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This thesis is an investigation into the measurement and analysis of the relationship between defense contractor risk and profit levels as compared to commercially oriented firms' risk and profit levels. Past studies that have attempted to quantify the interrelationship of risk and profit are examined. Hurdle's leverage, risk, market structure, and profitability model is used as a basis for the current model of risk and profitability. Empirical analyses of defense contractor risk and profit relationships are performed using least squares regression analysis, Chow tests, and three stage simultaneous regression analysis.

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A Pragmatic Assizement of Defense Contractor Risk, Profitability, and Debt: 1976-1984

by

David Joseph Louk Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., Virginia Commonwealth University, 1973

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation into the measurement and analysis of the relationship between defense contractor risk and profit levels as compared to commercially oriented firms' risk and profit levels. Past studies that have attempted to quantify the interrelationship of risk and profit are examined. Hurdle's leverage, risk, market structure, and profitability model is used as a basis for the current model of risk and profitability. Empirical analyses of defense contractor risk and profit relationships are performed using least squares regression analysis, Chow tests, and three stage simultaneous regression analysis.

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### I. INTRODUCTION

## A. PURPOSE

Defense oriented firms have been studied extensively in the past to determine if the remuneration they receive is commensurate with a reasonable profit level. The defense industry is usually compared to the commercially oriented industry as a basis in profit level studies. The importance of equitable profit levels for defense firms is stated in the objectives of the <u>Defense Financial and Investment</u> <u>Review</u>, as, "Reform of federal procurement practices (are important) to insure the effective and efficient spending of public funds and at the same time maintain the viability of the defense industrial base." [Ref. 1:p. I-1] Sector She She show and

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Past studies of defense industry profitability have been attacked on numerous issues. Martin in his work on contractor risk points out, "previous studies have been widely criticized for biased premises, nonrepresentative samples, inaccurate data, and misleading variations in statistical averages." [Ref. 2:p. 10] In addition to the above inadequacies in previous studies, risk had not been factored in as a regulator of profit until Martin broached the risk factor in his study of the issue in <u>An Empirical</u> <u>Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984</u>. Martin says,

None of the prior studies has totally reconciled the fact that rates of return are not completely comparable for having been earned under varying exposures to risk. Rather than ask what defense contractors' observed rates of return are, a more appropriate question would be whether defense contractors are appropriately rewarded for creative and wise risk taking. [Ref. 2:p. 10]

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The purpose of this study is to expand on Martin's work exploring the profit versus risk issue. A basis for this exploration is the model which was constructed by Gloria Hurdle in 1974. Hurdle's model, which analyzed a cross section of American firms, will be adapted to analyze commercial versus defense firms while measuring risk, profit, and debt.

This investigation will seek a determination of profit, or return on equity levels, for defense firms, and compare those levels to commercially oriented industries. The profit levels will be examined for the amount and influence of risk involved and the effect of risk on profit levels.

#### **B. OVERVIEW**

In order to comprehend the profit versus risk relationship, previous work on this relationship must be examined. Chapter II takes a look at Martin's work on contractor risk and Hurdle's model for measuring risk and profit.

With a solid foundation of knowledge of the profit versus risk issue, a model for measuring these factors in defense and commercial firms is developed in Chapter III. The empirical formulation of profit and risk levels is presented in what the author calls the Boger model.

Chapter IV attempts to empirically assess the results of the Boger model. Conclusions drawn from this assessment are presented in Chapter V.

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### II. MARTIN AND HURDLE ANALYSIS OF RISK AND PROFIT

This chapter explores some of the previous work that has been attempted in the field of risk and profit forecasting or the explanation of profit as a factor of risk. Both profit and risk are easily quantifiable, but as the following studies show, they are not easily captured in a model which makes simultaneous predictions of risk and/or profit.

### A. MARTIN ANALYSIS

Wayne Martin in his paper, <u>An Empirical Assessment of</u> <u>Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984</u>, "analyzed four possible methods for the evaluation and quantification of defense contractor risk." [Ref. 1:p. 121] Martin did a meanvariance analysis of rate of return, capital asset pricing model, mean-variance analysis of backlog, and mean-variance analysis of five-year defense program elements. Martin used 13 DOD oriented firms and 36 commercially oriented firms for his data base.

Martin's objective was to quantify the relationship between defense contractors' risk and rate of return. He showed that while risk can be empirically assessed and rate of return can easily be measured, the two factors do not fit smoothly in a simple model tying the two factors of risk and rate of return together.

#### **B. HURDLE ANALYSIS**

In 1974 Gloria Hurdle presented what will be called the Hurdle model. This model is a simultaneous three-equation regression model that looked at leverage, risk, market structure, and profitability. Hurdle's model attempted to explain and quantify the relationships that exist between leverage, market structure, risk, and profitability. Hurdle used 228 United States manufacturing firms that covered 85 different industries in the 1960's.

Hurdle based her model on previous studies completed by Hall and Weiss, 1967; Shepard, 1971, 1972; Stigler, 1963; Kilpatrick, 1968; Collins and Preston, 1969; and Gale, 1972. All of these authors "have included a risk variable or a financial structure variable or both in a linear regression model. They commonly represented the degree of risk by the variability of profit over time (hereafter denoted  $\sigma$ )." [Ref. 3:p. 478]

According to Hurdle, stockholders are overwhelmingly risk averters who require a higher return, a risk premium as it were, for taking on more risk. Hurdle stated that when using profit variability for risk, its correlation with rate of return should be positive when the risk premium hypothesis is used. [Ref. 3:p. 478]

Hurdle stated that "there are two major hypotheses concerning risk and debt: (1) risk premium--high risk leads

to high rate of return. (2) debt--requires low business risk, but causes large financial risk." [Ref. 3:p. 478]

According to Hurdle, a business's risk should be low under a minimum of two conditions. The first condition is when the industry is riskless. The second condition is when the business has the power to maintain stable profit through control of the industry's price or market structure. Because of this, a third condition must be included. Market power lowers business risk and allows for higher debt and rate of return.

These relationships described by Hurdle are conceptually illustrated in Figure 1. [Ref. 3:p. 479]



Figure 1. Market Power

The coefficients of these variables in a regression will be unknown a priori regardless of the variable used to estimate the business risk. Hurdle stated in her paper, The upper loop indicates a positive relationship between business risk and return on equity, while the lower loop indicates a negative relationship. Similarly, the relationship between debt and profitability is unpredictable. If the bottom loop dominates then debt and profits would be positively correlated. However, if low debt reflects large business risk, then the upper loop implies a negative correlation between debt and profitability. [Ref. 3:p. 479] alan bisisisin **saada kada**an kadaad

Hurdle uses a graph to show how risk is related to earnings on equity when considering two different types of firms, one being risk averse and the other being less risk averse.

Figure 2 [Ref. 3:p. 479] shows the earnings on equity plotted against risk to stockholders. Curve I is the risk averse firm, while curve II is the less risk averse firm. Risk to stockholders includes both business and financial risk.



Figure 2. The Earnings-Risk Curve

#### Hurdle describes the curves as:

Business risk varies from industry to industry, but it can be partially controlled by the firm, i.e., there is large inter-industry variation. Earnings and risk increase together up to some maximum (points A and A'), where the cost of debt becomes so high that earnings decrease with further debt. This is due to the rate of interest rising as debt increases. The firm is assumed to have a utility function, from which it decides the point on the earningsrisk curve which maximizes utility. The more horizontal the indifference curves, the more averse the risk to each firm is. Thus, the risk averse firm might choose point G, while a less risk averse firm would prefer point B.

Curve II represents a firm with an alternative market structure. The ability of a firm to control price should decrease its riskiness (business risk), which would allow it to increase its debt (and thus increase return on equity) without increasing risk to stockholders. Thus an advantaged firm (one with market power) would have an earnings-risk curve somewhat like curve II in Figure 2.

compare points curves One can on these two representing the same debt. Consider point B of Figure 2. This point represents some level of debt and some level of financial risk associated with that debt. One can locate the point on curve II corresponding to that same debt. Since financial risk corresponding to the same debt will be the same for both firms, but business risk will be lower for firm II, its risk to stockholders will be lower. Second, the earnings of firm II are higher because of its market power, plus the lower cost of its capital. Thus, B' (which represents the same debt as B) must lie somewhere between points D and E.

This diagram shows the relationships among risk, earnings, and leverage depending on the utility functions of firms and must therefore be determined empirically. For example, if firm I chooses point B, and firm II chooses point C, then firm II will have higher debt, higher earnings, and higher total risk to stockholders. On the other hand, if firm II chooses point F, it will have lower debt, lower risk and higher earnings. Debt, therefore, cannot be used to measure business risk, since both C and F have the same business risk but different levels of debt. [Ref. 3:p. 480]

# C. EQUATIONS

Hurdle's hypotheses are that can be used to measure total risk and that financial structure reflects an opportunity for the businessman to increase return on equity. She employs three dependent variables which are risk, financial structure, and rate of return using a threeequation simultaneous regression model to test the hypothesis. VEDERER'N DER

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## 1. <u>Risk</u>

According to Hurdle, "a large market share or strong oligopoly group should reduce business risk, because market share is usually related to market power or the ability to control price." [Ref. 3:p. 480] Size can be used to spread loses which decrease . Business risk may be alleviated by advertising intensity because it creates market power and also because it is an expense which can be cut when profits start to drop off.

## 2. <u>Debt</u>

"High-risk firms should have lower debt." [Ref. 3:p. 480] Hurdle also states that fast growing firms are likely to have high debt. The reasons for this are that the firm may be out of equilibrium due to fast or unexpected growth. Another reason for high debt among fast growth firms is that stockholders prefer debt for financing growth instead of new stock issues which dilute equity.

3. Profits

Hurdle's premise is that, "market share and the extent of oligopoly should be correlated with higher profits by allowing firms some control over price." [Ref. 3:p. 480]

The equations to describe debt, risk, and profit are:

- Risk = constant market share advertising assets - concentration of market + (total assets/sales) + debt + demand variance

### D. HURDLE'S CONCLUSIONS

Hurdle's research enabled her to make a tentative indication that while market power keeps risk at a lower level than firms with low-market power, both high and lowmarket power firms have about the same relative levels of debt. Market structure (i.e., control over price) is the determining factor for profit differences among similar firms.

## III. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the data sources and methodology used in the analysis of the data. The empirical formulation of the data is presented in the Boger model.

A. THE DATA

The data base has its foundation in Martin's work, An Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984 [Ref. 2]. Martin based his work on 49 different companies for the years 1976-1984 broken into two groups consisting of 36 commercially oriented firms and 13 defense oriented firms. The 36 commercially oriented firms had less than 30 percent Department of Defense sales, and the 13 defense firms had greater than 30 percent Department of Defense sales.

This investigation uses the same 49 companies for the years 1976-1984 as a basis. This group of firms has been reduced to 13 defense firms and 24 commercially oriented firms. The reduction in commercially oriented firms is due to the lack of backlog data for the 12 discarded firms. The 37 firms used in this work are contained in Tables 1 and 2.

Each company has nine variables used in this study which are contained in the Appendix. These nine variables are discussed below.

## TABLE 1

# SAMPLE OF 24 COMMERCIALLY-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS

Company	NYSE <u>Symbol</u>
AVCO Corporation	AV
Control Data Corporation	CDA
E-Systems, Inc.	ESY
Emerson Electric Company	EMR
Fairchild Industries, Inc.	FEN
General Electric Company	GE
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.	GT
Gould, Inc.	GLD
Harris Corporation	HRS
Hercules, Inc.	HPC
Honeywell, Inc.	HON
International Business Machines	IBM
Motorola, Inc.	MOT
Penn Central Corporation	PC
RCA Corporation	RCA
The Signal Companies, Inc.	SGN
Singer Company	SMF
Sperry Corporation	SY
TRW Inc.	TRW
Teledyne, Inc.	TDY
Tenneco, Inc.	TGT
Textron, Inc.	TXT
Todd Shipyards Corp.	TOD
Westinghouse Electric Corp.	WX

# TABLE 2

# SAMPLE OF 13 DOD-ORIENTED CONTRACTORS

Company	NYSE Symbo]
Boeing Company	BA
FMC Corporation	FMC
General Dynamics Corporation	GD
Grumman Corporation	GQ
Litton Industries Inc.	LIT
Lockheed Corporation	LK
Martin Marietta Corporation	ML
McDonnell Douglas Corporation	MD
Northrop Corporation	NOC
Raytheon Company	RTN
Rockwell International Corp.	ROK
Sanders Associates, Inc.	SAA
United Technologies Corp.	UTX

Backlog (BKLG) consists of those orders which cannot currently be delivered but will be filled within a later time period. Backlog data was collected from the SEC 10K reports in the same manner as described in Martin's <u>An</u> <u>Empirical Assessment of Defense Contractor Risk 1976-1984</u> [Ref. 1:p. 110].

Debt (DEBT) is defined as the total liabilities of a firm as reported on the SEC 10K reports.

Assets (ASST) is defined as the total assets of a firm as reported on the SEC 10K reports.

Profit variation (PVAR) is a proxy variable for risk. PVAR is the result of taking the current year rate of return minus the mean rate of return for the years 1976-1984 and squaring the result.

Leverage (LEV) is the result of the current year debt divided by the sum of current year debt and current year shareholders' equity.

Assets divided by sales (ASSAL) is current year assets divided by current year sales for the year in question.

Sales (SALES) are a revenue transaction where goods or services are delivered to a customer in return for cash or an obligation to pay. Sales figures were taken directly from each firm's SEC 10K reports.

Shareholders' equity (SHEQ) is the owners' equity of each firm. Shareholders' equity was taken directly from each firm's SEC 10K reports.

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Return on equity (ROE) is the rate of return on common shareholders equity calculated as:

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 $ROE = \frac{\text{net income after taxes}}{\text{capital stock + surplus + retained earnings}}$ 

#### B. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the equations involved as derived from Hurdle's model [Ref. 3:p. 481] discussed earlier in Chapter II. Hurdle used three equations to describe risk, debt, and profits. The three equations, with their expected signs are described and contrasted below.

Hurdle's equation for risk is:

Risk = constant - market share - advertising - asset - concentration of market + (total assets/sales) + debt + demand variance

Boger's equation for risk is:

**PVAR** = constant - backlog + leverage - asset

In the Boger model, backlog is used to capture market share, concentration of market, demand variance, and advertising used in Hurdle's equation. Debt was captured by the same method used by Hurdle, but is called leverage in the Boger model. Recall that leverage is the result of debt divided by the sum of debt and shareholders' equity.

Hurdle's equation for debt is:

Boger's equation for debt is:

Debt = constant + backlog - return on equity - PVAR + asset + (total assets/sales)

Once again, market share, growth in sales, and concentration of market are captured in backlog. Hurdle's profit is stated in the Boger equation as return on equity. Risk is measured by the term PVAR. The other terms in the two equations are the same except for debt. Debt in the Boger model is simply the current year total debt.

Hurdle's final equation is for profit.

Profit = constant + market share + advertising ± asset + concentration of market ± debt ± risk

The Boger profit equation is:

Return on equity = constant + backlog - leverage - asset + PVAR

As before, backlog was used to capture the esoteric terms (market share, advertising, and concentration of market) used in the Hurdle model. The other terms remain the same.

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## IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the empirical analysis and the implications of this analysis. The methods of investigation are ordinary single equation regression for the combined firms, defense firms, and the commercial firms; Chow tests on the regression of individual years, and regression of three simultaneous equations for the combined years of 1976-1984.

### A. ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION

The data contained in Table 3 show how the regressions for the Boger model compare to the Hurdle model for the year 1984. Similar results were obtained for the years 1983-1984. Results for the Boger model were in most cases not statistically significant.

The following differences were observed when comparing both defense firms and commercial firms combined to the Hurdle model. Profit variability is reduced by the constant factor in the Boger model for risk and is increased in the Hurdle model. The reason is that the profit variable is a fairly static term over the long run, and the constant is negative to dampen out the effects of the other variables in the equation. The Boger debt model has two variables which differ from the Hurdle debt model. These terms are profit variability and assets divided by sales. Profit variability

## TABLE 3

## ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION VARIABLES

### COMBINED FIRMS

ROE = Constant + BKLG - LEV - ASST + PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
<b>PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST</b>	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + Debt - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant $\pm$ BKLG $\pm$ ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle
DEFENSE FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST + PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant $\pm$ BKLG $\pm$ ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle
COMMERCIAL FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG - LEV + ASST + PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
<b>PVAR = -</b> Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST - ASSAL	Boger
$DEBT = Constant \pm BKLG \pm ROE - PVAR + ASST + ASSAL$	Hurdle

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is a positive variable in the Boger model, while in the Hurdle model it is negative. The reason for this is that risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease it. Hurdle found the same evidence for the years 1960 and 1964 in her work but chose to state that risk decreases the debt load. Sector sector

Assets divided by sales have a negative influence on debt in the Boger model while the opposite is true for the Hurdle model. Debt is commonly employed to increase assets which in turn increase sales. It follows then that assets divided by sales would have a calming effect or negative effect on overall debt.

The comparison of the Boger model to the Hurdle model on defense firms only and commercial firms only yields the same results as above with two exceptions. The constant in the Boger model for defense firms for the debt equation has a negative effect as opposed to Hurdle's positive effect. Once again this is a dampening effect for the other variables in the equation. The other exception is that in the Boger risk equation backlog increases risk while in the Hurdle risk equation backlog decreases risk. The reason for this difference in the Boger model is that defense firms with a large backlog are more likely to have higher risk because of their inability to secure new contracts due to that large backlog.

B. CHOW TEST ON STRAIGHT LINE REGRESSION

A Chow test was performed on the results of the regression equation's sum of squares residuals for the combination of defense and commercial firms, defense firms only, and commercial firms only. The results of this Chow test are presented in Table 4.

## TABLE 4

#### CHOW TEST

	ROE	5% 	CRITICAL VALUE	<u>PVAR</u>	5% CRITICAL VALUE	DEBT	5% CRITICAL VALUE
1984	2.03		2.57	.17	2.70	.38	2.49
1983	3.38			.99		.46	
1982	1.69			1.76		.65	
1981	4.15			3.87		3.89	
1980	1.60			.46		.42	
1979	.37			.20		.57	
1978	1.04		1	.0.56		.84	
1977	1.38			.73		.64	
1976	1.02			.91		1.60	

The data from the years 1976-1984 were pooled to perform the Chow tests. Pooling was performed by combining all the years and comparing that to the combination of previous years plus the present year. An example makes this concept clearer. The years in this example are 1979-1984. All of

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the data from 1979 through 1984 are combined and compared to the data from the years 1980 through 1984 plus the data from 1979.

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The Chow test showed that defense and commercial firms are the same with respect to profit, debt, and risk with five exceptions over nine years. In 1983 profit showed a significant difference but risk and debt did not. In 1981 profit, debt, and risk all showed significant differences between commercial and defense firms. This may be ascribed to the booming defense economy and the lagging commercial economy occurring at that time. The remaining difference is the risk in 1978. This may be an anomaly. All five exceptions need scrutinizing that is beyond the scope of this work to fully understand. It is concluded that all time series observations may be pooled with cross section observations.

In conjunction with the above discussion of the tests it should be stated that a two-stage least-squares simultaneous regression of all years combined was performed on all the data. The results of the two-stage regression were inconclusive.

C. THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES MODEL

A regression analysis for the years 1976-1984 combined was completed on the firms under investigation. This regression analysis was a three-stage least squares model performed on the three simultaneous equations for debt,

profit variability, and profit using the Boger model. The analysis was completed on all firms combined, defense oriented firms only, and commercially oriented firms only.

The data in Tables 5 and 6 compare and contrast the differences that arose between the data bases of combined, defense only, and commercial only firms. These differences are discussed in the section following Table 7.

### TABLE 5

#### THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION DATA

#### COMBINED FIRMS

DEPENDENT		PROFIT		
VARIABLE	ROE	VARIABILITY	DEBT	
Sum of Squared Residuals	19986.9	39297700	57936900	
Standard Error	7.74	343.5	1319	
Mean	14.7	68.4	2389.7	
Standard Deviation	9.6	356.1	2607.6	
R-Squared	.355	.06	.743	
R-Squared Adjusted	.357	.07	.744	
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.8	2.01	1.8	
DE	EFENSE FIR	MS		

Sum of Squared Residuals	5575.1	22179700	6215930
Standard Error	6.9	138.2	231.4
Mean	16.25	56.1	1778.2
Standard Deviation	7.9	145.6	1281.9
R-Squared	.241	.091	.96
R-Squared Adjusted	.247	.099	.96
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.85	2.1	2.1

#### COMMERCIAL FIRMS

Sum of Squares Residual	13129.5	36693300	53633400
Standard Error	7.7	412.1	1575.7
Mean	13.8	74.7	2759.7
Standard Deviation	10.3	429.2	3049.1
R-Squared	.42	.07	.731
R-Squared Adjusted	.43	.08	.732
Durbin-Watson Statistic	1.9	1.9	1.9

## TABLE 6

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## THREE-STAGE LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (Standard Errors in Parentheses Below Each Coefficient)

	COMBINED	DEFENSE	COMMERCIAL
ROE			
Constant	14.5	6.1	17.6
	(1.8)	(3.3)	(2.14
Backlog	.00019	.0004	0005
	(.001)	(.0004)	(.0002)
Leverage	1.12	21.5	-5.6
	(3,1)	(5.25)	(3.5)
Assets	.000058	0008	.0001
	(.76)	(.0005)	( 00008)
Profit Variability	016	02	-01
	(.12)	(.004)	( 002)
	(***)	(	(.002)
PROFIT VARIABILITY			
Constant	-327.1	-48.2	-418.2
	(81.1)	(66.8)	(110.3)
Backlog	11	.014	01
_	(.008)	(.008)	(.01)
Leverage	721.6	244.6	887.1
-	(130.3)	(104.8)	(176.8)
Assets	0001	03	.0003
·	(,002)	(.01)	(.004)
	(/	(/	()
DEBT			
Constant	389.1	-421.4	564.7
	(174.6)	(68.9)	(244.1)
Backlog	.17	.013	.2
-	(.03)	(.01)	(.05)
ROE	3.13	i5.1	17
	(9.2)	(2.9)	(14.5)
Profit Variability	.37	.78	.41
-	(.45)	(.16)	(.6)
Assets	.35	.58	. 32
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)
Assets/Sales	33.8	211.4	33.9
·	(38.6)	(25.7)	(52.8)

The data contained in Table 7 shows how the Boger model compares to the Hurdle model for the combined years 1976-1984. It is interesting to note how closely the Boger model approximates the Hurdle model when three-stage simultaneous

## TABLE 7

3 8.8 9 8 6 8 8 8.8 °s 8 's

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## THREE-STAGE REGRESSION VARIABLES

## COMBINED FIRMS

ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV + SST - PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Boger
$DEBT = Constant \pm BKLG \pm ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL$	Hurdle
DEFENSE FIRMS	
ROE = Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST - PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant + BKLG + LEV - ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = -Constant + BKLG + ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle

#### COMMERCIAL FIRMS

ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle

for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares regression of individual years model discussed previously in this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle concluded.

All other independent variables in the combined years for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model. It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt model of combined firms was not statistically significant, displaying a t-ratio of less than one.

When comparing the defense only firms and the commercial only firms using the Boger model against the Hurdle model,

#### COMMERCIAL FIRMS

ROE = Constant - BKLG - LEV + ASST - PVAR	Boger
$ROE = Constant + BKLG \pm DEBT \pm ASST \pm RISK$	Hurdle
<b>PVAR = -Constant - BKLG + LEV + ASST</b>	Boger
RISK = Constant - BKLG + DEBT - ASST	Hurdle
DEBT = Constant + BKLG - ROE + PVAR + ASST + ASSAL	Boger
DEBT = Constant ± BKLG ± ROE - RISK + ASST + ASSAL	Hurdle

regression is used instead of the ordinary least squares regression described earlier in this chapter.

The constant terms in the regression equations are discounted for their positive or negative effects when compared to the Hurdle model. The following differences came to light when comparing both defense and commercial firms combined in the Boger model to the Hurdle model. Profit variability is a positive variable in the Boger model for debt, while in the Hurdle model for debt, risk (profit variability) has a negative effect. The reason for this variance is the same as stated earlier for the least squares regression of individual years model discussed previously in this chapter. Risk or profit variability tends to increase the debt load rather than decrease the debt load as Hurdle concluded.

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All other independent variables in the combined years for the Boger models on debt, profit, and risk have the same effects as the independent variables in the Hurdle model. It must be noted that profit variability for the Boger debt model of combined firms was not statistically significant, displaying a t-ratio of less than one. いたたとうでは

When comparing the defense only firms and the commercial only firms using the Boger model against the Hurdle model, the profit variability described above carries over to both defense only and commercial only firms. In fact, the heavy influence of the Boger debt model independent variable profit variability in defense firms influences the combined firms and the commercially oriented firms to a significant degree when all three are combined.

The other exception for the defense firms is that the Boger model has backlog increasing the risk while the Hurdle model has backlog decreasing the risk factor. The fact that the positive effect of backlog on risk carries over from ordinary least squares regression to the combined years three-stage regression further strengthens the previous explanation of defense backlog. Namely, large backlogs are detrimental to defense firms attempting to secure new contracts.

#### V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The overall purpose of this study was to explore the relationship and effects of risk to profit levels in defense firms as compared to commercial firms. This involved a look at the past studies of Martin and Hurdle.

Hurdle's models for debt, profit, and risk were adapted to defense firms and commercially oriented firms in the Boger model. This provides a tool to evaluate the integrated relationship of profit, risk, and leverage among defense contractors.

It has become clear from this study that models such as Hurdle's see the financial structure of firms in the long run with an economic point of view. That is to say that the market forces of the economy will tend to reach an achievable and predictable state over a period of many years.

The Boger model demonstrates that defense firms are managed with a short run view of the economy. The accounting models of the economy look at the present year data and performance while discounting past or future trends. This accountant's point of view has been shown by the effect of backlog on profit variability and in turn the effect of profit variability on the debt structure. As was

seen, backlog increases risk in the Boger model, and risk of profit variability increases debt.

Defense firms must operate in a short run mode due to the capricious nature of Department of Defense contracts and congressional impact on operations. Because defense firms must operate differently than commercially oriented firms, defense firms should not be judged by the same models used to measure profitability in commercially oriented firms.

# APPENDIX

The following table (Table 8) shows the data for the individual defense and commercial firms. The data are listed by firm number which corresponds to an individual firm. The following list is used to identify the firms.

<u>Firm #</u>	<u>Firm Name</u>
1	Boeing Company
2	FMC Corporation
3	General Dynamics Corporation
4	Grumman Corporation
5	Litton Industries Incorporated
6	Lockheed Corporation
7	Martin Marietta Corporation
8	McDonnel Douglas Corporation
9	Northrup Corporation
10	Raytheon Company
11	Rockwell International Corporation
12	Sanders Associates, Incorporated
13	United Technologies Corporation
14	Avco Corporation
15	Control Data Corporation
16	E-Systems, Incorporated
17	Emerson Electric Company
18	Fairchild Industries, Incorporated
19	General Electric Company
20	Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
21	Gould, Incorporated
22	Harris Corporation
23	Hercules, Incorporated
24	Honeywell, Incorporated
25	International Business Machines
26	Motorola, Incorporated
27	Penn Central Corporation
28	RCA Corporation
29	The Signals Companies, Incorporated
30	Singer Company
31	Sperry Corporation
32	TRW Incorporated
33	Teledyne, Incorporated
34	Tenneco, Incorporated
35	Textron, Incorporated
36	Todd Shipyards Corporation
37	Westinghouse Electric Corporation

TABLE 8

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# SEC DATA

SALES84	10354.00000 3337.79980 7839.00000	2603.59985	8113.00000	9662.59766	5995.69922	9322.09766	16331.79688	1527.79980	5026.89844	6178.79688	898.79980	27947.00000	1200 20000	1995.79980	2571.00000	5185.09766	Z/165.00000 5534.00000	2569.09985	10111.59766	6005.00000	2518.79980	6061.59766	3494.29980	8939.00000	3221.09985	10264.50000
PVAR84	12.25000 88.35999 361.00000	5.29000	72.24998	2.89000	9.00000 9.00000	22.09000	2.56000	2.89000	37.20999	00010.0	292.40991	0.04000	00019 9	34.81000	2.56000	6.76000	9.61000	6.76000	0.25000	0.64000	36.UUUUU 0 41000	3.61000	542.88989	357.20996	7.84000	0.0000 9.61000
ASST84	8485.00000 2400.00000 3034.79980	1445.19995	3166.00000 2226 29980	6191.29688	3600.09985	5869.50000 526 20080	9904.50000	6915.50000	9588.89844	2979.59985	928.79980	24730.00000	0194.29665 1453 noors	1696.79980	2388.50000	47598.00000	4194.00000	2766.19995	8220.69922	5511.00000	14/U.UUUUU 5502 50762	3480.59985	2790.69995	13079.00000		9150.39844
DEB184	4790.00000 1500.19995 1972.79980	901.59985 2369.00000	2014.09985 1598.29980	3847.50000	1620.89990	3347.89990 209 00000	5735.09766	5747.69922	120 20000	1110.39990	705.89990	12157.00000	502 30000	878.69995	1021.59985	2378.89990	1916.00000	1147.00000	6130.69922	2706.00000	986.2998U 2690 69995	1724.00000	1631.39990	6639.00000	1022.29980	5409.59766
BKLG84	9895.09766       1823.29980       4630.69922	1 2764.00000 1797.00000	6605.19922 1929.50000	9282.00000	3483.00000	1 7020.00000 1 460 50000	8000.00000	1 1582.50000	1 1152.00000	707.39990	520.69995		000002.892 I	1031.00000	585.00000			637.89990	1 1039.79980		1 2803 79980	2432.00000	1701.00000			4500.00000

Source: 10K Reports

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SALES8	11308.00000	7146.29688	2254.69995 3959 0000	6490.00000	3228.09985	8111.0000	2354.50000	2030.69922 8007 80866	578.09985	14669.19922	1514.19995	4582.79688	826.79980	3475.69995	891.50000	26797.00000	9735.79688	1335.39990	1809.29980	2629.00000	4779.09766	23274.00000	4328.0000	14440.0002 14440.0002	6062.1169 6062 00000	2476.59985	4663.59766	5492.89844	2979.00000	8770.00000	2979.79980	788.09985	9532.59766
PVAR83	37.20999 1.44000	33.64000	47.60999 2 89000	108.15999	0.09000	1.21000	0.16000	1 96000	1.21000	0.16000	12.25000	1.00000	18.42999	1.00000	37.20999	0.09000	0.25000	0.36000	43.56000	0.49000	6.76000	2.10000	1.96000	06647774 1 60000	50.40999	0.04000	34.81000	19.35999	216.09000	30.24998	24.00999	65.60999	4.00000
ASS183	7471.00000 2752.39990	2836.19995	108/.69995 3999 39990	2830,00000	2380.09985	4791.79688	1596.00000	5231 09766	466.19995	8720.09766	6388.19922	8777.59766	370.59985	2515.59985	948.39990	23288,00000	5985.50000	1487.69995	1637.09985	2175.19995	4665.69922	5/245.00000	3236.UUUUU	7648 50000	5184.00000	1420.29980	5279.79688	3321.29980	3852.19995	12287.00000	2104.59985	347.59985	8569,00000
DEBT83	4433.00000 1292.00000	1575.19995	2169.79980 2169.79980	2003.79980	1534.79980	2723.89990		2863.79980 2863.79980	185.20000	4936.39844	5250.29688	6951.09766	13.20000	813.79980	705.09985	12018.00000	2969.50000	602.69995	875.79980	887.09985	2350.00000	14024.00000	1260.0000	5667 0074 7700 7775	2551.00000	984.89990	2880.89990	1707.39990	1211.00000	10651.00000	914.89990	223.20000	5158.69922
BKLG83	9743.19922   1888.69995	5442.29688	1 2200.00000	5390.00000	1483.00000	8234.0000	2268.69995	4860.00000	376.79980	1 7865.00000	1450.00000	1042.00000	652.09985	914.0000	<b>5</b> 8665.404	12201.69922	08662.296						CVVV3 14.04VV9		1 1682.00000	630.00000	2661.19995	2108.00000	1700.00000	1300.00000	1266.00000	360.0000	1 45UU.00UUU

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ROE83	70000	70000	50000	70000	79999	099999	30000	.50000	39999	39999	20000	50000	00000	90006	20000	79999	60000	00000	.00000	00000	10000	50000	00000	59999	.50000	40000	.20000	00006.	.30000	90000	.70000	.50000	.20000	50000	29999	2000
	11	22	24.	13.	31.	19.	13.	17.	16	16.	13.	13.	6	80	23.	17.	11	18.	6	6	<b>o</b>	13.	10.	23.	12.	-	12.	n	2	Ť	12.	11	29.	2	24	10
SHEQ83	00000.	00000	.39990	.59985	.19995	.29980	.89990	.89990	.39990	.29980	.00000	.69995	.89990	.50000	.29999	.79980	.29999	.00000	.00000	.00000	.29980	.09985	.69995	.00000	.00000	.39990	.39990	.00000	.39990	.89990	.89990	.19995	.00000	69995	. 39999	N0447.
	3038	1261	452	1829	826	845	2067	576	1887	2367	281	3783	1137	1826	238	1701	245	11270	3016	885	761	1288	2313	23219	1948	1441	1981	2633	435	2398	1613	2641	1636	1189	124	0110
LEV83	.59336	.55539	.58408	1.54253	.70806	.64485	.56845	.63853	.49382	1.54746	.39725	.56609	.82187	19191	05249	.32350	.74135	.51606	.49612	.40512	1.53497	1.40782	1.50389	1.37655	.39802	1.48716	1.74094	1.49209	.69345	.54565	1.51408	1.31437	1.86685	.43471	.64212	20200.0
	00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0				2
ASSAL83	0.66068	0.39688	0.48241	1.01020	0.43606	0.73731	0.59078	0.67785	0.66221	0.64598	0.80643	0.59445	4.21886	1.91534	0.44823	0.72377	1.06382	0.86905	0.61479	1.11405	0.90483	0.82739	0.97585	1.60020	0.74769	1.11765	0.85198	0.85516	0.57349	1.13213	0.60465	1.29312	1.40103	0.70629	0.44106	74040.N
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ACCOUNT STATES CONTRACT DISTURDS SECOND

TABLE 8 (CONTINUED)

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           	ASSAL82	LEV82	SHEQ82	ROE82
<b></b>	0.82479	0.62953	2813.00000	10.40000
	0 42887	1.20424 0 55686	1175 00000	13.70000
	0.48327	0.68266	315.39990	28.59999
	0.93038	0.56294	1676.89990	19.39999
_	0.43898	0.74740	622.39990	-0.30000
	0.81636	0.82367	436.59985	24.20000
	0.63037	0.60630	1819.59985	11.80000
	0.54693	0.62514	507.00000	9.40000
_	0.67280	0.51234	1711.79980	17.70000
_	0.65856	0.56937	2097.29980	15.80000
	0.77052	0.55103	150.89999	14.50000
	0.58873	0.57229	3418.79980	15.30000
	5.15917	0.83081	1067.19995	6.80000
	1.61041	0.75043	1725.00000	9.10000
	0.41808	0.39442	191.00000	18.70000
-	0.66234	0.32806	1558.69995	19.29999
_	0.83443	0.73975	237.39999	14.90000
	0.81566	0.52820	10198.00000	17.79999
	0.61380	0.58253	2457.19995	10.10000
	1.19228	0.40782	887.50000	9.00000
	0.97977	0.63005	596.69995	17.00000
	0.80159	0.45696	1141.29980	9.60000
_	0.99216	0.51892	2143.39990	12.70000
_	19.35236	0.38662	19960.00000	22.09999
_	0.74828	0.39993	1700.00000	10.50000
_	0.97902	0.52640	1467.69995	9.00000
	0.94429	0.75061	1887.69995	11.80000
_	0.83283	0.43965	1694.50000	6.70000
	0.56345	0.69370	435.50000	-0.70000
-	1.04814	0.54777	2391.50000	9.30000
_	0.60889	0.51376	1519.39990	12.90000
	1.14907	0.36597	2086.39990	12.50000
	1.24937	0.85197	1691.00000	32.09999
	0.69421	0.39785	1227.29980	6.90000
	0.46557	0.64926	116.89999	27.09999
	0.85679	0.61975	3175.00000	14.20000

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SALES81	9788.00000 2855.19995	4758.69922	3977.79980	5176.00000	2679.69995	7384.89844	1990.69995	2883.69922	/059.69922 226 EDDDD	00007 LYXL	877.69995	4100.69922	572.00000	3578.09985	1338.89990	27240.00000	10323.50000	1139.50000	1418.69995	2826.859999	12901.00000	3570.00000	3348.79980	7798.69922	3775.00000	27040.00000	4896.09766	5285,00000	3237.59985	9584.00000	3328.00000	610.39990	936/.5000
PVAR81	0.00000	10.24000	98.00999	246.48999	4.41000	2.25000	256.00000	0.64000	00060.0	00040.0	32.48999	8.41000	16.00000	1.00000	112.35999	0.04000	0.64000	1.96000	9.00000	00052.0	10.89000	1.00000	25.00000	106.09000	3.61000	1.21000	5.29000	1.00000	4.00000	171.60999	0.25000	156.24998	18.48444
ASST81	6954.00000 2676.89990	2289.29980	3687.59985	2105.00000	2251.89990	4384.19922	1257.39990	5565.79980	4/02.89844	7555 00725	5893.79688	6887.89844	280.39990	2288.19995	902.39990	20942.00000	5972.89844	1564.39990	1409.39990	2086.00000	29107.00000	2615.00000	3394.89990	7750.29688	3008.00000	1573.19995	5188.29688	3126.59985	2904.50000	10695.00000	2164.19995	289.19995	8501.29688
DEBT81	4299.00000	1217.29980	3393.69995	1686.59985	1051.89990	2730.69995	763.50000	1827.79980	2/92.29980	4463 50768 4369 50766	4868.50000	5310.29688	121.00000	845.00000	675.09985	11814.00000	3597.50000	686.59985	855.89990	2216 00000	10946.00000	1206.00000	3348.79980	7798.69922	1349.79980	1127.89990	2798.50000	1709.00000	1198.00000	8952.00000	937.19995	209.00000	9486.24/06
BKLG81	2177.59985	3391.39990	1 1865.50000	1 3430.00000	966.29980	7219.79688					1 1096.69995	i. 1145.00000	l 562.00000	<b>  811.50000</b>	586.79980	12408.00000	411.19995	639.0000		00000 282 1	595.00000	1 1047.19995	1 745.59985	581.79980	1345.89990	600.00000	2793.50000	1 1562.00000	1584.00000	00000.066		1 325.00000	4200.0000

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ROE81	17.79999	14./0000	27 89999	20.70000	37.09999	16.70000	10.70000	1.10000	21.00000	15.30000	15.10000	14.30000	6.80000	10.80000	14.90000	19.79999	28.29999	18.09999	10.30000	7.00000	18.70000	13.30000	12.40000	18.20000	12.90000	12.90000	3.20000	12.90000	8.60000	13.10000	16.09999	24.20000	36.79999	11.90000	28.70000	15.50000
SHEQ81	2655.00000	1072 00000	265 20080	1422.59985	418.39990	1200.00000	1653.50000	493.89990	1536.00000	1910.59985	174.79999	3212.50000	1025.29980	1577.59985	159.39999	1443.19995	227.29999	9128.00000	2375.39990	877.79980	555.89990	1103.59985	2098.00000	18161.00000	1409.00000	1309.29980	1687.89990	1658.19995	445.29980	2389.79980	1417.59985	1706.50000	1743.00000	1227.00000	80.20000	2820.69995
LEV81	0.61821	00010.0	0.75128	0.70463	0.80124	0.46712	0.62285	0.60721	0.54337	0.59374	0.36918	0.57479	0.82604	0.77096	0.43153	0.36929	0.74812	0.56413	0.60230	0.43889	0 60149	0.47095	0.51368	0.37606	0.46119	0.71892	0.82208	0.44874	0.71695	0.53939	0.54660	0.41246	0.83703	0.43305	0.72268	0.66046
ASSALBI	0.71046	20183 0	0.59678	0.92705	0.40668	0.84036	0.59367	0.63164	0.57172	0.66805	0.76022	0.55277	6.71505	1.67969	0.49021	0.63950	0.67399	0.76880	0.57857	1.37288	0.99344	0.73016	0.98444	2.25618	0.73249	1.01377	0.99379	0.79682	0.05818	1.05968	0.59160	0.89712	1.11592	0.65030	0.47379	0.88682
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•	BKLG80	DEBTSO	ASST80	PVAR80	SALES
-	8213.09766	3616.19995	5931.00000	65.60999	9426.0000
	1587.69995	1249.89990	2495.79980	3.24000	2599.89991
-	3880.39990	1436.79980	2435.79980	11.56000	4383.3984
_	991.00000	634.89990	901.19995	37.20999	1558.5998
	3219.39990	2097.50000	3264.29980	98.00999	3294.39991
	2853.89990	2136.79980	2443.00000	153.75999	4445.0000
-	478.29980	717.39990	1820.50000	4.41000	1950.6999
—	6502.09766	2386.59985	3899.09985	6.76000	6058.0976
-	1560.29980	751.29980	1233.69995	0.64000	1655.39991
	2648.00000	1625.00000	2928.50000	0.81000	4774.59761
-	3770.00000	2631.79980	4372.00000	1.21000	6906.5000
	177.70000	104.39999	234.89999	0.01000	281.0998
—	7410.00000	4601.19922	7336.09766	0.25000	12323.8984
-	738.50000	4944.79688	5843.50000	0.36000	961.6999
	993.00000	5094.39844	6549.09766	6.25000	3741.1999
	410.50000	95.50000	235.70000	96.03999	442.1999
	723.89990	730.29980	2007.39990	0.25000	3190.0998
-	916.00000	619.29980	808.19995	125.43999	906.1999
_	11782.00000	10311.00000	18511.00000	0.04000	24959.00000
	315.09985	3721.69995	6024.19922	0.25000	9300.29688
-	773.19995	702.00000	1565.00000	1.96000	942.89991
-	950.00000	715.59985	1168.59985	3.61000	1177.0998
-	295.00000	921.50000	1974.79980	3.61000	2617.1999
-	2434.00000	2010.79980	3884.79980	7.84000	4063.79981
_	545.00000	10250.00000	26703.00000	0.04000	10919.0000
	1049.79980	1042.00000	2292.00000	2.25000	3284.0000
	311.00000	1645.69995	2726.89990	0.64000	2013.6999
	581.79980	5196.50000	7058.69922	11.56000	7809.8984
-	1269.59985	1532.39990	2845.00000	3.24000	3201.00000
-	560.59985	1115.69995	1529.29980	2.89000	2659.6999
-	2730.19995	1821.19995	4205.59766	0.49000	4261.7968
	1562.00000	1582.19995	2885.79980	1.96000	4984.0000
-	1533.39990	1174.59985	2575.89990	2.89000	2926.39991
-	827.00000	7381.00000	8943.00000	31.35999	7879.00001
-	1149.00000	1002.89990	2156.69995	5.29000	3338.29980
-	300.00000	128.89999	187.59999	285.60986	507.29980
_	3900.00000	4285.50000	6815.39844	22.09000	8514.2968

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i	BK1679	DEB179	ASST79	PVAR79	SALES7
	9005.50000	3049.69995	4897.19922	92.15999	8131.0000
_	C 2666 . 676 T	06665.1821	2934.69995	00062.9	3307.5000
_	7468.00000	11/8./9980	2004.79980	23.03999	3641.7998
	898.59985	565.69995	793.59985	81.00000	1372.6999
_	3006.89990	2722.39990	3653.19995	68.89000	4067.7998(
_	2678.89990	1830.00000	2113.00000	72.24998	4058.0000
	340.00000	804,00000	1773.50000	0.16000	2060.79980
	6672.00000	2002.39990	3380.59985	5.29000	5278.5000
-	1092.00000	570.00000	990.39990	19.35999	1582.5000
	1788.00000	1537.69995	2624.19995	1.96000	4774.5976(
_	3650.00000	2533.89990	4073.09985	4.00000	6176.3984
	113.70000	65.59999	130.89999	60.84000	164.0999
_	6825.00000	3958.50000	6468.09766	0.81000	9053.2968
	592.39990	4410.69922	5300.39844	5.76000	862.79981
	908.50000	5571.09766	6765.89844	6.25000	3173.7998(
_	452.59985	108.59999	216.70000	2.89000	393.6999
_	642.29980	719.89990	1850.09985	0.09000	2834.00001
	636.00000	219.50000	355.59985	136.89000	717.79980
	8446.00000	9282.19922	16644.50000	0.64000	22460.59760
	259.29980	3207.79980	5371.19922	7.29000	8238.6992;
-	691.59985	775.79980	1546.59985	4.00000	806.0000
-	700.00000	475.19995	822.69995	16.81000	982.0998
	200.00000	771.59985	1761.09985	28.09000	2345.39991
-	2045.09985	1722.69995	3339.59985	10.89000	3504.5998
_	450.00000	9548.79688	24530.00000	1.96000	9473,0000
	945.19995	804.39990	1903.39990	2.89000	2713.6999!
_	311.00000	4902.89844	5392.39844	13.69000	1636.1999
	452.19995	4230.39844	5990.19922	6.76000	7454.59766
_	1193.29980	1666.79980	2850.50000	38.43999	4241.1992;
—	406.00000	1099.89990	1482.39990	998.55981	2598.0998
÷	2384.79980	2093.50000	3724.09985	8.41000	4201.5976(
-	1441.39990	1555.00000	2749.00000	1.69000	4560.0000
—	1466.89990	755.39990	2030.79980	9.00000	2705.5998
	611.00000	5557.00000	6795.00000	0.04000	6548.0000
_	1010.00000	994.09985	2079.09985	9.61000	3392.89991
-	280.00000	130.70000	152.39999	141.60999	389.6999
-	3800,00000	4571.50000	6821.50000	210.24998	7332.0000

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TABLE 8 (CONTINUED)

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	27			000	12	18	14	21	21	17	22	13	14	10	17	19	29	19	9	10	19	18	15	20	15	11	16	17	-24	13	15	29	23	51	28	<b>1</b>
SHEQ79	. 50000	02662.	. 00000	77770. 08002	00000	50000	19995	39990	. 50000	.19995	.50000	. 89844	.69995	. 79980	.09999	.19995	.09999	. 29688	. 39990	.79980	. 50000	. 50000	.89990	.19922	00000	. 50000	.79980	.69995	. 50000	. 59985	.00000	. 39990	.00000	.00000	.70000	.00000
	1847	2011	0/0	122	200	696	1378	420	1086	1539	130	27834	889	1194	108	1130	136	7362	2163	770	347	986	1616	14981	1099	489	1759	1183	382	1630	1194	1275	1238	1085	21	2250
LEV79	.62274	15020.1	77707	74521	86607	.45334	1.59232	1.57553	.58597	0.62211	1.33452	1.12451	.83214	0.82341	0.50115	1.38911	1.61727	1.55767	1.59722	.50162	0.57761	1.43814	.51584	1.38927	.42261	1.90922	1.70622	1.58474	1.74197	0.56215	.56566	.37197	.81781	.47814	.85761	0.67016
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ASSAL79	0.60229	110011		0.0000 U	0.52070	0.86059	0.64045	0.62585	0.54962	0.65946	0.79768	0.71445	6.14325	2.13180	0.55042	0.65282	0.49540	0.74105	0.65195	1.91886	0.83769	0.75087	0.95292	2.58946	0.70140	3.29568	0.80356	0.67210	0.57057	0.88635	0.60285	0.75059	1.03772	0.61278	0.39107	0.93037
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ROE78	.89999	.80000	.20000		. 70000	.40000	. 79999	. 50000	.00000	.20000	.20000	55666.	10006.	.80000	299995.	566660.	20000	.70000	. 90000	56666.	80000	.60000	66660.	.30000	.20000	.39999	66660.	.90000	. 30000	.79999	.70000	.09999	. 59999	. 90000	
	21 13	9-	9.0	01 - 17	15	13	24	24	13	40	13	16		13	61	S.	10 1	10	6	18	12	14	23	14		17	16	12	12	16	28	21	16		7 0
SHEQ78	. 59985	.00000	. 39999	000000	.89990	.79980	.00000	.09985	. 59985	.50000	.79980	<b>66661.</b>	08888.	66662.	20002	66667.	.69922	.19995	. 50000	.19995	.39990	. 39990	.59766	.69995	.69995	.29980	.79980	.50000	.29980	.00000	.69995	00000.	. 89990	00000	C0740.
	1473	674	216	2020 080	863	1199	356	739	1354	26	1772	257	VCNT	26	696 03	~~~~	6586	2108	685	278	848	1365	13493	958	362	1599	1000	488	1434	1033	865	1297	5101		4043
LEV78	.58760	.62107	.64059	83652	.44806	.61274	.61762	.68487	.61100	. 48213	. 56487	22828.	86428.	. 46400	01699.0	\$2550.	. 56194	. 59699	.51759	.61297	.46862	.51686	.38021	.42125	.92302	.67180	.58704	.65968	.56359	.56633	.45492	.76224	.48896	92816.	++7TQ.
	00	0	0		. 0	0	0	0	0			50		20		50				0		Ģ	0	0	0			0	0	•	0	0			2
ISSAL78	.77209	.61502	. 43451	68551	.89023	.75013	.50880	.63991	.65595	11191.0	.65028	16217.	00110.		.00012	100000.	.76504	.69850	.17945	.82412	.33405	11266.	.37251	.74627	57612	1.73825	1.67851	.58132	.89453	.62899	.65048	.00128	.61533	004000	
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SALES77	4018.00000 2202 19995	2597.29980	1409.89990	3442.89990	3348.00000	1439.69995	3544.69995	1601.29980	3182.09985	5390.50000	148.59999	5550.59766	717.00000	2301.39990	347.29980	2030.79980	399.29980	17518.59766	6627.79688	1619.59985	646.19995	1697.69995	2312.59985	7060.09766	1853.50000	120.09999	5880.89844	2964.39990	2284.79980	3292.09985	3264.00000	2209.69995	4928.00000	2802.19995	213.20000	6137.69922
PVAR77	10.24000	4.00000	2.89000	30.24998	27.03999	22.09000	0.25000	37.20999	5.76000	12.25000	1162.80981	0.16000	34.81000	1.96000	57.75999	0.04000	22.09000	0.00000	0.81000	0.0000	2.89000	24.00999	0.25000	0.01000	0.01000	2097.63989	14.44000	0.36000	187.68999	1.69000	0.16000	4.84000	24.00999	6.25000	184.95999	0.09000
ASS177	2440.39990	1601.09985	596.39990	1412.79980	1569.00000	1376.69995	2467.50000	747.39990	2042.29980	3330.29980	80.50000	2979.29980	4113.00000	1827.50000	137.59999	1292.39990	207.39999	13696.79688	4677.89844	1225.79980	579.19995	1477.50000	2429.29980	18978.39844	1419.79980	3601.89990	4351.69922	2152.79980	1461.89990	2841.79980	2092.00000	1443.09985	4864.69922	1738.19995	108.29999	5527.59766
DEB177	1209.09985	868.09985	393.19995	556.69995	1350.00000	651.09985	1411.69995	462.19995	1418.89990	2078.19995	55.79999	1522.50000	3479.09985	860.50000	66.00000	438.79980	133.79999	7753.89844	2704.00000	617.20180	349.60000	694.29980	1239.39990	6359.89844	580.39990	3461.59985	2921.39990	1278.59985	1018.00000	1545.69995	1167.00000	759.89990	3210.29980	816.50000	97.50000	3233.69995
BKLG77	4141.89844 1057 69995	2200.00000	611.79980	1153.89990	1832.50000	232.50000	3893.50000	929.50000	1848.00000	2620.00000	60.20000	4290.00000	394.09985	520.59985	340.39990	460.39990	436.00000	6369.00000	183.79999	681.79980	450.00000	120.00000	1389.29980	285.00000	5020.00000	0.00000	320.29980	665.00000	329.00000	1668.00000	944.00000	934.59985	663.00000	516.00000	137.50000	3000.00000

TABLE 8 (CONTINUED)

$ \begin{array}{c} 133333426 \\ 146864 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 148854 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 1485555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 148555 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 14855 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118559999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 118579999 \\ 122110000 \\ 1251999 \\ 118579999 \\ 122110000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12219999 \\ 1229999 \\ 12290999 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 1221000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 1221000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 1221000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 122100000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 12210000 \\ 122100000 \\ 12210000 \\ 122100$	ASSAL77		SHE	977		R0E77
$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.60737 0.93426	0.49545	951.79	9 <b>80</b> 9 <b>80</b>	14.	60000 30000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.61645	0.54219	733.00	000	14.	00006
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.42301	0.65929	203.200	000	15.	00006
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	25019.0	0.39404	856.09	985	• ;	20000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.46864	0.86042	219.00	000	26.	59999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.95624	0.47294	725.59	985	14.	10000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.69611	0.57212	1055.79	980	11.	70000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.46675	0.61841	285.19	995	23.	20000
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$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.61781	0.62403	1252.09	985	11	50000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.54172	0.69317	24.70	000	-19.	66662
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.53675	0.51103	1456.79	980	13.	50000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	5.73640	0.84588	633.89	066	18.	39999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.79408	0.47086	967.00	000	9	50000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.39620	0.47965	71.59	666	26.	50000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.63640	0.33952	853.59	985	18.	59999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.51941	0.64513	73.59	666	13.	00000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.78184	0.56611	5942.89	844	18.	29999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.70580	0.57804	1973.89	066	10.	40000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.75685	0.50359	608.50	000	•0	40000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.89632	0.60256	230.20	000	17.	39999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.87030	0.46992	783.19	995	7.	00006
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	1.05046	0.51019	1189.89	066	12.	10000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	2.68812	0.33511	12618.50	000	21.	59999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.76601	0.40879	839.39	066	13.	80000
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	29.99083	0.96105	140.29	666	-37.	89999
$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	0.73997	0.67132	1430.29	980	17.	29999
0.63984     0.69650     443.59985     21.20000       0.86322     0.54392     1296.09985     12.10000       0.86322     0.55784     925.00000     16.70000       0.64093     0.55784     925.00000     16.70000       0.65307     0.55784     925.00000     16.70000       0.65307     0.52657     683.19995     28.39999       0.98715     0.65992     1654.39990     18.79999       0.62030     0.46974     921.69995     14.90000       0.50797     0.90028     10.80000     2.60000	0.72622	0.59392	874.19	995	11.	60000
0.86322     0.54392     1296.09985     12.10000       0.64093     0.55784     925.00000     16.70000       0.65307     0.55784     925.00000     16.70000       0.65307     0.52657     683.19995     28.39999       0.98715     0.65992     1654.39990     18.79999       0.62030     0.46974     921.69995     14.90000       0.50797     0.90028     10.80000     2.60000	0.63984	0.69650	443.59	985	21.	20000
0.64093 0.55784 925.00000 16.70000 0.65307 0.52657 683.19995 28.39999 0.98715 0.65992 1654.39990 18.79999 0.62030 0.46974 921.69995 14.90000 0.50797 0.90028 10.80000 2.60000	0.86322	0.54392	1296.09	985	12.	10000
0.65307 0.52657 683.19995 28.39999 0.98715 0.65992 1654.39990 18.79999 0.62030 0.46974 921.69995 14.90000 0.50797 0.90028 10.80000 2.60000	0.64093	0.55784	925.00	000	16.	70000
0.98715 0.65992 1654.39990 18.79999 0.62030 0.46974 921.69995 14.90000 0.50797 0.90028 10.80000 2.60000	0.65307	0.52657	683.19	995	28.	39999
0.62030 0.46974 921.69995 14.90000 0.50797 0.90028 10.80000 2.60000	0.98715	0.65992	1654.39	066	18.	79999
0.50797 0.90028 10.80000 2.60000	0.62030	0.46974	921.69	995	14.	00006
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PVAR76	68.89000 27.03999 72.24998 72.24998 47.60999 67.609999 27.039999 27.039999 27.039999 22.09000 27.039999 16.81000 16.81000 16.81000 16.81000 16.81000 15.29999 228.09999 228.09099 17.959998 817.959960 817.959960 817.959960 817.959960	
ASS176	2017.29980 1457.19995 556.79980 1586.79980 1268.79980 1268.209990 2526.79980 2526.79980 2526.599999 2526.599999 1529.599999 12723.299999 12243.799999 12243.599999 12243.59999 12243.59999 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12253.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.59995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.59995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.599995 12243.59995 12243.599995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.59995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 12243.5995 122	
DEBT76	1051.29980     813.19995     813.19995     813.19995     813.19995     813.19995     1566.79980     1585.39990     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1585.39999     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1586.79980     1665.699995     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.79980     1666.799995     1666.799995     1666.799995     1666.799995     1666.799995     1666.799995     1666.799996     1666.799996  <	
BKLG76	3366.00000 897.00000 897.00000 1800.00000 1500.00000 1560.00000 2010.00000 2010.00000 2010.00000 2022.39999 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 26426.00000 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.299990 2662.29999 2662.299990 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.29999 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.29999 2662.299990 2662.299999 2662.299999 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.2999990 2662.2999990 2662.2999990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299990 2662.299900 2662.299900 2662.299900 2662.299900 2662.299900 2662.299900 2662.2999000 2662.299900 2662.2999000 2662.2999000 2662.299900000 2662.29990000000 2662.29990000000000000000000000000000000	
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TABLE 8 (CONTINUED)

Ì	ASSAL76	LEV76	SHEQ76	ROE76
_	0.51481	0.46225	1084.79980	9.5000
	0.92914	0.54769	868.19995	12.0000
	0.65575	0.55806	644.00000	16.2000
	0.39963	0.74213	190.00000	12.4000
	0.61321	0.60807	806.19995	3.5000
	0.49749	0.89470	167.00000	25.79999
	1.02489	0.47084	657.89990	11.90000
	0.60095	0.55611	945.29980	11.50000
	0.43546	0.59013	225.79999	15.9000
,	0.61490	0.68533	536.19995	19.70000
	0.61792	0.59242	1181.50000	10.30000
_	0.55021	0.68730	29.29999	19.5000(
_	0.50838	0.52612	1244.59985	12.7000(
	6.36293	0.86466	531.50000	17.2000
	0.87207	0.50879	905.79980	4.90000
	0.39794	0.55617	56.50000	25.7000
	0.68039	0.34437	756.19995	17.09999
_	0.62936	0.60579	65.39999	7.5000
_	0.76763	0.56406	5253.00000	17.7000(
_	0.76452	0.57971	1860.89990	6.5000
	0.92174	0.83178	190.00000	4.3000
_	0.85851	0.54613	200.20000	13.4000
_	0.89617	0.46574	764.09985	14.5000
_	1.11687	0.48813	1128.00000	10.0000
•	0.84397	0.43196	737.19995	13.20000
	2.97401	0.28065	12749.29688	18.79999
_	64.84433	0.95518	158.70000	-68.2000(
<u> </u>	0.72022	0.66707	1277.69995	13.9000
	0.77525	0.57161	814.19995	8.00000
	0.75141	0.76507	373.29980	19.89999
_	0.80443	0.54701	1169.29980	12.4000
	0.65415	0.56681	830.00000	32.2000
-	0.63403	0.59821	493.59985	27.29999
_	0.93996	0.62334	1605.59985	17.2000(
_	0.57976	0.44892	839.29980	14.4000
_	0.46750	0.90933	10.50000	-12.4000(
_	0.86544	0.59792	2138.39990	10.4000(

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