


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
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UNITED STATES GLOBAL STRATEGY

BY

DR. RICHARD W. HUTCHINSON

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER



UNITED STATES GLOBAL STRATEGY

An Individual Essay

by

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ABSTRACT

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As a global Superpower, the United States greatly affects and is greatly affected by the rest of the world. Its vision and future must lie beyond its borders. A set of US global objectives is proposed to channel US foreign policy in a coherent direction away from man's historical path of repetitive warfare. The US Global Objectives strive for an advanced world in which nations have secure borders, peace is secured by beneficial interaction between nations, arms levels and defense spending are decreasing, governments serve their people, the imbalance in world wealth is decreasing, and international problems are dealt with co-operatively. A US Global Strategy, which departs from today's world reality and problems, is proposed to achieve each of the global objectives. The paper is offered to stimulate thought and debate on the ends, ways and means of US international policy.

UNITED STATES GLOBAL STRATEGY

I. INTRODUCTION.

THE GIFT OUTRIGHT

"The land was ours before we were the land's.
She was our land more than a hundred years
Before we were her people. She was ours
In Massachusetts, in Virginia,
But we were England's, still colonials,
Possessing what we still were unpossessed by,
Possessed by what we now no more possessed.
Something we were withholding made us weak
Until we found out that it was ourselves
We were withholding from our land of living,
And forthwith found salvation in surrender.
Such as we were we gave ourselves outright
(The deed of gift was many deeds of war)
To the land vaguely realizing westward,
But still unstoried, artless, unenhanced,
Such as she was, such as she would become."¹

Robert Frost

Robert Frost's condensation of American history and spirit explicitly describes the inception of the United States.

Thinking back to the vision of our founding fathers, have we not largely fulfilled that vision? "...Such as she would become.": a land of freedom and democracy, a rich nation reaping the benefits of its labors, a strong nation directly facing its social problems, a people unwilling to limit their advancement, a world Superpower.

But what is our future vision? To formulate a US Global

Strategy we need objectives toward which to strive. Is the vision of our founding fathers still valid? Their objective was to create a free and democratic nation. It was an inward looking objective. We have become so economically successful during the twentieth century and so militarily powerful (we had to win two world wars along the way) that we are today a global superpower. In this position we greatly affect and are greatly affected by the rest of the world. We spend vast resources on defense in reaction to external forces. Our economic well-being is dependent on global trade. The United States is the world's beacon of liberty and freedom. We are pioneering into space. The future of our nation lies beyond our border, and so must our vision lie. Therefore, though the vision of our founders remains valid, today that vision appears incomplete.

The United States vision needs to be expanded to global proportions to address our goals and dreams as a world superpower. Such a global vision has not yet coalesced within our nation. Herein lies a fundamental problem in formulating a US global strategy - a global strategy to achieve what? Therefore, to formulate a US Global Strategy, one must first formulate a set of US Global Objectives. These objectives could be deduced in reaction to current world pressures. However, with imagination we can form proactive global objectives that go beyond today's realities and that seek a different and better world. Such objectives must consider the future position

of the United States among the nations of the world, indeed, the type of world we wish for in the future. Weighty questions involving national spirit and vision, but questions which cannot be left unanswered if we are to formulate an effective US Global Strategy. Our founding fathers extended their vision far beyond the realities of their day. Should we not be equally bold?

With this view in mind, a proposed United States Global Strategy, which includes suggested US Global Objectives, is offered to stimulate thought and debate. The paper is unconstrained by current US policy. Breadth takes priority over depth, and imagination holds sway of caution. Because the topic is global strategy, the proposals should be considered from both a US and a world perspective. The reader is challenged not only to consider these proposals but to formulate his own ideas of where the United States should be heading and how it might achieve those objectives. In our democracy, everyone needs to help in formulating this direction. We will all bear responsibility for its outcome. Such questions are too important to be left to a few politicians, bureaucrats and experts, or to fate.

The proposed US Global Strategy is presented in the following manner. Part II, Problem Definition, summarizes current US/world problems and serves as the departure point for projecting a US Global Strategy. Part III, US Global Objectives, presents the end objectives and world vision toward which to direct

the US strategy. A US Global Strategy is presented in Part IV to depart from our current problems and to achieve the global objectives. Implementation of the strategy is discussed in Part V. The relation of the proposed global strategy to the global problems is analyzed in Part VI. Part VII concludes the paper with a discussion on the probability of achieving the US Global Objectives.

II. PROBLEM DEFINITION.

World problems are vectors that have both an immediate component and a trend over time. Therefore, to capture both the trends and the current situation, US foreign policy and results are compared over the period 1950 to 1986. The perspective is then broadened to address general world problems that affect US strategy. Perspective on the problem of war is further expanded to place the current situation into historical perspective. Based on these trends and conditions, the primary world problems impacting US foreign policy are defined.

A. US policy and Soviet Challenge in 1950.

Following WW II the Soviet Union forced the establishment of subservient communist governments throughout Eastern Europe. Their action in combination with the relative weakness of Western Europe after the War caused the United States grave concern. The US strategy to deal with the Soviet threat was documented in the National Security Council Report #68, April 14, 1950.² The report is summarized as follows:

The US viewed the Soviet design as the "...complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin".³ The Soviets were creating an overwhelming military force which we anticipated would

be used for piecemeal aggression and intimidation of Western Europe to achieve the Soviet design. In addition, the relative US advantage in nuclear weapons was seen as declining such that a pre-emptive, conclusive blow against the US could not be ruled out in the future.⁴ Soviet assault on free countries was underway and constrained only by expediencies short of full-scale war. We feared that further extension of Soviet domination could produce a coalition stronger than any other able to confront it.⁴

To counter these ominous trends, the US implemented a strategy to foster a world environment in which our free and democratic system could live and prosper.⁷ The strategy had three main components. The first component was to frustrate Soviet design by containment in order to "foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system", or to "induce the Soviet Union to accommodate...itself to coexistence on tolerable terms with the non-Soviet world".⁸ The plan was to increase US military spending to develop a thermonuclear weapon, to improve nuclear retaliatory capability, and to increase air, ground, and sea conventional forces all aimed at deterring Soviet aggression.⁷ In addition, the US planned increased military assistance to NATO, intensified covert/overt economic, political and psychological warfare to support unrest and revolt in selected Soviet satellite countries, increased intelligence, and restraint of East - West trade in items of military importance.¹⁰ The second component was to create

a healthy international community by providing economic assistance to Western Europe, Japan, the Philippines, Korea, and under-developed areas; and by re-establishing an international economy based on multi-lateral trade, declining trade barriers, and convertible currencies.¹¹ The third component of US strategy was to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to record and facilitate further progress in US - Soviet relations, and to minimize the risk of war.¹²

In retrospect, this strategy marked the emergence of the US as a global superpower. The strategy and its implementation were developed largely in reaction to the Soviet challenge - a challenge, which by its means and goals, was abhorrent to US values. This policy remained in effect from 1950 to the present. Although there was a period of "detente" in the 1970's, that policy had minimal impact on Soviet design or US containment strategy. Detente was an attempt to change Soviet design through positive interaction - it failed.

B. US Policy and Soviet Challenge in 1986.

The following US policy and assessment in 1986 is summarized from three US government publications:

1. Soviet Military Power, 1986.¹³
2. DoD Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987.¹⁴
3. International Affairs, FY 1987.¹⁵

The Soviet Union continues to pursue its global ambitions using the strategy of "peaceful coexistence". Peaceful coexistence furthers socialist revolution and class struggle with states

of different social systems while capitalizing on the benefits of East - West interactions.¹⁶ The Soviet Union relies primarily on its ever growing military capability to achieve its goals through intimidation and force.¹⁷ Their strategy is to ferment discord between the US, NATO, and Pacific allies, and to support the spread of communism through insurgencies and wars of "national liberation".¹⁸ They control their alliances according to the Brezhnev Doctrine (1968): "The sovereignty of individual Socialist countries cannot be counterposed to the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement".¹⁹

The US strategy to counter the Soviet threat retains the same three components as in 1950: strengthen military deterrence to deter aggression, promote world order, and conduct US - Soviet negotiations on arms reductions and other matters of mutual interest. To strengthen military deterrence, the US seeks a balanced capability spanning strategic nuclear forces, conventional warfighting forces, and forces for low-intensity conflict. The US strategy is to strengthen alliances; to forward deploy forces in Europe, Korea, Japan, and in the oceans of the world; and to retain a capability for a flexible response to meet unanticipated conflict. The US is countering the massive Soviet military buildup by its own force modernization program and by exploiting US technology through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and other competitive weapon system developments.²⁰

The US promotes world order by supporting the Middle East peace process; by strengthening US military assistance to allies (ex. Spain and Turkey) and to resistance forces fighting communism (ex. Cambodia and Nicaragua); by promoting regional stability in Central America and the Caribbean through assistance (ex. El Salvador); by supporting democratic forces throughout the world (ex. Senegal and Colombia); and by supporting economic reforms by stimulating private sector productivity through the Agency for International Development, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund programs.²¹

The US focuses on incentives to reach arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union. The primary US incentives are the Strategic Defense Initiative program and the modernization of US forces. In addition, the US seeks agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce the risk of war by removing ambiguities, misperceptions, and misunderstandings.²²

As one can see, the US strategy of 1986 continues the strategy initiated in 1950. Based on increases in US defense spending in the 1980's, it is evident that the US is redoubling its efforts to implement the strategy. At the end of the US - Soviet summit in Geneva, Switzerland, Nov 21, 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev issued a joint statement where they "...agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields...".²³

Although the US strategy of containment remains in effect,

the strategy includes positive steps to improve the US - Soviet relationship. This policy could be called "cautious containment".

C. Results of US Policy 1950 - 1986 and Remaining Problems.

The United States policy of containment was highly successful in Western European countries and in Japan. These countries remained outside Soviet control, prospered under their democratic, pro-western governments, and are staunch US allies. The several countries that converted to socialism during the period, ex. Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Laos, Nicaragua, Cambodia and Vietnam, account for only 8% of total communist population and 1.4% of total communist GNP.²⁴

The United States successfully maintained a strong strategic nuclear deterrent and a strong conventional presence in Western Europe. Today, the current strategic nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States is essentially stable. The Soviet Union achieved nuclear parity for the first time in the early 1970's thereby eliminating the relative nuclear advantage enjoyed by the US prior to that period. However, the Soviet Union defense strategy is based on a policy of escalation dominance. Their goal is to have a military advantage at all levels of conflict (nuclear through conventional) to dominate their enemy and to assure Soviet victory. Therefore, they continue to expand their nuclear and conventional forces producing the largest military buildup in world history. The US - Soviet strategic nuclear balance will remain stable over the next ten years only if the US modernization program

is continued. Beyond that period, the US SDI system will be needed to enhance stability and deterrence by providing a shield against Soviet ballistic missiles and thus further reduce any Soviet incentive to initiate an attack against the US or its allies.²⁵

Considering conventional forces, NATO's deterrent posture is credible. However, trends in conventional ground combat power, as measured in terms of number and quality of armor, antiarmor, and fire-support weapons, favor the Warsaw Pact Organization by a factor of 2.2 to 1 over NATO.²⁶ The Soviets have a substantial advantage over NATO in chemical warfare capability and an undefined capability for biological warfare.²⁷ The United States is favored in maritime balance and power projection.²⁸ However, the United States must project its power across the world's oceans in order to deter Soviet aggression in contiguous states. As a result, the balance of power in Southwest and East Asia favors the Soviets.²⁹ US modernization is helping to correct the imbalance. In both nuclear and conventional forces, the US and the USSR compete intensively to achieve superiority and/or avoid inferiority.

The other goal of US containment policy, to foster a fundamental change in the Soviet system or design, was not fulfilled. The Soviet Union continues to foster communist insurrection and takeovers around the world under its policy of "peaceful coexistence". Because of these activities, US - Soviet relations remain confrontational, and positive economic,

political and socio-psychological interaction between the countries is minimal.

The US-Soviet military relationship poses a number of critical problems. Peace between the superpowers is secured almost entirely by strategic military deterrence (threat). The nature of the deterrence is such that the US and the USSR each have an immediate capability to destroy the other. The stability of the deterrence remains challenged by an open-ended and ongoing US-USSR arms race with the Soviets aspiring to achieve "escalation dominance". Another uncertainty is the possibility of an accidental nuclear war precipitated by a third party or by a nuclear accident. Furthermore, peace between the US and the USSR continues to be challenged by Soviet use of military force to impose communist regimes subservient to the Kremlin (ex. Afghanistan). Thus, the peace between the US and the USSR is a metastable peace secured by military deterrence including the capability for immediate and total destruction, (Problem #1). In addition to direct military threat, the USSR threatens the US by persisting in its fundamental design to foster, primarily through military instruments of power, the spread of communism throughout the world, (Problem #2).

The military confrontation between the US and the USSR is consuming enormous resources. Together, the countries spend \$600 billion per year.³⁰ This expense has contributed to the US debt and to curtailing Soviet economic advances.

Defense resources, if they were available, could be used in ways having greater benefit to both countries and to the world, (Problem #3).

The second element of US strategy, that of creating a healthy international community and promoting world order, was extremely successful. The world economy grew faster than during any previous period in history from \$1 trillion in 1950 to more than \$10 trillion today.³¹ The largest gains went to Western countries whose Gross National Product (GNP) is 2.5 times that of the Communist countries. In addition, democratic institutions emerged throughout Latin America and key countries elsewhere. Third World countries are shifting successfully to free market economies. The Western alliances are strong. Positive economic interaction with Third world countries is helping to improve standards of living.³² Conversely, most Soviet Block countries have been held only by military intimidation (ex. Poland) or intervention (ex. Hungary and Czechoslovakia).

The economy of the United States is much stronger than that of the Soviet Union. The US GNP is 1.9 times that of the USSR even though the US has fewer people than the USSR. As a result, the US percapita GNP is \$15,000/year versus \$7,000/year for the USSR.³³ The relatively poor performance of the Soviet economy is a primary reason why the Soviet model is unappealing to most Third World countries and the spread of communism was usually effected through military power

projection.

General Secretary Gorbachev in his address to the Communist Party Central Committee, 25 Feb 86, strongly emphasized the need to improve the Soviet economy.³⁴ The imbalance in US and USSR economic success produces a potential problem that should not be ignored. The US threatens the USSR by its dominant and expanding economy against which the Soviet Union has been unable to successfully compete, (Problem #4). Should this gap continue to widen, it could produce civil unrest within the Soviet Union and its "allies". Furthermore, the US economic superiority supports technical superiority which could produce a military break through giving the US a dominant military position. These factors are seen as potential problems because the USSR, should it perceive its survival threatened as a result of relative economic failure, might take desperate action precipitating a nuclear war. Less dramatically, if the Soviet Union cannot compete economically with the West it may be inclined or forced to continue placing its greatest emphasis on military instruments of power.

The third element of US policy, negotiations, has produced modest gains. Agreements were reached on confidence building measures in Europe, on control of levels of certain nuclear weapons (SALT I), and on limits on anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM Treaty). There were no agreements that reduced the levels of military forces or weapons. However, the negotiations have fostered a US - USSR dialogue which has

been helpful in avoiding misunderstandings. The primary reason why arms control negotiations have not produced better results appears to be Soviet determination to create a communist world through military instruments of power. In view of the Soviet threat, both in military capability and in intent, the United States had no prudent alternative but to continue the arms race. The US arms advances, in turn, are apparently viewed as threatening by the Soviets. US intent to contain communism and foster a fundamental change in the Soviet system may also be viewed as a threat by the USSR. Arms negotiations are of necessity linked to US - Soviet intent and relations, both of which are threatening and little improved over the past 35 years, (Problem #5).

D. World Factors and Associated Problems.

The preceding discussion addressed US - USSR policy and problems which have dominated US foreign policy over the past 30 years. However, other world factors also greatly impact US strategy and should be considered.

There is a great imbalance in world wealth. For example, 2.5 billion people, accounting for 52% of the world population, live in countries with annual average percapita GNP of less than \$500. Conversely, the worlds affluent countries with annual average percapita GNP greater then \$6,000 account for 22% of the world population (1.1 billion people) and 79% of the world GNP. The imbalance in wealth is reflected in other factors: Literacy averages 54% in the poorer countries versus

98% in the affluent countries. Population growth averages 1.9% in the poorer countries versus 0.6% in the affluent countries. Imbalance in wealth exists between Western, Communist and Third World countries. Western countries account for 18% of the world population and 61% of the world GNP. Communist countries account for 34% world population and 24% of the world GNP. Third World countries account for 48% of the world population and 15% of the world GNP. World military expenditures which amounts to \$1 Trillion/year is apportioned 52% Western countries, 43% Communist countries and 5% Third World countries. These imbalances manifest themselves in numerous problems which impact the United States and the US- USSR rivalry.³⁰

Because of the dominant wealth and power of the US and the USSR, they serve as role models to many developing countries. This situation sets the stage for competition between the US and the USSR for influence in those countries. A competition which can be very costly (ex. Vietnam and Afghanistan) and which tends to keep US - USSR relations at a hostile level. In addition to direct intervention in Third World military actions, the US and USSR provide military assistance to many Third World countries. The net result of US - USSR competition as power brokers to Third World countries is often financial drain on the Superpowers (ex. Vietnam), increased Superpower hostility (ex Afghanistan), and/or protraction of conflict (ex Cambodia). Thus, US - USSR competition in the power and wealth-deficient Third World often produces a net loss for

the US, the USSR, and The Third World countries, (Problem #6).

The economic advancement of Third World countries provides both opportunity and challenge to the United States. As Third World countries prosper they become markets for more advanced US products. However, Third World countries provide a vast low-cost labor pool which can produce many products much cheaper than the United States, thereby challenging the economic base of the United States. It appears that only through export of knowledge, services and technically superior products can the advanced countries remain competitive in world markets. In addition, developing Third World countries will increasingly compete with the advanced countries for raw materials and energy. The advanced countries will either have to accept higher prices, shortages, or find technological solutions. Any thought of disengaging the US from dependency on world trade is fruitless as foreign trade and investment are vital components of the US economy. Indeed, with world trade amounting to 11% of world GNP, the economies of most non-communist countries and the world economy are interrelated and mutually dependent.³⁴ Therefore, in order to advance the US standard of living and remain competitive in world markets, the US is challenged to maintain a world leadership position in knowledge, services and technology, (Problem #7).

Third World instabilities are a challenge to world order. Within the Third World, more than 500 million people live

in countries ruled by dictators, kings or military leaders.³⁷ Many others live in republics with only one political party. It would seem that countries with repressive government and/or where the wealth is concentrated into the hands of a few have a high probability for internal and external instability as the masses strive for equity and the rulers strive to maintain their status. Additionally, perceptions by Third World countries that the advanced nations are blocking their advancement and/or that their situation is hopeless could lead to violent and costly confrontation. Terrorism and mass migration of peoples (ex Latin's crossing southern US boarder) are likely unless the advanced countries effectively support the development of Third World countries. Therefore, the United States must assist the development of the Third World in spite of great Third World instability, (Problem #8).

The litany of would problems could be extended considerably further. The problems presented here are those appearing most critical to the US. Of the problems discussed so far, Problem #1, the metastable peace between Superpowers stands out as the most critical problem facing the United States. First, a failure in peace leading to WW III would destroy the world powers. Other problems would then become academic. Second, enormous resources are devoted to defense which are needed to address other problems facing the United States and other nations. It is helpful to consider war in a historical perspective to better understand the problem of peace between

the Superpowers.

E. Historical Perspective on War.

Montgomery observed in his book History of Warfare that "War has been a constant in human affairs since earliest societies of which there is record."³⁸ The first indication of major warfare was the fortifications of Jerico from 7000 BC. The most common cause of war among primitive peoples was overcrowding. For example, war in 4000 BC was caused by overcrowding in areas of fertile land along the Tigris, Euphrates and Nile rivers. Struggle for these lands continued unceasingly for thousands of years.³⁹

Other causes of war have been a deep-rooted desire for men to belong to groups, a desire for excitement, and the drive to satisfy demands for wealth, power, and religion.⁴⁰ Conflict was a continuum during the rise and fall of the Egyptian, Semite, Assyrian, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Norman, Ottoman, and various Asian empires. Warfare was the rule in Europe during the high Middle Ages 1214 - 1476 AD and included the 100 Years War between England and France. The English, French, Spanish, and Russian colonial conflicts and the colonial wars continued the warfare progression. World Wars I and II, the Korean, Vietnam, and the Middle Eastern wars bring the continuum of warfare to this day.

Except for nuclear war, the nature of warfare has changed little during recorded history. The Assyrians, a military people, excelled in chariots, cavalry, and infantry using

mail armor, shields, spears, bows and slings around 1000 BC. They developed siege warfare using rams and ladders.⁴¹ Alexander the Great and the generals of Greece and Rome displayed excellent ability in strategy and operational art applicable to today's conflict.⁴² Naval power was decisive in several of the Greek wars. Brutality of warfare varied from complete destruction and slaughter of captives to the often lenient treatment granted by Alexander the Great. The total war concept of WW I and WW II is in contrast to many of the colonial wars. However, the total war concept was the norm in many ancient societies in which all men were part of the military as in Assyria, Sparta, and early Rome. Certainly the material of warfare has changed dramatically, but the basic components and tactics of land and naval forces are quite consistent over the past 3000 years.

Warfare has caused great human suffering, but it has also supported great advancement. Past wars have generally resulted in net benefit to society as the more advanced or more robust people succeeded in conflict and endowed their advancement and/or vitality to the conquered. For example, between 336 and 323 BC Alexander the Great conquered the Middle East, Egypt and parts of Asia and spread Grecian advanced culture across the known world. The Roman empire spread its culture to all areas bordering the Mediterranean Sea giving major impetus to the advanced societies that would form in Europe. The British, Spanish, and French empires spread modern

civilization across the earth. Throughout history, warfare fostered advancement in science and engineering as exemplified by air and space technology. Thus, man prospered and advanced both in spite of and as a direct result of his wars.

However, the capability for global nuclear war (WW III) quantitatively and qualitatively changed the nature of warfare. The time-line for nuclear war is as short as minutes to hours as compared to past major conflicts spanning years to centuries. Such a compression of time coupled with the magnitude of destruction places incalculable pressures on any leader confronted with a nuclear attack. The compressed time also precludes input and feedback from the electorate on the conduct of such a war. Nuclear war will not produce a net gain to the participants. Rather, it will produce an great net loss of people, wealth, and perhaps the physical and spiritual destruction of modern society. Thus, global nuclear war is not rational and as President Reagan has said: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought."⁴³

Nevertheless, we have and are continually enhancing the capability for just such a war. We have no experience with global nuclear war. Our experience is with conflict that has changed little over time and which supported our advancement. Such war is a continuum throughout history; the momentum of this history is at our backs and pushes us forward a way we must not go, (Problem #9). There is no reason for confidence that this continuum has been altered. Peace between the

Superpowers is secured by preparing for nuclear war. It is a metastable peace.

F. Recap of Global Problems.

The following lists the problems identified in the previous section which critically impact US Global Strategy:

1. Peace between the US and the USSR is a metastable peace secured by military deterrence including the capability for immediate and total destruction.
2. The USSR threatens the US by persisting in its fundamental design to foster, primarily through military instruments of power, the spread of communism throughout the world.
3. Defense resources, if they were available, could be used in ways having greater benefit to both the US and the USSR, and to the world.
4. The US threatens the USSR by its dominant and expanding economy against which the Soviet Union has been unable to successfully compete.
5. Arms negotiations have made little progress because they are of necessity linked to US - Soviet intent and relations, both of which are threatening and little improved over the past 35 years.
6. US - USSR military competition in the power and wealth deficient Third World often produces a net loss for the US, the USSR, and The Third World countries.
7. In order to advance the US standard of living and remain competitive in world markets, the US is challenged

to maintain a world leadership position in knowledge, services and technology.

8. The United States must assist the development of the Third World in spite of great Third World instability.

9. War is a continuum throughout history; the momentum of this history is at our backs and pushes us forward a way we must not go - towards WW III.

It is interesting to note that five of the nine problems are directly associated with US - USSR military confrontation (Problems 1,2,3,5 and 6). The economic threat to the USSR is a problem because of its potential to produce a military reaction by the Soviets and, therefore, also has a military component. Only problems 7 and 8 involve non-military US challenges. Yet, even these are impacted by military technology and military competition in the Third World. Thus, all of our critical global problems involve military considerations or are impacted by military confrontation.

The last problem, that of the historical continuum of war acting upon us, places the other problems into perspective. We arrived at our current world situation not through any grand scheme, but through the natural progression of conflict through the ages coupled with technological advancement. This historical progression is conceptualized in Figure 1. Man left his cave with a club to compete with his kind for resources. We progressed through the centuries of conflict building empires, advancing and prospering. The continuum




FIGURE 1. MAN THE WARRIOR.

of history leads naturally to WW III. A continuum which is totally unacceptable but incredibly possible. We must change our historical path and head in a new direction. But, where should we head? The next section presents ideas to define our destination, our US Global Objectives.

III. US GLOBAL OBJECTIVES.

A. Objectives.

The problems discussed in the preceding Section are formidable and require attention. However, if we form our global objectives only in response to current problems we produce objectives that are reactionary. An alternative approach is to define global objectives in terms of our aspirations for a better world. In this manner we can define proactive objectives not constrained by today's world reality. On this basis the following are proposed as the US Global Objectives:

A world in which...

1. Nations have secure borders. Secure national borders are fundamental to world peace and order. The invasion of one nation by another signifies a major failure of peace and the dashing of progress achieved through economic, political and socio-psychological interaction. The threat of attack across borders is a principle cause for the current military build-up. Most nations today rely on military deterrence to deter attack. Ultimately, it is desired that borders be secured by universal acceptance of the secure border principle. The US - Canada border is an excellent example today of what might some day be achieved throughout the world.

2. Peace is secured primarily and increasingly by mutual

benefits from peaceful interaction between nations. Peace between the Western European countries exemplifies such a state of peace. These countries have military capability to deter invasion from the East, but peace between Western European countries is stabilized and greatly strengthened by their mutually beneficial interaction. Peace secured in this manner yields the benefits both of the interaction and of the savings from arms reductions supported by the positive relationship. Achieving this goal would greatly benefit the US since we currently contribute approximately 1/3 of the world defense spending.

3. The arms race and the magnitude of sufficient military capability to deter/counter aggression is decreasing. The goal is necessary because the world resources devoted to defense are needed in other areas and because the uncertainties associated with the arms race are potentially destabilizing to world peace. Progress in this area will reflect the progress being made towards goals 1 and 2.

4. Governments serve their people, and the people take responsibility for the form and direction of their governments. As Americans, we hold this goal to be a universal requirement for the wellbeing of men and for stable government. Governments that do not serve their people are transitory and threaten world order and peace. Conversely, until the people take responsibility for the form and direction of their government, they will not have a government that serves them. The goal

implies no right or wrong form of government.

5. World wealth and knowledge are shared by all nations, and the imbalance in world wealth is decreasing. The goal is required for both world stability and prosperity. Poorer nations must advance, or there will be world instability. Sharing wealth through trade and sharing knowledge through education and interaction will help the advancement of the Third World. In addition, there is great net benefit to all nations as knowledge and resources are shared to resolve critical problems and as world markets are developed.

6. International problems such as pollution, terrorism and drug traffic are dealt with effectively and cooperatively by all nations. Such problems cannot be solved unilaterally, and their solution is critical to all nations. Joint efforts enhance world stability and peace by practicing cooperation between nations.

B. Methodology.

The US Global Objectives are presented in terms of processes. For example, the objective "World wealth and knowledge are shared by all nations and the imbalance in world wealth is decreasing." specifies a process. There are several reasons why the objectives are defined in this manner. The objectives are applicable over time since they are not tied to specific events. The objectives are robust because they channel US actions in a coordinated direction but do not dictate specific actions.

Defining objectives as processes coincides with the US constitutional model. Our founding fathers assumed that if the proper process for governing the United States was defined, then intelligent people working within the process would govern well on average. The US "experiment" has validated their assumption. (In contrast, Communist countries emphasize ends and objectives, ex. 5 year plans, and subordinate the process to achieving the ends.) Therefore, the US Global Objectives are presented in a form consistent with the US political system.

C. Net Result.

The net result of these objectives is depicted conceptually in Figure 2. The path of our history forks and we take the branch directed towards the goals set herein. Achieving the goals would produce a world of great wealth as a result of freed defense spending and, more importantly, the positive interaction and competition between all the nations. It would be a more stable world where nations have secure borders, and governments serve their people. Thus, it would be a world unbounded both in wealth and duration. If we can characterize today as "Modern Civilization", then that which we ultimately seek could be called "Advanced Civilization".

What kind of earth is being proposed - a utopia? Not at all. Human nature will not change. There will be competition and disagreements between nations. However, we will have accepted the principle that war is counter productive and that the wellbeing of the whole earth affects the wellbeing




FIGURE 2 CHANGING DIRECTION

of each nation. It will be an older world in terms of maturity as we overcome collectively the destructive forces which reside within us as individuals. Competition and variance between nations will be played out through economic, political and socio-psychological means.

The US Global Objectives not only seek an improved world, but they also serve as an objective to lead us away from the historical path of recurring major wars. No one wants to continue down our historical path to WW III. Everyone would like to overcome the destructive forces within us. Will wishing and hoping be enough to change the course of history? Probably not. As we progress through history reacting to the random problems at hand, there is the statistical likelihood that our actions will net-out and not effect the main flow of history. This outcome is made more likely when we lack a unified view of where we are trying to head. Therefore, to set out on a new historical path we need objectives to orient our efforts and lead us from the old path. The proposed US Global Objectives are to serve that purpose.

Undoubtedly, the United States cannot on its own change the course of history. All nations would have to become players in both accepting and achieving the objectives. However, the United States is the only nation with the power, stature and moral foundation able to seize the initiative with world impact. The next section proposes a US Global Strategy to achieve the US Global Objectives.

IV. US GLOBAL STRATEGY.

The following Strategy Groups address each US Global Objective. Examples of actions for implementing the strategy are proposed. Each Strategy Group includes a cost and risk assessment and a comparison of the proposed strategy to current US policy.

A. Strategy Group #1.

1. Objective: Nations have secure borders.
2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US position: Invasion is the gravest and most unacceptable of all international acts. The US will act in collaboration with other nations to deter, deny or punish an invading nation.

b. Invasion, as used here, refers to conducting combat operations inside another country when those operations are directed against the populace and/or government of that country. Thus, it includes foreign combat participation in internal civil wars. It does not include sending military advisors which do not participate in combat. Sending forces from a third party nation to counter an invasion is not considered an invasion.

c. The US will use political and socio-psychological instruments to state the US position and to foster acceptance of the principle of secure borders. The US will work through

the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the World Bank, and diplomatic contacts to consistently press the principle.

d. The US will take political, economic, socio-psychological, and, as a last resort, military action to deter, deny or punish an invading nation. The goal is to develop an effective world deterrent to invasion by raising the cost of invasion above the potential benefits. The US will gather intelligence and develop strategies to address likely points of invasion in order to anticipate a move such as the invasion of Afghanistan. To the maximum extent possible, the US will develop multinational strategies to counter invading nations. Should deterrence fail and an invasion occurs, the US and other countries will implement the strategy to raise the cost to the aggressor and to frustrate his goals. For the strategy to be credible, it must be applied fairly whether it favors friend or foe. A strong and broad based intelligence capability will be maintained to allow timely action to deter invasion.

e. To protect its own borders and to fulfill its National Security Objectives, the US will continue to maintain a sufficient strategic deterrent which is capable of inflicting devastation on any attacking nation. The US will continue to modernize its forces to maintain a sufficient deterrence in the face of Soviet modernization. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will be continued to offset Soviet initiatives and to

maintain a second nuclear strike capability.

f. To augment the security of US allies and US National Security Objectives, the US will continue to maintain a full spectrum of war fighting capability which is capable of worldwide projection. Readiness and deployment status will demonstrate US capability and resolve to act to provide a credible deterrent. Thus, the US will continue to forward deploy US forces in Western Europe, Korea, and globally on the sea. The US in combination with its Allies will emphasize conventional, tactical nuclear and chemical deterrent forces to provide an effective deterrent to Soviet invasion.

g. The US will stress development of weapon systems which target on the attacking offensive weapons. For example, the strategic defensive position inherent in the secure-border concept will be exploited through a Tactical Defense Initiative. The object will be to develop systems which deny the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization of its ability to penetrate NATO with offensive and support vehicles.

h. The US will assist diplomatically in settling outstanding border disputes emphasizing timely resolution. For example, the US will renew its diplomatic efforts to effect a settlement of the Middle East Palestinian problem.

i. Nothing in this strategy will limit US efforts to fulfill its National Security Objectives and to support United Nation principles and objectives.

j. Soviet considerations: The strategy for maintaining

secure borders is a critical component of US - USSR relations. Soviet invasion of a sovereign nation to gain dominance over that nation threatens in principle the survival of the US. If not checked, one Soviet invasion could be followed by another, then another. The US is the only force capable of stopping the Soviet Union from achieving world domination through military conquest. Therefore, the proposed US strategy is to deter, deny or punish any Soviet invasion. The US strategy rejects the Brezhnev doctrine which permits Soviet intervention to maintain or dominate a foreign communist regime.

A successful example of this strategy was the use of diplomacy and strong rhetoric to help discourage a potential Soviet invasion of Poland.

3. Examples:

a. Deter/counter potential Nicaragua invasion of its neighbors Honduras and Costa Rica. The following actions are proposed.

(1). Expand intelligence capability as required to provide a reasonable assurance that preparation for an invasion can be detected in advance.

(2). Develop an economic, political and military response plan to deter and counter a potential Nicaragua invasion. Develop the plan in coordination with the regional countries. In order that the plan have "teeth" and serve as a deterrent, it should address US military support to friendly forces and US strikes against Nicaragua military targets. The plan should

address Cuba military targets in the event that Cuban forces join in the invasion.

(3). Initiate socio-psychological and diplomatic action to sell the plan and to provide a clear deterrent. Implement the plan if an invasion occurs.

The strategy is to draw a clear policy to deter a Nicaragua invasion by planning a response that will make the cost of such an invasion far greater than the possible benefits and, thereby, deny success.

b. Press for a solution to the Middle East/Palestinian problem. The US interest is served by reaching an agreement on this problem. The US continues to provide large amounts of aid to the countries involved, but little progress has occurred over the past five years. An alternate approach is to provide aid to help implement a solution and withhold aid when there is no progress. This approach coupled with an aggressive US political and socio-psychological campaign should help move the process forward. The approach would bring US actions clearly into line with US interests.

c. Initiate Tactical Defense Initiative (TDI) to deny Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WTO) ability to invade the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The goal of TDI is to exploit technically the strategic defensive position of NATO. To attack NATO, the WTO forces must move across the ground into friendly terrain relying primarily on vehicles. The non-invading forces in NATO have no such requirement although

NATO forces are today configured similarly to WTO forces. TDI would exploit this asymmetry. The strategy would be to use mines/obstacles to slow WTO vehicles and to use remotely guided munitions to destroy the vehicles. NATO would use small groups of dispersed soldiers using advanced target locators to guide the munitions which would be launched further to the rear. The targeting troops would utilize concealment, dispersal, and range to avoid enemy weapon fire. NATO defense positions and mobile units would intercept continuing WTO infantry. The TDI would stress cost and combat effectiveness to counter Soviet numerical superiority in ground forces. Other nations that stressed tactical defense could obtain secure borders without having to procure a massive offensive capability. Thus, the approach would support the secure border concept.

It is proposed that DARPA be funded to investigate feasible approaches for the concept.

4. Cost Impact. The proposed strategy would require a modest reprogramming of funds within the DoD budget to initiate the Tactical Defense Initiative.

5. Risk Assessment. This strategy has the risk that the US will be required to take military action to deny/punish invasion of one nation by another. The collective risk of this strategy is no greater than the risk of individual actions that the US might take at the operational level against a specific invasion. However, by having a clear US policy to

deny or punish invasion, the overall likelihood of such events occurring will be diminished by deterrence, and the risk of US involvement will be lowered.

As an alternative, if the US were to abandon the strategy to counter invasion, its survival would be threatened by a likely USSR expansion. The US would be forced to take action at some point to counter such Soviet actions. Postponing such action would not appear to serve US interests. Therefore, there does not appear to be any other alternative than to accept the risk associated with this Strategy Group.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. The proposed strategy incorporates current US defense strategy and adds the TDI program. It clarifies the US position that invasion of one nation by another is unacceptable and that the US in co-operation with other nations will take steps to deter, deny or punish invading nations. The proposed policy also clarifies the particular US responsibility to counter invasion by the Soviet Union. Thus, the strategy makes explicit the US position on invasion. The proposed policy clarifies that US interest is best served by timely resolution of boarder disputes.

B. Strategy Group #2.

1. Objective: Peace is secured primarily and increasingly by mutual benefit from peaceful interaction between nations.

2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US position: Positive interaction between nations stabilizes peace and acts as non-military deterrents to war.

Interactions stabilize peace by:

(1). Producing mutual benefits associated with peace which are lost if war occurs.

(2). Fostering understanding, camaraderie, acceptance, and trust.

(3). Offering all nations an alternative to military force in seeking national goals of prosperity and influence.

b. The US will strive for interaction with all nations on the basis of mutual benefit to the people of the US and of other nations.

(1). Agreements will be formed between the US and other nations covering joint projects, exchanges, tourism, trade, communications, ect.

(2). The agreements will be self standing, independent, and deal in things that can be observed as opposed to values, trust, ect.

(3). US commercial and private institutions will implement the strategy with the US Government agreeing on the broad areas of interchange and facilitating the process.

(4). The US Government will apply export control only on classified technology and defense materiel. (Broader restrictions are difficult to enforce and hurt the US economy.)

c. These interactions will be established and maintained in spite of political and other disagreements that may occur from time to time short of military confrontation.

d. Positive interaction between the US and the USSR

will be expanded. Interaction with other communist countries will also be encouraged.

3. Examples.

a. US - USSR Space Exploration Program. It is proposed that the US and the USSR initiate a joint program to establish permanent space colonies in free space, on the moon, or on Mars. Although the US and the USSR would jointly lead of the program, participation by other countries (able to pay their way) would be encouraged. The following benefits would result from the program:

(1). Space exploration and associated science, technology and engineering benefits would be accelerated by focusing world talent on common objectives.

(2). Cost of space exploration would be shared by many nations.

(3). Camaraderie and good will would be strengthened between nations working together on a program with high pay-off and enormous prestige.

(4). A global perspective would be fostered by international space teams who view earth from space and realize that the whole earth is man's home and that all mankind are one family. (US astronauts have mentioned this potential. Perhaps the US and USSR could someday conduct a "Space Summit".)

The program is partially funded in the current US space station program. This program might well be coupled with a US - USSR Space Treaty. Then the space based portion of

SDI could be dropped, and the freed resources could be applied to the joint space program. In combination, these actions could halt a budding arms race into space.

b. US - USSR Trade and Exchange Agreements. Trade with the USSR would be expanded by encouraging US industry to penetrate USSR markets and enter into agreements for USSR raw materials and products. The US Government would set categories of exchange, but let private industry develop the specific agreements. Thus, US private industry and institutions would insure US benefit (profit) without the US Government having to micro-manage the exchange. The sale of US wheat to the USSR is a good example of a successful trade agreement. Another example would be for US industry to assist the USSR in petroleum exploration and production.

The US Government would provide guidelines to US enterprises to strengthen understanding and cooperation between the US and Soviet people. For example, agreements would specify use of on-site personnel, joint teams, intra-country travel, cross-training, and marketing US products.

The cost of these programs to the US Government is expected to be minimal.

4. **Cost Impact.** The proposed strategy does not require a change to current budget totals, but does consider reprogramming funds from the space based portion of SDI into the Joint US - USSR Space Exploration Program.

5. **Risk Assessment.** The primary risk of this strategy

is associated with expanding interaction with the USSR. There is the risk that, regardless of good US intentions, the USSR will use all gains to enhance their defense posture and further threaten the US and/or other nations. The risk can not be defined, but it can be bounded by the following factors:

a. The risk associated with each individual action could be minimized if each action (1) is independent, (2) deals with exchange of things that can be measured or observed, and (3) is negotiated on the basis of balanced mutual benefits.

b. As a result of Strategy Group #1 the US would continue to maintain a sufficient military capability to deter Soviet aggression. US military posture would be based on Soviet military capability, not Soviet intent.

c. The US would always have the option of suspending all interaction with the USSR should relations turn hostile. Since the interactions would be based on balanced mutual benefit, their suspension would impact both countries proportionately. Thus, there is flexibility in limiting and bounding the cumulative risk of Strategy Group #2. With prudence, US - USSR interaction can be expanded without sacrificing US security.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. Current US policy, as a result of the Geneva Summit in November 85, includes expanded US - USSR interaction and exchanges. The proposed strategy allows private US business and institutions to take the lead to further the interaction with reduced restrictions on technology transfer. Also recommended is a joint US -

USSR project to give real momentum in improving US - USSR relations.

C. Strategy Group #3.

1. Objective: The arms race and the magnitude of sufficient military capability to deter/counter aggression is decreasing.

2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US position: The primary purpose of arms control is to enhance US and world security, and the secondary purpose is to reduce military spending without sacrificing security.

b. The US will press for verifiable agreements to:

(1). Reduce the likelihood of war, (priority 1).

(2). Reduce and contain the arms race in offensive weapons systems with emphasis on production/deployment decisions, (priority 2).

(3). Reduce the world arsenal of offensive weapons and force structure, (priority 3).

c. The US will use arms negotiations to document general progress in improved East - West relations. Arms agreements cannot be concluded in isolation from bilateral and world conduct because arms agreements involve an element of trust. Verification via national technical means and on site observation can enhance trust, but it will be rare that verification will provide absolute assurance. Therefore, trust is a key element in arms control, and there must be a rational basis for that trust.

d. Comment: Strategy Group #1 seeks to deter, deny

or punish invasion. Strategy Group #2 strives to enhance East - West relations and increase the benefits associated with peace. Therefore, these two strategies work together to raise the benefits of peace relative to war. Progress in these areas is expected to support progress in arms reduction.

3. Example: US - USSR Crisis Center. The center would coordinate US - USSR activities in times of international crisis. The threat of a nuclear detonation by a terrorist group exemplifies such a crisis. The center would facilitate communication between the two countries during a crisis and allow joint crisis teams to work together to seek solutions. The goal of the Crisis Center would be to contain the problems and to reduce the risk of a US - USSR military confrontation. This idea has been proposed by Congress. Its cost would be modest.

4. Cost Impact. This strategy has a minimal cost impact.

5. Risk Assessment. Strategy Group #3 is designed to hold risk to acceptable levels by requiring that the reductions in arms be verifiable and that they be consistent with overall progress in improving East - West relations.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. The proposed strategy is consistent with current policy on arms reductions. However, it clarifies the objectives and priority with which the US approaches arms negotiations.

D. Strategy Group #4.

1. Objective: Governments serve their people, and the

people take responsibility for the form and direction of their governments.

2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US Position: Democratic government by, of and for the people is the highest form of government. Governments which do not serve the will of their people are viewed as transitory. However, democracy can not take hold in a country until the people take responsibility for the form and direction of their government. Therefore, the US supports democratic governments and democratic reform but does not take responsibility for installing democracies in other nations. The US goal is strong, non-aligned countries that serve the needs of their people.

b. The US, in cooperation with her allies, will proactively support government reform which benefits the people which are being governed. Support will include economic and military aid, and international political support. The US will support government reform in both communist and non-communist countries. The responsibility for supporting specific nations and regions will be divided among US allies.

c. The US will act to thwart externally supported communist insurrection and take over of governments. (In this discussion, external support consists of military and economic aid but not the intervention of foreign troops which constitutes an invasion. Invasions are addressed in Strategy Group #1.) The US will work with the threatened governments to foster

reform which benefits the people and removes the gross inequities. The US will provide military aid to countries challenged by communist insurrection so long as the governments take action to rectify their systemic problems. This requirement is necessary because the most fertile areas for communist takeover are in nations where there is minimal distribution of wealth and a despotic government. The situation is one of a carrot and a stick. Communist insurrection is the stick, and we offer the carrot of helping to support reform and resistance to communism. The government in question can choose between internal reform and externally supported communist takeover.

The US will win some democracies and loose some nations to communism. The approach will motivate governments to reform because they will know that the US is not going to solve their problems for them. As a result, the US will obtain more return on its foreign aid programs and will avoid propping up unresponsive governments. If the communists take over a country, then the US will work with those governments to foster responsive leadership.

d. The US will give particular attention to nations, such as India, Egypt, Brazil and Senegal, that can serve as role models. The US will encourage these nations to support responsive governments and development in their areas. US aid will be used to involve role-model countries in regional development projects.

e. The US will support the independence of the non-aligned

countries. The non-allied countries provide a point of reference on the effectiveness of East - West competition to enhance Third World development. Their judgments can have a significant effect on changing the way the Soviet Union or any power behaves internationally. In addition, the non-allied countries serve as a counter weight to the East - West polarization.

f. The US will strive for positive interaction with communist countries. The objective is balanced communist countries with ties both East and West. As a result, these countries will be able to act more independently than if they were 100% dependent on the USSR. Therefore, the US will support the strengthening of the non-allied status of both Third World and Communist countries.

g. The US will support the efforts of the people to take responsibility for their governments by:

(1). Supporting and building educational institutions and student exchanges.

(2). Conducting socio-psychological operations to inform the people of approaches to introduce reform.

(3). Promoting interactions at the people level that help raise both hope and confidence in what can be done through hard work and initiative, ex. Peace Corps projects.

h. Soviet Considerations. As the Soviets promote communism through political, economic, socio-psychological and military assistance instruments, the US will counter communism and promote democracy using in other ways those same instruments.

US - USSR competition to foster their respective ideologies does not threaten the survival of either country as long as the gains and losses on each side are balanced. The US should focus on the long term, strategic implications of the competition and on cumulative gains and losses. To compete proactively with the USSR, the US needs, in cooperation with her allies, a plan for supporting democracies and government reform, and for resisting communism.

The strategy to actively support the non-aligned status of Third World and Communist countries is aimed at forcing, through competition, a change in Soviet approach to foreign policy. It is expected that the Soviet foreign model involving Soviet domination will have little appeal relative to the US model supporting non-aligned status. Therefore, the Soviets will be forced to compete with the US on the "non-aligned" basis. If they treat a country with contempt or threat, they will be asked to leave (ex. Egypt). If they do not leave, then they are undertaking an invasion which will be countered through Strategy Group #1. Therefore, to compete effectively on a "non-aligned" basis, the Soviets will be forced to respect the sovereignty of nations and act more responsibly.

3. Example: Countering Communist Insurrection in Latin America. Consider a country that has a repressive regime, a minimal distribution of wealth, and a threatening Communist insurrection. The US would offer military and economic assistance in conjunction with a host nation contract for government,

military and economic reform benefiting the people. The US would disseminate information to the people on the benefits and responsibilities of democracy and the problems of communism. To the extent possible, US economic aid would be administered through US institutions operating in the country to assure that the aid was used for the intended purposes and not lost to corruption. The US embassy, banks, and corporations would serve this function. The brightest students and officers would be selected for scholarships in the US with emphasis on ethnic distribution. Thus, the US would support the building of democracy and defenses against communism, but the responsibility for success of the efforts would lie with the people and government of the host country. Continuation of US aid would be contingent on the efforts put forth by the country.

4. Cost Impact. The need for additional resources is anticipated in order to implement this strategy and to effectively compete with the USSR. These resources can be minimized by cutting losses when success appears improbable, by sharing the responsibility among our Western allies, and by encouraging advancing Third World nations to help their neighbors. Because foreign aid and defense spending are both directed at external challenges and US Global Objectives, it is proposed that defense and foreign aid budgets be coordinated so that total spending is optimized to best meet US objectives.

5. Risk Assessment. The primary risk of this strategy is that non-aligned countries will continue to fall to communist

insurrections and become aligned with the USSR. The strategy is aimed at reducing this risk by supporting government and economic development that benefits the peoples of Third World countries to remove the conditions under which communism flourishes. The risk is further reduced by supporting, through interaction, the non-aligned status of communist countries. Since WW II, the spread of democracy has far outpaced the spread of communism, and it seems likely that this trend will continue. The real risk is that the US will not devote sufficient resources to compete effectively with the Soviets.

An alternate strategy would be for the US to intervene in any country turning to communism. Such a policy would run counter to the concept of secure borders, would be exceedingly expensive, and would be politically unacceptable to the US and its allies. The risk of such an approach would be high because of the likelihood of precipitating a US - USSR military confrontation.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. The proposed strategy is consistent with US policy in El Salvador and with our long term policy of supporting democracies around the world. The policy clarifies the US intent to proactively support government reform benefiting the people but not to take responsibility for installing or maintaining governments. The proposed policy differs from current policy by proposing that the US strengthen the non-aligned status of communist countries, and that the US tie its aid to government reform in cases where countries

are fighting communist insurrection.

E. Strategy Group #5.

1. Objective: World wealth and knowledge are shared by all nations, and the imbalance in world wealth is decreasing.

2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US position: The economic wellbeing of the United States is dependent on world economic wellbeing. In addition, economic progress by the developing countries is necessary for continued world peace and stability.

b. The US will continue to enhance world trade and to share technology, culture and knowledge with all nations, particularly developing nations. The US will continue to maintain low tariffs and press to eliminate international barriers to free trade. The US will apply export control only on classified technology and defense materiel. This strategy will further benefit the US by creating new markets.

c. The US will continue to enhance world development through international institutions and foreign assistance. US assistance will aim at helping the people by providing seed money to form programs benefiting both the US and the assisted country, and by encouraging expansion of free market economies.

d. The US will press for an equitable distribution of assistance responsibility among the Western allies. The US and its allies will compete with the Communist countries in providing beneficial assistance to developing countries.

e. Role-model countries will be encouraged, through additional aid, to assist their less successful neighbors. This approach will not only spread the responsibility of assistance, it will help the role model countries to further mature.

f. The US government will strongly support the further development of US technology, knowledge and services. It is in these areas that the US can continue to forge ahead and provide competitive exports. Trade is critical to the advancement of Third World nations, and to the economic wellbeing of the US. In addition, the advanced developments of the US and other countries are needed to help raise the standard of living of the 2.5 billion people in countries with annual percapita GNP of \$500 or less. (Stated another way, world resources are not sufficient to allow all the world's people to live like Americans using todays techniques.) US trade policy aimed at gaining access of US products into foreign markets and reducing restrictions on US exports will also enhance US competitiveness.

3. Example: Distribution of Foreign Aid. It is proposed that Canada and the US divide Latin America into areas where each country would concentrate its aid. For example, the US might address Central America, the Caribbean and Brazil. Canada would aid the other countries. Certain countries would be selected as role models. The US and Canada would work with those countries to assist the development of their neighbors.

Thus, the US and Canada would concentrate their economic aid.

4. Cost Impact. In addressing assistance to individual countries, the cost of this strategy and that of Strategy Group #4 would be combined into individual country programs. Therefore, the cost impact presented for the previous Strategy Group apply here. The cost of government support to enhance the US competitive position in technology, knowledge and services is addressed by current government spending through the executive departments and the National Science Foundation.

5. Risk Assessment. The risk of implementing this strategy appears minimal. There is always risk that foreign aid will not yield productive results, but such risk can be controlled by carefully monitoring the use of US aid. The risk that developing countries provide low cost imports that place Americans out of work is offset by the markets that the developing countries provide for US products. In addition, foreign competition causes US business to modernize and innovate which benefits the US and the rest of the world.

An opposing strategy of blocking Third World development would have extreme risk in precipitating violence and mass migrations into the Western countries. This strategy would also hurt the US economy by reducing foreign markets for US products.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. The proposed strategy is consistent with current US policy to assist developing countries and with emerging US policy to enhance US

competitiveness. The proposed strategy emphasizes the use of role models in developing countries, the dividing of development support responsibility among Western countries, and the need to compete with the Soviet Union in providing foreign aid.

F. Strategy Group #6.

1. Objective: International problems such as pollution, terrorism and drug traffic are dealt with effectively and cooperatively by all nations.

2. Proposed Strategy.

a. US position: Many problems now facing the world can only be solved through the sincere cooperative effort by many nations. Problems and their causes must be candidly defined in order to be effectively addressed.

b. The US will continue to utilize international organizations such as the United Nations and regional cooperative bodies to address international problems.

c. Although the US will continue to press for major "break-throughs" on problems, the underlining current of US policy will be continuous, incremental steps at addressing international problems.

3. Example: Countering international terrorism. The US would press for international cooperation to foil terrorists acts and to capture and bring terrorists to justice. The US would maintain special anti-terrorist teams and would assist other nations in training such teams. The US would assist other countries when requested to counter terrorist acts.

To frustrate terrorist activities, the US will not capitulate to terrorist demands. The US would expand its intelligence on terrorism and increase exchange of its intelligence with cooperating nations. The US would stress bilateral and regional agreements as building blocks for broader international agreements.

4. Cost Impact. The proposed strategy would have minimal cost impact.

5. Risk Assessment. The cumulative risk of this strategy appears to be minimal since the goal is to resolve international problems affecting the US.

6. Comparison to Current US Policy. The proposed strategy is consistent with current US policy. However, the proposed policy stresses continual forward progress on international problems through incremental steps.

H. Overall Soviet Considerations.

The previous Strategy Groups are applicable to all nations. However, the Soviet Union, our principle adversary, requires special consideration. As noted previously, five of the nine major global problems facing the US are directly associated with US - USSR military confrontation, and the remaining problems are impacted by that confrontation. The Soviet Union diametrically opposes the US in achieving its Global Objectives. The most basic starting point in addressing the Soviet challenge is the US - USSR "relationship".

The zero-sum US - USSR relationship is dominated by military threat, mutual mistrust and social isolation. The relationship

has changed little over the past 35 years. The situation is analogous to two football teams facing each other from the bench. Each team detests the other and neither can reach agreement on how the game is to be played. As a result, the intent of each team is not to "play ball" but to destroy the other from the bench. In 1950, we viewed the Soviets as a threatening but weaker opponent amenable to being pressured to play by US rules. Today we face a Soviet Union that is militarily our equal and which has effectively resisted US efforts to alter their design. We still face each other from the bench.

It is time to take another approach, one that will change the nature of the US - USSR relationship. It is time for both sides to gather the courage, leave the bench, and play ball. The proposed US - USSR relationship is one of enduring competition and engagement. It is a competition that the US cannot afford to loose. Our freedom, wellbeing and world position are at stake. It is a competition that we cannot afford to win. Not if by winning we foster the collapse or economic starvation of a nuclear armed superpower. The US challenge is to change the nature of US - USSR competition from military confrontation to more positive forms of competition in technology, economic development, and political and socio-psychological areas.

In leaving the bench and engaging the Soviets in an enduring competition we are in, fact making, three statements:

1. We accept the existence of the Soviet Union as the reality of today and into the foreseeable future.

2. We accept that the competition must be played in a way that does not threaten the survival of the US or the USSR.

3. We are confident that we can compete successfully with the USSR over an indefinite period.

The proposed US Global Strategy is directed at making those statements and engaging the USSR. The proposed US objectives and strategies do not threaten Soviet survival. Indeed, the US will strive for secure borders, interaction of mutual benefit, reduced arms levels, and competition in developing the Third World as non-aligned nations. These goals would benefit both the USSR and the US.

What if the Soviets do not accept the US, and their underlying intent is to destroy the US through military or other means? First, the US must maintain a sufficient military deterrent to deter Soviet attack on the US or its vital interests. Second, the US must have the will to exercise that deterrent to define the limits of Soviet action beyond which US survival is threatened. The US can and must maintain its security as it engages the Soviets. There will be ample opportunity for the US to observe Soviet intent as the US - USSR competition is played out. It is expected that the benefits of positive US - USSR competition and interaction will far outweigh the meager benefit and enormous cost and risk of current US - USSR relations. With prudence, the risks of engaging the

Soviets can be controlled. The potential benefits are great. In fact, realizing the US Global Objectives, changing to a new historical path, and changing the US - USSR relationship are interdependent.

V. IMPLEMENTATION.

The following steps are suggested for implementing a unified US global strategy. First, the National Security Council would reach agreement on the objectives and strategy and would summarize these in a policy statement. Then, the policy statement would be presented to the US people and Congress. Following a period of debate, a congressional vote of endorsement would be requested to document US acceptance of the proposals.

The Executive Department would then "rationalize" existing US international programs to bring them into concurrence with the US global objectives and strategy. In addition, the Executive department would present to Congress with each annual budget submission a US Global strategy to meet the US Global Objectives. It is envisioned that the objectives would remain constant over time and that the strategy would evolve from year to year. The programs and budgets of the Departments of State and Defense would dovetail with the US Global Strategy. Gaining international acceptance of the US global objectives and developing combined approaches to achieving the goals would be a component of the US strategy.

In addition, the following actions are proposed to gain international cooperation and to further institutionalize the US global objectives into government procedures and American values:

A. State of the World Address.

The President would present an annual State of the World Address to clearly and candidly discuss international problems, US objectives and US actions. The linkage between international wellbeing and US wellbeing would be presented. The President would provide an assessment of the Soviet challenge and of the US success and failure in addressing that challenge.

B. Involving the US Public in Foreign Affairs.

The strength of America lies with its people. The ingenuity and vitality of the American public are required to achieve foreign objectives just as they are required to achieve domestic goals. Tapping this potential would require mobilizing public involvement in US foreign affairs and changing US perspective from an inward looking nation to a more outward looking nation. To these ends, the State Department and other federal agencies would facilitate citizen, city, state and private institution involvement in foreign interaction and aid. For example, states would be encouraged to select sister states or nations of comparable populations for exchange, tourism, "getting to know you" programs, and assistance programs. US international corporations would be encouraged to assist developing countries. A set of guidelines similar to the Sullivan Plan would be formulated for US international businesses.

C. Gaining International Acceptance of US Global Objectives.

The US would press through the United Nations and other diplomatic channels for the general acceptance of the US Global

Objectives. The US approach in dealing with other countries would be one of "partners for mutual benefit". The US would strive to avoid the arrogance of power and wealth in its international dealings. (We may have a corner on human wealth and power today, but we do not hold that position on human intelligence, dignity, and drive for a better future. In these we are just one of the players.)

In foreign affairs, the US would balance long term gains and US prestige against short term expediencies. Generally, foreign policy instruments and actions would be in keeping with US moral principles and global objectives. Covert activities which if publicized would detract from the US international position would be avoided. (Intelligence activities would be continued or expanded as necessary.) By demonstrating US ideals internationally, as well as at home, we foster their adoption, enhance US credibility, and retain public support of US foreign policy.

In addition to these steps, it is proposed that the US take bold action to "break the ice" and capture world support for the policies. A joint US - USSR international program for the exploration of space coupled with a US - USSR space treaty is proposed as that action.

D. Promoting Earth Day.

In the book In Search of Excellence, Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies, the authors note that successful corporations often indulge in hoopla to maintain high morale and unity

of purpose.** This same principle could be applied on an international scale to promote world understanding, camaraderie, and to create an element of international fun. Therefore, it is suggested that the US propose to the United Nations the establishment of an international holiday called Earth Day. Earth Day would be a world-wide celebration in honor of our earth, the family of mankind and man's dreams for the future. It would commemorate ongoing international efforts, cooperation and exchanges. It could be a day that the guns of war cease through temporary cease fires. Enemies and adversaries could meet informally to discuss their vision for the future. It would be a day of reflection - where we are going and what kind of a world we want to pass on to the next generation. We could also hear the visions and dreams of our young people.

This celebration would occur alternately on every other spring and fall equinox. Thus, it would occur every 18 months. It would be one day every year and one-half celebrating our earth and our future.


D. Fostering the Whole Earth Perspective.

The Whole Earth Perspective views the whole earth as man's home and all mankind as family. The impact of this perspective is that everyone feels a sense of belonging and responsibility not just to his country but to his world. Adopting the perspective internationally would greatly facilitate achieving the US Global Objectives. Indeed, it is a context

in which these objectives could be achieved over time.

Promoting Earth Day, expanding international interaction, and presenting a State of the World address are actions that will strengthen the Whole Earth Perspective. To fully achieve the perspective will take a long time. However, explicitly supporting such a perspective will raise public awareness and, thereby, contribute to its adoption. It is proposed that the Whole Earth Perspective be a theme in Earth Day and in the State of the World address.

The following symbol is proposed to reinforce the concept of this perspective:



WHOLE EARTH PERSPECTIVE

The symbol is a view of the earth through the porthole of a space ship. The arrow leaving earth symbolizes man's penetration into the unknown and through its boundary. The arrow returning symbolizes man's return to his home. In the middle is earth,

the whole earth our home inhabited by mankind our family.

The cost to implement the US Global Strategy presented in Part IV. could be great if the spending were unconstrained. Since government resources are constrained, it is proposed that the US strategy be implemented at current and projected levels of government spending but with redistribution of resources as discussed within the Part IV. The approach is based on the view that the US can accomplish more with the same resources if foreign policy is focused on a set of global objectives and if the American public directs more of its interest and energy into the international area.

VI. ADDRESSING THE GLOBAL PROBLEMS.

Outstanding world problems were identified in Section II, Problem Definition. Does the proposed US Global Strategy address these problems and, thereby, provide a rational path between present conditions and the US Global Objectives?

In the following paragraphs, the proposed US Global Strategy is applied to each of the world problems.

Problem 1: Peace between the US and the USSR is a metastable peace secured by military deterrence including the capability for immediate and total destruction. This problem is addressed directly by Strategy Group #2 which seeks to develop non-military deterrents to war by expanding mutually beneficial interaction between the US and the USSR. Through Strategy Group #1 the US seeks to deter Soviet invasion of another sovereign nation. The immediate goal of Strategy Group #1 is to sustain the metastable peace while non-military deterrents to war are built. Progress in these areas will support progress in arms control negotiations directed at reducing the likelihood of war, the arms race, and force levels, Strategy Group #3. Thus, the first three Strategy Groups directly contribute to making peace more stable.

Problem 2: The USSR threatens the US by persisting in its fundamental design to foster, primarily through military instruments of power, the spread of communism throughout the world. The proposed US strategy addresses the Soviet design at two levels:

a. Spread of Communism through Soviet force. This approach is countered through Strategy Group #1 aimed at maintaining secure borders.

b. Spread of communism through Soviet support: This approach is countered by proactive US support to strengthen non-aligned nations and responsible governments around the world, Strategy Group #4.

Problem 3: Defense resources, if they were available, could be used in ways having greater benefit to both the US and the USSR and to the world. Strategy Group #3 is directly aimed at reducing force levels and the arms race through verified negotiations.

Problem 4: The US threatens the USSR by its dominant and expanding economy against which the Soviet Union has been unable to successfully compete. Strategy Group #2 is directed at expanding US - USSR interaction for mutual benefit. It is expected that this interaction will help the Soviet economy from the exchange of products, technology and business methods. As interaction builds understanding and mutual benefits, the possibility for arms agreements will be enhanced giving the Soviets an excellent opportunity to reduce military spending. This combination allows the Soviets to change emphasis from defense to economic progress without sacrificing their security. To take advantage of this opportunity, the Soviets need only to reduce their emphasis on offensive military power and to avoid invading other countries.

Problem 5: Arms negotiations have made little progress because they are of necessity linked to Soviet intent and relations, both of which are threatening and little improved over the past 35 years. Strategy Group #2 is aimed at building non-military deterrents to war by expanding US - USSR interaction. Improved US - USSR relations resulting from this exchange are expected to support progress in arms negotiations.

Problem #6: US - USSR military competition in the power and wealth deficient Third World often produces a net loss for the US, the USSR, and the Third World countries. The US will continue to provide aid to countries resisting communist insurrection as long as the countries address the social inequities which invite communism, Strategy Group #4. In addition, the US will proactively support democracy and government reform around the world which benefits the people being governed. Through this strategy the US will not take on military responsibility for the defeat of a communist insurrection. Thus, the US will press on a broad front for strengthened, non-aligned countries which can resist communist takeover. In countries that become communist, the US will seek interaction to strengthen their non-aligned status. The US will react through Strategy Group #1 to deter the spread of communism through invasion. These two strategies working together will help alleviate the more destructive aspects of East - West competition throughout the Third World.

Problem 7: In order to advance the US standard of living

and remain competitive in world markets, the US is challenged to maintain a world leadership position in knowledge, services and technology. A subset of Strategy Group #5 is directed at maintaining the US competitive position in these areas. Actions to open foreign markets to US goods, and government finance of basic research and advanced projects support this objective.

Problem 8: The United States must assist the development of the Third World in spite of great Third World instability. Strategy Group #5 is directed at assuring that the world wealth and knowledge are shared by all nations. As part of this strategy the US will assist Third World development through aid, trade and other interactions.

Problem #9: War is a continuum throughout history; the momentum of this history is at our backs and pushes us forward a way we must not go - towards WW III. The US Global Strategy taken as a whole is aimed at changing from our historical path of recurring major wars to a new path. The US Global Objectives are proposed as the objectives for that new path. This path is the fundamental objective of the proposals contained herein.

The comparison of current global problems and the proposed US Global Strategy indicates that each problem is addressed by the proposed strategies.

VII. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS.

US Global Objectives were proposed to focus US foreign policy in a coherent new direction. Are these proposals rational? The individual global objectives are consistent with US values and international law. The ultimate goal of avoiding major war is embraced by most people. The proposed US Global Strategy tends to modify and rationalize current US policy and does not require great "leaps of faith" or violent redirection. The risk of the proposed strategies is estimated to be minimal, controllable to acceptable levels, or lower than alternative courses of action. The cost impact for implementing the proposed strategies was estimated to be modest although reprogramming between funding elements is proposed. Therefore, the proposed US Global Objectives and Strategy appear rational on the basis of consistency with US values, risk and cost.

Having rational objectives and strategies does not assure success. Is there any basis to think that the US can consciously act to achieve the far-reaching goals proposed? The formation of the US exemplifies such action. Our founding fathers consciously established a form of government never tried before in order to achieve an objective never achieved before. More recently, the environmental and civil rights movements demonstrated rational actions taken by society to

change the nature and direction of that society. An example of a highly focused US accomplishment was placing man on the moon. The lessons of history demonstrate that man can consciously act to alter the course of history. These lessons are applicable to the global challenge facing the US.

Five factors must coalesce to achieve goals of historical proportions: timing, focus, leadership, courage and commitment. These factors are critical to acquire the proposed US Global Objectives.

1. Timing. We know that the nuclear capability created a situation for the first time in history where a future world war would threaten to destroy Modern Society. This situation demands that we change from the path of recurring war to a new path. Delaying this change risks not having sufficient time to alter direction should we later perceive an immediate threat of WW III. Therefore, it is both responsible and prudent to act now rather than later to seek a redirection.

2. Focus. The historical examples cited were focused on explicitly stated objectives. Americans did not just happen to land on the moon. It was our national goal. The civil rights movement was a focused goal shared by a few leaders and many supporters. Our democracy did not form by chance; it was created explicitly through the US constitution. These accomplishments did not just happen. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that we will change from our historical course of recurring major wars without a clear focus on a new

direction. Therefore, it is critical that the US develop and explicitly state its global objectives to focus its international efforts.

3. Leadership. Accomplishing the proposed objectives will require unified government effort and broad support and involvement by the American people. It is critical that leaders endorsing such objectives emerge, refine and sell the policy and lead the country in the effort. Others will be needed to support these leaders and facilitate implementation.

4. Courage. The proposed strategy and redirection can not be easily accomplished. Indeed, to overcome collectively the destructive forces within us and to change the course of history away from recurring major wars is perhaps the greatest challenge man has ever faced. To explicitly seek such a goal and to alter policies and international relations in pursuit of that goal will take great courage. Applying prudence and sound judgement to specific actions will reduce the risks and lend confidence to the process. Nevertheless, the fear of trying new approaches and seeking new goals will be present. This fear can only be overcome with courage.

5. Commitment. To climb a high mountain, the most important event is not the first step up the slope; it is the decision to climb the mountain. In a similar manner, national commitment to the goals would spark the entire process in motion. Furthermore, commitment is absolutely necessary to sustain the effort over extended time as it must be sustained. Such

commitment is not just of the mind to take rational actions, or just of the heart to overcome the fear of reaching for the unknown. It is a commitment of the spirit, a gift outright, to create a new and better world.

Are the proposed objectives beyond our reach? Certainly not. By committing to global objectives and implementing a global strategy we may very well alter our historical path. Once we are on the new path there will be plenty of time (over future generations) to totally achieve the objectives. The opportunity to make the commitment is within our grasp today. Why not seize the opportunity now? Americans have the power to achieve what they seek:

ON A TREE FALLEN ACROSS THE ROAD

"The tree the tempest with a crash of wood
Throws down in front of us is not to bar
Our passage to our journey's end for good,
But just to ask us who we think we are

Insisting always on our own way so.
She likes to halt us in our runner tracts,
And make us get down in a foot of snow
Debating what to do without an ax.

And yet she knows obstruction is in vain:
We will not be put off the final goal
We have it hidden in us to attain,
Not though we have to seize earth by the pole

And, tired of aimless circling in one place,
Steer straight off after something into space."⁴⁹

Robert Frost

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