


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<p>The Army Training Study (ARTS Study) conducted a comprehensive overview of Army training. The research probed across a wide range of training issues as the study group sought a broad perspective of army training. The study group conducted field surveys at numerous continental US Army posts and schools. The data obtained was analyzed using the Training Effectiveness Analysis (TEA).</p> <p>The Survey Data volume describes the results of only the field surveys conducted by the ARTS group and the analysis of that data.</p>			
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CHAPTER I

ARTS Survey Efforts

This chapter overviews the ARTS surveys designed to augment the collection of analytical data contained in the ARTS Conceptual Model and the Battalion Training Model. Included are brief descriptions of several surveys either administered or studied, as well as samplings of data and insights that emerged. The Army Training Study Survey results are included in this volume, while the Battalion Training Survey volume contains the results of the Battalion Training Survey and the Training Effectiveness Analysis (TEA) volumes contain the TEA survey data.

As the major attitudinal effort, the Army Training Study Survey was developed to meet two objectives. The first was to gather attitudes with regard to the Army's current thinking about the training system; the second was to compare current attitudes with those expressed as a result of the ground-breaking Board for Dynamic Training (BFDT) Study of 1971.

The questions which the Survey addressed concerned the operational units' attitudes on the ARTEP and soldier's manual/SQT--how well do they function as training assists, as standards for readiness, and as evaluation tools? Another series of questions dealt with the problem of training distractors, such as post support, while a third set addressed innovative training developments such as war gaming and simulation. The final set of survey questions solicited opinions on the quality of present institutional and field training programs. The link with the BFDT survey was made through questions on training facilities and aids, training distractors, and innovative training techniques.

The target population consisted of soldiers whom the study group thought had the greatest influence, directly or indirectly, on the Army's training system in the field: brigade commanders and brigade S3's; battalion commanders and battalion S3's; company commanders; platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders. The following representative random sample of FORSCOM and USAREUR units was selected: 28 combat arms brigades, 12 combat support brigades, and 5 combat service support brigades.

The survey was mailed during the last week in April 1978 and the study group received 75 percent return by the third week of May. With the assistance of the Military Sociology Department at the University of Maryland, an analysis of the data was undertaken. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for a number of different analyses including univariate frequency distributions as well as cross tabulations of various responses by rank, branch, theater, and analysis of variance. Where applicable, data was compared with the results of the BFDT survey.

Briefly, analysis of the survey demonstrated a high degree of consistency by the Army's key trainers. Although they seem to accept the present training philosophy, they are not overwhelming in their acceptance. The respondents may have reflected a generally complacent attitude with respect to training. This is demonstrated in that very few respondents answered in the extreme, positive or negative. This apparent complacency did not vary with rank, theater, perception of profession, or perception of the probability of war. The survey results also show a moderately positive acceptance of the state of training, yet there was limited proficiency demonstrated on several training effectiveness analysis (TEA) 78 tests (63C, M60A1 WSTEAs, and Redeye field tests). The problem could be low standards of training proficiency reflecting low expectations rather than complacency.

Univariate frequency analysis points out that post support requirements and command directed activities are seen as the most difficult obstacles to conducting both individual and collective training--even more than dollar, fuel, or ammunition resource constraints. What this may mean is that unit commanders do not believe that they have troops sufficiently available when they need to train. Written comments to the survey echoed this analysis: lack of time to train properly and competing priorities of higher headquarters were mentioned most often as obstacles.

Response frequencies seemed to show that new technology, computer modeling, and simulation devices are seen to have little value in the training area. Through cross-tabulation analysis, however, it was discovered that new technology is highly accepted by those who have had experiences with it, while rejected by those who have no experience. Another significant finding was the desire for evaluation by someone outside the unit on an unscheduled basis. The survey also explored the need for evaluation of training readiness and the value of evaluation measures presently in use. Respondents were asked to evaluate the effectiveness of several current training practices and guidelines and their usefulness as measures of unit training readiness, strengths, and weaknesses. After univariate analysis, a rank-ordering emerged with the unit commander's evaluation being the most effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness, followed by unscheduled evaluations, quarterly external evaluations, the focused training IG, and scheduled evaluations.

Significant differences were noted when responses were analyzed by grade of respondent. No significant differences are observed for the method of quarterly external evaluation, but in the remaining four areas it appears that generally higher ranking officers (O-4 through O-6) opinions are significantly different from those of junior officers (O-1 through O-3), NCOs, and enlisted personnel. The latter group gives a lower rating to the extent of effectiveness of the unit commanders' evaluation than do the higher ranking officers and they rate the remaining three areas (scheduled/unscheduled evaluations, and a training IG focused on proficiency) as more effective than O-4 through O-6 tended to rate them. Better objective measurement of the training product was important to the Army's trainers.

Analysis of the survey also demonstrated a high degree of consistency in the perceptions of the Army's key trainers concerning the relationship of training to readiness. Although only a few respondents thought that the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, EDRE, etc.) degraded unit readiness in the Army as a whole, only 27 percent saw the system as greatly improving readiness. In addition, only 23 percent saw the training as greatly improving readiness in their own units. The survey results also showed a moderately positive evaluation of the state of training and unit readiness. Overall, respondents evaluated their units current state of training readiness in tactics, weapons, support, maintenance, and communication between "good" and "fair" rather than as "very good."

Differences were observed by theater, but were not systematic. USAR-EUR respondents reported better states of training in tactics. Respondents stationed in CONUS reported better states of readiness in support and communications. Mean responses in the areas of weapons and maintenance are virtually identical. In no case is any area rated better than good.

Differences by type of unit were observed and seemed to relate to major mission areas of the units. For example, the lowest ratings in tactics and weapons readiness were observed in support units. On the other hand, the best ratings in support and maintenance were observed in support units. No such pattern exists in the area of communications. These observations suggest that although the general state of training is considered to be mediocre, the units see themselves as striving for and achieving a greater degree of readiness in their mission areas.

Rank differences tend to follow the pattern observed earlier, i.e., the highest ranking officers perceived conditions related to training readiness to be better than did their subordinates. The phenomena may reflect an inherent problem in the Army's feedback system as in the feedback systems of many other large organizations which have layered elements of evaluation, testing, and reporting. In many large scale organizations, that problem is associated with the consequences of reporting negative findings to superiors. Rather than make such reports, some subordinates will report "what my boss wants to hear" thus allowing the subordinates to avoid sanctions and creating a false sense of complacency among the ranking superior. This process may also be reflected in these findings.

The survey also tried to discover how the respondent viewed the very important resource of time. When asked how much time they spend weekly on certain kinds of activities and how much time they would like to spend, the respondents indicated that they would like to devote more time each week to all the training related items listed. They would like to spend slightly more time per week in reading other administrative literature and over two-thirds said they would like to spend much less time meeting post support requirements. In particular, the respondents most likely to want to spend more time reading administrative literature are the more junior

officers and NCOs. In the area of general planning for training and small unit training, junior officers (68 percent) and junior NCOs (55 percent) were most likely to say they would like to spend more time; for company size training it was primarily O-1 through O-3s (63 percent) and O-5s (65 percent) who wanted more time; and for larger unit training it was O-4s (59 percent), O-5s (58 percent) O-6s (61 percent) who would most prefer to spend more time.

Junior trainers and senior trainers to some extent saw each other as the source of their problem. For example, junior officers and NCOs saw higher commands as interfering with and oversupervising training, providing conflicting and changing priorities, and overloading them with demands which prevented them from being able to plan and be innovative in their training. Company grade officers and senior NCOs saw this as the most important of four possible factors that reduce innovation in training. On the other hand, senior officers are more likely to attribute these problems to the abilities of NCOs and junior officers, e.g., this was seen as the number one factor (among four reducing training innovation) among colonels and lieutenant colonels.

Those groups thought to be least innovative (NCOs and junior officers) by the higher leadership, themselves perceive higher frequencies of penalties and lower frequencies of reward for innovation in training than do higher ranking leadership groups. For example, only 7 percent of O-6s indicated that they were penalized at least some of the time for innovation in training, while 40 percent of E-5 to E-6s indicated they had been penalized. On the other hand, 67 percent of the O-6s responded that they had been rewarded at least some of the time for innovation compared to 33 percent among the junior NCO group.

ARTS survey respondents indicated overwhelmingly (77 percent) that an expanded ARTEP would be of assistance. An ARTS recommendation arising out of the BTM and survey is that battle drill, a "how to train" portion of ARTEP, be developed as a logical extension of the ARTEP.

In an analysis of the changes in trends over time between the Army Training Study Survey and the Board for Dynamic Training Survey (Gorman Survey), what stands out is there has been little apparent change of factors thought to affect training: distractors, turbulence, and availability of training material. Specific conclusions which may be drawn are:

1. Obstacles to effective training observed in the Gorman Study are still apparently serious problems. Among the most serious reported are (1) too many nontactical requirements imposed on the unit, (2) a shortage of qualified NCOs, (3) the need for stronger discipline, and (4) the problem of ensuring that day-to-day training is conducted.

2. The percentage of authorized TOE strength estimated to be needed in "present for duty" status at various organizational and rank

levels was approximately 80 percent. This is roughly 5 percent higher than levels estimated by the Active Army respondents in the Gorman Survey.

3. The estimated importance of several mission or problem areas compares nearly exactly between the two surveys. The most important areas are operational missions, small unit training, and vehicular maintenance. Command inspections were rated as slightly more demanding by ARTS respondents than in the earlier survey. Other areas are treated in greater detail in Chapter II of this volume.

Analysis across all respondents indicates one overriding conclusion--there has been little perceived change in the training environment since 1971. The environment is still seen as hostile to the conduct of "good" training.

A second major survey effort was undertaken by the study group in May and June to acquire the initial data to formulate a training program for the Battalion Training Model. The survey instrument used aggregative techniques (magnitude estimation scaling) to acquire time and frequency data relative to individual and collective tasks and ARTEP missions, and to assess the impact on these times and frequencies of such variables as proficiency level, training integration, turbulence, turnover, not-present-for-training, grade substitution, and soldier capability. Survey questions also solicited attitudes with regard to training program changes as people, dollar, and time resources are decremented.

The survey itself was administered to 277 officers and NCOs in Mechanized Infantry and Armor battalions at Fort Carson, and in USAREUR, and to students at the Sergeants Major Academy, the Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College. Even though the survey was complex and required a 3-5 hour response time, it was well received by most respondents. The results displayed a remarkable correlation and represent the Army's best available data on the precise training requirements of a Mechanized/Armor task force. Survey results and analysis are contained in the Battalion Training Survey, volumes I and II.

The ARTS TEA 78 program resulted in special surveys designed to complement the testing effort of various MOSs and systems being evaluated. Two major survey efforts were initiated--one for the Redeye (16P) and one for the M60A1. Both were completed with the assistance of US Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity and the respective schools--Air Defense and Armor. The ARTS Redeye study collected data from 1518 gunners in all 16 divisions in CONUS, USAREUR, and Korea, while the M60A1 study sampled 1288 individual tank crew members from four CONUS battalions and six USAREUR battalions.

Attitudinal data from the Redeye survey indicates soldier dissatisfaction with treatment in their units in that they are not properly used as Redeye gunners. They believe they do not receive enough "hands-on"

equipment training in either the Moving Target Simulator or during field exercises. This data, plus the survey findings concerning intent to reenlist, support a possible relationship between good training, job satisfaction, and reenlistment. Less than one-half of the Redeye gunners are satisfied with their work assignments and working conditions and over 50 percent do not plan to reenlist.

Significant findings were also reported in the M60A1 Weapons Systems Training Effectiveness Analyses. In CONUS, 56 percent of the crewmen (44 percent in USAREUR) claimed that less than four men were usually assigned to their tank. When asked the question "In what areas do you feel your tank crew needs the most training?", 68 percent responded negatively, with many stressing the need to keep crews together longer, to fire more often, and to eliminate other distractions which result in crewmen not being present for training. Further, a need for additional repair parts and enhanced maintenance capability was expressed. The tone of these comments indicates that poor training may have a significant impact on motivation and morale while impacting adversely on a unit's ability to achieve training readiness. Other surveys were conducted in O5C/F and 63C; however, the sample size and the test validity do not allow reliable insights to be drawn. A pilot effort was also made in the Training Time Ratio Survey as a method to study training institution/unit training responsibilities. This sample is too small to have confidence in the results; however, the technique appears useful and necessary. Complete analysis of all TEA 78 test and survey results can be found in the TEA Summary volume.

CHAPTER II

PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS OF THE
ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM

Results of a survey conducted for the
Army Training Study

by

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This research report was prepared for the Army Training Study under contract #DAAG 29-76-D-0100. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent institutional positions of the Department of the Army or the University of Maryland. The effective research assistance of Michael P. Massagli and Richard C. Thompson and the thoughtful typing of Geraldine D. Todd are much appreciated.

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OVERVIEW

The Army Training Study Survey was developed to meet two objectives. The first was to learn the field army's current thinking about the training system; the second was to make a link over time with the groundbreaking Board for the Dynamic Training (BFDT) or Gorman Survey of 1971.

The questions which the study addressed concerned the attitudes found in the field on a variety of training issues: First, a series of questions focused on how well the ARTEP and the Soldier's Manual/SQT function as training devices, as standards for readiness, and as evaluation tools. A second series of questions dealt with the problem of training distractors, while a third set addressed innovative training developments such as gaming and simulation. A fourth set of survey questions requested opinions on the quality of present institutional and field training programs. The link with the Gorman Survey was made through the questions on training facilities and aids, training distractors, and innovation.

The target population to be surveyed consisted of those people the Study Group thought had the greatest influence, directly or indirectly, on the Army's training system in the field: the brigade commander and brigade S-3; the battalion commander, battalion S-3, and battalion operations sergeant; and the company commander, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leader. Based upon the O-6 command criterion a sample of 45 FORSCOM and USAREUR brigade-sized units was selected: 28 combat arms brigades, 12 combat support brigades, and 5 combat service support brigades. The questionnaires were mailed to sampled units during the last week of April 1978. Seventy-five percent of the respondents (n=521) had returned their

questionnaires by the third week of May. A breakdown of respondents by rank, type of unit, and theater location is presented in Table 1.

A number of different analyses were undertaken. They included univariate frequency distributions, cross-tabulations, and analyses of variance of various responses by rank, type of unit, and theater. Where applicable, findings were compared with the results of the BFDI Survey.

Analysis of the survey demonstrated a high degree of consistency in the perceptions of the Army's key trainers. They were positive in their evaluations of the present training system but not overwhelmingly so. For example, although only a few respondents thought that the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, EDRE, etc.) degrades unit readiness in the Army as a whole, only 27% saw the system as greatly improving readiness. In addition, only 23% saw the training system as greatly improving readiness in their own units. The survey results also show a moderately positive evaluation of the state of training and unit readiness. Overall, respondents evaluated their unit's current state of training readiness in tactics, weapons, support, maintenance, and communication between "good" and "fair" rather than as "very good."

The initial analysis plan (see Appendix B) called for an even more complex set of analyses than are reported here. Many of these analyses were not carried out. There are two fundamental reasons for this which, in themselves, tell us quite a lot about the way current Army training is being viewed by these respondents. The first is that there was, as mentioned above, considerable consensus on most issues, i.e., there was little statistical variance. This high level of consistency or consensus is quite unusual in survey research and resulted in part from respondents not using the more extreme response categories in the questionnaire. That is, they were unlikely to evaluate some

Table 1

Description of ARTS Respondents
Rank by Type of Unit by Theater

	CONUS						USAREUR						TOTAL	
	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	TOTAL	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS		CSS
O6	3	3	1	3	6	3	19	3	4	0	1	1	1	10
O5	9	3	2	12	12	12	50	5	8	0	5	2	3	23
O4	8	5	2	7	11	3	36	7	8	0	6	1	4	26
O1-O3	36	4	3	29	39	37	148	14	17	0	10	0	4	45
E7-E9	13	6	3	12	16	13	63	5	10	0	5	2	2	24
E5-E6	13	1	1	14	15	10	54	3	6	0	4	1	2	16
TOTAL	82	22	12	77	99	78	370	37	53	0	31	7	16	144

aspect of training or readiness as very adequate or very inadequate except where forced to rank order items.

The second reason is that even the differences detected could generally not be "explained" by expected sources of variation in attitudes such as the respondent's rank, type of unit, or theater of operation. More complex analyses, therefore, were either not statistically appropriate or were simply unnecessary. These kinds of findings reveal something very interesting about the way the target population viewed Army training. This will be discussed below after a general summary of some of the more interesting results of our analysis.

Analyses of obstacles to training reveal that even more than resource constraints such as money, fuel, or ammunition, post support requirements and command directed activities were ranked first and second, respectively, of 12 obstacles to both individual and collective training. What this means is that company commanders do not have troops available when they want to train. Written comments on the survey echoed this analysis: time to plan for training and to train properly as well as needed relief from higher headquarters interference were mentioned most often.

When asked how much time they spend weekly on certain kinds of activities and how much time they would like to spend, the respondents indicated that they would like to devote more time each week to all the training related items listed. They would like to spend slightly more time per week in reading other administrative literature and over two-thirds said they would like to spend much less time meeting post support requirements. In particular, the respondents most likely to want to spend more time reading administrative literature are the more junior officers and NCOs. In the area of

general planning for training and small unit training, junior officers (68%) and junior NCOs (55%) were most likely to say they would like to spend more time; for company size training it was primarily O-1 through O-3s (63%) and O-5s (65%) who wanted more time and for larger unit training it was O-4s (59%), O-5s (58%) O-6s (61%) who would most prefer to spend more time.

Junior trainers and senior trainers to some extent saw each other as the source of their problem. For example, junior officers and NCOs saw higher commands as interfering with and oversupervising training, providing conflicting and changing priorities, and overloading them with demands which prevented them from being able to plan and innovate in their training. Company grade officers and senior NCOs saw this as the most important of four possible factors that reduce innovation in training. On the other hand, senior officers are more likely to attribute these problems to the abilities of NCOs and junior officers, e.g., this was seen as the number one factor (among four reducing training innovation) among colonels and lieutenant colonels.

Those groups thought to be least innovative (NCOs and junior officers) by the higher leadership, themselves perceive higher frequencies of penalties and lower frequencies of reward for innovation in training than do higher ranking leadership groups. For example, only 7% of O-6s indicated that they were penalized at least some of the time for innovation in training, while 40% of E-5 to E-6s indicated they had been penalized. On the other hand, 67% of the O-6s responded that they had been rewarded at least some of the time for innovation compared to 33% among the junior NCO group.

The overall results also show that new technology, computer modeling, and simulation devices are perceived to have little value in the training areas. Through analysis of cross-tabulations, however, it was discovered

that the new technology is more highly accepted by those who have had experience with it while generally rejected by those who have no such experience. For example, of those with extensive experience, 86% saw gaming/simulation as more effective than a CPX and 32% saw it as more effective than an FTX. Of those with no experience, 53% saw gaming/simulation as more effective than a CPX and 24% more effective than an FTX. However, gaming/simulation is regarded as one of those items least important to successful completion of the unit's mission in actual combat, and there is no difference in this perception between those experienced and those with no experience. It appears that when individuals have had experience with gaming/simulation, they regard it as a more effective training tool than when they have not, but even with experience, they fail to regard it as being as effective as other forms of training in preparing for combat.

Another important finding was the desire for evaluations of unit effectiveness by someone outside the unit on an unscheduled basis (2nd of 5 possible methods), although the commander's evaluation was regarded as the most important method of evaluation (1st of 5 possible methods). In addition, the ARTEP was clearly seen as the best measure of 6 of training readiness with gaming and simulation as the least useful of 6.

When asked about turbulence as a "training" problem, the general response was that it was only a problem "to some extent" and it was listed as the sixth worst out of 12 obstacles to training. However, when asked about the importance of personnel turnover in determining a unit's performance, 86% said it was important and 98% said group solidarity was important to a unit's performance in combat. The respondents seem to view personnel turnover as only a moderate problem for training but a substantial problem for a unit's

subsequent performance.

In an analysis of the changes over time between the Army Training Study Survey and the Board for Dynamic Training Survey what stands out is that there has been little change since 1971. The areas the 1978 survey examined were the leader's perceptions of factors thought to affect training: distractors, turbulence, and availability of training support material. Results from a detailed breakdown of the respondents by rank, type of unit, and theater produced an important finding: there has been little perceived change in the training environment since 1971.

The detailed findings from which the above discussion has been drawn will be presented in the various sections which follow this general overview. Other areas which were examined but not reported in detail in the sections that follow concern the hypothesized change of the military from a "calling" to an "occupation" (see Questions 43A-43E in Appendix A) and the probability of the U.S. getting involved in different kinds of war in the next 10 years (see Questions 58A-58F in Appendix A). These questions had been expected to show systematic relationships with perceptions of various aspects of Army training - the former since they deal with a major hypothesized shift under All-Volunteer conditions and the latter since they assess the degree of threat perceived by the respondent and hence the necessity of training. Systematic analyses of these attitudes as independent variables showed essentially no relationship to perceptions and evaluations of training. Nevertheless, they are interesting in themselves since they show that respondents were evenly divided on whether most soldiers have always thought of their Army service primarily as a job rather than as a calling, and they mostly agreed that most soldiers today think of it as a job. There is also general agreement that

soldiers should not think of it in that way. Nevertheless, a slight majority thought that soldiers who think of their service as a job will still perform well in actual combat although there was general agreement that those who think of their service primarily as a calling will perform better in combat than those who think of it just as a job.

In terms of the perceived probability of war, respondents as a whole thought a full nuclear exchange in the next 10 years fairly unlikely and regarded a war using tactical nuclear weapons in addition to conventional forces or a large-scale conventional war as nearly as unlikely. They saw the U.S. somewhat likely to be involved in an armed conflict as a peacekeeping force. This possibility was seen as most likely; the two next most likely were a limited conventional war or a guerrilla war.

For the specifics of the above or of other overall findings reported here, the reader should refer to Appendix A which is an annotated codebook based on the original questionnaire and which presents the basic findings. They are presented either as frequency distributions (in percentages) for each response category to a question or as mean scores (arithmetic averages) which summarize the responses to the range of response categories.

As indicated above, the overall pattern of findings reveal generally favorable evaluations of the Army training system, the level of the respondent's unit training and overall unit effectiveness and readiness. The interpretation of these findings is not an automatic one. On one hand, it is possible that the respondents are complacent or satisfied with the performance both of their unit in terms of readiness or training and also with the Army's system of training and readiness as a whole. On the other hand, the lack of intensity in the results, i.e., they are not very satisfied or very favorable

in their evaluations of the system, may mean that they are expressing a considerable amount of ambivalence about the system. In other words, they think the training system does help them do what they should in developing their units, but it is not a superb tool - only an adequate one. Their units, likewise, are generally perceived to be ready but they are not ready at an optimal level; only at a satisfactory level.

In fact, it is surprising in some respects that the results are not strikingly positive, for reasons related to the nature of the target population sampled. First, junior enlisted personnel are totally missing from the survey, which was concerned with perceptions within the chain of command. Failures in the planning of training as perceived by a battalion S-3 may well be quite different in intensity or magnitude from the same failure as seen by junior enlisted personnel who sit through boring, disorganized, inadequate classes. Likewise, post support activities are a nuisance to the company commander with regard to smooth conduct of his small unit training; "ash and trash" more directly affects the day to day behavior of a PFC.

In addition, those with appropriate rank and experience who are most critical of the current system and the state of readiness are disproportionately likely to have left the service and as a result disproportionately unlikely to appear in the sample. Both of these factors - research design selection of those in supervisory or authority roles as opposed to those who are on the receiving end of the Army training system, and the self-selection of those more accepting of and committed to the existing system among the available respondents - might result in a built in "floor effect" to the responses, i.e., there might be a sampling bias against very negative responses to items. Thus, one might have hypothesized that a good training system effec-

tively resulting in unit readiness would have led to glowing or very positive evaluations. These cautious responses, therefore, may reflect considerable perception of problems with the training system as it actually operates.

This conclusion is bolstered by the open-ended responses (which were more critical than supportive). The comments volunteered by the respondents do not show an outright rejection of the system - instead they point to bureaucratic pathologies in how it actually operates, e.g., changing and inconsistent priorities from higher headquarters coupled with ongoing crisis management by suspense dates result from a system designed to provide innovation, overall coordination, and feedback. It appears that perhaps one of the largest problems of "turbulence" is in the demands made upon those who actually do the training rather than in personnel per se, although frequent changes in commanders and their staff result in their own kinds of personnel turbulence problems.

Thus, there are both elements of ambivalence (a good system but somehow in actual operation it does not do what it should but still it does not really hurt anything...) and complacency (the system may not always be great, but it does get the job done...) in the responses of the Army's trainers in the field.

FINDINGS

In the sections that follow, a series of topics will be addressed in greater detail than in the overview and the specific findings will be presented in tabular form. Each section will generally first examine the overall pattern of responses on the topically relevant questions. Further information on question wording, placement in the questionnaire in relationship to other questions, and specific response categories can be obtained from the codebook (Appendix A) which also contains the univariate percentage distributions or measures of central tendency.

After a discussion of the univariate findings, each section systematically looks at the effects of the respondent's rank, type of unit, and theater of assignment. The rank categories that will be used are: O-6, O-5, O-4, O-1 through O-3, E-7 through E-8, and E-5 through E-6. This last category contains a very few lower ranking enlisted personnel but the category label remains appropriate both empirically and conceptually. The sampling design excluded junior enlisted personnel unless they were serving in an appropriate duty position related to training.

The type of unit a respondent is serving in has been categorized as infantry (including mechanized infantry), armor, field artillery, air defense artillery combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). Respondents have also been divided for analysis purposes according to whether they serve in the CONUS or USAREUR theater. As indicated earlier in this report, other independent variables were found to have little explanatory power and those tables have not been presented in the analyses to follow.

Evaluation of the Current Training System

Direct indicators of the respondents' support of the current training system are not present in this survey. However, indirect indicators which assess the respondents' perceptions of the relationship between various modes of training and their effect on readiness and performance at several levels within the organization are reported.

Table 2 reports means and standard deviations on selected items that focus on the training system in general. Overall, there is no discernible difference in perceptions concerning the effect of the training system in the Army as a whole or in the individual's unit. The mean response in both areas indicates a feeling that the present system moderately affects readiness.

With respect to their satisfaction with the instruction they have received on small unit training, there is a good deal of variance and the mean reflects a good deal of ambivalence concerning this area. Differences in these items by theater are not significant.

Variation by type of unit indicates that respondents in support units are most likely to perceive the present system as having more negative effects on the Army as a whole and particularly in their units. They are also most frequently dissatisfied with the instructions they have received in small unit training. This finding is consistent with the results reported in the section on "open-ended" responses where individuals in CS and CSS units reported that the ARTEPs they receive infringe on their ability to perform routine daily tasks which they saw as being more akin to the tasks that would be required of them in combat situations.

Respondents were asked about the importance of a series of items to unit

Table 2

Effects of current training; total sample;
by theater; by type of unit; by rank
(refer to codebook, Appendix B, for response scales)

	<u>THEATER</u>			<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>						<u>RANK</u>					
	<u>TOTAL</u> <u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>USAREUR</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>CSS</u>	<u>O6</u>	<u>O5</u>	<u>O4</u>	<u>O3</u>	<u>E7-</u> <u>E9</u>	<u>E5-</u> <u>E6</u>
(V1) In your opinion... how does the present training system affect unit readiness in the Army as a whole?	\bar{x} SD	2.1 .92	2.1 .82	2.0 .91	1.9 .72	2.1 .94	2.2 1.1	2.1 .89	2.3 1.0	1.8 .79	2.2 1.0	2.0 .79	2.1 .82	1.4 1.2	2.0 .86
(V24) how does the present training system affect your unit readiness?	\bar{x} SD	2.1 .99	2.3 1.02	2.1 .88	2.0 .86	2.1 1.1	1.9 1.2	2.4 .98	2.5 1.0	1.9 1.1	2.2 .97	2.3 1.0	2.3 .93	2.1 1.0	2.4 1.0
(v32) how satisfied are you with the instructions you have received on how to train small units?	\bar{x} SD	3.2 1.2	3.1 1.2	3.3 1.2	3.6 1.2	3.3 1.2	3.0 1.2	2.8 1.5	3.0 1.3	3.8 1.1	3.4 1.2	3.1 1.3	3.1 1.2	3.3 1.2	3.0 1.3

success in actual combat. ARTEP and SM training were among these items. Table 3 reports the mean and standard deviation on these items for the overall sample.

In the table one can observe that SM training is peacetime and ARTEP training in peacetime rank 7th and 8th out of 12 and they are regarded as "fairly important." Gaming/simulation has a significantly lower mean and the rank order among these three items suggests an emphasis on individual soldier training.

In Table 4, we report differences on these three training modes by theater, type of unit and rank. The only significant difference by theater occurs with respect to ARTEP training. USAREUR respondents reported it to be more important, in their perception, to unit success in the combat situation than did respondents in CONUS.

Significant variation by type of unit is observed only for the SM and ARTEP items. In these cases ADA respondents gave them the highest ratings while the lowest were found among respondents in CS and CSS units. No significant pattern is discernible when rank is varied.

Overall, these results indicate that current training modes are neither disliked nor particularly liked. They do seem to be particularly lacking in meeting the needs of support units.

References in the above and subsequent texts to significant relationships refer to substantive significance in the differences observed. Tests of statistical significance are not appropriate given the non-random sampling design of this survey, and hence, levels of statistical significance have not been reported.

Table 3

"In actual combat, how important do you think the following are to a unit's successful accomplishment of its mission."

	\bar{x}	<u>SD</u>
NCO leadership	3.9	.45
Platoon or Company leadership	3.8	.49
The condition of unit equipment	3.8	.53
The condition of individual equipment	3.7	.57
Squad or platoon solidarity	3.6	.59
Battalion or brigade leadership	3.5	.68
SM training in peacetime	3.4	.69
ARTEP training in peacetime	3.2	.69
Patriotism	3.1	.76
Gaming/simulation in peacetime	2.6	.83
Hatred of the enemy	2.4	.83
Department of the Army Guidance	2.4	.92

(1) Very unimportant (2) Fairly unimportant (3) Fairly important (4) Very important

Table 4

In actual combat, how important do you think the following are to a unit's successful accomplishment of its mission...; by theater, type of unit and rank

	<u>THEATER</u>											<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>						<u>RANK</u>				
	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>USAREUR</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>CSS</u>	<u>O6</u>	<u>O5</u>	<u>O4</u>	<u>O3</u>	<u>O1-</u>	<u>E7-</u>	<u>E5-</u>							
SM training in peacetime	\bar{x}	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.8	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5							
	SD	.72	.59	.66	.70	.74	.45	.68	.68	.70	.57	.69	.83	.70								
ARTEP training in peacetime	\bar{x}	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.2	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.3								
	SD	.71	.63	.64	.67	.79	.64	.72	.87	.62	.56	.68	.79	.69								
Gaming/simulation in peacetime	\bar{x}	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.7	3.0								
	SD	.83	.81	.80	.74	.88	.81	.84	.86	.87	.70	.80	.77	.82								

(1) Very unimportant (2) Fairly unimportant (3) Fairly important (4) Very important

Perceptions of the Current State of Training and Training Readiness

ARTS respondents were asked to report on their units' current state of training in three areas: OJT, unit training and individual training. Mean ratings in these areas are reported in Table 5 for the overall sample and by theater, type of unit and rank of respondent. (Note: due to missing data and a very low number in the sample, respondents in ADA are omitted.)

Overall, units were assessed as achieving the best state of training in the unit, next best at the individual level and worst in OJT. The range was between good and fair. When theater differences are taken into account it is observed that respondents in USAREUR gave higher evaluations in all three areas than did the respondents in CONUS. Differences observed by type of unit are not consistent nor very large. With respect to OJT, respondents in CSS units had perceptions indicating that their current state of training in their units was slightly better than those in other types of units. In the area of unit training, both types of support units received mean ratings representing poorer states of training. With respect to individual training, those in Field Artillery and combat support rated their state of training most poorly.

Differences by rank also exhibit little consistency except that in all three areas O6 officers give the best evaluation of training while their subordinates tended to give increasingly worse ratings as rank decreases.

In this section findings concerning the perceptions of training readiness in specific mission related areas are reported. Table 6 shows mean responses to the question: "What is your unit's current state of training readiness in the following areas?" The areas are tactics, weapons, support, maintenance and communications. The overall rank order of these areas from best to worst

Table 5

The perceived state of training in three areas;
by theater; by type of unit; by rank

(Items 38A to 38C) What is your unit's current state of training in
the following areas?

<u>THEATER</u>	<u>OJT</u>		<u>UNIT</u>		<u>INDIVIDUAL</u>	
	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>
Overall	2.98	1.03	2.39	.87	2.67	.94
CONUS	3.00	1.02	2.43	.85	2.73	.94
USAREUR	2.92	1.06	2.28	.90	2.54	.96
<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>						
Infantry	3.00	.97	2.29	.84	2.46	.84
Armor	3.08	.97	2.30	.84	2.53	.98
Field Artillery	3.12	1.03	2.26	.79	2.79	.88
Combat Support	2.93	1.09	2.56	.93	2.80	1.00
Combat Service Support	2.69	1.05	2.51	.87	2.69	.96
<u>RANK</u>						
06	2.57	.86	1.97	.61	2.47	.68
05	3.03	1.04	2.18	.69	2.73	.92
04	3.28	.86	2.32	.78	2.66	.94
O1 to O3	3.07	.99	2.52	.85	2.76	.89
E7 to E9	2.80	1.07	2.29	.93	2.43	1.05
E5 to E6	2.79	1.17	2.58	1.05	2.79	1.06

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (4) Poor (5) Very poor

Table 6

Perceived state of training readiness in five areas;
by theater; by type of unit; by rank

(Items 37A to 37E) What is your unit's current state of training readiness in the following areas?

THEATER	TACTICS		WEAPONS		SUPPORT		MAINTENANCE		COMMUNICATIONS	
	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD
Overall	2.41	.99	2.24	.88	2.24	.92	2.35	1.07	2.51	1.03
CONUS	2.49	.99	2.24	.88	2.15	.90	2.35	1.04	2.47	.99
USAREUR	2.20	.96	2.25	.89	2.48	.94	2.36	1.10	2.62	1.11
<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>										
Infantry	1.95	.82	2.20	.87	2.41	.87	2.36	.93	2.48	1.05
Armor	2.07	.80	2.16	.86	2.55	.88	2.31	1.08	2.50	1.01
Field Artillery	2.27	.82	2.02	.75	2.50	.93	2.62	1.10	2.45	.94
Combat Support	2.77	1.06	2.42	.91	2.10	.76	2.35	.97	2.48	1.05
Combat Service Support	3.01	1.00	2.43	.96	1.55	.76	2.05	1.21	2.62	1.07
<u>RANK</u>										
O6	1.90	.84	2.27	.91	1.93	.74	1.90	.96	2.40	.72
O5	2.26	.88	2.16	.88	2.07	.71	2.26	1.08	2.51	.95
O4	2.08	.84	2.21	.63	2.23	.88	2.37	1.12	2.66	1.12
O1 to O3	2.61	1.02	2.35	.89	2.30	.89	2.36	1.06	2.51	1.03
E7 to E9	2.33	.91	2.01	.90	2.15	.96	2.40	1.03	2.40	1.14
E5 to E6	2.64	1.12	2.33	1.00	2.49	1.19	2.54	1.06	2.53	1.00

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (4) Poor (5) Very poor

is weapons and support, maintenance, tactics, and communications.

Differences are observed by theater but are not systematic. USAREUR respondents report better states of training readiness in tactics. Respondents stationed in CONUS report better states of readiness in support and communications. Mean responses in the areas of weapons and maintenance are virtually identical. In no case is any area rated better than good.

Differences by type of unit are observed and seem to relate to major mission areas of the units. For example, the worst ratings in tactics and weapons readiness are observed in the support units. On the other hand, the best ratings in support and maintenance are observed in support units. No such pattern exists in the area of communications. These observations suggest that although the general state of training is considered to be mediocre, the units see themselves as striving for and achieving a greater degree of readiness in their mission areas.

Differences by rank tend to follow the pattern observed earlier, i.e., the highest ranking officers perceive conditions related to training readiness to be better than their subordinates. We might note at this juncture that this phenomena may reflect an inherent problem in the Army's feedback system as in the feedback systems of many other organizations which have bureaucratic elements of evaluation, testing and reporting. In many large scale organizations, that problem is associated with the consequences of reporting negative findings to superiors. Rather than make such reports many subordinates will report "what my boss wants to hear" thus allowing the subordinate to avoid sanctions and creating a false sense of complacency among the ranking superior. This process may also be reflected in these findings.

The final topic addressed in this section of the report concerns perceptions of the ARTEP as a readiness test, the level at which units are training to ARTEPS

and the percent of combat-ready proficiency the unit is able to maintain. The consistency in the percentage of tasks related to each of these items is remarkable. The data is presented in Table 7 for the overall sample, and is broken down by theater, type of unit and rank of respondent. Direct comparability across items does not exist because of the variety of response scales employed; however, in general terms, it appears that ARTS respondents believe that a figure of 70-75% is an appropriate figure for the percent of ARTEP events passed to be equivalent to C1, as the percent of ARTEP tasks they are training to and that proportion is also the percentage of combat-ready proficiency that they believe their units are able to maintain. These percentages are perceived to be somewhat higher in USAREUR than in CONUS. Respondents in infantry and armor units are also slightly higher in their ratings than are respondents in other types of units. Finally, the higher ranking officers also tend to perceive that these percentages are higher than do those in the lower ranks.

It appears, then, that if ARTEPs were used as readiness tests employing the standards of these respondents, all units would pass at C1 given their reported levels of training and readiness.

Perceptions of the Need for Evaluation and the Use of Current Training Guides in Evaluation

ARTS respondents were asked whether or not they thought a measure of training readiness was necessary in addition to a Commander's judgement in order to support requests for training resources. The respondents were divided on this question with 8.2% saying such a measure is not necessary at all, 29.2% saying such a measure is somewhat necessary, and 37.4 % saying such a measure

Table 7

The ARTEP as a measure of training readiness, percent of training to ARTEP and percent combat proficiency; by theater; by type of unit; by rank

THEATER	(Item 7) If ARTEP were to be used as a readiness test, what percentage of events passed would equal CI in training? a/		(Item 26) What percentage of your ARTEP tasks is your unit training to? b/		(Item 55) What percentage of combat ready proficiency is your unit able to maintain? c/	
	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD	\bar{x}	SD
Overall	7.50	1.87	1.85	.97	3.91	1.30
CONUS	7.44	1.89	1.90	.98	3.99	1.32
USAREUR	7.65	1.82	1.69	.92	3.70	1.20
TYPE OF UNIT						
Infantry	7.61	1.57	1.71	.75	3.75	1.18
Armor	7.74	1.70	1.70	.90	3.91	1.21
Field Artillery	7.51	1.82	1.82	.88	3.95	1.14
Combat Support	7.58	1.86	1.86	1.00	3.83	1.41
Combat Service Support	7.27	2.13	2.13	1.24	4.03	1.44
RANK						
O6	7.90	1.26	1.45	.69	3.37	1.10
O5	7.72	1.70	1.60	.67	3.76	1.12
O4	7.56	1.99	1.58	.56	3.95	1.15
O1 to O3	7.85	1.64	1.92	1.02	3.98	1.29
E7 to E9	6.83	2.28	1.92	.99	3.88	1.49
E5 to E6	6.80	1.89	2.22	1.24	4.10	1.38

a/ (0) 0% thru (10) 100%

b/ (1) 100% (2) 75% (3) 50% (4) 25% (5) less than 25%

c/ (1) 100% thru (11) 0%

is very necessary. No significant differences are observed when the respondents are analyzed by theater, type of unit or rank.

Respondents were asked for opinions concerning several current practices and guidelines and their usefulness as measures of unit effectiveness, training readiness and training strengths, weaknesses and readiness conditions. In Table 8, mean responses for theater, type of unit and rank are given for five areas subsumed under the general question: "To what extent is each of the following an effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness?"

From the overall responses, we observe that the unit commander's evaluation is rated as being the most effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness ($\bar{x} = 3.6$), followed by unscheduled evaluations ($\bar{x} = 3.3$), and quarterly external evaluation ($\bar{x} = 3.0$), the focused IG ($\bar{x} = 2.9$), and scheduled evaluations ($\bar{x} = 2.8$). When these responses were analyzed according to responses to the previous question (the need for a measure of training readiness) it was found that those favoring a measure gave more favorable ratings to the effectiveness of each of the measures in Table 8 and Table 9. Effects of theater and type of unit were not observed, except that those in combat support units consistently gave lower than average ratings to all methods of evaluation presented in Table 8.

Significant effects were noted when responses were analyzed by rank of respondent. No significant differences are observed for the method of quarterly external evaluation, but in the remaining four areas it appears that, generally, higher ranking officers' (O-4 through O-6) opinions are significantly different from those of junior officers (O-1 through O-3) and NCOs. The latter group gives a lower rating to the extent of effectiveness of the unit commanders' evaluation than do the higher ranking officers and rate the remaining

Table 8

Mean scores for theater, rank and type of Unit
on items concerning effective ways of evaluation of unit effectiveness

To what extent is each of the following an effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness,
in your opinion?

	<u>THEATER</u>	<u>RANK</u>						<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>						
		<u>CONUS</u>	<u>USAREUR</u>	<u>06</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>03</u>	<u>E7- E9</u>	<u>E5- E6</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>CS</u>
Quarterly external evaluation	3.0	3.0	3.3	2.9	2.8	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.0	3.1	3.2	2.9	3.0	2.8
Scheduled evaluation from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	2.6	2.8	2.6
An IC focused on training proficiency	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.8	3.1	2.8	3.0	2.8
Unit Commander's evaluation	3.5	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.7	3.5	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.5
Unscheduled evaluations from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	3.3	3.2	3.2	2.9	2.6	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.2

(1) To a very little extent (2) To a little extent (3) To some extent (4) To a great extent (5) To a very great extent

Table 9

Mean scores assigned to various measures of training readiness by theater, rank and type of unit

(Item 3) In your opinion, how good a measure of training readiness is:

	<u>THEATER</u>						<u>RANK</u>						<u>TYPE OF UNIT</u>					
	<u>CONUS</u>	<u>USAREUR</u>	<u>06</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>03</u>	<u>01-</u>	<u>E7-</u>	<u>E5-</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>CSS</u>			
\bar{x}	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.7			
The number of days training required to be fully combat ready as estimated by the Commander	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.7			
The Commander's general judgement	2.3	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3			
SQT results	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.6			
ARTEP results	2.0	2.1	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.2			
REALTRAIN results	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.5	2.7	2.5	2.8			
Gaming/Simulation (CAMMS/CATTS) results	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.0	2.9	3.0			

(1) Very good (2) Good (3) Fair (4) Poor (5) Very poor

three areas (scheduled evaluations, unscheduled evaluations and the IG focused on proficiency) as more effective than the O-4 through O-6 officers tended to rate them. This finding again marks another area in which these two groups differ in their perceptions concerning unit requirements. (See sections on frequency of and innovation in training.)

A related set of questions concerned the adequacy of six measures/estimates as measures of training readiness. Table 9 summarizes the mean responses to this series of questions. Respondents rated ARTEP as the best measure of training readiness and gaming/simulation results as the poorest. The rank-order of the other measures from best to worst is commanders' general judgement, REALTRAIN results and the commanders' judgement concerning the number of days training required to be fully combat ready, and finally SQT results. No significant differences were observed by theater or type of unit, but significant differences in three areas were observed when respondents were analyzed by rank. ARTEP results were rated as good ($\bar{x} = 1.6$) by O-6 officers but as rank decreases, the feeling concerning the adequacy of this measure also declines, receiving its lowest evaluation among the enlisted personnel, E-5, E-6 and E-7 through E-9 ($\bar{x} = 2.1$). This pattern is reversed however for REALTRAIN results and gaming/simulation results with higher grade officers rating both of these measures as poor relative to the opinions of junior officers and NCOs. It may be that the "realness" of these latter tests is attractive to individuals who must normally restrict their activity to drill, instruction, and post support.

The remainder of this portion of the analysis focuses on a closer examination of the ARTEP, which received the most favorable rating as a measure of training readiness. In response to the question: "Successful completion of

ARTEP is a valid test of unit training readiness," 15% strongly agreed, 55.5% agreed, 11.5% disagreed, 2.9% strongly disagreed and 15.2% were neutral or undecided. No significant variation from this occurs by theater, type of unit or rank, and as noted in the previous sections those who favor a measure of readiness in addition to the commanders' judgement were more likely to respond positively regarding ARTEP.

The above results are somewhat surprising in light of the data we are about to present. Respondents were asked: "How effective is the ARTEP in determining (a) training strengths (b) training weaknesses and (c) readiness conditions?" Table 10 presents the mean overall responses and standard deviations.

Our confusion begins when we observe that the effectiveness of ARTEP in determining readiness conditions receives the most negative rating (somewhere between somewhat effective and not very effective). It seems that there is most consensus that ARTEP is an effective measure of training weaknesses slightly more so than it is of training strengths. If readiness conditions derived from the ARTEP are reflectors of training weaknesses, rather than strengths, then this could explain the low rating of its effectiveness in determining readiness. Further elaboration of this problem is required. It may be noted that for all three items found in Table 10 there is a significant direct relationship between the respondent's agreement with the statement "successful completion of ARTEP is a valid test of unit training readiness" and the degree to which the ARTEP is seen as useful in determining strengths, weaknesses and readiness conditions. Table 11 displays the mean response on each of these items by type of unit and rank.

Table 11 indicates little significance with respect to and variation in ratings by type of unit, with the exception that combat service support

Table 10

Means and standard deviations
assigned to the effectiveness of ARTEP
in determining training conditions

(Item 11): How effective is the ARTEP in determining:

	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>
Training strengths	1.7	.71
Training weaknesses	1.6	.70
Readiness conditions	2.1	.80

(1) Very effective (2) Somewhat effective (3) Not very effective (4) Not effective at all

Table 11

Mean scores assigned to the effectiveness of ARTEP
by rank and type of unit

How effective is the ARTEP in determining:

	<u>Rank</u>						<u>Type of Unit</u>					
	<u>O6</u>	<u>O5</u>	<u>O4</u>	<u>O1- O3</u>	<u>E7- E9</u>	<u>E5- E6</u>	<u>INF</u>	<u>ARM</u>	<u>FA</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>CS</u>	<u>CSS</u>
Training strengths	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.6	2.0	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.7	2.0
Training weaknesses	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.7
Readiness Conditions	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.2

(1) Very effective (2) Somewhat effective (3) Not very effective (4) Not effective at all

personnel see the ARTEP as a substantially less effective measure of training strengths (see section on "open-ended" responses). By rank, we observe a "top to bottom" progression in perceived ineffectiveness of the ARTEP as any kind of measure, with the exception of those in E-7 through E-9. Their ratings rank close to those in the higher officer ranks and may thus reflect some interplay of experience with ARTEP as opposed to past training programs and methods of evaluation. In response to the statement "Unit reporting procedures should be changed to make the training ratings more objective (less a matter of the commander's judgement)", 11.4% disagree, 39.7% agree, 20.4% are undecided or neutral, 18.3% disagree and 6.6% strongly disagree. When this variable is analyzed by theater, type of unit and rank, significant group differences are observed only by rank. The mean responses by rank are shown in Table 12.

From Table 12 we see that O-6 officers were less likely to agree with the statement but were also one of the most heterogeneous of the groups in their responses. It is interesting to note that those ranks most distant from "the commander's judgement" (the NCOs) are most likely to favor a change toward objectivity and, further, those groups are the most homogeneous in their opinion.

All of this may ultimately suggest that considerations of more objective and better measurement of the training product are important to the Army's trainers, since those programs and training guides, as well as those methods of evaluation, which are perceived as objective and positive are evaluated as the most effective measures in training effectiveness and readiness.

Table 12

Mean scores and standard deviations on an item concerning making unit readiness reporting more objective by rank

(Item 10) Unit readiness reporting procedures should be changed to make the training rating (C-1 to C-4) more objective (less a matter of the Commander's judgment):

<u>Rank</u>	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>
06	3.3	1.3
05	3.3	1.1
04	2.9	1.3
01-03	2.5	1.1
E7-E9	2.2	.9
E5-E6	2.2	.8
Overall	2.6	1.1

(1) Strongly agree (2) Agree (3) Neutral (4) Disagree (5) Strongly disagree

Evaluations of Needed Frequency of Training

Respondents' opinions were asked on four items concerning the frequency with which certain tasks must be practiced to insure successful completion. Two of these items referred to individual training and two referred to company size unit training. Table 13 contains the overall response to these items. Table 13 shows that for both types of activities over 50% of the respondents feel that these should be practiced at least monthly. The table also demonstrates that it is felt that individual skills should be practiced on a much more frequent basis. Significant differences in the patterns of response may be observed when theater, type of unit, and rank vary.

Analysis of these items by theaters shows significant differences between CONUS and USAREUR with respect to the individual tasks, but not the unit level operations. Table 14 depicts these differences for the individual tasks. Emphasis on weekly performance of these kinds of individual training is much greater (by approximately 20%) among respondents in USAREUR than those in CONUS.

Differing perceptions regarding the necessary frequency of both the individual and collective tasks were found by type of unit. In general, those in combat specialties are more likely to see frequent practice of these essentially combat related tasks as necessary than are those in combat support or combat service support specialties. Table 15 displays this relationship.

Significant differences of opinion regarding the required frequency of practice were observed by rank on one item from each category (see Table 16). This set of observations finds the higher ranking officers more likely to favor more frequent exercises than lower ranking officers and enlisted. It may be added that this general pattern held for the other two items not included in Table 16, but the differences were less marked.

Table 13

Needed frequency of training exercises

	<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	<u>Once Every Six Months</u>	<u>Once a Year</u>	<u>Less Than Once a Year</u>
(Item 49): How often must soldiers practice to insure that they can put on their protective masks within nine seconds of a surprise attack?	2.7	27.6	52.3	13.6	3.1	.6
(Item 52): How often must soldiers train to insure they can correctly identify enemy vehicles, weapons, or aircraft to receive a "go" on an SQT test?	3.9	32.1	49.0	13.4	1.0	.6
(Item 50): How often must a company size unit practice deliberate attack in order to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?	.4	6.1	45.3	38.8	7.3	2.0
(Item 51): How often must a company size unit practice a night occupation of an assembly area to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?	.0	5.0	57.5	32.3	3.6	1.6

Table 14

Needed Frequency of individual practice by theater

	<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	<u>Once Every Six Months</u>	<u>Once a Year</u>	<u>Less Than Once a Year</u>
(Item 49): Practice putting on protective masks.						
CONUS (n=372)	1.9	21.8	54.3	17.2	4.3	0.5
USAREUR (n=142)	4.9	43.0	47.2	4.2	0.0	0.7
(Item 52): Practice enemy identification.						
CONUS	3.3	27.5	51.0	16.3	1.1	0.8
USAREUR	5.7	44.0	44.0	5.7	0.7	0.0

Table 15

Needed frequency of training exercises by type of unit

<u>(Item 49): Practice putting on protective masks.</u>	<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	<u>Once Every Six Months</u>	<u>Once a Year</u>	<u>Less Than Once a Year</u>
Infantry	5.1	25.4	55.5	11.9	1.7	.8
Armor	2.7	44.0	49.3	4.0	.0	.0
Field Artillery	2.8	34.9	55.5	5.7	.9	.0
Air Defense Artillery	8.3	25.0	50.0	16.7	.0	.0
Combat Support	1.9	19.8	50.0	22.6	4.7	.9
Combat Service Support	.0	17.6	49.5	23.1	8.8	1.1
<u>(Item 52): Practice enemy identification.</u>						
Infantry	.8	35.3	54.6	8.4	.8	.0
Armor	4.0	46.7	45.3	4.0	.0	.0
Field Artillery	4.7	40.6	44.3	10.4	.0	.0
Air Defense Artillery	.0	45.5	54.5	.0	.0	.0
Combat Support	3.0	18.8	52.5	22.8	2.0	1.0
Combat Service Support	7.8	21.1	44.4	23.3	1.1	2.2
<u>(Item 50): Practice deliberate attack.</u>						
Infantry	.0	4.4	45.1	44.2	5.3	.9
Armor	.0	2.7	41.3	49.3	6.7	.0
Field Artillery	.0	13.0	65.0	19.0	2.0	1.0
Air Defense Artillery	.0	.0	36.4	54.5	9.1	.0
Combat Support	1.0	5.2	34.4	42.7	12.5	4.2
Combat Service Support	1.1	4.5	39.3	40.4	11.2	3.4
<u>(Item 51): Practice night occupation.</u>						
Infantry	.0	1.7	56.0	39.7	1.7	.9
Armor	.0	.0	68.9	29.7	.0	1.4
Field Artillery	.0	13.5	74.0	11.5	1.0	.0
Air Defense Artillery	.0	9.1	81.8	9.1	.0	.0
Combat Support	.0	2.0	49.5	38.4	8.1	2.0
Combat Service Support	.0	5.5	37.4	45.1	7.7	4.4

Table 16

Needed frequency of training exercises by rank

	<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>	Once Every Six Months	Once a Year	Less Than Once a Year
<u>(Item 49): Practice putting on protective mask.</u>						
06	3.3	36.7	53.3	6.7	.0	.0
05	5.6	29.2	52.8	11.1	1.4	.0
04	.0	47.5	44.3	4.9	3.3	.0
O1 to O3	3.6	26.8	52.6	13.9	2.6	.5
E7 to E9	.0	24.1	54.0	17.2	3.4	1.1
E5 to E6	2.9	11.4	55.7	21.4	7.1	1.4
 <u>(Item 50): Practice deliberate attack.</u>						
06	3.7	3.7	37.0	55.6	.0	.0
05	.0	3.0	54.5	39.4	3.0	.0
04	.0	6.5	48.4	37.1	4.8	3.2
O1 to O3	.5	8.1	48.9	34.9	4.8	2.7
E7 to E9	.0	6.1	36.6	42.7	12.2	2.4
E5 to E6	.0	4.5	37.3	38.8	17.9	1.5

Perceptions and Preferences Concerning Allocation of Respondents' Time

We now ask whether or not such opinions regarding the frequency of training required for individual and unit effectiveness are related to the levels of personal commitment to training. Respondents were asked to report (a) how much time per week is personally devoted to ... and (b) how much time per week they would like to personally devote to ... each of seven duty requirements. Five of these are training related, two are not. Table 17 lists the overall response for the set of items. Respondents felt they would like to devote more time each week on all the training related items. They would like to spend only slightly more time per week in reading other administrative literature and would apparently like to spend much less time meeting post support requirements.

In Table 18, these responses are broken down by theater, type of unit and rank. The table gives the percent who would spend more time if they could, the same amount of time as now, and less time than now, for each of seven items.

Differences by theater are not large. Among the notable exceptions are that we find that respondents in CONUS are slightly more likely to indicate that they would like to spend more time reading nontraining related administrative literature. Post support requirements are apparently equally unpopular in both theaters and both groups would like to spend more time in all the training related areas. The only significant differences on these items find a larger percentage of respondents from USAREUR wanting to spend more time on small unit and company size training than in CONUS. This is generally consistent with the finding from Table 2, that respondents in USAREUR are more likely to respond that training on individual tasks should be more frequent.

Several patterns emerge from analysis of these items by rank. First, the

Table 17

Average time spent personally (per week)
on various facets of training

	<u>This is how it is now</u>	<u>This is how I'd like it</u>
(Items 36A-B): Reading training support materials	1.9	2.8
(Items 36C-D): Reading all admin. material except training support materials	2.2	2.3
(Items 36E-F): Planning for training	2.6	3.3
(Items 36G-H): Meeting post support requirements	2.9	1.6
(Items 36I-J): Performing small unit training	2.1	3.1
(Items 36K-L): Performing company size unit training	2.2	3.1
(Items 36 M-N): Performing large unit training	1.9	2.8

(1) less than one hour (2) 1 to 2 hours (3) 3 to 5 hours
(4) more than 5 hours

Table 18

Time respondents would like to spend personally (per week) percentages by theater, rank, type of unit

	RANK										TYPE OF UNIT								
	THEATER		01-		E7-		E5-		INF		ARM		FA		ADA		CS		CSS
	CONSU	USAREUR	06	05	04	03	E9	E6	INF	ARM	FA	ADA	CS	CSS					
Reading training support materials	66.0	67.0	60.0	65.8	62.3	70.0	61.9	67.7	64.8	67.7	62.7	83.4	67.5	67.8					
More	31.6	28.7	40.0	32.8	34.5	27.3	33.3	27.8	31.6	26.7	36.3	16.6	29.5	30.0					
Same	2.4	4.3	.0	1.4	3.2	2.7	4.8	4.5	3.6	5.6	1.0	.0	3.0	2.2					
Less																			
Reading all admin. lit. except training support	41.1	30.4	16.6	28.8	27.3	42.3	44.1	49.2	34.9	24.6	41.3	33.3	45.6	39.9					
More	37.1	38.4	33.4	31.4	45.1	34.0	44.0	40.0	30.7	42.4	35.6	41.6	42.7	37.8					
Same	21.8	31.2	50.0	39.8	27.6	23.7	11.9	10.8	34.4	33.0	23.1	24.9	11.7	22.3					
Less																			
Planning for training	52.2	55.5	34.6	56.3	46.0	55.0	54.3	57.0	49.1	54.2	45.2	75.0	59.3	55.5					
More	43.4	41.7	62.0	38.1	54.0	41.8	39.7	36.9	43.8	44.4	50.9	25.0	37.8	40.1					
Same	4.4	2.8	3.4	5.6	.0	3.2	6.0	6.1	7.1	1.4	3.9	.0	2.9	4.4					
Less																			
Meeting post support requirements	5.9	.7	.0	2.8	.0	3.1	6.0	13.5	3.5	1.4	4.0	.0	6.9	6.6					
More	23.6	33.3	37.8	23.9	22.9	22.7	27.5	36.4	20.6	26.4	26.5	16.6	32.3	27.5					
Same	70.6	66.0	62.2	73.3	77.1	74.2	66.5	50.1	75.9	72.2	69.5	83.4	60.8	65.9					
Less																			
Performing small unit training	53.2	63.6	40.7	54.0	39.6	67.6	48.8	55.4	60.1	61.8	47.5	58.4	54.0	60.5					
More	45.0	35.0	59.3	43.0	60.4	31.4	51.2	40.0	37.2	38.2	50.5	41.6	46.0	37.1					
Same	1.8	.8	.0	3.0	.0	1.0	.0	4.6	2.7	.0	2.0	.0	.0	2.4					
Less																			
Performing company size unit training	52.2	62.6	37.1	64.6	55.2	63.1	45.2	42.0	55.9	68.6	49.0	33.3	51.5	57.0					
More	42.6	33.6	62.9	32.4	43.1	32.7	49.9	65.4	34.0	26.9	50.0	67.7	43.7	39.5					
Same	5.2	3.8	.0	3.0	1.7	4.2	4.9	12.6	10.1	4.5	1.0	.0	4.8	3.5					
Less																			
Performing large unit training	46.5	51.4	60.7	58.2	59.1	45.3	44.0	33.9	46.5	57.2	50.6	41.3	49.5	41.1					
More	46.7	44.9	39.3	39.0	39.3	48.2	47.6	55.4	42.1	38.6	47.4	33.3	47.5	54.5					
Same	6.8	3.7	.0	2.8	1.6	6.5	8.4	10.7	11.4	4.2	2.0	25.0	3.0	4.4					
Less																			

respondents most likely to want to spend more time reading literature, whether for training support or administration are the more junior officers and enlisted men. Officers at the O-6 level and enlisted E-7 through E-9 were less likely to want to spend more time reading. This finding may make more sense if we remember that respondents in these categories are likely to have the most experience as well as the largest administrative burden. Second, post support is apparently distasteful at all levels, but least so among the E-5 through E-6 group. Even so, 50% indicated they would like to spend less time in this area. Related to this finding is a third, namely that a relation seems to exist between the level of training specified in each of the items and rank. Individuals appear to have responded that they would like to spend more time in an area when it is apparent that that level of training is most likely to be a particular area of responsibility for persons at that grade level. Thus, in the area of general planning for training and small unit training, junior officers (O-1 through O-3) and enlisted personnel (E-5 through E-6, E-7 through E-9) were most likely to say they would like to spend more time.

For company size unit training O-5, O-4 and O-1 to O-3 officers were most likely to want to spend more time in this area, and for large unit training O-4 to O-6 officer grades were significantly more likely to want to spend more time in this area than were junior officers and enlisted personnel. No discernible patterns of significant differences were observed by type of unit on these items.

Perceptions of Factors that Reduce Individual Innovation in Army Training

Individuals were asked to note the extent to which four factors reduced innovation in training. These four factors were (1) negative reactions from higher level inspectors who noted deviations from training guidance (2) over-

whelming amounts of subject matter to be presented (3) the lack of initiative and imagination on the part of NCOs and junior officers involved in training and (4) lack of trainer awareness of their freedom to be innovative.

Table 19 presents the mean rating and standard deviation in each of these areas for the overall sample. Higher means reflect that a factor is perceived as a greater obstacle to innovation. While all factors assessed are viewed as reducing innovation to at least some extent, the gross opinion indicates that negative evaluations from higher levels are the most detrimental among these four. Individual abilities to present the amount of material required and to do it in an innovative fashion are seen as next most troublesome and the level of knowledge about the permissibility of innovation is rated least problematic.

No significant differences in the rating of these four factors were found when theater and type of unit were held constant. Significant differences are observed among different grade levels. (See Table 20). From Table 20 it can be seen that opinion on the effects of these four factors varies as a function of rank in the organization. In general, personnel lower in the hierarchy attribute problems to the amount of material and to the pressures from higher in the chain of command, while more senior personnel attribute the problem to the abilities of company-level trainers. This split is also representative of a cleavage in training roles and may speak to difficulties in relations between training planners and those charged with implementing such plans. This point is elaborated below.

Respondents were asked to indicate (1) how often they had been penalized for initiating new or different training methods and (2) how often they had been rewarded for initiating new or different training methods. The overall pattern of responses is shown in Table 21. While approximately 75% of the

Table 19

(Item 19): In your opinion to what extent does each of the following reduce innovation in small unit training?

	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>
(1) Inspectors from higher levels of command note deviation from training guidance and react negatively	3.3	1.2
(2) Too much subject matter must be presented in a limited amount of time. It is impossible to accomplish anything other than what is prescribed	3.1	1.1
(3) Many NCOs and junior officers who present training are not used to thinking for themselves, thus they do not develop innovative techniques	3.0	1.1
(4) Trainers and commanders are unaware that they may take new approaches and use "novel" techniques in training	2.8	1.1

(1) Very little extent (2) Little extent (3) Some extent (4) Great extent
 (5) Very great extent

Table 20

Mean rating of factors reducing innovation; by rank

(Item 18): In your opinion to what extent does each of the following reduce innovation in small unit training?

	<u>RANK</u>					
	<u>06</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>01-03</u>	<u>E7-E9</u>	<u>E5-E6</u>
(1) Inspectors from higher levels of command note deviation from training guidance and react negatively.	2.8	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.3	3.1
(2) Too much subject matter must be presented in a limited amount of time. It is impossible to accomplish anything other than what is prescribed.	2.6	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.3	3.3
(3) Many NCOs and junior officers who present training are not used to thinking for themselves, thus they do not develop innovative techniques.	3.1	3.3	3.0	2.7	3.2	2.9
(4) Trainers and commanders are unaware that they may take new approaches and use "novel" techniques in training.	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.6	3.0	2.9

(1) Very little extent (2) little extent (3) some extent (4) great extent
 (5) Very great extent

Table 21

Percent distributions on those items concerning
feedback for training innovations

	<u>All of the time</u>	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Never</u>
(Item 30A): How often have you been penalized for initiating new or different training methods?	.6	3.9	20.6	25.4	49.5
(Item 31): How often have you been rewarded for initiating new or different training methods?	5.3	19.3	30.2	24.5	20.6

Table 22

Percentage distribution on penalty item
by theater

	<u>All of the time</u>	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Never</u>
(Item 30A): How often have you been penalized for training innovation?					
CONUS	.6	4.8	22.5	27.5	44.6
USAFENTR	.2	1.5	16.0	19.8	61.5

respondents reported that they seldom or never received penalties for introducing training innovations, 45% report that they seldom or never are rewarded for such innovation. Significant differences were not found among types of unit, but theater differences may be observed regarding penalties and rank differences are observed for both penalties and rewards. (See Tables 22, 23, and 24.)

Other indicators necessary to account for the observed variation in perceived penalties are not present in this survey, therefore no interpretation can be offered at this point for the observed pattern of responses in Table 22 which shows somewhat higher perceptions of penalization in CONUS.

As can be seen from Table 5, penalties, as would be expected, are perceived to occur more frequently among those lower in the hierarchy of rank. We can also ask whether or not perceived punishment is at least balanced by a reasonable expectancy of reward. Table 24 shows that in the officer categories O-4 to O-6 about 70% of the respondents report being rewarded at least some of the time, while in the lower officer ranks (O-1 to O-3) and upper enlisted (E-7 to E-9) about 50% report they are seldom or never rewarded, and nearly 70% of E-5 to E-6 enlisted personnel report they are seldom or never rewarded.

In conclusion, differences concerning opinion about factors reducing innovation have been shown and it has been noted that the higher and lower leadership opinions are divergent. Further it appears that those groups thought to be least innovative (NCOs and junior officers) by the higher leadership themselves perceive higher frequencies of penalties for such innovation coupled with lower frequencies of reward than do the higher ranking leadership groups.

Table 23

Percentage distribution for each rank
on the penalty item

(Item 30A): How often have you been penalized for training innovation?

<u>Rank</u>	<u>All of the time</u>	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Never</u>
O6	0.0	0.0	6.7	16.7	76.7
O5	1.4	1.4	7.1	25.7	64.3
O4	0.0	3.6	7.1	23.2	66.1
O1 - O3	0.6	4.4	26.5	28.2	40.3
E7 - E9	0.0	1.4	30.0	24.3	44.3
E5 - E6	1.8	10.5	28.1	24.6	35.1

Table 24

Percentage distribution for each rank
on the reward item

(Item 31): How often have you been rewarded for training innovation?

<u>Rank</u>	<u>All of the time</u>	<u>Most of the time</u>	<u>Some of the time</u>	<u>Seldom</u>	<u>Never</u>
O6	6.7	50.0	10.0	26.7	6.7
O5	10.1	30.4	29.0	23.2	7.2
O4	3.3	25.0	36.7	21.7	13.3
O1 - O3	3.7	16.6	32.6	27.3	19.8
E7 - E9	6.2	12.3	32.1	18.5	30.9
E5 - E6	5.2	3.4	24.1	27.6	39.6

Perceptions of the Utility of Gaming/Simulation

Before analyzing attitudes toward the utility of gaming/simulation we sought to establish the experience level of the respondents in the ARTS sample with respect to this training aid. In response to the question "What experience have you had with the use of gaming/simulation (CATTs, CAMMS, BATTLE, DUNN-KEMPF, etc.)?", 34.8% said they had no experience, 14.7% said they had heard or read about them 12.8% had seen them used, 33.3% had some experience as player or controller and 4.4% had extensive experience as player or controller. With roughly three experience levels significantly represented in the sample (none, limited, some), this question becomes a useful control variable.

Respondents were asked to compare the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation with the traditional training of Command Post Exercises and Field Training Exercises. Table 25 contains the distribution of the overall sample on these two questions. From Table 25 we see that a large portion of the sample (40%) felt they did not know enough about gaming/simulation to give an opinion. Of those who did express a sentiment, gaming/simulation was deemed most effective when compared to Command Post Exercises where approximately 30% found it somewhat or much more effective than CPX. Only 10% could say the same when comparing gaming/simulation to FTX.

If we now control for the respondent's experience, we find that experience with gaming/simulation can account for this overall finding. Tables 26 and 27 contain the cross classification of the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation compared to CPX and FTX with the respondent's experience with gaming/simulation.

Table 25

Training effectiveness of Gaming/Simulation
compared to CPX and FTX

	<u>CPX. %</u>	<u>FTX %</u>
(1) Gaming/Simulation is much more effective	10.9	3.2
(2) Gaming/Simulation is somewhat more effective	20.0	7.0
(3) Gaming/Simulation is equally effective	10.7	8.3
(4) Gaming/Simulation is somewhat less effective	11.5	17.9
(5) Gaming/Simulation is much less effective	4.3	24.7
(6) I don't know	42.7	39.0

In Table 26 it may be observed that those with at least some experience as player or controller rate gaming/simulation as more effective than CPX than do those with no experience. Those with little experience rate gaming/simulation less favorably when compared to CPX but, even here, those who have seen it are more likely to rate it as more effective (than CPX) than are those who have only read or heard about it.

Experience plays a different role when comparing gaming/simulation to FTX (see Table 27). In this case even those individuals with extensive experience with gaming/simulation rate it as less or much less effective than training through field training exercises.

No theater differences are observed on these two items, yet we regard this finding as tentative due to the small number of cases which result in this finer breakdown, and similar problems occur if we attempt to analyze the effects of rank or type of unit.

The differences in response to the items in Tables 26 and 27 might best be summarized by considering the responses to the following question: "How should gaming/simulation be used in tactical training for Battalion or Brigade command groups?" Table 28 displays the overall distribution of responses to this question. Only about 19% see gaming/simulation as a primary source of training, and approximately 36% see it as augmenting other training. 1.6 % of respondents felt it should not be used at all while, nearly 35% offered no opinion.

When the control for experience is introduced, the only significant observation is that personnel experienced in gaming/simulation are more likely to view it as useful while those with less experience are more likely to view it as a useful add-on (see Table 29).

Finally, as a measure of respondent's feelings concerning the practical

Table 26

Gaming/Simulation compared to CPX
by respondent's experience with Gaming/Simulation

	<u>Experience with Gaming/Simulation</u>				
	<u>None</u>	<u>Read about it</u>	<u>Seen it used</u>	<u>Played some</u>	<u>Played a lot</u>
Much more effective	21.1	3.2	7.7	21.3	50.0
More effective	31.5	22.6	26.9	39.6	36.4
Equal	26.3	32.3	25.9	15.2	4.5
Less effective	5.2	29.0	30.8	18.3	4.5
Much less effective	15.8	12.9	9.6	5.5	4.5
	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%

Table 27

Gaming/Simulation compared to FTX
by respondent's experience with Gaming/Simulation

	<u>Experience with Gaming/Simulation</u>				
	<u>None</u>	<u>Read about it</u>	<u>Seen it used</u>	<u>Played some</u>	<u>Played a lot</u>
Much more effective	16.0	.0	1.8	5.4	9.1
More effective	8.0	22.2	7.1	9.6	22.7
Equal	28.0	13.9	10.7	13.9	4.5
Less effective	20.0	27.8	28.6	32.5	22.7
Much less effective	28.0	36.1	51.8	38.6	40.9
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 28

Percentage distribution for responses to how
Gaming/Simulation should be used

(Item 22): How should gaming/simulation be used in tactical training for
Battalion or Brigade command groups?

	<u>Percent</u>
(1) Should be the only source of training.	8
(2) Very useful, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with gaming/simulation occupying the most time.	17.8
(3) Useful add-on but, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with FTX/CPX occupying the most time.	36.3
(4) It's marginal, use only when we don't have time, money or area to train properly.	8.7
(5) Should not be used at all, just doesn't provide proper training.	1.6
(6) I don't know.	34.9

Table 29

Percent distribution for responses to how Gaming/Simulation should be used in tactical training by experience with Gaming/Simulation

<u>(Item 22)</u>	<u>Experience with Gaming/Simulation</u>				
	<u>None</u>	<u>Read about it</u>	<u>Seen it used</u>	<u>Played some</u>	<u>Played a lot</u>
Only source	.0	2.3	1.7	1.2	.0
Most used source	30.6	22.7	20.7	26.1	56.5
As an added but less used source	44.4	56.8	58.6	59.4	39.1
Only when no alternative is available	19.4	18.2	15.5	10.9	4.3
Should not be used	5.6	.0	3.4	2.4	.0
	100.0%	100.0%	99.9%	100.0%	99.9%

utility of gaming/simulation vs. other factors, the following information is presented. Respondents were asked to rate the items appearing in Table 30 in terms of their importance to a unit's successful accomplishment of its mission.

From Table 30 we observe that gaming/simulation is regarded as one of those items least important to successful completion of the unit's mission in actual combat ($\bar{x} = 2.6$), significantly less so than peacetime ARTEP training ($\bar{x} = 3.2$) and SM training ($\bar{x} = 3.4$). Interestingly, when experience with gaming/simulation is held constant, no significant effect is observed on the rating of the importance of gaming/simulation in the actual combat situation.

In conclusion, it appears that when individuals have had experience with gaming/simulation, they are more likely to regard it as a more effective training tool yet still fail to regard it as effective as other forms of training for the actual combat situation.

Turnover, Turbulence and Unit Training

Three items from the ARTS survey concerned respondents' perceptions of the seriousness of personnel turbulence and turnover with respect to their impact on training and unit performance. When asked to rate unit generated personnel turbulence as one of twelve obstacles to training, respondents gave it a mean rating of 6.0 (refer to item 6 in the codebook). Rated as greater obstacles were post support requirements, command directed activities, resource constraints, a shortage of capable NCOs and the lack of time for proper training. Turnover appears to be a problem that has more of a long-run character because of detrimental effects on the experience

Table 30

Overall means and standard deviations
for importance attributed to various elements
of a unit's combat performance

In actual combat, how important do you think the following are to a unit's
successful accomplishment of its mission:

	<u>\bar{x}</u>	<u>SD</u>
NCO leadership	3.9	.45
Hatred of the enemy	2.4	.83
Department of the Army guidance	2.4	.92
The condition of <u>unit</u> equipment	3.8	.53
The condition of <u>individual</u> equipment	3.7	.57
Patriotism	3.1	.76
SM training in peacetime	3.4	.69
Squad or platoon solidarity	3.6	.59
Battalion or brigade leadership	3.5	.68
ARTEP training in peacetime	3.2	.69
Platoon or company leadership	3.8	.49
Gaming/Simulation in peacetime	2.6	.83

(1) Very unimportant (2) Fairly unimportant (3) Fairly important (4) Very important

levels available to get the job done.

It was also rated in the middle range of other problems which affect training and unit performance. When rated among a series of 11 items (see Q40 in the codebook) the "complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact of training" was assessed as being a problem to some extent. Problems of greater consideration were the imposition of too many non-tactical requirements on the unit, a shortage of qualified NCOs, the changing priorities of higher headquarters and discipline. In another series of items (see Q41 in the codebook) personnel turnover was fourth among seven areas considered important to unit performance.

In focusing on differing perceptions of the importance of turbulence and turnover by rank, type of unit and theater, it was found that the immediate problem of turbulence and the larger problem of turnover are both considered more problematic by ARTS respondents in CONUS than in USAREUR (see Table 31). When type of unit is varied, it is observed that turbulence is most problematic for those respondents in combat support, armor and air defense units. Respondents from two of the types of units (armor and ADA) were also more likely to rate turnover as a greater problem. Additionally, respondents in the field artillery units saw this as a greater problem than did those in infantry, combat support and combat service support units.

Examination of differing perceptions by the rank of the respondents indicates that only O-6 officers were much more likely to respond that these areas are great problems.

In summary, these problems do not appear as the greatest obstacles to training and effective performance relative to the problems generated by post support requirements and the conflicting demands of higher headquarters. The reader should remember, however, that these respondents have indicated that

Table 31

The effect of turbulence on unit training broken down by theater, type of unit and rank

THEATER	TYPE OF UNIT	(Item 6A): Listed were 12 obstacles to effective collective training. Among them, "personnel turbulence" was ranked: <u>a/</u>		(Item 40E): To what extent do you think "complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact of training" is a problem? <u>b/</u>	
		\bar{x}	\underline{SD}	\bar{x}	\underline{SD}
COMUS		5.76	3.49	2.71	1.37
USAREUR		6.76	3.41	3.26	1.46
	Infantry	6.52	3.38	2.93	1.12
	Armor	5.63	3.80	2.67	1.34
	Field Artillery	6.20	3.40	2.62	1.26
	Air Defense Artillery	5.73	3.17	2.33	.89
	Combat Support	5.59	3.35	3.00	1.54
	Combat Service Support	6.12	3.49	3.09	1.71
	RANK				
	06	4.24	3.03	2.40	1.04
	05	6.60	3.67	2.81	1.31
	04	6.85	3.42	2.74	1.22
	01 to 03	5.68	3.23	2.76	1.37
	E7 to E9	6.12	3.65	2.92	1.60
	E5 to E6	6.31	3.54	3.35	1.46

a/ (1) Worst obstacle to (12) least obstacle

b/ (1) To a very great extent thru (5) To a very little extent

Table 32

(Item 40E): To what extent do you think "complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact on training" is a problem?

	<u>Percent</u>	
(1) To a very great extent	18.1)	
) 42.4	
(2) To a great extent	24.3)	
(3) To some extent	30.7	
(4) To a little extent	16.2)	
) 26.9	
(5) To a very little extent	10.7)	

Table 33

(Item 41B): How important do you think the "personnel turnover" is in determining how well a unit performs?

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent saying important and unimportant</u>
(1) Very unimportant	2.2)	
) 14.4	
(2) Fairly unimportant	12.2)	
(3) Fairly important	50.8)	
) 85.6	
(4) Very important	34.8)	

Table 34

(Item 4B): In actual combat, how important do you think squad or platoon solidarity is to a unit's accomplishment of its mission?

	Percent	Percent saying important and unimportant
1) Very unimportant	1.2)	3.5
2) Fairly unimportant	2.3)	
3) Fairly important	27.2)	96.5
4) Very important	69.3)	

Table 35

Percentage distribution of ranks assigned to personnel turbulence as an obstacle

(Item 6A): Listed were 12 obstacles to effective collective training. Among them, "personnel turbulence unit generated" was ranked:

Worst to (12) least	Percent	Percent when collapsed into four categories	Percent of respondents ranking personnel turbulence in the upper and lower order as an obstacle
1	11.4		
2	7.5	28.5	
3	9.6		57.6
4	16.7		
5	7.5	29.1	
6	9.9		
7	6.5		
8	7.7	22.3	
9	9.1		42.4
10	4.9		
11	7.7	23.1	
12	7.7		

they believe the problems of turbulence and turnover to be most serious as they relate to competing demands on training time (see the section on open-ended responses below).

Content Analysis of Open-Ended Responses

In addition to responding to the structured items discussed in other sections of this report, ARTS respondents were asked to comment on problem areas of the training system which they felt were not adequately covered by the survey. Approximately forty respondents in USAREUR and approximately seventy respondents in CONUS provided interpretable responses. These individuals were predominantly in grades O-3 to O-5.

The most frequently expressed sentiments concerned what really seems to be a series of closely related problems which culminate in these respondents' opinion that they lack enough time to make training effective. Underlying this area of concern are several contributing factors.

Respondents at all positions in the organization stress that their training time is cut into because of competing demands which require their attention. Especially significant was the frequency with which O-3 through O-5s implicated higher headquarters as generating conflicting demands and requirements. The tendency was to perceive these actions of higher headquarters as detrimental to training and as actions which are generated by organizational requirements which do not coincide with successful training for mission requirements.

In other words, it appears that the latent effects of many required reports to superiors and directives imposed by superiors is to motivate individuals to respond with effort directed at simply complying with such requests in a fashion

that does not result in negative sanctions; i.e., there seems to be a discrepancy between their perception of a job well done and their superiors' perception. These respondents indicate that they are distressed because time which could be spent in planning for training or in training and coordinating lower level trainers is instead allocated to nontraining related paperwork and similar administrative requirements.

For example, officers in combat support and combat service support specialities felt that much of the training program passed on to them was not appropriate to those tasks which they are called upon to perform in a combat situation. Additionally, it was often mentioned that responding to such demands takes them away from regular daily maintenance, transportation or other support activities which they feel are more akin to their wartime tasks. In other cases, either the lack of clear direction or the interference from higher headquarters is perceived as lack of support for training. Several individuals cited this nonsupportive aspect of the actions of higher headquarters as a demoralizing factor for trainers and as a threat to their credibility with their men. The problem areas above which were identified in respondents' comments and others are listed in Table 36. It may well be that underlying the above complaints mentioned is a wellspring of discontent with the current training system that stems not from the type of training programs which exist but from the trainers inability to concentrate on training.

Factors Impinging on Training: A Comparison With The Gorman Survey

Use of the Army Training Study Survey and the Gorman Survey allows a partial examination of possible trends affecting training, or more correctly, trends in leader's perceptions regarding factors thought to affect training: distractors, the impact of variation in present for duty strength, and the

Table 36

Training problem areas commonly mentioned in open-ended comments.

1. Conflicting priorities of higher headquarters, too much task orientation, not enough mission orientation.
2. Post support and daily job details cause turbulence in units that leaves little time for effective training.
3. Lack of perception by higher level planners of the difficulties associated with implementing training packages.
4. Lack of trainer's time to plan training and give it the proper emphasis to make it effective.
5. Climate of "crisis management" impedes effective planning and execution.
6. Goals of higher headquarters are vaguely defined with respect to training results resulting in a perceived lack of support for training.
7. Lack of experience and training among the trainers.
8. Personnel problems - including low quality recruits and those with severe personal problems - interfere with effective training.

availability of training aids.

This section will begin with a summary of the results of the ARTS survey compared to the Gorman Survey. This initial overview will be followed by a detailed comparison of FBDT and ARTS respondents' perceptions and evaluations of the training system.

Summary

1. As found in the Gorman Survey, ARTS respondents indicated that Field Manuals had been used more than Army Training Programs and Army Subject Schedules.
2. As observed in the Gorman Survey, ARTS respondents in USAREUR found weapons ranges and general field training areas to be least available. Further, the absolute level of availability reported by ARTS respondents is less than observed in the Gorman data. This difference is also observed for training aids with models, mockups, gaming/simulation and POW interrogation personnel most likely to be in short supply.
3. Obstacles to effective training observed in the Gorman Study are still apparently serious problems. Among the most serious reported are (1) too many nontactical requirements imposed on the unit, (2) a shortage of qualified NCOs, (3) the need for stronger discipline, and (4) the problem of insuring that day-to-day training is conducted.
4. The percentage of authorized TOE strength estimated to be needed in "present for duty" status at various organizational and rank levels was approximately 80%. This is roughly 5% higher than levels estimated by the active army respondents in the Gorman Survey.
5. The estimated importance of several mission or problem areas compares nearly exactly between the two surveys. The most important areas are operational

missions, small unit training and vehicular maintenance. Command inspections were rated as slightly more demanding by ARTS respondents than in the earlier survey.

Distractors to Training and Competing Problem Areas

Respondents were asked to rate the importance of eight mission areas with respect to (1) how much importance their superiors attached to it, (2) how much they themselves attached to it and (3) how demanding each was on their time. The eight areas and their mean rating for the overall sample appear in Table 37.

While small unit training received the fourth highest rating with respect to its importance to superiors it received the second highest rating in terms of importance to the respondents themselves. In this regard it was among three areas which the respondents saw as more important to them than their superiors. The other two areas were operational missions and vehicular maintenance. Small unit training also received the third highest mean rating (3.5) for demands on the individuals' own time.

These responses may be analyzed in greater detail with respect to theater, rank and type of unit. These results are displayed in Tables 38 through 40 along with the results of responses to these same questions in the Gorman Survey. We will discuss the findings of the Army Training Study (ARTS) Survey with respect to the findings of the Gorman Survey where appropriate.

In Table 38, the above mentioned breakdowns are displayed for the question concerning importance of the eight mission areas to one's superiors. Significant differences by theater may be noted in two of the eight areas in ARTS, community relations and race relations, both being rated as more demanding to superiors in USAREUR. This is consistent with the findings of the Gorman Survey. However

Table 37

<u>Mean rating of importance/demand for:</u>	<u>Importance/demanding to your seniors</u>	<u>Importance/demanding in your view</u>	<u>How demanding of your time</u>
Drug abuse control	3.5	3.2	2.6
Community relations	2.9	2.6	2.2
Race relations	3.4	3.1	2.6
Small unit training	3.7	4.4	3.5
Command inspections	3.8	3.4	3.3
Operational missions	4.3	4.6	4.0
Vehicular maintenance	4.2	4.4	3.6
Administration	3.5	3.3	3.5

(1) Least demanding (2) Below average (3) Average (4) Above average (5) Demanding

Table 38 (part 1)

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

How Important/Demanding to your Seniors

Mission or Problem Area	06-08	05-07	04-03	03-02	02-01	01-03	E7-E9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER
1. Drug abuse control	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.9
2. Community relations	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3	3.0
3. Race relations	3.8	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.7	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.7	4.2	3.9
4. Small unit training	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.8
5. Command inspections	2.6	3.1	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4
6. Operational missions	3.5	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.2	4.0	3.8	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.8	4.1
7. Vehicular maintenance	3.5	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	4.0
8. Administration	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.6

(1) Least demanding (2) Below average (3) Average (4) Above average (5) Demanding

Table 38 (part 2)

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

How Important/Demanding to your Seniors

Mission or Problem Area	O6	O5	O4	O1-O3	E7-E9	E5-E6	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	CONTS	TSARETR
1. Drug abuse	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.4	3.9	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.6
2. Community relations	3.1	3.1	2.9	2.6	3.3	2.9	2.7	3.2	3.1	2.6	3.0	2.7	2.7	3.3
3. Race relations	3.6	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.8	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.5	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.6
4. Small unit training	4.2	3.6	3.6	3.6	4.0	3.4	4.0	3.8	3.8	3.2	3.6	3.4	3.7	3.8
5. Command inspections	3.6	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.9	3.5	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8
6. Operational missions	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.4	3.9	4.2	4.3	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.4
7. Vehicular maintenance	3.8	4.0	3.9	4.2	4.4	4.1	4.0	4.4	4.2	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2
8. Administration	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.4	3.5	2.8	3.6	3.2	3.5	3.4

the magnitude of the ratings in the Gorman Survey is slightly higher. Most other areas have ratings which are very similar between the two surveys, both in direction of difference between CONUS and USAREUR and with respect to magnitude. The only exception is in the case of operational missions. Superiors are perceived as having much more concern with this area in 1978 than they did in 1971, especially in USAREUR.

Significant differences are observed for only two areas when the ARTS respondents are categorized by type of unit. These areas are small unit training and administration. In both cases, respondents in Field Artillery unit perceive these two areas as much less important to their superiors than do the other specialities. This was not the case in the Gorman findings. Other differences between the two surveys are not substantial in this particular analysis.

Significant differences among rank categories in ARTS were observed in all areas except for command inspections and administration. Drug abuse was thought to be of importance to superiors most by E-7 through E-9 enlisted and least by O-4 officers. This is consistent with the Gorman findings. Community relations was thought to be of above average importance to superiors by E-7 through E-9 enlisted ($\bar{x} = 3.3$) and below average importance by O-1 to O-3 officers ($\bar{x} = 2.6$). This pattern is also consistent with the Gorman findings and may also be observed in the area of race relations. In the areas of small unit training and operational missions, O-6 officers attributed the most importance to superiors while E-5 to E-6 enlisted had the lowest mean scores in these areas. These findings are at variance with the Gorman Survey findings. Overall, it appears that respondents perceive the areas of small unit training, operational missions and vehicular maintenance to be more

important to their superiors in 1978 than in 1971.

Table 39 is concerned with how important each of these eight mission areas is to the respondent. Significant differences by theater were observed in only two areas: drug abuse control and community relations. In each case respondents in USAREUR gave these areas higher ratings: drug-abuse was 3.5 vs 3.1, community relations was 2.8 vs 2.5. This finding varies from the Gorman Survey in which no differences by theater were observed for these two areas. No significant differences were observed in the remaining six areas in either survey and the magnitude of the rating in each area is similar for the two surveys, except in race relations, command inspections and vehicular maintenance. The latter two received higher ratings by the ARTS respondents, while the former was rated as a more demanding problem in the Gorman Survey.

Significant differences between types of unit were observed in only two areas: small unit training and vehicular maintenance. Small unit training was rated most demanding by those in infantry, armor and field artillery (\bar{x} = 4.5 to 4.6) and lowest by those in combat service support units (\bar{x} = 3.9). Vehicle maintenance was a most demanding problem for those in armor (\bar{x} = 4.6) and field artillery and combat service support (\bar{x} = 4.4). These patterns coincide with differences observed in the Gorman Survey.

Significant differences with respect to the relative importance to the individual were observed in all mission or problem areas except command inspections and vehicular maintenance when ARTS respondents are categorized by rank. Drug abuse is rated highest by E-7 through E-9 NCOs and least important by O-4 officers. This pattern is also evident in the area of administration. The findings are similar to those reported by Gorman. Community relations is

Table 39 (part 1)

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

How Important/Demanding in your View

Mission or Problem Area	06-08	05-02 Bn CO	04 05-3	01-03	E7-E9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER
1. Drug abuse control	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.8
2. Community relations	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.9
3. Race relations	3.9	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.7	3.7
4. Small unit training	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.1	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.3
5. Command inspections	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9
6. Operational missions	4.4	4.3	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.4	4.4
7. Vehicular maintenance	4.1	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.4	4.0	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0
8. Administration	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.4

(1) Least demanding (2) Below average (3) Average (4) Above average (5) Demanding

Table 39 (part 2)

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

How Important/Demanding in your View

Mission or Problem Area	How Important/Demanding in your View													
	Q6	Q5	Q4	Q1-O2	E7-T9	E5-T6	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	CONTS	USAFETR
1. Drug abuse	3.1	3.5	2.8	3.1	3.7	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.5
2. Community relations	3.0	2.6	2.4	2.3	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.2	2.6	2.4	2.5	2.8
3. Race relations	3.6	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.5	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.3	3.2	2.9	3.0	3.2
4. Small unit training	4.5	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.4	3.9	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.3	4.3	3.9	4.4	4.5
5. Command inspections	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.4	3.5	3.3	2.9	3.2	3.6	3.3	3.5
6. Operational missions	4.8	4.7	4.9	4.6	4.5	4.1	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.8	4.7	4.5	4.6	4.6
7. Vehicular maintenance	4.2	4.5	4.2	4.4	4.5	4.1	4.2	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.4
8. Administration	3.3	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.8	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.2

rated most important by O-6 officers and E-7 through E-9 NCOs and least important by O-4 officers. This particular pattern is also observed in the area of race relations, but does not compare to the Gorman findings. Small unit training and operational missions receive their lowest rating from E-5 to E-6 NCOs and highest rating from the higher ranking officers. This finding cannot be compared directly to the Gorman survey because the junior NCO category was not included in that survey.

Table 40 shows the observations concerning how demanding each of the areas is for the individual. Again recalling the overall distribution, operational missions, vehicular maintenance and small unit training were most demanding on individuals in the ARTS survey. This appears similar to the Gorman findings, and the overall mean ratings for each year are quite similar.

Again, significant differences between CONUS and USAREUR are observed only in the areas of drug abuse and community relations, and again these are rated more demanding by ARTS respondents in USAREUR. This too is consistent with the Gorman findings.

Significant differences by type of unit were observed in two of the eight mission areas: small unit training and administration. Small unit training was seen as significantly more demanding among the combat units and administration was an above average problem area for those in infantry units. Comparability with the Gorman Survey is suggested but not precise due to the absence of a sample of support units in the Gorman report.

Significant differences by rank were observed for the ARTS respondents in three areas, drug abuse control, community relations and vehicular maintenance. E-5 to E-6 enlisted are most concerned in the former two areas while officer and enlisted groups report highest demand in the vehicle maintenance

Table 40 (part 1)

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

How Demanding Your Time

Mission or Problem Areas	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
1. Drug abuse control	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7
2. Community relations	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.0
3. Race relations	2.9	3.0	2.4	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8
4. Small unit training	3.4	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.8
5. Command inspections	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.0
6. Operational missions	4.4	3.7	4.1	3.7	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.7	3.9	3.7	3.9
7. Vehicular maintenance	4.1	3.9	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.9	3.5	3.6	3.3	3.9	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.6	3.4	3.4
8. Administration	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.7	3.6	3.6

(1) Least demanding (2) Below average (3) average (4) Above average (5) Demanding

Table 40 (part 2)

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

How Demanding Your Time

Mission or Problem Area	06	05	04	01-03	E7-E9	E5-E6	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	CONUS	USAREUR
1. Drug abuse	2.3	2.7	2.0	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.5	2.8
2. Community relations	2.6	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.1	2.6
3. Race relations	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.6	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.8
4. Small unit training	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.5	3.7	3.1	3.6	3.6	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.5	3.6
5. Command inspections	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.4
6. Operational missions	4.2	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.1	3.8	3.8	4.1	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.1
7. Vehicular maintenance	3.6	3.9	2.9	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.3	3.8	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.8
8. Administration	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	2.9	3.8	3.5	3.2	2.8	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.6

area. Direct comparison to the Gorman findings is not possible because the junior NCOs were not included in the BFDI sample.

Other Problem Areas

Direct comparison between the ARTS and Gorman Surveys on the items in this section is hampered by differing response scales in the studies and by very small numbers of cases in some breakdowns, e.g., there was only one air defense artillery O6 in the ARTS sample. In addition, information reported in the Gorman findings does not allow us to reproduce overall means. Our remarks will therefore note significant differences where they occur within each study and refer to differences between studies in terms of direction of difference only.

Among the group of items reported in Table 41 ARTS respondents cited the lack of motivated officers willing to perform their duties ($\bar{x} = 3.9$), the utilization of officers and NCOs at levels above their normal experience ($\bar{x} = 3.5$) and a shortage of qualified officers ($\bar{x} = 3.4$) as the three least serious potential problems (among those listed) for units. Those most serious were (1) that too many nontactical requirements are imposed on the unit ($\bar{x} = 2.2$), (2) a shortage of qualified NCOs ($\bar{x} = 2.3$) and (3a) the need for stronger discipline ($\bar{x} = 2.4$) and (3b) the training load is made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters ($\bar{x} = 2.4$). These same problems were among the five most serious in the Gorman Survey.

Significant differences by theater are noted in four areas and in all cases respondents in CONUS rate them as more problematic than those in USAREUR. The four areas are (from worst to least) (1) problems associated with training load created by changing priorities at higher headquarters, (2) complete turnover of personnel every seven or eight months and its potential impact on training, (3) a shortage of qualified officers, (4) officers and NCOs called

Table 41 (part 1)
 GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

The following statements describe various problem areas which may or may not apply to a unit. Please indicate, for each statement, how these areas apply to your current or previous unit by circling a number for each statement in the column to the right showing whether it is a "Grave Problem Area," Major Problem Area," Minor Problem Area," or "No Problem."

	06-08	05-07	04-06	03-05	01-03	E7-E9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER
1. Lack of motivated junior officers willing to adequately perform their duties.	2.2	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.1	2.2
3. Training time. Too many nontactical requirements imposed on the unit.	2.7	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.0
4. Shortage of qualified NCOs. Have excess E5 personnel but only a few are E6 and above. E5 and E6 types have knowledge and experience that E3 or E4s had a few years ago.	3.0	3.2	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.0	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0
5. Lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hard skill areas capable of keeping abreast of the daily administrative requirements.	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.6
6. Complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact on training.	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.2	2.9	3.1	3.3	2.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	2.9	3.0
8. Discipline. The need for stronger discipline in the new changing Army.	3.1	2.7	2.8	2.8	3.3	3.0	2.9	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.2	3.0
9. The officers and NCOs are called to perform duties well beyond the normal experience level - for example - line companies commanded by lieutenants with less than 2 years service.	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.1
10. The training load made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters.	2.5	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.7
13. Insuring day-to-day training is conducted.	2.3	2.5	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	2.1

(1) No problem (2) Minor problem (3) Major problem (4) Grave problem

Table 41 (part 2)
ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1975

The following statements describe potential problems which may apply to a unit. Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following is a problem:

	CO	TO	CO-TO	CS	ADJ	SI	AV	AD	ADV	SS	COMB	ENTR
Lack of motivated officers willing to perform their duties.	4.4	4.0	4.0	3.6	3.7	4.2	3.9	4.1	3.9	3.7	3.8	4.0
Too many non-tactical requirements imposed on the unit.	2.8	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.6	2.0	2.1	1.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.2
Shortage of qualified NCOs.	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.4	3.0	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.5	2.7	2.3
Lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hard skill areas.	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.2	3.5	3.4	3.7
Complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact on training	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.6	3.0	3.1	2.8
The officers and NCOs are called to perform duties well beyond the normal experience level - for example - line companies commanded by lieutenants with less than 2 years service.	2.4	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.3	2.9	2.7	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.6	3.2
Insuring day-to-day training is conducted.	3.4	2.8	2.4	2.0	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.3
Lack of motivated NCOs willing to adequately perform their duties.	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.9	3.0
Shortage of qualified officers.	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.9	3.2	2.9	2.5	2.8	2.5	3.2	3.0	2.9
Discipline. The need for stronger discipline in the new changing Army.	3.3	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.0	1.9	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.0	2.4	2.4
The training load made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters	3.4	3.3	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.5	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.2	3.5	3.4

(1) Very great extent (2) Great extent (3) Some extent (4) Little extent (5) Very little extent

to perform duties beyond the normal experience level. These findings are not comparable with the Gorman findings.

Significant differences by type of unit are observed in seven items, yet other than noting nontactical requirements as a particularly salient problem to respondents in air defense artillery no pattern to this variation can be observed.

Significant differences by rank among ARTS respondents can be noted on nearly all items. In approximately half the cases, the opinions of O-4 to O-6 officers and O-1 to O-3 officers, E-5 to E-6 enlisted and E-7 to E-9 unlisted are noticeably distinct. This can be observed for (1) lack of motivated officers (2) too many nontactical requirements on the unit (3) shortage of qualified NCOs (4) lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hardskill areas (5) difficulties with the training load stemming from the changing priorities of higher headquarters and (6) the need for discipline. (See Table 41 for the specific differences between these groups.)

In sum: the more serious problems for the higher officer group were (1) the shortage of qualified NCOs (2) the lack of experienced administrative personnel in hardskill areas (3) the lack of motivated NCOs willing to perform their duties. The more serious problems for the junior officer/enlisted group would be (1) lack of motivated officers willing to perform their duties (2) too many nontactical requirements imposed on the units (except E-5 and E-6) (3) training load made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters and (4) the need for stronger discipline. The findings are somewhat consistent with the Gorman findings.

Impact of Variation in Present for Duty Strength

ARTS respondents were asked to estimate the minimum platoon and minimum

company present for duty strengths required to achieve dynamic training at each level. Tables 42 and 43 display the mean response (percent level) and additionally display responses to questions concerning maximum turbulence at each level, broken down by theater, rank and type of unit. Though the turbulence items were not included in the Gorman Survey, they do present a measure of the reliability of the ARTS data in as much as the difference between 100% and the minimum present for duty strength should approximate the maximum turbulence. In general then, the officer data seem reliable, with most differences $[(100\% - \text{min. pres.}) - \text{max. turb.}]$ less than 10%. The NCO and enlisted data do not generally seem to be quite as good.

In general, all officer grades tend to respond that enlisted and NCO/officer minimum platoon and company present for duty strengths should be higher than do NCO personnel. Further, maximum turbulence levels are estimated to be lower by the officers than the NCOs. Coupled with this observation is a tendency for officers in USAREUR to give more conservative estimates (i.e., higher minimums and lower maximums) than their CONUS counterparts. The opposite tends to hold for NCOs. These findings are generally consistent with the Gorman Survey, though the estimates of minimum present for duty strength are slightly higher in 1978 among the ARTS respondents.

While the effect of rank remains, no significant pattern of differences is observed by type of unit with the exception that those respondents in air defense artillery and combat support tend to be most consistently conservative in their estimates.

Use of Guidelines in Training

The last series of questions which are found in both the Gorman and

Table 42

Minimum platoon necessary to achieve dynamic platoon training
(a comparison of ARTS and Gorman).*

GORMAN

What do you consider to be a minimum platoon "present for duty" strength to achieve dynamic PLT. training? (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength)

RANK	ENLISTED								NCO/OFFICER							
	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER	IN	AR	ADA	FA		
	06-08	70	81	64	68	71	88	70	61	77	67	55	71	89	95	
05 3																
Bn CO	74	73	76	73	80	82	72	76	73	75	73	82	78	75		
05 3																
04	76	73	78	75	81	71	77	79	73	83	77	89	73	79		
01-03	74	78	74	74	75	78	75	77	80	78	77	80	78	77		
E7-E9	75	75	75	72	77	78	77	70	73	71	69	70	73	72		

ARTS

(same question)

06	76	83	75	80	90	73	84	89	84	86	99	82
05	82	79	77	83	85	82	85	85	82	84	92	88
04	76	82	70	81	80	76	87	88	81	88	90	86
01 to 03	78	79	76	81	72	82	83	84	80	91	70	88
E7 to E9	74	67	70	73	75	67	74	67	75	66	72	69
E5 to E6	70	71	76	71	75	65	75	73	71	69	-	68

ARTS

Max platoon turbulence

06	17	13	13	14	70	20	16	12	12	11	70	17
05	12	12	14	14	10	11	9	9	10	11	5	8
04	14	16	16	15	25	9	11	13	18	8	25	8
01 to 03	22	18	22	13	17	23	17	14	16	13	25	13
E7 to E9	33	46	41	25	45	56	29	53	37	42	42	50
E5 to E6	40	24	34	16	10	52	40	28	34	13	-	57

* CS and SS Branch categories were omitted from the table to facilitate comparison (since branch differences were not significant).

Table 43

Minimum company necessary to achieve
dynamic company training*

GORMAN

What do you consider to be a minimum company "present for duty" strength to achieve dynamic co. training? (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength.)

RANK	ENLISTED							NCO/OFFICER						
	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER	IN	AR	ADA	FA
06-08 05>3	75	77	68	70	76	80	75	66	79	63	62	71	83	80
Bn Co 05<3	73	73	78	72	78	83	73	76	76	78	75	80	78	78
04	75	74	78	74	79	78	76	78	77	81	78	83	79	78
01-03	74	79	75	75	76	78	76	77	79	78	77	78	78	78
E7-E9	76	76	76	75	77	79	77	71	74	70	70	69	74	74

ARTS

(same question)

06	79	83	87	80	90	72	80	87	79	85	90	81
05	82	84	84	84	78	85	85	80	78	81	90	88
04	77	81	73	79	78	79	83	88	83	86	88	85
01-03	79	77	79	78	68	80	82	81	79	85	78	86
E7-E9	76	84	84	81	73	66	73	69	73	71	47	75
E5-E6	79	79	84	83	90	70	76	74	76	72	-	71

ARTS

Max company turbulence

06	18	16	18	14	70	22	17	13	13	11	70	20
05	16	14	22	14	12	16	12	10	11	12	5	15
04	14	20	17	16	28	14	14	16	21	9	25	13
01-03	21	18	19	16	20	24	16	16	16	16	14	17
E7-E9	34	53	41	35	47	51	32	56	44	41	58	41
E5-E6	35	18	31	10	5	41	34	14	23	6	-	41

*CS and SS Branch categories were omitted from the table to facilitate comparison (since branch differences were not significant).

ARTS Surveys reflect the extent to which various guidelines have been used in training. These data are reported in Table 44. For both groups it is observed that Army Training Programs and Army Subject Schedules did receive the least use, Field Manuals the most use and Army Regulations intermediate use. No significant differences by theater are observed although ARTS respondents in USAREUR report lower usage of Army regulations in training than do respondents in CONUS. Unit differences are noted only insofar as air defense artillery respondents report they have used the Army Subject Schedules, Field Manuals, and Regulations at significantly higher levels than those in other service specialities. Differences by rank are noted on each item with junior officers, senior NCOs and junior NCOs reporting higher usage in all areas than do O-4 to O-6 officers. This is generally consistent with the Gorman findings.

Availability of Training Facilities

Respondents to the ARTS and Gorman Surveys were asked to report on the availability of facilities and aids for use in small unit training. Table 45 arrays these data controlling for rank, theater and type of unit. Again we note that direct comparisons between the two surveys are impeded by the absence of several categories in the Gorman data.

Analysis of the univariate distribution of means would indicate that the five types of training facilities are usually available, yet significant differences can be observed by theater, type of unit and rank. ARTS respondents in USAREUR were more likely to have classrooms at their disposal than respondents in CONUS but less likely to find weapons ranges, small unit training areas and field training areas when needed. This pattern is also observed in the Gorman findings. While everyone reported that general field training areas

Table 44

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

To what extent did you use the following in conducting training:
(Circle one response for each of the following.)

	06-08	05-03	05-00	04-03	04-00	01-03	F1-F9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	COMS	EUROPE	OTHER
a. Army Training Program (ATP)	2.6	2.9	3.0	2.6	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.7
b. Army Subject Schedules	2.7	2.8	3.0	2.7	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.9	2.6	2.7
c. Field Manuals (FM)	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5
d. Technical Manuals (TM)	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.5	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2
e. Army Regulations	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.0	3.1

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Usually (4) Always

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

How often did you use the following in conducting training prior to ARTEP, SMS, TEC?

	06	05	04	01-03	F1-F9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	COMS	USAREUR	OVERALL
Army Training Programs	2.7	2.6	2.6	3.1	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Army Subject Schedules	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.5	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.8
Field Manuals	3.4	3.3	3.5	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.6	4.0	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.6	3.6	3.6
Army Regulations	2.8	2.6	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.2	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.9	3.0

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Usually (4) Always

Table 45

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

Please indicate how often each of the following training facilities was available to you in conducting small unit training: (Circle one response for each of the following.)

	06-08	05-03	05-03	04	01-03	E7-E9	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CONUS	EUROPE	OTHER
a. Weapons Ranges	3.2	3.2	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	2.7	3.2
b. Areas for Individual Training	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.0	3.2
c. Areas for Small Unit Training	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	3.2
d. Classrooms	3.6	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.6	3.4
e. General Field Training Areas	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.3	3.1	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.3	2.7	3.1

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Usually (4) Always

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

(same question)

	06	05	04	01-03	E7-E9	E5-E6	IN	AR	ADA	FA	CS	CSS	CONUS	USAREUR
Weapons Ranges	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.3	2.8	2.9	2.7	3.0	3.3	3.0	3.2	3.1	2.8
Areas for Individual Training	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.2	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.1
Areas of Small Unit Training	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.0	3.1	2.9	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.0	3.1	3.2	2.8
Classrooms	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.2	3.4
General Field Training Areas	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.2	2.8	3.1	3.1	2.6

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Usually (4) Always

were less than usually available, O-1 to O-3 officers and E-5 to E-6 enlisted personnel were most likely to report the lowest availability of the remaining four types of facilities. This pattern, too, seems consistent with the Gorman findings.

Finally, individuals in infantry, armor and combat support units were most likely to report the lowest levels of availability of these facilities when significant differences are observed (in the weapons ranges, area for individual training, and general field training areas).

These effects of type of unit, rank and theater seem to hold also for the availability of training aids (see Table 46). Significant theater differences are observed in eight of fourteen types of aids, and with one exception (sand tables) the reported availability of these materials is higher in CONUS. Again, this pattern is exactly consistent with the findings of the Gorman survey. Again, significant differences in reported availability by rank are observed, and are again consistent with the previous results. O-1 to O-3 officers and E-5 to E-6 enlisted are most likely to report the lowest level of availability in nearly every case. With respect to type of unit, those in field artillery and combat support units report the lowest availability of training aids.

The above discussion has focused on differences among groups of respondents in the ARTS Survey and has sought to show those few areas where the ARTS Survey and the Gorman Survey differ. Overall, the detailed analyses presented here point to strikingly parallel findings in the two studies and lead to one fundamental finding: there has been little perceived change in the training environment since 1971.

Table 46

GORMAN SURVEY, 1971

Please indicate how often each of the following training aids was available to you in conducting small unit training: (Circle one response for each of the following.)

	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never
a. Actual Equipment	3.7	3.7	3.5	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.5	3.3	3.3
b. Models	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.1	2.4	2.2	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.0
c. Mockups	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.3	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.3	1.9	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.8	2.1	2.3	1.9
d. Graphic Materials	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6	2.8	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.8	2.6
e. Displays	2.6	2.3	2.5	2.3	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.1
f. Chalkboards	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.5
g. Films	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.0
h. Sand Tables	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.9	2.4	2.4	1.6	1.8	2.2	2.5
i. Specially trained demonstrators	2.1	1.9	2.0	1.8	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.0
j. Training Demonstrations	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.0
k. Aggressors and Aggressor Materials	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.6	2.4	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.3
l. Prisoner of War Interrogation Pers.	2.0	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.9	1.9	1.7	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.7	1.7	1.4	1.5	1.8	1.5

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Frequency (4) Whenever desired

ARMY TRAINING STUDY, 1978

	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never	Often	Sometimes	Frequency	Never
a. Actual Equipment	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.4	3.1	3.4	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.3
b. Models	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.3	2.7	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.2
c. Mockups	2.1	2.6	2.5	2.2	2.4	2.0	2.0	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.1
d. Graphic Materials	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.7	2.8	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.1	3.0	2.8	3.1	2.8
e. Displays	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.3	2.7	2.6
f. Chalkboards	3.7	3.8	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
g. Films	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.1	3.3	3.0	3.3	3.3	3.0	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	2.9
h. Sand Tables	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.4	2.8	2.1	3.1	3.2	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.8
i. Training Demonstrations	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.4	3.0	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.4
j. Aggressors and Aggressive Materials	2.8	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.8	2.4	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.5	2.8	2.7	2.5
k. POW Interrogation Personnel	2.6	2.6	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.0	1.5	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	1.9
l. Simulation/Gaming	2.4	2.5	2.4	2.0	2.4	1.9	2.5	2.5	1.8	2.1	1.8	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.1	1.8	2.1	2.2	2.2
m. Tapes	3.3	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2	2.9	3.5	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.6
n. Video Tapes	3.1	3.2	3.1	2.8	3.0	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.5	3.0	2.7	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	3.0	2.8

(1) Never (2) Sometimes (3) Frequency (4) Whenever desired

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
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
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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

Appendix A

CODEBOOK

ARMY TRAINING STUDY SURVEY

As you may know the Army has been studying its training both in the training base and in the unit. In the fall of 1977 the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of TRADOC established the Army Training Study to assess individual and collective training--resources, programs, proficiency and readiness.

This questionnaire is part of that study through which we, the Study Group, are attempting to learn what you--the key trainers in the Army--think about some of the key issues in training today. Your opinions are needed so we can better understand training, both where we are today and where we want to be in the future. The survey instrument was prepared with the assistance of the Survey Branch of MILPERCEN and conforms to appropriate Department of the Army Regulations and the specific guidance of the Study Advisory Group chaired by the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command with senior officer representation from HQ Forces Command and HQ US Army Europe.

If this study is to be helpful, it is vital that you answer each question as thoughtfully and frankly as possible. This is not a test; there are no right or wrong answers. However, your responses and comments will be an essential element in developing specific proposals. We need the benefit of your experience!

The completed questionnaires are processed by automated equipment which summarizes the answers in statistical form. Your own individual answers will remain strictly confidential, since they will be combined with those of many other persons in reports which are prepared.

Your commander will give you the questionnaire. It will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. After completion, please place the questionnaire in the envelope provided, seal and mail immediately. We are working under a severe time constraint and need your thoughtful opinions as rapidly as possible--please place in mail not later than 1 May 1978.

1 CARD ONE **CODE = 1**
 2-5 ID Number
 6 **1** In your opinion, how does the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, EDRE, etc.) effect unit readiness in the Army as a whole?

Code

- 27.3 1. Greatly improves readiness
- 46.3 2. Moderately improves readiness
- 22.1 3. Slightly improves readiness
- 2.0 4. Has no impact whatsoever
- 1.4 5. Slightly degrades readiness
- 1.0 6. Moderately degrades readiness
- 0.0 7. Greatly degrades readiness
- 9. No Answer

100%

To what extent is each of the following an effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness, in your opinion?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

		to a very little extent	to a little extent	to some extent	to a great extent	to a very great extent	NO ANSWER
7	2A Quarterly external evaluation	1	2	3 $\bar{x} \uparrow 3.0$	4	5	9
8	2B Scheduled Evaluation from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	1	2	3 $\bar{x} \uparrow 2.75$	4	5	9
9	2C An IG focused on training proficiency	1	2	3 $\bar{x} \uparrow 2.9$	4	5	9
10	2D Unit Commander's evaluation	1	2	3 $\bar{x} \uparrow 3.6$	4	5	9
11	2E Unscheduled evaluations from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	1	2	3 $\bar{x} \uparrow 3.3$	4	5	9

In your opinion, how good a measure of training readiness is:

		CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE					
		VERY GOOD	GOOD	FAIR	POOR	VERY POOR	NO ANSWER
12	3A The number of days training required to be fully combat ready as estimated by the Commander	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 2.6			
13	3B The Commander's general judgement	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 2.3			
14	3C SQT results	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 2.7			
15	3D ARTEP results	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 2.1			
16	3E REALTRAIN results	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 2.7			
17	3F Gaming/Simulation (CAMMS/CATTS) results	1	2	3	4	5	9
				\bar{x} 3.1			

18

4 In your opinion, how necessary is some measure of training readiness, in addition to the Commander's judgement, in order to support requests for training resources?

Code

8.2	1. Not necessary at all
29.2	2. Somewhat necessary
37.4	3. Quite necessary
25.3	4. Very necessary
	9. No Answer
<u>100%</u>	

Listed below are 12 obstacles to effective individual training.
Rank order them, 1 (worst obstacle) to 12 (least obstacle).

ALL ITEMS ON THIS PAGE ARE CODED 01 THRU 12 ; NO ANSWER IS CODED 99

19-20	5A	<u>(X)</u> <u>5.8</u>	Personnel turbulence (Unit generated)
21-22	5B	<u>6.5</u>	Resource (money, fuel, ammo) constraints
23-24	5C	<u>4.9</u>	Command directed activities
25-26	5D	<u>4.5</u>	Post support requirements
27-28	5E	<u>6.6</u>	People programs (EEO, Drug/Alcohol, OE, etc.)
29-30	5F	<u>6.9</u>	General administration
31-32	5G	<u>8.0</u>	Maintenance
33-34	5H	<u>5.2</u>	Shortage of capable NCO's
35-36	5I	<u>8.4</u>	Shortage of training areas
37-38	5J	<u>6.7</u>	Inadequate training management
39-40	5K	<u>5.3</u>	Lack of time for proper training
41-42	5L	<u>8.6</u>	Shortage of qualified officers

Listed below are 12 obstacles to effective collective training.
Rank order them, 1 (worst obstacle) to 12 (least obstacle).

43-44	6A	<u>6.0</u>	Personnel turbulence (Unit generated)
45-46	6B	<u>5.7</u>	Resource (money, fuel, ammo) constraints
47-48	6C	<u>4.9</u>	Command directed activities
49-50	6D	<u>4.8</u>	Post support requirements
51-52	6E	<u>7.0</u>	People programs
53-54	6F	<u>7.2</u>	General administration
55-56	6G	<u>7.8</u>	Maintenance
57-58	6H	<u>5.7</u>	Shortage of capable NCO's
59-60	6I	<u>7.7</u>	Shortage of training areas
61-62	6J	<u>6.8</u>	Inadequate training management
63-64	6K	<u>5.3</u>	Lack of time for proper training
65-66	6L	<u>8.5</u>	Shortage of qualified officers

67-68

7

If ARTEP were to be used as a readiness test; in your opinion, what percentage of events passed would equal C-1 in training? (Do not consider personnel and equipment ratings.)

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Don't Know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99
								7.6			

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8

Soldier's Manuals/SQT describe the skills necessary for the individuals contribution to:

		Code	
4.6	1	ARTEP success	
13.1	2	Combat mission accomplishment	
79.2	3	Both 1 and 2	
3.1	7	Other	SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q 8.
	9	No Answer	
<u>100%</u>			

70

9

Successful completion of ARTEP is a valid test of unit training readiness:

		Code	
15.0	1	Strongly agree	
55.5	2	Agree	
15.2	3	Neutral or undecided	
11.5	4	Disagree	
2.9	5	Strongly disagree	
<u>100%</u>			

71

10

Unit readiness reporting procedures should be changed to make the training rating (C-1 to C-4) more objective (less a matter of the Commander's judgment):

		Code	
15.0	1	Strongly agree	
39.7	2	Agree	
20.4	3	Neutral or undecided	
18.3	4	Disagree	
6.6	5	Strongly disagree	
	9	No Answer	
<u>100%</u>			

How effective is the ARTEP in determining:

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

		Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Very Effective	Not Instructive At All	No ARTEP In My Unit or No Answer
72	11A Training strengths	1	2	3	4	9
			\bar{x} 1.7			
73	11B Training weaknesses	1	2	3	4	9
			\bar{x} 1.6			
74	11C Readiness Conditions	1	2	3	4	9
			\bar{x} 2.1			

75

12

Suppose you were provided with a Soldier's Manual expanded to specify priorities, time required for sustainment training, frequency of retraining, and resources required for an average individual to train for each SM task. In your opinion, how valuable would such detail in a Soldier's Manual be?

Code	
35.6	1. Very valuable
39.2	2. Of some value
16.3	3. Of little value
6.5	4. Not valuable
2.3	5. Do not know
	9. No Answer
<hr/> 100%	

76

13

Suppose your unit were provided with an ARTEP expanded to specify priorities, time required for sustainment training, frequency of retraining, and resources required for a typical unit to train for each ARTEP task. In your opinion, how valuable would such detail in an ARTEP be?

Code	
33.8	1. Very valuable
43.2	2. Of some value
15.8	3. Of little value
5.4	4. Not valuable
1.7	5. Do not know
	9. No Answer
<hr/> 100%	

CARD ONE
COLS.

VARIABLE

PAGE 6

How useful do you believe this expanded ARTEP would be for:

				Very useful	Somewhat useful	Undecided	Not very useful	Not useful at all	NO ANSWER
	(X)								
77	2.0	14A	Battalion Commanders	1	2	3	4	5	9
78	1.9	14B	Company Commanders	1	2	3	4	5	9
79	2.1	14C	Platoon Leaders	1	2	3	4	5	9
80	2.3	14D	Squad Leaders	1	2	3	4	5	9

END CARD ONE

CARD TWO
COLS.

VARIABLE

1
2-5

CARD TWO CODE = 2
ID NUMBER

				Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	NO ANSWER
	(X)							
6	1.9	15A	An expanded ARTEP would be very valuable for leaders and commanders	1	2	3	4	9
7	2.1	15B	An expanded SM would be very valuable for soldiers	1	2	3	4	9
8	2.4	15C	An expanded SM or ARTEP would add too much paperwork	1	2	3	4	9
9	2.5	15D	The ARTEP already includes enough information	1	2	3	4	9
10	2.5	15E	The SM already includes enough information	1	2	3	4	9
11	3.0	15F	An expanded ARTEP/SM is unnecessary, my commander tells me what to do	1	2	3	4	9
12	3.3	15G	An expanded ARTEP/SM is unnecessary, everyone knows the basic skills	1	2	3	4	9

With the current One Station Unit Training/AIT, what percentage of initial individual training must the following units provide to produce a trained soldier?

			CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE					NO ANSWER	
			100%	75%	50%	25%	0%		
13	2.4	16A	Infantry	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
14	2.2	16B	Armor	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
15	2.3	16C	Artillery	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
16	2.2	16D	Maintenance	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
17	2.2	16E	Communication	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
18	2.3	16F	Administrative	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
19	2.3	16G	Supply & Service	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
20	2.3	16H	Aviation	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>

If you could design the training system, how much training time would you devote to:

			CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE					NO ANSWER	
			Much more than now	Somewhat more than now	Same as now	Somewhat less than now	Much less than now		
21	1.9	17A	Training in the institution (CONUS service schools)	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
22	2.5	17B	Training in the unit schools (Shadow Schools)	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
23	2.4	17C	Training in the unit (Formal Supervised OJT)	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
24	2.1	17D	Training in the unit (Unit NCO/ Officer conduct)	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>

In your opinion to what extent does each of the following reduce innovation in small unit training?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

		VERY LITTLE EXTENT	LITTLE EXTENT	SOME EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	GREAT EXTENT	NO ANSWER	
25	18A	1	2	3 3.3	4	5	9	
26	18B	1	2	3 3.1	4	5	9	
27	18C	1	2	3 3.0	4	5	9	
28	18D	1	2	3 2.8	4	5	9	
29-30	18E	Write in your own ideas about situations that reduce innovation.						
SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q 19E.								

31

19

What experience have you had with the use of gaming/simulation (CATTS, CAMMS, BATTLE, DUNN-KEMPP, etc.)?

		Code	
34.8	1	No experience	
14.7	2	Have heard or read about them	
12.8	3	Have seen them used	
33.3	4	Some experience as player or controller	
4.4	5	Extensive experience as player or controller	
	9	No Answer	
<u>100%</u>			

32

20

How would you compare the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation with the traditional training of a Command Post Exercise (CPX)?

Code

10.9	1	Gaming/simulation is much more effective
20.0	2	Gaming/simulation is somewhat more effective
10.7	3	Gaming/simulation is equally effective
11.5	4	Gaming/simulation is somewhat less effective
4.3	5	Gaming/simulation is much less effective
42.7	8	I don't know
	9	No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

33

21

How would you compare the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation with a Field Training Exercise (FTX)?

Code

3.2	1	Gaming/simulation is much more effective
7.0	2	Gaming/simulation is somewhat more effective
8.3	3	Gaming/simulation is equally effective
17.9	4	Gaming/simulation is somewhat less effective
24.7	5	Gaming/simulation is much less effective
39.0	8	I don't know
	9	No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

34

22

How should gaming/simulation be used in tactical training for Battalion or Brigade command groups?

Code

.8	1	Should be the only source of training
17.8	2	Very useful, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with gaming/simulation occupying the most time
36.3	3	Useful add-on but, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with FTX/CPX occupying the most time
8.7	4	It's marginal, use only when we don't have time, money or area to train properly
1.6	5	Should not be used at all, just doesn't provide proper training
34.9	9	I don't know
	9	No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

23-56

23

In your opinion, what is the most effective method for evaluating the tactical proficiency of a Battalion Command Group (not the unit as a whole)?

Code	
16.7	01 Gaming/simulation w/o troops demonstrating formal ARTEP tasks
54.2	02 A field training exercise demonstrating formal ARTEP troops
17.7	03 Standard CPX
11.4	04 Write own idea
	99 No Answer

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q. 23.

100%

37

24

In your opinion how does the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, ORT/EDRE etc.) affect your unit readiness?

Code	
22.6	1 Greatly improves readiness
44.0	2 Moderately improves readiness
24.3	3 Slightly improves readiness
6.6	4 Has no impact whatsoever
1.7	5 Slightly degrades readiness
.6	6 Moderately degrades readiness
.2	7 Greatly degrades readiness
	9 No Answer

100%

How frequently is ARTEP used in your unit?

		CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE					No. times in My Unit or No. Answer		
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always			
38	<u>3</u> .8	25A	To plan training	1	2	3	4	5	
39	<u>3</u> .8	25B	To test performance	1	2	3	4	5	
40	<u>3</u> .8	25C	To identify unit strengths/weaknesses	1	2	3	4	5	
41	<u>3</u> .9	25D	As a guide for training	1	2	3	4	5	

42-43

26 What percentage of your ARTEP tasks is your unit training to?

Code

- 41.0 (01) 100%
- 44.8 (02) 75%
- 7.2 (03) 50%
- 3.4 (04) 25%
- 3.6 (05) Less than 25%
- (09) No ARTEP in my unit

100% If 50% or less, explain why SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR 2.26.

In your opinion, how do requirements to train to ARTEP standards affect:

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Greatly Improves	Somewhat Improves	Has No Effect	Somewhat Retards	Greatly Retards	No Answer
44	<input checked="" type="radio"/> 2.3	27A	Your conduct of SQT Training	1	2	3	4	5	9
45	2.1	27B	Your planning of Mission Training	1	2	3	4	5	9
46	3.1	27C	Your incorporation of Adventure Training into your program	1	2	3	4	5	9
47	2.1	27D	Your organization of Training (Training Management)	1	2	3	4	5	9

How often did you use the following in conducting training prior to ARTEP, SMS, TEC?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Never	Sometimes	Usually	Always	Don't Remember	No ANSWER OR Not in the Army
48	<input checked="" type="radio"/> 2.7	28A	Army Training Programs (ATP)	1	2	3	4	5	9
49	2.8	28B	Army Subject Schedules	1	2	3	4	5	9
50	3.4	28C	Field Manuals (FM)	1	2	3	4	5	9
51	2.8	28D	Army Regulations	1	2	3	4	5	9

How often do you feel that you are able to do the following in an innovative way?

(X)

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				All of the time	Most of the time	Some of the time	Seldom	Never	NO ANSWER
52	2.8	29A	Teach ARTEP tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
53	2.9	29B	Teach SM tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
54	2.8	29C	Perform ARTEP tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
55	2.9	29D	Perform SM tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9

56 30A How often have you been penalized for initiating new or different training methods?

Code

- .6 1. All of the time
- 3.9 2. Most of the time
- 20.6 3. Some of the time
- 25.4 4. Seldom
- 49.5 5. Never

9. Does not apply to me (or NO ANSWER)

100% If answered "all of the time" or "most of the time" please explain why

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q3

57 30B

58 31 How often have you been rewarded for initiating new or different training methods?

Code

- 5.1 1. All of the time
- 18.3 2. Most of the time
- 28.7 3. Some of the time
- 23.2 4. Seldom
- 19.5 5. Never
- 5.3 6. Does not apply to me

9. NO ANSWER

100%

59

32

How satisfied are you with the instructions you have received on how to train small units?

Code

9.9	1.	Very dissatisfied
23.6	2.	Somewhat dissatisfied
18.9	3.	Neither satisfied or dissatisfied
33.9	4.	Fairly satisfied
13.7	5.	Very satisfied
	9.	I have not received any instructions or No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

60-61

33

Which statement best expresses your opinion about the formal written small unit training guidance supplied by DA (e.g., ARTEP, Soldier's Manuals, Training Circulars, etc.)?

Code

47.8	01	They are very valuable and should be used as a reference when conducting training
42.9	02	They are valuable as general guidance but not always that useful when training is being conducted
6.6	03	They are of little value in that they do not take into consideration important local factors
2.7	04	Are of little value in that they (write in your own reason)
		<u>SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q33.</u>
	99	I have not seen written guidance or No Answer

Please indicate how often each of the following training facilities was available to you in conducting small unit training during the past year:

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Never	Sometimes	Usually	Whenever desired	No Answer OR Have not needed this facility
	(X)							
62	3.0	34A	Weapons Ranges	1	2	3	4	9
63	3.2	34B	Areas for Individual Training	1	2	3	4	9
64	3.1	34C	Area for Small Unit Training	1	2	3	4	9
65	3.3	34D	Classrooms	1	2	3	4	9
66	2.9	34E	General Field Training areas	1	2	3	4	9

Please indicate how often each of the following training aids was available to you in conducting small unit training during the past year.

				Never	Sometimes	Usually	Whenever Desired	Have Not Used This Training Aid OR No Answer
67	3.3	35A	Actual Equipment	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
68	2.4	35B	Models	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
69	2.3	35C	Mockups	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
70	2.9	35D	Graphic materials	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
71	2.5	35E	Displays	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
72	3.6	35F	Chalkboards	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
73	3.2	35G	Films	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
74	2.6	35H	Sand tables	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
75	2.5	35I	Training demonstrations	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
76	2.7	35J	Aggressor/OPFOR personnel and materials	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
77	2.2	35K	Prisoner of War Interrogation personnel	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
78	2.2	35L	Simulation/gaming	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
79	3.3	35M	TEC	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
80	3.0	35N	Video tape	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>

END CARD TWO

VARIABLE

CARD THREE CODE+3
ID NUMBER

On the average, how much time
do you personally devote each week to:

Less than one hour 1-2 hours 3-5 hours More than 5 hours NO ANSWER

Reading training support materials
(SM, TEC, ARTEP, ETC.)

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

6	36A	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
7	36B	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Reading all administrative literature
except training support materials
(DA Pamphlets, Circulars, etc.)

8	36C	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
9	36D	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Planning for training

10	36E	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
11	36F	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Meeting post support requirements

12	36G	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
13	36H	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Performing small unit (SQU/PLT)
training

14	36I	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
15	36J	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Performing company size unit training

16	36K	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
17	36L	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

Performing large unit (BN/BDE) training

18	36M	This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4	9
19	36N	This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4	9

What is your unit's current state of training readiness in the following areas?

(X)

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor	No Answer OR Not in TOE unit
20	2.4	37A	Tactics	1	2	3	4	5	9
21	2.2	37B	Weapons	1	2	3	4	5	9
22	2.2	37C	Support	1	2	3	4	5	9
23	2.4	37D	Maintenance	1	2	3	4	5	9
24	2.5	37E	Communication	1	2	3	4	5	9

What is your unit's current state of training in the following areas?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor	NO ANSWER
25	3.0	38A	Supervised OJT	1	2	3	4	5	9
26	2.4	38B	Unit Training	1	2	3	4	5	9
27	2.7	38C	Individual Training	1	2	3	4	5	9

What is your unit's level of proficiency in the following areas?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

				Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor	NO ANSWER
28	2.5	39A	Individual tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
29	2.4	39B	Squad/Section team tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
30	2.3	39C	Platoon tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
31	2.2	39D	Company/Battery tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9
32	2.3	39E	Battalion tasks	1	2	3	4	5	9

The following statements describe potential problems which may apply to a unit. Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following is a problem:

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

(X)

			To A Very Great Extent	To A Great Extent	To Some Extent	To A Little Extent	To A Very Little Extent	I don't know	No Answer	
33	4.0	40A	Lack of motivated officers willing to perform their duties	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
34	2.2	40B	Too many nontactical requirements imposed on the unit	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
35	2.3	40C	Shortage of qualified NCO's	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
36	3.0	40D	Lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hard skill areas	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
37	2.9	40E	Complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact on training	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
38	3.7	40F	The officers and NCO's are called to perform duties well beyond the normal experience level -- for example -- line companies commanded by lieutenants with less than two years service	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
39	2.4	40G	The training load made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
40	3.0	40H	Insuring day-to-day training is conducted	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
41	2.9	40I	Lack of motivated NCO's willing to adequately perform their duties	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
42	3.5	40J	Shortage of qualified officers	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
43	2.4	40K	Discipline. The need for stronger discipline in the new changing Army.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

Some units consistently outperform others even though mission and external conditions are essentially the same. How important do you think the following are in determining how well a unit performs?

(X)

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

			Very Unimportant	Fairly Unimportant	Fairly Important	Very Important	NO ANSWER
			1	2	3	4	9
44	3.7	41A	Esprit de' Corps				
45	3.2	41B	Personnel Turnover	1	2	3	4
46	3.7	41C	The Commander's Leadership ability	1	2	3	4
47	2.1	41D	Luck	1	2	3	4
48	2.4	41E	Unfair evaluations	1	2	3	4
49	3.6	41F	Quality of the NCO fill	1	2	3	4
50	3.1	41G	Individual Stamina/physical conditioning	1	2	3	4

In actual combat, how important do you think the following are to a unit's successful accomplishment of its mission:

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

			Very Unimportant	Fairly Unimportant	Fairly Important	Very Important	NO ANSWER
			1	2	3	4	9
51	3.9	42A	NCO Leadership				
52	2.5	42B	Hatred of the enemy	1	2	3	4
53	2.4	42C	Department of the Army guidance	1	2	3	4
54	3.8	42D	The condition of <u>Unit</u> equipment	1	2	3	4
55	3.7	42E	The condition of <u>Individual</u> equipment	1	2	3	4
56	3.1	42F	Patriotism	1	2	3	4
57	3.4	42G	SM training in peacetime	1	2	3	4
58	3.6	42H	Squad or platoon solidarity	1	2	3	4
59	3.5	42I	Battalion or brigade leadership	1	2	3	4
60	3.2	42J	ARTEP training in peacetime	1	2	3	4
61	3.8	42K	Platoon or company leadership	1	2	3	4
62	2.6	42L	Gaming simulation in operations	1	2	3	4

There is discussion today whether military service is primarily a "job" or a "calling". What do you think about the following statements?

CODE CIRCLED RESPONSE

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	NO ANSWER	
63	43A	Most soldiers have always thought of their Army service primarily as a job	1	2	3	4	9
				$\bar{x} \uparrow 2.5$			
64	43B	Most soldiers today think of their Army service primarily as a job	1		3	4	9
				$\bar{x} \uparrow 1.9$			
65	43C	Soldiers should think of their Army service primarily as a job	1	2		4	9
					$\bar{x} \uparrow 2.8$		
66	43D	Soldiers who think of their Army service primarily as a job will still perform well in actual combat	1	2	3	4	9
				$\bar{x} \uparrow 2.3$			
67	43E	Soldiers who think of their Army service primarily as a calling will perform better in combat than those who think of it as a job	1		3	4	9
				$\bar{x} \uparrow 2.0$			

68

44

Where can a soldier best learn the tasks necessary to meet combat proficiency levels?

Code	
18.3	1. Service School
.8	2. Shadow School
60.6	3. Unit Training Program
20.3	4. Supervised On The Job Training
	9. No Answer
100%	

69-70

45

In your opinion, what percentage of ARTEP tasks do soldiers in the field believe to be critical for combat success?

Code	
12.6	01 100%
52.0	02 75%
26.7	03 50%
4.3	04 25%
4.4	05 Less than 25%
	99 No experience with ARTEP
<u>100%</u>	

If less than 50%, explain why. **SEE SUPPLEMENTARY**

CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q.45.

(X)

Change "Not in TOE Unit" to a code of 98

71-72

7.0 46

In your opinion considering all the tasks required for combat success (in your unit), what percentage are covered by SQT's?

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Not in TOE Unit	No Answer
01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	99		99

73-74

7.1 47

Suppose the SQT were used as an individual combat readiness test, what percentage of tasks passed should equal combat readiness?

0%	10%	20%	30-4	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Not in TOE Unit	No Answer
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	99	99

75-76

2.1 48

In your opinion what percentage of SQT tasks are not required for combat success:

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Not in TOE Unit	No Answer
00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	99	99

77

49

How often must soldiers practice to insure that they can put on their protective masks within nine seconds of a surprise attack?

Code	
2.7	1 Daily
27.6	2 Weekly
52.3	3 Monthly
13.6	4 Once every six months
3.1	5 Once a year
.6	6 Less than once a year
	9 No Answer
<u>100%</u>	

A-21

78

50

How often must a company size unit practice deliberate attack (live fire) in order to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?

	<u>Code</u>	
.4	1	Daily
6.1	2	Weekly
45.3	3	Monthly
38.8	4	Once every six months
7.3	5	Once a year
2.0	6	Less than once a year
	9	No Answer
<u>100%</u>		

79

51

How often must a company size unit practice a night occupation of an assembly area to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?

	<u>Code</u>	
0.0	1	Daily
5.0	2	Weekly
57.4	3	Monthly
32.3	4	Once every six months
3.8	5	Once a year
1.6	6	Less than once a year
	9	No Answer
<u>100%</u>		

80

52

How often must soldiers train to insure they can correctly identify enemy vehicles, weapons, or aircraft to receive a "go" on an SQT test?

	<u>Code</u>	
3.9	1	Daily
32.1	2	Weekly
49.0	3	Monthly
13.4	4	Once every six months
1.0	5	Once a year
.6	6	Less than once a year
	9	No Answer
<u>100%</u>		

END CARD THREE

1
2-5

CARD FOUR **CODE = 4**

ID NUMBER

Rank order the following skills as to how fast you think they are forgotten (i.e., 1 = easiest to forget and 5 = hardest to forget. Answer 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 according to ease of forgetting.

CODE 1 THRU 5; NO ANSWER=9

\bar{x}

6	53A	Disassemble/Reassemble M16 Rifle	3.9
7	53B	Install TAB12 field telephone	3.5
8	53C	Recite General Orders/Guard Orders	2.1
9	53D	Apply four lifesaving measures	2.8
10	53E	Zero an M16 rifle	2.9

11-12

54

In your opinion what should be done to prevent individual soldiers from forgetting critical skills?

Code

- 1.1% 01 Overtrain individual (teach more initially so individual remembers better)
- 66.5% 02 Conduct frequent individual refresher training
- 26.3% 03 Both A and B
- 6.1% 04 None of the above. *(Write in another method)*

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q. 54

99 No Answer

13-14

55

What percent of combat-ready proficiency is your unit able to maintain? (Individual and collective skills)

Code

01. 10%	05. 6%	09. 2%
02. 9%	06. 5%	10. 1%
03. 8%	07. 4%	11. 0%
$\bar{x} = 3.9 \rightarrow$ 04. 7%	08. 3%	99. do not belong to a DCF unit OR No Answer

15

56

How many tours did you serve in Vietnam?

Code

- 39.5 1. None (skip QUESTION) OR No Answer
- 26.5 2. One full or partial tour
- 27.6 3. Two tours or extended first tour
- 6.3 4. More than two tours
- 100%

16

57

What kind of experiences did you have in Vietnam?

Code

13.1	1.	No unit I was in was ever in direct combat
6.1	2.	At least one unit was under fire but had no casualties
47.1	3.	At least one unit was under fire, had casualties, but I was not wounded
33.7	4.	Extended tough, heavy contact
	9.	No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

In your opinion, how likely is it that the United States will be involved in any of the following kinds of armed conflicts in the next 10 years:

(X)

	CODE	CIRCLED RESPONSE	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Fairly unlikely	Very unlikely	No Answer	
17	3.1	58A	In a full nuclear exchange	1	2	3	4	9
18	1.9	58B	As a peacekeeping force	1	2	3	4	9
19	2.3	58C	In a guerilla war	1	2	3	4	9
20	2.7	58D	In a large-scale conventional war	1	2	3	4	9
21	2.2	58E	In a limited conventional war	1	2	3	4	9
22	2.8	58F	In a war using tactical nuclear weapons in addition to conventional forces	1	2	3	4	9

23

59

Would you say your feelings about being in the military are:

Code

52.0	1	Strongly positive
41.5	2	Mostly positive
5.3	3	Mostly negative
1.2	4	Strongly negative
	9	No Answer
<hr/>		
100%		

ENLISTED PERSONNEL: skip questions 60 to 62, fill out questions 69 to 79.

OFFICER PERSONNEL: Fill out questions 60 to 68, skip questions 69 to 80.

For question 60, question 60 does not apply. Assign the appropriate code.

24	60	RANK	13.3	1.	0-1
			13.0	2.	0-2
			27.6	3.	0-3
			17.3	4.	0-4
			20.6	5.	0-5
			8.1	6.	0-6
			100%	0.	Not Applicable or No Answer

25	61	Source of Commission			
			<u>Code</u>		
			23.7	1.	USMA
			54.0	2.	ROTC
			18.0	3.	OCS
			1.9	4.	Direct
			1.4	5.	NG
			1.1	6.	Other (specify)
			100%	0.	Not Applicable or No Answer

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q. 61

26	62	Present Duty Assignment			
			<u>Code</u>		
			7.9	1.	Brigade Commander
			8.4	2.	Brigade S-3
			17.2	3.	Battalion Commander
			19.3	4.	Battalion S-3
			19.1	5.	Company Commander
			15.3	6.	Platoon Leader
			12.8	7.	Other (specify)
			100%	0.	Does not apply or No Answer

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q. 62

27

VARIABLE

63

How long have you been assigned to your present duty assignment?

Code

- 3.6% 1. less than 1 month
- 29.3 2. between 1 and 6 months
- 34.2 3. between 6 months and 1 year
- 29.9 4. between 1 and 2 years
- 2.5 5. between 2 and 3 years
- .6 6. more than 3 years
- 0. No Answer or not applicable

28

64

How long have you been assigned to your present unit?

Code

- 1.6% 1. less than 1 month
- 22.7 2. between 1 and 6 months
- 28.7 3. between 6 months and 1 year
- 33.3 4. between 1 and 2 years
- 10.9 5. between 2 and 3 years
- 2.7 6. greater than 3 years
- 0. No Answer or not applicable

29

65

What are your Army plans for the foreseeable future?

Code

- 67.8% 1. make the Army a career
- 21.0 2. continue on active duty ^{but undecided about} ~~making the Army a career~~
- 3.8 3. continue on active duty ^{but do not intend} ~~to make the Army a career~~
- 5.2 4. return to civilian life
- 2.2 5. retire
- 0. No Answer or not applicable

30

66

Indicate the highest service school attended:

Code

- 33.8% 1. Basic Officers Course
- 28.9 2. Advanced Officers Course
- 29.1 3. C&GSC or equivalent
- 8.2 4. Senior Service College
- 0. No Answer or not applicable

31-36 67 Write in your officer's specialty _____

37 68 Are you presently working in your primary MOS?

	<u>Code</u>	
87.6%	1	Yes
12.4	2	No
	0	No Answer

OFFICER PERSONNEL SKIP TO QUESTION 88

ENLISTED PERSONNEL FILL OUT QUESTIONS 69 TO 79

Note: For Officers, questions 69 thru 79 do not apply; Assign them a code of C. No Answer also is a 0

38 69 Rank

	<u>Code</u>	
1.9%	1.	E-1
.6	2.	E-2
0.0	3.	E-3
1.9	4.	E-4
14.6	5.	E-5
25.3	6.	E-6
36.1	7.	E-7
15.8	8.	E-8
3.8	9.	E-9
	0.	No Answer or not applicable

39 70 How did you first enter active service?

	<u>Code</u>	
68.4%	1.	Enlisted because I really wanted to be in the Army.
6.5	2.	Enlisted to avoid being drafted
20.0	3.	I was drafted
5.2	4.	Other (specify)
	0.	No Answer or not applicable

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY
CODING INSTRUCTIONS
FOR Q. 70.

40 71 Present Duty Assignment

	<u>Code</u>	
37.0	1.	Operations Sergeant
31.2	2.	Platoon Sergeant
18.2	3.	Squad Leader
13.6	4.	Other (specify)
100%	0.	No Answer or not applicable

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY
CODING INSTRUCTIONS
FOR Q. 71.

41

72 How long have you been assigned to your present duty station?

	<u>Code</u>
0.6%	1. less than 1 month
14.2	2. between 1 and 6 months
20.6	3. between 6 months and 1 year
29.0	4. between 1 year and 2 years
14.2	5. between 2 and 3 years
21.3	6. more than 3 years
	7. No Answer or not applicable

42

73 How long have you been assigned to your present unit?

	<u>Code</u>
1.3%	1. less than 1 month
14.8	2. between 1 and 6 months
21.9	3. between 6 months and 1 year
30.3	4. between 1 and 2 years
12.3	5. between 2 and 3 years
19.4	6. more than 3 years
	7. No Answer or not applicable

43

74 What are your Army plans for the foreseeable future?

	<u>Code</u>
51.0%	1. make the Army a career
13.1	2. continue on active duty but undecided about making the Army a career
3.3	3. continue on active duty but do not intend to make the Army a career
5.9	4. return to civilian life
26.8	5. retire
	6. No Answer or not applicable

44

75 What is the highest NCO course you have attended?

	<u>Code</u>
15.0	1. PNCOC (PTC)
32.5	2. BNCOC (BTC)
48.8	3. ANCOES
3.7	4. SMA
<u>100%</u>	

45 76 What grade high school did you attend? (Do not report if you did not attend high school.)
 SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q76

46-51 77 What is your MOS? CODE IS THIS NUMBER

52 78 Are you presently in your primary MOS?
Code
 83.3% 1. Yes
 16.7 2. No
 3. No Answer or Not Applicable

53 79 How did you acquire your training for this job?
Code
 1.9% 1. One-station-unit-training (OSUT)
 39.6 2. Military Service School or Training Center course (AIT)
 40.3 3. On-the-job training (OJT)
 0.0 4. Civilian acquired skill (including Stripes for Skills)
 3.9 5. Involuntarily reclassified with Service School or Training Center course
 5.8 6. Involuntarily reclassified without Service Schools or Training Center course
 8.4 7. Other (specify) SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q79
 8. No Answer or not applicable

ALL PERSONNEL PLEASE FILL IN REST OF QUESTIONNAIRE

54 80 How many years of active duty have you served? (round to nearest year)
 $\bar{X} = 11.2$

55-56 81 Present age $\bar{X} = 32.9$

57 82 Sex Code: 1=male, 2=female, 9=No Answer
 99.0% 1.0%

58 83 How much schooling have you had?
Code
 .2 1. completed grade school or less
 .6 2. some high school
 13.0 3. completed high school
 16.8 4. some college
 35.1 5. completed college
 10.1 6. some graduate school
 26.1 7. completed graduate school
 100% 9. No Answer $\bar{X} = 29$

CODE

VARIABLE

83-89

84

Write in type of unit (unit code from list)

- | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| 01 Infantry | 05 Air Defense | 39 DD/CH |
| 02 Infantry (Mech) | 06 Signal Corps | 40 Quartermaster |
| 03 Armor | 07 Military Police | 41 Trans. Corps |
| 04 Field Artillery | 08 Military Intel | 77 Other, Combat Sp |
| | | 88 Other, Service Sp |
| | | 99 No Answer |

For Questions 85 thru 88, any empty blanks (No Answer) are to be coded as blanks

81-84

85

What do you consider to be minimum platoon "present for duty" strength to achieve dynamic platoon training? (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength.)

ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER

76.8 81.2

Col 61 Col 62 Col 63 Col 64

65-68

86

What do you consider to be a minimum company "present for duty" strength to achieve dynamic company training? (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength.)

ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER

79.2 80.2

Col 65 Col 66 Col 67 Col 68

69-72

87

What do you consider to be the maximum platoon turbulence (personnel shifts within the platoon including movement from one squad/crew to another as well as personnel shifts out of the platoon to achieve Dynamic Platoon Training (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength.)

ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER

22.6 19.6

per quarter per quarter

Col 69 Col 70 Col 71 Col 72

73-76

88

What do you consider to be the maximum company turbulence (personnel shifts within the company and outside as well) to achieve Dynamic Company Training (Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned strength.)

ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER

230 19.8

per quarter per quarter

Col 73 Col 74 Col 75 Col 76

END CARD FOUR

1
2-5

CARD FIVE CODE = 5
ID NUMBER

Listed below are a number of missions or problem areas a typical unit might have to deal with in a three month period. Please:

89

1. First, look at the list and then add any problem areas or missions which your unit faces which are not included on the list. Please add these using the blank spaces at the end of the present list.
2. Second, use the first column (Column A) to indicate on the 5 point scale given below the importance you believe your superiors attach to these missions/problems. (5 the most important, 1 the least important)
3. Third, use Column B to indicate the importance that you believe should be attached to these missions/problems.
4. Fourth, use Column C to indicate how much of your time and attention is required by the mission/problem.
5. Finally, use Column D to indicate what percentage of the total effort of your unit was allocated over a three month period to each mission/problem. NOTE: Column D should add up to 100%.

USE THIS SCALE FOR COLUMNS A, B, C, ONLY (Enter Number Only)

Note: (5) Demanding/ Important (4) Above Average (3) Average (2) Below Average (1) Least Demanding/ Important

	Column A	COLUMN B	COLUMN C	COLUMN D
Mission or Problem Area	How Important/Demanding To Your Seniors	How Important/Demanding In Your View	How Demanding Your Time	% Total Effort Required
6-10 Drug Abuse Control	col. 6 DRUGA	col. 7 DRUGB	col. 8 DRUGC	col. 9-10 DRUGD
11-15 Community Relations	col. 11 CRA	col. 12 CRB	col. 13 CRC	col. 14-15 CRD
16-20 Race Relations	col. 16 RACIA	col. 17 RACIB	col. 18 RACIC	cols. 19-20 RACID
21-25 Small Unit Training	col. 21 SUTA	col. 22 SUTB	col. 23 SUTC	cols. 24-25 SUTD
26-30 Command Inspections	col. 26 CIA	col. 27 CIB	col. 28 CIC	cols. 29-30 CID
31-35 Operational Missions	col. 31 OMA	col. 32 OMB	col. 33 OMC	col. 34-35 OMD
36-40 Vehicular Maintenance	col. 36 VMA	col. 37 VMB	col. 38 VMC	cols. 39-40 VMD
41-45 Administration	col. 41 ADMINA	col. 42 ADMINB	col. 43 ADMINC	cols. 44-45 ADMIND
46-52	col. 46-47	col. 48-49	col. 50-51	col. 52-53
53-55	col. 53-54	col. 55-56	col. 57-58	col. 59-60

Note: No Answers Are coded as blanks.

Note: For other responses to question 89, see supplementary coding instructions for 89

- Each of the following are a number of missions or problem areas which your unit is expected to deal with in a three month period. Please:

1. First, look at the list and then add any problem areas or missions which you think you face which are not included on the list. Please add these to the blank spaces at the end of the present list.
2. Second, use the first column (Column A) to indicate on the 5 point scale given below the importance you believe your superiors attach to these missions/problems. (5 the most important, 1 the least important)
3. Third, use Column B to indicate the importance that you believe should be attached to these missions/problems.
4. Fourth, use Column C to indicate how much of your time and attention is required by the mission/problem.
5. Finally, use Column D to indicate what percentage of the total effort of your unit was allocated over a three month period to each mission/problem. NOTE: Column D should add up to 100%.

USE THIS SCALE FOR COLUMNS A, B, C, ONLY (Enter Number Only)

Note: (5) *Demanding/ Important (4) Above Average (3) Average (2) Below Average (1) Least Demanding Important

	Column A	COLUMN B	COLUMN C	COLUMN D
Mission or Problem Area	How Important/ Demanding To Your Seniors	How Important/ Demanding In Your View	How Demanding Your Time	% Total Effort Require
1. Drug Abuse Control	<u>\bar{X} = 3.5</u>	<u>3.2</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>5.9</u>
2. Community Relations	<u>2.9</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>2.2</u>	<u>5.0</u>
3. Race Relations	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.1</u>	<u>2.6</u>	<u>5.5</u>
4. Small Unit Training	<u>3.7</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>14.8</u>
5. Command Inspections	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>10.5</u>
6. Operational Missions	<u>4.3</u>	<u>4.6</u>	<u>4.0</u>	<u>19.3</u>
7. Vehicular Maintenance	<u>4.2</u>	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>15.2</u>
8. Administration	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.3</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>12.5</u>
9. _____	<u>4.2</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>3.6</u>
10. _____	<u>4.4</u>	<u>3.4</u>	<u>3.8</u>	<u>4.4</u>
			<u>100%</u>	

90-

90

Please feel free to make additional comments on the survey or on training issues which you have thought about as you completed this questionnaire. In other words, good training is vital to the kind of Army we all want to be in. If we didn't ask something we should have asked, tell us here.

SEE SUPPLEMENTARY CODING
INSTRUCTIONS FOR Q.90.

Appendix B

EVALUATING THE ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM
A PLAN FOR SURVEY ANALYSIS

Should deterrence fail, today's peacetime Army must be able to demonstrate appropriate combat effectiveness. There are many aspects to combat readiness, of course, but training readiness remains a critical factor. The Army Training System requires systematic, ongoing evaluation to ensure that it is contributing as desired to the combat readiness equation.

There are many dimensions to the evaluation of a complex system such as the Army has for training its soldiers. Some dimensions are amenable to logistical, budgetary, or personnel resource analysis and are beyond the scope of our present concern. However, the overall evaluation of the system in its final implementation--in the actual unit--can be facilitated by asking those leaders who are, in effect, the Army's primary trainers, to reflect on their experiences, their frustrations, their successes, their failures and their suggestions for changes. This type of evaluation can be performed through systematically analyzed data which are collected from samples of those leaders. The following is a plan for such an analysis to aid in the evaluation of the Army Training System.

INFORMATION AVAILABLE THROUGH SURVEY ANALYSIS

Survey research cannot provide a complete and objective picture of the Army Training System. It can, however, clearly describe the system as it is viewed by soldiers in the field who are in day-to-day contact with it. It can also examine how the system is perceived by people who are exposed to different parts of the system and who see different ways in which it limits or facilitates combat readiness.

The kinds of types of information and knowledge needed and which will be made available through survey analysis are summarized in Table 1. Knowledge and information of the types mentioned in Table 1 obviously do not translate directly to specific decisions, but the availability of such information should enhance by great measure the planning, implementation, and evaluation of Army training, since it should provide considerably more insight into the "on the ground" reality of the existing system.

To provide such information, however, requires systematic and thorough analysis of the data collected from Army trainers. In the next few pages the following will be presented: the logic of survey analysis as it applies to this problem, a conceptual model of the analysis, the phases of the analysis to be implemented, and methods of data presentation and reporting.

LOGIC OF SURVEY ANALYSIS

Since our task is to evaluate the Army Training System by summarizing the responses of our many informants or survey respondents, we will first

examine the extent to which there is consensus - unfortunately an unlikely event - we can simply take that to be a generally accepted view of reality. In the more likely event, when there is considerable variation in evaluation, we need to move to a more complex kind of analysis.

In this analysis we move to the identification of the geographical, organization, and social locus of those who see a particular aspect of Army training favorably or unfavorably. It is this process which is outlined in the second part of Table 1. As indicated there, the sources of the variation in perceptions, preferences, or evaluations of the respondents may be the respondents' differences in their backgrounds; in their training roles or environments; in their fundamental orientations and values; or, indeed, in some combination of these differences.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR ANALYSIS

It is possible to summarize these different sources of variation in respondents' evaluation of the Army Training System by providing a model. This model shows the conceptual ordering and causal directions of the factors leading to the variation in evaluations observed. Such a model is presented here as Figure 1. Figure 1 includes the variables listed in Table 1. (pg. B-7)

The model indicates that how soldiers evaluate the Army training is potentially the result of many characteristics not only of the training roles and environments from which they are observing the system, but also of their own background and their ways of looking at the world. For example, battalion commanders may look at training differently than squad leaders. In addition, battalion commanders in Europe may evaluate training in a different manner than do battalion commanders in CONUS, or a squad leader in a combat unit may see the relationship of training readiness to combat readiness in a different fashion than a squad leader in a transportation unit. On the other hand, any of the above differences may be more complex, e.g., if one battalion commander (or one squad leader) thinks a war in Europe is very likely and the other does not. In this last case, knowing the respondents' views on the probability of war is critical, for what one could easily have interpreted to be a positive evaluation of the training system may simply be apathy resulting from the belief that war is not likely anyway, so the training system is irrelevant in any case. The opposite sort of misinterpretation of the data could result from the individual's fundamental orientation toward his own military service. Those who are unhappy with their own Service are probably likely to be more critical of the training system than those in the same unit who are happy. Another case could involve a general unawareness of what training standards are required to meet necessary levels of proficiency. Thus, any systematic analysis must interpret the evaluations of Army training carefully and look not only at geographical and duty assignment differences as sources of variation, but also at fundamental orientations and values which can serve as intervening variables.

between those roles and environments and the evaluations of the Army Training System.

PHASES OF THE ANALYSIS

A systematic analysis of the collected data must proceed through several phases to ensure its accuracy and completeness. In addition, such an analysis allows the analyst to simplify the data structure to make it more amenable for analysis, presentation, and reporting.

Phase 1: Data Set Preparation and Editing

This phase requires (a) the development of a codebook which allows all the answers on the questionnaires to be translated into machine readable data, (b) coding of the questionnaires onto coding sheets, (c) the punching and verification of the data cards, (d) the building of a data file including labeling of variables, specification of missing data values, etc., and (e) the editing of the data file. For example, the first computer run will set up the Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) file and generate frequencies (the proportion who gave each answer) for the entire set of variables. This will be checked for values outside the range of acceptable values. If found, this will require (a) identifying the case or cases where the values occur, (b) returning to the questionnaire to find the correct values, (c) correcting the data in the SPSS file, and (d) checking the frequencies to verify corrections. Other more complex and time-consuming checks for consistency could be employed but are probably not necessary for this data set.

Phase 2: Univariate Analysis

This phase will let us look at the expected sources of variation one at a time. In other words, we will look at the variation in evaluation of each aspect of Army training which comes from each expected source of variation, e.g., duty assignment, theatre, type of unit, perceived probability of war, or career-orientation of the respondent, etc.

Depending on the nature of the variables involved, the amount of variance explained by the expected source of variation will be determined by cross-tabulation, analysis of variance, or correlational analysis. The statistical measures and coefficients indicating how important a source of variation each characteristic of the respondent is will be summarized; and for those aspects of the training system of most interest, the analysis will become more complex and will involve more than two variables. This will be done in two ways: through data reduction and through multivariate analysis.

Phase 4: Data Reduction

The questionnaire used in this study is long and complex with many

questions designed to measure the respondent's evaluation of Army training. To simplify the analysis, it will be useful to use a variety of techniques to condense the amount of data to be examined. This must be done carefully so that the analyst does not sacrifice accuracy in the search for simplicity. This process is termed data reduction and, in this case, will be based primarily on a series of correlational analyses followed by factor analyses (assuming that earlier univariate and bivariate analyses indicate that the variables selected are suitable for these kinds of statistical manipulations). These analyses will allow us to build indexes or scales which will summarize the information provided by the respondent to several questions.

Consolidating many questions or items into a smaller number of variables will serve two purposes. First, this data reduction will produce a number of multi-item indexes, which are generally more stable and reliable than single-item measures. Second, as indicated above, it will reduce the complexity of the material to a more manageable level. Through this procedure we may be able, for example, to create a limited set of indexes of training proficiency, combat effectiveness, or distractors.

Phase 5: Multivariate Analysis

Figure 1 reminds us that some explanatory variables (or sources of variation) will operate in conjunction with others to affect the evaluations of the respondent. In order to understand how these sources of variation operate together to create variation in the evaluations, we must go beyond bivariate analysis (which looks at the impact of one explanatory variable on one evaluation) to multivariate analysis (which looks at the simultaneous impact of more than one explanatory variable on the respondent's evaluation of some aspect of Army training). Thus, when discussing the conceptual model in Figure 1 we indicated that it may be important to know not only that a respondent is a battalion commander (and not a squad leader) but also that he is in Europe (not in CONUS) and that he commands an infantry battalion (not a transportation battalion) and that he thinks war is quite likely (not very unlikely). Only through such analyses can we sort out why there are different evaluations of some particular aspect of training. It helps us locate - geographically, organizationally, and socially where there are favorable evaluations and where there are unfavorable evaluations.

Phase 6: Baseline for Future Evaluations

Although it lies outside the scope of this particular analysis, it should be remembered that the next step, logically, is to do the study over (or replicate it) at a later time to see if there are any changes in evaluations. For example, is the system more positively or negatively evaluated (and presumably the system more effective or less so)? Can these

changes be attributed to changes in the training system or the changed complexity of weapons systems, or the external environment (such as changes in the technology or deployment or belligerence of potential adversaries)? Fully effective evaluation systems require ongoing means of evaluation. In addition to providing information on the current training system, these findings could represent a benchmark to interpret future evaluations of the same (or a different) system.

DATA PRESENTATION AND REPORTING

As described above, there are many phases to an analysis before meaningful findings can be presented. It will be the purpose of this analysis to review the data systematically and not just present large numbers of tables. In the short run, this means less weight to the report, but in the long run it means more understandable and meaningful numbers as well as that which is most critical - accuracy and interpretation. Efforts will be made to report findings in a fashion amenable to graphical presentation. The prior data reduction efforts and the systematic multivariate analysis will ensure that the findings to be presented reflect as accurately as possible the evaluations given by soldiers in the field of the Army Training System which they have routinely encounter first hand.

Table 1

INFORMATION AVAILABLE THROUGH SURVEY ANALYSIS

Overall Evaluations of Many Aspects of the Army Training System to Include:


- Factors in Combat Effectiveness
- Factors in Training Proficiency
- Factors in Training Evaluation
- Relationship of Training Readiness to Combat Readiness
- Distractors that Interfere with the Training System
- Need for Changes in the Training System
- Potential for Success of Suggested Changes in Training System

Geographical, Organizational, and Social Locus of Favorable and Unfavorable Evaluations of the Above Aspects of Army Training System as Determined by:

- Background and Demographic Characteristics of Respondent
 - Nonmilitary, e.g., education, age, or sex
 - Military, e.g., rank, years of service, career-orientation
- Training Roles and Environments of Respondent
 - Duty Assignment, e.g., Squad Leader to Brigade Commander
 - Type of Unit, e.g., Combat to Combat Service Support
 - Theatre, i.e., USAREUR or CONUS
- Fundamental Orientations and Values of Respondent Concerning:
 - Military Service, e.g., Feelings About Own Service
 - War, e.g., Estimates of Probability of War in Next 10 Years
 - Institution/Occupational Nature of Military, e.g., Orientation of Today's Soldier and Relationship to Combat

Figure 1

CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR EVALUATING THE ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM THROUGH SURVEY ANALYSIS



CHAPTER III

ARMY TRAINING STUDY SURVEY

As you may know the Army has been studying its training both in the training base and in the unit. In the fall of 1977 the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of TRADOC established the Army Training Study to assess individual and collective training--resources, programs, proficiency and readiness.

This questionnaire is part of that study through which we, the Study Group, are attempting to learn what you--the key trainers in the Army--think about some of the key issues in training today. Your opinions are needed so we can better understand training, both where we are today and where we want to be in the future. The survey instrument was prepared with the assistance of the Survey Branch of MILPERCEN and conforms to appropriate Department of the Army Regulations and the specific guidance of the Study Advisory Group chaired by the Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command with senior officer representation from HQ Forces Command and HQ US Army Europe.

If this study is to be helpful, it is vital that you answer each question as thoughtfully and frankly as possible. This is not a test; there are no right or wrong answers. However, your responses and comments will be an essential element in developing specific proposals. We need the benefit of your experience!

The completed questionnaires are processed by automated equipment which summarizes the answers in statistical form. Your own individual answers will remain strictly confidential, since they will be combined with those of many other persons in reports which are prepared.

Your commander will give you the questionnaire. It will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. After completion, please place the questionnaire in the envelope provided, seal and mail immediately. We are working under a severe time constraint and need your thoughtful opinions as rapidly as possible--please place in mail not later than 1 May 1978.

CIRCLE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE FOR EACH QUESTION

1. In your opinion, how does the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, EDRE, etc.) effect unit readiness in the Army as a whole?

1. Greatly improves readiness
2. Moderately improves readiness
3. Slightly improves readiness
4. Has no impact whatsoever
5. Slightly degrades readiness
6. Moderately degrades readiness
7. Greatly degrades readiness

2. To what extent is each of the following an effective way for the Army to evaluate unit effectiveness, in your opinion?

	To a very little extent	To a little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
Quarterly external evaluation	1	2	3	4	5
Scheduled Evaluation from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	1	2	3	4	5
An IG focused on training proficiency	1	2	3	4	5
Unit Commander's evaluation	1	2	3	4	5
Unscheduled evaluations from at least three levels higher in the chain of command	1	2	3	4	5

3. In your opinion, how good a measure of training readiness is:

	Very Good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor
The number of days training required to be fully combat ready as estimated by the Commander	1	2	3	4	5
The Commander's general judgement	1	2	3	4	5
SQT results	1	2	3	4	5
ARTEP results	1	2	3	4	5
REALTRAIN results	1	2	3	4	5
Gaming/Simulation (CAMMS/CATTS) results	1	2	3	4	5

4. In your opinion, how necessary is some measure of training readiness in addition to the Commander's judgement, in order to support request for training resources?

1. Not necessary at all
2. Somewhat necessary
3. Quite necessary
4. Very necessary

5. Listed below are 12 obstacles to effective individual training.
Rank order them, 1 (worst obstacle) to 12 (least obstacle).

- _____ Personnel turbulence (Unit generated)
- _____ Resource (money, fuel, ammo) constraints
- _____ Command directed activities
- _____ Post support requirements
- _____ People programs (EEO, Drug/Alcohol, OE, etc.)
- _____ General administration
- _____ Maintenance
- _____ Shortage of capable NCO's
- _____ Shortage of training areas
- _____ Inadequate training management
- _____ Lack of time for proper training
- _____ Shortage of qualified officers

6. Listed below are 12 obstacles to effective collective training.
Rank order them, 1 (worst obstacle) to 12 (least obstacle).

- _____ Personnel turbulence (Unit generated)
- _____ Resource (money, fuel, ammo) constraints
- _____ Command directed activities
- _____ Post support requirements
- _____ People programs
- _____ General administration
- _____ Maintenance
- _____ Shortage of capable NCO's
- _____ Shortage of training areas
- _____ Inadequate training management
- _____ Lack of time for proper training
- _____ Shortage of qualified officers

7. If ARTEP were to be used as a readiness test, in your opinion, what percentage of events passed would equal C-1 in training? (Do not consider personnel and equipment ratings.)

0%	10%	20%	30%	40%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	Don't Know
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	99

8. Soldier's Manuals/SQT describe the skills necessary for the individuals contribution to:

1 ARTEP success

2 Combat mission accomplishment

3 Both 1 and 2

9 Other _____

9. Successful completion of ARTEP is a valid test of unit training readiness:

1 Strongly agree

2 Agree

3 Neutral or undecided

4 Disagree

5 Strongly disagree

10. Unit readiness reporting procedures should be changed to make the training rating (C-1 to C-4) more objective (less a matter of the Commander's judgment):

1 Strongly agree

2 Agree

3 Neutral or undecided

4 Disagree

5 Strongly disagree

11. How effective is the ARTEP in determining:

	Very Effective	Somewhat Effective	Not Very Effective	Not Effective At All	No ARTEP In My Unit
Training strengths	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Training weaknesses	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Readiness Conditions	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>

12. Suppose you were provided with a Soldier's Manual expanded to specify priorities, time required for sustainment training, frequency of retraining, and resources required for an average individual to train for each SM task. In your opinion, how valuable would such detail in a Soldier's Manual be?

1. Very valuable
2. Of some value
3. Of little value
4. Not valuable
8. Do not know

13. Suppose your unit were provided with an ARTEP expanded to specify priorities, time required for sustainment training, frequency of retraining, and resources required for a typical unit to train for each ARTEP task. In your opinion, how valuable would such detail in an ARTEP be?

1. Very valuable
2. Of some value
3. Of little value
4. Not valuable
8. Do not know

14. How useful do you believe this expanded ARTEP would be for:

	Very useful	Somewhat useful	Undecided	Not very useful	Not useful at all
Battalion Commanders	1	2	3	4	5
Company Commanders	1	2	3	4	5
Platoon Leaders	1	2	3	4	5
Squad Leaders	1	2	3	4	5

15.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
An expanded ARTEP would be very valuable for leaders and commanders	1	2	3	4
An expanded SM would be very valuable for soldiers	1	2	3	4
An expanded SM or ARTEP would add too much paperwork	1	2	3	4
The ARTEP already includes enough information	1	2	3	4
The SM already includes enough information	1	2	3	4
An expanded ARTEP/SM is unnecessary, my commander tells me what to do	1	2	3	4
An expanded ARTEP/SM is unnecessary, everyone knows the basic skills	1	2	3	4

6. With the current One Station Unit Training/AIT, what percentage of initial individual training must the following units provide to produce a trained soldier?

	100%	75%	50%	25%	0%
Infantry	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Armor	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Artillery	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Maintenance	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Communication	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Administrative	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Supply & Service	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Aviation	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>

7. If you could design the training system, how much training time would you devote to:

	Much more than now	Somewhat more than now	Same as now	Somewhat less than now	Much less than now
Training in the institution (CONUS service schools)	1	2	3	4	5
Training in the unit schools (Shadow Schools)	1	2	3	4	5
Training in the unit Formal Supervised OJT)	1	2	3	4	5
Training in the unit Unit NCO/ Officer conduct)	1	2	3	4	5

18. In your opinion to what extent does each of the following reduce innovation in small unit training?

	To very little extent	To little extent	To some extent	To a great extent	To a very great extent
Inspectors from higher levels of command note deviation from training guidance and react negatively	1	2	3	4	5
Too much subject matter must be presented in a limited amount of time. It is impossible to accomplish anything other than what is prescribed	1	2	3	4	5
Many NCO's and junior officers who present training are not used to thinking for themselves, thus they do not develop innovative techniques	1	2	3	4	5
Trainers and commanders are unaware that they may take new approaches and use "novel" techniques in training	1	2	3	4	5

Write in your own ideas about situations that reduce innovation _____

19. What experience have you had with the use of gaming/simulation (CATTS, CAMMS, BATTLE, DUNN-KEMPF, etc.)?

- 1 No experience
- 2 Have heard or read about them
- 3 Have seen them used
- 4 Some experience as player or controller
- 5 Extensive experience as player or controller

20. How would you compare the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation with the traditional training of a Command Post Exercise (CPX)?

- 1 Gaming/simulation is much more effective
- 2 Gaming/simulation is somewhat more effective
- 3 Gaming/simulation is equally effective
- 4 Gaming/simulation is somewhat less effective
- 5 Gaming/simulation is much less effective
- 8 I don't know

21. How would you compare the training effectiveness of gaming/simulation with a Field Training Exercise (FTX)?

- 1 Gaming/simulation is much more effective
- 2 Gaming/simulation is somewhat more effective
- 3 Gaming/simulation is equally effective
- 4 Gaming/simulation is somewhat less effective
- 5 Gaming/simulation is much less effective
- 8 I don't know

22. How should gaming/simulation be used in tactical training for Battalion or Brigade command groups?

- 1 Should be the only source of training
- 2 Very useful, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with gaming/simulation occupying the most time
- 3 Useful add-on but, should be used in conjunction with other training such as FTX/CPX with FTX/CPX occupying the most time
- 4 It's marginal, use only when we don't have time, money or area to train properly
- 5 Should not be used at all, just doesn't provide proper training
- 8 I don't know

23. In your opinion, what is the most effective method for evaluating the tactical proficiency of a Battalion Command Group (not the unit as a whole)?

- 1 Gaming/simulation w/o troops demonstrating formal ARTEP tasks
 - 2 A field training exercise demonstrating formal ARTEP troops
 - 3 Standard CPX
 - 4 Write own idea _____
-

24. In your opinion how does the present training system (ARTEP, SM, SQT, ORT/EDRE etc.) affect your unit readiness?

- 1 Greatly improves readiness
- 2 Moderately improves readiness
- 3 Slightly improves readiness
- 4 Has no impact whatsoever
- 5 Slightly degrades readiness
- 6 Moderately degrades readiness
- 7 Greatly degrades readiness

25. How frequently is ARTEP used in your unit?

	Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
To plan training	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
To test performance	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
To identify unit strengths/ weaknesses	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
As a guide for training	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>

26. What percentage of your ARTEP tasks is your unit training to?

- (1) 100%
- (2) 75%
- (3) 50%
- (4) 25%
- (5) Less than 25%
- (9) No ARTEP in my unit

If 50% or less, explain why _____

27. In your opinion, how do requirements to train to ARTEP standards affect:

	Greatly Improves	Somewhat Improves	Has No Effect	Somewhat Retards	Greatly Retards
Your conduct of SQT Training	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Your planning of Mission Training	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Your incorporation of Adventure Training into your program	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
Your organization of Training (Training Management)	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>

28. How often did you use the following in conducting training prior to ARTEP, SMS, TEC?

	Never	Sometimes	Usually	Always	Don't Remember	Not in the Army then
Army Training Programs (ATP)	1	2	3	4	8	9
Army Subject Schedules	1	2	3	4	8	9
Field Manuals (FM)	1	2	3	4	8	9
Army Regulations	1	2	3	4	8	9

29. How often do you feel that you are able to do the following in an innovative way?

	All of the time	Most of the time	Some of the time	Seldom	Never
Teach ARTEP tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Teach SM tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Perform ARTEP tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Perform SM tasks	1	2	3	4	5

30. How often have you been penalized for initiating new or different training methods?

1. All of the time
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Seldom
5. Never
9. Does not apply to me

If answered "all of the time" or "most of the time" please explain why

31. How often have you been rewarded for initiating new or different training methods?

1. All of the time
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Seldom
5. Never
6. Does not apply to me

32. How satisfied are you with the instructions you have received on how to train small units?

1. Very dissatisfied
2. Somewhat dissatisfied
3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied
4. Fairly satisfied
5. Very satisfied
9. I have not received any instructions

33. Which statement best expresses your opinion about the formal written small unit training guidance supplied by DA (e.g., ARTEP, Soldier's Manuals, Training Circulars, etc.)?

- 1 They are very valuable and should be used as a reference when conducting training
 - 2 They are valuable as general guidance but not always that useful when training is being conducted
 - 3 They are of little value in that they do not take into consideration important local factors
 - 4 Are of little value in that they (write in your own reason) _____
-
- 9 I have not seen written guidance

34. Please indicate how often each of the following training facilities was available to you in conducting small unit training during the past year:

	Never	Sometimes	Usually	Whenever desired	Have not needed this facility
Weapons Ranges	1	2	3	4	9
Areas for Individual Training	1	2	3	4	9
Area for Small Unit Training	1	2	3	4	9
Classrooms	1	2	3	4	9
General Field Training areas	1	2	3	4	9

35. Please indicate how often each of the following training aids was available to you in conducting small unit training during the past year.

	Never	Sometimes	Usually	Whenever Desired	Have Not Needed This Training Aid
Actual Equipment	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Models	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Mockups	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Graphic materials	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Displays	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Chalkboards	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Films	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Sand tables	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Training demonstrations	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Aggressor/OPFOR personnel and materials	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Prisoner of War Interroga- tion personnel	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Simulation/gaming	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
TEC	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>
Video tape	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>9</u>

On the average, how much time do you personally devote each week to:

	Less than one hour	1-2 hours	3-5 hours	More than 5 hours
Reading training support materials (SM, TEC, ARTEP, ETC.)				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Reading all administrative litera- ture except training support mat- erials (DA Pamphlets, Circulars, etc.)				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Planning for training				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Meeting post support requirements				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Performing small unit (SQD/PLT) training				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Performing company size unit training				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4
Performing large unit (BN/BDE) training				
This is how it is <u>now</u>	1	2	3	4
This is how I'd <u>like</u> it to be	1	2	3	4

37. What is your unit's current state of training readiness in the following areas?

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very Poor	Not in TOE unit
Tactics	1	2	3	4	5	9
Weapons	1	2	3	4	5	9
Support	1	2	3	4	5	9
Maintenance	1	2	3	4	5	9
Communication	1	2	3	4	5	9

38. What is your unit's current state of training in the following areas?

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor
Supervised OJT	1	2	3	4	5
Unit Training	1	2	3	4	5
Individual Training	1	2	3	4	5

39. What is your unit's level of proficiency in the following areas?

	Very good	Good	Fair	Poor	Very poor
Individual tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Squad/Section team tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Platoon tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Company/Battery tasks	1	2	3	4	5
Battalion tasks	1	2	3	4	5

40. The following statements describe potential problems which may apply to a unit. Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following is a problem:

	To A Very Great Extent	To A Great Extent	To Some Extent	To A Little Extent	To A Very Little Extent	I don't know
Lack of motivated officers willing to perform their duties	1	2	3	4	5	8
Too many nontactical requirements imposed on the unit	1	2	3	4	5	8
Shortage of qualified NCO's	1	2	3	4	5	8
Lack of experienced administrative personnel in the hard skill areas	1	2	3	4	5	8
Complete turnover of personnel every 7 or 8 months and the impact on training	1	2	3	4	5	8
The officers and NCO's are called to perform duties well beyond the normal experience level -- for example -- line companies commanded by lieutenants with less than two years service	1	2	3	4	5	8
The training load made difficult by changing priorities of higher headquarters	1	2	3	4	5	8
Insuring day-to-day training is conducted	1	2	3	4	5	8
Lack of motivated NCO's willing to adequately perform their duties	1	2	3	4	5	8
Shortage of qualified officers	1	2	3	4	5	8
Discipline. The need for stronger discipline in the new changing Army.	1	2	3	4	5	8

41. Some units consistently outperform others even though missions and external conditions are essentially the same. How important do you think the following are in determining how well a unit performs?

	Very <u>Unimportant</u>	Fairly <u>Unimportant</u>	Fairly Important	Very Important
Esprit de' Corps	1	2	3	4
Personnel Turnover	1	2	3	4
The Commander's Leadership ability	1	2	3	4
Luck	1	2	3	4
Unfair evaluations	1	2	3	4
Quality of the NCO fill	1	2	3	4
Individual Stamina/ physical conditioning	1	2	3	4

42. In actual combat, how important do you think the following are to a unit's successful accomplishment of its mission:

	Very <u>Unimportant</u>	Fairly <u>Unimportant</u>	Fairly Important	Very Important
NCO Leadership	1	2	3	4
Hatred of the enemy	1	2	3	4
Department of the Army guidance	1	2	3	4
The condition of <u>Unit</u> equipment	1	2	3	4
The condition of <u>Individual</u> equipment	1	2	3	4
Patriotism	1	2	3	4
SM training in peacetime	1	2	3	4
Squad or platoon solidarity	1	2	3	4
Battalion or brigade leader- ship	1	2	3	4
ARTEP training in peacetime	1	2	3	4
Platoon or company leadership	1	2	3	4
Gaming/simulation in peacetime	1	2	3	4

43. There is discussion today whether military service is primarily a "job" or a "calling". What do you think about the following statements?

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Most soldiers have always thought of their Army service primarily as a job	1	2	3	4
Most soldiers <u>today</u> think of their Army service primarily as a job	1	2	3	4
Soldiers <u>should</u> think of their Army service primarily as a job	1	2	3	4
Soldiers who think of their Army service primarily as a job will still perform well in actual combat	1	2	3	4
Soldiers who think of their Army service primarily as a calling will perform better in combat than those who think of it as a job	1	2	3	4

44. Where can a soldier best learn the tasks necessary to meet combat proficiency levels?

- 1 Service School
- 2 Shadow School
- 3 Unit Training Program
- 4 Supervised On The Job Training

45. In your opinion, what percentage of ARTEP tasks do soldiers in the field believe to be critical for combat success?

- | | | | |
|---|------|---|--------------------------|
| 1 | 100% | 4 | 25% |
| 2 | 75% | 5 | Less than 25% |
| 3 | 50% | 9 | No experience with ARTEP |

If less than 50%, explain why _____

46. In your opinion considering all the tasks required for combat success (in your unit), what percentage are covered by SQT's?

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----------------|
| 0% | 10% | 20% | 30% | 40% | 50% | 60% | 70% | 80% | 90% | 100% | Not in TOE Unit |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 99 |

47. Suppose the SQT were used as an individual combat readiness test, what percentage of tasks passed should equal combat readiness?

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----------------|
| 0% | 10% | 20% | 30% | 40% | 50% | 60% | 70% | 80% | 90% | 100% | Not in TOE Unit |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 99 |

48. In your opinion what percentage of SQT tasks are not required for combat success:

- | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----------------|
| 0% | 10% | 20% | 30% | 40% | 50% | 60% | 70% | 80% | 90% | 100% | Not in TOE Unit |
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 99 |

49. How often must soldiers practice to insure that they can put on their protective masks within nine seconds of a surprise attack?

- 1 Daily
- 2 Weekly
- 3 Monthly
- 4 Once every six months
- 5 Once a year
- 6 Less than once a year

50. How often must a company size unit practice deliberate attack (live fire) in order to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?

- 1 Daily
- 2 Weekly
- 3 Monthly
- 4 Once every six months
- 5 Once a year
- 6 Less than once a year

51. How often must a company size unit practice a night occupation of an assembly area to receive a satisfactory rating on an ARTEP?

- 1 Daily
- 2 Weekly
- 3 Monthly
- 4 Once every six months
- 5 Once a year
- 6 Less than once a year

52. How often must soldiers train to insure they can correctly identify enemy vehicles, weapons, or aircraft to receive a "go" on an SQT test?

- 1 Daily
- 2 Weekly
- 3 Monthly
- 4 Once every six months
- 5 Once a year
- 6 Less than once a year

53. Rank order the following skills as to how fast you think they are forgotten (i.e., 1 = easiest to forget and 5 = hardest to forget. Answer 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 according to ease of forgetting)

- _____ Disassemble/Reassemble M16 Rifle
- _____ Install TA312 field telephone
- _____ Recite General Orders/Guard Orders
- _____ Apply four lifesaving measures
- _____ Zero an M16 rifle

54. In your opinion what should be done to prevent individual soldiers from forgetting critical skills?

- 1 Overtrain individual (teach more initially so individual remembers better)
- 2 Conduct frequent individual refresher training
- 3 Both A and B
- 4 None of the above. (Write in another method) _____

55. What percent of combat-ready proficiency is your unit able to maintain? (Individual and collective skills)

- | | | |
|---------|--------|---------------------------------|
| 1. 100% | 5. 60% | 9. 20% |
| 2. 90% | 6. 50% | 10. 10% |
| 3. 80% | 7. 40% | 11. 0% |
| 4. 70% | 8. 30% | 99. do not belong to a TOE unit |

56. How many tours did you serve in Vietnam?

- 1. None (skip QUESTION _____)
- 2. One full or partial tour
- 3. Two tours (or extended first tour)
- 4. More than two tours

57. What kind of experiences did you have in Vietnam?

1. No unit I was in was ever in direct combat
2. At least one unit was under fire but had no casualties
3. At least one unit was under fire, had casualties, but I was not wounded
4. Extended tough, heavy contact

58. In your opinion, how likely is it that the United States will be involved in any of the following kinds of armed conflicts in the next 10 years:

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Fairly unlikely	Very unlikely
In a full nuclear exchange	1	2	3	4
As a peacekeeping force	1	2	3	4
In a guerilla war	1	2	3	4
In a large-scale conventional war	1	2	3	4
In a limited conventional war	1	2	3	4
In a war using tactical nuclear weapons in addition to conventional forces	1	2	3	4

59. Would you say your feelings about being in the military are:

- 1 Strongly positive
- 2 Mostly positive
- 3 Mostly negative
- 4 Strongly negative

ENLISTED PERSONNEL: skip questions 60 to 69, fill out questions 69 to 79.

OFFICER PERSONNEL: Fill out questions 60 to 68, skip questions 69 to 80.

For Officer Personnel:

60. Rank

1. 0-1
2. 0-2
3. 0-3
4. 0-4
5. 0-5
6. 0-6

61. Source of Commission

1. USMA
2. ROTC
3. OCS
4. Direct
5. NG
6. Other (specify) _____

62. Present Duty Assignment

1. Brigade Commander
2. Brigade S-3
3. Battalion Commander
4. Battalion S-3
5. Company Commander
6. Platoon Leader
7. Other (specify) _____

63. How long have you been assigned to your present duty assignment?

1. less than 1 month
2. between 1 and 6 months
3. between 6 months and 1 year
4. between 1 and 2 years
5. between 2 and 3 years
6. more than 3 years

64. How long have you been assigned to your present unit?

1. less than 1 month
2. between 1 and 6 months
3. between 6 months and 1 year
4. between 1 and 2 years
5. between 2 and 3 years
6. greater than 3 years

65. What are your Army plans for the foreseeable future?

1. make the Army a career
2. continue on active duty but undecided about making the Army a career
3. continue on active duty but do not intend to make the Army a career
4. return to civilian life
5. retire

66. Indicate the highest service school attended:

1. Basic Officers Course
2. Advanced Officers Course
3. C&GSC or equivalent
4. Senior Service College

67. Write in your officer's specialty _____

68. Are you presently working in your primary MOS?

1. yes 2. no

OFFICER PERSONNEL SKIP TO QUESTION 80 .

ENLISTED PERSONNEL FILL OUT QUESTIONS 69 to 79 .

69. Rank

1. E-1
2. E-2
3. E-3
4. E-4
5. E-5
6. E-6
7. E-7
8. E-8
9. E-9

70. How did you first enter active service?

1. Enlisted because I really wanted to be in the Army.
2. Enlisted to avoid being drafted
3. I was drafted
4. Other (specify) _____

71. Present Duty Assignment

1. Operations Sergeant
2. Platoon Sergeant
3. Squad Leader
4. Other (specify) _____

72. How long have you been assigned to your present duty station?

1. less than 1 month
2. between 1 and 6 months
3. between 6 months and 1 year
4. between 1 year and 2 years
5. between 2 and 3 years
6. more than 3 years

73. How long have you been assigned to your present unit?

1. less than 1 month
2. between 1 and 6 months
3. between 6 months and 1 year
4. between 1 and 2 years
5. between 2 and 3 years
6. more than 3 years

74. What are your Army plans for the foreseeable future?

1. make the Army a career
2. continue on active duty but undecided about making the Army a career
3. continue on active duty but do not intend to make the Army a career
4. return to civilian life
5. retire

75. What is the highest NCO course you have attended?

1. PNCOC (PTC)
2. BNCOC (BTC)
3. ANCOES
4. SMA

76. What other NCO schools have you attended (e.g., Division NCO academy) write in if any _____

77. Write in your MOS. _____

78. Are you presently in your primary MOS?

1. yes 2. no

79. How did you acquire your training for this job?

1. One-station-unit-training (OSUT)
2. Military Service School or Training Center course (AIT)
3. On-the-job training (OJT)
4. Civilian acquired skill (including Stripes for Skills)
5. Involuntarily reclassified with Service School or Training Center course
6. Involuntarily reclassified without Service Schools or Training Center course
7. Other (specify) _____

AI PERSONNEL PLEASE FILL IN REST OF QUESTIONNAIRE

80. How many years of active duty have you served? (round to nearest year)

81. Present age (write in) _____

82. Sex: 1. Male 2. Female

83. How much schooling have you had?

1. completed grade school or less
2. some high school
3. completed high school
4. some college
5. completed college
6. some graduate school
7. completed graduate school

14. Write in type of unit (enter code from list) _____

- | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 01 Infantry | 05 Air Defense | 09 OD/CH |
| 02 Infantry (Mech) | 06 Signal Corps | 10 Quartermaster |
| 03 Armor | 07 Military Police | 11 Trans. Corps |
| 04 Field Artillery | 08 Military Intel | 77 Other, Combat Spt |
| | | 88 Other, Service Spt |

15. What do you consider to be minimum platoon "present (Write in)
for duty" strength to achieve dynamic plt. training? ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER
(Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned
strength.)..... _____ § _____ §

16. What do you consider to be a minimum company "present (Write in)
for duty" strength to achieve dynamic co. training? ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER
(Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned
strength.)..... _____ § _____ §

17. What do you consider to be the maximum platoon
turbulence (personnel shifts within the platoon in-
cluding movement from one squad/crew to another as well
as personnel shifts out of the platoon to achieve ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER
Dynamic Platoon Training (Please answer in terms of
TOE strength, not assigned strength.)..... _____ § _____ §
per quarter per quarter

18. What do you consider to be the maximum company
turbulence (personnel shifts within the company and
outside as well) to achieve Dynamic Company Training ENLISTED NCO/OFFICER
(Please answer in terms of TOE strength, not assigned
strength.)..... _____ § _____ §
per quarter per quarter

89. Listed below are a number of missions or problem areas a typical unit might have to deal with in a three month period. Please:

1. First, look at the list and then add any problem areas or missions which your unit faces which are not included on the list. Please add these using the blank spaces at the end of the present list.
2. Second, use the first column (Column A) to indicate on the 5 point scale given below the importance you believe your superiors attach to these missions/problems. (5 the most important, 1 the least important)
3. Third, use Column B to indicate the importance that you believe should be attached to these missions/problems.
4. Fourth, use Column C to indicate how much of your time and attention is required by the mission/problem.
5. Finally, use Column D to indicate what percentage of the total effort of your unit was allocated over a three month period to each mission/problem. NOTE: Column D should add up to 100%.

USE THIS SCALE FOR COLUMNS A, B, C, ONLY (Enter Number Only)

Note: (5) *Demanding/ Important (4) Above Average (3) Average (2) Below Average (1) Least Demanding Important

	Column A	COLUMN B	COLUMN C	COLUMN D
Mission or Problem Area	How Important/ Demanding To Your Seniors	How Important/ Demanding In Your View	How Demanding Your Time	% Total Effort Required
1. Drug Abuse Control	_____	_____	_____	_____
2. Community Relations	_____	_____	_____	_____
3. Race Relations	_____	_____	_____	_____
4. Small Unit Training	_____	_____	_____	_____
5. Command Inspections	_____	_____	_____	_____
6. Operational Missions	_____	_____	_____	_____
7. Vehicular Maintenance	_____	_____	_____	_____
8. Administration	_____	_____	_____	_____
9. _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
10. _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
			100%	

90. Please feel free to make additional comments on the survey or on training issues which you have thought about as you completed this questionnaire. In other words, good training is vital to the kind of Army we all want to be in. If we didn't ask something we should have asked, tell us here.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS OF TRAINING

Attrition and Reenlistment

One of the benefits of good training is that it permits the Army to better meet its mission of deterrence. With respect to other benefits of good training, such as improved morale and motivation, the Army has very little reliable data to support or deny the contention that good training will or will not resolve the difficult problems of pay, the male/female controversy, MOS mismatch, personnel turbulence/turnover, and deadline equipment. There is some sketchy data, however, which may allow insights on the importance of training to morale, job satisfaction, and general esprit.

People join the Army for reasons that fall into three categories: incentives (41.8 percent), personal reasons (27.2 percent), and patriotic reasons (26.0 percent). Specifically, under incentives, 19.3 percent join to become eligible for GI educational benefits, while 17.9 percent join to learn a skill or trade in civilian life. Other incentives make up the remaining 4.6 percent. Thus, the Army is attracting people who want to take advantage of its ability to train and its willingness to support people who want training.

ENLISTMENT CATEGORY/REASONS ¹	Percent
1. Enlistment Options - Incentives	41.8
a. To become eligible for GI educational benefits	19.3
b. To learn a skill/trade to use in civilian life	17.9
c. The training choice option that I wanted was available.	2.1
d. The enlistment cash bonus was available to me	1.1
e. The Army area/station of choice option that I wanted was available.	1.1
f. The unit of choice option that I wanted was still available.	0.3

Table 1. Percent of Enlistments by Category/Reasons for First-Term Soldiers¹

The reasons why first-term soldiers do not reenlist are also illuminating.

¹Data from Job/Career Satisfaction Survey, MODD, MILPERCEN, Feb 1977.

SEPARATION REASONS	Percent
a. The pay and allowances are too low.	9.8
b. I think there is too much concern for such things as haircuts, appearance, and discipline.	9.8
c. I joined to become eligible for GI educational benefits.	9.7
d. The amount of busy work, harassment, and extra duties.	9.6
e. I think there is very little "real work" to do in the Army.	9.5
f. I did not intend to serve more than one enlistment.	8.9
g. I joined to learn a skill/trade to use in civilian life, and I have done that.	6.4

Table 2. Separation Reasons for First-Term Soldiers Who Indicated They Definitely Plan to Separate²

Issues such as pay and allowances, post-Army educational benefits, and the soldier's desire to learn a trade for use in civilian life are reasons for separation over which the Army has very little control. Other issues, such as the proverbial harassment and job-related complaints, provide 28.9 percent of the reasons for first-term soldiers separating after the first term. When contrasted with issues which might be properly called situational, duty hours, and living conditions, these reasons for separation are given 1.9 and 1.2 percent respectively. Good leadership could help alleviate some of the problems which the first-term soldiers list as reasons for not reenlisting. Coupling leadership with job satisfaction could assist the Army in improving reenlistment rates from first-term soldiers.

Incentives for reenlistment is the third topic about which much survey work has been accomplished. According to findings from the MILPERCEN 1977 Job Satisfaction Survey, the key factor in reenlistment was interesting work. In fact, it was seen to be the best predictor of both job satisfaction and reenlistment; analysis of all variables: grade, sex, education level, race, and marital status confirmed this finding. It is interesting to note here that regardless of a soldier's sex, or any other variable, an interesting, challenging job is the most important element of job satisfaction.

Conclusions which can be drawn from this preliminary and fragmentary data are:

- a. Quality training is an important factor in attracting recruits.
- b. Inefficient use of other time continues to have a negative impact on soldier attitudes. The Army needs quality work/training to keep recruits.

2. Ibid.

This contention is supported by Lyman Porter and Richard Steers in a paper, prepared for a 1977 OSD and ONR (Office of Naval Research) conference on First Term Enlisted Attrition, discussing certain factors which affect the individual's commitment to the institution. According to Porter and Steers, people enter an organization "with certain needs, desires, skills, etc., and expect to find a work environment where they can utilize their abilities and satisfy many of their basic needs. When the organization provides such opportunities, the likelihood of increasing commitment is apparently enhanced." Two factors connected with commitment are job characteristics and personal work experience. Commitment is likely where the job is defined as challenging and there is open communication among and between the various command levels. Work experience, in addition to assisting the socialization process, will govern the faith the person has in the organization. Moreover, personal work experience, together with the shared experience of others, contributes to development of a strong commitment to the organization which can be enhanced by a reward system. Porter and Steers conclude that "one way to reduce personnel turnover (i.e., attrition) is to focus on building employee commitment to the organization."

Substantiating Porter and Steers on these issues is data from the DCSPER Command Climate Survey, February 1977. Analysis showed that soldiers who spend an inordinate amount of time (50 percent or more) working in areas not associated with their DMOS (duty MOS) had less positive views of such general issues as reenlistment, job satisfaction, and work morale. The same survey also showed that challenge, interest, and importance of present duties was the best predictor of reenlistment for first-term soldiers.

Yet David Gottleib in another paper given at the OSD/ONR conference, "Attrition: The Absorption and Integration of Newcomers", presents a different point of view in his analysis, which was based on survey work with college students and full time employed youth. Gottleib says that, "given rising expectations of the young and a decline in career opportunities which match expectations, an escalation in restlessness and mobility with more and more of the young taking more and more of their lifetime in deciding upon and an acceptable self-concept and an acceptable accommodation with their society." The implication for the military is that, since today's youth are taking more time to settle down, and mature, perhaps the Army should be recruiting an older, more stable, first-term soldier. Data presented in Human Readiness Report IV shows that the Army has stabilized reenlistment rates at approximately 20 percent since 1975. When compared with the seven most important reasons for leaving the service (table 2), as previously stated, it is only possible for the Army to affect three of the reasons.

As possible solutions to the attrition problem Gottleib points to re-search in work satisfaction: "The more evidence of achievement and achievement recognition, the greater the likelihood of career satisfaction and career stability." In addition, he would try to eliminate the boredom factors. Indeed, in the 1977 Command Climate Survey the most important reason given by career soldiers for not reenlisting (11.6 percent) was the amount of busy work, harassment, and extra duties. The next biggest reason (8.3 percent) was the proverbial complaints about discipline, haircuts, and appearance.

The foregoing analysis suggest certain conclusions:


- a. Assist the soldier in understanding and identifying with the Army's objectives and goals.
- b. Demonstrate to the soldier that his/her immediate supervisors are concerned about his/her welfare.
- c. Place people in situations where they can achieve goals that are meaningful to them.
- d. Provide a supportive environment where the individual's training is properly utilized and rewarded.
- e. Understand that reenlistment rates will probably remain low for first-term soldiers.
- f. Begin recruiting older, mature first-term soldiers.

Training Implications


The Army Administration Center in its 10th monograph, A Survey of Soldiers' Opinions (1977) surveyed 2383 soldiers from E-1 to O-6. A number of the survey questions dealt directly with the relationship of training to the individual and unit. Since the survey results have been released, several serious methodological flaws have been discovered. For example, senior personnel are overrepresented and some of the questions were ambiguous or misleading. The results, however, used with proper caution, can give the Army some important insights for the implications of training.

How important is training to the unit? In an attempt to assess the impact of training on the unit morale and job satisfaction, item 14 of the survey asked whether, "Meaningful training can provide a remedy for problems of motivation, morale, and job satisfaction for you." Response categories ranged from strongly agree (5) to strongly disagree (1). That training is considered important is demonstrated by a mean response of 4.07. The next charts show the responses broken out by rank.

14. MEANINGFUL TRAINING CAN PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION, MORALE, AND JOB SATISFACTION FOR YOU.




14. MEANINGFUL TRAINING CAN PROVIDE A REMEDY FOR PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION, MORALE, AND JOB SATISFACTION FOR YOU.




These data suggest that soldiers, irrespective of rank, want more training. However, in item 22, they were presented the statement: "There are so many mandatory (other than training) requirements from above, that your organization is not able to do the training needed to insure combat ready/effectiveness. They replied in an agree strongly (1) scale to disagree strongly (5) scale; the mean was 2.7. The breakout by rank (table below) seems to show that the people responsible for training feel much more strongly about the issue than those above who are imposing the requirements.

22. THERE ARE SO MANY MANDATORY (OTHER THAN TRAINING) REQUIREMENTS FROM ABOVE, THAT YOUR ORGANIZATION IS NOT ABLE TO DO THE TRAINING NEEDED TO INSURE COMBAT READY/EFFECTIVENESS.



22. THERE ARE SO MANY MANDATORY (OTHER THAN TRAINING) REQUIREMENTS FROM ABOVE, THAT YOUR ORGANIZATION IS NOT ABLE TO DO THE TRAINING NEEDED TO INSURE COMBAT READY/EFFECTIVENESS.



Moreover, the data tend to be supported by responses to the following three questions. Respondents were asked to choose the three activities most important to their seniors, to their subordinates, and to themselves. The comparison contrasts support for training at varying levels of command.

6. THE ACTIVITIES MOST IMPORTANT TO YOUR SENIORS ARE:

	Frequency of Response
1. Vehicular or weapon system maintenance	1270
2. Unit operational missions	998
3. <u>Individual, squad, or team training</u>	<u>664</u>
4. Physical training	664
5. Command inspection	626
6. Post or installation support	602
7. <u>Platoon, company, or battalion training</u>	<u>595</u>
8. Unit administration	537
9. Drug/alcohol abuse prevention or control	531
10. Community relations	252
11. Other	<u>122</u>
	6823 of maximum 7146

*7. THE ACTIVITIES MOST IMPORTANT TO YOUR SUBORDINATES ARE:

	Frequency of Response
1. <u>Individual, squad, or team training</u>	<u>1224</u>
2. Vehicular or weapon system maintenance	880
3. Unit operational missions	879
4. Physical training	586
5. <u>Platoon, company, or battalion training</u>	<u>586</u>
6. Unit administration	573
7. Community relations	419
8. Drug/alcohol abuse prevention or control	389
9. Post or installation support	347
10. Command inspection	274
11. Other	<u>183</u>
	6357 of maximum 7146

*8. THE ACTIVITIES MOST IMPORTANT TO YOU ARE:

	Frequency of Response
1. <u>Individual, squad, or team training</u>	1285
2. Vehicular or weapon system maintenance	1087
3. Unit operational missions	1042
4. <u>Platoon, company, or battalion training</u>	664
5. Physical training	612
6. Unit administration	611
7. Community relations	415
8. Drug/alcohol abuse prevention or control	397
9. Post or installation support	292
10. Command inspection	194
11. Other	<u>149</u>
	6372 of maximum 7146

COMBINED RESPONSES (RANK ORDERED)

	Senior	Subordinate	Self
1. Vehicular or weapon system maintenance	1	2	2
2. Unit operational	2	3	3
3. <u>Individual, squad or team training</u>	3	1	1
4. Physical training	4	4	5
5. Command inspection	5	10	10
6. Post or installation support	6	9	9
7. <u>Platoon, company or battalion training</u>	7	5	4
8. Unit administration	8	6	6
9. Drug/alcohol abuse prevention or control	9	8	8
10. Community relations	10	7	7
11. Other	11	11	11

The tables illustrate that more senior personnel in the chain of command have differing priorities than to their subordinates.

This finding was further verified through the responses to Question 4, in which they were again given 3 choices.

*4. THE GREATEST OBSTACLES TO TRAINING ARE:

	Frequency of Response
Personnel turbulence and under-staffing	889
Command directed activities	774
Resource (money, fuel, ammo) constraints	762
Post support requirements	726
Inadequate training management	719
Shortage of capable NCOs	647
General administration	563
Maintenance	555
People programs	425
Shortage of training areas	310
Other	<u>169</u>
	6539 of maximum 7100

A major problem illustrated by the data is that the first choice revolves around the issues of personnel turbulence and under-staffing which are not mutually compatible. In fact, "shortage of capable NCOs," may encompass understaffing, by eliminating personnel turbulence, one can see that command-directed activities are viewed as the most important problem. This is underscored by responses to item 22 concerning the effects on training of mandatory requirements from above. In addition the Army Training Study respondents, asked to rank-order the obstacles to both unit and individual training, rank post support and command-directed activities as the most important obstacle to training.

The Leadership Survey suggests that good training not only aids in increasing combat readiness but it also can be an important factor in increasing morale and motivation. The Army's investment in training devices

such as REALTRAIN, SCOPES, and MILES provides an important vehicle for more realistic training. The Army Research Institute tests in 1976 and 1977 both in CONUS and USAREUR with REALTRAIN demonstrated that "REALTRAIN squads exhibited an enhanced capability to accomplish their mission following engagement simulation training." The tests also showed that REALTRAIN provided psychological rewards leading to increased job satisfaction, troop morale, and motivation. The Army Training Study Survey (see Gaming/Simulation, Chapter II, this volume) seemed to say that soldiers did not like this form of training device. However, through correlation analysis, it was discovered that those who had used this method were extremely pleased with it. A conclusion that may be drawn here is:

a. REALTRAIN and other simulation devices should be given a high priority for training.

b. A supportive environment for training in its use and then proper utilization must be developed.

In the course of the Army Training Study's search to measure the importance and effect of training on other than readiness issues, other survey efforts are underway in the Army: the Organizational Effectiveness Training Center and the Human Readiness Development branch of DCSPER are both conducting tests on the mental health of the Army. The issue of training is treated only peripherally in both surveys. When analysis is completed, however, they should give the Army a better idea of how the various aspects of morale, job satisfaction, leadership, and communication fit together.

Having studied the trainers, a logical extension of the ARTS survey is a need to survey the attitudes of the products of Army training. This would include individual soldiers as well as noncommissioned soldiers who are products of NCOES and officers in the career schooling system. Separate survey instruments should be used to differentiate between those who train in the unit and those in the institution.

Surveys should also be developed to tie together the various efforts at such diverse agencies as: ARI; MODD, MILPERCEN; Human Resources Development, DCSPER; OETC; the Army Study Program, OCSA; and DCST, TRADOC to learn how the various aspects of job satisfaction, morale, motivation, and training complement one another. Significant data collection plans will also have to be developed to gather data for the improvement of the BTM. Improving training readiness in an efficient manner is our goal. The survey effort mounted at ARTS has shown that there is a reasonable amount of data available. However, the data has no common linkage; the Army must strive to use its research tools to better meet its goals.

END

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