



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PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SCHOOL FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE IN 1/1
THE PHILIPPINES(U) ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. A180 212	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Proposal to Establish a School for Irregular Warfare in the Philippines		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Individual Study
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Colonel Romeo B. Tarrayo		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Same		12. REPORT DATE 16 April 1987
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 39
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (If different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The object of this paper is to present the author's thoughts and those of more renowned thinkers and writers on an aspect of the effort to counter insurgency in the Philippines. This is not an attempt to present what the author believes to be the one answer to subversion and insurgency. It is a presentation of one measure that he believes is not taken advantage of by concerned government officials and agencies. It is taken for granted or has just not been thought of by government and civilian sectors.		

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The author bears sole responsibility for this paper and neither binds the New Armed Forces of the Philippines to his views nor do these views reflect those of the Philippine armed forces.

This paper is submitted this 8th day of April 1987 in satisfaction of the Military Studies Program of the United States Army War College.



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PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A SCHOOL FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE PHILIPPINES

An Individual Study

by

Colonel Romeo B. Tarrayo

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Project Adviser

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US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
16 April 1987

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines has a long history of warfare. It fought wars between tribes living on the different islands before the coming of the Spaniards, and struck a blow against foreign invasion and domination almost on the day that the foreigners landed on its shores. Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese who sailed under the Spanish flag in search of spices and riches in the East presumed to have discovered the islands now known as the Philippines. He was killed on the shores of Mactan Island in the Visayas in 1521. At that time, Magellan demanded of Lapu-Lapu, the local native chieftain of Mactan, to bow and pledge allegiance to the King of Spain. Lapu-Lapu said, "I bow to no king. I owe allegiance only to my people." Magellan, insulted by such a remark, attacked the village. A battle ensued between the natives and the Spaniards. Lapu-Lapu slew Magellan and drove the Spaniards back to their ships. In this battle, the Spaniards used swords, muskets and cannons; the natives fought with bow and arrows and the traditional "kampilan," a local broad sword.

The Spaniards persisted in their journeys to the islands and in all their journeys they had with them a man of the cloak, the friars. Initially, Spain tried to conquer the islands by the sword. They failed. They inverted the sword. It became the cross and this cross prevailed. The natives were easily won over by the missionaries because they spoke of one God and the islanders believed in one Supreme Being too, Bathala. The natives were converted to Catholicism; a religion diluted in its practice by pagantry. The islands became a colony of Spain for more than three centuries.

By virtue of the Treaty of Paris in December 10, 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. The Americans came at a particularly glorious moment in Philippine history when General Emilio Aquinaldo's forces and the Filipino people were knocking at the walls of Intramuros, Manila, and demanding the surrender of that last bastion of Spanish authority and resistance in the islands. By virtue of the treaty, the Americans took possession of the Philippines. The Filipinos then fought the Americans. Organized warfare went on for three years. The United States held the colony for forty-eight years. It set the date for the grant of independence on July 4, 1946. In the interim, World War II broke out and it engulfed the Philippines. The country once more suffered invasion by another foreign country, Japan. The Filipinos fought the Japanese invaders side-by-side with the Americans. For a while, Japanese military might prevailed. Once more, the country suffered the humiliation of being dominated by people from a foreign land. Then the day the Filipinos prayed for and looked forward to, arrived. That day was July 4, 1946. It was the day the Americans recognize as the day they granted Philippine independence. It was the day the Filipinos remember as the day the Americans recognized that the country and its people were independent, for on June 12, 1898, the Philippines declared her independence. This date remains as their Independence Day.

In the short association of Filipinos with Americans, the ideology of democracy gained greater meaning to the Filipinos. American democracy got easy acceptance by the people because its history of growth as a nation was never brought about under one leader who was either king or an autocrat who wielded dictatorial power over the people. It was a kinship brought about by the awakening among the natives that they are one in suffering and struggle

against a common enemy. History proved later on that their kinship was not brought about merely by common experiences but by real cultural and ethnic ties.

The end of World War II and the recognition of Philippine Independence should have brought to an end the invasion of the country by other states. Physical aggression from foreign shores, it seems, has ended. A more sinister and insidious invasion, worse than the military invasions of the past, has occurred. The portents of its severity and wickedness was shown when it manifested its arrival in the Philippines through the communist inspired "HUK" rebellion from 1946-1955. Once more the country was at war. It was a war that pitted the nation against itself. The warriors were his children and the battles were fought by brother against brother: fratricidal and internecine. Unfortunately, the invasion continues. The enemy has no face. It has no implements of war; only words and ideas. It strikes at the heart and the mind. The enemy is communism.

CHAPTER II

THE INSURGENCY SITUATION

The greatest threat to the national security of the Philippines today is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the self-styled New People's Army (NPA). This threat was there some twenty years ago and will remain so within the foreseeable future. There are several other threats that the country faces but none could approximate the gravity and urgency of the threat posed by the CPP/NPA. Through the years, it has managed to increase its party membership; increase NPA strength and armaments; adopt organizational improvements and widen its operational areas.

The CPP/NPA was born sometime in December 1968, when a splinter group of communists questioned the Partido Komunista ng Philipinas (PKP) adherence to the parliamentary struggle to seize power in the country. The group, allegedly led by Jose Maria Sison, followed the hard-line position of armed revolutionary struggle and established the present Communist Party of the Philippines. This is, by its own statement, a Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist oriented organization. It is this party that organized the communist New People's Army.

The New People's Army strength was estimated to be about only three hundred from its organization in 1969 to the early part of the 1970's. Sometime between 1973 up to 1986, the number of the armed group increased up to about 16,000 in 1985. It is now estimated to be more or less 24,000. Whether it is 16,000 or 24,000 is not so important as the fact that the group's number could increase so fast and their presence felt so strongly, not only in the former traditional dissident confines of Central Luzon, but practically throughout the country.

During the height of the communist "Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan (National Liberation Army)" depredations, its influence reached only as far as Central and Southern Luzon, Panay, and Negros Islands in the Visayas. This group numbered about 25,000 armed elements but they never got beyond the areas mentioned. They were relatively better equipped; better organized; better trained and had a lot of combat experience both against the Japanese Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines but they lost out to the government in about nine years of struggle from 1946 to 1955.

Several islands in the Visayas, now hot beds of communist insurgency, never were "Huk" affected areas. Mindanao was practically untouched by them. Now the New People's Army operates in varying levels of intensity in most of the country's provinces. The Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed group enjoys the active and militant support of thousands of the population and now have the audacity to openly show its true communist colors. Several factors have allowed this situation to happen. These factors include both foreign and local influences that have made communist propaganda more attractive and believable and government claims doubtful. These foreign negative influences constitute a vast area of consideration by themselves.

The Philippine government fully and correctly appreciates both the threat and the insurgency problem that the country faces. The subversive insurgency going on is a political conflict that has expressed itself in armed, violent terms and relies on the use of force primarily to seize power. There has been a lot of confusion though as to the real nature of the insurgency. Very few really believed before that the Communist Party and its terrorist military arm was real. Very few people believed all the tales about the communists; the liquidations; the ambushes of military and civilians; the attacks on military camps; attacks on municipal halls; the red bannering and sloganeering and a

host of other activities were communist inspired and conducted. A lot of people believed that the whole insurgency was stage-managed, and not really communist inspired and conducted. A substantial number of the population believed that everything was the last resort of popular desire for government attention to political as well as social problems; reforms in the various political as well as social problems; reforms in the various political and social systems that included the military, the judiciary, and the economy among others.

The political structure and conduct before the February 1986 revolution contributed immensely to the naivete and cynical attitude of the people. There was the Marcoses' New Society, that thinly veiled a dictatorship and perpetuation of political power, that had, at best, the doubtful approbation of the people and dubious legal bases notwithstanding so many constitutional referenda. Then there are those confusing, deceitful, hypocritical pronouncements and activities of some members of the church, both clergy and lay leaders. They criticized the government and some sectors of the population and actively endorsed and supported the communist terrorists. Some went to the extent of leading the terrorists while retaining the personality of a disciple of Christ. An overwhelmingly Christian as well as Muslim population could not believe that a wicked force could be behind the whole charade. People are thought to be so devout that none could even accept that a priest or a lay leader could be communist and therefore one could no longer be recognized as a man of God and the other a man of religion.

Another factor that left the people unbelieving was the government's own sidetracking of one of the very basic, if not the only reason for the subversive insurgency in the country. This is communism and its fanatical,

ruthless, untiring, and scheming advocates. The government sidetracks the basic cause for the present insurgency, perhaps because it has subconsciously recognized that and has presumed its basic nature and considered other areas instead which are not causes of insurgency. These add fuel merely to such problems and are a convenient source of communist agitation and propaganda. To the question: What is/are the root cause/causes of insurgency in the Philippines? The answers given are poverty, lack of opportunities, government neglect, various injustices, human rights violations and other reasons. If the basic causes of the insurgency are as enumerated, then the present political dispensation under President Corazon C. Aquino should have solved that problem by now. Granting, however, the subversive nature of the insurgency, the basic reason is communism and its doctrine of armed revolution to seize political power. One result of this confusion is the increase in the strength of the communist terrorists. In pursuit of their strategy to control the countryside, they conduct limited guerrilla operations to show their presence and acquire more firearms and ammunition. They conduct expansion activities designed to widen party influence, increase recruitment, and open up new bases and fronts.

Although the insurgents have gained in strength and firearms, they have also suffered losses that have placed difficulties on their organization. Since 1982, at least 119 key leaders have been either killed, captured or surrendered, including 10 Central Committee members. This has made the staffing of their territorial commissions a grave problem.

Recent events, however, have made a significant impact on the military as well as the insurgent situation. The February Revolution forced a change in the political leadership after a show of massive popular support for the present administration. The military has shown fractiousness and a confusion

of values while the dissidents have been shown their true measure of popular support. Events prior to the plebiscite to ratify the new Constitution on February 2, 1987, accentuated the state of the military as well as the insurgency. The greater significance of these events, however, is that the government may not be heeding certain signals that might plunge the country into greater instability.

CHAPTER III

GOVERNMENT COUNTERMEASURES

A sad fact in the Philippines is variance in the perception of what insurgency is, whose responsibility it is to solve, and what countermeasures should be taken.

Previous to the February 1986 Revolution that brought Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino to the Presidency, the government conducted various operations to counter the communist terrorists. It viewed the insurgency as a part of the whole spectrum of threats to national security. Government response therefore consisted of all facets of services addressed to the entire gamut of threats to the populace. The ideal would be for a concerted effort by all government agencies and the civilian sector to face up to the problem. Very few, however, appreciate the threat as all encompassing and the responsibility for counterinsurgency as a national responsibility. The greater segment of the people believed that the primary counterinsurgency responsibility belonged to the military. This view might as well mean that the military was the only one responsible to fight insurgency. The Philippine military hierarchy has not been remiss or found wanting on its determination and fortitude to combat the insurgency. The armed forces had a conscious and well-organized program of countermeasures. Before and just after the February 1986 Revolution, however, it had the handicap of a very low credibility; a shattered image that projected it as an abusive force, mainly as presented by the communists with some accounts that were outright lies or mostly concocted half-truths and exaggerations. It was demoralized because of some deficiencies and unfairness in the promotion and benefits system, and the active propaganda to discredit its role as no more than a private army no longer upholding,

protecting, and defending what it is sworn to uphold, protect, and defend. In the midst of this handicap, the military has adopted several measures aimed at its own members as well as the insurgents.

In 1985, three objectives were set which the armed forces hoped to achieve: maintenance of trust and confidence of the people, enhancement of morale and discipline of the troops, and increase in efficiency of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combat operations in order to minimize losses in material as well as human resources. Consequently, training, operations, and management were tailored to suit the achievement of those objectives. While all the proposals to fight the insurgency and prevent its spread are in order, those well-meant comments, suggestions, plans, and actions needed to be conceptualized, taught, and disseminated to all concerned in a well planned, deliberate, and honest to goodness manner in order to catch the popular attention, interest, and assimilation. What is required is education of the people on the threat, the nature of the threat, and countermeasures to remove it.

With the installation of the new political leadership and its policy of reconciliation to avoid needless bloodshed and popular suffering, and to give peace a chance, new measures were implemented. The government initiated contacts with the communists and invited them to peace talks. It resulted in a temporary ceasefire and short-lived peace that left both sides even more intransigent and uncompromising. Meanwhile, the government offered amnesty to the insurgents; proposed a package of social and economic amelioration programs; set aside a 3.9 billion peso fund, "to provide nearly two million jobs and community services"¹ to be hopefully completed by the end of the year. The government "announced that 20 million has been released as seed money for the processing of rebel returnees under the Government's National

Reconciliation and Development Program (NRDP)"² a vigorous land reform program and a host of other measures calculated to eliminate, or at least ease, the effects of various deficiencies that result in mass poverty, injustice, and other socio-economic problems. Teofisto Guingona, head of the current government panel of negotiators, told the National Democratic Front (NDF), which is negotiating on the insurgents' side,

That the government has a fresh mandate from the people; has repealed many of the oppressive decrees of the past regime; restored press freedom, stopped abuse against human rights; restored the rights to strike and other enlightened orders for the good of labor. It is in the process of implementing vital programs such as land reform, social amelioration, economic and social change for the uplift of the common man.³

Added to these are the release of political prisoners and the government initiative to negotiate a ceasefire, to give a chance especially for the non-ideologues to go back to the folds of the law and some other agenda.

A considerable number of dissidents have surrendered. Others have probably laid low and just gotten away from the violent struggle. The core of the group, however, that sets the stage for peace or war and the whole reason for the insurgency, remains intransigent. Reacting to the various moves of the government, the communists branded them as "narrow reformist and counter-revolutionary and fail to resolve the root cause of the country's problems."⁴ Putting one over the government, the communists added, "the agenda for peace rested on the elimination of the root cause of the political, economic, and social problems in the country as the basis for lasting peace."⁵ An encouraging development as far as perceptions perhaps are concerned, are the statements of Malacanang Press Secretary Teodoro Benigno who said that:

the Communist Party of the Philippines has not wavered in its bid to overthrow the present government and to

establish its own authority by force . . . Mrs. Aquino tried to reconcile all the diverse factions of society when she assume power by releasing political prisoners . . . in fulfillment of the promise The insurgency continued against the government because the aim of the communist insurgency is to capture political power.⁶

A newspaper commentary said:

The government is gambling that President Corazone Aquino's popularity and her promise of a new era in national politics will lure communist rebels into ending their insurgency on her terms. . . . But leaders of the rebel New people's Army . . . insist the government has underestimated the depth of their commitment to continue armed struggle until they achieve their goals.⁷

Pertinent statements and counterstatements are presented to prove the earnestness of the Philippine government to solve the insurgency problem. It is a bit naive, however, to count on the communists to budge from their avowed aims today.

ENDNOTES

1. Daily Report, Asia and Pacific, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, December 31, 1986, p. 4.
2. Ibid., p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 2
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., December 30, 1986, p. 5.
7. Robert Reed, "Each Side Misjudges Other in Philippines." The Sentinel, December 29, 1986, p. B9.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION AS A COUNTERMEASURE

In a forward to a Ministry of Defense pamphlet published in April 1985, entitled, "Insurgency Situation and Government Countermeasures," General Fidel V. Ramos, Chief of Staff of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines, said,

During this period of crisis on the life of the Filipino nation, the vigilance of the people is a paramount need. Knowing the enemy, the conspiracy it has been carrying to overthrow the country's democratic institutions, the clandestine nature of its process of infiltration and subversion of all sectors of the national community and the ruthlessness of its methods . . . should, open the eyes of those who wrongly believe they can flirt with the enemies of the Republic.

Paragraph 2, Section 5, Article XVI - General Provisions of the newly ratified Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines states that:

The state shall strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military and respect for people's rights in the performances of their duty.

These two preceding quotes establish the need for educating the Filipino people in general and the armed forces in particular. There is a mandate not only from an agency of government like the Ministry of Defense to establish a system of education but a constitutional mandate as well. How to accomplish these objectives of nationalism, patriotism, and respect for human rights in the military service is not an easy task. Field experience with the soldiers and civilians has shown a dearth, if not total absence, of the mechanism to satisfactorily achieve these goals.

The Philippine educational system does not adequately provide for awakening the youth in its early stages of development to the ideals of patriotism, nationalism, and respect for human rights. The home, among others, would be a good starting point for this. The Filipino household,

however, cannot give preferential treatment on this to the children if the home cannot point to any substantial spiritual values or physical assets that would show that patriotism and nationalism can assuage hunger, provide security, and insure their future. Children will not understand respect for human rights when the family's own state causes them to lose their own self-respect. When the children then depend on the schools for inculcation of certain basic values, the schools should allow in their curricula, a more careful and deliberate selection and treatment of related subjects. As former United States President Eisenhower said:

Competition for men's minds begins when they are students. This is when they must be taught to discriminate between truth and falsehood When they have all the facts . . . they will make the correct choice. . . .⁸

If at all, higher levels of education offer even less and less on the subjects of love of country, pride in one's race, and love and respect for freedom, equality, and liberty.

In military training, if there are any subjects taught concerning patriotism and nationalism, the schools do not make a good job of it. Teaching soldiers to respect human rights would be even harder. The compulsion for training the soldier to be an effective fighting machine; to have that spirit, stamina, and skill to survive for the ultimate successful accomplishment of a mission will almost always precede if not preclude any other training objective.

A more formal, well-planned, and deliberate system must be designed to instill in the military the best and most desirable traits sought after and needed not only to fight the present insurgency but to prevent one in the future. A formal education system must be instituted in the armed forces purposely to address the established objectives for the military to make it a

more effective force to combat insurgency and prevent making its conduct or misconduct an issue that would add fuel to one.

Ignorance is considered by many to be a primary cause for insurgency. This is only one of the factors that facilitate the establishment of an insurgency but not a root cause. Granting that, in some countries, ignorance can cause insurgency, this could not be true in the Philippines. On the contrary, it is the high level of literacy of the Filipinos that has caused some of them to sympathize with the communists and to support their cause. The people knew what was going on in their government. The people knew that the whole extravaganza of plebiscites and referenda, the mock and rigged elections, were all done to enable certain politicians to remain in office and consolidate and strengthen their hold on power. The people knew that the cause of the economic breakdown and the burgeoning foreign debt was the double dealing of certain politicians and their cronies. The people knew that there was no real compassion in the facade of government concern for the people. There was no heart in its protestations of love for the masses. If ignorance is involved, it is in the people not knowing that the alternative they supported does not represent a change for the better. The people do not know that the alternative they sought and are supporting would not restore the things they valued and cherished but would overturn everything they held dear and sacred. That alternative would foist on the people a government obsessed with the ideology that since the people have opted for controls by establishing a government, they must now submit to such government's control. If the communists are to be believed, they will not stop at this stage. The communist dream is a society where everyone is equal to the other with neither government nor controls and everyone is free. Not even Russia with its communist party run government has reached this dream state. It never will.

Whether there is popular ignorance or not, the point of contention is knowledge. Too much knowledge of one thing and so little of another could spell disaster to the Filipinos if they were to persist in their support of the insurgents, hoping that salvation is in communism and the communist party. These present certain risks that must immediately be removed. One measure is education. It should be a massive, intensive, and continuing education that should include everybody that can be reached and touched by this program. The communists have always recognized the importance of education. Their proponents have always emphasized and included it as an integral part of their party building and revolutionary activities.

Communist propaganda promotes the ideology of communism as the only true ideology for the people. It promotes the communist system as the only alternative to the present Philippine political system, and the only salvation from the bondage of alleged "feudalism, neo-colonialism, bureaucrat-capitalism, and clerico-fascism." Propaganda units of the party have so internalized, memorized, and mastered their lines that very few on the government side, particularly in the military service, would be able to overwhelm their facility to discuss or argue certain subjects. There is no spontaneity in this communist propaganda talent or skill. This was thought of well in advance for centuries and its importance drummed into the heads of their cadre and the communist propaganda corps. Lenin said, "We must go among all classes of the people as theoreticians, as propagandists, as agitators, and as organizers."²

What is interesting about the communist subversive effort is it talks very little about its ideology, apart from theory and its distorted meaning of democracy. Agitation is against whatever issues that can be exploited encompassing all social, political, economic, psychological, military, and

religious aspects of society. There is always a promise held out to the people that all of the alleged ills, the disparities, the persecution and oppression experienced in the present system shall be remedied and like a fairy tale ending, everybody will live happily ever after. So the mystique is there, all vague and mysterious and people sometimes desperate for anything to lift them from their state would flock to it and eagerly embrace it. To condemn the gullibility of the people is pointless. Indeed, a distinguishing feature of revolutionary conflict:

. . . is the fact that it is more important what the people believe than what may actually be factual. Thus the psychological consequences of any actions taken become of great importance and may well affect the balance of the support given by and sympathy received from the people.³

Mao Tse-Tung who, in the triumvirate of demigods, is worshipped by the Philippine communists together with Marx and Lenin, was ever sensitive to education and lack of it or its neglect. Observing backsliding among the people he said:

Recently there has been a falling off in ideological and political work among students and intellectuals, and some unhealthy tendencies have appeared. Some people seem to think that there is no longer any need to concern oneself with politics or the future of the motherland To counter these tendencies we must strengthen our ideological and political work. Both students and intellectuals should study hard . . . they must make progress both ideologically and politically . . . they should study . . . current events and political problems. Not to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul.⁴

ENDNOTES

1. Kenneth Colegrove, Democracy Versus Communism, Ed. by Hall Bartlett, New Jersey, D. Van Nostrand Co., 1961, p. 45.
2. Marguerite J. Fisher, Communist Doctrine and the Free World; The Ideology of Communism According to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, Syracuse University, Syracuse University Press, 1952, p. 113.
3. S. N. Bjelajac, Guidelines for Measuring Success in Counterinsurgency, McLean, Virginia, Research Analysis Corporation, 1966, p. 4.

CHAPTER V

MILITARY SCHOOL FOR IRREGULAR WARFARE

"An army without culture is a dull-witted army, and a dull-witted army cannot defeat the enemy," said Mao.¹

A common perception among the skeptics and the cynics is that the communist terrorists are nothing more than a bunch of hot-headed ignoramoses who have been misguided and misled. At some point in time and by a measure of communist indoctrination, they may well be. However, the manner with which they are indoctrinated and the almost perpetual conduct of instruction as shown by the documents often captured after a skirmish, must by now have made the members of the Party and the armed group very well educated on their communist course than other suspect. The degree of success that the communists have achieved in organizing the villages and far-flung municipalities show the level of expertise which can only be due to their intelligence and education.

The relatively advanced training and educational system of the Philippine armed forces focuses very slightly, if at all, on subjects that address psychological activities. Several reasons can be cited for this but one that is of immediate concern is the absence of a vehicle to teach officers and men what the enemy is and the driving forces behind him. Those who fight the insurgent should understand his cause; why he believes in his cause to the extent of enduring various hardships and deprivations and not hesitating to kill or be killed for it; the determination that drives him to violate the law and be hailed a hero for it, and dying, be exalted as a martyr by the masses; what he does that people sympathize and support him. On the other hand, what is in the government and the military that drives people to go to the other

side and embrace its ideology; believe in its cause and accept the violence of its methods and yet condemn the government and the military for theirs.

The counterinsurgent must know what insurgency is. The nature of insurgency in the Philippines should be studied as much as the efforts at countering it whether these are correctly addressed to the problems and if their implementation is the most effective. Concern must be given integrity and credibility, whether these back up every statement made and every promise given; whether sincerity goes with every little and big deed done for the common man.

On the other aspect of counterinsurgency, where force is met with force, and violence is met with violence, a clear idea of a plausible strategy should be established. Missions and tasks should be well understood and properly allocated. All the operating and cooperating units of the government outside the military should be made aware of their roles and join in the whole enterprise. Concerned non-military civil government agencies must realize that they too have a role to play, with some even greater than the military has, in fighting insurgency. The type of operations suited for certain kinds of insurgent activity should also be determined including the problems faced and the best solutions for them. All these and other relevant subjects must be taught to the members of the military organization and if possible to the civilian sector at various levels to make them understand the conflict, its nature, and the imperatives of having popular support for government countermeasures.

At present, the Philippines has a National Defense College, a Command and General Staff College, and in the Philippine Army, the Philippine Army Training Command. The National Defense College and the Command and General Staff College, if they do offer courses relevant to counterinsurgency warfare,

are much too high in the level of military schools to have any direct and immediate long-lasting impact on the military and other individuals proposed to be sent to undergo training. The Training Command handles training of recruits from basic to advanced courses short of the command and general staff course.

Certain courses offered in training now are called counterinsurgency courses. At most, they constitute tactical training courses that provide combat skills as well as enhance, individual skills and proficiency to a certain extent. An insurgency is a struggle for political power employing violent methods. The violent military aspect of an insurgency is not the totality of such struggle. It is not the totality of the insurgent personality. The more vicious and more sinister half of that personality is the political half. This is the heart and the brains of the insurgency and the insurgents themselves style their gunslinging group merely as their military arm. This other political half is the one that is perhaps not properly addressed by the military schools. It is this personality proposed to be addressed by a school for counterinsurgency warfare in the Philippines.

Chinese communism which appears to be typical of the Philippine subversive insurgency, emphasizes a great deal of political education for its movement. In 1944, while pondering the program of consolidation and training that lay ahead in 1945, Mao emphasized once more the political and military aspects of the program.

Equal importance should be attached to the military and political aspects of the consolidation and training programme . . . and the two aspects should be integrated. At the start, stress should be placed on the political aspect, on improving relations between officers and men . . . and arousing a high level of enthusiasm among the masses of cadres and fighters. Only thus will the military consolidation and training proceed smoothly and attain better results.²

Mao said further, that "educational policy must enable everyone who receives an education to develop morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker with both socialist consciousness and culture."³ Thus armed with so called "socialist consciousness and culture" the communist subversive machinery goes into action in the rural areas "educating the masses" and awakening them to a new consciousness, a political consciousness. This communist idea of education is really nothing but indoctrination. Education or indoctrination notwithstanding, the communists are having a field day in the remote villages, on school campuses, and the university belt. This resort to indoctrination is done "in order that the corrosive ideals which serve their ends may be spurred to action, disrupting order and corrupting the masses."⁴ This may well be right. The object then is how this indoctrinated masses can be reoriented in their thinking.

In the Philippines, three key figures can go to the remotest populated areas and can have significant interaction with the people. These are the priests, the teachers, and the soldiers on patrol. Both the priests and teachers have fairly well defined tasks to do just as much as the soldier. In the latter's case, however, seldom will a patrol result in an encounter. A patrol often ends up spending a few days and nights with the village people. It is this period that should serve a far more useful purpose than show government military presence in these areas. The soldiers should be trained and educated in the cause they are fighting for and this is the democratic ideology. They know much less of the enemy's communist ideology. The soldiers may have acquired excellent skills, speed, and stamina to fight the enemy aggressively in combat and destroy him, but they do not have the learning, education, and skills to win the masses over to their cause. This

is one facet of military education sadly lacking in Philippine military training schools.

The Philippines should have a school for counterinsurgency that should take care of political education of the soldiers just as much as their combat and tactical military training. The school should be a separate school that should provide training to elements of the four major services of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines including those undergoing basic military training; the members of the integrated National police and authorized civilians, government employees and officials. All the advantages of a uniform, integrated and intensive training effort under one training responsibility will thus be afforded. The school can be called Special Warfare Center or some other less military or non-military sounding name depending on the predisposition of the authorities who have to approve of this. If this is not feasible for some reason, then the Philippine Army must embark on its own training system. The Philippine Army Training Command can establish a department responsible for this type of training and it can be designated like the other departments of the Command according to its special line School for Counterinsurgency Warfare or any other name desired.

PROPOSED PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

A 12-week course covering a program of instruction can be initially conducted unless a broader curriculum is established or the tactical aspects of counterinsurgency training are also given as a training responsibility to the school. A six-month course, at least, should then be appropriate. If the course is added as a discipline to the Philippine Army Training Command, then a 12-week course should suffice. This could even be less, depending on the intent and requirements of the training.

Courses offering studies on certain subjects should be in the core curriculum of the school. These subjects should provide for the restructuring of Filipino values; strengthen the virtues of nationalism and patriotism, and strengthen faith and respect for supremacy of duly constituted civilian authority over the military. Other courses should build on the democratic principle that sovereignty resides on the people and all government authority emanates from them. Thus, the military is not there to persecute and oppress or destroy the people which is the source of the military's own power and strength but to defend and protect them from the depredations, corruption, and subversion by the enemies of the state. Study the enemy who purports to uphold people's rights, defend and protect them from their own government's alleged persecution and oppression, but activate the so-called historical forces of class differences and conflict into actual bloody struggles all for one selfish reason, the seizure of power for themselves. Study how they may then proceed to overturn the present system of democratic government in the Philippines and impose an alien system that has invaded the country and hold captive the hearts and minds of the people.

Knowledge of some of these subjects should hopefully provide the civil and military authorities the correct understanding of the enemy and its motivations; the impossibility of the society they want to build, and the deception, opportunism, and abuse they are doing to the people.

Subjects like Philippine Pre-history and Philippine History should be in the curriculum. Particular emphasis should be given the impact and influences of Spanish, American and Japanese occupation and colonization up to Philippine modern and contemporary times. The Philippine martial heritage base on unwritten and written history from Lapu-Lapu to people Power Revolution of February 1986 should form part of the courses to be offered. Particular

attention should be given to the various sporadic, spontaneous, and organized revolution of the Katiupnan and the Philippine Revolution against Spain; the Philippine-American War; Philippine participation in World War II, Philippine involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations during the Korean War; and other wars including the Vietnam War.

Brief and practical courses on Political Science and Philippine Government should also be offered. The course should include a study on the different political systems and governments of the world and tie these up with the Philippine political system. A formal study of the Philippine Constitution of 1986 and its history and evolution as well as the various constitutions previous to this should also be offered. Particular attention should be given to the Declaration of Principles; Bill of Rights; General Provisions; the principle of the supremacy of civilian authority over the military and the separation of church and state. So also should the Laws of Land Warfare or the Laws of War be studied. Martial law and the Philippines under martial law should also be given enough time for study.

A careful, well managed course on communism should be conducted. Particular emphasis should focus on the theory, nature, and practice of communism; the communist party as separate from a communist party administration of a state; the communist view of the different "classes" of society; position of the communists to the various existing opposition parties; and the communists' view of the peasants and their track record of deceit, terrorism, and violation of human rights. Some time should also be allotted to study the Communist Manifesto and the threat to the world that it portends. A special study should also be included on Chinese communism and Maoism; and revolutionary theories and doctrines by some known communist advocates like Vo Nguyen Giap, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, and indigenous insurgent

leaders and writers like Luis Taruc, Jose Maria Sison, and others. The history of communism in the Philippines should be included too. Brief courses on Nazism and Fascism should also be included for study. Communist party sloganeering touches on this especially against the Marcos regime and some church clergy and lay leaders who were tagged "clericofascists." Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes; Adolf Hitler, and Benito Mussolini should provide interesting study with their works.

Democracy, its theory, principles, and practice should be studied. Early philosophers like John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Edmund Burke, and Thomas Jefferson will provide interesting study with their works and treatises.

Greater time should be devoted to the study of insurgency and counterinsurgency. A good transition to a study of these subjects could be the study of the Hukbalahap Movement and the Partido ng Komunista ng Philipinas (PKP). The various views on insurgency by different people should be studied. There is the moralist view, the humanist view, and the attitudinal view on insurgency. The so-called "root causes of insurgency" should be further discussed and sorted out to avoid confusion over them. In the Philippine insurgency, what are the "root causes"? The common insurgent objectives, the stages of an insurgency, the indicators of an insurgency in the urban and rural areas; the determinants of control in an insurgency and indicators of insurgent success should be studied among others. All these should relate or be related to the Philippine insurgency model.

There is in the Philippines another influence that has taken its toll among the people of the church. This is Liberation Theology. This is a philosophy born out of the frustrations over some political systems in South America. The Philippines, a predominantly Catholic Christian country with its

active insurgency provided another fertile ground for this sordid politico-religious philosophy. This too must be studied.

The next important course should be the study of counterinsurgency operations. What should preoccupy the school is a study of the nature of counterinsurgency and whose responsibility it is. In the consideration of its conduct, a clear view should be made about a total effort that the government should conduct or is conducting. The political and military responses of the government should be studied critically and should be of some use to planners and policymakers in higher echelons of authority. A more exhaustive and intensive research should be made so that relevant subjects could be included like factors affecting non-military responses and military responses. Greater detail and more time should be devoted to this course in the curriculum as the very reason for the establishment of the school would be the turn-out of well educated, well-trained, intellectually able and communications skilled graduates. These graduates should be typical examples of a Filipino soldier, a soldier of the people and an effective force to destroy the insurgents by winning over to the government side, the people, who to the insurgent is, as water is to the fish.

PROPOSED MASTER TRAINING SCHEDULE

A master training schedule for the whole course should be prepared as required either as a regular ongoing activity of the school or when requested or directed to conduct the course on authorized personnel or individuals in military units, like a battalion on retraining, the civilian groups. It should be apportioned in weeks with the subjects to be taken daily and weekly to include time, type, place of instruction, and other details duly indicated.

A regular 12-week course should allow some time for in and out-processing, other administrative matters, and adjustments for unforeseen time delays.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICABILITY

Initially, the course should be given to selected officers and senior non-commissioned officers coming from all the four major services of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines as well as key senior members of the Integrated National Police. Selection should be based on actual positions held and if possible the projected assignments of the selectees whether they will be playing key roles as actual operators or as civil-military operations specialists in conflict areas. Educational qualifications should be set initially as a requirement. All services and the integrated National Police put a high premium on educational qualification for their members. There should not be a dearth of qualified personnel for the course.

Another requirement which is really basic in all other courses in Philippine service schools is the security clearance. All professors and instructors must be cleared according to armed forces security requirements. The mechanics for this is in place in the military schools. All students should be known for their unquestioned loyalty; their patriotism; strong conviction in the righteousness and justness of the government and military cause; and dedication to the service. Such other requirements as are necessary for administrative and other purposes should all be satisfied by all students.

This course should be included or integrated into the basic courses, advanced courses, and the basic training for reservists mandated by the National Defense Act, which is for six months. Some applicable subjects can

even be incorporated in the Reserve Officer Training Course program in colleges and universities. Meanwhile civil government agencies, appraised of the need to present a united front and cooperative effort against subversion and the insurgency should be encouraged to take the course. They should select from among their line officers and personnel those who will undergo training. Short term seminars of one day or two days can be conducted for governors and city mayors by region. A similar course can be conducted for the rest of the municipal mayors in each province. Barangay officials can also be given seminars in respective cities and towns. Priority should be given to frontline area government rank and file and then from the more secure areas or vice versa depending on feasibility.

When sufficient time shall have elapsed such that the present crop of military personnel should have undergone this course, no officer or enlisted man should be allowed to take branch basic courses up to the Advanced Courses until they have passed a study of this course either separately or integrated in the curriculum of another course.

SECURITY AND ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION
FOR FACULTY AND STUDENTS

To set both the faculty and the students at ease and to provide a secure forum for uninhibited discussion and debate under an atmosphere of academic freedom, a principle of non-attribution should be adopted. Frank and open objective and subjective discussion must be allowed in order to gain greater insight into the subjects discussed as much as maximum benefits in knowledge gained and lessons learned for the faculty, the students, and the school.

To provide that academic atmosphere and more importantly credibility, highly qualified and respected civilian and military resource speakers and

professors should be invited to teach. Organic military faculty instructors may handle instruction of subjects along their specialized lines. All should be qualified according to their academic and technical fields. Captured and surrendered communist party cadre and suitable members may be asked to talk on their experiences and share their views on their organization. Their comments and observations on government countermeasures, particularly military operations may prove priceless inputs to the government through the school.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

If a separate school is established as a New Armed Forces of the Philippines Special Warfare School or some other name, the Commandant should be a Brigadier General. His deputy can be the most senior officer from any of the major services organic to the school and the Chief of Staff may be as the Commandant may designate. The staff must be distributed among the organic personnel from the major services specialized on a particular staff line or specialty. An important office should be that of a comptroller or a fiscal and budget officer. A careful, prudent and frugal fiscal and budget system should assure adequate financing for the school. Another important office is that of the civil-military operations officer. The deputy may be designated as Deputy for Civil-Military Operations, although a Civil-Military Operations Staff officer should be separately designated to take care of the more detailed operations.

The normal Headquarters, and Headquarters support facilities and personnel should be allocated, based on a more detailed study of personnel requirements to serve as Headquarters, Headquarters Support, Service Support, and Faculty Instructors.

An adequate and comfortable facility should be provided by the school for staff and faculty, as well as the students. The minimum requirements basic and normal to a school should be assigned and allocated. Necessities such as transportation, fuel and lubricants, training aids and materials, and complete classroom equipment should be allotted on a regular basis consistent with government and armed forces policies and regulations. Financial and other appropriate incentives may be given the members of the school, and if feasible, the students.

If the school is to be a department in the present Philippine Army Training Command, a Colonel should head the department. Officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the department should be college degree holders in the field of Social and Political Sciences with field and combat experience and known especially for their academic and intellectual abilities as well as discipline and conduct. Excellent communicative skills and language facility in the vernacular should also be required. These qualifications should hold true for those assigned to a separate school if one is established.

As a department of the Training Command, additional facilities as well as equipment should be assigned and allocated to it separately and regularly.

PROPOSAL FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT

As a separate special training school, it can get financial support from the armed forces budget under the Ministry of Defense or a separate unit directly under the Defense Ministry. As this envisages training and participation of other civil government agencies, a status of a school center under the Ministry of Defense might even be more practical and advantageous. A school under the direct supervision of the General headquarters of the armed forces, would fare just as well. What is important is that the school be

separately and regularly allotted and appropriated a reasonable budget and allowances that would ensure adequacy, efficiency and effectiveness, and a credible image of an institution of learning and of leadership.

As a department under the Philippine Army Training Command, adequate financial resources specifically appropriated or allotted to the department must be given. It should be authorized support and financial allotments by other departments or offices of the civil government and other groups who send their personnel for training to the school.

In the conduct of out of school seminars or mobile training, agencies and units availing of the training can give financial assistance to the school or department from their own training budgets. Resource speakers and guest lecturers may be given honoraria for their services. These lecturers can be lent by their colleges to the school on their time. Transportation to and from the school can be provided to them.

Many other financial support arrangements can be made. Most importantly, a regular, constant, and timely financial allotment for the normal operations and sustenance of the school should be given and maintained.

ENDNOTES

1. Mao Tse-Tung, Four Essays on China and World Communism, New York, Lancer Books, 1972, p. 109.
2. Quotations from Chairman Mao, New York, Award Books, 1971, p. 105.
3. Ibid., p. 104.
4. Angola: Secret Government Documents on Counter-Subversion, Translated and ed. by Caroline Renner-Cohen and William Jerman, New York, IDOC-North America, 1974, p. 113.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In an insurgency, a common objective for the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is the control of the people. Russian and Chinese communist insurgent strategies differ. The former advocated for control and consolidation of the urban centers and then spread its influence and control to the countryside. The latter advocated encirclement of the cities and urban centers from the countryside. Their common objectives of attraction and control, however, are still the people. They have several and various means, including terrorism, to achieve their objectives. Their best, more lasting, and most effective means is education. Others call it brainwashing while others, indoctrination. Whatever the name, it centers and focuses on the hearts and minds of the people.

The Philippine military schools today train the soldier to fight the insurgent with the gun. The proposed school shall provide learning and education to enable the soldier to reconcile himself with his own people and spread the democratic gospel and proclaim the righteousness of his cause. Most importantly, it shall provide the ground for seeds of understanding, mutual respect, and solidarity with the masses to grow so that the fratricidal conflict can stop and future similar conflicts can be prevented.

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11. Taruc, Luis. He Who Rides the Tiger; The Story of an Asian Guerrilla Leader. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1967.
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