

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	
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NATO BURDENSHARING - WHAT IS	S THE BURDEN AND	Study Project
HOW IS IT SHARED?		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
AUTHOR(a)		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)
LTC DAVID L. PEEBLES		
. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
US Army War College		AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		
1. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE 30 March 1988
Same		JU MAICE 1988
		56
4. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(II dillerent from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS, (of this report)
		Unclassified
		15. DECLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
6. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the Report) Approved for public release 7. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the ebetrec	; distribution is unl:	
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NATO BURDENSHARING - - WHAT IS THE BURDEN AND HOW IS IT SHARED?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel David L. Peebles, IN

Colonel Henry G. Gole Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013 30 March 1988

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: David L. Peebles, LTC, IN

TITLE: NATO Burdensharing - - What Is The Burden And How Is It Shared?

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 30 March 1988 PAGES: 53 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

>Since the conclusion of World War II, the United States has maintained a substantial part of its military force in This presence results in large measure from the United Europe. States' participation in the multi-lateral mutual defense pact entitled The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO. Because the United States has a historic disdain for military involvement with other countries unless there is a direct and overt threat to our national security, our participation in NATO produces periodic criticism and pressure for reduction or withdrawal. The present domestic economic situation and the debate over how our scarce resources should be allocated, coupled with concern over foreign military involvement; is generating renewed questions as to our correct role in the defense of Western Europe; renewed concern that our allies bear their fair share of the cost; and more frequent calls for reduced involvement. This study seeks to identify the actual costs associated with maintaining NATO as a credible instrument of free-world strength. It is an attempt to go beyond a simple analysis of the monetary contribution of member nations, and examine elements of the economic, social, military and political contributions. The goal of the study is to draw conclusions regarding the total content of the burden of maintaining the alliance and how, and by whom, that burden is shared.

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NATO BURDENSHARING

WHAT IS THE BURDEN AND HOW IS IT SHARED?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO, is a multi-lateral mutual defense pact creating an alliance which provides for the common defense of all member nations. In return for the security provided by the alliance, each member nation contributes a portion of its resources to the organization. Periodically, the relative size and fairness of a nation's contribution comes in question. In the United States, the most common criticism of the alliance is that the US bears too much of the burden of maintaining NATO as a credible instrument of free-world strength. The critics become more prevalent, vocal and emotional when domestic economic conditions require close scrutiny of our national priorities in resource allocation.

Scope

This study seeks to identify the elements of the burden (or

cost) and to determine the relative equity of each member nation's share of that burden. In order to keep this study manageable in terms of scope and magnitude. I am going to limit the discussions of burden and sharing to the present and the relatively recent past.

BACKGROUND

Any discussion of NATO burdensharing is irrelevant without a clear understanding of the rationale behind NATO's creation.

Post World War II Climate

At the end of World War II, the Axis was defeated and occupied by the Allied Powers, creating a tremendous power vacuum in Central Europe. England and France were economically destroyed. Large communist parties operated in France and Italy. The Soviet Union was clearly in control of Eastern Germany and much of Eastern Europe. The postwar situation was filled with uncertainty and suspicion on both sides; the US and Western Europe, and the USSR and Eastern Europe. The Soviets' brutal policies in Eastern Europe, which they defended as necessary to ensure Soviet security, caused major concerns in the West regarding their respect for the independence of other nations.1

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Need For Alliances

Many European leaders felt the need for a regional alliance to ease the pressure that the Soviets were bringing to bear on them. In March 1948, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg signed the Brussels Pact which was founded on the principles of unity in Europe and the preservation of Europe as the heart of Western Civilization. When signed, the concept was that this agreement would be an economic, social, cultural and collective self-defense pact that could be extended over time to include "other historic members of European civilization".2

US Congressional Support

Within a month of reaching agreement the parties established a permanent organization which, in addition to other bodies, included a military commission to which both Canada and the US were associated through military observers. The US was viewing military developments in Europe in the context of the Marshall Plan, fully aware of Western European fears that Communist uprisings or Soviet pressures would seriously interfere with economic recovery. Congress openly supported the concept of regional associations for the purpose

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of mutual defense and urged President Truman to pursue the idea within the provisions of the United Nations Charter. It is worth noting that this was the first time the Congress encouraged an American military alliance during time of peace.3

CREATION OF NATO

The President acted quickly and in July 1948, talks between the Brussels Pact members, the US, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Fortugal began. These negotiations resulted in the establishment of NATO, the treaty for which was signed by the President on April 4, 1949 and ratified by the Senate in July 1949. During debate over ratification, some concern about the treaty commitments were voiced, but restrictions on stationing American troops in Europe and limitations on recognizing a moral or legal obligation to provide arms, naval and air supplies (including atomic weapons and information) were defeated. Thus, NATO was established and the US became an active participant.

Alliance Changes

The Brussels Pact concept of future expansion carried over to NATO and as the alliance matured its membership changed. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952. In 1955, after lengthy and

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Decasionally emotional debate, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) joined. NATO membership remained constant for over a decade but in 1966, President de Gaulle of France significantly changed the role of his nation as a NATO partner. By this time East-West tensions had lowered bringing with it a reduced member nation reliance on the alliance. Citing the importance of independence in foreign affairs, President de Gaulle withdrew French armed forces from NATO. In 1967, NATO headquarters moved from France, completing the separation of France from the NATO integrated military force, although it otherwise participates in the alliance. The final change in NATO composition occurred in 1982 when Spain joined.4 Spain, while joining the alliance formally, has not committed its forces to NATO's military commands. In many respects, Spain's status as a member is similar to that of France.5

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ENDNOTES

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1. Morton A. Kaplan, The Rationale For NATO, p. 9.

2. 1bid. p. 10.

3. lbid, p. ll.

4. "North Atlantic Treaty Organization", <u>Collier's</u> Encyclopedia, 1986, Vol 17, p. 607.

5. Department of Defense, <u>Report on Allied Contributions</u> to the Common Defense, p. 10, April 1987, (hereafter referred to as "DOD Report on Allied Contributions").

CHAPTER II

THE BURDEN

In a theoretical sense, there are nearly as many ways of determining the composition of the burden borne by NATO members as there are those who seriously attempt to make the determination. In large measure, this is because many elements of the burden have greater or lesser importance to individual member nations. In some cases, an element of the burden may be very important to one member and be totally irrelevant to another. In a practical sense however, the composition of NATO burdensharing can be divided into four broad categories: economic, military, political and social.

ECONOMIC

Many laymen view the economic contributions by NATO member nations as the number of dollars (or other national currency) that the member contributed directly to the upkeep of the alliance. This approach, used most often by those only scratching the surface of burden composition or to make a political point, results from the relative ease with which statistics on the subject can be found. There are numerous

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charts, tables and other forms of statistical display that report expenditure in terms of percent of Gross National Product (GNP) or Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or any other form of gross monetary expenditure in support of NATO. As simplistic a form of determining economic burden as this methodology is, there is some precedence for its use.

The NATO Method

NATO members, in the burdensharing agreement, have decided that the measure of a member's economic contribution is the amount of its "total defense spending". They further agree that this will be the sole determinant of contribution to the alliance. The obvious question that follows an agreement like this is what constitutes defense spending? Again by member agreement, this is broadly defined as expenditures made by national governments specifically to meet the needs of the country's armed forces.1 Because of this very simplistic approach to economic contribution, there are some distortions and some omissions worthy of mention.

Distortions and Omissions

The most obvious distortion in describing a NATO member's economic contribution to the alliance as its total defense

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spending is the fact that several members have defense commitments outside the NATO region. The US, for example, has global responsibilities and it is unreasonable, therefore, to credit the entire US defense budget to the defense of Europe. The same is true of Great Britain, Fortugal, France and Italy. Varying portions of their defense budgets are in fact dedicated to other than NATO defense.2 Some important economic contributions omitted from the NATO methodology are economic sanctions enforced by members in support of NATO goals; foreign aid provided by members to other members and to non-NATO countries which benefit NATO; raising or lowering trade restrictions in support of NATO objectives; and others.3 To get a true appreciation of the economic burden of NATO membership one must look beyond money spent for armed forces and include these other factors in the equation.

MILITARY

As in the case of the economic component of the burden of NATO membership, there is a tendency on the part of many to view the military component of the burden in gross terms. A cursory review of available reports on the subject quickly focuses on the statistics to support arguments for or against the relative level of a member's military contribution to the alliance. Most notable among the common measures of military contribution are numbers of personnel in uniform, numbers of tanks and other warfighting equipment, numbers of warplanes and numbers of tons of naval power.4

Distortions and Omissions

Just as the "total defense spending" approach to measuring economic contributions leads one into a complicated web of inequities, so too does the "bean counting" approach to measuring the military contribution. For example, only counting the number of combat units or weapons systems does not account for their relative effectiveness. A less distorted approach to their measure of contribution and the corresponding burden on their home nation is their quality and effectiveness on the battlefield. Factors such as ammunition availability, logistical support, and level of training also should be considered.5 In addition to the distortions, the "eaches" approach to measuring military burden in terms of units and equipment omits many significant components of the burden. Items such as overflight rights, basing rights and bases furnished other allies should be considered in burden identification.6

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POLITICAL

The political component, due to its non-quantifiable nature, may be difficult to measure but is clearly a part of the burden determination equation. Political decisions in an alliance are not always unanimous and this is certainly true of NATO. Consequently, member nations occasionally support policies that are not in their own political best interest but are for the greater good of the alliance. Political leadership or lack thereof, contributes to the burden of membership in NATO.7 In simple terms, the leader must lead and the follower must occasionally subordinate his position to that of the leader. This interaction among sovereign nations may, from time to time, be politically painful. Finally, the alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons (principally under US control but also in the hands of Britain and France) places member nations in burdensome positions politically. The entire spectrum of nuclear issues from release policies to basing weighs heavily on the political foundations of alliance governments.

SOCIAL

The social burdens of NATO membership are as difficult to measure quantitatively as are the political. They are none-the-less real and therefore any discussion of burdensharing without their inclusion is flawed. The most readily identifiable social cost to a member nation is the likelihood of war on its territory and the attendant likelihood or possibility of destruction of its society. The Western European members of the alliance are all familiar with the ravages of war on their society. Stationing of foreign soldiers on one's territory also contributes to the social burden on a member. This burden takes several forms ranging from the concept of being "occupied" by a foreign army to the disruption of life and customs resulting from training exercises to the actual loss of life from accidents attendant to training. The method by which a member meets its military force requirements may also cause a social burden on its population. If the country uses a conscript as opposed to a volunteer to man its force, the resulting "service without choice" places a social burden on the population.

This discussion of the components of the burden of NATO membership, while admittedly not all inclusive (as previously noted, there are many views as to what constitutes burden) is none-the-less an attempt to expand the discussion beyond economic and military costs. Moreover, it sets the stage for examining the relative share of the burden among members by grouping burden components by that which is quantifiable and that which is not.

ENDNOTES

1. Thomas J. Cawley, LTC (P), <u>Allied Contributions to NATO</u> Detense Efforts, p. 12.

- 2. Ibid, p. 14.
- 3. Ibid, p. 12.
- 4. "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 20-36.
- 5. Ibid, p. 12.
- 6. Cawley, p. 12.

7. James B. Steinberg, "Rethinking the Debate on Burdensharing", <u>Survival</u>. Jan/Feb 1987 p. 60.

CHAPTER III

MEASURING THE BURDEN

The burden as previously described can generally be divided into two groups: those components that can be examined objectively (usually through one or more quantitative manipulations) and those whose nature is such that only subjective evaluation is possible.

SUBJECTIVE EVALUATION

Critics of subjective evaluation will no doubt focus on the concept that the subjective evaluation of the magnitude of any component of the burden is solely "in the eye of the beholder". In terms of there being a right or wrong subjective value, the critics are correct. Debate over the relative merit of subjective evaluation notwithstanding, many components of the burden are sufficiently important to understanding a member nation's contribution to NATO that they cannot be ignored.

OBJECTIVE EVALUATION

If the subjective evaluation of a NATO member's

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contribution to the alliance generates debate, so too does the more objective analysis of those burden components which lend themselves to quantification.

The Problem With Input

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Any evaluation of contribution based on quantifiable data must have as its basis information provided by member nations. A problem arises in that each nation has its own budget and tax system. Each nation uses different methods of recruiting and managing manpower resources.1

Complicating Factors

In addition to the problems attendant to input data, there are factors which complicate objective evaluation of quantifiable information. Problems are created by fluctuations in international exchange rates and differences in the use of inflation indicators. When the currency of one member nation falls in comparison to that of other allies, that country's contribution appears to be reduced even though the amount of defense a given sum will buy remains the same in that country. Inflation can impact on the public perception of the level of contribution. As inflation rises, purchasing power decreases. Hence, if a member's defense spending total increases less than

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its rate of inflation, it is buying less defense even though it may be spending more money.2 A final factor that tends to cloud the objective evaluation of contribution is the impact of money spent by an ally in the country of another. Housing, food, and energy used to support the forces of allied nations in an ally's country are a few of the major expenditures which are largely bought from the host nation. Support services and administration are also largely staffed by host nation personnel making military bases important employers in several NATO nations.3

ENDNOTES

- 1. Simon Lunn, Burdensharing in NATO, p. 54.
- 2. "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 93.
- 3. Ibid, p. 95.

CHAPTER IV


HOW IS THE BURDEN SHARED?

The preceding chapters outline components of the burden and the difficulty in measuring them. The following discussion addresses available data on economic and military contribution and will also focus on the political and social costs of NATO membership. The data, unless otherwise noted, is from the 1987 Department of Defense, <u>Report on Allied Contributions to the</u> <u>Common Defense</u>. This data is "as of 1985" and is the most current available.

ECONOMIC

The NATO Method


As stated in Chapter II, the share a member nation contributes to the alliance is measured in terms of total defense spending. Chart 1 would therefore lead one to believe that the US generally bears more than twice the burden of all other NATO members combined. There are however, in addition to the distortion created by the global commitments of some member nations, other economic factors not addressed by this method of



calculating share. If the economic assistance provided to Eerlin by West Germany was counted, its contribution to the alliance would increase by 25%.1 Additionally, most NATO members spend substantial amounts of money either hardening or building redundancy into civil projects with military application such as roads, pipelines and civilian communication systems.2 Chart 2, while providing another graphic portrayal of member nation contribution based on total defense spending and reinforcing the argument that the US bears a disproportionate share, also provides an interesting insight as to how this measure has changed over time. The percent change in total defense spending over time clearly establishes that our NATO partners, for the most part, are spending increased amounts for the common defense. This is not a commonly recognized fact.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Charts 3 and 4 show total defense spending as a percent of gross domestic product. In the case of chart 3, once again, one could draw the conclusion that the US bears the brunt of the burden. Measuring contribution in terms of GDP is very popular because the data is readily available, and it is easy to compute and explain. There is, however, a pitfall to viewing it as the optimum measure of burdensharing. A strong



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



CHART 3

Based on NATO definition of defense spending. Excludes Spain



TOTAL DEFENSE SPENDING (CY) AS A PERCENT OF GDP

CHART 4

case can be made that it is in the best interests of the alliance that those members with the strongest economies carry a heavier load (or bear more of the cost). Chart 4 puts the GDP measure in perspective over time. It shows that over time, most alliance members' total defense spending as a percent of their GDP is relatively constant, that only Greece has made a dramatic increase, and only Portugal has made a dramatic decrease in total spending. Finally, it should be noted that the same shortcomings that apply to measuring sharing in absolute terms of total defense spending also apply to measuring it in terms of total defense spending as a percent of the Gross Domestic Product.3

Other Economic Contributions

The economic burden of NATO membership manifests itself in other ways. Several members have active, ongoing and expensive foreign assistance programs (non-military).4 These programs contribute to world stability thereby contributing to the common defense. Economic sanctions taken by NATO members against Poland following the imposition of martial law, while difficult to analyze in terms of contribution to common defense, did underscore allied concern for the situation.5 As it is difficult to assess the defense value of sanctions, it is also difficult to assess the monetary value they cost. Given

the volume of trade between Western and Eastern European countries, one can safely say that restrictions placed on the normal conduct of trade produces an economic cost, however difficult to compute. Another program, the infrastructure program which provides defense facilities that would be available during hostilities, places an economic burden on all members. This program provides airfields, naval bases, storage facilities, warning installations, wartime headquarters and a myriad of other fixed facilities. While the total value of the program represents only .3 percent of the alliance spending, it can become a large monetary expense for some countries. Members who benefit directly from a project usually assume a greater share of the cost. The US, which by most measures contributes about 60 percent of total NATO spending, pays about 27 percent of the infrastructure expense. West Germany on the other hand, which contributes roughly 10 percent of the total NATO expense, also contributes about 27 percent of the infrastructure costs.6 Finally, host nation support agreements place economic burdens on all members. Depending on the situation, the host country, and the type of support provided, costs may be reimbursed by the recipient or provided gratis by the host nation.7 In either case, host nation support is a valuable contribution, although frequently difficult to accurately and objectively compute.


There is no perfect way to determine economic contribution to the alliance. These measures are the most often used and present a generally accepted picture of how much each member contributes, economically, to NATO.

MILITARY

The military contribution to NATO is as difficult to assess as is the economic contribution of its members. The two most common methods are counting force structure (the number of armed forces members and major weapons systems), and measuring the combat power or efficiency of the forces provided to NATO by its members.

Manpower

Chart 5 shows the total active duty military and civilian manpower of the US compared to that of the remainder of the alliance. It indicates that with the exception of the Vietnam years when US strength exceeded that of all allies combined, the US still provides about three-fourths the manpower of all allies combined. This figure is misleading in that just as with measuring economic contributions in terms of total defense spending, it does not account for the significant global interests supported by that level of US military and




civilian mancower. Chart 6 provides insight into the relative contribution of members over time. It shows for example, that while the US provides the highest total number in manbower, the US and many other members have reduced their contributions in terms of percent of the total. Conversely, Greece, Turkey and several other countries have increased their share of the total over time. Total military and civilian manpower as a percent of total population is another reasonable measure of military contribution. Chart 7 shows that the US provides a greater portion of manpower versus total population than all our allies combined. Chart 8 depicts this same data over time and shows that most members, including the US, have decreased the percent of total population in their military and civilian manpower bool. Only West Germany, Greece, Luxembourg and Spain have increased the size of their forces relative to total population.

Division Equivalent Firepower (DEF)


Division Equivalent Firepower (DEF) is an indicator of the effectiveness of ground forces based on the quantity and quality of their major weapons.8 Chart 9 depicts the military contribution in terms of DEF. Again, the US appears to provide a disproportionate share of the force. As reasonable a measure as LEF is, it does not provide the total picture. This








% CHANGE IN TOTAL MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MANPOWER (1971 VS 1985)







Excludes Spain

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CHART 7








technique of measuring effectiveness develops a more complete assessment of warfighting capability than does simply counting the number and type of weapons systems. It also considers the effect of modernization programs ongoing in many NATO countries. It does not however consider ammunition availability, logistical support, training, communications and morale.9

Naval Forces

Tonnage is the most common measure of fleet size. In most cases it is more meaningful than a simple total of the number of ships a nation owns. Counting tonnage alone however, does not account for the number of weapons aboard or the effectiveness and reliability of those weapons. It also fails to account for personnel training and morale.10 Chart 10 reflects the amount of naval surface strength in tonnage and indicates that well over half is provided by the US. In terms of sharing the NATO defense burden, it must be remembered that the US has global commitments and often naval presence is the best or, in some cases, the only way to meet those world-wide requirements. Consequently, the fact that the US has a large naval force does not necessarily mean that it bears a disproportionate share of the burden




Tactical Air Forces

The best available indicator of contribution to NATO's defense in the air is the number of tactical aircraft a member nation has. Chart 11 shows that the US contributes about fifty percent of the air strength of NATO. In reality, the US contribution is even greater because only fighter/interceptors. attack, bomber and tactical reconnaissance aircraft are counted.11 Training aircraft and transport/cargo aircraft are not counted. Exclusion of transport/cargo aircraft takes on greater importance when one considers how many of these type aircraft the US maintains and how important they are to reinforcement and resupply of NATO. Omission of these aircraft however, should not be over-played because the US, as a global power, needs them to meet commitments in other regions as well. Finally, this measure of contribution does not account for modernization, ammunition. parts, pilot/crew training or morale. Consequently, it tells only a part of the story regarding total contribution to the common defense.

Many of the accounting shortcomings that one might say overstates the US contribution, may well understate the contributions of other NATO members. The relative effectiveness of their contributions are no doubt somewhat different than the pure numbers may indicate because of the

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lack of indexing to account for numbers of weapons on ships, training, ammunition availability, modernization, type aircraft counted and morale.

POLITICAL

The political burden borne by NATO members cannot be quantified hence comparisons in terms of share is virtually impossible. However, the inability to quantify this contribution should not keep it from being considered in the burdensharing equation.

Leadership and Followership

A significant political burden borne by many NATO members is the leadership role exerted over them by the US. As a result of its considerable economic and military contributions, the US has considerable influence over the defense and foreign policies (and, to a lesser extent, economic and trade policy) of its NATO allies.12 This leadership role occasionally causes NATO members to take politically difficult or unpopular steps. Support of the US initiated boycott of the Moscow Olympics, or supporting the US bombing raid of Libya are only two examples of political decisions that might have gone the other way but for US leadership in the alliance. It is important to note also, that just because the US enjoys a leadership position, it does not have carte blanche political influence over its allies. The West German and Italian refusal to turn over captured terrorists to the US for trial on charges of killing US citizens and destroying US property are two of many examples of allies exercising their sovereign rights in the face of US political pressure.

Weapons

The NATO allies also bear a political burden in terms of weapon development and deployment. The political burden associated with nuclear and chemical weapons is particularly heavy on several NATO members. The recent directive by the US Congress to require a NATO role in chemical weapon decisions was at least partially motivated by a desire to cause sharing in the burden/responsibility of ending the sixteen year moratorium on chemical weapon production. Likewise allied insistence on no peacetime European deployment of new chemical weapons was an attempt to reduce the political burden.13 These are a few of many examples of the existence of a political component of the burden of maintaining NATO. Non-quantifiable as they are, the political burden must be considered if determination of share is to have any meaning. Linkage Between Components of Burden

Components of the NATO burden should not be discussed in isolation. Frequently they overlap and have a cause-effect relationship. A good example of one such issue is the recent Spanish political decision to require the departure of the US 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. The US would like to keep the wing in Spain and failing that, move it to Italy. The Italian government is receptive to the move. Regardless of where the wing ultimately gets stationed, the economic burden on all members will increase because the cost of relocation will be viewed as a NATO expense, not solely a US expense.14

SOCIAL

The social component of the burden, like the political, is at best difficult to quantify. Yet it is critical to any meaningful discussion of burdensharing.

Stationing of Forces

The US has roughly forty six percent of its Army and much of its Air Force, Navy and Marine forces stationed overseas. Much of this force is in NATO countries or in support of NATO objectives. Other NATO members like France, Italy, Canada,

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Great Britain and West Germany also have forces overseas. The social cost in terms of long family separation, resocialization to accommodate different customs and ways of life is a burden shared by all who participate (but it is difficult to measure). The reverse of this burden is also real though in many respects somewhat easier to measure. Hosting a large standing foreign force, even an ally, can create an atmosphere of occupation. While difficult to quantify, it is real in the minds of those who experience it. What is quantifiable in this regard, is the economic cost attached to the stationing of foreign forces in a NATO member country. For example, estimates place the value of real property made available to NATO allies in West Germany alone at about 16 billion dollars. 15 Other NATO members make similar but smaller contributions. This is another good example of linkage between burden components, in this case, social and economic.

Training

The social cost associated with training exercises, large and small, may be overlooked by those who do not experience them. Damage to the environment resulting from pollution. disruption to the normal lifestyle of citizens, physical damage to property and occasionally deaths of citizens resulting from training accidents are all real costs associated with NATO membership. While countries who sustain these costs may be reimbursed for some, they are not repaid for all. Consequently, no discussion of burdensharing is complete without considering them. NUMBER REACTED DURING SYNTAX RECEPTS

Battlefield Proximity

There is a social cost attached to the geographic location of NATO member nations which is frequently overlooked. Western Europe was a principal battlefield in the last global conflict. The pain, suffering, and destruction caused by World War II is still a vivid memory to many Western Europeans. It is clear to most that in addition to being the staging area for NATO forces in the event of East West confrontation, West Germany for certain, and other NATO members most likely, will be the main operating area for the Warsaw Fact as well as NATO forces. The population's awareness of this seemingly permanent threat places a real social and psychological burden on it which should be considered in the burdensharing equation.16

These social burdens, while as difficult to meaningfully quantify as the political burden, must be addressed if a discussion of sharing the burden is to have any meaning. Examination of the total burden and efforts to identify the share borne by each NATO member leads one to question if each

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component of the burden effects each member somewhat

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ENDNOTES

1. "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 13.

2. Ibid, p. 16.

3. Ibid.

4. Simon Lynn, Burdensharing in NATO, p. 59.

5. James R. Golden, NATO Burdensharing, p. 21.

6. <u>lbid</u>, p. 43.

7. "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 48.

8. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 31.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid, p. 35.

12. James B. Steinberg, "Rethinking the Debate on Burdensharing", Survival, Jan/Feb 1987, p. 60.

13. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 61.

14. "Plan to Use Bases in Italy Draws Fire", <u>The Sentinel</u>, Feb 4, 1988, p. A3. 15. "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 13.

16. Herman O. Pfrengle, "Defense Expenditures and Burdensharing in NATO", Program Manager, p. 2.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding chapters have revisited the origin of the NATO alliance, explored the elements or components of the burden that accrue from membership, described the difficulty in measuring the burden and examined how the burden is divided among the members. It is appropriate at this point to make some judgements relative to the merit, fairness and equity of the way the burden is shared among the NATO members. In making these judgements, it is important to temper them with recognition of several realities. No one has yet developed a methodology of burdensharing measurement that satisfies everyone. There are inherent weaknesses in quantifying money spent and forces provided (described in Chapter III), and subjective evaluation is important because of the wide range of perspective among the alliance members.

ECONOMIC

By most methods of measurement, the US bears the lion's share of the monetary costs associated with NATO. There are however, some factors that tend to moderate the apparent

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inequity. The US, unlike most NATO members, has world-wide interests and responsibilities. Since total defense spending data is the common measure (either in absolute terms or as a percent of GDP) it would seem only logical that the US total would exceed that of other nations. It should be noted that the US enjoys the highest GDP of all NATO members (Chart 12) and therefore, at least in theory, has the greatest ability to pay. Another factor which should be considered is that in terms of defense spending percent change over time, many NATO allies have significantly increased while the US has increased at a relatively modest rate (Chart 13). The final point to remember when drawing conclusions on relative economic contributions to NATO is that there are many and varied "hidden costs" associated with maintaining the alliance which are not credited to member's share. The best example of this is West Germany which spends billions to support Berlin and loses billions in potential rents and taxes on real estate dedicated to defense. It is fair to say that the economic burden is shared more equitably than it may appear on the surface, particularly in the context of ability to pay.

MILITARY

The US again leads the alliance in terms of military contribution based on many measures of the burden. However, CHART 12

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A. Selected Indicators of Ability to Contribute (Including Spain)

(A3) Per Capita GDP	(% of Mighest Mation)					GE 63.51		FR 57.64	NE 53.0%	BE 49.6%	UK 49.64		SP 27.14		PO 12.61	71 6.61	45.01	50.9	65.70	66.41
(ZV)	Population Share				UK 7.47%	FR 7.26%	TU 6.50	SP 5.10%	CA 3.35%	NE 1.91	PO 1.35%	GR 1.31%	BE 1.30%	DE 0.67%	NO 0.55%	1000 nn	52.501	68.431	B4.074	100.000
(14)	GDP Share				UK 5.58%	IT 4.441	CA 4.231	SP 2.06%	NE 1.55%	BE 0.97%	DE 0.72%	NO 0.68%		GR 0.40%	PO 0.26%	LIU 0.041	35.61\	52.471	83.14%	100.001
	ant Ant	- ~	• ~	•	S	Ŷ	٢	8	0	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	Non US NATO	Mon US MATO + Japan	Total NATO	Total MATO + Japan

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Source: "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 6

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CHART 13

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B. Selected Indicators of Contribution (Including Spain)

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(88)	Naval	Tonnage	(All Ships	Less SSBN)	Share	US 64.021	UK 10.89%	FR 4.83%		NET.E AL	TU 3.091		IT 1.821	CA 1.78%	GR 1.661	NE 1.43%	PO 0.63%	NO 0.62%	DE 0.43%	BE 0.28%	LU 0.001	32.85%	35.981	96.871	100.001	
(B7)		Tac Air	Combat	Acft	Share	US 45.47%	UK 9.23%	FR 8.35%			TU 5.28%			BE 2.32%	CA 1.98%	SP 1.91	NE 1.80%		PO 1.31%	NO 0.961	LU 0.001	50.72%	54.53%	96.191	100.004	
(96)		Ground	Forces	DEF	Share	100.95 SU	GE 11.49%	TU 9.60%		FR 6.23%			SP 3.78%	JA 3.70%	NE 3.15%	DE 1.85%	NO 1.55%	BE 1.45%		PO 0.78%	10.0 UJ	57.29%	61.00	96.301	100.001	
(B5)	Active 6	Reserve	Defense	Manpower	Share	US 38.46%	GE 10.83%				SP 6.27%		GR 3.68%	JA 2.22%	NE 2.17%	NO 1.841	BE 1.79%	PO 1.26%	CA 1.13%	DE 0.83%	10.0 UL	59.32%	61.548	97.78	100.001	
(Including Spain) (B4)	Active	Defense	Manpower	(* Change	71 vs 85)	10 33.23 1	GR 16.29%	LU 15.57%			NO 0.198		FR -0.22%	BE -0.57%	IT -2.00%	CA -3.84%	NE -7.88%	NS -11.76%	UK ~25.12%	DE -27.16%	PO -53.35%	- 1.95**	- 1.64%*	- 6.60%*	- 6.29%*	
(10C) (B3)		Act ive	Defense	Manpower	Share	US 40.50%	TU 10.38%	FR 8.43%		IT 7.05%	UK 6.45%	SP 6.28%	JA 3.21%	GR 2.82%	NE 1.57%	CA 1.47%	PO 1.39%	BE 1.36%	NO 0.56%	DE 0.47%	LU 0.02N	56.301	59.50	96.79	100.00\$	
(82)		Defense	Spending	(1 Change	71 vs 85)	GR 133.36%	JA 131.84%	TU 123.99%		SP 62.611	NO 47.38%	-	FR 44.39%	CA 35.44%	IT 28.45%	GE 27.85%	NE 21.60%	US 20.21%	UK 15.76%	DE 5.10%	PO -28.651	11.16	36.91\$	23.261	25.418	
(B1)			Defense	Spending	Share	1 88.69 SN	UK 6.14%	FR 5.46%		JA 3.60%	IT 2.56%	CA 2.001	SP 1.26%	NE 1.024	BE 0.631	TU 0.62%	GR 0.61%	NO 0.47%	DE 0.331	PO 0.17%	LU 0.011	26.52	30.12%	96.40	100.001	
					Rank	I	2	Ē	4	S	9	7	8	6	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	NON-US NATO	Non-US NATO + Japan	Total NATO	+ Japan	

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Source: "DOD Report on Allied Contributions", p. 7.

*Excludes Spain

there are other, less commonly recognized but equally valid measures that indicate greater degrees of allied contribution compared to ability to pay (Chart 14). While there are many critics loudly claiming the US "does too much", the simple truth is that other NATO members contribute substantially, particularly in the context of their share of the total GDF and total population. Again, as with the case of total defense spending, the US is a global power with global interests. NATO is a regional alliance with some, but less, global involvement. Much of the US military force is dedicated to our global interests and responsibilities and a scenario where all our military force would be brought to bear on the defense of Europe is unlikely at best. Our NATO partners on the other hand, while sharing global concerns are significantly less involved and therefore have a far greater proportionate dedication and focus on European defense. In fact, in many cases, their total force is earmarked only for the defense of Europe.

LEVELED STREED EVENING MARKED PLANES

POLITICAL

Leaders and followers each bear a burden. Leaders must exercise sound judgement and respect the needs of all. Followers are enjoined to participate fully, often in the face of tough choices, or the cohesion of an organization, in this Chart 14

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Selected Indicators Comparing Contribution With Ability to Contribute ப்

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	Def. Spend.	ч.	Active	e Def.	Active	Active & Res.	DEF	DEF Share/	Acft	Acft Share/	Nava	NAVAL TONNAGE
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	Share		Pop. Share	Share	Pop.	Share					50 I	Shar e
Rank	(N + N)		Eal	1 A2)	(B5	1 A2)	98)	(B6 1 A1)	78J	1 11	188 1	1 1 I
_	GR 1.52	0	6	2.15	N	3.35	ß	16.10	GR	8.60	TU	4.75
			Ę	1.58	æ	2.81	F.	14.72	UT.	8.10	ся	4.20
1.00	UK 1.10	. 0	NS	1.28	T	1.38	2	3.04	8	5.08	8	2.42
	_	ъ	SP	1.23	BE	1.37	ЭC	2.58	BE	2.39	ň	1.95
5		G	FR	1.16	ЗO	1.35	Q	2.30	DE	2.09	NS	1.35
<u>م</u>	NO 0.70	0	BE	1.05	ЭC	1.23	NE	2.04	z	1.65	SP	90.1
,	GE 0.68	60	\$	1.03	SP	1.23	SP	1.82	N O	1.42	NE	0.92
8		•	Q	1.03	SN	1.22	9E	1.50	IT	1.33	NO	16.0
6	NE 0.66	G	GE	1.00	FR	1.20	8	1.49	FR	1.32	FR	0.76
10	BE 0.65	2	17	0.94	NE	1.13	æ	66.0	NE	1.16	DE	0.60
11	SP 0.61	T	ž	0.06	8	6.93	IT	0.96	NS	0.96	đ	0.42
12	IT 0.58	8	NE	0.82	IT	0.85	ž	94	SP	0.92	ы Э	0.42
61	CA 0.47	-	DE	0.69	Š	0.71	NS	0.82	39	0.87	IT	0.41
4	DE 0.46	ۍ	ð	0.44	đ	0.34	đ	0.32	J	0.47	BE	0.30
15 ·	LU 0.23	~	3	0.35	3	0.22	AU AU	0.22	٩C	0.23	A U	0.19
16 -			٨L	0.20	٨L	61.0	דח	61.0	F	0.00	E	01.0
Non-US NATO	0.74	4		1.07		1.13		1.61		1.42		0.92
Non-US NATO + Japan	0.57	4		0.87		06.0		1.16		1.04		0.69
Total NATO	1.16	Q		1.15		1.16		1.16		1.16		1.17
Total NATO + Japan	1.00	0		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00

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case NATO, will dissolve and with it, the organization's effectiveness. The US usually finds itself in a relative position of leadership within NATO. Other NATO members therefore, find themselves following US policy initiatives. While there is no adequate means of determining which burden (leader or led) is greater, and since the alliance has been effective for almost forty years, it is reasonable to judge the share of the political burden as about equal.

SOCIAL

The greatest social costs, hard as they are to attach concrete value to, appear to be borne by the European members of NATO. Living under the threat of conventional war on their homeland; enduring frequent training exercises with their attendant damage and disruption; service without choice caused by the need for a conscript force; loss of valuable land for defense installations; the stationing of large numbers of foreign forces in their countries; and other social burdens are all carried by the European allies. While US forces must endure separation and adapt to new customs, it is reasonable to grant Europeans the greatest share of the social burden.

When all factors are reviewed, this study has been no more successful in stating the burden or how it is shared in

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absolute terms than any other study that has preceded it. However, the process of examination of the components of the burden and evaluation of how it is distributed among the members has led to the conclusion that on balance and in the context of ability to contribute, the burden is shared reasonably equally. The real indicator of this equity is that NATO, over almost forty years, has been and continues to be, a viable instrument of free-world strength with an enviable record of cooperation economically, militarily, politically and socially.

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