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



STUDENT ESSAY

WHAT HAVE YOU DONE FOR ME LATELY? EXPLORING POSSIBLE MARITIME CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAR; ITS AVOIDANCE, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION

BY

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3 APRIL 1987

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

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USAWC Military Studies Program Paper

What Have You Done For Me Lately? Exploring Possible Maritime Contributions to War; Its Avoidance, Conduct and Termination

An Individual Essay

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What Have You Done For Me Lately?
Exploring Possible Maritime Contributions to War; Its Avoidance, Conduct and Termination

Going back at least as far as the Peloponnesian Wars those concerned with a nation's security have tried to examine the contribution that naval forces make towards the attainment of national objectives. Most often the question is asked within the context of how to apportion resources among a nation's air, land and naval forces. While it is difficult to divorce any discussion about military power from the resource allocation process, this piece will avoid that sticky wicket by (1) acknowledging that a constant and vigorous, I might add healthy, competition for resources exists between the military services and (2) by limiting the assessment of naval power, and its contribution to national security, to those naval forces in being and/or programmed for entry into the fleet during the funded delivery period.

The Threat

If we are to develop any meaningful discussion about maritime options, we must first take at least a cursory glance at the threat: the Soviet Union. A bean-counting exercise serves no purpose for this analysis. Suffice it to say there is general consensus among the experts that the total military power available to the Soviet Union, both organic and via surrogate forces is quantitatively superior and more readily available for use both at the nuclear

and conventional level than are the forces of the United States and its allies. This assessment holds true in both the global context as well as the principal regional areas of U.S.-Soviet competition. However, the admixture of the U.S./Allied technological advantage to the comparison of force capability suggests that the gap between the U.S. and Soviet forces is a small one but, on balance, the edge presently falls in the Soviet camp.

Were the military superiority of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact not reason enough for concern, the Politburo continues to embrace Vladimir I. Lenin's idea of the communist state's premier objective: Achievement of a single, worldwide Soviet Republic. One need not look far to confirm that this is so. How else can we explain the Soviet presence in Afghanistan or the power projection potential of the Soviet presence in Yemen, Ethiopia and Cam Ranh Bay? What other purpose might there be for a continental nation to transform a brown water navy whose primary mission was to aid in the defense of the homeland to one which possesses the capability to sail the high seas alongside the U.S. Navy? What is to be made of a conscious decision by a Navy whose capital ship has been for a generation the submarine to not only deploy the small deck carrier in the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) role but to have on the building ways a large deck super carrier? The message is clear; the Soviet Union intends to export communist ideology wherever possible for the expressed purpose of fomenting the seeds of revolution upon whatever target of opportunity might emerge.

The Soviet Union is a multi-national union whose territorial expanse crosses nine time zones and whose interests are guarded by the world's largest navy, legions of military forces whose ground divisions number more than 200,

whose tanks are counted in the tens of thousands and whose tactical air forces number in the thousands.[1] Were this conventional capability not enough, it is complemented by a tactical and strategic nuclear arsenal that can be rivalled by only the United States. Moreover, Soviet military forces can be expected to grow and modernize as the Kremlin continues to spend three times the percent of GNP on military capability than does the United States.[2] Clearly then, the Soviet Union is a nation which possesses the military capability, expansionist aims and political ideology to be antithetical to U.S./Allied interests and is the causative factor for the United States to be constantly vigilant for acts of aggression, and always prepared to unleash the full range of its national power in order to deter Soviet adventurism from turning into armed conflict.

While the Soviet Union represents a military capability of awesome proportion, it is not a nation without significant and exploitable weaknesses. A brief examination of these flaws is relevant as they serve as targets of opportunities for improving deterrence in peace and for altering the balance of power (correlation of forces) in war.

Although the export of communist ideology has continued to be a fervent objective, Soviet performance in the psycho-social realm has been mixed at best. The Soviet brand of Communism is no longer seen as monolithic in the international arena. While the Soviets can claim a measure of solidarity with their Cuban and Vietnamese surrogates, it has met strong and lasting resistance in Afghanistan and its presence has been rejected in a country of no less importance than Egypt.

Another significant crack in the Soviet shield is the very nature of empire. The USSR is an association of fifteen republics many which are of such ethnic and cultural disparity from their Russian benefactors, not to mention geographic remoteness from the Soviet heartland, that it takes little imagination to believe that many of these peoples, if given a choice would rather not be affiliated with the USSR. The Baltic States and the Central Asian Republics are examples that come immediately to mind. That is not to say that such states would attempt to sever their relationship with the mother country under any condition other than a cataclysmic dissolution of the empire. Nonetheless, the Soviets feel obliged to home base many of their military forces in distant republics so as to adequately protect their interests.

The Soviet Union exhibits several useful weaknesses in the geostrategic sense. Remarkably, the vast size of the nation causes it to share contiguous borders with twelve sovereign countries; thirteen counting Japan, vis-a-vis, the Kuril Islands.[3] Of those 12-13 nations seven are allied, one could be considered as neutral, and five could be characterized between antagonistic and hostile. As it happens, at least partially as a residual effect of our longstanding policy of containment, a number of our friends and allies find themselves in close proximity to Soviet and Warsaw Pact borders. Not the least among these are Norway and Japan. Given the Soviet inclination towards paranoia, these nations as well as others must have a direct impact on the Soviet decisionmaker's security equation.

Last but not least among Soviet weaknesses is the fact that its very size and absence of geographical obstacles provides it with a vast and effective

network of interior lines, along with all the strategic and tactical advantages that accrue from such a benefit. Precisely the same quirk of geography creates long, vulnerable borders, as well as lines of communication that are readily interdictable at numerous points along their length and breadth.

In sum then, the United States and its allies faces a Soviet threat that is global in nature. It is a threat which manifests itself both as a continental and a maritime superpower. It is a threat that is not without exploitable weaknesses. It is a threat whose national objectives demand and whose naval power provides the opportunity for the export of communist ideology, if not Soviet hegemony, across the far reaches of the planet, and in so doing violate traditional spheres of American influence; to include encroachment into the islands and land mass of the Western Hemisphere.

U. S. Objectives/Strategies

Having a description of Soviet capabilities and intentions to serve as a backdrop, let us examine those aspirations and plans the United States has to cope with its premier threat during this time which is often called an era of violent peace.

Recognizing that the reader will know very well the oft-repeated objectives of the United States, their synthesis would look something like this: (1)world peace, (2) collective and individual freedom and (3) security for ourselves and our friends around the world.[4] This Nation's leadership further believes that the attainment of those objectives is best achieved by providing nations and individuals the right to self-determination without coercion, the preservation and growth of democratic institutions wherever they may be desired, and the achievement of freedom through the economic well being

offered by free markets and trade. Regrettably, these very objectives are anathema to the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the United States is fundamentally opposed to any and all who would deny a people the option to embrace objectives common to ours or who would discourage international discourse on such objectives through the coercive threat embodied in military power.

National Military Strategy

Flowing directly from the aforementioned national goals are U. S. security objectives, of which the most fundamental is: The protection of the United States, along with its friends and allies, their institutions, peoples, and military forces. Review of U.S. national interests and security objectives has caused national decisionmakers to embrace what is a rather simple and now long standing military strategy made up of three objectives: (1) Deter war or acts of aggression against the U.S. and its allies and friends and (2) should deterrence fail to fight and win; at least a partial definition of "win" which is embodied in our third objective which is to terminate the conflict as soon as possible and on terms favorable to the United States and its allied nations.[5] Clearly, the underpinnings of such a strategy must include forces capable of being brought to bear across the entire spectrum of conflict from peace to strategic nuclear warfare. Since it is my intent to focus on maritime options, principally at the conventional level, allow me to pass over the nuclear component of U. S. strategy with full recognition that the credibility of our national military strategy rests squarely on all U. S. forces, both conventional and nuclear, their total capability, their survivability, and the enemy's perception of our willingness to retaliate against an attack with whatever level of military response is necessary.

Maritime Strategy

Any attempt to demonstrate the utility of naval power and its potential for application in peace and in war must be done within the context of the Maritime Strategy. However, before providing a description of the strategy, a soul-cleansing is in order so as to provide an assurance that no hidden agenda exists, the ferreting out of which need preoccupy the reader.

Disclaimers

The Maritime Strategy is not the national military strategy. Rather, it is a component of our strategy; complementary to but not preeminent among our nuclear and continental component strategies.

Naval forces are not the panacea for all our security concerns. Indeed, in war while air and naval power are capable of closing with and destroying the enemy in their respective regimes, it is only land forces which occupy and defend territory. Further, it is hard to conjure up a scenario in which an air or naval campaign are conducted for any other purpose than to provide support to the land battle.

I will leave to others the discussion of whether or not that from the development of the Maritime Strategy emerged a requirement for a 15 carrier, 600 ship navy or that the strategy was developed to justify sustaining the rebuilding of naval forces. While I would argue that the earliest versions of the Maritime Strategy had clear programmatic implications, it has over its various iterations become truly a strategy document which is of relevance and utility to the strategic planner.

The Maritime Strategy is a conceptual framework for the deployment and employment of naval forces across the spectrum of conflict. The Maritime Strategy is not a campaign directive to be executed by Unified Commanders and Fleet Commanders-in-Chief. Said another way, Washington-based strategists have a contribution to make in the development of national security policy. They do not have a place in directing the detailed warfighting efforts of the commander in the field. It is only the operational commander who is able to translate strategic direction into operations plans, application of force, and phasing of battle.

Having dismissed some of the issues surrounding the Maritime Strategy, including some of the things it is not, let us review what it is. First, the Maritime Strategy is global in scope. While recognizing that conflict may break out in any theater, it will first spread to and quickly focus on war in Europe. It sees that the course of the war in Western Europe can be influenced by events precipitated in part by maritime operations conducted against the flanks of the Soviet Union, even in theaters at some distance from the central battle. In this regard, the maritime theaters in the Northwest Pacific, North Atlantic and Indian Oceans are seen as potential areas of opportunity in which Soviet vulnerabilities can be exploited to a degree which can influence operations at the point of NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Secondly, the Maritime Strategy is a forward strategy. Two separate and distinct meanings emerge. First, in peacetime, naval forces can add a healthy measure of deterrence by exercising in waters along the littorals of Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations, and by maintaining a forward deployed presence such as NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic or the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediter-

ranean. Secondly, in time of conflict, this forward-looking perspective takes on added significance as it suggests the intention to cede no maritime theater to the enemy by default, to exploit U.S. and Allied maritime capability by forcing the Soviet Navy to withdraw into its coastal waters, and if successful in so doing, to demonstrate the capability to project naval power directly against Soviet and Warsaw Pact shores. It becomes obvious then that the Maritime Strategy is a vigorously offensive strategy. It seeks to use this offensive nature to exploit Soviet weakness, attrite Soviet forces, and exact a price for aggression that causes conflict termination to be an attractive alternative to continued hostility.

As has been mentioned, the Maritime Strategy is not an independent strategy but rather a component of the National Military Strategy. Not surprisingly then it has as its objectives those of the national strategy: (1) deterrence (2) if deterrence fails, fight and win and (3) terminate the conflict on favorable terms. Should deterrence fail, the strategy looks at its implied tasks in maritime terms, i.e., destroy enemy maritime forces, protect allied sea lines of communication and shipping, support the land campaign wherever and whenever possible, and create leverage for favorable termination.

To its credit, the strategy recognizes the strengths of the Soviet Navy while seeking to exploit its weakness. In either case it is clear that successful maritime operations can only be produced by coalition warfare, in terms of both joint and combined operations.

Finally, the maritime strategy recognizes that the preponderance of military power rests with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. As a result,

offensive action must take the form of sequential operations which allow for U.S. forces to form sufficient mass to blunt the initial assaults and advances of enemy ground, air and naval forces.

Consistent with the recognition that U.S. and Allied operations must by necessity be sequential, the Maritime Strategy also acknowledges many of the other constraints the military planner will face in a real world scenario. In the first instance, U.S. forces will be attempting to avoid conflict with its attendant delays in force mobilization and proper positioning. Should attempts at deterrence fail, then such issues as the timing and scope of the political decisions taken, synchronization of U.S. and Allied responses, and theater closure times must all be considered and overcome. The Maritime Strategy makes allowances for these and other vagaries by defining three phases for the conduct of the strategy. They are: (1) Transition to War, (2) Seize the Initiative and (3) Carry the Fight to the Enemy. It is important to note that no time lines are established for the phases of the strategy, but rather movement from one phase to another is event driven. For example; while U.S. forces may be repositioning during Phase I so as to exploit a given geographical advantage, such movements must be viewed from the perspective of their deterrent value versus that of the response expected by the other side. Said another way, the planner must be primarily concerned with a subjective measurement of the stabilizing effect of a movement order against the perception of a consciously escalatory signal. However, as soon as an act of aggression has been perpetrated, then Phase II of the strategy commences at which time the planner's focus shifts from deterrence to war and fighting to win.

Transition to War

Consistent with the objectives set forth in our National Military Strategy, the principal focus during Phase I is deterrence. But in fact it is more than that. U.S. and Allied decisionmakers, while clearly wishing to avoid war, are equally interested in defusing the crisis and avoiding a direct superpower confrontation. Nevertheless, they are obliged to utilize every moment of this phase to transition this Nation's forces to a wartime footing and to avoid the malpositioning of forces at the commencement of hostilities. Of course, any bellicose action taken must be balanced on the tightrope of escalation control.

Seize the Initiative

With the commencement of hostilities, air, land and naval forces from throughout the Alliance will endeavor to coalesce their forces for the purpose of blunting Soviet and Warsaw Pact advances, commencing the task of attriting a superior enemy force, and exploiting comparative advantages wherever they may appear. Further, air and land forces will have their hands full attempting to slow down the westward movement of the Soviet juggernaut while simultaneously attempting to assimilate and redeploy arriving reinforcements. Perhaps, then it is at sea that allied forces can first take advantage of technological and, in some cases, numerical superiority to initiate offensive action and counteraction. Be it Allied minelaying operations to deny use of a key strait, putting in place an ASW barrier to aid in protecting the Atlantic sea lines of communications (SLOCs), prosecution of the ASW campaign by U.S. attack submarines, or even limited power projection operations against land targets by carrier-based air or amphibious forces, it is likely that our initial offensive successes will come via maritime operations.

Carry the Fight to the Enemy

Upon entering Phase III of the strategy, it is the Alliance, via successful joint and combined operations, that has been able to more efficiently mass its military and industrial might at the point of decision and who begins to see Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces retreating in the face of advancing Allied forces. It is now that the Alliance is capable of sufficient freedom of movement to penetrate enemy defenses at times and points of its choosing and to conduct large scale joint and combined counterattacks. More importantly, the planner is now looking at the disposition and application of force in terms that would create the best leverage for early war termination. It is in Phase III where naval power can have its most direct impact on the land campaign and conduct those operations that have the best chance of avoiding nuclear escalation while coercing the Soviets to the bargaining table. Directly threatening Soviet strategic forces, seizing territory previously under Soviet dominance and/or demonstrating the potential tc attack the Soviet heartland from the flank are among those possibilities that might persuade the aggressor that a cessation of hostilities is the most desirable course of action.

Maritime Options

Before outlining some of the potential ways in which maritime forces may support national objectives, some assumptions are in order. Some sort of a Maritime Campaign must be conducted regardless of what NATO defense strategy is implemented. This is so simply because a war in Western Europe cannot be won without reinforcement from the United States; the vast majority of

reinforcement comes by sea; and reinforcement by sea cannot occur without establishing a measure of maritime superiority.[7]

Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs) and Amphibious Task Forces will be made available to sail in harm's way in order to project power against the shore in support of the land campaign. However, neither a maritime strike mission nor an amphibious assault will be conducted until the ASW and anti-air environments have been cleansed to a sufficiently low level of risk to make such operations practical. Said another way, such forces should be looked upon as a strategic asset, that once lost, cannot be replaced for the duration of the conflict.

Maritime operations and continental operations, although competitors for resources are complementary to and vital components of their respective campaign plans. It is easy to accept this premise if one believes that while the land campaign cannot be won at sea, it surely can be lost there.

A NATO war is a global war. Given the right correlation of forces and the belief that the Soviets can fight, escalate and terminate on their terms, they are likely to attack. While it is clear the Soviets believe a war against NATO would be decisive, it is not at all certain that the Soviets would not be satisfied solely with the "Grand Prize" of Western Europe's industrial base and the demise of the NATO Alliance. It remains then for the U.S. and its friends to change the Soviet decisionmakers equation by expanding the conflict to multiple theaters and to create the perception that escalation control, if there is any, rests with the leadership of the West.

The ASW and counter-air campaign in the North Atlantic-Norwegian Sea, while high risk, can be conducted at the conventional level. Having read

Clausewitz, the Soviet decisionmaker can accept as part of the "Fog of War" that a portion of his strategic nuclear submarine fleet may be subject to attrition as a by-product of prosecuting the ASW campaign. That is to say the loss of an SSBN need not be viewed as a counterforce attack, but rather as one of the costs of doing business in a high intensity conflict. It is left for us to apply the risk factor as to what reduction in the Soviet's strategic reserve would precipitate their crossing the nuclear threshold.

While the United States may have sufficient military capability to sustain a "1 1/2 war" global scenario, it can be said with certainty that the Soviet Union possesses the wherewithal to effect a simultaneous aggression on more than one front, indeed more than one region of the globe. Their ability to develop an integrated strategy for the conduct of war in all theaters, and to do so with the support of the totality of Soviet conventional and nuclear military power makes this proposition all the more troublesome.

If the U.S. is to continue to seek the highest level of deterrence in peacetime and to fight and win in war, then the current move towards "jointness" in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and among the services must be expanded beyond their current boundaries. Indeed, if Clausewitz's dictum that "war is a continuation of politics by other means" is to be believed then it seems reasonable to suggest that an opponent like the Soviet Union can only be dissuaded from violence, or beaten in her belligerence, if all of the instruments of U.S. power are focussed on a common objective. Such a suggestion is made in full recognition of the manifest difficulties associated with interagency cooperation. However, anything less than the concerted efforts of Defense, State, Treasury, CIA and others will fail to contain the Russian

Bear. In sum, if we are to accept containment as a valid strategy then such containment must have not only a military component but also strategies for ideological, geopolitical and economical containment as well.

Not unlike the threat to U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force units, the now formidable blue water capability of the Soviet Navy dictates a forward presence in peacetime and offensive, forward pressure in war. As the Soviets venture farther away from home, the only proposition that lends credence to conventional deterrence by naval forces is the threat of conventional retaliation by naval forces. Again, like the credibility invested in land and air forces, a strong forward postured naval force provides flexibility of response at the conventional level, and thereby reduces the automaticity of a nuclear response to a large scale act of aggression.

Peace and Transition Options

Perhaps the most important and effective use of naval forces during the peace and transition period is to increase their presence in forward areas that are likely to be contested in war. In so doing, a clear and unambiguous signal is transmitted that Soviet adventurism will result not in a containable regional conflict but rather a superpower confrontation. One example that serves U.S. interests well is our naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea. U.S. presence clearly demonstrates the depth of our regional interests, and our resolve to deter aggression. On those occasions that two or three CVBGs are present, the combat capability and "staying power" of U.S. forces is also made clear. Movement of U.S. and allied forces into the Aegean, Adriatic, and Tyrrhenian Seas serves notice that the allies will be supported, and that it is now possible to project power onto the central front from any where along

the southern region's littoral. No military planner can ignore this threat any more than he can the proposition that control of two international straits denies use of the Mediterranean Sea to Soviet forces and presents an exposed flank of any land force that ventures across the Inter-German border.

Another option available to the planner is to use the inherent flexibility of naval forces by exercising them in sensitive areas of the world, and where possible, demonstrate a range of naval capability, e.g., a fleet air defense exercise followed by a shore bombardment exercise. An example of this option may be to conduct sequential battle force operations in the North Atlantic or even Norwegian Sea while a like operation takes place somewhere in the northwest Pacific Ocean or Sea of Japan. Operations such as those described demonstrate the pressure that can be brought to bear directly against any exposed littoral of the Soviet Union at a time and place of our choosing. It also suggests that Soviet and Warsaw Pact victories in one theater might be offset by a retaliatory strike in another theater. It further signals loudly that despite setbacks in the land campaign, U.S. forces will continue to engage Soviet forces with naval power. Use of this type of option must create an increased level of uncertainty for the Soviet decision-maker. New questions arise about the potential cost of aggression as the planner attempts to measure the retaliatory and escalatory capability resident in the proximate naval force.

Another option for use of naval forces during this initial phase is to sail U.S. naval forces into areas in which the Soviets are attempting to extend their influence or impose a degree of hegemony. U.S. naval operations in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and throughout the emerging nations of

the Pacific Basin serve as current examples. In conducting those sorts of naval operations, the Soviets are impressed with the fact that the United States will cede no area to them by default and will tolerate no coercion of an emerging nation's economic prerogatives (e.g., fishing rights). Further, the Soviets will have learned that they will not be allowed a political foothold in a new region without a direct challenge from the U.S. Of equal import, the innocent bystanders will receive exactly the same message.

The final option for use of naval forces is to use them for political posturing. What is meant here is that naval forces offer the policymaker the capability to deter through gradual and yet deliberate escalation. When taken in concert with other actions such as exercising presidential call up authority, activation of U.S./NATO alert systems and breakout of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), escalatory moves by naval forces may cause the opponent to reassess the advantages of aggression. Naval force moves that should prove to be of utility are: Breakout of Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships, repositioning of a Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadron,[8] and airlift of a Marine Brigade to Norway to "exercise" their prepositioned equipment. One additional benefit resides in the fact that should deterrence fail, these early moves greatly enhance the U.S. capability to transition to war from something better than a standing start.

Some additional benefits that might accrue directly or indirectly to land and air forces from executing the aforementioned options are: (1) In the post World War II period, the United States has responded to more than 250 crises with military power. For 200 of those crises the force of choice has been our Navy.[9] In the vast majority of those cases, escalation has been averted and

U.S. military forces have been preserved for other missions. (2) Over the last thirty-odd years the Soviet Union has embarked upon the most vigorous shipbuilding program in history. At the heart of this buildup has been the objective of obtaining parity with the U.S. Navy. This superpower competition has siphoned-off billions of rubles that would have otherwise been spent to defeat allied land/air forces or be invested in the domestic economy for the purpose of improving a given defense industry or enhancing industrial preparedness for war.

Seizing the Initiative in War

In light of the geographical vulnerabilities present in the maritime theaters, it is with a heightened sense of urgency that U.S. and allied naval forces will attempt to establish maritime superiority. It will not escape the reader that these early naval operations will be focussed primarily on sea areas and that they will doubtless take a considerable time to accomplish. However, it should be noted that these maritime operations have as a principal objective the establishment of a protected sea bridge from the United States (CONUS) to Europe over which will flow much of our warmaking resources.

From a maritime perspective, the Eurasian land mass is a peninsula with all the vulnerability to naval power of any such geographic feature. It is a land whose flanks are deeply exposed by the Baltic Sea in the north and the Mediterranean Sea in the south. Indeed, transiting across their farthest reaches one arrives at the very coastal waters of the Soviet Union. Additionally, Norway, a staunch member of the Alliance sits astride two Soviet naval flanks: the Baltic and the Barents. Further, the Soviet Union has the world's longest ocean littoral stretching across its northern latitudes from

the Barents Sea to the Northwest Pacific Ocean. The Soviet's problem is immensely complicated by the absence of year round warm water ports and by the fact that the four concentrations of Soviet naval fleets are, because of geography, susceptible to being fixed in place by U.S. and allied naval forces.

Such traditional naval tasks as escort and control of shipping, construction and operation of ports, and employment of offload and cargo handling systems will be conducted simultaneously with the forward movement of CVBG's, amphibious task forces, SSN's and maritime patrol aircraft. Such movement will be for the expressed purpose of uncovering and securing the Atlantic, and perhaps Pacific SLOC's for friendly reinforcement. Of course, one of the ancillary benefits of such large scale operations is that Soviet naval forces are subjected to attrition. To the ground commander the benefit is clear. A Soviet naval vessel sunk, disarmed or forced to retreat to its home waters is a Soviet naval vessel that cannot weigh in to the land battle. The same could be said of Soviet naval aviation assets attempting to attack U.S. battle forces or provide fleet air defense for Soviet elements; they are airframes not available for strike, command and control or electronic warfare missions against the shore.

There are a series of naval operations that can be conducted early in the conflict that will have a decided psychological impact on the U.S. and its allies, as well as, the Soviet Union and its allies. The following options could be considered for their military and psychological implications early in the conflict; a time when both our political and military leadership will be in desperate need of a "victory" of any sort.

The first is the conduct or threat of conduct of a joint air and naval operation against Cuba. Tactical fighter wings from CONUS and/or a CVBG or Battleship Surface Action Group (BBSAG), with the attendant diplomatic demarche, may be sufficient to cause the Cuban leadership to opt out of the hostilities or after some initial aggression, sue for peace. An early victory at home and a threat to Soviet cohesiveness have obvious utility. In addition, control of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea lanes allows for unhampered reinforcements to flow from the gulf ports.

A second option is the neutralization of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron and naval shipping and facilities located at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. In addition to the psychological advantages to accrue from such operations, Soviet naval forces are being destroyed and U.S. naval forces now have the ability to swing forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and to do so unmolested. Further, the Soviet geostrategic position is severely complicated by the impact of U.S. maritime superiority on such nation's as Vietnam, North Korea, and most importantly of all, China. At least some doubt will be raised as to what these nations will do while Soviet attention is focussed on Europe. Additionally, one can expect such successful naval operations to enhance U.S. and allied solidarity, particularly as it applies to South Korea and Japan. From the Soviet perspective, these eventualities are near calamitous as the Kremlin will perceive its vulnerability and be obliged to keep in place those troops, tanks, artillery and aviation assets assigned to the far eastern theater TVD.[10] As importantly, they will be forced to bring these forces to the highest level of readiness. The impact on the central front battle is clear: The Soviet follow on echelons cannot expect augmentation from the far

eastern or Pacific theaters of operation (TVD). Nor can the units engaged expect reinforcement and replacement from reserve units and personnel boarding trains going east instead of west.

A third option, which offers a significant psychological and military advantage, might be provided by inserting Marines, both ground and air components, into North Norway.[11] At a time when alliance forces find themselves retreating, a "victory" can be claimed by inserting U.S. forces on a NATO flank. Additionally, denying overflight by Soviet Backfires and preventing a roll-up of the flank by airborne and/or Soviet Naval Infantry assaults serves both to preserve flank security for the land component commander and it preserves the eastern naval flank as Alliance forces in the Atlantic penetrate farther north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (G-I-UK) Gap.

Finally, it is a common occurrence in most global war games that Soviet forces, in overwhelming numbers, cross the Inter-German Border and begin the march of the Red Tide to, first the Rhine, and ultimately to the Benelux ports. Invariably, red forces move swiftly across the North German Plain pausing only briefly to protect their northern flank by deploying one to three divisions of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces into Schleswig-Holstein and then into all the Danish Peninsula. One possible response by the Alliance would be the conduct of a major amphibious operation into the western approaches to the Danish Peninsula by both Marine amphibious and MPS Brigades for the purpose of positing a MAF-size unit on the peninsula:[12] This quite plausible action serves to seriously complicate the Soviet decision cycle and may cause them to either pause in their westward advance or dedicate a significant number of additional forces to secure their flank. Either choice

buys time and space for the Alliance; both precious commodities in the early stages of the conflict.

The range of naval operations possible during Phase II, as outlined in the preceding paragraphs, suggests that naval power properly applied, can be folded in nicely with the objectives of both U.S. Air-Land Battle and NATO Follow On Forces Attack doctrines. Naval forces may indeed be critical to the rear battle by securing the leeward, channel and North Sea air and water approaches to both the United Kingdom and the Benelux ports. Further, vigorous offensive action projected against the shore by carrier-based air or even amphibious forces located on the flanks of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces may be successful in engaging large ground formations, interdicting lines of communication and transportation nodes, and destroying or disrupting command and control sites.

Additionally, the location, visibility and flexibility inherent in massed naval power may assist in eroding Soviet-Warsaw Pact solidarity. A seabased strike on a East German or Polish Baltic port can't help but sow the seeds of doubt as to the ultimate outcome of the conflict. Equally devastating to Soviet and Warsaw Pact morale will be when the opposing air forces have been reduced to near parity and the Alliance conducts an aerial engagement over the skies of East Germany with both U.S. and allied air forces and an additional 100 or more fighter aircraft launched from the nearby carriers of a massed battle force.

Terminating the Conflict

The contribution to be made by naval forces during the final phase of the conflict can only be evaluated within the context of what U.S. and NATO

decisionmakers determine to be acceptable war termination objectives. Clearly, there will be, during the last phase of the struggle, both a good bit of uncertainty about and diverse positions concerning how the post-war world should or could look. If the reader can accept that "unconditional surrender" is an unacceptable, if not irrelevant, basis on which to terminate conflict between two superpowers during the nuclear age, then a variety of possible environments for terminating hostilities can be explored. Both the military leadership and the national leadership will be obliged to answer the following questions: (1) What retribution is to be extracted from the nation(s) who precipitated the death and destruction the war has wrought? (2) What residual military power is to be left in the hands of the Soviet Union? (3) Must the Warsaw Pact be disbanded as a precondition of peace or will the status quo antebellum be acceptable to the belligerents? (4) Will the U.S. possess sufficient military capability to remain a superpower or in accomplishing our objectives will we have dissipated our resources to a level that preclude attainment of our former preeminence? (5) Will the world be a bi-polar or multi-polar sphere? (6) What will the role of China, Japan, Korea and the Third World be in establishing the global balance of power? (7) What about the reunification of Germany? These and many other issues must be addressed prior to determining how, when and where military power will be brought to bear to resolve the conflict.

The aforementioned notwithstanding, the disposition and residual combat power of engaged units will have a lot to do with U.S. and NATO termination objectives. It is quite conceivable that counterattacks by air and ground units may well find forces forward positioned on Warsaw Pact territory; an

event that would have direct influence on termination objectives. A nation gains a strong bargaining position by bringing to the negotiating table the following tools: (1) Measurable resources, both in military and industrial terms, that persuade the adversary that termination holds less risk than does continuing or escalating the fight and (2) friendly control of something the adversary holds dear, be it an institution or geography.

It can be argued that it is Phase III in which naval forces can best influence battlefield events. This is so because naval forces have been able to reduce enemy forces to levels of impotence and in so doing have gained the freedom of action necessary to project power at the time and place, as well as, at the intensity level that the ground commander may desire. For instance, it is not likely that carrier battle forces would sail into the European littoral of the North Sea or transit the Skaggerak into the Baltic until the later stages of the conflict. Likewise, it is hard to envision battle forces sailing through the Bosphorus and Dardenelles into the Black Sea until very late in the war. Nevertheless, the military utility of having forces in the positions described poised to conduct strike, amphibious warfare and/or naval surface fire support missions is enormous. Because naval forces have by now achieved maritime supremacy in all theaters, they area available to contain the Soviet Union along its rimland where no U.S. ground forces are deployed. In this instance, such locales as the Kamchatka Peninsula and Vietnam come to mind.

Seizing and controlling geography is a most powerful motivation to come to terms at the negotiating table. Several warfighting options come to mind that would also serve as leverage "chips" at the peace negotiations. A naval

blockade of Cam Ranh Bay which had originally served to neutralize Soviet naval forces in the South China Sea, could now be lifted as a concession to achieve peace. Had the majority of amphibious shipping been swung into the Pacific, then a reinforced MAF-sized amphibious assault could have been prosecuted against the Kurils or even Sakhalin Island. A lesser option would have been to conduct amphibious raids against key naval installations in and around the Sea of Okhotsk. During the warfighting stages, these amphibious operations would have had a substantial effect on establishing maritime superiority in the North Pacific while bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet in its territorial waters. At the negotiating table, the Kurils could be returned to Japan and occupied territory on Sakhalin, in the Northern Kurils, and Kamchatka could serve as negotiating points. Similar arguments could be made for territory seized as a result of maritime operations conducted against Bulgaria from the Black Sea, the Baltic Soviet Republics or even Leningrad from the Baltic Sea and Svalbard, Jan Mayen and other Islands in the Barents/ Norwegian Sea area.

Finally, the opportunity to mass naval forces into three to five carrier battle formations and multi-MAF amphibious and MPS Task Forces for application at a time and place of our choosing will serve as a persuasive instrument of peace. Indeed, it could be argued that the combat potential of these massed forces is of such magnitude, that just as during the deterrence phase, their movement and disposition create more leverage for termination than would their actual introduction into the conflict.

Summary

Embedded in this piece is the proposition that while the U.S. Army represents the cornerstone of this Nation's conventional deterrence and warfighting potential, U.S. air and naval forces, particularly forward deployed forces, play significant roles by deterring aggression in their own right, providing an early quick response capability during the transition to war, signalling reassurance to allies while dissuading potential foes, and they bring a measure of regional stability, particularly in areas that don't normally have a land-based presence.

Naval forces diminish the effect of Soviet global adventurism by providing a counterbalancing presence. They also have relevance across the spectrum of conflict; from the conventional deterrent value of strategic lift assets to the strategic deterrent of a Tomahawk missile housed on a conventional platform; from the conventional combat power of naval strike and amphibious forces to the strategic arsenal of an SSBN.

Naval forces can make a contribution to the prosecution of Air-Land Battle doctrine by extending the battlefield, providing some security/presence in friendly rear areas, and by projecting power ashore to disrupt events in the enemy rear. Further, naval forces can be applied to add combat power to decisive engagements or to avoid engagement when combat ratios have not yet tilted in our favor. The sequential nature of maritime operations can be made to complement the phasing of the land battle, i.e., naval forces can fight so as to first suppress the enemy, attrite his forces and ultimately aid in their destruction.

Finally, it is naval forces, employed in a cohesive manner with all other U.S. and allied forces that can assist in first protecting and later securing U.S. interests, help deny the enemy the attainment of his war aims, limit the scope and intensity of the conflict, by its presence cede no area to the enemy by default, and by transiting from presence to power projection, aid in defining and achieving our war termination objectives.

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power. 1986, pp. 9, 67 and 76. This publication reports that the Soviet Union can presently field 201 divisions, 52,600 main battle tanks, and 6300 aircraft.

2. Caspar Weinberger, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1988/FY1989 Budget and FY 1988-92 Defense Program, p. 17. This publication depicts Soviet spending over the last twenty years at approximately fifteen percent of GNP per annum versus U.S. spending at five percent per annum of GNP.

3. "Soviet Union," Goode's World Atlas, 1984, pp. 174-175.

4. Ronald Reagan, National Security Strategy of the United States, pp. 4-5.

5. Joint Staff, OJCS, United States Military Posture for FY 1988, pp. 2-4.

6. James D. Watkins, The Maritime Strategy, pp. 2-17. This article was published as part of a compendium on the Maritime Strategy by the U.S. Naval Institute. It represents the most comprehensive unclassified description of the Maritime Strategy presently available.

7. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985, p. 116. The author calculates that 95% of all dry cargo must be transported to overseas theaters by sealift assets.

8. U.S. Department of the Navy, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2710, p. 14. The Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron consists of a four or five ship squadron of Military Sealift Command chartered vessels designed to stow the prepositioned supplies and equipment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade, along with thirty days of sustainability. Purpose is to forward deploy all three MPS Squadrons in order to decrease the response time and strategic lift requirements to meet a given global response to crisis.

9. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concepts and Issues, 1985, p. I-11.

10. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1986, pp. 11 and 13. The Far Eastern Theater is one of three in the Soviet Union and it consists of two TVDs, the Far East and Pacific. Forces consist of approximately 53 divisions, 14,900 tanks and 1,730 tactical aircraft. In addition the maritime area has approximately 300 surface ships and 90 submarines in the active fleet. The Pacific Fleet is the largest of the four Soviet naval force fleet concentrations.

11. Hugh K. O'Donnell, "Northern Flank Maritime Offensive," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1985, p. 46. The Land Prepositioning Program in Norway is scheduled for completion in 1989. A detailed argument in support of maritime operations along NATO's northern flank is provided in this article.

12. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Concepts and Issues, 1985, p. 1-18. Emerging Marine Corps Doctrine addresses the ability of Marine Air-Ground Tasks Forces of various size to join together into a larger "composite" combat formation. Thus, it is possible that two or more units of MAB-size can be integrated into a larger MAF-size unit.

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