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WEST EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Robbin F. Laird

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GLOSSARY

ABM	Antiballistic Missile (Treaty)	FOFA	follow-on force attack
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (UK)	GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile(s)
ACDD	Arms Control Disarmament Department (UK)	IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
ACDRU	Arms Control Disarmament Research Unit (UK)	IMAGs	inter-departmental working groups
BMD	ballistic missile defense	INF	intermediate-range nuclear force(s)
BAOR	British Army on the Rhine	MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (Talks)
CAP	French Foreign Ministry Planning Staff	MoD	Ministry of Defense
CDE	Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm)	NSC	National Security Council (U.S.)
CDU/ CSU	Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union Party	PCI	Communist party (Ital.)
CESPI	International Political Studies Institute (Ital.)	SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe	SDP	Social Democratic Party (UK)
DACU	Defence Arms Control Unit (UK)	SGDN	National Defense Secretariat General
DGA	Delegation Generale pour l'Armement (Fr.)	SPD	Social Democratic Party (W. Ger.)
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)	SRINF	short-range intermediate nuclear force(s)
FDP	Free Democratic Party (W. Ger.)	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
		SWP	Foundation for Science and Policy (W. Ger.)
		SWP	Institute for the Foundation on Science and Policy
		WEU	Western European Union

WEST EUROPEAN ARMS CONTROL POLICY

This project has assessed the domestic policy processes in the four major West European countries, namely, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. Although historical perspectives have been provided where necessary, the focus of the project has been primarily on West European politics in the mid-1980s. The main focus of attention has been upon the executive decision making systems in the four countries, although the general political framework within which those systems operate has been analyzed as well.

The project has been written in a particularly turbulent time. Just when the dust seemed to settle on the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s, Western Europe then was faced with the Gorbachev challenge and with its dynamic movement in the arms control environment. In addition, the Reagan Administration offered the twin challenges of the strategic defense initiative and the Reykjavik summit. Because of this dynamic arms control environment, the analysts involved in this project have been forced constantly to update their assessments throughout the project.

During this time, the West European governments have also had to cope with the collapse of the Western defense consensus. In particular, the Euromissile deployment generated a significant public protest movement across the political spectrum. Yet despite the left's growing dissatisfaction with traditional NATO policy based on nuclear deterrence, conservative governments were returned to power in Britain and Germany, and one was elected in France. While it is clear that the Western Alliance survived a significant test in the Euromissile crisis, the conservative governments have been afforded no breathing space in dealing with the superpowers and have sought refuge in revived hopes for European defense cooperation.

This final report is based on a number of detailed assessments, which accompany it. A number of preliminary reports were generated during the research period for this

project and represented interim statements. These preliminary reports include two papers on the United Kingdom,¹ several papers on the Federal Republic of Germany (which were presented in a substantial report directed by Barry Blechman of Defense Forecasts)² and papers on France³ and on Italy.⁴ These preliminary assessments as well as a number of trip reports provided the basis for drafting the four major final working papers.⁵

The focus on arms control decision making in Western Europe necessitated conducting extensive interviews with a wide range of governmental and opinion elites. Virtually all of the major West European political and administrative officials in the arms control area have been interviewed at least once and some have been interviewed several times. The senior analysts involved in the project have worked with West European elites for several years so that interview data collected beyond the confines of the project itself have been drawn upon to generate the findings in this study.

It would have been impossible to conduct the research without substantial interviews, since they have provided the factual basis for the study. Unlike in the United States, there is not an extensive and accurate open-source data base for this subject in Western Europe. Governments simply do not publish much documentation of their activities. The European Parliaments are much weaker than the American Congress and tend to generate very few reports that provide data. The print media is much more political in character in Europe than in the United States. No premium is placed on providing factual material in the security area for West European publics. Often the media are more misleading than accurate in terms of what European governments are actually doing. Interviews are essential even for the researcher to determine what material in the public domain ought to be relied upon.

¹ David Robertson, "Arms Control and British Politics: The Opposition" and "Arms Control and British Politics: The Government and Administration."

² And, included papers by Blechman and Cathleen Fisher on "Arms Control Decision Making in the Federal Republic," by Clay Clemens on "The CDU/CSU and Arms Control," by Jeffrey Boutwell on "The SPD and West German Security," by Blechman and Fisher on "The Green Party," by Blechman and Fisher on "The FDP," and by Steve Szabo on "West German Attitudes Towards Arms Control."

³ "French Decision-Making in Arms Control" by Dinah Louda.

⁴ "Italian Security Policy" by Michael Harrison of Johns Hopkins University.

⁵ Robbin Laird and David Robertson, "British Arms Control Policy"; Robbin Laird and Dinah Louda, "French Arms Control Policy"; Barry Blechman, Cathleen Fisher, and Robbin Laird, "West German Arms Control Policy"; and Michael Harrison, "Italian Arms Control Policy."

Finally, there is a paucity of books published in Western Europe and in the United States which address the actual character and processes of policy making in Western Europe. There are less than a dozen books of varying quality published in the West European languages that provide information on the decision making systems and often these publications are extremely dated. Hence, it is clear that this project would have been impossible to pursue without extensive contacts with West European elites.

Although the primary focus of the research has been to assess the policy processes in the individual countries, we have also assessed some of the growing interconnections among these countries in the period under review. It is correct to say that the European preference option in arms control policy has been enhanced over the past three to four years, i.e., the desire of the Europeans to try to coordinate positions wherever possible on a bilateral or on a multilateral basis (especially within the confines of a revitalized West European Union). Some comparative judgments have emerged as well from the projects which are discussed below. Although there is the semblance of a European arms control policy process emerging, the differences among these countries are often more significant than are the similarities. This study has provided the basis for determining some of those differences and similarities.

A. EXTERNAL FACTORS

To a large extent, the debate about INF has shaped the context in which West European arms control issues have been discussed and organized. The famous Schmidt 1977 IISS speech was a call for the U.S. not to forget specific West European interests when pursuing arms control agreements. At the same time, it was a call for other Europeans to raise their own consciousness on the importance of arms control as an issue affecting their interests as well. In some respects, it was the first public call for the Europeans to work more closely together on arms control issues to ensure that their interests were met.

Few people, however, anticipated the ferocity of the public battle that would accompany the INF struggle. The revival of the peace movements, the debate about NATO strategy and the decline of the superpower dialogue on arms control which emerged in the context of the INF debate had a significant effect on the evolution of West European arms control policy processes.

The revival of the peace movements meant that in several countries, notably Britain, the Low Countries and West Germany, the governments faced a severe challenge over the legitimacy of their security policies. The peace movements elevated concern over the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. This came at a time when public figures in the West were expressing doubts about the future of nuclear deterrence as well.

Before the debate surrounding INF, the West European governments viewed arms control issues primarily as an alliance management issue. It was a question of developing some organizational capabilities in the government's executive arm to enable the head of state and his foreign and defense ministers to understand the U.S.-Soviet negotiations and to develop the language which could be used to intervene effectively with the Americans.

The INF debate changed all of this. It has required the heads of state and others responsible for defending government policy to commit themselves to a political struggle over the future of nuclear deterrence. Further, these governments committed themselves to associating flexible response with the deployment of the American GLCMs and Pershings. For the British and the French, there was the additional complication of carrying out significant modernization of their nuclear forces precisely at a time when the political temperature was rising because of the debate about the American weapons. These governments would have much preferred to have carried out their latest modernization efforts quietly, as the British did when adding the Chevaline warhead or allowing the Americans to put FB-111s in Britain. But that was in the quiescent seventies, not the turbulent eighties.

The governments of the key West European states had a keen sense of having gone through a serious political struggle from 1979-1983 to "win" the struggle for public opinion on the nuclear issue. That is why there was such deep concern over the American President's challenges to nuclear deterrence in the form of the star wars initiative and the Reykjavik summit. Whatever the administration's intentions, the public presentation of U.S. policy has been read by senior policy makers in Europe to have created a public challenge to the future of nuclear deterrence. Put more bluntly, having "won" the battle for public opinion, why did the Americans jeopardize this victory? It must be remembered that for European leaders and governments the arms control issue is about politics, not about excessive details of how to evaluate the military balance. It is the political and economic

impacts of strategic changes which interest the top European leadership most, not technical questions such as how to construct perfect verification measures.

This creates, of course, a problem for any U.S. administration. The Americans who deal directly with the Soviets in arms control negotiations and whose forces are under discussion must be primarily concerned with the technical details of how an agreement affects those forces. The difficulty is that any administration can become so preoccupied with those details that it can lose sight of the political struggle surrounding disarmament and strategic issues.

It has been seen as imperative by the European governments, however, to upgrade their technical capabilities in the arms control, as opposed to disarmament, area. As their interests have become more directly affected in the spread of superpower agreements to cover Europe as well, it is critical to be able to influence the Americans in a positive direction. Given the technical bias of the American governmental approach to arms control, it has been necessary to add similar technical expertise to European government bureaucracies. These capabilities have been largely grafted onto the foreign ministries, but to the extent that West European forces are more directly involved in potential arms limitation agreements, the West European militaries have become more involved. The new focus on conventional arms control talks may directly have the effect of upgrading military involvement. This trend is probably beneficial to the U.S. because most uniformed militaries, including the French, think in more cooperative or NATO terms than do European diplomats.

The Americans have affected the European arms control process in another way as well. The shift in the approach underlying American strategy has created problems for the European governments, given the conservative propensity of European decision making systems. In Europe the debate has been increasingly over whether NATO strategy should be altered to conform to American preferences. This debate about strategy has had critical implications for the arms control and disarmament debate as well. For the left, disarmament is sought as an alternative to the evolution of NATO strategy in conformity to PD-59, airland battle and FOFA. For the right, arms control has often been pursued to allow for the modernization of NATO strategy and capabilities.

Soviet actions and public diplomacy have clearly been an additional factor affecting West European arms control policy by influencing Western threat perceptions. Most

significant has been the new flexibility evident under General Secretary Gorbachev and the "charm offensive" associated with it. Already the Soviet leader is perceived by West European publics to be more interested in peace and arms control than the American President. This is hardly a desirable position for the American government to be in.

Gorbachev's approach has increased pressure on the West to be certain of the proposals it seeks. The old assumption no longer stands that any proposal can be put on the table with Soviet rejection a certainty. West European governments are especially keen about trying to not be outflanked by the General Secretary, although they are not certain how to do so.

The "charm offensive," and with it the prospects of an agreement on the "Double Zero," have had a significant effect on the disarmament debate. Conservative governments have not effectively exploited the argument that Western firmness brought the Soviets back to the bargaining table. They have been more preoccupied with the future of nuclear deterrence than with touting past victories. This is a serious mistake in Western public diplomacy, akin to the failure to exploit the Montebello decision. Gorbachev is trying to place the West, and particularly the U.S., in the position of appearing to escalate the arms race. Any Western discussions about modernizing nuclear weapons under the 500-kilometer range will be controversial among Western governments on their own merits, but the public debate will heat up that controversy because of Soviet efforts to appear willing to negotiate to lower levels (in pursuit, perhaps, of a denuclearized European theater--if Europe is understood not to encompass Soviet territory).

A further external factor has shaped the West European arms control policy processes of the mid-1980s as well, namely the growing propensity to pursue the European preference option in security matters wherever possible. This has more to do with the struggle over strategy and disarmament, than over quarrels with the U.S. on the technical details of arms control policy. But it has clear implications for arms control policy to the extent that the U.S. room for maneuver is reduced by some form of Europeanization.

The sense that European policy makers have is that a growing ability to cooperate with one another will help them in their struggle for public support. It is desirable to have European positions on security and arms control, rather than being perceived to be simply following the American lead. It may also be possible from this point of view to influence the Americans more effectively by cooperating with one another.

A particularly telling case in point is how the Europeans are pursuing the revival of the WEU (Western European Union). There is a general perception in the European governments that the NATO organization has become increasingly ritualistic and a forum for rubber stamping agreements reached elsewhere. It is necessary to increase real discussions on security matters among governments. The WEU could be a forum where the Europeans could consult in a frank and open atmosphere prior to taking their positions to NATO. Sometimes those positions will be common ones, often not. But the fact that a consultative process will have occurred will strengthen their position within the Alliance.

In short, external factors have been significant in shaping the European arms control policy process. Prior to a discussion of the specific policy processes in each of the four key countries, we will now turn to a discussion of some comparative judgments which can be made concerning these policy processes.

B. COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENTS

Arms control has become an increasingly significant component of the effort to have effective Alliance management. Arms control is not simply concerned with stabilizing the East-West military competition, but relates to ways in which the Alliance can hold together on political-military issues. While American analysts are quite familiar with the processes of Alliance management at the NATO institutional level, they are confronted with the problem of assessing the dynamic and divergent set of arms control policy processes extant in the political systems of their key West European allies. This report assesses those dynamics and tries to provide the American intelligence analyst and policy maker with some insights into the idiosyncratic and comparative dynamics of arms control policy in the four key West European countries under examination.

The study makes it abundantly clear that there is no single West European arms control policy process or outcome to that process. Although the study documents the gradually increasing effort by the key countries to coordinate positions wherever possible, the differences in policy making styles, national political cultures, and in the degree of political conflict over security policy across the four countries are often more prevalent than the similarities.

Nevertheless, even though differences are profound, there are important similarities. All of these countries examined in this study are heavily dominated by the

executive arm of government in the shaping of arms control policy. All of the European governments examined have much greater latitude in the formulation of arms control policy than does the American executive. This is largely due to the domination of European executives over their respective legislatures as compared to the American situation with Congress and is also partly due to the relative lack of expertise outside those governments as well.

The impact of executive predominance in Western Europe on security policy can have an important consequence for American-European tensions. In Western Europe there tends to be a high positive correlation between governmental declaratory and actual policy in the detailed making of policy. Europeans tend not to understand that American declaratory policy is often part of the struggle between the U.S. executive and Congress. Europeans tend to mirror image the U.S. policy process to their own thereby assuming greater executive predominance than is often the case. Conversely, when an American executive policy maker issues a public statement designed primarily for domestic consideration, often European policy makers read much more into the statement with regard to actual U.S. policy than may be the case.

For example, when the President made his famous "star wars" speech in 1983, many European policy makers assumed that the speech reflected the outcome of a deliberate process of decision making in the U.S. government with regard to the future of nuclear deterrence. Of course, it was simply the opening salvo in the making not only of administration policy (which had to backfill the policy process), but of the making of U.S. policy more generally. The Europeans often proceeded as if the Americans had already made up their minds to move ahead on this subject.

This general problem of mirror-imaging is often exacerbated by the lack of genuine expertise in dealing with the Americans. The European governments tend to rely heavily on their embassies to report on U.S. developments, which means that the quality of embassy reporting is especially significant. The British embassy in Washington stands almost alone in the quality of its analysis of the U.S. policy process, aided to a large extent by the special access the British have with the Americans. Also, civil servants who have previously been posted to Washington form an alumnus of experts for interpreting American developments, although the European governments vary widely in the extent to

which they allow civil servants to continue to work in areas which further or require their American expertise.

Nonetheless, whatever expertise on the United States that does exist in the European governments, is tempered by a general lack of understanding among high-ranking politicians in Western Europe. Finally, the European think tanks and universities have a very thin capability to analyze American developments.

There are, however, important differences among these countries, for instance in the degree of centralization in the executive branches dominating the arms control policy processes. For example, the British have the most centralized policy process of any European executive branch, which means that it is highly unlikely one would see differences among departments affecting the public presentation of policy. The Prime Minister can, of course, take initiatives which surprise the bureaucracy, such as when Thatcher embraced the "Double Zero" option prior to calling the election in May 1987. When differences emerge such as over the question of British participation in the American SDI program, these differences are bargained out at the cabinet level. It is useful for an American administration to remember that compromise has been required on such an issue, because differences among departments can reemerge, but these differences are unlikely to surface publicly.

At the other end of the centralization continuum is the policy process in the West German government. Not only are the Germans governed by a coalition of parties, but the division directors in the MoD and the Foreign Office have much greater power than in the British civil service. This means that differences here are more difficult to resolve and are more likely to be reflected in public debate than in Britain. The West German response to the "Double Zero" option is a useful reminder of the relative diffusion of power and its effects on German policy in the arms control area.

In addition, it has not been considered a legitimate province of persons outside of government to examine the details of that government's foreign and security policy, including arms control (as opposed to disarmament). Information flows have been tightly circumscribed and often the control of information has been more important than the generation of qualitatively better information. The West European governments have a much more insulated decision making process than does the American government on the details of arms control policy. The U.S. tends to have much more technical expertise due

to the larger number of experts inside and outside of government. To some extent quantity yields quality in the area of arms control assessments. As a result, the U.S. will almost always be more innovative than the European governments in suggesting changes and the Europeans will be placed in the position of responding to U.S. initiatives. This pattern of American initiatives and European responses creates major tensions in American-European relations, but it is difficult to resolve given that it is rooted in structural differences inherent in their respective decision making processes.

In addition, the information which generates the arms control discourse both inside and outside government in Western Europe often comes from the other side of the Atlantic. A key question which emerges is how the debate in the U.S. shapes the European debate, given the paucity of information the West European governments provide their publics. Even with the formation of new or upgraded research institutes in all of the countries examined, the key specialists have either been trained in the U.S. or rely heavily on American specialists and information to participate in the more technical debate about arms control.

There is an interesting parallel here between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Soviet specialists who are accessible to the West (as well as Soviet negotiators on arms control) largely use American information as well. Westerners often are concerned that these Soviet specialists are simply purveyors of disinformation or are simply trained in the care and handling of Americans. The situation, however, is analogous to the West Europeans. The specialists accessible to Americans through the institutes are rarely well plugged-in to their governments, but because they are accessible, Americans consider them to be important.

Getting access to West European elites who are affected by arms control matters, as opposed to those in the government charged with handling Americans is a related problem. For example, the European militaries have considerable influence over shaping European operational military policy, which is decisively affected by arms control matters. However, because these military forces have rarely been threatened by arms limitations agreements, military involvement has been much less than in the U.S. This could change if the conventional arms control talks become more central or if the British and French have to include their nuclear weapons in negotiations as well. Monitoring the attitudes of the

uniformed military in Western Europe could well become more important in the years ahead when assessing European responses to arms control.

Because the thrust of arms control agreements (as opposed to talks) has been upon U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons, European involvement has focused on the diplomatic game of alliance management or, bluntly put, managing the Americans in such a way that European interests are not neglected. The Europeans have varied significantly, however, in how they have handled the question of influencing the Americans in the arms control process. The British have pursued a process of direct influence over the Americans through the "special relationship." This has included considerable interaction at all governmental levels and has been encouraged by frequent British-American summits. The Germans have pursued a similar policy, the effectiveness of which has been limited by the much lower degree of German centralization and by the presence of a Chancellor more capable of being a domestic power broker than being a foreign policy statesman. The French have sought to influence the Americans by pursuing a European-oriented policy, especially through their relationship with the Germans. To this same aim, the Italians have primarily used the multinational institutions, especially NATO, although they have begun to use bilateral European relations as well.

Increasingly, the four European countries surveyed have pursued a European-oriented strategy to better influence Washington in an Alliance management context. The revival of the WEU, for example, has involved an effort to enhance European coordination between the bilateral and NATO levels as a better means of influencing Washington.

This nascent Europeanization has been limited, however, by the growing propensity of the Europeans to pursue national interests in the arms control process. For example, the Germans have sought relief from domestic pressures in dealing with the nuclear challenge facing the Alliance, and German governments have sought to ensure that their interests are as well served as possible by arms control agreements. The widely shared sentiment in West Germany that "the shorter the range of nuclear weapons, the more German the effect," will have a decisive influence on how the Germans pursue arms control agreements in the years ahead.

Europeanization is thereby often reduced to its lowest common denominator, namely, the West European governments will seek to protect national interests through European cooperation wherever possible. There is little effort to protect "European"

interests in a give and take atmosphere in which British, French, German, and Italian interests are amalgamated into a larger European interest as a whole. As a result, the kind of Europeanization which has emerged complicates rather than resolves U.S.-European differences on arms control issues.

Europeanization may, however, serve an important political purpose by allowing the European governments to stand before their publics and take more responsibility for their actions. For example, tensions between the Americans and Germans over what many Americans perceive as German unwillingness to take responsibility for their actions in the INF area (dating from the Chancellor's speech in 1977) might be reduced to the extent that Europeanization allows the German government to be seen by its public as playing a more assertive role in defining its interests and not "sacrificing" them to American diktat. The image of being a "lackey" of the U.S. is not a positive one for a European leader, and Europeanization may well be a help in dealing with this problem.

Nonetheless, alliance management is only part of the challenge to the West European policy process. Dealing with the disarmament and strategy debate is critical as well, and in terms of the future of the Alliance is even more critical. Clearly, the British and German governments have been the most affected of the four governments in terms of the need to pursue an arms control policy supportive of their strategy. Both conservative governments are facing serious challenges from the left about the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence. Arms control agreements, or at least the propensity to pursue them, are important contributors to their dealing effectively with the disarmament debate they face. As a result, these governments present a political image of desiring to pursue arms control agreements, which may be at odds with the proclivities of arms control decision makers in those governments who deal with the technical details of such issues. This tension between political requirements and participation in the technical assessment process leads to contradictory impulses coming from Western Europe and is an irritant to European-American relations.

There is an important problem confronting an American analyzing the European arms control policy process. For Americans, arms control encompasses both technical details and political choices in dealing with the Soviet Union. For the Europeans, arms control is limited to governments dealing with technical details whereas the public debates involve political choices in strategy or disarmament. Arms control is, after all, an American

term which has been grafted onto European political-military discourse. The Europeans are likely to think initially more in political than military terms when dealing with arms control and disarmament issues, whereas the Americans are more likely to think in military terms first and then political terms.

In other words, there is an important gap between technical and political language. Arms control discussions entail the use of technical language, mainly initiated, it should be remembered, by the U.S. government and private specialized research institutes. In large part, the Europeans are following the American lead. In contrast, disarmament discussions entail the use of political language and an emphasis on security provided by political means. To many Europeans, for example, verification relates to the politics of trust in East-West relations, not the resolution of technical details for negotiations.

For Americans listening to the European debate, the people who use the technical language of arms control seem to be more "serious and realistic," as opposed to the "abstract and unrealistic" analysts and "ideologues" involved in the disarmament debate. This perception has been, in fact, a major motivation for the West European governments who are seeking to develop technical expertise in order to influence the Americans. But it is the disarmament debate which matters most to the political future of the alliance, not debate over the technical details of arms control issues. The difficult challenge facing the U.S. government and specialized research community is how to influence both the arms control and disarmament debates, the two being related but not synonymous.

C. THE BRITISH CASE

The executive organs of the British government tend to dominate decision making on overall arms control issues (see Figure 1). Prime Minister Thatcher, by force of her strong character and keen interest in defense matters, is clearly the single most important player for any major decision on arms control. Thatcher distrusts much of the civil service and tends to rely on her own personal staff and close advisors for input. These individuals are personally loyal to her and provide her with counsel in her continuing struggle with the unilateralist majority of the opposition Labour Party.

Thatcher is a confirmed Atlanticist, having the strongest bias towards the U.S. in the Cabinet. Nonetheless, even she is gradually opening up to the idea of Europeanization.




Figure 1. Executive British Arms Control Decision Making System

The Prime Minister is assisted by foreign policy specialists in the Cabinet Office, which often serves to coordinate inter-departmental disputes. Through its Cabinet Assessment Staff, the Cabinet Office also coordinates incoming intelligence matters from various intelligence agencies, particularly in regard to Soviet policy. Thatcher and her close advisors often spur the bureaucracy towards speedier results. The Thatcher Cabinet, however, plays a small role in arms control decision making. There are a number of smaller and often ad hoc Cabinet subcommittees, such as the Overseas and Defence Subcommittee, which do play important roles, especially during crisis situations.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) provides Britain's day-to-day lead on arms control matters. FCO officers are considered highly intelligent, but seldom are specialists in arms control matters, largely due to the practice of rotating officers out of their areas every two to three years. This tends to deprive the FCO of institutional memory. The highest-ranking civil servant with direct responsibilities for arms control is the Permanent Under Secretary, currently Sir Patrick Wright. Directly beneath him are two Deputy Under Secretaries: John Boyd is responsible for arms control and Derek Thomas for bilateral relations affected by arms control policy. Boyd is aided in this by an Assistant Secretary of State, now Brian Fall; David Ratford is the Assistant to Thomas. Ratford's concerns are with the bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and European nations. Of the three departments directly concerned with arms control, the most important is the Arms Control and Disarmament Department (ACDD). This is headed by Michael Pakenham, a civil servant who enjoys the Prime Minister's confidence. ACDD is staffed by 12 administration-class officials.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit (ACDRU) was spun off from ACDD in January 1987 and is now a Foreign Office Department on its own. It has a Head of Department, an Assistant, and three Administrative Officers who deal with the public interest side of arms control matters. The FCO's Defence Department has control over conventional arms control issues such as CDE, CSCE, and MBFR. Its Head is Paul Lever. When Pakenham leaves ACDD in the fall, he will be replaced by Lever; it is believed that ACDD will then become part of the Defence Department and be led by Lever.

The Planning Staff, headed by David Gore-Booth, follows arms control issues in the context of keeping the Foreign Secretary informed of important foreign policy questions. Of the various geographic departments which touch on arms control, the most

important is the Soviet Department, which is tasked with evaluating the Soviet threat and arms control proposals.

In the actual formulation of arms control policy, the three key actors are Pakenham, Lever, and Fall. In general, FCO tends to see arms control issues in broad political terms. Its inherent bias is towards incremental and pragmatic approaches. The FCO has a realist view of the many voices shaping U.S. policy, but it identifies the most closely with State and ACDA.

The British Ministry of Defence (MoD) plays a lesser role in arms control than FCO. MoD's strength depends on the strength and interests of the Secretary of Defence. The Defence Arms Control Unit (DACU) was created in an MoD reorganization in 1985; it reports directly to the Minister. Under Michael Heseltine, DACU was influential, but this is less the case with the present Minister, George Younger. DACU now comes under the control of the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, David Nichols, who has been guiding the Unit towards Europeanization. The current Head of DACU is Howard Griffiths. In recent times, most of the Unit's work has consisted of coordinating MoD viewpoints and research. It does have some military staff; essentially the deputies for each section are military officers. DACU tends to work well with FCO, particularly ACDD. In general terms, DACU is Atlanticist, particularly the nuclear desk which is closely tied to protecting the Trident modernization program. The conventional arms control team is much more Europeanist in its orientation. In fact, more and more MoD officials are coming to take a Europeanist stance. The U.S. proposals at the Reykjavik summit certainly contributed to this feeling.

Britain's Embassy in Washington plays an important role in keeping London abreast of American developments in the arms control field. The embassies in Paris and Bonn play similar roles.

Unlike the U.S. Congress, the British Parliament does not have a major part in foreign and defense policy and decision making. For one thing, it lacks substantial resources. The 11 member Commons Select Committee on Defence has very little staff and the Commons as a whole has few others who devote their time to collecting information on defense issues. As a result the debates tend to be generalized and highly partisan. There is some movement towards expanding Parliamentary staff and expertise, however.

Despite the arms control elements within the bureaucracy, Britain remains primarily a "consumer" of U.S. arms control positions. The U.S., after all, is the principal Western participant in many arms control fora. Thus, a major thrust of British policy is to try to influence American policy. Britain's nuclear deterrent is closely tied to the U.S. through the Trident program. The need for the British to test their new warhead designs has put the government firmly against the Soviet proposals to cease nuclear testing. It is felt that Britain would probably suffer from an arms control agreement between the superpowers, in that it would possibly result in the U.S. agreeing to some technology transfer limits. Thus, the Reykjavik discussions appeared to many British officials as a direct threat to their Trident program; it has been a major thrust of Thatcher's policy since then to ensure that such is not the case.

In general, the British favor incremental cuts in strategic weapons, cuts which would not threaten the role of the British and French deterrents. The government continues to fear a cascading de-nuclearization and hopes to be able to keep the British deterrent outside the framework of any U.S.-Soviet agreement.

The British are much more actively involved in and much more concerned with conventional and chemical arms limitations and wish to see them addressed before a nuclear battlefield weapons reduction agreement. They do have an active interest in the INF verification process, in part because Britain serves as a host country for U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles.

On SDI, the British government seeks to continue with the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. One of the primary reasons for British participation in SDI was the desire to be able to influence its deployment. In general, it is felt that the Soviet Union would only abrogate the ABM Treaty if pushed to do so by significant U.S. advances in SDI technology.

In the nuclear field Britain is pursuing four basic policy points: to protect the viability of the British nuclear deterrent and the Trident modernization program; to encourage the U.S. to seek strategic stability at the lowest possible level compatible with the British deterrent; to negotiate lower levels of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe; and to support the ABM Treaty.

Unlike the nuclear weapons area, the British are direct participants in the conventional and chemical arms control areas. They do manage to influence Western positions in these negotiations. Basically, Britain seeks to ensure that the Alliance maintains as strong a conventional military posture as possible in the face of what they see as advantageous circumstances for the Warsaw Pact. Britain feels that the Soviet threat is serious enough to necessitate a permanent nuclear deterrent as a way of achieving an overall military equilibrium. This has led them to pursue the position within MBFR that any American withdrawals would have to be met by asymmetrical Soviet troop reductions. If the U.S. were not able to ensure asymmetrical reductions, then the British would attempt to prevent the U.S. from coming to any agreement. In this, the Germans have been Britain's key European partner.

Economic factors are affecting the British position considerably. The costs of maintaining the British Army on the Rhine (BOAR) over the next two decades is estimated at 55 percent of the overall defense budget. This comes at a time when even the Conservatives recognize that Britain is spending a disproportionately high percentage of GNP on defense; yet at the same time most defense experts feel that the British defense budget is seriously underfunded for the long term. Hence, the interest in mutual and balanced force reductions. The idea of reducing the 55,000 British troops in West Germany is increasingly acceptable, even among some Conservative parliamentarians. Yet British defense planners do not want to encourage other NATO members--particularly the West Germans--to draw down their troop commitments; they are well aware that such a move would hardly send the right signal to the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

The British have cooperated closely with the West Germans and the French to promote common European positions in the CDE negotiations. Thatcher's government made efforts to ensure that the West did not accept the Soviet proposal to include naval forces in CDE discussions. In MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks), the British encouraged the U.S. to table the December 5th proposal which would put aside the so-called data question in pursuing force reductions. Overall, the wide range of proposals put forth by the Soviets since early 1986 have given the British concern that the West might be outflanked even in the conventional arms control area.

Within the FCO, there is the opinion that troop reductions may not be the central issue for negotiation. Many would prefer to see limitations put on emerging technologies,

primarily because they realize that there is no way for Britain to compete effectively with the superpowers in this domain. This view has some support in the MoD as well. Both units tend to feel, for example, that new precision-guided weapons will be so easily disguised from observation as to render adequate verification unworkable.

On the subject of chemical weapons, the British are mostly of one mind: there is no support for the West building up its chemical weapons stocks. Thus any agreement on limitations in this area would be seen as a political gain for the administration. In any event, Britain has no chemical weapons manufacturing capability, nor would it be politically feasible to commence research on them.

While Britain chaired the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1986, the country actively promoted new ideas on how to conclude an accord. One proposal, which addressed the problem of challenge inspection, put Britain and the U.S. at loggerheads, with the Americans feeling that the British proposal was not sufficiently tight. The disagreement has left some legacy of bitterness between the two teams.

In short, the British positions on non-nuclear arms control can be summarized as: involving the U.S. in negotiations so as to avoid a precipitous unilateral withdrawal of conventional forces; providing a framework which might allow some drawdown of British forces in Germany; and reducing the conventional and chemical threat posed by the Soviet Union.

The split between the ruling Conservative Party and the largest opposition party, Labour, on defense issues cannot be overemphasized. Defense has been a major part of their political rivalry since Margaret Thatcher, a strong supporter of the British nuclear deterrent, was first elected in 1979. During that election, Labour suffered a major defeat, which contributed directly to the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Essentially since 1979, Labour has been dominated by those who advocate unilateral withdrawal of Britain's nuclear deterrent; those former Labour members who could not support this policy have primarily gone over to the SDP.

Labour also was defeated in the 1983 elections and many believe that it was their defense policy that was primarily responsible. Since then the party has actively sought to project a coherent Socialist view of defense and international conflict. Its *Defence and*

Security statement adopted in 1984 drew heavily on a previous document called *Defence Without the Bomb*, which posited that international confidence rests on a genuinely defensive deterrent or a "non-provocative defence." The logic behind this policy is to turn Britain into a non-nuclear state and to compel NATO to alter its policies accordingly.

Politically, this has meant that Labour's arms control policy is equivalent to its overall defense policy: unilateral disarmament, the forced removal of American theater and tactical nuclear weapons from British territory, and the urge to see NATO accept a "No First Use" policy. Labour further appears to believe that the arms race is but a function of an action-reaction cycle. Therefore unilateral reductions on the British and Western side would lead to corresponding reductions on the part of the Soviets. Similarly, Labour opposes the Follow-on-Attack and Airland Battle 2000 doctrines.

Since Neil Kinnock became head of the party, Labour has moved consistently towards the center on all issues but defense policy. Kinnock appears very deeply personally committed to unilateralism. There is some internal opposition to this stance with the party, essentially in the Foreign Affairs group and the Labour members of the Select Committee on Defence. In private many of these individuals have expressed the idea that arms control only comes about when the superpowers have already moved on to newer stages of weapons technology. Thus their feeling is that arms control should aim at preventing future developments. This group, essentially the party's right wing, has as its most visible member Denis Healey.

The SDP and the Liberal Party, collectively forming the Alliance, have traditionally held differing views on defense matters. The SDP position is much closer to that of the Conservatives, while the Liberals have recently been virtually without a genuine policy to call their own. For the 1987 elections, the two parties formed a Joint Commission, which essentially reduced their outstanding differences on defense issues to their least common denominator. This effectively served to mask a number of SDP defense positions. In general, the SDP can be said to support Britain's continued nuclear deterrence, although they would like to keep Polaris operational for as long as possible and avoid the controversy and expense associated with the Trident program. The party continues to support the United States and the struggle to maintain a strong conventional defense. There is some difference between the Atlanticist views of the SDP leadership, however, and the rest of the party, which has supported a mild version of the "Freeze."

For their part, the Liberals have generally deferred to their SDP partners or have ducked defense questions altogether. The party appears interested in keeping its options open in the event it ever attains power.

The Joint Commission of June 1986 reflected a wide degree of agreement, in particular concerning the need to strengthen the European pillar of NATO. Nuclear issues, however, were by and large side-stepped. SDP leader David Owen did criticize the Commission's indecision on how to resolve the succession to Polaris. Owen's concerns on the matter were ultimately papered over for electoral reasons, although not entirely to his satisfaction.

D. THE FRENCH ARMS CONTROL POLICY

French decision making on arms control policy is characterized by the very small number of key players and the informal nature of the interaction between them (see Figure 2). One advantage of this is that it allows for quick, consensual decisions; the bureaucratic process does not tend to slow things down. The idea to form a separate arms control agency along the lines of ACDA was considered and rejected in 1978.

France's Fifth Republic established a strong President, whose primacy over defense and foreign issues remained unchallenged until last year. Constitutionally, he alone controls the country's nuclear weapons. France's parliamentary system spares the President the kind of pressures and probes which are common in the U.S. Congressional system.

The President sets the direction for French security policy, including launching arms control initiatives. He has the final say on defense developments such as chemical weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, the S-X mobile missile, etc., which have implications for arms control policy and negotiations. His concerns are strategic, by and large, as he lacks the staff to become overly involved in day-to-day management of arms control matters.

The President retains considerable room to improvise and innovate either on his own or at the suggestion of one of his personal advisors. Generally speaking any new directions in the arms control arena come from the President.




Figure 2. The French Executive Decision Making System on Arms Control

The Secretary General of the Elysée has generally been the principal aide to the President on foreign affairs. He serves as a key intermediary with the other branches of the government and has frequent contacts with important officials from abroad. During times of crisis, he coordinates the information coming from the different ministries. The position is limited, however, by the fact that France has no equivalent of the NSC. Furthermore, the prestige of the President's office requires the President himself to appear to be the prime mover on forcing policy issues. Still, the Secretary General has a clear role as the President's closest aide and is viewed as someone who is intimately aware of the President's proclivities and propensities.

Under François Mitterrand, the role of the presidential entourage has increased markedly and in many cases roles have been deliberately made to overlap. On occasion, this has led to confusion and a certain flip-flopping from one position to another, depending on which advisor had reached Mitterrand last.

Mitterrand has been more empathetic to arms control or disarmament issues than the French conservatives, although since becoming President in 1981, he has adopted more of a Gaullist stance, at least publicly. Prior to the 1986 elections at least he viewed the major disarmament problems to be addressed as: "the overarmament of nuclear weapons, the *strategic destabilization which results from military reliance on new technologies*, the conventional disequilibrium and the threat of chemical war." Mitterrand has been more sensitive to Alliance policy than many others in the government and is less fearful of the forces which are driving NATO towards considering reducing its nuclear deterrent.

In addition to the President's diplomatic counsellors who maintain and coordinate relations with the Foreign Ministry (the Quai D'Orsay), the President has a military advisor. Traditionally, this man becomes the Chief of the General Staff upon leaving the Elysée. The military advisor is primarily concerned with operational matters, but his close relations with the President have often influenced the President's thinking. The current chief of the General Staff, for example, General Saulnier, has some expertise in Soviet affairs and has formed a high opinion of the improvement the Soviets have made in conventional war making capability. This has only added to the President's belief that nuclear deterrence will continue to be necessary for the protection of Europe.

The March 1986 elections, of course, brought the conservative Jacques Chirac to the Prime Ministership, forcing a power sharing between the two highest offices in the

country, a situation without precedent under the Fifth Republic. The result, in general, has been that the worst has been thus far avoided, while the two alternate somewhat uncertainly between confrontation and accommodation in the foreign policy arena. Mitterrand has not often interfered in Chirac's governmental program, but has reserved himself the right to veto certain decisions in cases such as the mobile missile. In this case, Chirac chose not to challenge the President so as not to undercut the country's reigning defense consensus.

In general, the conservatives have begrudgingly accepted the fact that the President will continue to play a key role in security matters: as sole custodian of the nuclear deterrent, commander of the armed forces, and head of the Defense Council, the country's highest decision-making body on security issues. (It is composed of a restricted group of ministers and top service chiefs.) Chirac wants to be President and would hardly want to see the office reduced in stature and power.

Still, cohabitation has clearly complicated French decision making. The Prime Minister's office has now increased its in-house expertise on foreign and defense affairs and Chirac's diplomatic adviser, François Bujon de l'Estaing, has acquired unprecedented influence. The Prime Minister's defense advisor, Jean Picq, has begun playing an important role in military affairs. For the first time this year, Matignon (the Prime Minister's office) prepared the defense budget, for example. Although Matignon does have an arms control advisor now, by and large he remains a secondary figure. The position papers and day-to-day management of arms control and negotiations remain in the hands of the Foreign Ministry. One shift which has taken place, however, has been that coordination efforts are now made at Matignon and not the Elysee.

Chirac has been outspoken in his criticism of the Reykjavik summit. His view, widely shared throughout France, is that any moves away from reliance on nuclear weapons could endanger Western security. Chirac has also been at odds with Mitterrand over how to respond to Gorbachev's Double Zero option, with the President taking the view that the West--having originally proposed Double Zero--could not credibly refuse it now. Mitterrand also felt that France could not take a position which would be fundamentally at odds with the majority of West German public opinion. Not without some misgivings, Chirac eventually came to accept Mitterrand's views. Nonetheless, the Chirac government's opposition to any agreement affecting shorter range nuclear weapons remains. The fears are that such an agreement would threaten France's land-based tactical

systems (Pluton and Hades), further weaken the U.S. commitment to Europe, and advance the Soviet goal of a denuclearized Europe. Mitterrand appears less opposed to a SRINF (short-range intermediate nuclear force) agreement. Both men have advanced positions which involve the West Germans, Chirac has push for a joint position which would include leaving 72 Pershing 1A missiles in West Germany, while Mitterrand's has more closely approached the views espoused by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister.

Whether or not cohabitation is repeated again following the 1988 presidential elections, or indeed ever, is not known at this point. What is known is that although the President may retain his primacy over foreign affairs and defense matters, that power has clearly been eroded by the present power sharing with a Prime Minister of the opposition.

The Foreign Minister, currently Jean-Bernard Raimond, is an interested consumer of the Quai D'Orsay's position on arms control, but is even more interested in shaping the overall context in which it is to be set in the Gorbachev era, having been Ambassador to the Soviet Union prior to his appointment as Foreign Minister. The Foreign Minister is aided by a cabinet, which is headed by a *chef du cabinet*. Policy can be influenced by the speed or lack thereof with which information is passed up and down the bureaucratic ladder.

The Minister's Political Director handles East-West relations and is concerned with arms control policy accordingly. Direction on these matters often comes from the Strategic Affairs Bureau. The Political Director keeps in close contact with the Elysée and Matignon as well as being an important point of contact for foreign governments. The present Political Director, Noiville, has left his Deputy, Benoit d'Aboville, in charge of the major East-West issues. D'Aboville is the single most important official in the French arms control effort on day-to-day matters. He has been covering the subject in the Ministry since 1977 and is well known in France for his forcefully expressed views, not always pro-American in their orientation. D'Aboville has been the principal French representative for conventional arms talks.

The Bureau of Strategic Affairs is the repository of experience on arms control within the Ministry. The Bureau is where d'Aboville came from. Most of the Bureau's personnel have been in their posts since it was formed in 1979. This fact reinforces the unit's cohesiveness, giving it a virtual monopoly on arms control policy making. The Bureau's staff will often take the initiative to shape policy or to alert political leaders to the

consequences of their statements and actions. They were known to be wary of what "imaginative things" Mitterrand, a Socialist, might do, particularly at the beginning of his term. As a result they kept a steady stream of educational papers flowing to the Elysée during that time. One of the biggest fears was that Mitterrand might put French nuclear missiles on the Plateau d'Albion up for negotiation, something he indeed hinted he might consider. It was with great relief that the Bureau saw the President eventually accept the country's traditional policy of supporting the independent "force de frappe." In general, the Quai is considered among the most Gaullist of French institutions.

The Quai also contains a Planning Unit, the CAP, which follows arms control issues and on occasion participates in ongoing negotiations. Powerful under Giscard d'Estaing, it has become less so since the disarmament process actually began. The CAP has played a role in shifting the Quai towards a more interdependent stance, somewhat removed from the classic Gaullist mode.

The Ministry of Defense generally shows little interest in becoming more involved in the arms control process, a fact of some irritation to certain nations which would appreciate some practical military input to balance the more theoretical approach of the diplomatic corps. This, many feel, would help France adjust its politics to the realities and requirements of Allied defense. MoD's real concern, however, continues to be the preparation for engagement in Germany. Generally, MoD is viewed as more Atlanticist than the Foreign Ministry. Few professional military officers actually believe that France today can be the "sanctuary" that traditional Gaullist orthodoxy requires.

In the past, MoD did not see France's direct security interests threatened by arms control negotiations. However, this perception is changing and it has prompted a growing awareness that the French defense establishment must play a more active role here. The SDI has forced some rethinking and the formation of several committees and study groups on space issues and directed energy weapons. MoD participation in the Conference on Disarmament in Europe helped heighten awareness of the need for greater involvement by military officials in the whole process.

Defense Minister Andre Giraud is a forceful player in the cohabitation government and may well be reappointed if a conservative government is formed following next year's elections. Giraud's background is in the weapons development field and he is an advocate of greater transatlantic ties. He has been active in encouraging the government to be more

supportive of Allied arms control objectives, while remaining vigilant to French security interests.

The Defense Minister is aided by his Cabinet and a diplomatic advisor, although this latter post does not normally carry a great deal of weight. The Delegation Generale pour l'Armement (DGA), one of the largest employers in the country, is also under the Minister. Obviously, DGA's orientation is armaments not disarmament, but its technical expertise is critical in assessing the impact of arms control proposals on force structure requirements. DGA has already been very much involved in assessing the impact of SDI on French nuclear forces. With the current DGA leadership concerned with enhancing France's nuclear weapons arsenal, this has also meant that they must follow the evolving arms control environment closely as well.

MoD has a Planning office, which provides assessments relevant to arms control issues. The Strategic Planning and Studies Group, called Groupes, is the closest equivalent the country has to DoD's Net Assessment Office. The Groupes' influence has been waning since its high point under Giscard d'Estaing, although this may not be a permanent trend. It still has played an important role in shaping French policy towards SDI. The Groupes has the responsibility to evaluate the effectiveness of ABM systems and *their consequences for French nuclear penetration capability*. Generally viewed as a technical body, Groupes engineers have regularly been requested to evaluate INF deployments or BMD developments.

The General Staff provides the overall leadership for operational military matters. Thus, it is concerned with arms control implications and East-West military force level agreements. Within the General Staff, arms control issues have been followed by the small Bureau of General Studies, in recent times filled by a high-ranking naval officer. This Bureau monitors the Geneva arms limitation talks. Over the last 18 months, it has expanded its international affairs division. The Bureau's head, General Hanrion, spends much of his time assessing the Gorbachev challenge to France. As much as anything, it is movement in the conventional arms control area which seems to be driving the military's new awareness of arms control.

In terms of arms control issues, a further resource available to the Prime Minister's office is the SGDN, the National Defense Secretariat General, a kind of administrative think tank. With a few exceptions, however, the SGDN has played a very minor role in

arms control. Instead it serves as the Secretariat for the Defense Council and is largely a bureaucratic instrument of administrative coordination.

One fact that distinguishes France from the other major European countries is the absence of strong public involvement in arms control issues. This gives French decision makers far greater leeway to define the country's security and arms control policies than elsewhere in Europe. The feeling is that this provides France with a buffer from the Soviet efforts to stir up public opinion by encouraging anti-nuclear movements. It also gives them an occasional sense of mission to protect French and even European security interests, without having to take into consideration local political opposition to nuclear deterrence.

France's major parties have achieved a rather remarkable consensus on defense policy, a condition not achieved elsewhere in Europe. Part of this may be a legacy from de Gaulle, who excluded the parties from management questions involving nuclear issues. Decisions were made by the President with advice from a few close advisors. The parties never developed many genuine experts on defense as a result.

There is some evidence that the country's strategic consensus is no longer quite so solid as before, however. Substantial increases in defense spending, for example, have very little public support, while a good number of voters, particularly on the left, would like to see it reduced. One poll showed that 32 percent of the country would prefer to abandon the "force de frappe." The country also appears split more or less equally among those who favor the U.S. alliance, those who would prefer an independent European military alliance, and those who would prefer neutrality.

Of the major parties, the Socialists do show some signs of divisions over defense issues at the grass roots level. Many party members have only reluctantly accepted the President's hard-line defense policy. Still, with Mitterrand firmly in control of the party, security questions have been largely dominated by a handful of party members, two of whom, Charles Hernu and Paul Quiles, were previously Defense Ministers.

The Communists continue to support France's independent strategic nuclear force, although they have recently abandoned support for its modernization program. The Communists' relative decline in importance during this decade has obviously reduced party influence on national policy, although this may ultimately have the effect of opening up the

peace movement--tainted by the Communists' close ties with the Soviet Union--to other groups.

In general, France sees the present as a new age. The Euromissile debate heightened French fears of decoupling the United States from Europe. French officials opposed both the START talks and the INF medium-range negotiations endorsed by the Atlantic Council in 1981. The U.S. position which emerged from Reykjavik and Gorbachev's recent proposals concerning Double Zero have further enhanced fears about decoupling. Nor are the French pleased with recent Soviet offers to discuss conventional disarmament, the feeling being that the Soviets have sufficient leeway there to be able to make an empty gesture which might capture European, particularly West German, imaginations. This has led the French to seek to define common positions with West Germany. French policy makers are also greatly concerned with the breakdown of the defense consensus in Germany and Britain, a fact that has propelled them to recognize the need for their own increased involvement in the European arms control debate. The country's main goal is to win European backing for France's nuclear posture. Their desire is to see French and British deterrent forces remain a "precious asset" for European security. Perhaps more importantly, they would also like the Europeans to recognize the contribution France's independent nuclear forces make to the present and future security of the region. Meanwhile, France's nuclear modernization keeps European options open for the future.

Increased French involvement in arms control issues allows France to pursue its long-standing objective of fostering a common European identity. This helps explain France's opposition to the bloc-to-bloc approach of the MBFR talks, and why they have sought an alternative forum for conventional disarmament negotiations, closely linked to the CSCE talks. In general, the country's basic skepticism about the military benefits of arms control agreements remains widespread, partly because much of France's international prestige is derived from its nuclear status.

Although the French are suspicious of Soviet intentions, the objective of French disarmament may be based more on pinning down West German attitudes than on changing the Soviet's. Above all, French interests remain concentrated on protecting the country's nuclear deterrent from political erosion and criticism. The nature of the country's military relations with the United States and its advocacy for a stronger European force may well

force the French into a number of political contortions, causing delays and irritation to the Allies.

E. THE WEST GERMAN CASE

Overall West German attitudes towards arms control issues remain closely tied to the country's special relationship with the United States. At the same time, however, the detente of the 1970s and the Ostpolitik begun then continue to be extremely popular, a fact which is pushing West Germany to the gradual evolution of its own independent, Western voice.

West Germany's Basic Law assigns primary responsibility for arms control decision making to the Executive branch, although it also guarantees the Ministry of Defense an input into the process (see Figure 3). In addition, the Chancellor's Office, the Cabinet, and the Federal Security Council play lesser roles, as does the Bundestag and the national political parties and their supporting political foundations.

The most important actor in the country's arms control process is the Foreign Minister. The Ministry's central role has been solidified due to the power and long tenure of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has been in office since 1974. Genscher takes an active interest in shaping arms control policy. Thus, the increasing importance of arms control in overall West German security policy can be partly attributed to him, as can the country's recent emphasis on the European aspects of this field.

Article 65 of the Basic Law establishes the principle of departmental autonomy, which limits the Chancellor's interference in the Foreign Minister's control over foreign policy. In effect, this guarantees the Ministry will initiate preparatory work on arms control and sign off on final policy decisions.

At the top level, the Foreign Minister is assisted by his Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries and his Commissioner of Arms Control and Disarmament. Due to his numerous responsibilities, the Foreign Minister is generally most concerned with the broad questions and implications of arms control policy. His four Secretaries' main function is to ensure that his guidelines are carried out at lower levels. The Special Commissioner occupies a pivotal position within the Ministry. Depending on the strength of the individual occupying the post, he can play an important role since he has access to




Figure 3. West German Institutional Structure for Arms Control Decision Making

both the Foreign Minister and the working-level operations of the Ministry's Political Division, 2a, where most of the day-to-day work on arms control takes place.

The two Parliamentary Secretaries are generally selected for political reasons. They act as liaisons between the Foreign Office, the political parties, various parliamentary groups, and the Federal Council.

The two Permanent Secretaries tend to be more active in formulating substantive policies, along with the division heads and desk officers. Traditionally, they are drawn from career civil service ranks. The ministerial staff is largely a personal task force, selected by and loyal to the Foreign Minister.

At the intermediate level, the Foreign Ministry's planning staff is only sporadically involved in specific arms control issues. It is composed of 12 civil servants, no more than one or two of whom is likely to be involved in arms control.

Political Divisions 2 and 2a, however, have major responsibilities on arms control questions. Division 2a was created in 1981, the result of a move within the Foreign Ministry to upgrade arms control policy. The Head of Division 2a is also the Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament; the post carries an ambassador's rank, indicative of its relative importance.

The Commissioner enjoys a significant degree of latitude to interpret his own role and the scope and nature of his activities. In general, he maintains regular contact with the Allies, non-nuclear states, and international organizations. He also sometimes participates in Cabinet meetings, meets with the Chancellor and Bundestag as well and participates in the Foreign Ministry's Directors' Conferences. On occasion, he also has reason to interact with the media or other public channels on arms control matters. Of even more significance, perhaps, the Commissioner has additional duties in maintaining contacts with Soviet and East German officials. From 1977 until early 1987, the Commissioner was Friedrich Ruth, who generally exploited the post's potential successfully. His successor is Josef Holik, who is expected to do the same. Holik had been Ruth's Deputy since December 1983 and headed the West German MBFR delegation between 1984 and 1986.

At the working level, Division 2a responsibilities are split among four desks. Desk 220 handles global disarmament and arms control, including START and INr. Desk 221 handles security, disarmament, and arms control in Europe, including MBFR and CSCE.

Desk 222 oversees non-proliferation and verification as well as the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons. Desk 223 is tasked with disarmament and the United Nations' efforts in this respect. These four desks routinely cooperate with Division 2, which has responsibilities for NATO and East-West questions. Within Division 2, Desk 201 deals with NATO and defense matters, while Desk 212 handles East-West relations and is assigned the primary authority for the CSCE process.

Personnel limitations hamper the working-level operations the Desks are able to perform. Division 2a has only 18-20 officers of diplomatic rank. This tends to limit the amount of time they have to carry out conceptual studies or innovation. This means that Division 2a must often work closely with Division 2's Desk 201, as well as with Defense Ministry officers. Desk officers within the Foreign Ministry are further restrained by a lack of outside source material. Generally, the diplomatic corps does not have sufficient technical experience. In addition, desk officers generally rotate out of the field every three to four years. Finally, funds for outside research are minimal, although the Research Institute of the Foundation on Science and Policy (SWP) and a couple of other institutes do provide some additional background. The result of these limitations is expected to be felt particularly if an increasing emphasis is given to negotiating conventional force reductions.

West Germany's concurrence principle guarantees the Ministry of Defense (MoD) the right to advise the Foreign Ministry and to contribute suggestions at all levels. The two ministries follow similarly strict hierarchical lines. MoD's influence in the overall arms control process is, of course, dependent on the personality and power of the Defense Minister within the Executive branch. MoD generally has more input when detailed analyses of the military implications of a negotiating position are needed, such as the military security aspects of MBFR, while in more political considerations, MoD plays a lesser role. On the whole, the current Defense Minister, Manfred Woerner has tried to play a greater role in shaping West German INF policy than his predecessor.

MoD's planning staff has a minor role in arms control, again depending on the Defense Minister. The current head of this staff is a close associate of Woerner's, Hans Ruehle. The Defense Minister is also assisted by a Parliamentary Secretary and three State Secretaries.

The highest-ranking military officer is the Inspector General, who is selected by the Defense Minister. He is the Government's chief military advisor and the country's NATO

representative as well as a non-voting member of the Federal Security Council. As Commander of the Armed Forces Staff, he relies largely on Division III in the Armed Forces Staff.

At the intermediate level, the Armed Forces Staff is MoD's most significant policy making body. It links the Minister, his Secretaries, and the Inspector General with the Division heads and thus to the working level. There are seven departments, mostly composed of military officers. Division III is responsible for all political/military affairs, including strategy, NATO, armaments, and arms control. This Division is broken down into nine Desks, each headed by a full colonel with 7 to 10 assistants. Desk 5 has the responsibility for arms control within MoD. It is staffed by seven officers including the desk chief, so each officer must commonly handle more than one issue. The main focus here is on operational issues. There appears to be a sharp division in Desk 5 between conventional and nuclear matters. Desk 5 tasks also include advising and coordinating policy with the Foreign Ministry's Division 2a and sending an officer to accompany the West German delegation to MBFR and CSCE. In addition to these tasks, MoD's Desk 5 works closely with Desk 3, which has responsibility for NATO and the Western European Union and serves as a link to the U.S. and other Western allies.

The third important Executive branch actor is the Chancellor's Office. The role of this office is shaped by the Chancellor's leadership style and interests. In general, the staff tends to include close personal advisors to the Chancellor. As such, it does have the potential to by-pass the Foreign Ministry decision-making process to a certain extent, as occurred during Helmut Schmidt's term in office. The Chancellor's Office also acts as a sort of political watchdog, warning the Chancellor of potential political conflicts and seeking to protect his reputation and overall interests.

Although constitutionally limited to established general policy guidelines, the Chancellor may influence policy by exerting control over ministerial jurisdiction, as well as by issuing periodic policy statements. Chancellor Helmut Kohl does, however, appear less willing to step into the fray of ministerial conflict than did Helmut Schmidt.

Within the Chancellor's Office, specific responsibility for security affairs lies with Division II. Within that division, Desk 212 handles responsibility for East-West relations and bilateral relations with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and North America. Group 23 is responsible for defense, arms control, and disarmament. It is made up of

four military officers, who advise the Chancellor on the military aspects of arms control and function as a Secretariat to the Federal Security Council. The Federal Security Council also has some arms control responsibilities, acting as a forum for political/military discussion and policy decisions based on papers prepared by the Foreign Ministry and MoD. Its members include the Chancellor, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice, Finance, and Economics, the Inspector General, and the Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament. However, the Council meets too infrequently to have a genuinely effective role in policy resolution.

In any dispute between the Foreign Ministry and MoD, the balance of power favors the former. Most West German representatives to bilateral or multilateral councils are from the Foreign Ministry, although MoD does send some delegates, too. MoD's best method of exerting its influence during moments of interdepartmental conflict often centers around its contacts with NATO and the U.S. military. Most interdepartmental conflicts are solved informally, although interdepartmental working groups (IMAGs) are sometimes formed for more difficult issues, such as the initial preparation of the West German position on SALT I.

Historically, the Bundestag has played little role in the formulation of major policies. The parliamentary system has meant that the parties generally follow the dictates of the political leadership, leaving the opposition as an unequal competitor to the Executive branch. However, the Bundestag does fulfill a number of secondary functions on arms control policy. It provides a forum for public debate. Many such debates are televised and thus provide the opposition and ruling coalition parties occasions for making their views known. This practice is somewhat limited by the fact that only designated security experts are generally permitted to challenge the government's policies.

The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees and the Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament all have some capacity to influence Executive decision making. Committee meetings are link-up points for the parties' defense experts and ministry officials. Typically, however, most Deputies lack training and expertise in security affairs. Even those who sit on the Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament receive only selective information at the weekly briefing with the Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, an event that is not always of a timely nature. However, various parliamentary working groups and the research groups associated with the major parties'

political foundations do offer background information and advice on specific issues to Bundestag members. Each of the parliamentary working groups is subdivided into smaller units corresponding to members' areas of competence. These meet to discuss prepared papers in weekly sessions.

Of the research institutes which have some input into the arms control decision-making process, the most important is the Foundation for Science and Policy (SWP), which has been designated the country's sole official research unit. It is financed through federal funds. In general, it is not considered innovative, however, and its input is not always suited to day-to-day issues of working level operations. Another group is the German Society for Foreign Policy, roughly similar to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations.

As a member of NATO, West Germany participates in many different consultative bodies, which have an interest in arms control matters. Most of these funnel their recommendations to the North Atlantic Council. Contact with U.S. officials and military officers in these organizations may have an influence on West German personnel. Coordination between the two countries' militaries is further reinforced by the number of U.S. personnel stationed in West Germany and by the West Germans who come to the U.S. for training. In general, it is felt that the U.S. dominates these bilateral and informal relationships, in part because of its status as a nuclear superpower. This U.S. advantage may disappear in the future, as West Germany becomes more and more involved in multilateral fora, where it can more easily ally itself with the other European NATO nations.

West Germany's geographic location along the NATO/Warsaw Pact divide and the division of the country into East and West has clearly made Ostpolitik a major concern to all Germans. The solid ties that bind West Germany to the U.S. nuclear umbrella cannot always mask the tension which these two divergent external realities create. In broad terms, all West Germans were marked by the country's World War I and II experience. This, of course, is less and less true as time passes, but it has left its mark in a lingering anti-militarist sentiment.

The Ostpolitik initiated during the Brandt-Scheel coalition and consolidated under Schmidt-Gensher (1974-82) continues to be overwhelmingly popular in the country. This has led the majority of the population to view arms control more favorably than is often the

case in the United States. Arms control and detente seem very closely linked in most West German minds.

Another change in attitude which has come about since the beginning of the eighties is the steady muting of the public fear of the Soviet Union. In fact, West Germans tend to be less concerned with the Soviet threat than most other European nations in the Western camp, while many Germans feel increasingly concerned about U.S. pressure on their own government. One thing seems certain: West German attitudes towards arms control and security policy have become "securitized," that is, they have become important to the public debate, particularly since NATO's dual track decision.

West Germany's CDU/CSU coalition can be essentially grouped into "Gaullists" and "Atlanticists," depending on what views the members take concerning the nature of the U.S. nuclear and conventional commitment to the country. Generally speaking, Gaullists fear that the emergence of the bloc system has left the Europeans too little room for growth and maneuver. The Atlanticists tend to see the bipolar world as irreversible and argue that the Europeans need to face that fact or risk alienating the U.S. partner. Thus the Gaullists tend to look towards increased European participation in security affairs and seek to end what may be seen as an overdependence on the U.S. Among those considered to be Gaullists are CSU chief Franz Josef Strauss and the CDU's Alfred Dregger.

For many in the CDU/CSU union, arms control has long been the most uncertain variable in the security equation. Thus the union has always expressed a commitment to arms control. Yet at the same time, many party leaders fear that a poorly conceived arms control policy could undermine America's nuclear guarantee, something they believe to be one of the logical aims of Soviet policy. For the union, arms control policies should promote risk reduction, rather than arms reduction for its own sake. Another fear is that arms control might isolate Bonn from its allies in Paris and London.

Although not originally a strong advocate of Ostpolitik, the union has now seemed to adopt it as its own, while stopping short of explicitly linking arms control policy directly to Ostpolitik. Still, however, the union as a whole gives precedence to security policy over detente and there is little belief that detente can ever replace deterrence.

The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has been moving away from internal consensus on security policy as the moderate wing of the Schmidt era loses influence. This internal

party division was a partial cause for the Free Democratic Party's (FDP) 1982 decision to leave the SPD and enter into a coalition with the CDU/CSU union. By the campaign in early 1983, the SPD was advancing the concept of "security partnership," essentially seen by critics as weighing German policy to the East to the disadvantage of NATO. SPD criticism of the Euromissile deployment led many to conclude that the party was seeking a neutralist path. The party's defeat did little to halt its leftward drift on security issues. The following year the party announced that it was initiating talks with the East German Socialist Unity Party on the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone in Central Europe.

The party's controversial arms control debate continued with the draft prepared by Andreas von Bulow, a former Parliamentary State Secretary for the MoD under Schmidt. Von Bulow's report essentially portrayed NATO and the Warsaw Pact as being equally responsible for the military confrontation in Europe and stressed the need to eliminate the nuclear arms which constitute much of the current Western deterrent. Despite the controversy the report generated, much of its contents reappeared in the SDP's party platform drawn up for the Nuremburg party conference in mid-1986. In brief, the SDP platform adopted then called for the withdrawal of the Pershing II and cruise missiles already installed, the creation of a nuclear-free corridor in Central Europe, the withdrawal of all chemical weapons from the region, a halt to nuclear testing, and the rejection of Airland Battle 2000 and Follow-on Forces Attack.

The Free Democrats have played a much more important role in arms control than their relatively small electoral numbers would normally indicate. This has been due to the party's key role as the country's coalition maker and breaker. Participation in every government since 1969 has given the FDP unusual continuity and opportunity to develop and implement its arms control and security policy. The party has long supported arms control negotiations. As Foreign Minister since 1974, Genscher's policies can accurately be said to be the party's policies: the maintenance of a firm NATO commitment coupled with dialogue and cooperation with the East and, increasingly, support for progress in European security efforts. Within Europe, Genscher rejects unilateral West German positions, while backing efforts in both Germanies to improve the East-West dialogue through the respective blocs.

The Green Party holds the most radical, if unformed, arms control positions of any of the West German parties. The Greens remain tied to the principle of non-violence and

advocate an "active peace policy" to replace Germany's membership in NATO. Although they currently have little impact on national arms control policy, the Greens' public stance against having nuclear weapons in the country may well have helped draw the SPD farther to the left in an effort to hold on to its left wing supporters.

For the future, the current ruling coalition appears likely to continue along present policy lines. With the FDP's good showing in the 1987 elections, Genscher's hand has been strengthened. In the absence of a major deterioration in East-West relations, Genscher has pushed for a new forum for conventional arms control. As part of CSCE, this would seem to imply a greater role for Europe. West Germany continues to remain vulnerable to changes in U.S and Soviet policy, however, and were Soviet-American relations to deteriorate appreciably, they could easily put overwhelming pressures on the current coalition.

F. THE ITALIAN CASE

In general, Italians do not see themselves as major players in international security affairs, although in the past seven years this has been changing, particularly during the prime ministership of Bettino Craxi. Most Italian leaders are realistic enough to understand that they have little direct influence over major East-West issues; they have therefore tended historically to ally themselves with U.S. policy in most cases and support key NATO decisions, even--as in the case of INF--when the nation is directly implicated.

Italian political culture is biased in favor of arms control and disarmament. The country's traditionally largest party, the Christian Democrats, are influenced in this direction by their ties to the Catholic Church. The country's other large party, the Communists, are also predisposed towards arms control in keeping with their Euro-Communist coolness towards NATO and their desire to maintain distance from the Soviet Union on security matters. The Socialist Party, whose influence has grown markedly during this decade, has generally been linked to the socialist peace tradition. The country's large left has engendered a peace movement, which further pushes political leaders in the direction of favoring arms control.

The Foreign Ministry dominates Italy's arms control process. The foreign minister is advised by his Director General for Political Affairs. During the last government, Foreign Minister Andreotti played a dominant role, while Defense Minister Spadolini had

but a small impact. In general, the foreign ministry lacks resources and technical expertise on arms control issues. Long dominated by the Christian Democrats, the foreign ministry usually concentrates on the political aspects of arms control. However, the country did take an active part in the Stockholm Conference and worked in close harmony with other West European nations in developing confidence-building measures such as exchanges of military information, pre-notification of maneuvers, and verification. On MBFR, however, Italy opted for observer status only. On INF, the country worked through the Nuclear Planning Group and NATO organizations.

The Communist Party (PCI) first accepted the legitimacy of Italy's membership in NATO in 1975. Traditionally, it has been the country's most internationally-oriented party. In 1979, it formed a separate foreign policy department. A number of officials are devoted full-time to defense and security matters. Generally, the party has more resources to devote to the field than the other parties. Its International Political Studies Institute (CESPI) holds seminars which attract people from outside the party; not all of its staff are PCI members.

The Christian Democrats generally appear less interested in security matters than the other important Italian parties. Andreotti appears an exception to this rule. The Christian Democrats do have ties to a number of foreign policy institutes. The Parliament's Defense Committee is chaired by a party member, former Defense Minister Ruffini. The Committee has issued a number of documents about SDI, but suffers from a lack of staff and tends to rely on the ministry of defense.

The Republican Party, of which the recent Defense Minister Spadolini is a leader, is also active on the Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, led by the Republican Giorgio La Malfa. Although not too interested in arms control, Spadolini was responsible for the important 1984 White Paper which looked at overall strategic and military affairs.

The Socialist Party has played an important role in opening up Italy to broader security issues, beginning first with Lelio Lagorio as Defense Minister from 1980-1983 and then during the tenure of Craxi as Prime Minister from 1983-1987. Lagorio was responsible for accelerating the Italian armed forces' modernization plan and advocating a shift in emphasis from the northeast towards the Mediterranean.

This shift away from purely NATO responsibilities towards the south is perhaps the most significant change in Italian security policy since the postwar decision to join NATO.

It followed closely the December 1979 NATO agreement to deploy U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Sicily. The missile decision seemed to mark a realization within Italian political circles that debate on security issues was now possible. Italian leaders began to take an interest in searching out and expressing purely Italian, as opposed to Western, thinking on the subject. The acceptance of NATO missiles led to the first major foreign policy dispute between the government and the Communists. The debate itself led to more press coverage of security and defense matters and corresponded with the growth of a number of research institutes. It also gave impetus to a sizeable anti-nuclear peace movement.

Military budgets in the early 1980s rose noticeably, as funding was allocated for the services' modernization plan. Much of the new equipment was destined primarily for the Mediterranean. At the same time, Italy began to take a more active role in international security matters, joining UNIFIL in 1979, guaranteeing Malta's neutrality in 1980, sending troops to patrol the Gulf of Aqaba and then into Beirut in 1982, and finally participating in the minesweeping force that operated in the northern Red Sea in 1984. Most of this activity took place in the context of Italy's expanded interest in the Middle East and Palestinian affairs.

The Craxi government was formed in 1984, with a pro-Arab foreign minister (Andreotti) and a pro-Israeli, pro-American defense minister (Spadolini). Their rivalry helped Craxi exert his own brand of leadership. Essentially an Atlanticist, Craxi pushed through the deployment of the Euromissiles despite widespread opposition. Yet his sense of independence from traditional Italian acquiescence to U.S. views also led him to challenge some American policies, notably in Central America and in the Middle East. In a speech in Lisbon in May 1984, he hinted that he might be willing to reconsider the immediate deployment of the Euromissiles so as to encourage an arms control agreement. Craxi's independence was also evidenced in the improvement of ties to Eastern Europe, something he associated with Italy's right to emerge from under the shadow of the superpowers and perhaps influence the East-West debate in the process.

Craxi has not gone far enough to please the Italian left, however. In general terms, the left remains critical of U.S. policy. In recent times, the Communists have become preoccupied with exposing the U.S.-Italian agreements covering NATO and opposing the

American military's right to control the activities of its troops stationed on sovereign Italian territory.

An obvious sticking point between the U.S. and Italy was the *Achille Lauro* affair, which temporarily led to the collapse of the Craxi government. It appears that this and other events may eventually lead the Italian government to tighten its controls over U.S. basing rights. In fact, Craxi appears to have submitted such a plan during the second half of 1986, which was defeated by the solidly pro-American Republican Party members of the government coalition.

The U.S. raid on Libya was also unpopular with many elements of the Italian electorate. When shortly thereafter Libya made an attempt to fire missiles at a facility on Lampadusa, manned by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Italians moved to take control of it, two years before the agreement in existence was to expire.

In short, Italy appears to have undergone an important change in the way in which it perceives itself in the overall international security scene. Although there is little question but that Italy will remain firmly within the Western camp and strongly attached to the U.S., for the first time Italians are coming to enjoy their own relative freedom to position themselves and define their own specific security concerns. The outstanding example of this is their gradual de-emphasis of their NATO responsibilities to the northeast in favor of increasing their resources oriented toward the Mediterranean. This provides the potential to complement NATO's southern flank capability as well as to help support the Italy's increasing interest in international operations.

G. THE FUTURE

A central tension in the European arms control policy process exists between Europeanist and nationalist tendencies. The key European countries are trying to pursue European cooperation where possible, for example Anglo-French cooperation on nuclear arms control issues. Europeanization will clearly become more significant in the years ahead in affecting the American approach to Alliance management, yet this European cooperation trend is limited by the enhanced national assertiveness of those same countries on security and arms control issues.

An additional trend overlays the European cooperation-nationalistic trend. The Europeans are increasingly concerned with ensuring a substantial American military presence in the years ahead, even if reductions can be tolerated. They will seek to ensure that arms control agreements bind, rather than free the Americans from their commitment to Europe, especially in the nuclear area. Nonetheless, for Europeanization to be pursued it is clearly necessary to shift the balance of power within Alliance leadership and managerial relationships. In other words, there is an additional tension between Europeanist and Atlanticist impulses which will shape the European arms control effort.

The result of these twin sets of tensions--Europeanist versus nationalist and Europeanist versus Atlanticist--will be the existence of shifting coalitions among the European powers and between selected European powers and the United States on security and arms control issues confronting the Alliance. Notably, the French and the British have every incentive to enhance their cooperation on nuclear arms control matters. The Germans may follow a European policy but the goal will be to ensure continued presence of significant American conventional forces, which will create a natural coalition with the British who will follow the same objective. The Germans will seek through the arms control process not only to anchor the American commitment to forward defense but hope to draw the French into a greater commitment to the conventional defense of Germany. The Italians will place increasing emphasis on the Mediterranean dimension of their security and seek cooperation with the French, such cooperation creating tensions with the Germans. The Italians and French will continue to try to ensure that no serious limits on naval forces in the Mediterranean are introduced into arms control talks and will be concerned that the Germans will allow the Soviets to lay down precedents for limits on naval forces in the follow-on to CDE.

Such cleavages of interests will continue to provide the Americans with ample opportunities to exercise leadership, but the Europeans will increasingly seek European institutional settings in order to limit the scope of that leadership. Notably, the WEU or something equivalent will be necessary to provide an effective halfway house between simple bilateral cooperation and the NATO institutions.

European complaints about the lack of consultation will increase in the years ahead as the United States becomes more concerned with reducing its defense burden in Europe. American administrations will almost assuredly seek to reduce American forces in Europe

through unilateral or negotiated measures. In contrast, the Europeans will seek to tie up the American forces in complex bargaining through multinational negotiating fora. Although the Europeans have a common interest in seeking Soviet reductions while maintaining a substantial U.S. presence, it is unlikely that they will be able to agree to a common set of negotiating goals. The inability of the Europeans, however, to present a cohesive image will be very frustrating to future American administrations and may well lead to the exacerbation of Alliance relations.

There is a change underfoot in Europe, however, to try to develop more realistic and positive proposals rather than just vetoing or "directing" the American effort. The European governments may well beef up their arms control units to develop greater capability to generate proposals of their own in order to shape the Atlantic debate. Put in other words, perhaps the INF debate will leave behind the legacy of a greater European effort to initiate, rather than simply to react.

Nonetheless, the Europeans are limited in their ability to initiate, given the significance of the American nuclear deterrent to Western security. As far as the central strategic systems are concerned, the Europeans can only be observers, although they will clearly try to be more active in shaping American thinking on extended deterrence.

In order to become more effective in the arms control area, we can anticipate institutional changes in the European arms control process as well. The uniformed military and the civilian MoDs are already becoming more involved in informing the policy process in the European governments. To become more active, the governments will almost assuredly have to provide greater opportunities for their military to play a role in assessing arms control options.

Greater involvement in the Alliance management of arms control issues contains within it, however, an important political challenge to the European governments. Increased involvement by the European governments will almost assuredly elevate public attention to security issues. The disarmament debate is unlikely to disappear and the prospects for re-establishing a European consensus on the validity of any form of nuclear or conventional deterrence will remain slim. This means that the European governments will seek to assure that the flexible response strategy remains the bedrock of Alliance policy and will seek arms control regimes which will be perceived to reinforce flexible response.

The absence of consensus and the challenges which the left will pose to the evolution of American strategy will be constant irritants to the transatlantic relationship. In fact the evolution of American strategy will itself continue to be the central bone of contention over security issues among the various political factions in the European polities. The (apparent) absence of serious arms control negotiations will be a serious detriment to those Europeans supportive of American security policy. An arms control card has become a sine qua non of American security policy towards Western Europe and this will undoubtedly continue to be the case in the future.

It is clear as well that the British and French nuclear forces are becoming far more important to the future of European nuclear deterrence than either of those countries would wish. It may well be difficult to avoid formulating an effective strategy that includes these forces in arms control talks in the future in order to protect them from anti-nuclear pressures in Western Europe. Creating such a strategy will be immensely difficult and will require American support of an Anglo-French dialogue on this subject. A serious crisis in British and French relations with the United States will emerge if the U.S. is unable to handle this issue carefully. The Soviets will, of course, do nothing to help the United States on this score, having had for many years the objective of encouraging the U.S. to ignore its Alliance responsibilities, for example in the technology and weapons transfer area. The Soviets have raised the Pershing I issue in the INF discussion for just this reason.

In short, the need to monitor developments within Western Europe in the years ahead will grow, rather than diminish. The dynamics of the security debate, the processes of governmental management of arms control issues, and the European cooperation phenomenon will create a fluid environment within which the United States must exercise its Alliance leadership. It will not be an easy task, but keeping a close ear to the ground will be critical to the effort.

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