

# RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS

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Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board

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**“...the Board has provided invaluable advice and counsel on policies and programs for enhancing and maintaining the combat and mobilization readiness of our Reserve and National Guard Forces. The defense planning actions taken as a result of that advice and counsel continue to guide the Guard and Reserve toward full partnership on the Total Force Team.”**

**Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States  
1981**

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

2 FEB 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1987

This forwards the Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

The Board, by statute, provides me policy advice on matters relating to the reserve components. This report reflects those issues addressed by the Board. I believe it presents a balanced view recognizing both the progress that has been made and problems that must be overcome.

I am confident the Board will actively continue to assist our efforts to ensure that the reserve components are manned, equipped, trained, and ready to mobilize as a part of the Total Force.

*Paul Carter*



Attachment:  
As Stated

RE: Distribution Statement  
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Per Captain Donald C. Gillies, Reserve Forces Policy Board

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

2 FEB 1988

Honorable George Bush  
President of the U.S. Senate  
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

This forwards the Fiscal Year 1987 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

The Board, by statute, provides me policy advice on matters relating to the reserve components. The report reflects those issues addressed by the Board. I believe it presents a balanced view recognizing both the progress that has been made and problems that must be overcome.

I am confident the Board will continue to assist our efforts to ensure that the reserve components are manned, equipped, trained, and ready to mobilize as a vital part of the Total Force.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely belonging to the Secretary of Defense at the time.

Enclosure:  
As Stated







THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

2 FEB 1988

Honorable James C. Wright, Jr.  
Speaker of the House of Representatives  
Washington, DC 20515-4312

Dear Mr. Speaker:

This forwards the Fiscal Year 1987 Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) in accordance with Title 10, United States Code, Section 113(c)(3).

The Board, by statute, provides me policy advice on matters relating to the reserve components. The report reflects those issues addressed by the Board. I believe it presents a balanced view recognizing both the progress that has been made and problems that must be overcome.

I am confident the Board will continue to assist our efforts to ensure that the reserve components are manned, equipped, trained, and ready to mobilize as a vital part of the Total Force.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul Carlisle".

Enclosure:  
As Stated





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# **Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1987**

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**Annual Report of the  
Reserve Forces Policy Board**

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**Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301-7300**



The Reserve Forces Policy Board, acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)). This Annual Report, as required by law (10 USC 113(c)(3)), presents the Board's independent evaluation of National Guard and Reserve programs. The report includes recommendations for changes to policies, procedures, or laws which affect the reserve components of the total military force of the United States.

This report represents the collective view of the members of the Reserve Forces Policy Board and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the United States government.

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The logo of the Reserve Forces Policy Board represents the total military force as the shield for the nation. The United States is identified by our national symbol, the eagle. The blue field represents the military departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. (The Marine Corps is a part of the Navy Department and the Coast Guard becomes a part of that department in time of war.) Integrated in that field are three stars depicting the active component, National Guard, and Reserve of the departments. The seven vertical stripes of the shield stand for the seven reserve components—Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.



## Reserve Forces Policy Board Members


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### **Honorable Will Hill Tankersley**

Chairman, Reserve Forces Policy Board. President, Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., Investment Bankers. Member New York Stock Exchange. Major General, United States Army Reserve (Retired). Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) 1974-1977. Civilian Aide to Secretary of the Army for Alabama 1969-1973. Appointed Chairman October 19, 1985.

*Will Hill Tankersley*




### **Major General William R. Berkman United States Army**

Military Executive of the Reserve Forces Policy Board. Former Chief of the Army Reserve, 1979-1986. Attorney-at-law, Morrison & Foerster, San Francisco, California, 1957 to 1979. Appointed Military Executive August 1, 1986.

*William R. Berkman*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**



**HONORABLE DELBERT L. SPURLOCK**

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),  
Washington, DC. Assigned to Board July 18, 1983.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Delbert L. Spurlock".



**LIEUTENANT GENERAL  
H. NORMAN SCHWARZKOPF  
UNITED STATES ARMY**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the  
Army, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board August 14, 1987.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "H. Norman Schwarzkopf".



**MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT F. ENSSLIN, JR.  
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED  
STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida.  
Assigned to Board February 12, 1987.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Robert F. Ensslin Jr.".



**BRIGADIER GENERAL GREGORY P. BARLOW**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Commander, 81st Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) in Seattle, Washington. Executive Director, Medina Foundation. President GPB, Incorporated, Seattle, Washington. Assigned to Board August 14, 1987.

*Gregory P. Barlow*



**MAJOR GENERAL DANIEL C. HELIX**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Deputy Commander (Reserve Component), Sixth U.S. Army, San Francisco, California. President, Helix Company, Inc., Concord, California. Assigned to Board February 1, 1985.

*Daniel C. Helix*



**MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH G. GRAY**  
**UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE**

Commander, 97th U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Vice President-Public Relations, Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc., Virginia Beach, Virginia. Assigned to Board December 9, 1987.

*Joseph G. Gray*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**



**HONORABLE CHASE UNTERMAYER**

Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs),  
Washington, DC. Assigned to Board August 6, 1984.

*Chase Untermeyer*

---



**MAJOR GENERAL JACOB W. MOORE  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, Headquarters, U.S.  
Marine Corps, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board  
September 1, 1987.

*JW Moore*

---



**REAR ADMIRAL DONALD T. CORRIGAN  
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Slade's  
Ferry Trust Company, Somerset, Massachusetts. Assigned to Board  
February 1, 1985.

*Donald Corrigan*





**REAR ADMIRAL TAMMY H. ETHERIDGE  
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

Flag Support, New Orleans, Louisiana, with mobilization assignment to Chief of Staff, US COMEASTLANT, London, England. President and Chief Executive Officer, Choctaw Maid Farms, Carthage, Mississippi. Assigned to Board April 25, 1986.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Tammy H. Etheridge".



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN J. SALESSES  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs, Mobilization Designee, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of Graduate Studies, Rhode Island College, Providence, Rhode Island. Assigned to Board April 5, 1985.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "John J. Salesses".



**BRIGADIER GENERAL G. RICHARD OMROD  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS RESERVE**

Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia. Consultant, Self-employed, Haddonfield, New Jersey. Assigned to Board August 14, 1985.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "G. R. Omrod".

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**



**HONORABLE RICHARD E. CARVER**

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Installations), Washington, DC. Assigned to Board March 27, 1987.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Richard E. Carver".



**BRIGADIER GENERAL MARALIN K. COFFINGER  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE**

Director of Personnel Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board December 1, 1986.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Maralin K. Coffinger".



**MAJOR GENERAL JOHN L. FRANCE  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Colorado, Denver, Colorado. Assigned to Board December 31, 1984.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "John L. France".



**MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD G. HOLESINGER  
AIR NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES**

Adjutant General for the State of Illinois, Springfield, Illinois.  
Assigned to Board February 28, 1986.

*Harold G. Holesinger*



**MAJOR GENERAL JAMES C. WAHLEITHNER  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Commander, 4th Air Force, McClellan Air Force Base, California.  
Assigned to Board October 17, 1986.

*James C. Wahleithner*



**MAJOR GENERAL JAMES E. MCADOO  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RESERVE**

Commander, 14th Air Force, Dobbins Air Force Base, Georgia.  
Assigned to Board April 13, 1987.

*James E. McAdoo*


**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**



**REAR ADMIRAL PAUL A. WELLING  
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

Chief, Office of Readiness and Reserve, United States Coast Guard  
Headquarters, Washington, DC. Assigned to Board June 22, 1987.

*Paul A. Welling*



**REAR ADMIRAL JAMES H. LIPSCOMB, III  
UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESERVE**

Executive Vice President, New England Financial Services, Inc.,  
Jacksonville, Florida. Assigned to Board January 1, 1985.

*James H. Lipscomb, III*

The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1987, is a reflection of the consensus of the 22 member Board. Although most recommendations and policy changes have unanimous support, neither this report nor the signature of the members purport to indicate that the Military Departments, services, or signers concur with each and every recommended action.



## Executive Summary

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### General

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)) and is required to prepare an Annual Report which the Secretary of Defense provides to the President and Congress (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report details the contributions of the reserve components to the Total Force and addresses matters pertaining to readiness of the National Guard and Reserve.

As full partners in the Total Force, the reserve components are vital to United States foreign and national security policies. They are essential elements of the national strategy of maintaining peace through deterrence or failing that, to reestablish peace through victory on the battlefield. In contingencies or conflict, reserve component units may be deployed simultaneously, or even ahead of active component forces. Employment of National Guard and Reserve forces is integral to the execution of operational plans and to mission accomplishment. Increased tasking of the National Guard and Reserve requires that readiness be continually evaluated and improved.

The reserve components in this decade have made unprecedented progress toward readiness goals in the areas of personnel, training, equipment, and mobilization preparedness. The Board believes that the nation's reserve components are the best they have ever been and, when provided adequate resources, are capable of accomplishing their wartime missions.

Force readiness is a major objective of the reserve components. Overall readiness levels and capabilities of many reserve component units have greatly improved in recent years. Factors which continue to limit readiness are discussed in the report. The reserve components are evaluated in this report by analyzing force structure, personnel, equipment, training, mobilization, medical, facilities, and budget issues.

### Force Structure

Force structure of the reserve components continued to expand during FY 1987. Force structure issues will continue to be important during periods of limited resources and constrained budgets. Capability can be more economically maintained or expanded, in many areas, by transferring missions to the reserve components. However, an appropriate balance should exist between the active and reserve components.

This balance should provide sufficient flexibility to the National Command Authority to respond to all challenges in both times of peace and conflict. There should be sufficient capability in the active components to meet short term operational missions or contingencies without augmentation by reserve component units.

### **Personnel**

Almost 70 percent of National Guard and Reserve personnel are in units. However, trained individuals are important for use as fillers and casualty replacements for all components upon mobilization. The Ready Reserve is comprised of 1,638,100 personnel of which 1,164,100 are in the Selected Reserve. The remainder is comprised of approximately 463,500 Individual Ready Reserve and 10,300 Inactive National Guard members. Trained personnel requirements for wartime cannot be met even when the Standby Reserve and military retired population are added to the Ready Reserve. There is no assurance that all the personnel in the mobilization pool will be deployable or physically fit for duty.

The reserve components, with the exception of the Coast Guard, are at 90 percent or above of mobilization requirements for personnel. Due to inadequate funding, the Coast Guard can meet only 47 percent of its Selected Reserve personnel mobilization requirements.

In Fiscal Year 1987, more than 266,000 personnel were recruited into the reserve components. Enlistment objectives were met or exceeded by four of the seven reserve components. These successes, along with excellent retention programs, result from a variety of incentive programs. The Montgomery GI Bill, in particular, has enhanced recruiting and retention.

Training individuals in the specific skills for positions to which they are assigned is a challenge for several of the reserve components. Many Guardsmen and Reservists are not fully qualified for their duty positions. Some personnel are awaiting training or are in varying stages of training. Although many are qualified in other skills, they may have been recruited into a National Guard or Reserve billet that requires a new skill. Individual training is difficult for reserve component personnel due to shortages in military school vacancies, length of training, and civilian job and family responsibilities. Skill mismatch adversely affects readiness. The services are working on this matter.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a pool of previously trained individuals who are not currently serving in reserve components units. The services have differing philosophies and policies for additional training of IRR members. Proper management of the IRR is important to wartime planners. In FY 1987, a mandatory screening of the IRR was conducted for the first time. Approximately 33 percent of the IRR members were brought on active duty, for one day, to test availability, readiness, and quality of IRR members. Fifty-nine percent of those selected for screening, reported as directed. The screening will reach a larger portion of the IRR when more adequate funding is available.

The Full-time Support (FTS) program enhances the capabilities and responsiveness of the National Guard and Reserve. Personnel in the FTS program are assigned to assist in recruiting and retention programs, organizing, administering, and training reserve component members. Increased numbers of FTS personnel are needed as force structure grows to meet expanding responsibilities.

### **Equipment**

The equipment status of the reserve components has significantly improved in recent years. Equipment modernization of the reserve components helps establish commonality, compatibility, and standardization with the active component and, in some cases, among services. The result is improvements in the ability of the National Guard and Reserve to accomplish assigned missions.

Equipment modernization of early deploying units is being accomplished under the "first to fight, first to equip" policy. This policy, recommended by the Reserve Forces Policy Board, was initiated by the Secretary of Defense in 1982. Equipment modernization of early deploying units provides increased confidence and morale to individual users and commanders alike.

Although substantial resources have been allocated for equipment modernization, critical shortages still exist in the areas of communications and electronics equipment, tactical and support vehicles, engineer equipment, and individual weapons. Equipment shortages adversely affect training and mobilization readiness. The overall dollar value of Department of Defense reserve component equipment shortages is approximately \$14.7 billion. The dollar value of Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment shortages is much greater than for the other reserve components in the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard Reserve shortage is valued at \$196 million.

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations provided by Congress, beyond those requested in the President's budget, have been a key factor in reducing equipment shortages in the National Guard and Reserve.

The wheeled vehicle fleets of the reserve components continued to age and are increasingly difficult to maintain to meet training and operational requirements. Of special concern in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are 2½ and 5-ton trucks and other tactical wheeled vehicles.

Generally, there is a shortage of defensive systems for reserve component aircraft which may face a mid or high-threat electronic environment in the next aerial conflict. Such equipment should be provided to the Total Force on a first to fight, first to equip basis. Every aircrew, regardless of service or component, must be given an equal opportunity for success when on similar missions.

The ability to deploy reserve component forces continues to be limited by strategic air and sealift capabilities. Deployment planning for reserve component units needs to be realistically based on the availability of current transportation assets. A well-trained

and equipped National Guard and Reserve must be available to theater commanders when needed to execute operational plans.

### **Training**

Progress can be seen in almost all facets of reserve component training. Additional equipment and better planning and scheduling have helped. But progress is primarily due to innovative programs and effective leadership within the services.

National Guard and Reserve units are increasingly fulfilling operational functions which previously had been the sole responsibility of the active components. To accomplish these functions, reserve component elements must be properly equipped and adequately funded.

The primary peacetime mission of the reserve components is to train to be ready to execute mobilization missions should deterrence fail. National Guard and Reserve units must be prepared for the same mobilization missions as active component units. They are expected to maintain mobilization readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active components. Therefore, training must be realistic, challenging, and oriented to wartime missions. Training detractors within each unit need to be identified so that limited available training time can be efficiently utilized. Equipment and facilities for effectively training reserve component members and units are essential to overall mobilization readiness.

Sufficient numbers of adequate small arms ranges and training areas are not available to the reserve components. These shortages make it difficult and time consuming for reserve components to maintain marksmanship and tactical skills using current doctrines and modern systems. The lack of training areas has a direct, adverse impact on readiness.

Training simulators and devices can satisfy some training requirements and help the reserve components attain and sustain individual and unit readiness levels. Funding for such systems has been limited, however, and sufficient numbers of simulators and devices are not available.

Overseas training provides excellent training for reserve component individuals and units. Last year, more than 94,000 Guardsmen and Reservists trained in 84 countries. This was nearly a 15 percent increase over the previous year. Actions required to prepare for and execute an overseas training mission closely parallel those required for mobilization and deployment. Increased morale and retention in the reserve components are additional benefits of overseas training. The Board believes that the overseas training program has been a key element in making the reserve components the ready force that they are today. Overseas training also demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve.

Reserve component participation in joint exercises provides realistic training and increases readiness. Guardsmen and Reservists are able to train as they would fight. War-time missions are executed with United States and foreign forces, just as would occur



upon mobilization. Joint exercises train the reserve components to face the challenges of extended and integrated battlefields within a combined environment.

The National Guard and Reserve support the national effort against drugs to the extent that it coincides with appropriate training, and is allowed by law. Support includes the use of facilities, loan of equipment, transportation, and ground and aerial surveillance. The extent of support varies considerably among reserve components.

### **Medical**

Approximately two thirds of the medical care and three fourths of the medical evacuation capability required during a major conflict, involving the United States, will be provided by reserve components. Readiness of these medical forces is critical since many of them will be required in the early days of any conflict.

Medical readiness is limited by shortages which are particularly acute in the categories of general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, and medical-surgical nurses. The reserve components are short of wartime requirements by approximately 7,100 physicians, 31,000 nurses, and 73,000 enlisted health specialists. Current programs should fill most of the medical personnel requirements by FY 1992.

Medical equipment shortages are particularly acute in the reserve components of the Army. Although much of this equipment is programmed for purchase, backlogs at supply depots prevent equipment from flowing to medical units. Non-medical equipment used to support medical operations is also in short supply. These shortages degrade the ability of medical units to provide treatment for the number of patients envisioned in operational plans.

### **Facilities**

Adequate facilities contribute to the readiness of the reserve components. As the National Guard and Reserve have grown, facility construction, maintenance, and repair have not kept up with expanding requirements. As a result, there have been significant increases in backlogs of construction and in the maintenance and repair of existing facilities. The construction backlog alone is \$6.7 billion. Additional appropriations are required to meet current construction and maintenance needs and to reduce large backlogs in all reserve components.

### **Budget**

In the last decade, expenditures for reserve component manning, equipping, and training programs increased significantly. Failing to sustain these programs and protect the investment in the ready, deployable, and growing National Guard and Reserve force will result in degradation of our military capability.

Appropriations need to provide funding for the tasks and responsibilities assigned to the reserve components. Increased tasking of the National Guard and Reserve should be accompanied by proportional increases in appropriations. Fixed percentage cuts, across all budget accounts, should not be applied to the reserve components when

missions and tasks are being transferred from the active components to the reserve components.

When determining priorities for the budget, resources should first be allocated to readiness of the existing force to ensure that it is properly manned, equipped, and trained to present an effective deterrent. Continuing emphasis must be focused on the readiness of early-deploying units. In a period of constrained budgets, National Guard and Reserve force structure changes should occur only to the extent that they are properly resourced, ameliorate the impact of constrained resources on the remainder of the force, and are a proper mission for the reserve components.

Summaries and recommendations pertaining to issues addressed by the Reserve Forces Policy Board during the year are at the conclusion of each chapter of the report. (U)



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## Executive Summary

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### General

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board), acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, is by statute the "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" (10 USC 175(c)) and is required to prepare an Annual Report which the Secretary of Defense provides to the President and Congress (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report details the contributions of the reserve components to the Total Force and addresses matters pertaining to readiness of the National Guard and Reserve.

As full partners in the Total Force, the reserve components are vital to United States foreign and national security policies. They are essential elements of the national strategy of maintaining peace through deterrence or failing that, to reestablish peace through victory on the battlefield. In contingencies or conflict, reserve component units may be deployed simultaneously, or even ahead of active component forces. Employment of National Guard and Reserve forces is integral to the execution of operational plans and to mission accomplishment. Increased tasking of the National Guard and Reserve requires that readiness be continually evaluated and improved.

The reserve components in this decade have made unprecedented progress toward readiness goals in the areas of personnel, training, equipment, and mobilization preparedness. The Board believes that the nation's reserve components are the best they have ever been and, when provided adequate resources, are capable of accomplishing their wartime missions.

Force readiness is a major objective of the reserve components. Overall readiness levels and capabilities of many reserve component units have greatly improved in recent years. Factors which continue to limit readiness are discussed in the report. The reserve components are evaluated in this report by analyzing force structure, personnel, equipment, training, mobilization, medical, facilities, and budget issues.

### Force Structure

Force structure of the reserve components continued to expand during FY 1987. Force structure issues will continue to be important during periods of limited resources and constrained budgets. Capability can be more economically maintained or expanded, in many areas, by transferring missions to the reserve components. However, an appropriate balance should exist between the active and reserve components.

This balance should provide sufficient flexibility to the National Command Authority to respond to all challenges in both times of peace and conflict. There should be sufficient capability in the active components to meet short term operational missions or contingencies without augmentation by reserve component units.

### **Personnel**

Almost 70 percent of National Guard and Reserve personnel are in units. However, trained individuals are important for use as fillers and casualty replacements for all components upon mobilization. The Ready Reserve is comprised of 1,638,100 personnel of which 1,164,100 are in the Selected Reserve. The remainder is comprised of approximately 463,500 Individual Ready Reserve and 10,300 Inactive National Guard members. Trained personnel requirements for wartime cannot be met even when the Standby Reserve and military retired population are added to the Ready Reserve. There is no assurance that all the personnel in the mobilization pool will be deployable or physically fit for duty.

The reserve components, with the exception of the Coast Guard, are at 90 percent or above of mobilization requirements for personnel. Due to inadequate funding, the Coast Guard can meet only 47 percent of its Selected Reserve personnel mobilization requirements.

In Fiscal Year 1987, more than 266,000 personnel were recruited into the reserve components. Enlistment objectives were met or exceeded by four of the seven reserve components. These successes, along with excellent retention programs, result from a variety of incentive programs. The Montgomery GI Bill, in particular, has enhanced recruiting and retention.

Training individuals in the specific skills for positions to which they are assigned is a challenge for several of the reserve components. Many Guardsmen and Reservists are not fully qualified for their duty positions. Some personnel are awaiting training or are in varying stages of training. Although many are qualified in other skills, they may have been recruited into a National Guard or Reserve billet that requires a new skill. Individual training is difficult for reserve component personnel due to shortages in military school vacancies, length of training, and civilian job and family responsibilities. Skill mismatch adversely affects readiness. The services are working on this matter.

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a pool of previously trained individuals who are not currently serving in reserve components units. The services have differing philosophies and policies for additional training of IRR members. Proper management of the IRR is important to wartime planners. In FY 1987, a mandatory screening of the IRR was conducted for the first time. Approximately 33 percent of the IRR members were brought on active duty, for one day, to test availability, readiness, and quality of IRR members. Fifty-nine percent of those selected for screening, reported as directed. The screening will reach a larger portion of the IRR when more adequate funding is available.

The Full-time Support (FTS) program enhances the capabilities and responsiveness of the National Guard and Reserve. Personnel in the FTS program are assigned to assist in recruiting and retention programs, organizing, administering, and training reserve component members. Increased numbers of FTS personnel are needed as force structure grows to meet expanding responsibilities.

### **Equipment**

The equipment status of the reserve components has significantly improved in recent years. Equipment modernization of the reserve components helps establish commonality, compatibility, and standardization with the active component and, in some cases, among services. The result is improvements in the ability of the National Guard and Reserve to accomplish assigned missions.

Equipment modernization of early deploying units is being accomplished under the "first to fight, first to equip" policy. This policy, recommended by the Reserve Forces Policy Board, was initiated by the Secretary of Defense in 1982. Equipment modernization of early deploying units provides increased confidence and morale to individual users and commanders alike.

Although substantial resources have been allocated for equipment modernization, critical shortages still exist in the areas of communications and electronics equipment, tactical and support vehicles, engineer equipment, and individual weapons. Equipment shortages adversely affect training and mobilization readiness. The overall dollar value of Department of Defense reserve component equipment shortages is approximately \$14.7 billion. The dollar value of Army National Guard and Army Reserve equipment shortages is much greater than for the other reserve components in the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard Reserve shortage is valued at \$196 million.

National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations provided by Congress, beyond those requested in the President's budget, have been a key factor in reducing equipment shortages in the National Guard and Reserve.

The wheeled vehicle fleets of the reserve components continued to age and are increasingly difficult to maintain to meet training and operational requirements. Of special concern in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are 2½ and 5-ton trucks and other tactical wheeled vehicles.

Generally, there is a shortage of defensive systems for reserve component aircraft which may face a mid or high-threat electronic environment in the next aerial conflict. Such equipment should be provided to the Total Force on a first to fight, first to equip basis. Every aircrew, regardless of service or component, must be given an equal opportunity for success when on similar missions.

The ability to deploy reserve component forces continues to be limited by strategic air and sealift capabilities. Deployment planning for reserve component units needs to be realistically based on the availability of current transportation assets. A well-trained

and equipped National Guard and Reserve must be available to theater commanders when needed to execute operational plans.

### **Training**

Progress can be seen in almost all facets of reserve component training. Additional equipment and better planning and scheduling have helped. But progress is primarily due to innovative programs and effective leadership within the services.

National Guard and Reserve units are increasingly fulfilling operational functions which previously had been the sole responsibility of the active components. To accomplish these functions, reserve component elements must be properly equipped and adequately funded.

The primary peacetime mission of the reserve components is to train to be ready to execute mobilization missions should deterrence fail. National Guard and Reserve units must be prepared for the same mobilization missions as active component units. They are expected to maintain mobilization readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active components. Therefore, training must be realistic, challenging, and oriented to wartime missions. Training detractors within each unit need to be identified so that limited available training time can be efficiently utilized. Equipment and facilities for effectively training reserve component members and units are essential to overall mobilization readiness.

Sufficient numbers of adequate small arms ranges and training areas are not available to the reserve components. These shortages make it difficult and time consuming for reserve components to maintain marksmanship and tactical skills using current doctrines and modern systems. The lack of training areas has a direct, adverse impact on readiness.

Training simulators and devices can satisfy some training requirements and help the reserve components attain and sustain individual and unit readiness levels. Funding for such systems has been limited, however, and sufficient numbers of simulators and devices are not available.

Overseas training provides excellent training for reserve component individuals and units. Last year, more than 94,000 Guardsmen and Reservists trained in 84 countries. This was nearly a 15 percent increase over the previous year. Actions required to prepare for and execute an overseas training mission closely parallel those required for mobilization and deployment. Increased morale and retention in the reserve components are additional benefits of overseas training. The Board believes that the overseas training program has been a key element in making the reserve components the ready force that they are today. Overseas training also demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve.

Reserve component participation in joint exercises provides realistic training and increases readiness. Guardsmen and Reservists are able to train as they would fight. War-time missions are executed with United States and foreign forces, just as would occur

upon mobilization. Joint exercises train the reserve components to face the challenges of extended and integrated battlefields within a combined environment.

The National Guard and Reserve support the national effort against drugs to the extent that it coincides with appropriate training, and is allowed by law. Support includes the use of facilities, loan of equipment, transportation, and ground and aerial surveillance. The extent of support varies considerably among reserve components.

### **Medical**

Approximately two thirds of the medical care and three fourths of the medical evacuation capability required during a major conflict, involving the United States, will be provided by reserve components. Readiness of these medical forces is critical since many of them will be required in the early days of any conflict.

Medical readiness is limited by shortages which are particularly acute in the categories of general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, and medical-surgical nurses. The reserve components are short of wartime requirements by approximately 7,100 physicians, 31,000 nurses, and 73,000 enlisted health specialists. Current programs should fill most of the medical personnel requirements by FY 1992.

Medical equipment shortages are particularly acute in the reserve components of the Army. Although much of this equipment is programmed for purchase, backlogs at supply depots prevent equipment from flowing to medical units. Non-medical equipment used to support medical operations is also in short supply. These shortages degrade the ability of medical units to provide treatment for the number of patients envisioned in operational plans.

### **Facilities**

Adequate facilities contribute to the readiness of the reserve components. As the National Guard and Reserve have grown, facility construction, maintenance, and repair have not kept up with expanding requirements. As a result, there have been significant increases in backlogs of construction and in the maintenance and repair of existing facilities. The construction backlog alone is \$6.7 billion. Additional appropriations are required to meet current construction and maintenance needs and to reduce large backlogs in all reserve components.

### **Budget**

In the last decade, expenditures for reserve component manning, equipping, and training programs increased significantly. Failing to sustain these programs and protect the investment in the ready, deployable, and growing National Guard and Reserve force will result in degradation of our military capability.

Appropriations need to provide funding for the tasks and responsibilities assigned to the reserve components. Increased tasking of the National Guard and Reserve should be accompanied by proportional increases in appropriations. Fixed percentage cuts, across all budget accounts, should not be applied to the reserve components when

missions and tasks are being transferred from the active components to the reserve components.

When determining priorities for the budget, resources should first be allocated to readiness of the existing force to ensure that it is properly manned, equipped, and trained to present an effective deterrent. Continuing emphasis must be focused on the readiness of early-deploying units. In a period of constrained budgets, National Guard and Reserve force structure changes should occur only to the extent that they are properly resourced, ameliorate the impact of constrained resources on the remainder of the force, and are a proper mission for the reserve components.

Summaries and recommendations pertaining to issues addressed by the Reserve Forces Policy Board during the year are at the conclusion of each chapter of the report. (S)





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
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## Preface



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### General

President Reagan, in his "National Security Strategy of the United States" dated January 1987, said of the reserve components:

They "... perform important missions and support functions on a daily basis. Their priority for manning, training, and equipment modernization is not based on their peacetime status as forces 'in reserve', but on the basis of their direct integration into the nation's operational plans and missions. In many cases, the sequence of deployment in the event of conflict would place reserve component units side-by-side, and sometimes ahead of active duty forces."

The reserve components are essential elements of the Total Force and are vitally important to national security. In this decade they have made unprecedented progress toward readiness goals in areas of personnel, training, equipment and mobilization preparedness. They perform an important role in the implementation of foreign and national security policies in peacetime or during national emergencies. Today, more than one third of United States military personnel are in the reserve components.

Secretary of Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, in 1982 stated:

"We can no longer consider reserve forces as merely forces in reserve. . . . Instead, they have to be an integral part of the Total Force. . . . They have to be, and in fact are, a blending of the professionalism of the full-time soldier with the professionalism of the citizen-soldier. Only in that way can we achieve the military strength that is necessary to defend freedom."

The Total Force Policy, established nearly a decade earlier, envisioned that the reserve components would become full partners with the active components. Today, they have achieved that role. Operational plans cannot be successfully executed without National Guard and Reserve forces since significant numbers of both fighting and support units are in the reserve components. Sufficiently resourced, the National Guard and Reserves effectively augment a theater commander's operational plans. The reserve components provide combat ready units and other trained individuals which increase the capabilities of the Total Force.

The roles and contributions of the reserve components to our national



security are important. This report will aid in the understanding of those roles and contributions.

### **Strategic Relevance of the Reserve Components**

Strategy provides a framework within which the nation's active and reserve components are established and trained. Strategy is derived from national security objectives and interests to protect the freedom and independence of our nation. Strategy also supports the international interests of the United States and our allies. United States national security strategy is designed to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggression across the entire spectrum of potential conflict. Consequently, the United States and our allies must have sufficient military forces to convince our adversaries that aggression would result in unacceptably high costs.

The Soviet threat and other factors such as regional alliances, geography, and necessary response time determine wartime requirements and proper force

mix, between active and reserve components. Such variables also provide the backdrop for deployment of forces in peacetime.

Prior to the implementation of the Total Force Policy, the reserve components were rarely used to carry out national defense strategies or foreign policies in peacetime. Historically, it has been the policy of our nation to maintain a small standing military force in peacetime and rely upon citizen-soldiers only to augment wartime needs. Now, as the Total Force Policy matures, the reserve components continue to be given added peacetime responsibilities because of the limitations on the size of the active components.

In the past few years, foreign policy has been supported increasingly by deployments of active and reserve components to many parts of the world. Deployments of Central Command's reserve component units to the Middle East and North Africa demonstrate a capability to protect vital interests in that region. REFORGER deployments provide support to NATO. Our policies in Korea are supported by TEAM SPIRIT exercises. In Central America, United States foreign policy is supported by Army National Guard and Army Reserve BLAZING TRAILS engineering and medical units and personnel. VOLANT OAK and CORONET COVE reserve component tactical airlift and fighter aircraft provide support throughout the United States Southern Command area of operations in Central and South America.

The Total Force Policy places a heavy reliance on the reserve components which must plan and train in peacetime

to be able to mobilize rapidly in support of national strategies. National Guard and Reserve participation in worldwide exercises, as well as the very important training at home station armories, reserve centers, and other training areas, provides experience necessary to carry out operational contingencies.

### **Logistics Support in the Reserve Components**

Logistics support was inadequate at the beginning of several military conflicts in which the United States has been involved. In World Wars I and II, some combat units could not be deployed overseas because of insufficient support to keep the units in action. Some of these units were converted to logistical units. Progress of combat forces in Korea was hampered by the lack of support forces—particularly transportation units. A rapid buildup of forces in the Vietnam Conflict was delayed, in part, because of deficiencies in base development elements.

A large portion of logistics support in future national emergencies will come from reserve component forces. More logistical support than ever before is required to support sophisticated equipment systems which will be deployed on the modern battlefield. Units are being equipped with complex, often heavy, equipment which must be moved quickly, over great distances. Ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and maintenance support for various generations of active and reserve component equipment needs to be supplied continually to units over widely-dispersed battle areas. Much support will be provided by National Guard and Reserve units. Detailed

planning is required to solve complex logistics problems which can impede execution of operational plans.

### **Funding for the Reserve Components**



There has usually been a reduction in funding following successful military defense rebuilding programs. The reduced funding generally has been insufficient to sustain readiness levels attained during rebuilding phases. This nation has been successfully rebuilding its reserve components since the beginning of this decade when expenditures were significantly increased to raise the readiness of the Total Force.



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The investment in ready, deployable, and growing reserve component forces needs to be protected. Mobilization capabilities and overall readiness levels have increased in recent years as effective manning, equipping, and training programs have been instituted. If we fail to sustain these programs and protect the investment in the Total Force, the resultant degradation of our military capability is inevitable. We must be concerned about the next decade and beyond. Readiness levels often take years to increase but could decrease rather quickly through reduced funding levels for reserve component programs.

### **Standards for the Reserve Components**

With the National Guard and Reserves being employed on a battlefield simultaneously with active component forces, we must ensure the strength of the Total Force. There can be no weak links in the chain. Each service must develop one set of standards for manning, equipping, and training units and personnel. However, all planners must realize that there are differing environments, working conditions, and methods to achieve these standards for the active and reserve components.

### **Background of the Reserve Forces Policy Board**

The Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) traces its origin to the Committee on Civilian Components, established by President Truman's Executive Order 10007 in 1947. That committee became the Civilian Components Policy Board in 1949 and three years later was established by statute as the Reserve Forces Policy Board. The stated purpose of the Board is to serve as "the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components" acting through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (10 USC 175(c)).

To meet the goals of its charter, the expertise of members of the reserve components is melded with that of representatives from the active components and secretariat appointees who have responsibility for National Guard and Reserve matters.

The Board considers issues brought to its attention from many sources. These sources have included: Congress; Office of the Secretary of Defense; the services; service committees, councils, or boards; theater commanders; and individual National Guard or Reserve members. The Board establishes and maintains communications with public and private individuals and agencies outside the Department of Defense, as necessary, to accomplish the Board mission.

The Board informally reports each quarter to the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services. A report is also published following any

field study undertaken by the Board. Additionally, the law requires "a report from the Reserve Forces Policy Board on the reserve programs of the Department of Defense . . ." (10 USC 113(c)(3)). The report covers the Coast Guard Reserve which remains under the Department of Transportation in peacetime. The report is submitted annually, by the Secretary of Defense, to the President and Congress.

### **Organization of the Report**

The mission readiness of the reserve components is evaluated in this annual report by first reviewing the contributions of the individual components to their parent services and then by analyzing personnel, equipment, training, mobilization, medical, facility, and budget issues. Readiness and mobilization capabilities

of the reserve components, addressed throughout the report, are evaluated separately in the final chapter.

An appendix briefly outlines the activities of the Board in FY 1987.

### **Comments and Additional Copies**

The Board appreciates the helpful comments and recommendations that followed each of its previous reports. It again invites comments on this report. Comments should be addressed to:

**Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Reserve Forces Policy Board  
Room 3B256, The Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-7300**

Additional copies of this report, or other Board publications, may be obtained at the above address. ☐





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


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# Force Structure **1**

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*"Guard and Reserve units have been integrated into active forces to a degree unprecedented in recent history . . ."*

*Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.  
Secretary of the Army*



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## General

The statutory purpose of the reserve components is:

“ . . . to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components” (10 USC 262).

As in the past, National Guard and Reserve units are required to augment active component forces. However, the



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historic role of backup to the active component has changed to one of full partnership. National Guard and Reserve units are now fully integrated into theater operational plans and, in some cases, are required to deploy in hours and days rather than in weeks and months.

In addition to the federal mission, the Army and Air National Guards have a state mission: to provide an organized, trained, and equipped force to function in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order, and public safety under state authority.

## Contributions to the Total Force

The strength of today's reserve components is primarily in trained units. However, trained individuals such as individual mobilization augmentees, individual ready reservists, standby reservists, and retirees are important for use as individual replacements and for filling organizations of all components.

The Army relies on National Guard and Reserve units to roundout active component divisions and to provide essential combat, tactical support, and general support units to both active and reserve elements. Naval Reserve units are an integral part of most mission areas of the Navy to include: surface combatants, carrier air wings, maritime patrol, airlift, and medical support. The Marine Corps Reserve provides a division-wing team and force service support group with balanced combat, combat support, and combat service support forces of the same type as active component units. Air National




Guard and Air Force Reserve units support many combat and combat support missions such as: tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance, strategic and tactical airlift, continental air defense, aerial refueling, aerospace rescue and recovery, and aeromedical evacuation. Except for three port security units, the entire Coast Guard


Reserve will augment active component units after mobilization. There are types of units and individual skills in the reserve components which are not found in the active components.

National Guard and Reserve personnel contributions to the Total Force, by service, are displayed in Table 1.

**Table 1  
PARTNERS IN THE TOTAL FORCE  
(ACTIVE AND SELECTED RESERVE MEMBERS)  
FY 1987 ACTUAL END STRENGTHS**



Data as of September 30, 1987.



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
## Army

Selected Reserve strength in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve is now almost as great as the strength of the active component. Projections indicate that in FY 1988, the Selected Reserve strength will surpass the active component by approximately 8,000 personnel.

Five of the twelve active component divisions within the United States Army Forces Command are organized with two active component brigades. This is one less than required in force structure documents. Upon mobilization, the Army's roundout program brings these divisions to wartime configuration by adding a reserve component brigade to each. Other types of units are also brought to wartime levels by roundout units from the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Reserve component roundout

units are given the same priorities for resources as their parent active component units and generally have the highest priority for resources of all Army National Guard and Army Reserve units. They are provided modern equipment which is compatible with that of their parent active component unit. As a result, these units generally have higher readiness levels than similar reserve component organizations not in the roundout program.

The Army's CAPSTONE program provides a coherent, integrating system for all Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and active component organizations. It focuses planning, resourcing, and training on wartime missions. It defines command and control lines for peace and wartime mobilization alignments, and describes time-phasing of units to a theater to meet operational requirements. The program also provides reserve



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component units with the opportunity to train in the geographic region in which they may be employed with associated CAPSTONE units. Major exercises are used to train the several components both within the United States' force structure and with allied nations' forces.

The Army National Guard has an assigned strength of 451,900. There are 2,043 units, which include 10 divisions, 18 maneuver units, three medical brigades, four armored cavalry regiments, two special forces groups, and 20 major headquarters. Other units, which are unique to the National Guard, include four antitank battalions equipped with TOW missiles, five scout battalions, and one mountain infantry battalion.

The assigned strength of the Army Reserve is 313,600. The 2,602 units provide 33 percent of the combat support and combat service support units, and seven percent of the combat units required by the Total Army. The combat units include three separate infantry brigades, three field artillery brigade headquarters, and two special forces groups. Assignment of new attack helicopter and combat aviation groups to the Army Reserve is shifting the traditional role of Army Reserve aviation from combat support to a combat element.

This past year a HAWK battalion was activated in the New Mexico Army National Guard. Other battalions are scheduled for activation in future years.

The Army's first reserve component multiple launch rocket system battalion will be activated in the Oklahoma Army National Guard in FY 1988. This unit will have some of the most modern and

complex field artillery equipment in the Army inventory.

Contributions to the Total Army by the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are reflected in Table 2.



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**Table 2**  
**ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL ARMY**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>National Guard</u> <u>Percent of</u> <u>Total Army</u>	<u>Army Reserve</u> <u>Percent of</u> <u>Total Army</u>	<u>Combined</u> <u>Percent of</u> <u>Total Army</u>
TOW Light Anti-tank Infantry Battalions	100	0	100
Infantry Scout Groups	100	0	100
Heavy Helicopter Companies	100	0	100
Training Divisions and Brigades	0	100	100
Judge Advocate General Units	2	98	100
Railroad Units	0	100	100
Rear Area Operations Centers	100	0	100
Civil Affairs Units	0	97	97
Public Affairs Units	64	30	94
Pathfinder Units	46	46	92
Supply and Service Units	31	59	90
Psychological Operations Units	0	89	89
Maintenance Companies (General/Direct)	46	43	89
Infantry Battalions	74	8	82
Corps Support Groups, Headquarters Companies	17	62	79
Separate Brigades	66	13	79
Chemical Units-Smoke Generator	0	78	78
Engineer Bridge Companies (Non-Divisional)	48	29	77
Army Hospitals	11	65	76
Medical Units (Other)	24	49	73
Conventional Ammunition Companies	17	51	68
Combat Engineer Battalions/Units	43	24	67
Truck Companies	37	30	67
Military Police Companies (Non-Divisional)	46	20	66
Corps Signal Battalions	47	16	63
Armored Cavalry Regiments	57	0	57
Field Artillery Battalions	47	9	56
Major Logistic Units	22	31	53
Watercraft Companies	7	44	51
Special Forces Groups	25	25	50
Mechanized Infantry Battalions	47	2	49
Armored Battalions	43	2	45
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricant Companies	0	45	45
Combat Divisions	36	0	36
Medium Helicopter Companies	11	11	22

Note: Percentage determined by counting like-type units.


Data as of September 30, 1987.

The Army relies heavily on National Guard and Reserve units to fill out the structure of its active divisions and to provide other essential combat units and tactical support to both active and reserve elements. Another way to look at the National Guard and Reserve contribution to the Total Army structure is by increments as shown in Table 3.




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**Table 3**  
**TOTAL ARMY STRUCTURE**



Note: Percentages determined by counting personnel.  
Source: POM 88-92.



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## Navy

The Naval Reserve has 148,100 personnel assigned. It has 3,046 units classified by types. The types and percentages of each in FY 1987 are indicated below.

- **Commissioned Units (6.2 percent):** Units with organic equipment such as aircraft squadrons or construction battalions. These units are tasked to deliver a complete operational entity to the operating force.
- **Reinforcing Units (28 percent):** Units which augment active component commissioned units and operating staffs, with trained personnel, to permit operations at the highest level of readiness for an indefinite period of time.
- **Sustaining Units (65.8 percent):** Units which augment fleet and force support activities with the trained personnel necessary to provide a surge capability and to sustain the

high level of activity required to adequately support the deployed forces.

Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships belong to the active component Navy and are in the chain of command of the Commanders-in-Chief, Atlantic or Pacific Fleets. Currently, 43 ships are assigned to the NRF. Included are three guided missile frigates and one antisubmarine warfare frigate added in FY 1987. Five frigates are expected to join the NRF in FY 1988. Amphibious, ocean minesweeping, and salvage ships are also assigned to the NRF.

NRF ships are manned by a reduced number of full-time personnel (from normal peacetime levels for these types of ships) and, in addition to the normal mission for the ship, are assigned a mission to train Naval reservists. Full-time personnel assigned to NRF ships are provided by the active component and the Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR) program. The percentage of full-time



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personnel on NRF ships varies from 57 percent for antisubmarine warfare frigates to 69 percent for ocean minesweepers. The determination of which positions in the crew of a NRF ship may be filled by Selected Reservists, is based on an analysis of whether the skills and training requirements for such positions are attainable by members of the Selected Reserve. In order for NRF ships to carry out sustained operations, their Selected Reserve crewmembers, or other additional active or reserve component personnel, must be on board.

A new reserve mine countermeasures helicopter squadron was commissioned in FY 1987 and a reserve light attack squadron was redesignated as a strike fighter squadron when it was upgraded to the F/A-18 aircraft. A strike fighter squadron augment unit will be activated in FY 1988. It will also fly this frontline fleet tactical aircraft. Another mine countermeasures helicopter squadron is programmed for commissioning in FY 1989.

Naval Reserve contributions to the Total Navy are displayed in Table 4.

**Table 4**  
**NAVAL RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO**  
**THE TOTAL NAVY**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Navy</u>
CONUS Based Logistical Airlift Squadrons	100
CONUS Based Fleet Composite (Service) Squadrons	100
Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons	100
Combat Search and Rescue Squadrons	100
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units	100
Naval Control of Shipping (Military Personnel)	99
Cargo Handling Battalions	92
Military Sealift Command Military Personnel	85
Ocean Minesweepers	82
Special Boat Forces	66
Mobile Construction Battalions	65
Medical Support (Military Personnel)	58
Maritime Air Patrol Squadrons	35
Intelligence Personnel	35
Airborne Mine Countermeasures Squadrons	25
LAMPS Anti-Submarine Warfare Squadrons	21
Base Operating Support Personnel	19
Frigates (FFG-7s/FF-1052s)	16
Carrier Air Wings	13
Amphibious Warfare Ships	5

Note: Percentage determined by counting like-type units or personnel.  
Data as of September 30, 1987.



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## **Marine Corps**

The Marine Corps Reserve has 45 aviation units and 166 ground units. It has 42,300 personnel assigned. The roles of the Marine Corps Reserve upon mobilization are:

- Selectively augment the active force in order to field three active marine amphibious forces at full wartime structure.
- Selectively reinforce active marine amphibious forces with Selected Marine Corps Reserve units.
- Provide the capability to field a marine amphibious brigade (with reduced aviation and limited combat service support capability) to reinforce an active marine amphibious force.

- If augmentation/reinforcement is not ordered, provide the capability to field a division, wing, and force service support group.
- If augmentation/reinforcement is ordered, provide a nucleus to reconstitute a division, wing, and force service support group.

During FY 1987, a light armored vehicle (LAV) battalion, a medical battalion, and a dental battalion were activated in the Marine Corps Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve also received Israeli-built KFIR F-21 fighter aircraft into a new adversarial squadron. The F-21 is used to simulate enemy aircraft in the training of both active and reserve component fixed and rotary wing aviators in aerial combat tactics. Although not a mobilization asset, this



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squadron will significantly increase reserve readiness. During FY 1988, planned activations include Company C and Weapons Company, 4th LAV

Battalion; and a target acquisition battery. Marine Corps Reserve contributions to the Total Marine Corps are displayed in Table 5.

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**Table 5**  
**MARINE CORPS RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO**  
**THE TOTAL MARINE CORPS**

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<u>Unit Types<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Marine Corps</u>
Civil Affairs Groups	100
Salvage Platoons	100
Force Reconnaissance Companies	50
Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies	50
Force Service Support Group Military Police Companies	40
Tank Battalions	40
Beach and Port Companies	40
Heavy Artillery Batteries	33
Division Reconnaissance Battalions	25
Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Battalions	25
Infantry Battalions	25
Marine Air Control Groups	25
Marine Wing Support Groups <sup>2</sup>	25
Bulk Fuel Companies	25
Force Service Support Groups	25
Forward Area Air Defense Batteries	25
 <u>Aircraft Types<sup>3</sup></u>	
Light Attack Aircraft	30
Observation Aircraft	29
Aerial Refueling Aircraft	29
Electronic Warfare Aircraft	18
Helicopters	18
Fighter Aircraft	15

- Notes: 1. Percentage determined by counting like-type units.  
 2. Reserve Wing Support Groups being reorganized into Marine Wing Support Squadrons to mirror active component support units.  
 3. Percentage determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

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## **Air Force**

There are 114,600 personnel in the Air National Guard. Of the 642 units in the Air National Guard, 91 are flying units (24 wings). The Air National Guard supports intertheater and tactical airlift requirements and is responsible for providing air defense and intercept protection, on a daily basis, for most of the continental United States and Puerto Rico. It is solely responsible for the air defense of Hawaii. National Guard air defense units provide 78 percent of the air defense assets for the United States with two fighter-interceptors on 24-hour alert at each of 22 locations.

The Air Force Reserve has 509 units and several programs to augment the active component. It has 80,400 personnel assigned. The Air Force Reserve associate program provides reserve component crews to fly active component aircraft on Air Force missions in the KC-10, C-141, C-5, and C-9. Under a memorandum of understanding with the Air Force, a reserve unit flies 70 percent of the WC-130 aircraft hurricane missions. The

memorandum is being reviewed and this high percentage may be lowered for future years. The Air Force Reserve provides 100 percent of the Department of Defense aerial spray capability and 50 percent of the Air Forces' AC-130 gunships.

Both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve provide year-round theater airlift support to the United States Southern Command in Panama. Missions rotate between these two components throughout the year. Additionally, the Air National Guard provides year-round tactical fighter support to that command.

During FY 1987, eight Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve flying units converted to different types or models of aircraft. During the year, the Air National Guard began training a portion of C-130 aircrews from all components.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contributions to the Total Air Force are displayed in Table 6.



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**Table 6**  
**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE**  
**CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE TOTAL AIR FORCE**

<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>National Guard Percent of Total Air Force</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Air Force</u>	<u>Combined Percent of Total Air Force</u>
<u>Flying Units</u>			
Aircraft <sup>1</sup>			
Aerial Spraying Capability	0	100	100
CONUS Strategic Interceptor Forces	78	0	78
Theater Airlift Aircraft	35	25	60
Tactical Reconnaissance	54	0	54
Tactical Air Support	40	0	40
Air Rescue/Recovery	14	24	38
Tactical Fighters	25	8	33
Weather Reconnaissance	0	28	28
Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tankers	18	4	22
Support Aircraft	19	0	19
Special Operations	11	17	28
Strategic Airlift Aircraft	4	6	10
Aircrews <sup>2</sup>			
Aeromedical Evacuation Crews	0	72	72
Strategic Airlift (Associate)	0	50	50
Tanker/Cargo (Associate)	0	50	50
Aeromedical Airlift (Associate)	0	30	30
<u>Non-Flying Units<sup>3</sup></u>			
Aircraft Control & Warning	67	0	67
Combat Communications	67	0	67
Engineering Installations	67	0	67
Aerial Port	14	47	61
Combat Logistics Support Squadrons	0	60	60
Tactical Control	55	0	55
Civil Engineering Personnel	24	20	44
Strategic Airlift Maintenance Personnel	0	40	40
Medical Personnel <sup>4</sup>	8	15	23
Weather	15	1	16

- Notes: 1. Percentage determined by counting primary authorized aircraft.  
 2. Percentage determined by counting authorized aircrews.  
 3. Percentage determined by counting authorized personnel.  
 4. Excludes aeromedical evacuation crews.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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## Coast Guard

There are 334 units in the Coast Guard Reserve. At the end of the fiscal year, the Reserve had 13,300 personnel.

The Coast Guard Reserve peacetime training program is built around augmenting active commands. Except for three overseas port security units, all Coast Guard reservists augment active component Coast Guard units after mobilization. Reservists support primarily port security and maritime defense zone missions, as well as merchant marine safety, navigational aids, port safety and security, and law enforcement. The training goal is a mix of 65 percent augmentation of the active component, and 35 percent

classroom training and administration.

The Coast Guard Reserve established aviation training units at three separate locations in FY 1987. Their mission is to train Selected Reserve personnel for augmentation of two deployable C-130 logistic support squadrons. Upon mobilization, these units will support Atlantic Theater Navy logistics requirements. Available active component aircraft and equipment will be used. The cost of establishing these units is approximately \$1.6 million including increased flight training and simulator time.

Coast Guard Reserve contributions to the Total Coast Guard are displayed in Table 7.

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**Table 7**  
**COAST GUARD RESERVE CONTRIBUTIONS**  
**TO THE TOTAL COAST GUARD**


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<u>Unit Types</u>	<u>Reserve Percent of Total Coast Guard</u>
Deployable Port Security Units (351 billets)	100
Port Safety & Security Forces (3,535 billets)	56
Small Boat Operational Shore Facilities (4,788 billets)	30
Command & Control (1,702 billets)	23
Repair/Supply/Research (1,126 billets)	21
Training Commands (320 billets)	15
Vessels (1,194 billets)	14
Air Stations (124 billets)	2

Note: Percentage determined by counting billets.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

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### **Mix of the Total Force**

An appropriate balance must be preserved between: active and reserve component forces; deployed and United States-based forces; combat, combat support, and combat service support forces; and types of forces (air, ground, sea, heavy, light, special operations). The National Command Authority must have flexibility to respond to challenges in the wide-ranging variety of contingencies—from peacetime missions to low intensity conflict to general war.

Constrained resources and no appreciable active component growth require greater reliance on the reserve components. As a result, additional National Guard and Reserve units are being established.

The primary considerations for placing a unit in a reserve component are the suitability of the unit mission to the reserve component and the required mission response time. The most

suitable missions for the National Guard and Reserves are those with low peacetime activity levels and high wartime surge requirements. If a mission must be performed on a daily basis or requires daily training, that mission is best suited to the active component. Force mix between the active and reserve components must be balanced against the forward-deployed and United States-based forces so that personnel turbulence and involuntary overseas assignments can be reduced.

When decisions are made that a new unit is needed in the reserve components, the Board recommends that activation be delayed until sufficient resources are, or will soon be, available for the manning, equipping, and training of the unit. Facilities must also be available.

Force structure changes which place additional aviation assets in the reserve components can be a cost-effective way to maintain Total Force capability. Given the appropriate



newly activated reserve component units will be located. Demographic studies are made which assess the ability of a potential location to provide personnel in the required numbers and skills to build and maintain a viable unit. Other factors in a stationing assessment include: availability of training areas and facilities, equipment maintenance, full-time support, deployability, command and control, and resources. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) is establishing procedures to require coordination between services during the stationing decision process. These procedures should ensure a balance between unit operational considerations and community environmental concerns.

resources, a reserve component aviation unit can accomplish its mission as effectively, and sometimes more economically, than an active component unit. Reserve component aviation units tend to be highly ready for immediate mobilization.<sup>34</sup>

### **Special Operations Forces**

In 1987, the newly formed United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) assumed operational command of all active and reserve component special operations forces (SOF). National Guard units are assigned to USSOCOM but are not available until mobilized or called to active duty. Army reserve component SOF units include civil affairs, psychological operations, chemical reconnaissance, special forces, and a special operations aviation battalion. These units provide significant percentages of the Total Army's SOF capabilities. (See Table 2). The Air Force has two SOF units in the reserve components. One is an electronic warfare combat unit in the Pennsylvania Air National Guard and the other is an AC-130 gunship unit in the Air Force Reserve. An Air Force Reserve SOF helicopter unit will be activated in FY 1988. In addition to its assigned missions, it will be available to

The Board recommends that force mix planners consider carefully whether a service's total capability, in a specific mission area, should be placed in the National Guard or Reserve. Doing so could limit options and, without invoking authorities to deploy reserve component forces, may also restrict use of forces to meet operational requirements. The Board recommends sufficient capability be retained in the active components (without augmentation by the National Guard or Reserve) for short-term operational missions or contingencies.

### **Reserve Component Unit Stationing**

Each service has its own procedures for determining where



assist the Drug Enforcement Agency in drug interdiction. There are special boat units in the Naval Reserve. The Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs group reports to the USSOCOM. There are no SOF units in the Coast Guard Reserve. Command and control relationships between the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and the USSOCOM are being established.

Civil affairs units and personnel provide essential support for the nation's armed forces in operations ranging from general war to low intensity conflict. Civil affairs support enables commanders to:

- prevent interference with U.S. military operations by local civilians in the area of operations.
- satisfy legal requirements and humanitarian principles regarding civilian populations in the area of operations.

- implement and gain support for national policies from civilian populations in the areas of operations.
- arrange for use of local labor, supplies, facilities, and other resources necessary for tactical operations.
- conduct coordination and liaison with host nation support organizations.

The Army Reserve provides 97 percent of the Total Army's civil affairs capability. One hundred percent of this capability in the Marine Corps is in the Reserve. The other services do not have civil affairs in their reserve components. The Army has been assigned by the Department of Defense to plan, resource, and support civil affairs missions for the Total Force.

In order to maintain adequate and appropriate civil affairs capabilities for



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the Total Force, the Board believes that:

- primary responsibility for civil affairs oversight should exist at the Department of Army level.
- civil affairs responsibilities within the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military commands must be clearly defined and relationships to the new special operations command clarified.
- sufficient structure should be created and resourced, and personnel trained in a civil affairs specialty school to satisfy civil affairs requirements of the Total Force and that the Civil Affairs Branch in the Army Reserve should be retained.
- all Department of Defense schools should include instruction or orientation on civil affairs missions, roles, and capabilities.

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
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### **Military Intelligence**

The reserve components contribute significantly to the total military intelligence effort. Forty-one percent of the Army's military intelligence units are in the National Guard or Reserve. They include combat electronic warfare intelligence units, strategic and tactical intelligence detachments, language units, and aerial surveillance units.

The Naval Reserve intelligence program provides about 15 percent of the Navy's peacetime intelligence capability and more than 60 percent of its wartime personnel. The Naval Reserve intelligence program has 4,700 Selected Reserve billets in 140 intelligence units and 170 other units.





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Marine Corps Reserve intelligence assets contribute nearly 10 percent of the total Marine Corps strategic intelligence capabilities in the areas of signal intelligence, human intelligence, counterintelligence, and photo intelligence. Marine Corps Reserve intelligence assets also support the Reserve's tactical requirements.

The Air National Guard provides 10 percent of the total Air Force intelligence assets. Air Force Reserve units contribute four percent of the Air Force intelligence assets and individual mobilization augmentees in the Air Force Intelligence Service contribute another 17 percent.

Coast Guard Reserve military intelligence assets constitute 35 percent of the overall Coast Guard intelligence program.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

During FY 1987, the reserve components continued to accept new

roles and expand the force structure through unit activations and conversions. National Guard and Reserve units are fully integrated into operational plans and are often required to deploy to a theater shortly after an outbreak of hostilities—in some cases before similar active component units. With the prospect of limited resources for defense programs, force planners are faced with difficult decisions on the proper mix of the Total Force and how to best organize the force.

The Board recommends:


- delay activation of programmed reserve component units until sufficient resources are, or will soon be, available for manning, equipping, training, and accommodation of the unit.
- retain sufficient capability in the active components (without augmentation by the National Guard or Reserve) for short term operational missions or contingencies. (U)



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## Personnel **2**



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*"As citizen soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, you are an important and prominent link between the armed forces and the nation's communities. Your service in the reserve components is a visible demonstration to all Americans of your dedication to the preservation of our way of life."*

*Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense*



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### **General**

Expanding roles and responsibilities, equipment modernization, unit conversions, a shrinking recruiting pool, and increased training affect personnel requirements in the National Guard and Reserve. Reserve component forces should be composed of members with the proper mix of age, grade, and experience to ensure accomplishment of the many missions and roles of the National Guard and Reserve.

New, imaginative, and aggressive methods and programs are required to attract and retain quality individuals in the National Guard and Reserve. Congress has approved and funded vitally needed recruiting and retention incentives to assist in personnel strength management. Improved

retention of personnel in the reserve components is a key factor in acquiring and maintaining a balanced force with the proper mix of age, grade, and experience.

### **Composition of the Ready Reserve**

The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the National Guard and Reserve who individually or in organized units, are subject to recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency (10 United States Code, Sections 268 and 269). Composition and strength of the Ready Reserve is shown in Table 8. Specific elements of the table are discussed later in this chapter.



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**Table 8  
COMPOSITION OF THE READY RESERVE  
FY 1987**

READY RESERVE 1,637,900				
SELECTED RESERVE 1,164,100 <sup>1</sup>			IRR/ING 473,800 (INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE/ INACTIVE NATIONAL GUARD)	
UNIT & AGR/TAR 1,136,628 <sup>2</sup>		IMA 27,472 (INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES)		
UNITS 1,067,695 (PAID DRILL STRENGTH ONLY)	FTS 133,572 (AGR/TAR AND MILITARY TECHNICIAN ONLY)			
<table border="1" style="margin: auto;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">MILITARY TECHNICIANS 64,639</td> </tr> </table>		MILITARY TECHNICIANS 64,639		
MILITARY TECHNICIANS 64,639				

Notes: 1. Selected Reserve includes 1,071,337 trained personnel.

2. Military Technician strength counted only once.

Source: Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, September 1987.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

**Personnel Strengths**

Personnel requirements for peacetime and wartime organizations result from efforts to most effectively use limited national personnel resources to counter the enemy threat. Increased numbers of drilling Selected Reservists are necessary to meet the expanding roles of the reserve components. Personnel are required for new units and to expand existing capabilities. Mobilization

readiness is affected by the personnel strength of any unit.

The Board is concerned that overall personnel reductions are being directed, because of costs, without adequate consideration for war plan requirements. Table 9 reflects the wartime personnel requirements, authorized personnel, and personnel assigned by component and category.



**Table 9**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTH**  
**(In Thousands)**

	FY 81 <sup>1</sup>	FY 86 <sup>1</sup>	FY 87 <sup>1</sup>	% Change FY 86-87	% Change FY 81-87	Projected FY 88 <sup>2</sup>	% Change FY 81-88
<b>READY RESERVE</b>							
Selected Reserve							
ARNG (468.9) <sup>3</sup>	389.0	446.2	451.9	1.3%	16.2%	457.3	17.6%
USAR (331.1) <sup>3</sup>	232.0	309.7	313.6	1.3%	35.2%	324.3	39.8%
USNR (129.9) <sup>3</sup>	98.3	141.5	148.1	4.7%	50.7%	152.6	55.2%
USMCR (46.6) <sup>3</sup>	37.3	41.6	42.3	1.7%	13.4%	43.6	16.9%
ANG (116.3) <sup>3</sup>	98.3	112.6	114.6	1.8%	16.6%	115.9	17.9%
USAFR (87.4) <sup>3</sup>	62.3	78.5	80.4	2.4%	29.1%	82.4	32.3%
TOTAL DOD	917.2	1130.1	1150.9	1.8%	25.5%	1176.1	28.2%
USCGR (27.5) <sup>3</sup>	11.9	13.0	13.3	2.3%	11.8%	12.0	0.8%
TOTAL Sel Reserve	929.1	1143.1	1164.1	1.8%	25.3%	1188.1	27.9%
<b>IRR/ING</b>							
ARNG	10.5	9.5	10.3	8.4%	-1.9%	10.3	-1.9%
USAR	205.9	300.8	287.5	-4.4%	39.6%	300.9	46.1%
USNR	99.3	73.8	78.4	6.2%	-21.0%	86.0	-13.4%
USMCR	51.4	49.3	44.6	-9.5%	-13.2%	55.0	7.0%
ANG	0.1	0.2	0.0	-100.0%	-100.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	43.7	48.7	48.3	-0.8%	10.5%	43.9	0.5%
TOTAL DOD	410.9	482.4	469.0	-2.8%	14.1%	496.1	20.7%
USCGR	8.1	4.7	4.8	2.1%	-40.7%	6.0	-25.9%
TOTAL IRR/ING	419.1	487.1	473.8	-2.7%	13.1%	502.1	19.8%
TOTAL READY RESERVE	1348.1	1630.2	1637.9	0.5%	21.5%	1690.2	25.4%
<b>ACTIVE COMPONENT<sup>4</sup></b>							
Army	781.0	781.0	780.8	-0.0%	-0.0%	780.9	-0.0%
Navy	529.8	581.1	586.8	1.0%	10.8%	593.2	12.0%
Marine Corps	190.6	198.8	199.5	0.4%	4.7%	199.6	4.7%
Air Force	570.3	608.2	607.0	-0.2%	6.4%	598.7	5.0%
TOTAL DOD	2071.7	2169.1	2174.2	-0.2%	4.9%	2172.4	4.9%
Coast Guard	39.8	37.4	38.6	3.2%	-3.0%	38.0	-4.5%
TOTAL AC Personnel	2111.5	2206.5	2212.8	-0.3%	4.8%	2210.4	4.7%
TOTAL READY RESERVE & ACTIVE COMPONENT	3459.6	3836.7	3850.7	0.4%	11.3%	3900.6	12.7%
<b>STANDBY RESERVE</b>							
ARNG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAR	5.0	0.3	0.4	33.3%	-92.0%	0.3	-94.0%
USNR	20.0	12.4	11.2	-9.7%	-44.0%	12.0	-40.0%
USMCR	1.8	2.2	1.4	-36.4%	-22.2%	1.0	-44.4%
ANG	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0%	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
USAFR	37.1	25.8	24.5	-5.0%	-34.0%	28.3	-23.7%
TOTAL DOD	64.0	40.8	37.5	-8.1%	-41.4%	41.6	-35.0%
USCGR	0.9	0.6	0.4	-33.3%	-55.6%	0.8	-11.1%
TOTAL STANDBY RESERVE	64.9	41.4	37.9	-8.5%	-41.6%	42.4	-34.7%

**Table 9 (Cont'd)**  
**PERSONNEL STRENGTH**  
**(In Thousands)**

	FY 81 <sup>1</sup>	FY 86 <sup>1</sup>	FY 87 <sup>1</sup>	% Change FY 86-87	% Change FY 81-87
<b>RETIRED<sup>5</sup></b>					
20 Years Reserve Component Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 672(a))					
Army	97.5	104.9	110.2	5.1%	13.0%
Navy	50.3	58.2	52.0	-10.7%	3.4%
Marine Corps	5.8	7.1	6.6	-7.0%	13.8%
Air Force	69.0	57.8	60.0	3.8%	-13.0%
TOTAL DOD	222.6	228.0	228.8	0.4%	2.8%
Coast Guard	1.6	2.3	2.3	0.0%	43.8%
TOTAL RC (Non-Dis)	224.2	230.3	231.1	0.3%	3.1%
20 Years Active Service (Non-Disabled)					
(10 USC 688(a))					
Army	320.4	342.5	348.0	1.6%	8.6%
Navy	286.6	302.2	315.7	4.5%	10.2%
Marine Corps	51.8	55.6	56.2	1.1%	8.5%
Air Force	402.2	442.4	449.5	1.6%	11.8%
TOTAL DOD	1061.0	1142.7	1169.5	2.3%	10.2%
Coast Guard	14.9	20.2	23.7	17.3%	59.1%
TOTAL Act (Non-Dis)	1075.9	1162.9	1193.2	2.6%	10.9%
Reserve & Active Components (Disabled)					
Army	104.9	105.0	108.4	3.2%	3.3%
Navy	43.1	43.5	44.4	2.1%	3.0%
Marine Corps	26.7	26.6	26.6	0.0%	-0.4%
Air Force	60.1	56.3	55.3	-1.8%	-8.0%
TOTAL DOD	234.8	231.4	234.8	1.5%	0.0%
Coast Guard	3.8	3.7	3.7	0.0%	-2.6%
TOTAL RC & AC (Dis)	238.6	235.1	238.5	1.4%	-0.0%
TOTAL RETIRED	1538.7	1628.3	1662.8	2.1%	8.1%
<b>TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL</b>					
(Active Component, Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve and Retired)					
Army	2146.2	2399.9	2411.1	0.5%	12.3%
Navy	1127.4	1212.7	1236.6	2.0%	9.7%
Marine Corps	365.4	381.2	377.2	-1.0%	3.2%
Air Force	1343.1	1430.5	1439.6	0.6%	7.2%
TOTAL DOD	4982.1	5424.3	5464.5	0.7%	9.7%
Coast Guard	81.0	81.9	86.8	6.0%	7.2%
TOTAL PERSONNEL	5063.1	5506.2	5551.3	0.8%	9.6%

Notes: 1. Reserve component data for 1981-1987 taken from Official Guard and Reserve, Manpower Strengths and Statistics, September 1987.

2. FY 1988 data submitted by the Services and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

3. FY 1987 Wartime Requirement from individual reserve components.

4. FY 1987 active component strengths obtained from Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release, dated November 30, 1987.

5. DOD Directive 1352.1 dated February 27, 1984.

6. Numbers may not add due to rounding.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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
### Personnel for Mobilization

Table 9 also indicates sources of personnel available for mobilization according to personnel data bank information and by Department of Defense directive. There is no assurance that all of the personnel in the mobilization pool will be physically fit for duty. Table 10 shows the percentages of Total Force personnel, by category, who are available for

mobilization. Current data is compared with FY 1981 information.

Some Selected Reserve units may have nondeployable personnel because of incompleting training or nonparticipation. Additional command emphasis is needed to rehabilitate nonparticipants, train the untrained, or if that fails, remove these personnel from unit rolls by either discharge or transfer to the IRR.

**Table 10**  
**TOTAL MOBILIZABLE PERSONNEL**  
**(DOD and Coast Guard)**



Sources: Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics, September, 1987; and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC 30-35). Data as of September 30, 1987.



## Personnel Shortages

Personnel shortages impair the operational capability of any unit. Some of the many factors which affect personnel status in the reserve components are:



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- family support
- employer support
- the declining pool of eligible personnel
- unit type and location
- civilian demands for similar skills
- similar military units in the area
- population density
- high technical skill requirements
- length of required military schooling
- geographic dispersion of skills
- training programs
- pay comparability, timeliness, and accuracy

The Coast Guard's personnel requirements for mobilization are 65,500. The active component provides 38,000 personnel while the remaining 27,500 personnel requirement must be filled by the Selected Reserve. Appropriations in FY 1987 provided for only 12,750 in the Selected Reserve, or 47 percent of reserve mobilization requirements. As a result, the Coast Guard cannot meet its mobilization requirements. All other reserve components are at least at the 90 percent level. The Board recommends that, in order to eliminate the critical 14,750 member shortfall in Coast Guard Reserve mobilization strength, significant annual personnel increases for the Coast Guard Selected Reserve be authorized and funded.

Table 11 displays key shortages of the reserve components. Programs have been established to address personnel shortages, especially in critical skills. Targeted recruiting and increased incentives will enable some components to overcome the shortages in time.



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**Table 11**  
**PERSONNEL SHORTAGES IN THE SELECTED RESERVE**


Component	No. of Career Fields Short at Least 10%	Skill Areas Short	Primary Grade Shortages
Army National Guard	35 Enlisted	Inf. Cmbt Eng, Arty, Armor, Air Def Maint, Comm Elec Maint, Comm Elec Opn, Sensor Rep, Medic, Mech Maint, Chem Opn, Ammo Spec, EOD Spec, Admin Spec, Topo Eng	E1 to E4 E7 to E9 Varying by field
Army Reserve	13 Officer All Warrant Officers	Psy Opns, Civil Affairs, Compt, Pub Affairs, Nuc Wpns Spec, Sys Auto, Chap, Med, Nurse, Med Svc, Chem, Sup Svc, Trans, Aero Obsv, Food Svc	03 W01 to CW4
Naval Reserve	13 Enlisted	Inf. Cmbt Eng, Spec Forces, Comm Elec Maint, Comm Elec Opn, Elec War Int Sys Maint, Eng, Chem Spec, Sup Svc, Trans, Medic, Aero Obsv, Food Svc	E1 to E4 E6 to E9 Varying by field
	7 Officer	Nav Flt Off, Anesthesiology, Orth Surg, Gen Surg, Nurse Anest, Opn Rm Nurse, Spec War Off	02 01 to 06 02 to 04
	2 Enlisted	Hosp Corpsman, Equip Opr	E3, E4 E3 to E5
Marine Corps Reserve	7 Officer	Admin, Log, Acft Maint, Intel, Ord, Air Cntl/Anti-air Warfare	01 to 05 Varying by field
	3 Warrant Officers	Engr, NBC, Air Traf Cntl, Flt Crew	W1 to W4
	18 Enlisted	Inf, Comm, Mtr Trans, Mil Pol, Avn Ord, Air Flt Svcs, Log, Util, Ord, NBC Electronic Maint, Air Traf Cntl, Flt Crew, Arty, Eng, Tank/Assault Amphib, Fin	E1, E2, E5 to E9 Varying by field
Air National Guard	9 Officer	Nav, Wea, Civ Eng, Svcs, Log, Fin, Chap, Bio Med, Nurse	03 to 05 Varying by field
	13 Enlisted	Visual Info, Wea, Air Traf Cntl, TAC Cntl, Aero Sp Con Wrng, Avion Sys, Wire Comm Sys, Photo Sens, Mun Sys, Acft Arm, Food Svcs	E4 to E9 Varying by field
Air Force Reserve	3 Officer	Surgeon, Nurse, Dentist	04 to 05 Varying by field
	1 Enlisted	Struct Pvmt Spec	E3, E4, E8
Coast Guard Reserve	3 Enlisted	Radarman, Fir Cntl Tech, Gunners Mate	Varying by field

Source: Individual reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1987.

### Recruiting

Each of the reserve components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, have full-time personnel with primary recruiting tasks. Although the programs vary, each has demonstrated its value in achieving personnel goals.

In FY 1987, the reserve components had excellent success in recruiting both prior and non-prior service personnel to meet strength goals. Recruiting of prior service personnel in most instances, provides a trained asset thereby reducing training costs. Prior service personnel require some retraining if they are recruited to work in a new speciality in the National Guard or Reserve. Non-prior service enlistees, on the other hand, require extensive training to become proficient in basic skills and their specialty. The latter are generally younger and provide a proper mix of age/grade/experience for a dynamic growing force.



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Many factors influence recruiting efforts of the reserve components to include:

- quality of leadership
- management practices
- Selected Reserve incentive programs
- Montgomery GI Bill
- challenging training
- civilian attitudes towards military service
- stability of the reserve components for their members
- professionalism and quality of recruiters
- numbers of recruiters
- advertising programs
- the domestic economy
- referral programs



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Table 12 presents the FY 1987 accessions for each of the reserve components. It shows prior and non-prior service officer and enlisted gains separately. Overall, Selected Reserve enlistments exceeded FY 1987 objectives. The Army Reserve, Air National Guard, and Coast Guard Reserve were short of their enlistment goals for the year.

**Table 12**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL ACCESSIONS**  
**FY 1987**

	Officer		Enlisted		Enlistment <sup>1</sup> Objective	Total
	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service	Prior Service	Non-Prior Service		
Army National Guard	5516	280	41837	43753	81000	91386
Army Reserve	8726	332	42742	31847	77100	83647
Naval Reserve	5695	24	21533	16204	33800	43456
Marine Corps Reserve	959	0	5836	8375	13500	15170
Air National Guard	1244	105	8157	4812	13300	14318
Air Force Reserve	1901	255	10475	3395	13900	16026
<b>Total</b>	<b>24041</b>	<b>996</b>	<b>130580</b>	<b>108386</b>		<b>264003</b>
<b>Total DOD</b>		<b>25037</b>		<b>238966</b>	<b>232600</b>	<b>264003</b>
Coast Guard Reserve	76	0	739	1225	2100	2040
		<b>25113</b>		<b>240930</b>	<b>234700</b>	<b>266043</b>

Note: 1. Numbers are rounded.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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Table 13 provides information on the number of recruiters for reserve component personnel and annual average accessions for each recruiter whose primary duty is production. Other personnel assigned to recruiting duty occupy supervisor, operations, administrative, and marketing positions, all of which contribute to successful recruiting programs. All National Guard recruiters are Title 32 USC Active Guard/Reserve personnel. Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve recruiters are Title 10 USC Active Guard/Reserve personnel. Naval Reserve recruiters are normally on tours of active duty for one year.

The Army Reserve has a small number of federal civilian employees performing recruiting duty.

The Coast Guard Reserve Forces Program provides funding for 43 recruiters to the Coast Guard recruiting organization. The Coast Guard Recruiting Program services active and reserve component accession requirements. Coast Guard Reserve funded recruiter billets are filled by active component personnel. Recruiters in these billets average 46 accessions per year for the active and reserve components.

**Table 13**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT RECRUITERS**  
**AND ANNUAL AVERAGE ACCESSIONS**  
**FY 1987**

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Annual Average Accessions<sup>2</sup></u>
Army National Guard	2459	2459 (1832)	42.0
Army Reserve	2311	2311 (1715)	42.2
Naval Reserve	1562	1397 (1034)	38.4
Marine Corps Reserve	202	153 (132)	42.0
Air National Guard	549	537 (407)	31.8
Air Force Reserve	355	330 (271)	53.0
Total DOD	7438	7187 (5391)	41.2

Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses indicate production recruiters. Others are in support.  
2. Production recruiters only.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Career Counselors and Inservice Recruiters**

Army National Guard and Army Reserve career counselors, or in-service recruiters at transition centers on active duty installations, assist soldiers leaving the active component with Total Army career planning, employment assistance, and identification of educational opportunities. This has been a very effective program for the Army's reserve components. The Army National Guard has 45 and the Army Reserve has 132 personnel located with active component reenlistment personnel. Assignments of soldiers, leaving active duty, to Army National Guard and Army Reserve units have more than doubled in the last five years from 11,875 in FY 1983 to 24,848 in FY 1987.

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve also have full-time career counselors at each military enlistment processing facility to assist non-prior service applicants in finding reserve component unit positions or vacancies in basic and advanced skill training

schools. Full-time Army National Guard and Army Reserve in-service recruiters and retention NCOs are valuable assets to their services. National Guard Bureau studies directly correlate full-time retention NCOs with the reduction of personnel losses over the past seven years. Full-time career counselors provide trained soldiers to drilling units resulting in considerable savings in training dollars.

The Naval Reserve has 48 full-time career counselors assigned to Career Information Teams (CARIT). They have overall responsibility for administering the career counseling program which supports full-time support and Selected Reserve personnel.

CARITs provide formal presentations to active component members leaving active duty. These briefings provide information on veterans' benefits and the advantages of being a member of the Naval Reserve. As leads are generated, they are provided to the Naval Reserve activity closest to the intended residence of the service member. CARITs have aided significantly in the manning of Naval Reserve units, providing approximately 33,600 leads in FY 1987. Approximately 14 percent of these joined the Naval Reserve.

The Marine Corps Reserve uses full-time personnel in three recruiting and retention programs. Recruiters from the Marine Corps Reserve Support Center recruit prior service marines. Procurement liaison personnel counsel marines separating from active duty about reserve benefits and obligations. Career planners, assigned to the Marine Corps Reserve units assist in their retention programs.

A Base Career Advisor (BCA) is stationed at each Air National Guard flying unit location, recruiters at all major Air National Guard locations, an in-service recruiter (Palace Front) at McGuire AFB, NJ, and a Palace Chase NCO at the Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, TX. All are full-time positions.

The BCA manages the Air National Guard Career Motivation Program (retention). Retention in FY 1987 was 78 percent—just two percent below the national goal. The Air National Guard has met its strength goals for the past 10 years. The Palace Front NCO refers interested active component personnel, at their expiration of term of service, to Air National Guard units. The Palace Chase program is a voluntary separation program whereby active component personnel who want to leave active duty agree to serve twice the term remaining on their active duty commitments.

The Air Force Reserve has full time recruiters/BCAs at each major Reserve

location, in-service recruiters at substantially all continental United States active component bases, a career advisor at each wing or group, and a Palace Chase NCO at the Air Force Military Personnel Center. The recruiter force at each location varies in size depending upon the size of the parent unit serviced. The in-service recruiter interviews and informs personnel separating from the active component about the benefits of joining the Air Force Reserve. Career advisors are responsible for monitoring career motivation programs at their respective bases and at geographically separated units without career advisors. They and supervisors counsel members prior to reenlistment and members that have been identified as unsatisfactory participants in Inactive Duty Training requirements.

The Coast Guard Reserve does not have any full-time career counselors. Unit officers and senior enlisted personnel counsel subordinates annually. Counseling is also done through Career Development Plans.



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Each year, Reserve unit members develop a five-year plan which combines schooling and on-the-job training to improve mobilization skills, help in advancements, and discuss reenlistment plans.

Recruiting and retention programs in each reserve component have a positive impact on personnel readiness by providing high quality, motivated, and trained individuals to the force.

### Retention Rates

"When people start voting with their feet it's too late. When the staff sergeant with 12 years of service decides to get out, it's going to take us four or five recruits and 12 years to replace him, with a tremendous amount of lost capability over that entire period of time." Lieutenant General Anthony

Lukeman, USMC, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel).

As the pool of eligible personnel for non-prior service personnel dwindles, retention of the existing force becomes increasingly important.

In addition to a myriad of other responsibilities, commanders are responsible for the effectiveness of their unit's retention program. Supervisors should assist the commander by insuring that each person is made to feel a key part of the unit, remains challenged, contributes to the unit mission, and is treated as a person rather than a statistic. Table 14 reflects retention percentage rates of the reserve components for first term and career enlisted for the past three fiscal years.



**Table 14**  
**ENLISTED RETENTION RATES**

Component	FY 85		FY 86		FY 87	
	FT	CAR	FT	CAR	FT	CAR
Army National Guard	85	79	83	71	80	68
Army Reserve	50	86	66	81	65	83
Naval Reserve	89	90	89	90	82	90
Marine Corps Reserve	69	74	71	72	75	74
Air National Guard	91	97	90	96	82	96
Air Force Reserve	78	89	83	88	81	88
Coast Guard Reserve	80	88	74	87	78	87

FT = First Term

CAR = Career Personnel

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987 (except for Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve which is August 30, 1987 information. Coast Guard Reserve data as of July 31, 1987. Its rates reflect the continuation rate as used by the Navy Department).





In addition to the commander's attention, other significant factors which influence retention rates are:

- family support of National Guardsmen or Reservists,
- employer support of the National Guard and Reserve, and
- timely, accurate pay for the individual.

Much attention has been given to employer and family support. Pay problems, however, recently have been identified as having an adverse impact on otherwise positive retention programs in some of the reserve components. Errors in the pay system result in no pay, late pay, or incorrect pay of dedicated reserve component members. Contributing factors to these errors—at all levels—must be identified and action taken to eliminate policies, systems, or procedures found to adversely affect timely and accurate pay.

### **Incentive Programs**

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Incentive and bonus programs are used by the Department of Defense reserve components to improve recruiting and retention in selected military occupational skills (MOS). With a declining recruiting pool, reduced advertising budgets, and increasing competition from civilian and education sectors, bonuses provide an excellent resource for recruiting and strength management programs. The reserve components are doing an effective job of reviewing and targeting their incentive programs. This should have a positive impact in filling critical skill shortages, thereby increasing readiness.

In FY 1987, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs approved the implementation of State Critical Skills Enlistment and Retention Bonus lists for the Army National Guard. These state lists will replace a single national list and should



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better target bonus resources to the different force structure vacancies in each state—especially for low density MOSs.

Changes for the Army Reserve will prioritize local (50 miles/one hour driving time) MOS vacancies offered to a prospect based on available training seats and critical skill shortages.

The Naval Reserve recently changed its incentive programs by targeting some bonuses to skill shortages in high priority units in specific geographic areas. For example, bonuses are now paid to operations specialists and electronic warfare technicians only if they affiliate with Naval Reserve Force ships. This should help fill many of the vacancies in high priority units.

The Marine Corps Reserve is reviewing its occupational field shortages to ensure bonuses are directed to extremely short specialties only.

The National Guard Bureau prepares quarterly lists of critical Air Force career fields that are manned at less than 90 percent in the Air National Guard. Limited funding for the incentives program requires that they delete from the lists some specialties which are

slightly under 90 percent of authorized levels. Fiscal constraints compel them to limit incentive payments to mission-related specialties with high intelligence level entry requirements.

In June, 1987, the Air Force Reserve regionalized its unit bonus program to permit wing and detached group commanders to select bonus specialties for their respective units. Previously unit bonus programs were applied across the command, regardless of unit manning concerns. The local commander now has greater flexibility in targeting bonuses to unit shortages, thereby enhancing recruiting and retention in targeted skills.

Except for the Montgomery GI Bill, the Coast Guard Reserve does not have any formal incentive programs. A significant portion of the Coast Guard Reserve budget is invested in recruiting efforts. Recruiting efforts have been effective in meeting authorized and appropriated end-strength goals which currently are less than 50 percent of wartime requirements. The Coast Guard Reserve has no plans to use bonuses in the immediate future.

### **Montgomery GI Bill**

The Montgomery GI Bill was signed by President Reagan on June 1, 1987, making it a permanent benefit for service members. It is a non-contributory, general entitlement program for Selected Reserve members. Officer and enlisted personnel become eligible for certain education benefits after completing their initial active duty for training and 180 days of service in the Selected Reserve. They are also required to enlist or agree to serve in the Selected Reserve for at least six years.



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## RESOLUTION

**WHEREAS** the readjustment of America's veterans to civilian life is the foremost objective of the Montgomery GI Bill, and

**WHEREAS** this education program will enable the Nation's All-Volunteer Total Force to attract bright, highly motivated recruits in large numbers in order to maintain a high state of combat readiness, and

**WHEREAS** the program will assure that millions of Americans -- many of whom would have been financially unable to do so -- will attend college, pursue technical training or otherwise further their education in return for honorable military service to their country, and

**WHEREAS** the Montgomery GI Bill sustains the commitment to veterans established by the first GI Bill forty-three years ago and carried through two successive GI Bill programs, Now therefore be it

**RESOLVED** that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives on June 30, 1987, recognizes that the **Reserve Forces Policy Board** was instrumental in the development and passage of the Montgomery GI Bill and that the Committee commends them for their determination and untiring efforts toward achieving final enactment of H.R. 1085 making it a permanent education assistance program.

  
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery  
Chairman

  
Gerald B.H. Solomon  
Ranking Minority Member



basically limited to a baccalaureate degree.

The Montgomery GI Bill is an extremely valuable recruiting and retention incentive for the Selected Reserve. Amendments are being considered by Congress which should make this an even more effective program for recruiting and retention. Of special interest to reserve component members is the expansion of coverage to vocational and graduate education.

Participants who remain members of the Selected Reserve have up to 10 years to use the full entitlement. Benefits for National Guard and Reserve members are payable for up to 36 months of education at the rate of \$140 per month for full-time study, \$105 for three-quarter time study, and \$70 per month for half-time study. Funded study must be at an approved institution of higher learning and is

Participation by reserve component members has steadily increased since its inception as a temporary benefit in July 1985. Table 15 shows the number of personnel identified as eligible and the number who have applied for benefits by reserve component. The numbers have been rounded down for uniformity and because of the numbers of unknowns still in the system, however, the table does indicate the high interest in this valuable benefit.

**Table 15**  
**MONTGOMERY GI BILL USAGE**

<u>Component</u>	<u>Eligibles<sup>1</sup></u>	<u>Applicants<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Army National Guard	86,600	27,400	31.6
Army Reserve	37,000	15,300	41.4
Naval Reserve	20,500	6,300	30.7
Marine Corps Reserve	8,700	3,100	35.6
Air National Guard	24,300	9,800	40.3
Air Force Reserve	18,200	4,500	24.7
Coast Guard Reserve	644	500	77.6

Notes: 1. Data as of August 31, 1987.

2. Data as of October 1, 1987.

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

### Individual Skill Qualification

The services utilize different terminology when referring to individual skill qualification and occupational specialties. The Army and Marine Corps refer to them as Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). The Navy identifies two categories—Naval Officer Billet Classification (NOBC), and Navy Enlisted Classification Code (NEC). The Air Force identifies jobs under the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). For purposes of this report the term MOS will encompass all of these.

Every effort is made to place an individual in an authorized position for their rank and skill level. However, in many cases in the reserve components, this may not be possible. MOS mismatch occurs when a member of the reserve components, who is trained in

an occupational specialty, is assigned to a unit to fill another occupational specialty for which he or she has not been trained and is not qualified. The result is a decrease in unit readiness since a person who is not fully qualified is assigned to a job.

Table 16 presents the extent of MOS mismatch and lack of MOS qualification in each of the reserve components. The lack of skill qualification for a specific job and position has an adverse effect on readiness.



**Table 16**  
**INDIVIDUAL SKILL QUALIFICATION (MOS) MISMATCH**  
**IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

	Not MOS Qualified		Not Working In MOS		Not Recruited To MOS	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Army National Guard	37000	9%	77000	20%		60-65% <sup>1</sup>
Army Reserve	29000	12%	54000	22%		60-65% <sup>1</sup>
Naval Reserve	12705 <sup>2</sup>	12%	29462 <sup>3</sup>	28%	8512	38%
Marine Corps Reserve	2218	5%	5971	15%	2588	44%
Air National Guard	4684	3%		0%	1391	11%
Air Force Reserve	340	1%	100	1%	2649	36%


Notes: 1. Estimated percentages.

2. There are billets for 12,433 non-rated personnel.

3. Substitution criteria assignments.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



The Naval Reserve cannot determine the impact of MOS mismatch on readiness. Although the Naval Reserve has over 28 percent of its personnel assigned to billets outside of their ratings, they are assigned through a substitution criteria which considers the billet requirements, and allows other ratings to fill the billet if it is not rate specific. Therefore, the mismatches do not affect unit status reports. Twelve percent of the Naval Reserve are non-rated (not MOS qualified), however, they are assigned to authorized non-rated billets.

The Air Force reserve components indicate that MOS mismatch has negligible impact on readiness of their units. One reason for this is that personnel who are assigned to a billet outside of their MOS are placed in a retraining category. Although qualified in another MOS, they are in training

and not considered as not assigned in their skill.

A primary reason for units reporting personnel as not MOS qualified is that those personnel are in training, awaiting training, or have not completed split training options. Completion of training will result in MOS qualification.

Among the other factors that contribute to MOS qualification problems in the reserve components are:

- recruiting prior service personnel for positions for which they are not MOS qualified.
- personnel turnover.
- unit conversions or mission changes.
- availability and flexibility of formal service schools.
- availability of reserve component members to attend schools.

There are numerous actions that may be considered to alleviate the MOS mismatch problem. They include:

- increase on the job training opportunities.
- increase vocational technical training opportunities.
- increase the use of civilian skills equivalency testing and qualification procedures.
- increase service school flexibility. The services must be creative and aggressive in applying this solution if the Total Force is to remain viable in terms of economy and readiness. Some examples are:
  - Taking the training programs to reserve component students,
  - intensifying courses for reserve component students, and
  - spreading courses of instruction over numerous active duty periods.
- share MOS information between the reserve components to match MOS to prior service member in given geographic areas.
- recruit to MOS or have a firm commitment that the recruit can attend formal schooling within a specified time period.
- if unable to fill all units with proper MOSs, program those IRR members, recently separated from active duty to fill those assignments upon mobilization.
- enhance or expand incentive programs.



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National Guard enlisted soldiers in the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program are limited to total years of active service by grade, up to a maximum of 30 years.

The Army Reserve requires senior grade enlisted members to transfer from units to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) based upon tenure and grade.

In January, 1986, the Naval Reserve implemented, for those in paid drill status, a waivable, 30-year maximum service limitation program. Additionally, the 1986 National Naval Reserve Policy Board recommended, and the Secretary of the Navy approved, implementation of a reenlistment quality control program for Selected Reserve personnel. The program is based on the active component "up or out" program which limits reenlistment terms based on length of service and the overall manning of an individual's specialty. Implementing instructions for this program are being prepared.



### **Enlisted Grade Progression**

Because of perceptions that lower grade enlisted retention was being adversely affected by retaining senior grade people in units long after they reach retirement eligibility, the Board reviewed service policies on this subject.

Each reserve component has programs which should eliminate grade stagnation, provide greater opportunity for advancement, and enhance retention and recruiting of younger service members. The programs are being carefully implemented and monitored to ensure there is no detrimental effect on end-strength attainment and personnel readiness. Selective retention can be an effective management tool for adding vitality and quality to the force.

In the Army National Guard, enlisted members with more than 20 years of service, who have been identified as being retirement eligible, are considered for retention on an annual basis. Army

The Selected Marine Corps Reserve currently limits service in grade. The same restrictions that apply to the active component apply to the reserve component.

Air National Guard enlisted members, with more than 20 years of service and who have been identified as being retirement eligible, are considered for retention biennially. Changing the review cycle for senior NCOs to an annual basis is being considered.

In July, 1987, the Air Force Reserve Enlisted Force Management Study Committee proposed that a retention board or panel be established to consider retaining 55-year-old



retirement eligible members. The recommendation has not yet been implemented.

The Coast Guard Reserve limits Selected Reserve participation to 30 years total service for enlisted personnel. Waivers are available on a year-to-year basis for those filling critical mobilization assignments for which there are no other qualified personnel.


### **Individual Ready Reserve**

The Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is a pool of individuals with military service obligations who have:

- had training commensurate with their military specialty.
- served in an active component or in the Selected Reserve, or have been directly appointed as commissioned officers.
- some period remaining of their initial military service obligation, or a contractual commitment, or have voluntarily extended their affiliation/service in the IRR.


IRR members may voluntarily participate in training for points and promotions with or without pay. Training of the IRR is discussed in the Training and Mobilization Chapter of this report.

The National Guard does not have an IRR. Its Inactive National Guard (ING) program is an administrative category that allows soldiers to remain in the Army National Guard when they are unable to participate satisfactorily in regularly scheduled training assemblies and/or annual training. The ING is



composed of federally recognized officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers assigned to Army National Guard units. They must attend one training assembly (muster) each year. They are encouraged to actively participate by taking courses that will help them maintain MOS and basic soldier qualification.

Table 17 provides information on the IRR of each component.



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**Table 17  
INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE MATRIX**

	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force		Coast Guard	
Composition	OFF/WO	45,000	OFF	15,600	OFF/WO	4,500	OFF	10,400	OFF	700
OFF/WO ENL		252,800	ENL	62,800	ENL	40,000	ENL	57,900	ENL	4,000
Wartime Requirement (M to M + 90)	OFF	39,500	OFF	22,400	Driven by manning deficiencies at mobilization		OFF	0	OFF	Under Development
ENL		222,000	ENL	78,300	ENL		ENL	45,500	ENL	
Anticipated Show Rates	OFF/WO	90%	IRR	80%	IRR	Not Avail	IRR	90%	OFF/WO	70%
ENL		70%	ENL		ENL		ENL		ENL	
Address Verification	Transient Management Section deliver DARP Form 1103		Accomplished by quarterly mailout of newsletter, annual screening questionnaire, annual screening muster		Biannual mailgram test, Continental Marine mailed monthly, address correction requested, Toll Free Info Center contact, contract being established with private provider to locate IRR with bad address		96% RCCPDS, 92% based IRR screening participation		89% verified good	
Critical Individual Skill Shortages	Medical Officers, Nurse, Communication, Chemical, Practical Nurse, Special Forces, Drill Sergeant		Ship Operations, Aviation Maintenance, Fire Control, Medical, Electronics, Underwater Demolition, Engineering		Eng, NBC, AirTfc/Ctrl, Admin, Log, AcftMaint, Intel, Ord, Inf, Comm, MtrTrans, MP, AvnOrd, ElecMaint, AirFldSvc, Tks&Asslt Amphib, Arty		Security Police, Food Handlers, Medical, Civil Engineers, EOD		Radarman, Gunner's Mate, Fire Control Technician	
Management Initiatives	Screening, Bonus Program, Affiliation Program, SL2/3, Training Program		IRR Bonus Program and Involuntary screening muster		Automated assignment process, IRR MOS skill management program, Microfiche records, Integrated office automation, IRR annual screening, Automated order writing system		IRR screening records verification, AD separation counselling, Push-Pull mobilization policy		Screen IRR for SELRES membership, Ongoing database and annual Ready Reserve screen	
Utilization	IRR provides available pretrained individual manpower to fill Active Army, Army Guard and Reserve units in times of national emergency		Strategic, tactical mobility auxiliary activity and support activity billet backfill active duty shortfall		Fillers and replacement for AC RC structure		Fillers and replacements responsive to specific requirements of the Air Force		Backfill lower priority mobilization billets	
Civilian Skills Identification	Use Directory of Occupational Titles, Civ Code in PMF database		Civilian occupation and critical skill indicator codes are entered in service records		Dictionary of Occupation Terms, automated tape incorporated into MCRSC management, Skills updated during IRR screening		Skill correlation to requirements using Wartime Shortage Skill List		Information on 47% of the IRR	
Preassignment Programs	MOBPERs earmarking for pre-assignment to specific MOBSTAS		24,000 Preselected, 35% of IRR, M + 1 billets in strategic, tactical/mobility, auxiliary and support activity		Assignment to Wartime Series TO&E of USMC bases and stations		None		Most hold advance pocket orders to Personnel Reporting Units for further assignment	
Refresher Training	IRR train in MOSS needed to meet early deployment M - M + 30 requirements and development to SL2/3 tasks		Voluntary ACDU TRA for critical ratings		Reserve Counterpart Training Program, emphasis on MOSS and ranks needed during mobilization, Formal schools		Skill degradation study, sample skill evaluations conducted during IRR screening to size potential training requirements		Not funded	
Reenlistment Bonus Program	100 MOSS approved by HQDA as bonus eligible \$750 cash incentive paid in increments		Reenlistment 4 years \$750, 6 years \$1500 selected ratings		\$400,000 was allocated for FY 1987		Reenlistment 5 year \$750, 6 year \$1500, 7 year \$2250 eligible		Not funded	

Note: Figures rounded to nearest hundred  
Source: Individual reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1987

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
RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1987(U)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE  
AFFAIRS/LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON N 1987


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### **Individual Ready Reserve Screen**

The first mandatory screening of members in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) was conducted in FY 1987. It has had a positive impact on the services' ability to manage the IRR. The screening was not simply meant to estimate crisis response rates. It was also to check availability, readiness, and quality of IRR members who are immediately mobilizable under the same conditions as drilling reservists in the event of national emergency.

Each of the reserve components conducted the screening somewhat differently. Nevertheless, all the screenings were very successful and provided valuable information on the status of the IRR. The screening process updated data bases, identified those who may not be considered mobilization assets due to their physical



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status, and informed IRR members of their military obligations.

Initially, many IRR members who were called for screening did not report to screening sites. As the program matured during the year, members better understood their obligations and increasing percentages reported as directed. Statutory authority exists for disciplinary actions against those who do not report to a mandatory screening. Those who did not report as directed were again contacted by mail and advised of actions that could be taken against them, including:

- involuntary recall to active duty.
- change of characterization of entire military service to other than honorable.
- recall to active duty for court martial.
- declared to be a deserter or absentee and subject to arrest for return to control of the military.

The Coast Guard Reserve was not funded for a screening in FY 1987. However, it does use an annual questionnaire for updating information. A random-sample telephone survey of their IRR is conducted every other year.

Funding provided for the screen in FY 1987 was limited. Consequently, the reserve components tailored their screening goals accordingly. Only the Army was able to screen in the first quarter of the fiscal year. Over 11,000 soldiers attempted to schedule screening in September, 1987, but were not able to be screened because of reduced funding. Screening results for FY 1987 are presented in Table 18.



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**Table 18**  
**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE SCREENING RESULTS**  
**FY 1987**

	<u>IRR Strength</u>	<u>No. Ordered to Screen</u>	<u>No. Screened (Percent)</u>	<u>Percent of IRR Screened</u>
Army	287,000	197,000	104,000 (53%)	36%
Navy	78,000	27,000	21,000 (80%)	27%
Marine Corps	45,000	15,000	13,000 (84%)	28%
Air Force	48,000	17,000	14,000 (81%)	29%
DOD Total	459,000	256,000	152,000 (59%)	33%

Note: Figures rounded to nearest thousand.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Data as of September 30, 1987.

In future years, the reserve components intend to reduce the number of exemptions from the screening so they can reach a larger proportion of the IRR. This can be successfully accomplished if the funding projected for FY 1988-1989 remains intact. Congressional support is essential in retaining funding to pursue this program.

There were significant side benefits realized as a result of the screening. A substantial number of personnel were recruited into the Selected Reserve because of quality education and information programs presented during the screening period.

The Army reported that of those screened, 26 percent indicated an interest in Selective Reserve programs. Of these, 5,380 individuals have actually been assigned. Additionally, over 150,000 mobilization data base items were corrected in the records of those

screened. Many of these items affect the Army's ability to locate IRR members, while others deal with soldiers' qualifications.

Other IRR members are beginning to update their military skills through IRR mobilization training programs. Overall, because of the screening, the services are gaining in many areas, all related to mobilization and readiness.

### **Individual Mobilization Augmentees**

The Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) program is designed to provide trained individuals to augment, upon mobilization, various active component organizations, the Selective Service System, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. An IMA is a member of the Selected Reserve and, therefore, is subject to call to involuntary active duty by the President, for up to 90

days for operational missions, under 10 USC 673b.

An IMA performs two weeks of annual training in a preassigned billet and may or may not (depending on the service policy and pay/training category) attend inactive duty for training periods. Some components allow IMAs to perform up to 48 drills per year.

In last year's report, the Board pointed out that there are qualified personnel within the IRR who may be willing to serve or train in their skill or specialty if made aware of IMA opportunities in their skill. The Board recommended that the services consider expanding IMA opportunities for officer and enlisted IRR personnel. The IMA program could be more fully utilized if appropriately funded. That recommendation of the Board continues.

The Army Reserve has received approval to implement a "drilling" IMA

program which will increase mobilization training opportunities for approximately 1,300 officer and enlisted soldiers. Other services have a similar program. The program was to start at the beginning of FY 1988, but is temporarily delayed because of budgetary issues. Nineteen-day annual training tours for IMAs participating in exercises have also been approved. Numbers participating will only be limited by the funds available. The number of IMA detachments will be increased to allow more IMA soldiers the opportunity to train voluntarily towards their mobilization mission. IMA soldiers are assigned to and train with active component units, in duties they would perform upon mobilization.

In August, 1987, a review of the Army IMA program revealed that 56 major Department of Defense and Department of Army activities had identified more than 22,500 Army Reserve officer and enlisted IMA positions. The number of assigned IMA



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officer and enlisted personnel totaled 13,139—58 percent of the identified positions. Nearly 500 IMA soldier positions exist with Federal Emergency Management Agency and only 244 of those positions are filled.

The Naval Reserve's participation in the IMA program is almost exclusively limited to liaison positions with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, state civil defense activities, and the Selective Service. A few IMAs are assigned to other headquarters activities.

Expansion of the Air Force IMA Program has been constrained by a lack of funding. The program was funded in FY 1986 at 54 percent of its authorized

level. It grew to 63 percent in FY 1987 and is programmed to operate at 66 percent of authorized strength for FY 1988. In FY 1987, The Air Force Reserve formed a task force to develop recommendations to improve their IMA program. Results of this study were not released by the end of the fiscal year. The Board commends this initiative.

Beginning in FY 1988, Air Force Reserve IMAs will use their retention/retirement date rather than the fiscal year system to count the 50 points needed for a satisfactory retention/retirement year. This eliminates the dual calendar system which has been used for years. By combining the fiscal year for training with the retirement year, IMAs continue to maintain mobilization readiness and will find it easier to meet participation requirements while getting a satisfactory year for retirement.

The Coast Guard Reserve has only 22 IMA officer positions and no enlisted positions authorized. Six of the positions are funded by the Coast Guard for liaison with the Department of Defense. The other 16 are provided under a reimbursable inter-agency agreement with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Failure to program funds for all validated IMA positions has a negative effect on the ability of active component major commands, separate operating agencies, and theater commanders to meet their wartime manpower requirements.

Table 19 shows the numbers of IMAs in each of the reserve components at the end of FY 1987.



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**Table 19**  
**INDIVIDUAL MOBILIZATION AUGMENTEES**  
**FY 1987**

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army Reserve			
Authorized	8700	4838	13538
Assigned	8225	4914	13139
Navy Reserve <sup>1</sup>			
Authorized	123	0	123
Assigned	101	0	101
Marine Corps Reserve			
Authorized	1128	1842	2970
Assigned	773	481	1254
Air Force Reserve <sup>1</sup>			
Authorized	10730	9890	20620
Assigned	7680	5289	12969
Coast Guard Reserve			
Authorized	22	0	22
Assigned	9	0	9

Note: 1. Total authorized but not fully funded for fill.

Source: Official Guard and Reserve Manpower Strengths and Statistics,  
September, 1987.  
Coast Guard Reserve.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

### **Full-Time Support**

The Full-time Support (FTS) program is important to the of the capabilities and responsiveness of the National Guard and Reserve. Personnel in the FTS program are assigned to assist in recruiting and retention programs, and organizing, administering, and training reserve component members. Increases in the number of personnel in the FTS

program are needed. At its March, 1987 quarterly meeting, the Board developed a position regarding the FTS programs of the services. The position statement was sent as a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense and to appropriate Congressional committees. It stated in part:

“As the reserve components continue to assume ever-increasing



missions and responsibilities and are required to sustain an unprecedented level of readiness for early deployment, the requirement for adequate levels of full-time support (FTS) becomes critically important.

“Growth in the FTS program is essential in order for the reserve components to meet their increased responsibilities and readiness as part of the Total Force strategy. Not only is growth required to support new units being activated with the reserve components, but it is also required for existing units.

“The full-time support force of each reserve component is made up of differing combinations of military technicians, reserve component members on active duty (AGR), active component members, and civilian employees. The Congress has supported these forces as a reflection of the individual mission requirements of each service and the unique operating environments in which each operate. The Reserve Forces Policy Board commends this policy and endorses the concept that

each service be allowed to determine the appropriate mix of their full-time support force.

“The Reserve Forces Policy Board also opposes any proposal that would mandate the replacement of AGR personnel with those from the active component or reduce the current compensation or benefits provided to AGR members. The AGR force is a dedicated professional force which makes a vital contribution to overall reserve component readiness by assisting drilling reserve component members to achieve and maintain their readiness requirements.”

### **Categories of Full-Time Personnel**

The categories of full-time support personnel are briefly described below. Complete definitions are in Department of Defense Directive I215.6.

- **Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) Personnel:** National Guard or Reserve members on active duty for 180 days

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or more who provide full-time support to the reserve components and are paid from the Reserve Personnel Appropriations of the military departments concerned. This classification includes Naval Reserve Training and Administration of Reserve (TAR) personnel and statutory tour personnel.

- **Military Technicians (MT):** Civilian personnel who occupy technician positions. They are required to be members of the Selected Reserve in the component which they support and simultaneously maintain civil service status.
- **Active Component (AC) Personnel:** Military personnel on active duty who directly support the reserve components and are paid from active component personnel appropriations. This classification includes all Coast Guard military personnel assigned to full-time support billets.
- **Civil Service (CS) Personnel:** Federal (Title 5) and state civil service personnel (Title 32), other than military technicians, who provide full-time support to the reserve components but do not occupy technician positions. They are not required to be members of the Selected Reserve.



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The numbers in each category varies for each component. Differences are based on many service-unique factors which have been carefully analyzed to provide the best FTS program to support readiness and mobilization capabilities. The Board fully supports the FTS mix decisions of the services.

Table 20 provides a breakout, by reserve component and by category, of full-time support personnel and compares ratios of these personnel to Selected Reserve personnel.

**Table 20**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL**  
**FY 1987**

	Army		Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Force		DOD Total	Coast Guard Reserve	Total
	Guard	Reserve			Guard	Reserve			
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>	25237	12414	21288	1742	7623	629	68933	0	68933
Military Technician	25592	7276	0	0	24049	8722	64639	0	64639
Active Component	771	1230	6945	5019	731	572	15268	604	15872
Civil Service	2572	4520	3041	352	2462	4906	17853	107	17960
Total Full-Time Support (FTS)	54172	25440	31274	7113	33865	14829	166693	711	167404
Total Selected Reserve (SELRES)	451858	313638	148096	42253	114595	80415	1150855	13287	1164142
FTS:SELRES Ratio	1:8.3	1:12.3	1:4.7	1:6.0	1:3.4	1:5.4	1:6.9	1:18.7	1:7.0

Note: 1. Includes AGR in Army and Air Force, TAR in the Naval Reserve, and military FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve

Source: Individual reserve components and Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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During the past eight years while there has been an 11 percent increase in Coast Guard Selected Reserve strength, there has been an eight percent decrease in full-time support personnel. The Coast Guard ratio of full-time support personnel to Selected Reserve strength is 1:19 while the average ratio of all Department of

Defense reserve components is 1:7. This disparity needs to be corrected.

### Growth of Full-Time support

Increased readiness of National Guard and Reserve units is, in significant part, attributable to growth in the FTS programs of the services. Table 21 reflects this growth in recent years.

**Table 21**  
**GROWTH OF THE FULL-TIME SUPPORT PROGRAM**

	Army Guard	Reserve	Naval Reserve	Marine Corps Reserve	Air Force Guard	Reserve	Total DOD
FY 1987							
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>	25237	12414	21288	1742	7623	629	68933
Military Technician	25592	7276	0	0	23049	8722	64639
Active Component	771	1230	6945	5019	731	572	15268
Civil Service	2572	4520	3041	352	2462	4906	17853
Total	54172	25440	31274	7113	33865	14829	166693
% Change from FY 1986	4.33%	-3.72%	10.37%	2.94%	4.99%	2.74%	4.00%
FY 1986							
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>	23780	12159	18391	1478	7098	612	63518
Military Technician	25292	7076	0	0	22005	8306	62679
Active Component	769	1230	6843	5180	719	649	15390
Civil Service	2084	5959	3102	252	2432	4867	18696
Total	51925	26424	28336	6910	32254	14434	160283
% Change from FY 1985	8.35%	0.04%	18.36%	5.74%	1.71%	2.01%	6.38%
FY 1985							
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>	21059	10751	15012	1134	6369	570	54895
Military Technician	23769	6706	0	0	22145	8019	60639
Active Component	973	1230	5847	5180	724	743	14697
Civil Service	2124	7726	3081	221	2474	4817	20443
Total	47925	26413	23940	6535	31712	14149	150674
% Change from FY 1984	10.71%	14.99%	2.99%	7.71%	3.73%	4.92%	7.91%
FY 1984							
AGR/TAR <sup>1</sup>	16656	8822	13327	803	5773	498	45879
Military Technician	23195	6040	0	0	21607	7921	58763
Active Component	1604	1230	6867	5032	754	691	16178
Civil Service	1833	6878	3050	232	2438	4376	18807
Total	43288	22970	23244	6067	30572	13486	139627
Total Growth FY 1984-1987	10884	2470	8030	1046	3293	1343	27066
% Change from FY 1984-1987	25.14%	10.75%	34.55%	17.24%	10.77%	9.96%	19.38%

Note: 1. Includes AGR in Army and Air Force, TAR in the Naval Reserve, and military FTS in the Marine Corps Reserve.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Full-Time Support Personnel Assigned Overseas**

Several of the reserve components have FTS personnel serving in overseas locations. They provide indirect support to reserve component personnel and units in the overseas theater by providing for the coordination, planning, administration, and reception of National Guard and Reserve members and units performing training overseas. They provide a vital service to the theater commanders and to the forces they support. The total numbers of FTS personnel overseas is a very small percentage of the FTS strength. Table 22 reflects these figures.



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**Table 22**  
**FULL-TIME SUPPORT PERSONNEL OVERSEAS<sup>1</sup>**  
**FY 1987**

	<u>AGR/TAR</u>	<u>Military Technician</u>	<u>Active Component</u>	<u>Civil Service</u>	<u>Total</u>
<b>Army National Guard</b>					
Europe	44				44
Central/South America	25				25
Pacific	6				6
Other	3				3
Totals	78				78
<b>Army Reserve</b>					
Europe	29	4	7	5	45
Central/South America	31		10		41
Pacific	7				7
Other	7				7
Totals	74	4	17	5	100
<b>Naval Reserve</b>					
Europe	1				1
Totals	1				1
<b>Marine Corps Reserve</b>					
Pacific	1				1
Totals	1				1
<b>Air National Guard</b>					
Europe	4				4
Central/South America	2				2
Pacific	1				1
Totals	7				7
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>					
Europe	3				3
Central/South America	1				1
Totals	4				4
<b>Total DOD</b>					
Europe	81	4	7	5	97
Central/South America	59		10	0	69
Pacific	15				15
Other	10				10
Totals	165	4	17	5	191

Note: 1. Excludes FTS personnel in U.S. Territories and Possessions.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Women in the Reserve Components**

Since 1980, the number of women serving in the Selected Reserve has increased more than 92 percent and in the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard by more than 400 percent. Combat exclusion policies of the services define those career fields to which women cannot be assigned. Other than these exclusions, women are assigned on an equitable basis with men who possess similar skills and qualifications.

It is the policy of the Commandant of the Coast Guard that all female service members be accorded the same career opportunities and responsibilities as male members, limited only by a unit's

ability to provide separate berthing and hygiene facilities. High endurance cutters, medium endurance cutters, and patrol boats are considered combat units. Currently, women are assigned to cutters both as active component crew and in wartime mobilization billets. Women routinely carry out duties afloat, including law enforcement and drug interdiction.

Table 23 reflects the numbers of women in each of the components. Women comprise 12.3 percent of Department of Defense and 10.3 percent of Coast Guard Selected Reserve members. This compares to 10.2 percent of Department of Defense and 7.2 percent of Coast Guard active component members.



**Table 23**  
**WOMEN IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

			FY 1980	FY 1987	Percent Change
Army National Guard	Officers	SELRES	1357	2697	98.7%
		ING	18	73	305.6%
	Enlisted	SELRES	15383	22622	47.1%
ING		387	733	89.4%	
Army Reserve	Officers	SELRES	3864	9673	150.3%
		IRR	2056	6630	222.5%
	Enlisted	SELRES	25267	47813	89.2%
IRR		4688	33271	609.7%	
Naval Reserve	Officers	SELRES	498	2425	386.9%
		IRR	1391	1493	7.3%
	Enlisted	SELRES	4888	16133	230.1%
IRR		1900	8409	342.6%	
Marine Corps Reserve	Officers	SELRES	42	153	264.3%
		IRR	126	205	62.7%
	Enlisted	SELRES	940	1683	79.0%
IRR		455	2287	402.6%	
Air National Guard	Officers	SELRES	554	1103	99.1%
		ING	0	0	0.0%
	Enlisted	SELRES	7654	12637	65.1%
ING		62	0	-100.0%	
Air Force Reserve	Officers	SELRES	1207	2835	134.9%
		IRR	779	2047	162.8%
	Enlisted	SELRES	6517	11645	78.7%
IRR		403	7119	1666.5%	
DOD Total	Officers	SELRES	7522	18886	151.1%
		IRR/ING	4370	10448	139.1%
	Enlisted	SELRES	60649	112533	85.5%
IRR/ING		7895	51819	556.4%	
Coast Guard Reserve	Officers	SELRES	41	96	134.1%
		IRR	22	41	86.4%
	Enlisted	SELRES	814	1267	55.7%
IRR		245	436	78.0%	
Reserve Components Total	Officers	SELRES	7563	18982	151.0%
		IRR/ING	4392	10489	138.8%
	Enlisted	SELRES	61463	113800	85.2%
IRR/ING		8140	52255	542.0%	
Total Women	SELRES	69026	132782	92.4%	
	IRR/ING	12532	62744	400.7%	
TOTAL			81558	195526	139.7%

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).  
Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA)**

The Board is required by 10 USC 113(c)(3) to review Reserve Officer Personnel Act (ROPA) policies pertaining to appointment, retention, promotion, and retirement of officers in the reserve components. The passage of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) in 1981 for active component personnel, is being followed by a counterpart Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) for the reserve components. The proposed ROPMA legislative package (DoD 100-25) submitted to Congress by the Department of Defense General Counsel on May 8, 1987, is a replacement for ROPA. Among other issues, ROPMA would:

- provide common statutes for all reserve components regarding appointment, promotion, separation, and retirement of reserve component officers.
- establish a visible, uniform, and improved officer personnel management system for reserve component officers not on the active duty list.
- provide the flexibility to be responsive to changing officer requirements.
- provide a balance between management objectives and equitable treatment of individual career expectations, including an attractive career progression for reserve component officers.

The Board recommends that passage of the proposed ROPMA legislation be given priority by the Congress.

### **Family Member Identification Cards**

All of the reserve components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, have a program for issuing identification cards to qualified National Guard and Reserve family members. Issuance is on a voluntary basis and would assist in identification of family members upon mobilization.

In August, 1986, the Coast Guard Reserve Policy Board forwarded a recommendation to the Reserve Forces Policy Board that a common Department of Defense form be established to serve as a reserve component dependent identification card with procedures applicable to all reserve components. At its December



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1986 meeting, the Board approved the following recommendation:

"... that DoD establish a Reserve Dependent Identification Card for all components to include the Coast Guard. . . . [I]t should contain a photograph; an expiration date of four years; it should be laminated; issuance would be on a voluntary basis; and the minimum age for dependents be established at 10 years of age."

On January 5, 1987, this recommendation was forwarded through the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) to the Secretary of Defense. The issue is scheduled to be considered by the next meeting of the Department of Defense Identification Card Working Group and, if approved, would be included in the next revision of the Department of Defense Directive 1000.13. The Board continues to support this recommendation.




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### **Family Member Mobilization Support**

Each of the reserve components recognizes the need for family member support in the event of mobilization. The Board commends the services for establishing family member support programs which have been documented in several publications. These programs include:

- U.S. Army Family Action Plan.
- Naval Reserve Force Pre-Mobilization Orientation Guide and "What's Next? A Guide to Family Readiness."
- Marine Corps Reserve Casualty/Family Assistance Team concept.
- National Guard Family Program.
- Air Force Family Support Centers.
- Coast Guard Reserve annual training requirement for pre-mobilization briefings.



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Family concerns can have a major impact on retention rates and on the effectiveness of individuals when they report for mobilization. National Guard and Reserve members should have confidence that their families will be properly cared for upon mobilization of their units. Education of family members on their responsibilities during mobilization must be continually stressed.

### **Commissary Usage by Reserve Component Personnel**

Year-round use of the commissary by reserve component personnel and their families is widely accepted. A new law, enacted in FY 1987, permits National Guardsmen and Reservists to use the commissary throughout the year rather than only during annual training. The general feeling exists among reserve component members and their families that they are being provided treatment more equitable with active component counterparts.

Several of the reserve components suggested that a uniform Department of Defense ration card, controlled at unit level, be devised for commissary access rather than the leave and earnings statement now in use. Also, each expressed concern about the way the implementing instructions from Department of Defense are in conflict with the Public Law 99-661.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) discussed this issue in a thoughtful memorandum dated August, 1987, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel) (ASD(FM&P)). The memorandum stated:

“... Specifically, the provisions of the memorandum establishing the December leave and earning statement as the required identification document create lengthy delays in service members using the commissary. In some cases, service members must wait up to a year before exercising their entitlement. Additionally, the provisions of ASD (FM&P) guidance establishing the entitlement period as “the calendar year” conflict with that provision of PL 99-661 which establishes the entitlement period as “one year from the date on which the member performs active duty for training.” The delay of the entitlement period, under the current procedure, is not in our best interest and will have an adverse effect on soldier performance as well as a negative impact on recruiting and retention.

“We believe use of the leave and earnings statement as an identification document should be reexamined. Although the services initially concurred with use of the

leave and earnings statement for this purpose, the document envisioned for use was the military pay voucher the service member received upon completion of a period of active duty training authorizing commissary entitlements and not the leave and earning statement for the period ending 31 December. Use of the leave and earnings statement to date, and the ensuing problems experienced by the services, has resulted in agreement that the system needs refining. We recommend adoption of a standardized ration card to be used by all services. . . ."


The Board recommends a standard ration card for commissary access be adopted for use by all reserve component members and their families. The Board further recommends that the Department of Defense reassess its current policy to eliminate the inequity stated that will 'penalize' personnel by not allowing use of the commissary immediately upon meeting the basic qualification criteria.

### **Low Cost/No Cost Benefits for National Guard and Reserve Retirees**

The Director of Naval Reserve in a 14 April 1987 letter to the Board outlined his ". . . support for the development of an equitable and rational benefits package for those Reservists who are retired but have not yet reached age 60. The lack of status for these 'gray area' retirees is not consistent with good personnel management. . . ." Each of the other six reserve components also support this proposal. Such a program may attract higher quality enlistees and result in improved retention.



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Extension of privileges such as base/post exchange, commissary, theater, club, recreation facilities, legal assistance, transient or temporary lodging, and space available travel to these retirees might have little or no effect on available funds. Those agencies that require a user fee/cost for services should realize increased revenues from additional participants. In light of the Congressionally mandated cuts in appropriated funding for revenue generating Morale, Welfare, and Recreation activities, expanding privileges to these National Guard and Reserve retirees would be most prudent and cost effective.

The Board recommends that low cost/no cost benefits be extended to National Guardsmen and Reservists qualified for retirement who have not yet reached age 60.

### **Sixty Points Maximum IDT Credit For Retirement**

Existing law limits the number of inactive duty for training (IDT) points

creditable for retirement purposes to 60 points per year per member. A member of the Selected Reserve who attends all drills (four each month for 48 points) also receives the annual membership points (15) for a total of 63 points – three more than the maximum creditable. Members who perform additional paid assemblies or unpaid IDTs, or those who complete military education courses receive points which sometimes cannot be credited to their account for retirement purposes. This may lessen motivation for continuing professional development required for promotion for some individuals. Almost all Selected Reserve members are adversely affected by the 60 point limit.

In previous years this Board, the Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, and the National Naval Reserve Policy Board, have considered this issue. A resolution of the issue is long overdue.

In the FY 1986 Annual Report, the Board recommended that the Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (6QRMC) consider the issue. The results of the 6QRMC had not been released at the end of FY 1987.

The Board still supports changing the current law to eliminate the inequities of the 60 point restrictions.

### **Other Issues**


The Board, in previous years, has adopted formal positions on other personnel related issues. Those of continuing interest to the Board are:

#### **General and Flag Officer Accountability**

Certain general and flag officer positions were created by Congress in order to permit the reserve components



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to administer and manage their own components. At present, these positions are counted against active component grade ceilings. National Guard and Reserve officers below general and flag rank are not accountable against active component ceilings under the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). The Board recommends that legislation be passed to exclude positions, which may be filled by National Guard/Reserve general or flag officers on active duty, from active component grade ceiling accountability

#### **National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserves (NCESGR)**

Ever increasing demands are being placed on members of the reserve components due to the introduction into the National Guard and Reserve of new, highly technical, and sophisticated equipment. Civilian employers are also increasing time demands on Guardsmen and Reservists. As the economy expands, and employers seek to increase production to meet demands, more and more jobs require weekend commitments. The Board recognizes that some reserve components already provide training opportunities during the week. However, the changing patterns of the civilian workforce may require a review of inactive duty training policies to possibly expand weekend training so that it can be available throughout the week. Trained personnel must not be lost from the National Guard and Reserve solely because of job conflicts.

The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) can assist in educating commanders, individual members, and employers in their legal



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obligations regarding employees, or potential employees, who are members of the reserve components. Commanders are encouraged to call on their state ESGR Committee for assistance.

The Omnibus Veterans' Benefits Improvement and Health Care Authorization Act of 1986 (38 USC (2021-26)) bans hiring discrimination based on a worker's status as a National Guardsman or Reservist. Previously, reserve component members were legally protected only from being fired from their civilian jobs, or discriminated against by their civilian employers, as they fulfilled their military obligations. Those protections continue under the 10 year old Veterans Reemployment Rights Act.

The Board is pleased to acknowledge the recent appointment of Mr. John G. McElwee as the National Chairman of the NCESGR. Under his leadership, NCESGR should broaden its activities in



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employer/employee problem resolution and in public education programs regarding the issue of employment for National Guard and Reserve members.

The Board commends the excellent support of the National Guard and Reserves which has been provided by the NCESGR Executive Director, his staff, and the state committees.

#### **Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (As Amended)**

This act provides, among other things, protection from eviction of dependents without a court order upon a service member's activation or mobilization for military duty. In today's economic environment, many reserve component members would suffer severe cuts in total income if mobilized. The nation's support of these individuals is vitally needed.

The limitation on monthly rental was last updated in 1966, raising the amount

from \$80 to \$150. Rental rates have greatly increased since then. In October, 1986, the Board made a recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) that a legislative package be developed to amend the act to raise the monthly rent to a realistic level, with a provision for automatic adjustment so that frequent legislative updates will not be required. That recommendation continues to be supported by the Board. The matter was forwarded to the Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation for study.

#### **Survivors' Benefit Plan**

The Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985 has an impact on reserve component members. Under the revised plan, for example, the surviving spouse of a reserve component noncommissioned officer in pay grade E-7 would receive about \$1,000 a year less than under the previous plan. National Guard members and Reservists previously eligible under the plan are grandfathered. The adverse impact on future reserve component members was certainly not intentional. The Board urges that corrective legislation be enacted.

#### **Summary and Recommendations**

Success of the reserve components in attaining and maintaining personnel strength levels is, in part, directly attributable to the funding provided by the Congress for the full-time support program and incentive programs. However, all components still have personnel gaps. Targeted recruiting, increased funding and flexibility in the incentive programs, and increased



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retention efforts will assist in attaining personnel goals. New and upgraded equipment and mission changes require increased numbers of both part-time and full-time personnel. Also, more training time is required to acquire and maintain needed skills. This can cause problems with employers who are demanding more time from their employees.

The Board recommends:

- authorize and fund significant annual increases for full-time support personnel for the Coast Guard Reserve and for the Coast Guard Selected Reserve to eliminate the 14,750 member shortage in Coast Guard Reserve mobilization strength.
- provide programmed growth in the individual augmentee programs by funding validated positions.
- fund programmed growth in the full-time support programs.
- enact Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA).
- establish a Department of Defense reserve component dependent identification card which may also be used by the Coast Guard.
- establish a standard ration card for reserve component members' commissary access instead of the leave and earning statement now in use.
- reassess Department of Defense policy that does not permit immediate use of the commissary by reserve component personnel upon their meeting the basic eligibility criteria.
- extend certain low cost/no cost benefits to National Guardsmen and Reservists, qualified for retirement, who have not yet reached age 60.
- enact legislation to exclude certain positions filled by National Guard or Reserve general/flag officers from active component grade ceiling accountability.
- amend the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 to reflect realistic monthly rental rates and to include provisions for adjustments of those rates without further amendments.
- enact legislation to correct the unintended adverse impact on reserve component personnel which is caused by the Survivors' Benefit Plan Amendment of 1985. (U)




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
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## Equipment **3**



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*"Allocation of our scarce resources must reflect the mission of the unit, not the component of the unit . . . We are a total force and must modernize as a total force."*

*General Carl E. Vuono  
Chief of Staff, US Army*

## General

The reserve components have made significant progress in their equipment status in recent years. The introduction of modern equipment into the force structure of each reserve component helps establish commonality, compatibility, and standardization between active and reserve components and in some cases, between services. Equipment modernization of the National Guard and Reserve is taking place at a rapid pace. This development, with improved training and increased personnel, results in dramatic improvements in the abilities of the reserve components to accomplish their missions.

Early deploying units are being equipped under the "first to fight, first to equip" policy recommended by the Board and initiated by the Secretary of Defense in 1982. Major equipment items such as tanks, helicopters, transport aircraft, wheeled vehicles,

hospital sets, fighter aircraft, and smaller items such as communications/electronic gear and individual weapons have been provided to reserve component units in the last year. Equipment modernization of early deploying units provides increased confidence not only to the individual user but also to theater commanders who will employ modernized units to meet operational needs in times of national emergency.

Although substantial resources have been allocated to modernize the reserve components, critical shortages still exist in the areas of communications/electronics equipment, tactical and support vehicles, engineer equipment, and individual weapons. The overall dollar value of these shortages was approximately \$14.7 billion for the reserve components in the Department of Defense and \$196 million for the Coast Guard Reserve at the end of FY 1987.


## Modernization

Equipment modernization is accomplished in the reserve components through equipment transfers from the active components, direct acquisitions from production lines, or through modification of existing equipment to give it greater capability. The Army estimates that through equipment modernization programs in the last few years, its reserve components have experienced a 40 percent increase in capability and the Total Army has shown a 45 percent increase.

One of the goals in the modernization program is to ensure that National Guard and Reserve equipment is compatible with active component equipment and that it can be properly



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


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and quickly supported and maintained in a combat theater. Modern equipment provides a unit with greater capability, better sustainability, and increased survivability.

During a modernization period—which could extend through several fiscal years—equipment shortages, reduced availability of spare parts, and the lack of individual and unit training with the new equipment, may cause a reported equipment status to be lowered. However, many units being modernized, could make significant contributions to warfighting theaters even though they may be in a transition status due to conversions to new equipment.

The impact on equipment status in FY 1987 due to conversions to modernized equipment is reflected in Table 24 as percentage changes in the number of units from the prior year, as reported by the services. Decreased



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equipment and unit status may be reported through Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) in many cases. This may be due to limited training conducted on new equipment by the unit's personnel or because all of the authorized new equipment has not yet arrived at the unit level. Decreased status does not necessarily reflect capability which, in fact, may be increased because of the conversion of the unit to more modern equipment. Information on SORTS is found in the Readiness Chapter.

**Table 24**  
**UNIT STATUS CHANGES DUE TO EQUIPMENT CONVERSION**  
**(Percentage of Units that Changed from Prior Year)**

	<u>ARNG</u>	<u>USAR</u>	<u>USNR</u>	<u>USMCR</u>	<u>ANG</u>	<u>USAFR</u>	<u>USCGR</u>
Increased	28	12	0	0	7	0	N/A
Decreased	14	8	13	0	9	8	N/A



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Examples of systems enhancing the capabilities in the reserve components are identified in Table 25. Some of these systems have already entered the inventory and others are programmed for purchase in the near future. Other equipment such as the C-17 aircraft should enter the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve in the mid-1990s.



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**Table 25**  
**MODERNIZED EQUIPMENT SYSTEMS PURCHASED**  
**OR PROGRAMMED FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

LAND FORCES		
ARNG	USAR	USMCR
<u>Major Systems</u>		
M-1 and M60A3 Tanks	Deployable Medical Systems	M249 Squad Automatic Weapon
Deployable Medical Systems	M60A3 Tank	Logistics Vehicle System
AH-64 Attack Helicopter	UH-60 Utility Helicopter	M198 155MM Howitzer
<u>Minor Systems</u>		
Position Azimuth Determining System	M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarm	Test Equipment
Battery Computer System	AN/UGC74 Teletype Terminal	Calibration Equipment
High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle	M3A4 Smoke Generator	Training Simulator
SEA FORCES		AIR FORCES
USNR	ANG	USAFR
<u>Major Systems</u>		
P-3C Aircraft	C-130H Aircraft	C-130H Aircraft
HH-60H Helicopter	F-16 Air Defense Modified Aircraft	F-16C/D Aircraft
F-14A Aircraft	TRC 170 Tropo (Wideband) Radios	
<u>Minor Systems</u>		
Mark 105 Mine Sweeping Sled	Electronic Countermeasures Pods	Night Vision Goggles
15-Ton Tractor Truck	M-35 2 1/2-Ton Trucks	M-60 Machine Gun
Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Van	Satellite Terminals (TSC 85, 93, 84, 100)	Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation System Pods



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Some equipment in current modernization programs may never be fielded as planned. Production lines for some items are being closed before reserve component units receive their full equipment authorization. This may be due to budget restrictions or because of more modern equipment development and procurement. Reduced mobilization capability results. There is also further degradation in equipment compatibility between the active and reserve components when newer equipment cannot be added to the force. Usefulness of older equipment in the inventory may decrease because of breakdowns, lack of repair parts, and incompatibility with active component equipment.


Some examples of equipment not expected to be fully distributed to the reserve components prior to production line closures are M113 armored personnel carriers and Series 12 communication equipment for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, and P-3C antisubmarine warfare patrol aircraft for the Naval Reserve.

The Board realizes that Department of Defense funding is inadequate to equip completely all active and reserve component units with new equipment. Some older equipment must be retained in the inventory, if for no other reason than affordability. However, the National Guard and Reserves must have adequate equipment to meet the current threat.

The Board recommends that modernization of the reserve components be continued to increase capabilities and assure compatibility when mobilized.

### **Critical Equipment Shortages**

Many items that were considered critically short in prior years have now been procured. However, other items have taken their place due to changes in the enemy threat, force structure, or both. Examples of current critical shortages for each reserve component are listed in Table 26.



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**Table 26**  
**EXAMPLES OF CRITICAL EQUIPMENT SHORTAGES**

<u>RESERVE COMPONENT</u>	<u>CRITICAL SHORTAGE</u>
Army National Guard	* M113 Family of Tracked Vehicles 5-Ton Cargo Trucks
Army Reserve	Tactical and Support Vehicles Communication-Electronic Equipment
Navy Reserve	* Upgraded AntiSubmarine Warfare Equipment Aviation Electronic Warfare Equipment
Marine Corps Reserve	* Communications/Electronics Equipment Engineer Equipment
Air National Guard	* Communications Electronic Meteorology Mission Equipment (F16/F-15)
Air Force Reserve	* Aircraft Ground Support Equipment Electronic Countermeasures Pods * Ground Defense Weapons <sup>1</sup> .
Coast Guard Reserve	Boats * Vehicles

\*Changes from FY 1986 Annual Report. Source: Individual reserve components.  
Note: 1. Procurement initiated and should be in inventory by FY 1990.

Lack of some of this equipment will seriously impair the ability of the reserve components to accomplish their mission effectively if mobilized. Equipment, which is being shared for training purposes by the reserve components today, will not be available to all its current users for war missions.

### **Dollar Shortages**

The dollar value of equipment shortages in the reserve components varies from year-to-year. Force structure changes, new missions, and associated equipment changes directly impact equipment on-hand compared to wartime requirements.

Table 27 compares FY 1986 with FY 1987 values of equipment required, authorized, and on-hand for each reserve component. The shortage for each component and for Department of Defense overall is derived from this data. The shortage in equipment on hand at the end of FY 1987 for all reserve components in the Department of Defense is valued at \$14.696 billion. This is down more than \$2 billion from last year. This figure does not include the value of Coast Guard Reserve equipment shortages, which has risen to \$196 million. The Coast Guard Reserve has just completed an equipment program review which, for the first time, has fully identified their equipment requirements.



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**Table 27**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT DOLLAR VALUES**  
**FY 1986 VS FY 1987**  
**(Expressed in Millions of Dollars or as a Percent)<sup>1</sup>**

	Wartime Requirement	Authorized	On-Hand	\$ Short On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percentage On-Hand vs Wartime Requirement	Percentage On-Hand vs Authorized
<b>Army National Guard</b>						
FY 1987	\$32460	\$31093	\$23324	\$ 9136	72%	75%
FY 1986	\$31452	\$29652	\$20732	\$10720	66%	70%
Difference (+/-)	1008	1441	2592	-1584		
Percent Change	3%	5%	13%	-15%		
<b>Army Reserve<sup>2</sup></b>						
FY 1987	\$7304	\$6717	\$5099	\$2205	70%	76%
FY 1986	\$6730	\$6083	\$4824	\$1906	72%	79%
Difference (+/-)	574	634	275	299		
Percent Change	9%	10%	6%	16%		
<b>Naval Reserve<sup>2,3</sup></b>						
FY 1987	\$6051	\$6023	\$5587	\$464	92%	93%
FY 1986	\$6024	\$6024	\$5641	\$383	94%	94%
Difference (+/-)	27	-1	-54	81		
Percent Change	0%	0%	-1%	21%		
<b>Marine Corps Reserve<sup>4</sup></b>						
FY 1987	\$3958	\$3958	\$3339	\$619	84%	84%
FY 1986	\$4121	\$4121	\$3723	\$398	90%	90%
Difference (+/-)	-163	-163	-384	221		
Percent Change	-4%	-4%	-10%	56%		
<b>Air National Guard</b>						
FY 1987	\$22699	\$22699	\$20984	\$1715	92%	92%
FY 1986	\$23160	\$23160	\$20505	\$2655	89%	89%
Difference (+/-)	-461	-461	479	-940		
Percent Change	-2%	-2%	2%	-35%		
<b>Air Force Reserve</b>						
FY 1987	\$9181	\$9181	\$8624	\$557	94%	94%
FY 1986	\$7261	\$7261	\$7073	\$188	97%	97%
Difference (+/-)	1920	1920	1551	369		
Percent Change	26%	26%	22%	196%		
<b>All DOD Services</b>						
FY 1987	\$81653	\$79671	\$66957	\$14696	82%	84%
FY 1986	\$78748	\$76301	\$62498	\$16250	79%	82%
Difference (+/-)	2905	3370	4459	-1554		
Percent Change	4%	4%	7%	-10%		
<b>Coast Guard Reserve</b>						
FY 1987	\$205	\$0	\$9	\$196	4%	0%
FY 1986	\$14	\$0	\$3	\$11	21%	0%
Difference (+/-)	191	0	6	185		
Percent Change	1364%	0%	300%	1682%		


- Notes: 1. Figures rounded to nearest whole million or percent.  
2. FY 1986 data has been corrected from previously reported information.  
3. Figures do not include values of ships, \$5.016 Billion.  
4. FY 1987 figures adjusted to new pricing guide.

Source: Individual reserve components.


Data as of September 30, 1987.

There is a great disparity among the reserve components in equipment dollar values when converted to a percentage of on-hand equipment compared to wartime requirements and current authorizations. The Air Force Reserve has the highest percentage (94 percent) on-hand compared to their wartime requirement, while the Army Reserve has only 70 percent of the dollar value of its wartime equipment on-hand. The Army National Guard has 72 percent. These disparities should be addressed within the Department of Defense and additional funds should continue to be appropriated by Congress to reduce the severity of the shortages in the Army's reserve components.

A comparison of percentages of the total equipment dollar values within the reserve components is displayed in Table 28.




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
129

**Table 28**  
**EQUIPMENT DOLLAR VALUES**  
**(Expressed in Percent of Reserve Component Totals)**


Wartime Equipment Requirements  
 FY 1987




Equipment Currently Authorized  
 FY 1987




Equipment Currently on Hand  
 FY 1987



Short—On Hand vs Wartime Requirements  
 FY 1987



Wartime Requirements  
 (In Millions \$)



Source: Individual reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1987.



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Table 29 provides a breakdown of dollar values into the categories of major items, spare parts, and other

items by service. The figures are compared to FY 1986.

**Table 29**  
**VALUES OF RESERVE COMPONENT**  
**MAJOR ITEMS, SPARE PARTS, AND OTHER ITEMS**  
**(Expressed in Millions of Dollars or as a Percent)<sup>1</sup>**

		Army Guard	Army Reserve	Naval <sup>2,4</sup> Reserve	Marine <sup>1,4</sup> Corps Reserve	Air Force Guard	Air Force Reserve	Coast Guard Reserve
<b>MAJOR ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$31000	\$6747	\$5154	\$3839	\$17037	\$7887	\$193
Wartime Reqmt	FY 86	\$30011	\$6257	\$5047	\$4007	\$16930	\$6134	\$5
Difference		\$989	\$490	\$107	(\$168)	\$107	\$1753	\$188
Authorized	FY 87	\$29600	\$6160	\$5154	\$3839	\$17037	\$7887	\$0
Authorized	FY 86	\$28211	\$5801	\$5047	\$4007	\$16930	\$6134	\$0
Difference		\$1389	\$359	\$107	(\$168)	\$107	\$1753	\$0
On-Hand	FY 87	\$22300	\$4731	\$5154	\$3220	\$17037	\$7887	\$7
On-Hand	FY 86	\$19766	\$3873	\$5047	\$3609	\$16930	\$6134	\$0
Difference		\$2534	\$858	\$107	(\$389)	\$107	\$1753	\$7
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	72%	70%	100%	84%	100%	100%	4%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 86	66%	62%	100%	90%	100%	100%	0%
Difference		6%	8%	0%	-6%	0%	0%	4%
<b>SPARE PARTS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$338	\$20	\$215	\$6	\$1376	\$270	\$0
Wartime Reqmt	FY 86	\$336	\$11	\$110	\$3	\$1295	\$379	\$0
Difference		\$2	\$9	\$105	\$3	\$81	(\$109)	\$0
Authorized	FY 87	\$338	\$20	\$215	\$6	\$1376	\$270	\$0
Authorized	FY 86	\$336	\$11	\$110	\$3	\$1295	\$379	\$0
Difference		\$2	\$9	\$105	\$3	\$81	(\$109)	\$0
On-Hand	FY 87	\$246	\$12	\$53	\$6	\$1170	\$229	\$0
On-Hand	FY 86	\$205	\$6	\$60	\$3	\$1101	\$335	\$0
Difference		\$41	\$6	(\$7)	\$3	\$69	(\$106)	\$0
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	73%	60%	25%	100%	85%	85%	0%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 86	61%	55%	55%	100%	85%	88%	0%
Difference		12%	5%	-30%	0%	0%	-4%	0%
<b>OTHER ITEMS</b>								
Wartime Reqmt	FY 87	\$1122	\$537	\$682	\$113	\$4286	\$1024	\$12
Wartime Reqmt	FY 86	\$1105	\$462	\$867	\$111	\$4935	\$748	\$9
Difference		\$17	\$75	(\$185)	\$2	(\$649)	\$276	\$3
Authorized	FY 87	\$1155	\$537	\$654	\$113	\$4086	\$1024	\$0
Authorized	FY 86	\$1105	\$462	\$867	\$111	\$4935	\$748	\$0
Difference		\$50	\$75	(\$213)	\$2	(\$849)	\$276	\$0
On-Hand	FY 87	\$778	\$356	\$380	\$113	\$2777	\$508	\$2
On-Hand	FY 86	\$761	\$341	\$534	\$111	\$2511	\$604	\$3
Difference		\$17	\$15	(\$154)	\$2	\$266	(\$96)	(\$1)
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 87	69%	66%	56%	100%	65%	50%	13%
% OH vs WT Reqmt	FY 86	69%	74%	62%	100%	51%	81%	33%
Difference		0%	-8%	-6%	0%	14%	-31%	-20%

Notes 1 Figures rounded to nearest whole million or percent  
2 Figures do not include value of ships \$5 016 Billion  
3 FY 1986 data corrected from previously provided information  
4 FY 1987 figures adjusted to new pricing guide

Source Individual reserve components  
Data as of September 30, 1987



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The value of Naval Reserve Force ships is not included in the tables because they are categorized as "forces" rather than as equipment. Their value is \$5.016 billion.

The Spare Parts category in Table 29 shows that the Naval Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve have had a 100 percent increase in both their wartime requirements and authorizations. The depot level repairable items, both quantity and value, were increased due to modernization of major equipment.

The Air National Guard's requirements were reduced due to receipt of newer aircraft and removal of older aircraft following transition. Support equipment for both aircraft were carried in FY 1986 figures. The Air Force Reserve requirement and authorization increased by nearly \$2 billion due to the assignment of newer and larger aircraft (C-5A, C-141B, C-130H, and F-16C/D). The increase in value of shortages is caused by delay in receipt of associated support equipment for the newer aircraft.

The Coast Guard continually refines equipment requirements for mobilization. After comparing the new equipment required and the equipment on-hand, a greater shortage was identified than previously reported due to many of the required items being unsuitable. As an example, the boats that were previously identified were smaller in size and not fully suitable to perform port security functions. The primary boats needed now under the new guidelines, account for a \$186 million requirement this year, as compared to a \$14 million requirement last year.

### **Shortage Reductions**

New equipment purchases from production lines and equipment transfers from the active components have provided major materiel improvements for the reserve components. The equipment is better and there is more of it. For additional detail on reserve component equipment status for future years, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Reserve Affairs annually prepares a report to Congress titled, "The National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report."

Special appropriations from Congress, over and above the President's budget request, have been provided to the National Guard and Reserve to use for procurement of equipment important to mission accomplishment. For the Army National Guard, this additional funding, along with that in the President's budget request, has eliminated the equipment category as the primary cause of reduced readiness. This is a major achievement. Equipment shortages continue, however, as one of the limiting factors for overall readiness.

In some cases, for the Army's reserve components, equipment authorizing documents need to be updated to accurately reflect equipment that can be made available in wartime. The Army Reserve estimates that approximately 27 percent of the equipment needed in FY 1987 could not be procured. This equates to 244 lines of equipment amounting to \$397 million. A special working group is reviewing all equipment authorizing documents to eliminate non-procurable items and correct the documents to ensure the units are supportable.

Programs need to continually address the shortages in spare parts and other items to ensure sustainability of major items and units in a national emergency.

The Coast Guard Reserve has only four percent of its required equipment on-hand. The Coast Guard Reserve does not have sufficient equipment to fully employ activated reservists if large-scale mobilization occurs.

Many equipment items have long procurement lead times. Equipment purchased with one fiscal year's funds may not be delivered to a component for a couple of years. Therefore, it is difficult to look at tables which indicate shortages to get an accurate picture of equipment programmed to arrive in the components. Trends over the years are important. Equipment posture trends in all of the reserve components, excepting the Coast Guard Reserve, are very positive and shortages are being reduced.

### **Equipment Appropriations**

Each year, the services budget for the purchase of equipment for their reserve components. Requested funds have been insufficient to rapidly modernize the reserve components. Congress has sometimes specified that certain funds be used only for specific equipment purchases. Since 1982, Congress has added, to the President's budget



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request, funds which are specifically designated for the purchase of reserve component equipment. The funds are allocated by component. In most years, some of these dedicated funds are specified for certain types and numbers of equipment items. The rest of the funds are undesignated and may be used, subject to Congressional committee approval, by the reserve components to purchase equipment to increase readiness. These funds are provided through National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), sometimes referred to as the Dedicated Procurement Program.

With this funding support, the components have been able to purchase equipment which they could not have

obtained in the normal budget processes. Some types of equipment purchased with NGRFA monies are: communications/electronics gear, vehicles, artillery weapons, tentage, aircraft, night vision devices, testing equipment, engineering equipment, chemical warfare defense equipment, electronic countermeasure pods, and upgrade kits for vehicles and aircraft. Some of the equipment purchased has fulfilled special training needs within the National Guard and Reserve.

Table 30 provides information on NGRFA for each of the reserve components since the program began. Table 31 vividly portrays the distribution of NGRFA among the reserve components over the years.

**Table 30**  
**NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE**  
**EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS<sup>1</sup>**  
**(Millions of Dollars)**

	FY 1982	FY 1983	FY 1984	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	FY 1988	Total
Army National Guard	\$50.0	\$50.0	\$100.0	\$150.0	\$532.0	\$146.0	\$273.0	\$1,301.0
Army Reserve	0.0	15.0	0.0	150.0	365.0	90.0	85.0	705.0
Naval Reserve	0.0	15.0	51.0	20.0	100.0	61.0	259.0	506.0
Marine Corps Reserve	0.0	15.0	0.0	30.0	70.0	60.0	40.0	215.0
Air National Guard	0.0	15.0	25.0	20.0	255.0	50.0	341.0	706.0
Air Force Reserve	0.0	15.0	0.0	10.0	180.0	150.0	202.0	557.0
DOD Total	\$50.0	\$125.0	\$176.0	\$380.0	\$1,502.0	\$557.0	\$1,200.0	\$3,990.0


Note: 1. Not adjusted for Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Does not include funds in budget request.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Data as of September 30, 1987.



**Table 31  
NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE  
EQUIPMENT APPROPRIATIONS  
BY RESERVE COMPONENT**



Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).  
Data as of December 31, 1987.



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The Board acknowledges the contributions that Congressionally-allocated NGREA have made to enhance the capabilities of the reserve components. Any budget reductions may adversely impact NGREA. This, in turn, would affect equipment modernization programs and cause

increasing compatibility and maintenance problems as equipment in the reserve components gets older. Survivability on the battlefield would be diminished.

When responsibilities and taskings for the reserve components increase, the



National Guard and Reserve share of equipment appropriations should increase proportionately. The services must adequately budget for equipment mobilization needs for their reserve components. Each year, National Guard and Reserve units are increasingly fulfilling operational functions which previously had been the sole responsibility of the active components.

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To accomplish these functions, reserve component elements must be properly equipped and adequately funded.

Budget reductions for FY 1987 affected the amount of equipment provided to the reserve components. New production equipment is not distributed to the National Guard and Reserve and the flow of used equipment from the active component is also reduced. Table 32 shows some examples of equipment planned for acquisition but inadequately funded in FY 1987. Some of these items may be acquired in future years. This considerably extends the time, however, for a unit to increase its equipment status level.

**Table 32**  
**EXAMPLES OF HARDWARE SYSTEMS REQUESTED BUT NOT ACQUIRED FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS IN FY 1987**  
**(Expressed in Number of Systems)**

<u>Component</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Budget Request</u>	<u>Appropriated</u>
Army National Guard	HMMWV*	3166	863
	OE 254 Communications Antenna Group	5748	2800
Army Reserve	HMMWV*	3490	1157
	UH-60 Helicopter	21	0
Marine Corps Reserve	Digital Communications Terminals	658	0
Air National Guard	Satellite Terminals	16	0

\*High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle  
 Source: Individual reserve components.  
 Data as of September 30, 1987.

### Equipment Age

Equipment age is not always an adequate determinant of equipment capability. Many systems have been modernized over the years through upgrade modifications which prolong their usefulness to the force. However, many other systems have not been sufficiently modernized and this adversely affects readiness.

Retaining old equipment is not an efficient nor wise use of defense dollars. Older equipment breaks down more frequently, is often incompatible with other equipment in the inventory, may be unsafe, and is difficult to support. Repair parts are used at an excessive pace, and in some instances, are no longer produced. Longer time in maintenance shops reduces the availability of the equipment for training and operations. The efficiency of an entire unit in peacetime or in battle may be diminished because of equipment age. Older equipment may not be effective against the threat on a modern battlefield.

The wheeled vehicle fleets of the reserve components continue to age and are increasingly difficult to maintain. Of special concern in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are 2 1/2 and 5-ton trucks and other tactical wheeled vehicles. Shortages of modern 5-ton trucks adversely impacts on routine training, equipping new force structures, maintenance and repair, and mobilization.

The average age of aircraft in the reserve components is displayed on Table 33. The table shows that the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have a tanker fleet that is older than 28 years. Large scale replacement to overcome obsolescence will be expensive. While some of these aircraft and other equipment in the reserve components have been modernized to improve capability and remain useful, the frame of the aircraft and equipment continues to age. The Coast Guard Reserve has no aircraft assigned, but uses active Coast Guard aircraft for training when available.



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**Table 33**  
**AIRCRAFT AVERAGE AGES**  
**ACTIVE, NATIONAL GUARD, AND RESERVES**  
**(Expressed in Years)**

	Army		Navy		Marine Corps		Air Force			Coast Guard <sup>1</sup>		
	Active	Guard	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Guard	Reserve	Active	Reserve
<b>Aircraft</b>												
<b>Fixed Wing</b>												
Bomber								21.2				
Attack				14.6	19.4	8.4	15.1	7.9	12.8	10.4		
Fighter/Interceptor				5.9	9.6	6.4	17.5	8.9	17.0	16.6		
Cargo/Transport	14.4	16.9	22.9	13.5	8.4			15.8	20.2	22.8	8.0	
Tankers				21.5	27.1	20.8	10.2	25.7	28.8	28.1		
ASW Patrol				11.9	20.9							
Observation/Recon	18.5	21.3	18.3			19.0	18.8	18.3	21.4	21.9		
AEW							22.8					
Trainer				7.2	10.7			18.5	23.2	28.9		
Rescue				13.9				19.3	21.3	20.9	6.0	
Other								17.1	14.8			
<b>Helicopters</b>												
Attack	10.4	16.3			17.1	9.5	16.2					
Utility	12.8	19.9	17.6	21.0		14.8	14.8					
Observation	14.9	16.2	15.2									
Cargo	9.2	16.7	19.5	4.3		16.6	19.6					
Rescue						23.9		17.2	20.1	18.7	6.0	
ASW				15.3	22.5							
Trainer	18.7			3.9								
Other	7.4	16.3		14.2	14.3							

Note: 1. Aircraft generally perform multiple missions, often simultaneously.

Average age is not shown in every category for the following reasons:

1. No aircraft of this type exists in the inventory of the respective component, or
2. Average age computations were made by consolidating several types of aircraft data including newer aircraft systems.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

### Equipment Maintenance

Aged equipment requires increased maintenance time. This time could be devoted to more effective training if the reserve components had modern equipment.

The Army National Guard and the Marine Corps Reserve have a backlog of

equipment maintenance in excess of 90 days. The Army National Guard has reduced its backlogs by filling vacant positions with trained technicians and military personnel and through increased utilization of commercial contractors. The Marine Corps Reserve has reduced its maintenance backlog through cooperative efforts of other services' maintenance facilities.

Maintenance funds have been increased each year to reduce the backlog of equipment maintenance.

Depot maintenance activities provide support for the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve. The Air Force Logistics Command (active component) is responsible for Total Air Force equipment maintenance. Maintenance problems increase when exchangeable parts and engine overhauls are in high demand and, therefore, not available. There is no maintenance backlog in the Coast Guard Reserve because of minimal equipment on hand.

Some equipment will be transferred to the National Guard and Reserve forces as newer equipment is issued to the active components. It is critical that the transferred equipment be maintained to service readiness and technical standards prior to its issuance to the reserve components. The reserve components' maintenance programs

cannot afford the expenditure of limited maintenance resources and time required to upgrade equipment transferred in an unsatisfactory condition.

### **Equipment Transfers**

Cross leveling is an Army program to provide sufficient equipment to



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deployable units which are rated low in status reports because of equipment issues. The Army's objective is to upgrade all deployable units, which have C-4 status levels because of equipment, to at least a C-3 level. The Readiness Chapter provides definitions of "C" ratings.

Cross leveling complements other equipping programs. It may move already fielded equipment from one unit, without lowering its status below C-3, to another organization in the active or reserve components to improve that unit's equipment on-hand status. Priorities for equipment are given to early-deploying units that are not C-3 or better. This policy increases the number of units in the force which are C-3 for equipment on-hand.

The Army National Guard conducts cross leveling within the state first. A nationwide program provides for the movement of equipment between states to increase equipment status levels of the entire Army National Guard.

As of August, 1987, the Army had upgraded 320 National Guard, 307

Reserve, and 94 active component units through cross leveling. In the next five years, the Army expects to bring to C-3, or higher status, an additional 89 active component, 100 Army National Guard, and 401 Army Reserve units.

The Navy Department does not conduct a formal program to transfer equipment. Their "horizontal integration" program assures that the Naval Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve receive equipment simultaneously with the active components.

The Air National Guard has formal and informal programs to transfer equipment between units to improve equipment status. The formal program transfers aircraft to units requiring additions to maintain their authorized aircraft strength, to provide training opportunities for personnel, and to maintain adequate aircraft on "24-Hour Alert" status. The informal program reallocates equipment, which may temporarily degrade the equipment status of one unit, while enhancing the status of the gaining unit.

### **Compatibility**

The distribution of modern equipment to the National Guard and Reserve reduces incompatibility problems between active and reserve component units. However, equipment incompatibilities continue for many units.

Communications equipment incompatibility is no longer a major problem in the Army National Guard, but continues to be a problem for the Army Reserve. The Army National Guard provided an example of an



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incompatibility issue which, if not resolved, could have a severe impact on vehicular support in a theater of operations. The National Guard's vintage truck fleet requires the use of gasoline. However, most of the vehicles in the active component fleet use diesel fuel. This problem must be solved for the Total Army.

Army Reserve test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment is geared for support of M60A3 tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers. The Army Reserve will also be required to perform maintenance on M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles (BFV) when deployed to a combat theater. Although mechanics are being trained in the maintenance of these new vehicles, they will not have the equipment with them to service M1s and BFVs when mobilized.

While the Naval Reserve has modernized the tactical navigation systems on their P-3A/B maritime patrol aircraft, the P-3C has more sophisticated

equipment which is incompatible with most reserve component aircraft. For example, the magnetic anomaly detection equipment of the reserve component is obsolete, unreliable, and lacks sensitivity and range for the current submarine operating environment. Also, electronic maintenance support of reserve component electronic warfare aircraft (EA-6A) cannot be provided on aircraft carriers.

Air National Guard tactical communications equipment is analog and will not interface satisfactorily with the digital equipment of the active component. This, together with lack of other equipment such as radar homing and warning and electronic countermeasures gear used by the active component, greatly reduces the ability to conduct joint operations.

Some Air Force Reserve airlift aircraft are not equipped with station keeping equipment and would be unable to fly certain missions in formation with more



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recent aircraft models operated by other components. Support for older aircraft such as the C-130A and F-4D would be limited, at other than their own operating bases, because of a lack of spare parts.

The Total Force must have common, compatible electronic systems in order to defeat enemy electronic threats. The goal of electronic combat is to control the electromagnetic spectrum and deny its use to the enemy. Virtually every aspect of modern warfare is dependent on the use of electronics. Due to the dynamic nature of the tactical environment, electronics can assist in early detection, quick response, and flexibility in employing appropriate ground, sea, or air forces when and where they are needed.

### **Aircraft Defensive Systems**

Generally, reserve component aircraft are not adequately equipped with defensive systems against the medium

and high threat electronic environment of modern air conflicts. National Guard and Reserve aircraft will be committed to warfighting theaters simultaneously with, or even before, many active component fighting units. Yet, most of the reserve component aircraft do not have active protection from electronic countermeasures pods or internal jammers which their active component counterparts possess. This disparity must be rectified. Electronic countermeasures and electronic countermeasures systems should be provided for each component on a first-to-fight, first-to-equip basis. Every aircrew, regardless of service or component, should be given equal opportunities for success when on similar missions.

The Board recommends that high priority be given to equipping reserve component aircraft with appropriate aircraft defensive systems. The "first to fight, first to equip" policy must be applied to aircraft defensive systems as well as to the major end item itself.

### **Training Equipment**

Equipment for effective training of reserve component members and units is essential to overall mobilization readiness. Individuals and units must be able to train on the equipment they will use when performing operational missions. In many cases in National Guard or Reserve units, equipment is either obsolete or nonexistent. In other units, some modern equipment may be available but is in such limited quantities that effective training cannot be conducted.

Training simulators and devices may satisfy some training requirements. Funding for such systems has been



limited, however, and sufficient numbers of simulators and devices are not located where National Guard and Reserve members can train in the limited time available. Construction planning for future armories and centers should incorporate layouts for training equipment. Budgetary constraints may reduce allotments for ammunition, fuel, maintenance, transportation, and operating tempos in each of the components. These factors will require increased usage of training simulators and devices at local levels. This issue is discussed further in the Training and Mobilization Chapter.

The Board recommends that sufficient training equipment be provided to the reserve components to attain and sustain individual and unit readiness levels.

### **Automated Information Systems**

The use of automated information systems is essential to effective management of administration, training, and mobilization of the reserve components. The services are identifying common systems to use between the active and reserve components so that when employed in a theater of operations, one component can properly support the other. Major commitments are being made to hardware and software development and component interface.

The automated information systems used by the reserve components of the Air Force are meeting current needs. However, automatic data processing systems in some of the other reserve components remain inadequate. Example: According to a readiness



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assessment conducted in FY 1987 by the U.S. Army, a data processing unit which is a sub-element of a major materiel management center in the Army Reserve "... has obsolete, outdated ADP systems that are difficult to maintain and have suffered much down time for maintenance. Due to the age of the equipment, repair parts for the system are in short supply. These systems, which are the 'hub' of the logistics operation, are in a questionable condition for deployment and are not supportable in the European Theater of Operations." The system uses 1960's technology and because it operates on software not in use elsewhere, the running of standard applications for logistics programs becomes difficult. The system is prone to software and hardware problems and is totally dependent on a contractor for maintenance and repair parts.

While the services' tactical computers are using compatible equipment and programs, availability of both, for training in a peacetime environment, is

lacking. The need exists to define support requirements and train to those requirements that will be necessary in a wartime environment.

### **Strategic Transportation**


The Board continues to be concerned about the shortage of strategic transportation capability to meet mobilization requirements. Sealift and airlift equipment available in the military and from civilian commercial sources is not adequate to transport forces to theaters, for large scale operations, in the times required.

In last year's report, the Board addressed the shortage of merchant marine vessels to provide strategic sealift for sustainment of forces should a conflict occur. In January 1987, the White House issued a document titled "National Security Strategy of the United States". That report indicates that objectives for mobility capabilities have not been met. More specifically, it states that "... the lack of merchant mariners in the near term could impede our ability adequately to project and sustain forces by strategic sealift." The U.S. merchant marine fleet is very short of its own and U.S. flagged commercial shipping assets. It also lacks sufficient personnel to operate those vessels.

Sufficient airlift to quickly deploy forces is critical in the early stages of any major conflict. There are significant shortages in the number of military aircraft and in the number of civilian aircraft which could be readily available for military transportation needs. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program is designed to supplement military strategic airlift capabilities. CRAF airplanes can accept military cargo



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pallets and other military equipment. However, overall CRAF airplane availability is inadequate to meet the requirements.

Deployment planning for reserve component units needs to be realistically based on the availability of current transportation assets. A well-trained and equipped National Guard and Reserve must be available to theater commanders when needed to execute operational plans.

The Board recommends that major efforts be devoted to solving the shortage of immediately available sealift and airlift intertheater transportation assets.


### **Summary and Recommendations**

The status of equipment in the reserve components has substantially improved over the past few years. Further modernization and delivery of ordered materiel continues but funding is inadequate to solve critical shortage problems in the near future. Equipment maintenance and availability has

improved as older equipment is removed from inventories. Compatibility between components has been enhanced by modernization.

The equipping of the reserve components has been a success story in the last few years. However, this success has created a requirement for storage facilities. Strategic transportation resources are still very short.

The Board recommends:

- continue modernization of the force to increase capabilities and ensure compatibility of reserve component equipment with that of the active components.
- give budgetary priority to equipping reserve component aircraft with appropriate defensive systems.
- provide sufficient training equipment to the reserve components to attain and sustain individual and unit readiness levels.
- devote major efforts to solving the shortage of immediately available sealift and airlift intertheater transportation assets. 



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## Training and Mobilization

# 4



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*"We tend to lose sight of our priorities. If you can't tie something to operations, training, or warrior preparedness, then you better think twice before doing it . . . We have allowed evaluation of paperwork to replace an evaluation of combat readiness and leadership."*

*General Alfred M. Gray  
Commandant, US Marine Corps*



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## **General**

The primary peacetime mission of the reserve components is to train to be ready to execute assigned mobilization missions should deterrence fail. Under the Total Force policy, accomplishment of this mission is vital to United States national security. Reserve component units must be prepared for the same mobilization missions as active component units. However, National Guard and Reserve organizations are expected to maintain mobilization readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active components.

Combat readiness is directly effected by training. In order to increase readiness and get the most out of training dollars, reserve component training must be realistic, challenging, oriented to wartime missions, and must efficiently utilize limited training time.

Today's training philosophies for the reserve components must be constantly


reviewed to accommodate new equipment and doctrine. Constant innovation overcomes training detractors. The training environment needs to be realistic so that individuals and units are prepared to function on the modern, dynamic battlefield.

Progress has been made in almost all facets of reserve component training. This can partly be credited to additional equipment, better planning, and scheduling. But primarily it is due to effective leadership within the components.

## **Service Training Initiatives**

Increased tasking of the National Guard and Reserve in recent years has required the implementation of various training initiatives to ensure that reserve component forces are ready to mobilize and fight.

The CAPSTONE program is an Army initiative that aligns active and reserve



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component elements to meet wartime operational requirements. This allows the reserve components of the Army to increase mobilization readiness by focusing peacetime training on wartime missions. CAPSTONE was not a new initiative in FY 1987, but has been an effective program for Army National Guard and Reserve commanders.

The Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, has proven successful in improving the combat readiness of United States-based active and reserve component heavy forces. To expand on this success, the Army is implementing a Combat Training Center concept which provides for a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) located in the United States, a Combat Maneuver Training Complex (CMTC) located in West Germany, and a Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).

The JRTC will train light forces, integrated with Air Force units, in a low to mid-threat battle environment while the CMTC will train heavy forces in a



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mid to high-threat environment. The BCTP will train senior commanders and their staffs through the use of free-play, corps-level, battle simulations. Both active and reserve component units will benefit from the realistic combat training to be provided by the Combat Training Center concept.


The Army recently initiated the Ready Reserve Aviator Sustainment Training Program. The purpose of the program is to maintain the proficiency of the approximately 4,600 aviators in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). IRR aviators are cycled through the 19-day refresher program which is instructed by other IRR aviators on extended active duty. The program should significantly increase mobilization readiness of IRR aviators.

The Army is establishing 21 Regional Training Sites—Maintenance, to improve the readiness of reserve component maintenance personnel. The sites will allow reserve component personnel to refresh old and acquire new skills. Two



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of the sites are for high-technology skill training. When completed, these facilities will enable personnel in approximately 73 percent of the Army's non-divisional maintenance units to train on current and programmed equipment.



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The Navy has implemented training initiatives, in both air and surface reserve forces, to accommodate increased roles and responsibilities. The Naval Air Reserve has initiated a Reserve Training Tracks program which defines training requirements for each mobilization billet and measures readiness of individuals and units. The program is monitored by periodic readiness reports and has been effective in improving readiness.

The Naval Reserve has designated 40 of its larger, better-equipped reserve centers as "Readiness Centers". They will coordinate training activities for smaller centers in their geographic regions. The objective is to enhance training capabilities of the regional facilities rather than spending limited funds to upgrade, for training

purposes, other Naval Reserve Centers. This initiative should increase readiness by providing highly effective training facilities within a reasonable commuting distance for most reservists.

The Naval Surface Reserve has initiated training programs to prepare for additional taskings of fleet hospitals, mine countermeasure (MCM) ships, and cargo handling units. Reserve personnel are trained in fleet hospital assembly and operations through the Fleet Hospital Operations Course. Specific billet training is provided at other training sites. This training is very important because 11 fleet hospitals will be staffed by the Selected Naval Reserve in the next few years.

The Naval Reserve has developed a one-year plan for training reserve crews to man new MCM-1 class ships programmed to enter service in FY 1988.

A new cargo handling training plan has been written to coordinate billets, personnel, construction schedules, training support requirements, and training program planning for the Navy Cargo Off-load and Discharge System. Another plan in development will significantly improve readiness by providing logistic planners, at all levels, with a comprehensive guide to cargo-handling force mobilization.

The Marine Corps Reserve's five-year plan encourages reserve participation in active component and overseas exercises. The establishment of a reserve marine amphibious brigade (MAB) staff and reserve participation in MAB exercises are other steps taken to prepare the Marine Corps Reserve for expanded roles.



Because of expansion in unit tasking, there have been many changes in the training of Air National Guard flying and support units. Increased participation in major exercises and overseas training allows personnel to become familiar with new operating areas and roles.


A newly created Air Force Reserve Training Technology Application Council will examine innovative training technology, developed in the public and private sectors, to discover applications appropriate for Air Force Reserve flight and support training activities. The council will determine training deficiencies, examine current training policies and procedures, develop recommendations for test programs, and monitor the implementation of new training technologies. Additionally, Air Force Reserve functional managers have been tasked to examine all aspects of

activities that affect training in the reserve.

The Coast Guard Reserve recently implemented a training and evaluation program which is designed to provide and document minimum levels of proficiency required for mobilization. The program systematically evaluates all formal training and includes data on critical skills and skill deterioration.



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
### **Training Detractors**

Reserve component units are expected to maintain readiness in less than 20 percent of the time available to active units. The limited time available to reserve components should be dedicated to training to improve readiness for operational missions. Time spent during drills and active duty periods on other functions detracts from readiness and endangers national security. Unfortunately, significant time is spent on administrative functions and other activities that do not contribute to readiness. Most of these functions should be handled by full-time support personnel so that maximum time during drill and annual training periods can be devoted to training. Specific training detractors are:

- reporting and administrative requirements are a continual drain on valuable training time. Department of Defense, the services, and the senior echelons of command of the reserve components, should continually

review all such requirements levied on subordinate reserve component units and eliminate those that do not contribute directly to mission readiness.

- inspection and testing policies of reserve component units often result in redundant inspections. Some inspections may be consolidated, eliminated, or decreased in frequency. Emphasis should be placed on testing reserve component members and units for mobilization and combat readiness.
- active component and full-time support personnel, who manage and maintain bases and facilities used by National Guard and Reserve units, should be flexible in their work schedules to ensure that facilities are available at times when reserve component personnel are most available to train. This will normally be at night and on weekends.
- equipment check in/out procedures can be very time consuming,



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particularly when going to an unfamiliar base for annual training. Procedures need to be streamlined so that National Guardsmen and Reservists are involved for the shortest time possible.

- time required to travel to distant training areas. Funding should be made available to ensure that adequate training facilities, areas, and simulators are available at or near drill sites. Increased sharing of training facilities between the services can reduce some of this travel and should increase both quantity and quality of training time available.
- non-mission oriented tasking is a significant training detractor for some reserve components particularly in aviation units. This both wastes scarce training assets and detracts from very limited, quality-training time. All levels of command must carefully screen taskings to eliminate those that do not contribute directly to mobilization or combat readiness.
- the high level of attrition, and its resulting unit turbulence, is a constant detractor from unit training programs. Programs required to

provide individual skill qualification compete for limited training time with unit training requirements.

Limited training time available to reserve component members is a serious training detractor requiring command attention at all levels. The Board recommends that the following actions be taken to reduce time spent on administrative functions and other activities that do not contribute to readiness. Some of these corrective actions may have already been initiated by some services:

- review all reporting requirements and eliminate those that do not contribute directly to mission readiness.
- review and revise inspection and testing policies to reduce interference with valuable training time.
- consolidate administrative functions at the highest level practical in order to relieve subordinate units of administrative burdens.
- provide sufficient full-time support personnel to handle peacetime administrative functions.



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- require increased flexibility to ensure that training support personnel and facilities are available when the reserve components can use them.
- streamline equipment check in/out procedures to involve National Guardsmen and Reservists for the shortest time possible.
- provide adequate training facilities, ranges, and simulators close to drill sites to reduce nonproductive travel time.
- encourage all active and reserve components to share training facilities.
- eliminate non-mission essential taskings.

Equipment shortages are identified by many of the reserve components as another significant training detractor. This issue is addressed in the Equipment Chapter of this report.

## **Physical Fitness**

All of the services have physical training programs that are applicable to their reserve components. These programs should be rigorously and uniformly enforced by reserve component commanders at all levels. It is impossible to conduct adequate physical fitness training during drill or annual training periods. It is the responsibility of all unit leaders to provide physical fitness advice and counseling but in the reserve components, individual members must be motivated to conduct fitness training on their own. Physical fitness is essential to combat readiness. Commanders must train their units to the level of physical fitness and stamina that is required to accomplish wartime missions. Under the Total Force policy, there will be little or no time for many reserve component members to train upon mobilization. They must be physically ready to fight now.

There are many issues — such as budget policies, construction priorities, and equipment distribution — that the reserve component unit commander cannot directly influence to improve combat readiness. However, physical conditioning is not one of them. Through sound leadership, commanders can and should ensure that their units are physically prepared for wartime missions.

## **Training Areas and Ranges**

Sufficient numbers of adequate small arms ranges are not available to the reserve components. The shortage of accessible firing ranges makes it very difficult and time consuming to maintain reserve component personnel

marksmanship skills. This problem is addressed in the Facilities Chapter of this report.

There are also insufficient training areas and ranges available to conduct ground combat unit proficiency training close to home stations. This hampers the ability of ground combat units to conduct realistic training and perfect combat skills.

The same problem exists for aviation training areas and ranges. Additionally, many of the existing areas are not adequate for training with high performance aircraft utilizing modern tactics and weapons systems.

In order to maintain the highest state of readiness, it is imperative that National Guardsmen and Reservists be provided with sufficient, adequate, and accessible areas in which to utilize their weapons and practice tactics. The lack

of training areas has a direct, adverse impact on readiness. It also makes an indirect, negative impact on retention because of unrealistic training. Time required for units to travel to distant, adequate training facilities is a serious training detractor.

### Training Simulators and Devices

Training devices and simulators can provide an environment that presents more intense and realistic situations than could otherwise be experienced in training. Modern, complex military systems require sophisticated training which may not be available to the reserve components because of high procurement or operating costs.

As Department of Defense budget requests are reduced by Congress, and resources become austere, the services and industry must find ways to offer relatively inexpensive and effective training to members of the active and reserve components. Training devices and simulators may replace or complement equipment systems which often are too expensive to use primarily for training purposes. In some cases, embedded training, a concept that provides training aids as part of the weapon system, may reduce training expenses.

The use of training devices can help to increase combat readiness, particularly in the reserve components. The lack of training time and easily accessible training areas/ranges are two of the most significant training detractors in the reserve components. The use of training devices to complement training with actual equipment and weapon systems can



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provide a cost-effective solution to these problems. Significant progress has been made in recent years in equipping the reserve forces with training devices and simulators.

The Army Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and the Naval Surface Reserve report that they are generally satisfied with the progress of their training devices programs. Funding is adequate for existing needs. Additional funding will be requested as new requirements are developed. The Army National Guard reports that funding levels are not adequate. Additionally, significant shortages have been identified by the reserve components of the Air Force and aviation elements of the Naval Reserve.

The Air National Guard needs training devices for newly acquired aircraft. F-15 Operational Flight Trainers (OFT) are programmed into three of the four units that have received or are in the process of converting to F-15s. An F-16 OFT is programmed for the air defense F-16

training unit and Cockpit Procedure Trainers (CPT) will go to operational units. However, the picture for the general purpose F-16 is not as bright. The Air National Guard requires F-16 OFTs (with visual systems) at training units. CPTs and radar intercept Part Task Trainers (PTT) are required at operational locations. Unfortunately, there is no money programmed for either CPTs or PTTs at any of the F-16 operational units. Program costs must be identified and budgeted.

The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve lack flight trainers in both the C-130 and C-5 programs. Two C-130 Weapon System Trainers (WST) are required for joint-use regional training facilities. One C-5 WST is needed at Westover Air Force Base, in Massachusetts, to support National Guard and Reserve units that will eventually have 26 aircraft and 50 aircrews.

The Naval Air Reserve needs six simulators for various types of aircraft at reserve stations. Currently, Reserve aircrews must travel extensively to train on simulators located at active component facilities. Required travel is expensive and reduces the time that Reserve aircrews have available for training and operational commitments. Alternatively, aircrews must train in the actual aircraft which is much more costly per hour and much less efficient for many training tasks. Some emergency procedures can be more realistically practiced in simulators. A greater number of both emergency and normal procedures can be practiced in a simulator, in a given time period, than can be practiced in the actual aircraft. Lessons are learned and readiness is



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increased without risking valuable aircraft and aircrews.

Training devices and simulators provide savings in overall equipment procurement costs, operating costs, and repair and replacement costs. Effective use of training devices and simulators can enhance readiness levels of equipment on-hand; reduce fuel and ammunition costs; make the most of available flight, steaming, and ground hours for equipment; and increase training readiness of personnel in the units.

The Board recommends that funding be authorized to enhance aircraft simulation systems in the Naval Air Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve.

#### **Ammunition and Ordnance— Training Allowances**

The Army, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves experienced no significant ammunition shortages in FY 1987. The Naval Reserve experienced

shortages that had a minor impact on aircrew proficiency. The Navy-wide shortages were attributable to production problems and operational commitments.

The Army and Air National Guards, and the Air Force Reserve experienced significant ammunition shortages that adversely affected combat readiness. The shortages were shared by the respective active components and resulted from both funding constraints and production problems.

#### **Overseas Training**

Overseas training provides excellent training for reserve component individuals and units by:

- exercising mobilization, deployment, operational, and redeployment plans.
- increasing awareness of wartime mission requirements.
- tailoring peacetime training to wartime missions in actual wartime environments.

- strengthening wartime command relationships.
- providing geographical orientation of deploying units.
- increasing readiness by providing realistic exercise scenarios for reserve component members and units.

Actions required to prepare for and execute an overseas training mission closely parallel those required for mobilization and deployment. Increased

morale and retention in the reserve components are additional benefits of overseas training.

Table 34 shows that the number of personnel training overseas continued to grow in FY 1987. The services clearly recognize the value of overseas training. Of the units training overseas in FY 1987, 19 percent were combat units, 25 percent were combat support, and 56 percent were combat service support. Table 35 indicates this breakdown by reserve component.

**Table 34**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT OVERSEAS TRAINING**

	FY 81		ACTUAL				PROJECTED	
			FY 86		FY 87		FY 88	
	Cells/Units	Pers	Cells/Units	Pers	Cells/Units	Pers	Cells/Units	Pers
Army National Guard	99	5785	1140	29429	1195	30014	1407	41716
Army Reserve	200	3500	1461	16739	2169	25518	1239	23319
Naval Reserve <sup>1,2</sup>	127	3422	468	14740	228	9523	206	9162
Marine Corps Reserve	4	186	12	2675	18	2580	10	3190
Air National Guard <sup>1</sup>	N/A	N/A	138	9877	363	10572	220	10926
Air Force Reserve	141	6931	627	14561	670	15722	680	15800
Coast Guard Reserve <sup>1</sup>	N/A	N/A	N/A	69	N/A	301	N/A	169
Total	571	19824	3846	88090	4643	94230	3762	104282

Notes: 1. FY 81 data incomplete.

2. FY 87-88 reporting criteria changed to count unit and personnel only once if deployed more than once during that year.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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**Table 35**  
**TYPES OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS—**  
**OVERSEAS TRAINING**  
**FY 1987**

	Combat		Combat Support		Combat Service Support		Total Units
Army National Guard	461	39%	247	21%	487	40%	1195
Army Reserve	288	13%	337	16%	1544	71%	2169
Naval Reserve	21	9%	107	47%	100	44%	228
Marine Corps Reserve	17	94%	0	0%	1	6%	18
Air National Guard	74	20%	289	80%	0	0%	363
Air Force Reserve	33	5%	186	28%	451	67%	670
Totals	894	19%	1166	25%	2583	56%	4643

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

The services utilize different criteria to determine which, and how often, units will train overseas. Personnel assigned to Coast Guard Reserve overseas mobilization positions regularly participate in overseas readiness exercises. Naval Reserve overseas training follows a three year cycle. Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units, with overseas wartime tasking, are scheduled to train overseas triennially.

Army National Guard and Reserve units train overseas based upon needs of theater commanders, identification and placement on a Time-Phased Force Deployment List, CAPSTONE alignment, mission priority, and unit status report.

Frequency of overseas training is determined by a unit's Latest Arrival Date (LAD) when mobilized. Units with LADs between D-day and D + 30 are programmed to train overseas every three years. Units with LADs of D + 31 to D + 60 are on a five-year cycle.

Various Marine Corps Reserve units participate in overseas exercises each year. Additionally, small, specialty units augment overseas active component forces throughout the year.

During FY 1987, overseas training was conducted by one or more reserve components in 84 overseas areas as well as over and on the world's oceans and seas. Overseas training areas are shaded on the following map and listed.



- |                   |                         |                   |                 |
|-------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Aleutian Islands  | Dominican Republic      | Hong Kong         | Panama          |
| Antigua & Barbuda | Ecuador                 | Iceland           | Paraguay        |
| Argentina         | Egypt                   | India             | Peru            |
| Australia         | England                 | Israel            | Philippines     |
| Austria           | Fiji                    | Italy             | Portugal        |
| Bahamas           | France                  | Jamaica           | Puerto Rico     |
| Bahrain           | French Guiana           | Japan             | St. Kitts-Nevis |
| Barbados          | Gabon                   | Jordan            | St. Lucia       |
| Belgium           | German Federal Republic | Kenya             | Saudi Arabia    |
| Belize            | Greece                  | Kuwait            | Scotland        |
| Bermuda           | Greenland               | Luxembourg        | Somalia         |
| Bolivia           | Grenada                 | Madagascar        | South Korea     |
| Brazil            | Guam                    | Malaysia          | Spain           |
| Cameroon          | Guantanamo Bay, Cuba    | Marshall Islands  | Sweden          |
| Canada            | Guatemala               | Mexico            | Thailand        |
| Chile             | Guyana                  | Morocco           | The Gambia      |
| Colombia          | Haiti                   | New Caledonia     | The Netherlands |
| Costa Rica        | Hawaii                  | New Zealand       | Tunisia         |
| Denmark           | Honduras                | Northern Marianas | Turkey          |
| Diego Garcia      |                         | Norway            | Uruguay         |
| Dominica          |                         | Okinawa           | Venezuela       |
|                   |                         | Oman              | Wake Island     |



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During 1987 the Board observed overseas training in Central and South America. Based on these and other observations, the Board believes that the overseas training program has been a key element in making the reserve components the ready force that they are today. Additionally, overseas training demonstrates, to allies and potential adversaries, the ability of the United States to execute its forward defense strategy.



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### **Exercise Participation**

Reserve component participation in joint exercises provides realistic training and increases readiness. National Guardsmen and Reservists are able to train as they would fight. Wartime missions are executed with other components (active and reserve) and foreign militaries, just as would occur upon mobilization. Joint exercises train the reserve components to face the challenges of extended and integrated battlefields within a combined environment.

Nearly 1,800 reserve component units/cells, with over 66,500 National

Guardsmen and Reservists, participated in a wide variety of joint exercises in FY 1987. Virtually every facet of warfare was practiced and every weapon system exercised.

### **Aviation Training**

Reserve component aircrew proficiency training requirements are the same as active component requirements in all services except the Navy, where requirements for active units deploying for shipboard operations are more extensive. Major factors affecting aircrew proficiency training are availability of flight hours, aircraft, training areas, simulators, and Additional Flying Training Periods (AFTPs).

All reserve components, except the Naval Reserve, reported that adequate flight hours were available for training in FY 1987. The Naval Reserve is funded at 135 hours per pilot which is 15 hours per pilot less than projected to complete primary mission training requirements. Adjustments are being made to ensure that the shortfall has minimal impact on readiness.

Although there was sufficient flight hour funding for the Army National Guard in FY 1987, current budgetary constraints do not allow for sufficient hours to meet minimum requirements for all aircraft systems in FY 1988 and FY 1989. Aircrew proficiency training will be adversely impacted.

Aircraft availability in the reserve components was not a major problem in FY 1987. The Army's reserve components reported some helicopter shortages, and the Navy reported SH-3 helicopter shortages. The Army Reserve indicated that sufficient numbers of



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fixed wing aircraft are available, but the planes are old and the fleet needs to be modernized.

Funding for Additional Flying Training Periods is generally adequate and should be maintained. The Air Force Reserve experienced minor shortages but readiness was not adversely affected.

Lack of adequate training areas, ranges, simulators, and devices was the greatest training problem faced by several of the reserve aviation components. These problem areas are discussed in other sections of this chapter.

Major problems were reported by various reserve components in the area of aircrew training proficiency. Encroachment of civilian residential and commercial property adjacent to airfields, and bases, is a factor that, if unresolved, will adversely impact aircrew proficiency training (See Facilities Chapter). Airspace restrictions, whether related to operating areas or airport traffic areas, also threaten to reduce training effectiveness.

Although some of the active components are experiencing pilot retention problems, this is not true in the National Guard and Reserve. The reserve components can effectively use pilots leaving the active components thereby amortizing costly initial pilot training over more years of service. It requires, in most cases, fewer flight hours for the average, highly-experienced National Guard or Reserve aviator to maintain combat readiness than for the active component aviator.

The Board recommends that reserve component aviation training programs be adequately funded in order to ensure force readiness and retention of expensive aircrew assets.

### **Training The Individual Ready Reserve**

The services have differing philosophies and policies for training Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)



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members. It should be noted that funding levels mentioned in this section do not include costs associated with the FY 1987 screening of the IRR. The IRR screen is discussed in the Personnel Chapter of this report.

The Army provides refresher training for a limited number of IRR members in peacetime. More than \$63 million was spent for IRR training in FY 1987. The Army believes that, upon mobilization, trained IRR personnel are critical for filling vacancies in deployed and early deploying units. Priority is given to training IRR soldiers who have been away from active duty for at least twelve months and need refresher training. Various programs are available to include specialty schools, professional development courses, training with active and reserve component units, exercise support, and support of annual training for troop program units.

The Marine Corps does not have a formal plan to ensure IRR skill retention. IRR members are encouraged

to apply for professional development schools and participation in exercises. However, this policy is under review because of IRR screening results and the eight-year military service obligation which can result in a four-year IRR commitment. A pilot program was initiated in FY 1987 to provide IRR members combat arms training with active component units. The Marine Corps spent \$1.4 million in FY 1987 to train more than 1,900 IRR members.

The Navy has a modest IRR training program directed primarily at members with critical skills. Funding for FY 1987 was \$1.1 million.

Air Force policy is that peacetime refresher training of the IRR is neither necessary nor cost effective. The Air Force has developed a concept designed to provide IRR refresher training upon mobilization. IRR members, with high demand wartime skills, will be sent directly to technical training centers for completion of formal refresher training prior to being assigned to a unit. This policy results



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from an initial skill degradation analysis in conjunction with IRR wartime requirements. An additional skill degradation study is planned. Unless the results are substantially different from the initial analysis, future funding of Air Force IRR peacetime refresher training is unlikely.

Due to budget constraints, the Coast Guard provides minimal training opportunities to IRR members and has no plans to expand the program.

### **Drug Interdiction—Impact on Training**

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, and subsequent legislation, directly



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affects the extent to which military forces (including reserve components) can participate in law enforcement activities. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of military forces to perform internal police functions.

Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the Posse Comitatus Act. The law prohibits direct military involvement (i.e., search, seizure, or arrest) in U.S. law enforcement actions. However, the law does authorize indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information obtained incidental to normal military operations. Indirect support must be incidental to a military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness nor the capacity of the Department of Defense to fulfill its defense mission. Title 32 USC authorizes state-controlled National Guard participation in drug law enforcement, provided that it is incidental to training.

As a result of laws, and other factors, the extent of drug interdiction activity, and its impact on training and readiness, varies considerably between the reserve components.

The Army and Air National Guards are committed to support of local, state, and federal drug enforcement agencies, to the extent that it is lawful and consistent with combat readiness requirements. The use of manpower and equipment is restricted to an assistance role only and is provided through state active duty and support incidental to training. Requests are submitted to the National Guard Bureau and approved only if all training

objectives are met. The state missions are conducted under control of the governor and in accordance with state law.

During FY 1987, National Guardsmen flew over 800 aircraft hours and spent over 4,900 mandays supporting the war on drugs. There has been little or no adverse impact on unit readiness and the National Guard will continue to support drug enforcement agencies.

The Army and Marine Corps Reserves do not participate in drug interdiction efforts.

The Naval Reserve maintains that participation by their forces in drug interdiction programs interferes with training requirements. The primary limiting factor for increased use of Naval Reserve forces is availability of Selected Reservists. Increased operating tempo, in support of coastal patrol and interdiction efforts, would expend the limited time available for training reservists for wartime missions. Drug interdiction missions do not always directly correlate to wartime missions. Mobilization readiness would be degraded since personnel would not be training in wartime tasks.

Mutual support and exercise participation may also be adversely effected. Fleet commanders depend on Naval Reserve support for many of their exercises. That support may be eroded if assets are committed to drug interdiction. Additionally, increased maintenance of weapons systems and equipment caused by heavier operations tempo may reduce overall readiness.

A further commitment of Naval Reserve assets to non-training missions

may result in important elements of the force being in a reduced state of readiness. Since the main constraint is personnel availability, an increase of operating dollars would not reduce the adverse impact on training nor improve combat readiness.



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The Air Force Reserve provides a minimal amount of reconnaissance and airlift support for drug interdiction on a non-interference basis. Support is provided only if the request is compatible with a previously planned mission. Current operations have no impact on readiness. However, any participation beyond the current levels may have a negative impact on training and readiness.

The Coast Guard Reserve is involved in the drug interdiction effort by augmenting active component commands. Reservists contribute directly by performing such duties as port security, surface interdiction, investigations, boardings, and surveillance. Reservists contribute indirectly by temporarily replacing active duty personnel who can then conduct drug enforcement activities. In either case, the reservists are receiving valuable training in their mobilization billets, and participation in the drug interdiction effort has increased their mobilization readiness.

In remarks to the Board in September, 1987, Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, said:

"I am particularly pleased that the Guard and Reserve have been an important part of this [narcotics interdiction process]. We have here an example of a total force working together to support national commitments of the President and on national strategies necessary for our security. . . . The willingness by the Guard and Reserve to share the load with our active forces has contributed far more assets, in terms of both manpower and equipment.

"The involvement of the Guard and the Reserve also support the military because they come from the heartland of America. In their civilian lives, people in the Guard and Reserve contribute to military support by acquainting their colleagues in business and the professions in their own communities with what's going on in the drug field.

"Third, there's a special ability in the Guard to offer assistance, under their "Title 32" authority, and under their State active-duty law enforcement authorities. This has been particularly true in eradication programs.

"In summary, the Guard and Reserve have supported the military in the fight against drugs in many ways. Some of the most critical areas have been the use of facilities, loan of equipment, transportation, and ground and aerial surveillance.

". . . The Guard and Reserves have done an outstanding job to date. We are obviously going to continue to rely on them as the military maintains, and perhaps even expands, its contribution to the total national battle against drugs."

The Board believes that the reserve components should continue to be used



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in the war on drugs only to the extent that their support coincides with appropriate training.

### **Additional Paid Periods**

Most members of the Selected Reserve perform about two weeks active duty for annual training and 48 drill periods a year. However, it would be impossible to maintain the high state of readiness, demanded by the Total Force Policy, if all Selected Reservists were limited to that amount of training. Personnel in key positions, and highly technical, critical assignments require more time to prepare and conduct training programs and maintain unit readiness. Additional paid drill and active duty for training periods are necessary for mobilization and combat readiness of the Total Force.

Funding levels were sufficient to meet minimum requirements for the Army, Naval, and Marine Corps Reserves, and the Air National Guard. However, the Army National Guard had to disapprove

some desired training due to funding constraints. To avoid degrading readiness, the Air Force Reserve had to transfer money from other personnel areas, to additional paid drill accounts. Even then, some training had to be delayed until FY 1988.

The Coast Guard Reserve received none of the \$5.6 million requested for additional training and was required to fund such training out of other accounts. Chronic underfunding of the Coast Guard Reserve, in critical training areas, seriously reduces mobilization readiness and should be remedied.

The Board recognizes that many members of the reserve components spend countless hours and mandays supporting the Total Force on a voluntary, non-pay basis. The Board commends these individuals. Funding levels will probably never be sufficient to compensate everyone for all the time spent supporting the reserve components.



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The Board recommends that current funding levels, for additional paid drill periods and mandays, be at least maintained, if not increased, and that funding of additional training for the Coast Guard Reserve be approved to support acceptable mobilization readiness levels.

### **Mobilization and Callup Categories**

Mobilization of the armed forces includes, but is not limited to, the following categories.

- Selective Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces to meet the requirements of a domestic emergency resulting from action by the President and/or Congress (10 USC 331, 332, 333).
- Partial Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces by not more than 1,000,000 individuals and the resources needed for their support, up to the attainment of full

mobilization, resulting from action by the President or Congress (10 USC 673a).

- Full Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces by mobilizing all reserve component units in the existing approved current force structure, all individual reservists, all retired military personnel, and the resources needed to support the above, resulting from action by the President and Congress (10 USC 671a).
- Total Mobilization—Expansion of the active component forces to organize and/or generate additional units or personnel beyond the existing force structure and the resources needed for their support, resulting from action by the President and Congress (10 USC 672).
- Presidential Call-up—The President may activate up to 200,000 Selected Reserve members involuntarily, for not more than 90 days, without declaring a national emergency (10 USC 673b). The President may use this authority when he determines it necessary to augment active component forces for an operational mission. The President, in cases where he determines such action necessary, may extend the original 90-day period for not more than an additional 90 days. Whenever the President exercises this authority, he must immediately notify Congress and provide reasons for the action. The service of units so ordered to active duty may be terminated by order of the President or law.

### **Direct Deployment**

Discussions at major headquarters visited by the Board in recent years



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
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have reinforced the Board's position that every effort should be made to plan for direct deployment of reserve component units. Some components already plan to direct deploy units from their home stations. This is becoming more feasible for the reserve components of the Army as CAPSTONE planning and training continues to focus on wartime missions, as equipment is becoming available at home station or deployment points, and as unit readiness improves.

A system of deployment certification similar to that used in the Air Force might be feasible in the other services. Particularly in the Army, there are many reserve component units which could direct deploy without processing through mobilization stations. Mobilization station functions such as cross leveling personnel and equipment and additional training are not necessary for all units. National Guard and Reserve units have shown the capability to deploy and accomplish operational missions without going to a mobilization station. Units that are prepared to deploy rapidly present the



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best deterrence, thereby better supporting national security policies.

The Board recommends that direct deployment should be the goal of as many reserve component units as possible. This capability should be expanded and capitalized on as an economical and timely way to mobilize.

The Board recommends that the other services investigate the feasibility of utilizing a system of reserve component deployment certification similar to that used by the Air Force.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

The reserve components most important peacetime mission is training to be ready in the event of mobilization. The better this mission is accomplished, the less likely mobilization will ever be necessary. Highly trained and ready National Guard and Reserve forces support the national goal of deterrence. Training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components continue to improve.

The Board recommends:

- review all reporting requirements for the reserve components and eliminate those which are an administrative burden but do not contribute directly to unit mission readiness.
- review and revise inspection and testing policies for the reserve components to reduce interference with limited training time.
- consolidate administrative functions of the reserve components, at the highest level practical, in order to relieve subordinate units of administrative burdens.
- provide sufficient full-time support personnel to handle peacetime administrative functions of the reserve components.
- require increased flexibility to ensure that training support personnel and facilities are available when the reserve components can use them.
- streamline equipment check-in/out procedures to involve National Guardsmen and Reservists for the shortest time possible.
- provide adequate training facilities, ranges, and simulators close to drill sites to reduce unproductive travel time.
- encourage all active and reserve components to share training facilities.
- eliminate non-mission essential tasking of the reserve components.
- authorize funding to enhance aircraft simulation systems in the Naval Air Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve.




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- adequately fund reserve component aviation training programs to ensure force readiness and retention of expensive aircrew assets.
- maintain or increase current funding levels for additional paid drill periods and mandays and fund additional training for the Coast Guard Reserve to support acceptable mobilization readiness levels.
- establish direct deployment as the goal of as many reserve component units as possible.
- investigate the feasibility of utilizing a system of reserve component deployment certification similar to that used by the Air Force. (U)



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
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


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# Medical **5**

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*"Reserve component personnel represent every discipline in health care in the nation, providing irreplaceable support to the active component."*

*William Mayer, M.D.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Health Affairs)*


## General

People are the most important resource in the Total Force. Special effort must be exerted to protect this resource from disease or physical harm. Should that fail, sufficient medical care needs to be readily available to restore individuals to duty in as little time as is medically possible.

Approximately two thirds of the medical care required during a major conflict in which the United States may be involved will be provided by reserve components. The Army National Guard and Army Reserve provide more than 69 percent of the Army's personnel in health related skills and units. The Naval Reserve provides nearly 58 percent and the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contribute 33 percent to their respective services' health care needs. Therefore, the readiness of these reserve component medical forces is critical since so many of them will be required in the early days of any conflict.



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Readiness of medical forces requires the same basic elements as combatant forces. They must have sufficient personnel and be properly trained and equipped to accomplish their mission. In each of these categories, the reserve components, overall, have significant shortages. However, many programs have been initiated to correct existing problems by early in the next decade.

## Medical Personnel

The reserve components are short of their wartime requirements by approximately 7,100 physicians, 31,000 nurses, and 73,000 enlisted health specialists. Medical readiness is limited by these shortages which are particularly acute in the categories of general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, and medical-surgical nurses. The percentages of shortages in the reserve components vary between the services with the Naval Reserve filling 83 percent of authorized spaces, the Army filling 40 percent of general surgeons and 68 percent of remaining specialties, and the Air Force filling 56 percent of physician specialties. Marine Corps Reserve medical care is provided by the Navy. Coast Guard Reserve care is provided by the U.S. Public Health Service and the Navy.

Significant progress has been made by all of the reserve components in the recruiting and retention of health care providers since FY 1981. It is anticipated that several recently initiated programs will provide most of the medical personnel requirements by FY 1992. In FY 1986, Congress enacted two new incentives to attract and retain health professionals in undermanned skills. The Health Professional Loan Repayment Program (HPLRP) provides



designated medical education loans in return for Selected Reserve service.

The second incentive is the Stipend Program for individuals training in anesthesiology, general surgery, orthopedic surgery, operating room nursing, and nurse anesthesia. Recent changes in the program provide for full, half, and student stipends. Physicians and nurses who are advancing their professional education and clinical skills are eligible for the monthly full and half stipends. Students in the third and fourth years of baccalaureate programs are eligible for the student stipend. At present, the latter stipend is directed primarily towards nursing students. The obligation for each year of financial assistance is: two years in the Selected Reserve for the full stipend (\$664), two years in the Individual Ready Reserve for the half stipend, and one year in the Ready Reserve for the student stipend (\$100). Additionally, members must remain in the same component and the same specialty for which the stipend was granted.

Because these programs have just been implemented, participation levels have not yet reached their potential. The Army National Guard has 51 members using the HPLRP, the Army Reserve 36, the Air Force Reserve six, the Air National Guard two, and the Naval Reserve one. The Army Reserve and the Naval Reserve are the only reserve components using the Stipend Program at this time. As these programs mature, they are expected to assist in reducing critical medical skills shortages in the reserve components.

Recognizing that shortages in certain critical skills may exist for the next few years, personnel managers might



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consider skill substitution to solve some of the problems in general surgery, orthopedics, and anesthesiology. Special incentives might be offered to medical professionals who agree to be cross-trained into shortage skills which are necessary for treating traumatic wound victims during the early days of a conflict.

To help resolve some of the health care personnel shortages, consideration could be given to assigning volunteer retired military medical professionals to reserve component, nondeployable positions in U.S.-based medical care installations. Most military retired medical professionals continue their profession in civilian life and should be current in their medical practice or specialty. Therefore, they would need little or no training prior to returning to active duty. Some type of retainer pay



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(in addition to their retirement pay) might be offered to such volunteers to occasionally "drill" with a reserve component unit so that both the unit and they would know their wartime assignment.

Recruiting of medical personnel is often hampered by unusually lengthy administrative processing of applications, training inflexibility, and shortages of nursing counselors. The Board believes that these problems can be overcome without unusual difficulty or extensive use of resources. Efforts to resolve the first two, in particular, should be given immediate attention.

Recruiting policies for nurses should be reviewed to determine if changes may be required to assist in reducing the severe nurse shortage. Policies which cause excessively long processing of nursing accessions should also be reviewed and modified. One reserve component's policy requires that nurses be working full time, for six out of the previous 12 months, before they can be accessed. There is no requirement, however, for that same individual to continue working as a nurse in the private sector after their accession into the reserve component.

Attaining manpower requirements coupled with quality training will increase the mobilization capability of the force.

### **Medical Training**

In order to enhance wartime medical readiness, each service offers a variety of programs and training opportunities to their reserve components.

Individually, reserve component members maintain medical skills

through private practice and civilian duties, attendance at professional association meetings, and participation in continuing health education programs. They may also attend active component schools—many of which are lengthy and require considerable time away from civilian jobs. Trauma-type instruction is offered in the Combat Casualty Care Course (a tri-service program), Battlefield Medicine, Battlefield Nursing, Deployment Medicine, and Advanced Trauma Life Support Courses. Attendance at these courses enhances skills for immediate care of wounded personnel.

Some enlisted personnel are offered licensed practical nurse instruction through civilian institutions with accredited programs. In some regions, U.S. Army Reserve Forces Schools are also offering licensed practical nurse instructional programs. Graduates are licensed by the state. As these programs mature, they should set a model for other locations and may help in reducing enlisted medical personnel shortages. The National Guard Bureau is considering establishing a reserve component nurse anesthetist civilian education program which would help alleviate personnel shortages in this specialty.

The Naval Reserve is developing a program for training enlisted personnel in medical skills to meet wartime requirements. This program uses civilian institutions to train Naval Reservists in their local communities rather than at military training facilities. Low density or critically short medical skills are targeted for the initial programs.

Recruits into these targeted skills attend basic training prior to starting

their medical skills education. They then attend an approved school where their tuition, fees, books, and equipment are paid for by the military. In exchange, the student attends drill periods and annual training with a reserve component unit while enrolled in school.

This model program, if implemented by the reserve components with enlisted medical shortages, could help reduce critically short skills such as licensed practical nurses; respiratory therapists; biomedical equipment repairmen; and operating room, pharmacy, dental, X-ray, and laboratory technicians.


Much military medical training is conducted during annual training. Some of the most valuable training occurs during medical readiness exercises both within the continental U.S. and at overseas locations. Various levels of involvement are scheduled for joint or single service active and reserve component participation. Approximately 1,200 members of the Army, Navy, and Air Force active and reserve

components took part in PATRIOT SPIRIT, a large aeromedical evacuation exercise conducted by the 4th Air Force (an Air Force Reserve Command) at bases in Washington State. The exercise was primarily a medical evacuation test for Air Force Reserve units which will be assigned to the Military Airlift Command upon mobilization.

National Guard and Reserve elements from the Army and Air Force have received valuable training in Central and South America in support of U.S. Southern Command's (SOUTHCOM) humanitarian medical efforts. In addition to practicing field medicine in several countries, the Army has a Field Medical Training Site (FMTS) in Panama operated by National Guard and Reserve full-time personnel. Necessary medical equipment is stored and maintained at the site. The FMTS serves as a logistical and administrative base for medical units deploying to SOUTHCOM to support regional missions or medical operations along with host country forces. The FMTS concept is an excellent training method to test deployment, readiness, and



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medical care capabilities while operating in an austere environment.

In the United States, reserve component medical units often conduct training under locally negotiated agreements at other services' medical facilities, Veterans Administration health care centers, and civilian medical facilities. By giving a local medical unit commander the flexibility to negotiate local agreements, the system remains responsive to the needs of the unit and the community. Actual medical treatment is furnished by properly credentialed reserve component health care professionals at such facilities.

Military health care personnel must be ready to manage mass casualties and treat traumatic wounds caused by war and disabling diseases often found in war zones. Although medical doctors are highly skilled in their areas of expertise, they may not be prepared to treat the types of injuries they may face if war should occur.

As they have in the past, many civilian doctors are expected to volunteer, if needed in the future, to

serve in the military. However, in their civilian occupations, they rarely have to evaluate mass casualties and treat the diversity of wounds that would be found in a battlefield environment. Some emergency room trauma surgeons treat severe injuries regularly. Even if all these personnel should join the military, mobilization medical needs would not be satisfied. Methods must be developed to permit National Guard and Reserve medical personnel to systematically improve their combat-related surgical and clinical skills. The talents of these individuals must be challenged in as realistic environment as possible so that they are prepared for national emergencies. Such programs would also aid in the recruiting and retention of medical personnel.

Because the Joint Medical Readiness Training Center has not been able to fill the reserve components' seats annually allocated to the Combat Casualty Care Course, a mobile medical training team (MMTT) was developed to take the course to reserve component physicians in local National Guard and Reserve units throughout the country. Within the first year of operation, FY 1987, the



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MMTT trained 480 medical corps officers. The MMTT furnishes instruction, nonexpendable supplies, all expendable supplies on a reimbursable basis, student and instructor manuals, laboratory subjects, and certification materials. Student National Guard and Reserve physicians completing the course receive Advanced Trauma Life Support certification and recognition from the American College of Surgeons.

A correspondence course has been prepared to train non-medical personnel to perform emergency care as a secondary mission when their combat missions allow. The Combat Lifesaver Correspondence Course is available from the Army's Institute for Professional Development. Commanders should encourage groups of personnel in their units to take this course to handle combat casualties when other medically trained personnel are not available. The course should not, however, be substituted for other mission essential training.

## **Medical Equipment**

### **Deployable Medical Systems**

The Department of Defense has standardized the field type hospital equipment for all of the services. The equipment consists of standard modules such as operating rooms, laboratories, X-ray facilities, and patient wards and is called Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS). The equipment can be configured to varying types or sizes of hospital units as required. DEPMEDS meets all Department of Defense transportability requirements and can be erected rapidly. It will be used by the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The system contains the latest

medical technology, expendable supplies, and major non-medical support equipment. Procurement and use of DEPMEDS will eliminate serious shortages of field medical equipment in certain hospital units. Funding plans for purchasing DEPMEDS sets should be made a high priority to ensure adequacy of field hospitals in operational theaters and to increase the numbers of hospital beds in the Total Force.

The Army is the only service providing the sets to their reserve components. One Army Reserve unit received DEPMEDS in FY 1987. By the end of FY 1993, 94 sets will be in the Army Reserve and 25 will be in the Army National Guard. In peacetime, portions of the DEPMEDS set will be available to each unit for training under the Minimum Essential Equipment for Training (MEET) program. Each DEPMEDS unit currently receives two



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weeks of new equipment training at the Academy of Health Sciences DEPAMEDS training site at Camp Bullis, Texas, in conjunction with the issue of their MEET.

As DEPAMEDS are produced, complete sets will be made available for new equipment training and sustainment training at regional training sites in each of the five continental U.S. Army areas and at two separate National Guard locations. DEPAMEDS units will then be scheduled to train every two or three years, with a full hospital set, at these locations.

The Naval Reserve will not receive any DEPAMEDS sets but will be trained to use the equipment. Twenty fleet hospitals are being established and equipped with DEPAMEDS. Eleven of these will be staffed by the Selected Reserve and one by the Individual Ready Reserve. The equipment and supplies for the hospitals are to be purchased, assembled, and provided as prepositioned war reserve stocks and will not be considered reserve component equipment. Naval Reserve units are being established coincident with the DEPAMEDS procurement

schedule and will commence training with a training set prior to the availability of all the DEPAMEDS equipment.

The Marine Corps Reserve will only use components of the DEPAMEDS sets for their medical support. All DEPAMEDS in the Air Force are in the active component. Coast Guard medical facilities are all outpatient units with no need for DEPAMEDS equipment sets. When transferred from the Department of Transportation for wartime employment, medical care for the Coast Guard will be provided by the Navy Department.

### Other Medical Equipment

Medical equipment shortages, other than DEPAMEDS, for reserve component medical units, varies widely between the services. The Naval and Air Force Reserves report that all units with medical equipment requirements are adequately outfitted. The majority of Air National Guard medical units deploy without equipment. The exceptions are 10 aeromedical evacuation units which recently have been authorized personnel and equipment for aeromedical staging facilities, evacuation liaison teams, and evacuation control centers. These units are tasked to deploy with equipment which has not yet been obtained. Shortages include radios, generators, and medical equipment. The Marine Corps Reserve lacks only one piece of medical equipment, a sterilizer, but is short medical support equipment such as tentage, ambulances and other wheeled vehicles, and tool kits.

The Army's reserve components have major shortages in medical equipment sets, air and ground ambulance medical

sets, dental sets, laboratory sets, X-ray sets, chemical agent patient treatment and decontamination sets, and high-speed sterilizers. Much of this equipment is programmed for purchase. However, there is a 24-36 month lag between funding and issue to units due to order backlogs at supply depots.

Major non-medical equipment shortages which impact severely on medical unit operational capabilities of the Army National Guard and Reserve include radios and their installation kits, 5-ton trucks, water trailers, and forklifts. Without such support equipment, the organic mobility of medical units will be adversely impacted. These shortages degrade the ability of medical units to accomplish their full wartime mission. The result could be increased morbidity rates, especially in a chemical environment.

### **Health Care Protection for Members of the Reserve Components**

On November 14, 1986, the President signed into law the Armed Forces

Reserve Health Care Benefits Act, PL 99-661, Sec 604. This law amends existing statutes and provides increased benefits to reserve component personnel who are injured or who incur or aggravate a disease while participating in training or training-related travel. Modifications to the old law were made in the areas of medical and dental care, pay and allowances for disabled personnel (incapacitation pay), inactive duty pay, disability retirement (including separation and temporary disability retired list), and death benefits. The amendments in the act apply to reserve component personnel who incur or aggravate an injury, illness, disease, or die after November 14, 1986.

The new law provides protection for National Guard and Reserve personnel participating in physical fitness training and 40-and-over cardiovascular screening programs. There had been inadequate protection under the old law when National Guardsmen or Reservists became temporarily or permanently disabled as a result of participation in these activities. The primary concern



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centered around entitlement to incapacitation pay and disability retirement or separation for reserve component personnel, who incur or aggravate an injury or disease, while participating in physical fitness training or cardiovascular screening. These gaps in coverage have been eliminated. Efforts to modify the Department of Defense military pay and allowances entitlements manual to reflect these changes have been initiated by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

### **Physical Fitness**

The importance of physical fitness to mobilization readiness has been addressed in the Training and Mobilization Chapter. Part of the physical fitness assessment is medical evaluation to ensure that an individual will be able to perform under the stress of an operational environment. The average age of reserve component personnel is higher for most skills than active component counterparts.

The Army requires cardiovascular testing of all soldiers, regardless of

component, who are over 40 years old prior to their taking the Army Physical Readiness Test. In most cases, screening is done during normal periodic physical exams or under contract. Some priority groups may be screened out of the normal examination cycle. National Guardsmen and Reservists found at risk, as a result of the initial testing, are given a stress test and, if needed, a definitive diagnostic evaluation. If an individual is recommended for medical or surgical treatment as a result of this last test, it will be at the reserve



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component member's own expense since they are not eligible for health care benefits as is an active component soldier. Actions to eliminate a National Guardsman or Reservist from the service will commence only if they reject evaluation or treatment or are subsequently found to not meet retention standards. The other services do not have specific cardiovascular screening for physical readiness programs. Questionnaires, routine physical examinations, and physical fitness tests are used to determine compliance with minimal acceptable physical standards.

### **Human Immunodeficiency Virus Policy**


The Board is concerned about the mission readiness impact of members in the reserve components who test positive for the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Individuals who test positive for HIV are not deployable.

The active components can reassign non-deployable individuals anywhere within the continental United States to meet operational needs of the service. An HIV positive person can be evaluated and reevaluated as necessary, can be medically discharged, and can be granted eligibility for disability compensation and continued medical care from the Veterans Administration.


The reserve components, however, are geographically constrained in reassignments by where the individual lives; must place the financial burden of further HIV-related medical evaluations on the reserve component member because they are not military health care beneficiaries; and cannot grant



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eligibility for disability compensation or Veterans Administration care (unless otherwise qualified). The Board believes these disparities require that separate policies be adopted for the active and reserve components.

At its September meeting, the Board reviewed and discussed the Department of Defense HIV policy and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense the following:

"Once again the Reserve Forces Policy Board (Board) strongly recommends to the Secretary of Defense, as DoD policy, that members of the Ready Reserve tested and determined to be HIV positive, if not discharged, be transferred to the Standby Reserve (Inactive Status List). The Board further recommends that DoD policy permit such individuals, at their request, to be permanently discharged (thereby terminating any remaining military service obligation).

"Some reasons for these recommendations follow. Current military regulations, as well as disparate State Public Health Laws make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to maintain required

confidentiality when a member of the reserve components tests HIV positive. Once tested positive, the service member is no longer deployable. Reserve component members, unlike the active components, who test HIV positive, are ineligible for military medical treatment. Finally, there is considerable concern about whether these members could ever be called to active duty upon mobilization."

### **Dental Panoramic Radiographs**

An effective means of identifying casualties is through the use of dental panoramic radiographs—a film record of teeth. Because of the potential loss of panoramic radiographs in high risk situations such as combat, national disasters, terrorist attacks, or when records are being transferred, it is necessary to maintain duplicate radiographs. In order to locate, catalogue, and store these films, the Department of Defense established a Central Panoramic Storage Facility (CPSF) where all members of all components of the armed forces will eventually have a radiograph on record. A copy is also to be retained in individual health records.

Approximately 97 percent of Selected Marine Corps Reserve members have panoramic radiographs in their dental records. Fifteen to 20 percent of these have been duplicated. Seventy-four percent of Army National Guard members had at least one film in their dental record at the end of the fiscal year. Again, only about 15 percent of these are on file at the CPSF. Initial problems with acceptance by the CPSF (because service members were not enrolled under the Defense Enrollment

Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)) have caused many radiographs to be returned to units. These problems are being resolved.

Air National Guard members' radiographs are retained in the individual's dental records. Approximately 40 percent of their personnel have had the panoramic radiographs taken. The Air Force Reserve is currently developing plans for implementing the radiograph duplication and storage program for its units and members. Although approximately 18 percent have the films in their individual records, duplicates have not been forwarded to the CPSF.

Radiographs have been completed for 65 percent of Naval Reserve priority manning units (Air, Seabee, and Naval Reserve Force Ships). All units and IRR members should have completed radiographs by the end of FY 1988. Storage of the films at the CPSF is to commence in FY 1988.

The Coast Guard Reserve currently does not perform dental panoramic radiographs for its members but is developing a plan that will bring reservists into the program when the Coast Guard Reserve fully participates in DEERS.

Members in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and Inactive National Guard are also required to have the radiographs in their records. However, because of current storage issues, Selected Reserve members have priority. Army Reserve IRR members' films are currently maintained at the Army Reserve Personnel Center.

Enrollment in DEERS is important to members of the National Guard and

Reserve for many reasons. It is highlighted here by the problems of storing and filing duplicate dental panoramic radiographs. Resources should be dedicated to enrollment of National Guard and Reserve personnel in DEERS.

### **Medical Evacuation**

Much of the medical evacuation capability of the Department of Defense is within the reserve components. Of the 1,427 medical evacuation crews in the department, 73 percent are in the National Guard and Reserve. These figures encompass dedicated crews for ground and helicopter ambulance units as well as crews on Air Force aeroevacuation aircraft. They do not include air and ground vehicle non-medical assets which will be used in combat as necessary. Table 36 provides information on the percentages of total medical evacuation crews which are in the reserve components. The Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard do not have medical evacuation crews.



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**Table 36  
MEDICAL EVACUATION CREWS  
IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS**

		FY 1981	FY 1986	FY 1987	Proj FY 1988
Army	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	506	524	530	542
National Guard	MEDEVAC Crews	196	208	208	208
	Percent of Total Crews	39%	40%	39%	38%
Reserve	MEDEVAC Crews	114	114	114	126
	Percent of Total Crews	23%	22%	22%	23%
	RC Percent of Army MEDEVAC Crews	61%	61%	61%	62%
Navy <sup>1</sup>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	135	135	135	135
Air Force	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	536	738	762	775
National Guard <sup>2</sup>	MEDEVAC Crews	134	146	182	195
	Percent of Total Crews	25%	20%	24%	25%
Reserve	MEDEVAC Crews	352	542	530	530
	Percent of Total Crews	66%	73%	70%	68%
	RC Percent of Air Force MEDEVAC Crews	91%	93%	93%	94%
Total DOD <sup>3</sup>	Total # MEDEVAC Crews	1177	1397	1427	1452
	Total # RC MEDEVAC Crews	796	1010	1034	1059
	RC Percent of Total DOD Crews	68%	72%	73%	73%

Notes: 1. There are no MEDEVAC crews in the Naval or Marine Corps Reserves.  
2. Ground crews only — no aircrews dedicated to MEDEVAC.  
3. Coast Guard has no MEDEVAC crews.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987.

### Hospital Ships

Two Navy hospital ships have been outfitted with the latest in medical technology to provide emergency surgical care to wartime casualties. The *MERCY* has been delivered and, in 1987, completed an operational tour in the Pacific area. The ship made several port calls in the Philippines where it provided medical and dental services to

more than 62,300 patients. Approximately 1,250 patients were seen on an average day. The Dental Department alone cared for almost 25 percent of the patients seen during the humanitarian cruise.

On the *MERCY*'s tour, members of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve had the opportunity to work beside other services' active component

and Naval Reserve personnel. Several of the reserve component personnel remained with the ship for the entire mission while others rotated on and off the ship for annual training periods. This opportunity provided excellent interservice training on modern equipment in an environment dissimilar to United States' culture. The patient load and disease or illnesses seen were unique and offered an unusual experience for professional development. Other reserve components are prepared to send medical personnel on future tours of the MERCY or the second hospital ship, the COMFORT, when it is ready for operational missions.


#### **Summary**

Considerable progress has been made, within the Department of Defense, towards increasing the quality of health care and the capability to provide adequate medical care for casualties of future conflicts. Long-term problems in


manning, training, and equipping medical units in the reserve components have been recognized and programs undertaken to reduce the near term impact.

Significant effort has been devoted to recruiting and retaining health care personnel. A variety of incentives are available which encourage those in the medical professions to join and stay with a National Guard or Reserve unit. Training opportunities within the United States and overseas have increased and additional programs have been created to allow flexibility for the professional development of medical personnel. Medical exercises are realistic and provide excellent training in medical and medical evacuation skills. Many dollars have been devoted to resolving mission-debilitating equipment shortages in medical units. Procurement of and training with Deployable Medical System (DEPMEDS) sets as scheduled will greatly enhance mobilization medical readiness. (U)






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## Facilities **6**


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*"The resources provided in the defense budget are the vital link between our military strategy and the forces we must develop and field to implement that strategy."*

*Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense*



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## General

The reserve components are a cost-effective means of providing a significant share of the nation's defense. In recent years, the National Guard and Reserve have been given increased responsibilities. Facility construction, maintenance, and repair have not been keeping pace with these additional missions, responsibilities, and force structure changes. As a result, there have been significant increases in backlogs of construction projects. This is due to inadequate appropriations and long lead times required for design, contracting, and construction. To meet the facilities requirements of the expanded reserve components, increases are needed in appropriations for military construction and real property maintenance. Construction and maintenance and repair backlogs need to be eliminated.

Adequate facilities contribute to the readiness of the reserve components. Training area and building space limitations impair the ability of many

National Guard and Reserve units to meet readiness goals. Sufficient training space is needed for both individual and unit training with modern equipment so that reserve component units are ready to rapidly mobilize and deploy to meet theater operational plans.

Urban encroachment, on previously remote National Guard and Reserve facilities, is another area that is adversely affecting reserve component training.

## Reserve Component Facilities

There are more than 5,000 separate installations where facilities are managed by the reserve components. Many are also used by the reserve components of other services and the active components. Multi-service use, generally at remote National Guard and Reserve Centers, and at air facilities, provides economical facility usage requiring joint service coordination. A high percentage of Navy Department facilities are jointly used by the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve. Of the 10 air bases operated



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by the Air Force Reserve, seven are shared with Air National Guard, Naval Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve units.

### **Inadequacy of Facilities**


Adequate facilities are important to the effective training and mobilization readiness of the reserve components. Military construction funding of new and expanded facilities is necessary each year but is often deferred in annual appropriations. Therefore, the average age of facilities continues to increase. There is a point when deterioration becomes very difficult to overcome. Safety also becomes a concern when aging facilities continue to be used without adequate maintenance or repair.

Deterioration of National Guard and Reserve facilities has continued despite maintenance efforts. This is due to the nature of the material used, needs at the time of construction, and methods of original construction. Many of the facilities were not designed for their current use. They were built during World War II as temporary structures, but are still used for storage of equipment, maintenance, training, and administration of the reserve components.

Many existing facilities are old, energy inefficient, and inadequate. They were designed to support units with fewer personnel and less equipment. Many facilities need new construction, rehabilitation, expansion, or a combination of the above, to support personnel and equipment increases. Meeting these needs should result in increased morale, retention, better training, and increased readiness.



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
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Additional personnel strength, and increases in both the amount and types of equipment provided to the reserve components, require constant evaluation of the adequacy of the physical plants. The wooden buildings of World War II vintage have outlived their designed life expectancy and now create fire and safety hazards. Alterations to the buildings to accommodate changes in mission or equipment are not practical. Table 37 displays estimates by the reserve components of inadequate facilities.



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**Table 37**  
**SERVICE ESTIMATES OF INADEQUATE FACILITIES**



Source: Individual reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1987.

### **Mobilization Facilities**

Most Army reserve component units are programmed to report to mobilization stations, following mobilization at home stations, so that cross leveling of personnel and equipment can be accomplished. Any additional training required prior to deployment is also conducted at the mobilization station. Most mobilization stations have provided for sufficient billeting for the personnel to be processed through that site. However, additional attention needs to be given to ensure that proper training facilities are available for units planned for mobilization sites. If a unit is scheduled to a mobilization site, there should be adequate space for that unit to train

while other units stationed at the site are also training. Mobilization and deployment cannot be timely if units and personnel are unable to train due to the lack of facilities.

### **Equipment Storage Facilities**

Storage facilities are important not only for access to equipment, but also for security of increased numbers and sizes of equipment items being distributed to the reserve components. Adequate, all-weather storage and maintenance areas are necessary to ensure equipment will be operable when needed. Adequate storage facilities enable the reserve components to better protect equipment investments.

Currently, because of inadequate space in a unit's geographical area, covered storage often must be dispersed over a wide area. This makes the materiel less available for units on their weekend drills—either for use operationally or for routine maintenance.

Lack of adequate, nearby storage or maintenance facilities for equipment often leads to rapid deterioration and reduced availability of equipment. This, in turn, has an adverse impact upon training and mobilization capabilities. Although the services have requested funds to reduce construction, as well as maintenance and repair backlogs, these requests have not been fully funded.

### **Small Arms Firing Ranges**

Marksmanship training is vital to the readiness of the force. Small arms firing ranges are generally inadequate to meet training requirements of the reserve components. Facilities are needed to provide year-round, all-weather training in order to enhance marksmanship skills in the limited time available during drill and annual training periods.

Many existing ranges have been closed because they no longer meet safety, environmental, or health standards and regulations. Funds have not been appropriated for repairs required to bring the ranges up to standard. The National Guard Bureau has initiated a study which will detail the cost of refurbishing National Guard ranges which are still required.

The reserve components are attempting to counter this problem, while maintaining marksmanship proficiency, by expending scarce time

and funds for transportation to distant range facilities. Scheduled training at these distant ranges may often be cancelled or postponed due to unforeseen conflicts. Reduced overall unit readiness can result.

Alternatives such as more sharing of ranges by the services, video interactive gunnery systems, indoor simulated marksmanship training systems, air pistols, and commercially available mobile range vans are being studied. These vans contain ranges, set up in a self-contained semi-trailer, which allow three personnel to shoot and qualify on individual weapons. The ranges are



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


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
especially designed for low velocity weapons. Vans may be moved to a parking lot at a drill site, provide opportunities for training, and move on to other sites. If more widely used by the reserve components, they will provide more opportunities for proficiency training at a greater number of centers. The National Guard and Reserve continue to search for ways to provide marksmanship training in less costly, environmentally sound facilities.

### **Encroachments on Training Land and Spaces**

Use of reserve component training areas, near civilian communities, has led to noise complaints from the civilian sector. Noise, at night and on weekends when much training is conducted, sometimes irritates home-owners and businesses adjacent to training areas. Artillery firing, convoy movement, and aircraft operations are some examples of training which has had to be curtailed due to noise complaints, even at facilities that have been in use since World War II.



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Availability of adjacent land for expansion of military facilities is limited due to civilian encroachment, even in areas previously thought to be remote. Expansion of base areas is often required to accommodate additional, new, or larger equipment; to provide training areas for personnel augmenting current units; or for new units assigned to the site. Operating areas and parking aprons for larger military aircraft or for expanded "clear zones" at the end of runways may not now be available due to civilian encroachment problems. Commercial expansion on sites shared with air units has forced relocation of some Air National Guard units.

These encroachments are a natural consequence of growth in areas which were originally selected for reserve component units due to accessibility to recruiting markets. Relocation of reserve component training facilities to more remote areas will require increased funds for personnel accommodations and training facilities. Relocation may also act as a disincentive for recruiting and retention.

Civilian developments near reserve component training spaces and facilities have sometimes strained military community relations. Property exchanges have been successfully negotiated, with some local governments, which allow relocation of National Guard and Reserve units to other adequate locations and facilities. In other cases relocation may be prohibitive, inefficient, or impractical.

The overall image and public perception of the reserve components often hinges on how such operations are conducted and how they affect the community and surrounding areas.

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
RESERVE COMPONENT PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1987(U)  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER RESERVE  
AFFAIRS/LOGISTICS) WASHINGTON 1987


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effort must be made to attain and maintain a positive image of the National Guard and Reserve. The reserve components must be able to accommodate basing and training needs near population centers, so that recruiting and retention goals can be met. Members of the reserve components must make every effort to educate the civilian community to this vital national security requirement.

### **Leased Facilities**

To reduce overcrowding of owned facilities, the Army Reserve now leases in excess of 450 facilities while awaiting funding for physical plant construction or expansion. Short term solutions, such as leased facilities, have provided facilities for the reserve components, but often at the expense of operation and maintenance funds. Acquisition of some of the facilities that are under lease/purchase agreements would shift the source of funds utilized and reduce future drains, thus freeing these funds for other purposes. Short term leasing of facilities or space may answer emergency needs, but it does not place the property fully under the service's control. Additional security personnel may be required. Paying for this security reduces funds for other operational needs. Short term leasing should be followed with permanent construction or long term leasing of facilities.

### **Reserve Component Military Construction Budget**

Table 38 shows that significant increases in military construction appropriations for the reserve components have been approved by Congress in recent years. However, the



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construction backlog continues to increase and has nearly doubled since FY 1985, when it was \$3.4 billion. Military construction supports new and expanded missions, unit relocations, additional force structure, and a wide variety of equipment additions and changes. The need for added facilities has increased faster than can be provided with appropriated funds. Funds committed to reduction of the construction backlog declined approximately 38 percent during FY 1987.

Similarly, funds from reserve components' operation and maintenance accounts committed to the backlog for maintenance and repair have been reduced by diversion to current operational and training needs. The deferral of maintenance and repair on facilities makes this work more expensive in the future, and facilities further deteriorate.



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**Table 38**  
**CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE & REPAIR FUNDING**  
**(Millions of Dollars)**

	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 86</u>	<u>FY 87</u>	<u>FY 88</u>
Guard/Reserve MilCon Request	206.7	428.6	456.1	579.3
Guard/Reserve MilCon Appropriations	233.5	370.5	482.3	583.8
Construction Backlog Cost at End FY	2,500.0	5,400.0	6,700.0	*
Funds Committed to Backlog Construction	*	259.41	160.0	229.4
Funds Committed to Backlog of Maint/Rep	*	129.4	30.0	42.3

\*Unknown in that year.

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Data as of September 30, 1987.

Probably the most critical facilities issue affecting the readiness of the reserve components is the increasing number of unfunded construction projects. Funding for military construction has been reduced in recent years, for various reasons, to include the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act. Funding reductions have caused some programmed projects to be deferred, thus increasing the backlog of unfunded projects. In some cases, projects have been added beyond those requested by the Department of Defense causing other programmed and necessary projects to be postponed. As

a result, design and construction costs are increased for many projects.

Use of funds for facilities to meet new or expanded reserve component missions has, at times, taken funds that might have been used to reduce the construction backlog. The addition of equipment to the reserve components often stresses facilities for storage, maintenance, and training. Unit training and equipment maintenance are adversely affected by crowded and deteriorating facilities. Ultimately, this affects the readiness of the reserve component forces. The services have



attempted to anticipate needs with construction programs for required facilities. However, the backlog is increasing as funds for construction have not been appropriated along with the shift in missions and equipment. At the end of FY 1987, the backlog for construction alone approached \$6.7 billion.

As the backlogs continue to grow, added emphasis must be placed on overcoming the shortfall to assure that the investment in equipment and personnel is not wasted. Adequate facilities for storage, maintenance, and training are required.

The biennial budget should enhance earlier execution of military construction projects and increase buying power. It forces advanced planning and ensures earlier design completion and construction contract awards. It aids in the packaging of design and construction projects. This reduces cost estimates, with the effect of increasing buying power with limited appropriations. However, if biennial budgets are adopted, there must be sufficient flexibility to allow changes in either cost, priority, or design, if adjustments become necessary in the second year.

The Board recognizes that the construction backlog will not be eliminated in any single Department of Defense budget request but recommends that Congress appropriate sufficient funds annually to reduce, rather than allow continual growth of, the backlog in construction. This funding, however, should not reduce appropriations for other newly requested construction projects, which may enhance the readiness of the force.

The Board recommends that the reduction of maintenance and repair backlogs of reserve component facilities be given higher priority in service budget requests. Congress should consider special appropriations to reduce these backlogs to assist in unit mobilization readiness.

### Construction Projects


During FY 1987, many facilities were added to the reserve components. They provide safer environments in which reservists work, operate, and train. Some



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new facilities provide storage space for the increasing amount of equipment being provided to the National Guard and Reserve. Other facilities will be used for training and administration of the reserve components. The following are examples of new and planned facilities.

The Army National Guard constructed storage facilities for increased quantities and sizes of equipment. Much of the materiel is bulky. Approximately 40,000 camouflage nets (screens) were issued to the Army National Guard in FY 1987. Screens issued to date amount to only about 65 percent of the total requirement of more than 180,000. Other examples of bulky materiel needing storage are cold weather and chemical defense equipment. Previously

allocated funds, although insufficient, are being utilized to acquire unheated metal buildings to meet some of the storage requirements for these items.

Construction projects for FY 1987 and FY 1988 include Automatic Record and Field Fire Ranges and Regional Training Sites-Maintenance. These are critically important to the training of the Army National Guard.

The Army Reserve is converting several facilities into headquarters, schools, and indoor storage and maintenance sites. Also, ground is being paved to provide for open equipment storage parks. Short term leasing of space is being utilized to meet emergency storage requirements.

In FY 1987, Army Reserve construction projects were completed at 18 locations in 13 states and the Territory of Guam. Scheduled for completion in FY 1988 are several projects, including an Armed Forces Reserve Center in Arkansas which will be shared by 15 Army Reserve units as well as Naval and Marine Corps Reserve units. Tactical training, for reserve component personnel in Army combat electronic warfare and intelligence units, will be provided at a new military intelligence training facility, in the Fifth U.S. Army area. Reservists will be able to train at the new facility using state-of-the-art equipment which is not available at their home station.

Temporary buildings, and portions of inadequate facilities, continue to be used by the Navy to meet equipment maintenance and storage needs. More appropriate facilities are programmed for construction in FY 1991. A hangar and maintenance support facility will be

constructed in FY 1991, for a squadron due to receive new aircraft in FY 1992.

Naval Reserve military construction projects completed in FY 1987 include: approach lighting systems installed at Naval air stations; training, administration, maintenance, and storage spaces; and an air passenger terminal. Several of the upgraded Naval air stations are used by the other reserve components and U.S. Customs for aviation operations.


The Marine Corps Reserve and the active component receive modern equipment simultaneously. Plans are made for storage and maintenance facilities early in the acquisition cycle. Some warehouse space has been acquired to provide increased and improved storage capabilities.

In addition to improvements to reserve centers shared with other services, military construction projects accomplished by the Navy for the Marine Corps Reserve included: a

logistics building, an addition to an aircraft parking apron and taxiway, and replacement of a hangar. Several of these projects will eliminate fire or safety hazards on the ground and in the clear zone at the end of runways.

As equipment changes have been made in the reserve components of the Air Force, necessary facility changes have not kept pace. New equipment requires modification or replacement of existing facilities to accommodate new or additional aircraft. Because of transfers from the active component, the time required to accomplish changes in facilities is often longer than the time required to receive the equipment.

During FY 1987, Air National Guard construction projects completed included: a combined engineering maintenance and telecommunications facility, maintenance hangar alterations, and a munitions maintenance and storage facility. Projects planned for the next two years include a jet fuel storage complex, and major additions at



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Stewart International Airport, Newburgh, New York. The Stewart project includes a maintenance hangar and a composite operational training facility. The Marine Corps Reserve is also providing funds, through the Navy Department, for improvements and joint usage at the Stewart facility.

In FY 1987, Air Force Reserve projects completed included: an avionics shop, a fuel system operations and maintenance shop, and a hangar. Over the next two years, the Air Force Reserve plans major additions and improvements to facilities at Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

Because appropriated funds are used only to meet current fiscal year needs, neither the Air National Guard nor the Air Force Reserve has directed any funds towards reduction of their backlog in military construction.

The Coast Guard has limited equipment assigned to its reserve

component, and recently identified its need to acquire some minimal amount of equipment to have available for mobilization. The Coast Guard Reserve currently utilizes active component equipment for training purposes. Storage and maintenance of equipment to be dedicated to the reserve component will require additional funding for facilities.

The Board recommends that military construction appropriations for the National Guard and Reserve be increased to more adequately address the requirements of the reserve components.

### **Summary and Recommendations**

National Guard and Reserve facilities are woefully inadequate. A number of facilities were built many years ago and are difficult and inefficient to maintain. Some are unsafe. They are inadequate

for storing and maintaining modern equipment being received by the reserve components.

Urban development has encroached upon reserve component facilities and training areas, precluding expansion to meet new missions. Improvement and expansion of National Guard and Reserve facilities are necessary for the continued readiness of the Total Force.

The reserve components continue to maintain existing facilities, and to develop initiatives to meet storage and maintenance requirements for their equipment.

The Board recommends:

- give higher priority in service budget requests to reduction of maintenance and repair backlogs of reserve component facilities.
  - increase military construction appropriations for the National Guard and Reserve to keep pace with the increasing roles and responsibilities to the reserve components. (U)
- Congress appropriate sufficient funds annually to reduce, rather than allow continual growth of, the backlog in construction.




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
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## Budget **7**


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*"Let me be clear where I stand on funding for the Department of Defense . . . we need the resources to meet the threat, and that should be the criterion . . . We must see that our fighting men and women continue to receive the support and the quality of life that they deserve."*

*Honorable Frank C. Carlucci  
Secretary of Defense*



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### **General**

In this decade, with Congressional and public support, defense capabilities have increased in both the active and reserve components with the implementation of the Total Force policy and new strategic and tactical doctrine. Priorities have been reoriented to wartime needs. Although the threat to peace has not changed significantly, defense budget reductions in real terms have occurred over the last two years and this trend is likely to continue. Resources must be provided for sufficient capabilities to ensure that the Total Force can maintain peace and fulfill national security objectives.

### **Reserve Component Appropriations**

Overall, annual appropriations for the reserve components have increased from FY 1980. Correspondingly, the capabilities of the National Guard and Reserve have increased dramatically in the past seven years. However, in FY 1987, all reserve component Personnel accounts, except the Naval Reserve,

decreased from the previous year. This was caused by a recomputation of the formula for retired pay accrual, and represents no reduction to programs. Reserve component Operation and Maintenance and Military Construction accounts increased in the fiscal year.

Appropriations have allowed for growth in personnel end-strengths and for increased schooling and training opportunities. Increased funds have been provided for operations, maintenance, repair, and minor construction at reserve component training facilities. Funding for major construction has also increased yet remains inadequate for facility needs. Coast Guard Reserve appropriations, historically, have not included military construction or mobilization equipment procurement. The Coast Guard has requested FY 1989 funding for their reserve to support establishing limited training equipment allowances that can also be used upon mobilization.

The increased appropriations in the recent years have significantly improved the mobilization capabilities of the Selected and Individual Ready Reserve. A breakout of funds for each of the reserve components is shown in Table 39.



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
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**Table 39**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT APPROPRIATIONS**  
**(Dollars in Thousands)**

		FY 1980 <sup>1</sup>	FY 1985 <sup>1</sup>	FY 1986 <sup>2</sup>	FY 1987 <sup>3</sup>	FY 1988 <sup>4</sup>
Army National Guard	Personnel	917.4	2866.4	3161.7	3088.9	3196.4
	Operation and Maintenance	840.0	1431.9	1566.3	1799.8	1856.5
	Military Construction	23.7	98.1	97.2	126.8	181.9
Army Reserve	Personnel	649.6	1966.7	2149.1	2115.3	2239.4
	Operation and Maintenance	439.7	731.4	740.9	777.1	857.5
	Military Construction	30.0	68.9	58.3	67.2	93.3
Naval Reserve	Personnel	267.7	1146.9	1329.3	1394.3	1496.5
	Operation and Maintenance	431.4	809.6	827.9	899.0	929.9
	Military Construction	12.3	49.8	30.9	53.4	72.5
Marine Corps Reserve	Personnel	96.1	269.9	283.1	278.0	292.2
	Operation and Maintenance	21.2	58.7	54.4	65.6	69.5
	Military Construction	6.0	11.0	8.9	20.0	0.0
Air National Guard	Personnel	299.5	885.2	974.3	948.4	976.9
	Operation and Maintenance	1282.7	1824.6	1723.3	1805.6	1958.1
	Military Construction	36.0	131.2	115.3	156.3	147.8
Air Force Reserve	Personnel	299.5	568.3	602.7	570.9	608.4
	Operation and Maintenance	511.4	877.9	857.4	929.7	1001.0
	Military Construction	12.0	66.5	59.9	52.1	77.3
Total DOD	Personnel	2529.8	7703.4	8500.2	8395.8	8809.8
	Operation and Maintenance	3526.4	5734.1	5770.2	6276.8	6672.5
	Military Construction	120.0	425.5	370.5	475.8	572.8
Coast Guard Reserve	Personnel	25.3	34.8	35.7	39.6	40.5
	Operation and Maintenance	17.6	25.0	23.2	26.0	25.8
	Military Construction	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Reserve Components	Personnel	2555.1	7738.2	8535.9	8435.4	8850.3
	Operation and Maintenance	3544.0	5759.1	5793.4	6302.8	6698.3
	Military Construction	120.0	425.5	370.5	475.8	572.8

Sources: 1. Five Year Defense Plan, dated May 12, 1986, and Coast Guard Reserve.  
 2. Reserve and Guard Programs Summary, OASD(C), February 1987.  
 3. FY 1987 DOD Obligational Availability and Obligations as of September 30, 1987.  
 4. FY 1988 DOD Appropriations Bill.

Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Operation and Maintenance Accounts**



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Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts are crucial to the readiness and sustainability of each of the reserve components. Much of the money in these accounts is designated for items such as civilian pay, contract facility operations, logistics support, and base utilities. Since these expenditures are fixed, any cuts taken in the O&M accounts must come from accounts such as training, schools, exercises, deployments, and equipment maintenance.

Funds for maintenance and repair of National Guard and Reserve facilities are also contained in reserve component O&M accounts. These funds are used to maintain facilities which directly relate to readiness. O&M funding shortages in the mid-to-late 1970s resulted in deteriorated facilities and large equipment and facilities maintenance backlogs for some reserve components. In spite of improved funding and Congressional actions during the early 1980s to correct this negative trend, current and future budget

constraints threaten to increase these deficiencies. Funding austerity in the O&M accounts adversely affects planned improvements in readiness and sustainability.

### **Pillars of Defense**

The four pillars of defense—readiness, force structure, modernization, and sustainability—are inextricably linked. Resource decisions affecting one impact the others. Financial investments in reserve components' force structure and modern equipment can produce effective warfighting capability only if readiness and sustainability programs are functioning well.


Resources should first be allocated to readiness of the existing force to ensure that it is properly manned, equipped, and trained to present an effective deterrent. Continuing emphasis must be focused on the readiness of early-deploying units. Reduced budgets for the reserve components may force the services to adopt a policy of increasing the readiness and capabilities of high priority, early-deploying units at the expense of late-deploying elements. If a unit is not programmed in the Five Year Defense Plan to improve significantly in their equipment, manning, and training status, there should be a careful evaluation to determine if that unit should remain in the force structure at this time. The dollars committed to that unit may be better used by a higher priority unit to ensure its mobilization readiness.

National Guard and Reserve force structure changes — with the accompanying requirements for equipment, personnel, and funding for

training a new unit — should be limited in a period of constrained budgets. Slowing force structure changes will ameliorate the impact of the constrained resources on readiness and sustainability of the remainder of the force.

Funds committed to reserve component forces' equipment and force structure modernization have increased dramatically in recent years. Modernization has added immense value to the contribution of the National Guard and Reserve to national security.

Modernization, in many units, is attributable to the "first-to-fight, first-to-equip" policy adopted in 1982. New tanks, aircraft, ships, smaller weapons systems, and support systems such as hospitals, trucks, kitchens, and generator sets have been added to National Guard and Reserve units to make them a more effective part of the Total Force.



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Table 40 displays funds which have been designated for force modernization programs since FY 1983. These and other force modernization programs need to continue to be funded in order to sustain and increase the warfighting capability of the National Guard and Reserve.

**Table 40**  
**FORCE MODERNIZATION FUNDS**  
**(Millions of Dollars)**

	<u>FY 1984</u>	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Army National Guard	39.0	107.0	119.0	159.0
Army Reserve	6.1	10.4	11.2	21.1
Naval Reserve	169.0	269.0	422.0	389.0
Marine Corps Reserve	70.6	212.6	137.9	61.1
Air National Guard	173.0	85.0	115.0	157.0
Air Force Reserve	44.0	78.0	53.0	59.0
Total DOD	501.7	762.0	858.1	846.2

Source: Individual reserve components.  
Data as of September 30, 1987.



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### **Budget Reductions**

Budget reductions cause programs to be reduced in scope, eliminated, stretched out, or postponed (sometimes effectively eliminating them). Examples of areas affected by budget reductions on reserve component programs are:

- Reduction in Scope—manning and full-time support authorizations for selected units; numbers of school quotas; flying hours, ground vehicle hours, or steaming time for ships; support of recruiting and retention programs; aircraft crew ratios; size of the force; performance of required active duty for training; purchase of spare parts; funding for depot level maintenance; numbers of or involvement in training exercises.
- Elimination—construction projects for training, storage, administration, or maintenance; force structure activations; building up current units; procurement of hardware; joint or single-service exercises.
- Stretched out—procurement of hardware compatible with active

components; construction or repair of facilities or ranges; maintenance because of increasing age of equipment; purchasing power due to inflation.

- Postponed—deterrent and warfighting capability for future operations; professional development programs for military and civilian personnel; inter and intra-theater transportation; transfer of assets from active to reserve components; decreased purchasing power; delay of unit's initial operation capability; construction or repair projects; individual mobilization augmentee training programs; maintenance of hardware.

Budget reductions in reserve component appropriations are detrimental to planned force structure improvements, readiness training, and the capability to mobilize rapidly during a national emergency. Consecutive years' reductions make it increasingly difficult for National Guard and Reserve forces to increase their resources status when additional responsibilities are


being placed upon them. Appropriations must be adequate to accomplish assigned tasks. All budget accounts should not be uniformly reduced when mission and role shifts are occurring. When critically needed reserve component programs or projects are not properly funded, optimum training cannot be conducted and mobilization readiness is eventually degraded. Declining defense budgets may have a negative effect on the ability of the Total Force to provide necessary security for our country.

### **Coast Guard Budget**


The Board notes the unique nature of the Coast Guard and its reserve component. This service is inadequately funded to accomplish assigned missions. The Coast Guard is a multi-mission service which, in addition to its defense preparedness role, performs a number of peacetime roles connected to maritime safety and law enforcement. While only a small percentage of its budget is directly programmed for

defense operations, most units and facilities performing peacetime missions train for and have capabilities which support essential wartime tasking as well. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard's budget is considered along with other domestic programs within the Department of Transportation where national defense issues are not the highest priority. The Coast Guard budget should not have to depend on a bail-out by Department of Defense supplementation, as in recent years. It must be sufficient and stand on its own as long as the Coast Guard is under the Department of Transportation.

Statutory missions coupled with port security, surveillance and interdiction, Maritime Defense Zone missions, and other Navy support missions will severely task the Coast Guard active and reserve component forces in contingencies and wartime. The Coast Guard is not properly manned, equipped, trained, or funded to meet these wartime tasks. The identified mobilization day force requirement of



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65,500 cannot be met with today's authorized strength.

The Coast Guard Reserve has filled less than 50 percent of its mobilization personnel requirements while other reserve components have at least 90 percent of their requirements. Congress has authorized a Coast Guard Reserve of 14,000 personnel but appropriations in FY 1988 are only sufficient for 12,000. The Board recommends immediate attention to this disparity.

### **Biennial PPBS**

The Board anticipates that the biennial Planning, Programming and Budget System (PPBS)—under which the Department of Defense, based on Congressional guidance, is currently planning to operate—will allow for



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better examination of requirements during budget formulation, particularly in the funding levels of various programs from the first to the second year. Planning stability should result. Although supplemental budget submissions will always be required, some flexibility in budget execution when dealing with unit conversions, military construction projects, and program changes may be more difficult under the biennial PPBS.

If the Congress adopts the use of the biennial PPBS for Department of Defense programs, interface between the Department of Transportation's budget initiatives for the Coast Guard and Department of Defense's budget request may be further complicated. The needed improvement in the Coast Guard's overall military readiness depends in part on the coordination of Coast Guard and Navy PPBS efforts. The implementation of fundamentally different PPBS processes between the two departments requires increased coordination to ensure that the military readiness of the Coast Guard is not weakened.

A two-year defense budget (if authorized and appropriated) should increase the ability to schedule and conduct training at formal schools. This is important to the professional development and skill sustainment of National Guard and Reserve members. A stable two-year budget should also allow reserve component planners to have greater confidence in procurement programs for major weapon systems, equipment modernization, and unit conversion plans.



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### **Summary and Recommendations**

Proper funding must be available to ensure that reserve component units and personnel are properly equipped, trained, and supplied and that adequate facilities for maintenance and repair functions are available.

The Coast Guard Reserve budget is not adequate. Appropriations support less than half of the authorized manning of the Coast Guard Reserve.

The biennial PPBS—if adopted and monies appropriated for the two-year cycle—should provide planning stability that has not existed before. This should enhance readiness and mobilization capabilities of the reserve components. The biennial PPBS may create some

initial problems for the Coast Guard since the program applies only to the Department of Defense. Increased coordination will be required between the Coast Guard and Navy budget planners.

The Board recommends:

- Congress deliberate defense issues based on the threat against national security rather than on short term affordability of the Total Force.
- ensure that National Guard and Reserve budgets are adequate for additional missions and roles being assigned and that reserve component units are adequately equipped.
- base the Coast Guard budget on the realistic needs of the service to perform its mission. 🇺🇸



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# Readiness 8

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*"Preparedness is the key to success  
and victory."*

*General Douglas MacArthur*



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## General

Maintaining peace by deterring war is the primary goal of United States national strategy. Defense forces must be strong enough to deter potential aggressors and, failing that, to restore peace through victory on the battlefield. The Total Force must be prepared to successfully defend the vital interests of the United States, wherever required.

Although some problem areas remain, overall readiness levels and capabilities of many reserve component units have greatly improved in recent years. The Board believes that the reserve components are the best they have ever been, and when provided adequate resources, are capable of accomplishing wartime objectives.

## Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS)

FY 1987 was the first full year in which units reported status under Status of Resources and Training System,



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rather than under the Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) System. UNITREP ratings were erroneously viewed by some as a measure for unit readiness and/or capability when, in fact, the ratings only measured the status of a unit's resources and training. The major differences between the two reporting systems are:

- name change from UNITREP to SORTS.
- "combat ratings" changed to "category levels".
- "equipment readiness" changed to "equipment condition."
- deleted descriptive short titles (i.e., Fully Combat Ready, Not Combat Ready, etc.).
- redefined category levels 1 through 5.


SORTS was established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to provide uniform policy and criteria, for selected active and reserve component units, to report the level and condition of unit resources and the level of training. Each service develops its own implementing instructions, as to what should be reported, based on JCS policy. Units report four resource areas under SORTS—personnel, equipment and supplies on-hand, equipment condition, and training. An overall unit resource area, based only on resources organic to and training under the operational control of the reporting unit, is also provided.

Each resource area is assigned one of five category levels under SORTS. The levels are used primarily as a management tool and merely indicate a unit's peacetime status, at the time of

the report, relative to the wartime requirement. Category levels do not project a unit's combat capability once mobilized. Definitions of the category levels are:

- C-1—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-2—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-3—Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-4—Unit requires additional resources and/or training in order to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on-hand.
- C-5—Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared, at this time, to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.

The Navy Department uses "C" levels for its commissioned units and "R" ratings for its reinforcing/sustaining units. The Coast Guard also reports "R" ratings. Coast Guard Reserve units do not report via SORTS. Ratings from R-1 through R-4 are utilized following standards and criteria similar to those followed by Naval Reserve reinforcing/sustaining units. For the purposes of this report, "R" ratings and "C" levels are considered synonymous.



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### **Interpreting Readiness Data**

SORTS reports should be only one of several indicators employed to determine reserve component unit readiness. SORTS reporting indicates a unit's status at a given point in time, in the resource areas reported. Tangible factors such as numbers of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, and funding all impact on readiness. Intangible factors such as leadership; morale; cohesiveness; skill retention; and personal fitness, strength, and stamina also affect a unit's combat readiness. In addition to SORTS, the results of mobilization tests, combat readiness evaluations, operational readiness inspections, and other criteria must be examined to determine the true combat readiness of a reserve component unit. There is no simple means for measuring readiness. The Board does not believe that SORTS category levels alone are a valid indicator of a unit's readiness. The Board recommends that an objective and uniform readiness measuring system be developed for reporting reserve component unit readiness.

The Board also cautions against utilizing the statistical information contained in this chapter to gain a clear



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picture of the overall military capability of the reserve components. Readiness, even when completely and accurately evaluated, is only one of many factors that go into determining military capability. Military capability is defined by Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 as "the ability to achieve a specified wartime objective". Readiness is defined as "the ability of the military forces, units, weapon systems or equipment to deliver the output for which they were designed." Readiness is only one supporting pillar of military

capability. The others are force structure, modernization, and sustainability. The abilities to mobilize and deploy the forces must also be considered when analyzing military capabilities of the reserve components.

### **SORTS Profile of the Reserve Components**

Table 41 presents a profile of unit status, and major limiting factors of the various reserve components, as reported through SORTS.

**Table 41**  
**SORTS PROFILE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS**  
**AND MAJOR LIMITING FACTORS**

	% of Units C-3/R-3 or Better			Limiting Factors FY 1987 <sup>1</sup>	
	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987	Most Critical	Second Most Critical
Army National Guard <sup>2</sup>	60	71	76	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)	Equipment Condition
Army Reserve <sup>2</sup>	40	45	56	Personnel (Strength)	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)
Naval Reserve					
Commissioned	88	90	97	Equipment Condition	Equipment On-Hand
Reinforcing/Sustaining (R-3)	76	78	81	Training	Personnel (Strength)
Marine Corps Reserve	50	55	67	Personnel (Individual Skill Qualification)	Equipment Condition
Air National Guard	83	87	94	Training	Equipment On-Hand
Air Force Reserve	76	77	90	Equipment Condition	Equipment On-Hand

Overall DOD Selected Reserve	% C-3/R-3 or Better	Limiting Factors	
FY 1987	75	Personnel	Equipment Condition
FY 1986	70	Equipment On-Hand	Personnel
FY 1985	66	Equipment On-Hand	Personnel
Coast Guard Reserve	% R-3 or Better		
FY 1987	89	Training	Personnel
FY 1986	87	Training	Personnel
FY 1985	97	Training	Personnel

Notes: 1. Limiting factors are based on number of units affected as reported in SORTS.  
2. Data as of October 15, 1987.

Source: Individual reserve components.

Data as of September 30, 1987 (except as noted).

An analysis of the table discloses the following information.

- Of the reporting units, 75 percent were rated C/R-3 or better at the end of FY 1987.
- All reserve components reported that the percentage of units reporting C/R-3 or better increased over FY 1986.
- The table shows limiting factors of each reserve component, as reported through SORTS. Overall limiting factors to Department of Defense reserve component readiness in FY 1987, in order of total number of units affected, were personnel shortages, individual skill qualification, equipment on-hand, equipment condition, and training. Equipment, personnel, and training

problems are discussed in the respective chapters of this report. Individual skill qualification is discussed in the Personnel chapter.

Readiness is limited by assets and time available. It is not expected that 100 percent of reserve component units will be C-1 during peacetime. They are not organized or resourced to achieve that level. Table 41 does not show which units are C-3 or better nor how rapidly the units that are not C-3 or better could achieve that status upon mobilization. For example, the table shows that 90 percent of the units in the Air Force Reserve are C-3 or better. However, when divided into categories of "flying" and "non-flying" units, the percentage would be significantly different. Nearly 100% percent of flying units are C-3 or better.



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There are other factors that must be considered when measuring readiness. Department of Defense policy is to equip first, those reserve component units that will be first to fight. Some units will not receive all of their equipment until mobilized and therefore cannot be C-3 or better until that time. Some units may have reduced category levels due to recent reorganizations, while others have low levels because they have received new equipment with which they have not had an opportunity to train. Many of these organizations could rapidly be made ready to deploy with an intense period of training upon mobilization.

A comparison of SORTS resource areas is shown below for each of the reserve components for FY 1985, FY 1986, and FY 1987. Numbers are percentages of units reporting as C/R-3 or better.



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### Army National Guard

	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987
Personnel	76	80	83
Individual Skill			
Qualification	78	80	80
Equipment			
On-Hand	58	79	86
Equipment			
Condition	79	84	85
Training	91	93	95
Overall	60	71	76

### Army Reserve

	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987
Personnel	53	56	65
Individual Skill			
Qualification	56	60	69
Equipment			
On-Hand	49	53	71
Equipment			
Condition	74	77	76
Training	84	86	90
Overall	40	45	56

### Naval Reserve

#### Commissioned Units

	FY 1985	FY 1986	FY 1987
Personnel	90	90	90
Equipment			
On-Hand	64	73	65
Equipment			
Condition	55	71	64
Training	86	95	85
Overall	88	90	97

#### Reinforcing/Sustaining Units

Personnel	91	88	95
Training	82	85	85
Overall	76	78	81

**Marine Corps Reserve**

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Personnel	74	69	98
Individual Skill			
Qualification	n/a	69	76
Equipment			
On-Hand	72	85	89
Equipment			
Condition	68	75	83
Training	86	94	93
Overall	50	55	67

**Air National Guard**

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Personnel	93	96	95
Individual Skill			
Qualification	93	93	93
Equipment			
On-Hand	83	87	94
Equipment			
Condition	82	89	97
Training	87	93	94
Overall	83	87	94

**Air Force Reserve**

	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Personnel	88	83	97
Individual Skill			
Qualification	n/a	n/a	83
Equipment			
On-Hand	75	73	78
Equipment			
Condition	61	67	74
Training	84	79	89
Overall	76	77	90

**Coast Guard Reserve**


	<u>FY 1985</u>	<u>FY 1986</u>	<u>FY 1987</u>
Personnel	99	90	94
Training	91	73	71
Overall	97	87	89



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
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### **Mobilization Readiness Limiting Factors**

Accounting for all factors, including SORTS reporting, the reserve components informed the Board of what they perceive to be the most serious limiting factors to mobilization readiness in FY 1987.



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The Army National Guard, Army Reserve, and Marine Corps Reserve identified Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) mismatch as one of the most critical limiting factors to mobilization readiness in FY 1987. (MOS mismatch is discussed in the Personnel Chapter of this report.) The Naval Reserve reported personnel shortages in some ratings.

All of the Department of Defense reserve components cite equipment deficiencies as readiness limiters. The Coast Guard Reserve has just completed a study which identifies equipment needs of that component. These problems are discussed in the Equipment Chapter of this report.

The Coast Guard Reserve has identified several key factors limiting its mobilization readiness. The predominant factor is the lack of funding support for a Selected Reserve force to adequately meet wartime personnel requirements. Additionally, significant shortages in equipment along with limited training time and inadequate full-time support are cited as



significant detractors to readiness. These issues are discussed elsewhere in the report.

### **Summary and Recommendation**

Mobilization preparedness is a major objective of the reserve components. All components, except the Coast Guard Reserve, utilize the Status of Resources and Training Systems report as an indicator of unit status. The SORTS report alone does not present a complete picture of unit readiness. All factors and indicators must be carefully analyzed to determine true mobilization and combat readiness of a reserve component unit.

The Board recommends:

- develop an objective and uniform readiness measuring system for reporting unit readiness for the Total Force. (P)



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## Board Activities in FY 1987 **A**

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*The Board is "... enormously important because of the increasing reliance being placed on our Reserve Components."*

*Senator Sam Nunn  
Chairman, Senate Armed  
Services Committee*

## General

Board activities during FY 1987 were planned to enable the Board to fulfill its mission as "principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense on matters relating to the reserve components." (10 USC 175(c)). Activities included quarterly meetings; committee meetings; a field study; briefings; and meetings with defense policy makers, Congressional leaders, leaders from executive departments and agencies, as well as from the private sector.



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## Board Meetings and Committees

The Board met in FY 1987 on the following dates:

- December 8-10, 1986
- March 9-11, 1987
- May 17-24, 1987
- September 14-16, 1987



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The Board uses standing committees to study and formulate recommendations on issues relating to the National Guard and Reserve. The two previous standing committees were reorganized during the year to form the three listed below.

- Personnel Committee
- Readiness Committee
- Logistics Committee

## Field Study

Members of the Board and staff conducted a field study in Panama; Honduras; Ecuador; Puerto Rico; and Key West, Florida, during the period May 17-24, 1987. The purpose of the field study was to review reserve component planning for mobilization, current training activities, and the contribution of the National Guard and Reserves to the mission accomplishment of the commands visited. A study report, "Overseas Study of Reserve Component Issues", was published by the Board. Copies are available upon request. The following elements and commands were visited.

- U.S. Embassy, Panama
- U.S. Embassy, Honduras
- U.S. Embassy, Ecuador
- U.S. Southern Command
- U.S. Army South
- U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command
- U.S. Air Force Southern Air Division
- U.S. Forces Caribbean
- U.S. Naval Forces Caribbean
- U.S. Atlantic Forces South



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- U.S. Coast Guard Group Key West
- U.S. Coast Guard Greater Antilles Section
- Puerto Rico Army National Guard
- Puerto Rico Air National Guard
- U.S. Army Reserve, Puerto Rico
- U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, Puerto Rico
- U.S. Merchant Marine
- Army Civil Affairs Capabilities
- Deployable Medical Systems (DEPMEDS)
- Hospital Ships—USNS Mercy and USNS Comfort
- Reserve Component Equipment and Facilities

### **Briefings**

- DoD and Reserve Component Role in Drug Interdiction
- Wartime Manpower Mobilization Planning System
- Human Immunodeficiency Virus Policy
- Mobilization Concepts Development Center
- Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
- Department of Defense Reorganization
- U.S. Humanitarian Assistance Program
- Central/South America Overview
- Middle East Issues
- Philippine Islands Report
- State Defense Forces
- Government Accounting Office Reserve Component Study
- National Committee for Employer Support of Guard and Reserves
- First U.S. Army OPERATION GOLDEN THRUST
- Sixth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation
- Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense
- U.S. Marine Corps



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- Foreign Disaster Assistance
- Manning Naval Reserve Force Ships
- Operational Use of Reserve Forces
- Low Intensity Conflict
- 10 USC 673b Authority and the War Powers Act

**Meetings with Military and Civilian Leaders**

- Abarca, Brigadier General Carlos E. Jaramillo, Commander, Ecuadoran Air Force Air Defense
- Anderson, Lieutenant Commander Jerry (USN), Office of Naval Medicine
- Andres, Colonel Dudley M. (USA) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, First U.S. Army
- Arellano, Lieutenant General Miguel Chief of Army Operations, Ecuador
- Babcock, Ms. Elaine P. Associate Director, Mobilization Planning Requirement Directorate, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
- Bailey, Captain Harry E. (USNR) Reserve Coordinator, DCNO (Surface Warfare)

- Berquist, Mr. Kenneth P. Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Department of Justice
- Brick, Mr. Samuel T. Jr. Director, Legislative Reference Service, Office of the General Counsel, Department of Defense
- Briggs, Honorable Everett E. Ambassador to Honduras
- Brooks, Rear Admiral Thomas A. (USN), Deputy Director For JCS Support, Defense Intelligence Agency
- Cameron, Dr. Allan W. Executive Director, Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense
- Carlson, Mr. Gary K. Executive Director, National Committee Employer Support for Guard and Reserve
- Carlucci, Honorable Frank C. Secretary of Defense
- Caster, Captain William A. (USCG) Commander, Coast Guard Greater Antilles Section
- Chandler, Rear Admiral David F. (USN), Commander, South Atlantic Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
- Chimbo, Mr. Augustin Yumbo Director of Hollin Sector and Village of Santo Domingo, Ecuador
- Cisneros, Brigadier General Marc A. (USA), J-3, United States Southern Command
- Clinton, Dr. J. Jarrett Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Professional Affairs and Quality Assurance)
- Cooke, Mr. D. O. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)
- Cox, Honorable Chapman B. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management & Personnel)

- Crowe, Admiral William J. (USN)  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Davis, Honorable Arthur H. Jr.  
Ambassador to Panama
- Davis, Dr. Jacquelyn K.  
Chairwoman, Defense Advisory  
Committee on Women in the Service
- Dixon, Colonel Howard L. (ANGUS)  
Army-Air Force Center for Low  
Intensity Conflict
- Duncan, Honorable Stephen M.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Reserve Affairs)
- Ebel, Mr. Wifred E.  
Acting Director, United States  
Selective Service System
- Fee, Colonel David T. (USAF)  
Principal Director, Office Deputy  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Guard/Reserves Manpower and  
Personnel)
- Fesmire, Colonel John A. (USA)  
Commander, Joint Task Force Bravo,  
Palmerola Air Base, Honduras
- Galvin, General John R. (USA)  
Commander-in-Chief, United States  
Southern Command
- Gill, Mr. Sloan R.  
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Guard/Reserves Manpower  
and Personnel)
- Gilliat, Mr. Robert L.  
Assistant General Counsel (Personnel  
and Health Policy)
- Gray, General Alfred M. Jr. (USMC)  
Commandant of the Marine Corps
- Halloran, Mr. Richard  
Military Correspondent, New York  
Times
- Hess, Lieutenant Colonel Monte  
(USA), Commander, 5/87 Infantry,  
193rd Infantry Brigade, United States  
Army South
- Holmes, Forrest S., Esq.  
Office of the General Counsel, OSD
- Hunter, Dr. Shireen T.  
Deputy Director of the Middle East  
Project of Georgetown University's  
Center for Strategic and International  
Studies
- Johnson, Colonel Jan P. (PRANG)  
Commander, 156th Tactical Fighter  
Group, Puerto Rico Air National  
Guard



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
- Lind, Colonel Richard W. (USA)  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Force Management &  
Personnel)
- Loeffke, Major General Bernard (USA)  
Commanding General, United States  
Army South
- Lugo, Mr. Vicente Raul Baguero  
Presidente, Junta Civic Archidona,  
Ecuador
- Marsh, Honorable John O. Jr.  
Secretary of the Army
- Mason, Captain Edward H. (USNR)  
Commander, Naval Control of  
Shipping Organization
- Meese, Honorable Edwin III  
The Attorney General
- Meetze, Major General Henry W.  
(USAR), Chairman, 6th Quadrennial  
Review of Military Compensation  
Steering Committee
- Minera, Colonel Leonel A. Gutierrez  
Chief of Staff, Honduran Army
- Montgomery, Congressman G.V.  
(Sonny), House Armed Services  
Committee
- Mora, Major General Alfredo J.  
(PRARNG), The Adjutant General,  
Puerto Rico
- Morley, Mr. Robert  
Deputy Chief of Mission, United  
States Embassy, Ecuador
- Naranjo, Colonel Mario Augusto  
Commander, Ecuadoran First Air  
Zone
- Navarrete, Colonel William  
Ecuadoran Deputy Chief of Army  
Operations
- Navas, Brigadier General William  
A. (PRARNG), Plans and Training  
Officer, Puerto Rico Army National  
Guard
- Nunn, Senator Sam  
Chairman, Senate Armed Services  
Committee
- O'Connor, Rear Admiral William J.  
(USN) Commander, United States  
Naval Forces, Caribbean
- Olmstead, Lieutenant General  
Stephen G. (USMC), Director,  
Department of Defense Task Force  
on Drug Enforcement




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- Puga, Major General Miguel  
Ecuadoran Chief of Army Operations
- Quinn, Major General Hugh J. (USA)  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Guard/Reserve Readiness and  
Training)
- Rawlins, Colonel Addison C. III  
(USAF), Vice Commander, Southern  
Air Division
- Rosamond, Mr. John B.  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Guard/Reserve Materiel  
and Facilities)
- Sanchez, Colonel Victorio  
Honduran Military Attache in Panama
- Santoni, Major General Felix (USAR)  
Commanding General, 7581st United  
States Army Garrison, Puerto Rico
- Saunders, Captain Norman T. (USCG)  
Commander, Coast Guard Group,  
Key West
- Schweitzer, Lieutenant General  
Robert L. (USA Ret.)
- Seiberlich, Rear Admiral Carl J. (USN  
Ret.)
- Sefton, Colonel William (ALARNG)  
Commander, Task Force 1169 in  
Ecuador
- Shaw, Mr. Dennis R.  
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy  
(Policy)
- Shiguango, Mr. Sharimiat  
Presidente, Conncejo Archidona,  
Ecuador
- Smith, Rear Admiral F. Neale, (USNR)  
Director of Naval Reserve
- Steele, Rear Admiral Ted C., Jr. (USN)  
Commander, United States Forces,  
Caribbean
- Stilwell, General Richard G. (USA  
Ret.)
- Summers, Colonel Harry G. Jr. (USA  
Ret.) Military Correspondent, U.S.  
News & World Report
- Taft, Mrs. Julia V.  
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- Wolthius, Mr. Robert K.  
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- Yopez, Colonel Felix F.  
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
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
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- Ms. Beverley A. Long, who served for many years as Executive Secretary, passed away in February, 1987. Colonel Larry V. Edwards, ARNGUS, completed his assignment as Staff Director in August, 1987. 🇺🇸



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Members of the reserve components''...like the citizen-soldier of earlier time, stand ready to respond to their country's call and their nation's need."


Ronald Reagan  
1983

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"The Militia of this Country must be considered as the Palladium of our security, and the first effectual resort in case of hostility."

George Washington  
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