The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has fundamentally changed the procedures by which officers are selected, trained, and managed for joint duty assignments. This study examines key personnel provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and seeks to determine its impact on Army officer management. Specifically, it looks at how the Army meets its quantitative and qualitative requirements - and what will be the effect on officer development policies. The study also examines some implications of (continued)
ABSTRACT--continued.

competing joint versus Army requirements. Finally, a presentation of possible officer perceptions are presented. From this analysis, conclusions are drawn concerning the overall effect of Goldwater-Nichols with supporting recommendations.
THE 1986 DOD REORGANIZATION ACT AND ITS EFFECT ON US ARMY OFFICER DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 legislated significant and far-reaching changes in the conduct of U.S. military affairs. In part, the reasons for this milestone legislation were growing perceptions by Congressional leaders that recent events such as the Iranian hostage raid and the Grenada intervention had demonstrated some fundamental deficiencies in the military services' ability to successfully conduct joint operations. Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act specifically addresses assignment, education, promotion, and tour length policies for officers selected for joint assignments. Figure 1 provides a working definition common to the military departments and joint organizations for the term "Joint Duty Assignments" (JDA).

The purpose of this study is not to debate the merits of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but to examine its potential effects on officer development policies in the United States Army. As this study project is being written, Army personnel managers are grappling with the development of policies designed to coherently implement the provisions of this law.
JOINT OFFICER PERSONNEL POLICY

JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT:

* An assignment which is involved in the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces of at least two of the four armed services.

* Such involvement includes, but is not limited to, matters relating to national military strategy, joint doctrine or policy, strategic planning, contingency planning, and command/control of combat operations under a unified command.

* Assignments within an officer's own military department are excluded by law as are assignments during joint training.

The intent here is to quantitatively and qualitatively address the impact of these new requirements, identify potential problems, and present possible solutions.

Several parameters are important to the development of this study. The first is an underlying assumption that the Goldwater-Nichols Act will be implemented without further significant change (There have, in fact, already been some modifications which will be addressed later). Secondly, it should be understood that the intent of the DOD Reorganization Act is to improve the qualifications and credentials of officers serving in joint assignments. As shown later, this is demonstrated through the emphasis on competitively selected military education, promotion rates, and selection procedures for joint officers. Therefore, the major focus of this study will be the demographics of qualified officers in the Army's combat arms specialties.

There have not been any published studies which address the specific implications of this significant change in officer development policies. There have been articles in military professional journals which generally address the potential impact of the DOD Reorganization Act, but these do not provide a detailed analysis of joint officer development policies as they pertain to the Army. This study is also relevant because, at present, the Army is under a Congressional mandate to reduce the total number of officers on active duty. Therefore, a major diversion of high quality officers could have a significant impact on other critical officer requirements.

2. "Questions on Title IV Outnumber Answers", *Army Times*, 22 February 1988, p.16. As defined under the DOD Reorganization Act, critical Army specialties are combat arms: infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense, aviation, special forces, and combat engineers (21B).

3. The Army is projected to undergo a 2% reduction in officer strength in FY 88.
As stated earlier, Title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act contains the major provisions concerning officer policies. An explanation of the key provisions is necessary as a backdrop for an examination of the effects on the officer management system of the Army.

* Development of Joint Specialty Officers (JSO): This provision requires the service nomination and Secretary of Defense selection of designated military officers to enter a new occupational classification of joint specialty. In the language of Title IV, the purpose is "the effective management of officers......who are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters".\(^1\) JSO nominees will not be considered fully qualified until successful completion of a joint professional military education course and a full tour in a joint duty assignment.\(^2\) There is a limited exception to assignment tour length for combat arms officers which will be subsequently addressed. During the transition period for the initial nomination of the first group of JSOs, either the education or joint duty requirement may be waived, but not both.\(^3\)

* Promotion Policy for Joint Officers: Figure 2 outlines the promotion policy objectives for this provision. This policy applies to all officers assigned to joint duty assignments and
JOINT OFFICER
PROMOTION POLICY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PROMOTION POLICY</th>
<th>ARMY POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>* JOINT STAFF</td>
<td>EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN</td>
<td>* ARMY STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* JOINT SPECIALTY OFFICER (JSO)</td>
<td>EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN</td>
<td>* ARMY STAFF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* ANY JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT</td>
<td>EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN</td>
<td>* ARMY AVERAGE PROMOTION RATE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: GOLDWATER–NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986
not just joint specialty officers. The intent is obviously to enhance the quality of officers serving in joint duty assignments by requiring these officers to be competitive for promotion equivalent to their non-joint service peers. It is important to recognize that this objective is based on aggregate promotion rates and not on individual officer promotions.

* **Joint Military Education:** Title IV of the Goldwater-Act requires that joint specialty officers graduate from a recognized joint professional military education school "to enhance the education and training of joint officers". In addition, the language of the Act makes it clear that it is desirable that most other officers serving in joint assignments also receive joint professional military education. Subject to waiver by the Secretary of Defense, all JSOs must be assigned to a joint duty assignment immediately upon graduation from a joint military education course, and a "high" proportion (greater than 50%) of other graduating officers must also receive joint duty assignments as their next assignment.

* **Joint Duty Assignments As Prerequisite For Promotion to General Or Flag Officer Grade:** An officer may not be selected for promotion to the grade of brigadier general unless the officer has served in a joint duty assignment. The Act provides for a transition period until January 1, 1992 for officers who have not had a joint duty assignment but have had an assignment that involved "significant experience in joint matters".
Additionally, there will be residual waiver authority for the Secretary of Defense, primarily for officers with scientific or technical qualifications, or when necessary for the good of the service.

**Other Provisions:**

* Besides the key provisions discussed above, there are a number of other provisions of Title IV which will have a lesser impact on Army officer management. While all of these will not be enumerated in this study, the most significant are the detailed and complex reporting requirements to the Congress. The Army will be required to track and report on promotion rates, post-joint education assignments, and tour lengths for all officers receiving joint duty assignments. At a minimum, this certainly means revision of the Army officer management system to monitor and assign officers in joint billets.

**The Army's Requirement Under Title IV**

The Army's specific requirements under the Goldwater-Nichols Act must be addressed to determine if these requirements can be met quantitatively. Figure 3 identifies the total number of Secretary of Defense designated joint duty positions. This shows that 3014 joint billets require Army officers. For critical joint duty assignments (i.e., those requiring joint specialty officers), the Army's share is 390 as shown in Figure 4.
## JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>COL</th>
<th>GO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>3014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>1061</td>
<td>1276</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>3067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2760</td>
<td>3479</td>
<td>1746</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>8235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY, JULY 1987

**FIGURE 3**
## JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT CRITICAL POSITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>COL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINES</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY, JULY 1967
As stated earlier, during the initial transition to full implementation, the Army Personnel Agency will designate the initial group of JSOs. These officers must have had either a previous joint duty assignment or graduated from a joint military education course. Although it is not possible to obtain a precise number of eligible officers (Note: The initial list of JSO nominees is scheduled for release in Spring 1988), the initial designation board will review the records of approximately 6,100 officers. Given a requirement of a minimum number of 390 JSO nominees - and more should be selected to provide flexibility in assignment management - it is reasonable to conclude that 6% or more of the eligible officer population will meet the criteria for initial selection.

The real issue for examination is sustainment of joint officer policies after full implementation. The maze of percentage fill requirements and exceptions contained in the Act, combined with the innate personnel turbulence of military service, makes a precise calculation of annual Army requirements for joint duty positions essentially impossible. At the risk of oversimplification of an admittedly complex issue, it is possible, however, to isolate certain factors and make some assumptions about the Army's gross capability to meet joint duty requirements.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandates a specific linkage between joint professional military education (JPME) and a follow-on joint duty assignment. The intent is first school, then assignment to insure optimum effectiveness for officers in
joint assignments. The second factor is tour length, which determines annual turnover rate of officers in joint duty assignments. Although statutory tour length remains at 3.5 years for joint duty assignments, a two-year tour length for combat arms officers in certain situations will make the average tour length somewhat less. Assuming a 30% annual take-out rate for combat officers, the Army Personnel Agency has used 3.05 years as an average tour length for analytical purposes. That factor will be used here. Figure 5 is a comparison of annual production of JPME graduates and annual joint duty requirements by grade.

This comparison shows that, in the aggregate, the total number of majors graduating from intermediate JPME substantially exceeds the projected annual requirement. By contrast, LTC/COL requirements exceed senior JPME graduates by approximately 20%. In the short term, this means that the Army could have difficulty in filling senior level joint duty assignments with recent JPME graduates. However, since JPME is a one-time career requirement, the annual surplus of intermediate JPME graduates will eventually provide a long-term pool of jointly educated officers to meet senior grade needs.

A compounding factor is the lack of correlation between the military specialties of JPME graduates and the specialties required for available joint assignments. Figure 6 shows Army joint requirements by branch and functional area. The selection process for identifying officers to fill joint education seats does not include identification of specific future assignments.
### JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND JPME SEATS PROJECTED REQUIREMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JOINT</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>LTC/COL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>167</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>375 (192)²</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>205 (106)²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **ANNUAL REQUIREMENTS DERIVED FROM TOTAL NUMBER OF JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS (BY GRADE) DIVIDED BY A FACTOR OF 3.05 YEAR TOUR LENGTH. CRITICAL JOINT DUTY POSITIONS ARE NOT INCLUDED.**

2. **SOURCE OF ANNUAL PROJECTED JOINT GRADUATES: TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY.**

3. **FIGURES IN PARENTHESES REFLECT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT 50% OF JPME GRADUATES MUST RECEIVE JOINT ASSIGNMENTS UPON GRADUATION.**
# JOINT DUTY LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRANCH¹</th>
<th>COL</th>
<th>LTC</th>
<th>MAJ</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>03</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>176</td>
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<td>49</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>116</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>1018</td>
<td>2960</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Numerical code designations for officer branches and specialty areas are explained in Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3: Commissioned Officer Development and Utilization, 30 April 1986.

Source: Total Army Personnel Agency, September 1987

Figure 8
This is a function of timing more than any other factor. For example, the officers to fill joint seats at the Army War College were announced in February 1988; these officers will not report to new assignments until June 1989. Under the present assignment requisition process, it is too early to link these officers to specific future assignments. Nonetheless, there is the potential to have officers filling scarce joint education seats who may not have the specific qualifications for the available joint assignments upon their graduation from JPME.

The preceding analysis suggests that it is not mathematically impossible for the Army to accomplish its joint duty requirements. The challenge, in a macro sense, will be to manage the officer population to insure that officers with the right professional qualifications are available to match the specific qualifications required for each joint duty assignment.

ENDNOTES

2. Ibid, section 661 (c).
3. Ibid, section 406 (b).
4. Ibid, section 663.
5. Ibid, section 401.
6. Ibid, section 667.
7. "Questions on Title IV Outnumber Answers", Army Times, 22 February 1988, p.16. The numbers cited in this recent article are 3,073 Army joint duty positions and 375 critical joint positions. I have elected to use the figures provided by the Army Personnel Agency.

8. Ibid, p.16.

9. Goldwater-Nichols, Title IV, Chapter 38, section 663 (d).
It is an inescapable fact that prior to the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act, joint duty did not receive the priority it will now receive in officer development. Moreover, since joint duty assignments are now statutorily linked to promotion rates, JPME, etc., the effect on officer development will be proportionally greater than the number of officers involved. Why is this so? Simply put, joint duty assignments will, to a large extent, involve officers who have been competitively selected for military service schools and enjoy promotion rates higher than the officer population at large. In the case of senior field grade officers in the combat arms branches, this also generally means officers who have been selected for and successfully commanded at the battalion and brigade level. Figure 7 illustrates the relative size of the target population as it compares to the overall population for a given year group.

A logical start point for an analysis of officer development is promotion to the rank of Major. Figure 8 depicts career pattern considerations which are arguably typical of most combat arms officers. The essential question is one of time.
CAREER PATTERN CONSIDERATIONS
(EXAMPLE)

MAJ
PROMOTION

BG
PROMOTION

MAJ ———→ BG

RANGE 13 YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROF DEVELOPMENT CONSIDERATIONS</th>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>REMAINING TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRANCH QUAL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5 YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC CMD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDE CMD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT ASSIGNMENT</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11.5 YEARS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OTHER DEMANDS

FUNCTIONAL AREA
ADV CIVIL SCHOOLING
ARMY STAFF
MAM
ROTC
RESERVE COMPONENTS
SVC SCHOOL INSTRUCTOR
USAREC
USMA

FIGURE III
With the additional of a full joint duty assignment (3.5 years), 11.5 of 13 available years are required to accomplish the professional development tasks of a successful combat arms officer. Will this cause a significant number of officers to be qualified only in their branch and as joint officers, with no opportunity for other service related demands? A partial answer lies in exercising the two-year joint assignment option for as many combat arms officers as possible. This solution is limited by the requirement for some of these officers to return to joint duty within eight years to receive full joint tour credit; the exact percentage has not yet been specified by Congress. Another potential solution is to acknowledge that a percentage of quality officers will be targeted for repetitive joint assignments with the exception of critical professional development requirements (e.g., command, military education, etc.)

Army Requirements vs Joint Requirements

Closely related to the foregoing discussion of officer development is the dilemma of Army requirements versus joint requirements. Given the obvious shift in priority mandated by the Goldwaters-Nichols Act, it is clear that key Army assignments will now compete with joint duty assignments for the same officer resources. There are no current projections to increase the total number of intermediate and senior level service school graduates.
Using ex-battalion and brigade commanders as two distinct groups available for key assignments, figures 9 and 10 depict the assignment priority shift under Title IV. There is no ready solution to this issue without expansion of the target population, which is not likely in the foreseeable future. As a first step, what must be accomplished is a rigorous debate and re-examination of the Army's high priority assignment categories. Which specific priorities should be reduced is beyond the scope of this paper. It is clear, however, that faced with a reduced number of available highly qualified officers, the Army will have to make difficult decisions on how to allocate scarce officer resources.

**Selection Process for Joint Officers**

As previously noted, officers will not be eligible (without waiver) for promotion to brigadier general without completion of a joint duty assignment. This makes selection for a joint duty assignment a critical milestone in an officer's career development. At present, this determination is a personnel management action rather than the competitive selection process used for other critical milestones, such as promotion, command selection, and service school attendance. In addition, the current system for selection of officers for JPME is also a personnel management action. Is this the correct method to choose the Army's joint officers?
TITLE IV IMPACT

DISTRIBUTION OF FORMER BRIGADE COMMANDERS

[Bar chart showing distribution of former brigade commanders with bars for JDA and FLD CMDs, with the legend indicating "TITLE IV" and "CURRENT".] 

SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY, MAY 1987

FIGURE 10
TITLE IV IMPACT

DISTRIBUTION OF FORMER BATTALION COMMANDERS

SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL AGENCY, MAY 1987

FIGURE 9
The largest share of joint requirements are found in the functional area specialties (e.g., operations, personnel, logistics, etc.) As shown earlier in Figure 6, a relatively small share requires branch specific combat arms specialties. This means that the combat arms officers of different branches with common functional area specialties will compete for the same joint duty assignments. The current orientation of management by branch - with some input from functional area controllers - does not lend itself to comparative selection of officers from different branches.

Board selection of officers for JPME and identification of potential JSO nominees would provide a more rational process for choosing the Army's joint duty officers. Selection on an annual cycle would be accomplished across the spectrum of branches by a single deliberative body. This requirement could be incorporated into the current board selection process for Command and General Staff College and Senior Service College attendance, particularly for JPME seats. Based on projected requirements established by the Army Personnel Agency, floors could be established for functional areas for board consideration to further reduce the potential mismatch of requirements versus qualified officers during an annual assignment cycle.
The proposal espoused in the preceding paragraph would also reinforce a concept of equity in the joint selection process. All other professional development milestones at the field grade level are decided by board deliberation. Why should this one be different? Since there will unquestionably be more officers seeking joint duty assignments than will be available, it is perhaps unwise and unfair to leave this important career decision to assignment managers. Their focus should be on finding the right assignment after an officer is selected for joint duty by senior Army officers based on performance, potential, and service needs.

Another challenge which the Army must face is the creation of a perceived "elite" within the officer corps. No matter how the rhetoric is presented concerning the importance of joint versus other assignments, the undeniable reality is that public law now limits the upward progression of an officer who does not complete a joint duty assignment (The waiver provision is not relevant to this issue, since it does not affect policy, but rather provides an exception in individual cases). It has already been shown that opportunities for joint duty assignments are roughly limited to one in five combat arms officers in the upper 50% of the combat arms officer population. The danger is the
creation of a "ticket-punching" syndrome which becomes internally divisive within the officer corps. Again, the development of a rigorous board selection process would underscore to the officer corps that selection for joint duty is competitive, fair, and rational.
CONCLUSIONS

The Army's critical challenge is how to implement the provisions of the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act to meet the intent of Congress and integrate joint officer management policies into the Officer Personnel Management System. Given the level of implementing details, the law significantly restricts the flexibility of the personnel management system. For that portion of the officer population which receives joint education and assignments, new rules and procedures must be established to comply with mandatory statutory procedures. There will be a need for greater personnel micro-management to meet mandated objectives and comply with significant reporting requirements to the Congress.

The data presented in this study suggests that the Army can meet its numerical and quality requirements for manning joint billets. While there could be moderate shortfalls initially in the senior field grade requirements, this problem should be corrected as the Army reaches "steady state" production of intermediate JPME graduates in the coming years. The greatest challenge will be in producing officers with the specific qualifications required for the joint assignments available in a given assignment cycle.
The imbalance between the combat arms target population (upper 50%) and opportunities for a joint assignment is likely to continue. The relatively small size of joint staffs, the types of functional area skills required, tour length requirements, and the limited number of annual JPME seats all combine to limit joint assignment opportunities.

Full joint duty tours of 3.5 years place a severe strain on an already overcrowded professional development model. Even without the joint duty requirement, many officers find their desired career pattern permanently altered because other legitimate service requirements prevent them from accomplishing critical professional development objectives. Those officers selected as Joint Specialty Officers pose a particular problem since they must serve repetitive joint tours, which further limits their ability to fill other service-related assignments.

While complying with the provisions of Goldwater-Nichols, the Army as an institution must also seek to place top performers in critical service-related positions. This tension will exist as both systemic requirements compete for the same target population. Additionally, both institutional and individual stress can be expected as officers respond to the new positive incentives associated with joint duty.

The Army currently has no system to competitively select officers, across the target population, for JPME seats and joint duty assignments. Leaving the decision to personnel managers will
fuel discontent and potentially exacerbate divisiveness within the officer corps. When faced with other professional development decisions that require choosing a few from the many, the Army has responded with an equitable board process which involves senior leadership from throughout the Army. The joint selection process should be administered in the same fashion.
CHAPTER VI

Recommendations

The conclusions presented above reflect an analysis of key aspects of the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act. Certain general recommendations flow from these conclusions and may provide a different perspective for implementation of the Army's joint officer policies.

* There should be earlier identification of projected joint vacancies to facilitate the selection of officers for joint duty assignments. Since by law, a large percentage of joint assignments will be filled directly by graduates of JPME, improvements in forecasting will particularly enhance the selection of JPME students. Specifically, joint assignment requisitions should be submitted 12-18 months in advance for projected joint vacancies. This process will never be 100% efficient, for unprogrammed vacancies - transfers, retirements, space reductions, etc. - will inevitably occur. Nonetheless, earlier forecasting will promote improvement in matching qualified officers with specific requirements. In a perfect assignment world, every officer would know his tentative joint assignment before attending intermediate or senior level JPME. While requiring long-range personnel planning, there would be obvious advantages for the individual, the joint organization, and the Army Personnel Agency.
Officers selected for joint duty assignments, especially at the major level, should be intensively managed to insure that they receive the opportunity to serve in branch related troop positions (executive officer, operations officer, etc.) This professional development phase is particularly important, since it is one of the key discriminators for battalion command. Maximum advantage should be taken of the two year tour length option for combat arms officers to provide this opportunity. For junior field grade officers selected as joint specialty officers, a different problem exists. As Colonel Don Snider states in a recent article in *Parameters*, "There is simply not enough time in a normal career for an officer to be trained and developed...... as a branch specialist fully proficient in Army operations and doctrines and also as a joint specialist". This suggests a developmental track for certain officers which focuses mainly on joint assignments with only certain key Army developmental assignments after reaching field grade rank. There are some potential pitfalls in this approach, such as developing officers who lack sufficient Army specific experience. It seems clear, however, that Army JSOs must be placed in a separate developmental track which will meet joint requirements and minimal Army specific developmental assignments.

* Selection for joint duty should be accomplished by competitive board selection. This could either be done by a special board or incorporated into existing boards, such as selection for CSC and SSC schooling. The Army has a
responsibility to select the qualified officers required to meet the intent of the DOD Reorganization Act. At the same time, it also has a responsibility to develop a selection process which the officer corps perceives is fair and rational. There can be no more logical way than involving the Army at large, through officer board members, in the joint selection process.

Although not addressed in detail, there has been an underlying view in this paper that Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols is unnecessarily complex and statistically oriented. There is an apparent danger that personnel management for joint duty officers could be reduced to seeking the achievement of the myriad of statistical goals contained in the legislation rather than the enduring requirement of placing the right officer in the right assignment. As a final recommendation, the Army needs to continue to petition Congress for increased flexibility in meeting the intent of Goldwater-Nichols, while reducing some of the more cumbersome requirements. There is no question that top performers are required in joint positions throughout the military establishment. But the challenge is to provide those officers without creating an elite with preferential benefits who require complex administrative management at the possible risk of alienation of other highly qualified officers throughout the Army.

ENDNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY


7. Much background material was provided by the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), Total Army Personnel Agency in the form of internal memoranda, information papers, and statistical data. Permission for use was granted by the Deputy Director, OPMD.