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



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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THE SOVIET QUEST FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
Studies of Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the USSR

JAN A. DELLENBRANT

September 1986

Final Report for Period July 1986 - September 1986

Approved for public release: distribution unlimited

Prepared for:
Chief of Naval Research
Arlington, VA 22217

NAVAL POSTRGADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

Rear Admiral R. C. Austin
Superintendent

David A. Schrady
Provost

The work reported herein was supported in part by the Foundation Reseach Program of the Naval Postgraduate School with funds provided by the Chief of Naval Research.

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This report analyses the regional dimension of Soviet foreign policy. A theoretical framework on a bureaucratic politics-regional politics framework, is presented. The behavior of some big actors, like first parts secretaries on central and regional levels are analyzed. The main portion of the report is devoted to an analysis of Soviet foreign decision-making concerning the Baltic region and decisions taken during the Afghanistan and Polish crises.

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

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the creation of the first Russian state the political leaders of Russia have been preoccupied by the security of the country's frontiers. This fact has been pointed out by several scholars, including the eminent British historian Hugh Seton-Watson.[1] The reasons for his security obsession are obvious. Russia lacked natural, defensible borders both to the West and to the East. Frequent invasions from both these directions have quite naturally added to this security obsession.

The leaders of the Soviet Union inherited the security concerns of the Russian tsarist leadership. Also the Soviet Union was invaded, the first time by the Western powers during the Civil War, the second time by Germany in 1941.

Throughout the Russian and Soviet history the search for defensible borders has led to annexation of vast geographical areas. These activities originally of a defensive character, led in several cases to clearly aggressive behavior. Also today, fear of foreign intervention remains an important factor in Soviet decision-making. The world outlook from Moscow's horizon is that of encirclement. This interpretation may be correct or not. However, this factor remains an important aspect of Soviet decision-making.

The security of the frontiers of the modern Soviet Union is especially important in certain regions of the country. For example, the border security issue has been especially relevant for the Soviet Central Asian republics since the end of the 1970's. In fact, when justifying the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Brezhnev referred to the security concerns during the Prague spring of 1968 and the Polish crisis of 1980-81. A major Soviet concern during these crises appears to be the possibility of spillover effects from

the developments on the other side of the border into regions of the Soviet Union.

This study will deal with three cases where the regional security aspect of Soviet decision-making was important. Firstly, the Baltic region will be considered. The Soviet strategy for promoting stability in the Baltic republics has been that of integration. The three republics have become politically and economically firmly integrated with the rest of the Soviet Union. Secondly, Soviet Central Asia will be analyzed. Here, the Soviet leaders decided that an intervention of Afghanistan would be the best measure to counteract alleged foreign influence. The third case deals with Soviet-Polish relations. During the Polish crisis of 1980-81 there was a definite possibility of the Soviet military invasion. One motive for an intervention would have been the destabilizing effects of the Western parts of the USSR that the Polish development had. However, another strategy was chosen, a strategy of non-intervention, namely that of martial law.

The concerns for regional security could be studied both at the central and regional level. The republic level first party secretaries who supervise the political stability of their regions constitute an especially interesting source when studying the regional component in the Soviet decision-making. During the Brezhnev period the regional party secretaries became far more active in foreign policy matters than earlier. This fact has largely been overlooked in Western research on the Soviet Union.

Before the three case studies on the Baltic region, Central Asia and the Soviet-Polish problem will be presented a special analysis of the speeches and activities of the first party secretaries will be made. By comparing the speeches at different party congress the increased interest of republic level

party secretaries in foreign policy matters will be shown.

In the following section, preceeding that on the regional secretaries, the theoretical framework of this study will be established. Departing from a critique of totalitarianism, a model for the study of the Soviet Union, based on a combined bureaucratic politics-regional politics approach, will be presented.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Hugh Seton-Watson, "The Historical Roots," in Curtis Ueeble, ed., The Soviet States: The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy (Westview Press: Boulder Colorado, 1985), pp. 11 ff.

[2]Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to conduct the US-Soviet Contest (Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986).

II. RETHINKING THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

The question of "Who governs?" has been posed frequently in the political science literature. There has, however, been no unanimity in the answers presented. On the contrary, the answers have varied substantially as a result of different methods of investigation used. Some scholars have advocated a power elite model, while others have found the existence of competing groups and pluralism in the society.*

Also the Soviet studies there is an ongoing discussion about the character of power relations. Several models - often very generally formulated - have been presented. For a long time the totalitarian model dominated among the scholars. But also other approaches, the interest group model, the bureaucractic model, the corporativist model, have been presented. Nevertheless, the totalitarian model, sometimes with due modification, has retained its attraction among many scholars.

The difficulties with the models presented are often associated with their high level of abstraction. The whole Soviet society is characterized as being totalitarian or bureaucratic. The case might be that totalitarian features dominate in one area while other areas are characterized by pluralism or bureaucratic politics.

In this study, one policy area, Soviet national security policy, will be covered. One could expect that decision-making in this important and sensitive area would be concentrated to a few decision makers in Moscow. But if also bureaucratic and pluralistic tendencies could be discerned here, the case for the non-totalitarian models for the analysis of the USSR would be strengthened.

Security policy is here defined as those measures a country takes to

guarantee its freedom of action, also in the face of external threat. The goal of security policy would accordingly be to secure its own society (or own alliance). The most important aspect of security policy is the retention of freedom of action. Several security policy measures are used. Some measures are associated with military build-up. Other measures are directed towards the promotion of peace.

The security policy is formed through the combination of efforts originating from several policy areas, e.g. foreign policy, defense policy, and policy of aid to underdeveloped countries.

These apsects of security policy, however, refer mainly to the society's external relations. But there is also an internal dimension of security policy. This dimension includes military defense, civil defense, psychological defense, economic autarchy, etc.[1]

So far, only direct measures of security policy have been mentioned. It is also possible to discern indirect security policy measures, like the promotion of political legitimacy, cultural cooperation, etc. This analysis will focus solely on the direct measures of security policy. If the indirect aspects were also included, the problem would prove to be too wide. The main emphasis of the paper will be on theoretical considerations of how decision-making for direct national security is made in the Soviet Union. The main part of the analysis will be concentrated on contemporary developments.

Before entering the discussion about the nature of Soviet national security policy, it is necessary to state the importance of differentiating between empirical and normative analysis of the Soviet system. As Adam B. Ulam has put it, the "student of Soviet affairs has as his first task to be neither hopeful nor pessimistic, but simply to state that facts and tendencies

of Russian politics."[2] This observation is especially important in a time of deteriorating East-West relations.

Totalitarianism and Beyond

The locus classicus in the totalitarian line of political science research is the book Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy by Friedrich and Brzezinski. The totalitarian society is characterized by an official ideology, a single mass party and a terroristic police control. Furthermore, the state has a monopoly of mass communications and means of armed combat. Also, there is a central control of the entire economy.[3]

These six basic traits of totalitarianism were said to characterize both Communist and Fascist societies, who accordingly were basically alike. This does not mean, however, that the two types of societies should be regarded as identical. But the six traits that were briefly mentioned here, were supposed to exist in both types of societies.

Friedrich and Brzezinski also acknowledge the existence of certain areas where the totalitarian penetration was not in effect. These islands of separateness are the family, the churches, the universities and the military. In the latter case, a military identity of its own could develop, which however, has been counteracted by the regime through different measures, for example by forming party organizations in the Soviet armed forces.[4]

The totalitarian model has been criticized by several scholars. In this text, the criticism will not be dealt with in detail. One of the most penetrating criticisms of the totalitarian concept was presented by Peter Christian Ludz. Ludz stressed that cognitive and evaluative functions were nearly invariably fused in the concept of totalitarianism which must lead to its immediate rejection. Also, Ludz criticized the unwillingness of scholars

in the totalitarian tradition to formulate hypotheses that were empirically controllable.[5]

A more favorable approach to totalitarianism is taken by Georg Brunner. Brunner distinguishes between three main elements of totalitarianism:

> (1) Monistic structure of political domination (Monistische Herrschaftsstruktur). This monistic structure is present when decision making power are concentrated to one center.
>
> (2) Total extensiveness of political domination (Totaler Herrschaftsumfang). The dominating rule extends to all areas of society.
>
> (3) Total pursuit of political domination (Totale Herrschaftsausubung). There are no limites for the methods used in ruling the society.[6]

Despite profound changes in the Soviet society after Stalin, the main elements of totalitarianism are still, according to Brunner, in effect. This is, for example, visible in the use of terror against certain elements in the society, like the dissidents.

In the 1980's there has been a renewed interest in the concept of totalitarianism. One line of thought stresses that the critics of the totalitarianism model have distorted the original models and directed their criiticism at this distorted model. For example, the idea that Stalin himself should have taken all political decisions appears absurd. Nevertheless, such caricatures of the totalitarian models have existed.[8]

It is clear, however, that the totalitarian model presupposes a unified approach in decision-making. One person or a small group of persons take the most important decisions. There is little room for competition and bargaining. This implies that the totalitarian model is closely related to the rational actor approach.

The rational actor approach has been a dominating approach in the

analysis of international politics.[9] This approach has also been of great importance in the study of Soviet external relations. One recent example originates from Hannes Adomeit who has analyzed Soviet risk-taking behavior.[10]

Adomeit finds the bureaucratic politics model as presented by Alison useful in some internal decision making processes. But

> it appears much less helpful in the examination of foreign policy, and least of all international crises. Indeed, it would be a sad reflection of any political system if it were true that: "Threats to interests from rival organizations, or competing political groups, are far more real than threats from abroad."[11]

Adomeit's argument is convincing as regards the relative importance of external and internal threats. But the existence of a dangerous external threat does, of course, not rule out the possibility of differences of opinion between organizations and bureaucracies on how this threat should be met. This is clearly stated by Vernon Aspaturian who claims that the Soviet Union is a multiple entity, whose

> constituent parts have both contradictory, conflicting - even irreconcilable - motives, intentions, interests, and constituencies, as well as overlapping, intersecting and harmonious ones.[12]

A further dimension that emphasizes the conflicting aims of Soviet policy is the national one. The multinational character is more complicated than in most other countries of the world. Although several studies still take their departure in the rational actor approach the use of bureaucratic and group-oriented approaches in the analysis of Soviet foreign relations has increased. An important example of this is the volume The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy. As Alexander Dallin puts it, the "role of groups and groupings, though still contested by some commentators, is increasingly hard to deny".[13]

The bureaucratic policy paradigm is also used by Jiri Valenta in his analysis of Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia 1968. Valenta here makes a strong case for the bureaucratic politics approach. According to Valenta the bureaucratic politics paradigm is especially valuable when analyzing the different interests of the central decision makers and the maneuvers they employ. The paradigm could be used to elucidate the coalition politics among the Soviet bureaucrats.[14]

Valenta summarizes the argument of the bureaucratic paradigm in the following way:

> Soviet foreign policy actions like those of other states, do not result from a single actor (the government) rationally maximizing national security or any other value. Instead, these actions result from a process of political interaction "pulling and hauling" among several actors ...[15]

Among the several actors that Valenta discerns are also party leaders on the republican and oblast levels. Valenta shows that especially the Ukrainian party leaders were actively proposing a Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia at a time when no definite decision were taken in Moscow.[16] Valenta's results are confirmed also in earlier studies of the decision-making process before the intervention.[17]

Valenta's approach is elaborated in a study by Arthur Alexander. Alexander makes a distinction between two levels of decision-making. The high-level actors consist of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Secretariat, and the Presidium of Council of Ministers. The lower-level decision-makers include the production ministers, the Defense Ministry and the party organizations on the republican and local levels.[18]

The higher levels have the authority to make the real decisions. They often have to make decisions where different goals conflict with each other.

The lower levels implement the decisions, put forward proposals, and they generate conflict with each other that often must be solved by decisions on the higher levels.[19] This argument can be summarized as in Table 1.

Alexander's model for national security decision making is an interesting point of departure for further research. It raises, however, the problem of linkages between national and international phenomena. This problem will be the focus of the next section.

TABLE 1. A Model of High and Low-Level Interactions



The Problems of Linkages

The problem of linkages refers to the interplay of external and domestic politics in decision-making. The question is how the relationship between the two types of politics should be interpreted. The problems of linkages include both domestic influencing external policies and external factors leading to a change in domestic affairs.

According to Professor Rosneau a national-international linkage could be

defined as "any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another". Linakges could be classified in terms of whether they originate in a national political system and terminate in the external environment, i.e. the international system, or vice versa.[20]

Roseneau has suggested a "linkage framework" where he differentiates between kinds of environments where linkage patterns exist. The environments are labeled contiguous, regional, cold war, racial, resource oriented, and organizational. The linkage framework consists of the interaction between the environment and four aspects of the political system: institutions, actors, processes, and attitudes.[21]

The contiguous environment refers to any cluster of national political systems that border geographically upon a given national system. Here, phenomena like boundary disputes, historic rivalries and friendships etc. can be considered. The regional environment includes a large area, like Central America or Northern Europe.[22]

In the context of Soviet security policy, the contiguous environment linkages could be used to analyze "spillover" effects from developments in countries bordering with the Soviet Union itself. The case involving the existence of a reformist Communist regime, like the Czechoslovak in 1968, might lead to influence in the neighboring part of the Soviet Union[23]. This could in turn lead to a foreign policy action by the Soviet Union.

Also in a large area, the regional environment, certain developments could occur that might influence the Soviet Union in negative way as perceived by the Soviet leaders. Even here, a connection with foreign policy decision-making is possible[24].

A third type of environment could be of interest, namely the racial or

ethnic environment. The existence of the same ethnic group outside and inside the Soviet Union may have an international effect. For example, there are many connections between Poles in Poland and the Polish minority in Belorussia. Another type of relationship exists between emigre groups in Sweden originating from Estonia and Lativa and the people in Baltic republics.

To bring the analysis further, it is now necessary to include in the specific contents of Soviet policy. In the next section, some aspects of the Soviet view of national security will be discussed.

The Soviet View of National Security

It has been argued that Soviet foreign policy has primarily been a policy of national security. For a long time the policy has been granted toward territorial concerns and coping with possible invaders.[25] Of course, Russian and Soviet history give many examples of the importance of a national security policy, as the country has many times experienced foreign intervention. As early as in the 13th century old Russia was invaded by the Mongols. And after the revolution the Soviet Union was invaded twice. The first occasion was in 1918, the second in 1941.

Whatever exaggeration there may be in this picture, it has led the Soviet leaders to a feeling of encirclement which still appears to exist. As an outcome of this perceived encirclement buffer zones have created in East Europe and a massive military curtain has been built up round the borders of the Soviet Union.

The system of Soviet national security consists of several barriers between the Russian lands and the perceived enemies. In Europe, there are first the non-Russian republics (the Baltic republics, Byelorussia, the

Ukraine, Moldavia - and the Karelian republic) that provide a buffer zone. Then there are the East European client states which could be regarded as the second barrier. In other areas the buffer zones are somewhat less well developed, although there are large parts of the borders which are either non-Russian republics (like in Transcaucasia and Central Asia) or allied states (as Mongolia).[26]

The center in this system is the Russian heartland. This is, of course, in accordance with the overriding importance that is attached to the Russian people and the Russian culture in the Soviet Union. The importance of the Russian people is often stressed by Soviet politicians nowadays. This aspect will be elaborated below.

The system of barriers obviously has weak points. Especially in the areas where the client-state populations touch upon the non-Russian populations in the Western Soviet Union the system is insecure. This was seen during the Prague spring in 1968 and during the development in Poland 1980-81. Also, in areas where the same people live on both sides of the border - as in Azerbaidzan - the system is weak.[27]

The stress on national security does, however, not rule out the possibility of an aggressive policy of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan provides a clear example of this. Nor could a sharper conflict with the US be ruled out, as the US is the main threat to Soviet security.

The Soviet policy of national security also contains other elements which a more thorough analysis based also on Soviet sources will show. Quite obviously, what has been called the Brezhnev doctrine still plays an important role. Here, some elements dealing with what could be called the regional aspect of security policy have been highlighted. In the next section, this regional aspect will be further elaborated.

The Regional Dimension

In a book from 1970, Greg Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj proposed the "Ukrainian hypothesis" as an attempt at explaining the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Acording to the Ukrainian hypothesis political leaders from the Ukraine played a decisive role in the decision-making process before the intervention. Hodnett and Potichnyj especially focussed Shelest's and other Ukrainians' speeches and actions just before the intervention. The actions of the Ukrainians appear to have been of great importance in a situation where the Soviet top leadership and difficulties in deciding about the course to be taken on the Czechoslovak reform movement.[28]

The Ukrianian hypothesis was elaborated by Jiri Valenta in his study of Soviet decision-making on the eve of the intervention of Czechoslavakia. Valenta found clear evidence of the fear of spillover from the Czechoslovak reforms into the Ukraine among the Ukrainian leaders. Of course, the final decision to intervene was made by the Politburo. Other organizational actors of importance were the various departments of the Central Committee, the Ministry of defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the Committee for State Security (KGB).[29]

The decision makers who were responsible for internal affairs were especially concerned about the problem of spillover.

> In the perception of Party bureaucrats in the USSR's non-Russian republics, such P.E. Shelest, Politburo member and First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, and P.M. Masherov, candidate Politburo member and First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party, "deviate" ideas of reformism and federalism could spill over from Czechoslovakia to encourage nationalism in their own non-Russian republics. Shelest was perhaps also alarmed because of Dubcek federalization of Czechoslovakia, the restoration of national rights of the Ukrainian minority living in Slovakia, and the revival of the forbidden Greek-Catholic Church ...[30]

The Ukrainian connection can be seen as an example of the importance of the regional dimension in Soviet security policy. If the stability of a

crucial part of the Soviet national security systems is threatened, firm action will probably be taken by the Soviet leaders. Of course, also direct relations with the Western powers play an important role in the Soviet security policy. But if the barrier system of client states and non-Russian republics is threatened, the foundations of Soviet security policy is severely endangered.

The importance of the regional dimension in Soviet security policy is most clearly seen during times of major crises. Czechoslovakia 1968 is the obvious example. Another example would be the Afghanistan intervention in 1979.[31] It could be expected that similar considerations were made about Poland in 1981. Severe concerns about the development in Poland were expressed by republican party leaders during the 26th Party Congress.[32] Similar statements were reported at the Central Committee Plenum in June 1983.[33]

It has been argued by Vernon Aspaturian that the Soviet republics have played an important role in Soviet foreign policy for a long time. Aspaturian showed that the republics could be used as instruments of Soviet territorial expansion. The Karelo-Finnish republic was designed, according to Aspaturian, in order to eventually be merged with Finland into a new Soviet republic. The plans were, however, not brought into effect as the development of Finland took a path that was acceptable to the Soviet Union. Another example of how the republics could be used was the claim for multiple Soviet representation, e.g. in the United Nations and the Paris peace conference.[34]

The work of Aspaturian clearly indicat d that the regional dimension in Soviet foreign relations should not be underestimated. Aspaturian's findings are also in accordance with the works of Valenta and Alexander which have

been discussed above. But one more aspect of Soviet security policy has to be discussed further, namely the role of nationalism. This topic will be dealt with in the following section.

The Role of Nationalism

The importance of nationalistic sentiments have already been mentioned. One of the factors that has historically been of importance when the Soviet Union has intervened in neighboring countries has been the growth of nationalism, in the non-Russian republics.

However, it is necessary to make a distinction between national sentiment and nationalism. A national sentiment would include a strong emotional attachment to a national group, while nationalism has a mere political connotation. Nationalism could be said to refer to a political doctrine or a developed political movement.[35]

It goes without saying that national sentiments are an integrated part of the Soviet political culture. It is when a political component is added to these sentiments, i.e. when a nationalist doctrine or movement is formed, that the development could threaten the stability of the Soviet system. This reasoning mainly refers to the situation in the non-Russian republics.

But there is also another nationalism that has to be taken into account. There has been a growth of the importance of Russian nationalism during the last decade. This nationalism was, for example, clearly expressed during the 26th Party Congress when the importance of the Great Russian People (Velikiy Russkiy Narod) was stressed. Also, the Russian language was glorified at several occasions. It is interesting to note that both the Russian leaders and their non-Russian counterparts took part in this praise.[36]

The current stress on the Russian people and the Russian language could

also be interpreted as an instrument of strengthening the central power in the Soviet Union. As the learning of the Russian language is stimulated at the cost of the non-Russian languages, the basis for non-Russian national opposition is diminished.[37]

The Russian nationalism could also be regarded as a part of Soviet security policy. The spread of the Russian language is important for security reasons as it is the command language in the Soviet armed forces. It seems also that the ultimate goal of the Soviet armed nationality policy is a more or less unified people where no particularities - social or ethnic - play an important role.

However, this theoretical reasoning must also be tested against a more empirical material. In the following sections, some examples of Soviet security decision-making - where the nationalistic and regional factors have been of importance - will be given.

Conclusions

One purpose of this chapter was to review some of the models developed in Western social science on Soviet decision making. It was argued that the national security policy of the Soviet Union could be expected to conform with the totalitarian model. However, the analysis of other models for decision making indicates that also these models could be used from the writings of Valenta and Alexander, it could be argued that also the bureaucractic model may be applied. The bureaucractic model should also be added a regional dimension in security decision making.

From the developments on the eve of the intervention in Czechoslovakia, it is clear that this proposed bureaucractic-regional model is useful. The same is most probably true for the cases of Afghanistan 1979 and Poland

1981.[38] Another area where it would be of interest to apply the model is Northern Europe. Both the Baltic and the Barents Sea play an important role for Soviet security considerations. Here as well the proposed framework could be of value.

Developments in Uzbekistan and Estonia indicate the importance of the regional dimension in security policy. In June 1984 the Central Committee of the CPSU critized party and government leaders of Uzbekistan for corruption and inefficiency. Party and state discipline should be strengthened. In August 1984 the Central Committee demanded that the Estonian political leaders should fight against nationalism and western subversive activities.[39]

The question "Who governs?" has not received an answer in this chapter. On the contrary, it is necessary to remember the severe difficulties facing Western scholars when finding relevant data on the Soviet Union. One must also conclude that the availability of sources has not increased lately.

But the discourse made here shows the practicability of a bureaucratic-regional approach in the study of Soviet security policy. But more empirical research must be carried out to conform the usefulness of this model. Only solid empirical research, with a minimum of normative elements, can bring us to a better understanding of the Soviet political system.

FOOTNOTES

This chapter was originally presented at a conference on Totalitarianism organized by Tampere University, Finland, August 1984

[1]Cf. Nils Andren, Den totala sakerhetspolitken (Stockholm: Liber, 1971), pp. 38ff.

[2]Adam B. Ulam. "The World Outside," in Robert F. Brynes, After Brezhnev (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), p. 345.

[3]Carl J. Friedrich & Zibigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), p. 9f.

[4]Ibid, pp. 239ff and 280.

[5]Peter C. Ludz, The Changing Party Elite in East Germany (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 15f.

[6]Georg Brunner, Politische Soziologie der UdSSR, Teil II (Weisbaden: Akademishe Verlagsgesellschaft, 1977), p. 1.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Bent Jensen, "Forsvar for et foraeldret begreb", Contributions to Soviet and East European Research, No. 4/1981.

[9]Cf. Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

[10]Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).

[11]Ibid, s. 38.

[12]Vernon Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 5.

[13]Alexander Dallin, "The Domestic Spurces of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bailer ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 364.

[14]Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intevention in Czechoslavakia 1968, Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979) pp. 154f.

[15]Ibid., p. 4.

[16]Ibid., p. 15 and passim.

[17]Greg Hodnett & Peter Potichnyj, The Ukraine and and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Australian National University, 1970, Occasional paper No. 6, Department of Political Science).

[18]Arthur J. Alexander, "Modeling Soviet Defense Decision-making," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds. Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984) pp. 9ff.

[19]Ibid., p. 12.

[20]James N. Rosenau, "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages," in James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press 1969) p. 45.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Ibid., p. 61.

[23]Dallin, op. cit., p. 344.

[24]Ibid., p. 347.

[25]Johnathan Steele, World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy under Brezhnev and Andropov (London: Michael Joseph, 1983) p. 15.

[26]Cf. Edward N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) p. 86.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Greg Hodnett and Peter Poltichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis, op. cit.

[29]Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of A Decision (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

[30]Ibid., p. 15.

[31]Cf. Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decisionmaking in Afghanistan," 1979, in Valenta & Potter, op. cit.

[32]XXVI syezd KPSS Stenograficheskv otchot, Moscow: Politizdat, 1981.

[33]Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyunia 1983 goda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983).

[34]Vernon V. Aspaturian, The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy (Geneva: Libraire E. Druz, 1960).

[35]Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, "Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Case," World Politics, No. 4/1984, p. 561.

[36]XXVI syed, op. cit.

[37]Boris Lewtzkyj, "Sovtskii narod" "Das Sowjetvolk" - Nationalitatenpolitik als Instrument des Sowjetimperialismus.

[38]Cf. Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Union (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

[39]Utverzhdat distsipliny, vospityvat kadry, Pravda, June 26, 1984, and Ob uchastii rukovodyashchikh kadrov Estonskoi SSSR v politiko-vospitatelnoi rabote sredi trudyashchikhsya, Pravda, August 5, 1984

III. THE CHANGING ATTITUDES OF THE REGIONAL ELITE TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY

Several major political crises have occurred at the borders of the Soviet Union during the last two decades. The most important of these crises have been the rise of the reformist movement in Czechoslovakia and the following Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968, the 1980-81 crisis in Poland and the "state of war" period in that country, and the developments in Afghanistan that led to a Soviet invasion in 1979. All these crises had repercussions also in the USSR itself. The Czechoslovak movement inspired nationalists and dissidents in the Ukraine. During the Polish crisis public unrest was noted in the Baltic republics, especially in Estonia. Also the political changes south of the Soviet Central Asian borders have affected the southern regions of the Soviet Union, although these effects are not easily measured.*

These tendencies to instability in Soviet border areas are of great importance for Soviet national security considerations. Soviet officials often criticize the influx of hostile propaganda from movements that are of an anti-Soviet character. Especially where there are cultural and linguistic links between populations outside and inside the Soviet border the potential threat for increased political instability is perceived as extremely dangerous to the interests of the Soviet state. As mentioned above, the Russian and Soviet leaders have been preoccupied throughout history with the defense of frontiers, buffer zones etc. One reason for these extreme security considerations is, of course, the fact Russia and the Soviet Union have been the target of several foreign invasions.

The decison-making concerning these regionally based crises is mainly carried out among the central political leaders in Moscow. However, it is probable that also the regional political elite could play a role in the

decision-making process. The regional leaders are responsible for law and order in their respective areas. An analysis of the views of regional leaders could shed further light on Soviet national security decision-making.

Regional leaders are here defined as the first party secretaries of the republics. Those leaders -- all originating from non-Russian republics as the RSFSR has no republic party organization of its own -- play an important role in the political life of their republics and some of them also hold influential positions at the central level. In this chapter, the attitudes on foreign policy articulated by these regional leaders will be analyzed. A vast majority of scientific studies on Soviet decision-making has focussed on the central level, while inputs from the regional leaders have been by and large neglected.

Some research has, however, been made on the role of regional politicians. Hauslohner has showed that the oblast level first secretaries made several remarks on foreign policy at the 25th party congress in 1976.[1] In his book on the Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, Jiri Valenta pointed at the crucial role of Ukrainian party officials in the decision-making process. Valenta's findings confirm that the role of regional politicians might increase during major political crises.[2]

In the present analysis, two periods of time will be studied. Firstly, the beginning of the 1960s will be focussed and an analysis will be made of the speeches republic level first secretaries at the 22nd party congress. The beginning of the 1980s was selected as the second period. Here, the speeches at the 26th congress will be analyzed. In the period between the two congresses some fundamental changes took place, e.g. the Czechoslovak and Afghanistan interventions. The 26th congress was furthermore held during the

first period of the Polish crisis when the Solidarity movement was still in full operation.

The speeches at the two congresses will also be compared. As mentioned, important political changes occurred between the congresses. Also, new leaders did appear, both at the central and the republic levels. Consequently, the interplay between political changes and changes in the political elites will be of great importance.

The basic material for the analysis is the Russian language documentation from the party congresses. Also, articles and other material in Russian will be used. In the concluding section, further references to Western scholarly work will also be made.

The Twenty-Second Party Congress

The Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU held in October 1961 is important because of a number of reasons. At the Congress, a new party program was adopted, the third since the creation of the party. The new program called for a rapid increase of the standard of living in the Soviet Union. Soon the material basis for the transformation of the Socialist Soviet society to a Communist society should be established. The Twenty-Second Congress also marks a second step in the anti-Stalinization process. The so-called anti-party group, Molotov, Malenkov, and their supporters were criticized by the First Party Secretary, Nikita Khrushchev, for retaining Stalinist sympathies, and they were accordingly transferred to some positions of minor political importance.

The Congress took place in a period of tense international relations. The second Berlin crisis, culminating before the Congress, passed through its final stages during the Congress. A couple of months before the Congress, the

Berlin wall had been erected. By 1961, some three million people had crossed the border from the eastern to the western part of Berlin, thus undermining the economic and social stability of the GDR. The decision to build the wall was clearly seen by the western powers as a violation of the Potsdam agreement and, accordingly, the east-west relations deteriorated severely as an outcome of the Berlin crisis.

Before the Congress it had become increasingly evident that also Sino-Soviet relations had changed significally. Areas of discontent articulated by the Chinese were the ongoing anti-Stalinization campaign and changes in the Soviet ideological framework. Chinese Premier Chou En Lai, who was an invited guest of the Congress, showed his dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's speeches by leaving the Congress.

During the period of the Congress signs of a new upcoming major US-Soviet crises could be seen. An American defense official had challenged the Soviet claim of military superiority over the US. At a later stage of this crisis, the Soviet Union installed its missiles in Cuba, and the Cuban Missile Crisis evolved.

Hence, the Soviet situation in regards to international affairs appeared to be problematic. Also, in the field of domestic politics several problems prevailed. One example of this was the difficulties in the decentralized planning system created by Khrushchev in 1957. Also, the Soviet agriculture had severe problems.

The problematic state of affairs for the Soviet Union was not at all reflected in the new party program. In fact, the program was extremely optimistic and stated that by 1980 the Soviet Union should surpress the United States for several important economic indicators. Furthermore, it was noted

that the world capitalist system was ripe for a social revolution conducted by the proletariat.

In virtually all speeches by republic level party secretaries at the Congress, the new program was praised and the role of Khrushchev was pointed out as crucial for the future development of the Soviet Union. The speeches by the first party secretaries are filled with general remarks about their support for the foreign policy purused by the Soviet leaders.

The attitudes of the regional party secretaries do not in particular differ from those of the central leaders as regards to foreign policy matters. This is by no means surprising taking into account the centralized character of the CPSU. There are, however, in a couple of cases different emphasis given to problems of national security and foreign policy. This is particularly evident for some of the leaders originating from the western Soviet republics.

The republic leaders made several general remarks on the international situation. The Soviet Union should, according to these leaders, stop evil propaganda attachs from the imperialist countries. According to Ukrainian party secretary, Podgorny, the imperialists try to falsify the ideas of Communism. But the experiences of the Soviet people clearly shows the futility of such action.[3]

Similar statements were also made by other leaders. Mzhavanadze of Georgia asked for continued support for the policy of the Soviet government to avoid war and to stop the aggression from imperialist circles.[4]

These general remarks by the republic leaders are characterized by an extreme vagueness. The imperialists are criticized for anti-Soviet propaganda, but these imperialists are not identified by name. On the whole,

a very cautious attitude was adopted by most of the leaders, and the statements were made in a more or less ritual fashion. It would be difficult to argue that these statements were made in order to influence Soviet foreign policy actions.

Only one of the republic leaders made more specific statements on foreign policy matters. Lithuanian first secretary Sneckus identified precisely the centers of imperialist aggression.

> American imperialists and their servants -- the Lithuanian bourgeois nationalists -- try in vain to revive nationalist presumptions in order to achieve their anti-Soviet goals. The same action is taken by the Vatican which tries to use some remaining influences of the Catholic church on segments of the population.[5]

There is no doubt that the threat perceived by Sneckus was real. Lithuanian emigrants have been active in their political work for a long time. Also, it is clear that the Catholic Church has an influence on the Lithuanian population that should not be underestimated. This influence was apparent also during later periods, e. g. during the 1980-81 Polish crisis.

Sneckus also criticized the Federal Republic of Germany for pursuing a militarist and revenchist policy. He also stated that Lithuania alone lost approximately the same number of lifes as the United States and England from World War II German aggression. To counteract the renewed West German militarism Lithuania had to strengthen its ties with the German Democratic Republic. Furthermore, Lithuania and the other Baltic republics are now an integral part of the Soviet Union which the imperialists cannot accept.[6]

It is interesting to note that Sneckus pointed at the Lithuanian friendship with the GDR as a stabilizing factor for this part of Europe. This could indicate that Sneckus did not perceive Poland as a stable country,

bearing in mind the Polish crisis in 1956. Also, it is clear that, in the parlance of Sneckus, Poland suffers from the same "destabilizing influence from the Vatican" as does Lithuania.

The world outlook of Sneckus could be summarized by one sentence in his speech: "By god, let us hope that the American people could be as free as we Lithuanians, in the Soviet Union."[7]

As mentioned, Sneckus was the only one of the party secretaries to give a more specific analysis of the foreign relations of a Soviet republic. This could be attributed to the fact that forces outside the Soviet Union had been especially active in their actions towards Lithuania. Also, it is clear that the resistance to incorporate into the Soviet Union remained longer in Lithuania than in other Soviet republics. Only 17 years had passed since the date when Lithuania definitely became a Soviet republic when the speech was made.

One explanation to the relative silence of other party secretaries on foreign affairs would be that external threats similar to those in Lithuania were not existing in the other republics. Another possibility would be that the secretaries of the other republics regarded foreign policy matters as the sole responsibility of the central leaders. This second explanation is supported by the fact that the Estonian party secretary Kabin made no reference whatsoever to foreign relations. The situation in Estonia should resemble closely Lithuania's. The remarks by Sneckus could still be related to the proximity of Lithuania to Germany and Poland and the extremely difficult internal situation to conform with this second explanation.

Athough the republic secretaries made few specific comments on foreign policy at the Twenty-Second Congress, several interesting comparisons between

Soviet republics and adjacent non-socialist countries were made. These remarks were almost exclusively made by party secretaries from the Southern Soviet republics.

The first party secretary of Kirgizia, Usubaliev, pointed out that production of major individual goods in Kirgizia surpassed that of Iran and Pakistan several times.[8] Achundov, first secretary of Azerbaidzhan, stated the level of economic development in his republic had for a long time been higher than that of its neighbors Iran and Turkey.[9] The level of education in Turkmenistan was, according to first party secretary Ovezov, higher than the corresponding level of its Southern neighbors. Also the medical services in Turkmenistan were well ahead of those of its neighbors.[10]

The purpose of these cross-national comparisons was, of course, primarily to show the superiority of the Soviet system. They could be used in the Soviet propaganda to attract segments of the population in the Southern neighboring states to a Soviet type communism. But the comparisons could also be used to show the domestic population that a non-socialist course of development would most probably lead to a lower standard of living. This is especially important taking into account the close cultural links between the people in the Central Asian region.

At the Twenty-Second party congress, the republic level first party secretaries devoted their speeches almost entirely to progress and problems in domestic politics. The main focus was on the economic development of the respective republics. Very few remarks were made on foreign affairs. When such remarks were made they were surprisely cautious and sweeping. This indicated that the main task of the republic level secretaries was to supervise the internal development of the republics, especially in the

economic sector. One exception from this pattern was first party secretary Sneckus of Lithuania. Due to extreme external influences on this republic combined with problems of internal stability Sneckus gave voice to severe concerns about foreign policy matters. The overall pattern, however, appears to be that in the beginning of the 1960s matters of foreign policy was exclusively left to the central leadership.

The Twenty-Sixth Party Congress

The Twenty-Sixth CPSU Congress took place in 1981, twenty years after the Twenty-Second Congress. In 1981 Leonid Brezhnev participated in his last party congress. About a year after the congress, the prolonged succession crisis after Brezhnev started. In 1981 the Soviet leadership had to face several severe problems, both in the international and the domestic areas. Yet, there were few novelties presented at the congress. Little information was received about the future political succession, which at that time was almost certain to occur in the immediate future. This does not preclude that comparatively interesting discussions were held at the congress, and that valuable data on the functioning of the Soviet society could be found.[11]

Both the superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, were confronted with serious crises at the beginning of the 1980s. The United States experienced deteriorating relations with Iran and Nicaragua. For the Soviet Union, old problems, as the conflict with China, remained and even more serious new crises appeared along its borders, in Afghanistan.

A special problem for the Soviet Union was how to deal with the new and more assertive leadership of the United States. The risk that the Soviet Union would be compelled to engage in a new large-scale arms race was apparent. On the whole, the prospects for a continued detente with the U.S.

appeared at that time as highly unlikely.

However, at the beginning the Soviet Union was far more powerful than it had ever been. It had achieved considerable gains in its international influence at the same time as it had met with significant failures.

The two major international crises that the Soviet Union had to cope with at this time were the invasion of Afghanistan and its aftermath and the events in Poland. The invasion of Afghanistan had turned out to be more costly than was initially expected. No significant gains could be registered for the Soviet troops. The whole situation developed into a kind of deadlock. No signs in the direction that the Soviet Union planned to withdraw from Afghanistan could be seen, however. At the time of the congress the war in Afghanistan had been going on for a little more than one year, and the outcome of the operation was to a large extent unclear.

The Polish crisis that erupted in Poland in 1980 posed an even more serious threat to Soviet security than did Afghanistan. Poland is an extremely important part of the East European alliance system with a large population, a highly developed economy, and a strong military force. The seriousness of the Polish crisis -- seen from Moscow's point of view -- originates from the fact that the Solidarity movement had considerable support from the population, especially the working class and that also the Catholic Church gave its support to the changes. The social revolution also had a devastating effect on the Polish United Workers Party which was partly desintegrated during the crisis. Even if the martial law -- which was declared in December of 1981 and lasted until July 21, 1983 -- solved the problems temporarily for the Polish leadership the situation was far from stable in Poland. When the CPSU congress was held, the Polish crisis was still in full effect.

In the domestic field, the Soviet decision-making elite had to face the problem of economic stagnation. This phenomenon had been virtually unknown in the Soviet Union, since the present planning system was introduced. Also, the Soviet economy was dependent on Western inputs in order to increase its level of technology. Another area where problems began to be encountered was energy. The new oil and gas fields in Siberia did not increase its production as expected. Especially, the situation for the oil industry was difficult. The economic difficulties could be easily noted by the fact that the overall growth rate for the Soviet economy was decreasing.

Most of these problems were also recognized by the speakers at the congress. The economic difficulties were analyzed in detail. But is somewhat surprising that almost no specific decisions were taken to improve the situation. The overall impression of the congress was that a cautious, conservative policy should be continued in virtually all areas.

The economic difficulties were also analyzed by the republic level party secretaries at the Twenty-Sixth Congress. As in 1961, these leaders devoted the major part of their speeches to describe the state of affairs in the economies of the republics. But contrary to the congress in 1961, the republic leaders at the Twenty-Sixth Congress also showed considerable interest in matters of foreign policy. Almost all republic leaders made extensive remarks on problems of foreign policy. As a general rule, they commented on problems that were especially relevant for their own republics, like the development in Poland for the western republics and the situation in Afghanistan and China for the Central Asian republics.

To a large extent, the attitudes of the republic leaders in the field of foreign policy appear much more open and modern in 1981 as compared to 1961.

Political successions have taken place in most of the republics during this twenty year period. Only four leaders were the same, all from Central Asian republics. The republic leaders had in 1981 to face major crises in the vicinity of their republics. It is therefore not surprising that they were far more outspoken about foreign affairs. Another explanation to their increased activity could be sought in the fact that interest groups came to play a more important role in the late Brezhnev era than earlier.

It is clear from many of the speeches that also the republican party secretaries regard the U.S. as the main enemy of the USSR. Imperialist aggression, directed by the U.S., could be seen in seven different areas. Shcherbitsky from the Ukrainian republic remarked that the aims of the Washington leadership to dominate the world was an extremely dangerous policy. Lately, the most reactionary militaristic forces of the U.S. had been activated.[12]

Some of the most interesting remarks from the republican leaders dealt with the situation in Poland. The three Baltic first party secretaries and the Byelorussian party secretary all indicated that the situation in Poland was extremely dangerous, especially as there was a connection between the Polish crisis and the alleged aggression of imperialist forces.

Kiselev of Byelorussia stressed the fact -- according to his opinion -- that the imperialists were inflicting terror against the democratic-revolutionary movement. It was therefore necessary to retain the unity of the socialist countries. Even "a minor deviation from the essence and principles of this true unity" would hurt the Communist and Workers' movement.[13]

The reference by Kiselev to the Polish situation's was obvious. The Polish crisis was not only a minor deviation but a major challenge to the unity of the socialist system. Kiselev hurried to ascertain that the workers

of Belorussia would support the Central Committee even more than earlier.

As in 1961, the Lithuanian party leader made several remarks on foreign policy at the 1981 congress. First secretary Griskevicius stressed that ideological work and political education had received considerable attention in Lithuania lately. In Lithuania, there were signs that parts of the population had been inspired by the influences of bourgeois moral and anti-Sovietism originating from Lithuanian emigres with the support of U.S. imperialism and the Catholic Church.[14]

Griskevicius also mentioned that the communists were "observing the development of the Polish situation with great worries". It was necessary to bring to an end the imperialist interference in that country which is a necessary part of the socialist system.[15]

The conclusion to be drawn by Griskevicius speech is that the Polish events had had a considerable impact on the Lithuanian population. The Lithuanian party leader was extremely outspoken on the dangerous situation in Poland. With the support of emigres, the ideas of the Polish social revolution could be transferred also to Lithuania. Bearing in mind that also in 1961 the situation in Lithuania showed signs of instability -- as indicated by Sneckus -- the new development in Poland would no doubt pose an extreme v serious threat to the existing system of Soviet power in Lithuania.

The general tone in the speech by Augusts Voss of Latvia was similar to that of the Lithuanian leader, although Voss' speech was somewhat more cautious. Voss made the remark that the party organizations in Latvia had increased its activities to encourage "Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism among the workers".[16]

Voss' speech indicates that the levels of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism had not been developed enough in Lativa. Following the

interpretation these concepts are given in Marxist-Leninist theory, one can only conclude that nationalism and support for the development in Poland had been wide-spread in Latvia. Soviet patriotism is most probably used by Voss as the opposite of nationalism. Socialist internationalism could, in this case, only refer to the Polish case. The Latvian workers must understand that deviation like the Polish one might endanger the whole system of cooperation among socialist countries.

The most succinct presentation of the position of the non-Russian republics was given by Karl Vaino, Estonia's first party secretary.

> Estonia is situated in the periphery of the ideological struggle because of its specific geographical position. It is situated where the anti-Soviet propaganda has concentrated its resources . . . .It is impossible not to label the situation a psychological war.[17]

Vaino here very strongly condemns the activities of anti-Soviet organizations. But in his reasoning he also includes the Finnish television network which could be received on the Northern shores of Estonia.

According to Vaino, the bourgeois propaganda attacks the principles of socialist internationalism in order to create divisions and cleavages among the socialist countries. Especially, the Baltic emigre groups are responsible for this development.[18]

The divisions and cleavages referred to by Vaino must be interpreted as relating to the Polish situation. Bourgeois strategists and emigre groups are responsible for the Polish events.

But apparently have the Polish events also had influence on the situation among workers and students in Estonia. Vaino reported that measures were taken to intensify propaganda and agitation work among the masses.[19] The more specific reasons for this was, of course, the unrest among workers and students in Estonia during the time of the Polish crisis.

The leaders of the western republics were mainly concerned with enemy propaganda originating from imperialist circles and emigre groups. They were also critical to the situation in Poland and its possible effects on their respective republics.

It is difficult not to believe that the concerns that were expressed by the western republican leaders were genuine. These leaders had, after all, the responsibility for law and order in their areas. For them it was a serious thing if their own populations were to a large extent influenced by the Polish "contagion". Their general outlook on the effects of the Polish events appear to be even more negative than the central leadership. Accordingly, it could be expected that these leaders on the republican level would prefer an even more powerful policy of the USSR against Poland.

A few of the republic level party leaders dealt with problems that referred to the current Sino-Soviet conflict. The Kazakh leader Kunaev stressed that at that time also the Chinese leaders took part in all anti-Soviet actions. China had also brought about a militarization of the province of Sin-Kiang, and furthermore, been responsible for provocations at the border.[20]

The Turkmenistan party leader Gapurov sided with the criticism of China as developed by Kunaev. He also criticized foreign centers and radio stations that provide desinformation about the Soviet Union. Especially unacceptable were the attempts to transfer certain "religous dogmas" to the USSR.[21]

The religious influences that Gapurov discussed was of course of Islamic origin. Gapurov pointed at the risks that this religious influence would mean. More specifically, the religious influences could probably refer to some type of Islam fundamentalism.

A clear support for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was voiced by Kirgizia's first secretary, Usubaliev. The Soviet people would, according to Usubaliev, oppose any imperialist interference in the Afghan revolution. This is especially important, as the Soviet decision to give support to the Afghan revolution was based on the principle of international solidarity and on the will of the Soviet people and its nationalities.[22]

At the 1981 party congress, the republican leaders dealt with foreign policy matters to a much larger extent than during the 1961 congress. Although of course the domestic problems were of major importance, nearly all of the non-Russian republican secretaries devoted sections of their speeches to foreign policy considerations. The geographical distribution was such that the leaders of the western republics, especially of Estonia, Lavia, and Lithuania as well as Byelorussia were much concerned with influences from Western Europe, from emigres, and, of course, also from the events originating from the Polish social revolution.

The leaders of Central Asia were mostly concerned with China's increasing influence, and the role of Islamic fundamentalism south of the Soviet border. An important force behind the anti-Soviet activities is also here U.S. imperialism.

Especially dangerous for the stability of the non-Russian republics appears the spread of external ideas into these republics which would in turn have a domestic effect. Examples of such scenario's are rapid political changes in the Baltic republics as a consequence of the Polish development. Another case would be the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to South Central Asia.

From the analysis of the speeches by republican leaders it has been

possible to find important differences in the attitudes to foreign policy as expressed by the party leaders. Is this a mere coincidence, or are the changing attitudes a function of new political conditions? In the concluding section, there will be made an attempt to give an answer to this question.

Conclusions

The Soviet Union changed significantly during the two decades between the Twenty-Second and the Twenty-Sixth congresses. During this period the Soviet Union became more open than during earlier times. The inflow of information from abroad increased, although the major means of communication were still very restricted. The number of foreign visitors to the Soviet Union also increased.

During the twenty-year period between the two congresses the Soviet Union was heavily engaged in foreign affairs. It extended its foreign policy actions also to areas outside the Eastern alliance, e.g. in Africa. Also, several major crises took place in areas adjacent to the Soviet Union, as in Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Poland.

The style of leadership in 1981 was quite different from that in 1961. At the beginning of the 1960s Khrushchev had reached the peak of his power, but there also visible signs of beginning erosion of his power. In 1981, the authority of Brezhnev was clearly descendant, and it was obvious that he no longer had total control of the Party's policies.[23]

The differences between the Soviet society in 1961 and 1981 are also reflected in the attitudes expressed by the republican party leaders. In 1961 they only mentioned foreign policy issues in passing. Their main interest appeared to be in the field of the domestic economy. In 1981 their attitudes were more open. Apart from considerations on domestic economic problems they

also frequently discussed problems of foreign policy. The situation in Poland was characterized as problematic by some of the republican leaders. The Catholic church was heavily criticized. Also, the relations with China were discussed and the "militarist" Chinese policy was condemned. Several of the leaders also dwelt upon the Afghanistan crisis. It was pointed out that imperialist infiltration was the main reason for the Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

From the wording of the speeches, the impression is clearly that of genuine concern from the party secretaries. They are mostly worried about the internal stability of their republics and the effects that external influences could get. From the written material available there are no reasons to believe that the republican leaders were not really worried by, for example, the "Polish contagion" and in influences on the non-Russian republics.

But there is also another possibility. The new attitudes of the regional politicians could be orchestrated from the center. For some reason, the decison-makers in Moscow would find it useful that the republican party leaders should bring up certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy. However, this interpretation is unlikely for a number of reasons. Firstly, the question remains why the republican leaders expressed an interest in foreign policy in 1981 and not in 1961. Secondly, the variations in the messages from the republican leaders are unaccounted for in this explanation. Why should some leaders speak in detail about foreign policy while others made more general remarks? Why should the leaders of Turkmenia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan discuss the external threats at great length but not the Uzbek leader? Orchestration does occur in the Soviet context, but it appears that it is more common when unity is called for, and not when differences are manifested.[24]

The increased interest in foreign policy was not uniformily distributed among the party secretaries. It occurred mostly among the leaders of the European republics close to the western border and among the Central Asian leaders. This pattern suggests that the leaders of the republics situated in the vicinity of crisis areas, like Poland and Afghanistan, have found it more important to voice their concern over external influences. No significant differences could be found between regional leaders who were members of central party organs and those who were not.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the material from the party congresses is that the republic level politicans have been forced to take a more active interest in foreign affairs. This has the origin in the fact that the Soviet Union nowadays is relatively more open to external influences. The severe crises close to the Soviet borders have had repercussions also for the adjacent non-Russian republics. It appears that the populations of these republics have been influenced by reformist ideas and religious revivalism. These influences have increased existing tendencies of nationalism in the non-Russian republics. The implications for Soviet national security have, in many cases, been serious. The reactions from the republic level party leadership has been firm. The republic leaders have adopted an extremely negative attitude to the external ideas and asked for decisive measures be taken by the central leadership.

This reasoning does not suggest that the republican leaders take an active part in foreign policy decision-making. But it seems that they try to influence decisions that directly concern their respective republics. It could be expected that these leaders play a more important role during major crises in areas close to their republics. Also, it appears the role of the

regional politicians would increase over time. This would, consequently, be in congruence with the findings of other scholars that have attributed a increasingly important role to groups in Soviet decisionmaking.[25]

The findings of this paper also seem to coincide with those of Jiri Valenta's in his analysis of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.[26] The reactions of the Baltic leaders during the Polish events closely resemble those of the Ukrainian leaders during the Czechoslovakia crisis.

The analysis of this paper has been limited to two party congresses. However, the regional party leaders have expressed similar attitudes in articles and speeches also after the Twenty-Sixth congress. An example of this is the June plenum of the Central Committee in 1983, where similar remarks as at the Twenty-Sixth congress were made. For example, the Estonian strikes in 1980 and 1981 were disucssed by Vaino and the Islamic influence was criticized by Usubaliev of Kirgizia.[27] Hence, the same kind of participation in the foreign policy decision-making process by the regional politicans continued also during the Andropov interlude. There is no reason to expect that this pattern will be discontinued during the Gorbachev reign.

FOOTNOTES

This chapter was originally presented to the III World Conference on Soviet and East European Studies, Washington, DC, October - November 1985.

[1]Peter Hauslohner, "Prefects as Senators: Soviet Regional Politicians Look to Foreign Policy", Slavic Review, March 1978.

[2]Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia: Anatomy of a Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

[3]XXII syezd KPSS, stenograficheskiy otchot, tom 1. Moscow: Politizdat, 1962, p. 269. It should be noted that some of the republic level leaders also held positions in the politburo. Problems of interpretation connected with this fact will be discussed in the concluding section.

[4]Ibid., p. 354.

[5]Ibid., tom 2, pp. 51f.

[6]Ibid., p. 53.

[7]Ibid., p. 54.

[8]Ibid., p. 55.

[9]Ibid., tom 1, p. 377.

[10]Ibid., p. 440.

[11]For a detailed account of the congress, especially on central political and economic themes, see Seweryn Bialer & Thane Gustafson, Russia the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

[12]XXVI syezd KPSS, stenograficheskiy otchot, tom 1. Moscow: Politizdat, 1981, p. 117.

[13]Ibid., p. 145.

[14]Ibid., p. 193.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid., p. 252.

[17]Ibid., p. 326

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 327.

[20]Ibid., p. 128.

[21]Ibid., p. 314.

[22]Ibid., p. 272.

[23]George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).

[24]Cf. Dina Rome Spechler, Domestic Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington: University Press of America, 1978), p. 5.

[25]Alexander Dallin, "The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981).

[26]Valenta, op. cit.

[27]Plenum TSK KPSS, 14-15 iyunia 1983, stenograficheskiy otchot (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983).

IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE BALTIC REPUBLICS INTO THE USSR

In 1940, the three independent republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania wre incorporated into the Soviet Union.* A rapid transformation of political, social, and economical life began shortly afterwards. Theses changes were interrupted by the German occupation 1941-44. In 1944, Estonia, latvia and Lithuania became Soviet republics for the second time - and now for many years to come.

With the acquisition of the Baltic states, natural borders were by and large obtained in the North-Western part of the Soviet Union. After the incorporation into the Soviet Union this area became an important military stronghold. Also, access to several important part of the east coast the Baltic was guaranteed.

But the republic remained a borderland of the Soviet Union with continuing ties with foreign countries, like Finland and Poland. Popular dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime was widespread. This dissatisfaction was obvious even in the beginning of the 1980's.

The policy chosen by the Soviet leaders to overcome the ongoing crisis in the Baltic republic was that of integration. By integrating these republics politically, economically and in other respects this border area should become stable. But as will be seen in the analysis below, the attempts at integration have only been partially successful. Thus the problem of regional security in this part of the Soviet Union remains crucial.

The Concept of Integration

The incorporation of the three Baltic republics into the Soviet Union would seem to corroborate Morgenthau's pessimistic comments on the subject of political integration almost forty years ago.

> We proposed that the first step towards the peaceful settlement of the international conflicts that might lead to war was the creation of an international community as foundation for a world state. We find that the creation of an international state presupposses at least the mitigation of minimization of international conflicts so that the interests uniting members of different nations may outweigh the interests separating them.[1]

Morgenthau addresses himself to the pros and cons of integration of the most comprehensive variety, but the problems are basically the same as we move from the global to a regional context. Nations are not likely to move towards political integration of their own accord unless already in a state of harmony, precluding conflicts among them. And to the extent that conflicts are an integral part of the international political system, moves towards political integration do not have particularly high probability of success attached to them.

This is not the place to delve into the nature of international politics. Suffice it to say that the notion of political integration, to say nothing about the actual process, has been known to introduce tensions where there were none before. Morgenthau, for instance, quotes representation as one of the most decisive issues among presumptive signatories to a treaty uniting nations. The catchword is the sovereignty cherished by leaders and followers alike.[2] The four Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden - constitute what Deutsch[3] calls a pluralistic security community, but proposals containing elements of supranationality have so far sheltered for mutual fear that the other parties to the treaty might not respect one's own fundamental national interests in a decisional context without minority safeguards.

This leads to the second part - war as a catalyst of political integration. The theme is implicit among the realists like Morgenthau with their emphasis on war as a last resort, and quite explicit among the students

of political development like Almond and Powell with their empahsis on the violent character of the process of national unification.[4] It is described as slow, disjointed and at least initially resisted by the weaker party. Nations like Sweden and France needed several hundred years to complete the process of national integration within present boundaries. Britain and Spain, whose government still encounter resistance - some of it serious - in the once conquered peripheries, apparently need even more time.

The Baltic states and the Soviet Union appear to be representative of the latter scenario which - for want of a better term - may be referred to as integration under duress. In 1940 and again in 1944 the Soviet Union was by far the strongest force in the region and in a position to impose its will on the peripheral states. The referenda of 1940 formally sanctioning the fait accompli - Estonia's Lativia's and Lithuania's loss of independence and incorporation into the Soviet Union - are often interpreted in this light. Their initially sympathetic attitude to Nazi Germany in the wake of Hitler's surprise attack on Russia in June of 1941 does in any event testify to the low level of allegiance to the Soviet Union in the Baltic republics at this juncture. It took Nazi Germany defeat by the Soviet army for the Baltic states to return to the status quo ante, i.e. to reappear as Soviet socialist republics; and the appropriate question now, almost half a century later, is what has been achieved by way of integration.

The rich Western literature on political integration has surprisingly little to say about the prospects of intergation on such conditions. The contending approaches -federalism, pluralism, functionalism and neo-functionalism -pivot on the theoretically attractive notion of integration with the consent of the parties concerned, seemingly oblivious that most, if

not all, West-European nation-states are by-products of what we just called integration under duress. The alternative approaches are, however, helpful in identifying key-variables conducive or detrimental to the process of integration.

FIGURE I

END-PRODUCT

INTEGRATIVE PROCESS	State-Model	Community-Model
DIRECT -Political Variables	Federalism	Pluralism
INDIRECT -Socio-Economic Variables	Neo-functionalism	Functionalism

CLASSIFICATION OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO INTEGRATION

Source: Pentland (1973)

The position of an approach in the above two-by-two matrix is determined by two phenomena; the end-product (state vs community) envisaged and the variables (political vs socio-economic) emphasized by scholars operating within the respective research tradition. It is worth noting that state in this context is synonymous with supranationality; i.e. a transfer of power and authority from the old nation-states to a new transnational body, while community refers to group loyalties transcending old national boundaries. The political variables pertain to power, responsiveness, control and, last but not least, to the habits and attitudes of leaders and followers alike, while the

socio-economic variables represent long-term structural determinants of change such as economic development and technological innovations. The federalists, many of who, were influential in drafting post WWII West-European integration schemes, may thus be seen to depart from a notion of supranationality while relying on the short-term political catalysts of change, thereby differentiating themselves from the neo-functionalists, many of who, subsequently rose to positions of influence within the European Community, who except the indirect long-term socio-economic factor to work towards the same goal, a federation of European states.[5]

Though not directly applicable to what we have called integration under duress, Pentlands's typology is helpful in structuring the questions to put. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are Soviet republics, legally on par with other republics of the federal union. Supranationality and common political - and military - action, but it is an open question to what extent this has affected political behavior and attitudes. The political and economic union between Soviet Union and the formerly independent Baltic states technically paved the way for socio-economic changes that may be conducive towards integration, but it is largely an open question to what extent this has happened. The questions, of course, are not rendered any less relevant by the fact that current Soviet theory on the subject forsees a gradual bridging of the gaps and barriers between regions and nationalities as part of the historically given development towards a classless society.

A similar approach to integration is advocated by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos in a study of integrative process in the EEC. According to Seers and Vaitos, integrative processes are at work almost everywhere by way of capital flows, migration, cultural interchange etc. A specific aspect of

economic integration is the refunction of social or geographic differences in income and wealth distribution.[6]

Soviet statistics are less than ideal for the purposes of this analysis. They are scant and -by some accounts -unreliable. Elections serve other functions than in the West; the party system leaves little or no room for dissent; opinion polls are rare and their results subject to restricted circulation. We have little choice but to use what little we have as best we can; and we, therefore, let nationality and its various dimensions (the ration of the ethnic groups over time, language skills over time, etc.) serve as a proxy for the crucial behavioral and attitudinal variables. Socio-economic data are available in richer supply, but not always cast in categories that lend themselves to the kinds of analyses we have preferred. By way of example, it may be mentioned that they do not allow to identify all relevant transactions between Estonia on one hand and the other Soviet socialist republics on the other. There is not much to do about that whether except issue appropriate warnings as to the validity of the indicators, whenever needed.

As for the quality of the Soviet data, the situation is quite straightforward. It is either Soviet data or no data at all; and to the extent that they are manipulated, we would expect the biases to be systematic and of limited relevance for those primarily interested in time series data. Our data do in any event lend themselves to the identification or theoretically meaningful trends as evidenced by the following sections on demographic, cultural, political and economic change in the Baltic Republics. The Soviet theory of integration and its importance for the study remain to be accounted for, however, and this section is concluded by addressing this topic.

In the Soviet theory, several stages in the development of the nationalities comprising the USSR could be singled out. An initial period of flourishment (rastsvet) where the national cultures develop independently as followed by a rapproachement (sblizhenie). Sblizhenie describes a process which intergates people without national differences being eliminated.[7]

There is also a third stage involved. For a long time it was assumed that the development of the nationalities would lead in the direction of complete fusion (sliyanie). However, during the Khrushchev period another concept (edinstvo) was introduced indicating that - although a future unitary culture should be constructed - national differences would remain for a considerable time.[8]

During the 1970s it was generally accepted by the leading authorities that the Soviet Union continued to be a state with the different yet integrated nationalities. Brezhnev made it clear in a speech in 1977 that the "socio-economic unity of the Soviet people in no ways means the disappearance of national differences."[9]

The term sliyanie was used again by Andropov in his address commemmorating the sixtieth anniversary of the formation of the Soviet Union.[10] But it is obvious that the goal of sliyanie was regarded by Andropov as a distant one. Instead, the main focus of Andropv's speech was on sblizhenie.

The Soviet theory which is largely normative in character does not contradict the theory of integration as developed in the beginning of this section. The Soviet theory is directed towards an assessment of how far integrative processes - cultural as well as socio-economic - have gone in the Soviet Union.

The concept of russification is related to that of integration.

Russification denotes an all-embracing Russian influence on the culture of the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union. But the concept is also used to describe the level of Russian immigration into the non-Russian republics. As the concept has no consistent meaning in the literature it will be avoided in this paper. This does not mean, however, that Russian cultural influence and immigration will not be discussed.

The incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union has been analyzed by other authors. In an illuminating study by Romuald Misiunas and Rein Taagepera a historical account of the development of the Baltic republics was made.[11] The material in the Misiunas-Taagepera volume has been of great use for the preparation of the present analysis. This analysis differs from the Misiunas-Taagepera volume through its concentration to the integration approach -which, incidentally, has not been systematically used on the Baltic-Soviet relationship. Another difference as compared to Misiunas-Taagepera is the more extensive use of statistics in the present chapter.

As stated above, the integration of the Baltic republics will be analyzed within four major areas: demography, culture, politics, and the economy. In the following sections, each of these areas will be considered.

Demographic Integration

During the tsarist period, the area which now constitutes the Baltic republics had a population of multi-national origin. Apart from the indigenous popluations (Estonians, Lativians and Lithuanians) a large number of Germans, Russians, Poles, Jews and even Swedes inhabited the area. The number of Germans was especially high in the cities.

Before the independence period the Baltic area was divided into four regions (gubernii), namely Estlandskaia, Liflandskaia, Kurlandskaia, and Kovenskaia. These regions do not completely overlap with the present

republics. However, an analysis of the national composition of these region will give a rough picture of the nationality situation before the first world war.

All four gubernii were dominated by the Baltic nationalties. However, significant minorities existed in all of the regions (Table 2).

The ethnic dominance of the Baltic nationalities carried over into the independence period. The role of the three indigenous nationalities even increased during the inter-war period. But, substantial national minorities continued to exist which is evident from an analysis of Lativian data (referring to 17 districts of Lativia before and after independence) (Table 3).

During the whole independence period the indigenous nationalities were by far the dominant ones, ranging from about 75% in Latvia to about 90% in Estonia just before the incorporation into the USSR.[12] Forty years later the republican nationalities have undergone a substantial relative decrease. (Table 4)

Table 2. National composition of the Baltic gubernii (regions) according to the 1897 census, in %.

Region	Nationality	%
Estlandskaia	Estonians	88.8
	Germans and Swedes	5.4
	Russians	5.1
Liflandskaia	Latvians	43.9
	Estonians	39.9
	Germans	7.7
	Russians	5.4
Kurlandskaia	Latvians and Lithuanians	77.8
	Germans	7.6
	Russians	5.7
Kovenskaia	Lithuanuans	68.3
	Russians	7.3
	Jews	13.8

Source: Statistichesky ezhegodnik Rossii 1913 g (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdanie Tsentralnago Statisticheskago Komiteta, 1914)

Table 3. National composition of Latvia (17 districts) according to the 1897, 1920 and 1925 censuses, in %

Nationality	1897	1920	1925
Latvians	68.3	74.9	75.4
Russians	12.0	10.2	10.2
Germans	6.2	3.8	4.0

Source: M Skujenikes, ed., Deuxieme recensement de la popluation de Lettonie, le 10. fevrier 1925. II. Nationalite et confession (Riga: Gada, 1925)

Table 4. Indigenous nationalities in the Baltic republics, in %

Republic	1939	1959	1979
Estonia	88.2	74.6	64.7
Lativia	75.5	62.0	53.7
Lithuania	80.6	79.3	80.0

Source: Misiunans and Taagepera, p. 272. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1982. (Moscow: Finansy i statiska, 1982), pp 33-37. Itogi vsesoyuznoi perpisi naselenia 1970 goda, tom IV (Moscow: Sttistika, 1973), pp. 9-15

There is no doubt that the share of the republican populations in Estonia and Latvia has decreased substantially during the Soviet period, nor that the Russian population has increased. During the last decade, however, the rate of change has been somewhat slower. (Table 5).

Table 5. National composition of the Baltic republics, in %

Republic	Nationality	1959	1970	1979
Estonia	Estonians	74.6	68.2	64.7
	Russians	20.1	24.7	27.9
Latvia	Latvians	62.0	56.8	53.7
	Russians	26.6	29.8	82.8
Lithuania	Lithuanians	73.9	80.1	80.8
	Russians	8.5	8.6	8.9

Source: Itogi 1970, pp. 9-15. Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1922-82, pp. 33-37

The national composition of Lithuania has remained roughly the same the Soviet period. Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, has experienced a substantial immigration of Russians, largely due to the necessity of acquiring labor resources in the rapidly growing industry of Estonia and Latvia. The somewhat smaller immigration of Russians during the last decade could probably be attributed to the fact that there has been a slowdown of economic growth in these republics.

The percentage of Russians is higher in the big cities than in other settlements. In 1970, Tallin had 55.7 Estonians and 35% Russians. In the same year, Russians were the largest populations group in Riga (42.7%), Latvians being 40.9%. Vilnius had 42.8% Lithuanians and 24.5% Russians. Vilnius also had a large minority of Poles, 18.3 %.[13] Also during the tsarist period, the share of the Baltic city population was relatively low[14].

In a sense, the Russian immigration could be seen as an indicator of increased integration as the societies became more multinational. On the other hand it seems that the integration of the nationalities in some respects is only superficial. In Estonia, for example, the two dominant nationalities to a large extent inhabit different areas. Certain cities, like Kohtla-Jarve,

Narva, Sillamae, and Paldiski have an overwhelming Russian majority while other cities are dominated by Estonians.[15] A large part of the Russian population is also concentrated to the eastern periphery of Estonia.

There are few signs that the nationalities in the Baltic republics are being demographically integrated with each other. On the contrary, it appears that the national consciousness of the Baltic nationalities is on a continuosuly high level. What is happening in Estonia and Latvia is that the share of the Russian population has been increasing. If these republics will get a majority of Russians, this could also be regarded as some kind of integration. It is however, contrary to the definition used in this study, where integration is used when two (or more) separate elements form a unity.

The further development of the nationality situation is to a considerable extent on the further industrial growth of the republics. Several new industrial projects are being planned. The construction of new plants may necessitate further immigration of Russians. However, it seems that the Soviet authorities nowadays adopt a more cautious attitude to the immigration of Russians to Estonia and Latvia due to local discontent. This problem will be further analyzed below. In the next section, the problem of cultural integration will be discussed.

Cultural Integration

In many respects the cultures of the Baltic republics are integrated into the Soviet-type culture predominating in the Soviet Union. The system of education, mass media, cultural institutions, etc, are all working within the framework set by the Soviet leaders, i.e. in practice the Communist party. This has led to a high degree of uniformity in the cultures of the Soviet republics. To some extent national variations in culture are encourgaed but

specific limits are set to these variations.

One way of measuring the actual cultural integration of the Baltic republics into the USSR is to analyze patterns of bilingualism. Russian is, of course, the lingua franca of the Soviet Union and efforts are made by the political leaders at promoting the knowledge and understanding of Russian. The Russian language here performs a clear integrative function. One might therefore argue that a wide-spread knowledge of Russian among the Baltic nationalities is a sign of a high degree of integration. There are of course other indicators that could be used to measure cultural integration. But as the languages spoken are of utmost importance for an individual's cultural orientation, it seems that bilingualism is an extremely useful indicator.

The Soviet censuses of 1970 and 1979 reveal some interesting information on bilingualism in the Baltic republics. The data provided indicates the percentage of Estonians (Latvians, Lithuanians) who speak their native language and who are at the same time fluent (svobodno vladeet) in Russian. A small percentage of Baltic nationalities do not primarily speak their native language; these individuals are excluded from the analysis. The figure 23.3% for Estonia in 1979 thus means that almost one out of four Estonians (who use Estonian as their language) are also fluent in Russian. (Table 6).

Table 6. Bilingualism in the Baltic republics: National Balts being fluent in Russian, in %

Republic	1970	1979	Increase/decrease 1970-1979
Estonia	27.8	23.3	-4.5
Latvia	46.2	59.6	+13.4
Lithuania	85.0	52.4	+17.4

Source: Itogi 1970, pp 317, 280, 273. Vestnik Statistiki, No 10/1980, p 72 and No 11/1980, p. 64

What strikes the observer first is the relatively low level of knowledge of Russian among the Baltic nationalities. In 1979 less than one quarter of the indigenous population in Estonia was fluent in Russian. In Latvia and Lithuania the knowledge of Russian was somewhat more wide-spread although also here some 40-50% of the population was not fluent in Russian. The Baltic republics are after all areas with a very high educational level. It could therefore be expected that the knowledge of Russian would be better. It could furthemore be noted that the level of knowledge of Russian among Estonians was lower than that of some Central Asian nationalities.

It is also extremely surprising that the degree of bilingualism among Estonians have decreased during the decade 1970-79. As Russian language teaching is compulsory in Estonian schools one would expect an increasing knowledge of Russian. The only possible conclusion is that there is a genuinely lacking interest among Estonians to learn Russian which, in turn is a sign of a low level of cultural integration.

The knowledge of the Baltic languages among the Russians living in the Baltic republics is likewise low. In 1970, only 2.8% of the Russians in Estonia were fluent in the republican language. For Latvia and Lithuania the corresponding figures were 17.3 and 31.5. Furthermore, the number of Russians fluent in Estonian had decreased in 1979 by 1.8% to 11.5%.

The insufficient knowledge of the Baltic languages among the Russians has also been noted by scholars. Shortly after the publication of the 1979 census data on bilingualism the vice president of Estonian Academy of Sciences, Viktor Maamagi, declared that the study of the indigenous language by the Russian population should be accelerated. He argued that the "growth of Russian bilingualism will have a positive infleunce on the further rapproachment of the peoples of the USSR..."[16]

According to Maamagi, an increased knowledge of Estonian among the Russians was necessary for the continued sblizhenie of nationalities, i.e. their integration. The existing situation was far from satisfactory. It is interesting to note that changes are required also by the Russian populatic in order to achieve sblizhenie. Usually, the indigenous populations are asked to increase their understanding of the Russian language and culture.

It is obvious, however, that the present school system -with separate schools for the indigenous and the Russian population -does not promote any integration among cultures. On the contrary, it tends to reinforce the separation of the two communities in the Baltic republics. This has been clearly noted by Maamagi and other scholars, especially from Estonia.

The need for improvements in Soviet language policy was also noted by the political leaders. In his speech at All-union Scientific-Practical Conference on "Patriotic and International Upbringing" the first party secretary of the Latvian Communist Party August Voss noted that a geniune bilingualism should be regarded the goal of Soviet langauge policy. At the conference, which was held in Riga in June 1982, it was also stated that Russians and other non-indigenous nationalities must also improve their knowledge of the republican languages. However, the Russian language should remain the cornerstone of Soviet language policy in the future.[17]

On several occasions, demands have been issued by the Soviet leaders to improve the teaching of Russian among the non-Russian nationalities. One example of this dates from a CPSU Politiburo meeting in May 1983. As the report from the meeting reveals a number of measures have taken in order to ensure that all Soviet citizens be fluent in Russian. The Russian language should be given a wider use in the educational system and the methods of teaching of Russian should also be improved.[18]

On several occasions, demands have been issued by the Soviet leaders to improve the teaching of Russian among the non-Russian nationalities. One example from the meeting reveals a number of measures have been taken in order to ensure that all Soviet citizens be fluent in Russian. The Russian language should be given a wider use in the educational system and the methods of teaching of Russian should also be improved.18

There seems to be a general dissatisfaction among the political leaders with the language situation. This is specially applicable to the situation in the Baltic republics. The dissatisfaction originates from two sources. Firstly, the knowledge of Russian among the indigenous nationalities is insufficient. Secondly, the Russian population does not generally have the necessary command of the local languages. Data from the Baltic republic clearly show that there is cause for dissatisfaction. At least from the point of view of the political decision-makers. The data actually indicate that the cultural intergation of the Baltic nationalities into the Russian-dominated Soviet culture is not particularly high. This is especially evident in Estonia where bilingualism decreased both among Estonians and Russians. Notwithstanding a strong Soviet cultural influence, the Baltic nationalities appear to keep a certain amount of cultural independence. If this independence will be retained also in the future is, however, questionable in the light in the light of energetic measures taken by the political leaders in the direction of a higher degree of integration and even assimilation.

Political Integration

To assess the level of political integration of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union poses a difficult problems to the researcher. On the one hand, the formal integration has reached very far. On the other hand, it

appears that in certain crisis situations the real integration is not high as the formal.

The Baltic republics are integated parts in the general political system of the Soviet Uinion. There are republican branches of the CPSU in all the three Baltic republics. There are lower level party organizations and the standard system of Soviets repsonsible for the admninistrative functions.

The number of party members has grown rapidly since the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the USSR. In the 1940 Estonia had only a little over 100 communists Latvia about 1,000 and Lithuania 1,700.

In the 1980's there are 100,000 party members or more in each republic. However, the percentage of the population that has been recruited to the CPSU is still low. (Table 7).

Table 7 Party membership, % of total population (i.e. including all nationalities living on the respective territories)

	1940	1960	1980
Estonia	0.01	2.8	6.2
Latvia	0.05	3.1	6.0
Lithuania	0.07	2.0	4.6
USSR	1.0	3.8	6.2

Sources: Misiunas and Taagepera, Appendix B. USSR Facts and Figures Annual (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1984.). Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia - Yezhegodnik 1980.

During the whole Soviet period the party membership in the Baltic republics has been on a lower level than the USSR average. It is not until the 1980's that the Estonia and Latvia begin to approach the national average. However, if the party membership figures are related to statistics on the adult popultation and not the total population the memebership percentage in

the Baltic republics is still lower than that of the Union.

There could be several reasons behind the comparatively low membership figures. Certainly, none of the Baltic states have traditionally had a large communist movement (whether legal or not). Latvia appears to be the country where communism was comparatively strongest. Within the CPSU, admission policies are of course regulated. One explanation for the low membership rates could be that the party leaders did not find enough candidates worthy of becoming members. Another possibility is that the interest among the Baltic nationalities in becoming members was not strong enough. Possibly both factors provide parts of the explantion.

The Russian population has always been overrepresented in the CPSU as compared to the other nationalities. The Baltic nationalities on the other hand, have been underrepresented. The following figures which originate from 1982 but reflect a long-term trend, testify to the skewed composition. (Table 8)

Table 8. National composition of the CPSU, 1982, in %

	% of CPSU	% of total population	over/under representation
Estonians	0.3	0.4	-0.1
Latvians	0.4	0.5	-0.1
Lithuanians	0.7	1.1	-0.4
Russians	59.8	52.4	+7.4

Source: Narodnoe Khoziaïstvo 1922-82, p 49

The low representation of the Baltic republics and the Baltic nationalities could be regarded as an indicator of a comparatively low level of

political integration. The fact that several individual party members from the Baltic republics, like Arvids Pelse and Augusts Voss, have received positions high up in the Soviet political hierarchy, does little or nothing to change the overall picture of underepresentation, whatever its underlying causes may be.

Hitherto only the formal political structures have been touched upon. But political actions take place also outside these structures. All three republics have a long history of separatist and dissident movements. Here, the focus will be on the 1980-81 period which constituted a major crisis in the whole socialist system. During this period the unique Polish social experiment took place which ended with the declaration of martial law in Poland in Dcember 1981.

The spread of the Polish "contagion" was feared by political leaders in most of the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union. They were evident among the Baltic republics, and possibly also Georgia were particularly exposed. In all these republics there existed traditions of dissent which were to a large extent reactivated by the Polish events.

The Polish in the political development of the Baltic republics could be noted in several ways in the years 1980 and 1981. As early as in September 1980 - only a short period after the creation of the new worker's movement in Poland - a group of dissidents representing all three Baltic nationalities sent a greeting to the Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. New dissident publications also appeared in the Baltic republics. A publication from Lithuania commented that the development in Poland might have serious consequences for all socialist countries. And the Gdansk agreement of August 1980 between the workers and the government was published in Estonia.[19]

Estonia was the republic where the Polish development had the greatest

impact. In the beginning of October about 1,000 workers at a tractor factory in Tartu went on strike. One of the leaders of the strike stated that the Estonian workers wanted to express their solidarity with the Polish workers. At the same time some massive youth demonstrations took place. More than 2,000 possibly 5,000 high school students marched, complaining about poor conditions in their schools. The youth demonstrations also had a political character as the students demanded "freedom for Estonia" and exhorted the Russians to "go home." Shortly afterwards, some forty artists, writers, and actors - some of them quite prominent - suggested in an open letter that the youth rebellion would continue until the Estonian language and the Estonian culture was given a secure future.[20]

The Polish connection was readily apparent within the strike movement in the Baltic republics in November 1981, only one month before the declaration of martial law in Poland. A group called the Democratic Front of the Soviet Union distributed leaflets calling the workers to strike for changes in Soviet policies in several years. The following demands were made on the Soviet government:

1. Recall members of the Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan;
2. Discontinue interference with the internal affairs of Poland;
3. Halt the continuous export of food products;
4. Discontinue special discriminatory trade practices;
5. Release political prisoners and abolish political exile;
6. Reduce the term of mandatory military service;
7. Begin to honor acepted international responsisbilities (like the Helsinki Accords.[21]

A "Half-Hour of Silence" was called for on the first working day of each month. The demands are particularly interesting as they contain far-reaching

both political and economic demands. However, only limited strikes took place, and then only in Estonia on December 1, 1981, and January 4, 1982.[22]

The reactions from the political leaders if the Baltic republics to the popular unrest was extremely harsh. Already at the republican level party congresses in January 1981 "nationlist tendencies" were criticized. Karl Vaino, Estonian party first secretary, claimed that the nationalist tendencies were the result of activities of people who are "immature in the field of ideological and poltiical relations."[23] The origins of the nationalist tendencies were pointed out by August Voss, first party secreatary of the Latvian Communist party. According to Voss, the "imperialist propaganda" used the national question in the anti-communist crusade. The imperialists also used the churches and the religion in their activities. In connection with this Voss demanded increased education of the population - both in ideological matters and in the field of "scientific atheist upbringing."[24]
Vaino returned to the problems of nationalism in his speech at the 26th congress of the CPSU in February-March 1981. Vaino pointed out that the anti-Soviet propaganda increased in intensity and that Estonia - because of its geographical prxomity to Captalist countries - was especially disturbed by such propaganda. The effects of the propaganda, originating from American or Chinese centers or from emigrant circles, would be strongly counteracted by Estonian ideological work.[25]

In his speech to the congress, Augusts Voss expressed similar concern as Vaino claimed that strong efforts were made in Latvia to educate the working people "in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and Socialist internationalism." However, no specific mention was made of nationalist tendencies.[26]

A sharp critism of Baltic nationalism could be found in the speech by

Lithuania's first party secretary Petras Griskevicius. Tendencies of bourgeois nationalism and anti-Sovietism was clearly inspired by US imperialists and "reactionary Lithuanisn emigrants." Griskevicius also claimed that the Soviet citizens were "greatly worried about the situation in Poland.[27]

It appears that it was the combination of nationalism and religions revival that was mostly feared by the Baltic leaders, especially in Lithuania. It is not difficult to understand that the Polish development was interpreted as extremely dangerous. Also, the Baltic leaders were worried about propaganda activities from Capitalist countries, and especially from Baltic emigres. The relatively open flow of information to the Baltic republics - especially from Finland and Poland - aggravated the situation in the eyes of the Baltic political leaders.

One might have suspected that the issue of the Baltic strike movement would have been settled through the strong condemnations from the party leaders during the 1981 congresses. However, writing in Kommunist in the spring of 1983 the Estonian party leader returned to the problem of Western psychological warfare on the Soviet Union.

> Abroad, mainly in Sweden, there has developed an Estonian emigration movement whose leadership works for anti-Communist forces and uses methods of imperialist espionage.[28]

The anti-Communist work of Western imperialist forces could, according to Vaino, be noted in the leaflet campaign for strikes in 1981. However, Vaino triumphantly stated that the strike campaign had been unsuccessful.[29]

Even though the strike campaign was unsuccessful, Vaino must have been deeply concerned about its effects when he returned to the subject for the fourth time at the June 1983 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

> Without the recipients even being able to understand who was calling them to strike and for what reasons, the Western press and all of the hostile radio waves beamed at us creating a sensation about an ostensibly forthcoming "major strike" in Soviet Estonia. Correspondents of a whole series of bourgeois newspapers and news agencies flocked to Tallin to pick "the fruits." But all of them made a mistake.[30]

In his speech to the plenum, also Augusts Voss criticized the emigre organizations, although in more general terms. Voss pointed out that the Western warfare used several channels for their activities: radio broadcasts, telephone and postal services, trade relations, cultural and scientific relations, and relations between families living inside and outside Latvia.[31]

All this material indicates that there really were important nationalist activities in the Baltic republics, especially in the 1980-81 period. This is also confirmed by a decree of the Central Committee from 1984 where the party members of Estonia are demanded to increase the level and quality of their ideological work.[32]

In the years of 1980 and 1981 the political integration of Baltic republics into the USSR was seriously challenged. Partly due to influences from the Polish social experiment, nationalist activities in all three Baltic republics increased greatly. The demands brought forward - greater political and cultural independence - could mainly be regarded as protests against a too far-reaching integration. From the speeches of the Baltic political leaders it becomes clear that the protests against integration were regarded as an extremely serious problem by the leaders - who are responsible for the stability in this region.

Economic Integration

The integration in the economic field of the Baltic republics is in many respects far-reaching. The economic activities of the Baltic republics are, of

course, part of the all-embracing Soviet system of planning and management. Each Baltic republic receives - on a yearly and a five-year basis - a set of indicators showing the expected growth in the different branches.

Already in 1940 there was a main transformation of the economics into the Soviet-type organization. All factories and commercial enterprises - apart from a small portion of undertakings with a few workers - were nationalized. Nationalization also affected housing. Quite brutal methods were used by the Soviet officials in this process.[33]

After the war, the reconstruction of the economies of the Baltic republic was a high priority goal for the Soviet leaders. Estonia and Latvia both had cadres of skilled workers not usually found in other areas of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Baltic republics had a highly developed infrastructure which had not been severely damaged during the war. In Latvia, there was an emphasis on machine-building and metal-working. The Estonian industry was directed towards reconstruction of the machine-building industry and redevelopment of oil-shale production. The reconstruction of the industry was accompanied by a large influx of Russians into the Baltic republics, especially into Estonia and Latvia.[34]

The rapid development of the economies of the Baltic republics continued also in the 1950's and 1960's. Some of the most important areas were the electro-technical and radio-technical branches. A substantial percentage of the Soviet production of refrigerators, radio and TV sets, motorcycles etc. originated from the Baltic republics. During the 1970's the economic growth was somewhat lower than during the earlier decades. Instead, the focus was more on the qualitative sides of production. The Baltics, and especially Estonia, was assigned a special "laboratory role" in the development of the Soviet economy. However, the economy began at this time to suffer from a

severe labor shortage which sincerely restricted the development.[35]

The economic slowdown continued in the 1980's, partly as a result of lower levels of capital investments. Still, the Baltic republics produced some key products, e.g. in the electronic industry, which greatly enhanced the importance of the Baltic republics in the Soviet economy.[36]

The integration of the Baltic economies into the USSR is most clearly seen in the centralized system of planning and management. About one third of all industry is subordinated to all-Union ministries which means that their activities are directed from Moscow. A little more than half of the industry belongs to the domain of Union-republican ministries which have supervising agencies both in Moscow and in the capitals of the Soviet republics. Some 10-15% of the industry is directed by republican ministries that are located in the three capitals of Tallin, Riga and Vilnius.[37]

Even if the Union-republican ministries have offices in the republican capitals the role of the Moscow based part of the ministries appears to be dominant. Furthermore, several new projects of All-Union importance have begun lately. An example of this is the construction of the largest commercial port in the Baltic, near Tallin in Munga Bay. This large construction project - which serves purposes of the whole union rather than those of Estonia - is expected to lead to a vast immigration of worker from outside the Baltic area. Other large projects are also instrumental in integrating the Baltic economies even closer into the Soviet economy.

About 30% of Estonia's production was exported out of the republic. Most of the export, about 90% went to the other Soviet republics. More than two thirds of the exports to other republics fo to the RSFSR and the Ukrainia. Import patterns are similar to export. (Table 9)

Table 9. Export and import of industrial and agricultural products from Estonia to other Soviet republics, %, in 1972.

Republics	Export	Import
RSFSR and Ukraine	70.7	67.4
Latvia and Lituania	10.3	12.4
Turkmenia, Kirgizia and Tadzhikistan	1.5	1.3
All other	17.5	18.9

Source: Sovetskaia Estonia. Entsiklopedicheski spravochnik (Tallin: Valgus, 1979), pg. 65

The major part of Estonia's economic inteactions take place with the large Slav republics. Only a little over 10% of the interactions are related to the other Baltic republics. A very low level of interaction is maintained with some of the Southern Central Asian republics. These data clearly indicate the high degree of economic integration into the Soviet economy and especially into the largest republican economies. A similar pattern could be expected also with Latvia and Lithuania.

But there are also some factors that point in another direction. Although the economies of the Baltic republics are heavily integrated into the USSR, they appear to be different in some important respects. First of all, economic growth in the Baltic republics has exceeded the USSR average during the long periods. This could be seen from the following data on the annual growth rates of industrial production. (Table 10)

Table 10 Average annual growth of industrial production, %

	1950-55	1960-65	1970-75	1980-85
Estonia	14.4	9.9	7.1	2.9
Latvia	14.1	9.6	6.4	3.1
Lithuania	20.9	11.7	8.3	4.1
USSR	13.1	8.6	7.4	4.9

Sources: Compiled from Misiunas and Taagepera., Pg 298. Data for 1980-85 are average plan targets for the 11th Five Year Plan

Moreover, the living standards of the Baltic republics are the highest in the Soviet Union, with the possible exception of parts of the RSFSR. All quantative indicators of living standards reveal that the Baltic republics occupy top positions.[38] There seems to be a genral agreement between Western and Soviet scholars that the Baltic republics enjoy the highest standards of living in the USSR.

Another element that differentiates the Baltic economies from those of the other republics has already been mentioned. The industrial production in the Baltic area is to a large extent directed towards the production of some key products of All-Union importance, e.g. in the field of electronics.

Generally, it appears that the economies of the Baltic republics are to a large extent intergrated into the Soviet economy. Probably, the economic integration has gone further than any other type of intergration. But there are also in the field of economies certain elements that make the Baltic republics somewhat differnt, e.g. the high living standards and the rapid economic growth.

FOOTNOTES

*An earlier version of this paper, co-authored with Professor Sten Bergland of Helsinki University, was published in 1986 by Abo Academy in Turhu, Finland.

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[7]Cf. Martha Brill Olcott, "Yuri Andropov and the 'National Question," Soviet Studies, No.1/1985.

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[13]Itogi 1970, pp. 275, 283 and 320.

[14]Misiunas and Taagepera, p. 6. Skujenieks, p. 57.

[15]Paevaleht, October 17, 1981.

[16]V. Maamagi, "Razvitie mezhnatsionalnykh otnoshenii v Estonii," Kommunist Estonii, No. 9/1981, p. 26.

[17]Sovetskaia Latvia, June 28, 29, 30, and July 1, 1982.

[18]Pravda, May 27, 1983.

[19]V. Stanley Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic", Problems of Communism, July-August 1983, p. 25.

[20]Ibid., p 26. Pedro Ramet, "Innenpolitische Determinanten der sowjetischen Interventionspolitik," Osteuropa, No. 3/1985.

[21]The Samizdat Bulletin, No. 106, February 1982.

[22]Cf Vardys, op cit, pp. 27.

[23]Sovetskaia Estonia, January 29, 1981.

[24]Sovetskaia Latvia, January 30, 1981.

[25]XXVI siezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Sojuza, Stenograficheskotchet, I (Moscow: Politizdat), pp. 326.

[26]Ibid., p. 252.

[27]Ibid., p. 192.

[28]Karl Vaino, "S tochnym znaiem ostanovki", Kommunist, No 4/1983, pp. 51

[29]Ibid., pp. 52

[30]Plenum Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 14-15 iyurai 1983 goda, Stenograficheskyotchet, pp. 141.

[31]Ibid., pp. 107.

[32]Pravda, August 1, 1984.

[33]Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 30 ff.

[34]Ibid., pp. 104 ff.

[35]Ibid., pp. 177ff and 223ff.

[36]Jan Ake Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People,and Natural Resources (Armonk, N.Y. Myron E. Sharpe, Inc. 1985).

[37]Cf. Misiunas and Taagepera, op. cit., pp. 180 and 228.

[38]Dellenbrant, op cit., Chapter 3.

V. THE AFGHANISTAN - CENTRAL ASIAN CONNECTION

In 1979, a series of events profoundly changed the political situation in Southwest Asia. In January 1979, the Shah was removed from power in Iran and replaced by a Muslim fundamentalist regime under Khomeiny. In April 1979, the People's Republic of China announced that it intended not to prolong the 1950 Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. This had, at least, an indirect effect on the political situation. During the fall of 1979 the Soviet Union increased its aid to the Amin regime in Kabul, although a growing dissatisfaction on the Soviet's part with the performance of the existing Afghan government became apparent. In December an actual Soviet intervention took place which installed Babrak Karmal as the new general secretary of the People's Democratic party of Afghanistan. This development had important repercussions also for other countries in the area; a first sign of this was the stream of refugees from Afghanistan to the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. During this period, a renewed interest in this area from other great powers, mainly the U.S. and the People's Republic of China, could be noted.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has been interpreted in different ways. Richard Pipes has viewed the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan as an expansionist move constituting a first step toward seizure of the Straight of Hormuz. George Kennan on the other hand, has stressed the defensive aspects of the Afghanistan intervention. The Soviet actions against Afghanistan were primarily motivated by the defense of the Soviet borders. According to Kennan, there are no indications of a Soviet intention to invade the Persian Gulf area.[1]

From the opposing views of Pipes and Kennan one might draw the conclusion that several factors have to be considered when evaluating the Aghanistan

crisis. Raymond Garthoff has especially focussed on three sets of partially interrelated factors behind the Soviet move:

1. Protection of long-standing Soviet investments in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had supported Afghanistan at least since the middle of the 1950s -- politically, militarily, and economically. An intervention was the only available measure that could secure future Soviet influence in the area, as the Amin regime was moving towards disintegration.
2. National security interests. Soviet action was necessary to avoid the possibility of the emergence of three anti-Soviet Muslim, possibly Muslim fundamentalist, regimes south of the Soviet border. Also, the Soviet Union wanted to counter perceived Western influence in the area.
3. Regional stability concerns. The Soviet leaders were concerned about the possible effect, that the emerging Islam fundamentalism could have on the Soviet republics with primarily Muslim populations that are populated by nationalities of similar background as those of Northern Afghanistan and parts of Iran. While this concern probably was not the most important aspect of Soviet decision-making it was still a central factor in the Soviet perception of the problem which added to the severity of the Afghan problem.[2]

Also other interpretations have been brought forward to the discussion. The economic gains that the Soviet Union could achieve from Afghanistan could be regarded as a supplementary explanatory factor for the invasion.[3] A majority of scholars have, however, concentrated on a combination of political and military motives.

After more than six years of war in Afghanistan, the Soviet dominated government forces and the opposing Mujahedeen have now reached something which might be called a stalemate. Although Soviet supported Afghan government forces have launched several major offensives, their victory is extremely uncertain. This situation makes it, of course, difficult to evaluate the possibility of more far-reaching motives behind the Soviet invasion along the lines that Pipes has suggested.

In this chapter, however, another aspect will be focussed, namely the regional stability concerns. During the Czechoslovak crisis in 1968 and the Polish events of 1980-81, regional stability concerns appeared to play an important role in the Soviet decision-making process. Reformist ideas had diffused from Czechoslovakia and Poland into some of the non Russian republics which caused major concerns within the party leadership there. Especially the Ukraine in 1968 and Estonia in 1980-81 were influenced by this "spill-over" effect. The increased unrest of some of the non-Russian nationalities in the West no doubt contributed to the decisions to intervene in 1968 and to impose martial law in 1981.[4]

In 1968 it became clear that especially the Ukrainian republican leadership was pressing for an intervention. There had been reported several instances of nationalist manifestations in the Ukraine which were to a considerable extent inspired by the Czechoslovak development. Similarly, strikes and demonstrations took place in the Baltic republics during the Polish crisis. The Polish reform movement had reinforced already existing nationalist inclinations in these republics.[5]

A similar pattern of the development hence emerged in the non-Russian republics both in 1968 and in 1980-81. According to our available knowledge,

this diffusion of ideas from the reform movements into the Soviet Union itself affected central decision-making. The question is now if the same pattern was discernible before the intervention in Afghanistan. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to evaluate the role of the Central Asian connection, i.e., the diffusion of revolutionary or fundamentalist ideas to Central Asia from other Muslim areas, in the process of Soviet decision-making. A more specific question is what role Soviet concerns about the spreading Muslim fundamentalism did play for the decision to intervene in Afghanistan.

The actors in the decision-making process are to be found both at the central and the republic levels. Representatives of the central party organs and the military establishment were the most important actors at the central level. Party and state officials representing different branches of the bureaucracy were very active at the republic level, i.e. among the Central Asian Republics.

In the chapter some elements of a bureaucratic politics approach will be used. Representatives of different bureaucracies will be identified as well as coalitions between groupings.[6] The pattern emerging will furthermore be compared with the situations in 1968 and 1980-81. Of special importance will be the analysis of the bureaucratic politics on the republican level.

Two distinct periods of time will be covered. Firstly, an analysis will be made of the situation immediately before and after the 1979 intervention. Secondly, the Gorbachev period will be studied which brought about some major changes in the policy towards the Central Asian republics. Although the Soviet intervention itself is of importance for the paper, the major emphasis will be on domestic factors affecting the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan.

A variety of sources will be used in this chapter. One focus will be on Soviet Central Asian publications concerning the so-called Muslim problem.

Commentaries from the central level will also be analyzed. Valuable material has been found in central and regional party leaders' speeches at different CPSU congresses. At some instances also Soviet statistics have been used. The author has also consulted the large western literature on related topics.

One possible disadvantage with the approach chosen for this essay is the heavy reliance on Soviet sources. Certain aspects of the problem under focus will not be covered by Soviet sources. However, the Soviet sources used here are not simple propaganda. They often consist of thorough analyses of socioeconomic problems, the state of affairs of Muslim revivalism, etc. Many of the local publications also consist of specific instructions to party personnel where important pieces of information can be collected. By combining these Soviet sources with Western material and interpretations an accurate picture of the problem should be reached.

When assessing the spillover effect the political changes in the countries south of the Soviet border had on the Central Asian republics, three general topics will be covered in this essay.[7] Firstly, the receptivity of the Central Asian societies to reform ideas will be studied. Secondly, the response of central and republic level political leaders will be studied. A third topic will be the responses from the Central Asian societies themselves to the changes that occurred south of the border.

The Receptivity of Diffusion

In order to evaluate the role of the spread of ideas from other Muslim areas to Soviet Central Asia it is necessary to make a judgment of the likehood of such a spread occurring. A society's receptivity to outside influence is depending on several variables. In this essay, the following factors will be considered: religious factors, the ethnic and demographic

situation, the socioeconomic situation, and political factors.

Traditionally, Muslim nationalities in the Soviet Union constitute majority of the population of the republics of Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus (as Azerbaidzhan and Dagestan) as well as areas within the RSFSR (as Tatar ASSR and Bashkir ASSR). Historically, Islam has played a major role in these areas. In fact, one of the world centers of Islam has been located in the Samarkand-Bukhara-Khiva area. According to the 1979 Soviet census, the Muslim nationalites amounted to about 44 million, i.e. just under 17% of the total Soviet population.

Despite some assertions that the role of Islam had diminished during the Soviet rule the "Muslim problem" is frequently referred to in the Soviet press. Repeated calls for energetic measures against Islam are voiced in the Soviet press.

> A study has shown that although tremendous success has been achieved in Uzbekistan in overcoming religious survivals, the religious question requires in-depth research. Even now one encounters religious wedding ceremonies among the population, baptisms, circumcision and religious funeral services. Holy places are still venerated and tabibs and mullahs are still consulted for the treatment of diseases and ailments.[8]

This statement from December 1979 clearly indicates that Islam still plays an important role in the Soviet Union. This conclusion is also supported by a number of Western scholars. A specific character of Islam is a national-religious symbiosis within the Muslim community (or umma). Ethnic and religious sentiments are merged and appear in virtually all aspects of society. The integration of the Central Asia into the Soviet social system has therefore been highly problematic according to Michael Rywkin:

> Conquered over a century ago, Sovietized for six decades, modernized, educated, and indoctrinated by a succession of regimes, Central Asian Muslims seem just as remote from

Russian reality and intentions as at the outset of Soviet rule.[9]

Differences do, of course, exist among Muslim groups in the Soviet Union. Over time, the differences of dogma between Sunnis and Shias have decreased, at least in some areas.[10] On the whole, the strong support for Islam in Soviet Central Asia and other Muslim areas tends to increase the receptivity of the Muslim peoples of USSR to the diffusion of ideas from other Muslim countries.

As mentioned, the religion in Central Asia is closely connected to that of ethnicity. The interesting factor in this context is not only that people to the north and the south of the border share the same faith. In fact, in many instances the same people live partly in one of the Soviet republics and partly in another country south of the border. The border in that area is political in character and does not reflect nationality distribution.

Accordingly, many Soviet nationalities have a "brother group" abroad. This group vary in size and in relative strength. The nationalities can be divided into the following groups:

1. Large groups with practically equal numbers in the Soviet Union and the Northern tier: Azeris, Turkmens, Tadzhiks.
2. Large Soviet nationalities with minorities outside the Soviet Union: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz.
3. Immigrant nationalities in the USSR with majorities abroad: Uighurs, Dungans, Baluchis, Kurds.
4. Soviet Muslim nationalities with small colonies abroad: Circassians.[11]

Quite naturally, these ethnic bonds provide a potential for communication and hence diffusion of reform ideas as well as religious revival.

Furthermore, the 45 million Soviet Muslims are in a sense a part of the whole Turko-Iranian world of some 100 million people.

The Central Asians differ from other Soviet non-Muslims nationalities in terms of culture, ethnicity and language. However, they also represent quite a distinct demographic pattern which might in the future create severe problems for the Soviet state. Between the 1959 and 1970 censuses, the population of Central Asian nationalities grew by more than 50%, while the Slavic population only increased by a little over 12%. Between 1970 and 1979 the figure was 32% for the Central Asians and less than 6% for the Slavs.[12]

This demographic development will probably cause severe problems in the longer perspective. Already now, there is an abundance of labor force in the Central Asian republics. There is no doubt a threatening underemployment or even unemployment in these areas. If this development will also continue in the future, difficult economic problems will be added to those already existing in the Central Asian area.

Compared to the other Soviet republics, the industrial development and standard of living is much lower in the Central Asian republics. According to data presented by Gertrude E. Schroeder, Turkmenistan has a living standard about 15-20% below the USSR average, while the three remaining Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan and Kirghizia as well as Azerbaidzhan have a living standard that is 75% of the national average or less.[13] These evaluations of living standards as well as industrial development have been confirmed by other studies.[14]

On the other hand, if the Central Asian republics are compared with countries like Iran and Pakistan a totally different pattern becomes visible. There could be no doubt that the socio-economic development in Central Asia is

far higher than that of its Southern neighbors. The following table gives some relevant indicators.

Table 10. Standards of living indicators for selected areas of Central Asia

Country/Republic	Population per Physician 1979/80	Adult literacy rate (%) 1979*	Radio and TV receivers per 1,000 population 1980**
Iran	2,320	50.0	117
Pakistan	3,480	24.3	77
Turkmenistan	336	99.7	519
Uzbekistan	336	99.7	414

Sources: World Tables, Vol. II (World Bank), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1983, pp. 44, 70. Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1983 godu. Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1984, pp. 8, 528.
*Soviet data from 1970. **Iranian data from 1978.

There are of course difficulties in comparing statistical data of different origin. In this case, however, there should be no doubt that the standard of living is higher in Soviet Central Asia than in its Southern neighbors. Using data from all the Central Asian republic would not change the pattern. The conclusions here are supported by earlier works by Alec Nove.[15]

The Central Asians do in Soviet terms, have a low standard of living, but in comparison with several other Muslim areas their situation is satisfactory at the present. In the future, however, the economic problems of Central Asia might increase. The relatively favorable economic position of Soviet Central Asia will change quickly, if no intensive measures are taken by the Soviet leadership to reactivate the economy.

This brings us to last of the factors affecting receptivity. It is clear that the political role of the Central Asian republics is not important. The major decisions are taken in Moscow where the Central Asians have few representatives. About half of the industry is governed directly from Moscow

without direct influence from the Central Asian capitals. According to Rywkin the Central Asian republics are regarded as "unreliable" by the Soviet leadership. Hence, extra control measures were necessary in these republics. A typical example being the party second secretaries who nearly always has been Russian.[16]

Several of the factors discussed here tend to support the conclusion that there should be a high level of receptivity of Central Asians to foreign influence from Muslim countries. The close cultural and ethnic affinities with other Muslim people naturally contributes to this. Some socio-economic factors point in the same direction, although the relatively high living standard in Central Asia would reduce the potential receptivity. The political factors tend to be the most important ones; they might influence the situation especially during major international crisis. Also, the accumulation of problems in the other areas will have political consequences.

In the title of this essay, "The Central Asian Connection" is referred to. This concept is used here as the Soviet perceived threat to the stability in the Central Asian republics from religious and nationalist revival originating outside the USSR. In this section of the paper, we have established that a relatively high receptivity of the Central Asian peoples to this connection to outside forces does exist. In the sections below, the actual importance of this connection will be discussed as well as the channels of diffusion involved in the process.

Assessments on the Central Area

From the ethnic, demographic, socio-economic variables that were analyzed it was clear that the receptivity of the Central Asian population to diffusion of ideas from neighboring countries should be relatively high. Some economic

factors, especially the comparatively high standard of living, pointed however, in another direction. Also, it should be added that the political control of the population is very strong through party and security origins.

The political leaders of the Soviet Union appear, on the other hand, to attribute great importance to foreign influence. When justifying the Soviet intervention in 1979 Leonid Brezhnev pointed especially at the security problems involved.

> Imperialism developed a persistent undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This created a main threat also to the security of our Southern border.[17]

In these sentences from his major speech at the 26th Party Congress in 1981 Brezhnev summarized the Soviet interpretation of the Soviet intervention. The forces of imperialism, i.e. mainly the U.S., had increased its activities in Afghanistan beyond all limits. This foreign influence also threatened the Soviet border.

Since the creation of the Soviet state, the Soviet leaders have been preoccupied by the security of their borders. In the Soviet comments to the intervention of Afghanistan, a coalition of imperialist and Afghan resistance forces was portrayed.

According to the Soviet view, not only the U.S. imperialists were involved. Also, the PRC (People's Republic of China) had an interest to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan. The Soviet commentator A. Petrov -- which is a pseudonym for Pravda's editorial board -- stated that

> the reactionaries enjoyed essentially unlimited support from U.S. imperialist circles, the Peking leaders and the governments of certain other countries, which lavishly supplied the counterrevolutionary bands with weapons, material and money.[18]

According to the Soviet commentator, the situation in Afghanistan was

extremely serious as both the U.S. and PRC supported the counterrevolutionarie in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Soviet action in 1979 was necessary and to

> act otherwise would have been to look on passively while a hotbed of serious danger to the security of the Soviet state was created on the Southern border.[19]

There was definitely a military component in the perceived threat to the Soviet Union as indicated in the quotation from Pravda. But another interrelated threat was that to stabilize the Central Asian republics internally. In the Soviet view, the emergence of three Muslim, possibly fundamentalist, regimes south of the border would no doubt have severe repercussions in Central Asia itself.

At the same time, it was obvious that the highest Soviet leaders recognized some instability already in the Central Asian republics. In the aforementioned speech Brezhnev pointed out several severe problems in Soviet Central Asia. The social conditions had not reached the same level as in other republics. The rapid growth of the Central Asian population threatened to develop into underemployment of the labor force.[20] Brezhnev's description here is similar to the one presented above on the receptivity of the Central Asian population to external influences.

At the 26th Congress also the republic level party secretaries from the four Central Asian republics and from Kazachstan and Azerbaidzhan -- which also have large Muslim populations -- vocied their concern over foreign influences. These party secretaries, have the direct responsibility for law and order in their republics and are therefore expected to advocate policies that opposes foreign influences.

First party secretary M. Gapurov of Turkmenistan stressed that imperialist and Chinese propaganda centers were concealing the truth about the

nationality relations in the USSR and that they propagated the use of "religious dogmas and reactionary beliefs" in the Central Asian republics.[21]

Also the other leaders linked the activities of the U.S. and the PRC with religious "remnants" in Central Asia. From the wordings of the speeches it is difficult not to draw the conclusions that the worries of these party secretaries about the situation in Central Asia were genuine.

Interestingly enough, the Central Asian republic level leaders returned to the "Islamic factor" also in their speeches at the Central Committee plenum in June 1983. Several of the leaders stressed that in that very year the U.S. had increased its activities in Afghanistan supposedly the Mujahedeen counter-revolutionaries and continuing the propaganda war against Central Asia. The Kazakh leader D. Kunaev, also a member of the CPSU Politburo, even cited "provocations from a number of foreign anti-Soviet organizatons, including Catholic and Muslim centers."[22] Even references to pro-Turkism were made. Energetic efforts were said to be made by Western agencies, to stimulate a movement to unify all Turkish peoples.[23]

The Soviet leaders probably overestimated the role of the U.S. and PRC activities in the Afghanistan and Central Asian areas. But it is still without doubt that the Soviet leaders feared a possible coalition of U.S., PRC and Afghan counterrevolutionary forces in the area. The large number of speeches and also newspaper articles confirm this conclusion. Also, the linkage between these forces with Muslim believers in Central Asia constituted a major concern. From a bureaucratic politics perspective, it is evident that this linkage should be of major concern for the republic level leaders. Their main task is to provide stability in their areas in order to maximize the economic production in the respective republics.

Also, the central leaders stressed the same factors as their regional counterparts. However, Brezhnev confined himself mostly to an assessment of the general situation and stressed especially the problems of border security.

The analysis above was based on information from leaders on the central areas, mainly at the Party Congress and the Central Committee plenum. More detailed information on the Afghan-Central Asian connection could, however, be received from an analysis of material originating directly from the Central Asian republics.

Development on the Regional Level

Judging from available press reports from the Central Asian republics and Azerbaidzhan it was obvious that the political situation in the years preceding the 1979 interention was far from stable. Anti-Soviet demonstrations and riots were reported at a couple of instances. Also, virtual terrorist acts were mentioned. At the same time representatives of the KGB and the Ministry of the Interior proposed increased vigilance against attempts at foreign ideological subversion. A large number of press articles also addressed the problem why Islam still had a stronghold in Central Asia and suggested measures to counteract the activities of Islam. These Soviet reactions were especially intensive during the period immediately preceding the invasion, although they continued also in the 1980s.

The dissatisfaction of the Central Asians with some aspects of Soviet rule was expressed in 1978 during two large-scale anti-Soviet riots. In Alma-Ata students protested violently against the result of university entrance examinations.[24] The Tadzhiks protested against "Russian rule" during the May Day celebrations in Dushanbe 1978.[25]

Although these protests must be regarded as isolated events they





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

nevertheless indicate a frustration with the Soviet system. The fact that these riots occurred in areas close to the Southern border must have aroused serious concern both with central and regional authorities.

Another far more serious event took place in 1980 when Sultan Ibrakhimov, Kirghiz Council of Ministers Chairman, died.[26] According to unoffcial sources Ibrakhimov was assassinated by Muslim nationalists, possibly by members of the Sufi Brotherhood of the "Volosatye Ishany" or "Hairy Ishans."[27] The fact that Pravda did not indicate the cause of Ibrakhimov's death support the conclusion that he died an unatural death.

Several singular incidents like the possible assassination of the Kirghiz Council of Minsters Chairman have been reported in the press. The general concern by regional authorities about shortcomings in ideology and problems with "remnants" of Islam have however, been a recurrent theme in the regional press.

In July 1979, the Kashkadarinsky Obkom plenum (in the Uzbek SSR) noted that the ideological and educational work in the oblast suffered from serious shortcomings. The work "still does not meet the requirements" and "formalism" had not been eradicated. The discussion at this and other plena originated from the CPSU Central Committee resolution on "The Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Education Work."[28]

Similar criticisms of insufficient ideological work were also voiced at the Turkmen and Azerbaidzhan Party plena in July 1979.[29] The shortcomings referred to here certainly also involved inefficient agitation against the Muslim religion and Muslim traditions.

An even more lucid description of problems of instability in the Muslim areas of the USSR was presented in 1980 by Major General Z. Yuzif-Zade,

Chairman of the Azerbaidzhan SSR KGB. In an article titled "Guarding the Security of the State and the People" he stressed that the State Security organs had exceptionally important tasks during that period. The U.S. imperialists and the PRC were carrying out "vigourous subversive activity" agianst the USSR.

> Along with espionage, the enemy implemented large-scale acts of ideological subversion against the USSR and the entire socialist community. And in contrast to past years, when efforts were directed primarily toward undermining the USSR's defense and economic might, at the present time the main emphasis is on undermining the Soviet state's politial and ideological foundations. . . .
>
> In view of the situation in Iran and Afghanistan the U.S. special services are trying to exploit the Islamic religion -- especially in areas where the Muslim population lives -- as one factor influencing the political situation in our country.[30]

Yuzif-Zade attributed increased activities of the Muslim population to actions taken by foreign agents. This may be true or not. The fact remains that the KGB head clearly admitted problems with the Islamic population in the Soviet Union. Of special importance, according to Yuzif-Zade, was the task of the KGB to protect the Southern border of the USSR. Clearly, the intention with Yuzif-Zade's article was to increase the vigilance against foreign interference that could influence the Muslim populations of the USSR.

Similar calls for vigilance were voiced also during the period preceding the 1979 invasion. The forces of the Ministry of Interior of Azerbaidzhan were demanded to increase in activities against foreign and internal enemies.[31]

The fact that KGB and MVD (Ministry of Interior) forces were asked to increase their activities are especially noteworthy. These organs have a special responsibility for preserving the stability of the Islamic areas.

Also the first party secretaries of the Soviet republics have a direct responsibility for the stability of their areas, as was pointed out in the preceding section. Their concern over stability was evident in a speech by Turkmenistan First Party Secretary M. Gapurov at a June 1980 conference in Ashkhabad. At this conference Gapurov pointed at foreign "propaganda" directed towards the Turkmen republic.

> Bourgeois propaganda tries to foster various reactionary theories of nations and national relations and uses nationalism as one of its main levers in its anticommunist activity . . . . They are spreading misinformation about the republic, conducting brazen propaganda of revisionism, nationalism, pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism (emphasis added) and trying to judge the republic's socialist transformations from nationalist positions.[32]

This theme of bourgeois propaganda was encountered at several times in the press during this period. It is interesting, though, to find that Gapurov referred to pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements that aim at uniting all Turks and Muslim believers. However, not all religious activity in Central Asia could be attributed to foreign influences. There are indigenous "nationalist and religious survivals" in the Turkmen republics.

Gapurov clearly admitted that "there are still many believers in the republic" and that "internationalist and atheist education" must be purposely combined "in order to rob nationalism of its religious cover and religion of its claim to represent the nation."[33] Gapurov was especially worried about

> the fact that such intolerable practices as infrigement of the honor and dignity of women, the marrying of minors, . . . and selling of young girls for bride money -- which still occur among the religious section of the population -- are playing into the hands of foreign bourgeois propaganda. . . .
>
> Muslim pseudo-confessors, champions of old, reactionary principles and rites, operating willfully in the so called 'holy places,' are trying to kindle religious fanaticism,

> fuel feelings of national narrow-mindedness and instill in family relations harmful feudal and kinship survivals and rituals.[34]

The reference here to religious fanaticism is especially remarkable. It indicates that ideas similar to these of Muslim fundamentalism also could be found in Soviet Central Asia. The pronounced dissatisfaction of Gapurov about the religious situation in Turkmenistan clearly supports the notion that there is a high degree of receptivity in the Muslim population to religious revival.

Several articles published in 1979 in the Central Asian press give indications that some kind of religious revival was under way. It is impossible to determine the size of this movement. But it was definitely large enough to arouse serious concern from Soviet authorities.

In Tadzhikistan, the "Navruz" festival in 1979 was used by the Muslim clergy to influence young people and to introduce them to religious ceremonies.[35] Also in Uzbekistan, numerous examples of increased Muslim activity was noted.[36] In Turkmenistan, the existence of Sufism was officially recognized.[37]

Sufism is a mystical doctrine of Islam which is based on initiation and ultimately leading to a personal union with the god. It is important that the existence of Sufism is recognized by Soviet authorities. According to Western scholars, Alexandre Bennigsen and others, the Sufi brotherhoods which are hidden in the Central Asian republics and other Muslim areas would be more susceptible to influences from Islam fundamentalism than other Muslim groupings.[38]

The religious activities in Central Asia in the beginning of the 1980's also included several organizations that were not officially recognized by the

Soviet authorities. This is a further indication of a renewed interest of Islam in this area. In a report from Kirghizia it was stated that:

> unregistered Muslim associations and priests are operating illegally in a number of regions of Oshskaia, Talasskaia, Narynskaia and Issyk-Kulskaia oblasts and in Chuisky, Panfilovsky, Kemensky and other regions. There have been attempts to illegally open and extend existing mosques in Bazar-Kurgansky, Liailiaksky, Moskovsky, Panfilovsky and a number of other regions owing to the lack of proper control.[39]

Here, the party newspaper Sovetskaia Kirghizia frankly admitted that there was a "lack of proper control" of Muslim activities. To this, several other articles could be added which stress the necessity of active countermeasures against Islam. References to "religious fanatics and extremists" were numerous in the 1979-1981 period.

Similar to the references quoted from the union level, the republican press also emphasised the connection between Muslim activities and U.S. and PRC agents. Even if there are some exaggerated reports in the Soviet press, it becames clear that the Muslim activities posed -- and probably still pose -- a severe problem to party, KGB, MVD and other authorities in charge of political stability in the region.

It is inconceivable that this "Muslim problem" and the possibility of spillover of ideas from, for example, Iran to Central Asia and Azerbaidzhan did not play a role in the Soviet foreign policy decision-making in 1979. This is not to say that the Central Asian connection was the sole determining factor in the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. But, no doubt, this factor might have played an important role, taking into account the "seriousness" of the situation, as depicted in the Soviet republic level press.

The Gorbachev Revolution

The first year of Mikhail Gorbachev's period as General Secretary of the CPSU brought about a veritable revolution in Soviet Central Asian politics. In Kirghizia, first party secretary Turdakun Usubaliev was removed from office and replaced by Absamat Masaliev. The Kazakh party organization went through several personnel changes, although Dinmukhamed Kunaev was left in office as first secretary. In Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan, the new party secretaries Inamdzhan Usmankhodzhaev and Kakhar Makhkamov have taken office. Also Turkmenistan had a new party secretary at the time of the 27th CPGU Congress, S. Niyazov.

The personnel changes in Central Asia have followed a pattern similar to that which has taken place in other areas of the Soviet Union. Younger, more technocratically oriented leaders have replaced the old guard on all administrative levels. Of special interest in the Central Asian case has been the sharp criticism that was directed at the republican party congresses towards the rule of earlier leaders.

This criticism of earlier leaders revealed an extremely problematic situation in the Central Asian republics. Former Uzbek first secretary Rashidov was accused of several abuses of his official position, including the support of major state criminals.[40] Corruption and bribery was said to have been widespread during Usubaliev's rule in Kirghizia.[41] Numerous reports with similar content were found in the press of all Soviet Muslim republics.

The criticisms were not only directed towards organizational shortcomings. Also the ideological work in the republics were criticized. Masaliev admitted in his speech at 1986 Kirghiz Communist Party Congress that

the influence of Islam had increased in his republic.[42] Also Usmankhodzhaev and Makhkamov noted that there was no signs of decline of religious customs and traditions in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan.[43]

From these and other reports from officials in Central Asia it becomes clear that the situation in terms of "ideological shortcomings" has not been changed in the 1979-86 period. Judging from the speeches by republic level party secretaries, one must conclude that Islam still has a stronghold in Central Asia. In fact, the party secretaries indicated an increase in religious activities. It is impossible to determine to what extent this increase resulted from spillover of ideas from outside the Soviet Union. In all events, it is apparent that the receptivity of the populations to foreign influences still must be regarded as high.

This receptivity must also be increased by the lack of interest expressed by Gorbachev in the problems of the Central Asian peoples. In his report to 27th CPSU party congress, Gorbachev made no mention of the severe problems of Central Asia as regards industrial and agricultural development. Nor did he discuss the demographic problems. He merely criticized the Central Asian republic for economic inefficiency. Kazahhstan and Turkmenistan were cited as especially bad examples. In Turkmenistan, labor productivity had not increased at all during the last 15 years, according to Gorbachev.[44]

Another setback for the Central Asia politicians was the apparent abandonmnet of the water diversion scheme. Earlier Central Asian party leaders, especially Rashidov, had proposed the construction of a canal diverting parts of the water from the Siberian rivers to Central Asia. No mention of this Sib-Aral canal, which could significally improve the agricultural situation in Central Asia, was made by Gorbachev.

In sum, the situation in Soviet Central Asia remained roughly the same in 1986 as at the end of the 1970s. No solution to the severe problems of Central Asia were presented at the 27th party congress. Instead, the focus was directed towards Siberia and the European parts of the USSR.

As the religious activities of the Central Asian Muslim population continues on a high level and the socio-economic problems remain acute the importance of Soviet presence in, or at least control of, Afghanistan appears still to be great. The Soviet leaders cannot allow any significant changes in Afghanistan as long as the political instability and the potential for spillover from other areas continue to exist.

Conclusions

From the Soviet sources analyzed in this chapter it becomes clear that serious socio-economic problems do exist in Soviet Central Asia. There are also indicators of an increased interest from the Muslim population in Muslim religious activities. This would clearly support the conclusion that the receptivity of the Soviet Muslim population has been and is still great.

The continued religious interest of Muslim population has aroused serious concerns among the republic level party politicians. The importance of ideological work and atheist propaganda has been stressed for a long time. The effectiveness of this atheist propaganda must be questioned, however, as there is no indication of decreased religious activity. On the contrary, the political leaders were concerned with increased religious fanaticism in Soviet Central Asia.

This situation was viewed by party officials as well as KGB and MVD representatives as being a threat to the Soviet system of security. Although

the picture is not entirely clear, it seems that these bureaucracies were pressing for political change in which the support of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Afghanistan -- as opposed to an Islam-oriented -- would constitute an essential element. There is little evidence of dissension among the Soviet leaders when making the crucial decision on Afghanistan. However, it is probable that some divisions did exist. At least, there was some early uncertainity on what course of action should be taken as indicated by the visits of several Soviet emissaries to Afghanistan who had the task of evaluating the situation.[45]

The relative lack of interest of the present leaders in Moscow auguments the severity of the Central Asian problem. If the economic situation deteriorates in Central Asia the potential influence of Muslim revivalism might transform to a real influence. Hence, the actions taken by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan -- which partly were directed in order to avoid such development -- might not be sufficient to avoid political instability in Central Asia.[46]

In the beginning of this essay three factors which could explain the Soviet move into Afghanistan were listed: 1) Protection of investments, 2) National security interests, 3) Regional stability concerns. All these factors evidently have played a significant role. In this essay, the analysis has been concentrated to regional stability problems and interrelated security problems. Although several factors contributed to the Soviet decision, one must not neglect the regional stability concerns and the possibility of diffusion of ideas from abroad. From the analysis of available material it becomes clear that the Soviet leaders perceived the possible spread of Muslim fundamentalism as a serious problem. This perception appears to be more

important than the occurrence of actual diffusion.

The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan may nence not be very different from the actions taken against Czechoslovakia 1968 and Poland 1981. In all three cases, security interests and regional stability concerns played a major role. This should, of course, not be regarded as a defense for the Soviet decision. It is merely an attempt to isolate some of the crucial variables that guide Soviet foreign policy decisions.

FOOTNOTES

*A first of this chapter was presented to the Asian Studies on the Pacfic Coast Conference, June 1986, in Monterey, CA.

[1]Cf. "How Real is the Soviet Threat," U.S. News & World Report, March 10, 1980, p. 33.

[2]Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985).

[3]M.S. Noorzoy, "Long-term Economic Relations Between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union: An Interpretative Study," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 17 (1985).

[4]Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj J. The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Australian National University, 1970). Jiri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia: Antomony of Decision (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979). Jan A. Dellenbrant, "The Soviet Union and the Polish Evolution: Responses to the Rise of Solidarnosc," ECPR, (Gothenburg, April 1986).

[5]Valenta, op. cit., p. 29.

[6]For a more extensive description of the bureaucratic politics paradigm, see Arthur J. Alexander, "Modeling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, Soviet Decisioning for National Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984).

[7]Cf V. Stanley Vardys, "Polish Echoes in the Baltic," Problems of Communism, July-August 1983.

[8]I. Dzhabbarov, "Light Against Darkness. Social Progress and Atheism," Pravda vostoka, 20 December 1979.

[9]Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia. Armonk, (NY: Myron E. Sharpe, 1982), pp. 89f.

[10]Alexandre Bernigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 116.

[11]Ibid., pp. 110ff.

[12]Rywkin, op. cit., p. 64. Originial data could be derived from Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR and Vestnik Statistiki.

[13]Gertrude E. Schroeder, "Regional Differences in Incomes and Levels of Living in the USSR," in V.N. Bandera and I.L. Melnik, eds., The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

[14]Cf A. K. Zakumbaev, Metody otsenki urovnia ekonomicheskogo razvitia soyuznych respubliki raionov. Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1975 and Jan A. Dellenbrant, The Soviet Regional Dilemma: Planning, People and Natural Resources. Armonk, (NY: Myron E. Sharpe, 1986).

[15]Alec Nove and G.A. Newth, The Soviet Middle East -- A Model for Development (New York: Allen & Unwin, 1963).

[16]Rywkin, op. cit., p. 123.

[17]XXVI syezd KPSS, 23 February - 3 March 1981, Stenographic Minutes (Moscow: Politizdat 1981).

[18]Pravda, 31 December 1979.

[19]Pravda, 13 January 1981.

[20]XXVI syezd KPSS, op. cit., pp. 721.

[21]Ibid., p. 314.

[22]Plenum Tsk KPSS, 14-15 June 1983. Moscow: Politizdat, 1983, p. 55.

[23]Ibid., p. 66.

[24]Kontinent, No. 38, 1983, pp. 209-220.

[25]Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 68.

[26]Pravda, 5 December 1980.

[27]Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan," Central Asian Survey, No. 1/1982, p. 71.

[28]Pravda vostoka, 1 July 1979.

[29]Turkmenskaia iskra, 21 July 1979.

Bakinski rabochi, 18 July 1979.

[30]Bakinski rabochi, 19 December 1980.

[31]Bakinski rabochi, 23 May 1979.

[32]Turkmenskaia iskra, 15 June 1980.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Selskaia zhizn 3 August 1979.

[36]Pravda vostoka, 23 March 1979.

[37]Suffizm v Turkmenii. Ashkhabad: Ylym, 1979.

[38]Bennigsen and Broxup, op. cit., p. 114.

[39]Sovetskaia Kirghizia, 27 December 1981.

[40]Pravda vostoka, 31 January 1986.

[41]Sovetskaia Kirghizia, 27 January 1986.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Pravda vostoka, 31 January 1986.

[44]Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27 Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Pravda, 16 February 1986.

[45]Garthoff, op. cit., pp. 502 ff.

[46]Cf Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Aims, Policies, and Alternatives in Afghanistan," in Ralph Magnus, ed., Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options, and Policies (New Brunswick: Transaction Books), 1985 p. 17.

VI. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE POLISH EVOLUTION

"In Poland all political thought and action must begin with the problem of Russia."* This assertion of the centuries long importance of Soviet/Russian-Polish relations was presented in the Polish publication Res Publica during the rise of Solidarity in 1980. To the author, Poland's close alliance with the Soviet Union, Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact and the SEV, and the connected limitations to its sovereignty, were a given fact dictated most of all by geopolitical considerations. This was true even at a time when aspirations for a more independent status of Poland were voiced.

But within these limitations, certain varieties could nevertheless be accepted by the Soviet leadership. This was shown, for example, in Poland during the period after 1956. The present examples of Hungary and Romania could also be cited. But the question remains how large deviations from the general framework that could be accepted by the leaderships in other Warsaw Pact countries. Too far-reaching reforms in one East European country could, in the eyes of the central political leaders, threaten the security system of the Warsaw Pact alliance. Also, such reforms could have allegedly negative influences into the domestic politics of the other WP countries.

The rise of Solidarity in Poland was no doubt a threat to the political system as developed already in Stalin's time. The very idea of an independent, self-governing trade union -- outside the control of the ruling party -- was revolutionary. It is quite natural that the Polish development met with resistance from the Soviet Union and also from some other Warsaw Pact countries. The Soviet leadership responded with a variety of measures, including both political and military pressure. But no military intervention was undertaken, as in Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and Afghanistan 1979. Instead, a Polish solution, the proclamation of martial law in December 1981,

was preferred.

It is beyond doubt that the leaders of the Soviet Union, being by far the largest and strongest member of the Warsaw Pact, participated in the decision to impose martial law. But the question is why and how this decision was taken. One might also ask why the Soviet Union did not opt for a military intervention, taking into account the seriousness of the Polish crisis 1980-81. In this chapter the Soviet reaction to the rise of Solidarity will be analyzed. An attempt will be made to uncover the Soviet decision-making concerning Poland and to evaluate the different options that the Soviet leaders had. But before analyzing into the Soviet reactions and decisions it is necessary to look back at some historical cases with similarities to the Polish crisis of 1980-81.

Historical Precedents

Throughout the last centuries Russian-Polish relations have been of great importance for the politics of Central and Eastern Europe. In general, these relations have been characterized by hostility. The political cultures of the two countries have been quite different, notwithstanding the fact that both the Russian and Polish peoples are of Slav origin. Poland has traditionally been more directed towards relations with Western Europe and is dominated by Roman Catholicism, while Russia's relations with the West have been much weaker. Furthermore, the Russian Orthodox Church has regarded itself as a main adversary of Catholicism.

Also geopolitical factors contribute to the understanding of the problematic Russian-Polish relations. Poland is located on the traditional "invasion corridor" from the west. Several attempts to conquer Russia originated from the Polish lands. Examples of these attempts are the Polish

invasion of Moscow in 1610, the Swedish King Charles' XII intervention of 1709, Napoleon's Grand Arme in 1812, and, most important of all, Hitler's invasion in 1941. The bolder areas between Russia and Poland have also been disputed for centuries. The flat grounds of Poland, Bielorussia and the Ukraine provide no natural frontiers between Russia and Poland.[2]

Up till the seventeenth century Poland usually was a stronger power than Russia, but after that time Russia came to play a dominant role in Polish politics. During the reign of Peter the Great, Poland was gradually transformed into a sattelite state. Already at that time Poland was regarded as a valuable buffer state against foreign interventions. Russia also took part in the three positions of Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795) which eventually erased Poland from the map of Europe.[3]

The Polish provinces of Russia were not, however, characterized by stability. Two insurrections, in 1830 and 1863, were suppressed by Russian military. Not until after the first World War, did Poland regain its independence. But also at that time Poland had to repulse Soviet Russia's encroachments. The 1919-1921 war between Poland and Soviet Russia ended with a compromise peace treaty in Riga, where disputed territories in Bielorussia and Western Ukraine were divided between the two powers.[4]

A fourth partition of Poland took place in 1939 when Germany and the Soviet Union both intervened. Eastern Poland was then annexed to the Soviet Union. After the second World War Poland was transformed into a People's republic and was firmly integrated into the East European security system.

With the inclusion of Poland in the Warsaw Pact system a long time goal of the Russian and Soviet leaders had been achieved. According to the Soviet interpretation of the war time agreements between the allied parties, Poland was clearly within the Soviet sphere of influence. Poland could be

regarded as a buffer zone that would protect the Soviet Union from further invasions from the West. But Poland had also an offensive importance. Soviet troops were stationed in Poland in positions close to the perceived Western enemies. Also, Poland was an important communications link for the Soviet military stationed in the German Democractic Republic. Certainly, the situation described here is also essentially valid today.

Like Tsarist Poland, the People's Democracy was characterized by internal instability. On several occasions, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976, violent protests were voiced against the Government's policies. All of these protests were crushed by the Government using armed force. These crises could all be solved by internal Polish forces, although there were speculations about possible Soviet intervention from time to time.

Although no Soviet military troops were used against Poland during these insurrections, it is obvious that the security concerns of Soviet leaders about Poland remained unchanged. Poland, being the second largest country in the Warsaw Pact, occupied a crucial position in the Soviet-dominated security system. It is highly probable that the Soviet Union would have reacted more violently, if the Polish crises had not been solved, i.e. in the eyes of the Soviet leadership, by internal measures.

Looking back at history, it becomes obvious that the Soviet leadership could not accept any major deviation from the course taken by Poland since the second World War. Poland will also for a long time remain crucial to the Soviet system of security. This is an important part of the explanation to the fierce Soviet reaction to solidarity.

The crises in Poland up till 1980 were never allowed to develop far enough to motivate a Soviet intervention. In the Soviet calculations, also the possibility of resistance from the large Polish army must have been taken

into account. In Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, the Soviet course of action was different. The development in these countries were perceived as more dangerous by the Soviet leaders.

The Prague spring of 1968 and the Warsaw pact intervention seems to be especially relevant when analyzing the 1980-81 Polish crisis. Several authors have analyzed Soviet decision-making concerning Czechoslovakia.[5] Among the factors most frequently mentioned by scholars that caused the development in Czechoslovakia were the following:

- Ending of police terror.
- Ending of censorship.
- Democratization of the Communist party.
- Tolerance of factions within the party.
- Growth of interest groups outside the party.
- Decentralization of the economy.
- Assertion of autonomy for Slovakia.
- Improvement of relations with the West, especially the FRG.
- Readjustment of relations with the Soviet Union, allowing deviances from the Soviet model for socialism.[6]

The Soviet perception of these developments was essentially negative. Two aspects of the Czechoslovak development were especially negative in the view of the Soviet leaders. The changes in the dominant role of the party and the opening of relations with the West were perceived as dangerous for the stability of the Warsaw Pact. No doubt, these factors contributed to the decision to intervene.

This decision to intervene was, however, by no means an easy one to take. From the works of Jiri Valenta it becomes clear that there were different opinions among the Soviet leaders concerning the invasion. One aspect which is underlined by Valenta was the fear of spillover of Czech reformist ideas into the USSR itself.[7]

It appears that several of the factors that caused the Czechoslovak development and the following Warsaw Pact intervention were present also

during the Polish crisis. In Poland, censorship was gradually abolished. The Polish United Workers Party became more or less desintegrated. Also, different factions within the party emerged. Strong interest groups, like Solidarity, evolved outisde the party. The Catholic Church was reactivated. Relations with the West were increased, especially within the Solidarity movement.

Yet, the Soviet Union did not intervene in Poland. One factor of importance was the fact that the Polish adherence to the Warsaw pact was not questioned to the same extent as in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet leaders might also have believed that the Polish leaders after all could handle the situation themselves.

The important factor in this development is the Soviet perception of the Polish development. The perceived development might be more important than the actual one.[8] In the following sections of this paper, the Soviet perceptions will be analyzed, using Soviet official statements and other data. But that some theoretical considerations must be made. In the next section, some theoretical concepts concerning decision-making will be discussed. Also, the problem of the level of analysis will be addresses.

Theoretical considerations

It is beyond doubt that the Soviet leadership perceived the Polish development in 1980-81 as a crisis. The rise of Solidarity threatened the dominance of the PUWP. Over time this party became more less desintegrated. The strikes organized by Solidarity also threatened the functioning of the Polish economy, which in the view of the Soviet leaders could lead to serious consequences for the stability and security of the Warsaw Pact.

Several scholars have addressed the problem of crises and crisis

decision-making. Charles Hermann has defined crisis as

> a situation that (1) threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, (2) restricts the amount of time available for response before the decision is transformed, and (3) surprises the members of the decision-making unit by its occurence.[9]

Hermann's definition, especially the first two elements, was elaborated by Michael Brecher who concluded that a crisis in foreign policy should be regarded as:

> a situational change in the external or internal environment which creates in the minds of the incumbent decision-makers of an international actor a perceived threat from the external environment to basic values to which a responsive decision is deemed necessary.[10]

The two definitions are clearly compatible. Two elements of a crisis -- the threat to basic values and the necessity of response -- are found by both authors. The third element, that of surprise, is more stressed by Hermann, but it also appears to be useful when applying the concept to real situations.

As already mentioned, the Polish crisis was perceived as a threat to some basic values of the Soviet leadership. Furthermore, it is clear from reading Soviet sources that the Soviet leadership regarded some kind of response to the Polish evolution as necessary. Soviet sources also indicated that the strikes in Poland and the emergence of Solidarity came as a surprise to the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, it seems that the Polish development satisfies all requirements for being regarded as a foreign policy crisis for the Soviet Union.

But the question is how this foreign policy crisis should be analyzed. From reading the Soviet sources it becomes evident that there was a great deal of hesitancy in the Soviet decision-making. Groups in the Soviet leadership appeared to advocate different solutions to the Polish "problem." To understand the Soviet decision-making it then seems appropriate to apply a

framework of analysis that investigates these differences and establishes the interests of different actors in the decision-making process.

One such framework of analysis that analyzes decision-making from the point of view of political interaction among different actors is the bureaucratic politics approach. This approach was successfully employed by Jiri Valenta in his analysis of Soviet decision-making on the eve of the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 which is a case that bears resemblance to the Polish crisis.[11]

Valenta summarized the main idea of the bureaucratic politics approach for the Soviet context in the following way:

> Soviet foreign policy actions, like those of other states do not result from a single actor (the government) rationally maximizing national security or any other value. Instead, these actions result from a process of political interaction ("pulling and hauling") among several actors-in this case, the senior decisionmakers and the heads of several bureaucratic organizations, the members of the Politburo, and the bureaucratic elites at the Central Committee level. Bureaucratic politics is seen as based upon and reflecting the division of labor and responsibility for various areas of policy among the Politburo members. This division arises from two historical conditions characteristic of the post-Stalin era: (1) a highly developed bureaucratic political system and (2) a collective leadership within which no single leader possesses sufficient power or wisdom to decide (or willingness to accept responsibility for) all important policy issues.[12]

Using the bureaucratic politics approach, governmental power is not viewed as unified but dispersed among several actors. These actors have different individual and organizational interests. They also differ in resources and power. Decisions are made by the political process of bargaining rather than through cost/benefit calculations. Bureaucratic politics furthermore emphasizes actions and control of the implementation process.

The use of the bureaucratic politics approach for this study does not

indicate that a rational actor approach could not be used in some instances for the study of Soviet foreign policy behavior. For example, during very short and intense crises it is probable that such an approach would be more useful. But for the Polish crisis -- which lasted more than one and a half year -- the bureaucratic politics approach could probably shed more light on Soviet decision-making. It is also obvious that different interests were involved in that process, that of the military, the Ministry of Interior, regional and local party leaders etc. On the whole, a bureaucratic politics approach seems extremely useful for analyzing Soviet politics. The large and politically powerful bureaucracies of the Soviet Union do play an important role in Soviet policies. This has been pointed out by Western scholars as well as by General Secretary Gorbachev at several occasions.

When dealing with the Polish crisis, there were several options available for the Soviet leadership, options that were advocated by different actors in the Soviet leadership. One option would be a Soviet intervention in order to change the course of the Polish development using military means. This option would have the drawback of severely decreasing the prestige of the Soviet leadership which at this time still wanted to preserve what remained of detente. Another option was an intervention by Warsaw Pact forces which would get similar negative consequences as the first option. Also, such an intervention would by necessity have to exclude the participation of the GDR as German troops on Polish soil would have been regarded as extremely offensive by Poles and other nationalities. A third option would be to reach some accommodation with Solidarity. But taking into account the gradually increasing militancy of Solidarity this option must have appeared risky. A fourth option would be to encourage some kind of Polish solution that could eliminate Solidarity. But also this option would appear somewhat risky, as

Solidarity's strength increased and the PUWP was in a process of disintegration. It could be expected that all these options were considered by the Soviet actors.

The Soviet-Polish relations during the Solidarity crisis were highly complex. Soviet leaders had to take into account several factors before making their actions. Although Poland is generally regarded to belong to the Soviet sphere of influence, the Soviet leaders would have to consider the possibility of fierce U.S. and West European reactions to a possible intervention in Poland. Also, Soviet interests in the sphere of national security were highly involved in the process, as Poland plays a crucial role in the Warsaw Pact security system. A third aspect of these relations were regional. The situation of the Soviet workers was in several respects similar to that of Polish workers which means that the Soviet leaders had to consider the possibility of influence from the Polish reform movement into the USSR itself, especially to the western parts. The sensibility of this issue was clearly shown during the Czechoslovak crisis.

This leads us to the well-known level of analysis problem. Scholars in international politics have pointed out that scientific investigations have to differentiate between several levels of analysis. For example, David Singer has suggested that at least two levels of analysis, that of the international system and that of the national state, should be considered.[13] Holsti suggests three levels of analysis, namely the system, the state, and the individual.[14] There is no agreement among scholars on how many levels should be included. The usefulness of this reasoning stems from the fact that it seems necessary to make some kind of differentation between levels, as actions and behavior are influenced by the specific relationships on these levels.

In this study, the level-of-analysis problem will be dealt with in a way

that is somewhat different from that described above. The Soviet-Polish relations could firstly be viewed in connection with the international arena. Soviet actions will most certainly be influenced by reactions and anticipated reactions from the U.S. and the West European countries. If the Soviet behavior would threaten the international balance of power it would definitely provoke reactions from the U.S. The second level of analysis that will be addressed is that of the Soviet national state. The Soviet decision-making concerning Poland was influenced by its national interest in areas such as stability and security. The third level will be called the regional. Here, Soviet considerations concerning the non-Russian republics of the Western part of the USSR will be analyzed. The Soviet fear of the "Polish contagion" and the spread of reformist ideas into these republics will be studied. These Western republics had close contacts with Poland, and several cases of possible "spillover" were reported in the Soviet press.

These three levels of analysis will be used when interpreting the Soviet material. It appears that the Soviet arguments were different on all these levels. The Soviet argumentation will furthermore be confronted with other material, mostly originating from the West, which will also be divided into the three levels.

The main part of the material used for this study originates from the Soviet Union. Soviet comments on the Polish situation in Pravda, Izvestia, Kraznaia Zvezda, Literaturnaia gazeta, Kommunist and other papers and journals will be analyzed. Also, some of the main speeches of major political leaders will be studied. The Soviet news reports from Poland in different papers have also been of value. To supplement the Soviet sources, Western analyses and samizdat material will be studied.

By carefully reading the Soviet material, some valuable information on

the decision-making process can be received. During certain periods it was obvious that the Soviet criticism was very harsh, and these periods coincided with preparations for intervention or the proclamation of martial law. This is not to say that all aspects of the decision-making process are reflected in press articles and speeches, but by combining these sources with other data it is possible to make an accurate picture of the process. In all events, this is the only possible course of action taking into account the present availability on information about decision-making in the Kremlin.

The initial Soviet reaction: Cordon sanitaire

The Soviet official reactions to the strike movement and the subsequent rise of Solidarnose went through several phases. After some hesitancy, the Soviet policy was directed towards minimizing the influence of the Polish evolution by means of sealing off the borders of Poland. This Abgrenzung took place with regard to the German and Czechoslovak borders as well as to the borders of the Soviet Union itself. Especially, the flow of travel between Poland and Lithuania was restricted.[15]

This first period, that of a cordon sanitaire lasted until December 1980. From the beginning of 1981 there was a period of rising tensions between the Soviet leadership and the leadership of Poland. In the course of events, Soviet authorities concentrated their efforts on preventing the take-over of the PUWP by reformist elements. The whole period could be characterized as a "war of attrition" between the Soviet Union and its Polish counterparts.

The third and final phase took place from October to December 1981 when martial law was proclaimed. In the beginning of this period Stanislaw Kania was replaced by Wojciech Jaruzelski as first secretary of the PUWP. During this period, preparations for martial law were made.

During these three periods, the cordon sanitaire, the war of attrition, and the preparation for martial law, Soviet reactions to the Polish development occurred on all the three aforementioned levels. The Soviet comments were related to the international balance of power, and the activities of the NATO countries concerning Poland were criticized. On another level, concerns about the Soviet state interest were voiced. Here, stability and security concerns were in the forefront. Some Soviet commentators, especially from the non-Russian republics, expressed worries about the possible spill-over of Polish reformist ideas into the Soviet Union itself.

The initial Soviet reactions to the Polish events appears to have been that of surprise and possibility also incomprehension. During July 1980 and through the major part of August Soviet media ignored the Polish development. It was only on August 20 when Pravda mentioned work stoppages in Poland when reporting on Edward Gierek's television speech to the Polish people, where he criticized "irresponsible, anarchist and anti-Socialist elements."[16]

The insecurity of the Soviet leaders on how to deal with the Polish crisis is reflected by the fact that the first real evaluative comment in Soviet media did not originate from Soviet sources, but from an American source, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USA, Gus Hall. On August 31, Pravda reprinted an article from the Daily World that criticized indirectly the Polish leadership. Gus Hall argued that the strikes took place "because of the weaknesses of the leadership, because of distortions in socialist methods and approaches."[17]

After the initial comment by Gus Hall, also Soviet sources began to evaluate the situation in Poland. In a series of articles signed by A. Petrov -- which is a pseudonym for the editorial board of Pravda -- the Polish

development was severly criticized. Much of Petrov's criticism was directed toward Western influences on Poland, and were hence to be referred to the aforementioned international level of the crisis.

It is important to note that the comments by Petrov from the beginning labeled the new Polish trade union movement as antisocialist. As such they were clearly unacceptable in Poland and any socialist society. The antisocialist character of the union movement was defined in negative terms. The antisocialists "place primary emphasis on political demands (cursive by this author) that reveal their true interests".[18]

It is, of course, not the task of a trade union movement to concentrate on political activities, according to the Constitution of Poland. The political life should be centered round the PUWP and the other Polish political parties. In the view of Petrov, the political demands were serious and dangerous. Firstly, political activity was directed towards destroying "the party's link with the working class, which is the main source of strength of the PUWP and the Polish state". Secondly, the strike movement sought support from the West, from Poland's enemies.[19]

The antisocialist elements of Poland received its initial Western support from mainly three sources, in the opinion of Petrov. Firstly, the Western mass media was mounting a "slanderous and inflammatory campaign" against the Polish state. Especially serious was the right wing press of the FRG which proposed that Poland should return former German territories as a security for loans. Also, the Christian Democratic Union had called for "a revision of the 'political structure' of Poland". Secondly, the strike movement found support from what was called "reactionary trade unions" of the U.S., which refused to load ships for Poland with foodstuffs and raw materials. Petrov found this solidarity with Poland highly questionable. The third source of support for

the antisocialist elements were the so called "reactionary Polish emigres and subversion centers" in the West. According to Petrov, it was clear that these emigres wanted to divert Poland from the path of Socialism.[20]

By establishing a link between Solidarity and Western institutions hostile to Poland, the Pravda article stressed the highly undesirable development of the Polish situation. Links with the West and attempts to increase Western influence have been mentioned as major causes for th earlier Soviet decisions to intervene in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. As the article was written by Pravda's editorial board, it is certain that the views reflected those of at least a majority of the Poliburo. However, the Petrov article was merely an analysis of the Polish situation from the Soviet point of view and did not give any indications about the future course of action to be taken by Soviet authorities.

The Western interference in the internal affairs became a recurrent theme in the Soviet comments to the Polish development during the last half of 1980. In another Pravda article, Petrov established the existence of relations between Solidarity and Western propaganda centers, as Radio Free Europe. Also, work in support of Solidarity was said to be financed by West German foundations as the Seidel Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation as well as the U.S. trade union AFL-CIO. Furthermore, NATO had set-up a special group to study the Polish events that was engaged in pre-military planning.[21]

The Soviet leadership was here faced by a double threat. Not only did the Polish development evolve in an undesirable way. But Solidarity was also perceived to get moral and financial support from the West, including West Germany. This situation must be regarded as a dilemma for the Soviet leadership. In the view of this author, there is a genuine fear in the Soviet Union for a strong Germany. The support from the West for Solidarity may have

been limited, but in the Soviet perception it must be considered as serious, and it no doubt influenced the Soviet decision-making.

Also China was accused of interference into the Polish affairs. In a third article by Petrov, it was stated that China was giving advice on how the foundations of socialism in Poland should be weakened and how Poland's relations with other socialist countries should be undermined.[22]

The picture of Soviet foreign relations during the first period of the Polish crisis appears, in the words of Petrov, to be highly problematic. Not only did the Soviet leaders have to face an unwanted development in Poland. But the Western powers and China did also want to interfere in the Polish affairs. To that one must also of course add the situation in Afghanistan, which had turned out to be a Soviet engagement for a longer period of time.

It is a striking fact that no recommendations for Soviet action were voiced by Petrov. On the whole, the Soviet policy towards Poland was characterized by indecisiveness. There were differences in opinion among the Soviet leaders on how to cope with the situation. This was indicated by the Polish Central Committee member, R. Wojna, who said that

> the Soviet comrades are watching and listening to the current process in Poland with eyes and ears well open.... Some comrades do not like our ideas but others are watching our efforts with great interest.[23]

One of the Soviet officials that would advocate a harsh policy against Poland was no doubt Politburo member Kirilenko who, at an early stage, indicated the possibility of a Soviet intervention.

> We have the correct compass: the Marxist-Leninist theory. The historical truth is on our side, the rich experiences and the mutual fraternal aid to the Socialist countries.[24]

With the words mutual fraternal aid Kirilenko most certainly must have referred to the possibility of a Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention. Similar

wordings were used about the invasion in Czechoslovakia. The idea of mutual fraternal aid originates from the principle of socialist internationalism in Soviet ideology. This principle states that the interests of the Socialist commonwealth is of superior importance to that of individual Socialist countries. Hence, fraternal aid could be required to be given to countries where the Socialist foundation is threatened. Variants of this principle have been labeled "the doctrine of limited sovereignty" or "the Brezhnev doctrine" in the West.

Towards the end of November 1980 it became clear that the Soviet Union really made some preparations for a military invasion in Poland. This alerted Western politicians to issue warnings about the possible negative consequences of such an undertaking. According to the memoirs of President Jimmy Carter, fifteen or twenty Soviet divisions were ready to move, and it appeared that Soviet and Czech were conducting night exercises together. Carter sent Brezhnev a direct warning indicating that a Soviet move in to Poland would mean that the U.S. would send advanced weaponry into China.[25] Also, the defense ministries of NATO issued a similar warning. A Soviet invasion would lead to increased Western defense spenditure. Furthermore, the NATO ministeries agreed to deploy four AWACS to monitor the Polish area and to place a naval force on alert.[26]

It is clear that the international dimension played an important role for the Soviet handling of the Polish crisis. Very early in the Soviet comments it was stated that Western support and influence strengthened the so called antisocialist elements in Poland. The strongly worded warnings from the West concerning the invasion were also of great importance. These warnings probably made the position of the proponents in Moscow for a military action weaker.

Even more important for the Soviet decision-making were of course the developments in Poland itself. Here, Soviet concerns about security and stability were involved. We are now turning to the second level of analysis, that of the Soviet national interest.

It is a well-known fact that Soviet leaders, and also the leaders of the Tsarist times, have been preoccupied with the security of their frontiers. The absence of natural borders in the west and the east has, as earlier mentioned made Russia vulnerable to foreign invasions.[27] In the present security system Poland, of course, plays a crucial role, situated between East and West.

Along with criticisms of Western interference, concerns about the security problems resulting from the Polish events was a recurrent theme in the Soviet press in the fall of 1980. The aforementioned Petrov and other authors claimed that the strikes instigated by Solidarity were a threat to the whole Warsaw Pact.

In his third article on the Polish quesiton, A. Petrov made clear that the borders of Poland were inviolable and that they were securely guarded by the Warsaw Treaty member countries.[28] But the activities of Solidarity could have a serious negative effect on the WP defense. The "warning strike" that railroad workers undertook in November "could affect national interests and the interests of the country's defense, as well as disrupt rail transit links across Poland".[29] The Pravda article author points here at the crucial role of Polish railroads for defense purposes. Especially, the link between the USSR and the GDR via Poland is of vital interests for the WP.

Soviet mass media also quoted Polish sources that expressed fears about negative consequences for the defense. In the beginning of December 1980, Pravda and Izvestia reported from a meeting of the Military Council of the

Polish Defense Ministry. Here, it was stated that the strike movement "may have serious negative consequences for the country's defense capability".[30]

Earlier during the fall of 1980 it was reported that joint exercises of the Polish Armed Forces and the Soviet Northern Group of Forces had taken place. The joint exercises which were carried out in September had the purpose of "improving the combat readiness of both armies".[31] These exercises, which were labeled Brotherhood in Arms, might have had the dual purpose of exerting psychological pressure on Poland and preparing for a future military intervention in Poland. The maneuver were attended by the Soviet Defense Minister, Dimitri Ustinov and by General A. Yepishev who played a crucial role in the interventions of both Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

After Brotherhood in Arms, several other exercises took place in the Western part of the Soviet Union. Also, a Soviet naval force was deployed in Gdansk. In early November new maneuver of Polish and Soviet troops were conducted.[32]

The situation in Poland was discussed in several meetings of Polish and Soviet leaders. In September it was agreed that Poland should receive additional deliveries of industrial goods and foodstuff.[33]

Only a week after the Gdansk settlement, Edward Gierek had been been replaced by Stanislaw Kania as First Secretary of the PUWP. On October 30, Kania and Polish Council of Ministers Chairman Jozef Pinkowski visited Moscow "on a friendly working visit." The Polish and Soviet leaders expressed their determination to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries. According to the reviews in the Soviet press, Kania reported on the "efforts that the Polish Communists are making to stabilize the situation in the country".[34]

This meeting between the leaders from the two countries took place at a

crucial point in the dispute with Solidarity over its legal status. It appears that the Polish leaders were able to convince their Soviet counterparts about the effectiveness of the measures taken by the Poles.

Even if the Soviet leaders, at least for the time being, had expressed their support for the Polish leadership, it undertook measures to isolate Poland from the other members of the Warsaw Pact. A cordon sanitaire around Poland was established. It consisted both of travel restrictions across the border of Poland and adjacent regions of the USSR and of deployment of several divisions of Soviet troops close to the border. Also the GDR and Czechoslovakia announced severe restrictions for travel to and from Poland.[35]

It is obvious that the deployment of Soviet forces close to the Polish border constituted a preparation for a future invasion. Beginning in December 1980, however, some unusual changes took place in the Soviet Ground Forces High Command. Some thirteen generals, commanding districts or groups of having other high posts, were reassigned for other duties. Several top posts in the military districts adjacent to Poland -- the Baltic, the Bielorussian, and the Carpathian military districts -- were changed.[36]

It was later reported by an unofficial source that the mobilization of troops in the Carpathian Military District was highly problematic. A number of reservists called up deserted in large numbers.[37]

On December 5, a previously not announced meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders took place in Moscow. The meeting resulted in a clear signal that no intervention of Poland should take place, at least not in the near future. The report from the meeting was remarkable. It was stated that the

> participants expressed the conviction that the Communist, the working class and the working people of fraternal Poland will be able to overcome the current difficulties and ensure the further development of the country along a socialist path. It was reiterated that Socialist Poland, the Polish

> United Workers Party and the Polish people can firmly count on the fraternal solidarity and support of the Warsaw Treaty member countries.[38]

Hence, the WP leaders expressed their confidence that the PUWP would be able to solve the situation using internal measures. But, should this not be the case, the other WP countries were prepared to give support, most probably in the form of military assistance.

There are indications that the decision not to intervene was taken even before the December WP summit meeting. The Rumanian leader Nicolae Ceaucescu attended the meeting, and he would certainly not have participated in any kinds of preparations for military moves. His negative views on Soviet military interventions are well known.

A combination of factors led to the final decision not to intervene. Obviously, the warnings from Western leaders must have had some effect. Also, the difficulties encountered in the military prepartions were important. Thirdly, the hesitancy of other leaders of the WP, notably Ceaucescu, must also have played an important role.

The December decision revealed a fundamental rift in the Soviet leadership concerning the Polish question. It could be expected that the military and the security forces favored some kind of military actions. Theses organs are responsible for the stability in the Eastern bloc. Also, some representatives of the Politburo shared this opinion. The speech by Kirilenko pointed at this direction. As a result of these stability considerations the Soviet military build-up took place. But there must also have been leaders that were more hesitant on the question of intervention. The views of these leaders, to which Party Secretary Ponomarev and his deputy Vadim Zagladin[39] should be included, were strengthened by the hesitancy of other WP leaders.

There was another group of Soviet leaders that proposed a firm Soviet stand against Poland, namely the republic level First party secretaries. This group was not strong enough to influence the December decision, but their views are still of importance. This leads us to our third level of analysis, namely the regional one, where some hitherto partly neglected aspects of the Polish crisis could be studied.

At the same time as the Solidarity movement emerged in Poland, several work stoppages and protests were noted in the USSR itself. These incidents were seldom noted in the central press but were mentioned in the regional press and in samizdat material. Many of these incidents took place in the Baltic republics and the Ukraine. These republics have traditionally maintained close relations with the West. At several occasions, explicit references were made to Solidarity. But there were also cases of unrest that were not directly related to Poland. However, working conditions in the USSR often bear great resemblance to that of Poland. In the eyes of the Soviet leadership, this unrest in the Western republics must have been disturbing whether they were related to the Polish development or not.

In all three Baltic republics, the development in Poland was well noted. Already in September 1980 a group of dissidents form the three republics delivered a greeting to Solidarity leader Lech Walesa. There was also a flow of underground publications reporting on the situation in Poland. Here, it was indicated that the rights won by the Poles might also have consequences for other Socialist countries.[40]

In fact, it was in Estonia where the repercussions from Poland were felt most clearly. Already in September 1980, youth protests took place in Tallin after the police had obstructed the concert of a popular orchestra. The youth rebellion, comprising several thousand people, spread to Parnu and other

cities. During a week of demonstratons in October, the protests changed into a political character. Demands of "freedom for Estonia" and "Russians go home" were voiced.[41] The paper Sovetskaia Estonia reported briefly on October 14 about "malicious hooligans" who had caused disturbances. The Estonian Prokuratura (procurator's office) was in the process of inhibiting criminal proceedings against the youths.[42]

In the beginning of October, some 1,000 workers went on strike in the Katseremonditehas tractor factory in Tartu. The workers demanded less difficult working norms and elimination of food shortages. The strikes in Tartu were followed by demonstrations both in Tartu and Parnu on October 10, where calls for Estonian independence were voiced. Apparently, these actions resulted in some success as several of the economic demands were granted by the Soviet authorities.[43]

The incidents in Estonia, and some similar actions in the other Baltic republics, were certainly regarded as serious by the Soviet authorities. It has been reported that KGB Head Yuri Andropov paid a visit to Tallin after the youth rebellion. Also, Estonian party secretary Karl Vaino commented on the incidents in articles and speeches. These documents will be discussed later.

Another important event that took place in Estonia was the submission of "An Open Letter from the Estonian SSR" to the main Communist party dailies in Tallin and Moscow. The letter which was signed by 40 Estonian writers and other cultural personalities suggested, in a very cautious manner, that the youth rebellions would continue as long as the preservations of Estonian culture was in danger and the socio-economic difficulties were not solved. The authors of the letter pointed specifically on shortages and inconsistent distribution of consumer goods.[44]

The open letter, dated October 28, was not published neither in

Sovetskaia Estonia nor in Pravda but it became widely known in the republic. The fact that several of the persons signing the letter were members of the literary and cultural establishment made this protest quite remarkable.

Several strikes and protests were also reported from Latvia and the Ukraine. Strikes took place in the city of Iwano-Frankiwsk and other Ukrainian cities. Leaflets supporting Solidarity and urging the workers to strike were distributed in the Western Ukraine.[45]

The protests in the Western Soviet republics which at least partially were inspired by Solidarity's activities posed a serious threat to the stability of these republics. The republican party leaders reacted very negatively to this development, as shown during the 1981 party congress, which will be dealt with in the next section of the paper.

The development in the Baltic and the Ukraine probably strengthened the position of those Soviet leaders advocating a military intervention in Poland, to which Suslov, Kirilenko and others must be counted. The leaders of the Western republics who were responsible for law and order in the regions adjacent to Poland should also be included in this group.

The proponents of a military intervention had several arguments to support them. The disruption of party authority in Poland had proceeded so far that a total intregation at the socialist society could be feared. The increasing number of strikes threatened the whole system of security in the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, reformist ideas spread from Poland into the USSR itself, where strikes and protests took place, especially in the Western parts.

Yet, the Soviet Union did not intervene in December. A number of reasons could explain this. Certainly, the warnings from Western politicians and military leaders had an effect. Also, some of the WP allies, especially

Romania, were extremely reluctant to engage in a military operation. It is also clear that the military preparations for an intervention were insufficient.

The solution for the Soviet leaders appeared to be an uneasy compromise between advocates and adversaries to intervention. The PUWP would get another chance to change the situation in Poland. In the meantime, the cordon sanitaire around Poland was kept intact.

The continued controversy: War of attrition

After a period of calmness during the weeks after the December WP Summit meeting, Soviet criticisms reemerged in the beginning of 1981. Similar arguments about the disintegration of the Polish socialist society and the threats to national security as were expressed in 1980, were reiterated also in 1981. Over time, however, the Soviet criticism became more harsh. At a couple of instances, especially in March 1981, there were indications that the Soviet Union once again prepared for a military action.

But no such action was undertaken. Instead, Polish-Soviet relations turned into some kind of war of attrition where the Soviet press and Soviet leaders continuously criticized the Polish development. In the course of events, the focus of the criticism changed from Solidarity to the leadership of the PUWP.

The fact that no action measures were taken against Poland during this period is an indication of a continued split of opinions within the Soviet leadership. The Polish issue developed into a kind of policy controversy within the leadership.

The three periods of the Polish development which are under focus here could be compared to stages in a sequential policy process. The policy

initiation phase of the decision-making process is the period during which a potential problem is recognized. During this period, it is determined, as pointed out by William Potter, which issues will be under considerations and which alternatives will be investigated.[46] This period took place during the fall of 1980 in the Soviet Polish crisis.

During the second period, that of policy controversy, the process of bargaining and consensus-building occurs. Here, different interests are articulated and support will be mobilized for certain proposals.[47] This description of the policy controversy period fits closely to the period January-October 1981 when the Soviet leadership evaluated different alternatives for a final solution of their Polish problem. During this period much of the "pulling and hauling" characteristic of the bureaucratic politics took place.

The formal decision,[48] which is the third stage in the policy process, took place in the fall of 1981. In the Polish case, the decision to impose martial law was agreed upon and preparations were carried out for the actual event in December. Potter also discusses the stages of implementation and termination, which, however, are out of the scope of this paper.

Also during the second period of the Soviet-Polish controversy, between January and October 1981, so called Western imperialist forces were accused of interference in Poland's internal affairs. The targets of Soviet criticism were at first Western trade unions and emigre centers, but later in the year interferences by the U.S. and NATO were specified.

According to the Soviet press, a stream of monetary donations had flown to so called antisocialist groupings in Poland. The funds were collected by the AFL-CIO, the emigre organization Polonia and other institutions.[49] During the spring of 1981 this activity was stepped up by the AFL-CIO and emigre

groups.[50]

The Soviet description of the activities of the AFL-CIO corresponds closely to information received in Western sources.[51] The U.S. support of Solidarity was regarded by Western trade union leaders as a legitimate and highly desirable measure in order to strengthen the free trade union imovement. The Soviet perception was of course, different. The support by the AFL-CIO was viewed as a foreign interference, that could constitute a first step in a continued and enlarged Western action.

This reasoning was followed up by Leonid Brezhnev during this major report to the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU which convened in Moscow on 23 February 1981. Brezhnev criticized in sharp words the campaigns of the imperialists against certain socialist countries.

> Wherever imperialism's subversive activity is compounded by mistakes and miscalculations in domestic policy, conditions arise for the activation of elements hostile to socialism. That is what has happened in fraternal Poland, where opponents to socialism, with the support of outside forces, are creating anarchy and are seeking to turn the development of events into a counterrevolutionary course.[52]

According to Brezhnev, policy mistakes made in Poland had given the imperialists a chance to strengthen its influence. Here, Brezhnev referred to the problems that arouse during the Gierek period. Soviet criticism of Kania did not start until later in 1981.

Stanislaw Kania's analysis of the Polish situation at the Soviet party congress was remarkably similar to that of Brezhnev's. Kania admitted that mistakes had been made in Polish politics, but he also pointed at Western subversion as one cause for the existing turmoil in Poland. However, Kania's criticism of the West was even stronger than Brezhnev's, and he used words like "imperialist sabotage".[53]

During the spring of 1981 there was a significant increase in the Soviet

criticism of Western interference. The tone of the Soviet press also became sharper. Furthermore, the U.S. and NATO were mentioned specifically by name, rather than alluding to "imperialist circles".[54]

The stepping up of Soviet criticism against the West should be seen against the background of several warnings issued by Western leaders during the spring of 1981. In March 1981, a Warsaw Pact command-staff exercise, Soyuz-81, took place. The exercises were extended in a way that led Western observes to conclude that the WP once again was preparing for an intervention. On March 27 and 28, the U.S. State Department and U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, issued warnings against such a move.[55]

Also other Western leaders warned the Soviet Union about the possible negative consequences of an invasion. The Soyuz-81 exercises were finally halted towards the end of March. Also, this time the decision was made not to intervene. As an important factor behind this was probably the decision by Solidarity to call off a nationwide strike that was planned for April 1.

The development of the Polish crisis during the first months of 1981, viewed from the international level, bears striking similarity to that of the first period, in 1980. The Soviet press continued to accuse the West of subversion and interference. The Western leaders counteracted by issuing warnings in connection with major WP military exercises. Even more important that these events on the international level were the development of Soviet-Polish relations which changed signficantly during 1981.

Already at the Twenty-Sixth party congress, Brezhnev noted that "a threat to the foundations of the socialist state had arisen in Poland".[56] This is of course a very serious condemnation of the Polish development. If Poland no longer would be a socialist state, it would loose its position as a vital link in the WP defense system.

But Brezhnev also displayed confidence in the ability of the Polish leaders to solve the problems. Referring to the December WP meeting, Brezhnev explained that the Polish people could "rely on their friends and allies".[57]

Implicit in Brezhnev's reasoning lies the consideration that the Polish leaders would have a restricted amount of time to change the situation. But if they were to become unsuccessful, they could rely on some kind of "fraternal aid" from the other socialist countries -- which most certainly would include a military action.

There is no doubt that the Polish leaders had not comprehended the message from the Kremilin leader. In his aforementioned speech at the Twenty-sixth party congress Stanislaw Kania said that the Polish leaders fully understood the anxiety expressed by other Communist leaders at the December WP summit. Also, Kania stressed Poland's importance for the security of the Warsaw pact countries

> The situation in and around Poland is directly linked with the security of all socialist countries. The socialist commonwealth is indissoluble, and its defense is the concern not only of each state but of the entire socialist coalition . . . We are grateful to the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the whole Soviet people for their fraternal assistance and support . . .[58]

Kania was here himself alluding to the principle of socialist internationalism. Accordingly, a military move to change the situation in Poland could not be excluded. But Kania also tried energetically to convince the other leaders that the so called counterrevolution should not succeed

> Poland has been and remains a socialist state, a loyal ally of the Soviet Union and an indestructible part of the socialist commonwealth. It will be an active participant in the political and defense alliance that was named after heroic Warsaw and an active participant in all joint measures taken within the framework of the CMEA.[59]

The assurances from the Polish leader was apparently not enough for the

Kremlin leaders. Immediately after the congress a meeting of seven Soviet and four Polish leaders was convened. The seven Soviet leaders were the same that participated in the December meeting, namely Brezhnev, Tikhonov, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov and Rusakov. The four Polish participants were Kania, Jaruzelski, Zabinski, and Wojtaszek. The communique from this meeting painted a much grimmer picture of the Polish situation than did the congress speeches. "Anarchy and chaos" was said to prevail in Poland. The communique also referred to the principle of socialist internationalism, reminding of the fact that the whole socialist bloc had a responsibility for the defense of every single socialist state.[60]

The intention with this meeting appears to have been to warn the Polish leaders of making further concessions to Solidarity. The time had now come for a change to a much more aggressive policy against the reform movement.

Indeed, after the Moscow meeting the Polish leaders took a much harder stand against Solidarity. Among other things, this led to the so called Bydgoszcz incident in March which resulted in some eleven days of confrontation between the Government and Solidarity. During this incident, during which invited guest from Solidarity were refused to speak at a meeting, the local militia used force to expel the trade union members from the meeting.[61]

The Bydgoszcz incident eventually led to the proclamation of a general strike by Solidarity. After negotiations with the Government the strike was, however, called off. This development led to several critical remarks in Soviet mass media.

The war of attrition in the Soviet press against Poland continued during the spring of 1981. During the Soyuz-81 exercised in March, there existed an

obvious possibility for the other WP counties to intervene. Soyuz-81 took place in late March on the territories of Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. During this period, the relations between Solidarity and the Polish government were especially intense. Apparently, the exercises were extended for a period of time longer than earlier was expected.

If the proclaimed several strike had taken place, it is conceivable that the Soviet Union had been forced to intervene with military force. Soyuz-81 did, however, not appear to have had that purpose as it was mainly a command-staff exercise.

Instead, another solution, i.e. in the eyes of the Kremlin leaders, to the Polish problem began to emerge. It was reported in the Western press that the Polish Politburo had discussed the possibility of introducing martial law during a meeting last March. This was later confirmed by a Polish ambassador to Japan who defected to the U.S. Also, Solidarity sources indicated this possibility.[62]

However, no such state of emergency was proclaimed by the Polish authorities. Apparently, the risks involved in such an operation were considerable, taking into account the strength of Solidarity. From this time on, it seems that the Soviet leaders began to loose their confidence for the Polish leadership.

The first direct criticism of the PUWP itself from Soviet sources came in beginning of April, when the party organizations in Warsaw were accused of allowing a counterrevolutionary meeting at Warsaw University.[63] The Warsaw party organization in the Polish capital is of course an important organ, more important than, say, the corresponding body in Gdansk.

In the beginning of April, Leonid Brezhnev addressed the Sixteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. He reminded the participants of

the activities of so called counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968. According to Brezhnev the situation was now similar in Poland. But he noted that "it must be presumed that the Polish Communists with the support of all genuine Polish patriots are able to administer the necessary rebuff to the schemes of the enemies of the socialist system. . . "[64]

Generally, Brezhnev's speech had the effect of calming fears in the West for a military intervention. But he did not specify what kind of rebuff should be used by the Polish communist. One should also note the use of the words "it must be presumed" which certainly cast some doubt on the probability that the Polish leaders really would be able to manage the situation.

After Brezhnev's visit to Prague it was reported that the Soyuz-81 had ended and that the exercise had achieved its aims.[65] The importance of this exercise is shown by the fact that it was headed by Marshal Kulikov, the Warsaw Pact Commander in Chief, and attended by Jaruzelski and other high WP commanders.

On April 25, CPSU politburo member Suslov, who was also the party secretary for ideology, paid a visit to Warsaw. The purpose of this visit must have been to make an evaluation of the policies of the PUWP. The disucssions with Kania and other leaders "dealt with questions involving urgent problems of the life of the two parties." The Polish delegation stressed that the Poles were counteracting "attempts by groupings of opponents of socialism to bring about anarchy, undermine the socialist state and establish dual power in the country".[66]

Shortly after Suslov's visit, TASS issued a dispatch from Warsaw where it was claimed that "revisionist elements" in the PUWP were trying to paralyze the leading role of the PUMP in Poland.[67] This was the first time that Soviet media mentioned the existence of revisionist within the PUWP. The message

from TASS could also be interpreted as indicating that Suslov was clearly dissatisfied with the Polish state of affairs at that time.

Even if revisionist elements in the PUWP were condemned the criticism did not extend to Kania himself at this time. This was to be changed, however, at a later stage.

In June there was a remarkable change in the Soviet policy towards Poland. The Soviet press began to cover in detail the activities of a small faction within the PUWP, the Katowice party forum. The Soviet press reported on some of the forum's hard-line views on Polish politics. The Katowice party forum was highly critical to the Kania leadership. It was stated that more harm had been done to the PUWP during the preceding 10 months, i.e. Kania's period of reign, than during the previous 10 years, i.e. the Gierek period.[68]

From June 1981 and onwards the Soviet press began to criticize the leadership of the PUWP directly. On the 12th, Pravda published the well-known June letter to the PUWP where it was stated that Poland had reached a "critical point".

> Endless concessions to the antisocialist forces and their inpunities have led to a situation in which the PUWP has retreated step by step under the onslaught of internal counterrevolution, which relies on the support of imperialist subversion centers abroad.
>
> Today the situation is not simply dangerous; it has brought the country to a critical point -- no other evaluation is possible.[69]

According to the June letter, the strikes organized by Solidarity had resulted in a wave of anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism, which in turn had resulted in a threat to the very existence of the Polish state. Although the Polish leaders Kania and Jaruzelski had voiced agreement with the Soviet opinions, "no corrections were made in the policy of concessions and

compromises".[70]

The June letter also pointed out that the development in Poland was a threat to the whole socialist commonwealth, to its integrity and to the security of its borders. The only possible remedy to this situation was to mobilize the "healthy forces" to combat the counterrevolution.[71]

The June letter appears to be a more or less desperate move from the Soviet leaders to bring about some change in Poland. Both Kania and Jaruzelski were criticized by name. However, this had the opposite effect of strengthening Kania's position at the upcoming Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the PUWP. If the Soviet leaders wanted to oust Kania this could have been done through other channels, private or diplomatic, rather than through a public letter. The most probable explanation for the June letter was that the Soviet leaders wanted to put Kania and Jaruzelski on a kind of probation. The June letter was a last warning to them in order to bring about changes. The letter might also reflect some hesitancy from the Soviet leaders who were unable to give concrete directions on how the Polish development should be turned.

The Ninth PUWP Congress in July was remarkably successful for Kania and Jaruzelski. Both were reelected and they were also able to ensure themselves a majority in the Central Committee. The Soviet leaders appeared to be pleased with the outcome of the congress which was attended by Politburo member Grishin.[72]

After the Party congress, Polish-Soviet relations became calmer for a period of time. In August General Jaruzelski met with Marshal Kulikov, Commander in Chief of the WP forces.[73] It is possible that already at that time discussions about a Polish military solution to the perceived problems in Poland were discussed.

In September 1981, one of the largest Soviet exercises to be held in many years was conducted in the Baltic Sea, the Baltic Military District and the Bielorussian Military District. This exercise, Soyuz-81, involved more than 100,000 troops and included maneuver by both naval and ground forces. During the exercise, an amphibious landing was conducted at the vicinity of Baltysk, not far from the Polish city of Gdansk.[74]

Soyuz-81 began just one day before the opening of Solidarity's first congress in Gdansk. The exercises appeared not to have any perceptible hampering effect on the congress. During this congress, a message to the workers of other socialist countries was issued.

> We support those among you who have decided to follow the difficult struggle for a free trade union movement. We have the firm hope that our representatives will be able to meet each other.[75]

The message was intended for "the workers in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania, Hungary, and all the peoples of the Soviet Union". According to the statement, Solidarity gave the workers of the other countries their firm support.

Perhaps it was unwise by Solidarity to issue a statement of this kind. The fear of reformist ideas spreading from Poland to other countries was no dobut great within the leadership of the respective countries. Especially sensitive was the allusion to "all the peoples" of the USSR, implying that some nationalities would have a greater interest in Polish type reformism than others. Even if this in fact was true, it could have been suspected that the Soviet reaction would be fierce.

After the Solidarity congress Soviet criticisms of the Polish development became much more virulent man earlier. Personal criticism against Kania began to resurface. In September 1981, a second letter from Moscow was delievered

to the PUWP. In the September letter, the charges were far more serious than in the June letter. In the new letter, it was stated that the Polish leaders had allowed anti-Sovietism to develop in Poland. These leaders had not taken any steps to stop the campaign against the USSR. In the letter, a virtual ultimatum was given to the Polish leaders.

> We expect the PUWP leadership and the Polish government immediately to take determined and radical steps in order to cut short the malicious anti-Soviet propaganda.[76]

From this time on Kania's position became increasingly difficult. It was obvious that the Soviet leaders were not satisfied, and that he had failed to fulfil the promises given about stabilizing Poland. At a PUWP Central Committee session in mid-October Kania stepped down from this post as First secretary. He was replaced by Jaruzelski who retained his posts as Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[77]

Just before the resignation of Kania, another waining concerning a possible Soviet intervention was issued. In a speech about the antisocialist crisis in Poland, Politburo member Michail Suslov remarked "that socialist Poland, the Polish communists and the Polish people could count on the fraternal solidarity and aid from the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact".[78]

This was the second time that Suslov publicly had alluded to the possibility of a Soviet military intervention in accordance with the ideological principle of socialist internationalism. This theme of national security and stability had become increasingly important during 1981 in the Polish-Soviet crisis.

The Soviet criticism of Poland reached a peak after Solidarity's congress in September. In the eyes of the Soviet leader, Solidarity's message to the workers in the other WP countries revealed the true intentions of

Solidarity. Solidarity's activities were now clearly interpreted as "anti-Sovietism."

In September 1981, it became clear that the Soviet leaders would not accept any further concessions to Solidarity. By supporting Jaruzelski, it appears that the majority of the Soviet leaders already at that time had decided that a Polish military solution was the only possible one. This did not, however, exclude the possibility of also Soviet military support. The views expressed by Suslov were a clear indication of this.

Folowing the Polish crisis on the national level of analysis, it is clear that the Soviet union followed a very cautious course during the first ten months of 1981. Diplomatic channels, personal visits, letters, etc. were used to influence the Polish leadership. Towards the end of the period, Soviet security considerations and concerns about anti-Sovietism forced the Soviet leaders to press for Kania's resignation. However, it appears that some leaders, notably Suslov, wanted to hold the possibility of a Soviet invasion open.

The extremely negative Soviet reaction on Solidarity's message to workers in other WP countries confirms the importance of the regional level of anlaysis. In this connection, the views of the republican party leaders were most interesting.

As already mentioned, the republic level party leaders took a firm stand against Polish reformism and the spillover effects that these ideas might have to the Western parts of the USSR -- where in fact these leaders had as one of their most important responsibilities to maintain law and order.

At the Twenty-Sixth party congress five party secretaries from the Western Soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bielorussia, and the Ukraine, gave extensive comments on the situation in Poland and on problems in

the international relations. It is not very common that the republic level leaders devote much time to international issues during the party congresses. But this time the concerns by these leaders were easily understood. Only a couple of months before the congress, there had been several reports about strikes and protest, most certainly inspired by Solidarity's ideas, in the Western republics.

During the Twenty-sixth party congress Lithuanian leader Petras Griskevicius made a fierce attack on the anti-Sovietism in Poland as inspired by emigre groups. But even before the congress, special measures had been taken in Lithuania to seal off the republic from unwanted foreign influences. It is not surprising that this action took place in Lithuania which has long historical connections with Poland. Before 1980, travel between the two areas had been relatively unrestricted. Also, Lithuania has a Polish minority which took a great interest in the development.

At the 8th Party Congress of the Lituanian Communist party in January, a resolution was adopted under which "any expressions of nationalism, chauvinism, and zionism" was condemned. The resolution also spoke out clearly on the principles of cooperation between socialist countries.

> It is important that through educational work it would be learned that national consciouness and pride must organically harmonize with the all-national Soviet pride and that socialist internationalism must harmonize with Soviet patriotism.[79]

The Lithuanian resolution also pointed at the negative influences of religious extremism and warned of the serious consequences of "using religion for reactionary political purposes, namely to undercut the friendship of Soviet nations and to revive bourgeois and nationalist sentiments".[80] The warnings were apparently addressed both to Polish activists and Lithuanians who were influenced by Solidarity ideas which had a definite religious

connection.

The problem of spillover and religious dissent was of great importance also in Latvia. At the Twenty-third Party Congress of the Latvian party in January 1981, views similar to those from Lithuania were expressed.[81] This was clearly a sign of the fact that the Catholic minority in Latvia also had taken an interest in the reformist ideas.

At the Twenty-sixth CPSU party congress, the strongest condemnations of Poland came from the Lithuanian leader Griskevicius

> Dear comrades! Soviet Communists and the working people of our country are following the development of the situation: Poland with concern. We wholly support the course set by our beloved party, a course aimed at rebuffing attempts at imperialist interference in the affairs of this fraternal country, which is an integral part of the socialist commonwealth. As Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev said in the Central Committee's report, we will not abandon socialist fraternal Poland in its time of trouble -- we will stand by it.[82]

The course taken by the Lithuanian communists would be to increase their political vigilance and to

> administer a resolute rebuff to all foreign-inspired manifestations of bourgeois morality and relapses into bourgeois nationalism and anti-Sovietism and to slanderous attacks by reactionary Lithuanian emigres -- underlinings of U.S. imperialism. We will persistently instill in our people firm Communist convictions and the noble feelings of the friendship of peoples, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism.[83]

It is difficult to envision that Griskevicius could have made his point more clear at the party congress. Segments of the Lithuanian population were indeed effected by Polish type reformism. Lithuanian emigres were in the process of stimulating this process. The Lithuanian party had to take all available resources into use in order to come to grips with the situation.

In another way, this could also be interpreted as a signal that the Baltic leaders would support a Soviet military intervention in Poland. The

characterizations given by all three leaders, presumably also including Sherbitsky, point clearly in his direction.

The most vivid presentation of the position of the Baltic republics with respect to foreign influence was given by Karl Vaino, Estonia's first secretary.

> Estonia is situated in the periphery of the ideological struggle because of its specific geographical position. It is situated where the anti-Soviet propaganda has concentrated its resources . . . It is impossible not to label the situation a psychological war.[84]

Vaino used an especially harsh language when he designated the situation as psychological war. Although this term is not uncommon in Soviet political vocabulary, it seems clear that Vaino was here using the term to depict a perceived serious situation. Of course, Vaino's evaluation of the situation in Estonia was influenced by the fact that several strikes and youth rebellions had taken place a few months earlier.

Also August Voss of Latvia made references to the Polish situation. Voss remarked that the "Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism"[85] had to be strengthened in Latvia, which again was an indication of the fear of spillover effects from Poland.

At the party congress, also Kiselev from Byelorussia, and some other republican and regional level leaders made further negative comments on Poland. A much more militant description of the situation was given by Poliburo member and Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitsky.

> In the face of stepped-up activity by the most reactionary militaristic forces and a serious threat to the course of peace and security, the unity and principled international position of the fraternal socialist countries and the communist and workers' parties are becoming more and more important. . . .
>
> Our valiant Armed Forces and state security agencies. . . are reliably safeguarding the gains of socialism and the

sacred borders of the Soviet fatherland.[86]

Here, Shcherbitshy clearly referred to the situation in Poland, which had deviated from the path of unity. According to Shcherbitshy, some kind of military action would be needed to slove the threat to socialism.

Shcherbitshy sided here with the other proponent of a more energetic action against Poland. Suslov and Kirilenko had described the options in a similar way. It is also obvious that the other republican leaders in the Western USSR were anxious to come to some kind of showdown, probably including military force. We can no doubt note the existence of a coalition -- even if it may not have been formally organized -- in favor of a military intervention. To this coalition, also some military leaders must be counted -- which will be discussed further in the following section.

The reports of the Twenty-sixth congress from the republican leaders reflected the situation during the fall of 1981, when indeed unrest was noted in most of the Western republics. During the first ten months of 1981 the unrest continued, but on a much smaller scale. The most important strikes occured in the Ukraine where two strikes took place in a Kiev experimental design plant. Apparently, the strikers had some success in their demands. Labor disputes were also reported from the Kiev Motorcycle Plant and from the Latvian capital of Riga as well as from different parts of Lithuania.[87]

The strikes had certain indigenous causes, no doubt, but they were also inspired by Solidarity. This could be seen from the harsh condemnations of Solidarity from the political leaders. The interest among Soviet citizens for the Polish development must also have been great, notwithstanding the fact that there were probably different opinions on Solidarity in the Soviet population. The interest of the Soviet people was confirmed by the Novosti commentator Beglov in July 1981:

> Today, regardless of what kind of Soviet audience one addresses with a lecture or discussion on a topic of international affairs, the first question asked of the speaker inevitably touches on Poland.[88]

When looking at the three levels of analysis it becomes clear that events on the regional level would support a Soviet military intervention in Poland. The strikes and unrest of citizens in the Western republics were no doubt a threat to the stability of the Soviet system. The anxiety of the republican leaders, Griskevicius, Shcherbitsky, and others, also point at this direction. But during this period, between January and October 1981, the Polish development was closely watched by Western politicians who issued serious warnings about the consequences of an intervention. As will be seen later, these warnings were not repeated later during the year.

Towards the end of the period under investigation it appeared that the Polish situation had become totally unacceptable for the Soviet leaders. Kania had not fulfilled his mission. Solidarity had become more militant and even issued a statement to other workers in the WP countries. But no Soviet action was taken. After the long war of attrition, Jaruzelski was given the responsibility to change the conditions. The cautious actions from the Soviet leaders probably originated in different opinions on how to counteract the Polish development. To allow the Poles themselves to find a solution of their own, even including the use of the Polish army, became an attractive compromise for the Soviet leadership.

The final decision: Martial Law

With the appointment of General Jaruzelski as First Secretary of the PUWP the decision on how to counteract Solidarity was, in practice, taken. The third of our periods under investigation, from October to December 1981, was foremost a preparation for the final imposition of martial law in December

1981.

The criticism of Western interference into Poland's internal affairs continued also during the fall of 1981. But the criticism now changed character. It was no longer the Western trade unions who were the main target. It was now Western intelligence services that were criticized.

> The crisis situation is conducive to the infiltration of hostile intelligence agents into Poland . . . At the same time, subversive activities are being stepped up by the political adversary that is seeking to seize power and destroy the foundations of the socialist state by sowing the seeds of anarchy and by whipping up hysteria and waging psychological terror against representatives of the state administration, the social and political aktiv and all patriotic forces.[89]

Increased coverage of foreign intelligence services might reflect the ongoing militarization of the Polish society at that times. In all events, the tone against Western representatives with any kind of military connection was increasingly negative. Sometimes, even accusations of espionage were made. The members of the intelligence services were

> recruiting Polish citizens for espionage and for supplying information to agents who were recruited abroad at earlier times. Military attaches of the NATO countries' embassies, as well as foreigners coming to Poland, including many journalist, have stepped up their espionage activities significantly.[90]

This alleged espionage was of course a serious charge. The purpose of this reasoning was to emphasize the critical conditions in Poland -- and to prepare for the final showdown.

In an article in Kommunist, S. Tsvigun, First Deputy Chairman of the KGB, linked the Polish development to a general step up of the Western intelligence activities against the WP countries. The same methods used against Poland were also instigated in the USSR itself.[91]

The Soviet commentators suggested that an increased intelligence activity from the west occurred during the fall of 1981. This may be partly true. But when observing the actual policies of the Western countries at this period, it appears that the concentration of political activities of these countries were directed towards other geopgraphical areas.

During the Carter administration, several sharp warnings had been issued against the alleged Soviet plans for invasion of Poland. Also during the spring of 1981, warnings were issued by major Western politicians and military leaders. During the fall of 1981, this pattern changed dramatically.

During the fall, the Reagan administration was preoccupied with events in the Middle East and Central America. But it is nevertheless difficult to understand why such little interest was devoted to Poland, precisely when the militarily take over there was planned.

A close reading of the Weekly Compiliation of Presidential Documents and the Department of State Bulletin reveals that virtually no official attention was given to considerations about a Soviet intervention or a Polish martial law. A typical statement came from President Reagan when he was asked about the possible consequences of the giant Soyuz-81 exercise

> I have no way of knowing what's in their mind.[92]

Other documents from the Readgan administration indicate that the interpretation was that Soviet policy was "restrained."[93] On the whole, there were no warnings from the U.S. leaders concerning a military move for several months during the Fall of 1981. Even if this was unintended -- and the author's view is that the U.S. leaders' views had not in fact changes -- the silence from the White House was interpreted by the Soviet leaders that the U.S. would not inflict any active countermeasures against a military take over in Poland.

Another event earlier in the year which had the effect of reassuring the Kremlin leadership was the removal of the embargo of sales of American grain to the Soviet Union.[94] Even if the situation was unclear in Poland the U.S. was willing to conduct normal business with the Soviet Union.

For the Soviet leaders, the international dimension of the Polish crisis became of less significance during the final period of our investigation. Instead, the events on the national and regional levels determined Soviet action.

The new Polish leader Jaruzelski was hailed by Brezhnev as "a consistent supporter of indestructive friendship between the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union" and he was assured "understanding and support from the CPSU and the Soviet state".[95]

The criticisms of the PUWP leadership which also had affected Jaruzelski suddenly disappeared from the Soviet press. Instead, a policy of cooperation between Jaruzelski and the Soviet leaders started with the ultimate aim of imposing martial law. It is impossible that the Polish actions were taken independently from the Soviet leaders. Poland is after all the second largest WP country and is of vital importance for Soviet security. Instead, a series of meetings between Soviet and Polish officials took place during which the details of the Polish military takeover were planned.

Already towards the end of October it became clear how Jaruzelski planned to change the whole Polish political scene. At a session of the Polish sejm Jaruzelski declared that the "anti-Soviet excesses" had gone too far. Therefore, he would propose some extraordianry measures to be taken.

> I have submitted to the Presidium of the Sejm the Government's draft law on emergency measures to protect the interests of citizens and the state, and today the Council of Elders presented to the Sejm a draft resolution that in no uncertain terms raises the question of the immediate

repudiation of the strike campaign, and also the termination of all actions that disturbs public order.[96]

Already in October, military task forces had been sent to the countryside to assist local authorities in maintaining order.[97] Towards the end of October and the beginning of November several meetings were held between officials from the WP countries and Polish leaders.[98] No doubt, these meetings constituted elements in the process of planning for martial law.

Towards the end of November the military task forces were also sent to the cities to perform similar functions in the countryside. At about this time, Jaruzelski received a visit from Marshal Kulikov, Commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact forces.[99] Also other meetings, including those with officers from the Soviet Northern Group of forces were held.

By the beginning of December, it became increasingly obvious that the military dominated the Polish scoiety. As a prelude to the declaration of martial law, Polish military and security personnel attacked the striking cadets of the Firemen's Academy in Warsaw. It was now evident that the Polish military would use force, if necessary, against strikers. At this time Politburo member Stefan Olszowski reported to a group of party members that "everything will be solved" before Christmas.[100]

December 10, 1981, TASS issued the by far most strongly worded dispatch against the alleged counterrevolutionary front in Poland. A second dispatch, on December 12, called for the enemies of socialism to be punished for their crimes.[101] When the TASS statement was received in Warsaw, the Solidarity headquarters were already surrounded and the arrests began. . .

The efficiency of the December 13 procedure indicates that several months of planning had preceeded the operation. There could be no doubt about the fact that this was a coordinated Soviet-Polish action. Several high ranking

Soviet military officials, including Kulikov, had visited Jaruzelski during the crucial planning period. The declaration of martial law ended a long controversy between the Soviet leaders and its Polish counterparts. After several months of "pulling and hauling," a solution was found that satisified all Soviet demands for security and stability -- without involving direct Soviet military force.

Developments on the regional level also had a definitive impact on the actions taken against Solidarity in Poland. Just before the proclamation of martial law a new period of unrest in Estonia emerged. Also in the other Western Soviet republicss protests were voiced against the existing situation.

The far most serious incident occurred in November 1981. A group called the Democratic Front of the Soviet Union distributed leaflets in Estonia and the other Baltic republics calling for workers' strikes in support of changes in several areas of Soviet politics. A one-hour strike was called for in Tallin on December 1, and the inhabitants of Riga and Vilnyus were also asked to participate. First of all, the protests were directed towards unsatisfactory living conditions. Secondly, also political demands were expressed. The Soviet Union should recall its army from Afghanistan and stop interferring in Polish internal politics. Furthermore, demands for the release of political prisoners in Estonia's were voiced.[102]

Some scattered partial strikes actually occurred in Estonia in December 1981 and January 1982. The workers and youth in Lithuania failed, however, to join this strike movement. In Latvia, there were some protest activities, involving the distribution of leaflets, during the fall.[103] Also in the Ukraine, there were reports about the anxiety of the authorities about possible spillover effects from Poland.[104]

In quantitative terms, the protests in Estonia and other Western republics appear to have ben small. The Soviet regional authorities, however, regarded these strike attempts as extremely serious. Estonian First Party Secretary Vaino returned to the December incident at several occasions and condemned these activities as extremely dangerous. Vaino even quoted the contents of the leaflets, that were distributed.

> If you are for justice and democracy, participate in a "quiet half hour" strike, starting on December 1. And do the same on the first day of each subsequent month.[105]

The ideological diversion that was represented among the protesters was attributed to inspiration by foreign emigre centers. Especially in Sweden, there existed anti-Soviet centers that influenced the Estonian strike movements. The Swedish emigre centers were allegedly directed by the U.S. intelligence service. It is interesting to note that this criticism of Sweden was voiced during a time when foreign, most certainly Soviet, submarine activities were observed in the Swedish territorial waters.

Vaino made his remarks about the strike movement in the theoretical party journal Kommunist which is an indication of the importance attributed to the events. But Vaino also returned to this subject later, at the session of the Central Committee of the CPSU in June 1983, one and a half year after the strike calls first were heard.

> A little over a year ago some inhabitants of Tallin suddenly began to receive letters in their mailboxes, asking them to participate in a half-hour strike.[105]

According to Vaino, the people of Tallin did not know from where the letters originated and why they were distributed. But he considered them to be a provocation against Estonia, inspired by Western "centers of subversion."

The strike movement was mentioned at several times also in the Estonian

press. Although the movement must have been small, it was regarded as extremely serious by Vaino. The republican leaders in the Soviet Union are, as mentioned, responsible for the stability of their regions, and any spillover from Polish reformists must be considered as dangerous.

According to the comments from Soviet official leaders, the situation in the Ukraine was similar to that in Estonia. The same problems had occurred in the Ukraine, although the dissent there had a closer connection to the prohibited Catholic Uniate Church. In a Kommunist article, KGB First Deputy Chairman Tsvigun stressed that

> the heads of Ukrainian nationalist organizations abroad are more and more brazenly proclaiming that Ukrainians have a "right to emigrate" from the USSR. Actions supporting illegal Uniate groups and encouraging extremism among certain members of the Catholic clergy have assumed a more obvious anti-Soviet thrust.[107]

It is clear that the regional level cannot be neglected when Soviet decision-making concerning Poland will be analyzed. There could be no doubt that there was an actual spillover of ideas from Polish reformism to the Western Soviet republics, where existing national tendencies were reinforced. Furthermore, it becomes clear that the Soviet leaders considered this spillover as extremely dangerous for the stability of the regions adjacent to Poland. The strong articulation by Vaino and others must have supported the Soviet leaders in favor of a military action against Solidarity.

Also, the possibility of spillover to the East European socialist countries must be considered in this connection. This aspect had not been covered in this paper, but it could be generally stated that the fear of the Polish contegion was great within the leaderships of especially the GDR and the CSSR. The extremely fierce reaction to Solidarity's call for cooperation with other independent workers' movement in East Europe and the USSR confirms

this conclusion.

A combination of factors, mainly on the national and regional levels of analysis, explains the decision to impose martial law in Poland in December 1981. The events on the national level were actual ones. The Polish strike movements had already become a threat to the security of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union itself. The events on the regional level were of a more potential danger. If the reformists ideas were to further infiltrate the non-Russian nationalities and also the peoples of the East European countries, the whole security system of the Soviet Union could have collapsed. Even if Western leaders would have issued warnings -- which they in fact did not do at that time -- the imposition of martial law was inevitable by December 1981.

Conclusions

The labor movement initiated by Solidarity and the strikes following were a major challenge to the system of government in Poland. This system had been developed after the Second World War and had remained in its essential features into the 1970s.

The deviation from the existing pattern instigated by Solidarity was too great to allow for any compromises. The security problems that resulted from Solidarity's actions and the spillover effects that the strike movement caused in the Western Soviet republics and elsewhere among the WP countries amounted to such a threat for the Soviet leaders that accommodation was out of the question. The options left for the Soviet leaders were either an armed intervention or some kind of indigenous Polish solution.

The Polish case bore several similarities with the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises. Both cases involved security and spillover concerns. As in the Czechoslovak case, the Polish crisis involved elements that were highly sensitive for the Soviet perception of control and stability. The emergence

of factions within the PUWP and of interest groups outside the party, as the different branches of Solidarity, were a serious challenge to the principle of the party's leading role in society.

But the Polish crisis was handled differently from the Czechoslovak crisis by the Soviet authorities. Much more sophisticated methods were used, dissimilar from those of Stalinist times. The Soviet Union used negotiations, diplomatic channels, press campaigns, open letters etc. Also military maneuvers were used to influence the situation, but no direct military force was employed.

The Polish crisis affected some values that were highly vital to the Soviet system. Poland's role in the WP was, of course, a major concern for the Soviet Union. Poland is also a vital link between the Soviet Union and the Soviet forces in the GDR which stand closest to the Western adversary. The Polish crisis appeared to strike the Soviet leaders with a great deal of surprise, which could be seen during the initial period of the Polish crisis. At that time, the Soviet reactions were uncertain and uncoordinated.

After the first period of uncertainty, when Poland was sealed off from its neighbors by a cordon sanitaire, a long period of political interactions took place among the main Soviet leaders and bureaucracies. The "war of attrition" period of 1981 had all characteristics that usually are attributed to bureaucratic politics. Some Soviet leaders advocated the use of military force while others were more restricted.

Among the leaders who openly suggested the possibility of a Soviet military intervention, Suslov, Kirilenko, and Kulikov, could be mentioned. These leaders handled -- among other things -- ideological matters, the provincial party organs, and coordination within the Warsaw Pact. It is easy to acknowledge that it was in their interest to take a firm stand against

Polish revisionism.

Two of the leaders opposed to a Soviet or WP intervention were Ponomarev and Zagladin. Both were responsible for work with relations with non-Communist countries. Their priorities would quite naturally be influenced by considerations concerning relations with the West. Taking into account the fierce warnings issued by Carter and also some of the Reagan administration officials during the first part of 1981, these Soviet leaders would anticipate worsening East-West relations in case of a Soviet military showdown.

The republic level party leaders, for example Vaino and Griskevicius, sided with the advocates of military intervention. Their influence must be regarded as smaller than the central leaders. But the formation of a bloc of central and regional leaders was of great importance for the final outcome.

It seems that the different blocs of pro- and anti-interventionists in 1981 were much similar to these that emerged in 1968 with reference to Czechoslovakia. Party officials with responsibilities in party organization and ideological matters as well as representatives of the bureaucracies of the non-Russian republics in the West formed a coalition of advocates of intervention. The skeptics of intervention mainly belonged to officials with responsibilities in international relations. Also, some officials engaged in economic planning were opposed to intervention in 1968.[108]

Unlike in 1968, the Soviet leaders could in 1981 reach a compromise which was more or less acceptable to both the blocs. An intervention was made -- but without the use of outside military force. From available evidence it is clear that the Soviet decision-makers participated in the planning of all details concerning this indigenous Polish intervention.

The decision on the Soviet <u>non-intervention</u> in Poland emerged out of considerations originating from all three levels of analysis that have been

applied to this study. During the first phases of the crisis the Western warnings had a hampering effect on proposals for intervention. But during the fall of 1981 the attention of the U.S. administration was devoted to other issues. In all events, the silence from the White House about Poland was interpreted as an acceptance of the Soviet rights to dominate its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

Instead, the events on the national and regional levels determined the outcome of the crisis. Concerns about security and stability certainly pointed in the direction of an intervention. Still, the hesitancy from some leaders in Kremlin combined with reluctant attitudes of some of the other East European leaders led to the decision of non-intervention constituted a East European leaders led to the decision of non-intervention and martial law rather than direct intervention. This non-intervention constituted a broader solution to the problem, a kind of compromise typical for Soviet politics in the late Brezhnev era.

But even if Solidarity was unacceptable to the Soviet leadership, being a too large deviation from the existing political system, the handling of the Polish crisis included some new features of Soviet policy. This policy was now far more cautious and also more sophisticated than earlier. In the Polish case the Soviet Union refrained from using military force. This is a small, but significant step from the policy pattern emerging out of Stalinist times.

FOOTNOTES

*A first vesion of this paper was presented to the Joint Sessions of European Consortium for Politics Research, Gothenburg, April 1986.

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[18]Pravda, 1 September 1980.

[19]Ibid.

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[21]Pravda, 20 September 1980.

[22]Pravda, 27 September 1980.

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[30]Pravda and Izvestia, 5 December 1980.

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VII. A POLICY CHANGE UNDER GORBACHEV?

Several factors contribute to the final decisions taken by the Soviet leadership on foreign policy. Both international and national aspects shape the outcomes of the decision-making process. As shown in the case-studies above during periods of major crisis the regional aspects have not been sufficiently analyzed in earlier research.

Much has been said about the aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy. In may cases, Soviet actions have indeed had aggressive consequences. But there is also an important defensive aspect to Soviet foreign policy. As shown above, actions were taken against Czechoslavakia and Afghanistan when the stability of the neighboring areas of the Soviet Union itself was undermined by spillover from reformist or other anti-Soviet movements.

In the Baltic republics there has been an ongoing political crisis since the 1940's. It appears that the Soviet regime has never attained a high level of legitimacy in these areas. The Soviet strategy to cope with this situation has been to integrate these republics firmly into the Soviet system. This integration has only been partially successful. Still, political and religious opposition movements do play an important role in these areas.

The unstable situation in Afghanistan prompted the Soviet leaders to undertake an invasion in 1979. This step was to a large extent taken in order to avoid the establishment of three anti-Soviet Muslim regimes south of the Soviet border. But also considerations about the stability in the Central Asian region played an important role. Several reports by political leaders indicate an increased interest in religious matters among the Central Asian during the latter part of the 1970's.

In Poland, a different strategy was chosen. Martial law was proclaimed in order to eliminate Solidarity and to counteract the possibility of the

revolution spreading to other East European countries or to areas of the Soviet Union. A direct Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention was avoided, but it seems clear that this possibility was seriously considered. Throughout the 1980-81 period, there were numerous reports about instability in the Soviet republics adjacent to Poland. Thus factor no doubt contributed significantly to the negative Soviet stance on the Polish development.

The Soviet decision-making appears to be characterized by an interplay of international and domestic factors. The regional security concerns seem to constitute some of the most important aspects in the area of domestic factors influencing foreign policy. Also, the increased interest of regional party leaders in foreign policy seems to corroborate this conclusion.

If the role of the regional demension of Soviet foreign policy more or less went unnoticed by the majority of Western scholars, a possible shift in this policy during Gorbachev was also neglected. During the 1986 party Congress, the regional leaders spent less time dealing with foreign policy matters. Also, the thrust of Gorbachev's policy in towards developing the Russian republic and he has hitherto shown remarkable little interest in the non-Russian republics. His border proposals to China about possible border changes might also be in indication of this shift.

Only the future will show if this shift will be permanent. It is probable, however, that Gorchev must devote more interest to the development of the non-Russian republics. If the economics and social problems of these republics are not solved, the cohesion of the Union will be threatened in the longer time perspective.

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