


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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Vittorfranco S. Pisano, LTC, MP

TITLE: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Army in Western Europe

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As stated in the title, this study addresses the terrorist threat to the U.S. Army in Western Europe. In so doing, it examines the sociopolitical environment out of which terrorism is born, the objectives and dynamics of specific terrorist groups that retain offensive potential, the lessons to be drawn from recorded incidents, detectable current trends, and the extent to which countermeasures represent a realistic protective shield. The emphasis is on the terrorist situation, indigenous as well as transnational/international, in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy, since the vast majority of U.S. Army troops stationed in Europe are located in those two allied countries. In the introductory portions of the text and, to a lesser degree, throughout it, an effort is made to delineate the nature of terrorism. This study concludes with a rapid examination of the counterterrorist setting and some observations as to the best means for the U.S. Army to cope with the terrorist phenomenon in the region.

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INTRODUCTION

The manifest objective of this paper is to describe and assess the terrorist threat to U.S. Army personnel and property in Western Europe in the light of terrorist dynamics in the region--particularly in those countries where the U.S. Army presence is most notable, namely, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Italy.

Because of the fluidity of the terrorist phenomenon, forecasting terrorist plans does not fall within the scope of this study. Rather, it will consider the sociopolitical environment, the objectives and modus operandi of specific terrorist groups that retain offensive potential, the lessons to be drawn from recorded incidents, detectable current trends, and the extent to which countermeasures constitute a realistic shield of protection. These considerations will be preceded by a concise delineation of the nature of terrorism in Western Europe.

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT

As frequently stressed in commentaries on contemporary terrorism, this phenomenon does not enjoy a universally agreedupon definition. In point of fact, not even the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government have adopted the same definition.¹ Nevertheless, for the purpose of examining the terrorist threat to the U.S. Army in Western Europe, terrorism in this region of the world may be functionally described as politically motivated, criminal violence perpetrated by clandestine groups or by clandestine means.² Indeed, political motivation sets terrorism apart from common as well as organized crime; criminal violence separates terrorism from the legitimate use of force; and the element of clandestinity distinguishes terrorism from ordinary political violence, which has a longstanding tradition in Western Europe, but always manifests itself overtly.³

Contrary to other areas of the world, where conflictual issues giving rise to terrorist practices often cut across state boundaries, terrorism in Western Europe tends to stem from environmental factors--historical, political, social, and/or economic--peculiar to individual nations in the region and exploitable by extremists associated with revolutionary subcultures of diverse ideological origins, usually leftist, rightist, or ethnically separatist. Nonetheless, from time to time, different terrorist groups sharing the same ideology, or even similar political goals, form menacing coalitions or support-oriented networks at the regional level. Moreover, Western Europe is not immune from transnational or international terrorist attacks⁴ originating in, or supported by, North African, Middle Eastern, or East European countries.⁵

Apart from their specific political aims, many terrorist groups--particularly those of the left, which are the most numerous and the best organized--profess an ideology that is

intrinsically inimical to the United States. Consequently, these groups, be they rigidly structured "organizations" or loosely held together "formations," constitute an immediate or potential threat to U.S. citizens, property, and interests, 35 the record of terrorist incidents in Western Europe dolefully reflects.⁶

Within the range of actual and potential American targets in the region, the U.S. Army clearly stands out, since it is a highly visible institution that represents American society and values. Though the threat is not limited to this component of the defense establishment of the United States, some statistics are significant. Out of 343,423 American military men and women stationed in Western Europe, 217,696 belong to the U.S. Army.⁷ These Army troops are located at 822 different sites consisting of 33,870 buildings.⁸ As stated in the U.S. Antiterrorism Task Force Report of March 1985, "Western Europe has the largest concentration of U.S. Army Forces outside of the United States. Accordingly, based on numbers alone, the potential for terrorist attacks against the U.S. Army is greatest in the region. Of those countries with sizeable U.S. military personnel within their borders, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey have historically been the most dangerous for U.S. military personnel."9

WEST GERMAN TERRORISM

Terrorism, in its present connotation, has been in existence in West Germany since the late 1960's. Substantially the offspring of violent political trends inaugurated by the Socialist Students Association (SDS) and other extremist elements of the student population, its perpetuation is largely attributable to the lasting effects of the generational revolt of that period, recurrent hostile attitudes vis-a-vis the largest concentration of U.S. troops in Western Europe, and the cyclic revival of ecological, anti-nuclear, and antimilitary sentiments collectively responsible for the nourishment of a broadly-based and heterogeneous pacifist movement lacking pro-Western commitment.¹⁰

Through the years, the largest number of terrorist attacks has been perpetrated by groups of Marxist-Leninist or, at any rate, leftist persuasion, the most menacing and resilient being the Red Army Faction (RAF), which emerged in 1970, and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ), constituted three years later. Aggregate official statistics for the period 1969-1986 reflect 1,989 terrorist incidents traceable to this ideological matrix.¹¹ Another 239 leftist terrorist attacks took place during January-August 1987.¹² On the other hand, it is estimated that rightist extremist groups have been responsible for 3% of all indigenous terrorist incidents in West Germany.¹³

Because of their record and continuing menace, the abovementioned RAF and RZ warrant specific attention. The RAF, originally referred to as the Baader-Meinhof gang (after the names of its two principal founders), is currently led by a third "generation" of militants bent on pursuing the revolutionary objectives of their fallen or captured predecessors. In fact, the RAF experienced operational peaks in 1972 and 1977, near destruction in 1982, and resurgence since 1984. Given its Marxist-Leninist orientation and the exploitability of global issues, the RAF began to internationalize its scope and thus include non-West German targets in its targeting spectrum way back in 1972, two years after coming into being. Significantly, its first foreign target was the U.S. Army, whose strength in West Germany numbers 208,168 soldiers out of 250,168 U.S. Department of Defense military personnel stationed there.¹⁴

In the course of time, the RAF structure, composition, and tactics do not appear to have undergone major changes. Four levels of militants still characterize the organization. The <u>command level</u> or <u>hard core</u> comprises some 20 full-time, totally clandestine members, who provide presumably collective--though compartmented--leadership and carry out lethal attacks with firearms and remote-control explosive devices. The second level, referred to as <u>illegal militants</u> or <u>fighting</u> <u>units</u>, includes about 200 part-time operatives with a clean police record and lawful occupations as students or workers. They are nonetheless fully committed to the revolutionary cause and their seemingly lawful posture is simply a cover. Their responsibilities include service support and generally

unsophisticated bomb attacks against property intended to complement the lethal actions of the hard core. The third level or <u>legal arm</u> embraces approximately 2,000 sympathizers dedicated to propagandizing RAF themes. The last level is made up of jailed members who continue their militancy in the prisons through various means, not least, demonstrative hunger strikes. RAF strength is believed to be concentrated in the states of Bavaria, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, and Rheinland-Palatinate.¹⁵

The list of RAF domestic targets encompasses judges and prosecutors, political figures, businessmen, government officials, and related property, but anti-American attacks equally stand out. In 1972, the RAF bombed the U.S. Army V Corps Headquarters in Frankfurt (14 casualties, including one death) and the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters - USAREUR in Heidelberg (eight casualties, including three deaths). In 1981, it bombed the U.S. Air Force European Headquarters in Ramstein (20 casualties) and fired a Soviet RPG-7W rocket launcher against the armored limousine of General Frederick Kroesen, the USAREUR Commander, slightly injuring him and his wife. In 1984, U.S. military installations in Frankfurt, Wertheim, Wiesbaden, and Mannheim were subjected to RAF bombings. The following year, U.S. Army SP4 Edward Pimental was murdered near Wiesbaden so that the RAF could acquire his military identification card, and the bombing of a U.S. Air Force base in Rhein-Main resulted in two deaths and 20 injuries.

Other attacks, though not directly involving American interests, are indicative of the RAF's inimical posture vis-avis the Western industrial-defense establishment. Three related murders are highly pertinent within this context: those of Dr. Ernst Zimmermann, chairman of the Engine and Turbine Union (MTU), in Munich in February 1985; Dr. Karl-Heinz Beckurts, a nuclear physicist responsible for research and technology at Siemens, also in Munich in July 1986; and Dr. Gerold von Braunmuehl, head of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry, in Bonn in October 1986. As stated by the President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the RAF "has three main targets of almost equal importance: NATO and the Bundeswehr, the military-industrial complex, and law enforcement and political circles.*¹⁶

Less vanguard oriented than the RAF, the RZ draw upon Marxist-Leninist as well as anarchist principles. Organized into autonomous five-to-eight-member cells, RZ militants are part-timers who emphasize the revolutionary role of the masses. In their pursuit of multiple issues of interest to the radical left, the RZ are more active but far less lethal than the RAF. Their tendency is to attack property rather than persons. Because of the part-time (and numerically not well defined) nature of their membership, RZ activity generally occurs at night and during week-ends. Included in their broad range of targets are U.S. military installations and other NATO facilities, as exemplified by the bombing of the U.S. Army V Corps Headquarters

in Frankfurt (16 injuries) and the U.S. Air Force Officers Club in Rhein Main (18 injuries) in 1976, sundry U.S. and West German military property in 1982-83, and the NATO pipeline in Lorch and a U.S. military facility in Duesseldorf in 1984. Identified RZ members, who must therefore adopt full clandestinity, tend to join or be absorbed by the RAF. The obvious implication is that some links exist between these two groups.

While neo-Nazi or rightist terrorism does not come close to the menace posed in West Germany by its leftist counterpart, it has nevertheless taken its toll largely in terms of damage to property. Moreover, there are disquieting indicators of rightist aspirations to pursue goals qualified as "popular socialist," "anti-imperialist," "national revolutionary," and "ecological."¹⁷ This could result in linkage, however tenuous and exploitative, with terrorist elements of the left. Were this to transpire, rightist terrorism could present a threat to in-country U.S. interests as well.

Another recent development of potential concern to both West German and U.S. personnel and property entails the conduct of hit-and-run operations by violent extremists in the course of public demonstrations, several of which are directed against the presence of U.S. military installations. As recently as October 2, 1987, two West German policemen were shot and killed in Hamburg by masked extremists during a march organized by environmentalists to protest against a new runway at the local airport. These "autonomists," as the violent fringe

elements are called by the authorities, total approximately 3,000, one third of whom are particularly difficult to identify, since they do not belong to any specific group of the extraparliamentary left.¹⁸

ITALIAN TERRORISM

Contemporary Italian terrorism traces its origins to the student and labor unrest of the late 1960's. Although environmental factors, including inadequate social services, an unbalanced educational system, political contradictions, and governmental instability, provided a fertile ground for protesters, the agitation of that period and the ensuing political violence--both overt and clandestine--are above all else the product of a revolutionary subculture animated by Marxist-Leninist and neo-Fascist goals.¹⁹

Between 1969 and 1986, a total of 14,589 terrorist incidents, which in addition to damage to property caused 415 deaths and 1,181 injuries, was recorded in Italy. Out of 357 attacks that produced casualties, 266 are the product of leftist terrorism and 27 of its rightist counterpart. (The remainder is attributable to transnational/international elements or to unidentified perpetrators.)²⁰ While complete official statistics for 1987 are not available at this writing, it should be noted that the yearly incidence of terrorism has been on the decline in Italy since 1980.²¹

The major indigenous threat has been, and continues to be, posed by the terrorist left. Within this revolutionary fold, the Red Brigades (BR), Front Line (PL), and Workers' Autonomy (AUTOP) stand out. The BR--though crippled--constitute a present danger, PL--though decapitated--still provides a "model" for emulation, and AUTOP represents a recruitment pool and an auxiliary source of violence.

The BR were created in 1970 by former members of the youth organization of the official Italian Communist Party (PCI) in concert with militants of the extraparliamentary left. From the industrial triangle of the North--Milan, Turin, and Genoa--the BR expanded to the rest of the country and escalated their actions from merely demonstrative to intentionally lethal. The classical BR structure--clandestine, compartmented, and pyramidal--traditionally included the strategic directorate, a revolutionary body of perhaps 20 individuals responsible for selecting political objectives and planning terrorist campaigns; a three-to-seven-member executive committee responsible for implementing the resolutions adopted by the strategic directorate; subordinate columns in Milan, Turin, Genoa, the Veneto region, Rome, Naples, and the Sardinian region, all tasked with local operations and intelligence collection; and brigades, small (about five members) maneuver and logistical units organic to each column, but varying in number. Fronts, made up of representatives from two or more of the above-described echelons, handled operational and

logistical coordination. BR membership encompassed <u>regulars</u>, full-time militants living in total clandestinity, and <u>irregulars</u>, part-time militants with a clean police record and a close to normal life style. As the result of crippling setbacks suffered in early 1982 and repeatedly thereafter, the BR have modified somewhat their organization, to include tighter structural compartmentation, rigid segregation between operational and logistical personnel, and greater reliance on irregulars, who are more difficult to detect. Current membership is believed to have dropped down from several hundred to a few dozen activists.

Until the end of 1981, the BR concentrated exclusively on domestic targets within the government and private sectors of Italian society. Significantly, their first foreign victim was U.S. Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier, at the time deputy chief of staff for logistics and administration of NATO'S Allied Land Forces Southern European Command (LANDSOUTH) in Verona, who was abducted from his local quarters in December 1981. Their next foreign victim was also an American, Mr. Leamon R. Hunt, director-general of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) for the Sinai with headquarters in Rome, where he was murdered in an ambush on February 15, 1984. Beginning in 1978, the BR revolutionary writings had repeatedly condemned the U.S. and NATO. The hostile sentiments expressed in these theoretical tracts have become progressively more virulent since Dozier's abduction and successful liberation by the Italian police 42 days later. Other BR actions, though

not specifically directed against Americans, are nevertheless indicative of the BR's anti-Western posture. They include two murders: that of Lando Conti, an industrialist interested in military technology and a close associate of the then minister of defense, in Florence in February 1986, and that of Air Force General Licio Giorgieri, a ministry of defense official responsible for air-and-space arms procurement and a supporter of the U.S.-advocated Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars), in Rome in March 1987. Given the BR's record and residual assets, their current menace to in-country U.S. interests should not be lightly dismissed. In fact, the U.S. Army constitutes a particularly accessible target with its 4,269 soldiers assigned to American installations in Italy.²²

On its part, PL, whose operational record is second only to the BR's, emerged in 1976, but self-dissolved in 1983 after virtual decapitation. The advocate of a loose federation among small terrorist formations of the left, PL believed in revolutionary spontaneity and did not follow the rigid structural/operational model of the elitist and vanguardist BR. A group known as the Organized Comrades for Proletarian Liberation (COLP) has attempted to resurrect PL with scarce results to date. Nonetheless, it warrants monitoring.

AUTOP, an umbrella organization for a variety of extremist groups of the left with an estimated aggregate strength of several thousand members, was formed in 1973 and has ever since endeavored to subvert Italian institutions. Though not

a terrorist organization in the strict sense, it has been responsible for overt violence and some of its component groups have conducted actual terrorist acts and served as a recruitment pool for both the BR and PL. Moreover, AUTOP is inimical to the U.S. and NATO. Among other anti-Western terrorist attacks, AUTOP militants--under the name of Communists Struggling Against Imperialism and Armaments--bombed the Rome residence of Leonetto De Leon, the Italian editor of <u>NATO</u> <u>News</u>, and injured his wife and son in July 1984. The threat to U.S. personnel and property is obvious.

Further, the interest displayed in the BR's theoretical tracts and responsibility claims vis-a-vis the pacifist movement and its infiltration by AUTOP and other elements of the extreme left are likewise a cause for concern. Instructively, areas adjacent to U.S. military installations are preferred sites for demonstrations, some of which degenerate into violent acts. Moreover, segments of Italy's terrorist right have not only voiced from time to time their willingness to cooperate with leftist counterparts, but more recently and even more ominously have addressed pacifist themes.²³

As a final observation, the frequently repeated allegation that Italy's terrorists of the left resort to guns and those of the right resort to bombs does not hold under close scrutiny. Both devices are used by both camps. This applies even to the BR, who most frequently resort to gun attacks against carefully selected human targets.

DOMESTIC TERRORISM ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION

Not as substantial as in West Germany and Italy, but still relatively visible are the contingents of U.S. Army troops stationed in Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey: 1,304, 558, 1,039, and 1,180 soldiers, respectively.²⁴ Consequently, the domestic terrorist milieu in these countries deserves some attention too.

At this writing, no ostensible immediate threat is posed to domestic or U.S. interests by indigenous terrorist groups in Belgium. A formation by the name of Communist Combat Cells (CCC) was aggressively active in that country from the fall of 1984 to the spring of 1985 against domestic, U.S., and NATO or NATO-perceived targets. There appears to have been no intent to injure persons, since the CCC issued pre-attack warnings. Numerically negligible, the CCC were neutralized by Belgian security by the end of 1985. Altogether, the CCC carried out approximately 29 bombings against property--primarily in Brussels--during a wave of regional terrorist attacks dubbed by the media as "Euroterrorism," a phenomenon to be discussed under the next heading. In view of the fact that the CCC enjoyed the external support of subversive circles gravitating around the leftist publications/organizations Red Line (Ligne Rouge) and Subversion, this extremist milieu could attempt, if given the opportunity, to resurrect the CCC.²⁵

Considerably different is the situation in Greece, where two principal Marxist-Leninist groups, Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA) and Revolutionary Organization "17 November," continue to engage domestic as well as U.S. targets. ELA was founded during the waning years of the rightist military junta that ruled Greece from 1967-1974. ELA's original and enduring goal is to serve as the spearhead of a Communist revolution against "imperialism." Over the last ten years, it has been responsible for some 100 bombings--its typical targeting technique aimed at property damage rather than personal injury.²⁶ ELA itself comprises a limited membership, but enjoys the support of sympathizers within the broad extraparliamentary movement of the left organized in the 1960's and collectively known as the New Revolutionary Left (NEA).²⁷ ELA's most recent anti-American attack was the bombing of the U.S. Air Force commissary in Athens on September 27, 1987.

Born at about the same time as ELA, "17 November" is named after the date of a student demonstration against the military junta in 1973. Presumably tiny and tightly-knit, "17 November" has relied heavily on meticulously planned gun attacks against select human targets. The victims of this modus operandi encompass not only Greek law-enforcement and private-sector figures, but also Americans. Reputed CIA station chief Richard Welch was murdered in 1975, Navy Captain George Tsantes was murdered in 1983, and Army Master Sergeant Robert Judd was wounded in 1984--all in Athens. However, in late 1986, "17 November" inaugurated bomb attacks, including two against U.S. military personnel. In April and August

1987, it bombed two military busses, thus injuring 16 and nine U.S. servicemen, respectively. According to the Greek police authorities, there may now be evidence of linkage between ELA and "17 November."²⁸

In the Netherlands, the record of indigenous subversive groups generally reflects overt violence, as opposed to terrorism in the strict sense of the term. A borderline case is represented by the Red Resistance Front (RVF), which conducts occasional clandestine bomb attacks. In any case, the major threat to in-country U.S. interests is posed by violent fringe elements of otherwise legal organizations connected to such causes as peace and environmentalism.

Lastly, the menace raised by domestic terrorist groups in Turkey appears to have subsided. Between 1979 and 1981, there were eight incidents involving lethal attacks against U.S. military personnel of all three services.²⁹ Responsibility claims were issued by the Turkish People's Liberation Front/Party and by the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit, a faction of the former. No major indigenous attacks against U.S. interests have been recorded thereafter, as the Turkish government adopted a series of successful countermeasures, including a period of marshal law, to contain what in the 1970's had become incipient insurgency. However, recent developments involving different players could lead to a new menace. In October 1986, ethnic separatists--associated with the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK)--who earlier on in the year had begun to

engage Turkish targets, expanded their sphere of operations by attacking with rockets and automatic weapons a NATO radar sight in southeast Turkey.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE REGION

Within the context of this survey, international terrorism encompasses three recurrent situations in the region: cooperation among kindred groups of different West European nationalities, terrorist actions by non-West European groups, and patronstate support for select West European groups.

Diverse environmental conditions, linguistic differences, geographical separation, communication gaps, frontier crossing problems, identification-documents requirements, and even psychological factors render cooperation among kindred groups at the regional level difficult. Nevertheless, ideological kinship frequently fosters the exchange of operational experience and lateral service support. For example, the RAF and the BR often traded information, documents, and safe haven. It is also likely that the RAF relied on local intelligence and logistical support when it carried out an abortive attempt on the life of U.S. Army General Alexander Haig, then NATO's supreme commander, in Mons, Belgium, in June 1979.

Considerably more problematic and therefore comparatively infrequent is the conduct of joint operations, which take the form of coordinated attacks perpetrated separately and individually by participating indigenous terrorist groups against collectively

agreed upon categories of targets.³⁰ The Western press has reported on regional terrorist "summits" attended by leftist groups from West Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Ireland.³¹ One of these meetings shortly preceded the RAF attack on General Kroesen and the BR abduction of General Dozier--both in 1981--but no cause-effect relationship can be readily established. Two more "summits" coincided with the wave of "Euroterrorist" attacks perpetrated in West Germany, France, the Benelux countries, and the Iberian peninsula against NATO-related or NATO-perceived facilities during the period October 1984-March 1985. In this case, the location of the targets, the time frame, the modus operandi, and the language of concomitant proclamations and responsibility claims tend to support the conclusion that those attacks constitute the execution of a coordinated plan, rather than overlapping, unrelated terrorist actions or mere copycat operations. It is once again significant that NATO and U.S. military power were the focus of "Euroterrorism."32

No less dangerous is the terrorist activity conducted in the region by non-indigenous actors--usually from Northern Africa and the Middle East--who, in most cases, intend to target resident political adversaries from their own area of the world, but in the process frequently harm extraneous bystanders and damage local property. Moreover, non-indigenous terrorist attacks are at times actually planned against West European targets as well as American ones in the region.³³

Some anti-American actions are exemplary. According to press accounts, a Libyan plot to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Rome, Maxwell M. Rabb, was foiled in October 1981.34 In January 1982, U.S. Army Lt. Col. Charles Ray, assistant military attache at the American Embassy in Paris, was shot and killed by the shadowy Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction. In February 1985, during the wave of "Euroterrorist" attacks, a bar frequented by Americans in Glyfada (Athens) was bombed and 69 U.S. servicemen were injured. Middle Eastern terrorists are the suspected culprits. In November 1985, the detonation of an explosive device next to a U.S. Army shopping center in Frankfurt injured 18 soldiers and 15 civilians--all Americans. Media sources point to Iranian involvement.³⁵ In April 1986, Libya had clear complicity in the bombing of a West Berlin disco frequented by U.S. military personnel. Two American soldiers were killed and 64 injured. (This led to the U.S. bombing raids over Tripoli and Bengazi later in the month.) And, in June 1987, an improvised-mortar attack, claimed by the International Anti-Imperialist Brigades, was directed against the U.S. Embassy in Rome, fortunately without casualties. Japanese Red Army militants may have been the perpetrators.

Whether in support of non-indigenous or indigenous terrorist groups in Western Europe, Libya, Iran, and Syria all possess well organized networks and "sleeper" agents coordinated by their embassies and consulates and linked with innocuous appearing cultural and religious associations or facilities.³⁶

With respect to the potential threat to U.S. Edilitary targets, it should be noted that at the height of the "Euroterrorist" campaign against NATO, an official Libyan press organ referred to the terrorists in the following terms: "We must arm them, train them, and help them achieve their noble objectives."³⁷ Also noteworthy is the fact that the largest Iranian community in Europe is located in West Germany. Moreover, Italian rightist extremists, who for some time have been fascinated with Islamic extremism, are now reportedly linked in a mutually supportive network with pro-Khomeini students in Italy.³⁸

As to the role of the USSR and her satellites -- a presumably exploitative one, since the terrorist phenomenon is too complex and varied to allow a puppeteer-marionette relationship--some examples pertaining to the West German and Italian scenes are to the point. RAF founding members maintained contacts with, and drew financial assistance from, East Germany during the RAF's organizational period. Thereafter, East Germany provided false documentation and served as a transit area for RAF militants en route to the Middle East.³⁹ Fugitive members of Italy's BR found asylum in Czechoslovakia in the early 1970's. In 1978, the Milan branch of AUTOP received a subsidy from the local representative of the Czech company Skoda. The same year, the BR were put in touch with a Marxist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) by a Paris-based language school regarded by Italian intelligence as a KGB operation. This PLO contact produced for the BR two shipments

of weapons. Three years later, during General Dozier's captivity, linkage was established between the BR and Bulgarian intelligence to barter Dozier's "interrogation" record for logistical assistance.40

CONCLUSIONS

The clandestine nature of the terrorist phenomenon distinguishes this form of aggression from the classical battlefield situation. It follows that military preparedness does not constitute the ultimate solution to the problem--at least in most cases. In point of fact, since a terrorist group can choose when and where to strike, not even standard or particular personnel and installation security measures are always a dependable passport to safety. Moreover, U.S. Army troops stationed in Western Europe must of necessity rely on the intelligence available to, and the policies adopted by, specific host countries.

Both West Germany and Italy, where most U.S. Army personnel in the region are posted, have been reasonably successful in containing--though not eradicating--domestic terrorism. The West German approach is predicated upon efforts to promote close cooperation between the governmental authorities and ordinary citizens. Besides passing stringent antiterrorism legislation and developing vast files to enhance investigations, the West German government systematically endeavors to keep the public informed in order to increase its cooperation in

isolating and identifying terrorist elements. The Italian approach combines repressive legislation with clemency measures designed to bring about the disassociation of terrorists from their subversive fold. In turn, the confessions of "repentant" terrorists enable the Italian authorities to make inroads into terrorist organizations and support structures.⁴¹

Greater are the problems faced by all West European governments in the neutralization of international terrorism, particularly when originating in the Third World. Political differences among the governmental players in each of the West European countries, on one hand, and foreign policy and foreign trade considerations, on the other, have often diluted their resolve to combat this type of terrorism with swift means, at times much to the consternation of American observers.⁴²

Under the circumstances, a viable U.S. Army terrorism counteraction program in Western Europe must depend on a twotrack system: first, the adoption of passive protective measures for the security of personnel, property, and installations, including the development of deep awareness as to the threat in the immediate area (not just the specific country or Western Europe in general); and, second, close and aggressive liaison with the pertinent host-country authorities. The second measure is more demanding than it might appear. It necessitates the selection of U.S. personnel with highly developed foreign area and language skills, a solid academic curriculum, and tactfulness, inasmuch as their host country

counterparts in this field are likely to be rather sophisticated in the European tradition. At the same time, consideration must be given to the appropriate grade and background of U.S. liaison personnel so as not to clash with the status consciousness of many West Europeans.

Despite progress made in combatting terrorism in Western Europe and elsewhere, the phenomenon is too well entrenched to be eradicated in the short term, if ever. Moreover, American targets--at times the military ones in particular--are highly lucrative to the terrorist mindset. Although even the most elaborate preventive measures will not stop all dedicated terrorists, unilateral prudence and close cooperation with host-country authorities will minimize injury to persons and damage to property. The effort spent in preparedness is well worth the cost.

ENDNOTES

1. For example, the Department of Defense defines terrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property for coercing or intimidating governments or societies and often for achieving political, religious, or ideological objectives." Department of Defense, <u>Directive Number 2000.12</u>, July 16, 1986, p. 2. On the other hand, the Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience." This definition appears inside the cover page of all yearly issues of United States Department of State, Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism</u>, Washington, D.C.

2. This functional description is derived from an earlier work by the author of this paper. See Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "Forecasting Terrorist Attacks: A Challenge for Intelligence Professionals," <u>DIC Newsletter</u>, Defense Intelligence College, Vol. III, Ed. 3, Winter 1987, pp. 1-2.

3. Though certainly menacing, neither the violent actions of two hostile political factions confronting each other nor the disorders caused by a politically motivated, rioting mob can be technically regarded as terrorism, since in both instances the perpetrators operate overtly.

4. In common usage, transnational and international terrorism are synonymous terms. However, some analysts regard transnational terrorism as conducted by autonomous non-state actors and international terrorism as conducted by individuals or groups under the direction of a sovereign state. The Department of State uses only the term "international" and defines international terrorism as "involving citizens or territory of more than one state." Same Department of State source indicated in endnote 1.

5. For individual country listings, see Allan Nanes, <u>International Terrorism</u>, Issue Brief Update, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., November 16, 1984, pp. 4-7. This information is confirmed in the annual <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism</u> reports prepared by the Department of State and cited in endnote 1 above.

6. See, for example, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans: 1973-1986, Washington, D.C., 1987.

7. Statistics from "Almanac," <u>Defense 87</u>, September/October 1987, p. 26.

8. Statistics from Gen. Glenn K. Otis et al, "USAREUR: Dedicated to Professionals at Work," Army, October 1987, p. 65.

9. Antiterrorism Task Force (ATTF) Report, March 1985, reprinted in U.S. Army War College, Selected Readings, Course 3, Joint Forces, Doctrine, and Planning, Vol. II, 26 October-17 December 1987, p. 593.

10. For an overview of causes, actors, and dynamics, see Josef Horchem, <u>Terrorism in West Germany</u>, Conflict Studies No. 186, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1986.

11. Statistics from Der Bundesminister des Intern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1987, Bonn, August 1987 and previous yearly editions.

12. Statistics from DPA (Hamburg), September 17, 1987.

13. Same statistical sources as in endnote 11.

14. Same statistical source as in endnote 7.

15. The RAF structure, composition, and tactics may be drawn from the following sources: <u>Die Zeit</u> (Hamburg), October 17, 1986, p. 2; <u>Die Welt</u> (Bonn), May 6, 1987, p. 5, May 25, 1987, p. 4, and July 10, 1987, p. 1; <u>Hansselsblatt</u> (Duesseldorf), October 5, 1987, p. 3; and ZDF Television Network (Mainz), October 18, 1987.

16. Interview with Dr. Holger Pfalhs, President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, by ARD Television Network (Munich), September 10, 1986.

17. See Bruce Hoffman, <u>Right-Wing Terrorism in West</u> Germany, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, October 1986.

18. For details and estimates, see <u>The New York Times</u>, November 4, 1987, P. A 11 and ARD Television Network (Hamburg), November 3, 1987.

19. For an overview of causes, actors, and dynamics, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Terrorism and Security: The Italian Experience, 98th Congress, November 1984.

20. Statistics from <u>La Repubblica</u> (Rome), January 4/5, 1987, p. 14.

21. U.S. Congress, endnote 19, pp. 62-63, and U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, Terrorism in Italy: An Update Report, 1983-1985, 99th Congress, October 1985, p. 1.

22. Same statistical source as in endnote 7.

23. All Italian criminological and security issues, including terrorism of the left and of the right as well as the pacifist movement, are discussed in detail in Vittorfranco S. Pisano, The Dynamics of Subversion and Violence in Contemporary Italy, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California, 1987.

24. Same statistical source as in endnote 7.

25. An informative survey of CCC activities appears in Le Soir (Brussels), May 20, 1985, p. 3.

26. Statistics from <u>The Washington Post</u>, October 12, 1986, p. A28.

27. See <u>I Vradyni</u> (Athens), May 26, 1986, p. 6, which quotes national security documents.

28. Athens News, October 7, 1987, p. 1.

29. Statistics from U.S. Department of State, endnote 6, pp. 79-81.

30. Occasional joint responsibility claims issued by two West European groups of different nationalities for the same terrorist attack are usually indicative of solidarity and not of an actual joint operation.

31. See <u>L'Express</u> (Paris), February 1, 1985, p. 7; Panorama (Milan), February 10, 1985, p. 65; Paese Sera (Rome), February 16, 1985, p. 3; and <u>Europeo</u> (Milan), February 23, 1985, p. 28.

32. For details, see Vittorfranco S. Pisano, <u>Euroterrorism</u> and <u>NATO</u>, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, 1985.

33. A concise but exhaustive overview of this phenomenon is available in Dennis Pluchinski, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe," <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, University of New Brunswick (Canada), Summer 1986, pp. 5-25.

34. Cited in Subcommittee report, endnote 19, p. 7.

35. See Newsweek, February 9, 1987, p. 7.

36. For Libyan activities in support of terrorism, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression, Special Report No. 138, January 1986. For Iranian clandestine and semi-clandestine activity in Western Europe, see <u>National Hebdo</u> (Paris), February 27-March 5, 1986, pp. 10 and 21 and March 20-26, 1986, pp. 8-9; and <u>Le Point</u> (Paris), March 30, 1987, pp. 56-61 and June 15, 1987, pp. 43-47.

37. Quoted in Il Tempo (Rome), February 20, 1985, p. 15.

38. See La Repubblica (Rome), December 22, 1987, p. 16, and December 23, 1987, p. 15.

39. See Alberta Goren, <u>The Soviet Union and Terrorism</u>, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1984, pp. 161-162.

40. See Subcommittee report, endnote 21, pp. 22-23.

41. For an overview of West European countermeasures, see Vittorfranco S. Pisano, <u>Terrorism Counteraction in Select</u> <u>West European Countries</u>, International Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, 1987.

42. For an analysis of the collective West European posture vis-a-vis terrorism, see Stanley S. Bedlington, <u>Combatting</u> <u>International Terrorism</u>, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Washington, D.C., November 1986.

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