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STUDENT REPORT

AN HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION OF
SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION

MAJOR ROBERT K. GEORGE 87-0955

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION

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<p>This study consolidates various, unclassified Soviet military and political writings on strategic deception into a theoretical model. The Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan are then compared and contrasted to the model. The study shows these two specific invasions to be "textbook" examples of Soviet strategic deceptions.</p>					
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PREFACE

This project is a study of the development of Soviet strategic deception, and its application in the 1968 Czechoslovakian, and 1979 Afghanistan invasions. This material is being submitted to the faculty of The University of Alabama in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters of Military History degree.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

RUZYNE AIRPORT, PRAGUE: There was nothing unusual about the unscheduled arrival of the Aeroflot An-24 late in the evening of 20 August, 1968. Such "special" flights often appeared. However, this one did not follow normal procedures by taxiing to the airport terminal. Instead, it remained parked at the edge of the runway. Later, in the very early hours of 21 August, another unannounced Soviet aircraft, this one an An-12, landed and quickly moved up to the airport terminal. An airborne unit of the Soviet Army hurried from it and immediately took control of the airport buildings. Moments later a long string of Soviet military An-12 transports started arriving at Ruzyně, in intervals of one minute. Their approach was controlled by the lone An-24 that had arrived earlier and still remained at the runways edge.¹ The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the climax of a plan that had possibly been put in motion six months earlier, was underway.² Later, after the dust had settled on the new Czechoslovakian Communist regime, a stunned Dubcek would tell his countrymen, "I declare on my honor as a Communist that I had no suspicion, no indication that anyone would want to undertake such measures against us ... that they should have done this to me after I have dedicated

my whole life to the Soviet Union is the tragedy of my life."³

Background

Among the many tools that a nation has available for the execution of its policies, strategic deception has recently received a great deal of consideration -- if not use. Given the correct circumstances, it can be an inexpensive, unimposing, and extremely effective way of realizing national objectives and goals. Unfortunately, targets of a well thought out and executed strategic deception will often deny its existence or effectiveness. This makes the study of strategic deceptions very difficult to say the least.

The "perfect deception" is a classic example. It is out there somewhere, but, like the perfect crime, it manifests itself only in results. It is difficult to prove, and harder to study because quite often the study would attack comfortable beliefs. These beliefs are often the assumptions of long standing policies and constituted positions.⁴ Policy makers might well have established the status quo based upon what could turn out to be a strategic deception. An example of a status quo that was nearly upset by a strategic deception can be found at the root of the Cuban missile crisis.

Top officials of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) voluntarily offered the information that it had no intention of placing its nuclear armed missiles in Cuba.

Its ICBM force, they explained, was so effective that it did not need to even consider such a move. Meanwhile, Soviet freighters were steaming towards Havana, their cargo holds filled with the very missiles the Soviets told the world it had no intention of deploying. Had this Soviet strategic deception been successful, the status quo in this hemisphere, and in the free world, certainly would have been altered.⁵

The concept of a successful program of strategic deception easily qualifies as an unknown quantity when considering the strategic balance. It has been suggested that the Soviet leadership not only employs deception as an instrument of strategic power, but their deceptions, like the leaders themselves, often are employed over extremely long periods of time.⁶ Indeed, recent studies go so far as to suggest that the Soviets possess a "national talent and propensity for deception".⁷

This "talent" for deception is put to work by the Soviets to shield the main goals of their strategy, and to mask the phases of operations it employs to realize those goals. Their operations are based on an excellent understanding of Western beliefs, desires, and social goals -- an understanding that the West deliberately promotes.⁸ The result is a coherent deception program that has adapted itself to the frequent shifts in Western public opinion.⁹

The Purpose of This Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the Soviet's deception program from the inside-out. This paper will attempt to dissect the program starting at its basis: the military and political writings the Soviets have released to the open press on the subject. In depth secondary sources such as CIA and various "think tank" studies will also be used to examine the Soviet deception program. Next, it will synthesize the arguments presented in those writings into a model representing a theoretical Soviet strategic deception. Finally, the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan will be investigated, focusing on the Soviet use of strategic deception preceding the specific invasions. The use of deception in these invasions will then be compared against each other, and the model. The goal of the paper is to determine if the Soviets have provided the West with a comprehensive blueprint of their strategic deception program.

A General Strategic Deception Discussion

The most obvious point of departure for this discussion is to first define exactly what is meant by the term "strategic deception". It shall be defined for the purposes of this study as deception planned and executed to result in foreign national policies and actions which support the

originator's national objectives, policies, and strategic plans.¹⁰

When employing a strategic deception, the goal is generally quite simple -- induce the leadership of the target (be it a nation, group of nations, or a specific group or minority within a nation) to make a decision which is unfavorable to its national objectives. As an example, the purpose statement of a Soviet strategic deception directed at the West might be, "to induce the Western adversaries to contribute unwittingly to the achievement of communist objectives".¹¹ The key is to make the target believe the decision it makes (be it the assumption upon which a foreign policy is developed, the deployment of its defensive resources, etc.) is the correct one. In order for such a deception to be effective, it "must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views."¹² That established, it is now in order to quickly discuss the two types of deceptions that are generally employed by nations.

The deception types referred to have been called the A-type and the M-type.¹³ Both of these types have the same ultimate goal -- induce the target to make the wrong decision. The A-type deception (the "A" standing for ambiguity) is the less polished of the two. The objective of this form of deception is to compound the uncertainties confronting the target's attempt to determine its adversary's intentions. This is accomplished by employing

elements such as contradictory indicators, missing data, fast-moving events, time lags between events, etc., all to restrain accurate intelligence assessments. An A-type deception is successful if enough ambiguity exists to hide the secret of the actual operation.

The second type, the "M" type deception (the "M" standing for misleading) is a much more sophisticated and complicated one. In this form, a deception is developed that actually reduces ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of the wrong alternative. The target then directs resources and energy towards the wrong objective, leaving the deceiver room to prevail in all other areas.¹⁴

Nations are most likely to employ deceptions when one or more of the following conditions are met:

1. A high-stake situation where outcomes are critical and every option must be employed to ensure victory or stave off defeat.
2. A way to lower costs is needed.
3. The deceiver is not fully confident due to his own military weaknesses.
4. The deceiver wishes to keep his policy options open.
5. The nation is one where political leaders take a strong, central role in military policies.
6. The bureaucratic imperative which suggests that organizations trained for a certain task will seek to perform it.
7. A nation's inclination to deception.¹⁵

Given that one or many of the above conditions are met, and the decision to employ a deception is made, the next step would be the development of the deception itself. Here lies the biggest difference between a deception and a mere lie. While minimum effort is required to come up with a simple lie or untruth, the development of a deception, at least at the tactical and strategic level, is an art in itself. Some writers have suggested that developing a strategic deception is like writing a play -- the author is concerned with the script, scenery, props, costumes, extras, sound effects, etc.¹⁶ For a strategic deception the playwrights tools would be substituted with items such as the United Nations, a friendly press, front organizations, "black" or "gray" radio stations (radio stations that either do not acknowledge a sponsor, or acknowledge a false one), and the Western media. The sophisticated use of these instruments are the strengths of a typical strategic deception.

To be successful, the deception must not only be sophisticated, it must of course be accepted by the target. In other words, the target must adapt or act on the deception. This success will often depend upon the method by which the deception is employed. Its parent organization must be organized, coordinated, and able to hold tightly to its secrets. The deception must be plausible and must present a variety of confirming sources for the target. The deception must be adaptable, adjusting to the different ways

that the target might interpret it. It must have a feedback loop to allow for the adaptability process. Any intentional leaks associated with the deception must not be too large; a large leak often makes the deception too obvious. Finally, it must be constructed and employed in such a way that the target is predisposed to accept it.¹⁷

An important point here is that studies by psychologists have suggested a person is most likely to follow his or her predispositions under two circumstances. First, when the target is relaxed and does not feel threatened. Second, if the target is extremely tense, ready to grasp at any known quantity it can. If presented with a moderately tense situation, the target is likely to feel no real time constraints, therefore it would be more likely to logically think out a problem.¹⁸

With all of the above in mind, the next step in this paper is to investigate how the Soviet military establishment has embraced the concept of strategic deception.

CHAPTER 2

SOVIET MILITARY VIEWS ON STRATEGIC DECEPTION

Deception and surprise are no strangers to the Soviet army. Their military writings are filled with stories detailing the fruits of successful deception campaigns. During the Great Patriotic War (known in the West as World War Two) it was the successful use of strategic deception that paved the way for the eventual victory over the German army. The decisive campaign centered around Kursk in the summer of 1943 is an excellent example.

Using intelligence gathered from sources in the highest positions of the German army, Soviet officials learned of the time, place, and size of the upcoming German offensive. This allowed them to develop and deploy forces to counter the offensive. To their great credit, they were able to mask the enormity of their efforts from the Germans, in essence, laying a massive trap for them. When the day of the offensive arrived, the opening artillery barrage was Soviet, beginning a full ten minutes before the scheduled German one. The Germans were caught off guard, and never fully recovered from the shock. Their offensive force was soon trapped in a Soviet meatgrinder and destroyed. This strategic deception was so decisive that for the remainder of the war, the German army never again regained the

strategic initiative on the Eastern front.² It is a small wonder with examples such as Kursk the Soviet army embraces strategic deception in the manner it does.

A Doctrine of Deception

When the Soviets define military doctrine, they are quick to point out that it is a direct reflection of the principles provided by the CPSU:

Contemporary Soviet military doctrine is a system of guiding principles and scientifically grounded views of the CPSU and Soviet Government on the essence, character, and methods of waging a war which might be imposed on the Soviet Union by imperialists: and on military development and preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for defeating the aggressor.³

It is interesting to note the military doctrine of services in the United States armed forces has yet to embrace "deception" as a principle of war.⁴ The principle of "surprise" is cited, but there is no principle other than "security" offered as a method of achieving surprise. The Soviet army not only recognizes "deception" as a valid tactic, they have integrated it into their strategic principles as well. The Soviets have a complete and methodical definition for the art of deception:

Strategic cover and deception is accomplished upon the decision of the Supreme High Command and includes a set of measures for security in preparing strategic operations and campaigns, and also for disorienting the enemy with respect to the true intentions and actions of the armed

forces.... Methods for accomplishing cover and deception include: concealment, feints, simulation, and fabrication of information using communications media, the press, radio broadcasting, television, etc.... It is emphasized that cover and deception measures should be continuous and realistic.⁵

As pointed out earlier, the qualities of deception referred to as realistic and continuous are considered cornerstones in any strategic deception campaign. Indeed, since it is impossible to hide the fact that large forces are deploying, it is common practice to declare the forces are "conducting training exercises or maneuvers". This adds the touch of "realism" to their movement, thereby employing proven deception techniques.⁶ If the exercises go on for extended periods of time, the target will sooner or later become, at least to some degree, desensitized to their presence. The Soviets have evidently embraced this idea, realizing the longer and more realistic a deception campaign is, the more likely the target is to accept it--perhaps as the "status quo". Recognizing this fact, Western analysts have recommended that cases of suspected Soviet deception should never be totally closed. Instead, these cases should be reopened at intervals of five years and once again addressed in depth.⁷ But besides being continuous and realistic, the method of transmitting the deception is also addressed in this definition.

The Soviet authors took the time to dwell upon "fabrication of information" as a method of strategic cover and deception, perhaps signaling that it should be given

special attention. When they explain it involves "spreading false information using communications media, etc.", they are referring to another concept in the Soviet deception maze, disinformation (dezinformatsiya):

Disinformation, a method of cover and deception consisting of the intentional dissemination of false information about one's own troops, groupings, composition, armament, fighting efficiency, combat operation plans, etc., in order to mislead the enemy and thereby create more favorable conditions for achieving success. Information is fabricated at the strategic and operational levels. Communications, radio and television broadcasting, the press, the release of false documents, etc., are used in disinformation.... Greater opportunities at disinformation appeared with the development of mass media and communications equipment...⁸

Officers in the Soviet army are very aware of the powerful effect the mass media can have upon people. Military essays often cite "artistic literature, movies, and the theater" as being "powerful weapons."⁹ In short, disinformation via the mass media is a principle of employment that should be expected from the Soviet army.

Other, more conventional methods of cover and deception cited in the Soviet definition include "concealment" and "simulation". Senior Soviet military commanders often find that the younger commanders in the army have little or no appreciation for the importance of these two methods:

In our opinion, some commanders today minimize the importance of deception only because they do not clearly perceive the capabilities of enemy reconnaissance systems. As a matter of fact, large troop contingents cannot be hidden now. It is possible, however, to mislead the

enemy about the location, size, actions and intent of friendly forces and weapons, but only with well conceived deception.¹⁰

The ability to conduct successful campaigns of "strategic cover and deception" and "disinformation" are considered a necessity if the overall military strategy of the Soviet army, and in that regard the CPSU, is to be realized. These principles are obviously a part of what the Soviet military calls a "strategic mission."

Strategic Mission, a mission, the accomplishment of which leads to important or radical changes in the situation in a theater of military operations and to the achievement of a strategic goal, or creates the conditions for its achievement.¹¹

The sum total of this direction towards cover, deception, and disinformation as they relate toward the strategic mission can only be the desire to achieve surprise. Not only surprise on a local level, but a strategic surprise as well.

A Doctrine of Strategic Surprise

One does not have to search very far, or look too deeply into the writings of Soviet military officers to find articles on the subject of surprise. They consider it one of the most important principles of military art. Their commanders are taught the virtues of acting suddenly, boldly, and decisively, noting that "it is particularly important to constantly teach personnel how to covertly

prepare for combat."¹² It should not come as a shock that their definition of "strategic surprise" reflects an appreciation for the value they place upon this principle:

Strategic surprise may be achieved both at the start of war (by making use of the enemies unpreparedness for war, by anticipating him at the start of active military operations) and in the conduct of strategic operations during the war (the unexpected employment of new means of armed conflict having a strategic capacity and new modes of strategic operations, by the skillfull choice of the sector of the main thrust, by disinformation, etc.).¹³

One method the Soviets use to achieve surprise is through controlled leaks, which is the exact opposite of the way most people believe surprise is achieved. "The pedestrian textbookish answer to the planning of surprise attack is security."¹⁴ Through the controlled use of leaks, the Soviets are attempting to gain an advantage via deception. The question is--are they employing the "A" type or the "M" type?

One must suspect that with such an elaborate deception program in being, the Soviets would be prone to favor "M" type deceptions. After all these are the most sophisticated deceptions, requiring the coordinated use of all available resources. But perhaps in the past they have labored under a few false notions concerning the proper orchestration of an "M" deception. Often their "leaks" were either directed in reponse to a false interpretation of U.S. policies, or completely backfired, producing a completely opposite result

than the one intended. The "bomber deception" is a good example.

During the Aviation Day display in July of 1955, the Soviets deceived Western observers as to the number of strategic intercontinental bombers they had available. They displayed twenty-seven planes, which appeared in three flights. The intent was to show the West that their bomber strength was sufficient to deter an attack upon their country. In fact, there were only ten operational intercontinental bombers in the entire Soviet Union at the time. The twenty-seven planes shown were actually the same nine aircraft which were flown over the reviewing stands three times. The U.S. reaction to this display was to inflate the estimates of the Soviet strategic capabilities, and to start a massive bomber production program of its own. The Soviets then found themselves spending the next few years trying to convince the West that bomber production in Russia had been halted.¹⁵ However, despite examples such as this, the Soviets "continue to be obsessed with the false notion that 'negative' security is the crucial factor in surprise."¹⁶

A Total Package

For all its trouble, the Soviet military has managed to develop something that the United States military has yet to embrace--a doctrine of deception. Like basic military doctrine in any country, it is taught to Soviet officers at

an early stage in their career. They are reminded of its importance as they progress through the ranks, and they are expected to be experts at orchestrating it. In order to support a military deception, the Soviets will employ not only cover and concealment, but will use the power of the mass media as well. Further, their military deceptions go beyond the scope of local, small scale activities. The Soviet military is charged with developing strategies in support of their national objectives, and therefore it orchestrates deceptions that are totally strategic in nature.

Soviet Military Doctrine and the CPSU

Just as in the United States, the military establishment of the Soviet Union is under the control of the government and hence a tool of the civilian leadership. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the military strategies pursued by both of these nations will be a reflection of their national objectives. As Gen N.V. Ogarkov puts it, "Military strategy is closely linked to politics, results from it, and serves it."¹⁷ One must therefore conclude that the surprise invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afganistan in 1979 resulted and served the politics of the CPSU.

Recalling the previously cited remarks Mr Dubcek made concerning the invasion of his country, one can see he was totally shocked by its occurrence. As quoted in the opening

of this study, he stated he had "no suspicion, no indication that anyone would want to undertake such measures against us." This statement implies the military deception that the Soviet army was able to achieve was but a part of the total deception orchestrated by the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that this statement is true. After all, the Soviet army serves the politics of the CPSU. It was the politicians of the Soviet Union that determined Czechoslovakia, and later Afghanistan, would be invaded.

The politicians in the Soviet Union were therefore part of the deception. After all, Dubcek had "no indication" the invasion was coming. Logically then, the next step in examining strategic deception in the Soviet Union should focus on its political direction.

CHAPTER 3

SOVIET POLITICAL ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION

The government of the Soviet Union has focused a large portion of its time and resources on producing an effective strategic deception organization. At the head of this organization lies the Politburo, the apex of Soviet political authority. Serving it are three main actors that develop, plan, and implement the various deception campaigns the CPSU deems necessary.¹ From there the deceptions are filtered throughout the world, using both the assets of the Soviet Union, and the unsuspecting assets of other nations.

This chapter will focus on the Soviets' recognition of the value of strategic deception in the world of politics. It will then briefly look at the historical roots of their deception organization, following its development through its current structure. Next, it will address the methods used by the CPSU to transmit its deceptions and finally, there will be a short summary of the topic presented.

Political Thoughts About Strategic Deception

If one was to go to the library with the idea of studying the political side of Soviet strategic deception, one point would become very clear--they do not use the term "strategic deception." However, that is not to say the

program does not exist, because it does. What others, including the Soviet military, call strategic deception; the Soviet politicians call "active measures" (aktivnyye meropriatia), "disinformation" (dezinformatsia), and "reflexive control." Active measures and disinformation are but the tools used to achieve the desired result, reflexive control.

When the term active measures is used, it refers to the coordinated use of all of the resources the politicians have on hand to conduct a deception. While the casual observer might suspect the use of all the Soviet political resources would soon become a bureaucratic nightmare, the opposite seems to be true. In fact, "one of the most distinctive elements of the concept is the high degree of central coordination under the direct control of the Politburo and the CPSU apparatus."²

Just as with any tool of deception, active measures are tailored to and directed at a specific target. In this regard, they may entail "influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents."³ The employment of these measures may be both overt and covert.

Disinformation can be thought of as a part of active measures, but actually disinformation is what active

measures seek to disseminate. It is usually the basis of the deception campaign. As stated in a KGB training manual:

Strategic disinformation assists in the execution of State tasks, and is directed at misleading the enemy concerning the basic questions of the State policy, the military-economic status, and the scientific-technical achievement of the Soviet Union; the policy of certain imperialist states with respect to each other and to other countries; and the specific counterintelligence tasks of the organs of State Security....Disinforming on strategic matters falls within the jurisdiction of the government, the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the country's armed forces. The organs of State Security constantly render assistance to the other departments on this matter....⁴

If one compares the KGB's definition of disinformation with that of the Soviet military's, parallels can easily be drawn. Where one speaks about "troops, groupings, and combat plans," the other addresses "State policy, the military-economic status, and scientific-technical achievement". Both communities wish to mislead their targets on these points, and where one speaks of using "radio and television broadcasting, the press, etc.," the other would employ "the appropriate ministries and committees, and the high command of the country's armed forces." While the reference to ministries and committees will be discussed in detail later, taken with the reference to the military high command, it shows the level of coordination that is used in the structure of active measures.

Finally, the term "reflexive control" needs to be addressed. As was stated in the general discussion of deception in Chapter One, the goal of a deception is to induce the leadership of the target, be it a nation, group of nations, or a group within the nation, to make a decision which is unfavorable to its national objectives. Soviet writers have essentially the same definition when they write that it is "the process of one of the sides giving reasons to the enemy from which he can logically infer his own decision, predetermined by the first side."⁵ This is what they call "reflexive control," and represents the goal of their active measures and disinformation.

The next step in this discussion will be to look at the structure that comprises the active measures, the ministries and the committees. As one would probably guess, they were not developed overnight. While it is impossible to determine exactly when they were created, they have their roots in Department D of the KGB which was created in 1959.

The Roots of Soviet Political Deception

The Soviet political deception apparatus, while in itself fairly new, has bureaucratic roots extending into the early post-Stalin era. Three main bodies evolved from that period into the three committees that exist today. As is the case with most Soviet committees, each has its own separate goals, and boundaries.

The first body to be addressed is today referred to by the Soviets as the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee. This department is rooted in the Third International, or Comintern which was dissolved by Stalin in 1943. When disbanded, most of the Comintern's functions were reassigned to other bodies. The Central Committee acquired the responsibility for the Foreign Affairs Department, thus continuing the Lenin's mission of using political warfare in foreign policy. In 1957 this department was subdivided into three departments: the Department for Relations with Communist and Workers Parties of Socialist Countries; the Department for Cadres Abroad; and the International Department. It is the ID, whose role is to deal in the relations with non-ruling Communist Parties, that plays a key role in the Soviet deception campaigns.⁶ The ID is used to coordinate and review inputs on foreign policy from the various bodies and "think-tanks" in the Soviet government. It coordinates active measures with its sister departments in other communist countries, as well as those with:

non-ruling Communist Parties, revolutionary movements, major international fronts, and national liberation movements throughout the world. Moreover, the ID has responsibility for operating a number of clandestine radios that broadcast to the non-communist world."⁷

Table 3-1 presents a partial list of the clandestine radios that have been linked directly to the ID. It is these clandestine radios, together with Soviet front

organizations, that provide the actual deception power of the ID.

<u>RADIO</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FIRST/LAST MONITOR</u>
Radio Espana (To Spain)	USSR, later Romania	1941/1975
Oggi (To Italy)	Several East European countries	1950/1971
Deutscher Freiheitssender 904 (To West Germany)	East Germany	1956/1972
Radio Peyke-e (To Iran)	USSR	1957/1976
Our Radio (To Turkey)	Romania, later East Germany	1958/present
Voice of Truth (Greece)	Romania, later East Germany	1958/75
Deutscher Soldatensender (To West Germany)	East Germany	1960/1972

Table 3-1, Clandestine Radio Stations⁸

According to the CIA, the ID is in close contact with over 70 pro-Soviet organizations world-wide.⁹

The next department to be discussed is the International Information Department (IID), whose role is to disseminate overt propaganda. Its roots lay in a pre-1978 body known as the Department of Agitation and Propaganda. At the height of its power, this department controlled most of the Soviet propaganda activities and supervised the Committee on the Press, the Committee on Radio Broadcasting and Television,

and the Committee on Cinematography.¹⁰ When this department was reorganized in 1978, it:

signaled the top leadership's desire to place even greater emphasis on the role of propaganda in Soviet foreign policy and to increase centralized control and coordination over the entire Soviet propaganda network, ensuring that the network is fully responsive to the demands of top policymakers and can be quickly mobilized to disseminate selected propaganda themes on a world-wide basis.¹¹

Today, the IID controls the foreign operations of TASS, Novosti, periodicals and books sent abroad, international radio broadcasting, and embassy information departments.¹²

The final body to be examined is also the oldest. The KGB has served the CPSU since 1917, when it was known as the Cheka. Over the years its designation changed to the GPU, OGPU, GUGB/NKVD, NKGB, MGB, and finally in 1954, the KGB. It is the KGB that bears the covert load of Soviet deception campaigns. Initially, a special department within the KGB, Department D, was created to handle the tasks of covert disinformation.¹³ This department was later upgraded to Service A (aktivnyye meropriatia) of the First Chief Directorate.¹⁴ Through the use of covert agents, and agents of influence, Service A inserts Soviet propaganda and disinformation into the various media in the West.

Political Methods of Transmitting a Deception

It is not hard to imagine the potential of the ID, IID, and Service A of the KGB. With organizations such as these,

all the prerequisites for a successful strategic deception can easily be satisfied. The front organizations of the ID can determine the predisposition of a target to a particular deception, the IID and covert agents in Service A can disseminate it, and other agents of the KGB can provide the feed-back, directing a refocus where required.

The front organizations of the ID are often advertised in their home nations as groups that are associated with non-communist goals. Due in large part to this, they are often more operationally useful to the Soviets than open Communist sympathizers.¹⁵ Often they have names which appeal to the Western sense of peace and freedom, but will always mirror Soviet campaigns on disarmament, peace offensives, and portrayal of Western Imperialism in the Third World. In doing so they "spread Soviet propaganda themes and create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union."¹⁶ The most notable front organizations are the World Peace Council, The International Institute for Peace, the World Federation of Trade Unions, The International Federation of Scientific Workers, the International Organization of Journalists, and the Christian Peace Council.¹⁷ The themes they mirror have their origins in the IID.

The IID will often use "impregnational propaganda" to achieve its goal of deceiving the target. Impregnational propaganda simply "strives to impregnate the audience with good will toward a certain propaganda source, to arouse

their interest and provoke their curiosity."¹⁸ Using this type of tactic, the deception tenets which call for a long-term and plausible story are filled. TASS, Pravda, and The New Times are often used as sources for many media stories throughout the world, thus providing the Soviets with a propaganda input of immense power. Often these stories will fail to cite a source or quote a Western source out of context. At times the stories will appear to one group as outrageous, while seeming completely plausible to others.

A perfect example is a TASS story published in Afghanistan in 1980, and targeted at the Afghan people. The story accused CBS correspondent Dan Rather, while visiting Afghanistan in March of 1980, of participating in the murder of three Afghan villagers. According to TASS:

Precisely at that time, the thugs from the Tor Padsha gang attacked the village of Fateabad, seizing three workers cleaning an irrigation canal. The workers were taken to the village square and here one of the U.S. newsmen [Dan Rather] took charge, ordering the bandits first to stone the captives and then to cut off their heads. The whole bloody sequence was photographed and filmed by the Americans.¹⁹

While the Afghan audience might well accept this story at face value, one can hardly imagine a right-wing audience in the U.S. buying any story that portrays Dan Rather as an anti-communist murderer!

Finally, the KGB is used in covert operations to insert the basics of a strategic deception into the media. Their

main tools are covert, or falsely attributed propaganda, agent of influence operations, forgeries, and, on some occasions, paramilitary assistance.²⁰ If their goal is to manipulate the foreign media, then covert propaganda, agents of influence, and forgeries are perfect weapons. Agents of influence appear to hold a special place in the strategy of Service A. They are defined as:

a person who uses his or her position, influence, power, and credibility to promote the objectives of a foreign power in ways unattributable to that power. Influence operations may be carried out by controlled agents (persons who are recruited, and advance the interests of a foreign power in response to specific orders); "trusted contacts" (persons who consciously collaborate to advance the objectives of a foreign power, but who are not formally recruited and controlled); and unwitting but manipulated individuals.²¹

According to the CIA, the KGB has officers that specialize in developing strong personal friendships with leaders of various Western economic, political and media organizations. This type of relationship is attractive to some Westerners because it allows them to collaborate only on issues of mutual interests, while letting the individual retain his integrity on other matters.²² The KGB has also been directed by top CPSU leadership to develop agents of influence among "prominent writers, scientists, trade unionists, nationalists, and religious leaders."²³ An excellent example of successful development by the KGB of an agent of influence (and evidently an unwitting one) appears on the pages of a 1967 Washington Post, in a story titled

"Secret Police Shift to 'Soft Sell' for Undermining West".

Note at the time, Service A was still known as Department D:

It is all very difficult. In a sense, what the KGB causes to be said is often true. Many of the more sophisticated employees of Section [Department] D are deeply attracted to the West. Some, personally known to me, are almost certainly at odds with the rigidities and the bleak authoritarianism of the system they are paid to uphold.²⁴

With the examination of Service A, the look into the political aspects of strategic deception is complete, requiring only a brief summary into what has been covered.

Political Deception in Summary

The Soviets have obviously developed an excellent machine to respond to political requirements for deception. When one refers back to the general deception discussion found in Chapter One, immediately apparent is the degree to which the Soviets have adhered to deception's theoretical basis. They have a strong, coordinated, and responsive system that tends to compliment itself and thrives on bureaucratic imperative. The actual organization is depicted in figure 3-2.

Soviet Organizational Structure for Active Measures




Figure 3-225

When the CPSU decides a strategic deception is in its best interests, the political and military apparatus begin to move in a coordinated fashion. Together they have produced textbook results, as will be seen in future chapters. What is needed now however, is for the pieces of the deception puzzle to be placed together to form a "model" on which their deception can be laid.

CHAPTER 4

A MODEL OF SOVIET DECEPTION

The goal of this chapter is to construct the "life-cycle" of a theoretical Soviet strategic deception. To accomplish this, a model of a Soviet deception will be constructed. The model will be based on information obtained in the first three chapters of this study. The first step of this portion of the study will be to establish why and when the CPSU might feel a strategic deception is warranted. Next, the actual mechanics of this notional deception will be addressed, concentrating on how the Soviet bureaucracy would respond to the requirement. Finally, there will be a summary which will present the theoretical model.

A Need For Strategic Deception

The Soviet Union enjoys a position as one of the two leading superpowers in the world today. Like any other nation, it has national objectives which it deems vital to its existence.¹ However, unlike most other nations, the Soviet Union has the power to accomplish almost any task it sees fit to undertake. Her political power is broad, reaching into every hemisphere and continent. Her military power is equally as broad, with naval and landing rights in

many strategic areas.² Why then would such a powerful nation require strategic deception to be added in its repertoire as an instrument of policy? As cited in Chapter One, the foremost condition where a strategic deception might be found is in:

a high-stake situation where outcomes are critical and every option must be employed to ensure victory or stave off defeat.³

Examples of specific high-stake situations will be provided in Chapter 5. It can be assumed, however, that a typical situation requiring the use of a strategic deception would be one where the leadership of the Soviet Union feels its vital interests are threatened. Next, one must remember that an exact target must be decided on, and a specific deception scenario for it developed.

The Target and Scenario

As pointed out in Chapter One, the purpose of a deception is to compel the target to make a decision which is not in its own interests. On the strategic level, the target will probably be either the leader, or within the upper leadership level of a nation. This type of target will receive information from a variety of sources in order to make what it feels to be the correct decision. Inputs are generally received from contacts in international politics, domestic politics, the target's intelligence assets, and the domestic and foreign media. It is these

types of input sources that the CPSU would use to insert its deception. Its tools would be the IID, ID, KGB, and the Soviet Military.

The deception itself is, as mentioned in Chapter One, developed much like a play. The IID, ID, KGB, and military would fill the roles of advertising director, background casting, critics, and stunt men. The deception would work into all the above mentioned sources, those the target would use to make his decision. By flooding the target with bogus information on all quadrants, eventually his perception of reality will likely alter in favor of the CPSU.

Information the target receives from international politics will be biased by numerous deception inputs. The IID can use Soviet embassies, in both the target nation and nations world-wide, as an official forum for its deception. This conveys to the target at least a certain degree of authenticity to the story. In addition, the IID can insert the story into news articles in various Soviet publications. One should expect TASS, Pravda, and New Times to mirror the story. These publications will also provide the sources for other publications to develop their own newslines. One should remember that TASS and Pravda are often quoted not only in Western newspapers and broadcasts, but in newspapers and broadcasts of nations throughout the world. International politics can also reflect the proper use of international communist front organizations. Quite often a vocal group, sponsored by the CPSU, will appear in a foreign

nation. Using this forum, the ID can lend the deception even more credibility by showing it to be taken as fact by these groups. Finally, the KGB through covert propaganda, disinformation, and agents of influence can make the deception appear to run deep into the fabric of international politics.

Domestic politics will, of course, respond to international inputs. National front organizations, controlled by the ID, can serve as excellent vehicles to convey the story. The ID can also use clandestine radio stations to broadcast the story directly to the people. As in the international arena, the KGB can employ disinformation, covert propaganda, and agents of influence to convey the story, and help manipulate the situation.

The media of the target nation, plus nations world-wide, play a tremendous role. Here the IID, ID, and KGB can all concentrate their efforts to control or manipulate the story into the media. Not only will the media effect directly what the target perceives, but it will effect the perceptions of those in the international and domestic arena as well.

The target's intelligence organization would probably be influenced by all of the above. Even if it were able to weed out the deception storyline from the truth, some confusion by the target might result. Its intelligence agency would tell him one thing, and all its other receptors

something else. The worst case for the CPSU would then become the "A" type (ambiguity) deception.

In summary, the CPSU has the capability to bias practically all the receptors the target would use to make its decision. Recalling the earlier description of the IID, ID, and KGB, one must remember of special note was the way all these agencies coordinated their actions. It is reasonable to expect at least some continuity in the storyline from historical sources can be found all around the world.

The Military Deception

If the CPSU has decided to employ its military capability in the course of the deception, it too should follow a predictable pattern. After all, it would be hard to mask the large scale movement of men and equipment needed to support a strategic type mission. The Soviet military realizes this, and as described in Chapter Two, will produce its own strategic cover and deception to mask its true strategic mission.

Recalling the military doctrine of deception, it is reasonable to expect the Soviets to desensitize the target to the military actions. This can be done in some cases by concealment. If, however, massive strength will be brought into eventual play, some other form must be used to explain their prepositioning. This can be accomplished with the

coordinated use of disinformation, simulation, and exercises.

The idea is to exercise along the eventual lines the military would actually employ, using disinformation to explain their actions. Since one might reasonably expect the target to be weary of such actions, (even though they were explained by the disinformation campaign) these exercises would probably continue for an extended period of time.⁴ The effect of this would be to condition the target to the actions of the military, in the long run causing him less concern.

It follows that IID, ID, and KGB would use all of its sources, in a coordinated fashion, to help explain the military preparations. Once the military is actually used, their first target, according to previously cited information, should be the various communication facilities in the target country. The IID with its own international broadcasting capability, the ID with its clandestine broadcasting capability, and the KGB with its agent of influence capability, can all serve to fill in the void created by the loss of the targets own broadcasting capability.

In summary, the Soviets' have built a model for the West to use to predict and follow a CPSU strategic deception.

The Model

Figure 4-1 represents a graphic portrayal of the theoretical Soviet strategic deception model. This section will provide a brief description of what it displays.

At the top is the CPSU Politburo, which will make the decision to employ a deception. This feeds directly to the CPSU Secretariat, who will inform, direct, and coordinate the bureaucracy as it develops and employs the deception. The Secretariat directs the IID, ID, KGB, and military in the deception. From them flow a large number of lines which represent the deception in the form of storylines carried by politicians, periodicals, broadcasts, front organizations, agents of influence, etc. As these lines progress through various filters, the domestic and international media, front organizations, domestic and international reaction etc., some lines are dropped. This is a result of the KGB feedback loop, present at every level, which provides the Secretariat with information from which he can orchestrate and focus the deception. Storylines that prove unsuccessful are dropped, and those that prove acceptable are enhanced.

As a result, by the time the deception filters down to the target, it is confronted with a coordinated, and coherent story which is present in all his receptors. The CPSU has stacked the cards in their favor. All that remains is for the target to make his decision.




Figure 4-1

In Summary

If the deception goes as planned, the target will make a choice which is not in his best interests. For example, he might choose not to place his military forces on alert, or not to challenge the Soviet actions publicly, an action which might rally popular support. In doing so, he will lower the costs the CPSU will incur when they eventually spring their deception trap shut.

All that remains now is to examine two classic cases where the CPSU successfully employed strategic deception as a part of their foreign policy.

CHAPTER 5

THE 1968 SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The aim of this section is threefold. First it will provide a brief overview of the events as they existed in Czechoslovakia prior to the Soviet invasion. Next, it will identify two policies the Soviets employed to achieve their goals with Czechoslovakia, the formal policy and the back-up invasion. Finally, it will examine the indicators Alexander Dubcek had available to indicate a Soviet invasion was imminent.

Background

The first half of 1968 was a time that has been called the "Czechoslovakian Spring." A new regime had come to power in Czechoslovakia, replacing the old, conservative watch of Antonin Novotny. Novotny had been the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party since September 1953. Under his leadership the government had developed into a:

rigid, centralized bureaucratic system controlled by a small group of Communist Party politicians; its foreign policy slavishly followed Moscow's instructions; its secret police all powerful; its economy stagnant, and the majority of people apathetic toward public affairs.

Novotny kept Stalinism intact in his country, long after the Soviet Union had modified it in their own government. His policies were characterized by half measures and ambiguity, leading eventually to general dissatisfaction and disillusionment in him.² Finally, in 1965, the Central Committee approved some general economic reforms, which produced strong criticism from party conservatives. Usually timid, this time the party liberals stood their ground, demanding the changes. In a speech given to the 13th Party Congress in June 1966, Dr Ota Sik, the author of the reforms, stated:

Conditions must be created in which, if somebody comes up with an idea...that differs from the views of the top official, his initiative will not be doomed from the outset. It is not enough to say that such initiatives are allowed and that nobody can be victimized. So far, people's experience has been different, and it is experience that counts, not words.³

The introduction of mass media to Czechoslovakia seemed to have a fair share in the eventual demise of Novotny. It was television that allowed people to actually see their leadership in action for the first time. Unfortunately, the leaders were unaware of the image they created of themselves as they stood erect in front of the cameras, reading turgid lectures at great length. It was this same media which allowed a few unknown, but dynamic and sincere men to step into the picture for the first time.⁴ These new faces, many of them liberal, grew in power. By the fall of 1967 they attempted to replace Novotny with elections.

Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party since 1963, appeared to be a choice acceptable to both conservatives and liberals. The conservatives considered him "somewhat timid", a man of compromise that could probably be manipulated.⁵ So it was, on 5 January 1968, Dubcek assumed the position of First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

Novotny held on to the position of President until 22 March 1968, when he was replaced by Ludvik Svoboda. Svoboda, whose name means "freedom" in the Czech language, was a hero of the Second World War--a man much admired in his country. In addition, he had been elected to his position by a secret ballot, the first time such an event had occurred in the National Assembly.⁶

Under their leadership bold moves were made. In a speech given to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, attended by Leonid Brezhnev, Dubcek declared that "everything must be really and thoroughly changed."⁷ The gauntlet had been thrown down!

Mr Dubcek saw the most important task in front of him was revival of the economy, something that seemed to him only possible as part of a larger, more general program of democratization. It was this process of democratization in which lay:

an extraordinary balance between spontaneity and control, which in the context in which the government had to operate, must rank as one of the great

political achievements of modern history....With the moving and unassuming eloquence which came to characterize his style of government, Mr Dubcek described it as 'Socialism with a human face.'⁸

His pluralistic "Socialism with a human face" was built into the "Action Program" and accepted in April 1968. Concentrating on domestic politics, it allowed greater intraparty democracy; granted more autonomy to state bureaucracies, the other political parties, and the Parliament; restored civil rights (e.g., freedom of assembly and association) and a more vigorous continuation of political rehabilitation; restored the national rights of ethnic minorities; and directed economic reform. Dubcek also permitted the establishment of several new political clubs, and eventually abolished censorship. "In foreign affairs, the Dubcek leadership pledged in the Action Program to pursue more independent policies -- but only policies that followed the interests of the Warsaw Pact in general and those of the USSR in particular."⁹

While these events were taking shape, the conservatives in the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria were beginning to express doubts towards the Dubcek regime. On March 26, a conference of five Warsaw Pact states was called to deliberate the Czech problem. The two fiercest guardians of dogmatism and orthodoxy, Walter Ulbricht and Wladyslaw Gomulka, led the attacks on the Czechs, warning of the dangers of freedom of the press and revisionism.¹⁰

So far as Ulbricht and Gomulka were concerned, the Czechoslovak virus had begun to spread beyond the frontier of the Republic. Not long before, large student demonstrations had been held in Poland and meetings of writers had protested Polish censorship. The students' slogan, 'All Poland awaits its Dubcek,' must still have rung in Gomulka's ears, in spite of the fact that the protest had been bloodily suppressed by police and mobilized detachments of the Party.¹¹

For her part, the Soviet Union, while at first not openly critical of the Czech plans for economic and political reforms, also became increasingly alarmed. Eventually they condemned the ideas of pluralism and the so-called anti-socialist forces, represented by political clubs and non-communist parties, and especially by the mass media.¹²

Other major reforms were anathema to the Soviet leadership: a real democratization of the party, revising the dogma of democratic centralism; market socialism with enterprise autonomy and workers participation; freedom of the press and of expression in general; full rehabilitation, condemnation of the guilty, and genuine legality; and autonomy of action in foreign relations. Finally, there [were] the...plans for legal reform and safeguards for human rights.¹³

The Soviets also feared the "virus" would spread into the USSR. Certain segments of their population, the nationalities and the intelligentsia, were at once attracted to these reforms. Of particular concern to the Soviets was the reaction of the Ukrainian nationals, youth, students, and Catholics. After all, prior to World War II many border

regions, including Transcarpathia, had once been part of Czechoslovakia.¹⁴

Finally, the Soviets feared an attempt by the West to neutralize the buffering effect Czechoslovakia provided the USSR from NATO. Since Czarist times the Russians had sought to create a natural barrier for their nation against invasion from the West. The Yalta Conference had provided them the legal means, and they were not about to give it up.¹⁵ As Soviet leader Breznev commented to the Czech Politburo following the invasion:

We in the Kremlin came to the conclusion that we could not depend on you any longer. You do what you feel like in domestic politics, even things that displease us, and you are not open to positive suggestions. But your country lies on territory where the Soviet soldier trod in the Second World War. We bought that territory at the cost of enormous sacrifices, and we shall never leave it. The borders of that area are our borders as well. Because you do not listen to us, we feel threatened.¹⁶

The Soviets heard the pleas to do something from their allies in the Warsaw Pact. They also felt the need to act themselves. They obviously considered this a high-stake situation where the outcomes were critical, requiring every option be employed to ensure victory and stave off defeat.

The Soviet Options

It is evident the Soviets took two approaches to the Czech problem. The first, and foremost of these was their diplomatic efforts to turn the Czech reforms around. These

efforts included all the political actions one might expect any nation to conduct. Shadowing these diplomatic efforts however, were the preparations for a Soviet armed intervention.

The exact date a military option was first given serious consideration may never be known. Some writers put the date in March, at the time of general Svoboda's election as President. However most historians put the date somewhere in May. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense, as well as the Foreign Ministries of Britain and West Germany all concluded independently that invasion preparations began in May. Additionally, during May a leaked East German memo claimed the Czechs to be guilty of treason and that it was the duty of the Warsaw Pact nations to intervene in her affairs.¹⁷

Given that preparations to invade Czechoslovakia began in May, the next step is to examine the actual actions that surrounded the invasion.

The Deception

In May, anonymous pamphlets and letters began to proliferate. They appeared on the doors of buildings, telephone booths and poles, and each had the same salutation, and each had no signature:

Dear friends and comrades!

We workers, Communists, exhort you to fulfill your civic responsibilities to the socialist state! We are warning you against the revisionist

group which has penetrated the Party and state apparatus and which, with the help of the press, radio, television, films, and literature, is demoralizing the people. This group stands intellectually against the workers and seeks to put an end to the leading role of the working class, to liquidate the Party as a whole, and thus deliver a death blow to the socialist achievements of the Czechs and Slovaks.

Put an end to unrestrained discussion, stamp out the screechers and careerists!¹⁸

One of the main storylines in the Soviet deception campaign involved accusations that the U.S. and West Germans were planning on an active intervention themselves in Czechoslovakia. This story seemed plausible in light of the policy of Ostpolitik that West Germany was preoccupied with at the time. The "German threat" became a "major and increasingly important theme for the public expression of concern over the reform movement in Prague."¹⁹ As far as the Soviets and Warsaw Pact nations (other than Czechoslovakia) were concerned, this alone was cause to increase local security. The "proof" of dangerous U.S. and West German intentions developed as the acceptance of the storyline increased.

Some attempts to manufacture proof were total failures. For example, the East German paper Berliner Zeitung ran a story on 9 May which reported American and West German units, supported by armored vehicles, were operating on Czech territory. As it turned out, the "units" were part of a film crew which was making a film about the battle of Remagen from World War Two!²¹ Still, it was announced in

Prague on 24 May that "Warsaw Pact command staff exercises would be held in Czechoslovakia in June."²⁰

More "proof" of the West's true intentions appeared on 12 July, two days before a scheduled meeting of Warsaw Pact leader (a meeting called to discuss the problems in Czechoslovakia). Acting on an anonymous tip, members of the Sokolovsko district security department found a hidden cache of weapons in an isolated area. According to Ladislav Dittman, a member of the Czech secret police who defected to the West as a result of the 1968 invasion, the Soviet KGB had hidden the weapons and then provided the Sokolovsko department with the tip as part of the deception campaign:

Security employees indeed found a store of weapons at the designated place, including twenty Thompson submachine guns, caliber 11.43mm; thirty-five full chambers, each with twenty-one cartridges; 756 machine gun cartridges in metal boxes; and thirty Walter pistols, caliber 7.65mm. This small arsenal was packed in five knapsacks with the English inscription "NORD-WEST-ORAIL-PACK" stamped in white with an illegible text and the year of production 1968...²²

So intense did the anti-West German rhetoric become, that eventually West German army maneuvers, code named "Black Lion" and scheduled to take place in September on her eastern frontiers, was shifted away from the Czech border.²³

On May 14 a Soviet military delegation visited Prague on a fact-finding tour. Leading this visit were Marshals Konev and Moskalenko. These men denounced West German revanchism, promising that the USSR would always defend her allies.

Marshal Moskalenko was also quoted by Prague radio and television as stating that the USSR would "not interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia."²⁴ Soon after this, Soviet tanks would enter Czechoslovakia, beginning what would be prolonged exercises.

Soviet troops first rolled on to Czech soil on 4 June, being sighted near Hranice, Moravia. On 5 June a ninety-vehicle Soviet convoy crossed from Moravia into Bohemia, bound for a station twenty miles north of Prague. Yet on 7 June, General Cepicky told the Bratislava Pravda that there were no Soviet tanks then on Czech soil!²⁵

Soviet troops would not leave Czechoslovakia again. The numbers kept on increasing, as did the deception. For example, following the Bratislava conference on 3 August, the Soviets pledged to remove all Warsaw Pact forces from Czech territory--an event which has yet to occur!²⁶ The Soviets marshalled their military assets in a continuing series of exercises code named "Sky Shield", an air defense exercise, and "Nemen", a logistics exercise. Of note, during "Nemen", which began on 23 July, the locus of command was shifted from the Warsaw Pact High Command to the Soviet Ministry of Defense.²⁷ While the Soviet military prepared their own troops for the invasion, they set about to insure the Czech army was in no way able to resist the coming storm.

During the Warsaw Pact Exercises, the Soviet General Staff lowered the Czech fuel and ammunition supplies, citing

that they were needed by East German troops engaged in the exercises. Further, on 19 August, just prior to the invasion, the Warsaw Pact Command had the Czech military commanders agree to conduct their own exercises in the western part of Czechoslovakia. This move insured the invading forces would meet with little opposition.²⁸ In an article titled "Czechs Foil Escape of East Germans to the West", a Times correspondent claimed Czech attention had already been focused there by the Soviets as a result of the previous West German intrigues.²⁹

Finally, as the last preparations for the invasion were being made, the Soviets, using assets from "Sky Shield", attempted to jam NATO's long-range radar sites covering East Europe. These last minute moves which spanned 17-20 August, involved:

heavy concentrations of flights over Poland, large-scale refuelings in Leningrad of Military transports (which were lifting the Soviet airborne division into Prague on the night of August 20), and the alert of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.³⁰

Perhaps it was massive Soviet air activity which caused the problems experienced by English tourists as the Times reported in a 20 August article titled "Russian promise jet for stranded tourists". (note that the invasion would be reported on the 21st):

A chartered aircraft of the Russian state airline, Aeroflot, which should have collected them [the tourists] at Gatwick on Saturday, did not arrive.

In London, Aeroflot said there had been 'some misunderstanding' between the airline and the tourist agency organizing the holiday.³¹

The length and scope of the prolonged Warsaw Pact and Soviet Military exercises in and around Czechoslovakia served two purposes. First, it allowed the Soviets to prepare for the invasion under the guise of maneuvers. Second, and just as important, it had a desensitizing effect on the Czech leadership. It was this desensitization that led the Czechs to approve the sending of their own forces to the far western frontier of their country--at a time when they were needed most in Prague!

Dubcek's own intelligence organization apparently had no warning of the impending invasion.³² There are indications that even if they had warned Dubcek, he would have disregarded them in light of the false arms cache they had previously produced.³³

On the domestic and international political scene, Dubcek was receiving a number of conflicting inputs. On one hand there was his own party, which by July was running towards reform at full speed. As more reforms took place, more reforms were demanded. Intellectuals encouraged the people not to:

think as a Czech or a Slovak, but consider yourself a European. The world will sooner adapt to Europe (where Eastern Europe belongs) than to fourteen million Czechs and Slovaks. You live neither in America nor in the Soviet Union; you live in Europe.³⁴

Dubcek tried to slow his party's reform down in the face of increasing political pressure from Moscow. A Washington Post article, titled "Soviets Hit Czechs on Party Role", described Moscow's anger with the Czechs over two incidents. The first, described by Pravda as a "noisy, rock-throwing melee", was a demonstration which took place in front of the Communist Party Central Committee building on 8 August. The second item was a letter reportedly written to the Soviet Union by ninety (out of three thousand) Czech auto workers, which pleaded with the CPSU to send troops to Czechoslovakia to stop the reforms.³⁵ This group of "black sheep" was immediately expelled from the Czech Communist Party by the other members of their cells.³⁶

The auto workers seemed to be one of the many communist organizations that openly sided with the CPSU on the issue of reforms. One of the others was the French Communist Party whose leader, Waldeck Rochet, traveled to Moscow for talks, and then to Prague. While in Prague he held talks with Dubcek where he discussed his fear of "a rupture of the Czechoslovak and Soviet parties..."³⁷ Eventually, thirty-five parties, including the North American Communist Party, would go on record as in favor of invasion. Eighteen, including China, would oppose it.³⁸

As the invasion drew closer, one of Dubcek's most outspoken opponents suddenly shifted his attitude towards him. A 14 August New York Times article titled "Ulbricht Bows to Czechs" noted that "Ulbricht has abruptly switched

to a policy of cautious reconciliation towards Czechoslovakia..."³⁹ Less than seven days later, Ulbricht's troops would be among those occupying Czech soil.

The Soviet media never made this switch in policy. In fact, they offered an almost constant barrage of attacks on the Czechs during this period. In May, Moscow radio increased the number of its Czech language radio broadcasts, and the number of attacks from the press increased.⁴⁰ These attacks, as previously mentioned, centered on the obvious intentions of West Germany and the U.S. to take advantage of the revisionist elements in Czechoslovakia and start a counter-revolution. This media rhetoric would lay the foundations for the rationale which later justified the actual invasion.

The Invasion

On 16 August, members of the CPSU Politburo were hurriedly called back from their vacations to attend a secret meeting. Many historians point to this meeting as the forum where the final decision to invade was made. On 18 August, members of the CPSU met with the leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations, who approved of the decision. At the same time, Marshals Grechko and Yakubovsky met with their counterparts in the Polish and East German armies.⁴¹

Pravda, reporting on the Marshals' movements, explained that the meeting with the East German commander allowed them to "exchange opinions concerning questions of interest to the

armies," while the Polish meeting provided a forum to discuss "interaction during training exercises."⁴²

It appears the invasion was planned to be coordinated with a coup in the Czech government. A Czech Presidium meeting began at 2:00 pm on 20 August to discuss two items. The first was the agenda for the upcoming 14th Extraordinary Congress of the Party, the second to discuss a document titled "Report on the Political Situation in Czechoslovakia and on the Conditions under which the Communist Party Pursues Its Work." Comrades Kolder and Indra, two conservatives, immediately demanded the agenda be changed to discuss the "Report" as the first order of business. In addition, they carried with them a fifteen page position paper which they demanded to read. An intense debate ensued, and Kolder and Indra were ruled out of order. Moments later a telephone call informed the members that troops of the Warsaw Pact had begun to cross over the Czech border. The position paper might well have been the device with which the conservatives intended to base their coup.⁴³

When the Soviet tanks rolled into Czechoslovakia, TASS reported that:

statesmen and Party representatives of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic appealed to the Soviet Union and other allied states with the request for immediate assistance, including armed forces, to the fraternal Czechoslovak people.⁴⁴

Perhaps TASS was expecting this request to actually come following a planned coup--one which failed to materialize.

When the announcement of the invasion came, members of the Czech Presidium noted Kolder, Indra, and Bilak did not seem surprised.⁴⁵ The statement which the leaders of the Czech Communist Party actually made included this paragraph:

The Czechoslovak Communist Party central committee Praesidium regard this act as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between socialist states, but also as contrary to the principles of international law.⁴⁶

Two of the first targets of the Soviet tanks were the Central Committee building, where they arrested the Czech leadership and whisked them away, appearing three days later in Moscow, and Radio-Prague. The radio station continued to broadcast, even with the sound of machine gun fire in the background. In fact, it was two weeks before the voice of the opposition could be stopped on the radio. Today it is clear the Soviets did not expect Dubcek to still be in power when their tanks reached the Presidium, nor the opposition to their presence to be so intense.⁴⁷

Eleven years later the CPSU would again find itself faced with another high-stake situation where the outcomes were critical, and every option had to be employed to ensure victory--this time in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 6

THE 1979 SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

This Chapter will follow the same general outline found in Chapter 5. First, it will provide a brief overview of the events as they existed in Afghanistan prior to the Soviet invasion. Next, it will identify two policies the Soviets employed to achieve its goals with Afghanistan, the formal policy and the back-up invasion. Finally, it will examine the indicators Hafizullah Amin had available to him suggesting a Soviet invasion was imminent.

Background

On 17 July, 1973, following an almost bloodless coup, Mohammed Daoud took over power in Afghanistan. Using the support of young, reform-oriented officers, he rallied practically the entire Afghan military behind him. His first political move was to abolish the monarchy of the increasingly pro-West Zahir Shah, and proclaim a republic.¹

Daoud was no stranger to the Afghan political world, having previously served as Afghanistan's Prime Minister. During this period, although exceedingly nationalistic, he became known to the world as the "Red Prince".² To Daoud, the most pressing problem on Afghanistan's agenda was the

question of Pushtunistan. This area, its tribal connections with Afghanistan in the form of 3-4 million Pushtuns, was incorporated as part of Pakistan by the British prior to their regional withdrawal. It was the Soviet Union which offered Daoud both political and military support in his quest to absorb Pushtunistan into the borders of Afghanistan:

Soviet economic aid began--the first post-Stalin program--and a year later Daoud convened a loya jirgah (an assembly of tribal elders) to consider a security relationship with the Soviets. Overcoming a deep, religious-inspired hatred of communism, the elders agreed. Over the ensuing 25 years--up to the historic watershed of December 1979--the Soviet-Afghan connection was to yield \$2.5 billion in economic and military aid, the education of 6,000 Afghan students in Soviet universities, and Soviet indoctrination of 4,000 Afghan soldiers.³

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was one of the fruits of the Soviet effort in education. Formed on 1 January 1965, it became the communist party of Afghanistan. Three of its founding members, Nur Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, and Babrak Karmal, would all become presidents of Afghanistan in the turmoil which followed Daoud's eventual demise.⁴ However, when the "Red Prince" seized power in 1973, the Soviets seemed more than satisfied with the non-PDPA ruler.

On 19 July, 1973, just two days after Daoud's coup, the Soviet Union became the first nation to formally recognize the Republic of Afghanistan. It did not take long, however,

for the Soviets to realize that the "Red Prince" might not be the man they hoped he would be. Much to their dismay, he remained intensely nationalistic, establishing his own National Revolutionary Party in 1975. Legally, Afghanistan was a one-party republic--which did not embrace the PDPA!⁵

As Daoud's time in office increased, his nationalistic policies matured. The U.S., a firm supporter of Pakistan, came to realize a stable relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan was in its own interest. Accordingly, not only did the U.S. move to increase support of the Daoud regime, but the Shah of Iran also developed an increased interest, offering Daoud \$2 billion in economic aid over a ten year period. Non-aligned nations, such as Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, took political steps to win Afghanistan over to a truly non-aligned status. Early in 1978, Daoud signed an agreement with the People's Republic of China for increased trade and economic support for Afghanistan industry.

Finally:

Just before his overthrow, President Daoud made a visit to Saudi Arabia, where, among other things, he signed a joint communique saying that the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia should be solved 'on the basis of the right of self-determination of the people of Ogaden.' As the people of Ogaden are Somalis, this could only be interpreted as a slap at Ethiopia, an ally of the Soviet Union.⁶

On 17 April, 1978, a prominent leader in the PDPA was assassinated in Kabul. Two days later Daoud faced his first public demonstration against him. A crowd of 15,000 Afghans

marched on the American embassy, shouting anti-American slogans. Daoud, surprised by the popular support the PDPA had acquired, moved to crush the left-wing party. Taraki, the leader of the PDPA, Amin, and Karmal, were all eventually thrown into prison. Amin, before capture, was able to issue instructions to key military units to initiate a coup. On 27 April the coup began.⁷

Heavy fighting between loyal and rebel military units lasted throughout the day. By 5:30 pm rebel elements stormed the prison holding the PDPA leadership, releasing the captives:

There was tension beneath the euphoria. While Amin, handcuffs still locked around one wrist, was congratulating Taraki, Babrak Karmal asked where they were going, and if victory was certain. Amin told him that if he did not want to come with them he could stay in jail.⁸

By the end of the day, Daoud and many members of his family had been killed in the fighting. Colonel Aboui Qader, the leader of the Revolutionary Air Force announced on Radio Afghanistan that power had passed to the hands of the masses, and that for the time being he would exercise power. Three days later he handed formal control of Afghanistan over to a Revolutionary Council, led by Taraki.⁹

As was the case following Daoud's own coup, the Soviet Union was the first nation to recognize the new Afghan regime, publicly doing so on 30 April, 1978. Recognition soon arrived from Bulgaria, Outer Mongolia, Czechoslovakia,

Cuba, and Vietnam. Although Taraki was quick to publically announce that Afghanistan would remain a non-aligned nation, actual events seemed to indicate otherwise. The number of Soviet advisors rose from 200 to several thousand in the space of two months. Moscow promised over \$1 billion in economic aid would be provided over the next five years, at the same time all Iranian and Arab-sponsored projects were halted. By November, at least thirty Soviet-Afghan treaty agreements had been signed.¹⁰

The government which Taraki put together was an attempt to band the Afghan PDPA, split into two rival factions, into one solid mass. To accomplish this, Taraki named Amin and Karmal, by this time bitter foes, jointly to the post of deputy Prime Minister. Karmal's faction, the Parcham, had little overall power, and by 5 July Amin was able to engineer an in-house coup which removed the Parcham from all power. Karmal was offered, and accepted, the post as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Later, Karmal would be relieved of this position and recalled home. Fearing for his life, he went into hiding, probably in the Soviet Union. Taraki's own Khalq faction, with Amin as its champion, was now free to initiate the Afghan countryside to an overnight lesson in Marxism-Leninism.¹¹

It was this misguided attempt to bring Afghanistan into the Marxist fold overnight which spelled doom for the Taraki regime. The regime issued a series of eight "Decrees" which often ran head-on into Islamic law. Among these Decrees,

number four declared total racial and ethnic equality, six eliminated all debts (in doing so cut farmers off from local funding), seven introduced equal rights for women and regularized dowry practices, and eight declared a policy of land reform. It was Decree eight which bit hard into Afghanistan's tribal-feudal power structure, causing wide spread resistance from landowners and peasants alike.¹² Finally, as if to symbolize:

the direction of events, and of its own radical insensitivity, the Taraki government changed the Afghan national flag--black, red, and Islamic green--to a new all-red design similar to the flags of the Soviet Central Asian republics.¹³

The people soon turned to the mullahs, foes of both the left and of modernization, to provide a network of opposition.¹⁴ Guerrilla bands soon appeared in the countryside, offering armed opposition to troops of the Afghan regime. In the spring of 1979, Afghan guerrilla made their first serious challenge to the PDPA changes, the uprising in Herat. Declaring a Jihad against the Kabul government, Sigbhatullah Mujaddidi directed the attack on Herat which ended in the deaths of forty Soviet advisors.¹⁵

It should be noted that Herat has close historical and cultural ties with Iran, its inhabitants ethnically Farsewan. These people viewed the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in February, and in fact felt some of the same urges which drove the Iranians into rebellion. The Kabul Times

was quick to point the finger at Iran following the Herat uprising, suggesting that the participants were Iranian soldiers in disguise.¹⁶

Concern in the Kremlin over the state of affairs in Afghanistan quickly grew. Privately, Soviet officials expressed concerns that the Afghan reforms were occurring too fast. By the time of the Herat uprising, all twenty-nine Afghan provinces and almost all its ethnic groups were involved in guerrilla warfare. The Afghan army was unreliable, often refusing to fight, and as a result the Soviets found themselves picking up the slack. More Soviet advisors arrived and the families of advisors already in the country were sent home.¹⁷

The Soviets desire to crush the rebels was perhaps motivated by more than a desire to aid the PDPA. As noted by some analysts, the Soviets had a genuine concern the revolutionary fervor in Iran would spill into the southern Soviet Union, via Afghanistan.¹⁸ After all, the Afghan-Soviet border cuts the domain of the Tajiks, Afghanistan's second largest tribe, the Uzbeks, and the Turkmen. The domain of the Turkmen also extends directly into Iran.¹⁹ It is easy to see the concern which the Kremlin might feel given the situation in Iran in 1979.

The Soviets felt that Taraki was still the best man for their interests. As they saw it, the Afghan problems lay in Amin. Amin had slowly increased his power, and the Soviets felt it was his policies, not Taraki's, which were causing

the guerrilla problems. Accordingly, they took steps to remove Amin from office.²⁰ In August, 1979, the "night letter" written by "Khalqis who favor unity" appeared on the doors of Kabul residents. Attacking Amin it listed his crimes, including:

...assigning his brother as chief security officer of the northern provinces, once again Amin showing that he and only he is in charge of everything and brooks no competition. He assigned all of his relatives, tribe and close friends to important positions. His nephew and son-in-law is deputy foreign minister. Another of his close relatives is in charge of the traffic department and is busy robbing people's pockets....

Amin's behavior and tyranny are an embarrassment to the democratic Khalq Party of Afghanistan. This has caused the oppositionist elements to unite to threaten the security and safety of the country.

Although we informed the General Secretary of the Party [Taraki] of Amin's acts and behavior many times, he told us with much regret that Amin is in charge of everything and he (the General Secretary) cannot do anything....

Therefore it is evident that all Khalqis should join hands against Amin and disarm him of his power.²¹

During this time, the U.S. embassy in Kabul reported an anti-Amin plot was developing in the cabinet. Taraki, returning on 11 September from a conference of non-aligned nations in Havana, was asked to stop in Moscow to meet with Brezhnev and Gromyko. At this meeting, the Soviets convinced Taraki to oust Amin and broaden his own political base.²²

In an article titled "Friendly Meeting", Pravda noted:

The Soviet side expressed solidarity with the Afghan people, who have embarked on the path of building a new society and are waging a resolute struggle against the intrigues of imperialist and reactionary forces. L. I. Brezhnev assured N. M. Taraki that the friendly Afghan people can continue to count on the Soviet Union's all-round, disinterested aid in this just struggle.²³

Taraki acted on the Soviet advice soon after he returned to Kabul. Summoning Amin to the Arg Palace for a meeting, he evidently planned to kill Amin upon his arrival. Fearing a plot, Amin refused. Alexander M. Puzanov, the Russian ambassador then guaranteed Amin's safety, and in turn Amin agreed to come. Possibly, Taraki's own aide-de-camp, Major Sayed Daoud Taroon, warned Amin of the plot. In any event, when Amin arrived a shoot-out occurred, Amin escaped, and later returned with a band of supporters who took Taraki prisoner. Official reports declared that Taraki was forced to step down from office due to health reasons.²⁴

Moscow was caught off-guard, but quickly tried to regroup in the face of this turn of events. On 18 September Pravda printed a greeting to Amin from both Brezhnev and Kosygin:

Congratulations on your election to the posts of General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

We are confident that fraternal relations between the Soviet Union and revolutionary Afghanistan will continue to develop successfully on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Nighbor Relations and Cooperation, in the interests of our countries' peoples and to

the benefit of peace and progress in Asia and around the world.²⁵

Moscow was now forced to deal with Amin, and it still faced the problem of an Islamic rebellion which was spreading through the countryside--threatening Russia itself.

The Soviet Options

The Soviets evidently saw the situation in Afghanistan as holding high stakes, with critical outcomes. As was the case in Czechoslovakia, they seemed prepared to employ every option to ensure victory.

The Soviets immediately initiated efforts in two directions. The first was purely diplomatic and took the form of a public reconciliation with Amin. Ambassador Puzanov and Amin held a private meeting for two hours on 15 September.²⁶ On 19 September a Moscow correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor reported the Soviets were evidently "surprised by the weekend power shift." He also suggested the Pravda greeting of 18 September indicated "either approval for the event, or a signal to Mr. Amin that the Soviets fully accepted his new leadership."²⁷

These efforts were designed to restore the status-quo with the Kabul regime. Once relations were again on solid ground, the work of crushing the rebels could be renewed.

The Soviets second effort seemed to be manifested in the form of General Ivan Pavlovskii (sometimes spelled as Pavlovskiy):

The arrival of Pavlovskii in Kabul was a sign that something big was afoot. He was an important man--commander-in-chief of Soviet Ground Forces and deputy minister of defense. Significantly, he had made a similar trip to Czechoslovakia in 1968 prior to the invasion and had been the commander of the Soviet troops who marched into Czechoslovakia. If there was to be a similar invasion of Afghanistan, Pavlovskii was a logical person to plan it because of his previous Czechoslovak experience and because he had no operational command. Indeed, there was no other obvious reason for him to be in Afghanistan.²⁸

Although the Soviets plainly tried to solve the problem with diplomatic efforts, an invasion ultimately occurred. The next section will examine the deception operations which preceded the eventual invasion.

The Deception and Invasion

The assessment which General Pavlovskii presented the CPSU offered three choices. Former U.S. ambassador to Kabul, Robert Neumann, identified them as: 1) Let Afghanistan go. 2) A "massive Russian military infusion." 3) A coup to install a puppet at the head of the government in hope that he could bring things under control. Neumann suggests the Soviets decided on a "combination of the last two options."²⁹

To justify a massive military infusion, an outside threat, something bigger than bands of rebels conducting a jihad, had to be developed. The answer came in the form of the "Red Prince's" old cause, the issue of Pushtunistan. Reports which indicated Pakistan, supported by both the U.S. and China, intended to invade Afghanistan over this issue began to appear in various publications. The Afrique-Asie reported "that the President of Pakistan had been preparing 'with the aid of the United States, the Emirates and China, an invasion since May 1978.'" The article offered "eyewitness" accounts of "decidedly non-Islamic instructors" preparing counter-revolutionary troops for the invasion.³⁰

Al-Shaab reported Washington and Peking had:

started organizing terrorist groups in Pakistan and later at training camps in China, composed of Afghan feudal lords dispossessed of their big estates, their retainers, and misled individuals who had fled from Afghanistan.³¹

In the summer of 1979, the French weekly Revolution reported:

The United States and China are openly colluding to install a pro-Western government in Afghanistan, subservient to imperialist interests. They are encircling the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with a chain of military bases and camps in which sabotage units are intensively trained for an invasion of the country.³²

During this period, U.S. newspapers were quoting officials of the Carter administration as saying:

the U.S. does not want to get involved even to the extent of providing secret support such as arms to the rebels. In the U.S. view, this would give the Soviets a chance to claim that they were countering U.S. imperialism. It would provide justification for the support of separatists in Iran and Pakistan.³³

With the required enemy established, the Soviets slowly began to increase the size of their advisor contingent. Afghan military units now operated under the direct supervision of the Soviets who accompanied them. But their presence seemed to hurt their cause rather than help it. Reports of Afghan troops gouging out the eyes of children in rural villages, while the Soviets stood by and watched, filtered in. Amin became known as a puppet of the Soviets, and hence an enemy of Islam.³⁴

Amin himself seemed to accept the Soviet line that Pakistan sought to do him harm. Accordingly, he acted to increase tensions between his country and Pakistan. Air-raid sirens sounded in Kabul during November, although the only border intrusions came out of Afghanistan. It is quite possible that Amin intended to side-track the discontent in his country by focusing on the Pushtunistan issue.³⁵

Despite the Pushtunistan issue, Amin repeatedly told the Soviets no additional Soviet assistance would be needed. To

appease the Soviets, he began to do what they had asked Taraki to do, broaden his base. He commuted death sentences, appointed a new constitutional convention, convened a loya Jirgah, and began diplomatic efforts with President Zia to close the Pakistan border to guerrillas. But these efforts appeared too late to satisfy the Afghan people, and hence the Soviets. Entire units of the Afghan army defected, taking their weapons with them. By the winter of 1979, less than half of the original Afghan army remained.³⁶

In the meantime, the Soviets continued to increase their advisor strength in Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence started to notice an increase in military transport activity in the Turkmen and adjoining military districts. Local Turkmen reservists were called up in November, bridging equipment was brought to positions, and a satellite communications station was established between Moscow and Termez. "On 8 December, an airborne regiment was posted to the Soviet-controlled Bagram Airbase."³⁷ While these events were unfolding, the KGB was attempting to take control of the Afghan secret police.

Viktor S. Paputin, the Soviet director of international security affairs, arrived in Kabul with a team of advisors who "tried to reorganize the Afghan secret police."³⁸ Not surprisingly, Amin's nephew, the head of the Afghan secret police, was wounded in December by an Afghan army officer.

Still not suspecting a plot, Amin sent him to Moscow for medical care. "Three days later, he returned: In a coffin."³⁹

By 14 December, U.S. newspapers were reporting that Soviet units were arriving in Afghanistan in "identifiable units", and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher had expressed U.S. concern to acting Soviet ambassador Vladilen M. Vasev.⁴⁰

On 20 December, the Soviet airborne regiment at Bagram, together with its BMD carriers and assault guns, was repositioned to two strategic locations. The first one was in the area near the Salang pass tunnel:

the key choke point between Kabul and Termez. Around the same time, a small element of this unit took up security duty at the Kabul International Airport. The Soviets then controlled the road leading into Afghanistan and the two airbases closest to Kabul. The doors to Afghanistan were open and under Soviet guard.⁴¹

When questioned on 21 December about the increased Soviet Military activity, Foreign Minister Gromyko replied: "The reports are wrong. We don't know what you are talking about."⁴² This line was echoed in Pravda on 23 December in a report titled "Soviet Troops in Afghanistan? -- 'Pure Fabrication'":

Recently Western, and especially American, mass news media have been disseminating deliberately planted rumors about some sort of 'interference' by the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of

Afghanistan. They have gone so far as to claim that Soviet 'military units' have been moved into Afghan territory.

All these assertions are pure fabrication, needless to say.⁴³

This same Pravda article noted Amin as "recently" stating:

'The Soviet Union has always shown profound respect for our independence and national sovereignty, for what we hold sacred. It has never infringed on our sovereignty and national independence, on our national traditions and honor, is not now doing so, and never will. It is for this reason that we are drawing fraternally closer to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.'⁴⁴

This statement would indicate Amin was still unaware of the Soviet intentions. Indeed, most of the Western press was equally deceived as to the Soviet intentions. Commenting on the recent appearance of Soviet troops at Kabul airport and along the Soviet-Afghan border in a 22 December article titled "Soviet Union sends 1,500 paratroops to Afghanistan", the Times noted "the troops were believed to have been sent to oppose the Muslim insurgents in Afghanistan..."⁴⁵

On Christmas eve the Soviets began their invasion. Kabul airport, secured a week earlier by the Soviet airborne detachment, provided the Soviet transport aircraft with the needed runway. The 105th Guards Airborne Division, together with elements of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division and a spetsnaz unit were the first troops to arrive. During the

next three days the Soviet airlift into Kabul would average 75-120 flights per day.⁴⁶ Columns of T-54 and T-64 battle tanks, artillery, trucks and fuel convoys from the 40th Army, which had massed on the Soviet-Afghan border, began to roll into Afghanistan on pontoon bridges.⁴⁷

At the same time, Soviet advisors were insuring the Afghan army would be unable to resist. Afghan tanks guarding the vital Kabul radio station had their diesel fuel siphoned off. The Soviets had Afghan army commanders conduct an inventory of their ammunition, thus removing it from its storage facilities. At Pul-e-Charkhi, an Afghan tank park, Soviet advisors had the Afghans remove the batteries from their tanks for winterizing.⁴⁸ Finally, "numerous key officials and military officers in Kabul were invited to parties on the 27th and, after having been plied with alcohol, were locked in until their reliability could be better assessed."⁴⁹

Amin was targeted on 27 December. Following an ill-fated attempt to poison him, Amin had retreated with his body guards to Darulaman. There, several hundred spetsnaz troops, wearing Afghan army uniforms, stormed the palace and shot Amin.⁵⁰

That evening, the pre-recorded voice of Babrak Karmal, the man Amin had purged earlier in the year, was heard over the frequency of Radio Kabul. He declared he had been elected Prime Minister and that Amin had been executed. The broadcast originated from Soviet Central Asia. The real

Radio Kabul was, in the meantime, "blissfully unaware" that a coup had occurred. When the world awoke the next morning, the Soviets presented it with a "fait accompli."⁵¹

In the days following the coup, the Soviets would suggest they were invited into the country by Amin.⁵² Some scholars note however, "it seemed somewhat illogical that Amin would ask the Soviets to intervene, overthrow his government, and kill him."⁵³

Summary

The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan ended with Babrak Karmal in control of the PDPA, and the Soviets fighting for control of the countryside. The following chapter will compare this 1979 invasion with its 1968 Czechoslovakian counterpart, and contrast both to the model presented in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 7

CZECHSLOVAKIA, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE MODEL

The aim of this chapter is to examine the similarities between the two Soviet invasions. It will focus on events surrounding the deceptions as they were played out. To accomplish this, first the background events will be compared. Next the Soviet options will be addressed, followed by highlights of the actual deceptions. Finally, the sum of all the events will be compared to the strategic deception model. In this final area, the focus will be on deciding if the Soviets followed a similar pattern in producing and employing the deceptions. The first step is to compare the two backgrounds.

The Backgrounds

By referring to Chapters 5 and 6, one finds Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan in a state of intense political turmoil prior to the Soviet invasions. Both had acquired new political leadership within less than a year-- leadership which was anxious to establish itself as the vehicle which would usher their country into the modern world.

To accomplish this, both leaders embarked on policies of massive reform. For the Czechs, the reforms were both political and economic. The Afghans were also subjected to political and economic reforms, which in turn translated into religious reforms. In the Czech reforms, the Soviets saw a buffer nation moving away from their fold. In the Afghan reforms, they saw an ominous confrontation between Marxism and Islam brewing--one which could easily spread into their own nation.

In both cases the CPSU felt it was approaching a threatening situation, one which could impact on their own security. As a result, the CPSU initiated a two option program which, by completing either option, would ultimately satisfy their desires.

The Options

The first option was totally diplomatic. It involved the normal process of political, economic, and military measures designed to sway a nations leadership to ones own point of view. The second option prepared the target nation for invasion. These preparations usually occurred as a covert portion of the overt diplomatic means. In doing so, the CPSU insured, should military action be required, the tools were immediately available to begin, and quickly realize, the desired result. In both cases, the leadership of the target nation proved so intensely nationalistic, no

amount of Soviet diplomacy could bring about their satisfactory control.

The Deceptions

As part of both deceptions, a plausible enemy of the target nation had to be developed. This enemy would provide the Soviets with the required excuse to deploy their military machine. At the same time, it would draw the attention of the target leadership away from the Soviets, fixing it in another direction.

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the enemy was perhaps predictable--West Germany, supported by the U.S. For Afghanistan the Pushtunistan issue was resurrected. Here, the foes were Pakistan, the U.S., and China. Both cases presented a traditional enemy to the target nation. In the Czech example, it was enough to gain the attention of the people. The Afghans were generally unmoved, instead concentrating on an enemy of Islam, the communists.

At the same time, events occurred which seemed designed to destabilize the target leadership. The "night letter" in Afghanistan and the anonymous letters which appeared on Czech doors are good examples.

Internationally, the CPSU found little support for its Czech adventures from front groups and various other communist parties around the world. Perhaps this is because the Czechs were seen as a new breed of modern communist --

something which would probably increase the CPSU insecurity. On the other hand, the CPSU found a great deal of support for its Afghan undertaking. Articles supporting the deception story appeared from sources throughout the world.

The KGB, already supported in Czechoslovakia, was able to engineer various deceptions, such as the so called weapons cache. They were not in control of the Afghan secret police, at least not until the shoot-out where Amin's nephew was gunned down.

The leadership of both nations was asked to allow an expanded Soviet military presence in their country to counter the threat. Both leaders declined in favor of increased political action. As a result, the Soviets concentrated their main forces on the borders of the target nations, while existing in-country forces made preparations for the eventual invasion. In both cases, high-ranking Soviet military delegations toured the target country within a few months of the actual invasion. Likewise, the Soviet military presence, be it in the form of exercises or advisors, was felt for prolonged periods of time prior to their intervention. When the invasion did come, both target nations, had they chosen to resist, would have found their own military virtually disarmed by the Soviets. Fuel was removed from battle tanks, ammunition removed from storage and, in some cases, the leadership locked away.

When asked by the world to explain their growing military presence in areas surrounding the target nations,

the Soviets called the Czech example exercises and denied completely their presence in the Afghan example.

In explaining the actual invasions, the Soviets elected to continue with their deception storylines. They claimed the Czech and Afghan leadership requested their assistance. In the Czech example, these claims were being made at the same time Radio Prague was transmitting to the world that they were indeed being invaded. In the Afghan case, the Soviets broadcasted their own signal, similar to Radio Kabul's, with the voice of Karmal asking the Soviets to continue with the aid which Amin himself had requested.

Finally, both invasions seemed to be planned around a simultaneous coup. When attempted in Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek leadership proved too strong to overturn. This explains why the "requests" for assistance the Soviets were counting on never materialized. In Afghanistan, the Soviets used a spetsnaz team to insure the new leadership would be installed. When Karmal made his plea for assistance, Amin was not around to challenge him.

With all of the above in mind, the last task is to contrast these events to the model produced in chapter 4.

The Model

Both of the examples in this paper were instances where the CPSU felt themselves in a high stakes situation. They made early decisions to prepare for military intervention in

the event their diplomatic efforts failed. This being the case, they tasked the KGB, ID, IID, and Military to produce a coordinated strategic deception campaign against the target leadership.

As was shown in this paper, these bodies developed a plausible deception story which revolved around a traditional threat. This story was filtered into the targets reality via the media, front groups and other communist parties, the CPSU, and the military high command.

As the targets reacted, the storyline was adjusted. In Czechoslovakia, the West German invasion became a counter-revolution. In Afghanistan, the Iranian extremists became Pakistan's designs on Pushtunistan.

Eventually, the international, domestic, intelligence, and military inputs all suggested to the leadership to react in a benign fashion. In both cases that was the decision they made, and the free world asked the question; "How could they let that happen, couldn't they see?"

Conclusions

The goal of this paper was to determine if the Soviets have provided the West with a blueprint of their strategic deception program. It has been shown that the Soviets have done extensive study and thinking about strategic deception. Their military has developed it into doctrine, and their

political bureaucracy has likewise embraced it. Taken as a whole, the blueprint, albeit a flexible one, is there.

Two cases were presented where the CPSU obviously employed strategic deception as a means to an end. These were obvious cases. Some scholars have suggested Soviet deceptions existed in their campaigns against the ABM, neutron bomb, and S.D.I. Had diplomatic efforts failed to satisfy the CPSU in Poland, an invasion might have occurred there as well. Certainly nations of the West were predicting it would happen, and the Soviets knew the eyes of the world were upon them. This was not the case in 1968, during the height of the Vietnam War--the year of a divisive U.S. presidential campaign. Nor was it the case in 1979, a year of world-wide recession and of U.S. hostages in Iran.

In any event, the Soviets have proved strategic deception to be a powerful, unimposing, inexpensive, and extremely effective way of realizing national objectives and goals.

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