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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE AMERICAN AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL IN 1973: POLITICAL AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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~The Arab-Israell War of 1973 provides an excellent case study for the use of airlift resources during a modern day The two sides in conflict, the Arabs and the Israelis, battle. were supplied with sophisticated weapons that would increase the rate of attrition and operational tempo. This excessive rate of loss caused the Israelis concern about supplies of equipment and ammunition needed to provide for a counter offensive. The Israelis would need the help or their friend the United States. The U.S. had the capacity to deliver much needed supplies but the new Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, did not want to disrupt detentr with the Soviets. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wanted to be sure the U.S. could play an a "honest broker" role in the peace settlement after the war ended. The Defense and State Departments were pursuing their own course of action but the combination was causing a delay in the start of the airlift. This paper will look at the effects of airlift and its ability to play a deterrent role in conflicts. The decision making process in the United States was hindered but a timely decision needed to This paper will evaluate the decision process and the be made. airlift resources available. A brief comparison of airlift with sealift will be made. The American airlift will be compared with the Soviet effort to show our strengths. The plans needed for the future will be discussed in light of the lessons learned during the American airlift to Israel in 1973.

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A.

THE AMERICAN AIRLIFT TO ISRAEL IN 1973: THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Chapter I

Introduction

The Arab-Israell conflict of 1973 was a test for the political and military instruments of the United States. The history of Israell forces in combat is an impressive record, filled with quick victories over an inferior foe, that tends to prejudge the outcome of Israell wars. A same type of initial judgment of the war in 1973 was to become evident in the decision making process of when to begin a resupply effort. If we played a moderate role we might have some influence over the Arabs and we could possibly mediate the peace settlement when the conflict ended.

The ability to aid Israel in time of need placed the airlift forces of this country in the limelight as a political instrument of national policy. The U.S. had been dedicated to maintaining the survival of Israel and attempting to maintain peace in the region. However, massive support to the Israelis would mean no influence over the Arabs and no role in the peace settlement.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had been a constant ally of the Arab states in the region. And as such they were not the least bit hesitant to come to the aid of their clients.

The United States Air Force possessed at the time an airlift force that could operate and function effectively on a short notice basis. This force consisted of two highly capable aircraft, one was the C-141 and the other was the world's largest aircraft, the C-5. The C-5 at the time was relatively new in the inventory, but it was suffering from a potential wing-life problem that could possibly cause the Air Force to take some drastic measures with the aircraft. Such proposals at the time ranged from putting half the fleet in flyable storage to drastically cutting the flying time of the aircraft itself and the payload it could carry. The repair costs to fix structural problems was estimated at \$259 million.¹ Despite the controversy the events of October were to drastically alter the life of the C-5 and thereby change the present mobility capacity of the United States.

In this paper I will discuss the events as they unfolded and how they affected the very life of Israel and still to this day impact on decisions. Without the will and determination of our governmental officials, all the power and might we have placed in our military capabilities will gr for nothing. We must look to the past to provide us with the lessons for the future. Therefore, the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 is a rich case study for us, both in the political and the military sense. A quick evaluation of the airlift in contrast to the sealift and the airlift of

the Soviets will allow us to see how valuable our airlift forces can be. Airlift force modernization is a must if we are to maintain influence throughout the world. Despite the lack of hard data from the Soviet Union we can draw conclusions from her actions and the capabilities of her airlift force. With the information available I will compare the Soviet capability with the U.S. to see how each superpower used her military as a political instrument of national power. On the U.S. side the various books and news periodicals written as the events progressed will afford us an opportunity to draw conclusions.

ENDNOTES

1. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Recommendation Expected Soon For Fixes to Extend C-5A Life," <u>Aviation Week & Space</u> <u>Technology</u>, p. 14.

CHAPTEP II

GENERAL BACKGROUND

The events surrounding the unrest in the Middle East in the fall of 1973 appear to be easily understood when one looks back. The problem however, is being able to interpret events and predict courses of action as the actual events unfold. This chapter will look at the actions of three actors: the Arabs, the Israelis, and the United States.

ARAB POSTURE

Since the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 the Arab nations had been looking for ways to regain the political and military initiative in the Middle East. The Six Day War of 1967 was a humiliating defeat for the Arabs as the Israelis had captured the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula.¹ Until the onset of hostilities there had been a constant drumbeat of defiance on the part of Egypt who with Sadat, now in charge, wanted to reestablish a measure of political and military credibility for the Arab cause. The state of occupation on the east bank of the Suez gave the Egyptians a persistent view of the Israeli presence.² This situation, the Israeli occupation and the loss of prestige for the Arab forces, needed to be corrected. Sadat had been indicating to the world press there would soon be a remedy

to the situation. In an interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave of <u>Newsweek</u> Sadat said that negotiations had failed and now was the time for action. He was pretty specific when he said: "Everyone has fallen asleep over the Mideast crisis. But they will soon wake up".³ Sadat was telling of the forthcoming war but unfortunately no one was listening to him.⁴ The Arabs were searching for a way to regain political influence in the area and were getting no where within the political and diplomatic chantels, so the next and only solution appeared to be through the use of military force.

ISRAELI MOOD

The mood in Israel during the first few days of October was uneasy as many conflicting signals, about a possible war, were being received. This uneasiness however, was calmed by the approaching high holy day of Yom Kippur and the usually highly accurate estimates of the Israeli intelligence community. According to these estimates the threat of war was low. Another assumption that contributed to this feeling of calm was that Sadat would not attack until Egypt had built up its air power.⁵ Additionally, Egypt had for the last ten years held the same type of maneuvers every autumn.⁶ In 'act, in May 1973 Egypt made preparations to cross the canal and withdrew its forces at

the very last moment. The Israell response to this was a partial mobilization that cost the government some \$11 million.⁷ The combination of these many factors led the evaluation of the situation to the erroneous conclusion that war was not imminent.

U.S. ESTIMATES

The United States intelligence community also failed in reading the Arab military signals and the growing Egyptian frustration in the lack of progress in the diplomatic arena. The belief was that the Arab armies were arrayed in defensive formations and the American intelligence sources had no reason to believe otherwise.⁸ While it cannot be positively determined it appears that the U.S. evaluation relied heavily upon the Israeli evaluation of events and the impressive record of the intelligence community in Israel which had very rarely been wrong in the past.

ENDNOTES

1. "Six Years of Stalemate," <u>Newsweek</u>, 15 October 1973, p. 42.

2. William A. Rugh, <u>Arab Perceptions of American</u> Policy During the October War, p. 7-8.

3. Insight Team of the LONDON SUNDAY TIMES, The Yom Kippur War, p. 62.

4. Ibid.

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5. Chaim Herzog, <u>The War of Atonement October, 1973</u>, p. 26.

6. Insight Team, p. 91.

7. Herzog, p. 29.

8. Matti Golan, <u>The Secret Conversations of Henry</u> <u>Klssinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East</u>. p. 37.

CHAPTER III CRISIS IN THE "HOLY LAND"

BACKGROUND

As the new Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, began to awake in his hotel room in New York City, fear was beginning to arise in Israel. The signals that had been so badly misread were now becoming clear. It was around 0615 on the morning of 6 October 1973 that Joseph Sisco. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, woke Kissinger to tell him of the impending Arab attack in the Mideast.¹ This began a flurry of activity that was aimed at avoiding a potentially dangerous conflict, but Kissinger had only ninety minutes of peace left before hostilities began on the northern and southern flanks of Israel. Kissinger's concern at the moment was to deter the outbreak of war and ensure that the state of Israel did not launch a preemptive strike against Arab targets.² A preemptive attack could possibly prevent the U.S. from taking unllateral action to aid the Israelis if they got into trouble.

Within the first hours on the sixth of October the U.S., however, had been assured twice that the Israeli military would not preempt. This assurance came from the Prime Minister, Golda Meir, herself.³ This information was also passed to the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. The

critical portion of this situation, eliminating any chance of a preemptive strike, would be world opinion and the ability of the United States to help Israel in the future. The Six Day War of 1967 started with an Israeli preemptive strike. A second war with the same kind of beginning would be hard to support, especially when the Arab nations were starting to discover the importance of the oil embargo weapon. The American public, which had just finished the Vietnam War, would be hard pressed to aid Israel if she attacked first. The Israeli feeling towards a preemptive raid was summed up by Golda Meir when she said: "We don't know now, any of us, what the future will hold, but there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first, we will get nothing from anyone."⁴ This feeling was one that left the government of Israei to believe she was making a great military sacrifice for the friendship of the U.S. by not launching a preemptive raid. 5

Rate of Attrition

This sacrifice of Israel, absorbing the first blow from the Arabs, was to become more evident as the war progressed. The biggest surprise of the war was to be the rate of attrition of both men and material. The new equipment supplied to the Arab forces, by the Soviets, had an unexpected impact upon the Israeli armed forces. The

acquisition of new and sophisticated surface-to-air-missiles (SAM) and anti-aircraft-artillery(AAA) gave the land forces of the Arabs an umbrella that would allow freedom of movement on the northern front in the Golan Heights and across the Suez Canal in the south. In the north the Syrians deployed this type of air umbrella to protect "defensive lines, military airfields, and major cities."⁶ The use of these same two systems, the SAMs and the AAA, on the southern front provided protection that was termed "...the densest area air defense in the world."⁷ The high rate of attrition in material was totally unexpected and worrisome to the Israelis. In fact, according to one source, the Israelis lost over 50 alrcraft by 9 October and this actually accounted for almost half of their total losses for the entire October War.⁸ The toll being taken on tanks and ammunition was also adding to the Israeli concern about the war effort. It is estimated that by the end of the first three days the Israelis had lost some 300-400 tanks, out of 900, earmarked for the whole southern sector.⁷

Arab Successes

The initial successes of the Arab forces not only surprised the Arabs themselves, but most of all it surprised the world. The effort on the northern front was different in that the Israelis were able to push the Arabs back to within 20 miles of Damascus after their initial thrust.¹⁰ The efforts of the Arabs even on this front changed the world's view of the Arab as a combat soldier.

On the southern front however, the Israelis were able to gain very little during the first week of fighting.¹¹ As each day went by the Arab soldier was gaining credibility.

The Arab successes and the unexpected high rate of attrition placed the Israelis in a position of requiring immediate assistance.

Israell Request for Assistance

Resupply was going to be the critical question and according to one source the thoughts on requesting resupply were discussed as early as the first cabinet meeting held by Prime Minister Golda Meir on 6 October.¹² The rate of attrition served to intensify the need as the war raged on two fronts. The initial request was delivered on 7 October and was for a small amount of supplies, 200 tons of equipment, which could go by ship.¹³ But by the end of the seventh day of October it was estimated that Israel had lost some 35 high performance aircraft.¹⁴ This was a staggering number when it is compared to the 1967 war and was the cause for much concern in Israel. The Washington response was much different than expected thereby heightening the Israel1 fears. Golda Meir had sent a personal message to Henry

Kissinger that said: "You know the reason we took no preemptive action. Our failure to take such action is the reason for our situation now."¹⁵ This message did have some effect in that it probably planted in Kissinger's mind a sense that all was not well on the war front in Israel.

The initial course of the war was going badly and Israel needed help and she was going to ask for it from her staunch supporter and friend, the United States.

ENDNOTES

- 1. Henry Klssinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 450.
- 2. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, p. 460.
- 3. Kissinger, p. 451.
- 4. Golda Meir, My Life, P. 426.

5. Matti Golan, <u>The Secret Conversations of Henry</u> <u>Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East</u>, p. 44.

6. Lawrence L. Whetten, <u>The Canal War: Four-Power</u> <u>Conflict in the Middle East</u>, p. 246.

7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 258.

- 8. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 265.
- 9. <u>Ibld</u>.

10. "A War That Broke the Myths," <u>Newsweek</u>, 22 October 1973, p. 60.

11. "A War That Broke the Myths," p. 60.

12. Golan, p. 45.

13. <u>Ibid</u>.

14. Kissinger, p. 476.

15. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 477.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET SUPPORT OF THE ARABS

The initial response of the Soviet Union in support of their friends in the Middle East was judged to be in line with the spirit of detente by Kissinger and he was willing to accept the present state of Soviet aid to the Arabs. The collusion of the Soviets in aiding the war is conclusive as the Soviets evacuated their dependents from Syria and Egypt on the two days prior to the beginning of hostilities.¹ It seems the U.S. attitude towards the Soviet actions, during the first two days of the war, was a wait-and-see approach. During this time the effect of this policy was to downplay the role of the Soviets and to refrain from criticizing both the Arabs and the Russians.² The eventual aim of this approach was to preserve the spirit of detente and the flow of oil to the United States.

THE SOVIET AIRLIFT

The Soviets can be a detriment to their own policies and courses of action at times. When the Arabs began their attack it was probably with the aid and advice of the U.S.S.R., not in a direct manner at the start, but in the most direct manner as the events unfolded. The U.S. was initially satisfied with the Soviet actions but by 13

October a change occurred that caused a major shift in American policy. The Russian airlift had changed from 200 tons per day, on 10 October, to over 1000 tons per day by 13 October and this aid was having an effect upon the outcome of the war. Israei was beginning to suffer a setback on the battlefield by not being able to mount a successful counter offensive on the southern front. Kissinger now started to suspect the Soviet's conduct for the Israeli problems,³ In fact, three occurrences took place that greatly influenced Kissinger. One, the Soviet Charge d Affairs in Jordan was urging King Hussein to enter the effort. Two, Brezhnev sent a message to President Boumedienne of Algeria encouraging him to lend a hand.⁴ Third, the Soviet airlift changed from "moderate" to "massive".⁵ All these events caused the Secretary of State great concern and speeded up his reactions to events that were taking shape. The reasons the Soviets took their action may never be known, but it most certainly drove the U.S. into action. Nixon despite all his troubles started to take an active interest in the events for he started to feel that he was being played for a fool; for the Soviet airlift was making a difference in the war.⁶

The Soviet airlift began a few days before the U.S. endeavor but it differed in many respects. The most obvious was that they were able to respond much quicker to the pace of events which will lead one to believe that they had already planned to deliver supplies and equipment before the

outbreak of the war.⁷ The Soviets also did not have to satisfy two opposing factions, for all they needed to do was satisfy the Arabs and begin an immediate airlift.

The actual airlift began on 10 October and ran until 23 October during which they flew over 900 missions.⁸ The mainstays of the Soviet effort were the AN-12 and AN-22 aircraft, both of which are turboprop cargo aircraft. They each are capable of carrying 20 tons and 85 tons respectively(See Appendix IV).⁹ Despite their capabilities it appears the Soviets only averaged 10 tons for the AN-12 and 50 tons for the AN-22(See Appendix IV).¹⁰ This meant the Soviets were only using half of their capability but this was probably done to preclude refueling on the ground in the Arab countries. The advantage for the Soviets of course was the short distance they had to fly which averaged only 1700 nautical miles.¹¹

The Soviets were able to muster their airlift in a much quicker fashion because of their form of government, but due to their aircraft capabilities they were not able to match the workload of the American airlift. Most certainly this lack of capacity led to their development of the AN-124, which presently is the world's largest aircraft. The Pussian effort had a significant impact upon the Arab forces who would not have had the success they did without their help.¹²

The question of supplies to Israel however, hinged upon the actions of the Soviets. The expansion of the airlift from moderate to massive had a profound reaction in the minds of the American leadership. The question that remained was, when was the airlift going to begin and would it change the military situation in the Middle East?

ENDNOTES

1. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, <u>Red Star on the Nile</u>, p. 256.

2. Peter Allen, The Yom Kippur War, p. 202.

3. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 493-494.

4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 494.

5. Ray Maghroori and Stephen M. Gorman, <u>The Yom Kippur</u> War, p. 19.

6. Matti Golan, <u>The Secret Conversations of Henry</u> <u>Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East</u>, p. 61.

7. Zeev Schiff, <u>A History of the Israell Army</u>, p. 19.

8. Stephen C. Mason, Capt, USAF, and Catherine M. Robertello, Capt, USAF, <u>Soviet Strategic Airlift</u>, p. 45.

9. "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons", <u>Air Force</u> <u>Magazine</u>, March 1987, p. 93.

10. William B. Quandt, <u>Soviet Policy in the October</u> 1973 War, p. 19.

11. Mason and Robertello, p. 45.

12. Mason and Robertello, p. 49.

CHAPTER V

U.S. DECISION MAKING

The initial request for resupply was made after the first Washington Special Actions Group(WSAG) meeting on 7 October. According to Henry Kissinger the attitude of the U.S. government towards this request could best be described as "sharply divided". Most military experts expected a replay of the Six Day War and that would mean most of the supplies would not arrive until the war was over. So whatever was sent now would not have much of an impact on the outcome of the present battle.¹ This feeling was set forth by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, James H. Noyes, who felt they did not need anything. By the second WSAG meeting that day there was a request for specialized equipment. The Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, suggested a delay prior to shipping anything as "...shipping any stuff into Israel blows any image we may have of a honest broker."2

The Defense Department was not alone in this appraisal for the Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush indicated he felt there were "...no real shortages."³ So the two major governmental departments, who would plan the resupply effort, agreed that the initial Israeli requests were premature to say the least. Kissinger however takes no side at this stage of the discussion in trying to reconcile the

Israell request with the attitudes of State and Defense. Perhaps it was the small request that made the Secretary decide that immediate action was not necessary.⁴ Kissinger was not trying to renege on America's responsibilities but he most certainly was trying to walk a narrow line between offending the Arabs and supporting the Israeli government and people.

As long as the Soviets kept their airlift and their support for the Arabs at a "modest" level the decision to hold off the resupply seemed like the easiest and best course of action for the moment. For the U.S., it would not be risking an oil embargo nor would detente be at risk. No action was the best course of action.

U.S. STRATEGY

The start of the war brought about three major concerns for the new Secretary of State. The first one was the need to ensure the survival and security of Israel and the second was to maintain relationships with the moderate Arab states.⁵ The third concern was the need to keep pursuing the course of detente with the Soviet Union and that would require restraint on the part of the United States in its support of Israel. But the opposite was also true in that the Soviets should act with restraint also and not provide massive overt support that would allow their client states,

Egypt and Syria, to defeat a friend of the United States.⁶ American support for Israel had to ensure the safety and security of that state, for the powerful friends of Israel in the American public and in the members of Congress would require such a response.

Arab Tensions

The resulting conflicts in interests were pulling the new Secretary in many different directions. The U.S. could not risk an oil embargo for about 15 percent of the American oil needs came from the Arab refineries and even more for our allies in Europe. The use of an oil embargo to elicit a pro-Arab posture from the U.S. could hinder our attempts at solving the political problems in the Middle East. The new Secretary of State did not want to begin his term of service with such a handicap. If the U.S. was perceived, by the Arabs, as having a heavy handed approach to providing support to Israel, then the American government could not play an "honest broker" role in the peace process.

Israeli Tensions

One of the most powerful lobbles within the United States is the Jewish lobby and Kissinger knew it. He wanted to avoid the subtle pressure that could be applied for he had plans, namely detente with the Soviets, that would take

precedence over a pure Israell agenda. The Israell Ambassador to the U.S. was Simcha Dinitz who had been the personal assistant to Golda Meir in the office of the Prime Minister.⁷ The relationship between Kissinger and Dinitz was close but not close enough for Dinitz to get everything he wanted from the Americans. Kissinger asserts that he was not overly influenced by his association with the Israeli Ambassador.⁸ However, Kissinger was aware that Dinitz was an exceptionally capable person who could mobilize Congressional pressure, 9 This capacity to work the American public led Kissinger to keep Dinitz informed, but at arms length to ensure that the Secretary of State could work his ow. course of events. There is no doubt that this independence of action allowed Kissinger place the responsibility for the airlift delays on the Secretary of Defense while remaining on a friendly basis with the Israell Ambassador. Dinitz on the other hand was getting pressure from his government on the support that was going to be needed.

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The new tactics and equipment of the Arabs were taking a heavy toll on the Israeli ability to mount a counterattack on the southern front. During the first meetings between the two men, the Israeli Ambassador was very optimistic and relayed to Kissinger that they would only need 48 hours (from Monday, 8 October) to finish the military operations underway.¹⁰ That optimism was to have more influence over

the course of events than anything the Israelis could have said or done. The Israeli agenda needed attention but it must be balanced by putting it in perspective of a possible Arab oil embargo of the U.S., loss of global detente, and a possible superpower confrontation.

<u>Global Detente</u>

Doctor Kissinger did not want to disrupt the policy of detente with the Soviets and most certainly he did not want a showdown with the USSR.¹¹ Despite the Arab attack and the subsequent Russian support, Kissinger still felt that detente was a viable process for dealing with the Soviets on the international level.¹² His view that detente was not a thing of the past seems strange in view of what was to come, but at the time Kissinger still sought to effectively deal with the Soviets. This was leading to further delays in the delivery of supplies to the Israelis.

The U.S. needed to have an evenhanded approach if it was going to have an impact on the peace process that would come after the conflict. The area could not be viewed as a competitive arena for the two superpowers. Fairness, with a feeling of equal consideration, was going to be the approach we would need in this new conflict and the emerging realities of a competent Arab soldier.

However, a crisis was taking place in the U.S. that would almost lead to no resupply effort for the Israelis.

U.S. Domestic Crisis

The deepening domestic crises taking place in the U.S. were absorbing most of the time of President Richard Nixon and these distractions were removing him from the active decision-making role in the resupply effort. The Watergate investigation and the resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew were occupying the thought processes of the President.

These problems were limiting the effectiveness of a decisive decision-maker. The conflict between the Department of State and the Department of Defense was not being resolved in terms of starting the airlift. This delay was causing great concern in Israel and in the pro-Israeli interest groups in the U.S. public and the Congress.

ENDNOTES

1. Henry Kisinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 478.

- 2. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 3. Ibld.

4. Matti Golan, <u>The Secret Conversations of Henry</u> <u>Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East</u>, pp. 45-46.

5. Kissinger, p. 467.

6. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 468.

- 7. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 484.
- 8. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 485.
- 9. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 10. <u>Ibld</u>.

11. Ray Maghroori and Stephen M. Gorman, <u>The Yom Kippur</u> <u>War</u>, pp. 1-2.

12. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, <u>Kissinger</u>, p. 460.

CHAPTER VI

U.S. DILEMMA

KISSINGER VERSUS SCHLESINGER

The U.S. dilemma of when to begin the airlift was taking shape in a controversy between Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, and James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense. The controversy centers around who was causing the delay in the start of the airlift. One version says the Kissinger from the start wanted to deliver supplies to Israel but the problem was when to start. Kissinger felt that it would be a short war with a guick Israeli victory. The other side of the controversy concerns Schlesinger. This side of the argument indicates he had a greater concern for oil interests than the survival of Israel.¹

Schlesinger supposedly denied an initial Israeli request for selected items of ammunition and spare parts on the third day of the war, 8 October. When told of this rejection, Kissinger promised Ambassador Dinitz he would help. But because of "bureaucratic difficulties" with the Defense Department, only two F-4 Phantom fighters would be replaced instead of the one-for-one loss policy that was believed to be in effect.²

As the losses in the war began to mount, over 50 aircraft in the first three days, the list of required supplies also grew in length. The delay process continued

until the critical day of 10 October, when the idea of a guick Israeli victory and fast cease-fire dissipated.³

At this point in time Kissinger told Schlesinger to get going on the resupply effort. But Kissinger still was not guaranteed of Schlesinger's help. To ensure the cooperation of the Defense Department Kissinger intervened with President Nixon to get a "direct Presidential order."⁴

Another version of the controversy, the delay of the resupply effort, indicates Kissinger was directing the entire delay plan and that the Defense Department was only following orders.⁵ Kissinger knew of the loyal following and support Israel had in the Congress and the American public. To try to go against such a wealth of support would be foolhardy and not consistent with Kissinger's style.

So it appears the controversy boils down to the differences between Schlesinger and Kissinger about the proper approach to the resupply mission. Once the decision was made by Nixon, who instructed Schlesinger to use the Military Airlift Command, the conflict between Schlesinger and Kissinger was over. Attempts at a low profile supply strategy were finished and we were now going to undertake a full blown resupply of Israel complete with United States Air Force aircraft.⁶

CONTINGENCY PLANS

It was clear by 10 October, and the fifth day of the war, that the battle was not going to end in a short period with the expected quick Israeli victory. As a matter of fact the question did arise about an eventual Israeli victory. The Soviets had begun to commit themselves to a "massive" airlift and started to provide considerable aid for Egypt and Syria. The American policy was to support Israel and President Nixon said it best, "We will not let Israel go down the tubes."⁷

The WSAG, on 9 October, had before it six options for the Israeli arms request. The options started at the low end of the spectrum where a low key effort was one method of resupply and extended all the way to the high visibility end where the U.S. used American military airplanes.⁸

The initial use of El Al, the Israeli airline, airplanes with their tails painted out was a very limited operation because of only having passenger airplanes and no true cargo carriers. In fact, El Al had only a maximum of twelve airplanes that could be used.⁹ The list of Israeli needs included such items as ordnance, electronic equipment, tanks, anti-tank ammunition and weapons, and F-4 Phantom fighters. The limitations of the El Al option became even

more obvious as the war progressed and the larger equipment was needed.

Another option, under consideration, was the chartering of American airline companies. This idea was not possible for several reasons which included the insurance complications of being in a war zone for the companies involved.¹⁰ Another reason was the risk of an Arab boycott that no airline wanted to face.

When Kissinger was presented with the additional delays and bottlenecks in the Department of Defense, he labeled them "foot-dragging."¹¹ The Secretary of State relayed his thoughts to Nixon about the situation who immediately told him: "Tell Schlesinger to speed it up."¹² The final decision was made and it was the use of American military uirplanes.

Initially the Pentagon wanted to use only three C-5 aircraft but the feeling was that " ... we would take just as much heat for sending three planes as for sending thirty.", said President Nixon.¹³ The President knew of Schlesinger's reluctance but the war had reached a crucial point and the President was willing to accept the responsibility if the U.S. was alienated from the Arab community.¹⁴

ALLIED SUPPORT

The lack of alled support had a major effect upon the planning of the airlift. The U.S. was denied the use of bases in Europe to help in the resupply. The decision made by our allies was done because of the threat of an oil embargo. A large portion of Europe's oil supply came from the Mideast and to cut the flow off would have a tremendous impact throughout their economies. Only Germany and Portugal played a supporting role.

Germany allowed the U.S. to pull military equipment out of its stocks, on German soil, in order to ship it to Israel. This was done on a very low profile basis to avoid diplomatic problems.

Portugal on the other hand provided the key support by allowing the U.S. to use its air base in the Azores. This island base served as a refueling stop to allow the airplanes to carry a maximum amount of cargo.

Support from other allies was nonexistent.

DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION

The lessons of history had an influence on the American psyche as much as anything else. The myth of Israeli invincibility and the infallibility of the intelligence

community, all served to develop a mind set that led to some very wrong conclusions. According to Kissinger the Israelis would have the upper hand by Tuesday or Wednesday of the first week, 9 or 10 October, and would have the original borders reestablished.¹⁵ Kissinger did not want to rush into anything especially if the war was going to end in a few days. However, he wanted to be sure there was at least a draw or a weak Israeli victory, but a thought of an Israeli defeat did not even enter his mind at the start. Aid delivered too soon could damage cooperation with the Arab nations and risk an oil embargo. This is the one point that both Kissinger and Schlesinger agree upon.¹⁶

There have been accusations that the Secretary of Defense had been overly concerned with the oil lobby and that the Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, may have had an influence. He supposedly convinced Schlesinger that more information would have to be gathered about U.S. inventories before timetables for delivery could be provided.¹⁷

Whatever the delay, the crisis in Israel was getting worse. What would drive the U.S. to action? It was not a sense of inner responsibility but the actions of the Soviet Union, which was trying to help achieve a decisive Arab victory through a massive airlift effort.

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ENDNOTES

1. Edward N. Luttwak and Walter Lacqueur, "Kissinger & the Yom Kippur War, Commentary, September 1974, p. 33. 2. Luttwak and Lacqueur, p. 34. 3. Luttwak and Lacqueur, p. 34. Luttwak and Lacqueur, p. 34. 4. 5. Luttwak and Lacqueur, p. 35. б. Luttwak and Lacqueur, p. 37. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 7. p. 924. 8. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 495. Herbert J. Coleman, "E" Al Played Key Role in 9. Israeli Defense", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 November 1973, p. 28. 10. Nixon, p. 926. 11. Kissinger, p. 501. 12. Nixon, p. 924. Ibld., p. 927. 13. 14. Ibld. 15. Kissinger, p. 481. 16. Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East. F. 46. 17. Ray Maghroori and Stephan M. Gorman, The Yom Kippur <u>War</u>, p. 19.

CHAPTER VII

THE AIRLIFT

President Richard Nixon knew by the third day of the October war that things were not going too well for the Israelis. "I had absolutely no doubt or hesitation about what we must do. I met with Kissinger and told him to let the Israelis know that we would replace all their losses, and asked him to work out the logistics for doing so."¹ Now that the decision had been made it should only be a matter of time before the arms started to flow.

THE MECHANICS

The airlift forces swung into immediate action with its various airlift aircraft. The initial problem that faced the airlift was the lack of advance planning because of the lack of information from Israel for there was no plan on the shelf that could be pulled out, dusted off, and put to immediate use. With the constantly changing political environment the planning was even more confused. Despite these hindrances the airlift began on 13 October and ran through 14 November. The planning was done on an ad hoc basis.² The civil carriers were asked to augment, but refused unless the provisions of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet(CRAF) were invoked. The use of transhipment to the

Azores was ruled out because of the large amount of time that would be needed for such an operation.³

The Secretary of Defense maintained control over the airlift to the extent of limiting the number of aircraft that could land at Lod Airport(now Ben Gurion Airport) in Tel Aviv. These limits were six C-5s and seventeen C-141s per day.⁴ This was to eventually result in approximately 1000 tons delivered per day and after the first full day of the American effort the U.S. had already matched the Soviet airlift of four days.⁵ While the airport and personnel could have probably handled more flights per day; this number was kept low to keep the American airlift from becoming massive, embarrassing the Soviets, and kept the Israelis from soundly defeating the Arab forces.

It was a distinct effort on the part of Kissinger to keep the airlift 25 percent ahead of the Soviets.⁶ This was done to keep the rhetoric of the airlift low and not to brag about how well the Military Airlift Command was doing.⁷ This still seems to fit into Kissinger's plan to not upset the Soviets or their clients, the Arabs.

The major workhorse in the effort was the C-5 aircraft which flew 147 of the total 569 flights(See Appendix II). This was about 26 percent of the total number, but the C-5 accounted for about 50 percent of the total tonnage delivered. Almost 30 percent of the C-5 missions carried outsized cargo which could only be carried by the C-5

alone.⁸ A list of some of the types of cargo delivered is at Appendix I.

One incredible fact of the airlift is the lengths that the Military Airlift Command had to go through to get to Israel. Since landing and overflight rights were denied by the European nations the one way flight distance from the Azores was some 3200 nautical miles(See Appendix VI). Add to this the distance from the United States and you will come up with some over 14,000 nautical miles for a complete round trip(See Appendix VII).⁹ This route avoided land masses and remained outside the Flight Information Region(FIR) of the Arab states on the North African coast. The U.S. Navy did provide some ten ships at various locations throughout the Mediterranean Sea. About 100 nautical miles from landing at Lod the Israeli Air Force fighters intercepted the cargo planes and escorted them to Tel Aviv.¹⁰

The work that had to be done on the ground at Lod was even more impressive. To offload cargo equipment you need specialized ground handling equipment especially configured to match the needs of the U.S. airfleet. In order to operate efficiently on the ground at Lod a team of U.S. Air Force ground personnel, composed of some fifty men to help with maintenance and servicing, was needed. However much of the servicing was done by El Al ground personnel.¹¹ The operations handled by these people were impressive for they

were able to keep the ground times to a minimum and greatly limit the exposure of U.S. assets. In fact the average offload and servicing time for the airplanes was 2.5 hours for the C-5 and 1.7 hours for the C-141.¹² This compares very favorably with the peacetime figures of 4 and 3 hours respectively for the normal operation of the aircraft involved. Golda Meir explained that her ground crews learned "almost overnight" how to use the special equipment.¹³

The airlift delivered only 39 percent of the total material prior to the cease-fire on 24 October, but the airlift served a greater purpose.¹⁴ It served notice on the Soviets that we would not sit idly by and watch the state of Israel be consumed by her hostile neighbors.

THE SEALIFT COMPARISON

For the sake of comparison a quick look at the delivery of supplies by sea is in order. Sealift while delivering the bulk of Israeli supplies, 74 percent, was very slow in response time. The first shipments to reach Israel were offloaded on 2 November, some 27 days after the start of the conflict. The ship delivered over 3200 tons of outsized supplies including tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and cargo trucks. By this time the C-5s alone had delivered some 1200 tons of equipment.¹⁵ The obvious advantage of

speed can provide a psychological boost for a friend or serve notice on a fee that we do have the resolve to aid allies in their time of need. However the only way to deliver big equipment and lots of it is through sealift which requires plenty of transit time. In total some 85,000 tons were delivered to Israel during October and November 1973 and of that total 63,000 tons were delivered by ship or about 74 percent(See Appendix V).¹⁶

Speed requires airlift while bulk equipment requires the capacity of sealift. This is abundantly evident in the resupply to Israel.

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2. Comptroller General of the United States, <u>Airlift</u> <u>Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973</u> <u>Middle East War</u>, p. 6.

3. <u>Itid.</u>, p. 7.

4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 9.

5. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 525.

6. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 531.

7. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 526.

8. Comptroller General, p. 10.

9. David A. Brown, "Israel Airlift Underscores C-5 Rapid Deployment Capability." <u>Aviation Week & Space</u> <u>Technology</u>, 10 December 1973, p. 16.

10. Brown, p. 19.

11. Brown, p. 19.

12. Comptroller General, pp. 14-15.

13. Golda Meir, <u>My Life</u>, p. 431.

14. Comptroller General, p. 1.

15. <u>Ibid</u>, p. ii.

16. Edward M. Bullard, Lt Col, <u>The Airlift Dilemma: An</u> <u>Update</u>, p. 26.

CHAPTER VIII AMERICAN AND SOVIET AIRLIFT COMPARISONS

The airlift forces of the two superpowers played a major role in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 by virtue of their commitment of supplies and airlift resources to this conflict. A comparison of these two efforts will highlight the differences and allow us to draw conclusions.

First, the Soviets flew almost twice a many missions as did the USAF. The Soviets generated 934 sorties to fulfill the needs of the Arabs and they took almost two weeks to complete the airlift.¹ The USAF, on the other hand, flew only 569 missions in a month's time.² This equates to about 60% of the total Russian sortie generation(See Appendix II).

Second, the total tonnage delivered differs by a wide margin. The Soviet estimated total, for there is no hard data, is around 12,500 tons³, while the American effort was about 22,300 tons⁴. The Soviets could only muster 56% of the U.S. tonnage while flying almost twice as many sorties(See Appendix II).

What accounts for the bigger total is the individual aircraft capabilities. The primary Soviet aircraft, the AN-12 and AN-22, could carry 22 and 85 tons respectively.⁵ The U.S. aircraft, the C-141 and C-5, could carry 32 and 107 tons respectively.⁶ The differences in the total tonnage delivered came in actual tonnage averaged during their

missions. The C-141 averaged 28 tons or 88% of its capability. The C-5 carried 73 tons or 68% of its capacity. This compares with the Soviet averages of 10 tons or 45% of capacity for the AN-12 and 50 tons or 58% of capability for the AN-22(See Appendix IV).

AN-12	45%	AN-22	58%
C-141	88%	C-5	68%
Difference	43*		10%

Table VIII-1 Percentage of Capability

The greater differences in the tonnage percentage of capability for the U.S. aircraft is the reason why the U.S. could deliver more cargo in less missions.

The biggest aircraft, the C-5 and the AN-22, accounted for 25% and 8% of the total U.S. and Soviet sorties. This also accounts for the tonnage disparity(See Appendix III).

> C-5 147 sorties (25% of total U.S sorties) AN-22 74 sorties (8% of total Soviet sorties) Table VII-2 Heavy Aircraft Sortie Rates

This was done while the U.S. had to average a round trip distance of over 14,000 miles(See Appendix VI and VII).⁷ The Soviets, on the other hand, had to only average a round trip of 1700 miles(See Appendix VI).⁸

Both countries had gone all out to aid their friends and the comparison shows the U.S. bettered the Soviets in every aspect. This was truly an impressive effort.

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2. David A. Brown, "Israel Airlift Underscores C-5 Rapid Deployment Capability," <u>Aviation Week & Space</u> <u>Technology</u>, 10 December 1973, p. 16.

3. Mason and Robertello, p. 45.

4. Brown, p. 16.

5. "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," <u>Air Force</u> <u>Magazine</u>, March 1987, p. 93.

5. Comptroller General of the United States, <u>Airlift</u> <u>Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973</u> <u>Middle East War</u>, p. 42.

7. Brown, p. 16.

8. Mason and Robertello, p. 45.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The events surrounding the American airlift to Israel are shrouded in secrecy and the human failings of selective recall. After the war was over and some of the dust had settled there arose a controversy between Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, and James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense. It basically centered around who was to blame for the delay in the star: of the airlift.

The abilities of two superpowers to aid their friends and allies can lead to the stability of a situation or to an increase in the tensions in a given area. A comparison of the airlift capabilities can give us a sense of how a superpower behaves on the international level. The lessons learned for the U.S. during this operation are many and we shall explore them.

THE CONTROVERSY

As Kissinger said in his news conference of 25 October the President was convinced there were two problems facing the U.S. during the hostilities. The first was to quickly end the fighting and the second was to end it in such a manner that the U.S. could play a major role.¹ With this policy as a broad guideline Kissinger went to work. He was

aware that a highly visible supporting role by the U.S. would lead to problems.

Secretary Schlesinger on the other hand was not privy to the ear of President Nixon. Besides the President had plenty of his own problems to deal with on a daily basis. Schlesinger undoubtedly knew that any aid on the part of the U.S. could lead to an Arab oil boycott which could have a disastrous effect upon the United States. He states that there were two foundations to our policy: "...that Israel would quickly defeat its foes, and that the U.S. should maintain a low profile and avoid visible involvement."²

An important event in the airlift decision was the briefing that was given to Kissinger by Ambassador Dinitz and General Mordechai Gur, Israel's Armed Forces Attache. In this briefing Kissinger was told that the losses experienced have been staggering, i.e. the loss of 500 tanks and 49 airplanes. A rate of attrition that was totally unexpectal. This told Kissinger why the Arabs had not asked for a cease fire earlier, as they had the opportunity for a big win if they kept up the pressure.³

As the crisis in Israel grew, the concern on the part of Dinitz and the Prime Minister increased. The situation was getting demarate on the home front and the Israelis needed not only moral support but material support. When the news kept getting worse something needed to be done and

it took the intercession of a domestically wounded President to get the airlift moving through the halls of the Pentagon.

I believe that after looking at news reports and examining books on the Kissinger versus Schlesinger feud there was not an active collusion on their parts to delay the start of the airlift. It was a combination of many factors including, domestic events, an effort to maintain a low profile on the international level, bureaucratic squabbling, and most of all relying too heavily on the history of the Six Day War. All these factors added together to cause a delay in the resupply of a friend, whom we had a responsibility to aid, and put at risk the ver, survival of Israel.

AIRLIFT COMPARISONS

The Soviet Union was operating in an international environment that permitted them to enjoy short flight time legs. In fact the flight time of most of the Russian flights was around two hours. They even overflew Turkey without permission in order to fly the most direct route to their destinations.⁴ This was taking place while Turkey denied the U.S. overflight rights.

When the comparisons are complete the Soviets flew over 900 missions to deliver approximately 12,500 tons of cargo over a round trip length of about 1700 miles. The United

States flew 569 missions and resupplied Israel with over 22,000 tons of equipment and material over a round trip length nearing 14,000 miles. A truly outstanding job.

LESSONS LEAPNED

The lessons learned were many but among them are the following. The first lesson learned was the need to have the airlift crews qualified in the inflight air refueling operation.⁵ This will eliminate the need for enroute stops to refuel. The reluctance of European nations to allow us landing rights made this point abundantly clear. The C-5 had been designed with this capability but the crews were not trained in the mission profile. A terrible waste of a capability that was bought and paid for in the initial design. Within nine months after the airlift, crews were being trained so we would have the capability if it was ever needed in the future.

Second, there was a need for improved management of airlift resources. I think this can be seen today in the studies that have looked at our mobility capacity and the need to procure the C-17, an air refuelable direct delivery aircraft of the future. This new aircraft is presently under design and the first prototype is already being constructed. It will have the ability to fly to the forward airfield and offload its cargo. Plus it will allow the U.S.

to increase its total airlift capacity.

Third, it was noted that the curtailment of the original C-5 procurement of 120 to a delivered number of 81 had an adverse effect on our airlift abilities.⁶ The present capacity is being increased by procuring 50 brand new C-5B aircraft from Lockheed. Back in 1974 this restart of the C-5 aircraft construction line was deemed the most economical way to proceed in order to increase our airlift assets.⁷

Fourth, the airlift would have been a much easing process if there had been a plan on the shelf. This would have given the decision makers a place to start from in order to speed up the initiation of the airlift. I certainly hope there is a skeleton form of an emergency airlift operation in someone's files. This will most assuredly help the planners in the future.

Fifth, the design of army equipment to fit into the airlifter of the future is also a task that needs to be studied further. Without coordination between the designers of aircraft and the designers of army equipment more army vehicles will not fit into aircraft and will have to go by sea. That obviously will extend the time to close the supply of critical resources.

Sixth, the speed of airlift can be decisive, especially If a nation is trying to project resolve during a crisis in the international arena. The airplane is the only thing

that can operate with speed. That speed, however, requires base access rights and overflight rights if an aircraft is to be effectively used. Large items, tanks and the like, if needed in meaningful quantities must go by ship if they are to play a role in conflicts that may only last a short time. The psychological effect will serve a greater purpose than the actual supplies delivered.

Seventh, nations supplied by the two superpowers with the most sophisticated and modern equipment may wage a very short war. The high rates of attrition on the modern battlefield will certainly strain the logistics tail of any army. Adequate mobility, transport aircraft, and lots of it are necessary to keep and maintain the momentum on the front lines.

A FINAL WORD

The final words should be left to the Prime Minister of Israel who said of the airlift: "Thank God I was right to reject the idea of a preemptive strike! It might have saved lives in the beginning, but I am sure that we would not have had that airlift, which is now saving so many lives."⁸

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3. Henry Kisinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 492.

4. Zeev Schlff, <u>A History of the Israell Army</u>, pp. 219-220.

5. Comptroller General of the United States, <u>Airlift</u> <u>Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973</u> <u>War</u>, p. 30 (hereafter known as "Comptroller General, <u>Airlift</u> <u>Operations</u>").

6. David A. Brown, "C-5 Saves Military Services Costs, Fuel," <u>Aviation Week & Space Technology</u>, 17 December 1973, p. 43.

7. "C-5A Line Reopening Contingencies Studied," <u>Aviation Week & Space Technology</u>, 7 January 1974, p. 52.

8. Golda Meir, <u>My Life</u>, p. 431.

PERSONAL NOTES

Back in October 1973, I was a young captain copilot in the C-5 and I had just returned from a year tour in Vietnam and Thalland. My family and I had just arrived at my parents home which was over 120 miles and a two hour drive from my station of Dover Air Force Base, Delaware when the airlift decision was announced on the television news.

After hearing the news, I called my squadron and they told me to come on back as I was now scheduled to depart the next day for the airlift. The family and I climbed back into the car and took off for Delaware after a 30 minute visit with my parents.

I called the squadron when I arrived and they said I was leaving the next afternoon. For where they had no idea. The next day we flew to Pamstein AB, Germany and picked up some equipment. The next stop was the Azores where we entered the flow to go down range to Israel. Having just returned from a war zone the previous spring, I was not too sure about what would happen as we approached Tel Aviv.

The mission consisted of a load of six 175mm gun barrels and two pallet positions of 105mm ammunition. As I remember it was a long seven hour flight down the Mediterranean. Along the way we relayed our positions back to a station in the U.S. who kept track of us. Our flight

plan kept us on the edge of the flight information regions which was basically a no-mans land.

Along the route we could see the U.S. Navy ships below us on the sea. They were visible to the naked eye and also on the radar. At various times fighters from the carriers would join up on our wing and fly with us for a few miles. About 100 miles out of Tel Aviv Israeli Air Force fighters would join us for the remainder of the trip to Lod. They were a welcome sight for we did not know what to expect of the Arab air forces. Along the way you could hear the Aeroflot aircraft relaying their position reports to the civil air traffic controllers in Cairo. A real strange turn of events as we crossed paths on our missions to help our friends.

Once on the ground I have never seen a more exuberant group of people. They were genuinely happy and grateful to see us and the equipment we had in the belly of our huge transport. We went into a makeshift operations room which was outfitted with the first class seats out of an El Al alrliner. We were fed with what was obviously food from the kitchens of El Al. Once finished we went back to our jet fully expecting to see some of the cargo still being offloaded. But much to our surprise the airplane was closed up, refueled, and the cargo gone. The Israeli ground crew with a big smile on their faces told us the cargo was probably aiready being used on one of the fronts. Their

expediency at ground handling the world's largest airplane dertainly belied their lack of extended experience with our ground equipment. Before we took off one of the leaders of the ground drew gave each member of the drew a memento and a word of thanks. I redelved a travel book about Israel and a key chain with the emblem of the Israeli Defense Forces engraved with their thanks. I still have both of these items today and I cherish them greatly as they are the only material remembrance of the airlift I have. My own government and Air Force gave nothing, not even a kind word. Most of all though, I have the memories of the ground drew who were so happy to see us that their exuberance overflowed. I have never again felt that genuine thankfulness for the job I was doing.

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APPENDIX I

TYPES OF EQUIPMENT ONLOADED BY C-5 AIRCRAFT*

- 1. A-4 fighter aircraft tail/fuselage sections
- 2. XM-48 Chapparel missile carriers
- 3. XM-163 Vulcan 20mm carrier
- 4. M-109 self-propelled 155mm howitzers
- 5. Communications vans
- 6. Fuel truck**
- 7. Cargo loading equipment**
- 8. Maverick missiles
- 9. C-97 aircraft engines
- 10. Shrike, Walleye, and Hawk missiles
- 11. M-107 self-propelled 175mm guns
- 12. C-5 engines and engine servicing platform**
- 13. Self-propelled aircraft towing vehicle**
- 14. Rockeye bombs
- 15. Fuel tanks
- 16. Tents
- 17. Aircraft wheels
- 18. Clothing
- 19. Support for Maverick missiles
- 20. Bombs
- 21. 105mm ammunition
- 22. Bomb fuses and pins

- 23. 2.75mm rockets
- 24. Chaff

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- 25. CH-53 helloopters
- 26. Hawk battery radar and illuminators
- 27. M-60 main battle tanks
- 28. M-48 hattle tanks
- 29. F-4 fighter aircraft wing
- 30. Power and transformer vans
- 31. 175mm gun tubes

*Source: Comptroller General of the United States, <u>Airlift</u> <u>Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973</u> <u>Middle East War</u>, pp. 45-47.

**Items specifically for support of the airlift.





Total Tonnage Delivered By Superpower

Sources: "Aviation Week & Space Technology", 10 December 1973; Mason and Robertello, "Soviet Strategic Airlift"

APPENDIX III



Missions By Aircraft Type By Superpower

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Comparison By Comparable Aircraft By Superpower

Sources: Comptroller General; wandt, William

APPENDIX IV



Aircraft Capability By Superpower



Actual Tonnage Delivered Comparison By Comparable Aircraft By Superpower : An Average

Sources: Comptroller General; Quandt, William

APPENDIX Y



Comparison Of Tonnage Delivered By Air And Sea

Source: Bullard, Edward N.



