JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT
FINAL REPORT

VOLUME I
ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

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JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
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Our adversaries are confronting us with with political violence short of conventional war to achieve their goals. If most forecasts are correct, this is precisely the form of conflict that will confront us in the years ahead. Four themes prevail throughout this report: As a nation, we do not understand low-intensity conflict; we respond without unity of effort; we execute our activities poorly; and we lack the ability to sustain operations. The findings of the project are summarized within these themes.

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DISCLAIMER

Conclusions and recommendations contained in the report are based on an analysis of the data collected. They are the independent conclusions and recommendations of the project and do not necessarily reflect the position of any service or interdepartmental agency. Volume II contains data that supports the findings.

Whenever the masculine gender is used, both genders, where appropriate, are intended.

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Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Volume I
ANALYTICAL REVIEW OF LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Volume II
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION D: DEVELOPMENT

SECTION E: INTELLIGENCE

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PREFACE

Battles waged at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict contain a complex mixture of social, political, economic, and military forces. Renewed attention has focused on United States capability, or lack of capability, to adequately defend its interests in nations and regions engulfed in this level of conflict. Strong disagreement exists within the government as to what actions civilian and military agencies and departments should take to prevent, deter, or confront activities that threaten United States interests in the low-intensity conflict environment.

While various departments, agencies, and services have done considerable work, a vehicle was lacking to pull together the numerous and diverse studies, publications, and reports resulting from that work. Lacking was a common data base; a systematic approach to the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of data on civilian agencies' responsibilities and policies; an appropriate military force structure; and joint doctrine.

To resolve that deficiency, the Army Chief of Staff directed, on 1 July 1985, the formation of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project. Its mission was to examine worldwide low-intensity conflict issues with a focus on Central America, to develop a common low-intensity conflict data base, to develop lessons learned, and to identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for low-intensity conflict. The project was tasked to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services, the Central Intelligence Agency, and numerous military and civilian government departments and agencies supported and participated in this initiative. A detailed description of the mission and the analytical methodology used are in the project's charter and directive, Appendixes A and B respectively.

This analysis of United States capability to protect interests threatened by low-intensity conflict is based on recent experiences. Chapters 1-3 in Volume I on the low-intensity conflict environment, the threat, and United States policy and strategy provide the necessary background for the analysis that follows. The conceptual portions of the report, Chapters 4-7, develop the essential features of the various categories of low-intensity conflict operations: insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction, peacetime

contingency, and peacekeeping. Considerable attention is devoted to these concepts, not because literature or insight into their nature is lacking, but because a need exists to renew our understanding of them. The mixed record of past responses to low-intensity conflict suggests that much of learning what to do involves relearning what has been done right.

Each of the conceptual chapters contains a statement of principles that ought to stimulate further thinking. These chapters call for continuing thought and education, coordination of effort, and sustained support and attention. The remaining chapters in Volume I deal with various functional areas such as logistics and intelligence, echoing the ideas and identifying various programs and reforms needed to achieve the goals established in the conceptual chapters.

Although Volume I is unclassified, project members called extensively on classified data for research and analysis. Volume II reflects the classified aspects of the conceptual and functional area studies of Volume I.

Volume II discusses specific issues and includes recommendations. The issues were identified as a result of our literary research and data collection. To the extent possible, each issue has been analyzed as an individual problem. While the project relied heavily on data collected in Central America, each conclusion and recommendation was included based on worldwide applicability.

The report neither identifies nor resolves all the complex issues associated with low-intensity conflict. Based upon guidance from the steering group, the project did not, for various reasons, investigate every facet of low-intensity conflict. For example, because considerable attention has been given to improving self-protection techniques against terrorism, only limited attention was paid to this area. Likewise, investigation concentrated on the third world, paid limited attention to Europe, and avoided analysis of low-intensity conflict in the United States. The report does, however, provide specific recommendations for more than sixty issues. These recommendations provide the common perspective and basis from which the services and United States government agencies can proceed to develop the necessary policies and instruments to safeguard United States interests in low-intensity conflict.

This report is not intended to satisfy any hidden agenda. Nor is it designed to examine the range of government and national activity and recommend a few relevant "fixes" that would settle this bothersome problem once and for all so that we can get back to minding the nation's "serious" business.

This report is a dialogue. Its most significant contribution is that it represents the beginning of a civil-military analysis of this civil-military form of conflict which is the most likely conflict that will confront this nation. If the report invites enlightened debate, sustained concern, and serious effort, it will have succeeded. In this sense, it is not a prescription but an invitation.

In addition to this final report, the project established the computer-based, on-line Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base at Fort Monroe, VA. The data base provides annotated bibliographic reference to books, articles, papers, and audiovisual material related to low-intensity conflict. It also provides reference to ongoing or recently completed low-intensity conflict research efforts and subject-matter experts. The Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base Handbook at Appendix C contains complete instructions on the use of the data base.

PART ONE

BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 1

THE ENVIRONMENT

GENERAL

> As a nation we don't understand it and as a government we are not prepared to deal with it.[1]

For over two decades, various conflicts short of conventional war have threatened United States global interests. This form of warfare is the most probable conflict this country will face in the foreseeable future. Low-intensity conflict will pose significant challenges to policymakers and the agencies and departments charged with our national security.

Given that perspective, one would expect to find a well-articulated national policy and strategy, as well as tailored policy instruments for low-intensity conflict. That is not the case. The United States does not understand fully low-intensity conflict nor does it display the capability to adequately defend against it.

The world in which the United States must function is perplexing and dangerous. As a superpower in the nuclear age with an economy largely dependent upon an extensive, vulnerable overseas trade system, this country faces challenges that are far more troubling and complicated than those that it faced before World War II. The demands to cope with this more intricate environment have produced considerable debate and dissension throughout society. Increasingly since World War II, and especially since Vietnam, intense, often divisive debate over priority, morality, purpose, and appropriate capability has compounded the problems of developing a consistent national response to a range of issues whose diversity alone would challenge the most creative and coherent of national wills.

As Americans we consider democracy to be the best form of government, but it is not always the most efficient. The cumbersome decision-making and concensus-building process inherent in a democracy can be too slow to respond to dangers before they become critical. This is especially true for threats that are uncertain or ambiguous.

The Soviet threat, for example, is one of the clearest, most perceptible dangers facing this nation. Yet opinion divides on just how dangerous, and it divides even more sharply on how to respond. How much more difficult is it, then, to

understand the imminent dangers arising from threats that are not so clear? It is also harder to develop a consistent response in an atmosphere in which problems seem to compound faster than solutions. And it is singularly difficult in a democracy to maintain a sense of crisis or commitment in the absence of some overpowering menace or great, clear universal sense of purpose. For these reasons, the low-intensity conflict environment is a particularly knotty problem for this nation to comprehend or to respond to effectively. Yet, its long-term dangers to United States interests make it necessary to understand that environment and to develop appropriate responses.

FEATURES OF THE LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT

The low-intensity conflict environment has two main features: the nature of conflict involved and the arena in which it occurs.

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

The term "low intensity" suggests a contrast to mid- or high-intensity conflict--a spectrum of warfare. Low-intensity conflict, however, cannot be understood to mean simply the degree of violence involved. Low-intensity conflict has more to do with the nature of the violence--the strategy that guides it and the way individuals engage each other in it--than with level or numbers.

No single issue has impeded the development of policy, strategy, doctrine, training, or organizations more than the lack of an approved definition of low-intensity conflict. After years of careful consideration and extensive coordination, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following definition in November 1985. While the definition does not specifically mention military objectives, it did enable the project to focus on specifics.

> Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.

The project adopted this definition and from it disaggregated low-intensity conflict into its following major component categories: insurgency/counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction, peacetime contingency, and peacekeeping operations.

Insurgency--An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JCS Pub 1).

Counterinsurgency--Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JCS Pub 1). It depends upon a balanced approach for mobilizing and developing the threatened society, securing the population and resources, and neutralizing the insurgent. These components are interdependent and must occur simultaneously. Before counterinsurgency operations can occur, the nature of the insurgency must be known, as well as the source of the participants.

Terrorism Counteraction--Terrorism counteraction is composed of antiterrorism which is defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack and counterterrorism which is offensive measures taken in response to terrorist acts.

Peacetime Contingency--Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war, for example, strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstration, show of force, unconventional warfare, and intelligence operations (TRADOC Pam 525-44). These operations usually involve politically sensitive issues and the pursuit of military, political, economic, or psychological objectives. They are normally brief and are rapidly executed.

Peacekeeping--Military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

While these categories of low-intensity conflict constitute individual concept areas, they may overlap in practice--a fact that makes sharp divisions difficult. In essence, low-intensity conflict incorporates all those situations involving the use of, or the threatened use of, force outside the realm of direct combat between conventional or nuclear forces. It is, in essence, an environment in which political concerns predominate.

Although all conflicts and the means used in them are extensions of politics, in low-intensity conflict this is strikingly true. It accounts, in part, for why the level and

use of violence are generally more constrained than in other forms of warfare. While the resort to force may be relatively unlimited--for example, the Soviet response to the Afghan insurgency--low-intensity conflict implies that appropriate responses exist. This is particularly true in counterinsurgency where use of unlimited force may be counterproductive.

Low-intensity conflict, especially insurgency, also differs from mid- or high-intensity conflict in that it is generally an internal rather than an external dispute. Although third, foreign parties may have a role, low-intensity conflict generally occurs within a nation and involves rival, domestic disputants. The dispute is usually between the government and those seeking to radically change the government, rather than between foreign belligerents. Also, insurgency often entails an imbalance in the means of violence available to, and the tactics used by, the disputants. It generally involves varying forms of civil or social strife rather than confrontation between distinct forces operating along traditional military lines. However, in the case of an advanced insurgency, clashes between regularly constituted forces may, in fact, come to predominate. An exception is the occupation of a country by an outside power, such as France in Algeria or the Soviets in Afghanistan. But even in such cases, the parties to the disputes are generally distinguished by a considerable imbalance in means, and the struggle is still largely an internal one, though with broader implications. These implications lead into the second aspect of the low-intensity conflict environment--the arena in which it occurs.

THE ARENAS OF CONFLICT

The environment is potentially the same for all conflict arenas. It is the nature of the conflict and the constraints on the use of force that separate them. The four distinct, but interrelated arenas are the local, the regional, the international, and the national. From a United States perspective, the two most important arenas in low-intensity conflict are the local and the United States national arenas. Since almost by definition low-intensity conflicts are localized, the discussion will start there.

Local. The local arena is crucial because of two significant developments: the emergence since World War II of a number of new, independent states whose sociopolitical stability is often fragile; and the growth (in various societies) of groups, often with international connections, that are dedicated to radical change through violent means.

The United States is concerned with these developments because of its expanded world posture since World War II,

its economic interdependence, and its strategic vulnerability. Although forms of low-intensity conflict are found in the developed nations, the instability of the strategically important third world states is of particular concern. It is here that the low-intensity battlefield is most commonly found.

The idea of stability in a sociopolitical system is a vague concept. All societies have varying degrees of instability at various times, but the postcolonial world has witnessed the emergence of a host of states whose stability is particularly delicate. Many of these new nations are governed by political elites whose claim to power is tenuous or open to challenge by internal rivals.

Severe social, economic, and political inequalities often exacerbate the problems ruling elites have in justifying their tenure. In addition, modernization and rapid development can seriously undermine traditional values, patterns of organization, and older forms of social cohesion. This can be a profoundly disruptive process that throws whole societies into revolutionary upheaval.

Nation building and rapid economic development are disruptive by nature and, in the short term at least, provide the basis for instability and violent change. Many low-intensity conflicts arise directly from this milieu and present, in some cases, almost intractable problems and the promise of future disharmony.

Along with these inherent features of the modern world, however, is another significant development. It is the emergence of groups dedicated to bringing about a radical change of power regardless of the sociopolitical conditions of a given society. The economic, social, and political grievances that exist in every developing society provide a convenient base for such groups. But the presence of legitimate grievances is only an excuse. In some cases they are a convenient blind for a more direct desire to seize power or to disrupt the functioning of a given system under any circumstances. Many such groups enjoy international support, transcending national boundaries. Others are the creation of foreign states willing to use them to spread confusion and enhance their own political goals. The phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism is one such situation.

While terrorism, subversion, revolution, and foreign meddling are hardly new, the emergence of full-time, professional revolutionaries and terrorists is. Some of these people are available for hire--along with internationally funded training institutes, a host of trainers and training aides, and a virtual parallel international system that supports them.

This in itself is an indication of how interests are interpreted at various levels. It also indicates the decline of national borders as respected frontiers for such interests.

Another aspect of this internationalization and professionalization of revolution and terrorism is that the revolutionaries and terrorists are almost uniformly anti-American and are quite often supported by states hostile to the United States. While not every revolutionary or terrorist is a professional or foreign supported, it is often difficult to tell the difference, and the consequences of their acts for United States interests may be the same.

The United States, concerned with protecting its interests, must consider a number of other aspects to the local arena of low-intensity conflict. Although factors will vary from situation to situation and their importance will change according to the involvement in question, several concerns are fairly typical. They include--

o The importance of United States interest and the degree to which it is threatened.

o The social, political, economic, geographic, and demographic characteristics of the local environment.

o The nature and degree of the problem--for example, an insurgency or a terrorist threat.

o The distances involved from the United States.

o The forces available for response.

o The physical, social, and political infrastructure of the local environment for supporting any United States involvement.

o The degree of local support or opposition to the United States.

One principal aspect of low-intensity conflict in all arenas is the constraints generally imposed upon responses--particularly on United States responses. The above factors may all play a role in determining the nature and extent of those constraints. For example, the United States may find it in its interest to assist a friendly state in a counterinsurgency effort. The role of assistance automatically entails constraints.

The United States will have to protect its interests through the good offices of a host nation. Yet, the host

government may be beset with major economic and political problems or regarded as illegitimate by a fair number of its citizens. The local government may be corrupt, inept, and intransigent when it comes to implementing reforms or programs that are contrary to the interests of the ruling elite but are needed to respond effectively to the situation. The United States may also find a poorly developed society lacking the necessary physical infrastructure and trained personnel to sustain the counterinsurgent efforts. In addition, there may be considerable local hostility to United States presence. Indeed, the United States, its interests, the role it sees for itself, and the ways it responds to situations may be major issues in the situation in question. If so, the very involvement of the United States may make matters worse.

Finally, the United States may find that its ability to influence the host nation is severely limited. Leverage to force the erstwhile ally may be lacking. The United States may find itself unable to sustain its interests, yet unable to simply walk away. Vietnam is an example of these problems. Thus, the local environment is both complex and perplexing.

Regional. Social, economic, and geographic factors, among others, may play a significant role in determining the regional context of a low-intensity conflict situation. However, the regional environment's main feature, from a United States perspective, is its political--particularly its diplomatic--character.

The regional environment, as a subset of the international system, will be composed of a number of independent states with varying degrees of interest and involvement in any low-intensity conflict in the region. This may range from neutrality to support for one side or another; and involvement may be direct or indirect, sustained or intermittent, substantial or ephemeral, independent or in combination with others.

The current situation in Central America and its Latin American context illustrates the intricate nature of the regional environment. Here, virtually every type of activity noted above can be found. In El Salvador, for example, some regional states support the insurgency while others support the government. Some states are only sympathetic to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), providing no tangible assistance, and others are only sympathetic to the government. Some states seek to effect a regionally based reconciliation and some states are altogether uninterested. If a common regional theme exists, it is concern over the nature of United States involvement.

Although concern ranges from open hostility to the desire for United States support, the history of United States intervention in Latin America has left a lasting concern in all the states over United States intentions. This legacy also can be used by forces hostile to the United States to enlarge their own support at the expense of the United States and its regional friends.

To a considerable degree, Central America's perception of the United States is shared by many other regions. This perception drives states to oppose United States policy or to refrain from taking steps that support it. This interaction can produce unexpected and unintended results. This is one reason why the regional environment is complex and at times bewildering.

International. The international community, composed of individual states, their public, and a multitude of multinational organizations, will have a wide range of responses to any particular low-intensity conflict situation and to United States involvement in it. The participation of the international community will come in a variety of ways from indifference to varying degrees of moral and material support for one side or another. As in the regional context, this involvement can impose a variety of constraints on the United States. International response to United States involvement in the resistance against the Sandinistas illustrates some of the constraining influence. In either case, the nature of the response is likely to fluctuate unexpectedly and to be elusive and frustrating.

One way the international community may respond to United States involvement in a low-intensity conflict is to support the opponents of the United States and its interests. Until recently, this support came largely from the Soviet Union or its surrogates. But with the development of a host of new states, the emergence of individual radical groups, and the growth of money and means to internationalize their goals and desires, the field has become far more complex. The ability of Iran, Libya or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to target United States interests, apart from any Soviet influence or support, is an example of the intricacy of the modern world. The problems and conflicting concerns represented are beyond the power of any state or combination of states to control.

Although low-intensity conflict tends to occur locally and to derive from local causes, the shrinking of the world and the growth of transnational concerns and rivalries have resulted in a new interpenetration of interests and environments. In this sense, international concerns are injected into local problems and local predicaments are internationalized.

National. The United States national arena is characterized by a number of subsets, to include the United States government and its components and the United States public, to include the media. Both of these subsets consist of numerous subdivisions, all with their own interests, goals, and sense of priority. Their attitudes towards low-intensity conflict are diverse, subject to change, and open to a variety of influences. From this welter of systems and opinions the United States must forge a response to low-intensity conflict. It is important to grasp some of the essentials of this environment, particularly the constraints on a United States response.

The United States is poorly postured institutionally, materially, and psychologically for low-intensity conflict. Much of the problem concerns the very meaning of the term, which emerged as a euphemism for "counterinsurgency" when that term lost favor. However, the scope of the term has grown to include a variety of United States missions outside the realm of conventional combat.

Largely as a result of Vietnam, the mood of the government and the nation has shifted away from wanting to deal with "dirty little wars" in some far corner of the world. After Vietnam the military refocused its attention on preparing for the big war in Europe, something it was far more comfortable with anyway, and the nation became absorbed in introspection. Unfortunately, the world did not stop, nor did the dependency of the United States on that world. In some ways, the United States preoccupation and loss of faith in itself as a result of the Vietnam War encouraged our enemies to be bolder and discouraged our friends, who came to doubt our wisdom and our reliability.

Today, the challenges to United States interests are just as great as they ever were. But our sense of purpose is less sure, and the consensus sustaining our actions is more fragile. While we have made progress recently, years of neglect, an innate prejudice against "limited" wars, and a lack of focus on the imminent dangers posed by low-intensity conflict have left the nation ill-prepared to respond.

As the balance of the report will argue, the United States does not understand the nature of the threat it faces. The demands for responding to threats, such as the direct threat posed by the Soviet Union, compete with demands to respond to "little" wars everywhere. It is an unequal competition. The direct threat is the centerpiece of United States concern, as it must be, but the emphasis on this threat, both mentally and materially, means little is left over for indirect threats, even though these are recognized as more likely than war with

the Soviet Union. The Soviets are the great menace, and much of United States policy and the raison d'etre of United States international involvement derive from this threat. Budgets and programs, the meat and potatoes of influence in government, depend upon it. Furthermore, the United States public's normal penchant for isolationism and self-absorption--its inertia, short of clear, immediate, impending crisis--is overcome only by conjuring with this menace. No constraint operating on United States responses to low-intensity conflict is more powerful than our inability to comprehend the threat that faces us or to develop a clear set of priorities that will permit us to respond to it with competence.

SUMMARY

The nature of threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum makes it difficult to convey any sense of urgency or enduring concern to either the public or to much of the government. Without this understanding and enduring commitment, particularly within the government, it is difficult to develop the consensus and the sustained, coordinated programs essential for effective response. It is virtually impossible to overcome the prejudice of established beliefs and the inertia of routine. Yet, without understanding and a national commitment, the United States faces the slow but steady whittling away of its international posture until it is without effective response.

This chapter began by noting the complexity and perplexity of the problems that face us. The report substantiates this perspective. Yet, if the problems are great, so are the opportunities. The challenge exists and this nation responds well to challenge.

NOTES

[1]LTG Wallace H. Nutting, "Nutting: Stand Fast," Newsweek 101.24 (6 June 1983).

CHAPTER 2

THE THREAT

GENERAL

Low-intensity conflict could erupt almost anywhere in the world. Each potential theater of operations presents distinctly unique characteristics and requirements. The various types of political-military struggles at the lower end of the conflict spectrum--terrorism, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, and other forms of conflict outside the realm of conventional or nuclear war--represent formidable challenges to the implementation of United States policy. These manifestations of international political volatility threaten national interests in virtually every region of the world.

Terrorism in the Middle East, for example, poses a direct threat to the security of United States citizens and property. Past terrorist acts, such as the bombing of the Marine battalion landing team (BLT) headquarters in Beirut, have forced the United States to change its foreign policy initiatives in the region. Moreover, the approval and direct support of terrorism as a tool for political change by several Middle Eastern Arab states have caused the United States and its regional allies additional security problems in protecting and securing their interests.

The problems involved in the low-intensity conflict environment do not end with terrorism, however. Today, areas of conflict exist where several types of threat occur simultaneously. Future threats are increasingly going to include many different types of conflict at the same time.

Numerous examples of the need for United States involvement exist in each category of low-intensity conflict. The stationing of combat forces in the Sinai and United States participation in the multinational peacekeeping force located there are examples of United States involvement in a peacekeeping operation. Our presence between Israel and Egypt reduces the potential for conflict in the Sinai. However, the world is a volatile place and the ever-present potential for hostility or minor incidents is a constant challenge to United States capability and stamina.

Closer to home, URGENT FURY in 1983 provides an example of a peacetime contingency operation. One purpose of this operation was to rescue United States citizens on Grenada whose safety was threatened by a political crisis.

The operation was also conducted to restore political order at the request of other Caribbean states and to ensure future political stability.

Latin America provides examples of both insurgency and counterinsurgency operations. Several factors cause Latin America to be of strategic importance to the United States. They include certain military and commercial facilities in the region; the vulnerability of sea lines of communication; proximity to the United States; historic relations; potential collective security support through application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty, and the Organization of American States (OAS); and the presence of certain strategic materials that the United States obtains from Latin America.

Involvement in Latin American guerrilla wars has posed one of the more complex and sensitive political-military problems faced by the United States since the early 1900s. Currently, the United States finds itself supporting a counterinsurgency campaign in El Salvador that has tested virtually all aspects of our foreign assistance capability. To varying degrees, the United States has called upon military advice and intelligence collection and analysis, as well as economic and diplomatic initiatives, to assist the Salvadoran government. On the other side of the fence, the United States has supported the Nicaraguan resistance to the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime. Intense scrutiny of political, moral, and practical aspects of United States assistance by the media, United States policy-makers, and the public has resulted in a general inconsistency in the type, amount, and availability of United States assistance.

TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS

The threat to political stability posed by low-intensity, political-military struggles is not new. By some accounts, approximately one thousand low-intensity conflicts have occurred since 1945.[1] Although the basic underlying factors which contribute to low-intensity conflict have not changed--social inequity, political corruption, repression, foreign influence, and the desire for power, to name a few--the means by which the conflicts are conducted and the environment in which they occur have changed.

The advent of electronic media has brought the gruesome aspects of political violence into the living rooms of millions of people worldwide. The result has been instant recognition for formerly unknown insurgent and terrorist groups. In addition, media coverage has lead to an intense scrutiny of United States policies and actions.

The availability of technologically advanced weapons and communications equipment has increased the lethality, mobility, and security of terrorist and insurgent groups. Rapidly changing technology has benefited insurgents and terrorists and allowed them to circumvent many advantages formerly gained by friendly governments through the acquisition of United States materiel assistance.

Death squads and vigilantes have appeared in some areas. They see themselves as doing the government's job and have become a prominent feature in some guerrilla conflicts. Uncontrolled by any government, or sometimes secretly controlled by elements within a government, they often alienate the very people whose loyalty the government is trying to win. In El Salvador they oppose government programs such as land reform and seek to veto them with violence.

Contemporary conflicts increasingly involve urban guerrilla warfare. The conflict in Northern Ireland, the civil war in Lebanon, and the increased incidence of guerrilla warfare in the urban areas of Latin America are examples of this trend. With continuing urbanization of the third world, this trend is likely to continue.

A relatively new situation has arisen as we see non-Marxist insurgents waging war on Marxist states. In such diverse countries as Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, Soviet-supported governments are fighting guerrillas dedicated to their overthrow.

The development of professional, full-time revolutionaries and terrorists, some of whom are available for hire, makes the environment more dangerous and response more difficult. These individuals often receive arms, logistics, and training support from sponsoring sovereign states and the international black market. In addition, some insurgent and terrorist groups are known to finance their activities through illicit narcotics sales or from funds provided by drug dealers for insurgent/terrorist protection of the drug trades. The net effect of these activities and technological changes has been to give small groups or individuals political power far beyond the strength of their numbers. The political impact of the bombing at the Marine BLT headquarters in Beirut is a case in point.

INSTABILITY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

No single action or reason can be cited as the cause of instability. Rather, instability evolves from a country's unique political, economic, religious, and social development.

Contributing factors range from the charismatic appeal of a political leader such as Fidel Castro, who led the model Cuban revolution, to the failure of a political or economic system.

The impact of these political-military struggles usually transcends country borders and is felt throughout a region. The guerrilla war in El Salvador and the consolidation of the Nicaraguan revolution, for example, have had a direct impact on the level of leftist antigovernment activity in Honduras. United States involvement, particularly political-military assistance, also has a regional impact. For example, United States assistance to the Salvadoran government has had a direct effect on the military balance in the region vis-a-vis the Hondurans. Fear and suspicion on the part of both nations date back even before their 1969 Soccer War. Any aid to either of these nations gives rise to new fears on the part of the other.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Numerous legitimate causes contribute to instability in the world. Forces determined to encourage and exploit these causes--legitimate or otherwise--also exist. A key factor in the outcome of any political-military conflict is the ability of an insurgent group, terrorist group, or legitimate political organization to rally external support for its cause.

External support is extremely important in low-intensity conflict. With it, a political or military organization with relatively few resources or followers can concentrate on achieving its objectives rather than on developing logistical support. In addition, external political support can invest an otherwise outlaw organization with political legitimacy.

External support has been a decisive factor in the outcome of many political-military conflicts since World War II. Cuban assistance to the Nicaraguan revolution; Soviet and Chinese support for the North Vietnamese; Soviet-sponsored training and the provision of weapons, finances, and political support directly to leftist groups; and the support of several Arab nations to international terrorist cells illustrate the role of external support in low-intensity conflict. Our peace-keeping role in the Sinai and the recent Grenada operation are examples of how United States external support and action have been decisive factors in the outcome of events.

External support can take many forms. Some examples are--

o Propaganda--National and international media campaigns and psychological operations; political support

in international forums such as the United Nations or the Organization of American States.

o Financing--Funds to maintain the struggle.

o Materiel--Weapons and covert logistics support.

o Intelligence--Information concerning plans, capabilities, facilities, organizations, and intentions of the enemy.

o Training--Internal and external training, including advisors.

o External sanctuary--The use of third country territory as a base of operations.

o Manpower--Combat troops such as Cuban support to Angola and Ethiopia.

The Soviet Union, its allies, and others have become masters of providing external support, both overt and covert, to client states and groups. Marxist-Leninist revolutionary philosophy predisposes these nations to support struggles they define as wars of national liberation. Their international propaganda and training programs are especially effective. Other states and organizations such as Libya, Iran, and the PLO also provide materiel, training, and propaganda support to insurgent or terrorist groups. Because of the significance external support can have in determining the outcome of a particular low-intensity conflict, it can threaten western interests and result in United States involvement.

SUMMARY

Today, the United States and the Soviet Union are major rivals restrained from direct conflict for varied and, in some cases, different reasons. However, both are restrained by the realities of the current nuclear threat. The threat posed to United States interests by low-intensity conflict is far more complex than the more precisely defined confrontation between East and West. The danger of escalation inherent in general war has encouraged greater reliance on indirect forms of conflict. The increasing complexity of international relations, due to the emergence of numerous new states, and the opposition's willingness to use indirect force make it difficult to respond effectively to the threat.

The potential for revolutionary warfare has always been with us. The Soviets and others use terrorism and insurgency

as techniques to project power, and ultimately, though sometimes awkwardly, to attain national strategic goals to the detriment of the United States. Today, the terrorist or insurgent often finds diplomatic support, training, and materiel aid readily available. All of these factors have tended to increase both the incidence and effectiveness of terrorism and insurgency.

The United States interests will be increasingly challenged at the low end of the conflict spectrum. Through the end of this century, insurgency is likely to increase in frequency, in sophistication of techniques, and in the technological sophistication of the equipment employed. The numbers of terrorist incidents and their destructiveness will also increase as terrorists search for new ways to gain the attention of an increasingly desensitized audience. The end results of any continued inability to fight in the low end of the conflict spectrum will be the need to subsequently fight in the high end.

Population growth, improved communications, and the destabilization of traditional societies because of economic, political, and sociological change will continue to plague developing nations. Low-intensity conflict will be more likely to occur in third world nations because of the factors just cited, but it will by no means be limited to the third world. Low-intensity conflict, by whatever form, will continue to challenge United States security interests around the world. Our ability to influence low-intensity conflicts in the future depends upon our success at understanding them now and developing the means to cope.

The scope of low-intensity conflict is so broad that only a synoptic discussion of the threat is possible here. Specific assessments require a synthesis of the most current intelligence information available. Regional and country-specific low-intensity conflict threat assessments are available within a variety of military and civilian intelligence estimates and surveys. They can be obtained locally or through national intelligence organizations. Threat-related bibliographic material is included as part of this report.

NOTES

[1]R. Lynn Rylander, "Tools of War/Skills of Peace: The US Response to Low-Intensity Conflict," Air Power Symposium: The Role of Airpower in Low Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, May 1985).

CHAPTER 3

POLICY AND STRATEGY

GENERAL

The United States responds to conflict and situations threatening national interests based on various national policies and strategies. Consequently, one of the first tasks of this project was to identify those policies and strategies that guide our involvement in low-intensity conflict.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Guam Doctrine, which originated as a 1969 presidential statement concerning United States Asian policy and our impending pullback from Vietnam, reflects much present-day United States third world policy. Like the Truman Doctrine (1948), National Security Council document, NSC-68 (1950), and the Eisenhower Doctrine (1958), the Guam Doctrine (also called the Nixon Doctrine) stresses United States commitment to defend international peace, development, and security. Reacting to the impact of the Vietnam experience, the Guam Doctrine sought to reaffirm United States support to others. Like early statements of policy, it stressed that the United States would continue to meet its alliance commitments. However, the principal burden of dealing with regional and internal threats rests with the ally and not with the United States. This position has been reaffirmed by the Reagan Administration. It emphasizes self-help programs rather than direct United States effort in third world situations not involving a direct Soviet threat.

The Guam Doctrine, as it has emerged, contains the following implicit and explicit principles:

o The doctrine applies to the third world.

o The host country has the primary burden of resisting aggression, subversion, and insurgency by armed force.

o The United States will support such resistance with advice and assistance (materiel and training).

o Political, economic, and social improvements must be undertaken with any military effort. Such military effort is viewed as a supporting and dependent effort rather than the primary effort.

o The greater the Marxist-Leninist participation in, penetration of, and control of such warfare, the greater the threat to United States interests.

o The United States will abide by its alliance and treaty commitments.

o The magnitude of United States support should be commensurate with the threat to United States interests but should be sufficient to win with minimum use of violence or loss of life.

o These efforts should be managed with minimal impact on United States East-West security relationships and the United States-USSR balance.

While the Guam Doctrine provides broad policy guidance for our relationship to the third world, the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries affect the way the broad policy is interpreted for Latin America. In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine defined a United States strategic interest in keeping Latin America secure and friendly for United States presence. It stated that foreign powers should be prevented from acquiring an economic and military foothold in the western hemisphere, and foreign balance-of-power struggles should be excluded from the area. It also implied that few United States military resources should be dedicated to protecting United States interests in the region.

Since 1823, the Monroe Doctrine has been the linchpin of United States Latin American policy. The United States has used its principles to justify frequent military and economic interventions. Although significantly modified by former Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy and a fluctuating United States interest in Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine remains a major element in United States policy and Latin American perceptions.

CONTEMPORARY USES OF THE GUAM DOCTRINE

To lesser or greater degrees, all United States presidents since World War II have used the principles that were ultimately expressed in the Guam Doctrine. President Reagan reaffirmed them as the key guidelines for his administration's policy for meeting threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. In May 1982, the President directed a study of United States national security strategy. This study reinforced the themes of the Guam Doctrine and emphasized the need for a coordinated, interdepartmental approach to dealing with problems such as insurgency and terrorism. The presidential decision to accept

that study established our current security policy concerning counterinsurgency. The current administration has made two important additions to the basic doctrine:

o First is what has become known as the Reagan Doctrine or what the media referred to as the first rollback principle--supporting nationalist groups seeking to overthrow a Marxist-Leninist government in the third world. Support for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua and Afghanistan is an example.

o Second is that the United States considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group in any cause a threat to national security and will counter the use of terrorism by all legal means available.

Defense Guidance is a further reflection of policy. While the FY87 Defense Guidance pays considerably more attention to low-intensity conflict than in previous years, it provides only general direction for four main areas of consideration: refining and elaborating on policy, improving ability to tailor force packages to low-intensity conflict, improving capabilities to provide rapid security assistance and intelligence support to allies, and, finally, providing better antiterrorism capabilities.

While the Guam Doctrine, related statements, and the Defense Guidance establish the boundaries for United States action in responding to threats at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, they are not complete. They do not, for example, fully address the questions of relative regional priority, levels of commitment, timing and location, or relationships of the elements of national power. Although the answers to these questions sometimes depend on the situation and can be satisfied by a theater or regional strategy, national strategy must clearly provide the key dimension.

National security policy has been established for involvement in various types of low-intensity conflict. However, an implementing defense strategy that adequately relates policy objectives to force structure objectives and requirements is lacking.

DIFFICULTIES IN DEVELOPING STRATEGY

Robert Osgood noted both the need for, and difficulty in, developing a low-intensity conflict strategy. In 1957, he wrote that United States involvements in the third world would increase and that the United States must develop a strategy for waging limited war.[1] In a book published in 1979,

however, he concludes that it was difficult to formulate such a strategy because of the public's opposition to involvement in third world conflicts.[2] Osgood felt this opposition resulted from a number of popular perceptions:

o Such involvements are messy and tend to spill over borders.

o Most Americans cannot identify with the cultures of the third world.

o The geographical distance from many of these countries and the lack of major alliances with the United States indicates to the American public that the third world is not important.

o Many lesser-developed countries are anti-American.

o Most third world conflicts are drawn-out affairs with poorly defined goals.

Most Americans rank the importance of the third world far behind that of Europe, the Pacific Basin, and the Soviet Union. Recent Rand unpublished research suggests that, as a result of factors like those discussed by Osgood, a president or congress contemplating any major United States military intervention in the third world would find little public support no matter how important the interests at stake.

In recent years the lack of support for limited war has profoundly affected United States actions in the third world. The Vietnam War intensified public opposition to such involvements. After more than a decade of active involvement in Vietnam, over half of which included the use of combat forces, the American public refused to continue to wage a large and messy war. Ultimately, the government was forced to negotiate a settlement. This strong opposition to limited war has resulted in the Vietnam syndrome--a deep-seated belief that the United States should not become involved in situations that might lead to such conflict. While some might argue that the Soviet Union played no major role in developing public opposition to involvement in third world conflict, they undoubtedly welcome United States hesitancy to become involved.

How should the United States deal with threats to its interests in low-intensity conflict? This issue was raised by the Reagan Administration's support of counterinsurgency and nation building in Central America and its active, though indirect, use of national military power in the third world for the first time since Vietnam. For reasons suggested above, any real consensus on this issue is unlikely.

The lack of domestic political consensus has not meant that the government has not produced policy. However, it does significantly limit the administration's ability to make that policy explicit or to execute it. The Rand study cited earlier concluded that while areas of consensus exist, the administration's ability to formulate and clearly enunciate policy and to develop a strategy will continue to be limited.

EXAMINATION OF CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY AND STRATEGY

One way of examining United States national policy and strategy in low-intensity conflict is to examine the guidance for its actions in a specific region or country. Central America provides a timely case to test this proposition for three reasons:

o Central America is beset with numerous and diverse conflicts and struggles that fit the definition of low-intensity conflict.

o The United States government has identified threats to its interests in the region, and for over five years public officials have articulated interests, objectives, policies, and strategies.

o The debate over United States national policy toward Central America is linked to the issue of national policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict.

United States policy and strategy in Central America are based on the principles in the Guam Doctrine. Speaking before a joint session of Congress on 27 April 1983, President Reagan stated that United States policy toward Central America and the Caribbean had four interlocking elements: democracy, development, dialogue, and defense. These elements, which have become known as the four D's, constitute broad presidential objectives for a strategy--

o To actively support democracy, reform, and human freedom against dictators and would-be dictators of both left and right.

o To promote economic recovery within a framework of sound growth and equitable development.

o To foster dialogue and negotiations--a dialogue of democracy within countries; a diplomacy of negotiations among nations willing to live at peace.

o To provide a security shield against those who use violence against democratization, development, and diplomacy.

These statements are remarkably consistent with the principles enunciated by a number of presidents since World War II. Those principally charged with developing and executing the United States policy for Central America have worked within these policy guidelines.

While the four D's provide a framework for a policy, they do not effect a consensus. Efforts to act at all levels face a variety of systemic and institutional obstacles. This is true for United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) where a great deal of emphasis has been placed on making things work despite the obstacles.

In 1982, policymakers reassessed United States policy in Central America. Throughout this reassessment, its proponents considered the economic, social, and security aspects of a national strategy for Central America. In the early months of 1983, considerable effort went into identifying objectives, plans, and programs that continued those begun in the early years (1981-82) of the Reagan Administration. Unfortunately, these programs continued to lag behind the level of destruction inflicted by the insurgents in El Salvador and the rapidly developing threats from Nicaragua.

Speaking in November 1983, Deputy Secretary of State Dam outlined the economic and political assistance that the United States was prepared to give to El Salvador. Secretary Dam stated that United States policy sought three goals:

o First, to combat social tensions and the long-term instability of right-wing or leftist dictatorships by supporting democratic policies and reform.

o Second, to help cushion adverse developments in the world economy and to complement local policy reforms by increasing bilateral economic assistance and devising new forms of cooperation.

o Third, to counter guerrilla violence and economic warfare by providing military assistance.

These remarks illustrate that during 1981-83 the Reagan Administration pursued a policy in Central America within the Guam Doctrine framework. The lack of resources and the inability of the United States political-military system to respond with flexibility undermined that policy and the strategy to implement it. Unable to persuade the Congress to vote for sufficient resources early in 1983, President Reagan appointed a commission to assess the Central American situation

and make recommendations on the course of action the United States should follow. The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by Dr. Henry Kissinger, recommended long-term United States support for democratic development, economic and security assistance, and strong-willed diplomacy.[3]

The President's frustration with congressional unwillingness to vote for resources for Central America continued after the Bipartisan Commission's report. In a nationally televised speech on 9 May 1984, President Reagan stated that we have not made that commitment to Central America. He said we have provided just enough aid to avoid outright disaster but not enough to resolve the crisis, so El Salvador is being left to slowly bleed to death.

During the remainder of 1984, Congress voted for significantly more development and security assistance funds for El Salvador and the rest of Central America. In a report published by the Department of State, Secretary of State George Schultz reviewed the progress in economic improvements in Central America during 1984 and highlighted progress. Economic improvements throughout the region and signs of social and political reform that improved the regional situation were evident.

Guided by decisions of the National Command Authority (NCA), the national security community in Washington, the State Department, USSOUTHCOM and the country teams in Central America developed a variety of programs to push United States objectives forward, while continuing to let the host nations take the lead. The process involved complex, frequent, and sometimes delicate consultations and negotiations among the staffs at USSOUTHCOM, the various country teams, the bureaus and policy staffs at the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, and the governments and military staffs of the Central American allies. It began by establishing objectives for the region and for the countries.

Many of the country objectives were derived from El Salvador's 1982 National Military Strategy and the Honduran's Force Structure Plan of 1981. Many, but not all, of the regional United States objectives were developed unilaterally. The creation of the Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) in Honduras to train Salvadoran troops is an example of a regional objective requiring constant and intimate Latin American consultation, involvement, and decisions.

Once objectives were established, programs to achieve the objectives were developed. Throughout this process the ambassadors and the United States Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) met frequently with one another and with the

political and military leaders of the host countries. These meetings, called combined planning committee (CPC) meetings, were gradually formalized into bimonthly meetings in El Salvador and monthly meetings in Honduras. The CPC provided a means for raising and deciding issues between the United States and the Latin Americans and also provided opportunities for face-to-face conversations between United States officers and their host country counterparts. This evolutionary approach helped produce agreements on objectives and appropriate programs.

Additionally, military objectives and plans had to support the country team's political, economic, and social objectives and regional United States diplomatic objectives. The United States coordinated the locations of its exercises and civic-action programs with the United States ambassador in Honduras to assure these activities supported his political and economic programs. Likewise, land-based exercises and maritime force deployments in Central America were timed to support United States regional diplomatic activities and objectives.

Working within the framework of the Guam Doctrine, the United States has avoided direct use of combat forces in Central America, but it has, nevertheless, contributed to the self-defense of the region. Training and materiel support for El Salvador and Honduras, support for the resistance in Nicaragua against the Cuban- and Soviet-supported Sandinista regime, various exercises and training and assistance missions, and economic aid have bolstered democratic institutions and sustained United States interests. USSOUTHCOM has demonstrated the art of the possible.

The progress the United States has made illustrates that a general strategy for low-intensity conflict will develop where priorities are; however, all levels of the government do not share the same priorities. Within this general strategy is little agreement on means and methods. The various departments and agencies that need to support the effort are reluctant to come to grips with low-intensity conflict. Progress is often made in spite of the system.

This discussion illustrates that, as disjointed and incomplete as they are, United States policy and strategy for Central America did permit United States officials charged with using our limited strategy for Central America to determine what to do. However, the absence of a clear statement of strategy reinforced by organizations was one of the factors limiting consensus and ability to act with maximum effectiveness. Neither were there indications that those actions being taken in a given Central American country were part of a carefully coordinated regional or national effort. This same

national-level guidance did not guarantee that the strategy was automatically sustained. A separate and complementary effort for providing resources was required in Central America. Future United States involvement in low-intensity conflict elsewhere will probably require a similar effort. The very nature of our resource system constrains the effort to make our responses efficient and precise and requires considerable distortion of the system.

SUMMARY

The principles of the Guam Doctrine provide only the broadest framework for counterinsurgency strategy and little in the way of an overall approach to low-intensity conflict. When combined with presidential policy statements and the statements and plans of various federal departments and agencies, they provide guidance that helps develop an operational strategy for threats to United States interests at the regional or country-team level. While collectively these statements do not prevent action, neither do they generate or ensure it. To act, the officials responsible for a region or country have to articulate the threat to United States interests and then put together these multiple policy statements into a coherent and logical statement. This would form the basis for an operational strategy which identifies capabilities and resource levels.

The lack of a clearly developed strategy for the various forms of low-intensity conflict creates obstacles in building support for a course of action and acquiring resources to carry it out. Without such a strategy, congressional and popular support will continue to be problematic even for courses of action clearly within the boundaries of such broadly accepted principles as the Guam Doctrine. The diffused structure of the federal government and the bureaucratic nature of planning, programing, and budgeting among the departments and agencies and between the Congress and the Executive Branch will continue to be difficult to discipline. Building support and providing resources for a sound policy and strategy will continue to be separate struggles after the strategy for a regional policy is developed.

Finally, United States government budgets as formulated through the Planning, Programing, Budget, and Execution System (PBBES) will continue to be unable to meet the threat of low-intensity conflict because resource requirements for it are relatively small, they are spread through all departments and agencies, and they have no single strong proponent to articulate total needs. The low-intensity conflict requirements continue to be low priority and therefore fall below the line

that divides resourced and unresourced budget programs. The project outlines some tentative findings and implications of the inability of the current budget processes to meet surge requirements. As a result of these shortfalls, resources will be inadequate to meet our nation's needs in low-intensity conflict. A danger also exists of damaging the existing budget system to meet the purposes it was designed to serve. These budgeting processes would probably contribute to diluting any improvement gained from a better-articulated policy and strategy. This dimension of the problem requires further study.

NOTES

[1]Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

[2]_____ Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

[3]Henry Kissinger, et al, Report of the Bipartisan Commission of Central America (Washington, DC: US Government, 1984).

PART TWO

LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 4

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

GENERAL

Insurgency is a style of warfare adapted to the modern age. Guerrilla tactics, a key element in insurgency, are by no means new. What is new is resorting to a politically based armed movement to replace one sociopolitical system with another.

Insurgency is appealing because it is used by the weak within a country to overthrow the greater power of the state. As a means of seizing power--short of a prolonged, armed referendum--it has had considerable success. Whatever the circumstances, numerous insurgencies have succeeded in the postwar era in China, Vietnam, Algeria, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Aden. While numerous others have failed, insurgency remains endemic.

If taken as a sign of a challenge to political legitimacy, then insurgency poses an open and direct threat to the ordering of society and the nature of government in the third world. For the United States, with extensive global interests and an economy increasingly reliant on a stable world order, the chronic instability in the third world is a serious concern.

The United States, however, is forced to divide its attention between two different threats. It must prepare for a general war with the Soviet Union, including the prospect of a nuclear exchange, while concurrently preparing to confront challenges to its interests in the third world. This dichotomy of concerns raises perplexing questions of organization, force structure, priority, budgets, and institutional commitments. For example, what is the relative priority of third world instability to the challenge from the Soviet Union?

The threat of instability is attenuated. It arises from many causes, and the United States is limited in what it can do in response. Conversely, the Soviet threat is more tangible and has been the center of United States political and military concerns for a generation. A large, dynamic constituency exists within government and society that perceives a serious and immediate challenge to the survival of the United States from the Soviets. The constituency for the need to respond to challenges in the third world, however, is relatively small, less influential, and more divided as to response.

The issue is further complicated by the fact that the Soviet threat overlaps the threat from global instability. It is not clear which threat is more dangerous. The Soviets are fully aware of the international interdependence needs of the United States and are anxious to exploit vulnerabilities. Thus, the Soviets are involved in fomenting or abetting crises in the third world to distract or weaken the United States. This fact does not make it any easier to resolve the problem of priority, however. The response to the threat of instability still remains very different from the methods of dealing directly with the Soviets.

Since most United States postwar policy has concentrated on the Soviet direct threat, United States strategy, organization, materiel, and doctrine reflect a bias for major conventional/ nuclear war. While some doctrine and force structure exist for dealing with insurgency/counterinsurgency, much thinking seems to equate low-intensity conflict with limited war. The result is confusion, misperception, and efforts that contradict or undermine each other.

A clear understanding is the first step to developing a more effective response. Although the United States has a tactical doctrine for supporting guerrilla operations, the peculiarities of, and the political and strategic questions involved in, supporting insurgency are not as well understood (see FM 31-20, Special Forces Operations). While insurgency and counterinsurgency are inextricably linked and must be considered as a pair, they are not synonymous. Methods for one are not necessarily methods for the other. Thus, understanding them, their similarities and dissimilarities, and their vital interrelationship is important.

INSURGENCY

Insurgency is a technique for winning power. It often relies upon protracted war to wear down a government's forces and the population. To undertake an insurgency against the armed power of the state is a bold and seemingly foolhardy act; but the success of various insurgencies clearly demonstrates that the effort is not hopeless. To undertake such an enterprise, insurgents must answer a fundamental question: How does one fight a total war with limited means?

In the insurgency environment, "total war" means unconditional victory without resorting to unlimited power. The goal is to replace the existing government absolutely; and thus the ruling elite and the counterelite are locked in a struggle, with the latter having few resources outside their own dedication. This imbalance between the power of the state and its

opponent is one of the most striking features of an insurgency. Yet, insurgents have devised means to convert weakness into strength and to turn the government's strength into weakness. To grasp this concept at the outset is essential.

An insurgency is an armed political struggle. It generally grows from a revolutionary doctrine aimed at seizing power, and it resorts to armed force or terror as an instrument of policy. Conflict or violence has existed against governments in the third world and in parts of the developed world since World War II. This violence ranges from isolated acts of terrorism to conventional war. Internal conflict of the sort that is of concern here can be categorized as follows:

1--Terrorism by small political groups aimed at disrupting government (as distinguished from the use of terrorism as a political instrument by an armed insurgency). An example is the Red Brigade in Italy.

2--National movements against colonial or foreign domination. Examples are Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

3--Autonomy movements by indigenous ethnic or religious minorities, such as Eritrea (which can also be classified as a political insurgency), Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka.

4--Political/ideological insurgencies by organized political parties and guerrilla bands.

5--Antimilitary, antiauthoritarian movements based on mass mobilization (these may be revolutionary, such as Iran; or democratic/centrist, such as Greece, Argentina, Chile).

6--Civil wars based on a fragmented political system.

These categories do not directly cover state-sponsored terrorism because that is a form of interstate conflict, not internal conflict. This chapter focuses on political/ ideological (Category 4) insurgencies.

The essential feature of political/ideological insurgencies is their revolutionary character. While not all insurgencies are revolutionary in intent, nor do all revolutions resort to insurgency, they are closely related in contemporary politics. The success of revolution in China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and against various colonial powers, as in Vietnam before 1954, Algeria, and in much of sub-Saharan Africa reinforces this linkage and makes insurgency a popular means to effect revolutionary change. This popularity and the likelihood that this form of struggle will require the most significant proportion of United States effort in low-intensity conflict make insurgency important to understand.

Category 4 insurgencies, particularly in Latin America, have evolved from two basic types--Maoist and foco. The Maoist-based insurgency concentrates on long-term organization; the foco type sees a much more rapid transition to armed struggle. The latter is based on the Cuban model and the belief that an armed force operating in the countryside can itself move towards revolution without extensive, preconflict political organization. This approach is characteristic of many Latin American movements, but it has lost credibility, especially after the failure of Che Guevarra, one of the principal promoters of the foco approach, in Bolivia. Urban-based guerrilla warfare is basically an offshoot of the foco-type insurgency.

Insurgent theory has evolved since World War II. Insurgents have published books and manuals, held conferences and attended courses that have studied essential elements of success and failure, and applied lessons learned to improve their effort. Thus insurgent doctrine is a developing concept which is no longer simply Maoist or foco. The emphasis, though, is on long-term political organization. In addition to these, a number of independent insurgencies have established their own pattern, although the principles that have emerged in these pragmatic, empirical movements share many characteristics with developed, existing concepts. The principal example is the Afghan insurgency. The Afghans are slowly piecing together the sort of effort that resembles other insurgent strategies and tactics.

The political/ideological insurgency, which focuses on long-term political organization, will be the main example covered. This is largely because these conflicts are well organized and have the best chance of success. This type of struggle is often communist-inspired, enjoys direct or indirect Soviet support, and is often directed at United States interests and allies. This is the form of conflict that the United States may have to support against communist governments.

In a Category 4 situation, the objective is to replace an existing government and social order with a new one. This requires the creation of a revolutionary system. Several key factors are necessary to the development of such a system: an ideology or ideational foundation, an organization, a cause, a skilled revolutionary leadership, time, and, in many cases, external support. An insurgency is the political, as well as armed, phase of a revolution. The insurgents, in turn, resort to guerrilla warfare as one way to achieve their objective. Revolutionary war is generally carried out by an educated, political elite that has spent considerable time organizing for a protracted struggle before the first signs of an armed conflict appear. The method usually is to move from political organization to armed assault.

The insurgents can typically resort to a variety of tactics, adapted to particular situations that have been tested over the years. These include--

o Guerrilla warfare--As it pertains to insurgency, guerrilla warfare is the use of small, armed bands, usually operating from secure base areas, to launch raids or ambushes on government installations, personnel, or economic assets (see Glossary).

o Terrorism--In an insurgency, terrorism is the use of selective violence against government personnel or supporters of the government, including foreigners, to demonstrate government incompetence or impotence and to encourage repressive acts that will alienate the population (see Glossary).

o Front organization--A front organization, typically, is a preexisting legitimate group that is penetrated by the insurgents and used to disguise antiregime activity behind a legal facade. Legitimate members of such bodies may be unaware of the presence of insurgents.

o Cover organization--Similar to a front organization, a cover organization is organized by the insurgents themselves to disguise their activities behind a seemingly legitimate operation. It, too, may include innocent participants.

o Legitimate/semilegitimate political parties--These parties are generally included in insurgent organizations which combine political-military activities. In some cases, they may operate legally within the existing political system.

o International relations--International relations are ties with foreign powers that are established by insurgent organizations to get direct or indirect support for the insurgency. This may involve winning sympathy for the cause and financial or military aid.

o Psychological operations--These operations are devised to exploit the media and other forms of communication to gain support for the insurgency and to undermine confidence in the government. They may include terrorist acts.

The insurgent assault on the existing political order is two-pronged, involving both a political and military strategy. Ideally, the two are closely linked, and the whole effort is generally managed by the political authorities within the insurgent movement. The elements of the political/ideological strategy can be schematically outlined as shown in the following figure.

STRATEGIES OF A POLITICAL IDEOLOGICAL INSURGENCY

POLITICAL ELEMENT

TACTIC	GOAL
Front organizations Cover organizations International relations Selective terror Psychological operations Shadow government	To win support and credibility as alternative to government

MILITARY ELEMENT

Selective terror Subversion Sabotage Ambushes Guerrilla warfare Psychological operations	To harass and undermine government; to demonstrate its failure

Figure 4-1

The revolutionary assault is not against the government, per se, but against the social system which sustains the government. The thrust of the revolutionary program is to deny to the government the support of as many of the people as possible across the broadest possible range of social groups. The revolutionist focuses on social classes and groups in order to win over the government's bases of support.

To accomplish its goal of subverting the target society, the revolution also relies on, and may try to exacerbate, social grievances. Social imbalance, political inequity, economic disadvantage, foreign domination, and racial or religious discrimination are in these complexes of social ills. Revolutionists, with their guiding philosophy, seek the material for change in these breeding grounds of discontent. The actual source of social discontent may be irrelevant to the revolutionist, whose philosophy provides the "true, objective" analytical framework for understanding the need for change. But in the real or apparent ills of society, the revolutionists must find the means to develop a political program to attract broader support.

No direct connection necessarily exists between the revolutionist and social grievance. Che Guevera's effort

in Bolivia is one example of this lack of linkage, but a most salient one is the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Their cause for revolution was based on an ideology that stressed the need for struggle. They worked to tie their effort to real social grievances, but their agenda was not based on these grievances. The linkage between the revolutionist and social grievance can be, and often is, a linkage of political expediency, though it is the job of the revolutionist to make the link appear real.

This expedient aspect should not obscure the fact that real social grievances exist. These can and will be exploited, and if they are not addressed by a counterinsurgency program, they make dealing with an insurgency immeasurably more difficult. The revolutionist will work to effect a direct link between social cause and revolutionary effect. The existence of an insurgency should not lead one to assume, furthermore, that Soviet or other outside involvement is the cause of social problems; they are only exploiters.

The real issues, which are complex and generally frustratingly difficult to address, lie within the fabric of a threatened society itself. Attributing the problem of insurgency to outside sources is a much easier path to follow in terms of devising a response, but such a concentration distracts from the real issues. This is true even in situations where the insurgency is wholly of foreign instigation--if the target population comes to believe in its deprivation and the need for change. Identifying the outside power as the primary cause of the difficulty provides no shortcuts to addressing an insurgency.

The insurgency will be characterized by commitment and discipline and a willingness to trade time for almost anything else--thus the protracted nature of most such conflicts. The objective is control of the population--not territory, towns, villages, or bridges--and its political allegiance. "When a country is being subverted," noted Bernard Fall, "it is not being outfought; it is being outadministered."[1]

The nature of the insurgency hinges on the issue of mobilization, a point that is neatly summarized by the master of insurgent warfare, Mao Tse-Tung:

> What is political mobilization? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political objective of the war. Every soldier and every civilian should be made to understand why the war must be fought and how it concerns him....Next, it is not enough simply to explain the objective;

> the steps and political programme.... Without a precise, specific political programme, we cannot mobilize all the armed forces and all the people....Next how to mobilize? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through schools, through mass organization, and through cadres....Next, it is not enough to mobilize only once; political mobilization for the...war must be done regularly. Our job is not merely to recite our political programme to the people, for nobody would care to listen to such recitations; but we must link it up with the developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, thereby transforming the political mobilization for the war into a regular movement. This is a matter of the first magnitude on which victory primarily depends.[2]

The struggle between the insurgent and the incumbent, then, is over political legitimacy--who should govern and how they should govern. One of the principal elements in this struggle is the effort to mobilize popular support. Whoever succeeds at this will ultimately prevail.

The numerous types of insurgency vary according to local circumstances. Thus, it is not possible to develop a model for an insurgency that conveniently fits the complexity of reality. It is possible, however, to outline a range of characteristics, some or all of which will apply in any given circumstances. The principal features of an insurgency generally include--

- o A revolutionary party--political organization.
- o A united front--not all members revolutionists.
- o A guerrilla organization--urban and/or rural.
- o A system of secure base areas.

Figure 4-2 outlines a more detailed breakdown of the phases of an insurgency. What it shows is the various elements of a "typical" insurgency, moving from initial organization to ultimate victory. The elements in the various phases are not mutually exclusive and will vary or overlap depending upon the circumstances of the particular revolutionary movement.

PROTOTYPICAL PHASES OF A POLITICAL/IDEOLOGICAL INSURGENCY

PHASE I. ORGANIZATION
- Organize, educate, proselytize
- Infiltrate other organizations
- Form party

PHASE II. PROBATION
- Infiltrate government and other organizations
- Create local cells, expand national cells, train groups
- Conduct political activity more openly:
  - Labor organization
  - Front groups/political organization
  - Strikes

PHASE III. INITIATION
- Initiate low-level violence:
  - Sabotage
  - Terrorism
- Conduct propaganda, conduct psychological operations
- Politically mobilize masses
- Seek international support
- Create base areas/low-level guerrilla action

PHASE IV. INSURRECTION
- Establish/expand base areas
- Expand guerrilla attacks
- Proclaim countergovernment

PHASE V. CONSOLIDATION
- Expand attacks
- Expand political activity
- Enlarge forces
- Enlarge, link base areas

PHASE VI. CONFRONTATION
- Begin conventional war
- Continue guerrilla war

PHASE VII. COUP DE MAITRE
- Establish national government
- Eliminate political front allies
- Consolidate military-political dominance
- Eliminate former political elite

GOAL: POLITICAL CONTROL/REPLACEMENT OF SOCIOECONOMIC SYSTEM

Figure 4-2

Revolutionary movements recognize that they may have to be flexible in adjusting strategies and tactics to the degree of success or opposition. Thus, an insurgency that fails in one phase may have to retreat to a previous phase. The goal is survival and ultimate victory; protracted effort the means. The insurgents will also use a variety of associated tactics: terror, propaganda, armed attacks, and psychological warfare. Guerrilla tactics, involving hit-and-run attacks and selective terror, will be employed as the insurgency gathers momentum. Such methods are forced upon the insurgents by the imbalance between government capabilities and the capabilities of the insurgents.

Since the guerrilla begins with virtually none of the materiel or manpower available to the government, he compensates by avoiding contact except where he enjoys an advantage. He relies on an accumulation of successes to enhance his prestige, and he disperses his attacks to wear government forces down. Conversely, if he faces superior forces, he is also able to disperse and elude pursuit. The guerrilla capitalizes on his ability to merge with his surroundings. He is able to do this and sustain his effort despite harsh conditions because he is usually imbued with a sense of teamwork and discipline and with a belief in a cause and the inevitability of success. These elements give him the stamina to survive failure and adversity for long periods of time. This commitment, however, is not necessarily uniform. Not every guerrilla is so totally committed as to be a diehard fanatic.

One of the typical features of insurgency is the intermingling of guerrilla and government forces within the same area. Battle lines are indistinct. Every point is both a forward edge and a rear area, a fact that can undermine the morale of regular forces who are used to, or are trained to respond to, regular formations in defined areas of control. This ambiguity can lead government forces into excesses that play into the hands of the insurgents by alienating the population among whom the war is fought.

The insurgents, conversely, spend a great deal of effort on indoctrinating their forces so that they will not lose sight of the nature of the conflict and the correct relationship between strategy and tactics. The guerrilla achieves this by a command structure that is at once coordinated and dispersed. The compartmented nature of most insurgencies enforces dispersion, but it also thrusts initiative onto the various component commands. This situation gives the various guerrilla forces flexibility. On the other hand, a centralized command system--one that is made effective by indoctrination and a system of rewards and punishments--ensures that disparate forces can contribute to a total effort.

External support may also be an important element in an insurgency. The nature and type of external support will be important elements in the insurgent environment. The insurgency may be supported with moral support or sanctuaries and staffed, funded, or equipped wholly or in part by external sources. It is important to know these sources, to know the extent of the support, and to understand the relationship that occasions the support in order to devise appropriate responses.

A final consideration in evaluating the insurgent environment is to determine its life cycle and the nature and quality of its organization. In evaluating an insurgency, knowing what phase it is in is important. The tempo of the insurgency is a correlation of the status and capability of the target society and the scale and ability of the insurgency. The tempo will significantly influence the degree and nature of support necessary if an external power is to provide assistance for a counterinsurgency or an insurgency effort.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

The existence of an insurgency, particularly a well-developed, Category 4, political-ideological insurgency, is evidence that a legitimate crisis already exists in the threatened society. Its existence indicates the likelihood that political, social, and economic disparities within society have advanced to a stage to promote armed opposition against the government. The presence of armed elements operating in open opposition to the government is an indication that a sophisticated political network is operating on a fairly large scale and is able to organize resistance. Armed opposition also indicates that the government police and intelligence systems have failed to detect or effectively respond to the threat at a sufficiently early stage to deal with it and that these systems have been subsequently overwhelmed in trying to cope with the expanded threat. The existence of such a threat can mean that the government itself and important social elements, including the military, also have been penetrated by the insurgency. The mistake that the counterinsurgent often makes, however, is to ignore the political aspect of the confrontation and to concentrate on the military problem, which seems to present the greatest threat and is the way the insurgency is most clearly manifested.

Quite often, authorities refuse to recognize that the insurgency requires a variety of political changes in order to effectively undermine the opposition. The government in such situations is often a narrow oligarchy more interested in protecting the special privileges of the elite than in the needs of society as a whole. In such cases, the military and

the intelligence systems are often geared to keeping political rivals within the hierarchy in check or are used as sinecures to reward political cronies. This can mean that political loyalty to individuals or groups is far more important than competence; indeed, competence can be a serious career handicap.

When such a system must cope with a well-developed insurgency, it is generally unable to respond effectively. The tendency is to employ raw force badly, which ends up alienating more of the society and playing into the hands of the insurgents. Indeed, one of the essential tactics developed by insurgents to compensate for their relative weakness is to induce the government to overreact--to misuse its power and thus alienate the people, reducing the government's basis for popular support.

Substituting tactics for strategy is one of the common mistakes that governments make. They come to see the detailed military aspects of counterguerrilla operations as their goal rather than the broad need to address legitimate grievances and to isolate the guerrillas from the population. In this fashion they further contribute to their own difficulties.

The counterinsurgent, therefore, faces the same question that confronts the insurgent: How does one conduct a total war with limited means? For the counterinsurgent, however, this question has an added dimension. Since the government generally begins with an articulated ruling system and is sustained by all the attributes of a state--foreign relations, a military, a bureaucracy, a degree of popular acceptance--the means of control available to it are generally far greater. The military and police power, in particular, are significantly greater than those of the insurgent. This disparity often blinds the state authorities to a threat when it is first developing and often leads them to overrespond to the threat once it is manifest.

Thus, for the governing authority, the question above does not necessarily imply that the means of power are limited in any sense comparable to the insurgent's limitations, but that the resort to those means must be limited; that careful discipline must govern the use of force. The government must also realize that the true nature of the insurgent threat lies in its political claims and not in the military movement. Although the armed elements must be dealt with, a concentration on the military aspect of the threat resembles the bull charging the matador's cape; it is a diversion masking the real danger.

The counterinsurgent, then, often faces a situation in which he must overcome the inertia and incompetence of his own

political system before he can begin to cope with the insurgency. This can involve unpalatable reforms that must be undertaken at a time of crisis, which makes it difficult for the system to be flexible.

Counterinsurgency operations should involve the following types of major programs at the local level: programs aimed at socioeconomic development; programs for political reform and social mobilization; programs to secure the population and isolate them from the insurgents; programs for military reform/reorganization; and military operations directed against the insurgent. These programs, collectively or in various combinations, are designed to strengthen the threatened society and combat the insurgency. Since the insurgency is a struggle for the political allegiance of the population, a major emphasis is on political approaches.

The development of a counterinsurgency program cannot rely upon a single, immutable formula. Although numerous similarities exist among various insurgencies, they are distinguished by their singularities. In other words, insurgent situations are unique to their time, place, and circumstances. Therefore, no template can be applied uniformly to all situations, though a response can be developed from elements that have worked in other circumstances. The use of these elements should be based on a plan and modified as the situation dictates.

A response also requires a sustained effort--something that may be difficult for the United States to deal with. As a rule, insurgents--communists in particular--regard conflict as routine and as inevitable. They expect it and they seek it. Insurgency is also predicated on protracted war as a response to the limited means that most insurgents begin with and as a rational strategy of wearing down the resolve of the enemy. This fact gives insurgents a psychological advantage over their opponents, especially western, democratic ones, for democratic countries regard struggle and strife as abhorrent and dysfunctional.

Protracted war troubles the western conscience. It causes people to doubt their purpose and to assume that the enemy may have a just cause. Protracted conflict also increases the ambiguities of the situation, and the modern news media will bring these ambiguities home for public debate, exacerbating the uncertainties and compounding the difficulties of involvement. Open-ended struggle is singularly difficult for democracies to justify.

UNITED STATES RESPONSE

Three salient points must be considered in developing a United States response to insurgency or counterinsurgency:

- o The differences between supporting insurgency and supporting counterinsurgency.
- o The nature of constraints influencing such support.
- o The types of programs, equipment, and techniques needed to develop a response.

Historically, the major United States effort has been to support a friendly government in its counterinsurgency effort. The main thrust behind this involvement was to continue United States containment policy directed at Soviet or Soviet-inspired movements that threatened United States and western security interests. Responding to this threat, the United States developed a fairly competent counterinsurgency doctrine after World War II and applied it with considerable success in Latin America and in the Philippines. United States pre-Vietnam experience contained a significant amount of firsthand knowledge on counterinsurgency that was incorporated into this doctrine. The Vietnam experience, however, overwhelmed the United States government and, as a result, counter-insurgency doctrine. The backlash against United States overseas involvement caused a sharp decline in interest in anything suggesting extended United States involvement in another country's internal war. The result was a renewed concentration on the threat of a general war in Europe and a deeper institutional prejudice against counterinsurgency doctrine and training. Indirect threats to United States interests, though, did not go away.

Immediately after World War II, United States containment policy was basically defensive, aimed at hemming the Soviets in and preventing the spread of communism. Support for insur-gency was not a significant consideration, except in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In this scenario, various special forces elements were created to operate behind Soviet lines to develop partisan activity in Eastern Europe.

Only recently, with the growth of significant insurgent movements against communist or Soviet-supported states, has the United States begun to consider support for such effort, enlarging the containment concept to include a roll-back element. Thus, although interest is renewed in both insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies, the organizations, skills, and well-thought-out concepts for such strategies have atrophied; and the institutional biases against such

strategies remain. Also, some quarters assume that strategies for supporting insurgency and counterinsurgency are equivalent; that if you can do one, you can do the other. Despite similarities, however, many significant differences must be considered in developing responses.

The similarities derive from the common purpose of insurgency and counterinsurgency--both aim at control of society. In the analogy used earlier, the struggle is like two political parties seeking to win public support, the difference being the use of armed force. Generally, however, the insurgents have had an appreciation of the political nature of the struggle. Counterinsurgents, on the other hand, have tended to concentrate more effort on military or repressive measures than on political programs because the means are available. Although means differ significantly, the goal of both insurgent and counterinsurgent is the same--political control--and this accounts for the parallels in the respective efforts. In general, although each insurgency/counter-insurgency is situation-specific, the chief differences between the two efforts lie in their respective starting points. In this sense the differences are largely quantitative.

The insurgent seeks to overthrow an organized state with all its strengths and weaknesses: a degree of public acceptance; international recognition; a bureaucracy; control of the instruments of force--the police and military; control over economic resources or access to financial support; legitimacy. The insurgent generally begins with little more than an idea or a grievance, and he must acquire painstakingly all the means to build his movement and then challenge the power of the state. In the process, the effective insurgent attempts to build an incipient state organization similar to that possessed by the counterinsurgent. This organization includes public administrators, teachers, doctors, soldiers, and policemen. It can include efforts to establish international relations and acquire territory or control over the public--in short, it is a shadow government that seeks to replace the existing one.

Given the enormity of the challenge, it is astonishing that anyone tries, much less succeeds. Insurgent strategy, however, has taken the difficulties into consideration. It has developed responses that seek to convert the disparaties and weaknesses into strengths and to convert the opponent's strengths into weaknesses. This is where the dissimilarities in the efforts become important, where quantitative disparities take on qualitative differences.

In the first place, although the insurgent seeks to establish a countergovernment and a countersociety with all the attributes of a state, he does not have to build or replace all the attributes of the society. The insurgent, instead, capitalizes on the fact that he is already operating within such a society, with the roads, farms, population, and other features of a complete society. He does not have to create these; he only has to dispute control of them. In addition--at least initially--he does not have to dispute this control openly or continuously. It is sufficient to exercise covert or intermittent control. This undermines the authority of the state and allows the insurgent to pursue his effort unseen or to simply withdraw when the threat of retaliation becomes too great.

The insurgent does not have to protect the population or an infrastructure to the same degree as the government. Although an insurgent must develop the instrument necessary for social control, initially he will not have to maintain a constant physical presence throughout society and administer a state on a day-to-day basis. The insurgent may not have to maintain a full-time, standing army or police force in the early stages. The insurgent concentrates on attacks and programs that contest the control of symbols rather than materials.

The mere fact that a guerrilla band is operating in defiance of the government, even if it poses no serious military challenge, can be a powerful symbolic act, openly challenging the incumbent's claim to authority. The insurgent, therefore, is unencumbered--at least until such time as his movement has reached a position to openly and effectively defy the government--from many of the burdens of the counter-insurgent and can use this freedom to particular advantage. Thus, quantitative differences can have a qualitative effect.

A number of other differences between insurgents and counterinsurgents must be kept in mind when contemplating strategies to support either. Insurgents, for example, since they are quite often few in number, dispersed, and generally rurally based, lack the infrastructure to receive or use sophisticated weapons or supplies. They generally lack air-port and port facilities, sufficient trained manpower, and a distribution network to handle or absorb large quantities or a wide range of items. In addition, their operations are generally clandestine and under the constant threat of attack.

Counterinsurgents, conversely, usually have airports and ports at their disposal, and though they may also lack sufficient trained manpower, they will generally be far better off than the insurgents. The insurgent, however, because he understands his disadvantages, will generally tend toward a

leanness in equipment and training that is immediately useful and does not overburden his abilities. Counterinsurgents, because they have access to greater means, are often tempted to go overboard and to acquire more than they can handle or to develop capabilities that are unsuited to the circumstances.

In developing a strategy for supporting insurgency or counterinsurgency, the United States must be alert to the particulars involved and to the often idiosyncratic demands of unique situations. Supporting insurgency or counter-insurgency, for example, can involve the United States in an effort that increases regional instability. Because this involvement can clash with other United States objectives to encourage stability, particular care must be exercised in balancing and reconciling programs as much as possible.

Still, such involvement can run counter to American notions of fair play and morality, thus creating negative domestic political consequences; especially if the group we support uses tactics that are likely to alienate United States public opinion. Such participation can also alienate allies who are concerned about the morality or long-term consequences of such involvement. In addition, various supported insurgencies or counterinsurgencies can be widely separated geographically and can be based on very different motives--situations that can further complicate United States support. Support for the Afghan resistance effort, for example, imposes problems different from those encountered in supporting the Contras.

Developing a support system for counterinsurgency or insurgency is also a problem. The normal procedures of the security assistance system are not adequate in a wartime, counterinsurgency effort. The nature of the equipment required by the insurgent or the counterinsurgent may fall outside United States equipment inventories, or the available equipment may be too sophisticated or complicated for local use. The United States predilection for technology and technological solutions can also lead to singularly inappropriate support. Advisory support can also be a problem, both politically and in terms of available and trained manpower.

Another problem is the tendency to concentrate on programs that answer to our strengths. In particular we tend to place a great deal of faith in modernization and economic development. While economic well-being is undeniably important, insurgency is not a struggle over it, per se, but over how people will participate politically in society. Rapid development and modernization are very disruptive processes that can destabilize societies, presenting individuals, groups, and interests with changes that undermine values and patterns of association. They can raise expectations and frustrate

them at the same time. Managing change, an appealing concept, is singularly difficult to do, and so the consequences and speed of change can be unexpected, abrupt, and beyond control.

The consequences of change can leave a society restless, disoriented, and hostile. Favored solutions quite often exacerbate these problems, while insurgents, particularly communist insurgents, exploit this process. Being out of power, they do not have to manage the process of change. They can, therefore, concentrate on pointing out its disruptiveness as a means to delegitimize the government and legitimize their own solutions. Never mind that they are after vague promises that disguise their real intent; what they promise is to restore a sense of social cohesion, a sense of belonging, a new authentication of membership in a whole, complete society in which change is harnessed for mutual good. They promise an end to ambivalence, disharmony, and fragmentation--in short they supply a powerful myth-building system that seems an answer to felt needs.

To many followers and supporters, the sense of community restored, of belonging, is an appeal that can be powerful and motivating. When coupled with the modern means of communication and mobilization, sophisticated propaganda, and psychological operations, the effort can produce almost religious devotion and support. Merely offering economic well-being is, under these circumstances, a pale substitute. Thus, the United States must give serious thought to its economic development programs and approaches which often do not address deeper psychological needs. It makes little difference that communists, once in power, resolve the real tensions in society with draconian measures leading to totalitarian government. Riding the wave of promise and euphoria may be enough to seize power.

In supporting an insurgency or a counterinsurgency, then, the United States may have to pay particular attention to the ideals that sustain it. The sustaining rationale for an insurgency generally must go beyond narrow self-interest in order to inspire support, locally or internationally. The United States may have to develop, or encourage the insurgency to develop, a persuasive political program. This is no easy task for the United States. We tend to equate the effort with unconventional war, which stresses operational aspects of armed resistance over the more difficult, long-term problem of political organization and ideological motivation. Our own reluctance to embrace ideologies tends to conflict with our ability to develop a coherent, ideological base for a supported insurgency. Conversely, an existing insurgent ideology may clash with our own views and prejudices.

Significant differences in goals and practices can result in operations that offend United States sensibilities and cause politically embarrassing publicity.

Although other aspects of the clash of perspectives and methods have been noted, we must deal with another mismatch between our approach to the world and the particularities of insurgency or counterinsurgency: namely, the question of time. The above discussion on insurgency noted that one of the principal ingredients in success was the role of time, or protracted effort. While not all insurgencies have faced prolonged struggles for power, the insurgency cannot count on sudden success and must prepare for the long term. Similarly, the counterinsurgent cannot count on eliminating the insurgency swiftly. In Malaya, for example, the emergency lasted for twelve years and some of the insurgents remained in the field until twenty-five years after the emergency officially ended. Thus, insurgents and counterinsurgents, as they face one another, must be prepared for the long haul. This presents the United States with a dilemma. Our short-term budget cycle, our four-year presidential election cycle, and our national impatience with long-term commitments in doubtful circumstances make it difficult for the United States to make long-term plans or to be sure of sustaining a protracted effort.

The Nicaraguan resistance, for example, faced with an entrenched government growing militarily more powerful and politically more confident, is not likely to succeed in overthrowing the government in short order; indeed, the resistance itself may face extinction. The record of successful resistance movements against organized, determined governments is not particularly good. The raison d'etre of political-military insurgency's resort to protracted war, to use time as an element of force, reflects this fact. Whether the United States, impatient and result-oriented, can sustain a commitment and help others prepare for the long term is in doubt. In doubt, too, is whether this impatience and action orientation can resist the temptation to escalate United States involvement to make up for the slowness of supported insurgency or counterinsurgency.

The problems surrounding United States involvement in either insurgency or counterinsurgency can be expanded indefinitely, but it is useful to organize these under a number of headings. One of the most perplexing issues involves the question of political will--whether the United States has the determination and the degree of public support for prolonged and pronounced involvement. It is by no means clear that the nation is ready or willing to involve itself in any profound fashion in the insurgency/counterinsurgency area. If it is going to do so, then various questions must be addressed at every level:

o What are United States interests and how are they communicated to the public?

o What are the priorities?

o What is an appropriate national strategy for insurgency/counterinsurgency?

o What is the military role in such a strategy and what are appropriate strategies for the military?

o What is the United States capability to implement strategy?

o How are shortcomings in implementation determined and addressed?

o How is strategy implemented?

United States policy to limit its involvement largely governs the degree of involvement. Although this point is noted elsewhere in this study, it is a point important enough to repeat. The Guam Doctrine reaffirmed a policy, distorted by United States involvement in Vietnam, that acknowledges limits to the amount of support the nation is willing to sustain in a foreign war. This idea recognizes that the United States will not, in most circumstances, shoulder the direct burden of a remote struggle. This means a support role, with all the ambiguities associated with coalition warfare. The requirements for supporting someone else in their struggle imposes a number of inherent constraints that can distort or frustrate any United States effort to assist an ally. This reality must be kept firmly in mind when trying to devise programs to respond to the demands of supporting insurgency and counterinsurgency.

One thorny problem involves devising and managing a support system that is flexible; is capable of handling unexpected, surge demands; is able to respond to a variety of disparate, often atypical needs; and is attuned to local circumstances and conditions. This requires a response to wartime-type demands with a system geared for peace. It also means resolving the recurring tension between perspectives at the center and on the periphery; that is, balancing the demands, priorities, and the view of the world held by authorities removed from local issues with the needs and views of those on the scene.

In addition to these issues, two further questions require attention. These questions revolve around the issue of threshold: at what point does or should the United States become involved in supporting a counterinsurgency or an insurgency? And at what point should the United States withdraw such support? These questions mean defining interests and their priority as noted above.

In counterinsurgency, if an interest is identified, the timing of involvement hinges upon the nature of the relationship with the supported parties and on what the United States can and is prepared to do. The question of a withdrawal threshold is more complex because it involves not only a question of interest and relationship but also of investment. While withdrawal with goals achieved is relatively painless, for example Grenada, withdrawal with the prospect of failure can have profound consequences, as in Vietnam. In other words, once the United States has committed resources and prestige to an involvement, it becomes more difficult to withdraw short of success. Yet, since the environment in question--a low-intensity situation--may limit commitment, this implies that the United States must be willing to cut its losses and withdraw if that should become necessary. But it is also difficult to determine the correct time to withdraw, and it has proved difficult for the United States to accept the implications of fighting in a limited environment, of accepting the fact that failure may be inherent because of constraints.

SUMMARY

In following through on the development of an insurgent strategy, the United States must establish the programs, skills, and material that can sustain insurgents. This means creating an effort that is sensitive to the environment and the needs of the insurgents, as well as commensurate with United States political objectives and will. This is no easy project. Yet, the piecemeal, episodic, and uncoordinated effort that results from ad hoc approaches that characterize present efforts runs counter to the needs of the time and to our own oft-repeated notions of the importance of unity of effort. Equally important in developing an insurgency strategy is the need to coordinate the effort, to establish its proper relationship with other efforts, and to make clearer the priorities that govern our responses. Failure to do so will undermine our policy and betray the people we seek to sustain.

Similarly, a United States counterinsurgency strategy must be coordinated, not only within the components dealing with it particularly, but also across governmental institutional boundaries. Counterinsurgency requires a total effort, a

coordinated response by all parties involved. This is the essence of the doctrine we preach to those states we support, yet it is a notion we honor more in the breach. In addition, we must develop doctrine, the appropriate skills, the trained manpower, and the equipment that is suited to the environment--points argued in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

In dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency, then, a number of factors influence the United States approach:

- o The uniqueness of each situation.
- o The necessity for appropriate skills and equipment.
- o The vital importance of unity of effort.
- o The priority of training which is the United States role.
- o The probable need to limit United States involvement.

Although similarities exist between various insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, it is fundamental to analyze and understand the particularities and peculiarities of a given situation. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes noted in reference to the law, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Similarities are important to know in order to reduce repetition, but the dissimilarities will kill a program that is insensitive to nuance and variation.

To realize the need to develop and sustain the appropriate skills and equipment for the low-intensity conflict environment is also important. As the report that follows illustrates, specific requirements for material and for talents must be developed if the United States is going to sustain an effort to support allies.

In relation to this, the absolute, fundamental importance of unity of effort must not only be recognized in principle, it must be implemented in practice. The best programs, skills, and materiel are nothing more than parts without purpose if coordination is lacking. An insurgency or counterinsurgency strategy must be more than the sum of its parts, and only a unity of effort that relates the parts dynamically to one another, that assigns them their appropriate relationship and employs them wisely, has any hope of success.

In implementing such a strategy, two more elements of policy must be respected. The first is recognizing that the main United States role in insurgency or counterinsurgency is

a training one, that the insurgency or the counterinsurgency in question is primarily someone else's war, and that the United States will be assisting this effort. Thus, programs and skills, the whole effort, must be conceived in terms of its transferability.

Second, given the constraints outlined earlier, it is essential to limit United States involvement. This is crucial not only in terms of restraining the temptation to Americanize the situation, to convert it into a context we are more comfortable with, but it is also imperative in order to avoid open-ended commitments that will undermine public support and thus debilitate the national will. Putting together a strategy that is flexible and coherent is a necessary but difficult task.

The United States has been involved in a number of insurgencies since World War II. The experience has not been exactly edifying. Failure and frustration have accompanied much of that involvement. The current enthusiasm for low-intensity conflict reflects the fact that the issues involved in coming to terms with low-intensity conflict are still with us and that we still have much to learn about appropriate responses. The need to develop effective offensive and defensive programs for low-intensity conflict is clear and immediate. We face a fundamental challenge to interests, made more dangerous because our enemies have found a form of warfare that is exceedingly difficult for us to respond to effectively. How well our country is willing to learn, or relearn, the lessons needed to respond to low-intensity conflict and to apply those lessons may well determine how well we survive as a nation in the coming years.

NOTES

[1]Bernard Fall, Last Reflections on a War (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967).

[2]John McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966): 55.

CHAPTER 5

TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

GENERAL

Terrorism is deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing to inspire fear for political gain (see glossary). It is conducted worldwide; prosecuted by political, governmental, or other groups within a nation (indigenous terrorism); frequently sponsored by an external nation (international terrorism); and also employed as a tactic of insurgents. In attacking their enemies, terrorists confine their violence in order to avoid the open and organized military confrontations associated with higher-intensity conflicts. While terrorism, like guerrilla warfare and other tactics, is associated with violence across the spectrum of conflict, it is most closely identified with low-intensity conflict and greatly exacerbates the challenges faced in the low-intensity conflict environment.

Although the American public is becoming increasingly concerned, it remains relatively detached from the threat of terrorism. It is basically viewed as a remote threat that affects someone else in some other place. The public remains essentially unaware that much of terrorism is directed at United States national security and the institutions associated with liberal democracies. Until the indirect threat of terrorism is understood, implementing the national programs needed to cope with terrorism will be difficult.

This report offers a broad but systematic civil-military approach to understanding terrorism. The approach is not limited to a specific region, terrorist group, or weapon but is aimed at creating a conceptual framework for effecting specific legislative and organizational fixes. Though success in combating terrorism will take a substantial international effort, the project focused primarily on those unilateral actions available to the United States.

Terrorism is not new. What is new is the emergence of full-time, professional terrorists, some of whom are available for hire, along with internationally funded training institutes, a host of trainers and training aids, and a virtual parallel international system that supports them. The results of terrorism are significant. From 1970 to 1984, according to Risks International, some 23,000 domestic and international terrorist incidents occurred. A total of 41,000 individuals have been murdered and another 24,000 wounded, with property

damage estimated over $1 billion.[1] Increasingly, Americans are the victims of these acts of violence. During the past fifteen years, terrorists have murdered or injured 1,000 Americans and caused millions of dollars in damage to United States public and private property. By most accounts, contemporary terrorism is likely to increase both within our borders and abroad.[2]

The proliferation of terrorist activities has focused increased attention on terrorism. Significant research, staff work, and thought have been dedicated to this subject, advancing knowledge and resulting in the development of new strategies and tactics. However, while progress has been made in protecting United States citizens--especially high-risk targets--protection for the nation as a whole remains inadequate. The numbers, types, and locations of soft targets are significant contributing factors. But the primary cause of inadequate protection against terrorism is the failure to understand this violent form of low-intensity conflict.

A democratic society comes to understand and address problems in a fairly predictable manner. Regardless of the issue, the process evolves through four stages:

- o Public and official understanding of the problem.
- o Public and official consensus to act on the problem.
- o Legislative (policy, strategy, law, funding) means to counter the problem.
- o Organizational (manpower, planning, training) means to counter the problem.

Understanding refers to public and official acceptance of the threat of terrorism; consensus refers to a public and official willingness to act against that threat, and legislation and organization are the means of acting. The majority of this nation's effort to combat terrorism has focused on legislative and organizational fixes without first creating a climate of understanding and a consensus to act. Without a significant level of public and official understanding of the threat and consensus to act, such fixes will be difficult to implement in a democratic society.

BUILDING UNDERSTANDING

While the public's awareness of terrorism has increased due to recent incidents, a major deficiency exists in understanding terrorism. We face our greatest challenge correcting this problem. The Vice President's task force on combating

terrorism concluded that, "The attitudes of the people and their understanding of the nature of the problem remain a major concern."[3]

Terrorists and their supporters have expended considerable time and resources to blur our understanding. Much of the public cannot differentiate between terrorists and idealists. Terrorists are alternately viewed as champions of the oppressed and as mad men conducting senseless acts. They have created myths to legitimize their unlawful acts. Only when myth is replaced with fact can we make real progress towards defeating terrorism.

The fact that government agencies cannot agree on a definition of terrorism further compounds the problem. Vice President Bush's task force concluded that it may even be useful not to precisely define it.[4] However, the public needs to know that its government is beyond the point of debating what terrorism is.

Acts of terrorism and terrorists are not in the least senseless. Terrorism consists of a series of carefully planned and ruthlessly executed military-like operations. While they are often aimed at soft targets--air passengers, school buses, unarmed politicians, and unprotected businessmen--these operations constitute an assault upon the security of sovereign states.

Terrorism is carried out purposefully, in a cold-blooded, calculated fashion. The men and women who plan and execute these precision operations are neither crazy nor mad. They are very resourceful and competent criminals, systematically and intelligently attacking legally constituted nations that, for the most part, believe in the protection of individual rights and respect for the law. Nations that use terror against their own citizens, either to counter terror or to maintain the government, are terrorists themselves. The following JCS definitions of concepts related to terrorism clarify the use of these terms in this chapter.[5] Once the facts and a careful definition of terrorism replace the myths, the process of constructing a more accurate statement of the threat of terrorism can begin.

o Antiterrorism--Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism.

o Counterterrorism--Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.

Terrorism counteraction, then, is the antiterrorism and counterterrorism actions taken by the United States government to counter the threat of terrorism.

RECOGNIZING THE THREAT

President Reagan told the American public, "In recent years there has been a steady and escalating pattern of terrorist acts against the United States, our allies, and the third world nations friendly toward our interests."[6]

New records were set in 1983 in both total terrorist casualties (1,925) and numbers of United States victims (387).[7] Terrorist acts also increased from about 500 in 1983 to over 600 in 1984. Over 300 bombings--almost one a day--ccurred in 1984. Based on the rate for the first half of the year, more than 1,000 acts of terrorism, or three a day, occurred in 1985. While statistics don't present the total threat picture, we must understand their implications.

First, the high casualties are attributable, not so much to an increase in terrorist acts, but to their increased effectiveness. The loss of American lives from terrorist violence in a single country in a single year (267 in Lebanon in 1983) was greater than that suffered by Americans throughout the world during the preceding fifteen years. Second, the summation of terrorist incidents is not at all comprehensive. According to the State Department, current terrorism statistics only "represent the tip of the iceberg with regard to terrorist violence." Last, terrorism statistics must be analyzed carefully. For example, if Ulster's 1,700+ deaths by political violence were extrapolated to larger countries like Great Britain and the United States, the deaths, respectively, would be 60,000 and 233,000.

To assess terrorism solely in these direct terms is to vastly underestimate its dangers. To comprehend the threat of terrorism to the United States, we must appreciate the indirect impact of terrorism on our interests. Those interests span collective alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), bilateral relations such as Turkey, and, most importantly, the very institutions of freedom associated with liberal democracies.

Paul Johnson argues that terrorism is war against civilization. Johnson refers to the deadly sins of terrorism.[8] Summarizing Johnson, the true threat of terrorism is--

- The deliberate and cold-blooded exaltation of violence over other forms of public activity.

o The deliberate suppression of the moral instincts of man.

o The rejection of politics as the normal means by which communities resolve conflict.

o The active, systematic spread of the totalitarian state.

o The exploitation and endangerment of freedom in liberal societies.

Terrorism saps the will of a civilized society to defend itself which contributes to its destabilization. It places intolerable pressure to concede politically, either by changing policies or yielding on fundamental principles. It undermines morale, imposes huge security costs, and can soften nations or societies for more conventional takeover.

The real threat of terrorism is that terrorists will attain their ultimate goal of destroying the institutions of free societies and sovereign states. Terrorism is a broad campaign aimed at disintegrating societies by undermining the citizens' confidence in their governments.

Terrorists' goals are to destroy the rules of behavior that form the cornerstone of our ethics. Terrorists do not distinguish between soldiers and small children, between authorities and helpless women, between governmental agents and ordinary citizens, between a military outpost and a common dwelling place. Each shares equally as the target of the terrorist. Terrorists have no moral restraint in the choice of their objectives or methods of attack.

Terrorism, both as a tactic of insurgents and as a strategy of those opposed to democratic order, is a form of low-intensity conflict. Failure to recognize terrorism for what it is has impeded progress in counteracting it.

Attempts to increase the awareness of terrorism need to be carefully structured to avoid playing into the hands of the terrorist. They thrive on attention, especially media coverage. This pitfall can be avoided only by depicting terrorists as they are--not how they want to be perceived.

ACHIEVING A CONSENSUS

Sufficient understanding of the threat of terrorism will not necessarily lead to agreement on substantial legislative and organizational means to combat that threat. First, a

consensus to act must exist. Three obstacles must be overcome to achieve this consensus:

o A lack of sufficient terrorism counteraction information in the public domain.

o A fear that terrorism counteraction will be accomplished at the expense of individual rights.

o A fragmented national terrorism counteraction program.

Much of the public debate waged in the United States press regarding terrorism counteraction is exacerbated by erroneous assumptions leading to faulty conclusions. For those "in the know," those debates are conducted without benefit of facts--facts that are frequently classified--regarding the threat or United States policy and capability. This is not an appropriate approach to build national consensus.

Much of United States government policy, strategy, and capabilities relating to terrorism counteraction, as well as threat data, is sensitive information and should be classified. But much is not. With the deletion of a few words, phrases, or paragraphs, numerous documents can be declassified or classified at a lower level.

For example, the Army recently conducted a functional area assessment on terrorism.[9] This excellent report could have been given wider dissemination had classified portions been published separately.

Much has been written about the apparent disconnect between what our national leadership says and what it does regarding terrorism counteraction. It must conduct a vigorous, in-depth review of classified information on the subject and declassify or reduce the level of classification whenever possible. In doing so, it would help alleviate the adverse effect on consensus building by expanding the information available to the American public and to serious researchers and middle management of the various United States government departments and services.

The American public needs to know that its government has the necessary policies, organizations, and capabilities to defeat terrorism. Believing otherwise almost ensures lack of consensus. Americans need to know that while the United States may choose not to act, it is not necessarily due to a lack of policy or capability.

We must assure the American public that a national terrorism counteraction program will not be developed at the expense of the freedoms, decencies, and standards we are attempting to protect. Liberal democracies do not enjoy the same "luxuries" that totalitarian regimes, like the Soviet Union, have to combat terrorism: application of whatever force is needed to liquidate the terrorist group; borders closed to unwanted entry or exit; individual rights held subservient to the state; publicity denied by fiat; terror countered by terror. That approach cannot be used in democratic societies. Our most effective defense can be our openness. So long as a vast majority of our population believes it has a stake in our system of government and understands that its destablization is the goal of the terrorist, then those who resort to violence will not gain widespread support.

The duty of any government is to protect order and defend its people. In the case of terrorism, it is to defend against chaos and terror. The challenge is to ensure that the nation's "police" powers are not excessive and do not lead to abuse of power. The best defense against this happening is to provide the citizenry ample opportunity to understand the terror of terrorism and to openly discuss, in dispassionate terms, the options for dealing with it. A free nation's perspective on terrorism and on terrorism counteraction must be firmly based in its own set of values. To abandon those values (such as freedom of the press) in the face of the threat or to accommodate ourselves to the demands of those who resort to violence is to give the terrorists the victory they seek.

Americans can never be totally protected from terrorism any more than they can be totally protected from any type of criminal attack. Acceptable levels of risk must be determined and appropriate resources allocated to reach that level. While at first this may appear to be an impossible task, local, state, and federal law-enforcement agencies have been accomplishing similar tasks on a continuing basis.

The last major action needed to build consensus is to pull together, in concert, the various elements of the overall national terrorism counteraction program. It has been suggested that, in order to achieve a national consensus, all terrorism counteraction programs need to be centralized under the supervision of a single organization.[10]

IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION AND ORGANIZATION

While numerous corrective actions have been recommended and several implemented, significant progress cannot be made until public understanding is dramatically increased and a

consensus to act is established. Once that has occurred, the necessary legislative and organizational changes can be effectively implemented.

A number of excellent studies have been conducted recently by various government departments and agencies to begin to identify these legislative and organizational issues.[11] Two factors plague the implementation of recommendations. The first has already been discussed in detail: issue resolution rarely precedes a substantial level of understanding and consensus to act. The second is the need to coordinate direct action at the highest levels. This may be overcome with the implementation of Vice President Bush's task force report on combating terrorism.

While conducting the research phase of this project, numerous studies were reviewed. Based upon that review, the following topics provide examples of civil-military legislative and organizational issues that the government will need to address. The first examples are loosely grouped under the heading of legislation. The list is not comprehensive, rather it is a start point for identifying the type of issues that must be addressed in order to enhance our terrorism counteraction program.

o Extradition treaties need to be examined to address extraditing terrorist fugitives from foreign countries. In most cases, those treaties are not applicable if the crime constituted a political offense. Terrorists claiming political crimes, therefore, are not extraditable.

o Legislation needs to be considered to make overseas murder of an American citizen a crime for which the United States has jurisdiction. At present, terrorists who murder Americans (nongovernment official or diplomat) abroad cannot be charged for that crime by United States courts.

o International agreements are needed to counteract terrorism. In the final analysis, terrorism is an international problem.

o The United States should consider developing legislation to make an act of terrorism a crime under United States law. Many democracies have made terrorism a national crime.

o United States law should consider the imposition of the death penalty for the conviction of murder of a hostage.

o Legislation is needed to deny the departure from a country of a hijacked aircraft. Denying terrorists freedom of

movement, especially once an act of hijacking has occurred, is a necessary condition to capturing the terrorists.

o Efforts are needed to establish an open-source, specific national policy statement on terrorism counteraction.

o The level of acceptable risk associated with United States terrorism counteraction needs to be determined. Until such level is determined, terrorism counteraction efforts will be aimed at a nonexistent goal.

The following are representative organizational issues:

o Roles and missions must be centrally coordinated.

o Specific guidelines and spokesmen are needed to represent the government in the aftermath of terrorism.

o The disparity between what the government says it will do and what it actually does in regard to terrorism counteraction must be eliminated. This issue needs careful analysis and resolution.

o A full-time centralized intelligence effort must be established.

o A media-government commission needs to be convened to study and make appropriate recommendations regarding the role of the media, both as a tool of terrorism and as a tool of terrorism counteraction.

o Handling of public information must be considered to ensure the public is adequately informed of the government's counterterrorism capability.

SUMMARY

A key deterrent to the United States capability to effectively combat terrorism is the nation's inadequate understanding of the true nature of terrorism. Without a firm foundation of public awareness and consensus to act, implementation of terrorist counteraction legislative and organizational means will be slow and haphazard. We cannot afford to view public awareness and consensus as secondary issues that will resolve themselves in due course. Specific strategy, action plan, and implementing initiatives need to be developed and aggressively pursued to encourage a strong public understanding of terrorism. The importance of this effort mandates that it be raised above an interdepartmental committee

level action. It must flow from the highest level of the government by an organization that can focus exclusively on this fundamental issue.

The first step towards achieving an effective terrorism counteraction capability is a greatly improved understanding of the nature of the terrorist threat. Limiting desired awareness to the physical threat is insufficient. Awareness needs to be expanded to include the indirect threat of terrorism to democratic freedoms and institutions. Terrorism needs to be carefully defined; the myths of terrorism replaced with facts; the goals, methods, and supporters of terrorists clearly defined; and responsibilities fixed for fostering public awareness of the threat.

During the late 1930s, the democracies of the world failed to understand how totalitarian aggression combined diplomacy, propaganda, and violence. Many people died as a result of that lack of understanding. Today, we are faced with a similar challenge--the terror of terrorism. If we can achieve the understanding to resist this peculiarly evil form of aggression, based upon propaganda, diplomacy, terror, and violence, then the necessary means will be found to adequately secure and defend our interests--our very value system. Without that understanding, little can be done.

NOTES

[1]Quarterly Risk Assessment, Risk International, Incorporated explains its data base as follows: "For the purposes of the data base, terrorism is defined as the threatened or actual use of force and violence to attain a political goal through fear, coercion, and intimidation. Materials contained in the data base relate only to significant actions carried out by terrorist groups operating within the United States and overseas, excluding communist countries. Actions by criminal elements are not recorded in the data base." (Alexandria, VA: Risk International, Inc., January 1985).

[2]Brian M. Jenkins, Terrorism and Beyond: An International Conference on Terrorism and Low-Level Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, R-2714-DOE/DOJ/DOS/RC, December 1982).

[3]Vice President's Task Force, Report on Combating Terrorism, 5 March 1986 (Classified).

[4]Ibid.

[5]The Joint Military Terminology Group has approved these terms for DOD use, and for inclusion in JCS Pub 1, The Dictionary of Military and Associate Terms (8 November 1985).

[6]Ronald Reagan, Remarks of the President to the American Bar Association Convention (Washington, DC: 8 July 1985).

[7]US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (US Department of State, September 1984).

[8]Paul Johnson, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Terrorism." Published in the proceedings of the Jerusalem Conference, International Terrorism, conducted at the Johnathan Institute, Jerusalem (1981).

[9]Department of Defense, U.S. Army, Functional Area Assessment on Terrorism (U) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1984) (Classified).

[10]Robert B. Oakley, "Organizing to Meet the Threat." 10th Annual Symposium on the Roles of Behavioral Science in Physical Security, Outthinking the Terrorist (Washington, DC: 1985).

[11]Two of the most comprehensive studies are Terrorism, Warfare of the 80s (U) (Joint Special Operations Agency, October 1985), and the Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism (Classified) (5 March 1986).

CHAPTER 6

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY

GENERAL

Peacetime contingency operations are military responses outside the realm of conventional conflict (see Glossary). They become necessary when diplomatic initiatives are ineffective in achieving extremely time-sensitive, high-value objectives, or when unexpected threats to United States interests require a rapid response. Diplomatic failure to influence a belligerent may require the immediate use of military forces to protect national interests, to rescue United States citizens, or to defend United States assets. In this regard, the military acts as an instrument of foreign policy. When conducting these operations, the military must coordinate its efforts with diplomatic and economic, as well as media and public relations, initiatives.

Although the military may have the most visible role in peacetime contingencies, the State Department plays the primary role. It recommends foreign policy objectives to the President and the National Security Council and secures access to foreign bases, air space, and waterways in the objective area. Its overall policy goals determine the military objectives, the mission, and the concept of employment.

Military objectives, as well as the composition of the military force in using military power, are determined from national policy; therefore, policymakers must clearly define the objectives and the parameters for using force. In executing his mission, the military commander must, in turn, be sensitive to policy needs and, through military analysis, translate policy guidance into contingency, concept, or operation plans.

To a considerable degree, the United States already possesses the doctrine and capabilities to perform contingency operations. The problem in low-intensity conflict lies in the areas of coordinated implementation and in use of appropriate force to carry out policy objectives.

This chapter outlines the significant problems, general solutions, and operational concepts of various types of peacetime contingency operations. It examines their nature, their characteristics, and requirements for their execution. It examines key operational considerations and concludes with the principles generated by the examination of these

operations. The functional area chapters and Volume II contain detailed recommendations regarding the economical and effective use of force in peacetime contingency operations.

TYPES OF OPERATIONS

Peacetime contingencies include operations such as humanitarian assistance, noncombatant emergency evacuation, military presence, peacemaking, and certain strike operations.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Generally, humanitarian assistance operations provide relief to victims of natural disasters abroad. The military can provide assistance in situations resulting from earthquakes, floods, volcanos, droughts, and famine. Normally, operations provide immediate relief and rehabilitation in response to an emergency request. Humanitarian assistance may include refugee assistance, food programs, or other civilian welfare programs.

Humanitarian assistance can also be provided as part of a military assistance and counterinsurgency program. In this case, the support or aid may be similar to emergency relief, but the objective is normally to change or prevent situations prejudicial to United States interests. This aspect of the joint strategy for counterinsurgency will be addressed in the chapters on development and logistics and in their respective sections in Volume II.

Political considerations, funding, and legal constraints frequently prevent United States military units from making a meaningful improvement to local conditions. Therefore, assistance during exercises or actual operations may not be available at times and places where it could have significant political or humanitarian effect. (See Issue D1, Volume II.)

Should a military force be committed to a humanitarian assistance operation, it is likely to be an integral part of a larger effort coordinated by the United States country team. (In the 1985 Mexico City earthquake and the Colombian volcano eruption, United States Army and Air Force relief elements were quickly deployed at State Department request.)

An integrated approach is key to the success of the mission and requires close coordination and cooperation at all levels among the military, the country team, and the host nation. The military force directly involved with a humanitarian assistance operation, while still under command of the

unified commander, will be responsive to the ambassador. The force must participate and coordinate actively with the country team, as well as host nation military and other agencies.

The military force involved in a humanitarian assistance operation will likely support civilian agencies, and overall command and control of the operation will not be distinctly military. Military elements will be concerned with a number of primary missions:

o Executing the assistance program developed by the State Department or United States Agency for International Development (USAID) such as distribution of food, medical supplies, and other emergency relief items and refugee and population control.

o Assisting in assessing the damage, the extent of the disaster, and the capabilities of the host country to deal with the emergency.

o Assisting the host nation and the United States country team in developing a short-term and a long-term recovery plan.

o Training host country military, paramilitary, and other agencies to implement emergency relief and civilian welfare programs.

o Providing highly specialized personnel, such as medical or engineer teams, and equipment for specific projects.

Logistics support is the primary concern of an assistance operation, with the military force in a supporting role. In almost all cases personnel will be sufficient to handle the emergency. Required immediately are items such as food, medical supplies, aid, transportation, engineering facilities, shelter, clothes, and blankets; and a disciplined organization to implement the program.

Since this type of operation is primarily concerned with civilian welfare, both economic and social, the military is normally concerned with supporting civilian activities rather than dealing with armed conflict. Nevertheless, situations of this nature can offer targets for terrorist or guerrilla attack. The military force should be capable of defending itself and protecting lives and property.

A number of requirements are necessary to carry out humanitarian assistance. The planner and key elements of his force need to be area-qualified. This means having not

just the skills to perform the mechanical aspects of the mission but also such soft skills as language ability and cultural awareness. The planner must--

o Consider the size of the force and its ability to carry out the mission, as well as its organization to perform the primary assigned tasks.

o Include specific methods of inserting and extracting the force.

o Consider development and availability of appropriate command and control structure and communication assets.

o Be aware of political considerations, guidance, and legal constraints.

o Be sensitive to the nuances of the local environment, especially since elements of his mission may include population control, refugee control, and interaction with host nation organizations.

o Ensure plans are flexible so that they can be adjusted to unexpected requirements.

o Ensure plans are realistic so that they can be executed quickly and without wasted effort.

o Ensure the effort has the appropriate logistical support, which is the heart of the mission and requires more than ad hoc planning at the time of the crisis.

NONCOMBATANT EMERGENCY EVACUATION

Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted in a host country faced with the threat of hostile action. They are normally conducted to evacuate United States citizens whose lives are in danger. An example is the 1983 Grenada operation which rescued hundreds of American students trapped during a violent takeover of the government. They may also include the evacuation of natives of the host country, as well as third country nationals friendly to the United States.

The situation requiring personnel evacuation may deteriorate as a result of military, political, or other emergencies. The State Department must initiate timely requests for military assistance and obtain necessary United States and allied government clearances, including basing and overflight authorizations, and facilities essential to execute the operation. The chief of the diplomatic mission should ensure that the number of evacuees is reduced to a minimum.

The Department of State, acting on the advice of the chief of the diplomatic mission, will determine when evacuation will occur. Normally, evacuation will begin in accordance with the embassy evacuation plan, using scheduled airlines, chartered flights, or surface transportation. If requirements exceed capability, the Secretary of State may request military assistance from the Department of Defense. The theater commander in chief (CINC) tasked by the Joint Chiefs of Staff will initiate appropriate military operations. Ideally, they will be in accordance with a previously developed course of action most applicable to that particular situation.

Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in several critical respects. Their very nature acknowledges that internal security or our political relations with a country have deteriorated to the point where an evacuation is required. Usually, all other options will have been exhausted before such an acknowledgement is made. Thus the decision to evacuate will likely have been delayed until the last possible moment.

Command and control at the evacuation site will probably be difficult since direction may not pass from the chief of the diplomatic mission to the evacuation force commander at the time of execution. Prior coordination and site survey will probably have been restricted because the presence of uniformed military personnel prior to the evacuation would be seen as tacit admission of deterioration. It may, in fact, serve to accelerate that deterioration. Furthermore, the element of tactical surprise would be forfeited. Indeed, the coordination and survey must be initiated early and may best be conducted by embassy personnel and by clandestinely inserted elements of the evacuation force.

The evacuation force commander must be prepared to deal with the situation as it actually exists at the time evacuation is ordered. Evacuation sites and timing of the operation will be determined not so much by the plan, but by the existing local situation which the commander can personally influence. The commander must be prepared to defend the evacuation from hostile forces without having the authority to preempt hostile actions. (See Issue B7, Volume II.) Overlying these considerations is the fact that evacuation operations are politically sensitive and will certainly be monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level.

An evacuation operation has certain characteristics that distinguish it from an assault, raid, or other type of military operation. Although these characteristics may be present to some degree in other operations, they are much more pronounced in an evacuation. A key characteristic is the number of uncertainties in planning, especially in regard to time of execution,

insertion sites, size of force required, means of insertion and extraction, numbers and categories of evacuees, hostile forces, and duration of the operation. The key factor in planning is to determine whether the evacuation will take place in a benign environment, whether it will face the threat of violent opposition, or whether it will, in fact, be a combat operation.

Military objectives will be limited to those tactically necessary to provide a suitable avenue of evacuation. Care of civilians and the maintenance of order in and around the evacuation site(s) will be prime responsibilities. The mission will require emphasis on lift capabilities to move troops and passengers swiftly to and from the scene.

The variety of circumstances beyond the control of the military commander will complicate the operation. That commander must be prepared to work within constraints and their unpredictable effects. This will require sensitivity, patience, and flexibility. The nature and extent of existing United States presence in the targeted nation will be a further complicating factor.

In executing the mission, flexibility in planning and a ready and responsive evacuation force are absolutely essential. Also needed are--

o Local surprise.

o An efficient and ready logistical support system (with special attention to medical requirements).

o Rapid execution of the operation.

o Special task organization of the evacuation force.

o Effective communication.

o Clear lines of command and control.

o Early and accurate intelligence.

o Special skills, particularly in evacuation procedures, riot and crowd control, and emergency services.

o Well-established liaison with cooperating commands and agencies.

o Continuous situation monitoring and reporting.

o The provision of care to evacuees.

Because of the sensitivity of the mission, political considerations and constraints will apply throughout and will be managed by the State Department. The operation will usually be monitored by the National Command Authority (NCA).

MILITARY PRESENCE

Forces deployed abroad constitute a military presence. They lend credibility to a nation's promises and commitments, increase influence in a region by representing national interests, and demonstrate the viability of military force as an instrument of national power. Deployment of strategic or rapidly deployable forces, such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to the Middle East and United States Army airborne or ranger forces into nontraditional areas of operation, are examples of military presence, either in response to specific threats or as part of routine exercises.

Military presence is created by the forward deployment or basing of military forces, by the use of aircraft and ship visits, by political intervention or reinforcement, and by the introduction or build-up of military forces in a region as a show of force. The objective is to reassure a friend or ally or to induce another government or political-military organization to respect United States interests. The mere appearance of credible military force can underscore national policy interests and commitment. Military presence may be enhanced by the use of complementary diplomatic and policy actions. Such actions, however, must temper local and international perceptions of imperialism or of evolution toward a puppet regime.

The United States has used military presence as an instrument of foreign policy on more than 200 occasions since World War II. More than three-quarters of these incidents involved naval presence. Since 1975, nearly one-third of these situations occurred in the Caribbean Basin. Periodically, fleet forces are present in the Central America and Caribbean region. Favorable outcomes have occurred far more frequently when the objective of military presence was to assure or deter behavior than to compel or induce behavior. In the long run, however, overuse of this option must be avoided, as the Soviets frequently exploit United States presence with far-reaching propaganda campaigns detrimental to our image abroad.

A number of characteristics are inherent to military presence. Timeliness, location, force composition and size, means of entry and withdrawal, the coordination of aim and execution, and duration are important in terms of planning. As with all operations in low-intensity conflict, the political nature of the operation predominates, especially in the use of

military forces to establish a presence. Since the object is not the actual use of force and since the operation may take place in or near and in cooperation with other states, delicate legal and political constraints are likely to apply. The presence also needs to be coordinated with the relevant country team(s). Finally, there must be a clear understanding and announcement of objectives and of United States national will to see the operation through.

The first element essential to a military presence is the forward deployment or basing of forces and the availability of supporting logistics and infrastructure. The appropriate inter- and intratheater mobility assets must be available to sustain the force. Sufficient interdepartmental and international liaison, accurate intelligence, clear lines of command and control, and adequate communications capability must exist and the participating forces must be ready and responsive. The mission needs to be well defined and understood and executed in a timely fashion. There must also be effective initiatives in relations with the local public and with worldwide media.

PEACEMAKING

Peacemaking operations attempt to ensure the maintenance of civil law and order under the supervision of a military force. Some aspects of peacemaking may occur as a result of a peacekeeping operation. Peacemaking operations are more likely to involve combat since they are conducted without the consent of all of the belligerents. For further discussion of the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking, see Chapter 7.

As part of a multinational force, contingency forces may conduct peacemaking operations unilaterally or in conjunction with a host government, to maintain civil order or to support a threatened host government. Although United States intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 had broad, hemispheric policy goals, military forces were essentially employed in a peacemaking role.

Peacemaking is a difficult area of consideration. This is especially true since the boundary line between peacemaking and peacekeeping missions may be very vague. Peacemaking has, however, a number of key characteristics. Planning, as in all operations, is vital. As with all low-intensity conflict situations, uncertainties and constraints must be dealt with. Short notice for a response is likely and the location may not be known in advance. Information on the belligerent forces and their relative composition, distribution, strength, and morale may be scanty. The mission itself may be unclear, the composition and size of the force to be used may fluctuate

unexpectedly, and the operation may be of uncertain duration. Furthermore, one can expect considerable political involvement, complex rules of engagement, and insistence on the minimal use of force.

What constitutes minimum force in any situation is unclear. The mission and military operations may be under major constraints. They may be subject to sudden change and unexpected demands, which may run counter to sound military practice. For the commander and his forces, the environment is likely to be dangerous and frustrating. The prompt commitment of overwhelming force, whose very presence might preclude violence, may be a desirable, but not always feasible, option.

The intricacy of the peacemaking mission requires considerable planning flexibility. It requires tact, innovation, and an understanding of the environment and the political ramifications involved. It also requires constant mission analysis, sound intelligence, appropriate and detailed training, a force size commensurate with the threat, independent and responsive logistical support, clear command and control relationships, effective communications, joint and combined force liaison, and an effective public diplomacy and psychological operations campaign to reduce the duration of use of the force. The mission will no doubt require that the forces be appropriate to the environment and that they be sustained, replaced, rotated, or reinforced in a manner that provides continuity of effort. The mission may also require adherence to local law and custom.

Ideally, once the force commander is given the mission and understands the constraints, he would have some personal discretion and latitude to carry out his mission. The political sensitivity of the effort, however, may preclude this. It will be a difficult mission in any event, and the personality of the commander, his training and expertise, and that of his organization will be crucial ingredients to success.

STRIKE OPERATIONS

In conditions short of war, strike operations may recover United States personnel and property or conduct punitive action in support of political and diplomatic measures. These attacks are made for purposes other than gaining or holding terrain. They may be deliberate-response or quick-reaction operations and may involve direct-action missions. They include raids, personnel and equipment recovery, interdiction of lines of communication, air strikes or naval bombardments against terrorist facilities, or combinations of the above. Multiple strike operations can have a synergistic effect and can create

situations that enable friendly nations to seize and maintain the political initiative. The Mayaguez rescue mission in 1975 was a classic example of such an operation.

Characteristics of successful strike operations are--

o Initiation at a time and location totally unexpected by the adversary.

o Avoidance of detection during planning, rehearsal, and deployment.

o Swift, violent, precise, and audacious actions that focus full combat power at the decisive time and place.

o Use of all available, appropriate combat power assets; precise timing of operations.

o Swift disengagement upon mission completion.

o Planned, swift withdrawal, incorporating deception plans.

Ground strike operations are best accomplished by organizations that are highly skilled in conventional war-fighting techniques. Such a force would either act unilaterally, in concert with direct-action missions by special operations elements, or with allied forces. Inserted by ship or by aircraft, elements strike strategic objectives, targets of high psychological profile, time-sensitive targets, or key personnel and facilities in enemy-controlled areas. When provided with the appropriate assets for insertion, strike units are capable of conducting extremely deep penetration raids. Exfiltration from such raids is most difficult, however, and is the major limiting factor. (See Issue B4, Volume II.)

A strategic raid would be approved by the NCA and conducted under the operational command (OPCOM) of a unified or joint task force (JTF) commander. Typical targets include insurgent command, control, communications, and intelligence centers; nuclear and chemical weapons storage sites and delivery means in the possession of irresponsible nations or factions; key terrorist or insurgent installations or facilities, such as logistics depots, airstrips, buildings, bridges, dams, tunnels, or lines of communication; and known terrorist living, training, and staging areas.

Strike operations may involve carrier-borne air strikes, naval bombardment, or air strikes from the continental United States or overseas land installations. Such operations in many cases are retaliatory or reactive in nature, such as the carrier

battle group airstrikes off the Lebanese coast in early 1984 or the interception of the PLO terrorists aboard the Egyptian airliner in 1985. Naval and air strikes are relatively indiscriminate. While accurate intelligence may provide targets, such strikes are usually impotent against the covert violence of terrorist attacks. The 1986 counterterrorism strikes against Libya are a notable exception.

Among peacetime contingencies, strike operations are the most clearly distinct military evolutions. Although their context may be highly political, the actual execution, once begun, is less subject to political and diplomatic control than are other low-intensity conflict missions. Still, the mission requires sensitivity to the attendant political contexts and must be "framed" by a comprehensive public information initiative. Mission execution usually requires a limited-size force operating against specific, but limited, objectives. The operation must be kept as short as possible and intensive planning and rehearsal of all phases must precede the effort. Precise, real-time intelligence, effective and redundant communications, the ability to augment the execution force, and clear lines of command and control are needed. The logistical support system must be attuned to the specific force requirements and be able to sustain it on short notice. Overall, the mission will require stringent operational security, which must continually be measured against effective execution of the mission. The aborted Iran rescue raid in 1980 provides an unfortunate example of this dilemma.

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A number of operational considerations influence the nature and scope of peacetime contingency missions. These include the execution of an operation by its planners, the requirement for well-developed psychological operations (PSYOP), the role of logistics, the complexity of command and control, and the constraints imposed by public opinion, by operational security, by rules of engagement, and by political concerns.

Because of the delicacy and complexity of peacetime contingencies, it is highly desirable that missions be executed by the same individuals who planned them. Standby contingency plans must be executed by commanders and staffs who have become intimately familiar with those plans and with the factors considered in their preparation. (See Issues A6 and A7, Volume II.)

Peacetime contingencies are, by their nature, complex and generally unanticipated, though they may involve long-term involvement once begun. This means it is difficult, yet

important, to prepare the mission environment in advance or in support of a commitment of force. Psychological operations, though time-consuming and more appropriate to longer-term involvements, are essential to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and to target audiences whose support is crucial to the success of the operation. This effort requires considerable preparation, regional sensitivity, and consistent coordination between civilian and military authorities, and, where appropriate, between United States and host country civil-military organizations. (See Chapter 14.)

A vital operational consideration in peacetime contingencies is the potentially pivotal role of logistics. Logistical requirements can present extraordinary demands on service and joint support forces. The missions are likely to be short-notice, unique, and in austere environments. Peacetime contingencies require that consideration be given to developing a precrisis logistics baseline for national contingency force structures. That baseline should include an awareness of the needs of various force sizes and compositions. This aspect of logistics support is dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 13.

Command relationships (service/joint/combined) will be more complex in such operations because of their unique nature, the special force requirements, and the peculiarities of political-military considerations. A continuing tension will exist between the need for sustained, coordinated command and control and the requirement to avoid micromanagement. In highly sensitive situations, combining constant monitoring with flexibility and initiative will not be easy. (See Chapter 8.)

Consideration must also be given to domestic and international public affairs. The media exerts a powerful, if indeterminate, influence on public opinion, and this can have an impact upon operations, either for good or ill. Political and military leaders must consider the media's role and develop appropriate programs and relationships that will sustain operations. In this regard, a deliberate, precrisis consideration should be the education of the media and the public on the nature and unique requirements of peacetime contingency operations.

The command should allow for real-time press coverage. Where appropriate to operational security, a clear public affairs policy must be established. Training and guidance must be provided at all force levels on appropriate media relations. Ignorance of, indifference to, or hostility towards the media and the media's reciprocation can undermine the effectiveness of any mission by alienating public opinion. Both the press and the government must understand that, while they have different perspectives and often conflicting job requirements,

animosity does not serve either them or the public good. Media coverage should be consistent with security practices, host government guidelines, and established Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) public affairs policy. Training programs and policy guidance must address appropriate media relations at every level. (See Chapter 15 and Issue H1, Volume II.)

Another important consideration is the role of operational security. High-level, worldwide political considerations and the sensitive nature of military operations will impose attention and constraints on operations that are likely to be disproportionate to the force being used. No easy way exists to balance the requirements for mission accomplishment with the need to closely hold the details of the mission in order to preserve surprise, success, and the lives of those involved. Only reasonableness and precrisis planning, training, and preparation, which may still not prepare one for all contingencies, can help to reconcile this tension.

To combine the requirements of physical security of the mission forces with the restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) that typify low-intensity conflict will be no easy task. ROE for tactical forces will emanate from the regional CINC based on NCA guidance, mission, threat, laws of war, and host nation or third country constraints on force deployment. The political considerations that go into developing the ROE may clash with the physical security requirements of the mission force. Political requirements should be weighed against the risks to the mission and to the force itself, and they should be practical, realistic, and enforceable. But no matter the situation, mission-oriented forces will have to operate in a highly constrained environment. This will require the utmost in patience, training, and dedication. (See Issue B7, Volume II.)

Restraint, however, is not a one-way street. It is profoundly hoped that political authorities will recognize the accumulative effect of constraints on military actions and capabilities. Military leadership must make clear how these constraints may ultimately make the use of force impossible. Politicians must be sensitive to the military possibilities of a situation and to changes in that situation and not undertake or sustain commitments that violate the practicable. This requires deft coordination among leadership sensitive to the political-military nature of the ongoing conflicts. (See Chapter 8 and Issue A11, Volume II.)

SUMMARY

In considering the nature of peacetime contingencies, a number of key principles seem inherent to the various missions:

o Military efforts must be closely coordinated with diplomatic, media, and public relations initiatives.

o With the exception of strike operations, the State Department is the lead agency for overseeing peacetime contingencies--with the military in a supporting role.

o National policy objectives will determine military objectives and the composition of the military force; policymakers must define clear objectives and be sensitive to military constraints.

o Careful, yet flexible, planning is necessary in situations fraught with uncertainties.

o Clear lines of command, control, and communications must be established, especially among civilian and military agencies.

o Planning for appropriate logistics support must be complete and detailed.

o Training must be specialized at all levels, especially to ensure that units "train down" or "train up" for appropriate levels of conflict.

o Minimal essential military pressure should be applied at the point of engagement, bearing in mind that in some situations this may mean rapid commitment of an overwhelming force to a target area which will, in fact, reduce the possibility of actual combat.

o Military units must be aware of the importance of careful handling of the civilian population or refugees.

o Security of the committed force will be weighed against the unique rules of engagement and tactical and political environment of each situation.

These principles stress the need for careful, precrisis planning and for military and political authorities to be sensitive to their different but complementary tasks. They underscore the fact that, although peacetime contingencies may be unexpected and unique, the ability to respond successfully in a timely fashion and at minimal cost in lives, resources, and political consequences depends upon awareness of, and adherence to, a number of sustaining commonalities. Ignorance of these principles, as in the law, is no excuse. Not to heed their role in formulating our responses is to plan for failure.

CHAPTER 7

PEACEKEEPING

GENERAL

Peacekeeping describes various activities undertaken by military and civil bureaucracies of nation states and international and ad hoc organizations. Peacekeeping takes many forms and involves the use of forces varying in strength, organization, and methods of operation.

The United States Army defines peacekeeping as military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, maintain, or restore peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. However, no single definition is accepted by all services and agencies.

Peacekeeping generally describes two types of activity: (1) operations conducted, with the consent of the belligerents, to interpose an uncommitted, nonaligned third party between two or more hostile states or communities (hereafter referred to as peacekeeping operations) and (2) those operations intended to achieve or maintain peace without the consent of one or more of the belligerents (hereafter referred to as peacemaking).

While the distinction between these two types of operations is clear, actual operations often cross the boundary between peacekeeping and peacemaking. In all cases, however, the objective is to establish and maintain peace.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Peacekeeping operations are designed to separate the belligerents so the dynamics of negotiation, mediation, and conciliation can resolve the issues which generated the belligerency. Peacekeeping involves far more than military participation, and some argue that military forces are not appropriate for peacekeeping. Nevertheless, while diplomatic efforts are associated with peacekeeping, the United States uses military forces as the primary element in such operations. Thus peacekeeping is examined as a military action. This is done to provide insight into the challenges faced by military leaders engaged in peacekeeping missions and the organization and individual requirements desired of participants.

Peacekeeping is politically sensitive down to and including the actions of the individual service member. The purpose of

the peacekeeping force is to prevent fighting to gain time for the disputing parties to work out their problems. Thus peacekeeping is substantially different from other types of military operations.

The essential difference is that a peacekeeping force acts on behalf of all parties to a dispute, at their invitation or with their consent; therefore it must, as far as possible, carry out its task without recourse to war-like action against any of them. This gives a wholly different character and style to the kind of military intervention required. It follows then that the organization sponsoring the force cannot be responsive to only one of the governments of the parties in the dispute. If it were, it would not be in a position to act on behalf of both parties and consent would be denied.

Furthermore, if the organization responds to one of the belligerents or is invited to participate with the agreemment of only one belligerent, the operation becomes a peacemaking or peacetime contingency operation. If the sponsoring organization attempts to become the government for all parties to the conflict, the peacekeeping force is likely to find itself the target of subversion, insurgency, or civil war.

Another important difference rests with the terms, or mandate, which govern the way a peacekeeping force operates. These terms are often far less precise than the military desires for two reasons. First, sponsors usually consist of many countries. Each may have its own idea of what the peacekeeping force should do according to its view of the rights and wrongs of the dispute. Second, the mandate for the peacekeeping force has to be framed so that it gives advantage to no side. For these reasons the mandate is likely to be imprecise and therefore susceptible to many different interpretations. Nevertheless, the peacekeeping force commander is obligated to construct as precise a mission statement as possible from the mandate and other factors to be addressed.

PRINCIPLES

Each peacekeeping operation is unique; therefore, nothing will supplant a thorough analysis of the immediate crisis situation and the application of sound judgment. However, the following principles should guide that analysis.

Consent. The notion of consent is of paramount importance. Conceptually, consent predominates in every aspect of the peacekeeping effort and draws the line between peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. It applies to the disputants and their desire for, or acquiescence to, the peacekeeping effort.

It also applies to the disputants' interest in participating in the venture and once in, the restricted or unrestricted use of their forces. Consent also extends to other interested parties, to include international organizations. They should agree to refrain from actions inimical to peacekeeping efforts.

A look at some of the activities of the multinational force (MNF) in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984 provides an operational example of the notion of consent. The MNF was initially deployed in August 1982 to facilitate the withdrawal of Palestinian forces from Lebanon. Its humanitarian mission was to interpose forces between Israeli and Palestinian forces at agreed upon locations in Beirut. Although it was harassed, the MNF was generally well received and operated without serious incident through completion of its mission. Within weeks of its withdrawal, however, and in response to the Sabra and Chatilla incidents, the MNF returned to the area at the request of the Lebanese government.

During its second deployment, some contingents of the MNF provided firepower and training to the Lebanese Army, which was involved concurrently in a multifactional civil war apart from the Israeli-Palestinian issue. As a result, the elements providing that support were perceived as biased parties participating in the civil war and consent was lost. This environment limited peacekeeping operations to the point that, one by one, the MNF contingents withdrew from the effort.

A more recent and positive example of peacekeeping efforts is the postcombat operations in Grenada. Following what was essentially a peacetime contingency operation, a Caribbean peacekeeping force of military and police personnel from seven regional nations gradually assumed responsibility for internal security from United States military forces.

Neutrality. The concept of neutrality is closely linked with the concept of consent in regard to states' contributing forces to the peacekeeping effort. Ideally, those states should be neutral in the crisis for which forces are provided. Given the nature of the world's political climate, however, such ideal participants often do not exist. The concept is modified when a host permits a state with an interest to contribute to the force as, for example, the United Kingdom in Cyprus.

Consent and neutrality connote complete impartiality of all participants in peacekeeping operations. Achieving and maintaining impartiality in the eyes of the belligerents, however, is a problem that has haunted all peacekeeping operations, particularly in light of the polarity and interdependence of the world today. Diplomats attempt to ensure

impartiality by balancing the geographical and political representation within the force and by ensuring that no one national element is dominant over the others.

Balance. An average of six national contingents operates in each peackeeping operation. In the case of operations sponsored by the United Nations, participants represent all regions of the world and all political persuasions. Nordic countries are involved consistently. Operations sponsored by regionally configured organizations reflect the range of their membership.

Two peacekeeping efforts of this decade were not sponsored by established multinational organizations but by ad hoc organizations established for that purpose. Participants in these operations represented various regions of the world but were not balanced politically. One of these efforts, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), still operates successfully. In sum, balance promotes neutrality and impartiality in peacekeeping operations.

Unity of Effort. Successful peacekeeping depends upon identifying the force as a single entity unified in its effort to keep the peace. Operational efficiency is jeopardized if individual contingents operate independently or if they are responsibile to their individual governments rather than the sponsoring body to which they have been pledged. This notion recognizes that all elements of the force are important to the accomplishment of the mission and the performance of the task. It further conveys to the sponsoring body the responsibility to ensure that once a peacekeeping effort is authorized and mounted, the structure is permitted to perform its function, subject to review but without unnecessary hindrance.

Concomitant notions are that a single manager is needed to oversee the peacekeeping effort and that something more must be done to gain a true peace than simply freezing the situation with a peacekeeping force. This has normally been accomplished in one of two ways. One establishes coequal military and political elements responsive to a single manager. The military force freezes the situation by its presence and interposition, and the political element negotiates and mediates the issues causing the dispute. The other provides a single element with both military and political powers.

Whichever organizational method is employed, from a military perspective the force commander should exercise complete military control. Contingent commanders are responsible to him for the functioning, conduct, and discipline of their contingents. They obey his orders and directives in the conduct of operations and in matters regarding the proficiency with which they are

carried out. Only in cases where orders and directives contradict accepted principles and policies governing the armed forces of a particular country has the national contingent a right to appeal to its home government. The notion of unity of effort relies heavily on the principle of consent.

Freedom of Movement. This principle applies to the force as a whole and to the individual contingents within the force. Its essence is that, to perform its peacekeeping functions and tasks, the force and its components are free to move in an unobstructed manner, in and around buffer zones and lines or throughout a host nation, according to the circumstances of the situation.

Limited Use of Force. A corollary to consent and neutrality and an issue that must be confronted when mounting any peacekeeping operation is the use of force. In theory it might seem desirable that a peacekeeping force should have as much freedom as possible in this respect, but in practice, avoiding the use of violence has certain advantages. No matter how justified the use of force might seem to a dispassionate observer, it will not appear the same to the people who are being shot at--particularly if someone is killed. Once a peacekeeping force actually draws blood, the hostility which they are bound to encounter in any case will become much more intense. The mission will, at least temporarily, take on the flavor of peacemaking.

Perhaps a more important reason for avoiding the use of force is that it counters the concept of the peacekeeper acting on behalf of both sides. One opinion is that a peacekeeping force should be strong enough to ensure compliance with its orders in the pursuit of its mandate, by force if necessary. But, apart from being impractical in relation to the size and the cost of the force, such an interpretation immediately founders because the disputants would not consent to such a force on their soil. Thus no mandate could be drawn up which would be acceptable to all parties concerned and sufficiently precise to enable the commander of the peacekeeping force to use his men in this way.

In principle, peacekeepers should not initiate force. Peacekeepers must only use sufficient force to achieve the mission at hand and to prevent, as far as possible, loss of human life or serious injury. Disregard of this fundamental principle could seriously damage the credibility and viability of the peacekeeping organization.

Every member of the unit must understand orders and directives on the use of force. They should be extremely

clear and simply explained since such restriction counters the soldier's basic training. The orders should define what is meant by force and point out that it should only be used in self-defense, as a last resort to enable soldiers to carry out their mandatory aims. In this context soldiers can use it to frustrate attempts to disarm them by force; to defend their posts, premises, vehicles, and equipment from armed attack; and to support other peacekeeping soldiers under armed attack.

METHODS

No single military method exists which will help to control violence. A combination of techniques is required. Among them are observation, surveillance and supervision, interposition, patrolling, investigation of complaints, negotiation and mediation, and information gathering.

Observation. Observation is common to all forms of peacekeeping operations. It is a primary responsibility and a basic requirement of the peacekeeper. The observer's main functions are to monitor everything that happens within his arc of observation and to provide timely and accurate reports on any suspicious situation, incident, or occurrence.

Observation requires an ability to intelligently assess the facts and their implications as they present themselves. The information so derived should be passed to the next higher echelon without delay. Successful peacekeeping depends on factual and impartial reporting accompanied by as much pertinent data as possible, such as maps, field sketches, diagrams, photographs (if permitted), and references to specific agreements or instructions.

Information can be gathered in a number of different ways, to include--

- o The deployment of observation posts in the confrontation areas.
- o The deployment of subunits in sensitive areas and potential trouble spots.
- o The manning of checkpoints on both major and minor roads of access and in towns and villages.
- o Extensive patrolling, including aerial reconnaissance.
- o The conduct of fact-finding inspections and investigation activities.

Vitally important to the success of any observation role is the establishment of a good working relationship with the contending parties. Without such understanding, it is doubtful if the observation role can be properly performed. Therefore, an efficient and constant liaison, based on good communications, has to be maintained with all sides.

Surveillance and Supervision. Surveillance and supervision are roles specific to particular and definitive operations. They ensure that the agreements made by the parties to a dispute are implemented. Some frequently encountered tasks falling into this category are--

- o Surveillance of cease-fire and armistice lines.
- o Supervision of armament control agreements.
- o Surveillance of military deployment limitations.
- o Supervision of military withdrawals or disengagements.
- o Supervision and management of the exchange of prisoners of war.
- o Supervision and observation of civilians in areas of dispute.
- o Supervision of refugee camps.
- o Supervision and surveillance of plebiscites and elections.
- o Supervision and observation along demarcation lines.

A disengagement is a complex and delicate operation requiring restraint, tact, and patience. Belligerents are involved in a tense and sensitive maneuver. The peacekeeper must be aware of their emotions and be careful and considerate in handling them. Disengagements in battle zones involve a finely timed series of phased withdrawals and redeployments. To counter the changes in dispositions, the peacekeeping force should make complementary deployments and redeployments to suit each phase. It should also ensure that the conditions of the disengagement agreement are being filled. During this time it is important that the peacekeeper continuously demonstrate to the parties concerned that the terms of the agreement are observed. Any cause for complaint by any belligerent party against any member of the peacekeeping force will undermine the credibility of the mission as a whole and weaken its position.

The peacekeeper may be required to undertake additional tasks during the process of disengagement. They include the marking of defined forward limits of each side's military forces, mine clearance, and the search and recovery of remains of soldiers killed in action.

After each phase of the withdrawal or disengagement has been completed, a clearly defined line of demarcation should be established. The line must be readily visible and accurate, showing no divergence with the marked maps used by both sides. Soldiers and officers with survey training should be included in the organization responsible for carrying out demarcation duties.

Any terrain which has been fought over and from which the opposing forces have withdrawn will probably be littered with mines of all types. Mine clearing, therefore, becomes a priority for peacekeeping forces. While some engineers may be included in the peacekeeping force list, it is likely that they will be insufficient to fulfill all mine-clearing requirements. Therefore, mine-clearing tasks will fall to the ordinary soldier, making it important that all soldiers serving with peacekeeping forces be trained in the skills and techniques of mine clearing and in the handling of mine-clearing equipment.

The recovery of remains will normally be a part of any disengagement mission. It is important that the delicate nature of the operation be fully appreciated and religious considerations and rites be fully respected. Arrangements for searches require careful planning and discussion with all parties involved.

Interposition. Interposition is the placement of a buffer force between two opposing armed forces to prevent an outbreak or a renewal of fighting between them. It can take the form of a prearranged operation agreed to by all parties, or it can be an emergency operation. The latter is designed to hold apart two or more armed groups while negotiations are initiated and to persuade those involved not to take aggressive action. This type of operation is more likely to be required in intercommunal conflict.

Interposition can be a hazardous operation, but its value is in its capacity to separate two warring or potentially warring parties and to defuse explosive situations. Whenever used to achieve these purposes, interposition must be operationally viable to gain credibility. It is of little purpose if its size is such that it can be easily pushed aside or neutralized. For the interposition to be credible, the use of force in self-defense and the defense of one's position have to be firmly recognized by those who might attempt to attack or

pass through the positions held by the peacekeeping force. A fine distinction exists between interposition and peacemaking. A peacekeeping operation attempt to use interposition can also very easily become peacemaking.

Patrolling. Patrolling is a key factor in most peacekeeping operations. If it is well planned and executed it can achieve important tactical advantages for the peacekeeper. To be fully effective, patrols need complete freedom of movement and of observation which is not necessarily accorded to peacekeeping forces whose powers can be restricted. They are, however, factors which should be clarified and agreed to when status-of-force agreements are drafted. Patrols--whether on foot, by ground vehicle, or in the air--usually have a combination of four tasks: information gathering, investigation, supervision, and publicizing a presence. Information gathering, investigation, and supervision are self-explanatory or have been addressed previously. Publicizing a presence, however, requires some explanation. In this context, it means making military or civilians in the area aware that a peacekeeping presence exists and monitoring the situation for any sign of deterioration or potential threat to the peace. This "showing of the flag" is intended to generate confidence among the local population and to deter those who seek to promote violence.

Patrolling during peacekeeping operations is likely to be confined to daylight hours in those areas where armed confrontations exist. After dark, when identification becomes difficult, the front-line troops of the opposing sides are more liable to be nervous and confused and are apt to fire without hesitation at anything they see or hear. Although the dangers are magnified by darkness, occasions may arise when night patrols are necessary. When this is the case, the procedures and ground rules under which they operate should be clearly defined and known to all, including the opposing armed forces.

Investigation of Complaints. In inter- or intrastate conflicts, one of the primary peacekeeping tasks is to investigate allegations or complaints made by one of the protagonists about another. The peacekeeper's ability to make a thorough and objective investigation and a fair assessment of the truth will influence whether fighting is renewed and tension increased and whether the peacekeeper retains an impartial image in the minds of the protagonists. Inevitably, evaluations which favor one side will not please the other; but, provided the peacekeeper is seen to be fair, objective, and consistent, the protagonists, though they may grumble, will respect and accept the peacekeeper's judgments. The peacekeeper must always remember that two or more sides are involved and that his duty is to listen to them before coming to his conclusions.

The peacekeeper must also proceed in accordance with recognized principles of investigation and standard rules of procedure. An investigation is based on the guidelines of factualness, thoroughness, and impartiality. To promote these guidelines and to promote a balanced evaluation, investigation teams should include personnel of different nationalities.

Negotiation and Mediation. Negotiation and mediation are diplomatic activities and in general are the concern of governments and experienced diplomats. As such they demand a political rather than a military approach. However, in peacekeeping, situations will arise where negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and perhaps arbitration will be required of the soldier-peacekeeper. In these situations, intervention is often spontaneous. The success of the effort will depend on the peacekeeper's personality, power of reasoning, persuasiveness, common sense, and, particularly, on tact and patience. The latter two are of supreme importance. This unaccustomed role for a soldier can be both exhausting and at times frustrating, but once he has gained the confidence of the parties involved, he will be accepted as a go-between and his "good offices" will be used to effect a solution. The peacekeeper's reputation for objectivity and his relationship with the respective parties are fundamental to his success as a negotiator. They depend upon the degree of cooperation and support he receives from the parties in the implementation of any agreement or arrangement made as a result of the negotiations. He must be aware of these new demands and adapt to them.

Information Gathering. The peacekeeper's ability to negotiate will depend on the intelligence at his disposal. Similarly, intelligence about the intended actions of belligerents is of great importance to a commander who is charged with protecting his force or deploying his troops to prevent an outbreak of violence. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that a peacekeeping force should have first-class information-gathering capability. Unfortunately, this deduction is different when viewed from the perspective of peacekeeping politics. While there is a requirement for intelligence, the peacekeeping force may not be the proper force to collect or produce intelligence.

Some argue that collecting information about people who do not wish to provide it is a hostile act and that collecting it by covert means involves deceit. Therefore intelligence operations destroy the trust which parties should have in the peacekeeping force. Conversely, it is reasonable to assume that contesting parties will continue to pursue their divergent aims by exploiting the presence of the peacekeeping force. They may even attempt to trick it from time to time. In other

circumstances, peacekeeping forces have come under direct attack from the forces of one of the parties to the agreement or from extremist elements acting independently of their party. This poses a serious dilemma. The answer to this dilemma must depend on the circumstances but, whatever they are, information (the term used by the United Nations) is a vital commodity to the peacekeeper. If the peacekeeper is precluded from using the full range of available resources, he must, at a minimum, be provided their products. There is also no reason why information gained solely by overt means cannot be systematically collected and efficiently collated.

Every item of operational information becomes important and because the sources are overt, all members of a peacekeeping force have to be information-conscious all the time. This means that both on and off duty, the peacekeeper must remain constantly alert to what takes place around him--to any changes or inconsistencies in the behavior, attitude, and activities of the military and civilian population on all sides. To that end, the art of good reporting should be studied and developed in any training program concerned with preparation for peacekeeping operations.

In sum, there are many methods of collecting overt information in a way which cannot possibly be regarded as a hostile act if carried out with discretion. In any case, whether the peacekeeper collects the information or it is furnished, peacekeeping requires timely, all-source intelligence.

PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS

Situations may arise which require deployment of United States military forces to impose peace for humanitarian reasons. These operations are included under the general term "peacekeeping," but are better described as peacemaking.

A peacemaking operation is essentially a peacetime contingency operation and is identical to other such operations except for the objective. In peacemaking the goal is to make the transition to peacekeeping as rapidly as possible, while peacetime contingencies move directly to secure other objectives.

Peacemaking missions differ greatly in execution from peacekeeping in a number of ways. While the ultimate objective may be to maintain a peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to achieve it. The significance of the difference is that peacemaking is generally unilateral, with possibly some consent from the "beneficiary" and is imposed by the peacemaking force.

The planning, deployment, and conduct of these operations employ the same doctrinal procedures and techniques as contingency operations which are discussed at length in Chapter 6. Peacemaking seeks to make a quick transition to a peacekeeping mission. As such these operations require close coordination with State Department officials to ensure a synchronized effort toward the political objective. Unilateral peacemaking operations are politically sensitive and subject to domestic and international criticism. A rapid transition from a peacemaking or peacetime contingency operation to a peacekeeping operation is desired. It is aided significantly by early humanitarian assistance efforts in the operational areas and persistent strategic public information programs aimed at the international community and parties to the conflict.

SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

Whether peacekeeping or peacemaking, the force requires significant communications, logistics, and public information support.

COMMUNICATIONS

The speed with which incidents can escalate into major military confrontations with serious political consequences calls for rapid and accurate reporting. It also calls for dependable command communications links to ensure that the chain of command can act quickly to prevent escalation and violence. Thus, as in any military operation, reliable, simple, and efficient communications are an essential and continuing requirement. However, it is difficult to provide adequate communications for a peacekeeping force before it is mounted because so much depends on the circumstances of the operation. In one theater the difficulty may be in great distances, whereas in another, or possibly in a different part of the same one, the difficulty is screening in urban areas.

Three communications links must be contemplated in any peacekeeping operation: a forward link involving contingent headquarters and its subunits, a link between military force headquarters and its contingent's headquarters, and a link from the headquarters of the political sponsoring body to the force headquarters. In a multinational peacekeeping effort, interoperability in the sense of equipment, procedure, and language will present a significant challenge to those charged with providing signal support. The keys to communications manning, apart from the normal considerations of topography and distance, are adaptability and flexibility. Planners must remember that one of the characteristics of peacekeeping operations is the use of detachments of differing size located at varying distances from their controlling headquarters.

LOGISTICS

In any military operation, careful planning and execution of logistics operations are essential. But, because of the improvised nature of peacekeeping operations, little can be said about logistics except that the categories of services to be provided are similar to any military operation. However, they will probably differ in scale.

In a multinational effort a gap will exist between the arrival of the contingents and the establishment of a viable logistics system. Therefore, the viability and self-sufficiency of the individual contingent's domestic system must be adequate to fill the gap. Ultimately the effective functioning of a peacekeeping force depends upon an administrative apparatus which can integrate and reconcile its different needs into a coherent whole.

The logistics support function does not simply mean the support to the force but also the support role the force itself may have in the host environment. This concept of an operational role for logistics is discussed in greater detail in the logistics and development chapters of this report.

One example of the operational role of logistics in peacekeeping is the conduct of humanitarian assistance. Such operations have both direct and indirect political impact. In this regard the military staff concerned with humanitarian operations should have a clear understanding of the political issues of the conflict and should be kept fully abreast of what is a dynamic political arena. In turn, they should give ample consideration to the political implications of the relief operations they contemplate.

Generally, the military role in those operations would be that of support and assistance to other agencies, including international and nongovernmental organizations. Principal tasks include the provision of humanitarian relief to those in need, the protection and security of minority groups, maintenance of essential services, restoration of normal economic and agricultural activities in confrontation areas, and the restoration of private and public property.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

The power of public information services in creating emotive response, both inside and outside the area of operations, cannot be underrated. The injection of the wrong kind of information can influence adversely the course of a dispute, just as the intelligent and diplomatic use of factual information can

contribute to success. Crises can be averted when confirmed information is used to counter rumors and misrepresentation of fact.

FORCE STRUCTURE

Without creating a specific operational scenario, little can be said about force structure other than that deduced from the foregoing conceptual and functional comments. Generally, the force must be large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence, but not so large as to be tempted to impose its will on the parties to the conflict. It must also have the inherent flexibility to concentrate in response to a local threat.

When mounting a peacekeeping force, commanders should first consider the political mandate generating the operation. They should carefully analyze the levels of consent to employment of the force by all parties having an interest in the area of operations. This completed, a judgment can be made about the risk the force may face and a military mission statement crafted. Adequate force structure and equipment needs can be designed to protect the force and accomplish the peacekeeping mission.

Forces that have participated in peacekeeping can best be described as austere infantry units augmented with combat support and combat service support elements. "Austere" means that forces lack much of the artillery firepower and mechanized equipment found in combat-intentioned organizations. With appropriate consideration given to requirements dictated by the mission and the environment, almost any military unit or formation can perform peacekeeping functions. However, efficient use of national defense assets indicates the appropriateness of infantry-oriented forces. Peacekeeping forces will probably require augmentation with night observation devices, communications equipment, and ground transportation equipment.

Consideration should also be given to police support--both military and civil. Military police are a decided asset if traffic control is a requirement. Civil police are useful in situations where the civil rights of the individual and his community are an issue and the peacekeeping force operates in heavily populated areas. The doctrinal considerations establishing the priorities for the use of civil police, paramilitary forces, and military forces in populace and resources control operations are appropriate for peacekeeping.

TRAINING

Training for peacekeeping should not be considered specialized but more as mission preparation. Most of the soldierly qualities developed in the training system are appropriate in peacekeeping; for instance, in peacekeeping you cannot do without discipline or corporate morale. However, the weapons used in peacekeeping are negotiation and mediation, not the rifle. Thus peacekeeping calls for an adjustment of attitude and approach to a set of circumstances different from those normally found on the field of battle--an adjustment to suit the needs of a peaceable intervention rather than an enforcement action. To that end the essential qualities of observation, reporting, patience, endurance, vigilance, quick reaction and response, initiative, and leadership should be emphasized and enhanced.

In peacekeeping, the soldier at the point of contact and his immediate leadership, rather than the top command level, hold crisis situations in check and avoid escalation in the conflict. Therefore, the preparation of the junior ranks is the cornerstone on which any training program or peacekeeping should be based. Peacekeepers must understand the framework in which they are to operate and assume the correct attitude relative to the tasks they will be required to perform. As an example, the Netherlands provide their soldiers with a comprehensive training program that begins upon conscription. It is equally important that units engaged in peacekeeping undergo a period of retraining on their return to normal duties to reinstill the offensive spirit required on the battlefield.

SUMMARY

The peacekeeping concept is that ending conflict and controlling violence can be achieved by means other than force or counterviolence. Since no two conflict situations are ever likely to be the same, the nature of the peacekeeping initiative and structure cannot be standardized, but must suit the pattern of the conflict. The yardstick for any peacekeeping initiative must be that of relevance and suitability, the composition and preparation for the operation evolving from an assessment of the two.

PART THREE

FUNCTIONAL AREA SUMMARIES

CHAPTER 8

COMMAND AND CONTROL

GENERAL

Command and control is the exercise of authority by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. In a broader sense, command and control relates to force management through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures.[1] At each command level, however, the means and methods of command and control necessarily differ.

The challenges we face involve both means and methods. The applicability of theater forces in low-intensity conflict is a relevant issue; but more to the point is the question of our capacity to effectively orchestrate a low-intensity, civil-military campaign. Even if one could respond to low-intensity conflict on the same basis as conventional war (albeit with fewer assets and more restrictive rules of engagement), the question remains whether the United States government possesses the mechanisms to execute the necessary programs. Coherent, integrated management is essential to the success of low-intensity conflict.

Examination of United States involvement in Central America and a review of historical cases worldwide offer ample evidence that we have not been, and are not now, institutionally postured to conduct low-intensity conflict operations. One incisive study of our efforts in Vietnam argues that the United States government "...dealt with the war in largely separate bureaucratic compartments, with little attention to unified management." A compelling case is presented that "...both governments [that is, the United States and Republic of Vietnam] attempted to cope with a highly atypical situation via institutions designed for quite different purposes." Despite fairly definitive policy direction suggesting an alternative approach, "we organized, equipped, and trained the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces to fight American style. Then, when the United States in effect took over the war, we further 'Americanized' it--on an even greater scale--by playing out our military repertoire."[2]

Stephen Hosmer's assessment was that "in all cases purely military objectives have been subordinated to broader political-military considerations."[3] If this is so, we have not succeeded in translating our conceptual understanding of what needs to be done into demonstrable actions--a fundamental function of

command and control. If, as Ambassador Robert Komer maintains, "...to win the military battle but to lose the political struggle is to fail," then an effective civil-military command and control mechanism is needed, from the strategic to the tactical levels, to implement national policy and defend United States interests in the third world.[4]

COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUE AREAS

In addressing United States capabilities for command and control of low-intensity conflict operations, combatant and noncombatant, five fundamental deficiencies emerge:

- o A comprehensive strategy and means for policy implementation for low-intensity conflict are lacking.
- o The use of ad hoc structures is debilitating.
- o We are structured to address low-intensity conflict issues in a country-specific rather than a regional context.
- o We are unable to routinely and effectively orchestrate multidisciplinary, cross-functional programs of state.
- o Existing communications resources will not sustain a protracted low-intensity operation.

The paragraphs that follow address the essence of these issue areas. Section A, Volume II, discusses specific issues and recommendations.

POLICY AND STRATEGY

Since the end of the war in Southeast Asia, the United States defense posture has been increasingly one of deterrence. On numerous occasions, the Secretary of Defense has declared our intention to deter war across the spectrum of conflict. Nonetheless, many argue that low-intensity conflict simply cannot be deterred, at least not in a conventional sense. If, in fact, deterrence is not feasible, or is only partially feasible, then a more encompassing strategy is needed.

The absence of such strategy becomes particularly acute when one contemplates extended or sustained engagements. Brief, episodic encounters, like counterterrorist operations, are relatively easily accommodated compared with long-term commitments, like those emerging in Central America. Long-term commitments fundamentally challenge the very institutions on which their continuance depends.

Chapter 3 provides a detailed discussion of United States policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict. To date, public statements and national security planning respond primarily to problems of terrorism. However, low-intensity conflict has a broader agenda encompassing equally serious concerns in the areas of regional conflict, insurgency, and third world instability.

On 20 January 1986, President Reagan approved a national program (NSDD-207) for combating terrorism which has received considerable attention. However, earlier statements for the remaining aspects of low-intensity conflict have not been fully implemented.[5] If, in fact, deterrence of low-intensity conflic is only moderately feasible, then we must establish a more active strategy to prevent conflict and control escalation. We must possess the command and control machinery whereby all instruments of United States power may be effectively brought to bear.

An active policy, however, does not imply the absence of constraints. Political constraints and stringent rules of engagement are the norm for military involvement in low-intensity conflict.

> The motivations to reduce the risks of conflict with the USSR, hold down civilian casualties, negotiate settlements, and avoid the alienation of domestic and international opinion have shaped Washington's response to all major third world conflicts and crises since World War II. Whatever their political affiliations, United States administrations have behaved similarly in imposing constraints.[6]

One example of constraint is the limitation on striking directly at international sources of insurgent support such as the Soviet Union. Examples of constraint at the tactical level are the limitations on the number of military in El Salvador and legislation forbidding the use of military police to train civilian or internal security police of a host country. Such constraints deny the security assistance force the ability to develop host nation expertise at the vital constabulary level.

Low-intensity conflict operations, already complex and subject to constraint, promise to become even more intractable. Given this certainty, we must embrace a more systematic approach to this form of conflict, structure our command and control machinery accordingly, and prepare ourselves psychologically. In short, we need to be clear-headed in enunciating policies,

devising strategies, and executing programs to secure United States interests in low-intensity conflict. To paraphrase Clausewitz, a commander's most decisive act of judgment is recognizing the kind of war he is undertaking and not trying to make it something by the nature of circumstances it cannot be.[7]

The following issue papers in Volume II, deal primarily with national policy and strategy:

o A1--The Need for Appropriate National Policy Guidance and Defense Strategy for Counterinsurgency.

o A2--The Need for Joint Military Doctrine for Counterinsurgency.

o A3--The Need To Emphasize Developmental Programs in Counterinsurgency.

o A4--The Need for Doctrine and Tactics Focusing on Decentralized Command and Small-Unit Independence.

o A11--The Need for a Political Staff Element To Advise All Command and Control Levels of Military Units Involved in Counterinsurgency Operations.

These national policy and strategy issue papers include recommendations which call for--

o Evaluation of existing plans and programs.

o Development of defense strategy.

o Development of joint and service doctrine.

o Emphasis on developmental programs.

o Development of small-unit tactics.

o Provisions for political advice for military operations in counterinsurgency.

AD HOC STRUCTURES

The American custom has been to view crises as incidents and to respond to them discretely in an episodic, even ad hoc fashion. The trend in special operations activities, as illustrated by the Entebbe rescue, Desert One, and Grenada, is more toward single-event type operations than toward the classic protracted campaign of the past.[8] The point here is not that situation-specific or short-fuse problems that

may require ad hoc structures or solutions do not exist. The point is that we tend to substitute ad hoc responses for situations or problems even when this is clearly dysfunctional.

This problem of substitution occurs many times when JCS plans and procedures are ignored. That is when JTFs are formed for a contingency operation without regard to existing plans and procedures or when they are formed to handle a protracted conflict with a temporary command and control structure. Recurring or protracted problems are often dealt with through ad hoc means, and this approach leads to inconsistency and perpetuates institutional isolation, shifting the focus for unified effort to unilateral, institution-specific responses.

Frequently, the temptation to use an ad hoc approach is reinforced by a reluctance to challenge existing institutional preferences. In Vietnam, a web of American and Vietnamese bureaucratic structures produced "...a plethora of programs conducted by different agencies, each jealously guarding its prerogatives and insistent on its own procedures."[9] Eliot Cohen has observed in the military an insidious characteristic of most, if not all, organizations: "A military desire to operate autonomously again runs counter to the requirements of small wars."[10]

Perhaps the most cogent example of genuine institutional conflict is the United States government's approach to combating terrorism. A number of ad hoc interagency committees deal with the terrorism problem, but none have broad interagency influence to orchestrate a long-term campaign. The Vice President's commission on terrorism recognized the problem and took appropriate steps. Much remains to be done, however, across the broad range of low-intensity conflict.

A prerequisite for effective execution of low-intensity conflict programs is area expertise. Military command and control elements must be knowledgeable of current third world situations and sensitive to the complexity and ambiguity associated with military roles in low-intensity conflict. Sarkesian maintains that military planners need experience and training that prepare them for the added dimensions of a highly political-military environment. "Developing political acumen, political-military sensitivity, and an understanding of the nature and requirements of low-intensity conflict requires, among other things, serious education...."[11]

At best, ad hoc responses only temporarily institutionalize the expertise necessary for effective execution of low-intensity conflict programs. At worst, ad hoc approaches compromise the integrity of these programs and perpetuate our casual, disjointed response to low-intensity threats of some import.

One of the most current examples of our use of ad hoc solutions is Joint Task Force Bravo (JTF-B) in Honduras. JTF-B, established in August 1983, is a multiservice temporary headquarters. USSOUTHCOM and the United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM) task organize its service-component elements from installations based in the continental United States. The purpose of JTF-B is to provide command, control, communications, and other support to United States forces deployed to Honduras for exercises and operations. Notwithstanding its task force designation, the organization has a continuing, if not semipermanent, mission in Central America. It is manned principally by temporary duty personnel on tours ranging from 59 to 179 days. These and similar management practices constrain the ability of the headquarters to accomplish its assigned mission.

General Paul Gorman, former USCINCSO, has been vocal in criticizing the use of ad hoc responses in the security assistance realm:

> Encrusted with bureaucracy, encumbered by law, handled by the services as a ho-hum ad hoc function for which they make few if any provisions in program, it is scarcely a deft instrument of policy.[12]

We have yet to address low-intensity conflict in a comprehensive, institutional fashion. As the preceding paragraphs have already established, a genuine requirement exists for appropriately educated and experienced regional experts who are sensitive to the cultural, social, and political nuances of an area of operations. Operational elements must share this expertise as well. Many have expressed concern that the Army's light infantry divisions, with an officially sanctioned low-intensity conflict mission, may not possess the organic capability to support the sociopolitical aspects of this mission. Such circumstances only increase the potential for our resorting to ad hoc, improvised responses to individual crises.[13]

Issue papers dealing with ad hoc structures are--

o A5--The Use of Ad Hoc Plans and Organizations in Peacetime Contingency Operations.

o A6--The Need for Low-Intensity Conflict Staff Elements for Unified Commands.

o A7--The Feasibility of Augmenting Light Infantry Divisions with Corps Assets for Use in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o A12--The Need for a Separate System for Providing Resources in Low-Intensity Conflict.

Recommendations in this area include--

o Tailoring existing plans for peacetime contingency operations.

o Providing unified commands with a small staff for dealing specifically with low-intensity conflict.

o Ensuring that augmenting units train with the augmented unit.

o Meeting the resource requirements of low-intensity conflict.

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The agency-unique and the national command and control structures active in the low-intensity conflict arena have striking dissimilarities. On the one hand, the military executes its activities through a regionally oriented unified command. On the civilian side, program management tends to be quite country-specific. While regional assistant secretaries are in Washington, the lack of any civilian field counterpart to the military unified commanders results in cross-functional, interagency efforts which tend to be less well focused.

> In theory, within a specific country, the United States ambassador, as head of the country team, can orchestrate this application of american support. Unfortunately, in too many cases, the ambassador has no background or training for such a task. Moreover, when the threat encompasses more than one country, the United States has no regional command and control mechanism to orchestrate the response. Geographically unified military commands can take a regional approach to military issues but there is no equivalent structure for political, economic, and psychological issues. Further, there is no central coordinating authority at the national level.[14]

Some have suggested establishing a civilian field counterpart to the theater commanders in chief who would be responsible for the coherent management of peacetime programs (including military security assistance) at the theater level. Not surprisingly, critics challenge this proposal. They feel it imposes another encumbering layer of bureaucracy and further diminishes the stature and authority of each individual

ambassador and the military commanders in chief. United States interests, especially those affected by low-intensity conflict threats, require a broader management focus than an individual country team can provide and a more rational interface mechanism than the "stovepiping" of field elements into their Washington headquarters allows. In short, unity of effort at the regional level is inherently difficult to achieve without unity of command.

Issue A17, The Need for Unity of Effort at the Regional and National Levels, deals specifically with the regional perspective. It recommends investigating the feasibility of establishing a regional center to coordinate all activities related to low-intensity conflict within each geographic region.

INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION

It comes as no great surprise that in a government such as ours, large and diverse as it is, we struggle to achieve a truly unified approach to any multidimensional problem. The cross-functional character of low-intensity conflict poses, therefore, a considerable challenge to United States policy-makers and policy implementors alike. The Soviets have capitalized on our problems in coordinating a unified approach. They have chosen to use low-intensity conflict as a means of countering United States interests overseas.

Short of a galvanizing or catastrophic event, institutions are naturally reluctant to transcend the conventional division of labor which defines organizational responsibilities. Since low-intensity conflict is a "peacetime" phenomenon, the national security bureaucracies frequently attempt to deal with associated issues in a routine, nondisruptive, business-as-usual fashion. One analyst summarizes the current orientation of the bureaucracies this way: the Department of State views the stability of friendly governments as a central national interest, CIA perceives domestic turmoil in the third world as the result of external interference, and the Department of Defense typically emphasizes predominantly military solutions.[15] The point is that bureaucracies have their own behavioral norms and routine responses.

Without central direction and unified management, we have no assurance that we can coherently concentrate our considerable national resources. Indeed, our track record suggests that when we have obtained the policy outcomes we desired, the result was due more to the breadth of our resources than the coherence of their application. We cannot afford to segregate a conflict's many aspects and attempt to cope with them in

separate and, at best, loosely coordinated bureaucratic compartments in the normal peacetime fashion of Washington or the field.[16] The broad, persistent, and insidious nature of low-intensity conflict demands an integrated United States government response.

Years ago, General H. K. Johnson, former Army Chief of Staff, outlined the key characteristics of a United States response to insurgency:

> Close integration of the political, economic, information, security, and military branches of government is essential to a coordinated effort against an insurgency. One must constantly keep foremost in mind that military civic action is only a part of counterinsurgency and that a well-integrated "team" can often compound a military success or minimize a failure.[17]

In Vietnam, however, the United States military predominated in a manner far exceeding the institutional inclination for seeking an independent role. Even while the Vietnam episode was a small war, "MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, the United States military headquarters] overshadowed the civilian agencies, just as the military effort dwarfed the civil effort. Civilian officials in Saigon played little role in military decision making, despite recognition that political and military factors were wholly intertwined...." In other words, the preference for institutional autonomy, civil and military, and the lack of effective unifying machinery characterized a United States posture emphasizing military means over the nonmilitary (or nonlethal) aspects of our involvement. The British, in contrast to the United States, have long recognized and come to grips with the fundamental requirement for unilateral civil-military integration in circumstances short of major conflicts.[18]

Despite a generally disappointing United States record of civil-military integration past and present, a number of encouraging counterpoints remain. In El Salvador, United States efforts have contributed to the stability and legitimacy of the Duarte government. At the working level, in particular, extensive coordination between civilian and military operatives is the norm. One former commander of the United States Military Assistance Group in El Salvador documented the close liaison when he wrote:

> Lieutenant Colonel Stevens, operations and training team commander, and Mr. Rueles

> [USAID] worked closely to coordinate military operations to support (emphasis added) the nonmilitary aspects of the campaign.[19]

Even in Vietnam, we finally succeeded in the Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) effort in achieving a modicum of integration, albeit principally as a result of the post-Tet disengagement strategy. CORDS, if nothing else, demonstrated that a centrally controlled, composite civilian-military force could function well in a low-intensity conflict environment. But, sadly, Robert Komer, the first director of CORDS, concludes that "institutional autonomy was more important than optimum results."[20] If a single lesson emerges in all of this, it is that the United States can ill-afford dysfunctional civil-military performance in an arena where coherence is a prerequisite to obtaining United States national security objectives.

If we have yet to devise and institutionalize command and control mechanisms for orchestrating complex United States civil-military campaigns, neither have we tackled the challenge of coalition operations with an ally. Many argue that "some kind of combined management is probably indispensable to optimum use of our resources."[21] Throughout the Vietnam years and in every significant case since, our preference for maintaining the image of a detached benefactor has precluded truly combined efforts. United States support in whatever form does provide a lever. Such leverage would be used only rarely, perhaps being used to rapidly stabilize a political situation or reduce "death-squad" activity. To be sure, coercing our allies is undesirable. But so too is a multinational effort completely devoid of common goals, means, and methods.[22]

We have made progress. JTF-B in Honduras, while largely an ad hoc arrangement, represents a genuine attempt to redress the deficiencies of previous piecemeal military undertakings in Central America. The presence of JTF-B has provided continuity to United States force presence by providing logistics support to diverse military elements for both operational and training missions. (See Issue F5, Volume II.) Ambassador Dean Hinton's vigorous management of all aspects of the United States assistance effort in El Salvador is another example.[23] El Salvador demonstrates what can be accomplished with a unified, centrally managed, and disciplined United States program. But a unified, coordinated, long-term program needs more than ad hoc or personality-driven solutions. The possible permutations are endless, but the essential thrust is the same: better integration of the collective efforts of disparate government activities, military and civilian.

As low-intensity conflict is neither war nor peace, our command and control machinery must provide the mechanism for skillful orchestration of military means in support of objectives which are far from wholly military. The establishment of a joint/interagency center for low-intensity conflict represents one initiative; others range from the integration of the effort at the national level to ensuring coordination of United States and host nation activities in country.

Integration is examined in the following issues:

o A8--The Need for Integrated Military and Civilian Security Assistance Efforts in a Nationally Coordinated Counterinsurgency Program.

o A9--The Need To Integrate Host Nation Military and Civilian Activities in United States Security Programs for Counterinsurgency.

o A10--The Need To Employ Civil Police Intelligence-Gathering Assets for More Effective Counterinsurgency Operations.

o A17--The Need for Unity of Effort at the Regional and National Levels.

Specific recommendations include--

o Integrating security assistance efforts.

o Integrating United States/host nation efforts.

o Improving doctrine on integration of military and civilian police efforts in counterinsurgency.

o Investigating the establishment of integrating organizations at the regional and national levels.

COMMUNICATIONS

The underlying assumption that low-intensity conflict is simply a lesser-included capability of our theater force structure also prevails in the communications arena. The civil-military community has been unable to effectively articulate peculiar low-intensity conflict communications requirements, even for dedicated United States operations. The resources currently allocated to USSOUTHCOM and JTF-B are temporarily but, for all practical purposes, indefinitely assigned. The hardware is organic to forces normally involved in repetitious JCS exercise support or other static missions. Communications personnel are deployed on brief temporary duty

assignments, some as short as fifty-nine days. The entire arrangement is, at best, piecemeal and hardly supportive of effective command and control machinery. Such problems are the result of overall institutional practice and not specific to USSOUTHCOM.

Quite apart from the force structure and personnel aspects of our communications support to low-intensity conflict is the key theme of compatibility with our non-DOD and non-United States counterparts. Only rarely are military systems compatible with embassy equipment; and given the cost and sophistication of United States gear, almost never are indigenous systems interoperable with ours. We must broaden the communications focus beyond the technical to encompass the essential need for intraservice, interservice, interagency, and interallied compatibility for low-intensity conflict. Although communications gear appropriate to the need is clearly not a guarantee of a successful low-intensity conflict campaign, it is a prerequisite.

The following communications issues were examined:

o A13--The Need To Integrate Communications Among Agencies and Services and To Designate a Central Communications Control Authority.

o A14--The Need for Suitable Communications Equipment for Host Nations.

o A15--The Dependency on Satellite Communications (SATCOM) in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o A16--The Need for Joint Communications Doctrine for a JTF on Extended Deployment.

Recommendations are centered on--

o Centralizing control of the development and communications systems.

o Developing standard support practices.

o Revising security-assistance procedures to provide for host nation needs.

o Decreasing dependency on satellite communications in low-intensity conflict.

o Providing for extended deployment of joint task forces.

SUMMARY

The vexing problems of the third world and the Soviet Union's capability to exploit these problems make it imperative that the United States coherently orchestrate all facets of its national power to meet the considerable challenges it faces. From an organizational point of view, coordinating effective multidisciplinary responses may well require innovations which transcend accepted institutional boundaries. The Vice President's task force on international terrorism has publicly proposed just such an initiative in suggesting a senior National Security Council coordinator for combating terrorism. This effort needs to be expanded to include all aspects of low-intensity conflict. The Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project and the establishment of the Army/Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict as the first step toward establishing a joint/interagency center are important initiatives in this regard. But, the nation's record is spotty, and only purposeful, disciplined command and control machinery will overcome the recurring shortcomings. We will need the courage to depart from conventional institutional norms and the vision to maintain a pragmatic defense posture increasingly relevant to low-intensity conflict in a world characterized by neither war nor peace.

NOTES

[1]United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1 April 1984).

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[3]Stephen T. Hosmer, Constraints on US Military Strategies in Post Third World Conflicts (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1984).

[4]See note 2.

[5]COL (ret.) James B. Motley, "Low Intensity Conflict: The Terrorist Dimension," Air Power Symposium: The Role of Airpower in Low Intensity Conflict (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, May 1985).

[6]See note 3.

[7]Karl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[8]COL Kenneth J. Alnwick, "Perspectives on Air Power at the Low End of the Conflict Spectrum," Air University Review 35 (March-April 1985): 17-28.

[9]See note 2.

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[11]Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully, eds., Potentials for Military Struggles in the 1980s: US Policy and Low Intensity Conflict (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981).

[12]GEN (ret.) Paul F. Gorman, "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola," Air Power Symposium: The Role of Airpower in Low Intensity Conflict, (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, May 1985).

[13]MAJ Peter N. Kafkalas, "The Light Divisions and Low Intensity Conflict: Are They Losing Sight of Each Other?" Military Review 66 (January 1966): 19-27.

[14]COL (ret.) Harry G. Summers, Jr., "On Joint Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict." Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology, Ed. David Dean, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, June 1986.

[15]Charles Maechling, Jr., "Insurgency and Counter-insurgency: The Role of Strategic Theory," Parameters 14 (Autumn 1984): 32-41.

[16]See note 2.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid.

[19]COL John D. Waghelstein, "El Salvador: Observations and Experiences in Counterinsurgency." Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1 January 1985.

[20]See note 2.

[21]Ibid.

[22]See note 14.

[23]Ibid.

CHAPTER 9

TACTICAL OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Tactical operations range from nonviolent missions such as reconnaisssance, surveillance, and show-of-force, to strikes and raids. National strategy, military campaigns, and actions at the operational level are supported by tactical operations, in which combat forces are employed against a threat or potential threat in a conflict or potential conflict area. In low-intensity conflicts these operations are generally joint and often combined.

Although this chapter emphasizes the roles of United States combat forces, the principles and guidelines also apply to the training of United States-supported forces in insurgency and counterinsurgency. Likewise, they apply to host nation or other forces involved in the various types of combined operations. We must understand not only how to conduct tactical operations but also how to develop the skills necessary to train other forces.

CONSTRAINTS ON USING UNITED STATES FORCES

United States policy and strategy for low-intensity conflict should focus on supporting a host country and on minimizing any direct United States involvement. The thrust of the Guam Doctrine and recent United States policy, as well as public sentiment, makes it clear that direct, open-ended United States commitment to other nations is not practicable. Thus, the direct use of United States ground combat forces in a low-intensity conflict is an option of last resort.

United States support to a host nation should emphasize political and economic assistance, intelligence, logistics, engineering, and communications, as well as other combat support and combat service support functions. The United States should consider these elements early with the aim of making the host nation self-sufficient in dealing with its problems. Only when all the following circumstances are met should the United States contemplate using its ground combat forces:

- The host country forces are no longer capable of dealing with a given situation.

o The host country clearly understands the role of United States ground combat forces.

o United States vital national interests are clearly involved.

o The United States has national support for its involvement.

Once committed, United States combat forces can make a significant contribution in these rather restricted circumstances. This is especially true if the combat forces are trained to function effectively in the low-intensity conflict environment and if other United States programs in the host nation have prepared the conflict area for United States forces.

Also sensitive is the withdrawal of United States ground combat forces. The United States must be flexible in its plans for withdrawal, taking into account the need to respond rapidly to political developments. It must also recognize the possible need to recommit military forces. Premature withdrawal can be disastrous, but prolonged military commitment may be equally harmful.

NATURE OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

The requirements for tactical operations in low-intensity conflict vary according to the categories into which low-intensity conflict is divided. The nature of tactical operations, for example, differs significantly from peacekeeping to counterinsurgency. Therefore, we must consider each category individually.

In the case of support to an insurgency, indigenous forces will usually conduct tactical operations. They may receive direct support by United States combat forces, but this is highly unlikely.

In counterinsurgency, tactical operations against guerrilla forces, called counterguerrilla operations, are one part of the overall effort to neutralize the insurgents. Counterguerrilla operations should keep the principle of minimal violence in mind when accomplishing the mission. However, some circumstances may require a large force in order to rapidly destroy guerrilla forces and provide a stable environment.

Civic action, psychological operations, and political, economic, and legal reforms are also methods of undermining the guerrilla. The guerrilla need not be killed to be neutralized but merely placed in a position where he can no longer

effectively influence the population, disrupt the basic services, and interfere with government internal development programs. (See Chapter 4.)

All elements in the force structure are involved in terrorism counteraction. Each unit and individual has the responsibility for defensive measures against terrorists. Elements can be brought to bear in response to terrorism in unique ways. This was exemplified by the United States Navy aircraft forcing the plane carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers to land and to surrender the terrorists. However, most counteraction has been in response to a terrorist attack or action. The ability to develop and execute worldwide offensive actions prior to terrorist attacks must be enhanced.

Tactical operations conducted as peacetime contingency operations vary from rescue missions for evacuation of endangered United States nationals from a foreign country, as in Grenada, to selected strike operations. Tactical operations support to peacekeeping consists of patrols, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions on air, land, and water. The use of United States combat forces is a means of providing a stable and, ideally, a tension-free atmosphere in which political elements can deal with the problem.

CONDUCT OF TACTICAL OPERATIONS

In examining the conduct of tactical operations in low-intensity conflict, three major issue areas emerge:

- o Applicability of basic military concepts.
- o Roles and missions of combat forces.
- o Procedures and equipment.

While some of the specific issues examined crosscut all types of low-intensity conflict, others pertain to only one type. These issues are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs and in greater detail in Section B, Volume II.

BASIC MILITARY CONCEPTS

At the tactical level, the United States military has the capability to conduct those actions and missions required in low-intensity conflict. However, at the operational and strategic levels, military and civilian leadership debate the employment of United States combat forces in low-intensity conflict. In the execution of tactical operations, most of our

doctrine addresses how to fight and win battles in the mid- to high-intensity scenarios. Since low-intensity conflicts are our most likely involvement, we must also be prepared to conduct tactical operations at that level. Thus, our basic doctrine must be applicable to all types of conflicts. An examination of current operations in Central America reflects a need to apply the principles of war to low-intensity conflict. Our planning processes and support measures must be adequate to meet all threats.

Issue papers dealing with the need to exercise basic military concepts are:

o B1--The Application of the Principles of War to Low-Intensity Conflict.

o B2--The Applicability of the United States Army's Basic Operational Doctrine to Low-Intensity Conflict.

o B3--The Application of METT-T to Counterinsurgency.

Research and analyis concerning the above issues resulted in recommendations on--

o Studying and teaching the application of the principles of war in low-intensity conflict.

o Teaching the application of METT-T to counter-insurgency.

o Revising Army FM 100-5 to fully incorporate low-intensity conflict or making FM 100-20 a sister manual.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Our forces must be prepared to meet the challenges and accomplish the diverse missions of low-intensity conflict. Special operations forces must develop appropriate strategies and acquire resources to assist or intervene prior to or during the early stages of a conflict. Conventional forces that might be deployed to conduct low-intensity conflict missions require appropriate training.

The following issue papers deal with the preparation of forces for low-intensity conflict missions:

o B4--The Roles of United States Conventional Ground Combat Forces in Counterinsurgency, Peacetime Contingency, and Peacekeeping Operations.

o B5--The Revitalization of United States Special Operations Forces.

o B6--The Application of United States Marine Corps Doctrine and Special Operations Capable Forces to Low-Intensity Conflict.

Recommendations concerning roles and missions include--

o Training light infantry forces and Marines for low-intensity conflict.

o Developing appropriate augmentation for light infantry.

o Providing joint training.

o Emphasizing small-unit tactics.

o Upgrading special operations forces.

o Developing special operations-capable Marine amphibious units.

PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENT

As a result of increased political considerations for low-intensity conflict, rules of engagement should be designed for each unique situation, be constantly analyzed, minimize violence, provide latitude for the leader to protect his forces, and be understood by all. Readiness exercises conducted in a low-intensity conflict environment can have a positive impact on achieving United States regional foreign policy goals. Readiness exercises must be understood and their operational value kept in mind during planning, execution, and evaluation. In addition we need equipment such as aircraft with a short takeoff and landing capability and a reconnaissance/surveillance and light strike capability. Training awareness for mine warfare, to include minimizing the effects on the host country population, is one of several additional subjects of concern.

Six issues dealt with procedures and equipment required for tactical operations in low-intensity conflict:

o B7--The Impact of Rules of Engagement on Mission Accomplishment and Unit Security in Counterinsurgency, Peacetime Contingency, and Peacekeeping Operations.

o B8--The Role of Readiness Exercises in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o B9--The Adequacy of Air Platforms for USAF Counter-insurgency Operations.

o B10--The Need for a Low-Cost, Light Armed Surveillance Aircraft for Counterinsurgency.

o B11--The Need for a Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) Airlift Aircraft for Counterinsurgency and Peacetime Contingency Operations.

o B12--The Use of Mines in Low-Intensity Conflict.

These issues included recommendations concerning--

o The handling of rules of engagement in low-intensity conflict.

o Using readiness exercises as foreign policy instruments.

o Developing procedures for evaluating low-intensity conflict aspects of readiness exercises.

o Developing aircraft particularly suited to the low-intensity conflict environment.

o Increasing mine warfare capabilities in low-intensity conflict.

SERVICE CAPABILITIES

Although low-intensity conflict is inherently joint, combined, or interagency activity, development of capabilities is the responsibility of individual services or agencies. Services and agencies have developed some unique capabilities that are applicable in low-intensity conflict. As an example of these capabilities, Issue B13, The Roles of United States Naval Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, examines Navy and Marine ability to perform at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Amphibious-ready groups and Marine amphibious units provide power projection capabilities. The newly created Marine Amphibious Unit (Special Operations Capable) is designed to provide an in extremis counterterrorism capability. As another example, the Naval special warfare forces can conduct a broad range of missions in low-intensity conflict. In addition to active duty forces, reserve units provide the Navy with additional capabilities.

SUMMARY

Tactical operations conducted in each category of low-intensity conflict will require clear mission requirements that the nation and the implementing force understand and support. The introduction of combat forces in a low-intensity conflict environment should be a last resort and, in the case of foreign internal defense, must clearly be in support of the host country effort. While this chapter and Section B of Volume II focus on issues developed from recent United States experiences in Central America, conclusions were found to apply as well to other theaters of operation.

CHAPTER 10

SECURITY

GENERAL

One of the principal concerns in all types of low-intensity conflict is security--the protection of friendly forces and the protection of population and resources. While this chapter discusses protection of friendly forces, it focuses on a host government's requirement to protect its population and resources from insurgents.

PROTECTION OF FORCES

Because of the political nature of conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, protection of friendly forces from terrorist or related incidents in a host country is a critical consideration. Terrorist attacks on friendly forces could drastically alter a peacetime situation. Bombing of the United States Marine barracks in Lebanon is the best-known example.

Terrorist attacks are, and will continue to be, a serious threat to our security. However, both government agencies and military services have made significant strides in antiterrorism programs and training in recent years. For example, they have made a relatively successful international effort to curb hijacking and other terrorist attacks against commercial airlines.

Another example of the effort against terrorism is the cooperation between the United States Army and the United States Marines in developing antiterrorism training and doctrine. Four years ago, the Army established its Terrorism Counteraction Office and began to develop concepts, doctrine, and training programs for combating terrorism. The Marines have contributed to this effort, producing several handbooks and training programs. A joint field circular/operational handbook on unit terrorism counteraction is the latest example of this effort.[1] It provides guidance to commanders at all levels on predeployment, deployment, and redeployment responsibilities.

The Army's keystone manual on terrorism, FM 100-37, covering individuals, units, and facilities in peacetime, mobilization, and war, is in draft. After editing, it will be submitted to other services for publication as a joint manual. These are first steps toward a much-needed joint service-civilian agency approach to combating terrorism. Because a number of efforts

are underway to deal with the protection of forces, this report addresses only the broad issue area rather than dealing with specific protection-of-the-force issues.

PROTECTION OF POPULATION AND RESOURCES

The central role of the population in any insurgency is well established. Mao equated insurgents to "fish" and the population to the "sea"; fish need the sea to survive. Che Guevara emphasized the vital role Cuban peasants played in Castro's revolution as sources of food, intelligence, and recruits.[2]

In counterinsurgency, the role of security and its related operational techniques is to "dry up the sea" by severing the parasitic link insurgents must have with the population to survive. This is especially true during the early stages of an insurgency. Likewise, the insurgent, who would be devastated by a head-on attack against the government, can weaken that government by developing an ever-increasing support of, and control over, the population.

Population security is an essential element in counter-insurgency and, to a certain extent, in insurgency. Protection and control of the population, thereby denying the enemy access to its most important resource--popular support--is one of four interrelated functions of counterinsurgency: mobilization, development, neutralization, and security. Consideration of these four elements is just as important for an insurgent force trying to defeat the government.

Security refers here to both the physical security measures designed to protect the population and resources from an enemy and strategic security. Physical security is directly protecting the population and denying resources to the enemy. Strategic security is the establishment of an environment composed of sympathetic and neutral elements, an environment from which hostile elements have been removed or in which they are unable to operate effectively.

The concept of strategic security is even more important than physical security. Developed by Jeffrey Race after an extensive examination of the Viet Cong effort in one province of Vietnam, strategic security accepts the limitations of attempting to provide physical security.[3] Instead of relying on physical security, it recognizes the interrelationship between the various functions of counterinsurgency and strives to establish a secure environment. The concept of strategic security also recognizes the key role of social mobilization in providing security--the motivation and organization of the population to provide for its own security.

PROTECTION OF POPULATION AND RESOURCES ISSUES

Issues examined in this report can be divided into three general categories:

- o The establishment of security as an essential element of counterinsurgency doctrine.
- o Mobilization and the respective roles for regular military forces, police, and paramilitary forces in counterinsurgency.
- o The advantages and limitations of populace and resources control techniques.

These issue areas are discussed briefly here and in greater detail in Section C, Volume II.

SECURITY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Security is one of the four essential components of a successful strategy for defeating insurgents. The others are mobilization--measures to motivate and organize the population to participate; development--measures to gain and maintain the support of the population; and neutralization--efforts directed at the insurgent to render him ineffective. While current military doctrine recognizes the need for security, doctrinal publications do not specifically list security as an element of the strategy to defeat insurgency.[4] Issue C1, The Need To Recognize Security as an Essential Element of Counterinsurgency Strategy, recommends changes to correct this. It calls for--

- o Revising current Army doctrine to include security as an element of counterinsurgency strategy.
- o Ensuring joint doctrine includes the concept of security.

MOBILIZATION AND SECURITY FORCE ROLES

Two issues address the respective roles of the regular military, police, and paramilitary (self-defense forces) in providing security. The issues recognize the different orientation of police (offensive versus protective) and the different capabilities to deal with violence. They stress the need to carefully consider these capabilities and to take full account of local social and cultural factors prior to making decisions on the employment of these forces. The importance of building self-defense forces and the need to develop the concept of strategic security are central to these issues.

The issues dealing with local security and the role of mobilization are--

o C3--The Need To Recognize the Respective Roles of Host Nation Police, Paramilitary, and Military in Security/ PRC.

o C4--The Need To Expand the Concept for Development of Civil Defense Forces for Counterinsurgency.

Recommendations call for--

o Ensuring that doctrine adequately reflects the role of civil defense issues and the requirement to involve the population in its own defense.

o Ensuring that doctrine accurately reflects the significant role of police in counterinsurgency.

o Reducing restrictions concerning training of police forces.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

Populace and resources control measures are operational techniques designed to cut off an enemy from human and material resources such as food, clothing, intelligence, and recruits. They are a firmly established part of counterinsurgency doctrine. Issue C2, The Role of Populace and Resources Control (PRC) Measures in Low-Intensity Conflict, examines several cases and identifies both advantages and limitations of populace and resources control. Particularly noteworthy is the temptation to place absolute faith in a given set of populace and resource control measures and to apply those specific measures rather than identifying the principles that led to success and applying them in accordance with the local situation. This tendency to apply rules and procedures rather than principles is not satisfactory in the insurgency/ counterinsurgency environment. Specific recommendations of this issue are directed toward initiating additional study to explore the value and limitation of populace and resources control.

SUMMARY

Both the protection of military and civilian forces stationed overseas and the protection of the population involved in an insurgent situation are key issues deserving further study. Programs presently underway must provide the

basis for a joint effort to protect against terrorism and other isolated incidents. The role of the United States in protecting the population involved in insurgency is to provide applicable doctrine and training programs. The actual job of protecting the population almost always belongs to host nation military, police, and paramilitary forces.

NOTES

[1]Department of Defense, US Army and US Marine Corps, FC 100-37-1/OH 7-14-1 Unit Terrorism Counteraction (Fort Leavenworth, KS and Quantico, VA: USACGSC and MCDEC, 1985).

[2]Raymond Estep, Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1975).

[3]Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).

[4]Department of Defense, US Army, FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Center, 1981).

CHAPTER 11

DEVELOPMENT

GENERAL

Development, in the limited sense that it is used here, is the process by which a government improves the quality of life for its people and strengthens its link to the population in order to gain support. Understanding development as an attempt to shape society is important since it can be a cause of instability, as well as a potent force to increase stability, depending on the effectiveness of the strategy chosen. This chapter examines efforts to prevent or combat instability, particularly insurgency.

Successful development strategies can be a major factor in the prevention of insurgency, as well as a means of responding to insurgencies already in progress. In addition to strengthening its link to the population through development strategies, a regime must also secure the population and neutralize the insurgent. Since the application of United States military power to those objectives is often both counterproductive and politically constrained, the use of effective political, social, and economic programs becomes particularly important to the success of a counterinsurgency effort.

Change is inevitable and must be managed or the political mobilization of dissatisfied groups may eventually overwhelm the regime. Unless the mechanisms of change are understood, little hope exists of developing or evaluating policies for its management. The absence of an understanding of the causes of political and economic change may preclude the adoption of strategies that will enhance stability.

A review of development concepts provides a number of key considerations that have important implications for United States policy and suggests a number of development strategies available to the host nation. They involve a combination of policies such as expanding political participation; providing for economic development; improving administration and the rural environment; establishing a legal framework for counterinsurgency programs; and implementing military reform. Any combination chosen will involve trade-offs between the goals of socioeconomic fairness, economic growth, and political participation.

The strategy chosen by the host government is a function of internal and external political, economic, and social forces and the values of key elites. The regime may have to walk a

narrow path between revolution and coup d'etat since the political and economic reforms that undercut popular support for the insurgent may undercut the political base of the regime as well.

The United States may have strong interests in assisting a host government to successfully execute an effective development strategy. It could reduce the necessity for the use of military force or possible United States military intervention. However, American policymakers often have very little influence in shaping the strategies of the host nation or they lack sufficient understanding of the dynamics of the indigenous situation to develop more effective strategies.

Without a clear understanding of the development process, strategies for managing change, and the possibilities and limitations on the United States role in helping the host government execute such strategies, United States assistance efforts may be reduced to ineffectual meddling. The host nation may be denied the opportunity to adapt alternatives to the use of military force and repression. If vital United States interests are at stake, our only recourse may be United States military intervention. However this increases the potential for loss with no guarantee of success. The necessity to use military force may not be eliminated, especially when insurgent efforts are supported by external forces. However, effective development strategies can prevent the problems that insurgents exploit in their efforts to topple a regime friendly to the United States interests. The remainder of this chapter will develop the above concepts more fully.

THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Change is inevitable. Economic development is an engine of change powering the transformation of entire political and social systems. Modernization produces change. It ultimately can result in instability by disrupting traditional social groups and relationships; increasing, at least temporarily, the gap between rich and poor; raising expectations; increasing the level of conflict over resource distribution among regions and ethnic groups; and creating new groups with newly acquired economic powers, but without commensurate political influence.[1] These social and economic changes can create demands that the government often cannot meet and frequently may not be aware of since its political institutions may not have adapted to new groups or to newly politicized groups.

In many third world countries facing insurgencies, the central governmental institutions may be so weak that they fail to penetrate into the countryside. Not only is the central

government incapable of delivering much-needed social services to rural populations, but rural populations are often practically unaware that the central government exists.[2] This institutional weakness provides the insurgents an opportunity to organize and control rural populations and to establish base areas with little challenge from the regime.

This political dilemma of weak institutions confronted by competing demands may be further exacerbated by the tendency of the regime to pursue development strategies designed to safeguard its narrow political base from competitors already participating in the system. While these policies may safeguard its existence in the short term, in the long term internal pressures may develop in the system that provide a fertile ground for the growth of revolution. An alternative strategy is requiring structural reforms aimed at broadening participation and reducing the appeal of revolutionaries.

Development, if properly managed, offers hope of stabilizing the regime. Over the long term, political and economic development can strengthen existing political institutions, create new institutions capable of accommodating demands for expanded participation, and provide upward socio-economic mobility. It can satisfy aspirations and assimilate potentially radical elements of society into the work force.

Over the short term, carefully managed and integrated programs of political and economic change are extremely effective tools which the regime can use to combat insurgency. The strategic goal of these programs, as with all counterinsurgency programs, is to secure the support of the population. With a secure population base, the regime can extract necessary resources to fight the guerrillas, deny those same resources to the guerrilla, and secure the necessary intelligence to eliminate guerrilla cadres by military force.

Two methods are available to the regime to secure each element of population: reinforcement and preemption.[3] In a reinforcement strategy the government seeks to consolidate and strengthen the existing social system. Disaffected groups are suppressed through physical reinforcement (restrictive measures, barbed wire, arming the holders of power) and numerical reinforcement (increased mobilization of society through military recruitment and forced membership in mass organizations). Those who hold power in society attempt to improve their ability to coerce those who would bring the system down.

In a strategy of preemption, the government adopts policies to reduce the appeal of the insurgents and to prevent the mobilization of significant elements of the population. The government may redistribute values such as power, status, and

economic well-being to those elements of the population whose support is most important (for example, peasant groups in contested areas). Rather than coerce, the government attempts to persuade the target population to resist the insurgents through programs that provide political or economic benefits.

STRATEGIES TO MANAGE CHANGE

In trying to manage change, regimes have pursued various alternatives. Creating democratic institutions resembling those of western constitutional democracies would seem to offer the best hope for legitimizing the regime. In fact, the expansion of participation through the electoral process, the toleration and institutionalization of dissent, and the creation of political parties and representative political institutions offer alternatives to armed revolution. Revolutionary theorist Che Guevara recognized, "where a government has come to power through some kind of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted."[4]

For several reasons, however, expanding political participation in general and adopting democratic reforms in particular often promise more than they can deliver:

o Massive increase in political participation may actually increase instability if the government is overwhelmed by conflicting demands. Democracy may increase the level of conflict in society without providing adequate institutions for its resolution--especially given the virtually intractable problems third world countries face.[5]

o Elites benefiting from the present regime may oppose such reforms if a transfer of power or change of policy threatens their interests.[6]

o The political culture of many third world countries may not be fertile ground for the abrupt introduction of democratic institutions.

o Such reforms can come at the cost of other possible reforms. Democracy disperses political power in society and can make other major structural reforms difficult.[7]

o Democracy does not necessarily guarantee economic growth. Democratic governments responding to demands by the lower classes for redistribution of wealth may adopt inefficient economic policies and use surplus as subsidies rather than investment capital.[8;9]

Another approach has been to establish mechanisms for participation that mobilize people to support the regime without allowing them to make any demands on it. While such a strategy can provide an outlet for pressure to increase participation, it runs the risk of the population becoming dissatisfied with having the form of participation without the substance. Still another approach is to attempt actively to restrict participation for fear that it may overwhelm political institutions developed to assimilate it. Unrestrained participation, because of the general lack of effective political institutions, can overwhelm the regime's ability to cope with increased demands. Poorly timed and managed political reforms may act as a catalyst instead of a substitute for revolution, leading some regimes to opt for a selective strategy of repression (reinforcement). Thus, such action discourages participation by the newly emerging groups, while institutions capable of mobilizing and accommodating the participation of the rural lower classes are developed.[10]

Although a strategy of repression and institution building may be workable, the regime may not, in fact, be able to harness sufficient power to simultaneously repress participation in the city while building rural participation mechanisms. Many societies today may be sufficiently well developed, with high levels of participation in the city so well established that severe restriction is no longer feasible. While repression strategies may buy time for newly developed institutions to become effective, often repression can also become a substitute for such institution building. Continued repression alienates the population, driving political activity underground and enabling insurgents to countermobilize broad elements of the population in opposition to the regime.

Regimes have also resorted to programs of economic growth to legitimize their position and to expand participation. Economic development offers the potential to satisfy rising economic aspirations of the people and co-opt potentially radical elements of society. However, it is not a panacea. Rapid economic growth may contribute to instability by alienating the rural poor, and retrenchment can exacerbate dissatisfaction.

Comparative studies indicate that in newly modernizing societies, rapid economic growth is correlated with socio-economic inequality--the more rapid the growth the higher the inequality.[11] Moreover, the poorest sixty percent of the population (the population group usually most vulnerable to insurgent mobilization) is often made poorer by economic development; especially if the regime fails to direct development strategies at redistribution.[12;13] Pursuing economic growth also might require abandoning other strategies

useful in stabilizing the regime. For example, many regimes have found that economic growth is not possible unless political participation is restricted.[14;15] For complex reasons beyond the scope of this report, often management of economic growth rates is simply beyond the control of governments, even in the most developed societies.

An economic development strategy, coupled with a program to improve rural administration--a fourth approach--can allow the regime to win over the rural population. Since governmental institutions for many third world countries are not well developed in rural areas, the first step in delivering resources to secure the support of rural populations would seem to be to improve rural administration. But, again, the regime may face many difficulties in its attempts to do this. Creating capabilities where none existed before inevitably threatens the interests and power of central governmental agencies or important elites. Extending the authority of the central government to the countryside may threaten the interests of local elites and disrupt important traditional relationships, if they still exist, such as that between patron and peasant. Also, creating these capabilities may require more skilled manpower than the regime can muster.

Programs to improve the rural environment should be closely allied to improvements in rural administration. Land reform, building of schools, public health programs, and agricultural development are significant weapons in the regime's arsenal to garner popular support.[16;17] But even these programs by themselves may be mere band-aids covering deep social problems; they may be ineffective unless coupled with coercive measures or additional programs promising further redistributions.

Fundamentally, regimes face the task of managing change. Limited resources and limited and questionable legitimacy make this task a difficult one for many regimes to accomplish. To combat an insurgency or to deal with other low-intensity threats with extremely limited resources, regimes are forced to make difficult strategic choices. They must decide which groups to win over and which groups to coerce. They must decide whether to pursue increased participation to increase the political base of the regime or to restrict participation if this is necessary to promote socioeconomic fairness and land reform. They may have to decide between greater equity or faster growth, military civic action today or civil-administered programs tomorrow, democracy now or democracy when political institutions are more developed. These are not easy choices and no formula exists for determining the objectively right answer for each trade-off. Establishing a successful program of political and economic development is very much a function of existing cultural and environmental factors and the skill

of the political leadership. The regimes themselves must make these decisions. They have a better understanding of the culture which shapes these decisions. They will have to administer the program. It is the regime's legitimacy that is at stake and its institutions that must be strengthened. The United States should not substitute its judgment for a regime in these delicate matters. But it can help in other ways.

ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN DEVELOPMENT

The role of the United States in development is to assist the host nation to manage change while recognizing that development is primarily the responsibility of the developing nation. (This view of the United States role is articulated in Section 2151-(b) and 2301 of Title 22, United States Code.) We can do this in several ways. We can--

o Provide resources to help a regime avoid the necessity of playing a "zero-sum game" between elites and masses.

o Assist modernization and economic growth by transferring technology and technical expertise.

o Provide expertise and advice needed by the host nation to increase capabilities and efficiency of military and civil governmental institutions.

o Influence key elites to support the regime's management of change.

The United States can assist the host nation in the management of change through the judicious application of its resources and political influence. When change threatens the interest of important elites, regimes often lack the power to change themselves. The United States can provide some of the support necessary by enabling the regime to address the needs and demands of the less incorporated groups without critically alienating groups that have traditionally supported and participated in the political process.

In strategies of change affecting the distribution of power and wealth, United States assistance can help regimes avoid the necessity of playing a zero-sum game between elites and the masses. Economic development programs can provide capital without requiring trade-offs in living standards. If properly targeted, such capital projects can develop a self-sustaining economic infrastructure without critically threatening existing social relationships. Such economic aid can also provide resources to meet immediate shortfalls, alleviate economic dislocations caused by modernization, and demonstrate concern and perhaps even progress to the people.

United States aid programs can also support the transfer of appropriate technology and needed expertise to various sectors of the economy. The transfer of appropriate technologies can spur economic development in both industry and agriculture. Technology transfer also holds out the hope that developing countries can break through market barriers and produce for export on the world market. The growth of modern industry can help to draw off surplus labor in agriculture and can provide tremendous opportunity for upward mobility. Technology transfer in agriculture can improve crop yields and create surpluses where most needed--in the countryside.

Technology transfer to the military sector can increase the mobility and fire power of its formation; increase its ability to collect, process, and disseminate information for better command, control, communications, and intelligence; and improve its ability to implement civic-action programs. In addition, technology can be a force multiplier keeping down the size of the army needed to control and defeat an insurgent force.

The transfer of United States expertise to both the military and civilian agencies can be essential to developing the regime's capability to respond to insurgency. The government may be generating a number of different kinds of civilian and military activities some of which may be new and unfamiliar. The United States government (USG) can assist the host nation in generating these capabilities and in developing the organizational and management structures to service and maintain them.[18]

The USG provides resources and expertise to the host nation primarily through security assistance programs administered by DOD or through economic aid programs administered by the USAID. (While the Department of State has overall responsibility for economic and military assistance programs, it does not directly administer them.) In both instances, the USG provides assistance largely through host nation governmental institutions to directly affect changes in the society.

Some assistance, primarily from nongovernment sources, is dispersed to private organizations in the host country. While these private organizations are used to funnel assistance directly to the population, the capacity of nongovernmental institutions to absorb this aid may be limited. Whether or not internal constraints exist on the United States efforts to interact directly with the people, we must be sensitive to the dangers of bypassing the indigenous government to directly affect changes in the society. Such action, rather than enhancing the legitimacy of the regime, could create a popular perception of the government as being ineffective and a lackey

of a foreign power. Lastly, United States efforts at direct assistance could be perceived by host governments as undermining their legitimacy and cause strains between the United States and the regime. On the other hand, private and/or voluntary organizations often provide technical and managerial resources which the government simply does not have, so they enhance absorptive capacity. In most cases, such organizations also work with the permission and support of the government.

The need to work through host government institutions makes the delivery of United States resources to targeted population groups a very complex and often inefficient process. Host nation corruption, institutional weaknesses and inefficiencies, divergent short-term interests, and complications resulting from the many United States and host nation agencies involved in the process can reduce the effectiveness of aid as a policy tool and add to an impatience and frustration to produce results. Since the United States is seeking to influence change indirectly, more patience and careful planning are required than in a more direct approach where projects are controlled by the agencies in the United States embassy.

Finally, the United States can assist the host nation in the management of change by the discrete use of its political influence to build coalitions of key elites to support the regime's strategy of development. The importance of United States assistance to the regime often gives it considerable influence with certain groups in the political system. United States ambassadors to the Philippines, El Salvador, Honduras, and even Nicaragua maintain overt contact with all sectors of the society and discuss United States policy and objectives with the leadership of these countries. In the past, the United States has often used this influence to persuade conservatives to support change, to prevent the military from blocking change, or to encourage the military to promote change. However, the United States has found that often its ability to persuade is severely limited when sensitive internal concerns are involved, such as the distribution of power, wealth, and status. Often the United States does not possess sufficient leverage to produce land reform, military reforms, or free elections.[19] Nonetheless, consistent, friendly, and firm persuasion can yield significant results.

United States efforts at assisting in the political and economic development of third world nations often suffer, however, from our failure to appreciate the limits of our own power. Our limited understanding of host nation culture and the mechanisms of economic and political change may result in ineffective United States programs that produce unanticipated consequences. At times in the past, we have assumed the

applicability of our own model of development in which economic growth leads to greater social and economic equality and political democracy. In fact, economic growth may be associated with less equality and restricted political participation.[20] We have also pressured regimes to adopt reforms that might be workable in equalitarian, literate, participatory societies with widely shared domestic values when in fact many third world societies are hierarchical, illiterate, and passive.[21]

We encourage third world regimes to confront insurgency by adopting the western model of civil-military relations, which emphasizes an apolitical professional military. In fact, because of history and culture, the military may inevitably be a major political force engaged in the inherently political struggle of guerrilla warfare. Forcing the military into the western model may force them out of many rural civic-action programs.

The regime and the United States advisors may believe that an apolitical military should relegate civic action to civil agencies while the military concentrates on securing the countryside to the exclusion of more political functions. In areas where the civilian agencies are incapable of managing these rural programs, the provision of services grinds to a halt and the relevance of the government to rural life is further reduced. The military is capable of establishing security in a limited number of contested areas, but if the populations of these areas are never co-opted by the provision of new government services, guerrilla influence will be reasserted once the military moves to another area. For this reason, the regime never really increases its influence with the rural population. Rather than destroying the roots of the insurgency, it merely prunes the branches which often results in a healthier insurgency.

Power is also constrained by the unwillingness of the American people and their political representatives to fund development programs and by the ability of the host nation to absorb the resources. Congress has sometimes been reluctant to allocate aid dollars. Since World War II, United States aid as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP) has declined. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of this aid has been concentrated in the few countries (for example, Israel and Egypt) that either have a strong domestic lobby or important security relationships with the United States. Nevertheless, on occasion the President has been able to make the case before Congress that ongoing insurgencies (for example, El Salvador) threaten important United States interests and require a greater expenditure of security assistance money.

The availability of United States resources and therefore United States power to assist is also constrained by the ability of the host nation to productively apply these resources to worthwhile development programs. Excessive aid levels may be counterproductive, actually encouraging instability, and may overwhelm the economy, producing inflation and increasing corruption. The regime may use the aid to subsidize imports and stabilize prices or to prop up currency exchange rates rather than invest in development programs yielding a rate of return. In effect, the regime may choose to prop up its own political fortunes by subsidizing urban lower classes where its institutions are strongest, rather than use the capital to broaden support with the rural peasantry where the risk of insurgency is greatest.

Excessive or improperly applied aid can also actually weaken rather than strengthen the regime's links to the people. Aid ties the government to port installations and lines of communication, not to the population. It tends to replace the population as the source of government resources. The government has less incentive to challenge the insurgents in the strategically decisive contested areas.[22]

The most productive role the United States can play in assisting the host nation is to supply resources, expertise, and technology to help develop organizational capability in critical shortfall areas. We must determine critical host nation requirements to combat insurgency and generate country-specific programs attuned to the requirements of specific cultures. The tendency of large organizations to execute existing routines and procedures no matter how inappropriate must be avoided if the United States is to react effectively to the unique requirements of low-intensity conflict.[23;24] Lack of well-defined development goals increases this problem as agencies can become focused on acquiring inputs (that is, budget dollars) for traditional functions rather than comprehensive analysis of changing objectives and how best to achieve them by modifying organizational programs.

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

The existing roles and missions of United States agencies, the capabilities generated to execute these assigned roles and missions, and the policy development mechanisms to integrate these programs into a coherent national policy are inadequate. Furthermore, policy integration and the evolution of agency roles and missions and capabilities are constrained by legislation which can deny the President the flexibility to develop programs to respond to low-intensity conflict. These problems are grouped into the following major areas of consideration:

- o Roles and missions.
- o Capabilities.
- o Policy integration.
- o Legislative constraints.

The remaining discussion will summarize these points. They are discussed in detail in Section D, Volume II.

ROLES AND MISSIONS

The United States has consistently failed to tailor the roles and missions of United States government agencies to requirements generated by low-intensity conflicts. Charles Maechling, the Staff Director of the NSC Special Group (Counterinsurgency) during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, writes, for example, of the USG response to insurgency during the Kennedy Administration:

> Each of the national security departments... reacted in typical agency fashion to third world revolutionary movements...(The State Department) looked to "quick fix" military and economic aid programs as a means of propping up "friendly" regimes. The Central Intelligence Agency focused on external sources of domestic subversion and tended to view left-wing dissent in terms of conspiracy and Marxist penetration. The Pentagon approached revolutionary movements in terms of their military impact and favored broad-brush modernization of local military forces and conversion of their missions from external defense to internal security--with no questions asked as to the political consequences.[25]

Attempts to develop counterinsurgency doctrine as the basis for a more rational reordering of agency roles, missions, and capabilities resulted in the creation of a very simplistic approach. It treated each revolutionary movement in a foreign society as if it were a clearly articulated military force instead of the apex of a pyramid deeply embedded in society. It contained virtually no political guidance as to the circumstances in which it should be applied and no criteria laying down conditions that had to be met by the host country before the aid programs could become operative. Nor did it refer to United States social or economic goals for the country concerned.[26]

Similar failure to articulate strategic counterinsurgency policy today continues to result in poorly defined roles and missions and the failure of United States agencies to adapt their programs and operational routines to meet the host nation's need for appropriate resources, technologies, and expertise. United States agency roles and missions may be inadequate or inappropriate, especially given the roles and missions of the host nation agencies. They may produce overlapping responsibilities, gaps in responsibility, or inappropriate capabilities.

Issue D1, The Effect of Legislation on Our Ability To Effectively Assist Developing Countries in Their Counter-insurgency Efforts, addresses this question. In addition, issues concerning capabilities are linked to the roles and missions question.

CAPABILITIES

Capabilities of United States agencies are often ill-suited to respond to specific insurgencies. For example, USAID has problems tailoring aid programs to meet the requirements of a unified counterinsurgency effort. The agency views its role as assisting in long-term host nation development and is constrained by both legislation and its own organizational perspective from involvement in joint programs with the military (United States and host nation). Because of its relationship to Congress and the budget process, USAID has a tendency to "projectize" programs, which results in reduced flexibility and difficulty in adjusting to the changing requirements of a counterinsurgency effort.

Similarly, DOD has often failed to generate the appropriate doctrine, technology, or management structure necessary to respond to the specific development needs of the host government. For example, security assistance organizations are inadequately staffed and chartered to effectively manage United States security assistance programs or to respond to the surge requirements generated by an escalating insurgency. This is due in part to legislative constraints. Problems are also created by a long, cumbersome budget process for security assistance programs. Furthermore, equipment produced in the United States is often too sophisticated or inappropriate for host nation counterinsurgency needs. Equipment designed to stop Soviet armored spearheads may not be suitable for success in underdeveloped countries.

The United States military does not have appropriate training, doctrine, force structure mix, or planning mechanisms to properly employ military assets in low-intensity conflict missions. This is due in large part to its focus on

high-intensity warfare missions. For example, the civic-action role of the military is important in low-intensity conflicts, yet ninety-eight percent of the civil affairs (CA) units are in the reserve component. They are primarily trained to provide military government in occupied territories rather than to assist host nation militaries in the performance of civic-action and other counterinsurgency programs.

The United States military lacks appropriate doctrine to assist host countries in developing logistics concepts, doctrine, and training to provide effective combat service support (CSS) for their national strategies and operational requirements. Although military medicine could provide a low-cost method of providing this vital nation-building assistance, the military has failed for many reasons to develop this capability and continues to focus on its traditional CSS role. The current concept of engineer operations does little to address requirements and methods of employment for engineer units in the low-intensity conflict environment. The problem also occurs with planning of the use of PSYOP assets. Lastly, the operational concept for employment of logistics assets is inappropriate.

The following issues in Section D, Volume II, examine capabilities for assisting in the development process:

o D2--The Need To Integrate Security Assistance Programs Among Agencies and To Develop a Less Cumbersome Security Assistance Policy Process.

o D3--The Applicability of United States Equipment to Host Nation Counterinsurgency Needs.

o D4--The Adequacy of Doctrine, Training, and Force Structure of Military Medicine to the Accomplishment of the Medical Mission in Counterinsurgency Operations.

o D5--The Adequacy of Military Doctrine To Assist Host Nations in Developing Logistics Concepts, Doctrine, and Training.

o D6--The Effects of United States Advice and Aid on Civil-Military Relations in a Country Confronting an Insurgency.

o D7--The Need for Policy Covering United States Army Engineer Support to Nations Facing Insurgency.

o D8--The Need for Army Doctrine, Training, and Force Structure for Civil Affairs Missions.

These issues make specific recommendations concerning--

o Improving budget procedures for security assistance.

o Providing both United States and host nation forces with equipment suited for the low-intensity conflict environment.

o Developing the roles of medical, engineer, civil affairs, PSYOP, and other combat support and combat service support forces for low-intensity conflict.

o Supporting host nation logistics needs.

o Developing host nation civil institutions.

POLICY INTEGRATION

The United States policy development mechanisms are inadequate to sort out these roles and mission difficulties and to integrate these programs into a coherent national policy. Firm central direction is needed to counteract the tendency of each agency involved to follow standard operating procedures without regard to the impact on the overall effort. Within the Executive Branch, the process is fragmented by conflict between rival organizations. Although the country team is nominally charged with responsibility to integrate the United States effort within the host nation, all too often the ambassador's control over the players on the team is tenuous or may reflect a lack of experience or expertise. In Vietnam, the country team was found to be a major weakness. "It...has been poorly informed and is not working to a common plan."[27] Currently, the effectiveness of the country teams appears to be more a function of personalities involved rather than a result of an institutional approach to integrating the United States programs.

As a result of the problem of coordinating programs, a new field agency, CORDS, was created with command authority over the programs of all agencies providing assistance to the Republic of Vietnam. The advantage of the CORDS approach was to examine all programs and make explicit trade-offs between them in order to force integration and coordination of the United States effort in Vietnam. Potential dangers with this approach are that it tends to bypass the host nation government and create a highly visible United States presence that could be perceived as neocolonial in nature. It is possible to achieve the required level of integration provided by the CORDS model without excessive visibility. British doctrine enhances integration by creating committees with command authority over all agency programs in country.[28] The British avoid supplanting the role of the host government and thus avoid the charge of neocolonialism.

The failure to take full advantage of integration mechanisms at the national level also results in duplication of effort and confusion. Given the limited resources available for security assistance, lack of integration and efficient allocation can result in a failure to accomplish security assistance objectives. Most interagency coordination appears to be done on an ad hoc basis and, although the budget process includes an integrating mechanism, separate budgets of various agencies limit trade-offs made between programs to achieve an optimal mix. Most of these problems arise because of our inability to forge a consensus of United States objectives in a country before a crisis arises and to develop a long-term commitment to provide adequate resources necessary to achieve our objectives.

However, the security assistance process itself limits the effectiveness of our security assistance policy. It is a slow, complicated, cumbersome system that has little flexibility and slow response time. For example, it takes more than a year for assistance requests to work through the system, making it difficult to respond effectively to fast-moving crises. When the system does respond quickly it generally requires extraordinary individual initiative and the warping of the system to achieve results. The system is so complicated the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) recommends that aid recipients expend security assistance funds to train their people to operate within the system in order to increase the possiblity of obtaining assistance.

Policy integration is discussed in Issue D2, The Need To Integrate Security Assistance Programs Among Agencies and To Develop a Less Cumbersome Security Assistance Policy Process. It recommends the National Security Council initiate a study of alternative policy mechanisms for improving integration of foreign internal defense programs.

LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS

The competition for power between the Executive and Legislative Branches further fragments the policy-making process and complicates the integration of policy. Following the Vietnam intervention and Watergate, popular distrust of the presidency encouraged Congress to seek ways to limit the President's authority while reasserting its own constitutional powers. While Congress supports United States economic and military assistance to developing nations and considers it an important part of national policy, current legislation governing the implementation of these policy objectives hampers the effort of the United States government to accomplish them. It has promulgated a series of laws and regulations that prohibit, restrict, delay, or dilute actions needed to assist a host nation government to successfully oppose insurgencies.

Collectively, the statutory limitations make efficient, effective United States programs more difficult to implement and create confusion and frustration among policymakers and foreign governments. Yet, congressional objectives for economic and security assistance programs appear to be essentially congruent with Executive Branch objectives as established by the Guam Doctrine.

While legislative restraints limit the flexibility of the Executive Branch, they can give the President increased influence with the host nation. One of the weaknesses with United States counterinsurgency policy in Vietnam was that the United States was so heavily committed to the regime in terms of resources and prestige that any threat by the President to reduce or end United States support if host government reforms were not forthcoming was just not credible. The necessity of the President to sell economic and security assistance programs to an assertive Congress makes these threats of withdrawn support all too real. Host governments now realize that abuses of the population, intransigence, or a coup could end United States assistance. The host government now has increased incentive to provide at least the appearance of reform.

Congressional constraints are also constructive in other ways. They prevent the United States from providing excessive levels of aid that could be destabilizing as discussed previously. Also, congressional ceilings on personnel level prevents the excessive bureaucratization of United States administrative machinery in the most strategically important countries. Personnel ceilings also ensure that the United States maintains a low profile in unstable countries, reducing the ability of the insurgents to co-opt the nationalist cause. The problem is that Executive policy and legislative constraints often cancel each other out and create doubt, confusion, and inefficiency. Oversight by the Congress is important and useful, but blindly mandated restrictions do not always allow for the effective tailoring of programs and policies to the particular situation in a nation facing an insurgency.

Legislative constraints are discussed in detail in Issue D1, The Effect of Legislation on Our Ability To Effectively Assist Developing Countries in Their Counterinsurgency Efforts. Recommendations are numerous but center around the call for an interagency examination of the constraints issue.

SUMMARY

The United States has not done well in its efforts to promote third world development. Often the situation has deteriorated to the point where our assistance cannot help.

The United States has become involved in numerous insurgency situations and has provided significant military assistance and advice in others. Today, several of these nations are ruled by communist governments. Many others have less-than-stable democratic regimes. None of the military authoritarian regimes can be considered free from the threat of insurgency. United States political objectives in these nations, even when defined simply as opposing communism or supporting allies, have seldom been fully met.

An important reason for this policy failure is our overall lack of focus on the process of social, political, and economic change in the third world. This is not meant to imply that agencies responsible for development such as USAID are uninterested in development, but that national priorities do not provide them the resources and leverage to carry out effective programs. Nor is it meant to imply that we have not been successful in numerous cases. South Asia is food self-sufficient because of the "green revolution." Smallpox has been eradicated worldwide. Brazil, Colombia, Taiwan, and Korea have benefitted from United States assistance and are now middle-income countries and important United States trading partners. Turkey, Thailand, Costa Rica, and Tunisia, beneficiaries of substantial United States technical and financial support, are developing rapidly. Tens of thousands of third world political, economic, and technical leaders have been trained by the United States. However, throughout the third world, the low-level insurgencies quietly grind away lives and legitimacy while the United States government applies policies that are often insufficient or, in some cases, irrelevant to the concerns of indigenous populations. Occasionally, the insurgency escalates as the guerrillas expand their control over the countryside and forge new alliances with urban groups. The crisis bell rings and decisionmakers often end up scurrying for programs and solutions after options have been foreclosed.

In order to effectively support the host government, the United States government needs to attune its advice and aid to local conditions. A national policy is needed as the basis for a more rational reordering of agency roles, missions, and capabilities. Appropriate political and economic programs need to be developed. Improved coordination between United States policymakers and the host nation government need to be effected if we are to be successful in our efforts to counter insurgency. Inability to do so will result in a repetition of past failure--a prospect that the United States can ill afford.

NOTES

[1]Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).

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[3]Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972).

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[7]Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson, No Easy Choice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976).

[8]See note 5.

[9]See note 7.

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[12]Irma Adelman, "Growth Income Distribution and Equity Oriented Development Strategies," The Political Economy of Underdevelopment., ed. Charles K. Wilber (New York: Random House, 1979): 312-323.

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[14]See note 5.

[15]See note 7.

[16]Douglas Blaufarb and George Tanham, "Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency" (BDM Corporation, BDM/W-84-0175-TR, 31 July 1984).

[17]See note 3.

[18]See note 16.

[19]Ibid.

[20]See note 7.

[21]Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

[22]See note 3.

[23]See note 16.

[24]Charles Maechling, Jr., "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, The Role of Strategic Theory," Parameters 14.3 (Autumn 1984): 32-41.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Ibid.

[27]"McNamara Report to Johnson on Situation in Saigon in '63," The Pentagon Papers (New York: New York Times and Bantam): 271-272.

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CHAPTER 12

INTELLIGENCE

GENERAL

Intelligence is the most powerful tool that United States operators, from the national level down to the country team, have to obtain their objectives in many low-intensity conflict situations. To a large extent, it will mark the difference between success or failure in reaching those objectives.

Intelligence is a unique commodity for which there is a constant requirement. It is the means to access and influence key government policymakers, military service heads, or foreign leaders. Unlike security assistance programs whose cost can be prohibitive, intelligence can in some cases be provided at little additional cost to the government or the recipient.

Intelligence is fundamental to any successful operation on the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Successful low-intensity conflict operations, ranging from a seemingly simple civic-action project or psychological operation to a complex rescue mission, depend on a firm intelligence base. As General Paul Gorman stated, "Intelligence is access and influence... knowledge is literally power."[1]

THE CHALLENGE

The challenge that low-intensity conflict poses to the intelligence community is different in scope and application from other levels of conflict. The intelligence community must support what seems to be an almost infinite number and variety of possible low-intensity situations. Each form of low-intensity conflict and indeed each individual situation will have different intelligence requirements based on the type situation and United States interests.

To meet this challenge, the intelligence community must rely on collection assets that are limited and sometimes unsuitable. It must work with the fact that national priorities, which determine the use of these assets, focus for the most part on the more dangerous, but less likely threats of conventional or nuclear war. Priorities must be set which do not lessen our ability to address these more dangerous threats.

Understanding the threat is critical to meeting the challenge. That threat, however, is ambiguous and complex. By nature, low-intensity conflict is civil-military. To be

most effective, the United States approach and commitment to intelligence should also be, but most often is not, a cooperative civil-military effort.

INTELLIGENCE ROLES

Three general situations require the capabilities of the intelligence community to support efforts in the low-intensity conflict arena. The United States is either--

o Strategically monitoring intelligence prior to involvement or response.

o Aiding another government's efforts to combat one of the threats of low-intensity conflict.

o Supporting our own operations and combat commanders during times of military response.

These situations have the common need for integration and coordination of strategic and tactical efforts; knowledge of social, economic, and political factors affecting the situation; and development and integration of security and information-gathering functions/assets.[2]

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE MONITORING

Intelligence helps Washington policymakers identify United States international interests and appropriate tools of policy. Information is needed to enable military commanders and planners to advise policymakers and prepare for possible military employment. Operators, such as tactical military commanders and country team members, should not only know what the national decisionmakers know, but they should also have much more detailed information. The intelligence requirements of special operations forces must also be considered. They can encompass the entire spectrum of support from national systems to organic assets. Special operations may include missions ranging from unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, or psychological operations to civil affairs measures.

Although these requirements may be very different, the intelligence community must understand the needs of many different consumers. They should also recognize during this monitoring period that intelligence is needed early, intelligence assets need to be among the first committed, and those assets must be tailored to the situation. The first job of intelligence is to give early warning of potential low-intensity conflict situations and to provide information on

which to base a decision on whether to get involved and how--what mix of national powers will work to deal with the low-intensity conflict situation.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

During involvement in security assistance missions, the United States requires intelligence support from both United States and host country sources. Intelligence needs in support of counterinsurgency efforts extend beyond the hostile force to information on fundamental causes of unrest, on any external cause or connections with that unrest, and on the general capabilities of the host country. A distinct requirement exists for coordination, planning, and integration of all sources of information and all analytical expertise between not only United States military and civilian players but also host country military and civilian personnel.

SUPPORT DURING MILITARY RESPONSE

Finally, during crises or military intervention, intelligence support focuses on the needs of operational forces and combat commanders. In this kind of situation, which could encompass any of the low-intensity conflict elements, the same needs apply as in both previous situations. However, a need exists to support a wide range of United States forces whose capability to collect and process information varies greatly and whose vulnerability has increased with the size and visibility of the United States presence. Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations needed to support any military response must be planned and initiated well in advance of conventional force deployment. Rather than bury the tactical commander with large volumes of data, intelligence must meet specific mission and product criteria.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

As a result of employing the project methodology explained earlier in this report, intelligence issues have been developed in each of the above three areas. Many of those issues overlap into the other areas. They have been organized as follows to facilitate discussion:

- Integration and coordination of strategic and tactical efforts, to include a knowledge of the information needs at both levels, of the ability to process it, and of specific product criteria.

- Knowledge of social, economic, and political factors affecting the situation.

o Development and integration of security and information-gathering functions/assets.

These issues are discussed briefly here and in detail in Section E, Volume II.

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE INTEGRATION

The adequacy of HUMINT, the lack of unity, and the viability of the doctrinal division between tactical and strategic intelligence are problems associated with this issue area.

HUMINT is critically important for collection of information in the third world which, for the most part, does not have large, observable military formations and does not possess sophisticated electronic assets. Electronic assets cannot read minds and judge the character, strengths, and weaknesses of individuals involved. Knowing this is critical in low-intensity conflict. Both the Long Commission Report on the 1983 bombing of the Marine BLT headquarters in Lebanon and the Operation URGENT FURY assessment of the 1983 Grenada operation cite the weakness of United States HUMINT capabilities or operations.

The overall intelligence program within the United States country team suffers from a lack of unity of effort because of system fragmentation. Data gathered in Central America supports the position that country-level intelligence efforts in support of counterinsurgency operations appear to suffer from fragmentation. Countrywide coordination of intelligence activities and efforts to integrate United States and host nation intelligence efforts are two problem areas. The national agency representatives at the country team level do not always share information and often tend to run independent operations. Many of these same problems appear to exist at the regional level. This problem is complicated by the political nature of insurgency and the constant blurring of traditional concepts used to organize our thinking about intelligence.

A question exists as to whether or not the present division between tactical and strategic intelligence is viable and appropriate in all forms of low-intensity conflict. The boundaries between strategic and tactical intelligence are not easily discernible. This tactical/strategic distinction and doctrine supporting it can have debilitating organizational, functional, and operational consequences on United States low-intensity conflict operations.

Specific issues addressing this area are--

o E2--The Need To Identify the Unique Nature of Intelligence in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o E4--The Adequacy of HUMINT Capabilities To Support Low-Intensity Conflict.

o E5--The Adequacy of Training of Intelligence Personnel To Operate in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o E8--The Need To Coordinate and Integrate Intelligence Activities at the Regional and Country Team Levels.

Recommendations associated with these issues centered around--

o Revising current doctrine categorizing intelligence as either tactical or strategic.

o Recognizing the unique nature of low-intensity conflict.

o Emphasizing the importance of HUMINT.

o Increasing both foreign area and advisory skills.

o Improving intelligence at the country team level.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL FACTORS

The effectiveness of United States training and advisory efforts is, to an extent, determined by how well a host nation's social, economic, and political factors are understood. In support of counterinsurgency operations, the United States often deals with a host nation which lacks a functional military intelligence and counterintelligence system and structure. Training alone may be inadequate, and the United States role may be more of an advisory one. An analysis must be made of a host nation's intelligence needs, then a choice must be made as to what to train and whether our training/advisory efforts will foster dependence or cooperation. The United States military is in many cases unprepared or prohibited from providing the needed training.

The criticality of language capability is well accepted. The services have recognized problems in our present system and are making efforts to improve the situation. However, the fact remains that even in the case of Spanish, a common second language in the United States, problems are numerous. In the case of other, less well known languages, United States capabilities to support low-intensity conflict operations could be critically lacking and impact dramatically on our ability to successfully accomplish a mission.

These economic, social, and political factors are addressed in the following issues:

o E6--The Need for Adequate Language Training and Linguist Management To Support Low-Intensity Conflict.

o E7--The Constraints on Efforts To Train and Advise Host Country Intelligence Personnel.

In addressing these issues, the project developed recommendations directed toward--

o Obtaining and using language and area-trained personnel.

o Improving language and area training methods.

o Improving advisory capabilities in intelligence.

o Easing restrictions on advisory personnel.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ASSETS

Current intelligence training focuses on preparing personnel to operate in a mid- to high-intensity conflict. Training for these levels of warfare centers on systems management and unit command. Intelligence training in support of low-intensity conflict operations poses different challenges. The threat is different and a greater need exists for advisory skills, HUMINT, area/cultural knowledge, and language capability. Present training falls short in meeting these requirements.

An indications and warning (I&W) system should allow decisionmakers time to formulate policy or plans and to ensure appropriately enhanced intelligence support. However, the present Department of Defense system does not fully address growing insurgency situations or terrorist activity. It is oriented to identifying potential crises which have an immediate, major impact on United States national security. Insurgencies and terrorist incidents usually do not meet this criterion.

Foreign nations often do not have sufficient assets and systems to gather and produce required intelligence. The United States has policies, directives, laws, and individual agreements that address this problem. Most provide clear peacetime and wartime provisions but do not adequately address the in-between area of low-intensity conflict. Consequently, United States decisionmakers are put into situations they are not equipped to deal with. This is especially true in the terrorism counteraction arena.

The majority of intelligence collection systems in the joint inventory are optimized and prioritized against the mid- to high-intensity threat at the expense of the low end of the conflict spectrum. Most current systems are less efficient and often ineffective when used against a lightly equipped insurgent force or terrorist group employing off-the-shelf electronics gear.

Development of intelligence assets is discussed in the following issues:

o E1--The Need for Early Recognition of Growing Insurgencies or Potential Terrorist Activity.

o E3--The Adequacy of Intelligence Sharing in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations.

o E5--The Adequacy of Training of Intelligence Personnel To Operate in Low-Intensity Conflict.

o E8--The Need To Coordinate and Integrate Intelligence Activities at the Regional and Country Team Levels.

o E9--The Need To Develop and/or Acquire Appropriate Intelligence-Collection Systems for Low-Intensity Conflict.

Recommendations related to development of assets include--

o Training on the nature of low-intensity conflict.

o Improving the I&W system.

o Improving procedures for intelligence sharing.

o Increasing language, area training, and advisory expertise.

o Reinforcing capabilities at the country team level.

o Providing specialized equipment needed for the low-intensity conflict environment.

SUMMARY

The issues identified here are not a complete catalogue of intelligence issues. However, they are considered key to determining the success or failure of intelligence support to low-intensity conflict.

NOTES

[1]GEN (ret.) Paul F. Gorman, "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not Kola," FC 100-39 Low Intensity Conflict. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, December 1984.

[2]This discussion of the roles of intelligence was this author's interpretation of the framework of the intelligence challenge presented by LTC John M. Oseth, U.S. Army, in his article titled "Intelligence in Low Intensity Conflict." Naval War College Review (November-December 1984).

CHAPTER 13

LOGISTICS

GENERAL

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It incorporates supply and services, maintenance, transportation, ammunition, construction, and medical services. This chapter covers logistics support to United States forces only. An even more important aspect of logistics is that of training of host nation forces and support for development. These emerging roles are the basis for a new logistics concept. Developmental aspects of logistics are discussed in Chapter 11.

Logistics is a critical part of any operation. As one military historian noted:

> The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation. It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader's plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks.[1]

Mao Tse Tung and General Vo Nguyan Giap reiterated the belief that logistics has a decisive impact on the outcome of military campaigns. After the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu, General Giap said, "A strong rear is always the decisive factor for victory in a revolutionary war."[2]

The importance of logistics was demonstated during the early stages of the Vietnam conflict. As early as 1962, the establishment of a centralized United States logistical organization was proposed but disapproved. Had a system been established in country to help develop and strengthen the Vietnamese logistical system, United States combat forces may never have been required. Not until 1 April 1965 did the United States activate the 1st Logistical Command in Saigon to support United States forces. Prior to this, logistical support in Vietnam was fragmented. Once the command was activated, it found that the ports and airfields were

inadequate and that no logistics organization for supply, transportation, or maintenance troops existed in country. Logistical planning was further complicated because to establish an adequate logistics base, logistics troops and units were deployed at the same time rather than in advance of tactical forces.

OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The logistics function is a key element in the development of a United States response to low-intensity conflict. It has a vital and innovative role to play in support of host nation developmental activities and in its traditional role of supporting United States forces. An operational concept needs to be developed to provide the basis for development of both these roles.

Recent experiences have emphasized the importance of logistics. We must include logisticians early in the planning of any operation to ensure that the operations plan is effectively supported. During Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, no logisticians at either the JCS level or from the Joint Deployment Agency were involved in the planning of the operation. Consequently, the services had to fend for themselves, causing confusion and duplication of effort. Vice Admiral William Cowhill, JCS Director of Logistics at the time of the Grenada operation, said, "You've got to get the logistics in early. You get different forces from different services and it causes overlaps and shortages. Unless you get the staffs together early, you can't do the proper coordinating."[3]

In low-intensity conflict, United States combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) elements will play a major role. They will most likely support joint or combined operations and may provide support to, or receive support from, other United States government agencies. United States logistics elements must be task-organized to support the variety of missions included in low-intensity conflict.

Security assistance programs designed to develop and train host country CS/CSS elements will reduce the need for direct involvement of United States forces in combat operations. The United States will be successful when it can achieve its national objectives without the protracted commitment of forces in a combat role.

TECHNOLOGY

Technology must be appropriate to the environment. User-friendly, lightweight equipment that is highly reliable and easy to maintain and transport is required. The respective services are examining equipment needs. For instance, the Army Materiel Command's Minor and Unconventional Warfare Project is tasked with identifying equipment requirements in low-intensity conflict. We must recognize, however, that high technology does not always ensure success.

During the Vietnam conflict, United States reliance on high-technology weapons and our inability to resort to "primitive tactics" caused serious problems. These facts were key to our reaction to the tunnel warfare in Vietnam. The tunnels represented a key logistical network for the North Vietnamese. They housed arms factories, rice stores, hospitals, conference rooms, and headquarters. The tunnels enabled the guerrillas to pre-position arms and supplies, to assemble troops, to take cover from bombing attacks, and to literally disappear from view.

The United States attitude initially was that technological inferiority, poverty, and stupidity somehow came together inside the tunnels.[4] Rather, the tunnels reduced the enemy's logistical signature and prevented the United States from denying the enemy its logistical base--a critical factor in winning in counterinsurgency.

SUPPORTING UNITED STATES FORCES

In addressing logistics support to United States forces, five basic issues emerge:

- The use of CS and CSS as the lead elements in low-intensity conflict operations to pave the way for combat forces.

- The use of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to support battlefield logistics functions.

- The feasibility of local resupply as an alternative or as a supplement to the austere organic support capability of United States forces operating in undeveloped theaters.

- The effect of inadequate joint logistics doctrine on logistics support to deployed United States forces.

- The requirements for direct requisitioning of logistics support to a joint task force operating for an extended period.

Section F, Volume II, discusses in detail the concept for logistical support to United States forces. Chapter 11 and Section D deal with further ideas for the logistics role in an overall program for low-intensity conflict.

COMBAT SUPPORT/COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

The latest concept of "logistics preparation of the battlefield" provides new roles for CS/CSS. Logistics takes on an added dimension. No longer is it in its traditional and more passive role of the supporting force. Rather, it takes on an active role as the lead element into the theater, becoming the supported force or the logistical "nose" as opposed to the traditional logistical "tail."

This new role of "preparing the battlefield" is two-dimensional. The first, or direct role, is that of emplacing the logistics system and upgrading the area to prepare for the possible arrival of United States forces. Early deployment of CS/CSS is optimal in counterinsurgency operations and in preparation for an exercise involving United States forces. The second, or indirect role, is that of assisting the host country to develop its own logistical base, to provide training to indigenous forces, and to assist the host country in developing its infrastructure. This second role is discussed in more detail in Chapter 11.

Issue F1, The Use of Combat Support/Combat Service Support as the Lead Elements in Low-Intensity Conflict Operations, recommends doctrine be developed to support this latest concept and calls for testing of the emerging doctrine during exercises in Central America.

INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

Viable logistics intelligence is essential in low-intensity conflict. The United States Army Logistics Center (USALOGC) has developed a system to provide this data. A computer model, called "Foraging," provides the framework for logistics intelligence. The program is currently available but has not been incorporated into contingency planning.

Issue F2, The Use of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) To Support Battlefield Logistics Functions, makes recommendations concerning--

- o Responsibility for implementing the program.
- o Training on use of the system.
- o Incorporating the Foraging Model in contingency planning.

LOCAL RESUPPLY

Local support offers unique opportunities in low-intensity conflict. While military supplies and services may not be available on the local enconomy, the option needs to be exploited when possible to conserve critical air and sea assets during deployment. To do so requires assignment of qualified contracting personnel, flexibility in adapting procedures, and including this option in contingency and exercise planning. Problems in this area were demonstrated in Operation URGENT FURY.

Issue F3, The Feasibility of Local Resupply in Undeveloped Theaters, recommends--

o Modifying the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to provide the flexibility needed in contingency operations.

o Amending the joint planning process to provide for contracting.

o Continuing present United States Army Logistics Center efforts to provide for contracting.

o Providing necessary training procedures for contracting.

JOINT LOGISTICS DOCTRINE

A central theme throughout this report is joint operations in low-intensity conflict. Future conflicts will almost certainly require a coordinated effort from two or more services. Currently, no joint logistics doctrine exists. Logistics is a service responsibility and the planning is often accomplished in a vacuum. The result is often confusion and a duplication of effort.

Issue F4, The Need for Joint Logistics Doctrine for Low-Intensity Conflict, examines this issue and one specific doctrinal issue--the extended JTF. It makes recommendations concerning--

o Developing joint doctrine.

o Establishing uniformity in JTF assignment policies.

o The need for unit fill in JTFs.

DIRECT REQUISITIONING

Recent experiences in logistically supporting Army elements of a joint task force for extended periods highlight doctrinal deficiencies in the way the Army sustains itself in an austere theater. Supplies, especially repair parts, ordered through the existing supply system were not received in a timely manner. This affected the CONUS-based units deploying to JTF-B in Honduras in the performance of their mission. The Army logistics community is developing and testing a direct-supply requisitioning capability to provide needed supplies with the minimum order ship time. Much has been accomplished to date, but further refinement is needed to make this system deployable worldwide.

Issue F5, The Need To Improve Logistics Doctrine To Support a Joint Task Force Operating for an Extended Period, discusses direct requisitions and makes recommendations concerning--

o Examining performance of the remote area support pipeline.

o Determining the adequacy of current logistics procedures.

o Developing doctrine for support of United States forces in low-intensity conflict.

SUMMARY

The importance of logistics throughout low-intensity conflict is best summed up in the thought that military power can only achieve its full potential when operations and support (logistics) come together in unison. Strategy cannot succeed unless it can be executed tactically, and the tactics cannot succeed without modern and sustainable systems. Therefore, the strategy and tactics of combat operations depend on combat logistical support. In essence, they are inseparable.

NOTES

[1]Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

[2]GEN Vo Nguyan Giap, People's War, People's Army (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961).

[3]Michael Duffy, "Grenada: Rampant Confusion," Military Logistics Forum (July-August 1985): 20.

[4]John Margold and John Penycate, The Tunnels of Cu Chi (New York: Random House, 1985).

CHAPTER 14

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

GENERAL

Low-intensity conflict is a limited political-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, and psychological objectives. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned psychological activities. They are directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in peace and war to win support for political and military objectives.[1] It follows, therefore, that psychological operations play a prominent role in all types of low-intensity conflict. It is not unrealistic to expect PSYOP to play the major role in many situations. Low-intensity conflict is basically a struggle for people's minds, and success or failure frequently reflects the degree to which a particular group or policy is accepted by the people concerned.

Pyschological operations both neutralize and motivate. PSYOP can cause an enemy to stop fighting. PSYOP can get people to support a particular cause, movement, or government. PSYOP can directly contribute to the military effort in low-intensity conflict. Their greatest contribution, however, is in their potential to help defeat an enemy without having to fight him. This, as Sun Tzu stated, reflects the highest level of military proficiency. In low-intensity conflict, the antagonist who is most effective in conducting PSYOP generally will prevail.

DEFINING PSYOP ROLES

Psychological operations have a significant place in all low-intensity conflict operations, even though doctrine for terrorism counteraction, peacetime contingency, and peacekeeping operations have not been fully developed.

INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY

Psychological operations are absolutely essential in insurgency and counterinsurgency where success depends upon the support of the population. Without popular support, the very existence of a government attempting to fight an insurgency is jeopardized. The successful insurgent employs all his psychological resources to show that the government is weak, that the insurgents are strong, and that the revolutionary movement is ascendant and assured of victory. To defeat the insurgent, the government must retain, gain, or win back the support of its people. This usually includes protecting the

people from the insurgents, providing essential governmental services, implementing required governmental reforms, and neutralizing the insurgency. PSYOP is required for each of these functions because the government must convince its citizens that it can provide a more desirable alternative than the insurgents.

Thus, an insurgency is essentially a battle for minds, and in such a battle, psychological operations are more significant than firepower. However, in countering an insurgency, even the most effective psychological operations campaign cannot overcome continued governmental failure, which in itself has psychological effect. Successful psychological operations must have a good product to sell! Psychological operations alone, however, cannot win an insurgency for either side. They must be part of a well-coordinated national strategy and they must be credible.

United States Army counterinsurgency doctrine asserts the need for psychological operations: "The inclusion of psychological operations in the national strategy cannot be overemphasized."[2] Psychological operations conducted by both the insurgent and the besieged government are aimed at the population. Thus, they generally encompass a wide range of informational activities not included in the realm of United States military psychological operations. Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, in analyzing counterinsurgency, cited psychological operations among fourteen factors comprising the principal actions, programs, and behaviors essential to counterinsurgency:

> Psychological operations and the various information activities conducted by a threatened government can be of very great utility to its counterinsurgency effort. However, they cannot be effective in isolation or in opposition to well-known facts. They must be closely related to the totality of the government's program, have some basis in fact, and be generally truthful.[3]

United States Army counterinsurgency doctrine specifically calls for all military and nonmilitary actions to be considered in terms of their psychological impact, acknowledging that "this may require short-range tactical advantages be sacrificed to preserve long-range psychological objectives."[4] Numerous studies have confirmed the importance of political over military efforts. Insurgencies, therefore, are primarily political and psychological struggles; military considerations are secondary.

Insurgent warfare requires thorough coordination and unity of effort. In developing a coordinated counterinsurgency program, the United States must include psychological operations during all stages--before, during, and after the shooting. PSYOP must be prominent throughout the planning and implementation of national strategy. In short, although good psychological operations cannot guarantee success in insurgent warfare, success is unlikely without them.

The United States policy provides for aiming counter-insurgency PSYOP at four audiences: foreign countries and groups who might support insurgents; friendly governments (including their armed forces) the United States is supporting; insurgents; and the populace of the friendly governments. A national strategy is necessary that identifies United States goals and the behaviors and desired actions of each broad target group. From this, the United States should prepare PSYOP strategy. The PSYOP strategy outlines uses of United States military and civilian capabilities for disseminating information and United States activities to influence various groups. PSYOP strategy objectives include--

o Fostering global support for United States policy.

o Discrediting insurgent motives and activities.

o Fostering United States regional objectives.

o Encouraging ties among United States forces and the military forces and peoples of the region.

When United States forces are involved in an advisory and external presence role, additional objectives are--

o Promoting apolitical behavior among foreign military personnel.

o Encouraging foreign military personnel to treat their fellow citizens with decency and respect.

o Developing bonds among United States military and foreign population groups.

o Fostering a friendly foreign appreciation for, and skills in using, PSYOP.

If United States forces become involved in in-country combat, a further objective is to use theater PSYOP to gain support for the United States in-country presence and operations and for the supported government among the foreign populace and foreign elites. (Tactically, PSYOP should be used to support all in-country operations.)

TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

In terrorism counteraction, psychological operations provide a relatively unrecognized and hitherto seldom used capability: PSYOP can be employed without endangering innocent civilians. PSYOP planning must consider all possible results of a counteraction operation. Successful actions can be enhanced by effective PSYOP. Advertising the terrorists' failure and extolling the skills of those combating terrorism can significantly extend the psychological impact of a successful action. Conversely, the damaging effects of an unsuccessful counteraction can be mitigated by stressing the positive aspects of the operations while downplaying the negative.[5]

PSYOP can be used to counter terrorism in two basic ways: to discredit terrorists and the means they use to attain their ends and to support United States counterterrorist operations.

Campaigns to discredit terrorists should be global and should tailor specific themes and aims to different cultural groups. They could be used to brand terror as criminal behavior, promote foreign acceptance of the right to retaliate against terrorists, and promote opinion that countries, groups, or individuals who train, supply, support, encourage, protect, shelter, or hide terrorists are legitimately subject to reprisal.

PSYOP might also focus on developing global acceptance of the use of force, if necessary, to resolve terrorist-caused crises. In addition, population groups in the vicinity of the terrorists could appreciate that the terrorists are causing them danger. They could be made aware of alternative actions such as turning in terrorists to police or protesting government support of terrorists.

PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Peacetime contingency operations are frequently psychological operations in themselves, since they are undertaken specifically to affect the attitudes and behavior of a foreign audience. A show of force to demonstrate national strength and intention is a well-recognized psychological activity. The critical role of psychological operations in the planning, implementation, evaluation, and exploitation of peacetime contingency operations is indisputable. PSYOP could support overall United States objectives. Globally, PSYOP could promote an understanding of, and support for, United States policy objectives and military preparedness. Regionally, PSYOP could develop support for the United States, acceptance of United States operations in the region, and reluctance to support United States adversaries and their military presence

and operations in a particular country or region. Theater and tactical PSYOP could be used for the same purposes at all levels of conflict.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Psychological operations are obviously critical in peacekeeping operations where the attitudes and behavior of the local citizens and the disputing parties must be tolerant or supportive of the peacekeeping effort. Psychological operations are essential to ensure that the peacekeeping operations are fully understood and supported, or at least not hampered, by people within the peacekeeping force's area of responsibility. Even relatively minor changes in attitudes and behavior can have a major effect on the ability of the peacekeeping force to perform its delicate mission. Regional and global strategic PSYOP should promote understanding, acceptance, and support of United States goals and peacekeeping activities. Thus, PSYOP must be deeply involved in all stages of the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS ISSUES

In examining the role of PSYOP in low-intensity conflict, three major issues emerge:

- The need to understand the role of PSYOP.
- The need for centralized direction of all informational and PSYOP efforts.
- The need to improve the quality of PSYOP personnel, education, and research.

A general discussion of these issues follows, with detailed discussion of the individual issues in Section G, Volume II.

UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF PSYOP

The role of PSYOP--its purpose, objectives, methodologies and, most importantly, its potential to contribute to military success--is not well understood in the United States. Psychological operations are not limited to combat but can play a significant role in preventing combat and gaining objectives without fighting. PSYOP can also be cost-effective:

> Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are far, far less expensive than bullets, let alone shells and bombs. Then, too, by killing him you merely

> deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the government forces, the enemy again becomes one less, but the government forces become one more, a gain of plus two. So the use of (psychological operations) is not only a humane weapon of modern warfare but a singularly cost-effective one.[6]

The lack of appreciation for PSYOP directly affects the military in two ways: psychological operations are poorly covered, if at all, in service school curricula and officers and NCOs perceive this specialty to be career limiting. The DOD PSYOP Master Plan, published in April 1985, provides a framework for rebuilding PSYOP capabilities. The Army/Air Force Center for Low-Intensity Conflict offers a means to implement PSYOP initiatives affecting low-intensity conflict.

One has only to look to insurgents or communist organizations to see the value of PSYOP. Information and perception management are fundamental to their programs. Extensive talent and resources are devoted to psychological programs used to influence behavior and attract support. The use of terrorism as a psychological weapon has also been noted. Resorting to such extra-legal programs is prohibited by United States policy and can backfire when used by regularly constituted authorities (as opposed to "outlaw" forces). Nevertheless, psychological programs can and do work when they are well planned and executed.

This issue is discussed as Issue G1, The Need To Understand the Importance of PSYOP in Low-Intensity Conflict. It recommends--

o Including PSYOP instruction in DOD professional education programs.

o Pursuing the DOD-PSYOP Master Plan.

o Specifically examining the role of PSYOP in low-intensity conflict.

CENTRALIZING DIRECTION

Psychological operations in low-intensity conflicts are most effectively performed by the indigenous government. To put the PSYOP message across, these efforts may cross a very broad spectrum of activities, such as fairs, dances, street parties, rallies, and musical events. The United States role is primarily advising, teaching, and informing on techniques and equipment. The United States needs a well-coordinated and unified interagency effort, including DOD, DOS, CIA, USIA,

and USAID. Timely direction and guidance on PSYOP policy and execution at the national level would provide the necessary framework for such an effort. No formal mechanism for that direction currently exists. The DOD PSYOP Master Plan is a step in that direction for the military. The interdepartmental PSYOP committee described in the plan would provide for integration of nonmilitary and military efforts.

The need to centralize direction of PSYOP is discussed in greater detail at Issue G2, The Need for National-Level Direction and Guidance of PSYOP in Low-Intensity Conflict. Recommendations call for:

o Establishing a joint PSYOP center.

o Establishing an interagency PSYOP committee under the NSC.

ASSESSING PERSONNEL, EDUCATION, AND RESEARCH

The DOD PSYOP Master Plan calls for a thorough assessment of current procedures and programs for the acquisition, training, retention, and progressive development of PSYOP personnel. This assessment should lead to the development of a comprehensive PSYOP program. Hopefully, this will overcome the current reluctance of career professional military personnel to concentrate in the PSYOP field. The inclusion of PSYOP in the development of exercise objectives and scenarios will make all levels of the military more aware of the proper use of, the need for, and the benefits provided by PSYOP. In low-intensity conflict, the PSYOP professional must combine foreign area expertise with advisory skill and apply these with some appreciation for the behavioral sciences. The application of behavioral science in developing PSYOP strategies is essential for PSYOP success but is largely ignored. Few people skilled in these disciplines devote research efforts to security-related studies. Policy, training, and practice suffer. Research, evaluation, and the scientific exploration of PSYOP must be pursued.

Management of PSYOP assets is discussed in the following issues:

o G3--The Need for PSYOP Personnel Incentives and Training.

o G4--The Need for an Effective Proponent for Army PSYOP.

Recommendations include--

o Pursuing recommendations of the PSYOP Master Plan.

o Applying behavioral science concepts to PSYOP.

o Associating the United States Army PSYOP officer career field with the foreign area specialty.

o Resolving PSYOP proponency questions.

SUMMARY

PSYOP can be a viable instrument for the prosecution of national and military policy. The United States needs to develop a means to articulate national policies and objectives. Improvements in military PSYOP capabilities, including training, personnel development, and academic analysis, are a start that, if successful, will greatly enhance this long-neglected, yet potentially effective weapon in the United States arsenal.

NOTES

[1]JCS Publication 1 describes United States psychological operations as: "Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidating PSYOP and battlefield psychological activities." Psychological warfare is "the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives." (8 November 1985).

[2]Department of Defense, FM 100-20 Low Intensity Conflict (Fort Bragg, NC: Special Warfare Center, 1981).

[3]Douglas S. Blaufarb and George Tanham, "Fourteen Points: A Framework for the Analysis of Counterinsurgency" (Vienna, VA: BDM Corporation, 31 July 1984).

[4]See note 2.

[5]Michael T. McEwen, "Psychological Operations Against Terrorism: The Unused Weapon," Military Review (January 1986).

[6]COL Tony Jeapes, SAS: Operation Oman (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1980).

CHAPTER 15

PUBLIC INFORMATION AND SUPPORT

GENERAL

Two public information functions have a significant impact on operations in low-intensity conflict:

o The need to gain and maintain popular support for a government's ongoing efforts.

o The requirement to keep the public informed of ongoing operations.

Because of the long-term nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, emphasis understandably is on gaining and maintaining public support--both in the United States and in the host nation concerned. During peacetime contingency and counterterrorism operations, the emphasis is on keeping the public informed without unduly jeopardizing the operation.

The need for government agencies, particularly the military, to understand the role and functions of the media is increased in low-intensity conflict, where the media has the potential either to hamper or to enhance chances for success. The military must recognize the crucial part the media plays in gaining popular support for the military mission in all categories of low-intensity conflict. The role of the media in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is especially critical.

Since the media can be expected to function during all forms of low-intensity conflict, the government agencies and departments must establish close, cooperative relationships in which both the media and the agency or department benefit and are mutually supportive. In the case of the military, it must recognize that it cannot control the media. Moreover, an antagonistic relationship with the press must be conscientiously avoided. A working cooperation between public affairs officials and the media can go far in ensuring that essential security restrictions on news dissemination are understood and complied with by the media. Mutual respect will be especially helpful in establishing and enforcing reasonable essential censorship guidelines, as well as media self-restraint without censorship in controversial situations. These comments are not intended to infer that the press is obligated to be supportive. Indeed, it is the role of the press to criticize, if necessary, or to be supportive, if appropriate.

GAINING AND MAINTAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT

Although gaining and maintaining public support are extremely important, only limited attention is devoted to that effort in this chapter. Distinctions between PSYOP and public information have resulted in serious gaps in an organizational and doctrinal base. These gaps prevent adequate treatment of issues such as the training of host nation public information personnel to mobilize popular support for governmental efforts; the building of a host nation public information program; and the persuasion of the host nation public to fully support an antiterrorism campaign.

Establishing a closer relationship between PSYOP and public information should in no way be directed toward subverting the congressional mandate that DOD public information resources cannot be used for "propaganda" purposes. Efforts should be directed toward mobilizing populations, while maintaining credibility in the process.

One expert in the PSYOP field noted the requirement to refer to the whole area, from public information to psychological warfare, as part of the psychological powers of a host nation. He stated the need to establish terms of reference for discussing these powers. As he indicated, "Confusion over terminology has probably done more than any other single factor to hamper United States efforts to harness America's psychological power and devise effective psychological efforts."[1]

Public information, public diplomacy, psychological operations, and psychological warfare can be viewed as individual parts of a continuum of information. They are defined below:

o Public information is information which is released or published for the primary purpose of keeping the host nation public fully informed, with the intent to gain their understanding and support.[2]

o Public diplomacy is the use of international information programs together with cultural exchanges to create ideas and attitudes which support foreign policy and national goals. It includes international political activities used in conjunction with information, cultural, and educational programs to develop democratic infrastructures. A public affairs component is used to explain foreign policy initiatives and programs to the general public and to gain their support.[3]

o Psychological operations include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military,

economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.[4]

o Psychological warfare is the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.[5]

Because this is a continuum and also represents the movement from dealing with friendly to hostile populations, United States military public affairs personnel are extremely reluctant to associate with the PSYOP community and bridge the gap between information and persuasion. However, if we are to be successful in supporting a host country fighting an insurgency, that bridge must be crossed. Put another way, public affairs and psychological operations have to be in touch with the United States mission and with the other's part of that mission in order to achieve maximum effectiveness.

In an insurgency environment, public affairs assumes an especially significant role. In countering an insurgency, third country governmental responsibilities expand to include mobilizing public opinion and fostering national unity. Third world public information programs stress persuasion over information. The distinction between psychological operations and public information blurs, with the PSYOP and public affairs roles in a host nation often merging. The traditional role of the media remains, but that role may be considerably altered and expanded as a third world government mobilizes its resources against the insurgent threat. The media becomes a major instrument in the government's efforts to foster patriotism and encourage national unity. Public affairs is greatly facilitated by a competent, responsive, effective government.

In countering insurgency, the government has a requirement to get its message to the people. It needs to publicize its successes and stress its responsiveness to the people's needs and desires. Likewise, in order to maintain credibility, it must acknowledge failures and describe corrective actions. The people must know and appreciate the government's efforts to respond to legitimate grievances. Effective developmental programs and popular reforms will have limited effect in building popular support if the people are not told about them. Also the government must counter hostile propaganda through every means possible.

Countries coping with an insurgency frequently lack an established, effective, and independent media. The role of the media is often undefined, underdeveloped, and unclear. The institutionalization of an effective media can add significantly to a government's ability to cope with insurgency. It can play a prominent role in countering hostile propaganda, encouraging governmental effectiveness, and gaining, maintaining, or regaining popular support for the government.

The United States may advise and assist friendly countries in the public affairs effort. Since public affairs and psychological operations are often combined in third world countries faced with insurgency, the United States may be required to provide both PSYOP and public affairs assistance and advisors. Present organizational arrangements within the United States do not facilitate a unified approach by these two activities as part of a security assistance effort.

KEEPING THE PUBLIC INFORMED

In the wake of the successful operation in Grenada, both the American military and the news media have done a great deal of soul-searching. The decision not to permit a host of news gatherers to assault the island along with combat forces resulted in hours of analysis and commentary and reams of newsprint. It also resulted in some basic reforms.

Central to these reforms is the work of the Sidle Panel, convened by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and charged with examining, in the post-Grenada climate, the relationship between the military and the news media in a low-intensity conflict situation. The Panel met in the spring of 1984, and its report was released publicly in August of that year.

The conclusion of the Sidle Panel was that an obligation exists to provide maximum news media coverage of United States military operations consistent with military security and the safety of United States forces. Fundamental to any such consideration, however, is the basic concern of the operational commander to carry out his primary mission with a minimum loss of life. Also, because of the need for operational security for his troops and because the military often cannot devote limited resources to the support of news media, the operational commander is naturally reluctant to have the media "underfoot" during an operation. One problem may be that untimely or inaccurate information published or broadcast by the news media can interfere with resolution of an incident, foreclose options for dealing with it, or unwittingly provide intelligence to an enemy. This is especially true in a terrorist incident with

"live" or frequent news media coverage. It can result in the perception that the military is not supportive of basic First Amendment rights, with the consequence being an "us versus them" adversary mentality. Preconceptions such as this, once formed, are difficult, if not impossible, to dislodge. Consequently, if one waits until the decision is made to employ military force before formulating public information plans, it will be too late to provide first-hand news reports on the military activity to the American people.

We need, therefore, to explore new ways to work closer with the news media and to solve these problems long before the conflict breaks out. This is particularly true in a fragile world filled with violence and terrorism which threatens public order, human lives, and international and national interests. The military and the media must reduce the adversarial nature of their relationship and cooperate within mutually agreed upon ground rules.

There has been much discussion since the Sidle Panel of ground rules and pooling of media assets under the auspices of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Indeed, much progress has been made in this area, and actions are underway to continue to refine the DOD news media pool concept through a variety of deployments and other exercises. But a question remains of balance between the goals of informing the public (via the media) and ensuring troop safety, public safety, and operational security.

Central to the pooling concept should be a clear understanding that while it may be a nece sity, a "lesser of evils," in certain instances some res ictions on the transmission of news might be necessary However, such restrictions should be applied only for military security or safety reasons. The military has a responsibility to exercise good public information skills during a conflict to avoid sending misleading signals to friend and foe alike. Conflicting statements or news media perceptions of government confusion or disarray could assist an enemy and confuse our friends.

To have established the pool concept and to have initiated public information planning in Washington are not enough. A need remains to further refine and detail the planning factors for news media pool deployment such as logistics, communication, and transportation needs, particularly at the field or fleet level. As a commander's plans are developed locally, each planning element should include the possibility that news media will be deployed. As operations orders and plans are written, they should include provisions to routinely support the media.

Of concern is the development of workable ground rules under which the media (first the pool, subsequently a larger group) would operate in the area of operations.

Analysis of the issues regarding public affairs in low-intensity conflict scenarios reveals a long history of working with the print media but a very short history of working with television cameras employed on the military battlefield. Many commanders have very serious concerns about TV coverage of contingency operations, particularly when they can be coupled with real- or near-real-time transmission, such as coverage from Beirut of the 1985 TWA terrorist hijacking.

Video coverage and real-time transmission have added a new dimension to news coverage and additional complexities to maintaining operational security and safety of friendly forces. Images on a video screen, in real time, can compromise security in ways that printed stories or still pictures cannot. This is not to say that TV cameramen would compromise security intentionally or ignore requests by military escorts. Rather, the very real possibility exists that accidental or unintentional compromise may occur.

Military and news media planners have not yet come to grips with this modern phenomenon and they must. It may be necessary to have some kind of on-scene military security review procedure, before video transmission, to maintain operational security. This should, of course, be clearly spelled out in the agreed-upon ground rules.

JCS is acting to incorporate a public affairs planning cell in their crisis staffing procedures. Action is also on-going to look at each contingency operation in the light of various public affairs planning factors, including--

o Policy on release of information before, during, and after an operation (this policy can refer to basic ground rules agreed upon by the media/military in advance).

o Activation orders for "contingency news media pool," including date, time, place, and so forth.

o Dedication of military air and/or other transportation for a pool to and from the operational area.

o Dedication of military ground or air transportation within operational areas.

o Dedication of field communications assets likely to be needed by public affairs officers to communicate with commanders and higher authority. This is a firm requirement

to allow commanders and higher authority to be kept informed by situation report (SITREP) of press corps in the area. It also allows feedback to the field commander of what is being printed and aired in CONUS, based upon news field reports.

o Designation of public affairs escorts, including providing command.

o Designation of general press briefing schedules, including briefing location requirements. Briefing locations may be within operational areas and/or at other support areas just outside.

o Timing for introduction of larger (nonpool) press corps.

o Field accreditation rules for pool and larger press corps.

An additional factor is the profound effect of "two-dimensional" or "multidimensional" press coverage of terrorists actions or low-intensity warfare situations as we have seen particularly in the Middle East. The United States press now has the technological capability and the means to cover both sides--the terrorists and the victims or the various factions engaged in a war such as we saw in Lebanon. Meanwhile the "other side," be it a terrorist or insurgency group, sees the media--particularly television--as a propaganda means to convey its threats or message. This on-the-scene, real-time coverage does raise the issue of censorship (or as some prefer--security review), an issue the military has been able to avoid since World War II. Can separate ground rules be worked out for the broadcast/telecast media? Should separate ground rules be established to avoid compromising security of United States forces and operations? Additionally, the press now has the means to get to the place of conflict without being taken by the United States forces. Should ground rules be developed to control press access in those situations? All these questions require resolution.

There is no question that coverage of low-intensity conflict by the news media will occur. It remains to be seen whether that coverage will be objective and accurate. But that should not deter the military from the level of planning and detailed execution needed to ensure that, whenever possible, the American people receive a maximum amount of information (consistent with operational security). Simply put, the media will cover an operation with or without the United States military's help. Without cooperation, there is only one source to which they can turn and that is the enemy or friends of the enemy. In the past few years, the enemy has become very skillful in using

the news media. Planners must remember that television coverage of a conflict can often turn a tactical field victory into a strategic public opinion loss.

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

While public information contains numerous areas of concern, an overriding need exists to develop the means for--

o Improving public official relationships with the media to make positive use of media coverage.

o Assisting host nations in developing public information systems.

This broad development question is discussed in Volume II as Issue H1, The Need To Use Media Coverage and the Free Press To Further United States Operational Objectives. It recommends an examination of the relationship between PSYOP and public affairs personnel involved in counterinsurgency operations. Other issues can be dealt with only after the system is examined with these goals in mind.

SUMMARY

In a democracy, the government and the media share a responsibility to inform, to explain, and to report. To fulfill this responsibility, both the government and the media must be credible, well informed, responsive, and accessible. A democratic government has numerous responsibilities and often must balance the need to keep its people informed with the need to limit information in the interest of operations security, troop safety, and public safety. The media must also balance its desire to inform with responsible professional reporting standards which reflect an understanding of the proper role of a free press in an effective democracy.

In a low-intensity conflict environment, a responsible government encourages, through its public affairs activities, accurate, responsible reporting, to include essential facts, lucid explanations of government policies, and trustworthy coverage of news events. Public affairs responsibilities include ensuring that accurate, reliable information is made available to the media. Public affairs professionals may also have to ensure that the media has access to people, places, and events necessary in the performance of its duties. In low-intensity conflict, government public affairs officials must be especially prompt in providing responses to media criticism of governmental policies and actions. They must

respond promptly when media criticism is unjustified or incorrect to ensure that the government's position is properly understood. Moreover, when media criticism is justified, the government must be similarly responsive and correct its errors promptly or change its policies as necessary. Public affairs officials must ensure that the government's efforts to respond to justified criticism are known and publicized. In short, effective public affairs are essential in winning popular support for a government involved in low-intensity conflict.

NOTES

[1]Melvin E. Kriesel, "Psychological Operations: A Strategic View," Essays on Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985).

[2]JCS Pub 1, The Dictionary of Military and Associate Terms (8 November 1985).

[3]See note 1.

[4]See note 2.

[5]Ibid.

PART FOUR

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER 16

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

GENERAL

Low-intensity conflict is neither war nor peace. It is an improbable compilation of dissimilar phenomena that, like the Cheshire cat--which seems to fade in and out as you look at it, leaving only its mocking smile--bedevils efforts at comprehension.

The Low-Intensity Conflict Project found that involvement in this form of conflict has often been an exercise in ambiguity. The unfamiliar nature of the environment, the diversity and murkiness of the threats, the uncertainty as to our own role and purpose, and conflicting views and varied institutional interests have created an atmosphere that encourages confusion and inaction at best and mistake and blunder at worse.

Furthermore, a historical survey of United States reactions to low-intensity conflict is replete with permutations of departmental rivalries and suspicions. Institutional obstacles, the battle for budgets, and the military views of what are appropriate missions have historically hampered our ability to respond to low-intensity conflict.

However, the beginning of wisdom sometimes requires that we step aside and try to see ourselves as others see us. Thus, the report cites a number of historical failures and intra-governmental obstacles to developing a clear, consistent response.

Planning, training, and constantly renewed insight, while not precluding failure, increase the possibility of success at any level of conflict. The importance of these factors is an underlying theme of this report, moving from a general appreciation of the nature of the problem to more particular observations on responses.

The diversity and fluctuating nature of the elements of low-intensity conflict require such an effort at comprehension that finding appropriate responses is indeed not easy. Yet coming to terms with low-intensity conflict is essential to the defense of national interests and the survival of values important to this nation and its allies.

This analysis of low-intensity conflict reinforces several key truths:

o No new and simple fixes exist to the old and complex problem of low-intensity conflict.

o A comprehensive approach is required rather than piecemeal fixes.

o A premium is placed on civil-military cooperation at every echelon.

o The procedures, organizations, and equipment designed for mid- or high-intensity conflict are not necessarily suitable to low-intensity conflict.

o The host nation must be primarily responsible for action in counterinsurgency.

The greatest impediment to our understanding of low-intensity conflict has been our tendency to compartmentalize our thinking along organizational and institutional lines developed for traditional forms of warfare. Our reliance upon these traditional structures and values places us at a certain disadvantage in the low-intensity conflict environment which our adversaries have exploited for over twenty years.

Typically, military operations in low-intensity conflict are a necessary adjunct to social, economic, and psychological dimensions of what is basically an intense political struggle. Our command and control machinery must, therefore, provide the mechanism for skillful orchestration of military means in support of objectives that are far from wholly military.

Traditionally, we have planned and programed for a high-intensity threat--an approach that has successfully deterred conventional war. In low-intensity conflict, however, we have simply made do as we could, witness the virtual invisibility that low-intensify conflict has in the military planning documents. This imbalance must be rectified.

SIGNIFICANT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT ISSUES

The conceptual portions of this report (Chapters 4-7) develop the essential features of the various types of low-intensity conflict. The functional area chapters (Chapters 8-15) with their supporting sections in Volume II identify numerous problems related to low-intensity conflict in each functional area. Those problems, which cut across types of low-intensity conflict and functional area lines, can be

grouped into four general categories. The following discussion synthesizes under these categories the issues raised in the functional area chapters and dealt with in detail in Volume II. The four general categories are--

- o Understanding the problem
- o Unifying the effort
- o Executing the mission
- o Sustaining the effort

UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

A central theme of this report is the need to better understand the nature of low-intensity conflict, the environment in which it occurs, the specific nature of the threat, and the problems associated with developing an effective response. To achieve understanding, we must--

- o Seriously evaluate the pecularities of each category of low-intensity conflict and each individual involvement.
- o Be sensitive to both the political and the military nature of the question.
- o Consider the influence of the United States internal environment, public opinion, and the orientation, role, and capabilities of United States institutions.
- o Acknowledge a variety of constraints.

To understand the issues involved in low-intensity conflict, a sophisticated public awareness effort is needed. We need to educate not only the United States public but also the various branches of government.

The nature of low-intensity conflict is such that its principles are not often appreciated throughout the United States system of agencies charged to deal with it. Thus, there must be programs to educate the system on the subject of low-intensity conflict. Understanding, for example, involves an appreciation of the characteristics of the local environment, its language, culture, people, and so on. This type of warfare requires trained, experienced individuals who not only possess the relevant technical skills but who also know how to apply them in a given situation. Yet the system does not do a good job in training cultural or language capabilities along with technical skills; and it often fails to match these, when they do exist, with assignments. The Army, for example, is the only

service that regularly trains officers in foreign area expertise and even this program is subject to fluctuating support and sudden cutbacks.

A need exists for programs to train the relevant "social" skills and to coordinate these with job requirements. Strong disagreement exists within the government as to what actions civilian and military agencies and departments should take to prevent, deter, or confront activities that threaten United States interests in the low-intensity conflict environment. Awareness of the problem must also extend throughout the relevant elements of the government. This means even the rank and file of military units must learn to understand the particulars inherent in various types of low-intensity conflict missions. Developing such an awareness requires doctrine and training programs that establish the concepts and guide the execution of the effort. Joint and interagency doctrine is lacking in many areas and needs to be created.

Neither the public diplomacy nor the internal training and development efforts can be expected to succeed without a clearly enunciated policy and a fully developed strategy for dealing with the various forms of low-intensity conflict. While general policy statements exist, the machinery to implement that policy (a comprehensive strategy and established procedures) is lacking.

UNIFYING THE EFFORT

Responses to low-intensity conflict require a civil-military partnership. The need for intimate cooperation among civilians and the military is profound and fundamental, whether at the United States national level, within the corresponding institutions of a country supported by the United States, or between the United States and the host nation.

United States involvement in low-intensity conflict, particularly counterinsurgency, will normally consist of in-country assistance to an ally. The United States contribution, in most circumstances, comprises political and advisory support, training, and materiel. In this support role the United States faces a number of obstacles, ranging from the possible lack of a local infrastructure and personnel capable of receiving United States assistance or sustaining the effort in question, to inappropriate or too expensive United States equipment for the local environment. It is also hampered by our own cumbersome and ultimately confusing system for supervising and regulating the support effort. A need exists to resolve these problems, to coordinate the effort, to develop the appropriate skills and equipment, and to streamline the process.

Gaining control of our system is a requisite to teaching others how to organize their own effort. We teach by example as well as by program. Passing on an understanding of the principle of unity of effort is an integral part of teaching others the knack of dealing with low-intensity conflicts, particularly insurgency. Learning to discipline our own effort is an important step in that direction.

Although various segments of the report underscore the importance of coordination and cooperation throughout, chapters on development and command and control focus on the most salient features needed to bring cohesion to the United States effort. Low-intensity conflict requires a multidisciplinary, cross-functional, joint, interagency, and combined effort to achieve success. In order to mount such an effort the United States must develop the mechanisms to execute the necessary programs and to increase the coherent collaboration among various agencies.

The need for coordination also extends to the regional level, where the unified commander is in charge of United States theater military forces. (To the extent that a corresponding regional control of diplomatic affairs has been established, it is the regional Assistant Secretary of State in Washington, DC.) The regional military commander supports a number of individual ambassadors, and the success of this relationship is contingent upon the idiosyncrasies of each individual country's needs and the personalities of the principals involved (respective unified commander and ambassadors). Yet, low-intensity conflict has regional dimensions that go beyond the perspective of individual ambassadors and their country team, as well as beyond the responsibilities of a single unified commander. Developing a system for regional unity therefore deserves consideration. (See Issue A17, Volume II.)

This, plus efforts to strengthen the in-country authority of the country team, is important in coordinating the overall United States effort which, when allowed to follow its fragmented course of the moment, can overwhelm an ally with conflicting methodologies, advice, and counsel. A poorly coordinated approach also permits the local authorities to play off various United States elements against one another to squeeze out inappropriate aid or to evade constraints. The resulting loss of control undermines United States policy.

Institutional and systemic obstacles to achieving cohesion include insufficient overall direction and strategy, ad hoc structures, poor mechanisms for interagency coordination, inappropriate weapons and materiel for low-intensity conflict,

a complex and cumbersome regulatory system, the inherent differences among allies, and institutional resistance to changing cherished practices. To respond to these problems we must rationalize the legal aspects of United States assistance programs, streamline the security assistance effort, reinforce the country team approach, develop a United States unified regional effort, and establish a national-level coordinating agency to supervise the overall low-intensity conflict effort.

Low-intensity conflict requires a partnership, but inter- and intradepartmental rivalry, United States host nation differences, and a welter of contradictory or inhibiting guidelines and laws have the cumulative effect of making policy incoherent and inefficient. Some "fixes" for these problems are noted in Volume II, but ultimately the agencies and departments that make up the United States effort must come to appreciate and support the need to pull together. Integration is vital to an effective low-intensity conflict response. The whole must be more than the sum of its parts.

EXECUTING THE MISSION

Concurrent with the requirement to further our understanding of low-intensity conflict and develop a unified effort is a need to improve our ability to operate in the low-intensity environment. Improving our ability to execute operations in low-intensity conflict falls into two basic categories:

o Understanding how to execute by developing concepts, doctrine, and procedures.

o Developing a ready and capable force by improving training, organization, and materiel.

The project identified the need to define the roles and missions for military PSYOP, civil affairs, logistics, intelligence, and combat forces in low-intensity conflict. The need to integrate the effort and to provide overall guidance is also noted. This requires developing both joint doctrine and separate service and agency doctrines that are compatible and flow directly from National Command Authority guidance.

First and foremost, the new emphasis on the G5 and concepts for using combat support and combat service support forces as operational elements must be fully developed. We also need to rely more heavily on decentralized command of tactical operations. In counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasis on involvement of the population in the development process must be increased. Examination of the military role in civil

aspects of counterinsurgency should continue. Finally, the role of public information and the relationship between PSYOP and public affairs must be emphasized.

Training and equipment also must be developed to meet the needs of doctrine. This requires organization, training programs, and materiel development. Recommendations identify requirements for--

- o Area expertise.
- o Improved human intelligence.
- o Development and collection capabilities.
- o The revitalization of special operations forces.
- o The training of ground combat forces in the nature of low-intensity conflict.
- o The development, procurement, and supply of materiel--air platforms, communications, equipment, and so forth--suited to the low-intensity conflict environment.
- o The integration and training of United States forces and their host nation counterparts.

Such programs are merely isolated entities able to generate only random effects. The unifying thread for execution, for placing all these elements in proper relation to one another, is coordination.

At the moment no overall mechanism exists for coordinating and supervising the coherent application of diverse policies. Procedures, terminology, and concepts for organization, for viewing the problem, and for organizing a response vary radically across the government; and coordination between departments is often ephemeral or ad hoc. Such coordination that exists usually results in compromises that achieve less than desirable results. This is one of the costs of our bureaucratic and functional organization, but the absence of a consistent pattern in low-intensity conflict is the most inhibiting element in achieving an effective response.

To establish required coordination, the United States needs to develop a clear national strategy for low-intensity conflict and to establish a national supervisory body with oversight responsiblity to coordinate the diverse programs necessary to implement national strategy. These programs include security assistance, logistics, materiel development, and training. The supervisory body should also provide guidance in the areas

of organization, training, materiel, concepts, doctrine, and procedures. It should have the authority to bring the disparate departments and agencies together to meet these needs.

SUSTAINING THE EFFORT

Low-intensity conflict is much like war in the sudden demands it can place on a system attuned to a peacetime environment. Its diversity strains the system because it demands flexibility, a surge capability, and innovative approaches to deal with unexpected or idiosyncratic requirements that require materiel and methods different from those typical to United States needs. The low-intensity conflict environment, in short, places unique burdens on the United States in sustaining its own or an allied effort. The difficulty of obtaining allied support and the inherent nature of a free media make sustainment even more difficult.

As noted throughout the report, the United States role in low-intensity conflict will largely involve providing support to allied forces in their struggle. Since this means indirect and limited United States involvement and the need to gear such involvement to the demands of particular situations, the United States will most frequently provide materiel, training, and similar forms of noncombatant support. Thus, the sustainment aspects of the United States role are particularly important. The demands for supporting someone else are varied and they require a system able to respond efficiently to such demands.

Two basic support needs can be identified with low-intensity conflict regardless of their individual idiosyncracies: sustainment of United States forces that may be required to perform peacetime contingency, counterterrorism, or peacekeeping operations; and support to third world or other nations or groups in their struggles. Variations in these basic requirements can be unexpected and unique to each situation. Uniqueness, in this sense, means the development of materiel and human resources that are appropriate to the circumstances, available when needed, and supportable quickly when employed.

One difficulty the United States has, for example, in supporting third world allies is an equipment inventory that is ill-suited to third world environments, either because it is too complex or too expensive. Our support system is also cumbersome and unresponsive to surge needs.

The role of combat support and combat service support is also important. The normal conception of the role of such forces in relation to combat must be reversed in many low-intensity conflict situations. Even if this principle

is recognized, however, the lack of appropriate, transferable skills and equipment will undermine the most efficient delivery and support system.

Sustainment goes beyond materiel. It also includes various other considerations. The importance of legislation and the creation of coordinating bodies to help rationalize the security assistance effort have already been noted, but it is also important to develop the human assets and the doctrines to enable the programs to function. This involves an emphasis on training and on employing people with the appropriate skills to carry out the effort at all levels. Sustainment requires flexibility and adaptability on the part of individuals and organizations.

SUMMARY

Constraint, ambiguity, interdepartmental quarrels, inconsistency, seeming systemic incapacity, and unpredictability are the realities of the current United States approach to low-intensity conflict. This reflects the complexity of this alien form of combat. This is not the first time such a study has been made, nor will it be the final word. The answers it provides are at best partial.

Although one cannot point to failure in a low-intensity conflict as in any way comparable to failure in general war, the cumulative effect of several such failures may be just as great. No situation is so hopeless or so irremediable as to discourage response or even preclude hasty, ad hoc actions, but chance favors the well prepared. This study cannot predict the low-intensity conflicts that may require a United States response, the most it can do is to suggest prudence in committing ourselves and to stress the importance of how we respond, once involved.

APPENDIX A

CHARTER

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

1 July 1985

CHARTER

FOR

JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT

1. Purpose. To establish the mission, scope, and concept for the Joint Low Intensity Conflict Project as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army and supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Mission. The project will identify and analyze civil-military activities which contribute to the success or failure of strategies and operations in low intensity conflict.

3. Scope. The project will examine worldwide low intensity conflict issues with a focus on Central American conflicts in order to develop a common low intensity conflict data base, develop "lessons learned," and identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for low intensity conflicts.

4. Concept.

a. The team, operating under a civilian/military steering group, will be based at HQ TRADOC. Team members will operate from HQ TRADOC, sub-group locations and home stations, taking maximum advantage of computer based teleconferencing. A five-person cell will be forward based in USSOUTHCOM for 179 days temporary duty.

b. The project will be conducted as follows:

(1) Phase I. Compilation of a centralized data base of ongoing and recent projects, approaches and products related to all levels of low intensity conflict. Historical material relevant to the project will be included.

(2) Phase II. Write detailed research plan.

(3) Phase III. Conduct research and analysis and write white papers.

(4) Phase IV. Write and publish final report and integrate into Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) process.

5. Coordinating Instructions. HQ TRADOC will coordinate the cooperation of those commands, departments, and agencies involved in the Low Intensity Conflict Project. These arrangements will include authority for project members to make direct contact with all individuals and organizations that promise to improve the quality and authority of the findings. This authorization will include access to classified and unclassified materials as well as the authority to reproduce documents to include ongoing study efforts.

6. Responsibilities.

a. The Chief of Staff of the Army directed that the project be conducted.

b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, has DA staff responsibility for the project.

c. The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Working Group approved by JCS will coordinate joint participation in the project.

d. Commander TRADOC is the DA executive agent to conduct the project.

e. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, TRADOC is the TRADOC executive agent.

WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
General, United States Army
Commanding

APPENDIX B

DIRECTIVE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

1 July 1985

JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT PROJECT

PROJECT DIRECTIVE

1. BACKGROUND. In April 1985, DA tasked TRADOC to form an analysis and observation team to identify, analyze, and codify the factors which contribute to the success or failure in worldwide low intensity conflict. The focus is on Central America, and is to include USSOUTHCOM's work and personnel. In May, 1985, the JCS requested CINCs, the Services, and OJCS to support and participate in the Army's effort. CG TRADOC developed the general approach for the project. The project will be joint and interagency in scope.

2. PURPOSE. The project will examine worldwide low intensity conflict issues with a focus on Central American conflicts in order to develop a common low intensity conflict data base, develop "lessons learned," and identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for low intensity conflicts.

3. REFERENCES. The project will develop references and a bibliography as a priority effort.

4. PROJECT SPONSOR: Department of the Army.

5. PROJECT AGENCY: HQ TRADOC.

6. PROJECT MONITOR: HQ DCSOPS.

7. TERMS OF REFERENCE:

a. Problem. There is a disagreement within the United States as to what actions civilian-military agencies should take when confronted with low intensity conflicts. A consensus within the government must be reached concerning the scope and conduct of low intensity conflict operations if U.S. resources are to be efficiently used. Particularly lacking are a common data base; a systematic approach to the acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of data on civilian agencies' responsibilities and policies; an appropriate military force structure; and joint doctrine.

b. Objective. The project involving four tasks will examine worldwide low intensity conflict issues and include a focus on Central American conflicts.

(1) Review published, ongoing, and recently completed low intensity related studies to provide a central data base.

(2) Develop "lessons learned" with respect to service doctrine, training, force structure, materiel, and civilian agencies' policies and procedures.

(3) Identify the implications for national strategies and their impact on military operations for low intensity conflict.

(4) Work in conjunction with, and incorporate the efforts of USCINCSO-directed CENTAM study.

c. Scope. Project will conduct a thorough examination of ongoing and recently completed studies, examine data collected by USSOUTHCOM, and gather additional data from other conflicts to achieve its objectives. No specific scenario will be used, nor will any specific forces be examined. The project will include an examination of existing Joint and Service doctrine, training, materiel, and force structure for its suitability to low intensity conflict.

d. Timeframe. No specific timeframe will be examined. Focus will be on current involvement in low intensity conflict.

e. Constraints. The study director will minimize study related travel to USSOUTHCOM, taking maximum advantage of data being collected by the USCINCSO-directed CENTAM study.

f. Assumptions.

(1) The Soviet Union will continue to support Third World revolutionary movements via the international communist party apparatus and its surrogates.

(2) The Cubans will continue to foment international leftist revolutions.

(3) Political, social, economic and overpopulation problems will continue to plague the Third World, causing severe political turmoil.

(4) The U.S. will become increasingly involved with Third World nations in which it believes its strategic interests and international prestige are threatened.

(5) Religious fanatics, especially in the Middle East and South West Asia, will continue to be a threat to U.S. regional and international interests.

(6) The United States will be involved in no major wars.

(7) There will be no wars on the European continent.

g. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA).

(1) An understanding of U.S. national objectives and U.S. strategy for conduct of low intensity conflict.

(2) A review of published materials and doctrine concerning the conduct of low intensity conflict by both U.S. and foreign governments.

(3) A compilation and categorization of recent and ongoing low intensity conflict projects.

(4) An overview of the projected Third World threats to U.S. interests.

(5) An understanding of international terrorism and worldwide state-sponsored terrorism, particularly in the Middle East and South West Asia.

(6) An identification of foreign and domestic policy options and constraints on the conduct of low intensity operations.

(7) The adequacy of civilian agencies' policies and procedures, and the military's tactics, techniques, and procedures.

(8) An understanding of U.S. military and political chains of command involved and a similar understanding of the foreign forces involved in the conflict.

(9) The adequacy of U.S. military and civilian assets available for low intensity conflict.

(10) The adequacy of low intensity conflict education and training.

(11) The adequacy of U.S. military equipment for use in low intensity conflict.

(12) Other EEA as developed during conduct of the project.

h. Policies and doctrine of selected foreign countries will be examined as part of the project.

i. Methodology.

(1) The team, operating under a civilian/military steering committee, will be based at HQ TRADOC. Team members will operate from HQ TRADOC subgroup locations and home stations, taking maximum advantage of teleconferencing. A four-person cell will be forward based in USSOUTHCOM for 179 days temporary duty.

(2) The project will be conducted as follows:

(a) Phase I. Compile centralized data base of ongoing and recent projects, approaches, and products related to all levels of low intensity conflict. Historical material relevant to the project will be included.

(b) Phase II. Write detailed research plan.

(c) Phase III. Conduct research and analysis and write white papers.

(d) Phase IV. Write and publish final report and integrate into Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) process.

8. SUPPORT AND RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS.

a. An initial $250,000 is provided for travel and per diem for the 6-month project.

b. Personnel. TRADOC will provide, for a period of at least 6 months, a project director, ten project officers from TRADOC centers and schools (to include four officers on 179-day TDY to USSOUTHCOM), an admin officer, and two clerk-typists. A minimum of 16 additional project officers are expected to be provided full time for a minimum of 6 months by other Army elements, other services, and civilian agencies. Full-time support is expected from all services, Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, National Defense University, the

State Department, USIA, CIA, and RAND Corp. (Total 15 man-years.) Other schools and agencies, both military and nonmilitary, are expected to provide points of contact and part-time support totaling approximately 2 man-years.

c. Lease of two "tempest approved" word processing systems and transfer or lease of 10 portable or transportable microcomputers are required for the duration of the project.

d. Access to Army:LICNET and formation of Army:LIC-PROJECT are required for the duration of the project in order to take maximum advantage of teleconferencing and reduce travel and per diem costs.

9. ADMINISTRATION.

a. Milestone Schedule.

(1) Phases (15 Jul 85 - 15 Jan 86).

PHASE I	Compile data base	15 Jul-23 Aug 85
PHASE II	Write research plan	23 Aug-31 Aug 85
PHASE III	Conduct analysis and write white papers	1 Sep-1 Nov 85
PHASE IV	Write final report	1 Nov 85-15 Jan 86

(2) Milestones.

General Officer Steering Group Meeting	12 Jul 85
IPR to DA, DCSOPS	11 Jul 85
Advance element on station in USSOUTHCOM	15 Jul 85
Complete PHASE I	23 Aug 85
Complete PHASE II	31 Aug 85
General Officer Steering Group Meeting	6 Sep 85
IPR to Joint Staff	30 Sep 85
General Officer Steering Group Meeting	16 Oct 85
Complete PHASE III	1 Nov 85

General Officer Steering Group Meeting	26 Nov 85
Complete PHASE IV	15 Jan 86
General Officer Steering Group Meeting	15 Jan 86

b. Control Procedures.

(1) The Chief of Staff of the Army directed that the project be conducted.

(2) Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, has DA staff responsibility for the project and will--

(a) Conduct in-process reviews and review the draft product.

(b) Coordinate the establishment of a joint military-civilian general/flag officer or equivalent steering group.

(c) Facilitate coordination and participation of military and civilian organizations and agencies outside TRADOC.

(3) The Joint Low Intensity Conflict Working Group approved by JCS will coordinate joint participation in the project.

(4) Commander TRADOC is the DA executive agency to conduct the project and will--

(a) Establish a project team and a project director.

(b) Establish direct contact with the project sponsor and other interested commands and agencies.

(c) Report to the HQDA project sponsor, as required, any difficulties hindering progress of the project or its completion within the prescribed milestones.

(d) Provide a final report documenting the results of the project.

(e) Be prepared to brief the results of the project upon request.

(5) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC, is the TRADOC executive agent and will--

(a) Serve as the TRADOC executive agent for the project.

(b) Chair the joint general/flag level steering group.

(c) Direct the progress of the project.

c. Coordination and other Communications:

(1) Direct coordination with the Army Staff, Army agencies, the Services, OSD elements, unified and specified commands, OJCS, DIA, CIA, State Department, NSC, and other civil and military organizations is authorized.

(2) The project director shall coordinate all project-related visits outside CONUS.

d. Security Classification Guidance: Products will adhere to classification guidelines established in AR 380-5. The final report will include classified and unclassified portions.

e. Action Control Numbers (ACN/Category): TBD.

WILLIAM R. RICHARDSON
General, United States Army
Commanding

APPENDIX C

RESOURCE DATA BASE HANDBOOK

JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

RESOURCE DATA BASE HANDBOOK

GENERAL

The Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base has three types of records, also known as documents. Each record describes either a publication, a subject-matter expert, or an ongoing research project. Regardless of the type, each record is divided into fields or paragraphs. You can search and display all the paragraphs shown below.

FIELDS IN A JOINT LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT RESOURCE DATA BASE RECORD

DOCN	BRS Assigned Accession Number
TYPE	TYPE OF RECORD:
AUTH	AUTHOR (POC):
TITL	TITLE:
PUB	PUBLISHER OR AVAILABILITY:
DATE	DATE:
EDC	EST DATE OF COMPLETION:
CAT	CATEGORY:
GEO	GEOGRAPHIC AREA:
CTRY	COUNTRY:
KEY	KEY WORDS:
FREE	FREE TEXT KEY WORDS:
LOC	LOCATION:
CATL	CATALOGER:
REM	REMARKS:
SUBJ:	CTRY, FREE, KEY, GEO

Figure C-1

The content of most of these paragraphs is obvious from their labels, but an explanation of some are shown in the following figure.

EXPLANATION OF SELECTED FIELDS

TYPE	The type of record can be only one of the following: a book, article, SME (subject-matter expert), project, or AV (audiovisual).
CAT	A broad classification scheme divides documents among these categories: insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism-counteraction, peacetime-contingency, peacekeeping, general.
KEY	This field contains key words chosen from a controlled list as follows: special-operations, air-operations, ground-operations, naval-operations, command-and-control,international-relations, regional-affairs, revolution, internal-security, guerrilla-warfare, PSYOP, logistics, constraint, development, security-assistance, intelligence.
FREE	This field contains any key words chosen by the cataloger.
LOC	This is the known location of a copy of a referenced publication. This paragraph must be completed for all unpublished documents.
SUBJ	This is a combined field which includes all the terms in the CTRY, FREE, KEY, and GEO fields. Searching this one field has the same effect as searching all four of these individually.
DATE	To allow searching and sorting by date, this paragraph is formatted as YYMMDD. Zeros should be used to fill the month or day digits when they are unknown.
EDC	This date pertains only to records on ongoing research projects. It has the same format as DATE.

Figure C-2

The data base management system on which the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base is running is called BRS/Search. It is loaded on an IBM/AT maintained by the TRADOC Library and Information Network (TRALINET) Center at HQ, TRADOC.

OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

SIGNING ON

You can use either a regular terminal or a microcomputer with communications software to access the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base. The communications parameters should be set at full duplex, 7 data bits, 1 stop bit, and even parity. The telephone number for the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base is (804) 727-2402. AUTOVON is 680-2402 and FTS is 931-2402. When connected, you will be asked to log in. Type the password that has been given to you. If you have no password yet, then type "guest" (no quotes).

A menu will appear on your screen offering you a choice of interfaces with the BRS/Search software. The first choice, SearchMate interface, operates through a combination of menus, help screens, and commands. The Native or Dot-Dot interface is a command-driven interface in which you will have to know what commands to type in order to make the system work. It is faster and more flexible than SearchMate but requires some knowledge of BRS/Search on your part. This handbook will give you the most common commands in the Dot-Dot interface. The Colleague interface provides even more on-line help to the searcher.

After you have selected your interface, you will be asked for the data base name. Type "JLIC" (no quotes).

At this point, the system has brought up the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base and is ready for your first query. In both the SearchMate and the Dot-Dot interface, you will have to know how to formulate search strategies. This handbook will show you how to do that. Although it does not cover all the possible commands in BRS/Search, it should be sufficient for most searches. If you cannot perform the search you want with the information provided here, call Mr. Phil Casey at the TRALINET Center, AUTOVON 680-4291, to discuss other possibilities.

FORMULATING SEARCH STRATEGIES

BRS/Search allows you to compile separate sets of records in your search for all the records relevant to your topic. These sets of records are retained in memory throughout the

search session and may be referred to at any point during the session. When you first log into the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Resource Data Base, you will see a prompt which looks like this:

1_:

This means the system is waiting for you to put in the search strategy for compiling set number one. Any terms you type in at this point will be searched in the data base, and records which contain those terms will be stored in set number one. If you want to issue a command to the system rather than give it search terms, you must precede the command with two dots to alert the system not to conduct a search for the terms of your command. This is how the Dot-Dot interface gets its name. For example, "..off" means sign off the system. Without the dots, the system would search for the term "off" in the data base.

You have many options in formulating your search strategy. A few examples should help you understand the flexibility of this system.

SAMPLE SEARCH STRATEGIES

SEARCH STRATEGY	ACTION TAKEN BY SYSTEM
terrorist	Searches for the term "terrorist" appearing in any field of the data base.
terrorist or guerrilla	Searches for either the term "terrorist" or "guerrilla" in any field. Either term will suffice for inclusion in the set.
terrorist and tactics	Searches for documents containing both of these terms anywhere in the record.
terrorist same tactics	Searches for documents containing both of these terms in the same paragraph. The fact that the terms are in the same paragraph helps ensure the terms are related.

Figure C-3

SAMPLE SEARCH STRATEGIES (CONT'D)

terrorist near3 tactics	Searches for documents with these two terms in either order but within three words of one another. The three is a variable which can be any number.
security adj assistance	Searches for occurrences the term "security" immediately adjacent to "assistance" and in that order.
psych$	Searches for any character string that begins with "psych." This would include "psychology," "psychological," and "psychiatric." This type of searching is called truncation.
$terror$	Searches for any occurrence of the string "terror." This would include "antiterrorist," "counterterrorism," or "terrorism." This strategy should be used with caution since it can take a while to execute.

Figure C-3

Sometimes the logical relationships of search terms need to be clarified through the use of parenthesis, as in the following search:

(guer$ or terr$) and (psychological adj warfare) and counteraction

All of the above examples would search through all the fields of each record. There are times when you may want your search terms to be compared with only a certain field. For example, if searching for the term "revolution" in every field results in too many records, you could limit your search

to just the key word field or the key word and title fields. This can be done by giving the search term followed by a dot and the sort field name(s):

revolution.key

or

revolution.key,titl

Another example is "Hamby.auth." Simply searching "Hamby" would produce records in which Hamby is the cataloger or the author. Limiting our search as above will produce only those records in which he is the author.

As stated previously, the sets you make can be referred to at any time during the search session. If you want to combine the results of one set with those of another, you can do so by referring to the set number. Legitimate search strategies using set numbers are shown below.

SEARCH STRATEGIES USING SET NUMBERS

1 and 2	Search for records that contain the terms used in both search one and search two.
1 and naval$	Search for records that contain the terms used in search one and terms beginning with "naval."
(1 or 2) and 3	Combine sets as indicated.

Figure C-4

If you forget which sets contained which key words, type "..d" (dot-dot d). Previous set numbers and their search terms will be displayed on your screen.

To search the DATE or EDC paragraph, you must precede them with an @ symbol to indicate they contain values. Since they are values, you can specify whether you want the dates in your set to be greater than, less than, or equal to a specified date of your choice.

SEARCH STRATEGIES USING DATES

@date>=840000	Searches for documents published in 1984 or later.
@edc=871231	Searches for projects whose EDC is 31 Dec 87.

Figure C-5

DISPLAYING SEARCH RESULTS

After you have compiled a set of potentially relevant documents, you will want to see them. To do this, use the print command. In the SearchMate interface you will be stepped through this process with menus. In the Dot-Dot interface, you will use the print command. As with all commands, it must be preceded by two dots. (If you are using PC-TALK as your telecommunications software, be sure to hit the Control PrtScr keys simultaneously to turn your printer on. Otherwise, the documents will only be printed to the screen.)

The "..p 2 titl,date,rem/1-5" print command tells the system to print the title, date, and remark fields for the first through the fifth records in set two.

The "..p 3 all/5" print command tells the system to print all paragraphs from the fifth record in set number 3.

The print command has default values which can save you from typing. The default value for a set number is equal to the most recent set compiled and the default for paragraphs to be shown is all. Therefore, the "..p /15" command says print all fields for the fifteenth record in the most recently compiled set.

The "..p/slice" command prints all fields and uses the most recent set per system defaults. It does so for the first, middle, and last document in the set in order to give a "slice" of what the set contains.

USING OTHER SEARCHES IN THE DOT-DOT INTERFACE

The following are other searches you can use in the Dot-Dot interface:

o ROOT--This search does not create a set but simply shows you all the words in the index which begin with the specified character string. Truncation is allowed. For example, root peace or root peace$.

o PREF--This search shows a list of all words in the index that end in the specified character string. For example, pref operations.

o EXPAND--This search produces a list from the index that is five words before and five words after the specified character string. This command helps identify misspelled key words. For example, expand psycholog.

Although none of these searches compile a set of documents, you can use the reference or R number they display for each key word as a search argument in order to compile a set containing that key word. See the sample search at Figure C-6 for examples.

USING THE SORT COMMAND

You can sort the documents in a set before displaying them. The sorted results are put into another unnumbered set.

The "..sort 3 au/all" command would sort all records in set three by author. To display the sorted results, enter a print command without specifying a set number. The system will default to the most recent set, which is the sorted output.

LOGGING OFF

Type "..off" and the system will terminate the session.

In the SearchMate interface, hit the return key when prompted for a search and a menu will appear. One choice is Q for quit.

SAMPLE SEARCH SESSION

Following is a sample search session showing many of the search strategies and commands already discussed. By reviewing each step in this session, you will see expected responses, common errors, and the logical flow of a search. Underlined text shows what the search typed. The rest of the lines are prompts and responses produced by BRS/Search.

SAMPLE SEARCH SESSION

```
ATDP2402
CONNECT

login: casey3

            Joint Low Intensity Conflict Database System


BRS Selection Menu                                          Tue Oct 15 1985

BRS/SEARCH System Selections are:

        **1** - SearchMate Interface

        **2** - Native (Dot-Dot) Interface

        **3** - COLLEAGUE Interface

        **4** - Set Terminal Type

        **5** - Database Maintenance Functions

        **H** - Help

        **Q** - Exit BRS/SEARCH System

Enter your selection [H]: 2
BRS Native Mode                                  Tue Oct 15 1985

Entering BRS/SEARCH Native Mode Interface ...

*** BRS/SEARCH Micro/Mini Version ***

Initializing ...

Revision 2.0 (036-0007-KX)

Wait ...

Enter Database Name_: jlic

*Sign-On                        Tue Oct 15 19:03:46 1985

JLIC   JOINT LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT DATABASE

BRS Search Mode -- Enter Query

  1_: terr$

        TERR$
     TERRORISM ..........................................      18 docs
  1_: TERR$ .............................................      18 docs

  2_: doctrine or tactics
     DOCTRINE ...........................................      16 docs
     TACTICS ............................................       8 docs
  2_: TACTICS OR DOCTRINE ...............................      22 docs

  3_: 1 and 2
  3_: 1 AND 2 ...........................................       4 docs
```

Figure C-6

SAMPLE SEARCH SESSION (CONT'D)

```
  4_: guer$

        GUER$
     GUERRILLA ..........................................      12 docs
     GUERRILLA-WARFARE ..................................       4 docs
  4_: GUER$ .............................................      12 docs

  5_: (1 or 4) and 2
  5_: 2 AND (4 OR 1) .....................................       6 docs

  6_: ..p auth,titl,date/1-3

       Document 1
AUTH Kitson, Frank
TITL LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping
DATE      1981

       Document 2
AUTH HAMBY, LARRY B.
TITL "A Realignment of US Army LIC **Doctrine**"

       Document 3
AUTH DoD, USA, CGSC
TITL FC 100-37 **Terrorism** Counteraction

BRS Print Mode -- Enter Command_: ..s

BRS Search Mode -- Enter Query

  6_: expand psych

          $(PSYCH)
 R1    PROMULGATE ..........................................      2 docs
 R2    PROPAGANDA ..........................................      2 docs
 R3    PROVIDE .............................................      4 docs
 R4    PROVIDES ............................................      2 docs
 R5    PROVINCE ............................................      2 docs
 R6    PSYCHOLOGICAL .......................................      2 docs
 R7    PSYOP ...............................................      4 docs
 R8    PUB .................................................      2 docs
 R9    PUBLISHED ...........................................      2 docs
 R10   PUTTING .............................................      2 docs
 R11   PYE .................................................      4 docs

  6_: r6 or r7
  6_: R6 OR R7 ............................................      6 docs

  7_: 6 and 1
  7_: 6 AND 1 .............................................      0 docs

  8_: root central

          CENTRAL$
 R1    CENTRAL .............................................      4 docs
 R2    CENTRALIZING ........................................      2 docs

  8_: doctrine.titl.
     DOCTRINE ............................................      16 docs
  8_: DOCTRINE.TITL. .....................................       8 docs
```

NOTE: Since no R number is selected following this command, the system does not compile a set. Compare with the expand command above.

Figure C-6

SAMPLE SEARCH SESSION (CONT'D)

```
  9_: root central

          CENTRAL$
 R1   CENTRAL ..........................................        4 docs
 R2   CENTRALIZING .....................................        2 docs

  9_: r1 or r2
  9_: R1 OR R2 ..........................................        6 docs

 10_: 9 and 8
 10_: 9 AND 8 ..........................................        2 docs

 11_: ..p titl,pub/1

       Document 1
TITL "A Realignment of US Army LIC **Doctrine**"
PUB  Role of Tech.  in LIC, Air U, forthcoming

BRS Print Mode -- Enter Command_: ..s

BRS Search Mode -- Enter Query

 11_: ..d

*** Display of Queries ***

  1_: TERR$ .............................................       18 docs
  2_: TACTICS OR DOCTRINE ...............................       22 docs
  3_: 1 AND 2 ...........................................        4 docs
  4_: GUER$ .............................................       12 docs
  5_: 2 AND (4 OR 1) ....................................        6 docs
  6_: EXPAND PSYCH
*R6   PSYCHOLOGICAL .....................................        2 docs
*R7   PSYOP .............................................        4 docs
  6_: R6 OR R7 ..........................................        6 docs
  7_: 6 AND 1 ...........................................        0 docs
  8_: ROOT CENTRAL
  8_: DOCTRINE.TITL. ....................................        8 docs
  9_: ROOT CENTRAL
*R1   CENTRAL .....................................................4 docs
*R2   CENTRALIZING ..............................................2 docs
  9_: R1 OR R2 ..................................................6 docs
 10_: 9 AND 8 ...................................................2 docs

*** End of Display ***

 11_: hamby.catl
      HAMBY ..................................................  178 docs
 11_: HAMBY.CATL. ............................................  178 docs
                    NOTE: Since command was not preceded by
 12_: sort 11 auth/all      two dots, the command did not execute.
      SORT ..................................................  Not in Dictionary
 12_: SORT OR (AUTH / ALL) OR 11 ............................  378 docs

 13_: ..sort 11 auth/all
Sorting documents ... Complete

BRS Print Mode -- Enter Command_: ..p auth/1-12
```

Figure C-6

SAMPLE SEARCH SESSION (CONT'D)

```
        Document 1
AUTH Arlinghouse, Bruce E.

        Document 2
AUTH Arlinghouse, Bruce E.

        Document 3
AUTH Army Magazine

        Document 4
AUTH Army Magazine

        Document 5
AUTH Beaumont, Roger

        Document 6
AUTH Beaumont, Roger

        Document 7
AUTH Beaumont, Roger

Strike RETURN for next screen_:


        Document 8
AUTH Beaumont, Roger

        Document 9
AUTH Bienen,

        Document 10
AUTH Bienen,

        Document 11
AUTH Blaufarb, Douglas

        Document 12
AUTH Blaufarb, Douglas

BRS Print Mode -- Enter Command_: ..o

Connect Time for JLIC:  00:08:37
   Total Connect Time:  00:08:51

Session Complete

Strike **RETURN** to continue ...
BRS Selection Menu                                  Tue Oct 15 1985

BRS/SEARCH System Selections are:

        **1** - SearchMate Interface

        **2** - Native (Dot-Dot) Interface

        **3** - COLLEAGUE Interface

        **4** - Set Terminal Type
```

Figure C-6

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS

ACN	Action Control Number
ACRA	Airlift Concepts and Requirements Agency
AR	Army Regulation
AT	Antiterrorism
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AV	Audiovisual
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BDE	Brigade
BLT	Battalion Landing Team
BRS	Bibliographic Research Service
CA	Civil Affairs
CAB	Combat Aviation Brigade
CADRE	Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education
CALL	Center for Army Lessons Learned
CDR	Commander
CENTAM	Central America
CG	Commanding General
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief (Unified and Specified Commands)
CONUS	Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support
CPC	Combined Planning Committee
CS	Combat Support
CSS	Combat Service Support
CT	Counterterrorism
DA	Department of the Army
DCSDOC	Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine
DCSOPS	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
DG	Defense Guidance
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
EEA	Essential Elements of Analysis
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FC	Field Circular
FM	Field Manual (Doctrinal Literature); Frequency Modulated (Communications)
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FTS	Federal Telephone Service
GNP	Gross National Product
HQ	Headquarters
HQDA	Headquarters Department of the Army
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I & W	Indications and Warning

IBM/AT	International Business Machine/Advanced Technology
IN	Infantry
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IPR	In Process Review
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JLIC	Joint Low-Intensity Conflict
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-B	Joint Task Force-Bravo (Honduras)
LIC	Low-Intensity Conflict
LICNET	Low-Intensity Conflict Net
LIC-PROJECT	Low-Intensity Conflict Project
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MACV	Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MCDEC	Marine Corps Development and Education Command
METT-T	Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time Available
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MILGP	Military Group
MNF	Multinational Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA	National Command Authority
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OAS	Organization of American States
ODC	Office of Defense Coordination
OH	Operational Handbook
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OPCOM	Operational Command
OSA OCPA	Office Secretary of the Army, Office, Chief of Public Affairs
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OTSG	Office of the Surgeon General
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PPBES	Planning, Programing, Budgeting, and Execution System
PPBS	Planning, Programing, and Budgeting System
PRC	Populace and Resources Control
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RC	Rand Corporation
RMTC	Regional Military Training Center
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SAF	Security Assistance Force
SAO	Security Assistance Organization
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SITREP	Situation Report
SME	Subject-Matter Expert
SSI	Strategic Studies Institute
STOL	Short Takeoff and Landing
TBD	To Be Determined
TDY	Temporary Duty
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (USA)

TRALINET	TRADOC Library and Information Network
TV	Television
TWA	Trans World Airlines
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USACAC	United States Army Combined Arms Center
USACGSC	United States Army Command and General Staff College
USAECS	United States Army Engineer Center and School
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFSOS	Unites States Air Force Special Operations School
USAICS	United States Army Intelligence Center and School
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAIS	United States Army Infantry School
USAJFKSWC	United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
USALOGC	United States Army Logistics Center
USARMS	United States Army Armor School
USASC & FG	United States Army Signal Center and Fort Gordon
USATSC	United States Army Training Support Center
USATSCH	United States Army Transportation School
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCINCSO	United States Commander in Chief Southern Command
USG	United States Government
USIA	United States Information Agency
USMA	United States Military Academy
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
USREDCOM	United States Readiness Command
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

DEFINITIONS

Antiterrorism: Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals or property to terrorism. Also called AT (approved definition for JCS Pub 1).

Civil affairs: Those activities conducted during peace and war that facilitate relationships between US military forces, civil authorities, and people of the nation in which the US military forces are operating (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (JCS Pub 1).

Communications: A method or means of conveying information of any kind from one person or place to another (JCS Pub 1).

Counter-guerrilla warfare: Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas (JCS Pub 1).

Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JCS Pub 1).

Counter-intelligence: Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, or subversion (JCS Pub 1).

Counterterrorism: Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT (approved definition for JCS Pub 1).

Developing nation (sometimes referred to as a "less developed country"): A nation that is progressing beyond a traditional society and is experiencing the turbulent process of economic, social, military, political, and psychological change (FM 100-20).

Economic support fund (formerly security supporting assistance): Funds used to finance imports of commodities, capital, or technical assistance provided either on a grant or loan basis in accordance with terms of a bilateral agreement;

counterpart funds thereby generated may be used as budgeting support. Most of these funds are used to enable a recipient to devote more of its own resources to defense and security purposes than it otherwise could without serious economic or political consequences (FM 100-20).

Foco: Foco (or Cuban model) insurgency is one in which a guerrilla band enters a rural area where it has never operated before with the hope of serving as an "insurrectional focus" for a larger rebellion (BDM Study).

Foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JCS Pub 1).

Foreign military sales: That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred (JCS Pub 1).

Guerrilla warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces (JCS Pub 1).

Human intelligence: A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT (JCS Pub 1).

Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict (JCS Pub 1).

Intelligence: The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas (JCS Pub 1).

Internal defense: The full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JCS Pub 1).

Internal development: Actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society (JCS Pub 1).

International military education and training: Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational or informational publications; and media of all kinds (JCS Pub 1).

Logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It incorporates supply and services, maintenance, transportation, ammunition, construction, and medical services (modified JCS Pub 1).

Low-intensity conflict: A limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psychosocial pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence. Also called LIC (approved definition for JCS Pub 1).

Low-intensity conflict medical operations: Those missions assigned in a low-intensity conflict environment to assist the host nation in conducting medical care, education, and training. Medical operations may include primary medical care, preventive medicine, dental care, veterinary care, medical research, and medical intelligence. These operations are an integral part of civil affairs and psychological operations. They are extremely effective in winning popular support for the host government (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

Military assistance advisory group: A joint Service group, normally under the military command of a commander of a unified command and representing the Secretary of Defense, which primarily administers the US military assistance planning and programming in the host country. Also called MAAG (JCS Pub 1).

Military assistance program: That portion of the US security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which provides defense articles and services to recipients on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis (JCS Pub 1).

Military civic action: The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JCS Pub 1).

Paramilitary forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission (JCS Pub 1).

Peacekeeping operations: Military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

Peacetime contingency operations: Politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war, e.g., strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstration, show of force, unconventional warfare and intelligence operations (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

Propaganda: Any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly (JCS Pub 1).

Psychological operations: Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological operations and battlefield psychological activities (JCS Pub 1).

Security assistance: Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives (JCS Pub 1).

Security assistance force (SAF): A specially trained, area-oriented, partially language-qualified, ready force available to the commander of a unified command for the support of operations in situations short of open hostilities and in limited and general war. SAF organizations may vary in size and capabilites according to theater requirements (FM 100-20).

Security assistance organization: This term encompasses all DOD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsiblities for carrying out security assistance management functions. For instance, it includes military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs), military missions and groups, offices of defense/military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attache personnel designated to perform security assistance functions (TRADOC Pam 525-44).

Strategic intelligence: Intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail (JCS Pub 1).

Tactical intelligence: Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ primarily in level of application but may also vary in terms of scope and detail (JCS Pub 1).

Terrorism: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives (approved definition for JCS Pub 1).

Unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert, or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions of war or peace (JCS Pub 1).

United States country team: The senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the Chief of the United States diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency (JCS Pub 1).

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