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



Building The Will To Fight
--Prerequisite To Winning The AirLand Battle

by

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This monograph discusses the relationship between the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and the individual's will to fight. The monograph contends that AirLand Battle doctrine relies heavily on individual and unit initiative. It further contends that tactical success will not be achieved unless individual soldiers and primary groups have internalized a will to fight. The monograph finally discusses several methods of instilling the will to fight at the individual and primary group level.

The monograph first examines the dispersing effects of modern battle and the concomitant development of decentralized command and control systems. Next, the monograph establishes the need for a strong will to fight in a system of decentralized execution. (continued on reverse)

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In describing methods of building a will to fight, this paper first establishes the fact that cohesion is insufficient. The monograph then establishes the importance of four elements required in building an aggressive will to fight--a masculine challenge, a combat creed, patriotism, and ties to a heroic past.

Lastly, this monograph describes the minimum requirements for using these elements in instilling a will to seek the defeat of the enemy. The paper demonstrates the need for the integration of the will-to-fight program into routine training. It shows the importance of wording; and finally it shows that different types of units need different orientations in fostering the will to fight.

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ABSTRACT

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BUILDING THE WILL TO FIGHT--PREREQUISITE TO WINNING THE AIRLAND BATTLE.

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"OH GOD OF BATTLES, STEEL MY SOLDIERS' HEARTS."

William Shakespeare
Henry V

I. MODERN BATTLE: DISPERSION AND DECENTRALIZATION

In his 19th century classic, Battle Studies, Ardant Du Picq accurately predicted the effects of the steadily increasing lethality of weapons on battle. Over one hundred years ago, he saw that

> Today the soldier is often unknown to his comrades. He is lost in the smoke, the dispersion, the confusion of battle. He seems to fight alone. Unity is no longer insured by mutual surveillance. A man falls and disappears. Who knows whether it was a bullet or the fear of advancing further that struck him! ...The more difficult surveillance, the more necessary becomes the individuality of companies, sections, squads.[1]

Du Picq also noted that, increasingly, "battles resolve themselves into battles of soldiers".[2] He fully agreed with General de Negrier's assertion that more and more "The tide of battle is in the hands of each fighter, and never, at any time, has the individual bravery of the soldier had more importance."[3] Recent conflicts have proven the prescience of Du Picq's work.

As Du Picq predicted, battle has become a contest between dispersed company, platoon, and squad sized forces. The tremendous increases in the efficiency and effectiveness of weapons have brought to an end the days of regiments and divisions massed for mutual support and protection. The machine gun, rapid fire artillery, the dive bomber, cluster bombs, and chemical and nuclear weaponry have all served to force opposing armies into dispersed tactical formations for the sake of survival.

At the tactical level, warfare has become a molecular affair with the responsibility for success resting heavily on the individual soldiers and primary groups that make up the formal organizations of opposing armies.

In World War I, the Germans reacted to the murderous situation created when modern weaponry was combined with outmoded tactics of mass by creating doctrinal concepts such as the Elastic Defense and Hutier tactics.[4] Both tactical concepts were built upon two assumptions: (1) that modern warfare required a doctrine that would accommodate and exploit the need for dispersal on the battlefield, and (2) that tactical success could be achieved by placing a significant amount of responsibility for achieving that success at the individual and sub-unit level. The German tactical concepts were built around aggressiveness, flexibility, and "stout hearted men with iron nerves"[5] .

World War II once more saw the Germans exploit the virtues of dispersal and decentralization in the execution of command orders. German commanders recognized that increased mechanization, wireless radios, effective air support, and the extended ranges and lethality of weapons would generate unprecedented dispersal and disorder on the modern battlefield. Recognizing the futility of attempting to impose order on an inherently chaotic environment, the Germans chose to exploit disorder with a command and control system that allowed for the decentralized execution of plans and orders.[6] This system of command and control, *Auftragstaktik*, relied on issuing mission type orders to the people required to execute plans. It relied on their initiative and dedication to see that the mission was accomplished. [7]

More recently, the Israelis and the British have demonstrated clearly the benefits of employing a command and control system that recognizes the critical role played by the individual soldier and his squad or section in gaining tactical, operational, and even strategic victory. In 1973, the Israelis dealt with a battlefield that saw troops so dispersed, "that there was one man per every 40,000 square meters."[8] They employed a system of "organized chaos" that demanded from troops and commanders at every level the qualities of individual daring, initiative, improvisation, maintenance of the aim, and resourcefulness.[9] Likewise the British attributed to the individual soldier and his first line leaders the lion's share of credit for their victory in the Falkland Islands. In the official lessons learned report presented to Parliament, the Secretary of State for Defence stated that, "The most important factor in the success of the task force was the skill, stamina and resolution displayed by individual servicemen."[10]

The U.S. Army recognizes that the increased lethality of modern battle requires forces to operate in a dispersed manner. It also acknowledges the value of using a command and control system that emphasizes decentralized execution. The Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, states that "In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level."[11] In adopting the AirLand Battle doctrine, the U.S. Army has officially sanctioned a way of doing business that "facilitate(s) freedom to operate, delegation of authority,

and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield."[12]

On examining the AirLand Battle doctrine, one quickly realizes that it is based upon certain key assumptions. Perhaps the most critical of these assumptions concerns the performance of individuals and sub-unit groups--squads, crews, sections, platoons, etc. This doctrine of decentralized execution assumes that the primary groups and individuals that make up the formally organized units of the army will, in the absence of higher authority, actively seek the defeat of the enemy. It is assumed that, even in the absence of coercive sanctions, individuals will pursue the seemingly irrational course of action of foregoing relative safety and comfort to risk life and limb in actively seeking the engagement and destruction of the enemy. According to FM 100-5, "decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks" and exploit the initiative.[13]

AirLand Battle doctrine seeks in large measure to replace external controls with internal ones. It accepts and seeks to exploit the assertion that "on the battlefield, self-discipline plays a much greater role in modern combat than discipline imposed from without".[14] It assumes that individual soldiers and front line leaders have so internalized discipline, that they have so deeply internalized a will to fight, that their actions in the face of the enemy will conform to the expectations of their

parent headquarters. It assumes that the will to fight has been so strongly instilled in each soldier that the American Army has safely heeded Lord Charles Moran's warning that "discipline, control from without, can only be relaxed safely when it is replaced by something higher and better, control from within".[15]

This paper examines the need to develop a unit level program designed to instill an aggressive will to fight in the individual soldier. In addressing this issue, it establishes that steps taken to build cohesive primary groups must be supplemented by a deliberate effort designed to insure that the aims of the primary group conform to those of the Army. It further describes four of the most effective tools available to unit commanders for building a willingness to display aggressiveness, initiative, courage, loyalty, and endurance in the face of the enemy. Lastly, this paper describes some of the minimum requirements for an effective will-to-fight program.

II. COHESION ISN'T ENOUGH

In 1947 Brigadier General S.L.A. Marshall published his now classic work , Men Against Fire, in which he identified the primacy of cohesion at the primary group level as a combat motivator. Marshall noted that

> Men who have been in battle know from first-hand experience that when the chips are down, a man fights to help the man next to him, just as a company fights to keep pace with its flanks. Things have to be that simple. An ideal does not become tangible at the moment of firing a volley or charging a hill. When the hard and momentary choice is life or death, the words once heard at an orientation lecture are clean forgotten, but the presence of a well-loved comrade is unforgettable.[16]

So well was the argument made for the decisive influence of cohesion at the squad, section, and crew level, that many who read Marshall quickly discounted the relevance of patriotism, codes of behavior and other elements that long-standing conventional wisdom had held to be important combat motivators. Cohesion, bonding, and mutual trust quickly came to be regarded as the only moral factors that really affected a soldier's willingness to engage the enemy. Leaders at all levels--military and civilian--have, in the words of Anthony Kellett, assumed "a rather uni-dimensional approach to the subject, with emphasis being placed on the so-called primary group almost to the exclusion of other factors".[17] A close examination of the works of Marshall and others shows, however, that cohesion alone isn't enough.

It is a mistake to assume automatically that a unit which has a high degree of cohesion at the primary group level is a good fighting unit. Unless the primary groups of a unit are bonded by loyalty to that unit and motivated

towards accomplishing the goals of the unit, what one has, in fact, is a collection of strongly cohesive primary groups whose principal concern is maintaining the safety and comfort of group members.[18] Furthermore, if primary groups are allowed, deliberately or by default, to establish their own standards of acceptable combat behavior, they will in all probability adopt standards which are incompatible with those of the Army. As Morris Janowitz notes, "the groups (that make up a unit) must be articulated with and dedicated to the goals of the larger organization, for (if not) primary group solidarity can develop into a basis of opposition to military requirements."[19] Experience in three major conflicts confirms the problems generated by allowing primary groups to develop without insuring that the goals of those groups conform to the needs of the military.

In World War I, troops on both sides of the war developed a system of 'live and let live' that became the accepted standard of behavior for many units.[20] While there was a minimum of direct disobedience, troops at all levels soon learned that minimal compliance with the letter but not the spirit of aggressive orders kept the front quite safe.

> Outward compliance was the essence of the live-and-let live system of trench fighting in the First World War. When inertia became widespread, the high commands were unable to apply disciplinary sanctions effectively because there was little overt disobedience involved. ...forced to display aggression, the soldiers could still ritualize it in some of its forms--for example, patrols went out but avoided the enemy; ammunition was expended generously but inaccurately; firing was made routine to limit its lethal effect and to signal pacific intent and thus invite reciprocity.[21]

In this laissez-faire world of undeclared truces

> group sanctions were applied against more active individuals whose aggression might provoke enemy retaliation and jeopardize not only the lives but also the relative comfort of their fellows. The more active men were the targets of derisive epithets such as 'fireater' and not infrequently were told to curb their enthusiasm for prosecuting the war.[22]

In the Korean War the Army allowed the norms of the primary group, especially the 'buddy group' to define acceptable standards of behavior.[23] Given that one of the principal functions of the primary group is to sustain the members of that group, acceptable standards quickly evolved into those that minimized the threat of danger to group members. Those individuals who displayed any initiative or aggressiveness in prosecuting the war were branded with the label of 'hero', a term of intense derogation. So dominant was the primary group in determining the acceptable limits of effectiveness in this conflict that NCOs and officers were assimilated into patterns of behavior which were subversive of the goals of their higher headquarters.[24] The following example does not appear to have been atypical:

> Sergeant Alex was calling Earl out of his bunker to give him orders every five minutes. Earl objected and Sergeant Alex called him 'our little hero' because he got the Bronze Star on Sandbag Castle. Earl got mad and said that he had never asked for it; they *gave* it to him. He told me that he wished that he'd been someplace else when it happened.[25]

Not surprisingly, "the negative definition of the hero's role tended to discourage aggressive behavior" in battle.[26]

In Vietnam a very similar picture was painted, where "veterans and short-timers sought to dissuade replacements from upsetting the tactical equilibrium."[27] Stories of 'Search and Avoid' missions and combat refusals came to be a

legacy of the American Army late in the war; and the number of leaders who were 'fragged' for being too aggressive in their pursuit of the enemy testify only too clearly how the formal organization failed to insure that the goals of the primary groups of the combat units conformed to the goals of the headquarters.[28] In fact, many observers agree that "where primary-group solidarity existed, more often than not it served to foster and reinforce dissent from the goals of the military organization and to organize refusal to perform according to institutional norms."[29]

If cohesion at the primary group level is to be a positive factor in combat motivation, a deliberate effort must be made to cause primary group members to feel a sense of obligation to their unit at large and the accomplishment of unit goals. Individuals must be animated by a sense of responsibility to the formal military organization to which they belong as well as their immediate associates. Cohesion must be supplemented by a willingness to express initiative and aggressiveness in the face of the enemy--a will to fight.

THE MASCULINE CHALLENGE

One method of instilling a will to fight in the combat soldier is to make successful combat performance, i.e. the display of initiative, courage, and aggressiveness, a challenge to the soldier's masculinity.

In his study of the American soldier in World War II, S.A. Stouffer noted that one of the most powerful forces

which caused individuals to face the enemy was the requirement to be seen in the eyes of one's peers as a man. Stouffer noted that "a code as universal as 'being a man' is very likely to have been deeply internalized" by the vast majority of men coming into the Army, be they volunteers or draftees.[30] He further noted that the Army proved successful in using this code of manhood as an instrument of combat motivation.

In a positive manner, the Army reinforced the association between courage and aggressiveness and proof of manhood. The theme being instilled was that "the man who had lived up to the code of the combat soldier had proved his manhood; he could take pride in being a combat man and draw support in his role from this pride." [31] In a negative manner, it was made clear that "to fail to measure up as a soldier in courage and endurance was to risk the charge of not being a man. ('Whatsa matter, bud--got lace on your drawers? Christ, he's acting like an old maid')".[32]

By luck or by design, the Army effectively associated combat performance and preconceived notions of masculinity to instill in individual soldiers the will to fight. It played on two themes which are central to the American male's masculine ideal--courage and aggressiveness--with such success that both were considered to be prime ingredients of the combat man's notion of a good soldier.[33] One of the hallmarks of the American combat soldier was his code that "combat was recognized as a test of being a man".[34] Furthermore, "when this code was internalized, or

enforced by playing on an internalized code of manliness, a man once in combat had to fight in order to keep his own self-respect: "Hell, I'm a soldier."[35]

In analyzing Stouffer's work, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath, Robert Merton concluded that the Army effectively reinforced the 'code of masculinity' it had instilled in individual soldiers by using the social pressures inherent in primary group relations. Noted Merton,

> The male character of the army accentuated, as we have indicated, the young soldier's needs to prove his masculinity. The formation of primary groups strengthened this tendency since each member feared both the subjective and social consequences of (having his manhood brought into question by his peers). In this way primary groups in the Army, by placing a high reaction-formative evaluation on bravery and aggressiveness--the chief values of masculinity--served the goals of the organization.[36]

Combat units that associate performance in combat with masculine status are employing one of the most powerful motivational tools available. Training programs which equate initiative, aggressiveness, and courage in combat with acceptable standards of masculinity are correctly reinforcing a deeply internalized social code that most men bring with them into the Army. By the same token, portraying an unwillingness to "do one's duty" in the face of the enemy as a sign of undesirable femininity also correctly reinforces that same social code. Equating combat performance with masculine status exploits the fact that "most men have more physical courage than moral courage and regard the possibility of death or injury with less terror than they do the possibility of disgrace" and loss of masculine standing in the eyes of their peers.[37]

THE COMBAT CREED

One of the most effective things a unit can do to build a will to fight is articulate a combat creed, which, for this paper, is defined as an expressed standard of acceptable behavior in the face of the enemy. A clearly stated combat creed defines for soldiers of all ranks exactly what the unit expects of them and what they should expect from each other in combat. It serves a dual function in building the will to fight. Firstly, it establishes minimum acceptable standards of initiative, courage, aggressiveness, and endurance that individuals and groups are expected to display under fire. Secondly, it fosters unit esprit de corps by reinforcing in individuals the fact that they are members of a heroic, honorable, and therefore esteemed organization, thus raising the self-esteem of the individual--a critical factor in combat motivation.[38]

In a 1976 study of the U.S. Army volunteer, Charles Moskos and Charles Brown noted that one of the things which set the elite units of the Army (Airborne and Ranger) apart from the standard units (mechanized infantry and armor) was the fact that these units had an established, clearly expressed combat creed which accentuated and encouraged a "fighter spirit marked by aggressive enthusiasm"[39] An examination of the two creeds reveals their heroic orientation, emphasis on performance in combat, and exaltation of warrior ideals.

The Paratrooper Creed

indicates that the paratrooper (1) is a volunteer, fully realizing the hazards of chosen service; (2) is an elite shock trooper; (3) is mentally and physically fit; (4) is loyal to superiors and comrades; (5) is courteous, neat, and attentive toward maintenance of weapons and equipment; (6) reflects high standards of training and morale; (7) fights fairly and never surrenders; (8) shows a high degree of initiative and fights on to the objective; (9) has proven ability as a fighting man on the field of battle; (10) fights as a member of a team; and (11) always upholds the honor and prestige of the finest unit in the United States Army.[40]

The Ranger Creed, the canon of the U.S. Army Rangers, reveals the same heroic fighter orientation and glorification of the esteemed role of the honorable warrior. It reads:

1. Recognizing that I volunteered as a Ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and esprit de corps of my Ranger Battalion.
2. Acknowledging the fact that a Ranger is a more elite soldier who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a Ranger my country expects me to move farther, faster and fight harder than any other soldier.
3. Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong and morally straight and I will shoulder more than my share of the task whatever it may be. One hundred-percent and then some.
4. Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, my neatness of dress and care for equipment shall set the example for others to follow.
5. Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a Ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.
6. Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the Ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.

RANGERS LEAD THE WAY[41]

Like the Paratrooper's Creed, the Ranger Creed emphasizes courageous, aggressive, last stand conduct in the face of the enemy. An unrelenting loyalty to one's unit as well as to one's comrades is required; and the idea that each soldier is directly responsible for upholding the honor and pride of his unit and his country is driven home in every paragraph. One might be tempted to dismiss these creeds with their requirements for absolute gallantry and heroism as hopelessly anachronistic were it not for the fact that solid evidence clearly demonstrates their utility in improving combat effectiveness.

Jacques Van Doorn correctly refers to the combat creed of a military unit as its *operational ideology* and relates its significance to building a will to fight.[42] In evaluating the role of ideology in combat motivation, Elliot Chodoff includes the role of operational ideology when he proposes that "ideological beliefs are important in precombat motivation"[43]. Chodoff further concludes that the social forces which operate at the primary group level can be used to reinforce the individual's need to adhere to a unit creed. Notes Chodoff, "(operational) ideology and primary group cohesion may overlap as motivational factors".[44]He further identifies the importance of a clearly stated fighting creed when he cites the potentially adverse effects of not having a well defined operational ideology. Chodoff concludes that "if ideological beliefs are absent or are disarticulate with those of the larger institution, the

norms of the primary group's behavior may conflict with those of the institution."[45] Other studies verify Chodoff's conclusions. They also establish the significant benefits derived from having a combat creed.

In their study of the American soldier, Moskos and Brown found that soldiers in the elite units (airborne and ranger) which have a firmly established fighting creed expressed a significantly greater willingness for combat than their counterparts in mechanized and armored units.[46] As shown by studies conducted in World War II, this expressed attitude towards willingness to engage in combat is an important indicator of a unit's potential combat effectiveness

S.A. Stouffer and his associates likewise assessed the relationship between expressed attitudes towards combat and actual combat performance . In conducting their studies, the Stouffer team interviewed 108 infantry companies from four divisions scheduled to participate in the Normandy campaign. The 12,300 soldiers interviewed were asked questions very similar to those asked by Moskos and Brown in their previously mentioned study of the American Army volunteer. These precombat interviews were followed-up with an evaluation of unit and individual combat effectiveness during the months of June and July, 1944. The two main criteria used to measure combat effectiveness were, for units, nonbattle ,i.e. psychiatric, casualty rates; and for individuals, ratings of performance in action by peers,

subordinates, and superiors. The results clearly establish the relationship between attitudes toward combat and actual performance.

Regarding unit performance, Stouffer noted that there

> is a consistent and statistically significant correlation between attitudes toward combat of companies before D Day and the nonbattle casualty rates in these companies during the Normandy campaign. (Further), companies with the worst attitudes tended to have from 30 to 60 per cent higher casualty rates (basing figures on all four divisions) than companies with the best attitudes.[47]

Stouffer and his associates further established the link between attitudes towards combat and actual combat performance when they determined that in 10 of the 12 regiments evaluated, the companies with the worst attitudes towards combat tended to have the highest nonbattle casualty rates; and in 10 of the 12 regiments evaluated, the companies with the best attitudes towards combat tended to have the lowest nonbattle casualty rates.[48]

Regarding individual performance, the study concluded that "the men rated above average in combat performance tended to show...attitudes with respect towards combat which were superior from the Army point of view, as compared with other men".[49] The same study also noted that those individuals who displayed the least satisfactory attitudes towards combat in training "tended, more than other men, to be among those rated below average in combat performance."[50]

There is then, a strong positive link between a well articulated creed that extols the virtues of initiative, courage, aggressiveness, loyalty, etc., and individual and

unit performance in combat operations. In the final analysis, a combat creed serves the function of causing the goals of individuals and primary groups to conform more closely to those of the formal organization. As we have seen, it does this by creating a more positive attitude towards combat among individuals and groups. We have also seen that in combat units, expressed attitudes towards combat "(a)...are not mere casual and idle verbal expressions, (b) that attitudes persist through time, and (c) that they relate to other behavior (performance in combat) which is important".[51]

It is interesting to note that the U.S. Army has no official combat creed designed to articulate standards of conduct in combat. The closest the Army has to a combat oriented creed is the Code of Conduct, which defines standards of behavior for captured personnel.

PATRIOTISM AND IDEOLOGY

In the rush to establish cohesion's dominant role in combat motivation, many have readily discarded such idealistic notions as patriotism and ideology. The role these ideals play in motivating soldiers to face the enemy with determination has been relegated by many to a status of anachronistic insignificance. However, numerous studies indicate quite clearly that ideology and patriotism are important factors in building a will to fight. For this discussion, the terms patriotism and ideology will be used interchangeably since they both connote dedication to a

political entity and the ideals it embraces. This is especially true in American society where concepts such as freedom, justice, liberty, etc. are considered to be synonymous with America itself.

In their critique of Stouffer's American Soldier studies, Merton and Lazarsfeld concluded that patriotism plays a critical role in laying the foundation upon which primary groups built a normative structure in World War II.

> ..it would be a mistake to say that the tacit patriotism of the soldiers played no significant part in disposing the men to acceptance, obedience and initiative. The widespread character of their acceptance of the legitimacy of the war although in itself, not a strong combat motivation, must still be viewed as flowing both directly and indirectly into combat motivation. First of all, as we have already indicated above, it makes for a general readiness to accept commands and to execute them. Also, through its provision of a very general common universe of discourse, it provided the rudiments of one of the most important pre-conditions for the formation of primary groups which have a more positive and immediate function in strengthening the soldier's will to exert himself under dangerous conditions.[52]

What is postulated here is that patriotism serves as the common ground--the fertile soil--in which other elements such as group cohesion, tradition, and unit creeds are planted, take root, and grow.

The role of patriotism and ideology is so essential in motivating the American soldier that Moskos concluded that "primary groups maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an underlying commitment, if not to the specific purpose of the war, then at least to the worth of the larger system for which he is fighting".[53] Essentially, if there is no patriotic or ideological commitment on behalf of the individual soldier, all the cohesion in the world won't be

sufficient to cause him actively to pursue the defeat of the enemy. S.L.A. Marshall noted that "those who respect history will deem it beyond argument that belief in a cause is the foundation of the aggressive will in battle".[54] A World War II survey conducted in the Pacific theater confirmed the importance of a patriotic cause when it determined that "the higher a man's conviction about America's war aims, the more likely he was to be willing to fight on".[55]

Several studies indicate that a lack of identification with their country's political cause was an important factor in explaining the increased unwillingness of American troops to engage the enemy in Korea and Vietnam versus World War II. Elliot Chodoff contends that the superficial compliance of Korea and the combat refusals of Vietnam were rarities in the Second World War because it was fought on a higher political and ideologic plane.[56] He further contends that soldiers who are not motivated ideologically may, if the option is present, meet the enemy with mass surrender--"preserving the integrity of their primary groups even as they march into captivity".[57]

Of special interest to today's army is the importance of patriotism to the volunteer soldier. James Burk specifically addressed the importance of patriotism in motivating soldiers in an all-volunteer force and concluded that it is indeed significant. He stated that "the role performance of patriotically motivated personnel will be

significantly different and of a higher quality than the role performance of other personnel".[58] Of equal importance to Burk's conclusion is the fact that the vast majority of enlistees--83 percent in 1984--listed "desire to serve one's country" as one of the main reason for joining the Army.[59] This tendency towards patriotic motivation is also found in reenlistees, although at a somewhat lower rate--71 percent.[60]

Given these facts, one can deduce that a deliberate effort should be made to reinforce the patriotic tendencies that volunteer soldiers bring with them into the Army, for patriotism and ideology do indeed play an important role in combat motivation. By themselves, patriotism and political ideology will not cause a soldier resolutely to seek the defeat of the enemy. As Archibald Wavell said, "A man does not flee because he is fighting in an unrighteous cause; he does not attack because his cause is just".[61] However, when used as part of a program designed to make the aims of individuals and primary groups conform to those of the military organization, patriotism and ideology are indispensable factors in generating a will to fight.

THE HEROIC PAST

An important measure to be taken in building a will to fight is tying soldiers of a unit to a heroic past. This is accomplished by surrounding soldiers with the history and

traditions that a unit will have developed over time. In building the will to fight, history serves three purposes: (1) It provides concrete examples of the standards of heroic behavior to which members of a given unit are expected to adhere; (2) It expands the "immediate family" beyond the limits of the group in which he associates; and (3) It places a moral burden on the soldier to uphold and maintain the honors that others have fought and died for.

Some of the 'elite' units of the Army have made good use of their unit histories and the heroism displayed by members of the unit. A particularly noteworthy example is the 82d Airborne Division. An example of the way in which past actions can be used to establish standards is the tale of the young trooper of the 82d who was caught in the maelstrom of the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. According to eyewitnesses, an unidentified bazookaman was digging a fox hole along the side of a road during the middle of a headlong retreat in the initial days of the battle. While he was digging, a tank destroyer, decks covered with infantrymen firing rifles, pulled up next to him. The 82d bazookaman asked Sergeant John Banister, who was riding on the tank destroyer, if they were looking for a safe place. "Yeah," replied Banister. The tired, dirty, unshaven, untroubled bazookaman hitched up his pants and said "Well, buddy, just pull your vehicle behind me. I'm the 82d Airborne and this is as far as the bastards are going."[62] The point of the story is not that this man was

extraordinarily heroic by 82d standards. Quite the contrary. That's simply the way the soldiers of the 82d do business. They are *supposed* to be braver and more resolute than anyone else, and they *are*--and history *proves* it. In the 101st Airborne Division, the incredible tale of how Staff Sergeant Harrison Summers of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry may have single-handedly saved the Normandy invasion serves the same function.[63] (APPENDIX A) By historical example, heroism is established as the standard by which all soldiers should measure themselves.

Bonding a soldier to those who have gone before him and thereby expanding his primary group to something greater and more permanent than its current membership is another useful function of the 'heroic past'. The British regiments have known this for a long time. Over one hundred years ago it was known that

> camaraderie extended beyond those a man lived with, beyond the present, beyond the grave, deep into the past. A soldier felt a kinship with all those who, like, him, had served in the regiment. He was proud of himself, of his companions in uniform, and of those who had fought and won the battle honors that graced his regiment's colours or drums.[64]

S.A. Stouffer also recognized that the past played a prominent role in shaping the present. The ability to identify with the past was a very important factor in creating unit pride and esprit de corps in the second world war. Stouffer explained that

> pride in outfit for the combat man included something over and above personal identification with the 'other guys' and the leaders in the outfit. He took pride in its history as well as its present, and identified with the men who had died in the outfit as well as with the living. As it has

> been suggested, he owed it to them--they hadn't got off easy. The intrapersonal ways in which this operated are probably complex, but there is little doubt that the process occurred.[65]

The third function of the 'heroic past', serving as a means to require courageous action from each soldier, is used very effectively by the Marine Corps. The *fighting* history and traditions of the Marine Corps are consciously drilled into every Marine from the day he arrives at boot camp. The perpetuation of Marine Corps legends and heroes is the product of a deliberate, overt effort designed to accomplish one thing--produce the best quality fighting soldier in the world.[66] From the day they enter boot camp, Marines are relentlessly bombarded with the fact that they are members of the world's proudest fighting force. They are also pressed to acknowledge that this reputation was paid for dearly with the blood of former Marines, and that anyone who fails to live up to the reputation of the Marines disgraces the sacrifices of their heroic ancestors. For example,

> All boots (trainees) are told that there are some things that Marines just don't do. Like taking care of the dead and wounded. The Marines never leave their dead and wounded on the field of battle. Never have, never will. And woe be unto the first son-of-a-bitch that ever does![67]

By performing the three functions discussed above, a heroic past provides a powerful supplement to primary group cohesion in building a will to fight. The time and effort taken to research and develop the proud combat traditions of a unit and instill them into the soldiers of all ranks is an investment that will pay big dividends in time of need.

III. THE WILL-TO-FIGHT PROGRAM

Having determined that a masculine challenge, combat creed, patriotism, and a heroic past are valuable combat motivators, it is important to examine three of the most important aspects of using these tools in building a will to fight. Perhaps the most important factor is how well the effort to build the will to fight is integrated into routine training activities.

INTEGRATING THE EFFORT

Integrating these elements into training serves to expose soldiers repeatedly to the standards of conduct to which they are expected to hold themselves and their peers, thus imprinting on their memories a requirement for aggressive, heroic action. It also translates abstract concepts into a practical behavioral code that is practiced in the daily routine. Two armed forces which adhere to this principle are the Soviet Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.

The Soviets use the all-encompassing term *pedagogy* to describe the process of building a soldier in the same manner we use the word training. They divide military pedagogy into three distinct components: Training, education, and indoctrination.[68] Training provides the skills necessary to carry out assigned duties. Education develops the soldier academically and is oriented on the acquisition of empirical knowledge. Indoctrination establishes the moral and emotional base that generates the

required standards of behavior for the Soviet soldier. The four elements of the will to fight discussed in this paper fit into the realm of indoctrination.

The Soviets state that each of the three elements of pedagogy is indispensable and must be intertwined in constructing a training program. In fact, the cardinal rule of Soviet military pedagogy requires the unity of education, training, and indoctrination .[69] The Soviets recognize that, "the structure of a soldier's activities--their motives, purpose, significance, tasks, goals and the methods of achieving them--determines what will be imprinted, retained, and subsequently recalled by his memory."[70]

It must be stressed that the purpose of the indoctrination program is not to produce a good communist. It is intended, primarily, to produce a soldier who is psychologically prepared to operate effectively in the devastating environment of modern combat. As Colonel I.F. Vydrin tells us

> Psychological preparation, which is closely connected with the entire process of training and indoctrination, is called on to ensure the formation of psychological stability in soldiers--that is, the formation of mental traits which increase their ability to perform combat missions and to act in the strained and dangerous situations of a modern war in full accordance with communist convictions and moral principles of behavior. The most important of these traits are bravery, valor, internal willingness to make self-sacrifices, and the ability to endure the most severe trials of war, to manifest self-control and staunchness at trying and critical moments, and to act selflessly, resolutely, and firmly in battle.[71]

Similarly, the Marine Corps believes that values and standards cannot simply be preached; that internalizing a warrior ethic is the product of routine training. Training

must be conducted in such a manner that it constantly reinforces the code of behavior acceptable to the Marine Corps. Exhortations to live up to the fighting codes and traditions of the world's finest armed force are carefully interwoven into all aspects of Marine Corps training for the specific purpose of driving home to each Marine the point that his actions must be guided by a code that stresses loyalty, initiative, honor, and courage. It also makes clear the point that failure to live up to that ethic lowers one's status to something less than human.[72]

A vignette from Phillip Caputo's account of his Marine Corps days, A Rumor of War, further illustrates the principle:

> The Marines had to chant slogans while running ("Hut-two-three-four, I love the Marine Corps!") and before meals (Sir, the United States Marines; since 1775, the most invincible fighting force in the history of man. Gung ho! Gung ho! Gung ho! Pray for War!). Caputo observed that these slogans may look ludicrous in print, but when recited in unison by a hundred voices they have a weird, hypnotic effect on a man, who ultimately begins to believe them."[73]

If the various factors that make up a will to fight are to be internalized by soldiers to the point that they are significant combat motivators they must be incorporated into the daily routine. A semi-annual lecture on the unit creed is insufficient. A brief recital of the unit history by the adjutant at the annual Organization Day Picnic will be remembered by few if any. Soldiers must be exposed to the code of behavior they are expected to live and die by in a manner that causes them to regard that code as a legitimate definition of acceptable conduct. That is accomplished best

through routine acknowledgment of and, if possible, adherence to the code's standards; for as the Soviets recognize, "Daily service is itself a unique teacher and educator."[74]

THE POWER OF WORDS

The second factor to be considered in incorporating the several items discussed here into a coherent will-to-fight program is wording. The importance of wording lies in the fact that it is in large measure words that are used to inspire, motivate, and convey principles and standards. In his work, Fighting Spirit, F.M. Richardson notes that Napoleon "said that men are what you want them to be, what you make them, and he frequently stressed the importance of words. Words, he said, must be as music which speaks to the soul--'In order to electrify the man you must speak to the soul'".[75]

The Soviets place great emphasis on wording and, in the finest Napoleonic tradition, seek to speak to a soldier's soul in order to motivate his body.

The Soviets identify four types of memory as being applicable to training the individual soldier: image, motor, emotional, and semantic-logical. The first two, image and motor, are related primarily to acquiring empirical knowledge and physical skills. The third, emotional, is

related primarily to establishing and fostering attitudes and establishing norms of behavior. The fourth, semantic-logical, is related exclusively to the expression of thoughts and concepts.[76]

The concept of semantic-logical memory asserts that "thoughts do not exist without language".[77] Consequently, a person's thoughts and ideals are shaped principally by the successful use of language. Naturally, then, the Soviets place great emphasis on the use of "all the possibilities of verbal and written speech, including: an eloquence of narration, expressiveness of comparisons, sharpness of contrasts and so forth".[78] It is important to recognize, however, that the use of effective wording is a means to a higher end.

The importance of using the *proper* semantic-logical tools in articulating a desired standard of combat behavior lies in the fact that they generate an emotional memory, and the fact that emotional memory has a "very important significance in the life and activity of each soldier."[79] Furthermore, "the feelings experienced and retained in (the emotional) memory either impel a soldier to action, or restrain him from it".[80]

The Marines also place a good deal of emphasis on using emotive language. One need but make a brief examination of Marine Corps publications or talk to Marine Corps officers to recognize the role played by such phrases as *uncommon valor is a common virtue* and *semper fidelis* (Always Faithful) in building the will to fight. The Marines also

place a good deal of importance on attaching a strong negative emotion to words such as *retreat* and *surrender* in a deliberate effort to associate the acts these words represent with absolute repugnance.[81]

CUSTOM FITTING THE WILL TO FIGHT

The third factor to be considered in building a will to fight in the soldiers of tactical units is the realization that soldiers in different types of units require different definitions of aggressive, heroic behavior and combat motivators. The need for different definitions of effective combat performance and different combat motivators can be seen readily when comparing light infantry squads and self-propelled artillery crews.

The requirement for different standards of valorous behavior lies in the fact that the mission requirements of each group differ in the extreme. For the light infantryman--especially the rifleman--battle in the offense revolves around the requirement to close with an enemy at ranges defined by crew-served machine guns and personal weapons. Battle in the defense requires the soldier to withstand the attacks of enemy forces at those same ranges. His environment is one of extreme vulnerability. He knows neither the armor protection, the firepower, nor the speed of the tanker, the artilleryman, or even the mechanized infantryman. Not being tied physically or emotionally, to a powerful weapon system he is somewhat autonomous and can avoid battle by lagging behind, "getting lost", etc.

Perhaps most importantly, unlike the tank crewman or howitzer gunner, he does not service a weapon. He is, instead, a complete weapon system in and of himself. He is also a functioning part of a larger weapon system--the rifle squad.

For the self-propelled cannoneer, battle--offensive and defensive--revolves around the requirement to deliver fires against an enemy who is almost certainly out of sight and most likely several miles away. He sees the battlefield in a totally different way than does his light infantry compatriot. He operates in relative security inside an armored turret, and the principal threat to his existence comes from enemy artillery. In contrast to the rifleman, the cannoneer is trained to service a piece of equipment. Unlike the rifleman, the artillery crewman rarely sees the people he kills or the people that will kill him. Like the armor crewman, his battlefield role is one of limited responsibility. He is physically and emotionally tied to an instrument of tremendous power. His *raison d'etre* is to make that instrument function properly.

As one might expect, being a part of a weapon crew offers a degree of cohesion that being a part of a light infantry squad simply does not. By virtue of the fact that he is a member of an artillery crew, a soldier is placed in an environment that is conducive to high self-esteem and primary group cohesion. As Morris Janowitz notes,

> The weapon becomes part of the self-image of the person, and the more powerful the weapon, the greater its contribution to the battle, and the greater is the person's sense of

> potency and group solidarity. Social cohesion in primary groups is not merely a human phenomenon; it is an outgrowth of environmental conditions, and in the military this means the technical dimensions of the various weapons systems.[82]

But cohesion and weapon associated esteem are not the only or even the most important difference between the artillery crew and the light infantry squad. The most significant difference is the quality and quantity of danger experienced by the two.

As mentioned earlier, the artilleryman knows that his principal threat is the enemy cannoneer. He may be subjected to intensive artillery bombardment. He may experience the occasional ground attack. He may be ambushed in convoy or bombed and strafed. But when compared to the dismounted infantry soldier, his is a rather safe and ordered environment. He is protected by armor, speed, and tremendous firepower with which he can retaliate. If wounded he can count on comrades in close proximity who are not required to abandon him in order to continue the advance. He is normally operating within friendly areas and guaranteed a reasonable chance of receiving prompt evacuation and medical care. He is also in an environment that provides for the constant support and direction provided by peers and supervisors. In essence,

> there is more to the weapon group than the affection that its members share for their gun or vehicle. They are, of necessity, close together in battle, and do not suffer from that loneliness in battle which so easily overwhelms the individual rifleman.[83]

The infantryman, on the other hand, is constantly subjected to rifle, machinegun, mortar, artillery, and every other kind of fire one can imagine. His speed is defined by

his own physical capabilities. His protection lies in his own tactical acumen or in the foxhole he digs. He disperses for survivability and increasingly becomes a single entity in a cruel and hostile environment. Unlike the artillery crewman, he has no powerful weapon to tend, no armored sanctuary from which he may continue the fight. His world shrinks "to the tremendous immediacies of staying alive and defeating the enemy".[84]

> A tired, cold, muddy rifleman goes forward with the bitter dryness of fear in his mouth into the mortar bursts and machinegun fire of a determined enemy. A tremendous psychological mobilization is necessary to make an individual do this, not just once but many times.[85]

The phenomenon of natural coalescence and powerful moral support which results from association with a weapon of tremendous power and the physical proximity of crewmates that occurs in artillery crews leads one to conclude that the emphasis of the will-to-fight effort should be different for an artillery unit than for a light infantry unit. In the infantry unit, the effort should be aimed at the individual soldier. It should stress the challenge of combat as primarily a test of the individual's worthiness rather than an indication of the worth of his primary group. In an artillery section the effort should be directed more--although by no means exclusively--towards the group. It should define combat as a challenge to be met by a gun crew rather than individual cannoneers.

This principle is, naturally, not limited to light infantry squads and armored artillery sections. Each combat unit has peculiar motivational requirements that are

reflections of the weapons assigned to it. Mechanized infantry, towed artillery, armor, combat engineer, air defense, attack helicopter; each poses a unique challenge to the commander who would build a will to fight in his soldiers. The requirement for different, mission peculiar, system generated motivators is derived from the fact that

> the technical dimensions of (different) weapons systems impose limitations on stability and cohesiveness in military primary groups. Is the weapon fired as a team or is it fired by an individual?.....Some weapons systems involve the aggressive expenditure of energy against a visible enemy.....(while) others require only a mechanical routine against a distant target..[86]

IV. CONCLUSION

The will to fight that the individual soldier takes into battle is the product of a multitude of interacting moral and physical forces. A ready supply of ammunition; exemplary leadership; hot chow; the presence of comrades; adequate equipment to perform an assigned task well; being part of a winning outfit; reliable weapons; the opportunity to get clean clothes, a hot shower, and a shave every now and then--all of these elements interact in a complex, not yet fully understood manner to create a determined will to win when used properly.

Of all the moral forces that go into building an aggressive will to fight, cohesion is the strongest. The support, comfort, and strength that is derived from close association with trusted comrades is the bedrock upon which the will to fight must be built. Without cohesion, all of the other moral forces--patriotism, creeds, history, traditions, and manliness--are irrelevant. By the same token, however, without the presence of these moral forces cohesion remains but a foundation upon which one might potentially build a will to fight and win. Determination to defeat the enemy in mortal combat is the product of both stable primary group relations and normative factors provided by the formally organized military unit. "Rather than conceiving the (normative) and primary group

explanations as mutually exclusive, our knowledge of combat motivation must be informed by an awareness of the manner in which both of these considerations are interrelated".[87]

There is a definite and prominent role to be played by the factors discussed in this paper in building in each soldier and primary group a compelling moral requirement to actively seek and defeat the enemy. If these factors are to be powerful motivators, however, they must be made an integral part of a soldier's training; for a soldier's willingness to fight will reflect the quality and quantity of the effort expended in molding the soldier's character. As Lord Moran stated,

> Character...is a habit, the daily choice of right instead of wrong; it is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is not suddenly developed on the outbreak of war. For war, in spite of much that we have heard to the contrary, has no power to transform, it merely exaggerates the good and evil that are in us, till it is plain for all to read; it cannot change, it exposes. Man's fate in battle is worked out before war begins.[88]

The tactical units that will fight the AirLand Battle must take deliberate steps to instill in their soldiers an aggressive will to fight and win. As Du Picq stated over a century ago, "what must be inculcated in (the soldier) is a will of his own, a personal impulse to send him forward".[89] If the combat units of the American Army fail to instill this impulse in their soldiers, the Army at large will be in serious trouble. It will end up trying to implement a doctrine that requires from each soldier aggressiveness, initiative, and a drive to conquer with a force made up of soldiers who, by and large, do not have the

resolve to execute that doctrine. The consequences of such a failure will be enormous. For, as Timothy Lupfer correctly observed, "An army that adopts tactical doctrine that it cannot apply will greatly multiply its misfortune".[90]

APPENDIX A: SSG HARRISON SUMMERS AT WXYZ (From Six Armies in Normandy by John Keegan, pages 108-110)

At about 2 a.m. on the 6th of June, 1944 the U.S. Army's 101st Airborne Division, the "Screaming Eagles", began jumping into the Cotentin peninsula of Northern France. They were the spearhead for the Normandy invasion. Their mission was to secure vital exits leading off of Utah beach and to destroy bridges across which the Germans would rush counterattack forces to the beach. The men of the 101st knew that if they failed, there was a good chance that the massive amphibious landing which was to follow could be trapped on the Normandy coast like a beached whale.

The 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry, 101st Airborne Division was assigned the mission of securing exits for the 4th Infantry Division near the village of St. Martin de Varreville. The 1st/502d succeeded in accomplishing its mission largely because of the actions of one man. John Keegan tells the tale in Six Armies in Normandy.

> Away on the northern extremity of the airhead, however, an even smaller force meanwhile had succeeded in overcoming superior forces at a critical point, largely because of their unpreparedness and the manic recklessness of a single soldier.
>
> He was Staff Sergeant Harrison Summers. His battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick Cassidy, short of men and with a variety of missions to perform, had assigned to him the task of capturing a German coastal artillery barracks, known from its map signification as WXYZ, while he set up a command post and sent the rest of his slim battalion northwards to mount road blocks at Beuzeville and Foucarville, between Neville (Turnbull's field of glory) and the beach. He could allot Summers only fifteen men, few of whom were from the 1st/502d, and Summers had no time even to ask their names. They followed him willingly enough from

Cassidy's command post but, when he deployed them within assaulting distance of WXYZ, he detected that they had little enthusiasm for his leadership or the coming fight. He decided therefore on the most dangerous course of action a leader can adopt: to advance alone in the hope that his example would draw the others in his wake.

WXYZ was a collection of thick-walled, stone farm buildings strung out along some 700 yards of road leading to the beach at Exit 4. The nearest was a small farmhouse. Summers sprinted for the door, kicked it in and sprayed the interior with his Thompson sub-machine-gun. Four of the defenders fell dead, the rest escaped through a back door to the neighbouring house. Summers looked round. Not one of his men had followed. They were sheltering in a roadside ditch. He charged the second house. The enemy left before he entered but his example now had its first effect. One of his fifteen, Private William Burt, came out into the open and set up his light machine-gun to cover Summers's movements. This took him to the third building, fifty yards away, from which the defenders were shooting through loopholes. On his run noticed that he had been joined by a lieutenant he knew, Elmer Brandenberger, but the officer was badly wounded as they reached the door and Summers entered alone. Again he sprayed the interior, killing six Germans and driving the remainder out of the back.

Summers was temporarily overcome by the physical and emotional shock of his single-handed demonstration. He crouched beside the building he had most recently cleared to recover, and it was half an hour before he moved again. But as he rose to go he found at his side an unknown captain *from* the All American, misdropped by miles, who said, "I'll go with you." He was shot through the heart almost with the words on his lips and Summers again found himself entering an enemy-held building without company. This time he killed six Germans and the rest ran out to surrender to his followers, who had crept up the ditch to within talking distance. One of them, Private John Camien, spoke.

"Why are you doing it?" he asked.

"I can't tell you", answered Summers.

"What about the others?"

"They don't seem to want to fight", said Summers, "and I can't make them. So I've got to finish it."

"OK", said Camien, "I'm with you."

Side by side, they worked their way down the row of buildings ahead of them, five in all, pausing to rest between each and swapping Camien's carbine for Summers's Tommy gun to take turns between charging and giving covering fire. In their rear, Burt, the machine-gunner, followed along to give extra support with his heavier weapon. Between the three of them they killed thirty more Germans.

Two buildings remained untaken. Summers charged the first and kicked the door open to find inside, inexplicably deaf to the fight raging around them, fifteen German artillerymen seated at mess tables eating breakfast.

He paused neither to reason why nor think of mercy; battle-crazed, he shot them all down in their places.

The last building was the largest and strongest in the WXYZ complex. Between it and the American party, which now included some of the stragglers who had been following Summers along the cover of the roadside ditch, stretched a small, flat and open field. From the cover of a bank, the attackers surveyed the objective. To one side of the building stood a shed and a haystack; Burt, Summers's lone machine-gunner, set up his weapon to fire tracer at them. Within minutes both were ablaze, the shed exploding as ammunition stored within caught the heat, driving its thirty German occupants into the open, where they were shot down. A new reinforcement to Summers's group now arrived with a bazooka and, deciding that walls of the last strongpoint were too stout to be penetrated by its rockets, fired at the roof instead. After seven shots flames began to lick through the rafters and torn tilework and to spread downwards. As the upper storey took fire the Germans in the lower storey continued to maintain a steady fusillade from loopholes in the walls. But as the heat rose their fire slackened and the collapse of the floor above drove them out to the waiting muzzles of the parachutists. Fifty died in the open. The survivors scattered into the hedges, but their escape was short-lived. When the Americans moved forward with levelled guns, thirty-one emerged with raised hands to offer their surrender. Those who had run earlier may have made the same gesture. But now that resistance was at an end, the mood of this terrible little battlefield changed. The attackers, suddenly *numerous* as the noise of fighting died away, lowered their weapons and hustled the prisoners to the rear. WXYZ thus passed to the invaders, and with it the last obstacle to free movement between Exit 4 and the landing zones. The 1st/502d had accomplished its mission.

Summers, bruised and bleeding all over his body from sharp and sudden encounters with door frames and house corners--a characteristic minor wound pattern of the street-fighting soldier--collapsed exhausted by his five hours of combat. As he lit a cigarette, a witness of his extraordinary exploits asked him, "How do you feel?" "Not very good", he answered. "It was all kind of crazy."

APPENDIX B: THE HISTORICAL PROGRAM--GETTING STARTED

I. Unit histories can be obtained by writing to the following address:

HQDA (DAAG-AMR-S)
Washington, D.C. 20310-1501

II. Assistance in establishing new unit associations or contacting those already in existence may be obtained from the following agencies:

Chief of Military History
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Washington, D.C. 20314
Phone: (202) 272-0317

Historical Services Division
U.S. Army Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
Phone: (717) 373-3178

III. The following agencies may be helpful in providing guidance and materials such as photographs, lineage and honors certificates, flags, etc. for unit museums, halls of fame, and other historical exhibits:

Chief of Military History
U.S. Army Center of Military History
Washington, D.C. 20314
Phone: (202) 272-0317/0308

Research Office
National Archives
Washington, D.C. 20409
Phone: (202) 523-3218

Historical Services Division
U.S. Army Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
Phone: (717) 373-3178

ENDNOTES

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2. Du Picq, p. 117.

3. Du Picq, p. 19. Du Picq is quoting General Francois de Negrier who served in the French Army in the early 19th century. General de Negrier served principally in the colonial army in North Africa.

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