Manuel Quesada, reported that his 61,694 troops were equipped with 13 artillery pieces, 16,000 rifles and guns, 3,558 pistols and revolvers, and 60,075 machetes.

The failure of the rebel army to resolve its equivocal position on the slavery issue, however, doomed the independence movement. Although there was growing realization that the armed support of slaves was needed in order to defeat the Spanish, the planters' refusal to free their slaves and support the abolition of slavery eventually caused a split in the rebel army. The schism dividing the forces between those with vested property interests and poorer Cubans—creoles as well as freed black slaves—persisted through the end of the war.

The Pact of Zanjón, signed in February 1878 and accepted by most of the rebel army's generals, established the formal terms for the cessation of hostilities but provided for neither Cuban independence nor the abolition of slavery. The estimated US\$300 million cost of the Ten Years' War, in which some 208,000 Spanish troops and 50,000 Cuban rebels had died, was added to the Cuban debt to Spain.

### **The War of Independence, 1895-98**

The second major war for Cuban independence was incorporated into the official military tradition of the armed forces and became part of what was often referred to as the Cuban "revolutionary myth." Many of the same national heroes who fought in the Ten Years' War fought in the second War of Independence, including Maceo and Gómez. Also associated with the 1895 war was the Cuban patriot and poet José Julian Martí y Pérez, who, after spending 15 years organizing support for the independence movement in the United States, returned to Cuba to fight—and to die—in one of the first battles of the war (see *The War of Independence*, ch. 1).

By mid-1885, several months after the outbreak of skirmishes in eastern Cuba, the rebel soldiers on the island, numbering only some 6,000 to 8,000, were pitted against a formidable Spanish force of 52,000. In contrast to their slow reaction to the 1868 rebellion, the Spanish were quick to respond to the renewed threat and by early 1896 had imposed an odious policy known as "reconcentration," which placed the populations of entire towns or vil-

*Cuba: A Country Study*

lages in concentration camps that were euphemistically called "military areas." After only six months of fighting, however, the rebels had moved far enough west to seize territory that had taken them seven years to capture during the previous war. By the end of the year the ranks of independence fighters had swelled to 25,000 troops.

Influential revolutionary support groups in the United States helped get favorable news articles published and guaranteed the rebels a continuous flow of arms, munitions, and other supplies. Cuban independence rapidly became a national political issue in the United States, and President William McKinley, inaugurated in 1897, was an avowed supporter of the cause of Cuban independence. The February 15 explosion and destruction of the United States battleship U.S.S. *Maine* in Havana harbor—the cause of which was never definitely established—triggered United States intervention in Cuba's War of Independence in April 1898 and transformed that struggle into the Spanish-Cuban-American War (See the Spanish-Cuban-American War, ch. 1).

Cuban independence was not the objective of the United States, which turned its attention to capturing Spain's colonial possessions in the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean. Cuban troops from the rebels' Army of Liberation who were permitted to join the United States war effort were used only as scouts, messengers, trench diggers, pack carriers, or sentries.

By the end of May the United States had made contact with the rebels, and plans were laid to capture the city of Santiago de Cuba on the southeast coast of the island and blockade its bay. A naval blockade of Santiago de Cuba, where the Spanish fleet was believed to be anchored, was accomplished in May 1898, but because of poor planning and inadequate coordination, the United States was unable to land troops there until the late June arrival of the Fifth Army Corps, composed of 85 officers and some 16,000 troops. Among the officers were colonels Theodore Roosevelt and Leonard Wood, who were at the head of a cavalry regiment known as the Rough Riders. Roosevelt went on to become president of the United States, and Wood served as military governor of Cuba between 1900 and 1902.

The war's only major land battle, the attack on the 800 strong Spanish contingent positioned at San Juan Hill, several kilometers to the east of Santiago de Cuba, came on July 1. This first United States victory in Cuba, however, was costly to the forces on both sides. Some 102 Spanish troops were killed; another 552 were wounded. United States losses included 223 dead, 1,243 wounded, and 79 missing. The small Cuban force allowed to par-

ticipate in the attack lost 10 men. The casualty figures from the successful naval engagement in the Bahía de Santiago two days later were less severe for the United States, which counted only one man dead and two wounded. The Spanish fleet, however, lost 350 of its 2,225-man force, and another 1,670 men were taken prisoner. Deaths from tropical disease, including malaria and dysentery, soon exacted an even heavier toll than deaths in battle.

Although skirmishes continued through the first weeks of July, the final terms for the Spanish surrender—which were negotiated without the participation of the Cuban revolutionaries—were agreed to on July 17, thus bringing an end to the Spanish-Cuban-American War the following month. In spite of the rebels' demand that "by the nature of the intervention" the island should be turned over to the Army of Liberation, the United States, which was still at war with Spain, was not planning to depart.

The 1898 Treaty of Paris formally ended hostilities between the United States and Spain and ratified United States sovereignty over the island. The terms of the treaty placed responsibility on the United States to ensure the protection of life and property not only of its own citizens on the island but also of other foreign citizens there. Such terms forced the dissolution of the Army of Liberation—believed to number only 1,000 at the war's end—which the United States considered a challenge to the authority of the occupation forces on the island.

By early 1899 the Rural Guard—which owed its training, equipment, and loyalty to the occupation forces—was assembled from the remnants of the rebel organization and assigned the mission of protecting properties in the island's interior. Landowners routinely offered part of their own property on which to build a Rural Guard outpost in return for more immediate protection. The enlistment qualifications for the guard included having good moral character and two letters of recommendation from well-known citizens, "preferably property owners." Other requirements, such as literacy and having to pay for one's own uniform and mount, tended to inhibit nonwhite recruitment. Even after the establishment of Cuban independence in 1902, the role of the guard failed to evolve beyond that of a rural police force designed to protect private property holdings.

#### **Cuba and the United States, 1902-33**

The departure of the United States occupation force in 1902 created pressures on the new government of Tomás Estrada Palma



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

to guarantee the security of private property, especially during the so-called dead season between sugar harvests, when idled workers might threaten the maintenance of internal order. In addition to increasing the size of the existing 1,250-man guard, four artillery companies were created to fill the vacuum left by the departing troops. Although the United States supported the strengthening of the guard, it opposed the creation of the artillery corps on the grounds that the United States would provide for Cuba's defense. In accord with the legislation sponsored by Senator Orville Platt and appended to the 1901 Cuban constitution, the United States initially maintained that the guarantee of political stability by United States military intervention meant that the island would have no need for its own standing army or navy (see United States Occupation and the Platt Amendment, ch. 1).

Despite United States opposition, both forces continued to grow. The guard, which numbered some 1,500 men by the following year, had more than 3,000 personnel by 1905. Likewise, the artillery corps had grown to some 700 personnel over the same three-year period. The 1906 uprising by members of the National Liberal Party against Estrada Palma not only resulted in the first United States intervention under the terms of the Platt Amendment but also led to the creation of the first regular Cuban army.

The initial efforts of the newly arrived United States military advisers in 1906 were directed at transforming the undisciplined Rural Guard into a professional force able to maintain domestic order and remain independent of partisan politics. In early 1907 the guard's size was increased to 10,000, and the outpost system—wherein the troops were deployed in small detachments throughout the country—was revamped with the aim of concentrating forces under closer supervision. Training schools were opened in the cities of Havana, Matanzas, Camagüey, and Santiago de Cuba, and new recruits were carefully screened. Nevertheless, the Liberals viewed the guard as discredited and tied to Estrada Palma and called for a regular army to be created in its place. Despite initial opposition, the United States acquiesced in 1908 and approved regulations creating the Permanent Army, consisting of a single infantry brigade. The guard remained intact under separate command, but its size was reduced to 5,180 troops.

After the election of José Miguel Gómez and the subsequent departure of the United States forces in early 1909, the Rural Guard continued to respond to the interests of the large landowners, and officers who had remained loyal to Estrada Palma in 1906 were purged. Liberal loyalists who had no prior military experience were readily rewarded with commissions in both the Rural Guard

and the Permanent Army. The party was divided, however, and these schisms were reflected in both forces, whose supporters were split between President Gómez and his vice president, Alfredo Zayas. In early 1911 Gómez united the command of the Permanent Army and the guard under a trusted officer. By 1912 the army alone was composed of some 12,500 officers and troops.

For the 1912 election Gómez threw his support and that of the military behind the Conservative Republican Party leader, General Mario García Menocal, against Zayas, the contender for the National Liberal Party. Widely distrusted because of his close association with the United States, Menocal ran again for the presidency in 1916 against a reunited National Liberal Party and was re-elected amid electoral violence and vote fraud. The Liberals refused to concede and in early 1917 began planning the uprising that became known as La Chambelona (The Lollipop), which was to be a swift, bloodless coup against Menocal. The February coup conspiracy was discovered, however, and widespread arrests of Liberal military officers followed. Still, the Liberal Constitutionalist Army, composed of defectors from the armed forces, managed to take and hold large portions of eastern Cuba (see *Fragile Independence and Fragile Republic*, ch. 1).

The defections allowed Menocal to consolidate his control over the armed forces. The United States roundly condemned the revolt and shipped the Menocal government several airplanes plus considerable arms and ammunition and, in a show of force, landed some 500 marines at Santiago de Cuba, enabling Conservatives to retake the city.

Upon his election as president in 1924, General Gerardo Machado y Morales—a longtime Liberal supporter and participant in La Chambelona, as well as a former cattle rustler and inspector general of the army—began programs that helped transform the Cuban military into a more modern and effective force. In the process he assured himself of the institution's loyalty, at least that of the officer corps. Through selective (and often extralegal) appointments, promotions, and transfers, he quickly placed his own military supporters in the key commands. An aviation corps was formally created under the army's command. Expenditures on the armed forces rose dramatically despite an economic crisis. An emphasis on improved training programs and better housing facilities for military personnel helped build support. Machado increased the size of the armed forces to almost 12,000, granted himself the right to reorganize the military at will, and placed the armed forces in charge of secondary-school education, adding marching drills and elementary military science to the regular curriculum.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

With the firm backing of the armed forces, Machado had the compliant legislature extend his rule for another six-year term in 1928. His opposition, primarily within the alienated middle class and the university community, increasingly advocated violent revolution. As a result, Machado established a virtual military dictatorship. Military officers replaced the municipal police chiefs and civilian government administrators. All members of the armed forces were granted the right to investigate and detain those suspected of subversive activities. Special military authorization was required for meetings of three or more individuals. Upon the creation of a national militia in 1932, all government agencies and bodies, including the judiciary, were officially placed under military control. By early 1933, as antigovernment violence continued unabated, Machado remained in power only through the sheer might of his military supporters and the inaction of the United States, which refused to intervene as was its right under the Platt Amendment (see *The Machado Dictatorship*, ch. 1).

The appointment of a new United States ambassador, Sumner Welles, in mid-1933 signaled the end of United States tolerance for the dictator's excesses. Although Machado initially responded to the ambassador's warnings with a policy of appeasement that included the release of political prisoners, he later attempted to turn the threat of intervention into a hemispheric issue, calling upon fellow Latin American nations to condemn what appeared to be imminent United States action. The same threat of intervention, however, prompted Machado's military backers to abandon their support of his government. On August 11 the commanders of the aviation corps and Havana's major military installations demanded that the dictator leave; they had already been assured that the civilian opposition would not seek retribution for the armed forces' past actions.

#### **Development of the Cuban Military under Batista**

A revolt engineered by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar and other noncommissioned officers (NCOs) broke out in September 1933 in response to the political paralysis evidenced by the civilian government of Carlos Manuel de Céspedes y Quesada. Apart from its inability to control the competing opposition groups, Céspedes' government had failed to protect the institution of the armed forces. Demands mounted for the prosecution of officers accused of crimes during the Machado dictatorship. At the same time, military authorities were reluctant to enforce order, fearing

that they would aggravate opposition pressures for action against their past excesses. Promotions were stalled, and discontent grew among junior officers. The final blow came with the General Staff's decision to withhold commissions from sergeants completing the officer training program, thereafter reserving commissions only for military academy graduates.

After attempts to seek redress were rebuffed, enlisted men at Havana's Camp Columbia military base organized a group variously referred to as the Columbia Military Union or the Revolutionary Military Union as the vehicle for their demands, which included addressing rumored force reductions and pay cuts for NCOs in addition to revising the policy that restricted sergeants' promotions. Other grievances included poor housing conditions and complaints about the quality of food and uniforms. On September 3 they took over the base; by the following day all of Havana's major military installations were under the control of the NCOs and their enlisted supporters. Up to that point the demands of the movement had focused solely on military issues. The NCO revolt took on political overtones, according to some historians, only after a group of radical university students and their professors allied themselves with the union and joined them at Camp Columbia. On September 4 the pentarchy, a five-man civilian junta supported by the NCOs, who were now led by Batista, installed itself in the Presidential Palace (see the Revolution of 1933 and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

The promotion of Batista to the commissioned rank of colonel and his appointment as army chief of staff, along with the promotions of other NCOs to fill the military's upper ranks, provoked a crisis within the pentarchy, resulting in the emergence of Ramon Gran San Martin as the new national leader in mid-September. In early October a planned revolt by a group of some 300 officers—those who had been forced to surrender their commissions—was quashed by Batista's army, and the Havana hotel in which the officers had lodged themselves was shelled by the Cuban navy's sole cruiser. Nevertheless, civilian support for the new regime failed to materialize. On January 13, 1934, Batista—convinced by the United States ambassador and business groups in Cuba that long-term national interests, including those of the reorganized military institution, were threatened—advised Gran that the armed forces could no longer support his government. In less than a week a new government, led by Carlos Mendieta, was placed in office and was readily recognized by the United States. In return for Batista's support, the new government formally created the Constitutional Army, legitimizing the commissions of the new officer corps.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

Through the remainder of the decade the failure of the national governments to establish their legitimacy by mobilizing popular support led to the expansion of Batista's influence and the growth of the military institution, both in size and in involvement in national life. By 1940 the armed forces consisted of some 14,000 personnel, not including the nationalized police and the remnants of the Rural Guard, both of which also came under military jurisdiction. Training programs emphasized marksmanship, enforcement of laws, and maintenance of public order, especially in growing urban areas.

Troops from the Constitutional Army were used as strike-breakers and were regularly employed to prevent the disruption of essential government and commercial services. After a 1934 strike by government workers, soldiers were assigned civilian administrative duties. The strike prompted a declaration of martial law, after which public employees were required to enlist in the army reserve. The reserve, in turn, was used as a labor force by the Cuban private sector, which benefited from its close ties to the military.

In the provinces the expanded reliance on the military for order led to its indirect domination of the civilian political process. In contrast to the Machado era, when both civil and military authority had resided with the local army commander, local and provincial authority was held by civilians who owed their positions to the support of military officials. The unfortunate result of the new role was the growth of corruption and graft within the military, wherein "protection" was provided for a price.

Throughout the 1930s the armed forces came increasingly to represent a "shadow government" headed by Batista. By the end of the decade the Cuban military assumed civilian responsibilities that went beyond its previous roles. It had taken over rural education—by distributing an army teacher corps to the provinces, placing military officers in charge of schools, and supervising adult education programs—in addition to providing information on health and agriculture to rural communities. Rural medical care and other social services were also administered by the armed forces.

The 1940 election of Batista as president only officially affirmed what had been the actual situation over the previous seven years. He obligingly retired from the military with the rank of general, yet retained his effective control over the institution as president. Before relinquishing his command, he had forced into retirement officers of doubtful loyalty and transferred potential competitors; those loyal to him were promoted to key commands.

Batista's tenure in office was distinguished by the return of the armed forces to strictly military duties. Batista lost military support, however, when he attempted to interfere with the lucrative system of graft upon which the armed forces had come to depend. In early 1941 Batista reduced the size of the armed forces and reshuffled its hierarchy after insubordination by the army command had nearly led to his overthrow. Active-duty personnel who had been junior commissioned officers at the time of the September 1933 revolt were rewarded with the command of key posts.

After Batista's departure from office in 1944, civil-military relations remained in a delicate balance in which civilians still had the slight advantage. Almost all officers who had supported the 1933 revolt were retired. An emphasis was placed on formal military education through the service academies, yet promotion opportunities remained available for sergeants and corporals. Although salary raises were granted to enlisted personnel, there was no commensurate rise in military expenditures, which represented fully one-fifth of the national budget.

Public disclosures of high-level corruption and graft in the armed forces, however, proved demoralizing and resulted in an institution divided between formally trained younger officers and older, higher-ranking officers over the issue of professionalism. The indifference shown by the civilian government toward the gangs of private thugs, or "action groups"—which by the early 1950s frequently fought among themselves as well as against the police and army—and the increasing levels of overall crime and political violence were perceived as threatening the institution of the armed forces.

In a March 1952 coup d'état, Batista returned to power as chief of state and supreme commander of the armed forces. After the early morning seizure of Havana's military installations, troops were deployed throughout the capital as roadblocks sealed the city. Public utilities, banking, and communications and transport were placed under military control. In less than 90 minutes Batista's supporters had taken the capital, and the new government was operating from Camp Columbia. By the time Havana's inhabitants woke up, constitutional guarantees had been suspended and the legislative dissolved (see Batista's Dictatorship, ch. 1).

Batista's new government was full of generosity for the armed forces. An across-the-board salary increase was promised to all military personnel. The army's new chief of staff pledged that no longer would military men be used as laborers for private concerns. To enforce law and order, the Havana National Police force was increased by 2,000, and all were promised new firearms and vehi-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

cles. Promotions were handed out to loyal supporters and those discovered to have not supported the coup were purged from the armed forces.

United States support was evidenced by the arrival that month of new equipment for the armed forces, provided under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) agreement signed by Batista in which he guaranteed to support United States goals in the Western Hemisphere. The new supreme commander volunteered to send Cuban troops to fight in Korea "if needed." The United States provided Cuba with a wide range of military equipment; the newly established Cuban Army Air Force, created from the old aviation corps, was sent F-47 fighters even before its pilots were trained to fly them.

The long-neglected Cuban navy received an infusion of funds from the Batista regime. New bases and port facilities, as well as a new General Staff headquarters, were constructed. A naval aviation corps was created with an initial force of six airplanes. Improved education programs were implemented for naval personnel, and a naval training center, described as a "model of its type for Latin America," was established with 24 different vocational and technical training programs.

Attention was paid to the provision of services for all armed forces personnel and the improvement of living conditions. New housing was built for officers and enlisted men under the auspices of the newly constituted Armed Forces Economic Housing Organization. The Armed Forces Credit Union and Insurance Exchange was also created to afford military personnel easy access to loans and establish an armed forces insurance fund. Batista's largess for the military, however, was not extended to the civilian population, which increasingly opposed the dictatorship.

### **The Origins of the Revolutionary Armed Forces**

The attack on Santiago de Cuba's Moncada Barracks on July 26, 1953, led by Fidel Castro, a lawyer and former University of Havana student leader and "action group" member, represented the first organized armed revolt against Batista. It was also the first military action by those who would provide the core leadership for the Rebel Army and, after its victory, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—FAR). Of the approximately 165 rebels who participated in simultaneous attacks on the army's Moncada Barracks—the country's second largest military post—and on the smaller installation in the nearby city of

Bayamo, at least half were killed, most after being captured and often brutally tortured by Cuban troops or members of Batista's feared Military Intelligence Service. Only 48 rebels managed to evade capture. Of the 100 or so believed captured, only Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and 30 others survived long enough to be brought to trial three months later.

After their release from prison on the Isle of Pines in May 1955 under Batista's general political amnesty, many of the attack's participants, plus others affiliated with the university student movement, joined Castro in the reorganization of what came to be called the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio—M-26-7). Two months later many of the same supporters departed with Castro for guerrilla training in Mexico.

When the 82 guerrillas returned to Cuba in December 1956, they were unaware that an insurrection by the urban wing of the M-26-7 in Santiago de Cuba had been put down the month before. The approach of the yacht *Granma*, which transported the new Rebel Army, was detected and followed by Cuban naval patrols and air reconnaissance. After the rebels landed on the eastern end of the island, army units mobilized to repel the invasion and killed all but between 12 and 20 of the rebels, who took refuge in the Sierra Maestra. After regrouping, the guerrillas launched their first offensive action against a Rural Guard outpost in January 1957. Two years later the Rebel Army would triumphantly enter Havana (see Fidel Castro and the Overthrow of Batista, ch. 1).

Batista's demise was owing as much to his failing support within the armed forces as to the failure of the once powerful military institution effectively to combat the guerrillas. Repression, corruption, and violence characterized political life and led some sectors of the military to withdraw their support from the dictator. At the same time that the rebels found support in rural Cuba and among the disenchanted and victimized urban middle class, Batista's armed forces were crumbling from within. Even before the *Granma* landing, Batista had been confronted with two coup attempts during 1956. The September 5, 1957, revolt at the Cayo Loco naval installation in Cienfuegos by some 400 young officers and sailors allied with members of M-26-7 represented the largest challenge the regime had thus far confronted. Although the uprising was successfully quashed by 2,000 army troops, an estimated 100 survivors fled to the Sierra de Escambray in central Cuba and opened a second front.

Massive assaults waged by army troops against the elusive guerrillas' hit-and-run tactics proved fruitless and harmful to troop morale. During the major campaign begun in May 1958—involving



*Cuba: A Country Study*

12,000 to 13,000 troops from all three services against the 500 or so guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra—the military began to show indications that it was losing its will to fight. Paralleling the final days of the Machado dictatorship, the armed forces began to sense not only the absence of popular support for Batista but also growing antimilitary sentiment among the general population. An arms embargo imposed in March 1958 as a symbol of United States disapproval over the use in a civil war of MDAP funds and matériel provided for hemispheric defense contributed to the deterioration of morale.

The Rebel Army carefully disavowed harboring antimilitary sentiments and said so repeatedly in broadcasts over Radio Rebelde, the clandestine radio network. Some troops openly defected to the guerrillas, who were believed to treat their prisoners well, often releasing them after a short detention. Both desertions and defections increased as the war went on. Pilots refused orders to bomb civilian areas in the Sierra Maestra, often dropping their bombs on uninhabited locales; some were arrested for insubordination while others sought asylum in Miami. By autumn 1958 Batista recorded that his officers in the field were surrendering their entire units to the guerrilla forces "with surprising frequency." As the Cuban armed forces lost personnel to the Rebel Army, the guerrillas often gained their weapons as well.

By the end of the year Batista's vain attempt at appeasing the United States by holding elections had failed. The demoralizing impact of the continuing lack of United States support for Batista's war against the guerrillas was finally interpreted by the officer corps as a sign that Batista must go. Had the final battle of Santa Clara, in central Cuba, in December not resulted in the complete collapse of the armed forces fighting structure, Batista would have been overthrown within days or weeks by his own officers, who were already plotting among themselves with the Rebel Army against him. On New Year's Eve 1958 Batista met quietly with his chiefs of staff at Camp Columbia, named his successor—ironically, a general who was conspiring with Castro—and left the country the next day.

After Batista's departure, all pretense of withholding absolute victory from the Rebel Army was soon abandoned. Even though the general named to the national command by Batista resisted surrendering to the guerrillas, army units throughout the country refused to continue fighting after learning the dictator had left. With the end at hand, many top army and police officials looted the treasury and fled the island; others less fortunate, many of whom

had been responsible for the torture and murder of innocent civilians, remained to face revolutionary justice.

In mid-January 1959 the provisional revolutionary government suspended the law regulating the structure of the old military, permitting it legally to reorganize the new armed forces according to its needs. The constitution, which had prohibited capital punishment, was amended to allow for the execution of Batista's collaborators judged guilty of "war crimes." The often televised executions by firing squad of former Batista-era officials were supported by the majority of Cubans, who were eager to avenge the dictatorship's excesses, but the United States government viewed them with alarm and used them as a standard by which it judged the civility of the new government. However, Castro, the *de facto* leader of the revolutionary government, eventually recognized that the bloodletting could not continue if the leadership wished to end the spasmodic violence that had wracked the country for most of the past decade. After the retributive executions were halted, efforts to consolidate the revolutionary government's power began in earnest.

### **Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations**

Article 64 of the 1976 Constitution of the Republic of Cuba establishes that the defense of the "socialist homeland is the greatest honor and the supreme duty of every Cuban citizen." Military service, incorporated under Article 64, is regulated by law. Treason against the nation is defined as "the most serious of crimes" and, accordingly, is "subject to the most severe of penalties." Also incorporated in the Constitution is the right of all Cuban citizens to "reach any rank of the Revolutionary Armed Forces . . . in keeping with their merits and abilities."

The National Assembly of People's Power, which acts as a national legislative body, bears constitutional responsibility for "declaring a state of war in the event of military aggression and approving peace treaties." The Assembly, however, meets in regular session only four days each year. As a result, Article 88 of the Constitution empowers the Council of State, also a representative body, to "decree general mobilizations whenever the defense of the country makes it necessary and assume the authority to declare war . . . [and] approve peace treaties . . . when the Assembly is in recess and cannot be called to session with the necessary security and urgency." According to the Constitution, "supreme command

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces" is retained by the president of the Council of State.

The Council of Ministers, the nation's highest-ranking executive and administrative organ, is also invested with national defense responsibilities and has the constitutional mandate to maintain domestic order and security in addition to ensuring the protection of lives and property in the event of natural disasters. The council is empowered to "determine the general organization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces." In early 1985 Castro acted as president of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers; he was also commander in chief of the FAR.

The revised Fundamental Law of the Armed Forces, promulgated in December 1976, establishes the legal basis of the FAR. Three other laws passed in November 1976 complement the FAR's legal framework, encompassing the provision of social security for the armed forces, the regulation of the military reserve system, and the reclassification of military ranks.

Between the early years of the Revolution and the mid-1980s, Cuba resisted entering multilateral or bilateral defense pacts and otherwise refused to enter into agreements that might limit its actions in the international arena. As Article 10 of the 1976 Constitution specifically stipulates, the Republic of Cuba "rejects and considers as illegal and null all treaties, pacts and concessions which were signed in conditions of inequality, or which disregard or diminish [Cuban] sovereignty over any part of the national territory."

This position remained consistent with the actions of the Cuban leadership in the early years of the Revolution. In March 1960 Cuba withdrew from the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), which provided for collective hemispheric defense against external aggressors. Five months later Castro terminated the United States Mutual Defense Assistance Program agreement signed by the Batista government in 1952. Cuban participation in the Organization of American States (OAS) was suspended in January 1962, when member states determined that the Cuban government's Marxist-Leninist ideology was "incompatible with the interests of the hemisphere."

The Castro government resisted participation in any multilateral agreements to control the spread of nuclear weapons. The government also refused to sign the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (known as the Tlatelolco Treaty). Cuba refused to sign the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the grounds, as stated by Raúl



*Helicopter formation over Havana parade ground*  
Photo by John Finan

Roa, Cuba's ambassador to the United Nations, that it "would never give up its inalienable right to defend itself using weapons of any kind, despite any international agreement." Cuba did, however, reach an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in May 1980 regarding safeguards for its first nuclear power plant, which was under construction near Cienfuegos, and its nuclear material.

In June 1966 the Castro government ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the wartime use of poisonous gases or bacteriological agents. It also ratified the four international agreements of the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of war victims. The 1972 Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Convention was ratified by Cuba in 1976.

Even though the Castro government continued close relations with the Soviet Union and received virtually all its military assist-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ance from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Cuba had not joined the Warsaw Pact as of early 1985. Cuban military officials, however, were invited to attend Warsaw Pact maneuvers as observers.

### **The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government**

Throughout the first 26 years of the Cuban Revolution, distinguishing the responsibilities of civilian government officials from those of FAR personnel was often difficult. This was especially true during the 1960s as the government attempted to consolidate its power and organize popular support. The term coined by Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University—the “civic soldier”—epitomized the nature of civil-military relations. The concept of the civic soldier represented the military men who ruled over large sectors of military and civilian life, who were held up as symbols to be emulated by all Cuban citizens, and who were the bearers of the tradition and ideology of the Revolution. The fusion of civilian and military roles and duties at the national level was embodied in Castro, who, in addition to being the commander in chief of the FAR, was also the head of the nation's top decision-making bodies, including the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba—PCC). His brother Raúl, minister of the FAR, held the second highest position in these same bodies.

In the chaotic governmental reorganization efforts of 1959 and the early 1960s, the FAR served as an important repository of leadership and administrative expertise and, as the successor to the Rebel Army, represented the most powerful institutional body that had survived the overthrow of Batista. The involvement of the Cuban military in public administration dated back to the 1920s and served to legitimize the newly created FARs participation in and control over governmental affairs. As the requirements of military specialization increased through the 1970s and as Cuban government officials independently developed expertise in public administration, the distinct responsibilities of the civilian and military sectors became somewhat more pronounced. Nevertheless, through the mid-1980s the highest levels within the Cuban government continued to be filled with former Rebel Army officers, many of whom, although not active-duty FAR officers, were regularly identified in the Cuban media as “commanders of the Revolution,” using the honorific rank in addition to their governmental title.

Members of the Cuban armed forces were not only educated to become professionals in civilian and military affairs but were also among the vanguard of the PCC. In late 1970 nearly 70 percent of all military officers belonged to either the PCC or its youth wing, the Union of Young Communists (Unión de Jóvenes Comunista—UJC). Of the PCC members holding military rank at that time, fully 69 percent were commissioned officers. By the time of the delegate selection for the Third Congress of the PCC, to be held in late 1985, however, foreign observers were arguing that civilian party cadre were attempting to reduce the influence of the FAR within the Party organization.

The representation of the military officers on the Central Committee of the PCC continued to reflect their significant influence in Cuba's only political party. Although the proportional representation of the Cuban military officers on the Central Committee declined between 1975 and 1980, their absolute numbers, as either full members or alternates, increased as the size of the Central Committee grew. This increase in the number of Central Committee members holding military rank paralleled an increase in the number of military officers belonging to the PCC during the latter half of the 1970s. In 1980 military officers on the Central Committee—full and alternate—accounted for slightly over 27 percent of the Central Committee's members. By April 1984 their numbers had increased to over 30 percent of the total. The representation of Cuban military officers at this level of the PCC bureaucracy was considerably greater than the representation of either Soviet or Chinese officers in their respective party organizations.

After its founding in 1965, the PCC was organized most quickly, within the armed forces. The PCC was organized at all commands within the FAR. Each of the three services—the army, air force, and navy—had its own political section. Political bureaus were organized at battalion or regimental levels, and political groups functioned at the level of company, "platoon and squad," battery, or squadron. Political units were organized from below, wherein party cell members did not report directly to the PCC but indirectly through higher-level units that ultimately reported to the armed forces' Central Political Directorate (see fig. 8).

Membership in either the PCC or the UJC was considered a decisive factor in promoting an individual within the FAR. The FAR was considered by the PCC leadership to be an excellent agent for the political indoctrination of nonparty members. Instruction in Marxist-Leninist ideology by a PCC political officer who held rank in the FAR was included as a regular component of basic military training.


### *Cuba: A Country Study*

The responsibilities of the civic soldier also entailed carrying out the economic mission of the armed forces, which included the organization of civilian sectors of the economy along military lines. The economic role of the Cuban armed forces, like its influence in the PCC, was also larger than that of the Soviet or Chinese armed forces. It was not until after 1973, when increasing Soviet influence resulted in an emphasis on military professionalism and specialization, that the direct involvement of the armed forces in the state economy began to decline.

After the 1973 reorganization of the FAR, a number of production-related tasks previously assigned to the armed forces were turned over to civilians. Defense-related work assigned by government ministries to civilians employed in production or in the field of education, however, did not revert to the armed forces. At the same time, all productive labor came to be viewed not only as an economic contribution that enhanced national security but also as a social duty. The result was an increase in the FAR's influence over a civilian population that often found itself working for both non-military and military ends, a situation that prevailed through the mid-1980s.

### **The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces**

The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias—MINFAR) was created on October 16, 1959, to replace the Batista-era Ministry of Defense. At that time Raúl Castro was appointed minister of the FAR, a post he held into the mid-1980s. After a restructuring of the MINFAR's system of ranks in 1973, Raúl Castro held the rank of general of the army and Fidel Castro, that of commander in chief of the FAR. Also at the top of the MINFAR hierarchy in the mid-1980s were three first vice ministers, all of whom held the rank of division general, and 10 vice ministers.



Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces*, Washington, April 1979, 1-10.

Figure 8. Organization of the Communist Party of Cuba Within the Revolutionary Armed Forces



### *Cuba: A Country Study*


Between 1959 and the mid-1980s, the MINFAR consisted of three major services: the Revolutionary Army (Ejército Revolucionario—ER), the Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force (Defensa Antiaérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR), and the Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria—MGR). In 1972 the DAAFAR and MGR had been established as separate services with their own commands. Various staff directorates augmented the MINFAR's organizational structure (see fig. 9).

The ER was traditionally under the direct control of the chief of the MINFAR General Staff. In early 1985 this position was held by Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, who had been in the post since at least April 1982 and was also a first vice minister of the MINFAR. The DAAFAR was commanded by Division General Julio Casas Regueiro, a vice minister, who had held that command since at least February 1981. During 1984 the command of the MGR passed from Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria Cuadrado—a command he had held since 1972—to Rear Admiral José Cuza Téllez-Girón, who also became a vice minister. Cuza Péllez-Girón was formerly the director of the naval academy.

There were varying estimates of the size of the FAR in early 1985. Data published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies in September 1984 placed the size of the regular armed forces at 153,000, not including the 94,500 conscripts who were then completing their period of conscription, known as General Military Service. The regular ER, which included a proportion of the reserve troops on active duty, was composed of some 125,000 officers and soldiers. In addition, some 75,000 conscripts were assigned to the ER. The DAAFAR force strength was estimated at 16,000, complemented by approximately 11,000 conscripts. The MGR was made up of 12,000 personnel, including 350 naval infantry, plus some 8,500 conscripts.

United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates in early 1985 placed the size of the FAR at 162,000, broken down into 130,000 personnel in the ER, 18,500 in the DAAFAR, and 13,500 in the MGR. These figures did not include members of the combat-ready reserve forces, estimated at 135,000, who could be mobilized on as little as two to four hours notice. Reserve forces were assigned to all three branches of the FAR, yet data regarding the reserves' distribution among them were unavailable.

In 1985 Cuba retained the Western Hemisphere's largest standing army in proportion to its population of 10 million. The size of the professional armed forces did not change dramatically after the time of its restructuring in the early 1970s—when the active-duty armed forces were reduced by some 150,000—and



Source: Based on information from United States Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces*. Washington, April 1979, 1-8 and United States Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba A Reference Aid*. Washington, June 1984, 113.

Figure 9. Organization of the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1984

*Cuba: A Country Study*

1980. During the mid-1970s the MINFAR had approximately 120,000 regular military personnel. Increases in manpower after 1980 coincided with an increased perception of threats to Cuban security. Whether this growth trend would continue beyond the mid-1980s was uncertain.

Regular military forces were complemented in early 1985 by other organizations with paramilitary duties. The MINFAR's only official paramilitary organization was the Youth Labor Army (*Ejército Juvenil de Trabajo—EJT*), the size of which was estimated in mid-1984 at 100,000 and whose mission was primarily that of civic action (see *Conscription and Military Manpower Resources*, this ch.). The Territorial Troops Militia (*Milicia de Tropas Territoriales—MTT*), created in mid-1980, was made up of some 1.2 million civilians in July 1984, according to Castro. Cuban officials stated that the MTT was established as a deterrent to the threat of a United States invasion (see *The Mobilized Population*, this ch.). The Civil Defense forces, estimated to be composed of some 100,000 civilians, also complemented the nation's defense organization.

Cuban military expenditures for 1985, as publicly announced by the MINFAR, were estimated at 1.471 billion pesos (roughly equivalent to US\$1.765 billion), an increase of almost 26 percent over the 1984 allocation. Military spending also grew at a rate faster than overall government expenditures between 1984 and 1985. Monies allocated to the military sector accounted for 13 percent of the 1985 budget; the comparable figure for 1984 had been only 10.4 percent. These expenditures were consistent with a continual increase in military spending that began in 1965, when defense spending accounted for 8.4 percent of the national budget. Cuban governments have had traditionally high military expenditures, however. In prerevolutionary Cuba it was not uncommon for 15 to 25 percent of the national budget to be spent on the armed forces. This was especially true during Batista's years in power, when military expenditures were used to ensure political support (see *Background and Traditions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces*, this ch.).

Additional monies for national defense were obtained through civilian-sponsored fund-raising drives and annual goals set for work centers in order to finance the MTT. Matériel, spare parts, training, and technical assistance provided the Cuban military by the Soviet Union were believed to be furnished free of charge. Although there was no question that at least some of this Soviet military assistance was supplied without cost to the Cuban government, there was discrepancy among analysts as to whether the entire

amount was furnished free of charge (see Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

### **The Revolutionary Army**

Troops belonging to the Revolutionary Army (*Ejército Revolucionario—ER*), which represented slightly over 80 percent of the MINFAR's active-duty personnel, were under the direct command of the MINFAR General Staff. The primary mission of Cuban ground forces included the provision of territorial defense against external threats and the maintenance of internal security. A third component of the ground forces' mission—the provision of military assistance, including combat personnel, abroad—was added during the mid-1970s when Cuban troops were sent to fight in Africa. The majority of the forces under the command of the ER was deployed domestically in three independent armies. The Isle of Youth Military Region, established in 1962, was under independent command even though only a single infantry division was stationed there. In early 1985 the MINFAR's two Expeditionary Forces, in Angola and Ethiopia, were treated as separate armies, as were personnel assigned to the foreign Military Assistance Forces (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, this ch.).

Although information on the deployment of Cuban personnel was not publicly available, the deployment of units throughout the country was believed to correspond roughly with the geographic distribution of the population. The Western Army, created in late 1970, shared its headquarters with the MINFAR in Havana and commanded troops deployed in the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, and Ciudad de La Habana. As of late 1983 the Western Army was under the command of a division general. The Western Army's armored division, stationed at Managua, near Havana, was considered the premium unit of the MINFAR's ground forces and was the only one of three armored divisions believed to be staffed at full strength. An army corps—composed of three infantry divisions, which at full peacetime establishment consisted of usually only 5,900 troops each—was based at the provincial capital of Pinar del Río. The Western Army also had a single mechanized division, believed to be almost fully manned, that was probably attached to the Havana headquarters. At full strength a mechanized division normally consisted of 8,200 troops.

The Central Army was established in 1961, only 13 days before the Bay of Pigs landing at Playa Girón in Matanzas Province. After the departure several years before of Division General

*Cuba: A Country Study*

Raúl Menéndez Tomashevich to command the MTT, the Central Army command had, by March 1985, been given to a brigadier general. Provinces included in the Central Army's command were Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Villa Clara, and Sancti Spíritus; its headquarters was in Santa Clara, Villa Clara, which was also the location of the Las Villas Army Corps. The Central Army was composed of a single armored division, stationed at or near Santa Clara, and a mechanized division in addition to the three infantry divisions attached to the army corps.

The headquarters of the Eastern Army, established in April 1961 and located in Santiago de Cuba, was under the command of a division general in March 1984. Conflicting information existed as of late 1985 regarding the structure of the Eastern Army. It was generally accepted among analysts that at least two army corps were under the control of the Eastern Army. Those bodies, the Camagüey Army Corps—encompassing the provinces of Ciego de Ávila and Camagüey—and the Holguín—Army Corps—encompassing the provinces of Las Tunas and Holguín—had headquarters in the capitals of those provinces for which they were named. The Southern Army Corps commanded units deployed in the provinces of Granma, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo. In the early 1980s the Southern Army Corps was believed responsible for the Guantánamo Frontier Brigade, the military complement that guards the perimeter just beyond the no-man's-land surrounding the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Forces attached to the Eastern Army included an armored division assigned to the Santiago de Cuba headquarters, a mechanized division, and as many as nine infantry divisions, provided three divisions were assigned to each army corps, as was usually the case.

Under normal circumstances each of the three armies, plus the Isle of Youth Military Region, reported directly to the MINFAR General Staff. During a crisis, however, the command structures of the armies were designed to operate independently. Each army was to assume full command responsibility for its ground forces as well as all paramilitary forces, official and unofficial, including the EJT, the civilian MTT, and the civilian Civil Defense forces (see Conscription and Military Manpower Resources; The Mobilized Population, this ch.). Whether command and control included the army corps continuing to report to their regional headquarters or to the MINFAR in Havana was not known. Contingency plans reportedly included the breakup of domestic forces into small, independent guerrilla groups that would continue to operate after the destruction of the independent army corps. Rumors abounded that weapons caches and stocks of critical supplies were



*Mobile radar unit*  
Photo by John Finan



*Cuban T-62 main battle  
tank on parade*  
Photo by Karin Anderson

hidden throughout the island in caves and in the mountains for use in such a contingency.

A number of troop formations were independent of the three regional army commands. Among these were eight independent infantry regiments of approximately 1,000 personnel each and no less than eight independent infantry battalions, each having a total of 365 officers and troops, that were identified as having a static defense role. Three of the independent regiments were believed to be located at or near Havana; the remaining five were in the provincial capitals of Pinar del Río, Matanzas, Santa Clara, Camagüey, and Santiago de Cuba. The independent battalions were believed to be located in the cities of Cienfuegos, Sancti Spíritus, Ciego de Ávila, Victoria de las Tunas, Holguín, Bayamo, and Guantánamo.

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ER force structure also included an artillery division, composed of at least three field artillery brigades, that was thought to be in command of all smaller artillery units and directly subordinate to the MINFAR command. The ER's armored divisions were considered the premium units of Cuban ground forces. The General Staff Security Battalion, attached to MINFAR headquarters in Havana, and the Airborne Assault and Landing Brigade, composed of two battalions, were also known to be under the command of the ER.

Commands of the Cuban armed forces generally were not manned at full strength during peacetime. Units were maintained at three distinct levels of combat readiness: those manned at full strength by active-duty troops, those manned partly by active-duty troops and reserve forces, and others manned by only a cadre of regular troops augmented by reserves.

ER infantry troops were armed mainly with 7.62mm Soviet Kalishnikov (AKM and AKMS) assault rifles. Other weapons used regularly by infantry personnel included the general purpose 7.62mm Kalishnikov (PK) machine gun and the 7.62mm Kalishnikov (ORPK) light machine gun. In terms of artillery, the extensive use of mortars and multiple rocket launchers was a reflection of the influence of Soviet military doctrine (see table 21, Appendix). Main battle tanks, which accounted for about 850 of Cuba's armored vehicles in 1984, were also used extensively and included the Soviet-manufactured T-62, T-54, and T-55. ER inventory included some SA-7 and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles and possibly some SA-3s, but air defense was primarily the concern of the DAAFAR.

#### **The Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force**

The Cuban Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air force (Defensa Antiaérea y Fuerza Aérea Revolucionaria—DAAFAR), whose origins date back to the single aircraft that constituted the Rebel Air Force in April 1958, was established as a separate service branch in April 1972 and had a command structure separate from that of the ER. The commander of the DAAFAR in early 1985 was Division General Casas. The second in command, the first deputy chief of the DAAFAR, acted as the chief of troops. His command comprised approximately 12 percent of all MINFAR regular forces. The DAAFAR's formal mission was recognized in the late 1970s as providing national air defense, tactical and airlift

support for ground forces and, on a selective basis, foreign military assistance.

The DAAFAR was believed to be organized into three regional air zones, similar to the ER, and its units were frequently rotated and deployed among them, based on operational requirements. The headquarters of the DAAFAR was located at the Campo Libertad Air Base near Havana. The exact geographic breakdown of the DAAFAR's three air zones was not known. The territory encompassed under the command of the Western Air Brigade, whose honorific name was the Playa Girón Guard Air Brigade, was believed to extend from the westernmost province of Pinar del Río as far east as Matanzas Province. Accordingly, air facilities under the command of the Western Air Brigade included the base at San Julián in the province of Pinar del Río, at San Antonio de los Baños and Güines in La Habana, and Varadero in Matanzas. It was unclear whether the air base at Siguanea on the Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth; formerly Isle of Pines) was commanded by the Western Air Brigade.

The divisions and responsibilities of the remaining two commands were even less clear. Nevertheless, based on the pattern established by the location of the DAAFAR's three main fighter bases at San Antonio de los Baños, Santa Clara, and Camagüey, it was reasonable to assume that the fighter bases distribution represented the rough territorial divisions among the three regional air zones. San Antonio de los Baños was located on Cuba's southern coast, directly south of Havana. Santa Clara was the capital of central Villa Clara Province. Camagüey was the capital of the province by the same name in east-central and eastern commands, in addition to Santa Clara and Camagüey, appeared to include facilities at the cities of Cienfuegos, Sancti Spiritus, Holguín, and Santiago de Cuba.

In mid-1984 the DAAFAR was reported to have between two and four fighter-ground attack squadrons equipped with a minimum of 30 MiG-23s. At least two of the squadrons were believed to be based at San Antonio de los Baños and Santa Clara. Analysts listed the number of interceptor squadrons controlled by the DAAFAR as between six and 16, depending on how certain aircraft were designated. The interceptor squadrons were equipped mainly with MiG-21s. In 1979 the MiG-21 was considered the principal combat aircraft used by the DAAFAR. One source noted that a total of 90 MiG-17s and MiG-19s made up an additional six fighter-bomber squadrons. By the mid-1980s the DAAFAR was reported to be replacing the MiG-17s assigned to the fighter-bomber squadrons with MiG-23s.



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

At least four interceptor squadrons as well as four fighter-bomber squadrons were understood to be under the central air zone's command. The DAAFAR's four main transport squadrons were equipped with Il-14s, An-2s, An-24s, and An-26s and were based in Havana and San Antonio de los Baños—under the Western Air Brigade's command—and in Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba under the command of the central and eastern air zones, respectively. The three regional commands were each believed to have two helicopter squadrons, equipped mainly with Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters, some of which were reported to be armed. The Mi-24s that made up the single helicopter gunship squadron were thought to be assigned to the eastern air zone. The first Mi-24s arrived in Cuba in early 1982 and were armed with a 57mm cannon, minigun, and rocket pods.

Publicly available figures regarding the organization and size of the DAAFAR's air fleet varied considerably depending on the source consulted (see table 21, Appendix). There was a consensus, however, that the number of Soviet-supplied MiG combat aircraft in the Cuban air force was at least 200 to 250 in mid-1984. In June 1984 Adrian J. English, writing in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, identified three DAAFAR operational commands as the Air Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Air Transport Command. The Air Transport Command was reportedly able to call on the state-owned commercial aviation company, Cubana de Aviación, for operational support. Cubana reportedly had nine long-range Il-62 and four medium- to long-range Tu-154 transports in 1983. Its aircraft were used by the MINFAR in the late 1970s to airlift troops to Africa (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, this ch.).

The Air Defense Command had jurisdiction over 24 surface-to-air missile batteries equipped with SA-2 missiles and 12 batteries equipped with SA-3s and SA-7s. Interceptor units were also under the Air Defense Command. In addition, this command was responsible for the operations of Cuba's electronic air defense and early warning system. The six fighter-bomber and two fighter-ground attack squadrons were under the Tactical Air Command.

The DAAFAR's principal flight training program was carried out at the Military Aviation School at the San Julián Air Base in western Cuba and was commanded by a brigadier general in early 1981 (see *Professional Military Training*, this ch.). Trainers included approximately two dozen MiG-15UTIs, MiG-21Us, and MiG-23Us. Czechoslovak-manufactured Zlin-326s were used as basic trainers. Several transports, including Il-14s and An-2s, were also used for training. Those completing advanced training programs usually attended flight schools in the Soviet Union.

### **The Revolutionary Navy**

The Revolutionary Navy (Marina de Guerra Revolucionaria—MGR), whose manpower represented about 7 percent of active-duty MINFAR troops, was the smallest of the three armed services. In 1979 approximately 75 percent of the MGR's personnel were believed assigned to shore-bound units. The MGR was officially established in August 1963, even though it had been active in the years immediately following the victory of the Revolution. Like the DAAFAR, its autonomous command was established in 1972, and its headquarters was located in Havana. The commander of the MGR in early 1985 was Rear Admiral José Cuza Téllez-Girón. The MGR's missions included coastal defense, provision of escort protection to ships belonging to the merchant marine or fishing fleets, and surveillance of Cuban territorial waters, both to support coastal defense and to prevent the unauthorized exit of Cuban nationals or others from the island. By the mid-1980s the MGR was also hoping to upgrade its limited antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities in order to enhance its defense posture. The MGR worked closely with the MTT and the Border Guard Troops in carrying out its coastal defense mission (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.).

The MGR's forces were divided among three territorial commands, in a deployment pattern similar to the ER and the DAAFAR. The oldest command was that of the Western Naval Flotilla, established at the time of the MGR's creation in 1963. The Western Naval Flotilla was also identified as the Granma Landing Guard Flotilla. Its command included patrol of the territorial waters and coasts corresponding to the provinces of Pinar del Río, La Habana, and Ciudad de La Habana, as well as the Isla de la Juventud. The major naval bases at Mariel and Havana fell under the Western Naval Flotilla's command. The naval academy, once located at Mariel, had been moved by mid-1984 to Punta San'a Ana, between Mariel and Havana.

The Central Naval Flotilla covered territory corresponding to the coasts of Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Villa Clara, and Sancti Spiritus provinces. In addition to the Varadero Naval Base was the facility at Cienfuegos—the site at which the MGR's submarines were based. The MGR's submarine training school was also at the Cienfuegos Naval Base. The construction of the submarine base at Cienfuegos raised United States security concerns in mid-1970 when it was discovered that Soviet personnel were constructing facilities capable of servicing their own ballistic missile-carrying submarines. This was considered a violation of the 1962 United States-Soviet understanding that settled the Cuban missile crisis

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
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*Cuba: A Country Study*

and prohibited the emplacement by the Soviet Union of offensive weapons systems on the island. As a result of strong United States objections, the construction of the strategic submarine support facility was abandoned in late 1970.

The Eastern Naval Flotilla included the coasts and waters corresponding to the provinces of Ciego de Ávila, Camagüey, Las Tunas, Granma, Holguín, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantánamo. The territory under the command of the Eastern Naval Flotilla represented approximately one-half of the island's 3,735 kilometers of coastline. Major bases controlled by the Eastern Naval Flotilla included facilities at Nuevitas in Camagüey, the Bahía de Nipe in Holguín, and at Santiago de Cuba.

In terms of operational command, the seagoing units of the MGR were divided into separate flotillas (some identified as divisions), which were further subdivided into squadrons. These included a submarine division, a missile boat flotilla, a torpedo boat flotilla, a submarine chaser flotilla, and a minesweeper division. The submarines were the only permanently based vessels. Patrol craft, the largest of which were 60-ton ex-Soviet Zhuk-class fast-attack craft, were also deployed among the regional commands.

The transfer of two former Soviet Foxtrot-class attack submarines delivered in 1979 and 1980 and a third delivered in January 1984 greatly enhanced the MGR's ability to patrol its territorial waters. Among other major vessels transferred to Cuba by the Soviet Union were four Osa-IIs, delivered in late 1982, and a Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boat, delivered in late 1983, bringing the total of Turya-class vessels in the MGR's inventory to eight or nine. The second 1,800-ton Koni-class frigate was delivered in January 1984.

The MGR was also believed to operate a small fleet of shore-based Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters used in surveillance and search-and-rescue operations. A single Whiskey-class submarine was used exclusively for training. The 165-ton Osa-class and 75-ton Komar-class missile attack craft were considered the Cuban fleet's most potent vessels in the early 1980s. The Osa-class vessels—both Osa Is and Osa IIs—were armed with four SS-N-2 surface-to-surface missile launchers in addition to four L65 30mm guns. The Komar-class craft had two SS-N-2 missile launchers and two L80 twin 25mm guns. The range of Styx missiles was approximately 40 kilometers. In the early 1980s the MGR was believed to have in its fleet between eight and 10 Komar-class and 18 Osa-class vessels in fully operational condition (see table 21, Appendix).

**Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces**

Although formal diplomatic relations were established by Cuba with the Soviet Union in May 1960, the consolidation of Cuban-Soviet amity did not occur until nearly a decade later. Between 1970 and 1985 improved relations between the Cuban and the Soviet governments proved critical in terms of the MINFAR's professionalization and the development of its military capabilities.

One of the first indications of the growing Soviet influence on the Cuban armed forces was the 1973 MINFAR reorganization. Increased emphasis was placed on professionalization and military discipline. The development of the MINFAR's technical capabilities also resulted from the decision to assign greater numbers of regular troops to exclusively military tasks (see *The Revolutionary Armed Forces and the Government*, this ch.). The system of military ranks—made up of varying grades within the single rank of “commander”—was restructured to conform to more universally accepted standards. The reorganization also resulted in a decrease in the size of the armed forces to some 120,000 personnel.

After 1975 Soviet support included the provision of airlifts and sealifts of Soviet equipment and supplies and Cuban troops to the MINFAR's Expeditionary Forces in Africa (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, this ch.) The Soviets undertook an intensive force modernization program that increased both the level and the sophistication of the matériel it provided the MINFAR. During the late 1970s, as United States-Cuban relations again became hostile, the level of sophistication of the military equipment provided by the Soviets increased markedly.

By the early 1980s Cuba was receiving the most advanced military equipment that the Soviet Union was willing to export to any of its allies. This enabled the Cuban FAR to become one of the best educated, equipped, and disciplined of armed forces in the Western Hemisphere. Deliveries of military equipment and supplies increased markedly after 1981, the beginning of a new five-year economic planning cycle. Between 1981 and 1984, according to United States government sources, Cuba received an average of US\$750 billion a year in Soviet military assistance. During these four years Soviet merchant ships delivered an estimated 200,000 tons of military equipment in contrast to the 21,000-ton annual average over the previous 10 years. The increased assistance was believed to include light weapons destined for the newly created MTT and equipment for increasing the mechanization, mobility, and armored capacities of the MINFAR ground forces. Soviet military assistance to Cuba traditionally included arms and equipment as well

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

as technical training and advice with respect to Cuban military operations. Cuba relied on soviet technical personnel for the maintenance and repair of much of the more sophisticated equipment in its inventory and for the petroleum, oil and lubricants they require.

The continuing relations also allowed the Soviet Union to maintain a regular, peacetime presence in Cuba. Through the mid-1980s Soviet naval flotillas and reconnaissance and antisubmarine aircraft routinely paid visits to Cuba and often carried out joint Soviet-Cuban maneuvers off the coasts of Havana or Cienfuegos. As part of the naval ship visit program begun in 1969, about 24 naval task groups had visited Cuba by the end of 1984. The largest electronic intelligence collection facility located outside the Soviet Union was in operation at Lourdes on Cuba's northern coast near Havana, monitoring the military and civilian communications of the United States as well as of other countries, if desired. There was also considerable concern among United States strategic planners in the mid-1980s that Cuba could be used as a recovery and relaunch platform for the long-range TU-26 strategic bomber. The island was a likely site for the refueling and resupply of nuclear-equipped Soviet submarines.

A Soviet military advisory group on the island, made up of some 2,500 to 2,800 personnel in early 1985, provided technical advice in support of the MINFARs more sophisticated weaponry. Some advisers were also believed attached to Cuban ground units. A separate group, a ground forces brigade, was believed to number between 2,600 to 3,000 troops. It was the "discovery" of this force in August 1979 that raised United States concerns over the possible stationing of Soviet combat forces on the island (see Cuba in the Late 1970s, ch. 1). It was later recognized that the formation had been known to have been on the island since at least 1962 and did not have significant airlift and sealift capabilities that might enable it to engage in combat outside of Cuba. Although the unit was not the combat brigade it was initially believed to be, the administration of President Jimmy Carter subsequently ordered an increase in surveillance of the island and the establishment of the joint United States Forces Caribbean Command at Key West, which in 1981 was upgraded to Commander, United States Forces Caribbean. In 1982 the ground forces brigade consisted of one tank and three motorized rifle battalions as well as various combat and support units. Its likely mission was to provide security for Soviet personnel and key Soviet facilities, such as the Lourdes monitoring complex, and to provide a symbol of Soviet support. Brigade members may also have been involved in training Cuban personnel in the use of sophisticated Soviet equipment, such as the

T-62 main battle tanks, BMP combat carriers, and ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns, delivered in the late 1970s.

Most observers agreed that this aid and influence enabled the Soviet Union to exercise some leverage in Cuban military decision-making, not only with respect to the utilization of the equipment provided but also with respect to the deployment of Cuban armed forces. Analysts debated, however, the extent to which the prestige among fellow Third World nations earned by the presence of the Cuban Expeditionary Forces in Angola and Ethiopia had helped provide Cuba a counterbalance to the Soviet leverage. Nevertheless, given the continuing close nature of the two countries' relations between 1970 and 1985 and the levels of sophisticated Soviet-supplied military equipment in the Cuban inventory, it was likely that the MINFAR would continue to rely on and receive military assistance from the Soviet Union through the remainder of the 1980s.

#### **Conscription and Military Manpower Resources**

Under the provisions of the 1973 Law of General Military Service, all Cuban males between the ages of 16 and 50 were required to perform a minimum of three years service in the active-duty military, the military reserve, or both. Although compulsory military service had first been instituted by the Castro government in 1963, the 1973 regulation expanded the kinds of military service to be performed by conscripts. General Military Service options included being drafted into either the paramilitary Youth Labor Army (Ejército Juvenil de Trabajo—EJT) or the regular armed forces units or performing alternative civilian social service at places and posts designated by the government. Women were exempt from obligatory service, yet were eligible to enlist in the armed forces after age 16. Those women with special training were eligible to be members of the reserve forces until age 40 (see *Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces*, this ch.).

Males were required to register with the local military committee after reaching their sixteenth birthday and were then issued a certificate showing that they had registered. Those between the ages of 16 and 28 who had not completed some form of military service were called prerecruits and were required to undergo military instruction, which included ideological preparation, during evenings and weekends. Vocational training was also provided. Most prerecruits were between the ages of 17 and 20.



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

Induction calls for General Military Service were held twice annually. Youth were required to pass a physical examination before being accepted for basic training. Most basic training was carried out at camps located closest to the youth's home. Depending on the unit, basic training lasted between 45 and 60 days in the late 1970s. It reportedly included classroom and field instruction held six days a week from 5:00 A.M. to almost 10:00 P.M. On Sunday, their only day off, recruits were reportedly restricted to base. After completion of basic training, recruits took an oath of enlistment and began their three years of military service. Assignments were made based on aptitude shown during basic training. By the late 1970s there was believed to be growing popular dissatisfaction with the requirements of General Military Service that was partly attributed to the demands placed on the Cuban population and the armed forces by the commitment of combat troops in Africa.

Those youth completing their General Military Service with units of the active-duty armed forces were encouraged to enlist in the regular military and permitted to do so at any time during their three-year term of service. Those who did enlist signed an agreement for a minimum of five years of service, which included any previous time served. Pay, uniforms, and privileges were better for members of the regular armed forces than for those completing General Military Service. During the early 1980s slightly under 30,000 youth were accepted each year for service with regular MINFAR troops.

According to the 1973 Law of Social Service, all students attending schools of higher education for technical, scientific, or cultural studies were required to provide up to three years of service to the nation in the field of their expertise and were usually assigned to a government ministry to carry out their service. Deferrals for General Military Service and social service were available on a limited basis for students pursuing higher education. Political pull was reported by some sources as influencing one's chances of obtaining a deferral. Those receiving deferments were still required to complete their active service at a later date, usually by the time they were 28 years old. Upon completion of their education, those who trained in what were considered "necessary" or "essential" fields, such as engineering or medicine, were allowed to perform alternative social service, as stipulated by the social service law, while pursuing their careers. Those students who did choose to enter the armed forces after completing their education usually became commissioned officers working in technical fields.

### ***The Youth Labor Army***

Members of the 100,000-strong EJT, which was granted its official paramilitary status after the 1973 reorganization of the armed forces, were formally inducted into either the MINFAR or the Ministry of Interior, the governmental body responsible for internal security (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). The MINFAR reserved the right to assign EJT inductees to work for other government agencies. Those completing General Military Service who were assigned to the EJT usually had no education beyond the sixth grade or were considered social misfits. The primary missions of the EJT included contributing to the country's economic development, providing for the political indoctrination and education of its personnel, and assisting with territorial defense. After 1977 a system of military ranks separate from that of the regular armed forces was established for the EJT.

### ***The Reserves***

MINFAR reserve troops—of whom at least 125,000 could be rapidly mobilized—were divided between first and second reserves. The two reserves were distinguished by the political reliability of their members and their level of readiness. Those belonging to the first reserve had completed their General Military Service. They were divided among those who reportedly could be mobilized within four hours' notice and those who could be mobilized in two to four days; younger reserve members were usually mobilized before those closer to the upper age limit for military service. Those reservists also played a crucial combat role in supporting the regular MINFAR troops in Africa. The second reserve consisted mainly of politically unreliable individuals and even criminals. They also had received less training than first reserve members.

All members of the reserves spent a minimum of 45 days each year on active duty with the regular MINFAR troop units to which they were assigned. The MINFAR also had the right to demand more time of the reservists, if required. Those fulfilling their 45 days of service while serving with full-time regular troops received pay equal to their regular civilian salaries. Those fulfilling their reserve service requirement during the evenings and on weekends did not receive remuneration. Reservists were guaranteed re-employment upon completion of their full-time service requirement.

Most youth became members of the reserve forces after completing their military service requirement. The proportion of reserve troops serving alongside regular forces varied, based on three distinct levels of manning, from units with almost no reserve per-

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

sonnel to those manned almost entirely by reserve forces (see The Revolutionary Army, this ch.). Reserve ranks were distinguished from regular military ranks only by the addition of the word "reserve." In 1979 the highest-ranking reserve officer was believed to be a colonel.

### **Women in the Revolutionary Armed Forces**

Women's Voluntary Military Service was established as a result of efforts by the mass organization representing women, the Federation of Cuban Women (Federación de Mujeres Cubanas—FMC), in mid-1983. Women who volunteered for service were generally between ages 18 and 21 and were active in the FMC or the UJC, or both organizations in some instances. Applications for enlistment in Women's Voluntary Military Service were coordinated by and made directly to the FMC. New volunteers were accepted twice a year and signed up for two-year tours of duty. Training appeared to be carried out at each province's military recruitment center. In late 1984 the female volunteers were organized into a single combat unit, the First Female Regiment of Antiaircraft Artillery, which was created March 8, 1984.

Women belonging to the FAR were eligible to become officers; the woman in command of the female artillery regiment in late 1984 held the rank of major. The only impediment to the upward mobility of female officers through the ranks of the FAR appeared to be that opportunities for professional military education were limited. The only professional education program open to them beyond the pre-university level was sponsored by the Military Technical Institute (see Professional Military Training, this ch.). One account noted that by late 1983 women in the regular FAR accounted for less than 10 percent of its personnel and for only 3 percent of the MINFAR officials. At that time the highest ranking woman was a lieutenant colonel serving as a judge in the Military Justice Department.

### **The Mobilized Population**

#### ***The Territorial Troops Militia***

The Territorial Troops Militia (Milicia de Tropas Territoriales—MTT) was created by the Cuban government on May 1, 1980, under the command of the MINFAR. The commander of the

MTT in early 1985 was Division General Raúl Menéndez Tomassevich, a MINFAR vice minister, a title also held by the commanders of the FAR's three armed services. The first units of the MTT were established in eastern Cuba at a ceremony led by Castro on January 20, 1981, the same day—as Castro noted in his speech—that United States president Ronald Reagan took his oath of office. Within two years the size of the MTT had grown to 500,000, and in July 1983 Castro announced the decision to increase it to 1 million. By May 1984 the government revealed that this goal had been reached. On July 26, 1984—exactly a year after the decision to increase rapidly the force's size—Castro declared that the MTT, including its reserves, was 1.2 million strong.

The MTT rank and file were composed mainly of men above draft age who were not active members of the MINFAR reserve or Civil Defense forces, young men between ages 16 and 18, and women of all ages. Participation in the MTT was voluntary. Public consideration was given by Cuban officials in late 1984 to possibly lowering the age for MTT youth membership to include 15-year-olds. In late 1982 approximately 25 percent of MTT members were women, according to Castro.

Members of the MTT were identified by their uniform—a blue shirt, olive-drab trousers, and combat boots—which was the traditional uniform of Cuban militia members dating back to the militias first organized in the early 1960s. Those volunteering for the standard five-year term of service with the MTT agreed to undergo at least 40 hours of annual troop training and spend 10 days with their mobilized battalions in the field. Militia members were required to repeat and sign oaths of service before being issued their light arms.

MTT forces were organized from the levels of platoons and companies to those of regiments and divisions. The largest formation was the MTT's single army corps, organized in 1984. A women's battalion was established at the headquarters of each MTT regiment (in provincial capitals), and every municipal battalion had at least one company composed entirely of female militia members. MINFAR officers commanded provincial and municipal MTT formations. The president of all provincial and municipal assemblies of people's power also had a MINFAR officer assigned to them in order to assist in the handling of all matters related to the MTT or to defense in general.

According to Raúl Castro the MTT's wartime mission was to include fighting alongside, and providing replacements for, regular armed forces personnel; protecting strategic defense positions, such as bridges, highways, railroads, factories, and towns; and undertak-

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

ing any other measures of harassment that might immobilize, wear out, and ultimately destroy an enemy invader. The 336-page *Basic Manual of the Territorial Troops Militia Member* outlined these objectives and described procedures to be followed in the event of an attack. Training of MTT units was usually carried out on weekends or in the evenings after work in order not to interfere with a worker's productivity or a student's studies. In addition to receiving field training in the handling and use of light weaponry, the militia members were taught military discipline. MTT maneuvers were conducted in collaboration with the MINFAR and the Ministry of Interior; militia members were also trained for operations in a chemical and biological warfare environment. More formal instruction was provided at MTT military training centers or MTT schools established in most provinces. The Andrés Voisin MTT Officers' School in Havana provided advanced training for aspiring civilian MTT commanders. MTT educational programs were controlled by the MINFAR's MTT directorate rather than by MINFAR's directorate responsible for professional training programs (see Professional Military Training, this ch.).

### *Civil Defense*

The civilian-based Civil Defense forces, the institutional remnant of the National Revolutionary Militia (Milicia Nacional Revolucionaria—MNR), also had paramilitary responsibilities in the mid-1980s. The latest available estimate regarding the force's size, published in 1979, indicated that some 100,000 civilians constituted the body. The mission of Civil Defense at that time was to provide for local defense and rear-area security during wartime and, in the event of a peacetime disaster, to aid the civilian population and help protect economic centers. These responsibilities overlapped those assigned the MTT after its creation in 1980. In view of this, it was unclear what impact the rapid development of the MTT might have had on Civil Defense.

The origins of Civil Defense dated to the changing perceptions of national defense requirements during the early 1960s. The MNR, like FAR, was organized in October 1959 and was originally conceived of as a vehicle to mobilize rural and urban working-class support for the revolutionary government. It was also designed to support FAR regular troops and to provide for rear-area security. The role played by the MNR in helping defeat the counterrevolutionary guerrilla forces based in the Sierra de Escambray during the early 1960s was reported to be significant.



*Militia members*  
Photo by John Finan

At its peak in 1962 the MNR was composed of some 500,000 citizens. The reorientation of Cuban defense policy in 1963 resulted in the reorganization of the MNR. The body was renamed the Popular Defense Force, was trained and organized into combat units, and was deployed to provide security at government- and state-owned installations. Another policy decision in 1965 led to the disarming and downgrading of the force's status. In mid-1966 the group was officially disbanded, and its personnel were divided between the two newly organized groups of Civil Defense and the FAR reserve forces. The mission of supporting regular military personnel was absorbed by the new reserve troops.

Civil Defense forces were controlled by the MINFAR's Civil Defense National Staff, a body directly subordinate to the minister of the FAR rather than to the MINFAR General Staff. The chief of the National Staff in early 1985 was Brigadier General Guillermo Rodríguez del Pozo, a vice minister of the FAR. Regular MINFAR

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

officers were in command of Civil Defense at both the national and the provincial levels.

Members of the PCC were reported to hold key positions throughout the organization. Rank-and-file members of Civil Defense in the late 1970s included men and women; units were organized at the workplace as well as at schools. A special school also trained Civil Defense personnel for both combat-related and non-military tasks (see Professional Military Training, this ch.).

#### ***Civilian Defense Preparedness***

The mid-1983 creation of defense zones throughout Cuba represented the Castro government's renewed commitment to maintaining a high level of civilian defense preparedness. The formation of these zones was designed to help ensure and support Cuban defense, security, and internal order and to provide a deterrent, by "waging a people's war," to any foreign aggression. At the national level civilian combat readiness activities were under the supervision of Civil Defense, although both the government and the PCC coordinated and guided the defense zone activities. Defense councils were responsible for the organization of civilian activities at both the provincial and the municipal levels. Municipalities were subdivided into defense zones, each of which organized a local defense unit around its local Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (Comité de Defensa de la Revolución—CDR), which was directly subordinate to its particular municipal Defense Council. These defense zone units were to become fully operational in wartime. The mobilization of CDR members, estimated at about 6 million in 1985, was expected to add considerably to Cuba's defensive capabilities in any conventional conflict.

The coordinated activities of the defense zones included the construction of concrete-reinforced underground shelters—supplied with electricity, water, and special areas for children—and other fortifications that would help protect the civilian population from an external attack. Members of the MTT, Civil Defense, and those citizens who were active in other mass and party organizations in addition to the CDRs were believed to play a crucial role in the execution of these activities, which also included providing for the defense of work centers and other economically productive endeavors. The principal members of the defense zone units were women and either the very young or the very old. Members of the MTT and of the military reserves, who regularly participated in defense zone activities, were expected to be called for duty by their respective organizations during wartime. Many of the projects undertaken

by the defense zone units were reportedly modeled on the experience gained by Vietnam's civilian population in facing United States air attacks.

In June 1984 the Cuban government announced publicly its decision to require all citizens to undergo compulsory military training one Sunday each month. As a result, civilians dedicated that day, designated Red Sunday, to learning how to handle firearms and dig trenches in order to prepare for national defense.

On the weekends of Red Sunday, military defense exercises—in which the vast majority of the civilian population participated—began to be held at different locations throughout the island. These exercises, in addition to the routine firearms practice and trench digging, included evacuation drills, first-aid training, firefighting, and the implementation of plans for agitation and propaganda dissemination designed to hamper consolidation efforts by an occupying force. They were carried out in response to simulated land or air attacks and were reviewed by FAR and, often, PCC officials who judged the participants' level of combat readiness.

The renewed mobilization of the society at large was reminiscent of efforts carried out in the early 1960s when components of the MNR and the CDRs helped repel the United States-Cuban exile coordinated assault in April 1961 (see *Toward a Soviet Model, 1961-62*, ch. 1). This high state of popular mobilization appeared to have been relaxed after 1965—after the defeat of the counterrevolutionaries in the Sierra de Escambray and the decline in attacks by Miami-based Cuban exiles on the island—and had reached a low point during the mid-1970s.

#### **Professional Military Training**

Cuba's system of professional military education was under the control of the MINFAR's Directorate of Military Training Centers and Noncombat Training, an entity directly subordinate to the General Staff. The programs of the upper-level military educational institutions were granted university status as a result of raised enrollment standards in the last half of the 1970s. In mid-1982 the director for all military education held the rank of brigadier general.

The MINFAR's senior service school, the General Máximo Gómez Revolutionary Armed Forces Academy, was founded in July 1963, and after December 1976 it was located in western La Habana Province. The academy provided the highest level of military education available in Cuba to middle- and upper-level officers



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

from the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops and to officers from all three of the MINFAR's services (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). By the mid-1980s attendance at the school had become a requisite for officers hoping to be assigned to the MINFAR General Staff. Programs offered at the academy were said to be similar to those offered at middle- and senior-level United States advanced officer training schools, such as the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, or the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. A chemical troops program was reportedly included in the school's curriculum along with other more standard courses dealing with national security issues and resource management. Extension courses were provided through the academy, enabling qualified active-duty officers under the age of 40 to further their professional training.

The General Antonio Maceo Interservice School was located in Ceiba del Agua, a short distance southeast of the capital, and was founded in February 1963. Programs of instruction were designed primarily for members of armored and mechanized infantry units and for engineering and logistics personnel. The school's three- and four-year programs emphasized training of tactical and technical command officers. Courses were also provided for chemical troops and communications and transport specialists. A special program was offered for training the MINFAR's political officers, those with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of ideological integrity within the armed forces. The requirements for admission stipulated only that those in attendance have a minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between the ages of 15 and 21.

The Comandante Camilo Cienfuegos Artillery School was founded in 1963 at La Cabaña Fortress in Havana harbor. All field and antiaircraft artillery officers underwent advanced training at the school, receiving a degree in science or engineering upon completion of their studies. A five-year course trained military engineers in munitions, armaments, and antiaircraft electronic systems. Those admitted to the engineering programs were required to have graduated from a university preparatory school, technical institute, or high school and to be between the ages of 17 and 21. The four-year courses prepared officers who would assume command of field and antiaircraft artillery, reconnaissance, and radio-technical units. In addition, courses were provided for political officers assigned to field and artillery units. Requirements for the four-year course were identical to those for the five-year engineering course.

The Military Technical Institute, located in Havana and founded in 1966, offered the most sophisticated technical training programs available in Cuba to MINFAR personnel. By 1979 over

1,000 technical officers had completed the school's four- and five-year programs. All three services were believed eligible to send personnel there for training; it was the only advanced military school that accepted women in the early 1980s. Those enrolled in the five-year program received instruction in field artillery, infantry weapons, tanks, and transport, becoming qualified mechanical engineers upon graduation. A five-year program was available for construction engineers and was open to both military and civilian personnel in the late 1970s. Requirements for admission to the five-year programs included graduation from a university preparatory school and being between the ages of 17 and 21.

Two less advanced four-year programs were offered. The first provided training for those who would graduate as electromechanical technicians and mechanical technicians. Electromechanical technicians' work focused primarily on antiaircraft artillery weapons. General mechanical technicians received training related to field artillery, infantry armaments, tanks, and transports. Admission standards to the four-year programs were less stringent than those for the longer courses, requiring only that applicants have a minimum of a tenth-grade education and be between 16 and 21 years of age. Political loyalty, although not an outright requirement, was considered to be a factor in determining a student's qualifications for admission to either the four-year or the five-year program. The school's faculty reportedly was composed of Soviet instructors and Cuban nationals trained in the Soviet Union.

The General José Maceo y Grajales Interservice School, located in Santiago de Cuba and founded in 1980, trained personnel from armored, motorized infantry, artillery, and engineering units. In late 1984 the school reportedly had a role in training civilian MTT commanders and political officers (see *The Mobilized Population*, this ch.). Advanced training for artillery officers was offered at the General Carlos Roloff Communications and Chemical Troops School at San José de las Lajas in La Habana Province. Those completing a four- to five-year course of study graduated as operational engineers.

Eleven Camilo Cienfuegos Military Vocational Schools had been established in various provinces by mid-1984, two of which were controlled by the navy, another by the DAAFAR, and a fourth by the EJT. The remaining seven schools were controlled by the army. The first Camilo Cienfuegos school was opened in 1966 in Matanzas Province to provide a preuniversity education for youth—male and female—between the ages of 11 and 17. The schools' first graduates completed their studies in 1971.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

The general curriculum paralleled that offered by civilian schools; additional introductory courses provided the students with a basic knowledge of military tactics, handling of light weapons, topography, chemical defense, and engineering. Military discipline and drills were also part of the schools' curriculum. Most students admitted had been active in the youth affiliates of the PCC—either the UJC or the Organization of José Martí Pioneers. Many gained admittance, in part, at least, by virtue of their parents membership in the FAR and PCC. Party loyalty was a definite criterion in the allocation of the schools' cadetships. Furthermore, preference was given to Camilo Cienfuegos School graduates in obtaining admission to more advanced military schools. It was anticipated by the MINFAR in the early 1980s that the next generation of FAR officers would be almost entirely composed of graduates from these preuniversity institutions.

Each branch of the armed forces had its own schools and service academies. Included among these schools were the Naval Academy, at Punta Santa Ana near Havana, which trained both MGR personnel and those from the merchant marine; the DAA-FAR's Military Aviation School, located at San Julián in Pinar del Río Province, and the Technical School of Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force. The Antonio Maceo Interservice School acted as the ER's service academy.

MINFAR officers also received training in the Soviet Union; those pursuing strictly professional careers often completed postgraduate studies at the F.V. Frunze Military Academy in Moscow. By the late 1970s hundreds of MINFAR personnel were believed to undergo training in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe each year. Most enlisted troops were trained by the units to which they were assigned. Soviet military advisers were assigned to many Cuban units and assisted in training (see Soviet Assistance to the Revolutionary Armed Forces, this ch.).

### **Rank Insignia and Uniforms**

The MINFAR's system of military ranks underwent a second major revision in late 1976, creating a system that corresponded closely with that used by most Western armed forces (see fig. 10). A minor revision to the MINFAR's regulations was made in mid-1978 when stars replaced chevrons on the rank insignia for junior officers and a new rank was created within the warrant officer class of all three services.

In early 1959 the only military ranks that existed were those inherited from the Rebel Army, consisting of lieutenant, first lieutenant, captain, and major. Fidel Castro held the rank of commander in chief. In the latter part of 1959 the rank of second lieutenant was added to the military echelons. Between 1963 and 1973 the ranks of first captain, division commander, corps commander, and army commander were established; only that of first captain was actually conferred, however. The rank of second captain was created in 1970.

A December 1973 law recognized the rank of commander in chief as that representing the highest echelon of the FAR. Also established, in descending order, were the ranks of army commander, corps commander, division commander, and brigade commander; among first-class officers, the ranks of first commander, commander, and major; and among junior officers, captain, first lieutenant, lieutenant, and second lieutenant.

Law No. 1315, issued in November 1976, and the minor change in regulations made on July 28, 1976, established the system of ranks that remained in place in early 1985. These ranks were held by personnel assigned to infantry, artillery, armor, engineering, communications, the air force, and the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops (see The Ministry of Interior, this ch.). In the case of officers who were specialists, their field of specialty was added after their rank. Reserve personnel used the same means of identification, although "reserve" was added to their rank. A separate system of ranks was created for personnel belonging to the EJT (see Conscription and Military Manpower Resources, this ch.). Fidel Castro retained the rank of commander in chief, and Raúl Castro held the rank of general of the army. Other senior officer ranks included army corps general, division general, and brigadier general (*general de brigada*). First-class officer ranks were composed of, in descending order, colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major; junior officers' ranks included captain, first lieutenant, lieutenant, and second lieutenant. The warrant officer class was composed of the ranks of chief warrant officer, established in 1978, and warrant officer. Sergeants were divided into first through third classes, and privates were divided into private first class and private.

The MGR's senior officer corps was composed of the ranks of admiral, vice admiral, and rear admiral. First-class officers served in the ranks of ship captain, frigate captain, and corvette captain, and junior officers served in the ranks of ship lieutenant, frigate lieutenant, corvette lieutenant, and ensign. As with ground and air personnel, the warrant officer class was divided into the ranks of

# Cuba: A Country Study

ARMY AND AIR FORCE <sup>1</sup>	Subteniente	Teniente	Teniente Primer Teniente	Capitan	Mayor	Teniente Coronel	Coronel	General de Brigada	General de Division	General de Cuerpo	General de Ejército	Comandante en Jefe
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Second Lieutenant	First Lieutenant		Captain	Major	Lieutenant Colonel	Colonel	Brigadier General	Major General	Lieutenant General	General	Commander in Chief <sup>2</sup>
NAVY	Alférez	Teniente de Corbeta	Teniente de Fragata	Teniente de Navio	Capitan de Corbeta	Capitan de Fragata	Capitan de Navio	Contralmirante	Vice Almirante	Almirante		
UNITED STATES EQUIVALENT	Ensign	Lieutenant Junior Grade	Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Lieutenant Commander	Commander	Captain	Rear Admiral "Lower Half"	Rear Admiral	Vice Admiral	Admiral	

<sup>1</sup> Army and air force officers of the rank of colonel and below are distinguished by red piping and light blue piping, respectively, on their rank insignia. Insignia for army and air force officers of the rank of brigadier general and above are the same for both services.

<sup>2</sup> The rank of commander in chief over all three services was held by Fidel Castro.

<sup>3</sup> No rank.

NOTE: United States equivalents represent ranks of relatively comparable authority and are not necessarily the corresponding ranks for protocol purposes.

Figure 10. Rank Insignia of the Revolutionary Armed Forces Officer Corps and United States Equivalents, 1985

chief warrant officer and warrant officer. Sergeants serving with the MGR were divided into three classes; seamen were divided into seaman first class and seaman.

The olive-drab fatigues made famous by Castro continued to be the standard field uniform for the FAR's ground and air forces' enlisted personnel in early 1985. Enlisted personnel were also issued ceremonial parade, parade, and service uniforms. Enlisted personnel in the MGR were issued a parade uniform, a summer service uniform, a winter service off-duty uniform, a summer service off-duty uniform, and two kinds of work uniforms. There was a special marine parade uniform for the small complement attached to the MGR.

The uniforms issued to the ER's officer corps included a ceremonial parade uniform, parade uniform, various styles of service uniforms, and field uniforms. Air force officers were provided a parade, service, and field uniform. Male members of the MGR officer corps were issued two styles of winter service uniforms and a summer work uniform. Female naval officers were provided two parade uniforms—one for summer and one for winter—and two service uniforms, one for each of the two seasons.

Special uniforms were issued to ground and air forces, including a paratrooper uniform, a chemical warfare uniform, and a tanker uniform. Three kinds of pilot uniforms were used: the conventional uniform, the antigravity uniform, and a special pressurized uniform.

#### **The Cuban Military Abroad**

Cuban military forces on active duty outside the country were divided into two groups: the Expeditionary Forces, which included personnel assigned to combat duty, and the Military Assistance Forces, which included personnel assigned to train and advise foreign military personnel. In early 1985 the two Cuban Expeditionary Forces retained the status of independent armies and were assigned to Angola and Ethiopia. Should the Expeditionary Force be withdrawn from either of those locations, it is likely that its status as an army would be downgraded. In late 1984 one estimate placed the total number of Cuban military personnel abroad—including members of the Expeditionary Forces and the Military Assistance Forces—at some 70,000 officers and troops. By early 1985 there appeared to be no reason to assume that this figure, if correct, would decrease substantially.

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

### ***The Expeditionary Force in Angola***

The deployment of the first Cuban combat forces to Angola in 1975 marked the beginning of a new mission for the MINFAR, that of providing official foreign combat support to fellow Third World nations. In early 1985, almost 10 years later, the size of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Angola was estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000.

The level of Cuban involvement and the point at which the Cuban government decided to send troops to fight in Angola continued to be debated in the mid-1980s. Some sources noted that up to 300 Cuban military advisers may have been in Angola as early as May or June 1975, supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA), then led by Agostinho Neto. Cuban relations with the socialist MPLA dated back to at least mid-1965, when approximately 100 Cuban military advisers provided aid and training.

The Cuban government maintained that it had sent combat personnel only after South African forces intervened—shortly before Angola was scheduled to become independent in November 1975. Foreign military support was also provided to the two other domestic contenders for national control, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para la Independência Total de Angola—UNITA). Under the terms of the Alvor Agreement, worked out with the Portuguese colonial government in April 1974, the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA would enter into a power-sharing arrangement after independence was granted on November 11, 1975.

As tensions in Angola increased, MPLA leader Neto requested additional Cuban support, possibly in early May. Analysts agreed that Cuba first provided increased amounts of arms and military advisers to the MPLA before sending in combat personnel. It was believed that the Cuban government initially decided sometime in mid-August 1975 to commit a force of up to 3,000 combat personnel. The level of Cuban involvement, however, escalated rapidly. United States secretary of state Henry Kissinger first announced the presence of Cuban combat troops in Angola in an official statement issued on November 24, 1975. The original United States estimate of 15,000 personnel was revised down to 12,000 a few weeks later. The decision to build the Cuban forces up to a level of 20,000 to 30,000 however, had most probably been made in late October or early November.

The 650-man battalion of the Ministry of Interior's Special Troops airlifted to Angola in "Operation Carlota" in early Novem-

ber played a key role in ensuring the victory of the MPLA. According to the Cuban government, the first sealoft of Cuban combat personnel was also begun at that time; however, the first of these troops reached Angola only on November 27. Military equipment and supplies were also provided by the Soviet Union and were believed to have first been airlifted in October 1975 via Brazzaville and after Angolan independence, to Luanda, its capital. Most of the Soviet material was shipped by sea. The Soviet Union helped transport Cuban combat troops in airlifts and sealofts.

The most intense period of fighting of the Angolan war came in December 1975, when the major clashes between South African forces and Cuban troops occurred. By early December the Cubans were reported to have been reassessing their continued presence in the country, after having been defeated by highly trained South Africans in several confrontations. The Battle of Bridge 14, from December 9 to 12, was a severe defeat for the Cubans. In late December, however, the United States Congress cut off funding for continued United States Central Intelligence Agency covert operations in Angola and opted to embargo all United States arms shipments to the South African government. The South Africans then began their disengagement from the conflict, and the MPLA consolidated its control over the country as the *de facto* national power, excluding UNITA and the FNLA. At the peak of the war the Cuban military presence in Angola reached a total of 36,000 troops; of these possibly as many as 80 percent were members of the reserves.

After Neto's death in 1979, the People's Republic of Angola was led by President José Eduardo dos Santos and continued to receive Cuban military assistance as the Expeditionary Force remained in the country to repel attacks launched from abroad by the South Africans or the rebels. Cuban advisers remained in the country for training purposes as well, and Angola was reported to serve as a training site for other African liberation movements. Among such groups was the South West Africa People's Organization, which fought against South African forces occupying Namibia—the territory between Angola and South Africa—which had been recognized as a nation independent from South African rule by the United Nations (UN).

The Cuban government did not release casualty figures, but by the mid-1980s it was believed that several thousand Cubans had died in combat in Angola. The bodies of those who died in action were not returned to Cuba, however, thus complicating the assessment of actual combat deaths. Though denied by Castro, it was believed that domestic opposition to Cuba's involvement in Angola was growing. Cuban military assistance to Angola prior to



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

1977 was provided without cost to the MPLA; however, some analysts asserted that the remuneration received after 1977 had been a contributing factor to Cuba's ongoing presence in Angola into the 1980s. The Cuban government continued to maintain that the sole mission of the Expeditionary Force in Angola was to help safeguard the country's borders and that after the borders were secure, or could be secured by Angolan army troops—estimated at 30,000—the Expeditionary Force would leave.

By early 1985 Cuba predicated its departure from Angola on four concrete developments: South African recognition of Namibia's independence, an end to South African aggression against Angola, an end to South African assistance to UNITA rebels, and "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of South African forces occupying southern Angola. Plans for a phased withdrawal over a three-year period of some 20,000 Cuban troops, based on South Africa's adherence to these four provisions, were presented to the UN in November 1984 by the dos Santos government.

### ***The Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia***

By early 1985 Castro stated that the size of the Cuban Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia had fallen to a "symbolic" level. Although Castro refused to elaborate on the size of the force, United States officials estimated it at 5,000. At the peak of the Ethiopian-Somali war in 1978, United States intelligence officials estimated that as many as 17,000 Cuban combat personnel were assigned there. In 1979 Castro stated that the figure was only some 12,000. While the United States had underestimated the level of Cuban involvement in Angola, it had overestimated its presence in Ethiopia, according to the Cuban leader.

Castro maintained that Cuba intervened in Ethiopia only after the invading forces from Somalia threatened to destroy the country. In May 1977 only a small group of some 50 Cuban military personnel were providing advice to the newly formed Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam on the country's defense organization and in the use of Soviet-supplied equipment. In July the Ethiopian leader was faced with separatist activities led by rebels seeking to force the secession of the eastern Ogaden desert to Somalia and requested that Cuba send at least 300 tank specialists.

As the conflict escalated in late 1977 and early 1978 with regular incursions into Ethiopian territory by Somali forces, Cuban troops arrived by air from Havana and Angola and by sea aboard Soviet ships that also transported military equipment and supplies. In March 1978, after at least US\$850 million of arms—including

400 tanks and 50 MiGs—were reportedly provided Ethiopian and Cuban troops by the Soviets, Somalia stopped fighting and returned to its side of the border. The main role of the Cuban Expeditionary Force was played by the MINFAR's mechanized brigades, using T-54 and T-55 tanks, which were supported by BM-21 rocket launchers in addition to air cover by MiGs. Soviet advisers were reported to have planned and commanded the counteroffensive against Somalia.

By August 1979 the level of Cuban combat personnel in Ethiopia was believed to have fallen by several thousand. Some sources stated that they had been transferred to Angola. Division General Arnaldo T. Ochoa Sánchez, the former commander of the Expeditionary Force in Angola, was eventually sent to supervise Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua after leaving his command of the Expeditionary Force in Ethiopia. A majority of those assigned to the Expeditionary Force remaining in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s were engineers and other advisory and support personnel. In April 1984 Castro stated his belief that Ethiopia then needed Cuba's help less urgently than did Angola.

### ***The Military Assistance Forces***

The provision of military assistance—in terms of both training and the supply of matériel—to other Third World nations and revolutionary movements had been a feature of Cuba's foreign military policy since shortly after the 1959 revolutionary victory. The main justification for the presence of a Cuban military advisory mission in a given country was "internationalist solidarity." Much conflicting information existed with respect to the size of Cuba's foreign military involvement. To complicate matters further, in the mid-1980s the Cuban government was unwilling to discuss the activities of its foreign assistance missions beyond the tacit recognition that they provided military equipment and training.

One example of the kind and scale of possible involvement of Cuban military assistance personnel in a foreign country was cited in an account of the activities of the Cuban mission in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) in the late 1970s. After the attack in early 1979 by South Yemen on the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) in a dispute over their mutual border, Cuban military personnel reportedly provided some artillery backup in addition to logistics and communications support. Cuban personnel were not believed to have crossed into North Yemen after the invading South Yemeni troops, however. By the end of the border war in mid-March 1979, Cuban pilots in MiG

*Cuba: A Country Study*

jets were reported to have been flying daily patrols over the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Almost all reports of Cuban military assistance personnel participating in foreign combat stated that those personnel involved were small in number and that they saw only limited combat. In the early 1960s some 400 Cuban tank troops were reportedly sent to Algeria to aid in its border conflict with Morocco. Small numbers of Cuban personnel were reportedly involved in guerrilla fighting in territory encompassing present-day Zaïre, Tanzania, and Guinea-Bissau. In late 1973 some 500 Cuban tank and air troops were sent to support Syria after the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. Cuban military personnel were believed to have supported guerrillas operating out of bases in Mozambique in the late 1970s. The number of these personnel that belonged to military assistance missions, however, was unclear.

The United States government in the mid-1980s supported accounts that Cuban military assistance personnel were not only using Nicaragua to channel covert military assistance to Central American revolutionaries, including rebels belonging to the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional—FMLN), which was fighting the United States-supported government in El Salvador. Castro had provided arms to the FMLN rebels. At the same time, he said such aid had ceased. The Cuban government subsequently denied United States government assertions that Cuba continued to channel substantial amounts of arms and military supplies to the Salvadoran rebels through Nicaragua into the mid-1980s. At that time most accounts of Cuban activities in Nicaragua agreed that the Cuban Military Assistance Force was involved in advising the Nicaraguan armed forces' General Staff and helping train recruits to fight against the United States-backed forces—often identified as the counterrevolutionaries, or the *contras*—who sought to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

The level and activities of Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua remained a hotly contested issue in late 1984 and early 1985. The International Institute for Strategic Studies placed the number of Cuban military and security personnel at 3,000 in *The Military Balance, 1984–1985*, a 2,000-man increase over what it had reported the previous year. The more recent figure coincided with the 2,500, to 3,500 estimate often used by the United States government in early 1985. In mid-March 1985 Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega stated that there were exactly 786 Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua and that the total size of the Cuban presence, including civilian advisers, was below 1,500.

In March 1984 Cuba announced that it had reduced the number of military advisers in Nicaragua while increasing the military training given the civilian advisers, known as "internationalists" (see History and General Principles; Proletarian Internationalism, ch. 4). These internationalists were civilian volunteers in the fields of health, education, and construction, who, as part of the government-sponsored development assistance program, had received a minimum of a month's rudimentary military training that emphasized defensive tactics and included the handling of light weapons. It was believed that civilian internationalists sent abroad after training were routinely issued light arms for their defense. By 1985 as many as 5,000 civilian internationalists were believed to be working in Nicaragua.

Between 1984 and 1985 the Cuban government affirmed its willingness to withdraw all military and security personnel from Nicaragua in accord with the peace proposal drawn up by the so-called Contadora Group—composed of representatives from the governments of Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia—as part of its efforts to remove all foreign forces from Central America. In March 1985 the Cuban government announced it would withdraw 100 of its military advisers from Nicaragua in May. The Cuban government also noted, however, that it might send them back with reinforcements if, after May, the United States continued to support efforts to forcibly change the Nicaraguan government's leadership.

The Cuban presence in Grenada was established shortly after the 1979 takeover by the New Jewel Movement (NJM) led by Maurice Bishop. At that time Cuba began to supply the revolutionary government with light arms and military advisers who helped organize and train the Grenadian People's Revolutionary Army. The initially limited assistance expanded through the early 1980s and included the participation of Cuban civilian internationalists. At the time of the United States invasion in October 1983 these internationalists—believed to have then totaled 784—included the "armed construction workers" helping to build Grenada's new international airport who fought against the invading United States troops.

The conduct of Cuban army engineer Colonel Pedro Tortoló Comas—who had arrived in Grenada to take command of the civilian internationalists only two days before the United States invasion—led to his court-martial, demotion to private, and assignment to duty in Angola in mid-1984. Tortoló, a former chief of staff of the MINFAR's Central Army, was reported to have abandoned his command to take refuge in the Soviet embassy, leaving the Cuban

### *Cuba: A Country Study*

civilians to fend for themselves. Some 42 other Cuban military officers said to have been on the island at the time of the invasion were given similar punishment for their cowardice. Twenty-four civilian internationalists were reported killed during the invasion.

In the days immediately following the invasion by United States military forces, the Cuban government judiciously refrained from escalating its cost by not sending the MINFAR's air or ground forces to Grenada, even though it was operationally capable of doing so. The deterrent of major United States retaliation was undoubtedly a consideration in the Cuban government's decision not to send in military personnel. Another factor was that Bishop, the leader of the NJM and a close friend of the Cuban government, had been killed a few days before the invasion by a faction of his government believed closely aligned with the Soviet Union.

### **The Ministry of Interior**

The Ministry of Interior (Ministerio del Interior—MININT), created in June 1961, was the primary government body charged with maintaining Cuba's internal security and had responsibilities that ranged from counterintelligence to firefighting. In early 1985 the MININT was headed by Ramiro Valdés Menéndez, a veteran of the Rebel Army. Valdés had reassumed control of the ministry in December 1979 in what appeared to be a government crackdown on internal security that affected various sectors of the state bureaucracy. Sergio del Valle Jiménez, a physician who had headed the MININT throughout the 1970s, returned to the post of minister of public health, a position he had held during the 1960s when Valdés had first been the minister of interior. Valdés was also a member of the PCC Political Bureau.

In early 1985 the MININT had one first vice minister and four vice ministers, all of whom held military rank and were either full or alternate members of the Central Committee of the PCC. Individuals holding military rank were in key positions through the MININT, including heading its vice ministries and general directorates. Division General José Abrahantes Fernández, the first vice minister of the MININT, had commanded the Vice Ministry for Security since 1972; Division General Pascual Martínez Gil, a vice minister of the MININT, had headed the Vice Ministry for Internal Order and Crime Prevention since 1980. By 1985 Division General José Joaquín Méndez Cominches, the vice minister in charge of the General Directorate of Intelligence (Dirección General de Inteligencia—DGI) since 1981, was believed to have been replaced.

The chief of the General Directorate of Identification and Information, Colonel Haydée Díaz Ortega, held a vice ministerial post and was the only individual among the hierarchy of the MININT who was neither a full nor an alternate member of the PCC Central Committee. Little information was available about the fourth vice minister, Brigadier General Angel Mariano Mártir Carrión, other than that in April 1984 he was an alternate Central Committee member, indicating that his vice ministerial responsibilities may have been substantial.

In late 1975 a separate Technical Vice Ministry was reported to exist within the MININT, and under it was the command of the DGI, among other directorates and departments. It was unclear in early 1985 whether this vice ministry still existed within the MININT hierarchy. Other important entities that were administered directly by the MININT and incorporated under the control of the two identified vice ministries were the Department of State Security, the General Directorate of the National Revolutionary Police, the General Directorate of Penal Establishments, the General Directorate of Immigration and Naturalization, and the General Directorate of Fire Prevention and Firefighting, among others. Security for foreign diplomatic missions in Cuba was controlled by the MININT.

Two organizations with more strictly military functions included those forces attached to the General Directorate of Border Guard Troops (Tropas de Guarda Fronteras—TGF) and those attached to the General Directorate of Special Operations, who were called the Special Troops. Although organizationally part of the MININT, each of these bodies came under the jurisdiction of the MINFAR, which was responsible for their operational organization, weapons, combat training, and deployment. There was some speculation that Fidel Castro was in direct control of the two battalions of Special Troops, which together were composed of some 1,200 highly trained and politically reliable personnel. The role of the Special Troops, which were established in the mid-1960s, came to international attention a decade later when one of their battalions was deployed in Angola (see *The Cuban Military Abroad*, this ch.). Their specific mission was reportedly to serve as a highly mobile shock force capable of providing protection to high-ranking officials, to help support other internal security requirements, and to provide training to selected foreign forces. Their training prepared them to act as a commando-style unit; most were both parachute- and scuba-qualified as well as trained in hand-to-hand combat. The Special Troops were considered the elite of Cuban armed forces.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

The TGF were composed of some 3,000 personnel in early 1985 and were supported by two civilian auxiliary units, the Sea Watchers Detachment and the Border Militia. They were first created within the MININT in March 1963 and were originally known as the Department of Coastal and Port Vigilance and, later, as the Fight Against the Pirates. It was not until after the reorganization of the MININT in the 1970s that the TGF assumed the form they retained in the mid-1980s. While the TGF fell under MININT control, they provided support to the MGR and were expected to come under the full operational control of naval forces during a crisis. The TGF received support from the MGR and the DAA FAR in carrying out their mission of coastal surveillance. Their responsibilities included the detection and interdiction of individuals or groups attempting to enter or leave the island without legal authorization and the monitoring of all maritime activities close to shore. They were equipped with at least 20 small patrol boats for their maritime duties and with motorcycles for guarding the Cuban coastline. Dogs were reportedly used by the TGF for tracking.

The MININT's Department of State Security (Departamento de Seguridad del Estado—DSE) and the DGI were the Cuban government's primary intelligence organizations. The DSE was the primary domestic intelligence agency and had responsibilities similar to such agencies in many other countries, including the identification and apprehension of individuals or groups that constituted threats to the central government. The DSE had been a part of the MININT since its creation in 1961. In 1979 it was believed composed of between 10,000 and 15,000 individuals, some of them covert agents operating domestically. Ideological control was a responsibility of the DSE. Those Cuban citizens who refused to live by the ideals of the Revolution—such as antigovernment activities, arsonists, saboteurs, or spies—were considered counterrevolutionary and subject to apprehension, detention and, according to some, sentencing by the DSE. The United States Department of State human rights report for 1984 said that the DSE, which it called "the secret police," was the Cuban security organization responsible for numerous unexplained disappearances of Cuban citizens as well as naturalized United States citizens who returned to visit the island. The DSE received support from the National Revolutionary Police (Policía Nacional Revolucionaria—PNR) and the CDRs in identifying individuals suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. The size of the PNR, the uniformed law enforcement body established in January 5, 1959, was estimated at approximately 10,000 in mid-1984. CDR membership was estimated at about 6 million.

DSE personnel were deployed throughout the island, and their activities were coordinated by the provincial MININT headquarters. All members of the DSE underwent military training, and many were reportedly skilled in the use of electronic surveillance devices and other monitoring techniques. DSE operations were expected to provide support to the MINFAR during a national emergency; in wartime it was believed that the DSE would take charge of interrogating captured prisoners.

The DGI was also created in 1961 as a result of the Castro government's concerns regarding threats against it from abroad. The DGI acted as the Cuban government's primary foreign intelligence service in the mid-1980s. Agents were given "covers" and were often assigned to the embassies in foreign countries. In the mid-1970s the DGI was believed to have been under only nominal MININT control and to have reported directly to Fidel Castro. By the 1980s the DGI had benefited from the Cuban government's close relations with the Soviet Union. Many of its personnel were trained abroad by personnel from the Soviet Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti—KGB), foreign intelligence gained by either organization was occasionally shared. Such intelligence coordination was said to have contributed to Castro's success in eluding numerous foreign assassination attempts against him.

## **Crime and Punishment**

### **Crime in Cuba**

From the perspective of the Cuban government in early 1985, criminal activity was generally attributed to an individual's lack of education. After the first 26 years of the Revolution the Cuban government proudly asserted that prostitution, drug trafficking, and gambling had been eliminated. United States allegations during the 1980s regarding Cuba's involvement in the international drug trade and the indictment of four Cuban officials by a Miami grand jury in 1984, were reported to have angered the Cuban leadership. The topics of Cuban crime, punishment, and political prisoners remained exceptionally volatile emotional issues for both the Cuban and the United States governments in 1985.

Cuba was noted as having one of the world's lowest crime rates, especially in crimes against the person. Homicides that occurred in Cuba usually resulted from family disputes. Crimes in-



### *Cuba: A Country Study*

volving theft, graft, and corruption, referred to as "economic crimes," reportedly were on the increase during the early 1980s. One novel kind of crime was referred to as "crimes of style"—thefts committed by individuals trying to keep up with the latest fashions. The increase in economic crimes prompted the creation of a system of automatic punishment—believed separate from the 1979 Penal Code—in which penalties were imposed even if the victim decided against filing charges. For these economic crimes penalties were automatic, even if the victim decided against filing charges. Stealing from a foreigner, for example, brought an automatic prison term of no less than 16 years.

#### **The Penal Code**

On November 1, 1979, a new Cuban penal code became effective that deleted some acts previously considered criminal, including prostitution and the accidental landing of foreign vessels or aircraft on the island. The new code reduced the length of sentences for many common crimes, especially those committed by persons under age 20, and introduced *finest for punishment for noncriminal offenses* that "slightly harm law and order, general safety, the orderliness of population supplements, health, and property." It also established a two- to six-year prison term for public employees who interfered in any way with the distribution of consumer goods, including the forging of ration-book coupons used for the acquisition of government-controlled items at subsidized prices.

In late 1982 a special code became effective for dealing with minors under age 16 accused of crimes. Such cases were reported to have been removed from criminal courts to a special agency of the educational system that offered a number of sentencing options for young offenders. Among these options were internment or compulsory attendance at a disciplinary school controlled by the Ministry of Education or at a reeducation center controlled by the MININT; compulsory internment at a clinic controlled by the Ministry of Public Health; compulsory outpatient treatment; and vigilance and supervision by the MININT.

The provisions set forth under the new juvenile code reflected the attitude of the government toward crime in general. Antisocial behavior was embodied in the rejection of values "supported and defended" by the Cuban working class and was viewed as an ideological problem. The strategy adopted by the Cuban penal system was to reinstill these values and thus fight crime at its roots.

### **Sentencing and Appeals**

The national policy of criminal rehabilitation was aimed at enabling criminals to rejoin society. The Cuban government did, however, acknowledge that some members of society were incorrigible. Three options guided sentencing for adults convicted of minor crimes. These ranged from prison terms to making periodic reports to the court to having one's work center or a mass organization assume responsibility for the individual's conduct.

All individuals found guilty of a crime were legally permitted to file an appeal to the next higher court, stating the reasons for disagreement with the lower court's decision. Time limits for response by provincial courts required that an initial hearing be held within 20 days from receipt of an appeal. Legal representation was required at provincial-level hearings, and an individual was reportedly able to choose his or her own counsel or have the court appoint it. Free legal representation was provided Cuban citizens as a service of the state. Appeals to the highest level of the judiciary, the People's Supreme Court, were reported to take from two to three months to process in early 1983.

In meting out punishment for crimes, the Cuban penal system's policy was to allow an individual to make amends, in most cases, or to be rehabilitated. The prison system was reported to guarantee a job for all individuals upon their release. For those who had proved themselves a menace to society, however, the policy was to make the full weight of justice felt. The maximum prison term in Cuba was 30 years. Capital punishment remained legal in the mid-1980s. The method of execution was reported to be by firing squad. A Cuban-based human rights organization cited in the United States Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984* maintained that 37 persons were executed between October 1983 and May 1984 and that another 131 individuals had been sentenced to death during the same period.

### **Political Prisoners**

Charges were also made by human rights organizations that individuals jailed for political crimes were often kept under detention long after their prison sentences had been completed. Such prisoners, according to the Department of State human rights report for 1984, were also subject to physical and psychological torture in addition to inhuman treatment. The Boniato prison in eastern Cuba was believed to be among the worst prisons in the

*Cuba: A Country Study*

country. Cuban government officials maintained in 1983 that there was an ongoing effort to improve prison conditions.

The most difficult conditions while under detention were reportedly endured by the political prisoners known as the *plantados* (literally, the planted ones), who refused to be rehabilitated, participate in any prison-sponsored activities, including wage labor, or even wear prison garb. Cuban prisons required that all inmates work for a wage that was reported to be comparable to that earned outside the prison. The rationale expressed by the Cuban government for its treatment of the *plantados* was that those who refused to work could not expect to be accorded the same rights as those who did.

Estimates of the number of political detainees in Cuba varied widely—ranging from 250 to 10,000, depending on the human rights organization consulted. The same Cuban human rights organization that accumulated information on the executions asserted that as of May 1984 there were 390 prisoners of conscience and another 800 persons held under the “law of dangerousness.” This law, incorporated into the 1979 Penal Code, permitted the preventive detention of individuals believed likely—based on “observed conduct”—to commit crimes against the interests of “socialist coexistence.” In early 1985 Fidel Castro maintained there were no more than 1,000 political prisoners under detention.

An estimated 3,600 political prisoners were released from detention in 1979 as a result of a dialogue between the Cuban government and the Cuban exile community in the United States. The negotiated release also included the Cuban government’s promise to grant exit visas for the prisoners’ departure from Cuba. Of the prisoners released, some 1,500 remained on the island as of late 1983, unable to leave because the issuance of United States emigration visas was suspended for Cuban nationals in the wake of the mid-1980 Mariel exodus. Upon intervention by the Reverend Jesse Jackson in mid-1984, Cuban exit and United States entry visas were secured for 27 political detainees who had relatives in the United States along with 22 imprisoned United States citizens who arrived in the United States in July. Under the terms of an agreement signed between the United States and Cuba in December 1984, the United States agreed to accept up to 20,000 Cuban emigrants during 1985, including up to 3,000 released political prisoners and the relatives of those Cubans already in the United States in July 1984.

\* \* \*

Resources for information on the FAR were limited. The best analytical work on the Cuban military was prepared by Professor Jorge I. Domínguez of Harvard University, the author of a number of materials dealing with the FAR as well as with Cuba in general. The chapter entitled "The Civic Soldier" in his 1978 text, *Cuba: Order and Revolution*, reflected the best combination of factual and analytical information. However, given the rapid evolution of the armed forces institution, a considerable amount of the factual data, and even some of the analysis, was becoming dated by early 1985. Other excellent sources of factual information were the United States Defense Intelligence Agency's *Handbook on the Cuban Armed Forces*, published in April 1979, and an article prepared by Adrian J. English entitled "The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces," which was published in *Jane's Defence Weekly* in June 1984. The Central Intelligence Agency's annual *Directory of Officials of the Republic of Cuba: A Reference Aid* was the most comprehensive source available listing personnel assigned to the MINFAR and the MININT, members of the upper levels of the PCC, and other government officials. Such a listing was helpful in determining the organization of the ministries and the relative influence of those in command positions. It was not, however, as accurate or as up-to-date as one might have wished. Historical information on the armed forces was primarily based on accounts published by Louis A. Pérez, Jr., and Hugh S. Thomas.

Other sources consulted included a number of articles from the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Miami Herald*, most of which were reprinted by the Information Service for Latin America (ISLA) during 1983 and 1984. Also consulted were the weekly English edition of *Granma Weekly Review* and *Verde Olivo*, the official magazine of the FAR. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Joint Publications Research Service bulletins for Latin America were also consulted for materials dating from the latter half of the 1970s. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

## Appendix

### Table

- 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients
- 2 Estimated Population and Population Density, 1982
- 3 Enrollment in the School System, School Year 1980-81
- 4 Estimated Income Distribution, 1978
- 5 Global Social Product, 1981-83
- 6 Labor Force, 1980-83
- 7 Production of Minerals, 1980-83
- 8 Indicators of Manufacturing Material Product, 1980-83
- 9 Production of Selected Agricultural Products, 1980-83
- 10 Fiscal Budget of the State, 1980-83
- 11 Value of Exports by Major Commodity, 1980-83
- 12 Volume of Imports by Major Commodity, 1980-82
- 13 Foreign Trade by Major Area, 1980-83
- 14 Sugar Exports to Communist Countries, 1980-83
- 15 Sugar Exports to Noncommunist Countries, 1980-83
- 16 Value of Trade with Selected Noncommunist Countries, 1980-83
- 17 Estimated Energy Consumption, 1980-82
- 18 Soviet and East European Aid to Cuba, 1980-83
- 19 Soviet Hard Currency Flows to Cuba, 1980-83
- 20 Cuban International Aid Programs, Selected Years, 1976-83
- 21 Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

## APPENDIX

*Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients*

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters.....	0.04	inches
Centimeters.....	0.39	inches
Meters.....	3.3	feet
Kilometers .....	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m) .....	2.47	acres
Square kilometers .....	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters.....	35.3	cubic feet
Liters .....	0.26	gallons
Kilograms .....	2.2	pounds
Metric tons.....	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2.204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade).....	9	degrees
	divide by 5	Fahrenheit
	and add 32	

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 2. Estimated Population and Population Density, 1982*

Area	Area per Square Kilometer	Population (in thousands)	Density
<b>Provinces</b>			
Camagüey .....	14,158	675.2	47.0
Ciego de Ávila .....	6,321	325.9	52.0
Cienfuegos .....	4,177	330.3	79.0
Ciudad de La Habana .....	727	1,942.3	2,672.0
Granma .....	8,362	743.3	89.0
Guantánamo .....	6,184	468.3	76.0
Holguín .....	9,295	918.0	99.0
La Habana .....	5,691	592.1	104.0
Las Tunas .....	6,584	441.7	67.0
Matanzas .....	11,739	562.9	48.0
Pinar del Río .....	10,861	646.5	59.0
Sancti Spiritus .....	6,732	402.5	60.0
Santiago de Cuba .....	6,170	915.5	148.0
Villa Clara .....	7,944	770.2	97.0
<b>Islands</b>			
Isla de la Juventud .....	2,200	59.8	27.0
Other .....	3,715	n.a.	n.a.
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>110,860</b>	<b>9,794.5</b>	<b>88.4</b>

n.a.—not available

Source: Based on information from Cuba, Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, *Anuario estadístico de Cuba, 1982*, Havana, n.d., 29.

## Appendix

**Table 3. Enrollment in the School System, School Year 1980-81**

Level	Students	Percentage
Preschool.....	123,741	3.8
Primary education.....	1,468,538	44.8
High school.....	1,177,813	35.9
Adult education.....	227,003	8.5
Youth education.....	n.a.	0.0
Special education.....	28,568	0.9
Higher education.....	202,000	6.2
TOTAL.....	3,277,663	100.0*

n.a.—not available.

Figures may not add up to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from José Ángel Pescador Osuna, "Una aproximación a la experiencia educativa en Cuba," *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Educativos*, Mexico City, 12, No. 2, 1982, 98.

**Table 4. Estimated Income Distribution, 1978\***

(in percentage)

Population Decile (percentage of total)	Estimate "A"		Estimate "B"	
	Percentage of National Income	Cumulative Percentage of Income	Percentage of National Income	Cumulative Percentage of Income
0-10.....	3.4	3.4	5.1	5.1
11-20.....	4.4	7.8	5.9	11.0
21-30.....	5.3	13.1	6.5	17.5
31-40.....	7.1	20.2	7.3	24.8
41-50.....	9.3	29.5	8.0	32.8
51-60.....	10.4	39.9	8.5	41.3
61-70.....	12.6	52.5	9.9	51.2
71-80.....	14.1	66.6	12.8	64.0
81-90.....	15.3	81.9	14.9	78.9
91-100.....	18.1	100.0	21.1	100.0

\*Owing to the unavailability of reliable figures on Cuban income distribution, the figures used in this table were based on two different hypothetical situations (estimates A and B). The actual income distribution in 1978 was likely to have been between these two figures.

Source: Based on information from Claes Brundenius, *Economic Growth, Basic Needs, and Income Distribution in Revolutionary Cuba*, Lund, Sweden, 1981, 151.



*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 5. Global Social Product, 1981-83\**

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1981	1982	1983
<b>Material product</b>			
Agriculture			
Sugar.....	1,464	1,278	1,223
Nonsugar.....	1,158	1,062	976
Livestock.....	1,811	1,672	1,714
Services.....	45	42	41
Total agriculture.....	4,478	4,054	3,954
Forestry.....	102	101	122
Fishing.....	271	292	292
Industry			
Electric energy.....	578	587	585
Mining.....	313	300	319
Manufacturing.....	11,075	10,739	10,900
Total industry.....	11,966	11,626	11,804
Construction.....	2,301	2,161	2,320
Total material product.....	19,119	18,234	18,492
<b>Nonmaterial product</b>			
Transportation.....	2,077	1,934	1,940
Communication.....	220	229	237
Commerce.....	6,953	5,893	7,133
Other.....	128	131	144
Total nonmaterial product.....	9,378	9,187	9,454
<b>GLOBAL SOCIAL PRODUCT.....</b>	<b>28,497</b>	<b>27,421</b>	<b>27,947</b>

\*In constant 1981 prices.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 7.

Table 6. Labor Force, 1980-83

(in thousands)

Sector	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>Civilian</b>				
State				
Productive				
Agriculture.....	624	619	616	594
Forestry .....	20	21	21	27
Industry .....	548	576	690	627
Construction .....	273	266	261	285
Transportation.....	171	181	180	185
Communication .....	22	23	24	25
Commerce .....	302	311	324	344
Other .....	10	11	13	14
Total productive .....	1,970	2,008	2,129	2,101
Nonproductive .....	766	817	845	870*
Total state .....	2,736	2,825	2,974	2,971
Private .....	213	186	178	176
Total civilian .....	2,949	3,011	3,152	3,147
Military.....	319	300	300	300
Unemployed.....	261	200	180	160
<b>TOTAL.....</b>	<b>3,529</b>	<b>3,511</b>	<b>3,632</b>	<b>3,607</b>

\*Estimated.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 27; and Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, *A Description of the Cuban Economic Analysis and Forecasting System (CEAFS) with Projections for the Cuban Economy to 1985*, Philadelphia, August 1983, 11.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 7. Production of Minerals, 1980-83*

(in thousands of tons)

Mineral	1980	1981	1982 <sup>1</sup>	1983 <sup>2</sup>
Hydraulic cement.....	2,831	3,292	3,163	3,400
Chromite.....	29	21	27	32
Cobalt.....	1,613	1,715	1,500	1,650
Copper.....	3,305	2,908	2,645	3,000
Gypsum.....	122	130	127	130
Iron and crude steel.....	304	330	301	353
Lime.....	146	140	145	145
Nickel.....	38,207	40,260	37,600	39,000

<sup>1</sup>Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup>Estimated.

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, *The Mineral Industry of the Islands of the Caribbean*. Washington, 1983. 2.

Appendix

Table 8. Indicators of Manufacturing Material Product 1980-83

(index 1975=100)

Product	1980	1981	1982	1983*
<b>Nondurable goods</b>				
Food (excluding sugar).....	120.2	137.4	142.2	156.4
Sugar and sugar products .....	121.6	141.1	145.7	143.2
Beverages and tobacco .....	117.0	142.6	161.9	157.7
Clothing.....	143.1	171.7	165.9	192.0
Printed matter.....	129.3	153.7	119.2	124.7
Average nondurable goods .....	122.3	141.0	149.1	153.0
<b>Intermediate goods</b>				
Textiles .....	101.0	113.7	113.8	128.4
Chemicals .....	100.1	124.9	103.5	113.0
Fuels.....	96.7	100.3	102.0	104.5
Construction materials .....	117.7	133.3	122.8	127.0
Average intermediate goods .....	102.4	116.8	107.8	114.3
<b>Consumer durables and capital goods</b>				
Construction of nonelectrical machinery.....	172.2	215.8	234.9	268.9
Electrotechnical and electronic goods .....	93.6	123.9	110.6	137.1
Metal products .....	130.9	150.2	185.3	187.7
Average consumer durables and capital goods .....	143.2	177.7	189.2	218.0
Other manufactured goods.....	116.4	142.9	144.8	153.5
Average manufacturing sector.....	118.2	138.4	142.2	149.0

\*Preliminary.

Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*. Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 12.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 9. Production of Selected Agricultural Products, 1980-83*

(in thousands of tons)

Product	1980	1981	1982	1983*
Rice .....	478	461	520	518
Corn .....	23	23	22	30
Dry beans .....	9	8	12	13
Tomatoes .....	207	312	227	151
Onions .....	10	17	15	10
Peppers .....	45	34	34	23
Potatoes .....	239	272	258	207
Sweet potatoes .....	228	200	177	201
Taro root .....	161	99	48	45
Citrus fruits				
Oranges .....	298	257	339	399
Lemons .....	25	30	41	30
Grapefruit .....	84	146	128	166
Other .....	37	38	22	36
Total citrus fruits .....	444	471	530	631
Bananas .....	233	260	272	315
Mangoes .....	59	58	52	39
Guava .....	46	43	43	50
Tobacco .....	8	53	45	30
Coffee .....	19	22	29	26
Sugar .....	6,600	7,300	8,210	7,100

\*Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*, Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 8.

Table 10. *Fiscal Budget of the State, 1980-83*

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>Revenues</b>				
State sector .....	n.a.	n.a.	11,825	13,018
Nonstate sector .....	n.a.	n.a.	27	27
Taxes .....	n.a.	n.a.	132	159
Total revenues .....	13,200	13,824	11,985*	13,205*
<b>Expenditures</b>				
Productive sector .....	6,419	7,332	4,587	4,880
Housing and community services ...	550	598	568	663
Education and public health .....	2,501	2,568	2,516	2,637
Other social, cultural, and scientific activities .....	1,863	1,794	1,710	1,907
Public administration .....	645	764	744	751
Defense and internal security .....	1,067	1,191	1,331	1,299
Other .....	513	568	652	618
Total expenditures .....	13,558	14,816*	12,108	12,758*
<b>BALANCE</b> .....	- 358	- 992	- 123	447

n.a.—not available.

\*Figures may not add to total because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe: Cuba, 1983*. Santiago, Chile, November 1984, 35.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 11. Value of Exports by Major Commodity, 1980-83<sup>1</sup>*

(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982	1983 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Sugar</b>				
Raw and refined .....	4,624	4,225	4,526	4,717
Molasses .....	53	44	34	13
Total sugar.....	4,677	4,269	4,560	4,730
<b>Minerals</b>				
Nickel.....	260	400	339	352
Other .....	10	9	8	8
Total minerals.....	270	409	347	360
<b>Tobacco</b>				
Raw .....	8	24	54	37
Manufactured.....	43	48	70	82
Total tobacco.....	51	72	124	119
<b>Foodstuffs and beverages</b>				
Fish and shellfish .....	124	126	117	122
Citrus fruits .....	58	99	118	137
Other .....	73	76	77	113
Total foodstuffs and beverages...	255	301	312	372
Other .....	340	355	585	835
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	5,593	5,406	5,928	6,416

<sup>1</sup>Exports or free on board.

<sup>2</sup>Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984. 31.

Appendix

Table 12. *Volume of Imports by Major Commodity, 1980-82*

(in thousands of tons, unless otherwise indicated)

Commodity	1980	1981	1982
<b>Foodstuffs</b>			
Rice (milled) .....	230	199	201
Wheat .....	873	984	1,023
Wheat flour .....	299	263	177
Corn .....	711	523	367
Fruits and legumes .....	182	176	190
Lard .....	89	83	84
Canned milk .....	21	23	21
<b>Raw materials and intermediate goods</b>			
Raw cotton .....	37	41	39
Crude vegetable oil .....	75	78	66
Wood pulp .....	48	42	45
Rubber .....	17	14	6
Sulfur .....	148	168	170
Caustic soda .....	49	41	49
Cast iron .....	149	162	164
Tin plate .....	56	64	46
Coke .....	53	59	60
Fertilizer .....	1,186	1,256	1,241
Cotton cloth (millions of square meters) .....	75	64	59
<b>Fuel</b>			
Crude oil .....	6,025	6,355	6,247
Gasoline .....	250	203	263
Fuel oil .....	2,820	2,954	3,438
Diesel oil .....	952	1,134	1,298
<b>Transportation equipment (units)</b>			
Locomotives .....	12	4	4
Automobiles .....	8,594	11,440	12,941
Trucks .....	7,777	6,271	8,744
Buses .....	2,199	2,740	505
Tractors .....	9,988	10,562	10,058

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 34.



*Cuba: A Country Study*

**Table 13. Foreign Trade by Major Area, 1980-83**

(in millions of United States dollars)

Area	1980	1981	1982	1983 <sup>1</sup>
<b>Exports (f.o.b.)<sup>2</sup></b>				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union .....	3,177	3,018	3,956	4,494
Eastern Europe .....	569	730	666	746
Far East .....	176	315	386	281
Total communist countries ..	3,922	4,063	5,008	5,521
Noncommunist countries .....	1,671	1,343	920	895
Total exports .....	5,593	5,406	5,928	6,416
<b>Imports (c.i.f.)<sup>3</sup></b>				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union .....	3,989	4,139	4,507	4,926
Eastern Europe .....	826	918	1,082	1,120
Far East .....	168	203	297	209
Total communist countries ..	4,983	5,260	5,886	6,255
Noncommunist countries .....	1,426	1,286	759	964
Total imports .....	6,409	6,546	6,645	7,219
<b>Trade balance</b>				
Communist countries				
Soviet Union .....	-812	-1,121	-551	-432
Eastern Europe .....	-257	-188	-416	-374
Far East .....	8	112	89	72
Total communist countries ..	-1,061	-1,197	-878	-734
Noncommunist countries .....	245	57	161	69
<b>Total trade balance .....</b>	<b>-816</b>	<b>-1,140</b>	<b>-717</b>	<b>-803</b>

<sup>1</sup>Preliminary.

<sup>2</sup>f.o.b. (free on board).

<sup>3</sup>c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight).

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984. 25.

Appendix

Table 14. *Sugar Exports to Communist Countries, 1980-83*

(in thousands of tons)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet Union.....	2,726	3,204	4,426	3,315
Eastern Europe				
Albania .....	17	12	16	16
Bulgaria .....	234	250	278	331
Czechoslovakia .....	99	100	135	145
East Germany .....	210	255	213	281
Hungary .....	34	76	73	0
Poland .....	63	70	0	0
Romania .....	47	139	90	221
Total Eastern Europe .....	704	902	805	994
Far East				
China .....	512	573	915	772
Mongolia .....	5	5	5	5
North Korea.....	11	28	17	22
Vietnam .....	42	103	24	77
Total Far East .....	570	709	961	876
TOTAL .....	4,000	4,815	6,192	5,185

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*. Washington, June 1984. 35.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 15. Sugar Exports to Noncommunist Countries, 1980-83*

(in thousands of tons)

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983
Algeria.....	207	253	208	99
Angola.....	67	58	52	41
Britain.....	0	0	0	0
Canada.....	264	376	160	190
Egypt.....	138	162	190	230
Ethiopia.....	0	0	0	0
Finland.....	78	173	39	65
Indonesia.....	39	14	14	0
Iran.....	0	0	0	0
Iraq.....	278	178	134	158
Japan.....	267	355	295	355
Malaysia.....	25	108	26	48
Mexico.....	401	138	140	63
Morocco.....	0	0	0	0
New Zealand.....	0	0	16	0
Portugal.....	131	155	71	15
Spain.....	0	23	22	0
Sweden.....	0	25	0	5
Syria.....	134	109	109	109
United States.....	0	0	0	0
Yugoslavia.....	0	10	0	9
Other.....	162	119	66	157
TOTAL.....	2,191	2,256	1,542	1,606

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 36.

Appendix

Table 16. Value of Trade with Selected Noncommunist Countries  
1980-83

(in millions of United States dollars)

	1980	1981	1982	1983
<b>Exports</b>				
Belgium/Luxembourg .....	3.3	0.6	0.8	1.1
Britain .....	5.1	2.8	2.6	1.8
Canada .....	11.2	13.8	6.4	3.8
Finland .....	4.4	4.1	2.1	1.2
France .....	5.6	4.8	4.7	4.8
Italy .....	4.0	3.2	3.6	3.1
Japan .....	16.0	12.5	9.3	7.6
Netherlands .....	6.0	2.3	3.9	7.5
Portugal .....	1.9	4.7	3.6	0.5
Spain .....	7.5	5.2	9.2	7.8
Switzerland .....	0.6	0.5	0.6	0.5
West Germany .....	4.7	2.3	2.7	2.5
<b>Imports</b>				
Belgium/Luxembourg .....	2.3	2.8	1.3	1.2
Britain .....	6.8	4.6	9.5	5.8
Canada .....	29.9	31.8	21.9	24.5
France .....	22.3	12.4	4.7	8.3
Ireland .....	1.7	1.3	2.1	2.2
Italy .....	4.5	3.7	3.2	2.5
Japan .....	20.0	22.0	10.5	8.7
Netherlands .....	3.8	3.2	4.8	3.3
Spain .....	15.7	14.5	8.9	7.5
Sweden .....	4.3	4.9	1.6	1.4
Switzerland .....	2.3	2.6	1.5	2.2
West Germany .....	9.1	7.7	5.4	5.4

*Cuba: A Country Study*

**Table 17. Estimated Energy Consumption, 1980-82**

(barrels per day of oil equivalent)

	1980	1981	1982
<b>Energy consumption</b>			
Oil .....	214,405	220,085	210,865
Nonoil .....	61,161	63,343	69,181
Total energy consumption .....	275,566	283,428	280,046
<b>Domestic production</b>			
Oil .....	5,491	5,085	10,865
Hydroelectricity .....	1,200	1,200	1,200
Natural gas .....	310	232	250
Ethyl alcohol .....	700	700	700
Bagasse .....	51,621	53,571	59,391
Fuelwood and charcoal .....	5,740	5,740	5,740
Total domestic production .....	65,062	66,528	78,146
<b>Energy imports</b>			
Oil .....	127,201	125,000	125,000
Oil products .....	81,403	90,000	75,000
Coal .....	1,900	1,900	1,900
Total energy imports .....	210,504	216,900	201,900

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 11.

Table 18. *Soviet and East European Aid to Cuba, 1980-83*

(in millions of United States dollars)

Economic Aid	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet aid				
Development aid .....	830	1,415	975	1,000
Trade subsidies				
Sugar.....	1,165	1,366	2,580	2,800
Petroleum.....	1,480	1,657	1,006	300
Nickel .....	-12	122	107	100
Total trade subsidies.....	2,633	3,145	3,693	3,200
Total Soviet aid.....	3,463	4,560	4,668	4,200
East European aid				
Sugar subsidy .....	-10	222	311	370
Trade financing.....	257	188	416	374
Total East European aid .....	247	410	727	744
TOTAL.....	3,710	4,970	5,395	4,944

\*Figures for Soviet Union are preliminary; figures for Eastern Europe are estimated.  
Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 41.

Table 19. *Soviet Hard Currency Flows to Cuba, 1980-83*

(in millions of United States dollars)

Economic Aid	1980	1981	1982	1983
Soviet sugar purchases.....	0	168	291	16
Grain and flour exports.....	234	319	266	250
Other.....	141	216	216	571
TOTAL.....	375	703	773	837

\*Preliminary.

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review*, Washington, June 1984, 41.

*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 20. Cuban International Aid Programs, Selected Years, 1976-83*

	1983	1976-77	1978	1981
<b>Africa</b>				
Algeria.....	n.a.	15 (m)	15 (m)	170 (m-c)
Angola.....	24,000 (m)	20,000 (m)	19,000 (m)	25,000 (m)
	n.a.	5,000 (c)	n.a.	7,000 (c)
Benin.....	20 (m)	20 (m)	10 (m)*	n.a.
Equatorial Guinea.....	150 (m)	150 (m)	200 (m)*	n.a.
Ethiopia.....	400 (m)	15,000 (m)	13,000 (m)	10,500 (m)
	300 (c)	500 (c)	n.a.	500 (c)
Guinea-Bissau ...	300 (m)	140 (m)	50 (m)	100 (m)
	n.a.	60 (c)	n.a.	50 (c)
Libya.....	125 (m)	200 (m)	200 (m)*	3,000 (m-c)
	n.a.	400 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
Madagascar.....	30 (m)	n.a.	50 (m)	
Mozambique.....	600 (m)	800 (m)	215 (m)	750 (m)
	n.a.	150 (c)	n.a.	150 (c)
Sierra Leone.....	25 (m)	100 (m)	100 (m)*	n.a.
Somalia.....	1,500 (m)	0 (m)	0 (m)	0 (m)
Tanzania.....	500 (m)	50 (m)	n.a.	n.a.
	n.a.	20 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
Zaire.....	1,000 (m)	400 (m)	500 (m)	750 (m)
Zambia.....	n.a.	60 (m)	100 (m)*	n.a.
	n.a.	20 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Middle East</b>				
Iraq.....	150 (m)	150 (m)	n.a.	2,200 (m)
	n.a.	400 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
South Yemen .....	n.a.	100 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Latin America</b>				
Grenada.....	n.a.	150 (m)	100 (m)	900 (m-c)
	n.a.	350 (c)	1,000 (c)	n.a.
Guyana.....	n.a.	10 (m)	5 (m)*	n.a.
	n.a.	65 (c)	n.a.	n.a.
Jamaica.....	n.a.	450 (c)	600 (c)	n.a.
Nicaragua.....	n.a.	n.a.	200 (m)	2,000 (m)
	n.a.	n.a.	1,700 (c)	8,000 (c)
Panama.....	n.a.	n.a.	30 (m)*	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

\*Estimated.

NOTE—(m)—military personnel; (c)—civilian personnel; (m-c)—military and civilian personnel.

Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
<i>Revolutionary Army</i>	
<b>Armored fighting vehicles</b>	
T-34 main battle tanks.....	350
T-54 and T-55 main battle tanks.....	350
T-62 main battle tanks.....	150
PT-76 light tanks.....	40
BRDM-1 and BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles.....	150
BMP mechanized infantry combat vehicles.....	100
BTR-40, BTR-60, and BTR-152 armored personnel carriers.....	400
<b>Artillery (estimated at 1,200 guns and howitzers)</b>	
76mm and 85mm M1942 field guns.....	n.a.
122mm SU-100 self-propelled assault guns.....	100
130mm M-46 field guns.....	n.a.
152mm D-1 gun-howitzers.....	n.a.
152mm D-20 gun-howitzers.....	n.a.
152mm ML-20 gun-howitzers.....	n.a.
122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.....	n.a.
140mm BM-14 multiple rocket launchers.....	n.a.
240mm BM-24 multiple rocket launchers.....	n.a.
FROG-4 and FROG-7 surface-to-surface missiles.....	65
<b>Antitank weapons</b>	
57mm M1943 antitank guns.....	n.a.
57mm CH-26 antitank guns.....	n.a.
AT-3 Sapper and AT-1 Sapper antitank guided weapons.....	n.a.
<b>Air defense weapons (estimated at 1,500)</b>	
23mm ZU-23 light antiaircraft guns (towed).....	n.a.
23mm ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns.....	n.a.
57mm ZSU-57 self-propelled antiaircraft guns.....	n.a.
SA-7 Grail and SA-9 Gaskin surface-to-air missile.....	n.a.
<i>Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force</i>	
<b>Combat aircraft</b>	
MiG-17 Fresco interceptors.....	15
MiG-21 Fishbed interceptor/ground attack aircraft.....	184
Mi-23 Flogger interceptor/ground attack aircraft.....	51
<b>Transport aircraft</b>	
Il-14 Crate short-range transports.....	16
AN-2 Colt short-range transports.....	35
AN-24 Coke short-range transports.....	3
An-26 Curl.....	22
Yak-40.....	4



*Cuba: A Country Study*

*Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces—  
Continued*

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
<b>Helicopters</b>	
Mi-4 .....	60
Mi-8 <sup>1</sup> .....	40
Mi-24 Hind D helicopter gunships .....	18
<b>Trainers</b>	
Mi-21U .....	10
Mi-23U .....	2
An-2 .....	n.a.
Zlin-326 <sup>2</sup> .....	30
L-39 .....	n.a.
<b>Air-to-air missiles</b>	
AA-1 Alkali .....	n.a.
AA-2 Atoll .....	n.a.
AA-8 Aphid .....	n.a.
<b>Surface-to-air missiles</b>	
SA-2 Guideline .....	60
SA-3 Goa .....	140
SA-6 Gainful .....	12
 <i>Revolutionary Navy</i>	
<b>Submarines</b>	
Foxtrot-class, diesel-powered .....	3
Whiskey-class, diesel-powered (used for training) .....	1
<b>Frigates</b>	
Koni-class .....	2
<b>Large patrol craft</b>	
SO-1 .....	9
Kronshtadt-class .....	2
<b>Fast attack craft</b>	
Armed with Styx surface-to-surface missiles	
Osa-I class .....	5
Osa-II class .....	13
Komar-class .....	8
Armed with torpedoes	
Turya-class hydrofoils .....	8
P-6 .....	6
P-4 .....	12
Used for patrols	
Zhuk-class .....	22
<b>Minesweepers</b>	
Sonya-class .....	2
Yevgenya-class .....	10

Table 21. Major Equipment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces—  
Continued

Equipment	Estimated Number in Inventory
<b>Coastal defense</b>	
122mm M1931/37 corps guns .....	n.a.
152mm M1937 gun-howitzers .....	n.a.
130mm SM-4-1 coastal guns .....	n.a.
SSC-2b Samlet surface-to-surface missiles .....	50

n.a.—not available.

<sup>1</sup>One-half Mi-8s believed to be armed.<sup>2</sup>Manufactured in Czechoslovakia.

NOTE—The Soviet Union is almost the exclusive supplier of Cuban military equipment.

Source: Based on information from "Cuba," *The Military Balance, 1984-1985*, London, 1984, 119-20.

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## Glossary

**Club of Paris**—An informal organization of countries that considers and coordinates rescheduling of official debt to creditor governments. The French minister of the treasury acts as the unofficial chairman for the member countries.

**Comecon**—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. An economic organization of the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), the Soviet Union, the Mongolian People's Republic, Vietnam, and Cuba that is headquartered in Moscow. Cuba became a member in 1972. Purpose is to further economic cooperation among member countries. Sometimes abbreviated as CEMA or CMEA.

**Global social product (GSP)**—The most often used measure of economic growth. Includes the output values of the material and nonmaterial product and excludes consumption.

**International Monetary Fund (IMF)**—Established along with the World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries. In 1984 the IMF had 148 members.

**peso**—The national currency, consisting of 100 centavos. Between 1914 and 1971 the peso was exchanged at parity with the United States dollar. Since the early 1960s the peso has not been freely exchanged in the international market. The peso was tied to the ruble—the Soviet Union's currency. In tandem with the gradual devaluation of the dollar after 1970, the value of the peso was artificially raised. There are no estimates for a real dollar/peso exchange rate. Consequently, the official exchange rate of the peso in relation to the dollar was highly overvalued. The official exchange rate was arbitrarily fixed at US\$1.40 per peso in 1980; US\$1.28 in 1981; US\$1.20 in 1982; US\$1.16 in 1983; and US\$1.13 in 1984.

## Index

- ABC (terrorist group): 29, 31  
 abortion: 85  
 Abrahantes Fernández, José: 284  
 Abrams, Elliot: 83  
 Acosta Cordero, Armando: 179  
 adult education: 78, 299  
 Agramonte, Roberto: 35  
 agreements with the United States: anti-hijacking, 220; fishing, 134; prisoner ransom, 44  
 agriculture: xiv, 56, 128-33; basic crops versus sugar, 53; growth measurement, 116; labor force, 99, 299  
 Agrupación Católica: 96  
 air force. *See* Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air Force  
 airlines: 117-18, 258  
 airports: Fig. 4  
 Albania: 180, 309  
 Algeria: 212, 282, 308  
 Allende Gossens, Salvador: 214  
 Almeida Bosque, Juan: 179  
 Alvor Agreement: 278  
 Amanico Rodríguez mill: 126  
 American Sugar Refining company: 16  
 Angola: xxv, xxvi, 57, 58, 199, 214, 218, 312; trade, 308; troops in, 221, 253, 277-80, 285  
 Antiaircraft Defense and Revolutionary Air force (DAAFAR): 240, 250, 251, 256-58, 273, 274, 313, 314  
 Antilla: Fig. 4  
 Antón Recio: Fig. 4  
 Arango y Parreño, Francisco de: 13  
 Arce Méndez, Sergio: 97  
 Archipiélago de Camagüey: 66, 67  
 Archipiélago de los Canarreos: 66, Fig. 2  
 Archipiélago de los Colorados: 66  
 Archipiélago de Sabana: 66, Fig. 2  
 Argentina: xxvi, 142, 150, 214, 215  
 armed forces (*see also* Revolutionary Armed Forces): xvi, 120, 261; Colonial era, 227-31; under Batista, 238-43; under Castro, 45, 51, 123; wars of independence, 231-33  
 army. *See* Revolutionary Army  
 Army of Liberation: 19, 20, 21, 232, 233  
 Australia: 142  
 Auténticos: 32, 34, 175, 187  
 Azicri, Max: 196  
 bagasse: 144, 150, 310  
 Bahía Cabañas: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Cienfuegos: Fig. 2  
 Bahía de La Habana: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Matanzas: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Nipe: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Nuevitas: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Puerto Padre: 66, Fig. 2  
 Bahía de Santiago: Fig. 2  
 Bahía del Mariel: 66  
 Bahía Honda: 66, Fig. 2  
 Balaguer, José Ramón: 179  
 Banes: Fig. 4  
 banks and banking: 137-39; foreign banks, 40, 151, 154  
 Baracoa: 7, 228  
 Barbados: 214  
 Barnet, José A.: 32  
 Batista Santana, Sixto: 179  
 Batista y Zaldívar, Fulgencio: 4, 30, 31, 32, 33, 187, 236-43; Communist party and, 176; dictatorship, 27, 34-38; military expenditures, 252  
 Bay of Pigs invasion: 44, Fig. 2  
 Bayamo: Fig. 1, 7, Fig. 2, Fig. 4, 230  
 Ben Bella, Ahmed: 212  
 Benavides Rodríguez, Joaquín: Fig. 6  
 Benin: 312  
 Betancourt, Pedro E.: 19  
 Betancourt, Salvador Cisneros: 20  
 Betancourt Gallegos, Rómulo: 211  
 Bettelheim, Charles: 103  
 Bialer, Seweryn: 222  
 birth rate: 69



## *Cuba: A Country Study*

- Bishop, Maurice: xxvi, 215, 283  
 Bolivia: 214  
 Boniato prison: 289  
 Boquerón: 117  
 border guard troops: 259, 285  
 Brazil, xxvi, 142, 227  
 Britain: 11, 142, 150, 309  
 Brooke, John R.: 22  
 Brundenius, Claes: 99, 102  
 budget: 93, 103, 134, 135, 136, 138; education, 77; health care, 89; military sector, 252; revenues, 135-36, 138; 303  
 Bulgaria: 141, 144, 148, 307  
 Cabo Maisi: Fig. 2  
 Cabo San Antonio: Fig. 2  
 Cabrisas Ruiz, Ricardo: Fig. 6, 218  
 Caibarién: Fig. 4  
 Caimanera: Fig. 4  
 Camacho Aguilera, Julio E.: 179  
 Camagüey (province and city): Fig. 1, 26, 67, 68, 73, Fig. 4; agriculture, 128, 132; population, 296  
 Cambodia: 218  
 Camp Columbia: 30, 35, 237, 239, 242  
 Canada: 40; trade, 142, 149, 150, 308, 309  
 Cano Blanco, Miguel José: 178  
 Cárdenas: Fig. 4  
 Carrillo, Francisco: 19  
 Carter, Jimmy: 57-58, 199, 262  
 Casas Regueiro, Julio: 250  
 Casas Regueiro, Senén: 178  
 Castro Ruz, Fidel: xix, 4, 5, 35-36, 42, 53, 54, 192, 242; army and, 44, 252, 268-69, 275; church and state relations, 96, 97; economy and, 48, 50, 51; foreign aid program, 222; foreign policy, 218, 221, 222, 280; ideology versus economic incentives, 205; military missions, 288; official titles, xx, 159, 161, 166, 167, Fig. 6, 178, 244, 246; politics, 176, 181, 196; Soviet Union and, 206, 213, 214, 215; state security, 184, 286-87; statements and speeches, 57, 65, 83, 87, 189, 213, 214, 267  
 Castro Ruz, Raúl: 37, 42, 54; army and, 194, 197, 219, 246, 248, 275; official titles, xxi, 48, Fig. 6, 167, 179, 184; politics, 51-52, 192, 193, 194; statements, 98, 189, 267  
 Cayo del Rosario: Fig. 2  
 Cayo Largo: Fig. 2  
 Cayo Loco naval stations: 241  
 Cayo Mambi: Fig. 4  
 CDRs. *See* Committees for the Defense of the Revolution  
 censorship: 190  
 censuses: 12, 22  
 Central Planning Board (JUCEPLAN): 119, 134, 198, 210  
 Céspedes y Quesada, Carlos Manuel de: 15, 30, 230, 236  
 Chibás, Eduardo (Eddie): 34, 35  
 children and youth: 288; mass organizations, 87, 88  
 Chile: 214, 218  
 China: 46, 50, 69; trade, 141, 307  
 Christianity: 95  
 church and state: 96-98  
 Ciego de Ávila (province and city): Fig. 1, 67, Fig. 4, 128; population, 296  
 Cienfuegos (province and city): Fig. 1, 128, 146; nuclear plant, 144, 245; population, 296; port, 66, 117, Fig. 4; submarine base, 259-60  
 Cienfuegos Gorriarán, Osmani: Fig. 6, 179  
 Ciudad de La Habana (province): Fig. 1, 69  
 civic action: military manpower and, 248, 252; social service, 264  
 Civil Defense forces: 252, 268-71  
 climate: xiv, 68  
 Club of Paris: 152, 154  
 coffee: 11, 130, 302  
 Colomé Ibarra, Abelardo: 179  
 Colombia: xxvi, 212, 213, 215  
 Columbus, Christopher (Cristóbal Colón): 5, 7  
 Columbus, Diego: 7  
 Comecon. *See* Council for Mutual Economic Assistance  
 Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs): 39, 42, 81, 82, 93, 182,

## Index

- 184-85, 198, 286; Civil Defense, 270; purpose, 83; reports to police, 205, 286; women in, 187
- communist countries: 140, 306, 307
- Communist Parties of Latin America and the Caribbean: 220
- Communist Party of Cuba (PCC): xx, 32, 48, 50, 51-52, 104, 161, 162, 188, 190, 191, 193, 198, 199, 209, 210; Central Committees, 178, 182, 249; Congresses, 55, 56, 57; history, 173-177; mass organizations and, 82, 182; military officers in leadership roles, 201-02, 247; newspapers, 190; organization, 177-80; Political Bureau, 203, 204, 218; religion and, 100; role in armed forces, 248-50; role in government, 181-82, 194; women in, 185
- Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 209
- Communist Revolutionary Union: 175
- Confederation of the Cuban Workers (CTC): 32, 38, 47, 54, 81, 82, 175, 182, 183, 187-88; weekly paper, 190
- conscription: 250, 263-64
- Conservative Republican Party: 24, 33, 235
- Constitution of 1976: xx, 55, 159, 161, 162-63, 170; Communist party and, 181-82; education, 75; landownership, 86; mass organizations, 81, 182-83; national sovereignty, 243-44; religious freedom, 95
- constitutions: 22, 23, 35, 159-60, 243
- consumer goods: 104, 126, 200, 301; shortages; 112
- cooperatives: 95; agricultural, 32, 40, 86, 87, 119, 188
- copper: 10, 125, 300
- Cordillera de Guaniguanico: 67
- Cortés, Hernán: 7
- Costa Rica: xxvi, 215
- Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon): xxiii, xxviii, 54, 124; aid from, 148, 149; membership, 141, 198, 210; relations with, 147-48; trade with, 130, 207
- Council of Ministers: 118, 135, 161, 163, 165, 166-69, 183, 196, 203, 204, 244; Executive Committee, 167, Fig. 6, 190, 193, 218; military officers as members, 202; multiple posts, 203
- Council of State: 55, 82, 162-63, 165-66, 203, 204, 218, 243; judicial review, 170; military officers as members, 202
- Crahan, Margaret E.: 96
- Crédit Lyonnais: 154
- crime and punishment: 287-89; economic crimes, 184, 203, 205, 288
- Crombet Hernández-Baquero, Jaime: 179
- crop diseases: 128-30
- crops, 87, 128-30; Colonial era, 6, 11, 12; on private land, 86; production, 302
- Crowder, Enoch: 25, 29
- Cuban People's Party: 34
- Cuban Revolutionary Party: *See* Auténticos
- Cubana de Aviación: 258
- Cuchillas de Toa: Fig. 2, 69
- Cunagua: Fig. 4
- currency: xv
- Cuza Téllez-Girón, José: 250, 259
- Cyboneyes: 6
- Czechoslovakia: 141, 148, 214, 221, 307
- Darias Rodés, Ramón: Fig. 6
- de las Casas, Bartolomé: 8
- death, causes, 92; penalty, 289; rate, 70
- del Aguila, Juan: 178
- del Valle Jiménez, Sergio: Fig. 6, 179, 284
- development planning: 51, 118, 120, 194, 198-99, 210; management, 195; project aid, 149, 150
- Díaz-Briquets, Sergio: 69, 93
- Díaz Ortega, Haydée: 285
- Díaz Suarez, Adolfo: Fig. 6
- diseases: 21, 72, 90, 91
- divorce: 85
- Domenech Benítez, Joel: Fig. 6
- Dominguez, Jorge L.: 165, 188, 191, 246
- Dominica: 215
- Dominican Republic: 211, 214, 230
- Dorticos Torrado, Osvaldo: 39, 48, 54, 195
- dos Santos, José Eduardo: 279
- drug trafficking: 287
- East Germany: 141, 148, 307

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

- Economic Society of Friends of the Country: 13
- Ecuador (country): xxvi, 215
- Ecuador sugar mill: 126
- education (*see also* schools): xiv, xxii, 4, 43, 74-80; budget, 24, 136; foreign students, 218; Marxist-Leninist instruction, 87, 88, 189
- Egypt: 308
- Eisenhower, Dwight D.: 42, 44
- EJT. *See* Youth Labor Army
- El Habañero*: 13
- El Pan de Guajaibón: Fig. 2
- El Salvador: 222
- elderly persons: 90; pensions, 93, 121, 123
- elections: 172-73
- electricity: 116-17, 120, 143
- emigration (*see also* Mariel boatlift): xxii, 58, 67-70; exiles, 42; fleeing refugees, 286; freedom flights, 59; physicians, 89
- employment: 119, 122-23; absenteeism, 51; anti-loafing law, 121
- encomiendas* system: 8
- energy: 143-46, 245; consumption, 310
- English, Adrian J.: 258
- Escalante, Anibal: 43, 51, 52, 176, 193, 198, 199, 209, 214
- Escalona Reguera, Juan: Fig. 6
- Esmeralda: Fig. 4
- Espin Guillois, Vilma: 84, 179
- Esquivel Yedra, Antonio: Fig. 6
- Estrada Palma, Tomás: 20, 23, 24, 25, 233-34
- Ethiopia: 57, 199, 215, 312; troops to, 221, 253, 277
- ethnic groups: xiv, 6, 8, 12
- European Economic Community: 142
- Expeditionary Forces: 261, 263, 265, 277, 278-81
- exports (*see also* sugar exports): xv, 139, 141-42; agriculture, 112, 130; by areas, 306; nickel, 139, 148; tobacco, 129, 139; value, 304
- Family Code: 185
- FAR. *See* Revolutionary Armed Forces
- Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front: 282
- Farah Balmaseda, Levi: Fig. 6
- Fauriol, Georges A.: 196
- Federation of Cuban Women (FMC): 54, 77, 81, 82, 84, 182, 185, 187, 266; magazine, 190
- Federation of Intermediate Level Students: 82, 88
- Federation of University Students (FEU): 81, 82, 88, 175
- Fernández Álvarez, José Ramón: 87, Fig. 6
- Fernández Cuervo-Vinent, Jorge A.: Fig. 6
- Fernandina: 7
- fertilizers: 128
- fidelistas*: 42, 48, 50, 192, 193, 196, 200, 205
- Finlay, Carlos Juan: 22, 72
- fisheries: 116, 133-34
- flag: xiii
- Florida: Fig. 4
- Foner, Philip: 10
- food: 93, 132, 133, 134; imports, 130, 305; manufacturing, 301; rationing, 50, 65, 93, 105
- Ford, Gerald R.: 57
- foreign debt: xxiii; owed to Soviet Union, 150, 152, 209; rescheduling, 112, 149-50, 153-54
- foreign exchange: 139, 151; rate, xv
- foreign investment: 25, 137; by United States companies, 17, 24, 27; joint ventures, 111, 112
- foreign policy (*see also* military advisers abroad): xvi, xxiv, xxvi, 211, 215; decisionmaking, 218-19; overseas aid programs, 217, 312; Soviet Union and, 209, 215; United States and, 219-22
- foreign trade (*see also* Soviet Union): xv, 50, 139-43; by areas, 306; Colonial era, 11, 13, 14, 29, 111-12; with the United States, 16, 24, 27
- forestry: 122
- France: 142, 150, 309
- free peasant markets: 104, 111, 119, 189, 205, 210
- Freemasons: 229

## Index

- Fundamental Law of the Armed Forces: 244  
Fundamental Law of the Revolution: 161
- Gaitán, Eliécer: 36  
Galván Vilá, Carlos: Fig. 6  
García, Calixto: 16  
García Frias, Guillermo: Fig. 6, 179  
García Ponce, Manuel: 19  
García Valls, Francisco: Fig. 6  
General Military Service: 250, 263, 264  
Geneva Convention: 245  
Geneva Protocol: 245  
Georgetown University: 196  
Ghana: 212  
Gibara: Fig. 4  
global social product (GSP): xiv, 113, 116-17, 298  
gold: 7, 10  
Golfo de Batabanó: 66, Fig. 2  
Golfo de Guacanayabo: Fig. 2, 67  
Gómez, José Miguel: 25, 27, 234-35  
Gómez, Juan Gualberto: 19  
Gómez, Máximo: 15, 18, 19, 20, 230, 231  
Gómez, Miguel M.: 32  
Gonzalez, Edward: 191-92  
Gordon, Antonio M.: 93  
GOSPLAN: 198, 210  
government: xv-xvi, 159, Fig. 6; Colonial era, 8-9; decree laws, 165; independence, 24, 27-29; Revolutionary era, 48, 50, 51-52, 55, 161; role in economic policy, 118, 119; United States occupation, 22  
graft and corruption: fringe benefits, 99, 104-05; in public office, 25, 27, 34, 37, 242; within the military, 238, 239, 242  
Grande mines: 125  
*Granma* (newspaper): 50, 180, 190  
Granma (province): Fig. 1, 126, 132; population, 296  
*Granma* (yacht): 37, 241  
*Granma Weekly Review*: 88, 190  
Grau San Martín Ramón: 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 175, 237  
Grenada: xxv, xxvii, 58, 215, 221-22, 283, 284, 312  
Grito de Baire: 19  
Grito de Yara: 15, 230  
gross material product: 113  
Guanahacabibes: 6  
Guane: Fig. 4  
Guantánamo (province and city): Fig. 1, 67, 68, Fig. 4, 296  
Guantanamo Bay: 66  
Guantanamo Bay naval base. *See under* United States  
Guatemala: 212, 214  
Guayabal: 117, Fig. 4  
Güelmes González, Pedro: Fig. 6  
guerrilla warfare training: 212, 215  
Guevara, Ernesto (Che): 37, 38, 42, 45, 47, 50, 51, 197, 213, 214; "new man" concept, 73, 102, 103  
Guinea-Bissau: 282, 312  
Guyana: 214, 312  
Guzmán Pascual, Arturo: Fig. 6
- Haig, Alexander M.: 222  
Haiti: 11, 211, 212, 214  
Handelman, Howard: 73, 93  
hard currency: 125, 145, 148; from Soviets, 311; shortages, 129, 145, 146, 150, 154  
Hart Dávalos, Armando: 48, Fig. 6, 179  
Hateuy: 7  
Havana (province and city): Fig. 1, 7, 131; industry, 146; population, 296; port, 9, 10, 117, Fig. 4, 228  
Havana Compromise: 213  
health care: xiv, xxii, 43, 72, 73, 88-92, 93  
Hermanos Ameijeiras Hospital: 90  
Herrera Sardiñas, Nivaldo: Fig. 6  
Herring, Hubert: 8  
Hevia, Carlos: 31, 34, 35  
higher education (*see also* military schools): 75, 77, 78, 79, 297; admission based on political loyalty, 96, 104, 105, 205, 273; social service requirement, 264  
Hispaniola: 5, 9, 66, 227

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
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## *Cuba: A Country Study*

- Holguin (province and city): Fig. 1, 67, Fig. 4, 124, 128; population, 296
- Hollerback, Paula E.: 69
- Honduras: 212, 214
- housing: 102, 105, 117
- human rights: 38, 84; Department of State report, 286; Organization of American States report, 82, 83, 86, 99; religious freedom, 95-96, 97
- Hungary: 307
- hurricanes and storms: 48, 68
- identification cards: 65, 103, 105, 106
- immigration: 24, 69
- import substitution: 40, 120
- imports: xv, 13, 125, 139, 142, 309; by areas, 306; foodstuffs, 111, 130, 132; in hard currency, 125; oil, 145; value, 305
- independence: 14, 18-20, 24
- Independent Colored Union: 25
- Indians: 8
- industry: xv, 118; role of government, 118, 121
- infant mortality: xxii, 70, 91
- inflation: 113
- Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI): 43, 44, 176, 197
- internal security (*see also* Ministry of Interior): 37, 139, 204; surveillance, 184, 185
- international agreements and memberships: xvi, 211, 244-46, 278
- International Atomic Energy Agency: 144, 245
- International Coffee Organization: 130, 139
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (London): 250, 282
- International Monetary Fund: 152
- International Sugar Agreement: 142
- International Sugar Organization: 151
- Iraq: 142, 308, 312
- iron ore: 125, 300
- Isla de la Juventud (Isle of Youth; Isle of Pines): Fig. 1, 26, 66, Fig. 2, 170, 241; military region, 251, 253, 254; population, 69, 218, 296
- Italy: 309
- Jackson, Jesse: 290
- Jagüey citrus plant: 126
- Jagüey Grande: Fig. 4
- Jamaica: 214, 215, 312
- Japan: 125, 141, 142, 150, 308, 309
- Jardines de la Reina: 66, Fig. 2
- Jatibonico: Fig. 4
- Jesuits: 6, 12
- Joint Caribbean Task Force: 221
- Joint Cuba-Soviet Governmental Commission: 198
- José Martí Airport: 118
- José Martí steel plant: 125
- Júcaro: Fig. 4, 125
- JUCEPLAN. *See* Central Planning Board
- judicial system: 54-55, 168-70, 204, 286-89
- Kennedy, John F.: 44, 45, 46
- Khrushchev, Nikita: 42, 46, 206
- Kissinger, Henry: 221, 278
- Kosygin, Aleksei: 207
- La Chambelona: 235
- La Esperanza: Fig. 4
- La Guerra Chiquita: 16
- La Habana. *See* Havana
- labor force: 7, 8, 15, 120-24, 299; four categories, 99; mass organizations and, 182-83; sugar industry, 129; women in, 84
- labor movement (*see also* Confederation of Cuban Workers): 29, 47; labor courts, 169
- Lage Coello, Marcos: Fig. 6
- landownership: 14, 40, 48, 97; private farmers, 188, 205; state farms, 86, 119; sugar lands, 39; tenant farmers, 87
- languages: xiv, 190
- Laredo Bru, Federico: 32
- La Camariocas plant: 124
- Las Casas, Luis de: 13
- Las Tunas (province): Fig. 1, 296

## Index

- Lawton: 93  
 Leclerc, Peg-Leg: 9  
 Legra López, Daniel: Fig. 6  
 Lemus, José Francisco: 229  
 LeoGrande, William M.: 196, 199  
*León Torras, Raúl Eugenio*: Fig. 6  
 Liberal Constitutionalist Army: 235  
 Libya: 312  
 life expectancy: 70, 92  
 Limited Test Ban Treaty: 46  
 literacy: 4-5, 43, 74, 75  
 livestock: 10, 11, 68, 116, 130, 132-33  
 local and regional government (*see also* *Organs of People's Power*): 169, 170-75, 178; budgets, 135, 137; Communist Party and, 182  
 López Moreno, José: Fig. 6  
 Lourdes complex: 207, 262  
  
 Maceo, Antonio: 15, 19, 20, 230, 231  
 Machado Ventura, José Ramón: 179  
 Machado y Morales, Gerardo: 4, 27, 29, 30; army and, 235-36  
 Madagascar: 312  
 Magoon, Charles E.: 25  
 malaria: 22, 91  
 Malmierca Peoli, Isidoro Octavio: Fig. 6, 217  
 malnutrition: 73, 93  
*Manifiesto de Montecristi*: 19  
 Manley, Michael: xxvi, 215  
 manufacturing: 117, 122, 125-26, 128, 301  
 Manzanillo: 67, 117, 120  
 Mariel: Fig. 2, 117, 120  
 Mariel boatlift: xxii, 59, 82, 98, 123, 290; type of person emigrating, 183-84, 204; undesirables to be returned to Cuba, xxvii, 222  
 Marinello, Juan: 175  
 Márques Sterling, Carlos: 38  
 Martí: Fig. 4  
 Martí y Pérez, José Julian: 4, 17, 18, 19, 20, 34, 39, 231  
 Martínez Gil, Pascual: 284  
 Mártir Carrión, Ángel Mariano: 285  
  
 Marxist-Leninist ideology: 71, 79, 217; indoctrination, 87, 88, 189, 247; religion and, 95  
 Masó, Bartolomé: 19, 20  
 mass media: 189-91, 204  
 mass organizations: 86, 182-84; children and youth, 74, 87; health care programs, 88; Revolutionary, 42, 43, 44, 53, 54; role of, 80-83; women, 84  
 Matahambre mines: 125  
 Matanzas (province and city): Fig. 1, 68, Fig. 4; agriculture, Fig. 2, 128, 130; port, 117, 146; population, 296  
 Matthews, Herbert: 37, 48  
 McKinley, William: 232  
 Mella, Julio Antonio: 173  
 Méndez Cominches, José Joaquín: 284  
 Mendieta, Carlos: 29, 31, 32, 237  
 Menéndez Tomashevich, Raúl: 254, 267  
 Menocal, Mario García: 25, 26, 235  
 Mesa-Lago, Carmelo: 75, 134  
 metric conversion coefficients: 295  
 Mexico: guerrilla training, 241; oil, 144, 156; relations with, 9, 45, 220; trade, 142, 143, 150, 308  
 MGR. *See* Revolutionary Navy  
 Miami Cuban community: 58  
*Miami Herald*: 87  
 Mikoyan, Anastas: 42, 211  
 Milian, Arnaldo: 176  
 military advisers abroad (*see also* Angola; Ethiopia: Expeditionary Forces; Military Assistance Forces): 56, 57, 58, 212, 215, 219, 277, 278, 280, 281; civilian volunteers, 282, 283  
 Military Assistance Forces: 251, 253, 277, 281-84  
 military bases and headquarters: air force, 256, 257, 258; army, 253, 254, 257; navy, 259, 260  
 military officers: in Communist party, 181, 247; in politics and government, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201-02, 284-85  
 military ranks, insignia, and uniforms: 261, 274-77; reclassification, 244



## *Cuba: A Country Study*

- military schools: 268 271-73; aviation, 258-59; civil defense, 271; naval academy, 251, 259; women's training, 266
- Millares Rodríguez, Manuel: Fig. 6
- minerals and mining: 111, 117, 124-25, 300
- MINFAR. *See* Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
- MININT. *See* Ministry of Interior
- ministries: 167, Fig. 6, 169; military officers in, 202, 284-85; reorganization, 203-04
- Ministry of Agriculture: 87, 171
- Ministry of Basic Industry: 118
- Ministry of Construction: 218
- Ministry of Education: 75, 77, 78, 171, 188
- Ministry of Finance: 134
- Ministry of Fishing Industry: 134
- Ministry of Foreign Trade: 171
- Ministry of Higher Education: 77, 78
- Ministry of Interior (MININT): xvii, 83, 284; criminal justice, 288; military officers in, 197, 284-85; ministers, 166, 167, Fig. 6; Special Troops, 272, 274, 278, 285; state security, 184, 185, 209, 286-87
- Ministry of Justice: 80, 169, 171
- Ministry of Light Industry: 171
- Ministry of Public Health: 78, 85, 88, 90, 92, 288
- Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR): 78, 167, 184, 193, 197, 199, 250-53, 268; minister, 248; reserves, 265; Soviet aid, 261
- Ministry of Transportation: 171
- Miramar neighborhood: 104
- Miret Prieto, Pedro: Fig. 6, 179
- missile crisis: 45, 58, 206-07, 212
- mobilized population: 82-83, 252, 270, 271; children, 87
- Moncada, Guillermo: 19
- Moncada army barracks: 36, 175, 240
- Monroe Doctrine: 14
- Montané Oropesa, Jesús: 179
- Morín Zorilla, José: Fig. 6
- Morón: Fig. 4
- motor vehicles: 53, 118; buses, 118, 126; imports, 307
- Movimiento 26 de Julio (M-26-7): 37, 39, 42, 43, 175, 176, 187, 241
- Mozambique: 282, 312
- Namibia: 279
- Naranjo Morales, José Alberto: Fig. 6
- National Assembly of People's Power: 163-65, 170, 243; elections, 172
- National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP): 81, 82, 85-87, 182, 183, 188, 189
- National Bank of Cuba: 134, 138
- national defense: xvi, 209; crimes against the state, 168, 169, 185, 243, 286-87; funding, 137, 252, 303
- National Institute for Agrarian Reform: 40
- National Institutes: 167, Fig. 6
- National Liberal Party: 24, 28, 31, 234, 235
- National Research Council (U.S.): 69
- National Revolutionary Militia: 268, 269
- National Revolutionary Police: 286
- Nationalist Union: 29, 31
- Nationalization of enterprises: 29, 52, 75, 88; Unites States companies, 40, 212
- navy. *See* Revolutionary Navy
- Netherlands: 142, 150, 309
- Neto, Agostinho: 278, 279
- "new man" model: 47, 51, 52, 71-72, 73, 88
- New York Times*: 37
- Nicaragua: 211, 215, 221, 282, 283, 312
- Nicaró: Fig. 2, 67
- Nicaró and Pedro Sotto Alba plants: 124
- nickel: 111, 116, 120, 124, 125, 139, 148, 300, 304, 311
- Niquero: Fig. 4
- Nkrumah, Kwame: 212
- nonaligned countries: 209
- Nonaligned Movement: 159, 212, 215
- North Korea: 307
- nuclear power plant: 111, 144, 245
- nuclear weapons: 244, 245
- Nueva Gerona: Fig. 4

## Index

- Nuevitas: 68, 122
- OAS. *See* Organization of American States
- Ochoa Sánchez, Arnaldo T.: 281
- oil: 111, 146, 305, 310; from Soviet Union, 141, 143, 145, 214, 262, 311; resale, xxiv, 145
- oil-for-sugar swap: 145
- Oman: 214
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development: 142
- Organization for Latin American Solidarity: 213
- Organization of American States (OAS): 143, 211, 212, 219, 221, 244; commission on human rights report, 82, 83, 86, 99
- Organization of José Martí Pioneers (OPJM): 73, 74, 82, 87-88, 180, 181
- Organs of People's Power: xxi, 82, 167, 171, 182, 183, 199
- ORI. *See* Integrated Revolutionary Organizations
- Ortega, Daniel: 282
- Ortodoxos: 34, 35
- Pact of Zanjón: 15
- Padrón González, José Luis: Fig. 6
- Pan American Union: 211
- Panama: 211, 312
- Paraguay: 212
- PCC. *See* Communist Party of Cuba
- Península de Guanahacabibes: Fig. 2
- Península de Zapata: Fig. 2
- People's Supreme Court: 163, 168, 169, 289
- Pérez González, Humberto: Fig. 6, 179
- Pérez Herrero, Antonio: 205
- Permanent Reciprocity Treaty: 160
- Perón, Juan Domingo: 36
- Peru: xxv, xxvi, 134, 212, 213, 214, 215
- Philippine islands: 21
- physicians: 88, 90, 91, 92
- Pico Real del Turquino: Fig. 2, 67
- Pico San Juan (La Cuca): 67
- Pinar del Río (province and city): Fig. 1, 67, Fig. 4, 125, 132; climate, 68; population, 296
- pirates: 9
- Platt Amendment: 3, 22-23, 24, 31, 160, 234
- Playa Girón: 44, Fig. 2, Fig. 4
- Poland: 307
- police: 239; secret police, 286
- political elite: xx, 65, 82, 178, 192, 193, 195; multiple posts, 205
- political prisoners: 36, 58, 105, 198, 220-21, 236, 289-90
- politics: xv, 23, 30, 32, 35, 39, 48; national level, 191-95; military officers and, 199, 247
- Popular Defense Force: 269
- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola: 278, 279
- Popular Party: 26
- Popular Socialist Party (PSP): 32, 39, 42, 43, 44, 160, 175, 176; "old communists," 192, 193, 197, 209
- population: xiv, 3, 12, 70-73; provinces, 296
- Population Reference Bureau: 70
- Portal León, Marcos: Fig. 6
- ports and harbors: 66, 117, Fig. 4, 119
- Portugal: 308, 309
- Preston: Fig. 4
- Prío Socorrás, Carlos: 34, 35, 36, 175, 187
- private employment: 121, 122, 123
- Progressive Action Party: 36
- prostitution: 27, 84, 287, 288
- Protestant Evangelical Theological Seminary: 97
- provinces: Fig. 1, 169, 170, 296
- Puerto Gibara: 66
- Puerto Padre: Fig. 4
- Puerto Príncipe (Camagüey): 7
- Puerto Rico: 21, 57
- Punta Gorda: 124
- radio and television: 126, 171, 190; listening to foreign broadcasts, 84; Radio Havana, 190

*Cuba: A Country Study*

- Radio Martí: xxvii  
 railroads: 117, 118, Fig. 4  
 rainfall: 67, 68  
 Ramirez Cruz, José G.: 179  
*raulistas*: 42, 192, 193, 194, 219  
 Reagan, Ronald: xxv, 59, 199, 267  
 Red Sundays: 271  
 Reed, Walter: 22  
 religion: xiv, 95-98  
*repartimientos* system: 8  
 research: 90  
 reserve troops: 250, 263, 265  
 retail prices: 119, 138  
 Revolution of 1933: 30-33  
 Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) (*see also* Ministry of Interior: Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces): xx, xxi, 51, 52, 55, 190, 249; as a political force, 194, 196-200, 201-02, 272-74; civilian government and, 246-48; Communist party and, 247-50; ranks, 275; recruits, 264; Soviet Union and, 209, 210; women in, 85  
 Revolutionary Army (ER): 250, 251, 253-56, 313  
 Revolutionary Navy (MGR): 250, 251, 259-60, 274, 314-15; ranks, 275-77  
 Revolutionary Student Directorate (DER): 37, 39, 43, 175, 176  
 Revolutionary Union Party: 174  
 rice: 50, 129, 130, 302  
 right of recall of delegates: 172, 182  
 Río Cauto: Fig. 2, 67  
 Río Cuyaguateje: Fig. 2  
 Río Sagua la Grande: Fig. 2  
 Río Salado: Fig. 2, 67  
 Río San Pedro: Fig. 2  
 Río Saramaguacán: Fig. 2  
 Río Treaty: 211, 244  
 Río Zaza: Fig. 2  
 Risquet Valdés, Jorge: 179  
 Ritter, Archibald, R.M.: 196  
 Rivero Agüero, Andrés: 38  
 rivers: Fig. 2, 67  
 Rizo Alvarez, Julián: 179  
 Roa, Raúl: 244-45  
 roads and highways: 118, Fig. 4, 119  
 Roca, Blas (Francisco Calderio): 162, 172, 176, 179  
 Roca Iglesias, Alejandro: Fig. 6  
 Rodríguez, Carlos, Rafael: 47, 103, 194, 210, 222; official titles, Fig. 6, 168, 175, 176, 179, 218  
 Rodríguez del Pozo, Guillermo: 269  
 Rodríguez Llopart, Héctor: Fig. 6  
 Rodríguez Maurell, Antonio: Fig. 6  
 Roman Catholic Church: 6, 12, 95, 98; conflict with the state, 75, 96, 97  
 Romainia: 141, 307  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D.: 30  
 Roosevelt, Theodore: 232  
 Root, Elihu: 22  
 Rosales del Toro, Ulises: 250  
 rural areas: 105; education, 75, 80  
 Rural Guard: 233, 234, 238, 241  
 Saint Lucia: 215  
 Saladrigas, Carlos: 34, 175  
 San Antonio fish nursery: 134  
 San Juan Hill battle: 232  
 Sánchez Valdés, Irma: Fig. 6  
 Sancti Spiritus (province and city): Fig. 1, 7, Fig. 4, 296  
 Sangüily, Julio: 19  
 sanitation and hygiene: 90, 92  
 Santa Clara: Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 4, 242  
 Santa Cruz del Sur: Fig. 4  
 Santa Lucia: Fig. 4  
 Santamaria Cuadrado, Aldo: 250  
 Santiago de Cuba (province and city): Fig. 1, 7, 9, 67, 68, 73, Fig. 4, 146; harbor, 64, 232; population, 296  
 schools (*see also* military schools): 77-79; church-related, 75, 97; enrollment, 297; medical, 78, 90, 92  
 Seaga, Edward: 215  
 Sierra de Escambray: Fig. 2, 67, 176, 241, 268  
 Sierra de los Órganos: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra de Nicaro: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra de Nipe: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra de Sancti Spiritus: Fig. 2, 67

## Index

- Sierra de Trinidad: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra del Cristal: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra del Rosario: Fig. 2, 67  
 Sierra Leone: 314  
 Sierra Maestra: 4, 37, 38, Fig. 2, 67, 228, 242  
 size: xiv, 65-66  
 slavery: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 69, 229, 230; abolished, 16  
 social class: 12, 72, 85, 98-99; mobility, 104-05  
 social security system: 94-95, 135; farmers, 87  
 Somalia: 218, 281, 312  
 Somoza Debayle, Anastasio: 215  
 Somoza Debayle, Luis: 211  
 Sores, Jacques de: 9  
 Soto Prieto, Lionel: 179  
 South Africa: xxvi, 279, 280  
 South Yemen: 214, 281, 312  
 Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation: 194, 207, 210  
 Soviet Union (*see also* missile crisis; oil); development assistance, 194, 198, 199; economic aid from, xxiv, 112, 147, 148, 149, 154, 207, 209-10; economic model, 43, 47, 113, 118; military assistance from, 206, 252, 259, 261-63, 279; military bases and advisers in Cuba, 207, 221, 274; political model, 162, 173, 177; relations with, xxvii, 5, 33, 46, 52, 53, 54, 193, 206-07, 214, 215; subsidies from, 145, 146, 147, 148, 311; technical assistance from, 44, 120, 256, 280; trade, xxiii, 42, 48, 139, 141-42, 200, 306, 307  
 Spain: 9, 69; trade, 143, 152, 307, 309; war with United States, 21, 232-33  
 standard of living: 73, 102, 104, 105, 137  
 State Committees: 167, Fig. 6  
 state security. *See* national defense  
 statistical measurement of National accounts: 113, 116-17  
 Stepan, Alfred: 222  
 Stroessner, Alfredo: xx  
 students abroad: 74; military officers, 274  
 subsidies (*see also* Soviet Union): 135, 137, 148  
 sugar exports: 26, 27, 48, 112, 304, 307, 308; to the Soviet Union, 141-147; to the United States, 24, 27, 32, 40  
 sugar industry: xxiii, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 86; importance, 14, 45, 48, 120, 128, 139; manufacturing, 303; mechanization, 122, 126, 129; production, 33, 35, 50, 52-53, 128, 210, 302; United States interests, 26, 27, 40; world prices, 148, 151, 200  
 suicide: 92  
 Surgidero de Batabanó: Fig. 4  
 Suriname: xxvi, 58  
 Sweden: 150, 308, 309  
 Switzerland: 221, 309  
 Syria: 142, 282, 308  
 System of Economic Management and Planning: 138  
 Taft, William Howard: 25  
 Taino Indians: 6, 227  
 Tanzania: 282, 312  
 Taxes: 135, 136  
 teachers: 74, 75, 77, 86  
 Teller Amendment: 20, 22  
 territorial limit: 134  
 Territorial Troops Militia (MTT): 80, 88, 251, 252, 266-68  
 Thomas, Hugh S.: 196  
 tobacco: 6, 111, 129, 200, 302; exports, 139, 141, 148, 304; government monopoly, 10-11, 14  
 topography: xxii, Fig. 2, 67  
 Torralba González, Docles: Fig. 6  
 Torres Yribar, Wilfredo: Fig. 6  
 Torrijos, Omar: xxvii  
 Tortoló Comas, Pedro: 283  
 tourism: 36, 111, 123; Cuban travel to the United States, 58, 221, 222 visits by United States citizens, 57, 143, 200, 203-04, 221  
 transportation: 117, Fig. 4, 119  
 Treaty of Paris: 21, 160, 233  
 Treaty of Reciprocity: 31  
 Treaty of Relations: 23, 24, 31

## *Cuba: A Country Study*

- Treaty of Ryswick: 10
- Tricontinental conference: 213
- Trinidad (city): 7, Fig. 4
- Trinidad and Tobago: 217
- Trujillo Molina, Rafael Leóidas: 36, 211, 216
- Tshombe, Moise: 213
- Tunas de Zaza: Fig. 4
- Uganda: 312
- unemployment: 98, 120, 121, 123, 200
- Union of Cuban Journalists: 189
- Union of Young Communists (UJC): 82, 87, 88, 177, 181, 182, 247; daily paper, 190
- United Nations: 150
- United Party of the Socialist Revolution: 44, 48, 176
- United States: Batista and, 242-43; Bureau of the Census, 68; Caribbean Forces, 59, 262; Central Intelligence Agency, 279; Defense Intelligence Agency, 212, 249; Department of State human rights report of 1984, 286, 289; emigration to, xxii, 82, 172, 290; humanitarian donations by citizens of, 144; Marines, 25, 26, 234; Mutual Defense Assistance Program, 240, 242, 244; naval base at Guantanamo Bay, 3, 23, 31, 56, 221, 254; property expropriation by Cuba, 40, 212; security concerns, xxv, 221, 222, 259-60; U-2 reconnaissance plan, 42
- United States embargos against Cuba: arms, 242; trade, 53, 57, 143, 151, 219, 222
- United States relations with Cuba: xxvi, 14-15, 20, 31, 34, 38, 42, 56-57, 58, 59, 199-200, 211, 214, 218-22; occupation era, 21-23, 233; perceived threat from United States, 252
- University of Havana: 22, 29, 30, 34, 74, 79, 204
- Urrutia Lléo, Manuel: 36, 39
- Uruguay: xxvi
- U.S.S. *Maine*: 20, 232
- Valdés, Menéndez, Ramiro: Fig. 6, 168, 179, 284
- Varadero: Fig. 4
- Varela, Félix: 13
- Varona, Enrique José: 25
- Vascós González, Fidel: Fig. 6
- Vecino Alegret, Fernando: Fig. 6
- Veiga Menéndez, Roberto: 179
- Velásquez, Diego: 7, 8, 9, 228
- Venezuela: xxvi, 45, 146, 211, 212, 213, 215
- Victoria, Nelson: 83
- Victoria de las Tunas: Fig. 1, Fig. 2, Fig. 4
- Vietnam: 213, 307
- Vila sosa, Manuel: Fig. 6
- Villa Clara (province): Fig. 1, 128, 132, 296
- volunteer labor: 184
- wages and income distribution: 98, 99, 102, 103, 297; wage reform, 118
- Walters, Vernon: 222
- Warsaw Pact: 246
- weapons and military equipment: 256, 257, 258, 260, 261-62, 280-81, 313-15
- Weiss, Juan Carlos: 196
- Welles, Sumner: 30, 31, 236
- West Germany: 142, 150, 309
- Weyler y Nicolau, Valeriano: 20
- women (*see also* Federation of Cuban Women): child care, 77, 121; civil defense, 270, 271; Communist party membership, 181; education, 74, 273; employment, 98, 121, 122, 123; in armed forces, 263, 266, 267; maternity leave, 95; role of, 84; voting rights, 32
- Wood, Leonard: 22, 24, 232
- work-study system: 79-80
- workers overseas: 74, 91, 98, 123
- World Christian Encyclopedia*: 95
- yellow fever: 22, 72
- Youth Labor Army (EJT): 252, 263, 265, 273, 275
- yucca: 10
- Zacci, Césaire: 97
- Zaire: 213, 282, 312
- Zambia: 312
- Zayas, Alfredo: 25, 26, 235
- zebu cattle: 132

## Published Country Studies

### (Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan	550-87	Greece
550-98	Albania	550-78	Guatemala
550-44	Algeria	550-174	Guinea
550-59	Angola	550-82	Guyana
550-73	Argentina	550-164	Haiti
550-169	Australia	550-151	Honduras
550-176	Austria	550-165	Hungary
550-175	Bangladesh	550-21	India
550-170	Belgium	550-154	Indian Ocean
550-66	Bolivia	550-39	Indonesia
550-20	Brazil	550-68	Iran
550-168	Bulgaria	550-31	Iraq
550-61	Burma	550-25	Israel
550-83	Burundi	550-182	Italy
550-50	Cambodia	550-69	Ivory Coast
550-166	Cameroon	550-177	Jamaica
550-159	Chad	550-30	Japan
550-77	Chile	550-34	Jordan
550-60	China	550-56	Kenya
550-63	China, Republic of	550-81	Korea, North
550-26	Colombia	550-41	Korea, South
550-91	Congo	550-58	Laos
550-90	Costa Rica	550-24	Lebanon
550-152	Cuba	550-38	Liberia
550-22	Cyprus	550-85	Libya
550-158	Czechoslovakia	550-172	Malawi
550-54	Dominican Republic	550-45	Malaysia
550-52	Ecuador	550-161	Mauritania
550-43	Egypt	550-79	Mexico
550-150	El Salvador	550-76	Mongolia
550-28	Ethiopia	550-49	Morocco
550-167	Finland	550-64	Mozambique
550-155	Germany, East	550-35	Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim
550-173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of	550-88	Nicaragua
550-153	Ghana	550-157	Nigeria

550-94 Oceania  
550-48 Pakistan  
550-46 Panama  
550-156 Paraguay  
550-185 Persian Gulf States

550-42 Peru  
550-72 Philippines  
550-162 Poland  
550-181 Portugal  
550-160 Romania

550-84 Rwanda  
550-51 Saudi Arabia  
550-70 Senegal  
550-180 Sierra Leone  
550-184 Singapore

550-86 Somalia  
550-93 South Africa  
550-95 Soviet Union  
550-179 Spain  
550-96 Sri Lanka (Ceylon)

550-27 Sudan  
550-47 Syria  
550-62 Tanzania  
550-53 Thailand  
550-178 Trinidad and Tobago

550-89 Tunisia  
550-80 Turkey  
550-74 Uganda  
550-97 Uruguay  
550-71 Venezuela

550-57 Vietnam, North  
550-55 Vietnam, South  
550-183 Yemens, The  
550-99 Yugoslavia  
550-67 Zaire

550-75 Zambia  
550-171 Zimbabwe

ATE  
LMED  
8