The Trend Toward Rationalization and The Military Profession

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
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The organizational trend toward increasing bureaucracy and rationality in the American military during the post-World War II period is described. The effect of this trend on the professional officer corps is examined using a symbolic interactionist approach drawing the theoretical link between structures and individuals. The danger of the dominance of "bureaucratic-managerial" officer stereotypes in the peacetime military is raised. The performance of the officer corps is examined in the combat environment in Vietnam and in the (cont'd)

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Army's current program to improve combat effectiveness (COHORT). The major conclusion is that military leaders must be cognizant of the strong organizational bias towards rationality and efficiency in peacetime and the tendency to eclipse the military profession's core values of "Duty, Honor, Country" and leadership skills that are ultimately required in combat.

THE TREND TOWARD RATIONALIZATION
AND
THE MILITARY PROFESSION

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THE TREND TOWARD RATIONALIZATION
AND
THE MILITARY PROFESSION

by

ROBERT WILLIAM CONE, B.S.

THESIS

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

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of the Requirements

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VITA

Robert William Cone was born in ████████ ████ ████████ on ████████ the son of ████████ Cone and ██ ██ Cone. After graduation from ████████ High School, ████████ ████████████████ he entered the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. He earned a Bachelor of Science Degree from West Point in June, 1979 and was commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army of the United States in the Armor Branch. He served in a variety of assignments ranging from Platoon Leader to Company Commander until his selection in 1984 for an advanced degree program in preparation for duty as an instructor in the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at West Point. He entered The Graduate School of the The University of Texas in July, 1985.

This thesis was typed by Robert W. Cone.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The field of military sociology attempts to embrace the entirety
of examining the macro-organizational tendencies as represented in
the military's interaction with the larger civilian society, while
simultaneously grappling with the effects of such trends on the
individual and group levels of analysis. Ultimately, the study of the
military organization attempts to examine the structure, functioning,
and interrelatedness of all of the parts of the military system.[1]
Inherent in this analysis is a consideration of both the individual and
structural level tendencies on the military's primary mission: combat
effectiveness.

The American military establishment has undergone a
tremendous amount of change in the post-World War II period.
Some of this change has been caused by the evolving nature of warfare
itself while a still larger amount of change has been dictated by the
changing nature of American society. The predominant tradition in
military sociology during this period has been to describe the evolution
of the military organization toward increasing levels of

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rationalization.[2] This larger organizational trend is derived from the writings of Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, and Max Weber who suggest that:

> concomitant with economic development, and particularly with the advance of industrialization, societies become more dependent on science, increasingly regulated by formal legal systems rather than informal customs, and increasingly urbanized, secularized, and commercialized. Organizations and occupations within these systems are increasingly impersonal, bureaucratized and professionalized. And individuals within such systems base their behavior increasingly on utilitarian principles of self-interest and self-advancement.[3]

Despite its advantages in many formal organizations, the trend toward rationalization poses a number of theoretical problems within the military environment. The military is nearly unique as an institution in that it usually does not perform its primary function of "fighting wars." Rather, the military typically performs its peacetime function of training and preparing for war. One serious contradiction that stems from this involves the continued importance of the less rational "human skills" of leadership in the combat environment[4] versus the organizationally dictated strain toward impersonality and reliance on formal-legal authority in the peacetime environment. The purpose of this thesis is to examine this contradiction as it applies to

the key actors who provide leadership in the military, the professional officer.

THESIS STATEMENT

My thesis is that the trend toward rationalization of the American military as represented in the reliance on technological innovation and increased bureaucratic efficiency generates a potential contradiction between the military's rational peacetime configuration and its less rational wartime form. This contradiction is most apparent in the interaction of individual and organizational structure as is the case in the development of the military professional. The trend toward rationalization in the peacetime environment and its influence on military professionals creates the potential for the unanticipated outcome of an ascendant "managerial" officer stereotype who is ineffective in the less rational wartime environment.

In developing this thesis, I have drawn primarily from the original works of Max Weber, the Convergence-Divergence Model of Morris Janowitz, and the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis of Charles Moskos in describing the trend toward rationalization in the military. I have applied the ideas of Vaughn and Sjoberg on the interaction of individuals and organizational structures to the military environment and the military profession. Finally, I have examined

the performance of the American military during the period of rationalization both in war and in peace.

ADVANCE OUTLINE

Chapter Two describes the structural transition of the American military toward a more rationalized form in the post-World War II period. This chapter describes the Divergence-Convergence Model and the Institutional/ Occupational Change Thesis as well as the original theory of bureaucracy of Max Weber. Chapter Three specifically describes the changing nature of military professionalism as it is defined in traditional terms by Samuel Huntington and in the later period by Morris Janowitz. The classical "manager versus warrior debate" is also discussed. Chapter Four expands the debate into a theoretical examination of the effects of bureaucratic structure on individuals using the ideas provided Ted Vaughn and Gideon Sjoberg. A view of the structural bias toward more "rational" military professionals is provided. Chapter Five presents an examination of the issue of cohesiveness as it relates to the military's major goal of combat effectiveness. The military's performance during the Vietnam War and under the All-Volunteer Force is examined and analyzed. Finally, Chapter Six presents conclusions and implications regarding the

dominace of rationality on the military profession and the need for reemphasis of the more "human" skills of offficerhood.

NOTES

[1] Charles Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, <u>Military Sociology</u>. (College Park, MD: The Social Science Press, 1965), p. 5.

[2] David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, "Change in Military Organizations." <u>American Review of Sociology</u> 9 (1983), pp. 151-170.

[3] David R. Segal , "Measuring the Institutional/Occupational Change Thesis," <u>Armed Forces and Society</u> 12 (1986), p 352.

[4] Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," <u>Public Opinion Quarterly</u> 12 (1948), p. 280-315.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TREND TOWARD RATIONALIZATION

INTRODUCTION

The primary thrust of military sociology in the post-World War II period has been to analyze the military establishment as a social system in the form of a bureaucracy. This perspective has been principally derived from the writings of Max Weber, whose work instilled tremendous interest in the analysis of bureaucratic organizations and professions. Central to this tradition is the organizational trend toward rationalization.[1]

The post-World War II period has generated numerous sociologically significant events in the nature of the military establishment and related theoretical development have followed. The study of military sociology in this period can best be examined by dividing the post-World War II era into two distinct periods. First, with the advent of nuclear weapons, there is the period dating from 1946 to 1973. This period includes such significant events as the Korean Conflict and the Vietnam War and is theoretically characterized by the Convergence - Divergence Model. Second, there is the period from

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1973 to the present. This period represents the post-Vietnam era and the transition from conscription to the All-Volunteer Force and is represented by the Institutional/Occupational Thesis. Before discussing these theories and their research and implications, it is necessary to briefly examine the original works of Weber as they relate to bureaucracy and the military establishment.

THE WEBERIAN TRADITION

The classical analysis of bureaucracy was provided by Max Weber. In his original work, <u>Wirtshaft and Gesellschaft</u>[2], and the later translation in Talcott Parson's <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u>[3], Weber established the framework of analysis of types of social action, rationality, authority, and legitimacy. He used these concepts to describe the development of the modern Western institutional system. A review of Weber's original concepts is essential to an understanding of more contemporary works dealing with the military institution.

Weber began his analysis with a description of the basic concepts of social action. He established four organizational forms based upon certain orientations. Ultimately, the form of the organization depends upon the orientation of the social action of the participating actors[4]. Weber described the four orientations of social action in this way:

(1) In terms of rational orientation to a system of discrete individual ends (zweckrational), that is, through expectations as to the behavior of objects in the external situation and of other human individuals, making use of these expectations as "conditions" or "means" for the successful attainment of the actor's own rationally chosen ends; (2) in terms of rational orientation to an absolute value (wertrational); involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success; (3) in terms of affectual orientation, especially emotional, determined by the specific affects and states of feeling of the actor; (4) traditionally oriented, through the habituation of long practice.[5]

The notions of orientations to action can be further developed within the Weberian tradition as the basis of a social order. Using the four types of social action described earlier, Weber developed three pure types of legitimate authority:

> 1). Rational Grounds- resting on a belief in the "legality" of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under suci. ᐧᕐᔆ to issue commands (legal authority).
> 2). Traditional Grounds- resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of

the status of those excercising authority
under them (traditional authority); or finally,
3). Charismatic Grounds- resting on
devotion to the specific and exceptional
sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of
an individual person, and the normative
patterns or order revealed or ordained by
him (charismatic authority).[6]

It is apparent that Weber realized that these pure forms did not
exist in reality. Rather, most social situations included a combination
of these types of authority driven by an underlying combination of
types of rationality.[7]

Weber viewed the transistion of society within this framework
of action and orientation to be moving away from the traditional and
charismatic and toward the direction of the rational and formal/ legal.
This transistion ulitmately entailed the change of orgizational form
toward that of the more formal. The ideal form of such an
organization could be found in the bureaucracy. Key points of
Weber's notion of modern bureaucracy are provided by Merton:

Bureaucracy involves a clear-cut division of
integrated activities which are regarded as
duties inherent in the office. A system of
differentiated controls and sanctions are
stated in the regulations. The assignment of
roles occurs on the basis of technical
qualifications which are ascertained through
formalized, impersonal procedures (e.g.
examinations). Within the structure of

hierarchically arranged authority, the activities of "trained and salaried experts" are governed by general, abstract, clearly defined rules which preclude the issuance of specific instructions for each specific case. The generality of the rules requires the constant use of categorization, whereby individual problems and cases are classified on the basis of designated criteria and are treated accordingly.[8]

Other important features of Weber's notion of bureaucracy involved the expectation of life-long tenure of the individual bureaucrats within the system and the centralization of the means of production in the capitalist enterprise. This means the separation of bureaucrat from the actual technical equipment of his trade. The ultimate merit of the bureaucracy is its technical efficiency, and its ability to provide "precision, speed, expert control, continuity, discretion, and optimal return on input." [9]

In Weber's writings on the military, in "The Origins and Discipline of War," "Types of Social Organization," and " Types of Authority," it is apparent that he gave special consideration to the situation of the military organization. He recognized the importance of affectual and traditional orientations in the development of the "espirit de corps" of the military unit.[10] Weber expanded on this notion in his discussion of "the conflict between discipline and individual charisma."[11] He analyzed the historical development of

the technique of warfare and he emphasized the critical importance of discipline. He saw discipline as the driving mechanism in the development of new weapons and tactics. Weber states "The kind of weapon has been the result of and not the cause of discipline."[12] An important determinant of military discipline was derived from the economic bases upon which the military organization is founded. Weber saw the primeval basis of such discipline in the nature of "warrior communism." This source of discipline was tied almost exclusively to the power of the charismatic warlord who provided weapons, food, and the institution of the "bachelor house" which provided familial relations as well as captured women.[13]

Weber saw the transition away from such a "communal" military establishment toward more of decentralization resulting in an all-around weakening of discipline. Discipline would eventually be restored through a change in the means of economic organization. Seen in the modern era as:

> . . . the raising and equipping of standing armies by means of political authority and a collective economy. The whole process meant, in effect, the clearly increasing importance of discipline and , just as clearly, the consistent execution of the economic process through which a public and collective economy was substituted for private capitalism as the basis for military organization.[14]

Weber also saw the modern military as "...essentially a bureaucratic organization administered by that peculiar type of military functionary, the 'officer'."[15] Weber has established in these writings the transition of the military organization and its basis in discipline from the "patriarchical warlord" of communal societies to the modern bureaucratic military force.

CONVERGENCE-DIVERGENCE MODEL

The most influential early writer on the subject of military sociology in the post-World War II period was Morris Janowitz. In the Weberian tradition, Janowitz sought to provide a system of analysis of the military establishment in the form of a bureaucracy. Janowitz and other scholars such as Lang[16] and Grusky[17] saw beyond many of the superficial differences between civilian and military organizations and developed a model of analysis that compared various features of civilian and military bureaucracies. The thrust of this approach was:

> To analyze the contemporary military establishment as a social system, it is necessary to assume that for some time it has tended to display more and more of the characteristics typical of any large-scale non-military bureaucracy. The decreasing difference is a result of continuous technological change which vastly expands the size of the military establishment, increases its interdependence with civilian

society, and alters its internal social structure.[18]

Janowitz identified the basis of the "civilianization" of the military to reside in a series of six propositions about the nature of social change. First, he described the tendency for modern industrialized nations to spend an increasing percentage of their gross national products on defense. This increased expenditure created significantly greater popular involvement in the management and supervision of the military establishment.

Second, Janowitz saw an increase in the military's reliance on technology and a subsequent increase in the destructiveness and automation of new weapon systems. These developments tended to lessen the distinction between military and civilian members as weapons of mass destruction spread the risk of war into all sectors of society. In addition, at the time of Janowitz's writings, the military continued to rely on civilian conscripts to fill its ranks which tended to further blur the civilian-military distinction and place limits on the extent of military professionalism that was possible.

Third, the increased emphasis on military technology and its horrific lethality had changed the nature of the military mission from that of the preparation for the application of violence to the mission of deterence. This new mission was better suited to civilian management

and analysis techniques as it must consider a broader range of political, social and economic factors.

Fourth, Janowitz cited the new and permanent stature of the military establishment as having broken with the tradition of the past. After previous wars, the military establishment had been all but dismantled and abandoned and the nation had relied on its geographical isolation as its principal defense. In the advent of crisis, the nation would have time to raise a military force capable of meeting a potential threat. With modern technology, weapon systems of mass destruction, and improved transportation systems, the security provided by geographical separation withered and the military was required to develop a more permanent posture. The concept of a permanent military establishment generated new relationships between the branches of the military and the civilian sector.

Fifth, the technological complexity of new weapon systems demanded skills for research, development, and maintenance that were not available in the existing military organization. Hence, the military was forced to rely on civilian technicians to maintain complex equipment or have military personnel trained by civilian experts. This reliance on civilian expertise tended to weaken military organizational boundries and created greater interaction with the civilian sector.

Sixth, the constant threat of war and the new "permanent" status of the military establishment greatly widened the role of the military leader or professional. The highly complex military organization required the military professional to gain education and expertise in every facet of the vast organization. This broadening of the notion of the military professional generated a greatly enlarged spectrum of interaction between military and civilian experts.[19]

It is important to note that Janowitz recognized certain limitations of civilianization and some "uniquely" military features of the military establishment. Even in the context of the new highly technical battlefield, Janowitz saw a need to maintain certain conventional forces. These forces were to be ultimately used as back-ups to automated systems and to, in effect, "finish the fight" after the initial exchange of firepower. In this role, Janowitz recognized the importance of certain more traditional means of motivating and instilling discipline in conventional forces. This he described in the maintenance of the "fighter spirit."[20]

Janowitz focused much of his analysis on the changing role of the military professional within the military bureaucracy. In his classical work, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,[21] Janowitz described the changing nature of military professional life in the post-World War II period. Specific features of

this analysis will be discussed in a later chapter; however, it is important to note that Janowitz foresaw significant changes in the concept of the military profession which incorporated a greater emphasis on rationalization.

The Divergence-Convergence Model become the dominant theme in military sociology throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. The model incorporated the rich Weberian tradition of increasing formalization and rationalization into the previous sacrosanct realm of the military establishment. Moreover, it provided a theoretical justification for the conduct of limited warfare as it had occurred in Korea and Vietnam. Despite the popularity of the model it received a variety of criticisms from numerous quarters. First, there was the view offered by military "absolutists" who felt that the emeging similarities between civilian and military bureaucracies represented a significant weakening of the military establishment.[22] Second, there were a number of criticisms that cited the potential dangers of the trend toward convergence as they related to only certain elements of the military. This notion of a "segmented" or "plural" military was offered by scholars such as Moskos[23] and Hauser[24] and essentially called for combat arms soldiers to maintain a traditional perspective while combat support and combat service support soldiers would adopt a more civilianized orientation. And third, there was criticism that focused exclusively on the theoretical soundness of the model itself. It

was in this tradition that Moskos developed the Institutional/Occupational Thesis.

INSTITUTIONAL/OCCUPATIONAL THESIS

Charles Moskos' work continued in the convergence-divergence tradition[25]; however, he perceived a need for a new model which provided for certain "pure types" of organizational forms for use as reference points. He viewed as a significant weakness in Janowitz's theory the fact that, although the military was evolving toward the civilian industrial organization, that civilian organizations themselves were undergoing significant change. This criticism became increasingly valid given the new emphasis on "human relations" management techniques that became popular in the civilian sector during the 1970's. Therefore, he developed the concepts of "institutional" versus "occupational" as two theoretically "pure types".[26]

Another significant event that affected Moskos' theoretical conceptualization was the transition of the American military from a conscripted force to that of an all-volunteer composition. Butler describes this development:

> The switch from a military based on the draft to one based on volunteers stands as the single major event which initiated the institutional/occupational thesis. Instead of

> concentrating on measuring subtle changes
> of convergence or divergence, the creation of
> the All-Volunteer Force clearly called for a
> theoretical conceptualization of civilian-
> military interface. It was into this theoretical
> vacuum that Moskos stepped and developed
> his ideas. [27]

The essence of Moskos' model is found in his definitions of his two "pure types." Moskos describes an institution to be legitimated in terms of values and norms. These values and norms are represented in a general purpose that transcends individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Institutional members are perceived to be following a "calling;" and they generally consider themselves to be different and isolated from their overall society. Society also tends to recognize their distinctiveness. Moskos points out that, although financial remuneration may not equal the marketplace standard of the overall economy; compensation is frequently made in other forms such as a variety of benefits and forms of "psychic income." [28]

Traditional military service possesses many institutional features. Moskos cites "fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service, subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate working conditions." Further, he points out the ulitmate danger of loss of life or casualty as it occurs in combat maneuvers or actual war.[29]

In stark contrast to the institution, there is the "pure type" of occupation. Moskos describes the occupation to be legitimated in terms of the economic marketplace. Specifically, monetary rewards are provided for equivalent competencies. Moskos views a balance of worker rights and contractual obligations. Workers gain an element of control over appropriate salary and working conditions in exchange for commitment to contractual obligations. Self-interest achieves primacy over the interests of the employing organization.[30]

Given these two pure types, Moskos posits that the American military is moving away from an institutional format toward one more resembling that of an occupation. He also specifies certain organizational outcomes that will likely result from the shift in organizational formats and points out a variety of indicators of change. Other than the adoption of the all-volunteer force and the rise in military pay that accompanied it, he cites; 1) congressional proposals to eliminate or reduce military benefits; 2) the increasing class and racial unrepresentativeness of the all-volunteer force particularly in the ground combat arms; 3) the separation of workplace and residence and the growing numbers of soldiers choosing to reside off-post; 4) resistance by both officers and non-commissioned officers and their wives to participate in traditional social activities and fulfill traditional social roles; 5) the high rate of attrition and desertion among the

soldiers of the all-volunteer force; and 6) the tendency of active duty personnel to bring grievances with the military to litigation.[31]

In a 1986 update of the Institutional/Occupational Thesis, Moskos described the core assumptions which essentially redefine the occupational military in this manner:

> 1. There is no analytical distinction between military and other systems; in particular, no difference between cost-effectiveness analyses of civilian enterprises and military services;
> 2. Military compensation should as much as possible be in cash, rather than in kind or deferred, thereby allowing for a more efficient operation or marketplace;
> 3. Military compensation should be linked directly to skill differences of individual members.[32]

DISCUSSION

Moskos' thesis has generated a tremendous amount of controversy in the last decade. A variety of theoretical and methodological issues have surrounded the Institutional/Occupational Thesis and unfortunately many are based on fundamental misconceptions of Moskos' actual work.[33] At the root of many of these debates are a variety of conceptualizations about the effect of social structure on the individual and the issue of appropriate measurement.

A reluctant advocate of the assessment of the effects of the Institutional/Occuapational Thesis in individual terms is David R. Segal. Segal and his many colleagues have used individual service member attitudes to attempt to depict structural level tendencies despite recognition of this approaches obvious weaknesses:

> . . . the social survey has become the dominant research method, and the individual the dominant unit of analysis. . . the survey is a useful tool for evaluating whether military personnel see their service as a calling, a job, or some combination of the two. Indeed there are several ways of doing this. Given the relative recency of the method and the even greater recency of this particular theoretical concern, however, they do not give us a very good basis for inferring long-term secular trends one way or the other. Neither are they particularly useful in describing organzational changes.[34]

Despite this recognition, most of the research conducted is in exactly the empirical and individual form described above. Among the more noteworthy were several studies conducted by Segal[35], Stahl, et. al.[36] and Cotton[37] which will be discussed later.

Butler has criticized the dominance of this research approach and calls for a broadening of research to examine the changing structure of the military:

It is very important to understand that Moskos' analysis is structural. It is not an analysis based on the individual wishes of military personnel. We pause to make this point because research attempting to measure Moskos' metaphor have utilized individuals as a unit of analysis. Although this research is needed and adds to our knowledge of the military, it cannot be viewed as a direct measure of Moskos' ideas because they are structural in nature.[38]

This is not to say that Moskos' analysis totally excluded from consideration the effects of organizations on individuals. In the tradition of Emile Durkheim, Butler holds that changing structural variables exerts certain pressures on individuals which caused them to respond in certain ways:

Central to Moskos' ideas is that if you change certain structural features of an organization, then individuals will respond in certain predictable ways. Thus his "features" which are outlined as relating to the institutional and occupational formats are really structural variables. For the former, . . . they include inablility to resign or negotiate working conditions, compensation in non-cash forms, and subsidized consumer facilities. The structural features associated with the latter include legitimation of the cash-nexus basis, separation of the work place and residence, decreasing subsidized consumer facilities, and the increase in the number of civilian employees. Notice that the original ideas of Moskos said nothing about the attitudes of military personnel. He did say, however, that if you legitimate a cash-nexus system, then

military personnel will by definition begin to concentrate on increasing their pay, and military unionization becomes a possible vehicle for that goal. Likewise, if you separate the work place from the place of residence, military personnel will react by becoming like their civilian counterparts-arriving early and leaving late in the afternoon rush hour. Put simply, because of structural changes in the military, it begins to resemble an "occupation" rather than an "institution." Its members also begin to react like they are in an occupation rather than an institution.[39]

Unfortunately, at this time there is a paucity of research in the structural realm. Directions for future research might well entail an assessment of the change in structural level variables since the adoption of the all-volunteer force compared to earlier periods. Possible areas of analysis might be the change in the on-off- post housing balance, the change in the ratio of military to civilian workers used to accomplish similar missions, and the change in actual non-cash to cash benefits.

Despite the shortcomings described by Butler in using the individual attitude approach, various findings in this tradition are of interest. Perhaps of greatest merit is in the consideration of the individual's orientation toward the organizational form and anticipated values and norms. Clearly, the thrust of Moskos' writings would imply that the value systems supporting the occupation based

on promotion of self-interest and the institution based on self-sacrifice would at the very least generate conflict. Stahl, et al. , Cotton, and Segal have all attempted to determine if, at ʰe individual level of analysis, institutional and occupational orientations can simultaneously exist, or if they are a "zero sum" type gain. Stated more simply, would it be a "contradiction to expect a highly skilled technician, engineer, or surgeon to also be a loyal self-sacrificing military person in the traditional sense?"[40]

The empirical findings of these three studies would appear to indicate that at the individual level these orientations exist simultaneously among many service members. Stahl, et al. examined the attitudes of 10,687 actve duty Air Force personnel ranging in grade from airman to colonel as well as 202 senior military personnel from all branches of the service. They found significant orientations of both institution and occupation at all grade levels. Hence, they conclude that institution and occupation should be viewed as two separate dimensions and that "if we see each as representing a distinctive set and ordering of values and norms, we find that it is possible for an individual to either high or low in both as well as being predominantly one or the other."[41]

Segal et al. reached a similar conclusion in a 1974-75 study of first-term Army enlisted personnel.[42] Cotton examined the attitudes

of Canadian Army personnel of a variety of ranks also finding mixed orientations.[43] Cotton, however, made the additional observation that higher ranking and more experienced service members assigned to the combat arms tended to be more institutionally oriented.[44]

The orientation of individual actors toward values and norms raises some interesting questions. A central issue to this thesis is the relationship of such values to the notion of "professionalism." This subject will be discussed more extensively in the following chapter; however, the above research holds strong implications for the maintenance of the dual orientations of "warrior" and "manager."

SUMMARY

Given this brief review of the development of the dominant trends in military sociology, several key issues stand out. First, the central theme of both Moskos' and Janowitz's work is rooted in the tradition of Emile Durkheim, Ferdinand Toennies, and most directly Max Weber. This tradition describes the evolution of modern industrialized societies towards increasing rationalization and dictates increased reliance on science and technology, formal legal systems over informal customs and traditions, and organizations characterized by impersonal and bureaucratized relations. Within such organizations individuals are viewed to base their behavior increasingly on

utilitarian principles of self-interest.[45] Both authors view the rationalization of the American military to simply be a natural outgrowth of the military's relationship to society. As Moskos states, "the military can be understood as a social organization which maintains a level of automomy while refracting broader societal trends".[46]

Second, the problematic nature of dealing with structural (macro) and individual (micro) level variables is highlighted in the military case. Clearly, the military organization's ability to implement structural level imperatives on individual organizational members tends to greatly exaggerate their effects. This is because individuals are required to comply with organizational rules to a much greater extent than in the civilian world. Moreover, a clearer conceptualization of the relationship between individual and organization is potentially possible for this very reason.

Finally, although it is clear that the trend toward rationality in the military is not likely to be easily observed within the professional officer ranks, its effect there is likely to be the most profound. The organizational hierarchies and leadership roles controlled by professional officers are extremely influential because they maintain the links between institutional goals and values and the means of implementation themselves. There are certainly strong traditional

pressures to maintain "institutional" orientations among the officer corps and perhaps equally strong pressures to conceal "occupational" tendencies if they existed.

NOTES

[1] Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 11.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE MILITARY PROFESSION DEFINED

INTRODUCTION

Given the trend toward rationalization within the military establishment described in the previous chapter, an important theoretical issue is the effect of such a trend on the military profession. This issue has created significant controversy in the field of military sociology, but more importantly within the military profession itself. The widely perceived poor performance of the officer corps during the Vietnam War and recent trends in promotion profiles have fueled the fires of this controversy and the issue has typically been framed in the "warrior versus manager" debate.[1] The warrior viewpoint represents a "absolutist" or traditional viewpoint while the manager perspective illustrates the importance of the trend toward rationalization. An example of the nature of the controversy is found in Armed Forces Journal International:

> Warriors, competent combat leaders, are an endangered species in our Army. . .the warrior in today's Army has been largely replaced by managerial technocrats with little interest or feel for the human dimension of war. In fact, the few surviving combat leaders today remain professionally intact

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> only because they were able to master the peacetime management skills so demanded by the non-fighter. . .The Officer Personnel Management System is a system created by non-warriors, for non-warriors, at the expense of combat leaders. . . We bend over backwards to kill off our warriors at a young age.[2]

The two major theoretical perspectives on the issue of military professionalism are provided by Samuel Huntington, who represents the historical-traditional perspective, and Morris Janowitz who advocates a new conceptualization of the profession based upon the trend toward rationalization. At this point it is important to provide some clarification of the concept of the military profession. The label of military professional has generally been reserved for members of the commissioned officer corps.[3] This distinction is not meant to slight members of the warrant or non-commissioned officer corps. Rather, it is based in certain requirements of education, socialization, and the constitutional relationship of the state to the officer corps. In the later requirement, the commissioned officer corps is empowered as a member of the executive branch of government and is legally responsible for the control and supervision of the military establishment.[4]

THE HISTORICAL-TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The historical-traditional view of the military profession is provided by the political scientist, Samuel Huntington. In his influential work, The Soldier and the State, Huntington portrayed the need for the American officer corps to remain anchored to certain absolute values despite a significantly changing national security environment. Huntington based his views in the tremendous historical importance he placed in the skills required of a military professional.

Huntington's view of the concept of a "profession" entailed three principal characteristics: expertise, responsibilty and corporateness. He defined the expertise of professional officership solely in terms of a commander's ability to fight the battle. He described this task to be a "complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training."[5] He felt that this experience was universal in that it was not affected by time or location and that it involved the application of the various "principles of war" in dynamic situations involving both individual and structural level variables. Specifically, he claimed that the profession involved the mastery of the technological innovations of the day, a knowledge of military history and tactics, an analytical mind, and the control of human relations. Huntington distinguished between the true military profession of

"commandership," and those of certain highly specialized and technical skills which he labeled as "auxilary" and apart from the true nature of the profession.[6]

Huntington described the responsibility of officership in terms of a obligation to the society to which is served. The officer's sense of motivation to his duty must stem from a deep sense of patriotism and obligation to his nation and not to any sense of economic reward. The application of his expertise, the management of violence, must occur only in pursuit of socially approved purposes and for the military security of his client, the society. Huntington is careful to point out that the military profession is essentially a restricted one:

> Like the lawyer and the physician, he is concerned with only one segment of the activities of his client. Consequently, he cannot impose decisions upon his client that have implications beyond his field of specialization. He can only explain to his client his needs in this area, advise him how to meet these needs, and then, when the client has made his decisions, aid him in implementing them.[7]

Huntington's view of the responsibility of officerhood then very clearly illustrates the extremely restricted and highly specialized view that he holds of the military profession. From this perspective it is

apparent that Huntington sees no potential for the expansion or modification of the responsibilities of officerhood.

The corporate character of officership is provided through the formality of the "commission" which provides the officer a legal right to practice his role as a professional within the military bureaucracy. The special characteristics of the officer corps are described in this manner:

> The functional imperatives of security give rise to complex vocational institutions which mold the officer corps into an autonomous social unit. Entrance into this unit is restricted to those with the requisite education and training and is usually permitted only at the lowest level of professional competence. The corporate structure of the officer corps includes not just the official bureaucracy but also societies, associations, schools, journals, customs, and traditions. The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of activities. He normally lives and works apart from the rest of society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men. The line between him and the layman or civilian is publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank.[8]

Key points concerning Huntington's notion of the corporate character of officership revolve around the rigid formality of the

bureaucratic structure and the all encompassing nature of military society. Entrance into the profession must occur at the lowest level virtually regardless of skill and promotion is from within the structure of office and rank. Actual authority derives from office and eligibility for office is derived from rank. Hence, in most cases the professional character of the officer corps is based upon the hieracrchy of rank over the hierarchy of office. The closed nature of this system tends to create a form of reality unto itself. Further, Huntington's view of the military as an isolated and all encompassing form of society strongly supports the notion of "corporateness."

In examining Huntington's thesis, it is important to realize the time at which he wrote. Huntington's conceptualization of the military profession represented the notion of total war and the clear distinction between military and political interests. Under this conception of civil-military control, politicians were clearly in command until the outbreak of war and at that moment the military assumed total control of the war effort. The military view of war was based in the adage "there is no substitute for victory." The ulitimate clash of military and politcal interests occurred in the Korean Conflict. The clash was personified in the relief of General Douglas MacArthur by President Truman beacause of MacArthur's failure to confine military operations to political guidelines.[9] Clearly, Huntington's conceptualization of the military profession was developed in the wake

of these developments. His perspective demands strict separation of military and political roles through the narrowest definition of the military profession.

THE NEW MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

It was in the wake of events in Korea and the advent of limited warfare that Morris Janowitz sought to redefine the nature of military professionalism. One of the principal features of his divergence-convergence model, dicussed in Chapter Two, was a reconceptualization of the officer corps. Janowitz's analysis of the affected areas of convergence was all encompassing. He described 5 basic propositions which depict the convergence tendencies as they relate to the officer corps:

1. Changing Organizational Authority. He described the trend away from authoritarian leadership styles toward greater similarity with the civilian techniques of persuasion, manipulation, and group consensus. Janowitz cites the origin of this trend to be rooted in the larger society and affecting the military establishment. Janowitz describes an overall trend toward more relaxed forms of organizational leadership despite the rigid hierarchy of the military bureaucracy:

> The central concern of commanders is no longer the enforcement of rigid discipline, but rather the maintenance of high levels of

initiative and morale . . . The technical
character of modern warfare requires highly
skilled and highly motivated soldiers. In any
complex military team an important element
of power resides in each member who must
make a technical contribution to the success
of the undertaking. Therefore, the more
mechanized the military formation, the
greater the reliance on the team concept of
organization.[10]

2. Narrowing Skill Differentiation Between Military and
Civilian Elites. The new military professional was viewed as being a
technical expert in a specialized field that frequently related directly to a
civilian technical specialty. In other words; a large number of military
professionals held alternate specialties outside the traditional realm of
purely military concerns. This change gradually affected the
qualifications of military elite by changing the nature of
commandership. The new military leader emerged form the ranks of
the highly technical organization and was required to become more
involved in the supervision of more technically complex aspects of the
organization than traditonal leaders of the past. Hence, it was not
uncommon to find members of the new military elite with an
alternate specialty and academic background in engineering, financial
management, or business management.[11]

3. Shift in Officer Recruitment. Janowitz viewed the broadening
of the base of recruitment of officers from within the existing circle of

military elites based primarily in relatively high social status to one that was more representative of the whole of society. This change was necessitated by the growth of the military establishment and the increased demand for technical specialists. [12]

4. Significance of Career Patterns. Janowitz cited the emergence of uniform patterns of career service for entrance into the higher professional levels while the career patterns for entrance into the elite nucleus tended to be more innovative and adaptive. This dichotomy probably represents a trend that is apparent in most large organizations. Janowitz noted a fine line of distinction between the perception of innovation and criticism. Those who were percieved to be innovative worked cooperatively within the existing institutional framework and were rewarded. Those who crossed the line of institutional norms and became critics were not likely to survive.[13]

5. Trends in Political Indoctrination. Janowitz saw the development of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise to create certain strains on traditional military self-images and concepts of honor. This generated the need for a new and explicit military political ethos. The challenge of "limited warfare" and the increased significance of political decisions on military affairs required the military to broaden its viewpoint and develop more of a political perspective of world events. This development changed the notion of

the "military mind" and "created new opinions on many political, social, and economic subjects, opinions which he [the military professional] feels obliged to form as a result of his new role, and to which he was expected to be indifferent to in the past."[14]

In addition to these five propositions, Janowitz described the deterioration of the tradition of isolation the military community has held from the civilian world. He sees the traditional and separate military community gradually becoming weakened due to a number of factors. He cites the separation of workplace and residence, the sheer increase in the size of the military and the diversity of social backgrounds of newer officers, the increase in civilian technicians in the military structure, and the decrease in emphasis on distinctions of rank, all leading to a decrease in the traditional professional identity.[15]

Perhaps the most important facet of Janowitz's convergence theory involves changes in the traditional values that comprise the military profession. Janowitz defines this element to reside principally in the code of military honor clasically consisting of four parts. These were: gentlemanly conduct, personal fealty, self-regulatory brotherhood, and the pursuit of glory. He then described modifications of emphasis on each of these components in order to accommodate organizational changes. Janowitz viewed the new scheme of military honor to consist of: 1) a decrease in emphasis on gentlemanly conduct;

2) a shift from allegiance to the constitution to individuals occupying positions within the bureaucratic structure; 3) an increase in emphasis on tradition and group loyalty represented by generalizations about group honor and integrity; and 4) the reduction of the overt pursuit of glory as officers rise to higher ranks.[16]

Janowitz summarized the overall trend in this manner:

> After two centuries, the United States officer corps has been transformed in the direction of a technical specialty, and military honor has been made compatible with skill and technical achievement, despite the fact that honor is essentially ascriptive and traditional. Military honor has had to respond, likewise, to changes in social values in the society at large. [17]

An important theoretical consideration at this point is the degree to which Moskos' institutional/occupational thesis addresses the issue of officer professionalism. Moskos recognized that certain elements of the military are likely to remain institutionally oriented and that the military is not likely to become totally oriented in one direction or the other. He also saw distinctions within certain branches of the military based upon degree of technological advancement. He described occupationalism as an "overarching" tendency, but did not specifically predict a change in the professional officer corps.[18] In a 1986 article, Moskos describes the Institutional/Occupational Thesis to

be "oblique" to the issue of officer professionalism and redirects the debate to the positions held by Huntington, falling closest to an institutional type, and Janowitz, which is congruent with the occupational type.[19]

Despite Moskos' delicate treatment of the subject, Janowitz criticized the implications of Moskos thesis with regard to the officer corps in his stinging rebuttal of the institutional/occupational thesis. Janowitz accused Moskos of "changing the rules of the game of social analysis without clearly signaling the changes he has introduced.[20] Janowitz stated that the concept of military professionalism is not in danger and that in reality, the trend towards technical expertise enhances the sense of professionalism. Janowitz defined the new concept of military professionalism to consist of three major elements: 1) a high level of skill (higher than an occupation); 2) an important degree of self-regulation; and 3) a strong element of corporate cohesion. He states that the officer corps is still in a trend toward "civilianization" and that the situation of military officers is not unlike many civilian professionals who are "struggling in an advanced industrial society to achieve a clearer sense of purpose."[21]

THE WARRIOR VERSUS MANAGER DEBATE

The contrast in the perspectives of military professionalism as offered by Huntington and Janowitz is typically described in what has become known as "the warrior versus manager" debate. In a sense, either perspective in the debate attempts to generalize about the ascendent form of individual professionalism within the changing military bureaucracy. Clearly, any such analysis must be based upon certain domain assumptions about the effect of changing organizational structure on individual agents. A detailed discussion of this issue will be presented in Chapter Four; however, at this point a closer examintation of Huntington's and Janowitz's arguments is in order.

Huntington's perspective can be seen to sharply contrast with Janowitz's thesis in a number of important areas. Huntington's analysis is based on a deep historical understanding of the role of the military leader in balancing individual and structural concerns. Huntington holds great respect for the unique skill required in motivating human actors to endanger their lives while simultaneously coordinating the more rational activities of the larger military organization. Huntington recognizes the importance of technological innovation in the post-World War II era, but places it in a secondary position to the importance of certain absolute institutional

values (ie. duty, honor, country). Janowitz, on the other hand, views the profession to be in a state of transistion with technological innovation achieving primacy over a set of professional values which are then altered in individual emphasis.

The difference between Huntington's and Janowitz's approaches to military professionalism can be viewed in the different positions of the military professional's relationship to politics.[22] Huntington's approach demands that the military professional remain totally apolitical and focus solely on the issue of achieving success on the battlefield regardless of political implications. The military professional is to conduct the battle giving consideration only to factors relevant to achieving victory. This view stands in stark contrast to Janowitz's conception of the need for the new military professional to be extremely sensitive to political interests. Janowitz's view, developed with the advent of "limited warfare" designed to achieve "limited" goals, obviously became extremely popular among the elected politicians who control the military.

From a theoretical viewpoint, the important question is whether two such orientations to management, the "warrrior and the manager" can simultaneously exist within the same profession serving within the same organizational framework. In answer 'o this question, I

return to the original work of Max Weber and his discussion of orientations of individual action. In applying these orientations to the military profession, it is apparent that two different forms of rationality hold particular applicability to the two concepts of the military profession discussed by Huntington and Janowitz. From the traditional perspective held by Huntington, the military profession can be viewed to be anchored in the sacred institutional values of "duty, honor, country." This focus on absolute values closely relates this conception to the notion of "wertrational." Moreover, the risk of the loss of life to the military professional demonstrates the total commitment to the cause. Weber described it in this way:

> Examples of pure rational orientation to absolute values would be the action of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some "cause" no matter what it consists.[23]

On the other hand, in the tradition of Janowitz and Moskos, we have the new conception of the military professional. This officer exists in the day of a technologically advanced military funded by multi-billion dollar defense budgets, making decisions about cost effectiveness of personnel policies in order to maximize funds for the appropriation of new highly technological weapon systems. This

officer is selected for promotion based upon his ability at generating maximum results from a variety of alternatives. This is represented in Weberian terms as:

> Action is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends (zweckrational) when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken account and weighed. This involves rational consideration of alternative means to an end, of the relations of the ends to the other prospective results fo employment of any given means, and finally the relative importance of different possible ends.[24]

In Janowitz's analysis then, we are to believe that the concern for absolute values can still be maintained within a rational consideration of a variety of possible alternatives. Weber appears to account for such a possibility in his original description of rationality. He states "choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined by considerations of absolute value. In that case, action is rationally oriented to a system of discrete individual ends only in respect to the choice of means."[25]

However, Weber does go on to add that absolute values that are considered within such a framework of rational action are to be considered "irrational." He states that "the more the value to which

action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more "irrational" in this sense the corresponding action is."[26]

This reexamination of Weber's original work raises some important theoretical points. First, it illustrates that Weber accounted for the possibility of an organization which was concerned both with a dedication to absolute values and maximizing organizational efficiency. Second, it pinpoints certain seeds of "contradiction" or "tension" within the bureaucratic framework. The source of these "tensions" would be the seen in the strain against the selection of "irrational" choice of means within the "rational" framework.

SUMMARY

The "warrior" versus "manager" debate highlights some extremely important and controversial issues in the transition of society towards a more rational form. On the one hand, Janowitz redefines the nature of professional officerhood to keep pace with the increasingly technological nature of warfare. On the other hand, Huntington demands that the profession must remain focused in more traditional values and mastery of new technologies. The key elements of the debate then would seem to focus on the importance of certain "human skills" and ultimately the source of discipline.

In Janowitz's notion of the military profession, the most important elements are technology and weapon systems. The need for "human skills" is noted, but clearly takes a back seat. This lack of emphasis on the importance of personal relations is consistent with Weber's concept of the trend toward formality. Huntington insists on the primacy of the skills of command which to a great extent would appear to be leadership skills or "human skills," with technological skill clearly taking a back seat. The source of tension in the military organization would occur when certain "irrational" decisions based on solely human consiJerations or value consderations are made within the overall "rational" organizational framework.

A second point of discussion involves the issue of discipline. In Chapter Two, Weber's discussion of the "Origins of Discipline in War" was presented. The essence of Weber's analysis was that the origins of discipline had evolved from the primeval "warrior communism" based in the charismatic leadership of the warlord toward a form of bureaucracy based upon the society's form of economic organization and rational-legal authority. This was characterized by rigid and formal discipline.[27]   It is interesting to note that Janowitz describes a movement away from such authoritarian leadership in the new military organization with greater emphasis on persuasion, manipulation, and group consensus.[28] Moreover, Janowitz cites the increasing importance of initiative on the part of individuals as the

organization becomes more and more technical and mechanized.[29] In one sense, Janowitz's view would appear to conflict with Weber's original work. The trend toward less rigid discipline is not accounted for in Weber's writings; however, he does link forms of military discipline to the society's form of economic organization. Although this does not specifically indicate a trend toward the more individualistic form of discipline as described by Janowitz, it certainly leaves the door open to further changes as they occur in the larger society.

In defense of Weber it should be noted that his writings were originally intended to describe the evolution of society from the preindustrial to the industrial period. It is not surprising then that Weber could not thoroughly comprehend or foresee every detail of the post-industrial period.

The crux of the issue then is this: Within an organization that strains so strongly toward increased rationality and formality, can a basic concern for certain non-rational entities such as absolute values and human skills be maintained? At the vary least, we can assume that some degree of tension will exist. However, a closer look at the relationship between individual and structure is necessary and will be presented in the following chapter.

NOTES

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[2] John C. Bahnsen, "Warriors: An Endangered Species," <u>Armed Forces Journal International</u> (September, 1984), p. 117.

[3] Cathy B. Downs, "To Be or Not to Be a Profession: The Military Case," <u>Defense Analysis</u> 1, 3 (September, 1985), pp. 147-171.

[4] Sam C. Sarkesian, <u>Beyond the Battlefield: The New Military Professionalism</u> (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), p. 42.

[5] Samuel Huntington, <u>The Soldier and The State</u> (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univiversity Press, 1957), p. 14.

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[7] Ibid., p. 16.

[8] Ibid., p. 16.

[9] Sarkesian, op. cit., p. 43.

[10] Janowitz, op. cit., p. 9.

[11] Ibid., p. 10.

[12] Ibid., pp. 10-11.

[13] Ibid., p. 12.

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[15] Ibid., p. 179.

[16] Ibid. , p. 223.

[17] Ibid. , p. 217.

[18] Charles C. Moskos, Jr. "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization," Armed Forces and Society 4 (November, 1977), p. 44.

[19] Charles C. Moskos, Jr. "Institutional/Occupational Trends in Armed Forces: An Update." Armed Forces and Society 12,3 (Spring, 1986), p. 382.

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[21] Ibid. , p. 53.

[22] Sarkesian, op. cit. , pp. 41-54.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE PROFESSIONAL
AND
THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

INTRODUCTION

The fundamental issue that must be resolved in examining the structural transition of the military establishment toward a more rational form is the effect of such a transistion on the individual organizational member. In the previous chapter, we have examined the effect of rationalization on the key actors within the military organization in the form of a redefinition of the nature of the military profession at the structural level. A critical task now is in integrating structural and individual level tendencies as they relate to the performance of the military mission.

Robert K. Merton's classical work "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action" and his subsequent discussion in "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" highlight the problematic effects of the structural trend toward rationalization in modern bureaucracies and the emergence of certain personality types within the organization. Merton described the ulitimate strains or

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tensions developing between individual psychological mechanisms of motivation within a bureaucracy and the constraints of social structure. He described the tension as becoming potentially dysfunctional to larger organizational goals:

> Adherence to the rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end-in-itself; there occurs the familiar process of displacement of goals whereby "an instrumental value becomes a terminal value." Discipline readily becomes interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes an immediate value in the life-organization of the bureaucrat. This emphasis, resulting from displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily. Formalism, even ritualism, ensues with an unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formal procedures. This may be exaggerated to the point where primary concern with conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the organization, in which case we have the familiar phenomenon of technicism or red tape of the official.[1]

Moreover, within an bureaucratic organizational framework Merton saw the strains against any individual activity which went against the bureaucratic norms of impersonality or informality.[2] This in turn resulted in a conflict between the organizational nature of

secondary group relations and the demand of certain primary group tendencies in certain organizational functions.

Merton's work provides an important capstone to our discussion of the interaction between individual and military organization because it highlights the problem of ascendent bureaucratic personality types and the potential for conflict with ultimate organizational goals. The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the theoretical implications of the structural trend toward rationalization and its effects at the individual level within the military profession. It is my major premise that, although there are clearly numerous advantages in the trend toward rationalization, there is the potential for serious conflict or tension as the trend applies to the nature of military professionalism and that this conflict could ultimately be dysfunctional to organizational goals.

INDIVIDUAL AND BUREAUCRACY

The controversy of individual (micro) versus structure (macro) is a central feature of the debate in organizational theory.[3] This debate has been classically defined in the primacy of one type of concern over the other. Structuralists, on the one hand, hold that "structural reality exists independently of and not reducible to, the agents within the organization in terms of either their personal characteristics or their

interpersonal relations."[4] Typically, concern for human agents in this view is restrained to their conformity with structural imperatives. On the other hand, the individualist, or micro view, holds that organizational reality is reducible to the sum of the micro relationships contained within.[5] In addition to these extreme perspectives there are a number of promising integrative approaches that seek to simulataneously consider both macro and micro level orientations. The perspective of organizations used in this thesis is provided by Ted R. Vaughn and Gideon Sjoberg and offers a Meadian approach to the problem. Vaughn and Sjoberg call for a reassessment of organizational theory based upon Mead's work as a starting point:

> Extending certain elements of Mead's line of reasoning enables us to come to terms with some empirical features of bureaucratic organization that have largely been ignored in traditional organizational literature. Without a theory that includes human agents, one cannot understand bureaucracy. And without knowledge of this empirical reality, one cannot understand the powerful moral issues that emanate from bureaucracy."[6]

Vaughn and Sjoberg's approach seizes on Mead's notion of the social mind as the key link between individual and structure. They see the social mind in Meadian terms as a product of interaction with others and to possess a wide range of social capabilities. These

capabilities are described as: "thinking abstractly, making causal inferences, a social memory, the creation of images, and the use of logic such as typification, analogy, the relating of parts to wholes, and deduction."[7] Perhaps most importantly, the social mind possesses the capacity to conceptualize social roles, allow individuals to assume the role of others, and to "look back upon one's self as an object." Vaughn and Sjoberg describe this unique ability to be the process of "reflectivity."

It should be noted that Vaughn and Sjoberg view the social mind as much larger construct than the other more frequently emphasized concept of the self. Vaughn and Sjoberg see the self as just one component of the larger notion of the social mind. It is the entirety of the social mind and its components described above that provide for the process of reflectivity, which as Vaughn and Sjoberg descibe "provides us with the main criterion for defining what is human."[8]

As society has tended to become more and more formalized and bureaucratized, as is described in the Weberian tradition, the patterns of social interaction have become increasingly influenced and controlled by formal institutions. These institutions constrain patterns of individual interaction to conform to prescribed organizational

structure. Hence, the organizational structure influences the development of the individual's social mind.

Vaughn and Sjoberg further develop this perspective along the specific lines of Weber's features of bureaucracy: a complex division of labor, a hierarchy of authority, and the emphasis on efficiency. These features contribute to significantly restrict and direct patterns of social interaction. A strict division of labor precisely defines an individual's responsibilities and structural conditions. To a great extent, the organizational position assigned by the division of labor has its greatest effect in determining the amount and type of information provided to the individual. The differential basis of this information ultimately represents structural control of individual activity.

The hierarchy of authority provides individuals with differential access to organizational resources. Individuals in certain higher organizational positions attain greater ability or power to control organizational resources. At the lower end of the spectrum are organizational members with little control of resources. The interaction between the powerful and the non-powerful individuals generates a differential relationship which lends itself to what Vaughn and Sjoberg describe as "coercion." Coercion is viewed to occur well beyond the bounds of simple role relationships and in the larger

context of access to organizational structure. Vaughn and Sjoberg elaborate:

> To view this interaction in narrow role terms is insufficient, for the roles are embedded in a broader structural context. Powerful agents, for example, carry out some of their activities under the protection of legal status. Moreover, agents do more than interact with one another; they interact with structures, too. And these structures represent both constraints and resources. As human products, these structures are not mere extensions of human producers but social phenomena in their own right - although agents are needed to sustain them.[9]

Another interesting facet of this theory involves the inherent development of certain dialectical "tensions" between individuals and organizational structures. Vaughn and Sjoberg describe a constant struggle occurring within the organization between individual and structural interests. They provide three examples of this form of tension. First, they cite the tendency for individual agents occupying relatively powerful positions to augment the authority system that provides them with power by requiring loyalty of subordinates. This loyalty to both individuals and organizations appears to provide a form of "glue" that binds the organization together by successfully intertwining individual identities with the organization itself. The tension arises when the certain coalitions or subgroups develop bases

of loyalty or support which exceed their more formal organizational role.

Second, Vaughn and Sjoberg descibe the tendency of organizations to develop secrecy systems. Although overtly intended to protect the organization from external attack, they are more frequently used to isolate or compartmentalize internal individuals to maintain the authority structure. In other words, lower status individuals with highly specialized and technical skills are kept from getting information that would show them the "big picture" in order to insure that they do not challenge higher authority. This tendency creates a tension both on the part of highly skilled subordinates who realize their restricted understanding and the superior who must struggle to conceal the details of the use of the subordinates output.

Third, the degree of individual discretion to interpret organizational rules is dictated by organizational structure. High level executives are given far more latitude of discretion in interpreting rules than lower ranking members. And typically, higher ranking members tend to accept and follow organizational rules while lower members tend to challenge existing arrangements. This inverse relationship of structural ability and individual desire creates significant internal tension.[10]

The result of this organizational tension often develops in the social mind of individual agents into what Vaughn and Sjoberg descibe as "organizational contradictions." It is here that the reflective aspect of the social mind takes hold:

> Consequently, accomodations must be made to deal with a contradiction not acknowledged by the official structure. In these circumstances, agents, rather than being totally absorbed within official reality, are in a position to confront the structure - at least in the sense of gaining reflective insight into how the system operates. Here we see how the system can stimulate reflectivity, despite powerful constraints against it.[11]

Certain key features of Vaughn and Sjoberg's perspective must be reemphasized at this point. First, and perhaps most important, Vaughn and Sjoberg's theory expands on the classical view held by Mead and other symbolic interactionists to develop an integrative perspective of the individual and structure which represents a theoretical middle ground in the micro-macro debate. Second, they posit that both social minds and social structures exist and stand in dialectical tension with each other. Both are very real entities and are capable of influencing and shaping the other. Although for the most part, organizational structure dominates over individuals and shapes the social mind, in certain circumstances the tensions created by this process develop into contradictions. It is these contradictions in the

social mind of individual agents that develop into the tendency to reflect. Through this critical reflectivity, the individual can hope to substantially influence the organizational structure.

BUREAUCRATIC PERSONALITY: THE STRAIN TOWARD HOMOGENEITY

An important aspect of the interaction of individual and structure as it occurs over a sustained period involves the development of certain ascendent personality types within the organization. Merton's classical analysis, cited in the introduction, highlights the influence of bureaucratic structure in dictating formality and the banishment of interpersonal relations "The structure is one which approaches the complete elimination of personalized relationships and nonrational considerations (hostility, anxiety, affectual involvements, etc.)."[12] Other scholars, such as Hummel,[13] Argyris,[14] and Perrow[15] have expanded on this subject in more contemporary works emphasizing informal as well as formal influences. While Williams, Sjoberg and Sjoberg[16] have focused on the darker side of bureaucracy and the influence of hidden bureacratic arrangements on the development of personality. Regardless of the particular theoretical orientation that is adopted, the influence of organization on individual type is a very fertile subject area.

My conceptualization is that there would appear to be two important components of this tendency toward homogeneity. First, I would cite the organizational forces which actually shape the individual personality. And second, there is the organizational trend to promote or reward certain organizationally desirable types that ultimately achieve dominance and power within the organization. The first component would involve the actual influence of the organization to change the individual. The second is much more subtle and can be seen to promote a kind of organizational "homogeneity" of personality type increasingly at each level of hierarchy.

Using Vaughn and Sjoberg's interpretation of the Meadian concept of the social mind, it is possible to see how the the individual actor can be influenced by the organization away from irrational or personal relations. The organization can simply constrain the patterns of social interaction and the social role occupied by the actor to exclude such experience. In this way, the social mind and the included social memory define a social existence which is devoid of such considerations.

In the second case, the organization and its existing norms of rationality and impersonality tend to promote only those individuals who adhere to these same norms. Within a hierarchial system, the

promotion process is repetitive and only the very "pure" rise to the top while only the very highest ranks are allowed to determine promotion. The net effect is a continuous cirlce of selection which promotes bureaucratic norms. In simpler terms, the process can be described as sort of a bureaucratic application of the sociobiological notion of "survival of the fittest." It is easy to see how a bureaucrat with a blemished record of making an "irrational" decision or becoming involved in "personal" relations is not likely to rise to positions of significant power.

THE PROFESSIONAL/BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT

Given this discussion of the influence of bureaucratic structure on the individual, it is important to identify certain "tensions" that are unique to the professional working within a bureaucracy. The literature in this area has typically focused on two principal conflicts. First, there is the fundamental conflict between differential levels of expertise. And second, there is the conflict that is rooted in the freedoms normally associated with a professional's competence.

The controversy between professionalism and discipline is based in the perceived discrepancy between the expertise of the subordinate and that of his superior. This is an extremely popular criticism of bureaucracy and can be traced to Talcott Parson's remarks in his

translation of Max Weber's Economy and Society .[17]   Parsons
highlighted the potential case of high officials who lacked specific
expertise in the very subject area that they directed the activities of
more expert subordinates.   This situation places the need for
organizational discipline directly at odds with the pursuit of
organizational goals and efficiency.[18] This conflict gained considerable
popularity in the 1950's and 1960's with the rise of the technological
and scientific revolutions in the United States. A variety of authors
such as Gouldner,[19] Udy,[20] and Stinchcombe[21] sought to examine the
controversy in specific organizational contexts.   Perhaps the most
graphic example of the conflict between professionalism and
bureaucracy is offered in Nuel Pharr Davis' account of the
administration of the Manhattan Project.   In this massive attempt to
produce an atomic weapon at the close of World War II,   a military
bureaucracy was used to administer the work of teams of scientists who
were developing the weaponry. In this case, military bureaucrats with
little or no technical knowledge of science were directing the activities
of Nobel laureate physicists.[22] Examples are provided of the tension
between administrators who insisted on rigid adherance to minor
regulations and the rather strange work habits of creative scientists.

The second form of conflict stems from the typical freedoms and
perogatives afforded to "professionals" and their resticted roles within
bureaucracies.   Blau and Scott[23], Etzioni,[24] and Hoy and Miskel[25]

described three professional characteristics that stand in direct opposition to bureaucratic administration. First, the extensive education (typically college and post-graduate) that the professional has undergone usually tends to create an expectation of some degree of self-administration. Second, the professional's commitment to disavow personal interests and to selflessly promote the interests of his clients generates a sense of dedication to his profession. And third, this dedication to the profession gives rise to great loyalty and comradery among professionals. The overall picture provided is of a tightly knit group serving a higher calling and susceptible only to criticism and recognition from within its own ranks. Research into this source of conflict has typically come from the field of education. Alvin Gouldner's classic study of "cosmopolitans and locals" illustrates the internal conflict within the educational profession between educators who are oriented toward the pursuit of professional expertise(cosmopolitans) versus those with vested organizational loyalties and interests (locals).[26] As is summarized by Angona and Williams:

> Locals possess extremely strong loyalty to their organization, generally subordinate their individual professional interests to the goals of their organization, and see themselves as members of the organizational team. . .Locals are in fact what their formal job requirements stipulate: loyal, submissive organizational team members. . . Cosmopolitans are distinguished by three

characteristics: minimal loyalty to the
employing organization, high commitment
to the growth of professional skills, and
intimate ties with a reference group of peers,
wherever they are employed.[27]

Several key points about the professional-bureaucratic conflict should be emphasized. The crux of the controversy in my view revolves around the issue of discipline. The bureaucratic model holds that discipline is an end to itself and that it is imposed externally on all the actors by the system of bureaucratic rules. Professionals within the bureaucracy are required to fall in line with these rules and are subordinate to the system. The professional model appears to place an equal emphasis on discipline; however, it is imposed by the individual professional. The professional is imbued with the requisite education and commitment to organizational goals and values to impose discipline on himself and the component of the organization he is responsible for. This perspective requires a greater degree of latitude of action and decision-making authority to be held by individual professionals within the organization.

It is also apparent that some organizations are better suited than others at accomodating or requiring the "professional" type. Certain less centralized or more remote activities would be better suited to a professional orientation. In this manner, each isolated organization

would possess a leader or professional who represented the ability to make decisions in the best interests of organizational values and goals. On the other hand, an organization located in a centralized location with excellent internal communications would have less of a need for highly qualified professionals. In another dimension, organizations which perform routine functions are better suited to the bureaucratic system of discipline and decision-making because there are likely to be few exceptions to established procedures. On the other hand, dynamic organizations that continually confront changing situations involving different variables are better suited to more localized systems of decision-making and authority. In this way, a professional who represents organizational goals and values look after the organization's best interests. At this juncture, it is necessary to take a close look at the military organization, the trend toward rationality, and the indiviudual professional.

THE MILITARY PROFESSIONAL AND THE BUREAUCRACY

Moving this discussion back into the military context, it is important to raise the question of exactly what organizational form is the military best suited. Is the military the classic form of bureaucracy as depicted by Weber? Does the military include all of the features inherent in the formal bureaucratic model? Is the trend toward rationality, reliance on technology and bureaucracy as described by

Janowitz and Moskos a reflection of this? And if so, what possible organizational contradictions or tensions can be expected to develop?

The issue of determining which organizational form the military is best suited would appear to have its roots in various forms of the nature of modern warfare. This argument can be considered at a number of theoretical levels ranging from the extreme belief that future wars will be entirely an exercise of rationally placing weaponry and forces on the battlefield and anticipating outcomes, on the one hand. And on the other, the realization that regardless of technological innovation the only way that ground can ever actually be taken is by placing foot soldiers or infantry on it. This is really a false dichotomy as virtually all viewpoints recognize that the human dimension remains a critical element of warfare. My view, however, is that in the absence of actually engaging in combat, the military organization tends toward an overemphasis on the management perspective. Stated another way, the military can be viewed in peacetime and wartime configurations. The peacetime military can be best described as a centrally located, rigid bureaucratic organization with primary emphasis on achieving maximum efficiency in the expenditure of tax dollars for defense. The wartime military can be described as an extremely dynamic and decentralized organization which must simultaneously consider rational considerations in allocating and manuevering forces and the all important element of controlling

human relations so that they are sure that the men will fight when they get to the battle. An expanded version of this argument will be presented in Chapter Five.

From these descriptions it is clear that the two organizational forms tend to require rather different conceptualizations of the military professional. The peacetime bureaucracy tends to demand a skilled bureaucrat capable of delivering results on the bottom line. In this regard, the focus of his skills is principally in technical efficiency. Little professional latitude is required as the task is mostly routine. The wartime organization would appear to demand a much greater ability to deal in human affairs. It is important to note that the role of the military professional varies greatly. It is doubtful that a fighter pilot's actual job performance is much different in peace than in war. However, the focus of the military profession would appear to change drastically for leaders in the combat arms with far greater emphasis on charismatic leadership and human relations. It is important to note that despite the tremendous emphasis on technological innovation and increasingly automated weapon systems, a large percentage of the American military is still serving in the personnel intensive conventional warfare role.

My major contention is that the peacetime organizational configuration and its bias toward bureaucratic management has a

significant effect on the individual professional officer. The trend in development of individual types within the peacetime bureaucracy is toward emphasis on technical efficiency and rational management at the expense of skill in the less rational notions of leadership. The natural primacy of the wartime organizational form over the peacetime organizational form was previously maintained by frequent wars, the dismantlement of the military organization in peace, and the relatively low cost of maintaining the peace-time force. The advent of a full-time and full-sized peacetime military, the tremendous cost of equipping this force with highly technological weaponry, the absence of war coupled with the need to minimize costs has led to the dominance of the rational and bureaucratic management form.

Stated in a way that is more consistent with Vaughn and Sjoberg's thesis, the peacetime military bureaucracy is acting to constrain and develop an ideal bureaucratic type. This individual exists in the form of the new military professional. Athough this individual is clearly well suited to the organization's peacetime form, the important question is what will be his performance in the very different wartime organization? In order to answer this question, a closer examination of the wartime military and its recent experience is provided in the following chapter.

SUMMARY

In this chapter, we have provided the theoretical link between structural tendency and individual organizational member. According to Vaughn and Sjoberg's interpretation of Mead, it is the concept of the "social mind" that is greatly influenced and constrained by organizational structure. Taking the specific case of the military professional serving within the military establishment, it is possible to observe the organizational trend toward rationality as it affects the individual officer.

I have presented an interpretation of the military's peacetime and wartime forms that indicates two very different organizational bases. The peacetime bureacracy based in the formal and rational-legal and the wartime military based in irrational and charismatic human dimensions. It is in the description of the latter organizational form that I part company with the Weberian tradition. Weber saw the military as changing from the charismatic and irrational "warrior communism" to the ultimate form of modern bureaucracy. It can be inferred then, that Weber saw the source of discipline in modern battle to be the rational and legal. It is my contention that this is incorrect. To my view, the basis of discipline and success on the modern battlefield remains anchored to more irrational and charismatic sources of motivation. Therefore, the structural trend toward

rationality in peacetime and its subsequent effect on individuals, particularly the military officer who is ultimately responsible for leadership, can be seen to generate a significant potential for danger. This danger would occur when, in the face of battle, the soldiers of a nation demand leaders and the military organization provides bureaucrats.

NOTES

[1] Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," <u>Social Forces</u> 40 (1940), p.563.

[2] Merton, ibid. , p. 567.

[3] Bruce H. Mayhew, "Structuralism Versus Individualism," <u>Social Forces</u> 59 (1980), pp. 335-376.

[4] Ted R. Vaughn and Gideon Sjoberg, "The Individual and Bureaucracy: An Alternative Meadian Interpretation," <u>The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science</u> 20, 1 (1984), p. 58.

[5] Randall Collins, "On the Microfoundations of Macrosociology," <u>American Journal of Sociology</u> 86, 5 (1981), pp. 985-988.

[6] Vaughn and Sjoberg, op. cit. , p. 59.

[7] Ibid. , p. 60.

[8] Ibid. , p. 60.

[9] Ibid. , p. 61.

[10] Ibid. , pp. 63-65.

[11] Ibid. , p. 64.

[12] Merton, op. cit. , p. 561.

[13] R.P. Hummel, <u>The Bureaucratic Experience</u>. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

[14] C. Argyris, "Personality and Organizational Theory Revisited." <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u> 18 (1973), pp. 141-167.

[15] Charles Perrow, <u>Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay</u> (New York: Random House, 1979), 2nd Edition.

[16] Norma Williams, Gideon Sjobeg and Andree Sjoberg. 'The Bureaucratic Personality: An Aternate View." <u>The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science</u> 16, 3 (1980), pp. 389-405.

[17] Talcott Parsons and A. M. Henderson, <u>The Theory of Social and Economic Organization</u> (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1947).

[18] Perrow, op. cit., p. 51.

[19] Alvin W. Gouldner, <u>Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy</u> (New York: Free Press, 1954).

[20] Stanley W. Udy, "'Bureaucracy' and 'Rationality' in Weber's Organization Theory," <u>American Sociological Review</u> 24 (1959), pp. 591-595.

[21] Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production," <u>Administrative Science Quarterly</u> 4 (1959), pp. 168-187.

[22] Perrow, op. cit. , p. 53.

[23] Peter M. Blau and Richard Scott, <u>Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach</u> (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962).

[24] Amitai Etzioni, <u>Modern Organizations</u> (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), P. 68.

[25] Wayne K. Hoy and Cecil Miskel, <u>Educational Administration: Theory, Research and Practice</u> (New York: Random House, 1978), pp. 69-70.

[26] Alvin Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," <u>Administraitive Science Quarterly,</u> 2 (1957), p. 290.

27 Judith Angona and Leonard B. Williams, "The Professional Bureaucratic Conflict: Origins, Implications, Resolution," Planning and Changing (1985), p. 13.

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPLICATIONS FOR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

INTRODUCTION

> Four brave men who do not know each
> other will not dare to attack a lion. Four less
> brave men, but knowing each other well,
> sure of their reliability and consequently of
> mutual aid, will attack resolutely. This is the
> science of the organization of armies in a
> nutshell. -Du Pieq[1]

In the previous chapter, the contention was made that there was a distinction between the military's peacetime and wartime organizational forms. The peacetime military was decribed as being optimally organized as a bureaucracy based in rationality and efficiency. The evidence to support the trend toward rationalization of the peacetime or garrison military was provided in the review of the works of scholars such as Moskos, Janowitz, Butler, and Segal. It is now necessary to examine the optimal form of organization for the wartime military establishment. It is my view that the historical evidence indicates that the basis of successful military performance or combat effectiveness has been based primarily on less rational human

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considerations such as the effects of group dynamics and group cohesiveness. I will support this contention by first defining what is meant by combat effectiveness and then examining the research on successful military organizations in combat. In extending my major thesis about the influence of the structural trend toward rationality and its effect on the officer corps, I will present accounts of the professional officer's role in the failure of the American Army in Vietnam and the current problems of leadership in today's Army.

Once again, I should point out that the focus of this discussion will be primarily directed at the effectiveness of conventional ground combat forces. Although it can be argued that as a result of technological innovation in the nuclear age that the military is less reliant on conventional forces, recent world events have highlighted the importance of such forces in the low to mid intensity combat environments such as Vietnam, Central America, and numerous anti-terrorist operations. In a sense, the nuclear age has resulted in a technological stalemate with the focus of military emphasis turning from large scale conflict to very limited and down-scaled conflict. The central players in this new arena will be the conventional foot soldier. The effectiveness of this type organization is therefore the focus of my analysis.

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS DEFINED

What is combat effectiveness? This is an extremely complicated issue that involves a variety of variables and levels of analysis. Considerations range from the broadest influences of society on the total military organization down to the psychological state of individual soldiers and from the effectiveness of an entire Army down to the performance of the smallest subordinate unit and at every level in between. In the simplest terms, however, the basic question at all levels of analysis is whether the unit (ranging from individual to crganizational) is capable and willing to impose its "will" upon the enemy.[2]

In analyzing this definition there would appear to be two separate components: "capability" and "will." In terms of the capability to fight, there are a host of clearly objective factors that must be taken into consideration. Such factors as: weapon systems and their capabilities and availability; the sheer size of the military force, the ability of the organization's supply system to provide food, clothing, ammunition, and other necessary supplies; the ability of the organization to maintain and repair its equipment; and, the efficiency of the organization's administrative system in responding to its needs. All of these relatively objective factors would appear to be rather easily evaluated and assessed. It is also easy to see that such quantifiable and

manageable entities easily lend themselves to more rational forms of organizational control. However, as stated above this is only part of the equation for combat effectiveness. The second component is the unit's actual "will" to impose these capabilities on an ememy and this is a far more slippery and subjective a notion.

I should add at this point that, in the minds of many more "rationalized" military thinkers the issue of the "will" to fight is a moot point. Taking an extreme view of discipline within a rigid and formalized military bureaucracy we could simply expect precise compliance with organizational imperatives. The individual soldier's "will" would not be at issue. Orders would simply be issued and the responding unit would simply march forward to accomplish the task notwithstanding the very real possibility of loss of life and its associated fear. Realistically however, this has not been the case and a more detailed examination of the the influences which contribute to the soldier's "will" to fight is called for.

The central element of a soldier's "will" to fight has historically been percieved to be that of cohesion. This is an extremely problematic term in many regards. From a military viewpoint, cohesion is described as "the attitudes and commitment of individual soldiers to the integrity of the unit, the "will" to fight, and the degree to which these are in accord with societal values and e.:pectations. Unit

cohesion, in the most simple terms, is espirit de corps."[3] In further defining the notion of cohesion in a military sense, reference is typically made to the term "synergism." Taken from medical terminology, synergism is defined as "the ability of a unit to produce an effect greater that the sum of its parts. In simple terms, the combat effectiveness of an infantry battalion should be something greater than the combat effectiveness of each of its infantry companies measured individually."[4] The responsibility of insuring that a unit possesses this "espirit de corps" and "synergism" is invariably the responsibility of the unit's leadership.

Several key points in the military definition of cohesion require elaboration. First, this notion of "espirit de corps" is precisely the same entity that Weber described as the critical source of discipline in the primeval "warrior communism."[5] It is interesting to note that contemporary military literature describing the highly modern and formal military establishment of the 1980's would attribute such importance to this rather personal and irrational concept.

Second, the important role of unit leadership is highlighted in creating unit cohesion. It should be noted that by organizational design, the professional officer acting in the role of "commander" is responsible for creating the cohesive environment. This is widely considered to be the "art" of military leadership.[6] Further, it is this

same professional officer corps that is required to imbue this sense of cohesion that has been described in the rationalization process in previous chapters.

Third, the relatively recent reemphasis of the importance of group or unit cohesiveness is the result the American experience in Vietnam. Analyses in this regard have typically focused on the absense of unit cohesion and soldier "will" as the cause of poor combat performance despite overwhelming superiority of actual "capabilities" such as weapons and organization.[7] A more detailed examination of the Vietnam experience and research on cohesion will be presented later in this chapter.

Fourth, the problematic nature of attempting to measure cohesion should be noted. Specifically, we are trying to assess the combination of individual attitudes about other group members, the group itself and the larger organization to which it belongs. This approach is principally derived from the field theory perspective of Leon Festinger who defined cohesion as "the total field of forces which act on a member to remain in a group."[8] Despite nearly forty years of research from within the field of social psychology there remains significant controversy as to the appropriate means of measurement, unit of analysis, and method of combination of different forces acting

on the group.[9] At this point, an examination of the tradition of research on cohesion and the military is warranted.

THE TRADITION OF UNIT COHESION

Cohesion has long been considered a vital element on the battlefield. An interesting account of the subject of cohesion in pre-modern times is offered by Marlowe.[10] His major thesis is that the effectiveness of pre-modern military units was in large part determined by the physical formations used in battle. The close proximity and integrity of the "battle line" in which soldiers marched shoulder to shoulder against the enemy is described as creating a feeling of support and coherence in being a member of a disciplined mass. Marlowe supports his contention by examining historical accounts of pre-modern battle. He claims that the psychological and moral integrity of the individual soldier was largely dependent on the maintenance of physical integrity of the battle line. He states:

> The Roman legion, as described by Vegetius (390
> A.D.), devoted its core training and built its
> organizational structure to ensure the
> functional integrity and indissolubility of the
> line of battle and its constituent groups.
> Vegetius says the most essential reason for drills
> is to "teach soldiers to keep their ranks and
> never abandon their colors in the most difficult
> evolutions."

Further, Marlowe discribes the training technique of the Roman legions and the requirement for each conturbinia or maniple (group of ten men as organized on the battlefield) to eat, sleep and live together. These training techniques continued throughout pre-modern times and accounts exist of the same processes occuring in the American Civil War and into World War I.[11]

Given the changing nature of modern warfare, the pre-modern approach of unit cohesion is called into question. New and more lethal weapon systems made the concept of a "battle line" and close physical proximity on the battlefield impractical. Soldiers would simply have to be more dispersed on the battlefield to survive. Therefore, the importance of cohesion in the modern era beginning with World War II required reexamination.

The classical study that focused so much attention on the issue of military group cohesiveness on the modern battlefield was conducted by Shils and Janowitz on the Wehrmacht at the close of World War II. They sought to determine exactly what factors allowed the greatly outnumbered and outgunned German military to fight on so ferocioulsy and effectively despite eminent defeat in the closing years of the war. The popular believe prior to this study pointed to the strong ideological orientation of individual soldiers to the National Socialist Party as the basis of the extreme discipline and tenacity of the

German Army.[12] However, Shils and Janowitz found that the primary basis of the individual soldier's ability to continue to fight was the support provided by his primary group. Shils and Janowitz descibed their findings in this way:

> It appears that a soldier's ability to resist is a function of the capacity of his immediate primary group (his squad or section) to avoid social disintegration. When the individual's immediate group, and its supporting formations, met his basic organic needs, offered him affection and esteem from both his officers and comrades, supplied him with a sense of power and adequately regulated his relations with authority, the element of self-concern in battle, which would lead to disruption of the effective functioning of his primary group was minimized.[13]

Another important finding offered by Shils and Janowitz was the tremendous importance of quality leadership in generating group cohesion. Despite heavy casualties, the quality and integrity of the German officer corps was maintained throughout the war.[14] These officers, by virtue of their dedication to their profession and willingness to share in the hardships and dangers suffered by their men, provided the basis of esteem and respect required for the primary group environment. It should be noted that this quality leadership was able to balance the delicate demands of intimacy, formalilty, esteem, and respect in an extremely effective manner.

Shils and Janowitz's conclusions were widely accepted within the military community. Perhaps the primary reason for this was that they were relatively consistent with the writings of a number of popular authors from outside the field of social science. Military historians such as S.L.A. Marshall in Men Against Fire [15] John Keegan in The Face of Battle [16] and John Baynes' Morale: A Study of Men and Courage [17] all wrote convincing accounts of the critical importance of group cohesion in combat and the important role of quality leadership in promoting it.

Despite this tradition of the critical importance of unit or group cohesiveness as the prime determinant of combat effectiveness, the subject slipped away into obscurity in the post-World War II era. Morris Janowitz offered the following explanation of the diminished importance of cohesion in 1979 "The question is not how to create cohesion. Armies have known how for centuries. The question is why the American Army doesn't want cohesive units." [18] Janowitz's analysis goes on to focus on the issue of the traditional suspicion held by the American people against the military. This fear of soldiers developing greater allegiance to the military unit than the nation state can be traced back to the founding fathers.

Although I recognize the validity of Janowitz's argument which is based firmly in the history of civil-military relations, I would cite another major factor contributing to the deemphasis of unit cohesion that is more consistent with the subject of this thesis. The trend toward a deemphasis on such interpersonal and irrational relationships in the post-World War II military is certainly consistent with the rise of formality and the trend toward rational-legal authority. Clearly, the Convergence-Divergence Model described in Chapter 2 and its structural tendencies of increased emphasis on technology and the changing role of professional officers can be seen to detract significantly from the importance of group cohesion. I should also note that Janowitz did point out the continued importance of the "fighter spirit" in conventional forces[19] which can be interpreted to advocate the continued importance of dynamics such as cohesion. However, I submit that the ascendancy of the structural level trend toward rationalization adversely affected the formation of such interpersonal relationships. Moreover, that the desired balance between impersonal and personal or formal and informal has tilted toward the former. A closer examination of the military's performance during this period is warranted.

THE VIETNAM ERA

One of the most painful and shocking events in the history of the United States was the defeat of its military by a force a fraction of its size in the jungles of Vietnam. Although a tremendous amount has been written as to the causes and blame for this horrific war, none is more controversial or provocative than Savage and Gabriel's "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army."[20] These authors suggest two interrelated hypotheses as the primary reasons for the United States Army's performance in Vietnam:

> (1) The United States Army underwent a progressive disintegration and finally an accelerating one over an approximate period, 1961-1971, and that to a significant degree the disintegrative process operated independently of sociopolitical factors in the larger American society.
>
> (2) The disintegration of the Army, together with the dissolution of primary group cohesion, is directly related to the loss of officer professionalism expressed in the pervasive phenomenon of "managerial careerism."[21]

In support of these hypotheses, Gabriel and Savage offer several convincing indicators of disintegration. These were: 1) The incidence of desertion in Vietnam substantially exceeded that of both Korea and World War II; 2) The high incidence of "fragging" of superior officers

by subordinates (ie. fragging refers to the anonymous murder of an officer by an explosive device); 3) The high incidence of unit mutinies and refusal of individual soldiers to fight; and 4) The extremely high use of illegal drugs by U.S. soldiers (thought to exceed 50%).[22]

Savage and Gabriel further identify three distinct processes of disintegration. First, they described the replacement of the traditional "gladitorial" officer stereotype with the managerial combat nonparticipant. They pointed to the emphasis on "efficiency" as a standard of performance rather than that of "honor." They described the transistion in this way:

> The managerial disposition undermines the sense of military honor. Inasmuch as the latter is involved with "profitless" personal sacrifice, a managerial "commander" may tend to see his troops as a resource base of potential career survival and profitability, not as a moral charge upon his honor and duty rested in reciprocal trust and self-sacrifice.[23]

Second, Savage and Gabriel described the process of swelling the size of officer ranks and its subsequent effect upon officer quality. They point t) the growth of the officer corps from 7 to 9% of the total force structure in World War II and Korea to over 15% in Vietnam.

And third, they described the process of "individual rotation" in which soldiers were replaced on a one to one basis after fixed periods of service without regard for unit performance. It should be noted that in previous wars, soldiers were replaced in groups and often the unit was not relieved until either the war had been won or the unit had successfully performed a high number of combat missions. In Vietnam the natural emphasis shifted toward minimal individual involvement and risk while simply waiting out the combat tour.[24]

Savage and Gabriel's article clearly supports my view of the effect of rationalization on the military profession and its subsequent effect on unit cohesion. Their discussion of the "managerial officer stereotype" is consistent with my view of the unintended by-products of the ascendent structural trend toward rationality. This unfortunate change in the nature of the military profession deprived many units of the "quality" of leadership that is so important in developing unit cohesion. Further, they also point out that the increasingly technological nature of the military required more highly trained members in the form of officers. The rapid expansion of the officer corps to accomodate this demand resulted in much poorer "quality" officers.

Another point raised by Savage and Gabriel that merits further discussion is the policy of "individual rotation." Given the earlier

discussion of the importance of developing cohesiveness and closeness of soldiers together prior to battle in pre-modern times, it is difficult to imagine a policy that could possibly be more disruptive to unit cohesion. It would seem that such a policy would violate every existing piece of historical evidence on the subject of combat effectiveness. The question that must be asked then is how this decision could have been made? The answer is apparently found in the nature of "limited warfare." This concept derives from the limited use of military means to achieve limited political goals. Janowitz describes this new requirement as resulting in a reconceptualization of the use of military force into what he descibes as a "constabulary:"

> The use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabulary forces. The constabulary concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated protective military posture.[25]

The key elements of this concept involve a rather permanent projection of force and attainment of limited goals. These two factors combine to produce a new concept of raising mass armies which is in fact taken from mass production in industry.[26] The soldiers within the

constabulary were defined as interchangeable parts in a more complex system that simply required the repetition of stereotyped sequences of individual behavior. Marlowe suggests:

> In many ways the performance of the unit was assumed, despite evidence to the contrary and the belief of many line commanders, to be a simple summation of the individual soldier's skills and stereotypical behavior. These concepts were further supported by the economies of scale attendant upon mass training and the economies and responsive flexability, particularly in combat, of an individual replacement and training system. They have been further reinforced by the vision of military operations as essentially driven and shaped by technology and not by the structure and nature of the human groups that carry them out.[27]

In addition to these factors, the policy of individual rotation has a variety of anticipated political advantages. When the purpose of conflict is not total victory and is expected to exist over an extended period of time, there is a real need to disperse the hardship of the war over a larger portion of the population. It would simply be unreasonable to expect the same soldiers to remain in combat for extended periods fighting the same battles over and over for limited goals. The impact of the war is significantly lessened on the individuals involved by prescribing fixed periods of individual service while maintaining a larger organizational presence. The political advantage was that the effect of the war was not expected to be as severe

on the overall population. This however, did not turn out to be the case.

Once again, I should highlight the fact that the thrust of the decision to implement the individual rotation system stems from the overall organizational trend toward rationality. The pursuit of efficiency, the focus on technology, and the movement away from emphasis on personal relations were the primary determinants of this decision.

Savage and Gabriel's article has drawn a variety of criticisms from a number of quarters. Gregory, for example, totally rejects Savage and Gabriel's analysis because he claims that it is based upon a desire to bring back a "past cultural system that was relevant to a bygone time and place."[28] He believes that the processes and indicators of disintegration described by Savage and Gabriel are in reality artifacts of modern culture. Simply stated, the problems of modern armies cannot be solved by demanding that they return to a pre-modern cultural system. Gregory feels that we must strive to improve our military based on the cultural standards of the modern industrialized society. He also raises the issue of professional honor and claims that the tradition of honor is no longer viable in the military as it was once known. He states that "an absolute professionalism with regard to honor is irrelevant and unreal."[29]

Another interesting perspective on Savage and Gabriel's work is offered by Faris[30]. He interprets some of the indicators of disintegration offered by Savage and Gabriel in a somewhat different manner. He claims that there is no evidence to indicate that there was any lesser degree of primary group cohesion in Vietnam than in other wars. High incidences of fraggings, mutinies, and refusals to fight reflect what he calls "disarticulated" cohesion. This means that such actions actually reflect a high degree of group cohesion; however, they are not oriented towards accomplishing organizationally sanctioned goals. In other words, soldiers who engaged in such activities often did so in cohesive groups which did not coincide with unit's formal structure and unfortunately acted against the military establishment. Faris would appear to agree with Savage and Gabriel in that the primary reason that this occurred was the failure of small unit leaders to be effectively incorporated within these groups. In a real sense, this shows a rejection of "formal" leadership and the formation of more effective groups based in charismatic bonds. This is a similar indictment of the officer corps' poor "quality" of leadership as offered in Savage and Gabriel's work.

In summary, it is apparent that the Vietnam War can be viewed as a mid-course examination of the trend toward rationalization and its related effects. Although there are a variety of arguments that would

point to the detrimental influences of the larger society on the military's performance, there is little debate that the war effort was a failure. Another common conclusion is that a major contributing factor to this failure was the overall poor performance of the officer corps. Clearly, Savage and Gabriel's analysis presents a viable set of hypotheses for explaining that performance. It is important that we now turn our attention to the American Army in the post-Vietnam period and the significant developments related to the transistion to the All-Volunteer Force.

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Since the adoption of the All-Volunteer force in 1973 the American military has not been directly involved in any sustained military conflict. Therefore, a direct assessment of the further structural tendencies toward "occupationalism" and their effects on actual combat effectiveness is not available. Despite the absence of such direct means of evaluating unit effectiveness, various indicators of serious problems with the All-Volunteer Force began to surface in the late 1970's. In an assessment of the All-Volunteer Army made at a conference of senior Army commanders in 1979 the following conclusion was offered:

> Much of the U.S. Army did not exist in a state capable of meeting demands of current tactics, technology, doctrine, and weaponry. In many

units cohesion was minimal. There was a palpable hostility and real adversarial relationship across ranks. Many units offered little or no support to their members. In some units, soldiers died strangling in their own vomit following combined alcohol and drug use. They died in sight of their fellows who uncaringly passed them by. In other units, NCOs and officers routinely referred to their soldiers as "scum bags" and "dirt balls." Others announced that they had banned all family members from their company areas to avoid the exposure of women and children to the ". . . kind of animals I command."[31]

In response to this conclusion, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Edward Meyer ordered the formation of the Army Cohesion and Stability Task Force (ARCOST) to further evaluate the status of cohesion in the U.S. Army and develop policies and plans to support its development. The initial conclusion drawn by the task force was that in its current state the "creation of cohesive units was a function of: 1) the special gifts of commanders; 2) accident; or 3) the by-product of the way in which units contended with external circumstances."[32] The task force recommended the adoption of what would be known as The New Manning System. The purpose of the system was to create military units "possessing the kinds of unit bonding, cohesion, competence, self-confidence and trust that would ensure effective combat performance and organizational coherence."[33] The New Manning System itself consisted of two major subsystems:

the U.S. Army Regimental System and the COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training) Unit Movement System.

The U.S. Army Regimental System is designed to provide greater identification of the individual soldier with particular Army units. In this program, each soldier would voluntarily affiliate with a single, approximately four thousand man regiment. The soldier would then spend his entire career rotating between overseas and stateside regimental locations in approximately three year increments. Regimental affiliation would associate a soldier with a single regiment consisting of four battalions, thereby dramatically increasing a soldier's chances of working with other soldiers he knew at some point in h. s career. As of 1986, the Regimental System has not been fully implemented and there is no research exclusively on this subject.

The second subsystem, COHORT, has been partially implemented for evaluation and research purposes. COHORT is defined as the assignment of first term enlisted soldiers and more seasoned leaders together within a military unit, typically a company size, for a three year unit life cycle. Soldiers are grouped immediately upon induction into the military into their COHORT unit, undergo initial socialization together, and then deploy for one overseas and one stateside tour together. The goal of the system is to foster the development of primary group ties by minimizing the turbulence

created by the individual rotation system and by maximizing shared group experience.

Several key issues require discussion at this point. First, the U.S. Army's decision to explore changes in personnel assignment policy to improve unit cohesion must be seen as a fundamental recognition of a serious problem in unit effectiveness. Second, the initial task forces' conclusion that the conditions that appear to foster cohesion in existing units under the old system identified the "special gifts of unit commanders" as one of three contributing variables. It is interesting to note that the ability to create a cohesive unit is considered a "special gift" and not the professional norm. Moreover, in its proposal for the New Manning System, the task force only makes structural changes in assignment policies to improve the the climate of cohesiveness. No effort is made to systematically upgrade the capacity of unit commanders to contribute to the cohesive environment. Third, from a viewpoint as a social scientist, it is interesting to observe the aggressive nature that the military has tackled the extremely complex area of cause and effect relationships in group dynamics. The simple reality is that the COHORT program and its original eight battalions provide an extremely fertile environment for study. It is now important that we examine the results of the research conducted to date to specifically examine the role of leadership in improving the environment of cohesiveness.

THE NEW MANNING SYSTEM EVALUATION

The major research effort to examine the effects of COHORT on the development of unit cohesion has been conducted by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research through their Department of Military Psychiatry. This group has been collecting data since 1981 on nearly 8,000 COHORT soldiers assigned to eight COHORT battlalions stationed both overseas and in the continental United States. Their research has included a variety of research methodologies including both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study group's findings currently number four volumes and are far too voluminous to report; however, certain general findings are relevant to this thesis.

For the purposes of the study, military cohesion was defined as a complex end state that is built upon three interdependent processes. These processes are: 1) the bonding of equals (soldiers with each other); 2) the bonding of structural unequals (superiors and subordinates); and 3) the bonding and affirmation of special properties of a group, a team, a crew, a company; and a set of perceptions of the skills and abilities of self and others.[34] The scope of the initial study only sought to evaluate these three processes in COHORT and non-COHORT units. Unit case studies, interviews, and survey questionnaires were used to evaluate each component process.

The study developed a measure of what they considered the individual soldier's will to fight. This questionnaire was entitled the "soldier will" survey and was administered to 2839 soldiers in COHORT and non-COHORT units. The survey measured individual attitudes about peer relations, leader relations, and confidence in peers and leaders, and overall unit confidence. These survey results were statistically analyzed for internal reliability and then overall correlations were estimated. Researchers then went to the field to gain insight into the units overall proficiency in Army training and to conduct interviews with soldiers and leaders.

The major finding was that COHORT units kept together throughout their first term achieved greater horizontal cohesion than did non-COHORT units. General conclusions with regard to vertical bonding were not available due to the tremendous variability in vertical bonding in COHORT units. Marlowe described the findings in COHORT units in this manner:

> The OSUT (Basic Training) experience seemed to weld the lower ranking enlisted into a cohesive whole, but many NCOs and officers seemed to have difficulty talking informally with their soldiers at all! Instead of joining the unit and earning respect- - as they would have to do in combat- - leaders seem to react with social distance and an authoritarian leadership

style better suited to leading trainees or green troops without an established social history.[35]

It should be noted that units that possessed both elements of high horizontal and vertical bonding scored the highest in their attitudes and confidence about their unit. And, these same units were adjudged by Army standards to be more proficient at unit training. Units that scored well in horizontal bonding alone were only slightly higher than non-COHORT units in attitudes, confidence, and training. Depite the significanct variance in vertical bonding, the Army is continuing with further COHORT research and intends to field additional COHORT units. The overall COHORT project is summarized in the executive summary in this manner:

> Interviews and observations summarized in this report repeatedly come back to company/battery (leadership) policies and practices which either enhance or inhibit the potentials of COHORT. The COHORT process cannot substitute for good leadership but may, to a limited degree, compensate for leadership deficiencies. There is no question that gifted company/battery leadership can achieve higher levels of soldier will and family- - unit identification and bonding in a COHORT unit. The question is why all COHORT commanders cannot better capitalize on the considerable assets provided.[36]

In summary, it is apparent that the study of cohesiveness has once again come back to the important issue of leadership. The single variable

that has not been moderated in the COHORT study appears to be playing a critical role in the findings. The answer to the question asked above is, in reality, the essence of this thesis.

SUMMARY

In this Chapter, we have examined the concept of "combat effectiveness" and its basis in the notion of unit cohesiveness. I have traced the significance of cohesion from pre-modern to modern combat and examined the extremely controversial issue of the performance of the American Army in Vietnam. I have also presented a brief review of the U.S. Army's major effort to improve combat effectiveness in the All-Volunteer Force.

The intervening variable that has continually surfaced as the major factor linking group cohesion and unit performance is the issue of "leadership." The contrast between the highly effective officers of the German Wehrmacht in World War II, the "managerial non-participant" officer stereotype of the U.S. Army in Vietnam, and the "non-gifted" norm of professionalism of the U.S. Army of the 1980's should illustrate various trends in the qua :ty of leadership. This thesis, as it applies to professionalism, describes this trend. The gradual transition of the peacetime military towards increased rationality has redefined the notion of military professionalism from that of personal

and charismatic leadership to impersonal and authoritative bureaucracy. The individual military professional within this bureaucracy has been shaped accordingly and therefore it is little wonder that he does not possess this important interpersonal skills of his predecessors of an earlier time. The only exception to this is the "gifted" leader who has obtained these skills in some other fashion. The important question that must now be answered is what structural changes can be affected to insure that the individual officer possesses the necessary "management" skills required to survive in the modern Army while simultaneously promoting the less rational "gifts" of quality leadership.

NOTES

[1] DuPieq, Ardent, Col. , <u>Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern</u>, translated by Col. John N. Greeley and Major Robert C. Cotton, (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), p. 74.

[2] Sam C. Sarkesian, "Combat Effectiveness," in <u>Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military.</u> (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, INC. , 1980), p. 9.

[3] Ibid. , p. 11.

[4] Ibid. , p. 12.

[5] <u>Max Weber, On Charsima and Institution Building.</u> translated by S.N. Eisenstadt (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p.32-34.

[6] Sarkesian, op. cit. , p. 12.

[7] Roger A. Beaumont and William P. Snyder, "Combat Effectiveness: Paradigms and Paradoxes." in <u>Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military.</u> (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, INC. ,1980), p. 21.

[8] Leon Festinger, Stanley Schacter, and Kurt Back. <u>Social Processes in Informal Groups: The Study of a Housing Project.</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 164.

[9] Dorwin Cartwright, "The Nature of Group Cohesiveness," in D. Cartwright and A. Zander (eds.), <u>Group Dynamics: Research and Theory.</u> (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 91-109.

[10] David H. Marlowe, <u>The New Manning System: Technical Report I.</u> (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985). , p. III-4.

[11] Ibid. , p. III-6.

[12] Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disinteg ation in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Public Opinion Quarterly (1948), p. 281.

[13] Ibid. , p. 281.

[14] Ibid. , p. 299.

[15] S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire. (New York: Murrow Pub. , 1966).

[16] John Keegan, The Face of Battle. (New York: Viking Press , 1976).

[17] John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage. (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1967).

[18] Morris Janowitz in The New Manning System Field Evaluation: Technical Report I. Larry H. Ingraham (ed.), (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. II-2.

[19] Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 37.

[20] Paul L. Savage and Richard L. Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army: An Alternate Perspective," Armed Forces and Society 2,3 (May, 1976), pp. 340-375.

[21] Ibid. , p. 341.

[22] Ibid. , p. 351.

[23] Ibid. , p. 340.

[24] Ibid. , p. 341.

[25] Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait. (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), p. 418.

26 Marlowe, op. cit. , p. III-3.

27 Ibid.

28 Stanford W. Gregory, Jr. "Toward a Situated Discription of Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army." Armed Forces and Society 3,3 (May, 1977), p. 468.

29 Ibid. , p. 469.

30 John H. Faris, "An Alternate Perspective to Savage and Gabriel." Armed Forces and Society 3,3 (May, 1977), pp. 457-462.

31 Marlowe, op. cit. , p. III-9.

32 Ibid. p. III-2.

33 Ibid.

34 Larry H. Ingraham, The New Manning System: Technical Report One. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985.

35 Ibid. , p. II-3.

36 Marlowe, op. cit. , p. 2.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

SUMMARY

In this thesis, I have presented the argument that the trend toward rationalization in the American military has created the unanticipated outcome of the dominance of a "managerial" officer stereotype in the peacetime military. I have traced the development of the American military toward increased rationality in the post-World War II period using the two dominant theoretical models of Janowitz and Moskos. The changing nature of the military profession during this period has been illustrated by contrasting the traditional view of the military profession held by Huntington with the more rationalized view of Janowitz.

I have used Vaughn and Sjoberg's interpretation of the Meadian "social mind" to theoretically illustrate the ability of large organizations to constrain and shape the very nature of individual actors. I have further illustrated that the critical element of combat

effectiveness is the "human dimension" of unit cohesiveness. My contention is that the organizational strains toward rationality during the peacetime military have diminished the less rational "human skills" of individual officers significantly lessening their effectiveness as group leaders in war. I have used Savage and Gabriel's analysis of the American Army in Vietnam to support this contention as well as the current study of cohesion in peacetime Army units. In both instances the performance of the officer corps in providing "effective" leadership, on the whole, has been sadly lacking.

There are a number of conclusions that should be drawn from this work. First, it would be ridiculous to simply reject the trend toward rationalization and attempt to return to a culture of days gone by. Savage and Gabriel have been accused of just such a conclusion by Gregory.[1] This is not the point. There is little doubt that technological innovation in weapons, communication, and transportation sytems have greatly altered the nature of war and that these highly quantifiable entities are best "managed" using highly rational techniques. In fact, given their tremendous cost, complexity, and lethality, it would be negligent to do otherwise.

Second, despite the rise of technology and management, there will always be a "human" and irrational dimension to war. Janowitz's original analysis of the military establishment in The Professional

Soldier recognized that fact. He called for a balance of the "fighter spirit" and modern management[2] and clearly recognized that the maintenance of such a balance would not be easy. My point is that the balance has been tipped toward management. The constraints of the bureaucracy described by Weber to be an "iron cage" have tremendous powers to influence and shape individual actors. The notion of the "social mind" is a valuable construct in illustrating this influence. Although Janowitz's work is enlightened enough to recognize the importance of the "human dimension" of leadership particularly at the small unit level, his major shortcoming is in failing to see the darker side of the bureaucracy in influencing actors as do Vaughn and Sjoberg.

Third, a major contributing factor in the dominance of rational management over "human" leadership has been the prolonged peacetime or garrison posture of the military. I have described the organizational tendency towards formal-legal authority and bureaucratization in peacetime versus the charismatic authority and dynamic environment of war. Clearly, if we were engaged in sustained war the importance of "leadership" skills would be reemphasized and a balance between "management" and the "fighter spirit" might be achieved. Very fortunately however, we are not at war and we must seek other remedies to reemphasize the importance of the more irrational human skills of the military profession. The first step in doing so is in recognizing the tremendous power of formal

organizations in influencing and shaping individual human actors. Only in this way can we attempt to restructure the military experience to achieve a balance.

Finally, in terms of the micro-macro debate, it is important to develop more holistic and integrated theories of society that consider all levels of analysis. The military case is an example of the dominance of two extremely popular and frequently misinterpreted "structural" level models over an organization's development. Both the Convergence-Divergence Model and the Institutional/Occupational Thesis have been widely accepted in both sociological, political, and military arenas because they accurately describe events at the macro level. The difficulty has arisen in the failure of these theories to address their implications at other levels. In this instance, the problem is in the failure to recognize the effect of the structural level tendency toward rationalization on the individual military professional and his expected contribution to group dynamics. This is an indictment of both the sociological community and senior political and military leaders. In the former case, the problem is in failing to adequately resolve the micro-macro debate and develop holistic theories. And the latter is in using "structural" level models for political expedience without realizing the inherent limitations and implications of the model on other levels of analysis.

IMPLICATIONS

The major implication of this thesis is of a need to reestablish a balance between the emphases of "management" and "warrior" orientations in a formal organization that leans strongly toward the more rational orientation. Moreover, the goal is to insure that the "norm" of leadership skills in the U.S. military is such that the individual professional officer possesses the required skills to form cohesive units. The elements of change cannot be found in echoing a series of platitudes about the importance of the time honored values of "duty, honor, and country" and the importance of maintaining the "warrior spirit." Rather, in view of the ideas of Vaughn and Sjoberg, changes in the structures that influence the development of officers are required.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to offer an extensive analysis of military policies regarding officer professional development. However, some very general comments are provided. First, it should be noted that a large number of officers are involved in skills and specialties that do not involve leadership tasks. Some of these jobs are largely technical and others of higher rank simply do not involve dealing with soldiers and are not the focus of my analysis. In reality, these tasks are correctly managed by bureaucratic policies and

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rationalization. It is only the broad structural imperatives that impinge on troop leaders that require examination.

One major structural feature that emphasizes "bottom-line" results and efficiency in troop units without an equal emphasis on values and human elements is the Officer Personnel Management System. Typically, higher commanders evaluate subordinate troop leaders based upon an accumulation of statistics about every facet of a unit's performance in conjunction with subjective assessment of the officer's leadership skills. Examples of such statistics are: vehicle operationally ready rate, A.W.O.L rate, parts requisition rejection rate, lead-acid battery usage rate, disciplinary rate, reenlistment rate, etc. Leaders who score well in such statistical rankings and meet the higher commander's subjective approval are considered to be competent leaders. However, this is not necessarily the case. The structural bias in the highly rationalized system weighs plainly to the side of the objective and measurable statisical result. Equal "structural" emphasis in evaluating leaders must be placed on skills that contribute to unit cohesion such as the factors identified by the COHORT study group (ie. solider attitudes about unit and leaders, etc.).

Another major structural change could be implemented in the pre-commissioning and officer basic course socialization processes. Greater emphasis should be placed on teaching and evaluating

potential officers in the more "human" dimensions of leadership. Officers with the greatest potential for quality leadership should be steered toward duty as a leader of troops. It is only through the implementation of such broad structural changes that we can bring about the goal of having "gifted" leaders as the norm and not the exception.

NOTES

¹ Stanford W. Gregory, Jr. "Toward a Situated Description of Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army." <u>Armed Forces and Society</u> 3,3 (May, 1977), p. 468.

2   Morris Janowitz, <u>The Professional Soldier.</u> (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1960), p. 36.

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