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## THESIS

ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY

by

Laurence N. Schuetz

June 1987

Thesis Advisor:

Edward J. Laurance

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

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Arms Transfers to the Irish Republican Army

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
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requirements for the degree of

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
  
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## ABSTRACT

↳ This <sup>thesis</sup>~~paper~~ describes the arms transfer relationships of a non-governmental organization, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Open source information is used to develop models of munitions, financial and training relationships. These models are then explained in terms of (1) systemic influences, (2) supplier rationales, objectives and interests, and (3) recipient demand factors. Finally, the implications of these relationships are briefly addressed in the summary and conclusions. The closing section also includes suggestions for future research, based upon an assessment of (1) possible sources of detailed arms transfer data, and (2) methodological challenges.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This paper develops several preliminary models which depict the arms transfer relationships of an insurgent group, the Irish Republican Army (IRA). First, open source accounts are compiled into a chronology of arms transfer reports linked to the IRA. These accounts are then used to derive models depicting insurgent sources of munitions, financing, and training. Next, (1) systemic influences, (2) supplier rationales, objectives and interests and (3) recipient demand factors are examined in search of a better understanding of apparent arms transfer patterns. The analysis concludes with an assessment of the implications of the IRA's arms transfer relationships.

In the final section, which focuses on promising areas for future research, the challenges of data availability, validity and reliability are examined. A more rigorous analytical approach appears to be feasible if an arms transfer event data base can be constructed, at reasonable expense, from existing data sources.

The assessment is limited to the current "troubles" in Northern Ireland, which date from 1969. The principal focus is on the physical movement of munitions; time and scope (and the intuitive prospect of marginal return) dictate only a cursory treatment of financing and weapons training. Before

turning to the specifics of arms transfers to the rebels in Northern Ireland, it is appropriate to (1) identify some of the players, (2) question the significance of munitions, financing and training to insurgent movements, and (3) ask precisely what is meant by "arms transfers."

#### A. SOME OF THE PLAYERS

Under the heading, "Who's Who in Northern Ireland" Warren Richey writes,

The Provisional Irish Republican Army is a guerrilla force determined to wage a joint military and political battle aimed at ending Britain's rule in Northern Ireland and eventually joining both the North and South of Ireland into a united socialist republic. The group is outlawed in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic, and membership in the Provisional IRA is illegal in both states.

The "Provos," as they are called, were formed in 1969 and split away from the mainstream official IRA because they felt the IRA was becoming a Marxist political organization to the point of neglecting guerrilla operations against the British. The two groups constitute an extremist part of the Republican/Nationalist movement in Ireland, which seeks to end the British presence in Northern Ireland and to unite the North and South into a single country.

Sinn Fein is the political wing of the IRA. It seeks the same ends as the guerrilla force, but says it confines its efforts to legal political activity. Sinn Fein candidates have contested and won races in both the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Roman Catholics constitute 37 percent of Ulster's population, and a majority of them supports the Social Democratic and Labor Party, which denounces the use of force as a means to end British rule in Northern Ireland.

Although British troops were originally committed to Northern Ireland in 1969 mainly to protect Catholic civil rights demonstrators and to back up political and economic reforms insisted on by London, many Republicans still view Britain as trying to perpetuate the status quo, in favor of Protestant "loyalists" (loyal to Britain).

Northern Ireland's Catholic minority suffered for decades from economic deprivation and institutionalized discrimination. It was frozen out of a political process dominated by Protestants.

Republicans contend that life will be better for Catholics if the North is united with the South. But most of Northern Ireland's Protestant majority doesn't want to unite with the overwhelmingly Catholic South. Britain's position has been that Northern Ireland will remain a part of the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" (the U.K.) for as long as the majority of those living in Northern Ireland want to remain so.

Other separatists players include the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, a Marxist faction that broke away from the IRA in 1975.<sup>2</sup> The term IRA, as used in this paper, is synonymous with "armed separatists," as the open source reports upon which it is based often do not distinguish among the parties to the dispute.

Other armed factions further confound the analyst, because the IRA are not the only group engaged in transferring arms to Northern Ireland. Armed "loyalists" include a half-dozen Protestant paramilitary organizations, the largest of which are the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF).

## B. ARMS TRANSFERS AND INSURGENCIES

Arms transfers are not the cause of insurgencies, any more than they are the cause of other types of warfare. A more meaningful point of focus is the political movements which use the technique and means of insurgency war to achieve their ends. Arms transfers can contribute

decisively, however, to the conduct of insurgency war by revolutionary political movements. Fuzzy thinking about cause and effect persists -- allusions to "the flow of men and supplies" are all too frequently encountered in references to settings as different as Northern Ireland and Central America. These echoes of Vietnam should remind us to examine carefully the assumptions which may be obscured by the way we "frame the problem." In fact, there is no guarantee that "controlling the flow of men and supplies" will control the insurgency -- they are not synonymous.

On the other hand, the weapons and skills available to the political revolutionary can clearly make his conduct of "war" easier or more difficult, so they are far from irrelevant. Arms transfers are perhaps best characterized as a necessary (but not sufficient) precursor to a successful insurgency. In A Framework for Analyzing and Predicting Insurgency, Daniel Wagner describes the analyst's task,

Insurgency presents four successive challenges to the intelligence analyst. Each involves evaluating a complex array of data and calls for the prediction of specific developments or events.

1. Prior to the existence of an insurgent movement, the analyst must evaluate the country's vulnerability and predict a group's appearance.
2. Once a potential insurgent movement exists, he must anticipate an armed struggle.
3. Throughout the struggle, he constantly reevaluates the prospects of insurgent success and tries to predict the outcome.
4. Finally, if the insurgents win, he must anticipate the type of regime they will install.

Wagner outlines a procedure which will help the analyst "to examine rigorously insurgent situations and to make use of indicators that aid prediction,

Because organization, legitimacy, and coercion are so telling, we propose to compare the government and the insurgents -- or any two sides in an insurgency -- on the basis of these three criteria. The relative "balances" of organization, legitimacy, and coercion break down into twenty-eight components or "factors." The rationale here is simple: it is easier to evaluate each of the twenty-eight factors one at a time, and then to recombine them, than it is to assess the entire situation in all its complexity.<sup>4</sup>

The twenty-eight analytical factors Wagner identifies (see Figures 1 thru 3, immediately following this page) describe the society, the physical environment, the government, and the insurgents. Where do arms transfers fit in? Six of Wagner's twenty-eight factors are directly related to arms transfers -- the relevant factors, as he describes them, are,

#### Situational Factors (Figure 1)

FACTOR S-8 Arms and Military Skills - calculates the military skills and arms available within the country. Although guns alone do not shoot people, they are essential nonetheless. Even if the government controls the skills bank and arsenal, defections and raids can effect the transfers.

#### Government Factors (Figure 2)

&

#### Insurgent Factors (Figure 3)

FACTOR G-7 Armed Forces & Police/FACTOR I-7 Guerrillas - estimates of government and insurgent armed strength. Taken separately, they are less meaningful than when combined into a ratio. The direction and rate of change in the ratio is more significant than its absolute level.

TOWARD THE LEFT FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT; TOWARD THE  
RIGHT FAVORS THE INSURGENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

FACTOR S-1. CULTURAL PLURALISM.

0 OR MANY 2 OR 3  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR S-2. MASS-ELITE GAP.

SAME % AS IN POPULATION 0%  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR S-3. URBAN-RURAL INTERACTION.

MINIMAL/CONTROLLED EXTENSIVE/UNCONTROLLED  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR S-4. PEASANT MOBILIZATION.

EXIT OPTION VULNERABLE  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

LEGITIMACY FACTORS

FACTOR S-5. LANDLESSNESS.

0 20% 30% 40% 60%  
1----1----2----3|---4----|---6---17---8---9----1

FACTOR S-6. DIFFERENTIAL MODERNIZATION.

EQUITABLE HIGHLY POLARIZING  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

COERCION FACTORS

FACTOR S-7. TRADITIONAL LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

LOW HIGH  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR S-8. ARMS & MILITARY SKILLS.

SCARCE ABUNDANT  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR S-9. BORDERS AND SANCTUARIES.

IMPENETRABLE/NONE POROUS/PLENTIFUL  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7---8---9---

FACTOR S-10. TERRAIN & LINES OF COMMUNICATION

OPEN/GOOD ROUGH/POOR  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and Predicting Insurgency, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 44.

Figure 1. Situational Factors



TOWARD THE LEFT FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT; TOWARD THE  
RIGHT FAVORS THE INSURGENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

FACTOR G-1. CONCENTRATION OF AUTHORITY.

UNITARY . . . . . DIFFUSED  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-2. REGIME ACCESS.

OPEN . . . . . BLOCKED  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-3. LOYALTY.

INTACT . . . . . DEFECTIONS  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

LEGITIMACY FACTORS

FACTOR G-4. ORIGIN & INDIGENOUS AUTHORITY.

8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
1----1|---2--|---3---|---5|---6--|---7---8|---9---|

FACTOR G-5. RURAL SERVICES.

EFFECTIVE . . . . . INEFFICIENT  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

COERCION FACTORS

FACTOR G-6. CONTROL.

TOTALITARIAN . . . . . WEAK  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-7. ARMED FORCES & POLICE.

STRONG . . . . . WEAK  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

FACTOR G-8. EXTERNAL AID.

UNNEEDED PLENTY . . . . . SOME . . . . . NONE  
1----1----2|---3---4----5----6----7----8|---9---|

FACTOR G-9. REPRESSIVE VIOLENCE.

LEGAL/APPROPRIATE . . . . . ILLEGAL/EXCESSIVE  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----|

SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and Predicting Insurgency, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 46.

Figure 2. Government Factors

TOWARD THE LEFT FAVORS THE GOVERNMENT; TOWARD THE  
RIGHT FAVORS THE INSURGENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS

FACTOR 1-1. UNITY OF COMMAND.

HOSTILE RIVALS COOPERATIVE UNITARY  
1----1----2-1-3----4----5----6----7-1-8----9----1

FACTOR 1-2. UPWARD MOBILITY.

BLOCKED OPEN  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR 1-3. COMMITMENT.

"RETURNEES" DETERMINED  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

LEGITIMACY FACTORS

FACTOR 1-4. IDEOLOGY & APPEAL.

FRAGILE STRONG  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR 1-5. ADMINISTRATION IN REBEL AREAS.

INEFFECTIVE EFFECTIVE  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

COERCION FACTORS

FACTOR 1-6. LIBERATED AREAS.

NONE DEFENDED  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR 1-7. GUERRILLAS.

WEAK STRONG  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

FACTOR 1-8. EXTERNAL AID.

NONE SOME PLENTY UNNEEDED  
1----1----2-1-3----4----5----6----7-1-8----9----1

FACTOR 1-9. TACTICS.

NONVIOLENT PARAMILITARY  
1----1----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9----1

SOURCE: Daniel W. Wagner, A Framework for Analyzing and  
Predicting Insurgency, Master's Thesis, Naval  
Postgraduate School, December 1982, p. 47.

Figure 3. Insurgent Factors.

FACTOR G-8/FACTOR I-8 External Aid - estimates of the external support available to each side. The "taint" of foreign association, and the patron's constraints on one's actions, are among the caveates here.

FACTOR I-9 Tactics - paramilitary organization and tactics imply the capability to field forces able<sup>5</sup> effectively to challenge those of the government.

Wagner's framework puts arms transfers to an insurgent group in context, not as the key variable, but as an important component in assessing the setting, and the relative strengths and vulnerabilities of both the government and the insurgents.

In the case of the IRA, arms transfers (or, in several instances, attempted arms transfers) include small arms, heavy machine guns, anti-tank weapons, ammunition, mortars, mines, hand grenades, rocket-propelled grenades, explosives, detonators, a flame thrower, remotely piloted vehicles, and shoulder-fired SAM's. The significance of these arms transfers must, of course, take into account their utility to the terrorist.

Any assessment of how various munitions translate into "combat capability" depends, among other things, upon a model (either explicit or implicit) of terrorist strategy and tactics. Brian Jenkins provides an elegant model:

Terrorism is often described as *mindless* violence, *senseless* violence, or *irrational* violence. None of these adjectives is correct. [Political] Terrorism is *not* mindless violence. There is a theory of terrorism, and it often works. To understand the theory, it must first be understood that terrorism is a means to an end, not an end in itself; in other words, terrorism has objectives.

(The terrorists themselves -- those who carry out the missions -- do not always understand this, or sometimes seem to forget it.)

The objectives may be obscured by the fact that terrorist attacks often seem random and directed toward targets whose death or destruction does not directly benefit the terrorists. But the objectives of terrorism are not conventional military ones. Terrorists do not seek to take and hold ground or physically destroy their opponents' forces. Terrorist groups usually lack that kind of power.

Individual acts of terrorism may be directed toward the achievement of specific objectives that the terrorists often make explicit: widespread news coverage, perhaps the publication of the terrorists' grievances or demands, the payment of ransom, the release of prisoners.

As opposed to the tactics of individual acts, the strategy of terrorism is aimed at achieving broader goals, which may range from attracting worldwide attention to the terrorists' cause to the dissolution of society or of international order. Terrorism aims at creating an atmosphere of fear and alarm -- of terror. Such an atmosphere causes people to exaggerate the apparent strength of the terrorists' movement and cause, which means that their strength is judged not by their actual numbers or violent accomplishments, but by the effect these have on their audience. Since most terrorist groups are actually small and weak, the violence must be all the more dramatic, deliberately shocking; hence, they may choose innocent civilians as targets. "Pure terrorism" is totally and deliberately indiscriminate, because indiscriminate violence gets the most attention, is the most alarming, and is difficult to protect against.

Terrorist acts are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Holding hostages increases the drama. If certain demands are not satisfied, the hostages may be killed. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.

In addition to the military, or internal security dimension, arms transfers involving an insurgent group influence, and are influenced by a wide range of economic and

political factors. These will be addressed after the IRA's arms transfer patterns for munitions, financing and training are described.

### C. WHAT IS AN ARMS TRANSFER?

Not surprisingly, the central question, "What is an arms transfer?" is, if anything, somewhat more difficult to answer when the level of analysis shifts from the familiar realm of nation-to-nation relations to transnational arms transfer patterns. Setting aside, for the moment, the challenges of data availability, reliability and validity; the question "What are we trying to measure?" is certainly no easier to answer when the recipient is an insurgent group. As in state-centric arms transfers, just where to "draw the line" is far from clear. Foreign-made military hardware in the hands of the insurgents is straightforward enough, however, other munitions "in the pipeline," weapons training, and the financing of arms purchases are also of concern.

If "significant data gaps" challenge the researcher probing state-to-state arms transfer relationships,<sup>7</sup> is it futile to attempt an assessment of arms transfers to an insurgent group? It is certainly frustrating, but it may not be entirely futile. Laurance identifies "the characteristics of an arms transfer which need to be measured in order to provide answers."<sup>8</sup> These characteristics (with minor modifications to adapt them to an insurgency) are shown in Figure 4, on the following page.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Examples of Values/Attributes</u>
1. Type/Number of Equipment	10 RPG-7, 1,000 detonators
2. Country of Manufacture	U.S., USSR, Czechoslovakia
3. Terrorism Quotient	Shock value, media leverage
4. Shelf life/Perishability	Attributes depicting rate of degradation over time
5. Technical/Training	Number of donor personnel to accompany equipment/Number of recipient personnel to be trained in donor nation
6. Dollar value	Static valuation formula incorporating production costs, inflation, depreciation
7. Mode of Acquisition	covert state-supported, bogus end user certificate, theft, over-the-counter purchase
8. Means of payment	Cash, credit, gift, barter
9. Delivery stage	Rumor, agreement, delivered, ready for use in insurgency, operational use

SOURCE: based upon Edward J. Laurance, "The International Transfer of Arms: Problems of Measurement and Conceptualization," a paper delivered at the 1977 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association

Figure 4. Characteristics of an Arms Transfer

Information is available regarding at least some of these characteristics. There is, of course, little prospect that the exact details of IRA arms transfer relationships will ever be available. Many will remain, for all practical purposes, "non-observable" attributes, therefore, indirect measures are needed.

What kind of research might the available data support? With few exceptions, open source reports do not contain the level of detail (e.g., specific numbers and types of munitions, including country of manufacture) needed to conduct meaningful quantitative analysis. The most appropriate use of open source reports appears to be as a source of hypotheses. For example, in the sections which follow, Figures 5 thru 7, which detail insurgent sources of munitions, financing, and training, are preliminary models based upon open source reports. Conversely, physical evidence in the form of capture/cache discovery inventories, enroute seizure inventories, explosive incident forensic reports, and ballistic reports, may be sufficiently detailed to test at least some of these hypotheses. The final section of this paper explores the possibilities for future research.

Selected open source arms transfer reports have been arranged chronologically in the first two appendices to this paper. This "almost raw" data varies considerably in both scope and detail, and its validity and reliability

undoubtedly range widely, not only from report to report, but also from topic to topic within individual accounts.

This unwieldy mass of data on IRA arms transfer-related activities since 1969 has been reduced to preliminary models of arms transfer relationships, as a prelude to assessing supplier rationales, objectives and interests and recipient demand factors. The patterns associated with munitions, financing, and training are described in the sections which follow.



## II. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - MUNITIONS

Open source reports suggest that the arms transfer patterns which have evolved during the Irish Republican Army's current insurgency in Northern Ireland are varied and complex. Figure 5, below, shows the group's principal sources of arms, as reflected in these reports.

- Indigenous Production
  
- In-Country Capture
  
- Transnational Arms Transfers
  - Illicit Extra-National
    - with documentation
    - without documentation
  - State-Supported
    - Covert
      - with documentation
      - without documentation
    - Overt
      - with documentation
      - without documentation

Figure 5. Insurgent Arms Sources

## A. INDIGENOUS SOURCES

The first arms source listed, indigenous production, is of particular importance to the arms transfer analyst. In assessing arms transfers to the IRA, he cannot begin to estimate the extent and significance of transnational arms transfers without first establishing the technological limits of indigenous arms production capability and attempting to gauge productive capacity.

While an early attempt at manufacturing rockets met with little success, the IRA has fielded a serviceable mortar, as well as the ubiquitous "improvised explosive device," which has become their stock-in-trade.<sup>9</sup> These devices range in size from hand grenades and firebombs to virtual "block-busters." However, they are not entirely "homemade." As Lt Col George Styles, a British explosive ordnance disposal expert, points out,

...the terrorist not only improvises his devices but the explosive ingredients as well. Given a stringent control on explosives, the terrorist has shown that he can revert to commonly available substances, the control of which is virtually impossible. This is not however true of the detonator -- the key of the explosive lock. Several attempts have been made by criminals and terrorists alike to improvise a detonator. Fortunately all attempts have ended in disaster for the improviser. The detonator therefore becomes vital in the control of the explosives situation....

The technological limits of the IRA's indigenous production base have left them no choice but to turn to transnational sources for the remainder of the arms in their current inventory -- small arms, machine guns, anti-tank

weapons, ammunition, rocket-propelled grenades, night vision devices, and radar detectors. Similarly, they will have to look to either the same sources or in-country capture for new capabilities.

#### B. ILLICIT EXTRA-NATIONAL

The first transnational arms transfer category, non-governmental criminal activity of one kind or another, accounts for the greatest volume of munitions transfers, in terms of both numbers and dollar value. Theft from U.S. military installations, for example, may account for most of the IRA's inventory of heavy machine guns,<sup>11</sup> and U.S. over-the-counter sales are alleged to be the principal source of small arms.<sup>12</sup>

The IRA is a regular customer in the "underworld of secret arms dealers" described by Peter Durisch in "How to Make an Illicit Arms Deal."<sup>13</sup> Open source accounts mention transfers arranged by American, West German, and South African arms dealers. A U.S. government "sting" operation in 1983 netted a New York-based arms dealer who supplied illicitly manufactured submachine guns to agents posing as IRA gun-runners.<sup>14</sup> The IRA has also attempted, through arms dealers, to acquire new capabilities, such as surface-to-air missiles and remotely piloted vehicles capable of carrying explosives.<sup>15</sup>

Bogus documentation has been linked to IRA arms transfer attempts,<sup>16</sup> as have bribes (or planned bribes) of customs

and export control officials.<sup>17</sup> Ideologically-motivated collusion has also been reported in both the U.S. and Irish customs services.<sup>18</sup>

Both the Palestine Liberation Organization and ETA, the left-wing Basque terrorist group, have also reportedly provided arms and explosives to the IRA,<sup>19</sup> and, in 1983, the U.S. Commissioner of Customs reported, "the IRA is turning to the Mafia and other underworld crime organizations in the United States to buy arms and explosives."<sup>20</sup>

#### C. STATE-SUPPORTED

Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Libya appear to have provided arms covertly to the Irish Republican Army.

Czech involvement surfaced in 1971, when a 3 1/2 ton shipment from Prague was intercepted at Schiphol airport, in Amsterdam. Britain accused Czechoslovakia of attempting to supply arms to the IRA; the Czechs denied sending or selling the arms and canceled their Foreign Minister's scheduled visit to London.<sup>21</sup>

Soviet-made rocket launchers were introduced in mid-1972. The British Foreign Office asked the Soviet Union to cooperate in tracing how the rockets got to Northern Ireland; the Soviet government denied involvement in Northern Ireland and refused to help track down the source of the rockets. In 1983, three Soviets attached to the Embassy in Dublin [Guenadi Saline, Viktor Lipassov and Irina Lipassov] were expelled from the Irish Republic for spying. They were

allegedly involved in an "arms for information" deal with the IRA.<sup>22</sup>

In March 1973, the Irish Navy captured a Cyprus-registered coaster smuggling a 5 ton arms shipment, which was later determined to have originated in Libya. The seizure provided the first tangible evidence of covert Libyan arms transfers, although Colonel Qaddafi had announced he was supplying arms to the IRA in June of the previous year. Britain suspended the sale to Libya of any arms that "could conceivably be re-exported for use by the Irish Republican Army," and asked the Libyans for an explanation of Libyan involvement in the affair.<sup>23</sup> Qaddafi has continued to voice support for the IRA, most recently in 1984, following the seige of the Libyan Embassy in London.

State-supported transfers appear to be the sole source of some capabilities, such as rocket launchers and rocket-propelled grenades. Other munitions linked to state-supported arms transfers include pistols, rifles, submachine guns, ammunition, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, grenades, gelignite, TNT, fuses and detonators.

### III. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - FINANCING

IRA financing of arms purchases, as reflected in open source reports, depends upon the four sources shown below:

- Private Fund-Raising
  
- Criminal Activities
  
- Non-Governmental Organizations
  - grants
  - loans
  
- State-Supported
  - Covert
    - grants
    - loans
  - Overt
    - grants
    - loans

Figure 6. Insurgent Financing Sources

While IRA financing is said to come from all of these sources, there appears to be little prospect that the researcher can determine with confidence how much has come from each source and how the pattern of support may have

varied over time. Open source accounts differ over the relative importance of each source; most identify private fund-raising as the primary source in the early years, and report that criminal activities have recently moved into first place.<sup>24</sup>

#### A. PRIVATE FUND-RAISING

On the surface it may seem ironic that the Provisional IRA's supply lines should originate in the United States, close friend and ideological ally of Britain. But the US is also home to 44 million Americans who claim at least some Irish heritage, with roughly 10 million direct Irish descendants. There are fewer than 5 million Irish men, women,<sup>25</sup> and children in all of Ireland, both North and South.

The success of IRA fund-raising efforts through organizations such as the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) or its recent clone, the Irish American Fenian Society is virtually impossible to assess. Estimates of the level of support vary, with "something under \$10 million a year" the highest figure.<sup>26</sup> Some accounts say American support is falling off, other reports say just the opposite. According to an FBI spokesman,

There is no way we can check on their money-laundering operation, because you never know how much they collect," says Donald J. McGorty, head of the division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in New York that handles international terrorism.

He adds: "There's no way we can tell if they collected \$100,000 or \$5 million..."<sup>27</sup>

Using currency regulations, the Reagan administration has targeted possible Irish Republican Army couriers for special attention.<sup>28</sup> Because the financial instruments which

provide the fungibility essential to international trade are also available to insurgent groups, the U.S. effort to interdict the flow of funds is likely to enjoy limited success.<sup>29</sup>

#### B. CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

Criminal activity linked to IRA financing includes bank robberies, kidnapping, extortion, protection rackets, and tax evasion. Even the case of bank robberies, where information should be readily available, is not as simple as it might at first appear. The amount taken in bank robberies may be relatively easy to establish, yet the analyst must determine why specific thefts have been linked to the IRA, and assign some kind of "confidence level" to each instance.

#### C. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The Palestine Liberation Organization is the only non-governmental organization alleged to have provided financial support to the IRA.<sup>30</sup>

#### D. STATE-SUPPORTED

The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Libya and the Irish Republic have all been mentioned as sources of state-sponsored aid, however, the Irish case appears to be an anomaly. While state funds were, in fact, diverted in 1970 to purchase arms for the IRA, the officials responsible were subsequently dismissed and charged with criminal offenses.<sup>31</sup>



As long as there is a viable "black market" for arms and ammunition, both nation-states and non-governmental organizations can provide covert financial support to insurgent groups and maximize "plausible denial." Thus, without access to the group's balance sheet, the analyst must be alert to, and avoid, implicit assumptions regarding the ultimate source of IRA munitions based solely on their country of manufacture or mode of acquisition.

#### IV. ARMS TRANSFER PATTERNS - TRAINING

...Above his [arms dealer Sam Cummings] desk hangs an ugly-looking weapon, a rifle-propelled [sic] grenade called the RPG 7, which specially interests him. It was captured in Northern Ireland, one of a hundred which were imported from Libya by the IRA, with instructions in Arabic: they did not know how to use it, it was said, until the BBC explained on television.<sup>32</sup>

- In-Country On-the-Job Training
  - without advisors
  - with advisors
    - state-supported
    - non-governmental organization
  
- Foreign Non-Governmental Organization Paramilitary Training Camp
  - with acquiescence of host nation
  - without acquiescence of host nation
  
- Foreign State-Supported Paramilitary Training Camp

Figure 7. Insurgent Training Sources

The unclassified reports suggest the sources of IRA training shown above. It is difficult to judge what, if any,

effect the reported training has on terrorist capabilities. There is no shortage of accounts picturing IRA terrorists honing their skills through rigorous training, however, security force officials have thus far remained silent regarding any increase in capability.

A. IN-COUNTRY ON-THE-JOB TRAINING

Open source reports indicate both Libyan and Palestinian advisors have operated with the IRA in Northern Ireland.<sup>33</sup>

A U.S. Army intelligence report released in 1975 reported that the IRA was attempting to recruit members in the United States Marine Corps, trained in communications and crew-served weapons.<sup>34</sup> Perhaps coincidentally, one of the IRA gun-runners captured by the Irish Navy in 1984 was a former Marine, an Irishman who joined the Corps when he lived in the United States.<sup>35</sup>

B. FOREIGN PARAMILITARY TRAINING CAMPS

Terrorist training courses have been reported in the Soviet Union, Libya, Jordan, and the ever-popular "unspecified Middle Eastern country," and both the Libyans and the PLO have allegedly been involved in training members of the IRA.<sup>36</sup> Appendix C contains selected open source reports reflecting IRA links to international terrorism.

## V. THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING

### A. AT THE START OF THE CURRENT "TROUBLES"

Edward Kolodziej characterizes arms transfers as a subsystem of international relations, which can be thought of as the product of four sets of actor relations: national, subnational, transnational, and international.<sup>37</sup> It might appear that the influences which determined arms transfer patterns for a non-governmental organization, such as the IRA, would be concentrated in transnational actor relations. Indeed, much of the popular literature has such a focus, concentrating on the "phenomenon" of terrorism. That perspective, however, often ignores complex interdependencies and leads to the conclusion that the actions of insurgent groups are "unpredictable."

At the start of the current "troubles," in 1969, the international environment included a number of factors, many of which were beyond the control of the Irish rebels or their arms suppliers, which helped to shape the IRA's arms transfer relationships. Two intersecting international subsystems, East-West and North-South, had evolved since World War II. Many of the outputs of these subsystems, for instance, those associated with East-West competition, decolonization, and third world economic development, have influenced the pattern of arms transfers to the IRA, as have the outputs of the

principal actors at the national, subnational, and transnational levels. Several of these outputs are treated briefly in the following paragraphs.

Britain's central position in the Western Alliance, which dates from the very onset of the cold war, made the Soviet Union a promising patron for the IRA. In the USSR's view, the United Kingdom (1) had intervened during the Russian Revolution, attempting to thwart the Bolsheviks, (2) was the birthplace of exploitive capitalism, and (3) cleverly entrapped her former colonies with economic imperialism, even as she publicly dismantled her Empire.

The British were attempting to manage an orderly transition to a post-colonial era. The process was largely complete in Asia and the Middle East, and still underway in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Western hemisphere. To the Irish separatist-nationalists, the exclusion of Northern Ireland from the policy of divestiture added insult to injury.

There were sharp increases in the late '60s in both arms manufacturing and in the volume of international trade in arms and ammunition. These increases have been attributed, in large part, to the emergence of new "third world" states from former colonies.<sup>38</sup> These conditions arose at the very time that events in Northern Ireland renewed the IRA's interest in arms transfers. Arms, ammunition and explosives were being manufactured in more and more countries. Seeking

economies of scale, both private and state-controlled arms manufacturers in many countries turned to export sales to improve their economic viability. In this intensely competitive environment, manufacturers had every incentive to avoid asking potential customers too many questions.

There was a spirited domestic debate in the United States over proposed gun control legislation, in the wake of the 1968 inner city riots. The opposition, which rallied 'round the constitutionally guaranteed right to bear arms, was led by the National Rifle Association lobby. When the rhetorical exchanges on this emotionally-charged "hot potato" were over, arms and ammunition continued to be available over-the-counter.

#### B. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

There have been many changes in the international setting over the past 16 years, none having had a greater impact upon IRA arms transfers than the image the media has created in the public mind regarding "international terrorism." The Irish rebels are no longer seen as the "brave boys at the barricades," but rather, as members of a ruthless international conspiracy. Noel Koch (an OSD official whose responsibilities include international terrorism) observes.

The terrorist looks out on a world which, not universally, but in many quarters, romanticized him and gave him a grudging respect; which often sympathized with his motives, if not his deeds; which allowed him a measure of tolerance, if not acceptance. Today, he is an object of revulsion.

In addition to worldwide changes, such as tightened airport security and increased cooperation among Western security forces, there have been major repercussions in both the Irish Republic and the United States. The change in public perceptions has made it possible to take concerted actions against the IRA and IRA sympathizers -- intelligence exchanges, cooperation among law enforcement authorities, and even extradition of terrorist fugitives from both the Irish Republic and the United States to England.<sup>40</sup>

## VI. SUPPLIER RATIONALES, OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS

Arms transfers to the IRA involve nation-states, bureaucratic players within various countries, non-governmental organizations, firms producing arms, arms dealers, and private individuals. The rationales, objectives and interests that make them active players (and by inference, others non-players) are outlined in the following paragraphs.

### A. ILLICIT EXTRA-NATIONAL SOURCES

The principal incentive among most illicit extra-national sources is economic gain. It is the engine that motivates firms producing arms, arms dealers, and, to a some extent, those popularly thought to be driven only by revolutionary fervor.<sup>41</sup> Their rationale, objective and interest is corporate or personal gain.

Support from the Basque separatists and the Palestine liberation Organization stems from the political and ideological affinity of separatist-nationalist terrorists who see analogies in their objectives and interests. Their objective in providing munitions, financial support, training or advisors is to continue the struggle, and to lend legitimacy to one another's cause.



Irish-American sources have historically responded to sectarian appeals to both nationalistic and religious values. Their objective is consistent, at least in part, with the declaratory goal of the insurgents -- to unite all of Ireland. It is less likely that they support the IRA's political goal of a united socialist republic.

#### B. STATE-SUPPORTED SOURCES

Michael Klare has identified six factors<sup>42</sup> which appear to be significant in motivating Soviet arms exports: (1) political presence, (2) superpower competition, (3) Sino-Soviet competition, (4) acquisition of basing facilities, (5) political insurance, and (6) source of hard currency. The focus of Klare's analysis is arms transfers to the third world, however, three of the factors he puts forward -- political presence, superpower competition, and source of hard currency -- also appear to have explanatory power in the case of the IRA.

When the situation in Northern Ireland deteriorated to crisis proportions in the late '60s, it was undoubtedly perceived by the Soviets as a low cost, low risk opportunity to shift yet another component of the "correlation of forces" against the West.<sup>43</sup> The Politburo probably thought that the split between the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic would grow worse.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, because of private American support for the rebels, animosity between the United States and the British portended problems for the NATO alliance.

The Soviet's opportunity to play the "spoiler" and attempt to weaken the NATO military alliance through arms transfers to the Irish rebels coincided in time with several relevant changes; (1) the coordination of Eastern bloc arms transfer policies,<sup>45</sup> and (2) "...the shifting of Soviet arms sales from a strictly or mainly political basis to an economic basis as well."<sup>46</sup>

"Socialist camp" arms transfer relationships with the Irish Republican Army reflect both of these trends. As the SIPRI publication The Arms Trade With the Third World pointed out in 1971,

...in pursuing its arms supply policy, the Soviet Union has frequently relied on member countries of the Warsaw Pact. In most of these other countries, however, the armaments industries cannot produce either the type or quantity of weapons which the developing countries need. So the role for most other Warsaw Pact countries has been to provide training and technical assistance, which has particularly been the case for Poland. Czechoslovakia is an exception: it had been a major arms manufacturer in the inter-war period and continued to export significant quantities of arms after World War II....<sup>47</sup>

Open source reports suggest that economic interests were an important consideration, at least in early Czech and Soviet arms transfers to the IRA. Although virtually nothing is available from open sources regarding the terms of direct Soviet Union - Irish Republican Army arms transfers, the involvement of an American arms dealer in the abortive 1971 attempt to transfer Czech arms to the IRA indicates a straightforward cash-for-arms relationship.<sup>48</sup>

The circumstances surrounding the September 1983 allegations of Soviet support to the IRA reinforce the view that the Soviets do not feel that the conflict affects their vital interests, yet they are willing to exploit the situation in Northern Ireland "for what it's worth." They were accused of offering the IRA arms in exchange for information regarding British military installations in Northern Ireland.<sup>49</sup>

It is difficult to establish ideological grounds for Soviet support to the IRA. The Provisionals could hardly be described as a vanguard party, fighting a "just war" that it was the Soviet Union's duty to support, as the leader of the socialist camp. The separatist-nationalist struggle may have fit the definition of a "war of national liberation,"<sup>50</sup> yet the Provisionals, while they might not be bourgeois, were really not proletarian enough to be truly worthy. Although many other movements were cited as participants in the worldwide struggle, the Irish separatists were not mentioned in Soviet pronouncements regarding national liberation movements during the years 1969 thru 1971.<sup>51</sup> In a 1966 Orbis article, Stephen Gibert's words predicted Soviet actions in Northern Ireland,

In those cases where insurgents, whether communist, leftist, of moderate nationalist-bourgeois, faced regimes clearly hostile to the USSR, they benefited from Soviet support, at least on a limited basis, even if they had little probability of success.<sup>52</sup>

Conversely, anti-colonial ideology appears to be a more significant factor in Libya's calculation of whether or not to transfer arms. Colonel Qaddafi announced in June 1972,

We support the Irish revolutionaries fighting Britain...When we give weapons to the Irish revolutionaries, it is not to kill innocent children, but to gain the freedom of an enslaved people. We are doing this because Britain has done much worse to the Arab nation.<sup>53</sup>

Colonel Qaddafi's public announcement of support for the IRA marked the beginning of a new arms transfer relationship, one of overt support by a nation-state, similar to the Palestine Liberation Organization's relationships with a number of arab countries.<sup>54</sup> According to press reports, Qaddafi accused Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in 1948 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf Islands in 1971. Qaddafi reportedly vowed he would pursue British imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home."<sup>55</sup>

Anthony Cordesman probably overstates his case when he says,

The USSR has also succeeded in using Libya as a general training ground for terrorist and revolutionary groups throughout the Third World and increasingly as a proxy in providing arms to Third World nations....<sup>56</sup>


It may be more appropriate to characterize the relationship between the Soviet Union and Libya as a marriage of convenience. Libya's anti-colonial crusade and the political, military and economic interests of the USSR often coincide.

### C. A STATE-SUPPORTED "SUPPLIER PROFILE"?

An attempt was made to construct a "supplier profile" using content analysis of Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports of Libyan, Czech and Soviet media. Soviet FBIS reports were supplemented with The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. The assessment was focused on identifying possible "leading indicators" of a covert state-supported arms transfer relationship. All broadcast and press items were examined for the period from 1969, the start of the current "troubles" in Northern Ireland, through the initial appearance of evidence suggesting active state support.

Figure 8, on the following page, captures perhaps the most significant result of the research, showing that even though all three countries have been linked to arms transfers to the IRA, only the Soviet media had more than a few references to Northern Ireland.

The predominant themes used to characterize the Northern Ireland situation in Soviet coverage were imperialism (39 references) and colonialism (34 references). There were a total of eleven allusions to facism, and religious differences were mentioned eight times. All references to religion as an issue were negative; Soviet commentators either downplayed its significance or accused the British of playing upon differences to foster conflict.



\* as reflected in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports and The Current Digest of the Soviet Press

Figure 8. Media References\* to Northern Ireland

Both Czech commentaries were precipitated by the British expulsion of 105 Soviets on espionage charges. The theme of these items is not surprising; they reflect extensive Soviet involvement in all phases of Czechoslovakian life, to counter the effects of the reactionary "Prague Spring" of 1968,

...The newspapers are breaking all records in nonsensical fabrications so as to lay the responsibility for the events in Ulster, for strikes all over Britain, and even for the growing opposition of the English public to the plans for British entry into the EEC at the door of the Soviet Union.<sup>57</sup>

Before Colonel Qaddafi openly acknowledged support to the IRA, the Libyan media (as reflected in FBIS reports) did not mention Northern Ireland.

With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the Libyan leader's first interview with AL-AHRAM appears relevant,

...Concluding his interview, the Libyan revolution leader explains his country's foreign policy during the revolutionary era and says: In short, this policy is positive neutrality, nonalignment, and support for all the cases of liberation and freedom in the whole world. Al-Qadhdhafi declares: The existence of one man under the yoke of imperialism in our world is a restriction on the freedom of the Arab man in Libya. The liberation of any man from the imperialist yoke is another guarantee to be added to the credit of the Arab's freedom in Libya.<sup>58</sup>

This unsuccessful attempt at detecting arms transfer relationships through public policy statements is yet another example of the difficulties facing the analyst charged with clarifying the problem.

## VII. RECIPIENT DEMAND FACTORS

A number of factors affect the Irish Republican Army's preferences for specific types of arms, sources of supply, and financing arrangements. Like any arms transfer recipient, the IRA must make choices between sometimes conflicting demands. Some of the principal IRA demand factors are:

### A. DIVERSIFICATION

Perhaps the most apparent characteristic of IRA arms transfers is the diversity of suppliers. With the possible exception of rocket-propelled grenades (and even that is problematic, because of the large number now in circulation), no single supplier can cut off the IRA's access to additional arms of the types already in their inventory. This affords the insurgents maximum freedom of action and avoids dependency upon any one supplier.

### B. TERROR QUOTIENT

The desirability of certain types of munitions can be linked to the terrorist's perception of their utility for his unique application. The open source reports include obvious examples -- explosives, detonators, surface-to-air missiles, remotely piloted vehicles capable of carrying explosives, a flame thrower, and an "assassination kit" briefcase (complete



with built-in machine gun). The "terror quotient" must be considered a strong determinant, for as Walter Laqueur observed,

...The real danger facing the terrorist is that of being ignored, of receiving insufficient publicity, of losing the image of the desperate freedom fighter and, of course, of having to face determined enemies, unwilling to negotiate regardless of the cost. <sup>59</sup>

### C. THREAT PERCEPTION

A number of observers attribute IRA arms transfers in the early years of the current "troubles" to the Catholic minority's inability to defend itself against roving bands of Ulster Protestants when sectarian fighting first broke out. The actions of the IRA are perhaps best understood in terms of the perceptions of their popular support base. The insurgents could not afford to remain on the sidelines, even if it were possible for the British Army to control the fighting and protect the Catholic enclaves. To do nothing would destroy their credibility and fatally undermine their *raison d'etre*.

The terrorists' perception of their immediate tactical situation vis-a-vis the security forces also translates into demand for certain arms transfers. For example, Thomas Green observed a significant change in the Irish Republic's role,

...Increasing cooperation between governments in Dublin and London in the 1970s helped to reduce the incidence of the IRA terrorist activities in Northern Ireland, activities that had depended on the sanctuary and supply routes available from the south. <sup>60</sup>

The IRA responded to the changing security environment with specific arms transfers designed to redress the new United Kingdom-Irish Republic advantage and avoid technological surprise -- starlight scopes, radio intercept and radar detection equipment.<sup>61</sup>

Perceptions of the threat posed by security forces could also influence insurgent decisions concerning how much they should depend upon indigenous production of arms. There are several considerations: What is the risk that in-country manufacturing facilities will be discovered? (Maybe it's too risky.) How much is likely to get through from outside suppliers? (Maybe we have no choice but to make our own.) If long storage in caches will be required, how does the shelf life of indigenously manufactured arms and explosives compare with the "perishability" of munitions transferred from outside suppliers? ("Wooden" arms and explosives are difficult to manufacture at home.)

#### D. ABILITY TO PAY

Throughout most of its history, the IRA has enjoyed solid, if relatively modest, financial security, based largely on support from sympathizers in the United States. Financial independence has enabled the group to achieve the degree of diversification outlined above. Open source reports suggest that contributions from American donors may have fallen in recent years, citing an upsurge in robberies

and kidnappings.<sup>62</sup> The evidence appears to be inconclusive, however. Should these reports prove true, they could presage either an increase in covert state-supported deliveries or a reduction in IRA access to "open market" arms, or both. Yet another possibility exists; greater dependence upon non-governmental or state-supported grant or loan aid, with continued access to the illicit arms market.

#### E. LEGITIMIZATION

The insurgents may feel that the relationship between themselves and an arms supplier lends legitimacy to their cause.<sup>63</sup> Nor must the rebels pledge themselves to a single sponsor. It may be the best strategy to "play both ends against the middle." Using what could be called the "driven into the arms" argument, Richard Lawlor, a Noraid spokesman, said at a Belfast press conference last year,

People often say if they (the IRA) get Soviet arms they must be communists. If they get arms from Libya they must be anarchists. It that is to be the case, it is a moral duty of every average American to ensure they get American guns to ensure democracy.<sup>64</sup>

Legitimacy of another sort may account for the transfer of large numbers of arms (rifles, pistols, and machine guns) of only marginal utility to the terrorist. S.G. Styles made the point,

Without the ability to use bombs any terrorist campaign would quickly become an armed confrontation -- on the one side irregular, generally poorly trained and equipped terrorists and, on the other, the organised security forces of law and order. The violence in these circumstances

could be confined to areas which least affect the general public, until attrition or logistical defeat can be imposed on the terrorists by the sheer weight of the superiority of the security forces. (We have witnessed the principle of these tactics being adopted by the Soviet Union in their suppression firstly of the Hungarian revolt and later in Czechoslovakia.) The introduction of explosives into terrorism brings an entirely new and higher plane of activity. It involves more people and organisations than a purely shooting campaign and the degree of preventative reaction that is called for can, in the limit, be extremely costly and wasteful of time and resources.<sup>65</sup> It cannot be denied that bombing is cost effective....

In order to foster and encourage the image Laqueur called the "desperate freedom fighter," the revolutionaries may feel it necessary to act as if there will be a popular "rising."

That could explain the discrepancy noted by an FBI spokesman,

There is no need to send 5,000 weapons over there. They don't need that many. If you can keep a constant flow of small numbers, maybe 50, 60, or 100 a year, they will have enough to do what they want to do.<sup>66</sup>

#### F. IDEOLOGY

The Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army has less in common with Marxist-Leninists than either the Official IRA or the Irish National Liberation Army. In fact, the Provos split away from the Official IRA in 1969 because they felt that guerrilla operations against the British were being slighted, and the IRA had become a Marxist political organization.<sup>67</sup> After sixteen years, however, at least one observer feels that may be changing,

The Provisional IRA's reorganization also reflects its recent political swing to the left, led by a new generation of young Marxists. Provisional IRA literature, like that of the official IRA, now reveals an undisguised Marxist philosophy, condemning all the elected parties in the

Dublin parliament and calling for the supplanting<sup>68</sup> of parliamentary democracy by a "People's Republic."

Nonetheless, declaratory policy statements should always be approached with appropriate misgivings, and compared carefully with operative policy. Any contention that the Provisional IRA is "going communist" will take a lot of proving. Walter Laqueur provides a historical perspective,

Nationalist terrorist groups usually had no scruples in looking for, and accepting, aid from foreign powers...IRA leaders collaborated with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, which did not prevent them from accepting help from communist countries two decades later...Members of the IRA...were not necessarily either Facist or Communist.... they acted according to the time-honored<sup>69</sup> principle that the enemy of their enemy was their friend.

Perhaps what some have called the "bizarre" alliance between the IRA and Colonel Quaddafi of Libya is not as "strange" as it is made out to be. They share a close ideological affinity, an anti-imperialist view of England as the embodiment of colonial exploitation, past and present.<sup>70</sup>

## VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

### A. IMPLICATIONS AND EFFECTS

...But the war in Northern Ireland, Cummings [the arms dealer] stresses, was very petty in terms of the arms business: 'just a few misguided nuts in America, and a few guns from Libya; thank God Gadaffi didn't really support them seriously....'<sup>71</sup>

Arms transfers to the Irish Republican Army have been sufficient to ensure the continuation of low-level violence in Northern Ireland. In the past sixteen years security forces have seized nearly 9,000 weapons, over a million rounds of ammunition, and more than 100 tons of explosives.<sup>72</sup> However, what has been shipped to the insurgents may be of less significance than what has not. It has long been within the capability of any of the states identified as covert patrons -- Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union or Libya -- to supply GRAIL shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles to the IRA. The same could be said regarding SAGGER wire-guided antitank missiles.<sup>73</sup> The inescapable conclusion: so far, at least, state-sponsored arms transfers to the IRA evidence restraint.

No supplier has achieved significant influence over the IRA as a result of arms transfers, nor has the IRA garnered influence over suppliers. In the future, however, one or more suppliers may be in a position to exert pressure on IRA leaders. The IRA's relative affluence in past years has

enabled them to diversify their sources of arms and ammunition, affording them a measure of independence from any one supplier. If reports of reduced income are correct, and they are forced to depend upon covert financial aid from either nation-states or non-governmental organizations, the Irish insurgents may have much less latitude in the future. Thus, the extent of covert financial support is a key assumption in any arms transfer analysis. If, for example, IRA leaders perceive their objectives to be unattainable without such funds, comensurate leverage could accrue to the donor(s).

Most of the IRA's arms and ammunition were manufactured in free world arms factories, and somehow made their way to Northern Ireland. Some of these transfers required export licenses, which were obtained by criminal means -- misrepresentation, bribery, and forgery. Many of the small arms were legally purchased in the United States, then smuggled to Ireland in small lots. These small arms transactions exemplify the difficulties inherent in attempting to assess arms transfers to the IRA. Taxonomies based upon country of manufacture are rendered almost meaningless by the possibility of (to name a few) Palestine Liberation Organization, Libyan, or Soviet-supplied covert financial aid. With that caveat very much in mind, the closing section of this paper will include suggestions for

future research, based upon an assessment of (1) possible sources of detailed arms transfer data, and (2) methodological challenges.



## IX. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

### A. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF ARMS TRANSFER INFORMATION

This thesis can perhaps best be described as a "scoping" exercise, based entirely upon open source information. It seems apparent, even from the limited amount of information which is available to the public, that the current "troubles" in Northern Ireland may be the best-documented case of arms transfers to an insurgent group in the post-war era.

Figure 9, on the following page, reflects a number of potential data sources, which are suggested by the open source reports. The categories shown are, of course, not mutually exclusive; for example, press and broadcast reports are often based upon the other sources listed. Much of the data is, expectedly, under the purview of security forces in either the United Kingdom or the Irish Republic. Yet, because arms transfers to the IRA are worldwide in scope, there may be many additional sources of information. For instance, reports detailing enroute seizures should be available through Interpol, or from the countries where confiscations took place -- the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic, the United States, France, Belgium, Austria, and the Netherlands. The principal United States government information sources include the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

- Capture/cache discovery reports and inventories
- Enroute seizure reports and inventories
- IRA and/or supplier financial accounts
- IRA and/or supplier correspondence
- Explosive incident forensic reports
- Ballistic test reports
- Army and security force after-action reports
- Agent reports
- Defector debriefs
- Prisoner interrogation reports
- Wiretap transcripts
- Radio intercepts
- Trial transcripts
- Export licenses
- Munitions production intelligence reports
- Foreign broadcast reports
- Press reports

Figure 3. Potential Sources of IRA  
Arms Transfer Information

U.S. Customs Service; the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the State Department's Office of Munitions Control.

#### B. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

In his treatment of the thought processes of the analyst, Richards Heuer identifies one of the many problems facing the arms transfer researcher,

Ideally, intelligence analysts should recognize what relevant evidence is lacking and be able to factor this into their calculations, estimating the potential impact of the missing data and adjusting confidence in their judgment downward in recognition that key information is unavailable. Unfortunately, this ideal may not be the norm. "Out of sight, out of mind" may be a better<sup>74</sup> description of the impact of gaps in the evidence.

Because of the analyst's availability, anchoring and overconfidence biases,<sup>75</sup> there is more than a little risk of "looking under the lamppost," and drifting into the implicit assumption that the available data is, in fact, representative. When significant gaps are the norm, it may be worth the effort to consciously assess the potential impact of missing data. One possible approach would be to assign a validity "weight" to the principal types of information; a weight which takes into account both the source and the topic, or arms transfer "event." Weights could be assigned using some variant of expert judging, such as Delphi or multiattribute utility.<sup>76</sup> With this data in hand, the analyst could construct a Bayesian map of the entire realm of possible information sources and their validity, a counter-

measure which may help him to resist the siren call of quantity over quality. This procedure will result in meaningful measures of face validity only to the extent that the chosen arms transfer "events" reflect the research questions to be addressed.<sup>77</sup>

Is it worth the trouble? The complexity of the task can be inferred from the size of the matrix. The previously discussed potential sources of information regarding arms transfers have been arbitrarily grouped under five headings on the horizontal axis of Table 1, on the following page. The vertical axis of the matrix consists of eight arms transfer "events" it may be useful to consider, if and when data is available. They include (1) financing, (2) shopping, (3) purchasing, (4) shipping, (5) training, (6) interception enroute, (7) in-country capture/cache discovery, and (8) operational use. With this scheme, 40 weights are required. If Table 1 included validity weights, it would depict what the analyst wants to find out (the events), where the information might come from (the sources), and how confident he should feel when he receives information from a particular source about a particular class of event (the validity weights). If the analyst conceptualizes his task in this way, it provides two useful reminders:

- bad reports don't get any better just because there are a lot of them, and
- the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts if a variety of sources suggest the same conclusion.

TABLE 1. ARMS TRANSFER EVENTS AND POSSIBLE INFORMATION SOURCES

POSSIBLE INFORMATION SOURCES

	physical evidence (e.g., material and/or documents)	interception of private messages	qualified observer	agent report	press report
operational use (initial)					
in-country capture/ cache discovery					
interception enroute					
training					
shipping					
purchasing					
shopping					
financing					

A R M S T R A N S F E R E V E N T S

### C. AN "ARMS TRANSFER EVENT" DATA BASE

A more rigorous treatment of arms transfer-related reports would be possible if the existing material were transformed into an arms transfer data base, tailored to accommodate the relevant attributes of the IRA data set. Table 1 identified eight arms transfer "events" suggested by open source reports of Irish Republican Army activity. Before building a unique data base structure around these events, it is appropriate to ask whether an existing arms transfer data base could accommodate the insurgent case. In fact, there appears to be no need to "reinvent the wheel." In Comparative Foreign Policy Notes, Llewellyn Howell and Joyce Mullen describe a promising "event" focused analytical approach,

While the concept of an 'international political event' is well known among international relationists, the concept of an 'arms transfer event' may not be. The basic purpose for the creation of an arms transfer events database is to aid foreign policy decision makers at the national level as they evaluate the patterns, purposes and effects of international arms transfers. The international transfer of arms, a seminal event which has military, economic, political, and diplomatic implications, is a central issue for both the supplying and receiving countries, and certainly for those not directly involved in the transaction but who are threatened by it. The transfer of arms is becoming an increasingly important phenomenon in a world marked by both a superpower nuclear standoff and persistent conflict among developing countries. An arms transfer data set allows decision makers to assess past and current patterns of international arms transfers, guiding them in their attempts to influence others, providing for their own and/or their allies security, and controlling transfers which may create or exacerbate conflict.

An arms transfer is actually a process rather than a single discrete event but it can [be] separated in such a way that its components are events in the same sense that a meeting, a critical comment, or an attack by armed forces are international political events. For our purposes, each

component is an event, with an arms transfer process therefore being a series of events.

. . .

In our conceptualization, twelve event codes delineate the stages of an arms transfer (see the graphic depiction of these codes below). The actual activities of the transfer are represented by the nine connected blocks. The three blocks to the right represent relevant opinions and comments expressed by governmental or industrial officials or representatives of the opposition, which may occur at any or all stages of the transfer. The event codes represent the distinct elements of an arms transfer process and each can be reflected in a separate event record.

The event record is divided into two sections. The analytical section consists of several fields in which alpha and numeric codes are entered. These codes provide a skeletal description of the action and include the following information: date of the event, actor country (or initiator of the action), event code, target country (or recipient of the action), domestic actor/target (groups or individuals acting within their countries), issues, terms of payment, and weapons systems or equipment types. Sources and coder ID are also recorded in this section and are important for editing and quality control. These analytical fields are essential to data management although they may never be viewed by the end user.

The second section of the data record -- the narrative summary -- documents and enhances the information entered in the analytical fields with details such as names, titles, and interesting elements of the transfer. Unlike the analytical field, the narrative field will be viewed directly by the end user and therefore must easily be clear, concise and informative.

. . .

The fact that the arms transfer process has been converted into discrete and codified elements permits computerization and instant availability. Analyses of the data may be displayed in the form of graphic presentations, tables with frequency counts, trend lines, and narrative summaries of events. Aspects of particular interest may be highlighted with geographic displays, icons and strategic simulations. A current data set can provide decision makers with instant access to a picture of the capabilities of the world around them and become a key ingredient in formulating an appropriate defensive posture.




Figure 10. The Arms Transfer Event



The data set does not presuppose any specific hypotheses about international arms transfers. The data fields for each event are designed to allow policy analysts to aggregate these data in a manner which deals specifically with their questions or problems. If the policy problem involves a particular country, pair of countries, weapons systems, or any other combination, the analyst can sort the data and construct indicators for that specific purpose.<sup>78</sup>

Appendix D contains selected extracts from the Third Point Systems arms transfer event Coding Handbook which explain in detail the criteria associated with each of the data base codes. While this data base was designed for state-to-state transactions, with only minor modifications the Third Point Systems arms transfer coding scheme could accommodate the insurgent case.

Necessary changes include:

ACTOR COUNTRY:	Add codes for non-governmental organizations and private individuals (no known affiliation with nation state, multinational or international organization)
DOMESTIC ACTOR:	Add codes for non-governmental organizations and security forces
ISSUES:	Add OPERATIONAL USE Add a GEOLOCATION field to 27 CAPTURE Use 06 EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS for SHIP/SMUGGLE
SYSTEMS:	Add fields for SERIAL NO. and COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE

How many entries would an IRA arms transfer event data base entail? The number of weapons seized since 1969 -- nearly 9,000 -- indicates building such a data base may be a major undertaking.

#### D. A RECOMMENDED APPROACH

The design, construction, and maintenance of an arms transfer event data base at the individual weapon/incident level of detail would entail both direct costs and opportunity costs for the builders. The first decision on whether or not to proceed should be based upon an assessment which weighs these burdens against likely benefits. If the only result would be "more than you ever wanted to know about the Irish Republican Army," then it is probably not worth the effort. The crux appears to be, can models be derived which are applicable in other insurgent cases?

Students and faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School may be able to make a significant contribution to the development of (an) arms transfer model(s) applicable to other insurgencies in open societies. Because some information regarding IRA arms transfers is protected by security classification, a comprehensive arms transfer event data base can only be compiled by researchers at the cognizant government agencies, government contractors, and/or institutions like the Naval Postgraduate School.

##### 1. Test for Generality

The transferability of insights gained through the development of an Irish Republican Army "insurgent case" arms transfer event data base to other insurgent cases should not be assumed. Rather, the extent to which the results of research in the relatively data-rich IRA case may be

applicable to other insurgencies warrants rigorous investigation before proceeding. The first undertaking, therefore, is to test the hypothesis that arms transfers to insurgent groups evidence common attributes. The list of potentially analogous movements includes, but is obviously not limited to:

- Germany - Baader-MeinHof Gang (Red Army Faction)  
Wehrsportgruppe (Military sports group) Hoffman
- Japan - The Red Army (Sekigun)
- Palestine - Black September  
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
As-Sa'iqah (Thunderbolt)  
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
National Arab Youth for the Liberation of Palestine  
Black June (The Corrective Movement for Al Fatah)
- Argentina - Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo  
Montoneros
- France - Front de Liberation de la Bretagne - Armees  
Revolutionnaire Bretonne
- Holland - Republik Maluku Selatan - Independent Republic  
of the South Moluccas
- Spain - Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna - Basque Land and  
Liberty  
Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primo de  
Octubre - First of October Anti-Facist  
Resistance Group  
Guerrilleros Del Cristo Rey - Warriors of  
Christ the King
- Turkey - Turkish People's Liberation Army
- Italy - Brigade Rosse - Red Brigades  
Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari - Armed  
Revolutionary Nuclei
- Egypt - Al Takfir<sup>79</sup> Wal Higrat (Atonement and Holy  
Fight)

The research should result in reasonably high confidence that (a) widely applicable insurgent case arms transfer model(s) can be developed before proceeding.

2. Assess Data Availability and Derivability

If the initial research effort tends to support generality, the second project should be a thorough scoping exercise to determine the availability and derivability of relevant data, and the prospects for future maintainability. The derivability question offers opportunities for additional computer science research efforts, aimed at developing the means to "translate" data stored on magnetic media in various existing data bases into the requisite formats.

3. Assess Maintainability

After all relevant data sources and form(at)s have been identified, a strategy for updating the arms transfer event data base should be developed. Recommendations should address both update frequency and data accuracy, and identify various means which could be used to accomplish updates. The research should encompass, as a related issue, the tasking of intelligence collection resources and the functioning of associated feedback mechanisms.

4. Estimate Construction and Maintenance Costs

For each data source identified by researchers in steps 2 and 3, an estimate should be made of the man-years, hardware, software, and other resources required to (1) code the existing information and (2) perform future maintenance.

## 5. Gather Data

Data gathering should proceed only after all previous steps have been accomplished, i.e., the project has been judged widely applicable, data availability and derivability have been thoroughly researched, and costs have been estimated.

## 6. Analyze Data

With the existing data available in the form of an IRA arms transfer event data base, the analyst could pursue an exceptionally wide range of research. If, for example, the information derived from physical evidence were complemented by (1) munitions production intelligence from law enforcement and intelligence community data bases and (2) U.S. export license data from the State Department's Office of Munitions Control, the data base might make it possible, in some cases, to establish an audit trail to the country of manufacture.

Other promising avenues for future research include:

- o What is the pattern of transnational arms transfers to the IRA?
- o Are trends apparent over time?
- o Are there "leading indicators" which precede the introduction of a new capability?
- o Does the transfer of certain munitions have an "accelerator" effect on insurgency?
- o To what extent are insurgencies dependent upon state-sponsored support?

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...Anyone regularly watching television recently must, however, get the impression that the world has entered a quiet season. If we examine more than five two- or three-sentence reports from abroad there is sure to be one about a giraffe escaping from a New Zealand zoo or a retired nun who formerly saw to the proper dress of visitors to the Vatican.

But there is no quiet season in the world. On the contrary, massacres are being perpetrated against communists in one place, thousands of women and children are dying of hunger in another, a political or economic problem has arisen in yet another (and should merit a more detailed explanation for the initiated), and in yet another place a country has been struck by a natural disaster. A

picture of this part of the world could certainly be gotten hold of.

Our television news lack all this. The shortcomings in reporting are not made up for either by the pleasant manner (and familiar) appearances of the announcers or by the otherwise not uninteresting feature Etapa [daily film reportage on different communities in Czechoslovakia].

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APPENDIX A

SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS

IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY  
ARMS TRANSFERS

Prime Minister John Lynch May 5 [1970] dismissed Finance Minister Charles J. Haughey and Agriculture Minister Neil T. Blaney on charges of attempting to ship arms across the border to Roman Catholics in Northern Ireland. Another cabinet member, Kevin Boland, minister for local government and social welfare, resigned in support of his two colleagues.

Announcing his action to a reconvened session of the Dail Eireann (parliament) May 6, Lynch said he had received information April 19-20 that Haughey and Blaney had been linked with "alleged attempts to unlawfully import arms" for reported transshipment to Northern Ireland. He said the two ministers had twice refused his request to resign and he was forced to oust them after news of the charges had leaked out. Lynch assured parliament that "this was the only intended importation of arms of the two members. These arms have not been imported and have not been landed in this country."

. . .

Lynch won a parliamentary vote of confidence (72-65) May 7 on his handling of the crisis...

. . .

Kevin Boland told parliament May 8 that he had resigned because he could not serve a government "whose leader kept members under Gestapo surveillance." Boland accused Lynch of establishing a special force in the police to spy on cabinet ministers. [Facts on File, 1970, pp. 354-355.]

The new wing of the IRA needed guns. They went to the Irish government for them and created an scandal that led to the fall of three cabinet ministers and the two top Irish Army intelligence officers.

The Dublin arms scandal began with a committee of the government party, Fianna Fail, which was set up in 1969 to provide relief for the Catholics in the north and to promote a worldwide propaganda campaign arguing the case for a united Ireland.

The committee wound up involved in a \$75,000 arms deal for 800 Lugar pistols, Browning and Biretta automatic rifles, Sterling submachine guns and 250,000 rounds of ammunition. The plan called for smuggling them from Vienna into Dublin airport.

British intelligence got wind of the deal and tipped off Austrian police, who prevented the weapons from leaving the country.

Two trials followed. One ended when the judge dismissed the jury after he was challenged by the defense for biased behavior from the bench. The second trial ended after a speech by one of the defendants, a Provisional IRA officer, which was applauded by a member of the jury. All of the men charged in the case were acquitted.

By the time the final verdict came through in the fall of 1970, the Provisionals had other sources for guns and money. [Jim Landers, "Running Guns to Ulster," The Washington Post, 8 September 1974, section 2, p. 3.]

Ireland is trying to recover from a West German arms dealer about \$70,000 voted for relief operations in Northern Ireland but diverted to buy weapons and ammunition, a Government report said today [23 August 1972].

The report, by the Department of Finance, charged that the money was used to buy arms for the IRA, which is trying to force the largely Protestant British province to join Catholic Ireland.

The report does not say whom the weapons were destined for, but there was speculation that they were intended for the I.R.A. Nor does the report say that the arms were delivered, but since the department is trying to get the

money back it was assumed that at least some of the arms were not delivered.

The report followed an investigation ordered by the Irish Parliament into the spending of relief grants of 105,000 pounds, or \$262,500, earmarked for Catholic victims of rioting in Northern Ireland.

It said only \$75,000 of this money had gone to relieve distress in Northern Ireland. "About \$85,000 was possibly spent in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland."

But \$102,000 was "not spent on the relief of distress."

Captain James Kelly, an Irish Army intelligence officer who figured in a recent Dublin scandal over arms-smuggling that involved leading politicians, told the inquiry he had negotiated a contract for weapons with Otto Schluter of Hamburg reputedly one of Europe's biggest private arms dealers.

According to the report, Captain Kelly said that \$81,250 was set aside for the arms deal, of which \$70,000 went to the West German arms dealer.

Witnesses who testified included the Minister of Agriculture, James Gibbons, and three former ministers, Charles Haughey, Neil Blaney and Michael O'Morain. Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney were ousted by Prime Minister John Lynch before the arms smuggling conspiracy trial of 1970. Mr. O'Morain resigned because of ill health. ["Dublin Says Relief Funds for Ulster Went for Arms," The New York Times 24 August 1972, p. 3.]

...A house-to-house search by troops in the area [the Falls Road district of Belfast] July 4-5 [1972] resulted in the seizure of 20,000 rounds of ammunition, more than 100 guns and rifles, 25 pounds of explosives, about 100 incendiary devices and an unspecified number of grenades. [Facts on File, 1970, p. 507.]

Large caches of bombs and explosives believed destined for use by a dissident Irish Republican Army faction in

Northern Ireland and England were uncovered by British police in raids in London Aug. 13-14 [1970] [Facts on File, 1970, p. 633.]

Faulkner announced March 30 [1971] an amnesty period until April 8 for people returning illegal arms and gelignite. Faulkner reported April 6 that more than 340 guns and 20,000 rounds of ammunition had been turned in, representing only a small fraction of privately held arms in Northern Ireland.

British troops and police found caches of illegal arms in predawn raids in Roman Catholic areas of Belfast April 3. [Facts on File, 1971, p. 279.]

As part of a campaign to curb the activities of the outlawed Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Dail Eireann (parliament) unanimously approved a bill June 9 [1971] restricting the purchase and carrying of arms. The law specifically banned the holding of arms designed to be used beyond Ireland's frontier. This was viewed as an attempt to halt the illicit traffic of arms to Northern Ireland.

Justice Minister Desmond O'Malley said the main purpose of the bill was to authorize energetic government action against armed clandestine groups. He said the police would halt such IRA activities as recent marches through the capital. The bill provided for an amnesty to arms holders who yielded their weapons before the law's enforcement. [Facts on File, 1971, p. 456.]

Dutch police seized a 3 1/2-ton cargo of Czechoslovak-made arms and ammunition on a Belgian charter plane at an Amsterdam airport Oct. 16 [1971]. The arms were flown from Prague and were thought to be destined for the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

The Official Czechoslovak press agency CTK Oct. 18 described as "without foundation" reports that Czechoslovakia had sent or sold the arms. [Facts on File, 1971, p. 820.]



According to the official Dutch News Agency, Mr. Winslow [Special Branch Chief Inspector] and his colleagues flew to Amsterdam to help question Mr. E.A. Konig, the American arms dealer held by Dutch police, who was the only passenger on board the Belgian-owned charter plane when it arrived at Schiphol airport.

. . .

Had the arms consignment not been accompanied by documents containing an irregularity, there would have been nothing that the Dutch authorities could have done to stop them passing through Holland on their way to their destination. But the Dutch had been tipped off that there was something odd about the consignment.

A scrutiny of the waybill revealed that the arms, including sub-machineguns, rifles and rocket launchers, as well as ammunition, were consigned to a British company with an address in London. This information was flashed to Scotland Yard, who checked out the firm -- named as Wendamont Ltd. of City Road.

. . .

The arms were to have been moved by lorry from the airport to the coast, then by sea, ostensibly to Britain. It is well known that Dutch coasters have been involved in international arms smuggling.

. . .

Gelignite in the Republic of Ireland has been taken out of private hands and is now held by the Army in a Dublin magazine. The transfer has been effected by the Army and police in secret over a number of days.

In future any firm or county council using gelignite will have to obtain supplies from the Government and use it under police supervision.

The round-up of gelignite coincides with the circulation of a new Bill by the Government which provides much stricter control over explosives.

The Bill, which will come before the Dail in the winter session, provides that everyone importing, manufacturing, storing or selling explosives must be licensed. [Peter

Hopkirk, "Foreign Office Waits for Special Branch Report on Arms Haul in Holland," The Times of London, 18 October 1971, p. 2.]

The incident bears all the hallmarks of an Omnipol job. International arms dealers report that this is not the first time that Czech arms have gone to Ireland. The supplies come from the State-owned Omnipol organisation in Prague, who specialise in supplying subversive organisations and guerrilla groups.

Omnipol is the sales organisation for the Czechoslovak arms factory at Brno. [Anthony Terry, "Arms Plane Held in Holland: Top IRA Man Sought," The London Sunday Times, 17 October 1971, p. 1.]

Irish Republic customs officials seized six suitcases of weapons thought to be destined for Ulster's IRA from luggage taken off the liner, Queen Elizabeth 2, in the port of Cobh Oct. 19 [1971]. [Facts on File, 1971, p. 820.]

Arms and ammunition, including rifles, machineguns, and hand grenades were found in luggage brought ashore from the Cunard liner Queen Elizabeth 2 at Cork today.

...

It was later learnt that the arms included at least eight modern lightweight automatic rifles with telescopic sights. There were also about 20 hand grenades and much ammunition. [Christopher Warman, "Arms Are Found in IFA Luggage at Cork," The Times of London, 20 October 1971, p. 1.]

Another route out for the weapons he [McMullen] said, "was through passenger luggage aboard the luxury liner IFA."

Two IRA men were crew members who took care of seven suitcases every two weeks.

"An Irish customs agent in Cork would be given the claim numbers on the tickets, and he would take care of them -- put them aside. But he could only watch them for a certain period of time before he had to turn them in as unclaimed. If he didn't, then he'd be implicated.

"Well Joe Cahill screwed that route up by simple neglect. He didn't show to claim the suitcases. The weapons were found, wrapped in New York Times newspapers, and of course, they still had serial numbers on them. The guns were traced to a store in New York and the buyers were traced from there. That resulted in a well-known case in America known as "The Fort Worth Five." [Andrew Blake, "The American Connection: Running Guns to the IRA," The Washington Post, 4 September 1979, p. 13.]

The army discovered arms caches throughout the province in a series of raids Nov. 4-9 [1971]. Fifty-two persons were detained for questioning in Belfast Nov. 4 during house-to-house raids that also netted sizable quantities of arms, ammunitions and explosives. The army reported Nov. 6 the discovery of a bomb factory in Carrickmore in County Tyrone.

According to figures released Nov. 9, arms searches in 1971 had netted 62,121 rounds of ammunition and 362 weapons, of which 124 were rifles and 10 were machineguns. [Facts on File, 1971, p. 877.]

Troops and policemen today (11 November 1971) made their biggest and most successful arms raid in Northern Ireland at a farmhouse in county Antrim.

The raid was the largest of its kind in the history of the province and resulted in the seizure of a large quantity of arms and explosives.

...

Among weapons also seized today were an automatic rifle, a Thompson sub-machine gun, an M1 American carbine, two American battle rifles, a shotgun and three pistols and two revolvers.

The arms were ingeniously hidden. A furniture van with a secret compartment capable of hiding up to six men was found. The discovery included many Belgian-made shotgun cartridges capable of killing at up to 100 yards. ["Army Find 54 Weapons in Raid on Farmhouse," The Times of London, 16 November, 1971), p. 2.]

Britain, meanwhile, has accused Czechoslovakia of attempting to supply arms to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. As a result, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jan Marko, has called off an official visit to London. [James Feron, "Prague is Uneasy on Election's Eve," The New York Times, 26 November 1971, p. 20.]

The flow of information to the army has steadily increased, with the result that more caches of explosives and arms have been discovered. Much of the information, anonymous but accurate, comes, intelligence believes, from Roman Catholics weary of the fighting.

...

The chief logistics advantage of the I.R.A. is the state of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to the south.

The border could be closed on the northern side as the Communists have closed the border between Eastern and Western Europe. But the idea of a frontier guarded by watchtowers, minefields and pillboxes is repugnant to the British.

The army contends that adequate cooperation from the south would greatly reduce the traffic in explosives and arms. But the Republic has shown no willingness to provide adequate security on its side of the border. [Drew Middleton, "British Army Feels Tactics in Ulster Are Succeeding," The New York Times, 24 December 1971, p. 3.]

The Minister of Justice, Desmond O'Malley, announced today [20 February 1972] that the Attorney General would

order certain persons who had been freed by "inexplicable" court decisions to be placed on trial.

This was seen here [Dublin] as a reference to the case of seven men, allegedly members of the illegal Irish Republican Army, who appeared before a court at Dundalk on arms-smuggling charges last week. The charges were dismissed because of insufficient evidence.

. . .

The Prime Minister, John Lynch, confirmed in a radio interview that the Attorney General had decided to intervene in certain cases. He declined to identify the cases but said he thought most people would know which they were. ["Ireland to Order Arms Case Trial," The New York Times, 21 February 1972, p. 8.]

British soldiers raided a house in the Roman Catholic Ardoyne district of Belfast and uncovered an arms cache that included 16 pounds of gelignite, 29 detonators, fuses, timing devices and a number of rifles, shotguns and pistols. ["Northern Ireland Pushes Hunt in Restaurant Blast Fatal to 2," The New York Times, 6 March 1972, p. 8.]

Three men were expected to appear before the Special Criminal Court in Dublin today [30 April 1972] after the discovery of a big Provisional IRA arms dump about 18 miles north of the city. Police said it was the largest arms discovery in the Irish Republic during the present troubles.

It included mortars, rockets, grenades and complex machinery apparently used to manufacture all three types of weapon. The haul is so big that police say it will take a few days to categorize it and disclose the details.

It was discovered by a police patrol in the shed of an old farmhouse in the remote hamlet of Donabare.

Although the discovery is understood to have been made late on Monday afternoon, for security reasons no details were disclosed until a brief statement yesterday. The factory appeared to have been one of the Provisional IRA's main manufacturing and transport points for its guerrilla

campaign in the North. [Christopher Walker, Eire Police Find Big IRA Arms Dump," The Times of London, 30 April 1972, p. 1.]

Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money, arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.

Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in 1948 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf Islands in 1971, Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [Facts on File, 1972, p. 439.]

Attorney General Richard G. Kleindienst has ordered a Federal grand jury investigation here [Fort Worth] into the alleged smuggling of American arms into Northern Ireland to supply the Irish Republican Army.

. . .

The inquiry reportedly focused here because of reports that some of the weapons supplied the I.R.A. were purchased in north-central Texas and because of the high regard in which Attorney General Kleindienst holds Mr. Mahon and Judge Brewster. ["U.S. Jury Focuses on Guns for I.R.A.," The New York Times, 25 June 1972, p. 17.]

The title of illicit armaments and explosives is becoming a genuine menace. It is particularly difficult to control in Europe where smuggling is relatively easy and one country's gun control laws can be undermined by its neighbor's laxity. In one of the more bizarre alliances of current politics, President Qaddafi of Libya claims to have supplied the Irish Republican Army with guns. In present evidence, that claim

can neither be proved nor disproved. Perhaps the real point of the episode is that automatic weapons are now sufficiently available in Europe that no Irish terrorist need depend on North Africa for supplies.

Most of the small arms now in commerce among illegal dealers can, regrettably, be traced back to one or another of the great power blocs. In Northern Ireland, the IRA is well equipped with, chiefly, British and American weapons. At Lydda airport, in Israel, the Japanese assassins had Czech submachine guns.

Although current terrorism in Europe has been far more limited than in Ireland or in the Middle East, there has been enough of it to make law and order a very sensitive political issue. After the most extensive manhunt in their postwar history, the West Germans have succeeded in arresting the leaders of the small but spectacular Baader-Meinhof group, a band of well-armed political radicals who for two years pursued a wild campaign of explosions and robberies. The anarchist with a bomb is not currently considered a joke in Germany. In Italy, police have been carrying out an unprecedented series of raids on political movements of the far right and left, seizing a remarkable array of armaments. In addition to machine guns and submachine guns, the inventory runs to thousands of rifles and pistols, and tons of explosives. Most of the weapons are of obvious military design.

Some European countries have been permitting the open sale of semiautomatic weapons under the fiction that they are sporting arms. Some arms factories sell only to governments but avoid the questions of whether, or to whom, those governments might resell the goods. As for bombs, modern explosives are easy to manufacture and they are sufficiently widely used in industry that they are very easily obtained.

The current market in contraband military armaments has a good deal in common with the traffic in drugs. For many years a few governments covertly encouraged the distribution of drugs, and many tacitly tolerated it. There is always a certain profit, political or otherwise, to be extracted from the vices of other people who live in other places. But the traffic in drugs has not remained so open and unregulated as it once was. The same is true of military armaments. Governments are undertaking serious enforcement.

Even very vigorous policing probably cannot entirely stop the illegal traffic in military weapons, for a great many are already in circulation. But policing can make it much harder and more expensive to find them. It would be ironic if, when nations could agree on controlling nuclear missiles, they

could not cooperate to disarm terrorists. For guns, as for drugs, control begins with the manufacturers. In the case of guns, the manufacturers are well known. ["Arms and the Terrorists," The Washington Post, 27 June 1972, editorial, p. 16.]

Explaining his resort to stronger military action, William Whitelaw, British administrator for Northern Ireland, announced July 14 [1972] that rocket launchers had been used for the first time in the area the previous day. He said he had ordered the soldiers to "respond with action to control the areas from which the attacks were launched and to protect themselves and the civil population." Defense Secretary Lord Carrington also said July 14 that the use of rocket launchers represented a "considerable escalation of violence" and warned that Northern Ireland was on the brink of disaster. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 560.]

Although officials in the Justice, Treasury and State Departments are reluctant to talk about the investigation in any detail, several have indicated that it began in Northern Ireland recently with the appearance of a semi-automatic rifle called the AR-180 in the hands of I.R.A. terrorists.

The AR-180 is manufactured in Japan for the Armalite Corporation of Costa Mesa, Calif. The entire Japanese production is reportedly shipped to the United States, where the light-weight, aluminium-frame weapon has a ready market among sportsmen and, to an extent, police departments.

According to the Office of Munitions Control in the State Department, only 138 foreign export licenses have been issued to Armalite for shipping the AR-180 outside the country. About half of these licenses were for shipment to gun dealers in Italy, 22 were for Britain, and the rest were scattered among dealers in a handful of other nations.

Since the bitter, triangular hostilities erupted in 1969 -- involving I.R.A. gunmen, the British Army and Protestant extremists -- 11 AR-180s have been seized from the I.R.A. by British troops and the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Several of the seized Armalites were traced back to purchases made from local gun dealers in the United States, according to the Constabulary headquarters. [James M. Markham,



"Gun-Running Case in U.S. Embitters I.R.A. Supporters," The New York Times, 17 July 1972), p. 1.]

...Troops of the Gordon Highlanders uncovered a cache today [29 July 1972] in woods near Lurgan and confiscated 100 pounds of explosives, 12 grenades, 1,500 rounds of ammunition, two rifles, a shotgun and a .45-caliber revolver. ["Hotel Man Killed in Belfast; Senator's House Set Afire," The New York Times, 29 July 1972, p. 3.]

The army claimed Aug. 1 [1972] that arms searches since the assaults on the "no-go" areas had netted massive amounts of IRA weapons in Belfast and Londonderry, including an antitank gun, a heavy machinegun, rifles, shotguns, ammunition and materials used to make bombs. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 598.]

The 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Aug. 3 [1972] upheld contempt of court sentences imposed in June on five witnesses [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey and Mathias Reilly] for refusing to testify to a Fort Worth grand jury about alleged gun smuggling to the IRA in Ulster. The five had been jailed in June. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 617.]

A federal grand jury in New York City Aug 29 [1972] indicted a gun dealer, Edward Agramonte, for illegally possessing, selling and dealing in guns, ammunition and other weapons. Unidentified sources said Agramonte was under investigation in connection with the alleged IRA gun smuggling plot, the New York Times reported Aug. 30. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 794.]

Five men known as the "Fort Worth Five" [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey and Mathias Reilly] were freed from a Texas jail Sept. 24 [1972] after being imprisoned since June for refusing to testify before a Fort Worth grand jury about an alleged plot to smuggle guns to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 794.]

At least half of the 16 anti-tank rockets fired by the Provisional IRA within the past 48 hours were manufactured in the Soviet Union, but the Army is by no means certain that the Russians or even Soviet block countries sent them to Ireland.

The IRA went to some lengths to obliterate the markings on the 14 1/2 lb RPG-7 launchers before using them. Thick black paint covered code letters.

Most Eastern European countries are unlikely to incriminate themselves directly with the transport of arms to Ireland. It seems more likely that they were sent from one of the North African countries such as Egypt or Libya, which are known to have used Russian weapons. Colonel Gaddafi, the Libyan President, said in June that his country was sending arms, money and equipment to the IRA.

The Army today exhibited the Soviet launcher and projectile captured at a road checkpoint in Londonderry yesterday. They were made in 1970 in the Soviet Union although the manufacturer's name had been filed off. [Robert Fisk, "IRA Rockets are Made in Russia," The Times of London, 30 November 1972, p. 1.]

...For all that, the IRA was able to mount a new rash of rocket attacks in Ulster last week. Angry British intelligence sources accused Soviet agents of supplying the rocket launchers, and the British Foreign Office made a grim request for Russian cooperation in tracing how the Soviet rockets got to Northern Ireland.

...

...Even weapons and gelignite now can no longer be safely stored in friendly homes, and they are often buried in fields instead.

...IRA insiders already concede that their sources of money and support from conservative Irish-Americans have dried up, and doors are slamming shut throughout Ireland as well. "There was once a saying that an Irishman might not vote for the IRA man but he would give him food, shelter and pray for him," observes one IRA watcher, "Now it's an open question whether he'd even pray for him." ["Dublin Puts the Squeeze on the IRA," Newsweek, 18 December 1972), p. 47-48.]

The official Soviet news agency Tass Dec. 11 [1972] denied reports of Moscow's involvement in the Northern Ireland conflict. The statement, however, did not disclaim the specific charge that Soviet-made RPG-7 rocket launchers had been supplied to the IRA. The Soviet Government Dec. 20 refused a British request to help track down the source of the rockets. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 1063.]

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The current IRA campaign carried on by the Provisional wing of the revolutionary underground is particularly notable because of the way it reveals distinctive Irish factors against the background of the widespread guerrilla phenomena of our times. It is an example of how quickly and with what little input of ordnance a guerrilla tradition can be made operational where that tradition has a long history and strong emotional supports.

. . .

In terms of weaponry, the IRA has until recently worked with the traditional pistols, rifles and gelignite memorialized in the fights of the 1920s. Some newer machine guns have replaced the venerable Thompson sub-machine guns

first acquired from the earliest production in the U.S. High-powered rifles with telescopic sights have added to the deadliness of sniper fire. The recent addition of rockets, however, represents a breakthrough in ordnance of great significance. The rockets, probably procured via Eastern Europe, are the most radical and effective innovation in guerrilla armament in this century. They place the IRA on a footing with the Viet Cong and the Arab commandos in firepower, and make possible the striking of compounds in which the massive counter-insurgency forces hole up between sweeps.

On the strength of its successful bombing campaign, and its relatively successful mining of roads, the IRA came very close to dominating the major urban areas of Northern Ireland. Its limitations have been largely technological, having to do with the kind of explosives available and the minimal weaponry it could use. [Dennis Clark, "Which Way the I.R.A.?" Commonweal, 5 January 1973, pp. 294-297.]

Five Irish-born New Yorkers [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey and Mathias Reilly] resumed their indefinite sentences in a Fort Worth, Texas jail Jan. 29 [1973] with a warning from U.S. Attorney Frank McCowan that they would remain there until they cooperated with a grand jury investigation into alleged gun smuggling to Northern Ireland. The five had been jailed for several months in 1972. According to the New York Times Jan. 31, the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to hear the appeal of an appellate court decision against the defendants. [Facts on File, 1973, p. 123.]

The Irish Republic Navy intercepted a West German-owned Cyprus-registered ship off County Waterford on the southeast coast of Ireland March 28 [1973] and seized five tons of arms and ammunition destined for the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). Security forces called the incident the biggest arms smuggling plot uncovered in the Irish Republic during the civil unrest that started in Ulster in 1969.

The ship, the 298-ton coaster Claudia, had begun its voyage at Cyprus. Most of the arms and ammunition were of Russian and East European manufacture.

. . .

The government did not disclose the actual port of loading, however, Guenther Leinhaeuser, a convicted West German arms smuggler who identified himself April 2 as the "middle man" in what he said was an arms deal between Libya and the IRA, said the arms had been loaded off the Libyan coast outside Libyan territorial waters. He said the deal had involved 100 tons of arms worth more than \$1 million, but disclaimed knowledge of what happened to the missing 95 tons. Leinhaeuser and his wife owned 90% of the Claudia. [Facts on File, 1973, p. 368.]

On March 15, 1973, Captain Hans-Ludwig Fleugal, master of the 289-ton Cyprus based coaster Claudia, watched from his ship's rail as nine soldiers in uniform of the Libyan Army staggered under the weight of five tons of arms and explosives.

The weapons, including Russian A47 service rifles, were loaded into the Claudia's hold -- ironically only a few hundred yards from where the Union Jack fluttered over the British embassy on the Tripoli waterfront -- under the eyes of Mr. Joe Cahill, one of the Provisional IRA's Army Council from Dublin. In the hot afternoon, with Mr. Cahill aboard, the Claudia chugged out into the Mediterranean, escorted by naval vessels of the Libyan Arab Republic on the first stage of its highly illegal voyage to Ireland.

That, at least, is Captain Fleugal's account of the start of the Claudia affair, and is remarkable because it is the only eyewitness evidence to be made public of Colonel Gaddafi's involvement with the IRA. British submarines apparently shadowed the Claudia all the way to Ireland where, two miles off Helvic Head in Co. Cork, she was stopped by minesweepers of the Irish Naval Service. [Robert Fisk, "The Role Libya Sees for Itself in the Irish Struggle," The Times of London, 21 April 1975, p. 14.]

The Claudia's voyage to Ireland began at Cyprus and included calls at Tunis, Cadiz and Gibraltar. Though most of the arms and ammunition were of Soviet and East European make, the actual port of loading has not been disclosed.

The cargo, under Army supervision at Cork, Ireland, included 250 rifles, 250 pistols, 25,000 rounds of ammunition, 200 anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, 500 pounds of gelignite, 300 grenades and quantities of TNT, fuses and detonators.

It was reported from Cork that some of the cases were marked "Tripoli." ["Ireland's Navy Seizes Vessel with Arms for I.R.A." The New York Times, 30 March 1973, p. 3.]

...The vessel was carrying 15 tons of arms from Libya. [Bernard Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to Flow of Arms," The New York Times, 16 December 1975, p. 16.]

The last dramatic seizure of a gun-running vessel in Irish waters occurred in 1973 when the motor vessel Claudia, carrying five tons of arms from Libya, was intercepted off the southeast coast.

The Libyan source of supply to the IRA dried up soon after, and since then the overwhelming bulk -- perhaps 80 percent -- of IRA arms has come from the U.S., which is also the organization's main source of funds.

However, the authorities know that shipments like these represent only a small proportion of the arms and ammunition brought in illegally over the past 14 years. Usually they are smuggled in cargo containers into ports in the Irish Republic and later transferred in small lots across the border into Northern Ireland. [James Downey, "Ireland Deals Blow to U.S.-IRA Connection," Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 9.]

...The army also uncovered caches of arms and explosives in Belfast and detained three men.

. . .

The army said Mr. Hughes [the second member of the Officials killed in three days] was in a group of men found loading weapons into a car. ["Explosion Damages a Church in Ulster; Soldier is Wounded," The New York Times, 11 April 1973, p. 14.]

Britain has suspended the sale to Libya of any arms that "could conceivably be re-exported for use by the Irish Republican Army."

A German vessel, the Claudia, was intercepted off the Irish coast two weeks ago with five tons of arms loaded in Tripoli, Libya, for use by the I.R.A.

The British Ambassador, Peter Tripp, informed Foreign Ministry officials in Tripoli yesterday that London wanted a satisfactory explanation of "circumstantial reports" of Libya's involvement in the affair. ["Britain Cuts Arms to Libya," The New York Times, 14 April 1973, p. 3.]

Security forces seized almost a ton of arms, ammunition and explosives from a British ship that arrived in Dublin harbor from Montreal, Canada July 16 [1973]. The arms, mostly U.S. or Swedish-made, were thought headed for the IRA in Northern Ireland. An Irish Canadian, John P.D. Murphy, was charged the following day in Dublin's Special Criminal Court with illegally importing the arms. [Facts on File, 1973, p. 657.]

Policemen and troops seized almost a ton of arms, ammunition and explosives on a British ship that arrived here [Dublin] from Montreal today.

The arms -- 17 rifles, 29,000 rounds of ammunition and about 60 pounds of gunpowder -- were found in one of 51 containers aboard the cargo vessel Manchester Vigor. The police picked out the container with the arms as soon as they boarded the ship.

Police sources said that the consignment was believed to be intended for the militant Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army and had probably been sent by Irishmen in the United States or Canada. Most of the rifles were made in the United States or Sweden. ["Ton of Arms Seized from Ship in Dublin," The New York Times, 17 July 1973, p. 17.]

The "Fort Worth 5" [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey, and Mathias Reilly] imprisoned in a Fort Worth, Texas jail. were freed on bail for the second time and returned to New York City Aug. 14 [1973].

The five, who had refused to testify to a grand jury about alleged gun smuggling to Northern Ireland, were released on bonds of \$5,000-\$15,000. Bail had been ordered set by U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas Aug. 10. [Facts on File, 1973, p. 740.]

U.S. Federal Judge Leo Brewster dismissed contempt charges against the five Irish-Americans known as the "Fort Worth 5" [Kenneth Tierney, Paschal Morahan, Daniel Crawford, Thomas Laffey, and Mathias Reilly] Nov. 7 [1973], one day after the term of the grand jury before which they had refused to testify had expired. [Facts on File, 1973, p. 1028.]

A Federal judge has denied motions urging the release of a Vietnam veteran [Robert K. Meisel, Jr.] held in custody since June 25 for refusing to testify before a Federal grand jury here [San Francisco] on alleged gun-running to the Irish Republican Army.

...

Mr. Meisel, a house painter, was originally called to testify along with 10 other persons in October 1972, shortly after a trunk of arms and ammunition was discovered at London airport.

...



In the interim, Charles Malone, in whose house Mr. Meisel had lived for a while, was indicted for Federal firearms violations in connection with rifle shipments to the I.R.A. He pleaded guilty and received a suspended sentence and a year's probation.

David P. Bancroft, Assistant United States Attorney, said, however, that the grand jury was still interested in asking Mr. Meisel questions about an August, 1972 trip he allegedly made to New York with two other individuals to deliver guns and explosives, and about whether he "ever, with others, received any explosives from Butte, Mont." ["I.R.A. Case Suspect Denied Release," The New York Times, 7 October 1973, p. 80.]

The five individuals subpoenaed from Butte to testify here [San Francisco] a year ago denied any involvement in illegal activities.

Their attorney, William Murphy of San Francisco, said Lieut. Michael Sullivan and Deputy Lieut. Morris Mulcahy of the Butte Police Department "were asked if they planned to rob the National Guard Armory in Butte" and ship the confiscated weapons to Ireland.

Mr. Murphy said Mr. Sullivan was also asked if he had talked with Ken Cunningham, sheriff of Silver Bow County, "about getting machine guns from the sheriff" for shipment to Ireland. Mr. Murphy said that Mr. Cunningham was asked "if packages of arms had been shipped by him and if he had ever discussed machine guns" with a man Mr. Murphy declined to name.

The investigation originated when a trunk full of arms broke open at London's Heathrow Airport on June 1, 1972. According to the Malone indictment, the trunk was addressed to Maumeen, Letermore, County Galway, Ireland and contained two rifles, three pistols and 350 rounds of ammunition. One of the rifles, a .44 caliber Luger carbine, was traced to Mr. Malone, who had purchased it on May 23. ["Arms Query Grand Jury Role," The New York Times, 28 October 1973, p. 9.]

A Federal grand jury here [Baltimore] indicted five men today [2 April 1974] on charges of conspiring to smuggle arms and ammunition to the Irish Republican Army.

The men, three from Maryland [Kiernan F. McMahon, William Westerlund, and Francis M. Larkin] and two from Ireland [Henry Hillick and James Conlon], were charged on 23 counts with shipping 175 semi-automatic rifles, several thousand machine guns, and 20,000 rounds of ammunition to the underground I.R.A.

The operation took place, according to the indictment, between March 1973 and Feb. 14 of this year. ["5 Said to Attempt to Run Arms to I.R.A.," The New York Times, 3 April 1974, p. 30.]

The British Army announced yesterday [23 October 1974] that it had captured a two-truck arms convoy in what it said was a major blow to the Irish Republican Army. Discovery of the trucks, which contained mortars, primed incendiaries, submachine guns and explosives, coincided with the opening of a major security operation by police and soldiers to protect Catholic neighborhoods from roving Protestant militiamen. [The New York Times, 24 October 1974, p. 3.]

US Army field manuals which describe in detail how to construct dozens of different types of terrorist devices are openly on sale in Britain. Army intelligence reports that these books form the basis of IRA terrorism in Ireland.

The books give details on explosives, incendiaries, booby traps, basic doctrines and planning. They also give details, with diagrams, on various types of bombs, including pipe bombs, nail bombs, and "come-on" bombs (where a small bomb is triggered after by a larger one designed to explode in a crowded place). [Peter Chappell, "IRA's Secret Weapons," The Manchester Guardian, 1974, p. 10.]

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART  
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Belgian police will this week ask British authorities to provide the missing link in the evidence against two men suspected of arms trafficking from Brussels to Northern Ireland. The men, Cesaire Dauwe and Simon Wanjtal, were arrested this month after buying large quantities of arms from a highly respected Brussels dealer.

The link would be established if numbers on pistols, seized in recent Belfast raids, correspond with those recorded in the Brussels shop.

Last June Paul Binet, arms dealer in the fashionable Rue Royale, had a visit from a man calling himself Rouvrier, but who was in fact 44-year old Dauwe, who had once been in prison for gun-running from France to Germany. Dauwe ordered 12 pistols and said he represented the African Ambassador of Mali. "I often get requests for guns to defend embassies," said Binet.

"Rouvrier" returned a few days later with the cash and papers needed for buying the guns, complete with the seal of Mali. With him was the "embassy chauffeur," Simon Wajntal, a Pole aged about 50, retired coal miner from Leige where he was known in the underground as a blower of safes.

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...But by then the two arrested men had bought 600 guns, most of which police believe were sent to the IRA. [Denis Herstein, "Continental Gun-Running Clues Sought in Belfast," The Times of London, 19 January 1975, p. 6.]

An Army judge today [11 March 1975] ordered a psychiatric examination of a young lieutenant accused of plotting to murder a fellow officer and steal six tons of Army weapons for sale to the Irish Republican Army.

Col. Thomas Nichols ordered the examination of Lieut. Mark Kohn, 22 years old, of Queens, as the military court considered several pre-trial motions to dismiss the charges. The court was to consider the defense motions and then postpone trial pending completion of the mental examination.

Lieutenant Kohn is charged with soliciting a fellow military policeman, Sgt. Emmett Snellgrove, during a taped telephone conversation Jan. 9 to join him in blasting into the arms cache at Fort Myer, Va. -- where both were station-

ed -- steal arms and kill the officer in charge with an ice pick.

Colonel Nichols read into the record the conclusion of a private psychiatrist, Dr. Eric Reinhardt, who examined Lieutenant Kohn after the conversation.

The psychiatrist said that the officer's remarks during the taped conversation were "fantasies in the average range of people hurt, left out, cheated or treated unfairly. These fantasies of revenge read like a bad movie script and are totally incapable of being carried out," he said. ["Mental Test Asked in Army Plot Case," The New York Times, 12 March 1975, p. 35.]

BALTIMORE. May 23 -- Four men, three of them from the Washington area, [Henry Hillick, James Conlon, Kiernan Francis McMahon, and Francis Michael Larkin] were convicted in U.S. District Court here today of conspiring to smuggle weapons to the Irish Republic Army and of violating federal gun control laws.

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Among the items the men purchased for shipment to the IRA in Northern Ireland were 158 AR-15 semi-automatic rifles, which are capable of firing single shots or short bursts. The AR-15 has many similarities to the M-16, the basic infantry weapon used by U.S. troops in Vietnam.

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In addition to purchasing the AR-15 rifles, the four were convicted of buying seven handguns, more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition and six blasting caps. [Jim Landers, "4 Guilty in IRA Gun Case," The Washington Post, 24 May 1974, section 3, p. 1.]

BALTIMORE. July 9 (UPI) -- Four men [Henry Hillick, James Conlon, Kiernan Francis McMahon, and Francis Michael Larkin] accused of smuggling guns to the Irish Republican Army were sentenced to six years in prison today, despite pleas that the men had committed no crimes against the United States. [The New York Times, 10 July 1974, p. 6.]

Police also raided a house in the Roman Catholic Lower Falls Road area [of Belfast] and uncovered what they claimed was a central I.R.A. "factory" for explosives: fire bombs wired to watches and American-made booby traps as well as arms and ammunition. ["Northern Ireland: Crackdown on the I.R.A.," Time, 23 December 1974, p. 38.]

Police had found April 28 [1975] what they described as the biggest arms discovery in the Irish Republic, authorities disclosed April 29. The arsenal, which included mortars, rockets, launchers, grenades and explosives, was believed owned by the Provisional IRA. [Facts on File, 1975, p. 335.]

Sixteen members of the Dail (lower house of parliament) had held four days of talks with senior Libyan government officials in Tripoli but failed to receive assurances that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's government would halt its weapons aid to the IRA, it was reported April 20 [1975]. Qaddafi was believed to have provided the IRA with Soviet rocket launchers and other weapons, according to a London Times report April 20. [Facts on File, 1975, p. 549.]

The outlawed Irish Republican Army has stolen weapons from United States military bases for shipment to Northern Ireland, according to a Defense Department document made public today [1 September 1975].

The charge was reported in a previously classified document released by Representative Les Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat.

He said that the Department of the Army report asserted that various extremist groups and unknown individuals stole a total of 6,900 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition from 1971 to 1974 -- enough to supply 10 battalions, or 8,000 men.

A portion of the 368-page report said that the Irish Republican Army was also reported to be attempting to recruit

members of the Marine Corps who were qualified with machine guns and communications equipment.

The Army's report said the I.R.A. Provisionals were engaged in the acquisition of weapons for eventual shipment to Northern Ireland. It quoted a confidential naval intelligence service source as charging that military weapons had been stolen from the Marine Corps base at Camp LeJeune, N.C., and shipped to Ireland.

Another such charge was that an I.R.A. contact was operating in the area of Fort Bragg, the Army base in North Carolina.

Furthermore, the report said, about 75 per cent of the money used by Irish militants to purchase arms, ammunition and explosives is from American sources. ["Pentagon Says I.R.A. Stole Arms at U.S. Bases," The New York Times, 2 September 1975, p. 21.]

BRUSSELS. Oct. 16 [1975] Authorities here are investigating possible links between Belgian dealers of illicit weapons and terrorist organizations throughout the world.

Reports of widespread gun-running have circulated here for several months. This week, a fatal explosion led to the discovery of a vast ring with sizable arsenals and international connections.

So far no definite connections to terrorist groups have been proved, but police say there are strong indications of sales at least to Basque and Portuguese radical elements.

This week's arrests and incidents have renewed rumors that such groups as the Irish Republican Army and the West German radical Baader-Meinhoff gang do their shopping at what is being described as "arms department stores" in Belgium. There has been a report that an attempt was made a few months ago to purchase weapons here to ransom French anthropologist Françoise Claustre, long held by rebels in Chad.

This week's bizarre chain of events began in Bastogne, when a man was blown up while working with a bomb from World War II.

Investigations at the explosion site uncovered a veritable armory there and links to other depots in Leige, a



nearby city with a centuries-old tradition in arms manufacture. There more weapons were found, three persons were arrested and other links were made with earlier gun-smugglings and thefts. A manhunt is underway for the suspected leader of this operation.

This episode is but the latest of several in recent months involving the illicit arms trade here. Trucks with secret compartments, numerous thefts and attempted purchases by persons posing as Mali diplomats have surfaced.

Thefts from gunsmith shops, military installations and arms factories have been used to obtain illegal weapons for sale. Large quantities of American, German and Israeli weapons are also involved. [David Fouquet, "Belgians Probe Illicit Arms Trade," Washington Post, 17 October 1975, p. 22.]

There are estimates that 75 to 90 percent of I.R.A. firepower is of American origin. Though serial numbers are usually filed off gun barrels before they are shipped to Ulster, one source in Belfast says that weapons have been traced to nine separate dealers in the United States.

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Perhaps the case that touches Noraid closest involves Frank Grady, a 42-year-old former Westchester County Chairman of Northern Aid who was indicted in May with John Jankowski, a Yonkers gun dealer, on charges of having violated firearms laws and illegally exported weapons. Several of the weapons were reportedly seized by British troops in Belfast and were traced to the gun dealer. The case is awaiting trial. [Bernard Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to Flow of Arms," The New York Times, 16 December 1975, p. 16.]

Five Americans of Irish descent [Daniel Duff, Daniel Cahalane, Neil Byrne, Vincent Conlon, and Thomas Regan] were indicted today [22 December 1975] on charges of smuggling guns and ammunition to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, the Justice Department announced.

The indictments were handed down by a Federal grand jury in Philadelphia. The five men were charged with shipping 378

rifles and 140,000 rounds of ammunition to the I.R.A. from August 1970 to the present date.

The indictment also charges the men with attempting to buy rocket launchers, mortars and machine guns for use by the I.R.A.

The guns purchased by the men included .30-caliber carbines and rifles, .303-caliber British Enfield rifles and automatic rifles.

Some of the ammunition purchased was armor-piercing to penetrate the body armor worn by British soldiers, according to the indictment. ["5 Indicted in Philadelphia in Ulster Gunrunning," The New York Times, 23 December 1975, p. 8.]

A group of American customs agents arrived here [London] today [4 April 1976] for talks with British officials on how to stop the flow of arms and money from the United States to Irish Republican Army guerrillas. ["Talks Seek to Curb I.R.A.," The New York Times, 5 April 1976, p. 61.]

The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread network of terrorist gangs ranging from the Middle East to Africa and Europe.

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Qaddafi's drive was said to stretch far beyond the Middle East. He was believed to have dispatched Soviet-made weapons to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, to Moslem guerrillas in the Philippines and Thailand and to insurgents in Chad and Ethiopia. [Facts on File, 1976, p. 531.]

Mortars and mortar bombs evolved quickly from a comparatively crude launcher and bomb to a serviceable military replica which was dubbed the 'IRA Mortar Mk 5'. The bomb for this model had two turned obturating surfaces at

each end of the bomb body and was quite impressive in its performance. Considering the time it takes to develop a new military weapon from design to production stage, the IRA achievement of Mk 1 to Mk 5 in twelve months is noteworthy.

In the rocket field some early attempts were made to fire 3.5 inch anti-tank rockets at police and military posts without great success. Diagnostic examination of the recovered projectiles showed a lack of knowledge of this weapon, but within weeks the appearance of Russian RPG-7 rockets and launchers occurred. The successful employment of Service weapons depends entirely on training and practice, and it is apparent that the terrorist generally lacks the resources to achieve a high standard of handling and firing.

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...The explosive used is generally one improvised from agricultural fertilizer but is commonly found to be boosted with a small amount of commercial explosive and always initiated by the inevitable commercial detonator. [S.G. Styles, "Bombs and Bomb-Beaters" International Defense Review, October 1976, pp. 817-819.]

Without the ability to use bombs any terrorist campaign would quickly become an armed confrontation -- on the one side irregular, generally poorly trained and equipped terrorists and, on the other, the organised security forces of law and order. The violence in these circumstances could be confined to areas which least affect the general public, until attrition or logistical defeat can be imposed on the terrorists by the sheer weight of the superiority of the security forces. (We have witnessed the principle of these tactics being adopted by the Soviet Union in their suppression firstly of the Hungarian revolt and later in Czechoslovakia.) The introduction of explosives into terrorism brings an entirely new and higher plane of activity. It involves more people and organisations than a purely shooting campaign and the degree of preventative reaction that is called for can, in the limit, be extremely costly and wasteful of time and resources. It cannot be denied that bombing is cost effective. It can be shown by costing out an Improvised Explosive Device of the type used to destroy the Main Belfast Cooperative Store (damage estimated at 14 million pounds) or the New Daily Mirror Printing Works, Belfast (estimated damage 3 million pounds).

Cost (in pounds)

1 detonator (about)	.09
1 battery	.60
1 clothes peg and sundries	.10
Small amount of commercial explosive as booster	.10
10 lbs. sugar*	1.20
1 tin weedkiller*	.30
	<u>2.39</u>

\* The last two items could be substituted for about 3 1/2 pounds worth of commercial explosives.

For ease of argument let us say the carrier bag/duffle bag hand carried bomb costs about 5 pounds. For an investment of 50 pounds, therefore, 10 devastations can be caused with a financial impact upon the economy of probably several million pounds. Give the 50 pounds to the procurement of a pistol and ammunition and one would probably obtain a pistol and about 100 rounds of ammunition with it. It is difficult to see how a comparable effect could be achieved.

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As has been discussed earlier, the terrorist not only improvises his devices but the explosive ingredients as well. Given a stringent control on explosives, the terrorist has shown that he can revert to commonly available substances, the control of which is virtually impossible. This is not however true of the detonator -- the key of the explosive lock. Several attempts have been made by criminals and terrorists alike to improvise a detonator. Fortunately all attempts have ended in disaster for the improviser. The detonator therefore becomes vital in the control of the explosives situation... [S.G. Styles, "Defeating the Terrorist Bomber" International Defense Review, January 1977, p. 121.]

The most heartening aspect of the figures, from the military point of view, is the continuing success of the army in seeking out hidden arms and explosives. The quantity of death-dealing equipment captured over the past eight years is truly colossal: some 43 tons of assorted ammunition, for example, and more than 100 tons of explosives.

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FINDS	1974	1975	1976	total
machine guns	54	43	41	279
rifles	465	226	274	2,458
pistols	558	416	338	2,819
shotguns	126	135	79	841
rocket launchers	4	0	1	16
rockets	9	0	7	49
mortars	20	5	100	402
mortar bombs	155	26	122	418
ammunition	147,202	73,604	70,264	862,918
explosives (lbs.)	53,214	22,174	37,810	252,029
bombs neutralised	428	236	440	2,716
explosions	685	399	849	5,367
shootings	3,206	1,803	1,858	24,482

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However, the figures cut both ways. The army and police continue to be efficient in finding arms stores, but the paramilitary organizations continue to be efficient in supplying themselves.

Their basic sources of materiel remain the same: firearms smuggled from North America, gelignite pilfered from quarries in the Republic, and home-made explosives improvised from weedkiller, fertiliser, firelighters and petrol. There have been no significant new imports of hardware, but the ingenuity of the bomb makers has continued to improve. [Derek Brown, "Ulster's Dismal Balance Sheet," The Manchester Guardian, 9 January 1977, p. 5.]

The Provisional IRA now has at least two modern high-powered, belt-fed machine guns, the Browning .3 and the much larger Browning .5. Photographs of the weapons were distributed by the organization and published yesterday [13 February 1977] in the Belfast Sunday News.

An accompanying article said the photographs were taken recently during training close to the border but inside Northern Ireland. It said the general-purpose machine guns were part of a consignment which the IRA says was smuggled into Northern Ireland earlier this year. [Christopher Walker, "IRA Now Has Modern Machine Guns," The Times of London, 14 February 1977, p. 2.]

...But the experts -- the security authorities in Britain and Ireland -- believe that at least six and perhaps as many as eight of every ten illegal weapons brought into Ireland came from the U.S. Most of them were probably bought out of funds donated, in large part, by unsuspecting or naive Americans in the belief that the money was being used to relieve the sufferings of innocent victims in Northern Ireland.

Time and again, Irish politicians have warned their American opposite numbers about the traffic. Time and again, they have pleaded with political leaders to be more careful about what they say on Northern Ireland because their statements can give a wrong impression and result in loss of lives. Dr. FitzGerald's mission in mid-March was the latest attempt to drive home the lesson.

In Ireland, his journey was regarded as a success -- at least up to a point. Irish people, North and South, were pleased that he appeared to have cleared up President Carter's woolly thinking on the problem and enlisted his active support in stopping the illegal arms traffic.

They were even more pleased that he got the four leading "Irish" politicians in the U.S. -- Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Moynihan, House Speaker 'Tip' O'Niell and Governor Hugh Carey of New York -- to abandon what had seemed to be their sneaking regard for the IRA. On St. Patrick's Day, they issued a joint statement calling on Americans "to renounce any action that promotes the current violence or provides support or encouragement for organizations engaged in violence."

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...Their view was that, despite Dr. FitzGerald's best efforts, the illegal arms traffic from the U.S. to Northern Ireland would not be cut down appreciably as long as guns and ammunition could be bought across the counter in many states. One source estimated that some 40 percent of the guns brought into Northern Ireland from North America are obtained in this way.

Part of the trouble is that it has proved impossible to trace how the arms reach Northern Ireland. In the last few years, especially, substantial quantities of guns and ammunition have been captured. Some of it was found in ships and boats, especially in the narrow channel between Scotland and Northern Ireland. Police on both sides of the Border have captured some big caches.

But there seems to be no one special route from the U.S. to Ireland. Security experts believe that arms and

ammunition are smuggled through in small lots, one handgun or rifle or even separate pieces of rifle or submachine gun at a time. The Armalite rifle, the favorite weapon of the Provisional IRA sniper, when fitted with a telescopic sight, is particularly easy to smuggle. It is light and it can be broken down into separate bits easy to conceal. With millions of American tourists coming into Britain and Ireland every year, it is physically easy, though decidedly risky, to bring in the pieces in a suitcase. Goods containers, cabins and even coffins containing corpses for burial in Ireland are said to be some of the hiding-places used.

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What the Irish government hopes for is that, by a combination of methods, the U.S. authorities will be able to reduce the traffic to the point where the IRA will begin to feel the pinch. At present, the Provisionals have all the arms they want: the best estimates suggest that in Belfast alone the extremists of all kinds have enough to keep up the present level of fighting for years. But if the traffic could be significantly reduced and the discovery of arms caches stepped up, the situation would be better. Apart from tracing and stopping the arms leaving the U.S., the Dublin government is hoping that the American authorities will stop the traffic at the source... [Desmond Fisher, "Guns and Money: Exporting Death to Ireland" Commonweal, 10 June 10 1977, pp. 356-358.]

Dublin police believe they may have cut a major route used by the Provisional Irish Republican Army to ferry arms to Northern Ireland, police said today [28 August 1977].

The police discovered an arms cache last night that contained nearly 200 pounds of explosives, as well as rifles and revolvers.

They later detained two men under the Irish Republic's tough anti-terrorist laws, the sources said.

The police are examining the possibility that the Dublin hiding place of the weapons may have been a stop on the weapons route leading from Europe to I.R.A. strongholds in British-ruled Northern Ireland, the sources said. ["Irish Police Believe Arms Route to Ulster May Have Been Broken," The New York Times, 29 August 1977, p. 7.]

A five-ton secret shipment of sophisticated weapons, sent to Irish Republican Army militants in Northern Ireland, had been seized in November 1977 by Belgian customs officials, it was reported Jan. 6 [1978]. According to Ulster military sources, the arms had been sent from Lebanon where the factions that had fought the 1975-1977 civil war were selling their surplus weapons. [Facts on File, 1978, p. 7.]

The Provisional IRA set up a roadblock Jan. 29 [1978] near Londonderry where it displayed its newest and most powerful weapon, the U.S.-made M60 belt-fed machine gun. The weapon was able to fire 550 rounds a minute and was accurate up to a distance of 1,800 meters (1,968 yards). According to press reports Jan. 24, the weapon had been used to attack two police cars near Londonderry Jan. 19. The IRA was believed to possess six M60s, which had been obtained in the Middle East and shipped through the Irish Republic to Ulster. [Facts on File, 1978, p. 71.]

Police in Londonderry Feb. 3 [1978] discovered 200 rounds of ammunition for the U.S.-made M60 machine gun. Weapons and bomb-making devices were also found.

The M60 was the most powerful weapon in the IRA's arsenal and had been displayed by IRA soldiers and used against British security forces. Airey Neave, Conservative spokesman on Ulster, said Feb. 1 that the IRA had 12 of the weapons in its possession. He said the guns had been stolen from U.S. Army bases in West Germany and shipped to Ulster via the Middle East. Neave said the M60s were a threat to British forces and had to be found. [Facts on File, 1978, p. 132.]

The Provos have indeed suffered some stunning setbacks. An intensive anti-IRA lobbying campaign among the Irish community in the U.S. caused American contributions to the terrorists to fall off dramatically last year. At the same time, the British Army and the police made tremendous headway infiltrating both Catholic and Protestant paramilitary organizations. More than 1,300 terrorists were arrested in 1977, and in December, authorities in Antwerp seized 4 tons



of arms, ammunition and explosives destined for IRA arsenals.

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...They also seem to have made new supply connections. "Last year, we made no bones about the fact that our sources of supply had dried up," says an IRA insider, "Well, now we have new sources." As proof, the Provisionals last month displayed for the press a new American-made M60 machine gun, the most lethal weapon yet to fall into IRA hands and one of a half-dozen that intelligence experts believe they recently acquired from suppliers in the Mideast. [Allan J. Mayer, "Northern Ireland: The IRA Reborn" Newsweek, 27 February 1978, p. 40.]

Police found an IRA arms storehouse April 3 while searching a house in Belfast. One of the weapons found was a U.S.-made M60 machine gun with its ammunition. It was the first of the sophisticated machine guns to be captured from the IRA. [Facts on File, 1978, p. 268.]

Seamus McCollum, an Englishman, was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment July 18 [1978] by an Irish court in Dublin for involvement in arms smuggling and for membership in the IRA. [Facts on File, 1978, p. 630.]

The Madrid weekly El Pais said Jan. 28 [1979] that ETA [the left-wing Basque terrorist group] was working closely with the Irish Republican Army. The two terrorist groups reportedly exchanged men, arms and explosives and trained together in an unspecified Middle Eastern country. [Facts on File, 1979, p. 100.]

At first, McMullen said, it was his job to screen weapons buyers and sellers to make sure they were not agents of the

U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) or FBI agents.

He would then examine the weapons offered for sale to make sure they were in good working order and were of a type preferred by the IRA, "like any kind of assault rifle, Armalites especially. Ar15s, M16s, Ar18s, but almost any kind of high-powered, self-loading weapon would do, as well as shorts (short arms, handguns)." Then he began buying weapons in upstate New York, Connecticut, Vermont and as far away as the Carolinas.

Where did he get the money?

"A bartender at the night club was skimming as much as \$3,000 a week, most of it on weekends. The owner knew nothing about it," he said.

McMullen said that weapons were stored at his (McMullen's) apartment on 72nd Street in Jackson Heights, Queens. When he had a dozen or so weapons on hand a confederate would pick them up "and take them to a guy who was an officer in one of the transport unions."

The way the weapons got out [of the country] was in household and office furniture. They'd strip the furniture down and fill it with weapons. Guns would go inside everything, cabinets, beds, sofas, chairs -- everything."

The shipment was then loaded aboard a sealed container bound by ship from New York to Dublin. There was never a problem with U.S. customs. Someone took care of that here and on the other side, too. Telephone calls would be made to a contact in Dublin giving the date of arrival of the container, the numbers and so forth, and it would be let through customs," he said.

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A union official in New York, McMullen says, perfected the smuggling routes years before, "when the Queen Mary was still making runs across the Atlantic. He was amazing, this union man. I mean, he could get anything. I once carried two cases of hand grenades for him." [Andrew Blake, "The American Connection: Running Guns to the IRA," The Washington Post, 4 September 1979, p. 1.]

The guns that McMullen purchased were smuggled to Dublin in household and office furniture, he said. Labor union

contacts made the arrangements, McMullen explained, and other sympathizers ensured smooth passage through U.S. and Irish customs. From Dublin it was easy to spirit the weapons into Ulster in cars often driven by women with children on busy Sunday afternoons.

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New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and transportation.

. . .

...U.S. authorities say that whatever may have been the case in 1972, the I.R.A. in the U.S. now limits itself to fund raising. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A." Time, 17 September 1979, p. 39.]

On November 2 [1979] the Irish police seized 156 weapons and 40,000 rounds of ammunition from a ship in Dublin harbor. These items were hidden in containers, and all were of American manufacture, including two M60 machine guns. They were intended for the Irish Republican Army. [Richard Clutterbuck, "Ireland's American Enemies," The New Republic 15 December 1979, p. 17.]

Irish Republic security forces Jan 3 [1980] discovered a bomb factory operated by the Irish Republican Army near Drogheda, about 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of the border with Northern Ireland. The raid netted a large cache of explosives. In a later raid reported Jan. 14, police in the republic found explosives, bombs, several mortars and 30 Soviet-made rockets in an abandoned house near Dundalk, a town near the border with Northern Ireland. [Facts on File, 1980, p. 59.]

...Also on April 24 [1980], police in Ireland discovered a cache of rockets, rocket launchers, a machine gun and ammunition close to the border with Northern Ireland. [Facts on File, 1980, p. 619.]

A police spokesman in Dublin said Aug. 5 [1980] that police had raided an IRA training camp in the republic a few miles from the border with Northern Ireland. The police had taken some weapons and ammunition, but had not captured any IRA members. [Facts on File, 1980, p. 619.]

Policemen searched a farm with metal detectors today [13 September 1980] after finding a big guerrilla arms cache containing rocket launchers, mortars and home-made bombs. The arms were hidden in tunnels at the farm near Carrickmacross, four miles from the border with British-ruled Northern Ireland, and were believed to belong to the Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army. ["Arms Cache is Found in Ireland," The New York Times, 14 September 1980, 1980, p. 10.]

As for the Provisionals, they are continuing to affirm the Army's 1978 judgment that they have an "adequate supply" of members with skilled technical expertise.

Besides their demonstrated command of radio-controlled bombs, and their rather less successful attempts at rocket mortars, they have been conducting a technological war to counter the sophisticated surveillance equipment used by the Army.

The man-detecting radar, used by the Special Air Services at observation posts on the border, can now be detected by an American-made cheap receiver openly available in Dublin. Infrared torches which illuminate the countryside at night, but are invisible to the naked eye, have been made worthless for undercover work since the Provos acquired some stolen US Army electronic binoculars which can see the beams.

The Provisionals have also been able to intercept Army communications from their helicopter mounted television; and

when they were confronted with devices like Carabel, which detected a sniper's position by microwaves, they simply changed their tactics.

New developments in night vision using light intensifiers and thermal image enhancers, have been more difficult to neutralise. But they have a limited field of view and the Provos have discovered that these devices can be blinded by car headlights. Volunteers have also been trained to use cover in the rural areas where they are used. ["Why the IRA Remains a Potent Rival to the Army," The Manchester Guardian, 19 October 1980, p. 5.]

Noraid's own financial records are one indication of flagging support among Irish-Americans. Last year, the group says, it received \$195,180, less than half the amount recorded in 1972. Gun traffic across the Atlantic also is down. U.S. officials say they have virtually no active cases of arms smuggling to Ulster -- and in fact haven't picked up any IRA-related gun activity in more than a year. [John Brecher, "The IRA's Angels" Newsweek, 18 May 1981, p. 53.]

Three New York men, who reportedly told undercover agents they were interested in "social justice" in Northern Ireland were arrested by Federal authorities Friday night and yesterday morning on charges of supplying weapons to the Irish Republican Army.

Two of the men -- Thomas Falvey...and George Harrison... -- were seized outside Mr. Falvey's home Friday evening, hours after they had paid an undercover agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation \$16,000 for 42 automatic rifles, submachine guns and handguns. Both were born in Ireland, the FBI said.

The third man, Patrick Mullin...was taken into custody... yesterday at his home...where the authorities found seven automatic rifles, similar to the M16's used in Vietnam, a machine pistol, a pre-World War II 20-millimeter cannon and a flame thrower.

. . .

He said the agents had been unable to determine where Mr. Falvey and Mr. Harrison had obtained the money to buy the weapons, whose serial numbers had been obliterated. [Joseph B. Treaster, "3 New Yorkers Accused of Buying Arms for I.R.A.," The New York Times, 21 June 1981, p. 40.]

Police in Belfast Sept. 11 [1981] discovered a cache of more than 1,300 pounds (over 590 kilograms) of explosives in a furniture store in the Falls Road area in the west part of the city. On Sept. 10, police had found 300 pounds (over 130 kilograms) of explosives in the back of a van. The seizures, police said, had perhaps foiled a major bombing campaign. [Facts on File, 1981, p. 701.]

...FBI agents this month arrested a Noraid trustee in New York on a charge of conspiring to ship sub-machine guns to the IRA. ["Does U.S. Money Finance IRA Terror?" U.S. News and World Report, 26 October 1981, p. 5.]

Although Noraid officials say the organization has never been formally linked to gunrunning activities, the group's director, Flannery, has.

The link became public during the 1982 gunrunning trial in Brooklyn, Flannery and four other Irish-Americans were charged with conspiring to smuggle a 20-millimeter cannon, a flame thrower, 47 machine guns, and 11 automatic rifles to the IRA. (One of the defendants, Patrick Mullin, had served as treasurer of the Flatbush branch of Noraid, in New York City.) [Warren Richey, "On the Trail of US Funds for IRA," The Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1985, p. 6.]

Police in the republic said Feb. 1 and 3 [1982] that several caches of IRA arms and explosives had been found, hidden near the border. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 191.]

In February 1982, five men were arrested trying to sneak into the United States near Buffalo. They were carrying \$10,000 in cash and what appeared to be a "shopping list" for weapons and bomb equipment.

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Among items the men were said to be shopping for in the US: 200,000 rounds of ammunition, various remote-control model airplanes capable of carrying 20 pounds of explosives as far as five miles.

Benedict J. Ferro, director of the Buffalo office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, says that in addition to recovering the cash and the "shopping list," federal officials found an address book with names and phone numbers of contacts in the US.

It was this last item that made at least one group of New York City-based IRA gunrunners nervous in early 1982. Among the names in the book: Gabriel Megahey, a New York bartender.

A few days after the five were arrested in Buffalo, the FBI -- as part of an investigation begun months before -- placed a wiretap on Megahey's home phone in Queens, New York. Megahey was believed to be the head of an IRA gunrunning "cell" operating in New York.

. . .

Meanwhile, in New York City, Megahey was in the process of being set up for a sting operation by a well-placed informant and a host of FBI undercover agents. The agents, posing as Latin American arms merchants, offered to sell the IRA gunrunners five Redeye surface-to-air missiles at \$10,000 each.

Megahey and Duggan were interested. According to wiretap transcripts and transcripts compiled by the FBI from other electronic surveillance, Duggan told undercover agents: "I know one of the things that's super important is the SAM missiles." He called their purchase "No. 1 priority."

He noted that the IRA wanted the missiles to shoot down British helicopters in Northern Ireland.

At one point Megahey bragged to an undercover FBI agent that he was the head of the IRA in the United States. He also boasted that he had access to \$1 million for weapons purchases.

"What we are dealing for here at the minute moneywise is chicken feed. It's nothing," Megahey told special agent Enrique Ghimenti speaking of the proposed \$50,000 deal for five SAM missiles.

He added, "Once we hit the first one, right, and we build a relationship up, then we're prepared to come in with a lot of big money."

Duggan is recorded saying that the group had "probably 10 sources" of arms in the US. [Warren Richey, "Roller Skates and Rifles: How IRA Group Tried to Sneak Arms Out of US" The Christian Science Monitor, 18 January 1985, p. 1.]

Police in the republic said March 22 [1982] that they had seized about 50 radio-controlled firebombs, and arrested seven persons in raids on IRA hide-outs in the west coast city of Galway. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 532.]

More than 3,000 gasoline bombs were found by police in Belfast May 5 [1982] as Irish nationalists observed the first anniversary of the death of hunger striker Bobby Sands. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 532.]

Four men were arrested in New York City June 21 [1982] in connection with two separate federal probes into the supplying of arms to Provisional IRA terrorists. Two days earlier, on June 19, police in the Irish Republic had announced the arrest of three men, including a Roman Catholic priest who had lived in New York for 25 years, as a result of an investigation into gun-running for republican terrorists. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 531.]

Two men were arrested in New York City yesterday on charges of conspiring to purchase and export weapons and munitions, including surface-to-air missiles, for use by the



Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Federal authorities said.

Two other men were seized in the city, and a third was being sought, in connection with another Federal investigation involving the illegal shipment of weapons to the Irish underground army.

One of the men arrested in the conspiracy case, Gabriel Megahey, told undercover agents posing as arms dealers that he was the leader of the I.R.A.'s operation in the United States and that his organization had \$1 million to purchase weapons, according to Kenneth P. Walton, deputy assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York office.

"The missiles were to be used against British helicopters," Mr. Walton said. No missiles or other weapons were actually sold to the two men. Under Federal law, the missiles and other weapons on a "controlled list" cannot be exported without a State Department license.

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As the result of a separate investigation by Federal agents, Eamon Anthony Meehan, . . . and his brother, Colm Meehan . . . were arrested at their homes on charges of illegally shipping arms and ammunition, in crates marked as roller skates and comforters, for use against British troops in Northern Ireland. The man being sought was identified as Patrick McFarland . . . All three were said to be Irish citizens.

Mr. Walton said that most of the weapons and ammunition were seized before shipment, but that a small quantity had been "marked" and "allowed to be shipped" to John Moloney in Ireland. He was arrested in Dublin Friday with his brother, the Rev. Patrick Moloney, a Melkite priest who runs Lazarus House in New York, a home for troubled youths at 606 East Ninth Avenue, and a third man, on charges of illegal possession of firearms. Mr. Walton said he "knew nothing" about the priest's role. [Leonard Buder, "F.B.I. in City Arrests 4 in Plots to Export Arms to I.R.A. Units" The New York Times, 22 June 1982.]

Electrical devices designed to ignite firebombs were found inside a workshop used by republican prisoners in the Maze, a maximum security prison near Belfast, it was revealed

Aug. 27 [1982]. None of the devices contained explosive material. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 653.]

A general contractor from Flushing, Queens, was indicted by a Federal grand jury in Brooklyn yesterday [26 August 1982] in connection with a scheme to ship 151 guns to Ireland three years ago.

A nine count indictment against the contractor, Bernard McKeon, charged him with numerous violations of the Arms Export Control Act.

Thirteen of the weapons involved were machine guns, 10 of which had had their serial numbers removed, the indictment said. The rest of the weapons were described only as rifles, carbines, revolvers and pistols of various makes and models.

The guns were intercepted by the Irish police, according to John B. Lattela, an assistant United States attorney. The charges are punishable by up to 10 years in prison. "Contractor Faces Weapons Charges," The New York Times, 27 August 1982, section 2, p. 8.]

Police Aug. 28 [1982] discovered over a ton of explosives in a truck stopped at a checkpoint in county Down. It was thought to be the largest single find of explosives in Northern Ireland. [Facts on File, 1982, p. 806.]

Only one courtroom in America is permanently closed to the public.

Located in a vaultlike chamber on the sixth floor of the Justice Department, its locked door is always guarded and its walls are insulated. It is regularly inspected for signs of bugging.

But the chamber is used as a courtroom only twice a month. And its decisions are never published, although department records indicate that in the court's three-year history, all its rulings have been in favor of the Government.

Known as the FISA court, for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act with which Congress voted to establish it in 1978, the court has just one function: granting warrants for electronic surveillance in cases involving foreign intelligence.

The bugging business has been growing. In the court's first seven and a half months of operation, it issued 207 electronic surveillance orders; in 1980 it granted 322, and in 1981 it issued 433.

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But in the handful of cases that lead to criminal prosecution, the evidence of electronic listening devices comes to light at trial when the Government reveals its evidence. One such case currently underway in the eastern district of New York led to the first judicial opinion upholding the constitutionality of the FISA court's procedures.

The defendants, accused of conspiring to smuggle arms and equipment to the Provisional Irish Republican Army, were informed that the Government would introduce as trial evidence tapes of their telephone conversations that had been secretly recorded. The defendants attempted to have the evidence excluded on the ground that the surveillance had violated the Constitution, but Federal District Court Judge John M. McLaughlin disagreed. [Leslie Maitland, "A Closed Court's One-Issue Caseload," The New York Times, 14 October 1982, section 2, p. 16.]

Five U.S. citizens [George Harrison, Patrick Mullin, Thomas Falvey, Michael Flannery, and Daniel Gormley] were acquitted Nov. 5 [1982] in federal court in Brooklyn, N.Y. of conspiring to sell weapons to the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

During the seven-week trial, the defendants admitted buying the arms (including a 20-millimeter cannon, a flame thrower and 47 machine guns) from an undercover agent. The five also acknowledged that they had planned to sell the guns to the IRA. As a defense, the men claimed that their actions had been sanctioned by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Jurors, who deliberated for two and one-half days, apparently voted for acquittal because they believed the CIA had been involved. "I think we firmly believed that the

operation could not have gone on that long without government sanction," said one juror. [Facts on File, 1982, pp. 878-879.]

There was a problem, however, in the person of Federal Judge Joseph McLaughlin, former dean of Fordham University School of Law in Manhattan. McLaughlin permitted defendants' lawyers to present what government officials regard as a preposterous defense.

. . .

McLaughlin allowed the defense to turn the case into an arena for unsubstantiated allegations about the CIA, for they did not have a shred of evidence of a CIA link. DeMeo's purported CIA relationship was not established as anything more than a frequent boast. A CIA official swore the agency had nothing to do with DeMeo or with gun shipments to Ulster.

The jury found the men not guilty. When the verdict was announced, friends and relatives of the defendants shouted, "Up the Provos!" and "Up the IRA!" Addressing the jurors, Judge McLaughlin declared, "I stand in awe of you! I salute you!" [David Reed, "Terror in Northern Ireland: The American Connection," Reader's Digest, April 1983, pp. 169-170.]

Security forces in Northern Ireland have seized more than 8000 firearms and a million rounds of ammunition since the conflict began in 1969. Some came from Palestinian terrorists, Libya and Czechoslovakia. But the United States is the Provos' major weapons source. Says Sir John Hermon, head of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, "If American weapons were not here, we'd have a great deal less of a problem." [David Reed, "Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The American Connection," Reader's Digest, April 1983, p. 166.]

In Ireland, 4 miles south of the Ulster border near the village of Enniskillen, police Sunday uncovered a large arms

cache believed to have belonged the outlawed Irish Republican Army.

Army experts were called to examine the dump, which included ammunition for rifles, a machine gun, detonators, timing devices, fuse wire for bombs, hand grenades and a booby-trap device, a police spokesman in Dublin said. [UPI, 25 April 1983.]

Four men [Gabriel Megahey, Andrew Duggan, Eamon Meehan, and Colum Meehan] were convicted in New York yesterday [13 May 1983] of plotting to smuggle guns, explosives and surface-to-air missiles to the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the outlawed group battling British rule in Northern Ireland.

A spokesman for the Federal Bureau of Investigation said the convictions were the first to come from a series of indictments of I.R.A. sympathizers in the last decade. Last fall, five men were acquitted in a similar case.

. . .

The FBI spokesman, Lane Bonner, said that the F.B.I. investigations in the last decade had led to indictments of 18 I.R.A. sympathizers on weapons or other charges in the United States.

Mr. Bonner said nine people were awaiting trial or were fugitives. Other I.R.A.-related prosecutions, he said, might have resulted from investigations by other agencies, but he did not know their results.

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The C.I.A. said in affidavits that Mr. Hanratty had never worked for it. Mr. Hanratty testified that he was a security systems consultant and that Mr. Duggan had asked his help to obtain detonating equipment "for use against the British in Northern Ireland." He said he reported the request to the authorities and then worked with them. [Joseph P. Fried, "Four Found Guilty of Plotting to Smuggle Arms for I.R.A.," The New York Times, 14 May 1983, p. 1.]

Agent Stephen J. Rogers was once a rising star in the U.S. Customs Service. Now his enemies say Rogers nearly sabotaged a top-secret investigation into gun-smuggling by the Irish Republican Army, that he may have endangered the lives of Irish and British undercover agents and that he seriously disrupted the Anglo-American effort to combat IRA terrorism in Northern Ireland.

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It all began in 1979, when Rogers was put in charge of a special team of New York agents investigating "neutrality cases" -- alleged violations of U.S. laws restricting the shipment of arms and military aid to foreign countries. Gun-smuggling to Northern Ireland, organized by IRA supporters in the United States and often funded by contributions from well-meaning Irish-Americans, was and is a major target for Customs investigators in New York. For some time, however, British officials have suspected that at least a few Irish-Americans within the Customs Service itself are sympathetic to the IRA cause -- and some Customs agents privately agree.

In one important case, Roger's enforcement team began investigating Bernard McKeon, a New York contractor, for smuggling guns to Ireland. The tip came from British intelligence, which alerted Roger's team in November 1979 that McKeon was implicated in a shipment of 151 guns and 60,000 rounds of ammunition that had been seized in Dublin...

. . .

Nearly five years after it began, the Rogers affair has damaged morale in the Customs Service -- and some say its effectiveness. Yet the intrigue has produced only one clear-cut result: after three separate trials, Benard McKeon was convicted in mid-1983 of violating the U.S. Neutrality Act by conspiring to smuggle arms to the IRA. Last month an appeals court upheld his conviction. [Nicholas M. Horrock, "A Feud Among U.S. Agents" Newsweek, 13 August 1984, p. 44.]

Three Northern Ireland men [Gabriel Megahey, Eamon Heehan, and Colum Meehan] and an Irish-American [Andrew Duggan] were sentenced July 22 [1983] for their convictions stemming from a conspiracy to smuggle weapons from the U.S. to the outlawed Provisional Irish Republican Army. [Facts on File, 1983, p. 612.]

Federal authorities in New York City July 27 [1983] arrested and charged eight men with conspiring to sell \$2 billion worth of sophisticated weapons to Iran and \$15 million worth of machine guns to the outlawed Provisional Irish Republican Army. According to the charges, the men had unknowingly been negotiating to sell the weapons to undercover agents. Neither the government of Iran nor the IRA was involved in the alleged plot.

Three of the arrested men were accused of orchestrating the illegal deals. Abbot van Bacher, 62 years old, Alan Harvey, 73, and Robert Krejcik, 45, were charged with planning the Iranian sale. Harvey and Krejcik were charged in the IRA conspiracy. The other five men arrested were machinists who allegedly manufactured the machineguns.

Undercover agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, posing as representatives of the foreign parties, had shown the defendants \$10 million in the preliminary transactions, according to the charges.

More than 100 machine guns intended for the IRA were said to have been seized. Authorities also said they had confiscated an "executive assassination kit," which was a machine gun enclosed in a briefcase with an exterior trigger. [Facts on File, 1983, p. 612.]

The arrests resulted from a year-long investigation by undercover agents of the U.S. Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and New York City detectives.

Abbot Van Backer, 62, who said he was a retired South African army general working for a weapons exporter in New York was the mastermind of the illegal weapons operation, Virella [prosecutor] said. His bail was set at \$1.2 million in cash.

Alan Harvey, 73, of Haworth, N.J., a lawyer, was the defendant who boasted he had access to a nuclear device, the prosecutor said. Bail of \$750,000 was set for him.

The third major defendant, Robert Krejcik, 45, of Brooklyn, president of United States Aviation Co. of Manhattan, was held in lieu of \$350,000 cash bail.

United States Aviation, where Harvey was also employed, was described in the criminal complaint as a company specializing in the export of new and used commercial and

military airplanes, army trucks, armored vehicles, tanks and airport ground support vehicles.

The five other suspects were said to be machinists, mostly of Czech background, who copied models of fully automatic hand-held weapons for shipment to the IRA. One firearms expert said the models were superior in quality to the original machine guns. [UPI, 28 July 1983.]

The Guardian newspaper said today it obtained a copy of the Irish Republican Army's training manual, including an outline of the IRA's constitution, organization and general orders, one of which specifies that "treachery" is punishable by death.

"Treachery" includes the seizure, or being party to the seizure of "arms, ammunition or explosives which are being held under (Irish Republican) Army control," the newspaper said. [UPI, 28 July 1983.]

LE HAVRE, France. -- Police Sunday said they have discovered a large cache of weapons in a truckful of electrical equipment that was destined for the Irish Republican Army.

The truck was intercepted in Le Havre Friday while waiting to be loaded on a ferry to Ireland.

Police said they discovered 28 handguns, 12,000 cartridges, 100 loading clips, 22 pounds explosives, 150 detonators, 40 yards of detonating wire and some grenades.

They found the arsenal hidden among 25 tons of electro-mechanical equipment in the box of the truck which bore Irish license plates. Officials were questioning two Frenchmen and Irishman. [UPI, 14 August 1983.]

At Le Havre on the northern coast of France, police Sunday seized a cache of weapons hidden in a false fuel tank of a 32-ton Volvo truck. The vehicle was waiting for a ferry



to the Irish Republic port of Rossiare, about 75 miles south of Dublin.

The shipment contained 28 pistols and revolvers, 12,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 magazines for Russian-made rifles, 22 pounds of explosives, 200 detonators and nearly 500 yards of detonating wire.

Police, believing they may have blocked off a new IRA gun-running route, said the truck came through France from western Europe. [UPI, 15 August 1983.]

The outlawed Irish Republican Army is turning to the Mafia and other underworld crime organizations in the United States to buy arms and explosives, America's chief customs officer said Thursday.

William von Raab, U.S. Commissioner of Customs, told reporters the IRA was "looking for anything that might shoot or explode" but the quest for "under the counter arms" was becoming more difficult because of tougher action by customs officers.

"We have reason to believe they have begun to use some organized crime figures as middlemen to look for some of the arms they would then obtain to export from the United States into Northern Ireland," said von Raab, who was visiting London to address the American Chamber of Commerce.

The IRA switch to the Mafia and other American crime groups for weapons procurement was a "somewhat recent" development, he said.

The IRA was in the market mainly for explosives and more sophisticated detonating devices, von Raab said. "But I've never known terrorists who would not happily walk away with a missile if they could get one."

"If they can lay their hands on a hand-held missile they will try to buy that and ship it out," he said.

The IRA's character "as criminals working with other criminal organizations" had not been fully understood by many people who thought of them as "ideological zealots," said von Raab.

He said the FBI and customs organizations are both responsible for trying to prevent the illegal arms traffic.

Von Raab said the U.S. Customs service was tackling the problem in two ways by tougher inspection methods at high risk ports of entry and with "hundreds of investigators" involved in gathering intelligence on smugglers. [UPI, 8 September 1983.]

A 57-year-old Queens man [Bernard McKeon] was sentenced to three years in prison and fined \$10,000 yesterday [9 September 1983] for his conviction for conspiring to smuggle arms and ammunition to Ireland.

The 1979 shipment was seized in Dublin, but Federal investigators have said they believe the weapons were destined for the Irish Republican Army for use against the British in Northern Ireland. ["Man Gets 3 Years on Arms Charge," The New York Times, 10 September 1983, p. 27.]

Two Soviet diplomats and wife of one of them were expelled from Ireland on Friday, and today [10 September 1983] Government sources were quoted as saying the Soviet Embassy in Dublin was a "clearing house for a major international spy ring."

. . .

The Mail on Sunday quoted security sources as saying Mrs. Lipasov led a spy ring that organized the supply of Soviet arms and ammunition to units of the outlawed Irish Republican Army operating in Northern Ireland and England. ["Ireland Expels Three Russians in Espionage Case," The New York Times, 11 September 1983, p. 8.]

Two Soviet diplomats and the wife of one of them had gotten in touch with the outlawed Irish Republican Army apparently in an attempt to trade arms for information before they were expelled from the Irish Republic, according to Irish security sources.

The Foreign Ministry cited "unacceptable activities," which is common diplomatic language for spying, when it

announced the expulsions of Gennadi Salin, a first secretary and press attache; Viktor Lipasov, a second secretary, and Mr. Lipasov's wife, Irina, on Sept. 9.

Sources in the security and intelligence branch of the Irish police said Saturday that the police had watched at least one of the trio cross the border to Northern Ireland.

The sources said the diplomats, in their meetings with I.R.A. leaders, were believed to have discussed trading Soviet arms for information about British military bases in Northern Ireland. ["Irish Detail Allegations in Russian Expulsions," The New York Times, 26 September 1983, p. 3.]

The Irish Special Branch has always maintained that the Soviets are one of the main arms suppliers to the IRA, which seeks to oust the British from Northern Ireland.

The expulsions of the Soviet Embassy's First Secretary Guenadi Saline and Second Secretary Viktor Lipassov, along with Lipassov's wife, were Ireland's first diplomatic expulsions in history. [UPI, 24 September 1983.]

During the night troops in Cookstown, 55 miles west of Belfast, uncovered a cache of more than 2,000 pounds of explosives that police believe was being stored by the IRA or their allies for a bombing offensive. [UPI, 26 September 1983.]

A jury Thursday found a former bartender innocent of gunrunning charges for allegedly trying to buy guns and explosives for the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.

The jury of eight women and four men in U.S. District Court deliberated two days after a two-week trial before acquitting Patrick McParland, 48, of six counts of gunrunning.

Four of McParland's alleged associates were found guilty of similar charges May 13 and sentenced to federal prison terms ranging from two to seven years. Their convictions are being appealed.

. . .

The prosecution maintained McParland and others bought firearms and explosives, including blasting caps and 26 rifles and revolvers, from undercover FBI agents in 1982.

McParland had been accused of loading a truck with boxes of the weapons to be transported to New Jersey for shipment to Ireland. [UPI, 17 November 1983.]

FitzGerald said the United States remains a principal source of weapons for the IRA because arms are more freely available on the commercial market in America than elsewhere in the world. During his visit, Irish and U.S. officials are expected to discuss ways of detecting and halting the flow of funds and guns to the IRA and similar groups.

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Forty senators and 58 members of the House led by Massachusetts Democrats Sen. Edward Kennedy and O'Neill signed a letter Wednesday vowing to continue efforts for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

"We renew our urgent appeal to all Americans to renounce the path of the bomb and the bullet and to reject the pleas of those who seek by word or deed or dollars to promote or condone the cause of violence," the letter said. [UPI, 15 March 1984.]

Police searching the Libyan Embassy discovered two loaded handguns and a spent cartridge case of the same caliber as the gun that killed a policewoman outside the embassy, Home Secretary Leon Brittan said today.

. . .

...There was no evidence that the departing Libyans flushed gelignite down the sewers, a police spokesman said, denying a newspaper report.

. . .

Khadafy said in an interview with French television broadcast Monday that he would open formal relations with the outlawed Irish Republican Army unless Britain restores diplomatic ties with Libya. [UPI, 1 May 1984.]

Col. Moammar Khadafy charged Britain today with sheltering Libyan terrorists and accused British police of planting weapons and ammunition in the Libyan Embassy in London following a 10-day siege.

. . .

Asked about Libya's support for the outlawed Irish Republican Army, fighting a terrorist campaign to end British rule of Northern Ireland, Khadafy said Libya did not feel embarrassed about supporting the "just cause" of the IRA "in every respect."

Asked what practical steps he would take to help the IRA, Khadafy replied: "It's urgent, we can provide the support that they need and that we have available." [UPI, 2 May 1984.]

The IRA has been plagued in the last year by shrinking money sources, informers and an American administration out to cut off the supply of arms and money.

. . .

The FBI has stopped the IRA arms shipments in Europe and the United States.

"The whole logistical trail has been cut off by the FBI in the last two years," a police spokesman said. "It's a trickle situation of arms. The really big shipments are prevented from getting through." [UPI, 13 May 1984.]

Ulster police May 24 [1984] discovered the biggest single explosives cache ever after receiving directions from an informer. They discovered two tons of explosives in dumps in Tyrone County. [Facts on File, 1984, p. 663.]

Security forces Thursday seized more than 2 tons of homemade bombs and ammunition apparently stockpiled by the outlawed Irish Republican Army, police said.

It was the biggest munitions cache uncovered in Northern Ireland since the IRA's guerrilla war against British rule began 15 years ago. A security spokesman said the seizure will be a "serious blow" to terrorism in the area.

Officials did not publicly link the ammunition dump with the IRA, but police sources said the dump was uncovered after an IRA source tipped authorities that "something big" was about to happen in the area.

More than 2 tons of homemade explosives, 1,600 rounds of ammunition, two weapons, detonators and bomb-making equipment were found during a police and army search of the rural Carrickmore area of County Tyrone, 65 miles west of Belfast, a police spokesman said.

The cache was hidden in four farm fertilizer tanks located between two villages.

. . .

Since 1969, authorities have uncovered more than 78.3 tons of explosives, 8,936 weapons and more than 1 million rounds of ammunition. [UPI, 24 May 1984.]

Richard Lawlor, a Noraid spokesman, said at a Belfast press conference Monday that "every average American" has a "moral duty" to arm the outlawed IRA, which is waging a bloody battle to drive the British from Ulster and unite the province with Ireland.

"People often say if they (the IRA) get Soviet arms they must be communists. If they get arms from Libya they must be anarchists. If that is to be the case, it is a moral duty of every average American to ensure they get American guns to ensure democracy," Lawlor said. [UPI, 14 August 1984.]

For anyone who might still believe that the Northern Irish "problem" is merely "local," it might be instructive to consider what Dublin authorities found when they boarded the trawler Marita Anne off the western coast of County Kerry Saturday. The list included 100 West German-made semiautomatic rifles, submachine guns, some 20 to 30 handguns, hand grenades made in South Korea, and assorted shotguns, rockets, and other small ammunition. ["Stemming the High Seas Arms Flow," Christian Science Monitor, editorial, 2 October 1984, p. 17.]

Mr. Noonan, speaking at a news conference, asserted that American sympathizers of the Irish Republican Army had paid for the cache of arms. He did not say what evidence he had that the shipment was financed by Americans.

He said the arms included rockets, hand grenades and submachine guns meant for use on both sides of the Irish border.

. . .

Mr. Noonan said the Irish government was especially concerned about the inclusion of hand grenades in the consignment.

"I cannot remember an occasion when the I.R.A. used hand grenades," he said. "Were they planning to get into a situation of hurling hand grenades into shops, pubs and cafes or whatever? That particular aspect has me worried." ["Dublin Says the U.S. Helped in Seizure of Arms Shipment," The New York Times, 1 October 1984, p. A8.]

Irish officials are hoping the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation -- using evidence provided by the Irish authorities -- can trace the origin of the shipment and by doing so break up or at least seriously damage the IRA gun-running network. They also hope that in the course of this investigation evidence may emerge to implicate members of the New York-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) who collect money for the IRA but who have denied involvement in this gun-running venture.

. . .

Officials here say that as long as guns and ammunition can be bought by criminals on the international arms market, and as long as American money is available, the campaign of the Irish Republican Army will continue in some form. [James Downey, "Ireland Deals Blow to U.S.-IRA Connection," Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 9.]

Police and intelligence sources say there is no doubt that the main source of weapons for the IRA is the United States and that money from the New York-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) is a major factor in buying arms.

Even more money, they say, comes from bank robberies in the north and in Ireland, and from extortion, rackets and tax evasion.

All officials believe that the new IRA strategy is linked closely to Noraid -- and to U.S. gun dealers who take a big chance in arranging shipments -- in terms of continually proving to its supporters that it can attack the British while toning down the more indiscriminate bombing.

Noraid, which is openly sympathetic to the IRA, denies U.S. and Irish government charges of gun-running and insists that the funds it raises go solely to help the families of IRA prisoners.

Police officials also say that while the IRA has fraternal contacts abroad, and gets some arms in Europe and the Middle East, these links tend to be exaggerated. The IRA is "essentially an indigenous terror group," Ulster police say.

The recent seizure of seven tons of IRA arms en route by sea from the United States, and the less publicized but significant discovery of large quantities of sophisticated bomb timers outside Dublin two weeks ago, have dealt the IRA serious setbacks. But the quantity of these finds also discloses the scope of the ambitions of the organization. [Michael Getler, "Ulster Conflict in New Phase: Reorganization into Cells Makes IRA Terrorists Harder to Catch," The Washington Post, 2 November 1984, p. A25.]



David Conklin, chief of the Firearms Division of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, said that from 1970 through 1979 his agency investigated a large number of cases involving gunrunners for the IRA. He estimated that BATF handled eight to 10 major cases each year during that period, most of them in cities along the northeastern coast, particularly New York and Boston.

He said the volume of cases has dropped significantly since 1979, partly because of the arrests of a number of IRA leaders and partly in response to a growing new market for illegal arms in Latin America, both for political insurgents and for the illicit drug trade.

An increase in the number of bank robberies and kidnappings in Ireland also indicates that the flow of arms and funds from the United States may have decreased in recent years.

However, Conklin said there still are generally two or three major cases each year dealing with gunrunning for Irish terrorist groups. He added that there was a major case last year in which BATF agents posed as IRA gunrunners seeking to purchase machine guns. The agency eventually seized 99 MAC10 automatic weapons equipped with silencers, as well as an assassination kit. The 11 defendants were convicted and are awaiting sentencing.

Conklin would not discuss current investigations, but he said his agency cooperates closely with the Irish and British governments and is assisting in tracing the weapons seized from the trawler last month. [Mary Thornton, "U.S. Investigating the Smuggling of Weapons to Irish Terrorists," The Washington Post, 2 November 1984, p. A28.]

Five men charged with attempting to smuggle arms to the Provisional IRA were convicted Dec. 11 [1984] at a special criminal court in Dublin. The five had been arrested aboard a ship carrying the arms after it was seized by authorities off the coast of Ireland.

. . .

The Times of London Dec. 12 reported that a tip by a U.S. informer to the U.S. Customs Service had led to the ship's capture. According to U.S. federal law enforcement sources, the U.S. government was investigating suspected Irish guerrillas and U.S. citizens involved in smuggling arms to

the Provisional IRA and other guerrilla groups, the Washington Post reported Nov. 2. [Facts on File, 1984, p. 953.]

Since 1969, more than 8,000 weapons have been seized or captured by security forces in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

Of these, 2,843 of the weapons seized in Northern Ireland were believed to have been smuggled originally from the US, and 1,357 of the weapons seized in the Republic were thought to have come from America, according to the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern Ireland's police force.

"There is no need to send 5,000 weapons over there. They don't need that many. If you can keep a constant flow of small numbers, maybe 50, 60, or 100 a year, they will have enough to do what they want to do," says the FBI's Mr. McGorty.

"We can always tell when they get a resupply," says an RUC spokesman. Ballistics tests and detailed records enable the RUC to keep track of how many different weapons were involved in various attacks in Northern Ireland and how often the same weapons are used.

From this the RUC has concluded that at some point last year the Provisionals received a resupply of weapons.

"Certainly there has been one resupply -- possibly from America. It wasn't huge, but it was larger than the usual trickle of eight," the RUC source says.

But the overall picture as related by security sources here is that the Provisionals are beginning to feel the pinch in terms of the American source of supply. In addition, they say the Provisionals are strapped for money.

"When you see one firearm turning up in four, five, or six jobs, you can be sure they are not doing well," says an Irish official in Dublin. [Warren Richey, "How IRA Ships Arms into Ulster" The Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1985, p. 7.]

## APPENDIX B

### SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS

#### IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY FINANCING

Gunmen staged five robberies in Ulster today [8 November 1971]. The British army said that stolen money -- at least \$4,750 from a post office in County Tyrone -- almost certainly would be used to buy weapons for the outlawed Irish Republican Army. ["5 Ulster Robberies Staged; Explosion Damages Shops," The New York Times, 9 November 1971, p. 8.]

Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money, arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.

Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in 1948 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf Islands in 1971, Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [Facts on File, 1972, p. 439.]

American-Irish funds, ironically, not only helped set up the IRA's ancestor, the violently nationalistic Fenian movement in Paris in the 1850's, but have also nurtured the movement ever since. Since 1969 when the current troubles began, about two million dollars have been collected through the Irish Northern Aid Committee, in the guise of relief. Department of Justice records show that in six months alone, during 1971-72, some \$200,000 in relief was sent in currency to one Joseph Cahill in Dublin. Cahill is now serving a three-year jail term imposed by the Eire government for

attempted arms-running. [Benjamin Welles, "IRA Terrorism: No End in Sight" The New Republic, 7 December 1974, p. 17.]

But United States intelligence sources in Washington charge that 75 percent of the money sent by the committee, which is called Noraid for short, has gone to buy arms, and 25 percent for food, clothing and allowances for Catholic dependants.

The authorities in Ireland, Britain and the United States are convinced that Noraid's official accounting of its fund-raising efforts is too low, and that \$2 million to \$3 million may actually have been raised at dances, dinners and collections in the Bronx, Queens, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, Baltimore and Philadelphia.

Over the last four years, the United States Justice Department has brought a dozen criminal cases involving the procurement and shipment of weapons to Ireland. American sources say that more cases are in the offing. [Bernard Weinraub, "I.R.A. Aid Unit in the Bronx Linked to Flow of Arms," The New York Times, 16 December 1975, p. 1.]

The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread network of terrorist gangs ranging from the Middle East to Africa and Europe. [Facts on File, 1976, p. 531.]

The Provos have indeed suffered some stunning setbacks. An intensive anti-IRA lobbying campaign among the Irish community in the U.S. caused American contributions to the terrorists to fall off dramatically last year. [Allan J. Mayer, "Northern Ireland: The IRA Reborn," Newsweek, 27 February 1978, p. 40.]

"At that time I didn't do the robberies," McMullen said. The mobile units carried them out. Robberies were a major source of money for the IRA.

Later, McMullen said, he participated in nine bank and hotel robberies in both the north and south of Ireland, bringing in about \$500,000. The receipts, he says, were always counted in the presence of IRA officers in those days, and "anyone caught stuffing his own pockets was in for a kneecapping at best." [Andrew Blake, "Doubts on the IRA Mount," The Washington Post, 3 September 1979, p. 1.]

A major split between two Irish-American groups aligned with the Irish Republican Army has led to a sharp reduction of American financial support for the organization, Irish officials said today [6 September 1979].

They said that American aid, which, though illegal, has served over the past decade as the principal source of funds for the I.R.A.'s militant Provisional wing, has declined in the past year, now providing perhaps 25 percent of the funds to buy weapons for the terror campaign against the British presence in Northern Ireland.

In the mid-1970's funds raised at bars, dances, dinners and parties across the United States accounted for 70 percent of the I.R.A.'s support, it was said.

According to the Irish officials, the bulk of the organization's funds now derive from waves of bank robberies in the Irish Republic, as well as in the six counties of Northern Ireland and from extortion there as well as payoffs from the owners of illegal drinking clubs and taxi services.

Irish and British intelligence officials put the cost of the current I.R.A. terrorist campaign, involving the purchase of rifles, including the Soviet-made AK-47, and Soviet-made rocket-propelled grenades, at \$2 million a year. [Bernard Weinraub, "Split Among Irish-Americans Said to Cut Funds to I.R.A.," The New York Times, 7 September 1979, p. 10.]

New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine

Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and transportation. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A.," Time, 17 September 1979, p. 39.]

The great majority of Irish Americans finally have realized that many contributions to IRA "welfare" funds are in fact used to finance killing. The Irish American contribution reached \$600,000 in 1972 (the peak year of violence), but mercifully has now fallen to \$150,000 a year. Most of the IRA's annual budget, estimated at one million dollars, is now obtained in Ireland from robberies of banks and liquor stores, supplemented by protection money (such as a "license" of \$100 a day to run a hotel or two dollars a day to drive a taxi through certain districts of Belfast.)

Most of this money is used to buy arms, sometimes from Europe (the IRA has an active cell in Holland), sometimes from Arab countries, sometimes from surpluses abandoned in Vietnam, but mainly from the United States. [Richard Clutterbuck, "Ireland's American Enemies," The New Republic, 15 December 1979, p. 17.]

When three Irish nationalists starved themselves to death in 1920, 100,000 angry Irish-Americans poured onto the Boston Common. Then, and for decades since, Irish republicans have depended on their brethren across the sea for moral support -- and for guns and money. But in recent years, the ties have worn thin. Assimilation into U.S. society and revulsion at IRA terrorism have discouraged many Irish-Americans from active support for the cause. Last week, when Bobby Sands died, a protest outside the home of the British consul general in Boston drew barely 100 people.

...  
Noraid's own financial records are one indication of flagging support among Irish-Americans. Last year, the group says, it received \$195,180, less than half the amount recorded in 1972. Gun traffic across the Atlantic also is down. U.S. officials say they have virtually no active cases of arms smuggling to Ulster -- and in fact haven't picked up any IRA-related gun activity in more than a year.

. . .

The turning point in American support for the IRA may have come on the eve of St. Patrick's Day 1977, when Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Niell and New York Governor Hugh Carey -- known in Irish-American circles as "The Four Horsemen" -- broke a political tradition of silence about IRA terrorism. They urged Americans not to support violence in Northern Ireland and set about trying to move public opinion toward a moderate position. Other politicians have followed their lead, balancing criticism of British policy in Ulster with strong condemnations of terrorism. They have helped make support for the IRA less fashionable -- and have forced Irish-Americans to consider the bloody uses of their guns and money. [John Brecher, "The IRA's Angels," Newsweek, 18 May 1981, p. 53.]

...Noraid officials said donations reached \$250,000 during the seven-month hunger strike in which 10 inmates died at Ulster's Maze Prison.

The U.S. government joins Thatcher in claiming that not all of Noraid's money goes to feed women and children. The Justice Department, calling Noraid a "collection agent" for the guerrillas, won a court order directing it to register as the IRA's foreign agent.

In addition, FBI agents this month arrested a Noraid trustee in New York on a charge of conspiring to ship sub-machine guns to the IRA. ["Does U.S. Money Finance IRA Terror?" U.S. News and World Report, 26 October 1981, p. 5.]

...Finance is raised on a regular basis both in the Irish community in the USA, and through bank raids in Ireland itself. [Andrew Wheatcroft, The World Atlas of Revolutions, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 191.]

Most Provos come from the slums of West Belfast. Operating Mafia-style protection rackets, the Provos force

taxi drivers, pubkeepers and store owners in Catholic areas to come up with weekly payments. When more funds are needed, they rob banks. [David Reed, "Terror in Northern Ireland: The American Connection," Reader's Digest, April 1983, p. 166.]

Money restrictions used to combat organized crime and drug dealers are now being used against U.S. groups supporting Irish terrorists, according to Charles Price, the American ambassador to Britain.

The campaign uses a U.S. regulation under which people entering or leaving the country must declare to customs officials amounts of cash in excess of \$5,000, Price said Friday.

"Recently, the United States has started applying this act to those who would cause violence in Northern Ireland," Price said.

Sympathizers of the outlawed Irish Republican Army have been targeted for special attention, he said. The IRA is fighting to oust the British from Northern Ireland and to unify the two Irelands.

"We started by digging out the records of known American couriers, financiers and organizers, such as Noraid (a New York-based group that raises funds for the IRA)," the ambassador said. "We have now identified others who were previously unknown."

"Tens of millions of dollars have been confiscated in the narcotics area. We are now working to do the same thing with terrorist money. We want to confiscate it, thereby drying up the funds to buy arms," Price said. [UPI, 25 February 1984.]

FitzGerald told a group of reporters at a breakfast meeting that statistics about aid coming from the United States to the outlawed Irish Republican Army are, by the nature of terrorist organizations, unreliable and difficult to gather. But he said, "I have the impression that the flow has diminished."



One clue, he said, is that the IRA has recently gone into kidnapping people for large ransoms, a sign that money from American contributors may be drying up. Irish officials have put the level of aid from Americans to the IRA at "something under \$10 million a year."

FitzGerald said the United States remains a principal source of weapons for the IRA because arms are more freely available on the commercial market in America than elsewhere in the world. During his visit, Irish and U.S. officials are expected to discuss ways of detecting and halting the flow of funds and guns to the IRA and similar groups.

. . .

Forty senators and 58 members of the House led by Massachusetts Democrats Sen. Edward Kennedy and O'Neill signed a letter Wednesday vowing to continue efforts for peace and reconciliation in Northern Ireland.

"We renew our urgent appeal to all Americans to renounce the path of the bomb and the bullet and to reject the pleas of those who seek by word or deed or dollars to promote or condone the cause of violence," the letter said. [UPI, 15 March 1984.]

Qaddafi also reiterated earlier threats that Libya would increase aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland in retaliation for the harassment of Libyans in Britain. [Facts on File, 1984, p. 314.]

But the flow of money from the U.S. fluctuates according to the political situation in Northern Ireland. Upturns, in the words of a senior Irish official, "reflect policy disasters by the British government."

Before the hunger strikes by Provisional IRA prisoners in 1981, which claimed 10 lives, the American contribution may have fallen as low as \$250,000.

The present figure is thought to be at least \$2 million annually, and could be much higher.

Officials here say that as long as guns and ammunition can be bought by criminals on the international arms market, and as long as American money is available, the campaign of the Irish Republican Army will continue in some form. [James Downey, "Ireland Deals Blow to U.S.-IRA Connection," Christian Science Monitor, 4 October 1984, p. 9.]

Police and intelligence sources say there is no doubt that the main source of weapons for the IRA is the United States and that money from the New York-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid) is a major factor in buying arms.

Even more money, they say, comes from bank robberies in the north and in Ireland, and from extortion, rackets and tax evasion.

All officials believe that the new IRA strategy is linked closely to Noraid -- and to U.S. gun dealers who take a big chance in arranging shipments -- in terms of continually proving to its supporters that it can attack the British while toning down the more indiscriminate bombing.

Noraid, which is openly sympathetic to the IRA, denies U.S. and Irish government charges of gun-running and insists that the funds it raises go solely to help the families of IRA prisoners.

Police officials also say that while the IRA has fraternal contacts abroad, and gets some arms in Europe and the Middle East, these links tend to be exaggerated. The IRA is "essentially an indigenous terror group," Ulster police say.

The recent seizure of seven tons of IRA arms en route by sea from the United States, and the less publicized but significant discovery of large quantities of sophisticated bomb timers outside Dublin two weeks ago, have dealt the IRA serious setbacks. But the quantity of these finds also discloses the scope of the ambitions of the organization. [Michael Getler, "Ulster Conflict in New Phase: Reorganization into Cells Makes IRA Terrorists Harder to Catch," The Washington Post, 2 November 1984, p. A25.]

An increase in the number of bank robberies and kidnappings in Ireland also indicates that the flow of arms

and funds from the United States may have decreased in recent years. [Mary Thornton, "U.S. Investigating the Smuggling of Weapons to Irish Terrorists," The Washington Post, 2 November 1984, p. A28.]

In May 1981, US District Court Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. in New York ruled in a Justice Department suit against Noraid that the organization was acting in America as an arm of the Provisional IRA. Judge Haight wrote in his decision: "The uncontroverted evidence is that [Noraid] is an agent of the IRA, providing money and services for other than relief purposes." Flannery objected. Noraid lawyers appealed the decision but lost.

"At least half of what is raised in America stays in the US for the purchase of weapons," says a spokesman in Belfast for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force in Northern Ireland.

An Irish security official in Dublin says: "It is difficult to know if all their funds are channeled in this direction [relief efforts]. We think that surplus funds may be channeled to the purchase of bombs and bullets."

"Our feeling," says a British security official in Northern Ireland, "is that most of the money that is raised in America is never declared -- it is simply used for the purchase of weapons."

"There is no way we can check on their money-laundering operation, because you never know how much they collect," says Donald J. McGorty, head of the division at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in New York that handles international terrorism.

He adds: "There's no way we can tell if they collected \$100,000 or \$5 million. Now, whether all that money is sent to Ireland, who's to say? But in any scenario you can think of about the money, there is a probability against all other scenarios that it has been used." [Warren Richey, "On the Trail of US Funds for IRA," Christian Science Monitor, 14 January 1985, p. 6.]

According to security officials, most of the IRA's funding has historically come from bank robberies, extortion,

protection rackets, and kidnappings in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. In 1983, police say, IRA-sanctioned bank robberies in Northern Ireland netted some 300,000 British pounds. [Warren Richey, "How the IRA Ships Arms into Ulster," Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1985, p. 6.

There is no Justice Department audit of Noraid's books, according to Justice officials. Nor are they able, government officials say, to confirm, with the sparse information Noraid discloses, the accuracy of Noraid's financial reports. One source says Justice Department officials take the reports they receive from Noraid "at face value."

"There are penalties for making misstatements, but basically it's an honor system," says an official with the Justice Department's Internal Security Section, which oversees the registration of foreign agents in the US.

Donald J. McGorty, who heads the international terrorism section of the Federal Bureau of Investigation office in New York, has his own theory on why there are no independent audits at Noraid: "It would pinpoint exactly how much money they are actually collecting, and maybe they don't want that known."

. . .

Because Noraid uses a variety of means to transfer its funds to Ireland -- including couriers -- it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for US or Irish law-enforcement officials to verify that \$93,000 was, in fact, received in Ireland or was, in fact, ever sent to Ireland in 1984.

"Their books consist of a torn envelope, a piece of paper here, the back of a newspaper there," says the FBI's McGorty. "It's not your regular double-entry bookkeeping, a set of books you would expect if you went to the Ford Foundation or some charitable organization.

"The situation is very difficult because you don't know if they collect \$1 or \$1 million. If you are doing business by cash, it is very difficult to keep track of." [Warren Richey, "Noraid Fund-Raisers Elude Compliance with US Laws," Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 1985, p. 4.]

"We're never without something to excite the people here," says Flannery. "When the hunger strike was over, it started up again with the St. Patrick's Day Parade." He ticks off a list of controversial events beginning with the 1981 fatal hunger strike of Bobby Sands and nine other Republican prisoners in Northern Ireland. His list ends with the September death of a Belfast man who had been shot by Northern Ireland security forces with a plastic bullet. The man was killed as police attempted to arrest Noraid publicity director Martin Galvin. Mr. Galvin appeared at a pro-IRA political rally in Belfast, though Northern Ireland officials had forbidden him to enter the country. "All this excites the people. Right away they rally," Flannery says. "During the hunger strike, for instance, we took in more money in two months than we did for a whole year before. It was almost \$300,000 taken in."

There have been indications, according to Irish and British government officials, that as IRA military operations in Northern Ireland and England have fallen off, funds contributed to Noraid in the US have fallen off as well. The reverse may also be true. In certain extremist Irish-American circles in the US the IRA's bombing last October of a Brighton, England, hotel where Prime Minister Thatcher and most of her cabinet were meeting was seen as a victory for the IRA and as a potential boost to pro-IRA fund-raising efforts in America. It was seen as a demonstration of the IRA's ability to carry out sophisticated bombing attacks in England at the very heart of the British establishment. Such high-visibility bombings keep the IRA's struggle against Britain in the American public eye through widespread press coverage. It is seen in part as helping keep potential American contributors and supporters aware that the IRA's struggle continues. This is the public-relations dimension of guerrilla warfare.

. . .

Hal Erbe, a spokesman for the Fenian Society, said in a telephone interview that the group raised less than \$5,000 last year. [Warren Richey, "British, Irish Officials Advise Against Donations to Noraid," Christian Science Monitor, 21 January 1985, pp. 7,9.

## APPENDIX C

### SELECTED OPEN SOURCE REPORTS

#### IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Qaddafi announced June 11 [1972] that Libya supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and was supplying it with money, arms and volunteers to fight British occupation forces in Northern Ireland. He supplied no further details on the nature of the aid. Qaddafi made the disclosure in a speech marking the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. forces from Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya.

Accusing Britain of handing over Palestine to the Jews in 1948 and of permitting Iran to occupy three Persian Gulf Islands in 1971, Qaddafi vowed he would pursue British imperialism everywhere, even "in her own home." [Facts on File, 1972, p. 439.]

...Walder [Swiss Attorney General] denied a New York Times report, based on information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other Western intelligence services, that foreign revolutionary groups had opened a central coordinating office in Zurich in 1971. The intelligence data had also allegedly indicated that terrorist groups such as the Red Army of Japan, the Tupamaros of Uruguay and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine maintained an international revolutionary network through agents and "safe houses" in Beirut, Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries, in Europe and in Tokyo. The alleged network was said to have arranged secret talks between foreign guerrilla groups and the Irish Republican Army in Dublin May 26 and 28 [1972]. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 562.]

British military sources, as reported by the United Press International Aug. 2 [1972], claimed that secret papers

seized during searches of the rebel areas of Londonderry and Belfast had revealed links between the IRA and such foreign guerrilla and anarchist movements as the U.S. Black Panthers, the Maoist Red Star Army of Japan, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Fourth International in Brussels. The latter had staged pro-IRA demonstrations in several European cities, according to the Washington Post Aug. 3. Revolutionary groups in Cuba, France, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and parts of Africa were also reportedly mentioned in the documents. [Facts on File, 1972, p. 598.]

The Lebanese daily newspaper Al Liwa had indicated that Palestinian guerrillas and the IRA had agreed on joint terrorist acts in Britain, it was reported Jan. 3 [1974]. [Facts on File, 1974, p. 13.]

According to the London Times Jan. 8 [1975]. . .The Times report also said the militants [from the protestant paramilitary Ulster Defense Association (UDA)] disapproved of a visit to Libya by a delegation of Protestants, including Tommy Lyttle, a West Belfast UDA leader, who talked to IRA representatives there. [Facts on File, 1975, p. 5.]

Sixteen members of the Dail (lower house of parliament) had held four days of talks with senior Libyan government officials in Tripoli but failed to receive assurances that Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's government would halt its weapons aid to the IRA, it was reported April 20 [1975]. Qaddafi was believed to have provided the IRA with Soviet rocket launchers and other weapons, according to a London Times report April 20. [Facts on File, 1975, p. 549.]

The New York Times July 15 [1976] quoted diplomatic sources as saying that Libya's leader, Col. Muammar

el-Qaddafi, was financing, training and arming a widespread network of terrorist gangs ranging from the Middle East to Africa and Europe.

. . .

Qaddafi's drive was said to stretch far beyond the Middle East. He was believed to have dispatched Soviet-made weapons to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland, to Moslem guerrillas in the Philippines and Thailand and to insurgents in Chad and Ethiopia. [Facts on File, 1976, p. 531.]

But the terrorist professionals also supply equipment, manpower, or both to groups like the IRA, operating in Northern Ireland and England...

. . .

...At least three Palestinian advisers serve with the IRA in Ireland today. In Benghazi, Libya, a punishing, systematic, two-month course in commando training is available to all comers.

. . .

...A Basque lawyer named Jose Echebarrietta flew to Dublin in November, 1974. After enlisting the active help of top IRA personnel, including explosives expert Patrick Young, his group was able to pull off a series of killings, bank robberies and raids on military bases. [Walter W. Howard, "Terrorists: How They Operate a Worldwide Network," The Washington Post, 18 January 1976, Parade, p. 14.]

The Madrid weekly El Pais said Jan. 28 [1979] that ETA [the left-wing Basque terrorist group] was working closely with the Irish Republican Army. The two terrorist groups reportedly exchanged men, arms and explosives and trained together in an unspecified Middle Eastern country. [Facts on File, 1979, p. 100.]



Little was known about INLA [Irish National Liberation Army] or its potential for troublemaking. It is the military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party, a Marxist faction that broke away from the IRA four years ago. British security officials believe that INLA has no more than 50 members, but the group is said to have close ties with the Palestine Liberation Organization and Italy's Red Brigades. They have been well trained, possibly abroad. [Raymond Carroll and Tony Clifton, "The IRA's Lethal New Look," Newsweek, 16 April 1979, p. 63.]

New leadership, under Gerry Adams, has regrouped the I.R.A. into smaller cells and tightened screening against informers. It has negotiated alliances with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which supplies arms, money and training, and the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, which, McMullen says, provides loans, arms and transportation. ["Tantalizing Tales from the I.R.A.," Time, 17 September 1979, p. 39.]

Guasco [Italian prosecutor in the Aldo Moro kidnapping and murder case] also claimed, without giving details, that evidence had been found linking Italian terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades, with "extreme leftist Americans" and with the Red Army Faction in West Germany, the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatists in Spain. [Facts on File, 1980, p. 20.]

...The six-page leaflet from the [Red] Brigades was found in a garbage can near the Rome railway station after a newspaper received an anonymous phone call telling where to look for it...

. . .

Backing was expressed for the West German terrorist group, the Red Army Faction. That group and the Brigades, the communique said, were "standing together in the forefront of the attack against the war schemes incarnated by NATO." The Brigades also offered an "outstretched hand" to other

terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland and the Basque separatist group ETA in Spain. Those two groups, the document said, "could find the possibility of a qualitative jump if only they could get out of the suffocating optic of nationalism and insert themselves into the wider context of the war against imperialism according to the strategic principle that the only possible revolution is an international revolution." [Facts on File, 1981, p. 959.]

Qaddafi also reiterated earlier threats that Libya would increase aid to the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland in retaliation for the harassment of Libyans in Britain. [Facts on File, 1984, p. 314.]

Police searching the Libyan Embassy discovered two loaded handguns and a spent cartridge case of the same caliber as the gun that killed a policewoman outside the embassy, Home Secretary Leon Brittan said today.

. . .

...There was no evidence that the departing Libyans flushed gelignite down the sewers, a police spokesman said, denying a newspaper report.

. . .

Khadafy said in an interview with French television broadcast Monday that he would open formal relations with the outlawed Irish Republican Army unless Britain restores diplomatic ties with Libya. [UPI, May 1, 1984.]

Col. Moammar Khadafy charged Britain today with sheltering Libyan terrorists and accused British police of planting weapons and ammunition in the Libyan Embassy in London following a 10-day siege.

. . .

Asked about Libya's support for the outlawed Irish Republican Army, fighting a terrorist campaign to end British rule of Northern Ireland, Khadafy said Libya did not feel embarrassed about supporting the "just cause" of the IRA "in every respect."

Asked what practical steps he would take to help the IRA, Khadafy replied: "It's urgent, we can provide the support that they need and that we have available." [UPI, 2 May 1984.]

## APPENDIX D

### SELECTED EXTRACTS FROM THE

#### THIRD POINT SYSTEMS ARMS TRANSFER EVENT CODING HANDBOOK

(12 SEPTEMBER 1984)

## II. The Basic Data Record

The basic arms transfer event is comprised of the following variables. (Section III of this handbook discusses the coding rules and provides in-depth descriptions of each variable).

DATE:	The date of the event
ACTOR COUNTRY:	The originator of the transfer or transaction. Actors (and targets) are normally nations, but could be a multinational or international organization.
DOMESTIC ACTOR:	The individual, department, organization or group within the actor country who is primarily responsible for the action.
EVENT CODE:	An interaction that describes the relationship between the originator of an arms transfer event and the target or recipient of the event (e.g., delivery, request, denial, etc.).
DOMESTIC TARGET:	The individual, department, organization or group within the target country who is the object or recipient of an actor's action.

**TARGET COUNTRY:** The object or recipient of an actor's action.

**ISSUE:** Any discrete event may be concerned with one or more issues, such as training, coproduction, etc.

**TERMS:** Specified payment procedures, financial agreements, and assistance plans are indicated here, e.g., gift, loan, cash, sale, etc.

**SYSTEMS:** Specified weapons systems, types of hardware, and equipment are entered in these fields.

**SUMMARY:** For each discrete event, up to five lines of text can be entered. The purpose is to describe in narrative form, the arms transfer event, including details, such as quantity of arms, value of the transaction, etc. Key word searches can be conducted using this portion of the data field.

**CODER:** The coder's initials and the date of entry are included in each record.

**SOURCES:** The source code(s) of the publication(s) used to generate the event data and its date of publication.

#### INTERACTION EVENT CODES

Countries do many different types of things to one another regarding arms transfers. Besides actually transferring arms they engage in such activities as meeting to discuss the terms of arms aid; they applaud or criticize each others' arms transfer policies; they promise equipment and personnel; they withdraw equipment and so on. The arms transfer interaction variable permits defining the discrete activities nations engage in while interacting about arms transfers.

## BASIC EVENT CODES

- 51 CONSULT/MEET/VISIT
- 52 PROPOSE/OFFER/URGE
- 53 REQUEST
- 54 EVALUATE/CONSIDER/NEGOTIATE
- 55 REJECT/REFUSE
- 56 ORDER/ACCEPT/CONTRACT
- 57 DELIVER
- 58 INCREASE/IMPROVE/PROGRESS/FULFILL
- 59 REDUCE/WITHDRAW
- 70 COMMENT
- 71 APPROVE/ENDORSE/ASSURE/PROMISE/AGREE/CONFIRM
- 72 ACCUSE/CRITICIZE/PROTEST/THREATEN

Coding an arms transfer event requires the selection of a two-digit event code from the above list. The twelve basic categories of arms transfer events are mutually exclusive. The coder must select one code to describe each event contained in a report.

## JOINT-ACTIONS

Many events are joint-actions and must be coded as two discrete events.

EXAMPLE: The Mexican Defense minister visited France for the purpose of discussing the purchase of the VBL scout car.

This event is coded as two discrete events.

	<u>Actor Country</u>	<u>Event Code</u>	<u>Target Country</u>
Event 1	MEX	51	FRN
Event 2	FRN	51	MEX

This approach achieves several objectives. First, if the user focuses on a single country, double coding is the only way to ensure that the picture of arms transfer activity is complete. In the above example, it is not clear whether the initiative lies with France or with Mexico.

### 51 CONSULT/MEET/VISIT

This category includes the exchange of notes, messages and information, as well as the physical meetings between personnel from at least two countries. If reference is made to consideration or evaluation of a particular piece of hardware, or to negotiations over terms of the transfer, the

event is coded as a 54, not as a 51. The overall purpose of putting events in this category is to capture those instances where two countries actually meet regarding an arms transfer issue.

A typical sequence may find Turkey announcing a need for a transport aircraft (70 Comment); various countries visit Turkey with the specifics of their aircraft (51 Consult/Meet/Visit); Turkey evaluates the offers and negotiates with the suppliers (54 Evaluate/Consider/Negotiate); selects the supplier and eventually orders the aircraft (56 Order/Deliver).

Bilateral meetings are reciprocal in the sense that if Country A meets with country B, then Country B must also be meeting with Country A. Consequently, bilateral meetings are doublecoded: A meets B; and B meets A. Meetings involving more than two countries are not to be doublecoded. If the meeting is of a general nature (i.e., a weapons show or demonstration), it is coded as 51 with the target country as "NSC". If it is a meeting or an organized group, such as NATO or the Gulf Cooperation Council, the target country is a nongovernmental actor. On the other hand, if five countries meet to discuss the joint development of a tank or fighter aircraft, this event is coded as five events. Each country interacts with an "MLG", since the "group" of five exists only in regard to that event: the development of the tank or aircraft.

All reports of future meetings and visits will not be coded in this category. They will be coded either as 70 Comment or, if the report views the visit as a positive event, 71 (or 72, if negative).

If, as a result of a meeting or consultation the outcome is negative (55 Reject) or positive (56 Order), these latter codes (55, 56) should be used, not 51 Meet.

## 52 PROPOSE/OFFER/URGE

In a typical arms transfer sequence, the supplier country will offer or propose that the recipient country buy a particular weapon system, or accept a certain training or support package. This event is used when the initiative is with the supplier.

For example, when the U.S. State Department notifies the Congress of an impending sale, this system has at this stage been offered to the country in question. In another example, Short Brothers of the U.K. and Embraer of Brazil are cooperating in the manufacture and marketing of the Tucano

turboprop trainer. It is one of two aircraft to have bid for the contract for the U.K.'s R.A.F. In this sense, Short/Embraer is offering their aircraft to the U.K. Marketing then becomes a key word in this event category.

#### 53 REQUEST

Events in this category put the emphasis on the recipient of equipment, training and/or support. In the typical arms transfer, a visit (51) during which an F-16A is demonstrated is followed by either an offer (52) or a request (53) for a squadron of F-16As. If the interaction is clearly one initiated and sustained by the recipient, code 53 should be used. If, on the other hand, the supplier is actively countering the request with the offer of an alternative aircraft, such as the F-20, then this event should be coded 52.

#### 54 EVALUATE/CONSIDER/NEGOTIATE

This event code is used for those reports which indicate that a country is in the process of considering the acquisition or supply of hardware or training. Often an extensive period of time elapses between an offer and a decision to order. For example, if the U.S. Congress does not veto a proposed sale of F-16A aircraft to Kuwait, Kuwait then has a fixed period of time to accept the offer. News sources may report "Kuwait has still not decided to buy the F-16" or similar language. The fact that it has been reported indicates interest in the transfer and qualifies it as an event.

Evaluations can also be conducted by supplier countries who are considering requests by other countries. These instances may become events if an anxious recipient decides to put pressure on the supplier by reminding them publicly that they are still waiting for a response. Two separate codes will be entered in this case since a single report may include both an urging (52) on the part of the prospective recipient and evaluation (54) on the part of the supplier.

Often, the first time a transfer is made public is when a recipient or supplier reports that two or three aircraft are being evaluated for sale or purchase. In this case, code 54 will not have been preceded by either an offer (52) or a request (53). Since it is not appropriate to reconstruct the dates of the offer/request, 54 is used and the transfer tracked from that date. When an article tracks the history of an arms transfer, each element will be coded.



EXAMPLE: The Finnish Ministry of Defense is evaluating the Swedish J35 Drakens as a possible aircraft for the Finnish Air Force. The two nations met in October of 1983. This meeting was immediately followed by a Swedish proposal on December 12, 1983. There still has been no final decision from the Finnish government.

There are three events here: the meeting 51 which would be dated as 10/99/83, the proposal 52 on 12/12/83, and the evaluation which would be dated, unless otherwise specified, the same as the date of the report.

#### 55 REJECT/REFUSE

This category captures a common type of event in which a supplier or recipient reacts negatively to a request or offer. For example, Jordan's rejection of U.S. air defense missiles would be coded as 55, as would the U.S. rejection of Singapore's request for F-16A aircraft. Continuous statements of a rejection, even if it concerns the same request or offer, will be recorded as discrete events. Companies ("IND") that lose bids must be recorded as the domestic target (object) of 55 Reject, and the names of these companies must be included in the summary.

#### 56 ORDER/ACCEPT/CONTRACT

This category is used only when the report clearly indicates the signing or awarding of a contract, a signed agreement or in some cases "plans" to either purchase, buy, or coproduce. Considering an order is code 54. Endorsing or approving the concept of ordering is code 71. Meeting to discuss an order is either 51, 54, or 71.

Orders between a government and an arms industrial firm within that country will not be recorded, since it is assumed that such a contract is a domestic event.

#### 57 DELIVERY

This type of event may include the actual delivery of a weapon system or support package, a weapon system becoming operational after an overhaul/upgrade by an external supplier, or the entry into service or equipment manufactured under the terms of licensed coproduction or coproduction.

If equipment or hardware has been shipped to a destination (target country) but is waiting in a third country, it is coded as an Order 56, if the coder is certain

that the equipment has in fact been ordered by that country. For example, the U.S. reports that Nicaragua has ordered MiG-21 aircraft from the U.S.S.R., but they never got beyond delivery to Cuba. Nicaragua has publicly complained that Cuba won't give her the MiG-21s, though Cuba is storing, not using the aircraft. This event remains an order 56. The key action which classifies a transfer as a delivery, beyond an order, is actual receipt. This would also be recorded as a Complaint (72).

#### 58 INCREASE/IMPROVE/PROGRESS/FULFILL

Events included in this category are decisions to resume a delivery previously halted, reduce a sanction, or supplement a previous order or agreement. In the latter type of event, code 58 is used only when the additional equipment or support is clearly supplemental and/or incremental. For example, an agreement by France to supply submarines to Pakistan is coded as 56. If subsequent to agreement the quantity is changed from 4 to 5, code 58 would be used. If, on the other hand, France agrees to upgrade the deal with a new, more capable torpedo, a separate event for the torpedoes (56) would be used.

Also coded in this category are those events which indicate a step-up in the production or in the progression of the arms transfer event, which signal an improvement in the relations between the interacting countries.

NOTE: A difference should be noted between a 70 Comment, which reports the normal progression of an arms transfer event, and this category, where some incremental change must be suggested.

#### 59 REDUCE/WITHDRAW/CANCEL

Events in this category are the most negative that can occur. Included in this category are decisions to reduce the number or quality of weapons/hardware, to withdraw an offer, to slow down production, or to cancel an agreement.

EXAMPLE: The U.S. cancelled the delivery of twelve fighter jets to Jordan following a series of hostile remarks by King Hussein.

#### 70 COMMENT

The comment category identifies statements emanating from a country concerning arms transfers. In order for a

statement to be recorded as a comment it must be made by a specifically identified governmental official or agency, or a person or group considered to be influential in effecting arms transfer decisions. In addition, comments must be public statements and not reports of comments which may not have been intended for public consumption. (Consequently, "comments" are the arms transfer events which are never coded as "rumored".)

There are various types of comments.

\*Decline to comment.

\*Explain policy: interpreting their own country's policy or explaining future actions.

\*Status report on an arms transfer when the transfer is progressing as scheduled: delivery situation, development, production.

\*Statement of need/threat assessment: only when linked explicitly to a need for arms acquisition from non-indigenous sources.

#### EXAMPLES:

A British MOD spokesman confirmed that although diplomatic relations between Libya and Britain have now been severed following the London 'embassy' siege, exports of military equipment to Libya will continue because of long-standing contracts which cannot be broken.

Gen. Sankoy has confirmed that some 200 Saron [sic] APCs have been sold to seven countries with production currently running at about 70 vehicles a year.

The Salvadorean President-elect, Jose Napolean Duarte, claimed in Washington that the Salvadorean Army has sufficient supplies of small arms ammunition on hand for only three month's consumption.

#### 71 APPROVE/ENDORSE/ASSURE/PROMISE/CONFIRM/AGREE

This category of event is intended for those actions or comments which indicate supportive or affirmative attitudes and/or policies, but are not quite specific enough for categories 51-59. For example, France approving or endorsing (71) the concept of a Gulf Cooperation Council policy of coordinating arms purchases is a positive interaction with the GCC, but not specific enough to qualify as Consultation (52), Urge (53) or Order (57).

If the coder is unable to determine the tone of the interaction, the Comment category should be used. An announcement by Kuwait that the USSR will visit in two weeks to sign an arms agreement will be coded as 71 if in the context of the report Kuwait views this event as a step toward better relations between the USSR and Kuwait. Conversely, a U.S. announcement that in a week the U.S. will confer with Greece about the U.S. denial of F-5 aircraft will likely be coded as code 72, the negative equivalent of code 71. If, on the other hand, an announcement is made that a meeting will be held next week between France and the FRG to discuss the joint development of a tank, this is coded 70 Comment since the statement is neutral.

If the interaction involves a specific promise to deliver equipment or support at some future time, it should be coded either as 53 Propose, or, if specific enough, 56 Order. Similarly, meetings at which promises of general support are made should be coded as 51 Consult, not 71.

## 72 ACCUSE/CRITICIZE/PROTEST/THREATEN

This category is the counterpoint to the affirmative actions described in category 71. Events in the 72 category are not specific enough to be categorized as 56 Reject or 59 Reduce/Withdraw. Nevertheless, they indicate an unsupportive orientation towards some aspect of arms transfers.

An arms recipient's unhappiness regarding delivery time or quality of equipment would fit this category. Also, threats to alter the arms transfer relationship by reduction or withdrawal are coded as 72. As with category 71, if the coder is unable to determine the tone of the interaction, the event should be coded as 70 Comment.

## ISSUES

Once the relevant actor, target, and interaction have been identified for an arms transfer event, assigning an issue code to the event requires answering the question "What is Country A interacting with Country B about?" Coders will record the relevant issues for each event. Up to five issues can be recorded for each discrete event.

**EXAMPLE:** Singapore has accepted a letter of offer for 8 F-16/J-79 fighter aircraft. The Pentagon estimated the cost of the sale with spares, support and training at \$280 million.

Issues in the above example include training, equipment transfers, and spares.

On the other hand, if a source reports the transfer of pilot training and the upgrading of I-Hawk air defense missiles to Kuwait, these are two discrete events, not one event involving two issues (training, overhaul/upgrade). The two keys to determining the number of discrete events are time -- an appropriate interval -- and the hardware or support involved.

## 01 TRAINING

One of the arms transfer issues about which nations interact is training in which the country providing military aid trains the personnel of its client. Training may involve client personnel traveling to the country supplying the training. Training may also involve countries supplying training to their clients in the form of advisors. This category will include all training of a military nature. Technicians are coded under "Technical Assistance." If the coder cannot distinguish between "training" and "technical assistance," code it as training. The key aspect of the event being captured is the presence of supplier or recipient personnel as part of the transfer.

Care must be taken not to confuse training and advice with the stationing of forces from the supplier country in the recipient country.

Based on the U.S. model, training is defined as "formal or informal instruction of foreign students in the United States or overseas by officers or employees of the U.S., contract technicians, or by correspondence courses, technical, educational, or information publications and media of all kinds, training aids, orientation, training exercise, and military advice to foreign military units and forces."

Foreign students attend U.S. courses in the following categories: professional military education, flying training, maintenance and skill level training, OJT, orientation training tours.

Training which is exported by the U.S. includes: Mobile training teams -- used for 1) specific in-country training requirements beyond the use of permanent U.S. personnel in country; 2) training associated with equipment transfer; or 3) conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements.

## 02 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

This category is used when the supplier country's advice and/or training is clearly technical. It includes those instances where technical advice accompanies an equipment transfer, as well as the transfer of pure technology.

## 03 COPRODUCTION

This category is used if the transfer involves equipment which has been coproduced. For the purposes of this data set, the term "coproduce" can mean any of the following:

Co-assembly: all of the components of a weapon system are manufactured in the supplier country but some of the assembly is conducted in the recipient country.

Coproduction of Components: some of the parts for the weapons system are manufactured in the recipient country.

Dual-production: a weapon system is wholly produced in two or more countries. An example is the AIM-9L AAM, a U.S. missile manufactured in both the U.S. and the F.R.G.

## 04 LICENSED PRODUCTION

Licensed Production involves agreements made by commercial firms with international organizations, foreign governments, or foreign commercial firms. Involvement on the part of the government of the producer is limited to the licensing process.

## 05 OFFSETS

A transaction in which a company selling military equipment is required by the buyer government, as a condition of sale, to assist in, or arrange for marketing of products produced in the buying country, to "offset" the hard currency drain resulting from the purchase.

There are several types of offsets:

Coproduction: Government to government agreement permitting a foreign government or producer to acquire the technology and know-how to manufacture all or part of an item.

Direct Licensed Production: Foreign firm provides technical information and know-how to a foreign firm or government to produce item of equipment.

Subcontractor Production: Direct commercial arrangement in which a foreign company produces a component or part for a U.S. firm without the transfer of technology or know-how.

Direct Investment: Capital invested in a foreign country to establish a subsidiary or joint venture.

Counter trade: Direct purchase and subsequent sale of civilian or military goods and services, not related to the arms involved, from the buyer country by the U.S., U.S. contracts, the contractors' suppliers, or by third parties.

Technology Transfer: Government to government agreement permitting the recipient country to acquire technology from the supplier country, so that the recipient may eventually produce the equipment or item.

## 06 EQUIPMENT TRANSFERS

Any stage of a transaction which pertains to, plans, or carries out a change in the ownership or possession of weapons and/or hardware.

EXAMPLE: The Danish Air Force ordered 12 F-16s from General Dynamics last week following the Danish Government allocation of DK 1,700 million to this department.

## 07 MILITARY ACCESS

Refers to the relationship between the supplier and the recipient, which specifies the supplier's accessibility to facilities, and rights of passage, and the presence of support vessels within the recipient's boundaries. Military access ranges from low to high.

Low:

- \*Aircraft overflight privileges
- \*Landing rights and refueling of aircraft
- \*Port access for fishing and merchant vessels
- \*Port visits of naval ships

Moderate:

- \*All of the above
- \*ASW monitoring
- \*Naval repair, replenishment, refueling, and shore leave with quasi-permanent presence of support ships
- \*Other reconnaissance options

Moderate-High:

- \*Permanent presence of support ships
- \*Training areas
- \*Intelligence, surveillance, and common facilities
- \*Staging of arms, personnel, aircraft, and spare parts

High:

- \*All of the above
- \*Arms supplier controls facilities

08 FINANCIAL SUPPORT

An agreement between a supplier and a recipient whereby the supplier gives the recipient cash for a specified purpose: the acquisition of defense articles and services.

09 SPARES/LOGISTICS

Arms transfer agreements which include arrangements wherein spare parts and/or continued support is provided to a foreign government after the completed transfer.

10 MILITARY ASSISTANCE

An agreement between a supplier and a recipient, whereby the supplier gives the recipient cash in order to purchase defense articles and services from commercial firms native to the supplier country.

11 MAINTENANCE

Involves a commitment on the part of the supplier country to maintain the equipment, systems, or arms transferred to the recipient country.



## 12 OVERHAUL

Involves remodeling, renovation, or major changes in existing equipment. Overhauls are often viewed as a relatively inexpensive means of updating and upgrading major equipment.

### TERMS

The terms or means of payment for the acquired weapons/hardware provide valuable information and insight into the relationship between nations involved in an arms transfer event. When this information is available, it is imperative that it is included in both the narrative summary and in the analytical field. The summary should discuss the monetary value and the various elements of the transfer (i.e., training, supplies, support systems, etc.). In the analytical field, the coder is given a choice of 10 terms, ranging from 21 UNKNOWN to 30 NOT APPLICABLE. A discussion of each follows.

#### 21 UNKNOWN

Often, in arms transfer events, the terms of the transfer or the method or payment are not disclosed. Enter 21 when either there is no reference to payment, or the value of the equipment/training, etc. is given, but the terms are not explicitly stated.

Example: Two initial contracts have been signed with the US Navy for air-to-air missiles for the Royal Australian Air Force's new F/A-18 Hornet aircraft. The Australian Minister of Defense said the contracts totaled an estimated \$A26 million.

#### 22 RECIPIENT PAYS CASH

To enter 22, the text must state that in exchange for the weapons/hardware, the recipient paid a certain sum in cash.

#### 23 THIRD COUNTRY PAYS

A nation may contract and pay to provide another nation with certain weapons/hardware. A 23 should not be entered unless this is clearly the case. Often such arrangements are implied or rumored, but should not be assumed.

An example of this type of covert, but unofficial relationship exists between the U.S.S.R., Cuba, and Nicaragua.

#### 24 CREDIT/LOAN

For various economic, political, or strategic reasons, sales may involve credit terms or loan agreements. This classification includes those transfers involving cash down payments. When these terms are provided in the text, 24 is entered.

#### 25 GIFT/GRANT

When a supplier agrees to give or grant weapons/hardware to the recipient, the terms of the transfer should be entered as 25.

#### 26 BARTER

When an exchange or trade is suggested as a component of an arms transfer, 26 qualifies as the term of payment.

EXAMPLE: Libya agreed to make a partial payment of \$25 million in cash and deliver \$40 million in oil to Turkey as payment for the Turkish exports she received last year.

#### 27 CAPTURE

When weapons/hardware are seized during an act of war, by force, or by surprise and new ownership or possession is established, 27 is entered.

EXAMPLE: Iraq claimed it downed an Iranian fighter jet that violated Iraqi airspace. The fighter was confiscated, and the pilot and copilot were imprisoned.

#### 28 RENT/LEASE

When a program involving the lease or rental of equipment is outlined or described, 28 is entered.

EXAMPLE: Zambia accepted its first McDonnell Douglas DC-10 in ceremonies at the company's Long Beach facility on July 30. It is being leased to Zambia over a 15-year term with Zambia having the option to buy at any time during the lease period at a price based on its stipulated loss value.

## 29 OTHER

When an alternative plan is discussed with regard to terms of payment, 29 is entered. Details of these terms should be included in the summary.

## 30 NOT APPLICABLE

When the terms of an agreement are not relevant to the event being coded, 30 is entered. This rule will apply most often with those events coded as 70 Comment, 71 Approval, or 72 Criticism.

## SYSTEMS

The type(s) of weapons or hardware involved in the transfer are recorded in this field. If an article refers to more than one event and more than one weapon type, enter in the systems field only the weapon(s)/hardware which directly pertains to the event code. Include all information in the summary.

Since there will be no fixed-format code, the coder enters the type of weapon or hardware as specified in the source of reference. There will always be varying degrees of precision in the designation of the weapons system as well as different ways of referring to the same weapon type.

Weapons systems usually have both a DoD designation and a NATO code name.

EXAMPLE: AIM-9L Sidewinder AAM

In this case, the 'proper' designation of this weapon is AIM-9L, which is an air-to-air missile (AAM). The AIM-9L is also commonly referred to as the Sidewinder, its NATO code name.

The convention will be to record the weapon designation followed by its NATO code name and the weapon description (AAM) as shown in the example above. The weapon description contains the weapon system's 'primary mission'. See Appendix E for a list of commonly used abbreviations and acronyms [not included].

To accommodate those arms transfers involving various weapon systems and/or equipment, six fields are provided on the screen. One type of weapon/hardware is entered in each field. If more than six weapon types are discussed, include

all information in the summary, and create another record for the event, where the additional weapons/hardware may be entered.

In order to conserve space as well as maintain consistency, use the abbreviations provided in Appendix E [not included].

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