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   MONTEREY CA I J CULORA JUN 86

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THESIS

CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THREE AFRICAN CASE STUDIES

by

Thomas John Culora

June 1986

Thesis Advisor: David Winterford

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Conflict Resolution is a process in which two or more players, holding dissimilar perceptions of a central issue in a dispute, employ strategies consonant with the resources they hold to obtain their goals in the conflict.

This thesis examines this process in three contemporary conflicts on the African continent--the Sudan civil war, the Zimbabwe/Rhodesia independence crisis, and the continuing conflict in Namibia. A checklist was developed to establish a theoretical framework for examining the key elements in each conflict. The interaction of these elements--the issues, goals, strategy, resources and limitations and the patterns that evolve from this interaction is analyzed from the perspective of the African continent and within the context of conflict resolution.

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The primary objective of this project is to provide a comparative analysis of the three conflicts selected for study to gain increased insight into the dynamics of each case and to expand upon the theoretical and practical understanding of conflict resolution.

Conflict Resolution:
A Comparative Analysis of Three African Case Studies

by

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MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

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conflict resolution.

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANC	African National Congress
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
FRELIMO	Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique
ICJ	International Court of Justice
LFA	Land Freedom Army
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NUP	National Unionist Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OPO	Ovamboland People's Organization
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
PF	Patriotic Front
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RF	Rhodesian Front
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SACDNU	Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
SADF	South African Defense Force
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSPG	Southern Sudan Provisional Government
SWA	South West Africa (Namibia)
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence

UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNITA	National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
WWC	World Council of Churches
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

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I. INTRODUCTION

When a conflict arises between two players in the inter-
national system, there are two principal ways in which the dis-
pute is settled. Either one party, through a clear and
overwhelming victory, dictates the terms of a settlement to the
second party, or as is more often the case, the conflict is
resolved through negotiation. The main focus of this thesis is
on conflict resolution, and how various elements influence the
course and outcome of a conflict. This thesis, though not a
strict study of conflict in Africa, examines three conflicts
on the African continent as a base to further understand con-
flict resolution in general, and to analyze the process of
conflict resolution.

This thesis has three main purposes. First, to develop a
simple, but effective checklist as a tool for examining inter-
national conflicts that have been resolved or have the poten-
tial to be resolved. The checklist was initially designed to
be used by a negotiator or a mediator to grasp the essential
elements of a conflict either as it was occurring or for a
retrospective study of a particular conflict. The checklist
is intended to expand the theoretical understanding of conflict
resolution to a practical interpretation of real life conflict
resolution. The second purpose is to examine three inter-
national conflicts using the checklist to identify the main

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elements of each individual conflict. And, third, to expand
an understanding of conflict negotiation through a comparative
analysis of the three conflicts examined. A secondary aim in
examining these conflicts is to test the applicability and
effectiveness of the conflict resolution checklist.

It should be made clear that this thesis views conflict
resolution, as it applies to the cases studied, as a competi-
tive relationship between two players, each seeking to maximize
his gains and minimize his concessions. Although it is recog-
nized that the process of negotiation is a problem solving
activity by nature, and an entire school of thought exists
that emphasizes the cooperative elements of negotiation, this
analysis will be concerned primarily with the competitive
aspect of conflict resolution.

This thesis is structured in the following manner. The
introductory chapter will include a brief explanation of why
the Sudan Civil War, the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe independence crisis,
and the current conflict in Namibia were selected as case
studies. In addition, a brief review of the conflict resolu-
tion checklist is included in this chapter. Chapters II, III,
and IV will examine the Sudan, Zimbabwe and Namibia cases
respectively. A brief review of each case is provided later
in this chapter. And a fifth and final chapter will provide a
comparative analysis of these three cases and will contrast
the key elements found in each conflict.

This thesis is not intended to be a historical or chrono-
logical presentation of each conflict, nor is it a comprehensive

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analysis of all the elements involved in each case. As such, a chronology of significant events in each conflict is provided in Appendices A, B, and C. The purpose of each chronology is to introduce those readers who are unfamiliar with Sudan, Zimbabwe, and Namibia cases to the general sequence of events in each conflict. Although each conflict is complex, a chronological perspective aids in examining and analyzing each case. Appendix D will provide a brief review of the positive and negative aspects of the conflict resolution checklist following its practical application to each of the conflicts examined in this thesis. In addition, a bibliography is included at the end of the thesis to assist those interested in further examining each conflict.

Three cases were selected for study, and although they are similar, each contains several dissimilar elements, displays varying levels of violent conflict, and addresses different sets of issues. International conflicts can be divided into one of three general categories: (1) conflict which was resolved by a negotiated resolution, (2) conflict where negotiation has either not been initiated or where negotiation has failed to produce a settlement (and subsequently the conflict either continues or stalemates), and (3) conflict in which a single party, through an overwhelming victory, dictates the terms of a settlement. The cases selected for study in this thesis fall into categories one and two. The Sudan and the Zimbabwe conflicts represent cases where a successful settlement

to a violent conflict was reached through negotiation. The Namibian conflict was selected as a case where negotiation had failed to produce a settlement, and where, at the time of this writing, conflict continues.

It should be noted that this analysis omits a case that fits category three. The main reason for this is that a situation where one player is the clear victor, the scope of negotiation is often limited between the players and the process of conflict resolution through negotiation is constrained. In general this type of conflict is resolved by one player weakening his opponent's position to the point that the opponent no longer has any leverage in negotiating. As such, the terms of the settlement are dictated by the dominant player. The usefulness of including this type of case into this analysis is limited.

For the purposes of this thesis, a successful settlement has two essential elements. First and foremost, the settlement must address the immediate subjective issues of the conflict. That is to say, the agreement reached between the two players does not have to be a comprehensive document that addresses all future problems that may later arise. Although an agreement can include provisions that address these possible problems, it should not be considered a final document designed to address all difficulties that each player may face. For example, the settlement should include provisions for a ceasefire if military forces are involved, but it does not

necessarily need to address all circumstances from which armed conflict may arise. In addition, the status of opposing political opponents should be addressed and the position of these individuals at the end of the conflict should be considered. Here again, long term arrangements for these individuals is not essential.

Second, the agreement should establish a base from which a future non-conflict oriented relationship can develop between the players. One key aspect of this second element is that the settlement should be structured so that sufficient time is allowed for implementation of alternative solutions that address the objective issues.

The three cases selected for analysis are sufficiently different to permit testing of the conflict resolution checklist and provide a wide range of elements to compare and analyze. Chapter two examines the Sudan civil war. Fought between the predominantly Arabic North and the African South, the main features of the Sudan conflict are: (1) the conflict was resolved through negotiation (the Addis Ababa Accords), (2) there was a relative absence of external players and forces, and (3) there was a low but increasing level of force being employed by both players. Essentially, chapter two examines a conflict resolved through negotiation that was relatively free of external interference and influence.

Chapter three focuses on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. This conflict initially developed between Great Britain and

the white minority in Rhodesia, but as the dispute progressed, black African nationalists began to assume a major role in the conflict. The main features of this case are: (1) the conflict was resolved through negotiation, (2) the conflict involved several players, both internal and external to Zimbabwe, (3) outside political and military forces played a role in the conflict, and (4) the level of violent conflict in Zimbabwe had reached intense proportions. Therefore, chapter three is a study of a conflict resolved through negotiation involving several external players and forces.

Chapter four examines the current conflict in Namibia between the United Nations and the Republic of South Africa. Similar to the Zimbabwe case, black African nationalists within the territory have played a prominent role in the conflict. In addition, several other players, most notably the United States and Angola have assumed important, but secondary positions in the conflict. The main features of the Namibian case are: (1) extensive negotiations have yet to resolve the conflict, (2) many external players and forces are involved, and (3) several external political and military forces have major roles in the conflict. Thus, chapter four will examine a conflict that has not been resolved through negotiation and where several external players have become involved.

Before proceeding it is necessary to explain the key points of the conflict resolution checklist and to provide a brief review of the questions that arise from a comparative analysis

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of the elements identified by the checklist. As noted, the checklist was designed to be used by negotiators as a practical tool for identifying key elements of any conflict where negotiation had occurred, was presently underway, or had the potential to be resolved through negotiation. The checklist provides a theoretical framework wherein the specific elements of an individual conflict can be substituted in order to obtain a clear understanding of the conflict. A negotiator that identifies the specific elements of a conflict, and understands the relationships of these elements can then adopt a strategy that best reflects his individual goals. For a negotiator representing a single party this means maximizing his position, obtaining the best outcome, and minimizing his concessions. For a third party mediator this means being able to reconcile differences and promote concessions from each of the players he is operating between.

The conflict resolution checklist is given in Table 1. The following is a brief explanation of each element. STEP I is the most basic element of the checklist. It identifies each player in the conflict. A player is defined as any group of individuals, acting as a unitary force. A player may take the form of a state, a territory, a nationalist organization, or a multinational regime that is involved directly or indirectly in the conflict. Players fall into two general categories; (1) Primary players--those unitary actors who are in direct conflict and who are directly affected by the main objective issue. (2) Secondary players--those unitary actors

TABLE 1

CONFLICT RESOLUTION CHECKLIST

I.   Identify each of the players: Primary/Secondary.

II. Identify the issues:

    A. Objective issues--what does the conflict center on?

    B. Subjective issues--what does each side perceive as
                             the center of the conflict?

    C. Identify each player's goals.

       1. Stated.

       2. Perceived maximum they can obtain.

       3. Minimum they can accept.

    D. Does each player:

       1. prefer conflict to obtain its goals?

       2. prefer negotiation to obtain its goals?

III. Identify each player's initial strategy.

IV. Identify resources available to each player to implement
its strategy. (Identify any limitations imposed on a
player.)

V.   Identify adjustments in each player's:

    A. Strategy.

    B. Changing resources.

    C. Goals: (1) Stated. (2) Perceived Min/Max.

VI. Identify the final outcome/resolution.

If no solution is reached, repeat steps II,D through VI.

that are affected by the course and outcome of the conflict but are not a part of the main objective issue.

As the conflict develops, new players may become involved, a secondary player may be elevated to a primary player, and conversely a primary player may assume a secondary rule. The evolving positions of each player will influence the objective and subjective issues in the conflict. Therefore, it is important to be cognizant of each player's position in the conflict when analyzing the issues and the goals and strategy of each player.

It should be noted that individuals are not considered "unitary actors" and thus are not identified specifically as "players." This analysis focuses on groups of individuals, and therefore, single individuals are considered sub-units of these groups. As such, the role that key individuals have in influencing their respective groups and affecting the course and outcome of the conflict will be examined separately in chapter five. It is anticipated that key individuals will have great influence on the process of conflict resolution. However, do individuals serve as mere symbols, or can they have significant practical influence on the course of the conflict itself? Are those individuals with the greatest amount of influence most often the leaders of each group, or can individuals that hold less formal, less public positions have major impact on a conflict?

STEPs II A and B identify the objective and subjective issues in the conflict. The central question in identifying

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the objective issue is, what does the conflict center on? In other words, on what central issue do both players share the same perception. The subjective issues reflect the dissimilar perceptions that each player holds towards the central issue. Therefore, the main difference between objective and subjective issues is in how each player perceives the central issue of the conflict. Moreover, a clear understanding of the issues is essential, since the issues will have great influence on the goals and strategies of each player.

As each conflict progresses it will be important to identify any changes in the objective and subjective issues. Since the objective issues are similarly perceived by both players, it would seem unlikely that there would be a drastic redefinition of the objective issues. Although one way in which objective issues may be redefined is when other primary or secondary players become involved in the conflict. On the other hand, since subjective issues vary from player to player, they may be subject to several adjustments. These adjustments will affect the goals and strategy of each player.

In preparing the conflict resolution checklist it was assumed that the subjective issues would define the respective goals of each player. Essentially, goals are a practical definition of the issues. In STEP II C, the goals of each player are identified. Each player has three sets of goals; stated, maximum, and minimum. Within this range each player seeks to obtain the best possible outcome. Figure 1 is a simplified linear model of a range of goals between two players.

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 +_____+_____+_____+__
A,max            B,min               A,min             B,max
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
Figure 1

The area between B,min and A,min is the area of compromise--that area where negotiation is possible. Each player seeks to obtain a settlement that is as close to his maximum as possible. For player A this means obtaining an agreement in which the provisions reflect a point as far left as possible within the area B,min/A,min. Player A may employ strategies and resources to force player B's minimum position more to the left to obtain a settlement that is closer to A's maximum goals. Conversely player B would resist the efforts of player A and would attempt to push A's minimum position to the right. One key to understanding conflict resolution is to comprehend the relationship between each player's initial stated goals and the perceived minimum-maximum range of goals each player adopts. Chapter V will examine how these stated goals reflect the subjective issues and how they influence the strategy of each player.

A player establishes a range of goals by taking into consideration the issues of the conflict and the resources he has available. On the one hand, maximum goals generally reflect an optimistic view and may at times ignore the realities of the conflict itself. For example, maximum goals may ignore the goals and capabilities of the opponent, and may

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represent the best possible outcome. On the other hand, minimum goals reflect a less than optimistic view of the conflict, and more often are based on the realities of the political and military environment. They represent a very conservative estimate of one's own resources and may in fact over-estimate an opponent's strengths.

STEP II D, simply identifies whether the players chose conflict or negotiation to obtain their respective goals. In all of the cases reviewed at least one, if not both players, had decided that conflict was preferred over negotiation. That is, that one player must perceive the cost associated with negotiating (concessions and acceptance of the other players' goals), as higher than the cost of standing firm. A fundamental step in the conflict resolution checklist is to continually assess each case in order to determine whether the costs of standing firm are higher than the costs of conceding for both players and to assess whether a player's changing abilities have diminished relative to his goals. This will be the point in the conflict where a negotiated settlement is possible.

STEP III examines each player's initial strategy. Simply stated, strategy is the way in which a player applies his resources to obtain his goals. The strategy a player employs is driven by two primary considerations--goals and resources. Just as a player's goals are a practical definition of the issues, strategy is a direct reflection of goals. If during a conflict a player's goals change, a similar adjustment in

strategy would be likely. One way in which a player can assess his opponent's true goals is to study his strategy, and since his strategy reflects his goals, insight into an opponent's principal objectives in a conflict can be gained. However, a player should be cautious, since his opponent may be intentionally employing a strategy designed to deceive.

Strategy also reflects the interactive nature of conflict. A player's strategy is not only designed around his own goals and resources, but also considers his opponent's goals, resources, and strategy. How does a change in one player's strategy affect the other player? What portion of a player's strategy is aimed at resisting and combatting the strategy of his opponent? How does a player's perceptions affect his selection of strategy? In general limited consideration is given to an opponent's strategy when a player is first initiating his own strategy. However, as the conflict progresses greater consideration is given to an opponent's strategy. In the cases selected for study, understanding the relationship between initial and subsequent strategy is key to obtaining a clear perspective on the process of conflict resolution.

STEP IV identifies each player's resources. Resources are any political, psychological, economic, or military means that a player possesses to: (1) implement his own strategy, and (2) resist the strategy of his opponent. How do resources influence strategy and how do they affect the eventual outcome

of the conflict? As noted, the types of resources a player holds, coupled with his goals, will drive his strategy. For example, if a player has a strong and effective political organization (and a forum to exercise this political resource), and his military resources (troops, equipment, etc.) are limited, it would be likely that his strategy would center on resolving the conflict through political vice military means. In this example a political settlement also would put that player in the strongest position to obtain the best settlement for himself.

In general, each player holds a mix of resources, and accordingly uses them in a strategy that makes the most effective use of these resources. Of the types of resources a player holds (military, political, economic, psychological) can one be identified as the most valuable? Or is the employment of resources in the proper manner and at the right time the essential point?

STEP IV also identifies the limitations imposed on a player. This step was not included in the original design of the checklist. However, following a precursory look at each case, it became clear that certain elements constrained the action of players. And in fact limitations were found to be a factor in determining a player's strategy. In general limitations prevent a player from implementing all aspects of his strategy. For example, limitations may come in the form of limited military supplies, lack of player cohesion within a group, or

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political or military pressure from another player that de-
flects a player from pursuing a specific course of action.
Limitations are essentially the reverse of resources, and in
general a limiting element of one player is a resource for
his opponent.

STEP V is the most difficult and perhaps the most important
step in the checklist. It examines the changing goals,
strategy, and resources of each player. Does each player ad-
just his initial goals? If so what prompts this adjustment?
Is it in response to changing resources and the type of strategy
adopted by his opponent? What effect does time have on a
player's strengths and weaknesses? These are central questions
in understanding the dynamics of any conflict. The relative
position of each player will change and evolve, and as we will
see the level and nature of each conflict continually changes
as a result of changing goals, resources, and strategy. STEP
V is crucial in understanding conflict resolution since it
is the step that attempts to clarify a dynamic and most often
complex set of elements that define the parameters of a conflict.

STEP VI applies only to those conflicts that have been
resolved through negotiation. This step is an examination of
the final settlement of the conflict. How the final resolu-
tion reflects the initial and changing goals of each player
can provide some insight into how the actions of each player
influence the outcome of the conflict. From the vantage point
of hindsight, the positive and negative aspects of a player's

strategy can be evaluated. If no settlement is reached it is necessary *to go back to* STEP II D and ask whether conflict or negotiation is preferred. In general, if the dispute is unresolved, then conflict continues to be preferred by at least one primary player.

It is important to remember that the checklist is designed as a tool for examining conflict. It establishes a general framework for looking at each case. As each case is examined it is anticipated that several patterns will emerge. These include: (a) initially weak players gaining strength over time and conversely dominant players diminishing in strength as the conflict progresses, (b) the use of nationalist guerrilla movements when political solutions become unlikely or impractical, (c) the rise of key individuals that become crucial to the course and outcome of a conflict. Chapter V will analyze these patterns and hopefully provide some insight into the general trends of conflict resolution and into the key elements of each case examined.

Armed with the theoretical framework of the conflict resolution checklist, the following three chapters will examine the Sudan, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and Namibia conflicts.

THE SUDAN

Source: Best, Alan, G.G., and deBlij, Harm J.
         African Survey. New York: John
         Wiley and Sons, 1977.

II. THE SUDAN CONFLICT

In February 1972, representatives from North and South
Sudan reached an agreement over the debilitating and protracted
conflict that had plagued Sudan since its independence. The
Sudan conflict is a case where a long and difficult struggle
between two players was resolved through negotiation. The
immediate results of the settlement, known as the Addis Ababa
accords, included: (1) ending the military confrontation
between the North and the South, (2) allowing Sudan to begin
reconstructing its economy, (3) integrating the southern Anya-
Nya guerrillas into the Sudanese armed forces, and (4) strength-
ening Colonel Jafar el-Nimeiri's position as the leader of
the Sudan. The agreement, set against the backdrop of the
long Afro-Arab conflict in the Sudan, is an impressive diplo-
matic accomplishment.

It should be noted that the time period addressed in this
examination of Sudan begins in the mid-1950's and ends in
1972. Sudan's recent history would suggest that many of the
same problems that Sudan faced in the period examined have
resurfaced in the 1980's. However, this chapter is not a
comprehensive examination of Sudan's political, social, and
military problems, but instead is limited to a discussion of
the issues and events prior to 1972.

To gain a deeper understanding of the Sudan conflict
within the context of conflict resolution, the conflict

resolution checklist, developed in the previous chapter,
will be applied to this case. This checklist is a useful
tool in analyzing how elements of the conflict have combined
to produce an agreement. The strategies and resources of the
North and the South are analyzed in two respective sections.
This chapter is structured this way to emphasize the separate
nature and dissimilarities between the two players and to
underline the overall disregard the North had toward the
South. Appendix A provides an historical chronology of the
conflict.

A. THE PLAYERS

The Sudan conflict centers around two main groups--the
predominantly Arabic North, and the mainly African South.
Among these two major groups, several sub-groups have played
important roles in the Sudan conflict. The northern provinces
are mostly Muslim (Sunni), and the main ethnic groups "that
exhibit strong tribal cohesiveness and act as political
pressure units are the Nubians (originally Hamites), the Beja
of the eastern region (also Hamite)." [Ref. 1:p. 11] Vari-
ous groups occupy the central region, the most notable of
these are the Fur and the Nuba. The southern Sudanese can
be classified into three groups: (1) the Sudanic, (2) the
Nilo-Hamitic, and (3) the Nilotic [Ref. 1:p. 11 and Ref. 2:
pp. 15-32]. The important point to be made about these groups
is that political parties in Sudan draw upon different ethnic
divisions for support.

Within these major ethnic divisions, various individual sects in the north act as cohesive political units, and political loyalties generally follow traditional religious lines. The impact of divergent political groups in the North on the Sudan conflict cannot be overstated. The ethnic divisions in the South have not had as great an impact on the overall course of the conflict in Sudan as the political rivalries in the North have had. However, tribal divisions have been a primary factor in limiting southern political and military cohesion.

During the transition to independence several political groups developed in the North. The two main parties in 1956 were the National Unionist Party (NUP) led by Ismail al-Azhari and supported by the Khatima sect, and the Umma Party, which received its support from the Ansars and was led by Abdullah Khalil. In June of 1956, a third political party was formed when members of the NUP split over the issue of Sudan's relationship with Egypt. The new party, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), led by Murghani Hamza, received allegiance from twenty-one members in the National Assembly. [Ref. 3: pp. 44-45] The PDP and the Umma party formed a coalition and voted against Azhari and the NUP. On 5 July 1956, Khalil became Premier.

This political reshuffling was the beginning of a larger political competition in the North. An analysis of the Sudan conflict must be set in the context of the intense political rivalry in the North. As we will see, the political instability

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that results from this rivalry will be a primary catalyst in bringing about a settlement in 1972.

B.   THE OBJECTIVE ISSUE

The objective issue in this case is the unification of Sudan following independence. Since 1930 the British had administered the North and South separately under the "Southern Policy." The British considered the South as a separate territory from the North and accordingly administered each region differently. "This policy was based on two premises: (1) that the Negroid Africans of the South are culturally and, to some extent, racially distinct from the northern Arab Sudanese; and (2) that the Southern provinces would either develop eventually as a separate territorial and political entity or be integrated into what was then British East Africa." [Ref. 2:p. 35]

In 1946, the British, anticipating the eventual indepen-dence of Sudan, reversed its Southern Policy. The new British policy was designed to establish Sudan as a "united state as independent as possible of Egypt." [Ref. 4:p. 163] The northern nationalists, while pressing for independence, were simultaneously pushing for the unification of the North and South. From 1946 onward, the future of the South was inex-tricably bound to the North.

Several elements separate the North from the South. The Arabic and African ethnic character of the North and South respectively, and the accompanying cultural, social, and

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language dissimilarities is the most striking difference between the two regions. The Arabic language and culture of the North and its indissoluble link with Islam contrasts sharply with the multi-tribal, non-Muslim South.

The language difference also contributes to the dissimilarity in the educational experience of the two regions. The key factor relating to the conflict was in the intense competition for government jobs. This conflict was particularly bitter since very few southerners are educated in Arabic and thus could not obtain a government post because of the North's Arabic language requirement. Moreover, preventing southerners from obtaining those posts vacated by the British following Sudan's independence was a major source of resentment in the South.

Economic inequality was another distinguishing element between the two regions. The North had experienced greater development under the British Administration. Most funds for development were channeled to the North. By comparison the South experienced little growth.

Each of these elements combined to reinforce the perception held by most northerners of their superiority over the South. The North, through religious, educational, social, and economic differences came to view the South as inferior. This in turn fostered a mood of resentment and suspicion in the South. Moreover, the South was resisting the idea of a united Sudan governed from Khartoum, especially since they perceived

the level of northern domination would grow. Uniting the
North and the South under a single government was the objec-
tive issue in the Sudan conflict.

C. SUBJECTIVE ISSUES

For the North and the South the issues are very subjective
and their reasons for pursuing their respective policies are
quite divergent. The North has traditionally dominated the
Sudan. This Arab dominance was reinforced in 1946 at the Juba
Conference. Here it was decided that Arabic would be the
official language, essentially ensuring that those government
positions vacated by the British would be filled by Northerners
since, as noted, very few Southerners spoke Arabic. [Ref. 3:
p. 35]

For most northern politicians the "Southern question" was
a sub-issue at best. For them the issue was not the form and
degree of autonomy for the South after independence, but
first, how each politician could promote his own political
party, and second, how to fully Arabicize Sudan.

As noted, southern resentment towards northern domination
had developed. This early resentment was not the result of
an indigenous concept of being a southerner or "of a wider
African world, or of political ideals." [Ref. 4:p. 165]
Instead, it was directly related to the filling of all of
the government posts vacated by the British by Northerners, and
the general abuse many Southerners received under these new
administrators. Azhari rushed to consolidate his political

security by moving quickly towards Sudanization of the South, and "by imposing alien Northerners he set the stage for an internal crisis." [Ref. 5:p. 467] In 1952, the Umma Party-dominated legislature negotiated a "Self-Determination Agreement" with the British. The North proceeded with establishing a government under the new agreement. And although the South was given a voice in the new government, they were relegated to a secondary position. From this point, southern political grievances with the independence government expanded rapidly.

By the mid-1950's, southern political consciousness began to grow. An outward display of the growing discontent among many Southerners was the 1955 mutiny of the South's Equatoria Corps. On 19 August 1955, the army and police refused the orders of their northern officers to open fire on a labor demonstration protesting the trial of a southern politician. The mutiny set off uprisings in all three southern Sudan provinces. These uprisings were not a pre-planned response, but instead were a "spontaneous expression of discontent." [Ref. 5:p. 466]

By late 1955, Azhari's government was pushing for independence, and in order to broaden its base of support, had promised the southern politicians that federation for the South would be fully considered. On 1 January 1956 Sudan became an independent state. A year later Azhari led the National Assembly in a vote that set up a constitutional committee to examine the possibility of a federal structure for

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Sudan. However, only three Southerners were on the forty-six member committee. [Ref. 3:pp. 45-46] The chances that the committee would recommend federation for the South were remote.

It is important to note that the North never considered the South a full partner in the future of Sudan. Northern politics and politicians dominated Khartoum. Southern representatives had limited influence on Sudanese politics and it would not be until 1956 that the southern politicians would form an effective voting bloc in the legislature. The North had complete disregard for the South and northern politicians only used the South and southern representatives to further their own political self-interest.

Thus for the South, the issue initially centered on career resentment, and fierce discontent with northern domination. But by the later-1950's the issue developed into a question of Southern autonomy and self-rule. For both the North and the South the subjective issues will define their respective goals.

D. GOALS

The North's primary goal in the Sudan conflict was to retain control over southern Sudan. At no time in the conflict did northern politicans believe that southern Sudan should be allowed to secede and become an independent state. An important assumption among most northern politicians was that the North would always subsume the South. As such,

retaining as much control over the South was paramount for the North.

As noted earlier, the Southern problem for northern politicians was at best a distraction, and the South in their eyes was never considered an equal partner in the Sudan. The southern politician's significance in Sudanese politics lay not in their representation of the South, but in their ability to tip the scales in political battles among northern politicians.

A secondary goal of the North, which reinforced their primary goal, is the desire on the part of virtually all northern politicians to Arabicize the entire Sudan--including the South. Although there was disagreement over the nature of Sudan's relationship with other Arab states (most notably Egypt), the consensus was that Sudan should be fully Arabicized.

The early goals for the South stemmed from their desire to free themselves from northern domination. The initial goal of the South was not to obtain complete independence, but instead they sought a form of federation that would allow them some autonomy. Members of the Southern Liberal Party, Saturino Lohure and Elia Lupe, campaigned for autonomy for the South. [Ref. 3:p. 46] Pursuit of this goal by southern political leaders attracted little attention from northern politicians.

In February 1962, exiled southern leaders formed the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union (SACDNU). By now the primary goal for the South had evolved so that the stated

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policy of SACDNU, "was to obtain complete independence for the South." [Ref. 3:p. 53] It is from this point onward that southern political leaders will split over whether the South should seek independence or opt for federalism. In 1963 SACDNU changed its name to the Sudan African National Union (SANU).

In summary, the North wanted to retain control over southern Sudan and to Arabicize the entire country. And for the South, the initial goal of autonomy in the form of federalism, evolved into a call for independence.

Did this divergence in goals result in direct confrontation, or did the North and South believe that negotiation was the key to a solution? Although the North had been trying to suppress the "bandits" in the South, up until the early 1960's, negotiation, not military intervention, was the preferred route to a settlement. Clearly neither side had the ability nor the resolve to force a settlement in their favor. Throughout the conflict, even as the level of military activity increased, southern politicians operated openly in Khartoum, and a negotiated settlement was always a possibility. Southern politicians continued to seek a political agreement with Khartoum up until November 1958 when, following Ibrahim Abboud's military coup, all overt political activity in Sudan came to a halt. Six years later, when the Abboud regime was replaced by the civilian government of Mohammed al-Khalifa, southern political parties re-emerged to further the Southern cause.

The North's initial response to the outbreaks of violence
in the mid-1950's was to take a moderate stance against the
southern rebels. Through the mid-1960's Khartoum had sought
only to control the rebels and maintain peace in the South.
And while southern rebels were able to "tie down about 15,000
Sudanese regulars, and absorbed a major portion of Khartoum's
$60 million annual defense budget," [Ref. 5:p. 470] the North
did not seek an outright military solution to the "Southern
Problem" in part because the problem had not become critical
and because most northern leaders were completely preoccupied
with the politics of Khartoum.

Both sides still viewed the conflict as variable-sum. In
March 1965, representatives from the North and South met in
Khartoum "to discuss the Southern Question with a view to
reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the regional inter-
ests as well as the national interests of the Sudan." [Ref.
6] Both parties came to the conference with the desire to
settle the conflict through negotiation. The North proposed
to set up a regional government in the South [Ref. 7:p. 948].
The southern representatives were divided throughout the
conference and this division directly contributed to the failure
of the conference. Although the Round Table Conference was
unable to resolve the Southern question, it is significant in
that both sides were seeking a dialogue, and each perceived
that through negotiation, a settlement might be possible.

By the end of 1964 the political situation in the North
had changed, and as the "Southern Problem" gained more

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prominence, adjustments to the North's strategy followed. The South too was changing. A growing political consciousness coupled with the growth of the southern Anya-Nya guerrilla organization, set the stage for increased southern militancy and a corresponding adjustment in the North's strategy. What was each player's initial strategy, and how did this strategy change? What were the resources that influenced the strategy that each side employed?

E. STRATEGY

The strategy used by the North and South changed throughout the conflict. Adjustments in strategy and tactics were the result of both changing perceptions and resources. In this section, a brief review of the strategies used by each player and the corresponding resources and perceptions that influenced the choice of strategies used will be examined.

1. The North

There are three distinct phases in the strategy employed by the North. These phases roughly correspond to the changes in political leadership in the North.

Phase One. The first phase in the North's strategy occurred between 1955 and 1965. Immediately following the 1955 mutiny in Equatoria, the North took a moderate stance towards the rebels [Ref. 5:p. 465]. The North did not perceive the rebels as a major threat in the South once the immediate disruption caused by the mutiny had ended. In addition, the North did not believe that much of the discontent

felt by the Southerners was the result of their Arabization policy. Instead much of the blame for increased southern hostility was placed on the Christian missionaries who were active in the South. "Khartoum's continuing fear that Christian missionaries were increasing separatist sentiments among the Southern peoples," led to the enactment of the Christian Missionaries Act in February 1957 [Ref. 5:p. 468]. The Act called for the eventual government takeover of all missionary schools in the South. The strategy here was aimed at decreasing what the North believed was the catalyst of discontent.

Military action in the South was limited and was designed to suppress rebel activity immediately following the 1955 mutiny, not to force the South into submitting to northern domination. What prevented the North from exercising a military option in the South earlier in the conflict? There are three factors that precluded use of a concentrated military strategy during this phase.

First, building a consensus and achieving the resolve required to exercise a military strategy would have been difficult in light of the fierce division among northern politicians. Second, generally most Sudanese preferred a parliamentary form of government. Control of the government is based in large part on political coalitions in Khartoum, and in general national and regional problems were solved using political means. The problem with the South is no exception. Third, using military force in the South would

only have further antagonized the southern people. This would
have generated a militant reaction from the South much sooner
in the conflict, and would have cuased the North to focus
resources and attention on the Southern problem--something
most Northern politicians sought to avoid.

The North's strategy was also built around a limited
measure of accommodation. Southern politicians were allowed
to lobby for autonomy in the National Assembly. And clearly,
while the North would not have allowed the secession, "the
idea of federation was gaining support among certain majority
groups in the North." [Ref. 3:p. 47]

During this phase the North continued with its policy
of Arabization. As early as 1954 a "Sudanization Committee"
was appointed by Azhari to place Sudanese into administrative
posts vacated by the British. During this phase, out of the
roughly 800 posts available, only 6 were obtained by Southerners.
[Ref. 3:p. 37] Part of the reason for this tremendous in-
equity in distribution of posts is related to the Arabic
language requirement imposed on the South by the North. In
addition, the North looking to Arabicize the entire country
and to further its control in the South placed northern
proxies in the South to establish direct lines of control in
the southern provinces.

The North had two major resources in this phase.
First, no matter how hard the South pushed for independence,
the North believed that it was its right to maintain Sudan's

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territorial integrity. The South would never be allowed to secede. The North could consistently rely on the support of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in preventing a complete split in the Sudan. The OAU views secession as "detrimental to African interests because it is considered to be incompatible with the (OAU's) goal of African Unity." [Ref. 2:p. 127-134] In addition, the North had the support of Egypt and other Islamic states along with the tacit support of the international community. While at times, this support did not translate into direct aid, it did support the North's perception of its legitimacy in keeping Sudan united.

The second resource that the North had in this phase, which can also be considered a southern limitation, was the lack of southern political consciousness and the absence of an organized political movement in the South. While the South had representatives from various political parties operating in Khartoum, these representatives operated in comparative isolation from the South.

Political consciousness first emerged in the secondary schools in the mid to late-1950's. However, spreading this political consciousness among the relatively uneducated villages was difficult. "Students had only limited impact upon political awareness in their home communities; more often they were regarded as work shy townsfolk." [Ref. 4:p. 168] It would not be until 1964, when political parties in Sudan began to reemerge, that the North would have to contend with a strong political movement in the South.

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Along with these two resources, the northern strategy was also influenced by two main limitations. The first limitation was the well-documented, intense political rivalries that existed in the North. Throughout the conflict, northern political maneuvering distracted political leaders from concentrating on the Southern problem. This limitation will be present in all three phases of northern strategy, and will continue right up until the time when Nimeiri actively seeks a solution to the conflict.

The second limitation constraining the North was the generally poor performance of the Sudanese economy during this period. Much of the dissatisfaction with the Azhari, Khalil, and Abboud regimes in the late 1950's, early 1960's, was a result of the inability of each administration to promote consistent economic growth. Contributing to the problem was Sudan's heavy reliance on cotton as a source of revenue. Poor marketing coupled with several weak harvests led to sharp downturns in Sudanese economic performance. Without a strong growing economy the North could not finance any long-term social programs to appease the South, nor could it financially support a comprehensive military campaign. In addition, poor economic performance contributed to the instability of each of the regimes in this period. Many Northerners were dissatisfied with the way the economy was being managed, and this diminished the support given to those in power.

Phase Two. The Round Table Conference in March 1965, marked the end of phase one. In phase two the North took a

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much more militant stance towards the South. This was brought
about by two changing realities. First, the southern rebel
organization, the Anya-Nya, increased its guerrilla activity
in the South. And second, continued frustration with the
Southern problem had changed northern perceptions. For over
ten years following independence, a moderate approach in the
South had not solved the problem. Most northern politicians
partially attributed Sudan's difficulty with formulating a
constitution and its inability to promote economic and social
development since the British withdrawal to the continuing
problem with the South.

Following the 1964 "October Revolution," when the
country returned to party politics, General Abboud was re-
placed by Mohammed al-Khalifa. Khalifa was genuinely sympa-
thetic to the Southern cause, and his administration actively
pressed for a negotiated settlement. [Ref. 2:pp. 105-106]
However, Khalifa's regime was short-lived, and the new govern-
ment, formed from a coalition established between the Umma
Party and the NUP, changed northern strategy in the South.
The new coalition leader, "Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoud
had an antipathy for the southern Sudan and argued persistently
that the only language Africans in the South can understand
is force." [Ref. 2:p. 109] This perception is reflected in
the North's adoption of a new military policy in the South.
Mahgoub launched an extensive counter-offensive in the South,
and he had "given the Southern Army Command a free hand to
destroy the Anya-Nya." [Ref. 4:p. 175]

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Early in 1965, the North had tried to limit the Anya-Nya's capability by cancelling permission for the transhipment of Soviet arms to rebels in the northeast Congo. These arms were being intercepted enroute by the Anya-Nya. Additional arms were obtained from Congolese rebels who traded their arms for radios, Sudanese beer, and other goods. [Ref. 5:p. 470] By this time the North was faced with two stark options. With the growing capability and strength of the Anya-Nya, coupled with their refusal to negotiate anything less than the dissolution of the Union, the North could only respond by either acquiescing to Southern demands for independence or by meeting the Anya-Nya guerrilla attacks with force. It chose the latter.

Raw power struggles dominated northern politics during this phase. In early July 1966, Mahgoub was replaced by Sadiq al-Mahdi. And, while Sadiq's political orientation was much different from Mahgoub's his policy towards the Southern problem was similar to that of his predecessor. Sadiq advocated the spread of Islam and Arabic, and following his tour of the South in November 1966, reaffirmed a tough policy against the Anya-Nya. [Ref. 2:p. 118]

The North's inability to secure a military victory in the South was limited by a number of factors. The most notable of these were the deteriorating relationships Sudan was experiencing with its neighboring states. From 1964 to mid-1965, Khartoum adopted a radical foreign policy. [Ref. 8:

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p. 301] This policy antagonized the surrounding states and contributed to the ineffectiveness of the North's military strategy.

By 1965 the Anya-Nya received support from Moise Tshombe in the Congo. The Anya-Nya was now helping the Congolese government track down Congolese rebels who had been armed by Sudan. The Congolese troops ignored the Sudanese border as they pursued rebels fleeing into the Sudan. One positive aspect of the Congo revolt for the North was that it gave Khartoum an excuse to send a great number of troops to the South. [Ref. 3:p. 79] This alleviated some of the external criticism the North was starting to receive as a result of its brutal military offensive in the South.

Also in 1965 problems with Chad started to surface. Since its independence in 1960, Chad had experienced problems with Islamic tribes in the east who had tribal links with the western Sudan. Angry at the support the Chadean exiles were receiving from Khartoum, President Tombalbye publicly threatened reprisals against those Sudanese living in Chad. Of significance for the North was the inference that Chad might open up its borders to southern Sudanese rebels. [Ref. 8:p. 304]

The Sudanese shift in policy further "exacerbated a long standing source of tension on the Ethiopian border." [Ref. 8:p. 303] Several border incidents occurred during this period and the level of antagonism between Addis Ababa and Khartoum increased. As insurance against aggressive Sudanese

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behavior, Ethiopia formed an alliance with the Anya-Nya.
Active support for the Anya-Nya could only increase the
North's difficulty with combatting the Southern rebels.

The original intention of Sudan's foreign policy in
1964 was to encourage revolutionary activity within Africa,
and the politicians in Khartoum believed that Sudan should
support other revolutionary movements. However, the result
of this policy was that surrounding states, threatened by
Sudanese supported rebels in their own countries, diverted
Sudan's resources and attention by supporting the Anya-Nya.
By late 1965, as a reaction to the mounting pressure the
North received from its neighboring states, it adopted a
moderate policy in aiding rebels in other states. Khartoum
sought neutrality in the region in hopes that support for the
Anya-Nya would diminish. In addition, those factions in the
North that had originally advocated a radical policy were
losing their influence. The North took a more pragmatic
approach and adjusted its policy accordingly.

By 1968 relationships with neighboring states had im-
proved. In October, the Congo agreed to halt the flow of arms
and troops across the Sudan-Congo border [Ref. 5:p. 472].
The Anya-Nya had already experienced difficulty in obtaining
arms and ammunition, and this reduction in support diminished
the fighting capacity of the rebels. This was an important
resource for the North.

In sum, Northern efforts to win militarily in the South
had proven fruitless. What was needed was a new approach to

the Southern problem and with the overthrow of the Mahgoud government by Jafar el-Nimeiri in 1969, the second phase ended. Armed with the lessons gained from the failure of the civilian government to resolve the Southern problem, the new military government adopted a different strategy for resolving the conflict.

Phase Three. The shift away from a military solution to the Southern problem by a military government might, at first, seem unusual. However, Nimeiri had first hand experience at fighting the southern rebels, and he understood the difficulty with winning militarily in the South. [Ref. 9: p. 4] His perceptions shaped the North's new strategy.

Nimeiri realized the importance of incorporating the southern provinces into a united Sudan. To gauge the dynamics of the southern problem more accurately, Nimeiri established the "Office of Southern Affairs" headed by a southerner. In addition, Nimeiri sought to gain the trust of southern leaders and reduce the intense resentment the South held for the North by promoting greater social and economic development in the southern provinces. Both of these steps were designed to influence southern perceptions and make southerners more receptive to an agreement with Khartoum. The key point here is that Nimeiri understood the role that perceptions play in a conflict. And although his programs in the South could only begin to redress two decades of inequality, they would go far in reorienting southern perceptions of the North's intentions in Sudan.

Nimeiri's strategy had two basic points. First, the South would never be allowed to secede. Nimeiri stated that, "We do not believe in secession, we consider such an event as a crime that should not be forgiven." [Ref. 10] Second, the new regime focused on a political vice military solution in the South. Nimeiri recognized, "the existence of historic discrepancies between the South and North, especially in traditions and culture." The new regime granted "regional autonomy to southern provinces within the framework of a new integral socialist Sudan." [Ref. 11] By granting the South autonomy, and allowing southerners to have some control over their own affairs, Nimeiri gave them the security they would need in order to accept a united socialist Sudan. In addition, the political option was pursued in part because the war was draining the limited financial resources of Sudan. "The Nimeiri regime came to realize the enormous amount of borrowed money spent on sustaining the war could be used beneficially in social and economic development, to which it was committed." [Ref. 2:p. 162]

The Nimeiri regime was able to focus on the Southern problem more than the preceding regimes because of two principal reasons. First, Nimeiri barred all political parties in Sudan, and established the Sudan Scoialist Union (SSU) which would subsume all former political organizations. This diminished the constant political fighting in the North, and allowed him to consolidate his power. The constant political

divisiveness in the North that had precluded any unity in solving the Southern problem was reduced. Second, pressures from Sudan's surrounding states had diminished. During this period Sudan slipped back into its traditional isolation in foreign affairs. Therefore, Nimeiri was not distracted with many external problems and could concentrate on domestic issues.

By the beginning of 1970, the new regime was headed towards a solution in the South. Clearly the North now perceived the conflict as variable-sum, and believed that a solution in the South would benefit both sides. Progress towards a settlement was slow. Breaking out of old patterns of behavior and changing perceptions throughout the North though not impossible, would be difficult. However, in mid-1971, a single event accelerated the new regime's drive for a settlement in the South.

On 19 July 1971, a military coup was staged by officers within Nimeiri's regime who wanted to move Sudan away from Nimeiri's form of socialism to a system which incorporated a (Soviet) communist orientation. For three days Nimeiri was held prisoner in the Presidential Palace. Realizing that Sudan would be dominated by communists, the overwhelming majority of Sudanese supported the counter-coup that returned Nimeiri to power. [Ref. 12:pp. 12-15]

The coup attempt changed Nimeiri's perceptions and forced him to reorder his priorities. Prior to the coup, the Soviet Union had been Sudan's main arms supplier. But after

the communist-supported coup, the relationship between Nimeiri
and the Soviets deteriorated. Nimeiri looked to the West
for support and aid. Though sympathetic, the Western powers
wanted a more stable Sudan before they would completely sup-
port Nimeiri. They convinced him that the key to a stable
Sudan (the condition for aid and support) was a settlement in
the South.

Nimeiri realized that his most ardent supporters dur-
ing the attempted coup were Egypt, Libya, and Syria--his
Arab brothers. His desire to Arabicize Sudan was as strong
as his predecessors, however, he was "aware of the need to
anchor the Sudan firmly in the realities of its African
environment." [Ref. 12:p. 15] This awareness prompted Nimeiri
to actively push for a settlement with the South, and to shift
Sudan's foreign policy to promote this goal.

During phase three, Nimeiri's adjustments to Sudan's
foreign policy as it related to the conflict with the South
were designed to signal to the South the North's commitment
to maintaining a united Sudan and to prevent Sudan's neighbors
from further encouraging or supporting any secessionist activity
in the South. To support this policy Nimeiri expressed his
commitment to both the OAU and the Arab League, and to non-
intervention and self-determination for African states.

Nimeiri began to establish Sudan as the link between
the Arabic and African states in the region. This tended to
deemphasize and postpone the North's rapid move to Arabicize
the entire country and was designed to establish firmer ties

with the black African states in the region. This was a
critical reorientation in the North's policy, and while the
Anya-Nya continued to be suspicious of Nimeiri's intentions,
this reorientation laid the foundation for a future agreement.

In addition, this policy adjustment was aimed at pro-
moting stability and cooperation in the region so that Khartoum
could pursue its strategy in the South without the apprehension
that external forces would undermine its efforts to resolve
the conflict.

Nimeiri appointed a new Minister for Southern Affairs,
Abel Alier, to replace Joseph Garang, a communist purged from
the administration as a result of his involvement in the abor-
tive coup. Alier enjoyed the confidence and trust of many
Southerners, and he had consistently encouraged negotiations
with the Anya-Nya. [Ref. 2:p. 163] In 1971, working through
the World Council of Churches (WCC), Alier opened preliminary
talks with the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).
These talks would eventually lead to the Addis Ababa accords.

While these changes were occurring in the North, what
were the factors that brought the South to the negotiating
table? What was the South's strategy in the conflict, and what
resources and perceptions did they hold that would influence
their strategy?

2. The South

The South's strategy and resources, like the North's,
can be separated into three general phases. The time periods

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each of these phases encompass coincide roughly to the phases in the North's strategy. The changing strategy of the South is a response to shifting northern strategies and of its own changing resources and perceptions.

Phase One. From the time of independence until mid-1964, the South's strategy had consistently focused on the attainment of autonomy through peaceful means. Immediately following independence most southerners believed autonomy would come in the form of a federal system with the North. But by the early 1960's a push for independence replaced the call for federation. Southern politicians operating in Khartoum at the time of independence had been promised that autonomy for the South would be considered. Prior to 1958, when Abboud's military regime outlawed political parties, southern politicians, under the leadership of Stanislaus Peysama, were able to form an effective voting bloc in the National Assembly. And while they could not challenge the power of northern political coalitions, they "had a potentially decisive strength, in a parliament based on fragile coalition governments." [Ref. 3:p. 46]

Many southern politicians were accused by their Southern political constituencies (who were far removed from Khartoum) of betraying the Southern cause. However, many politicians did in fact push for autonomy. "Both Saturino Lohure and Elia Lupe of the Federal Party openly campaigned for complete autonomy for the South." [Ref. 3:p. 46] In a speech to the House, "Saturino had spoken openly of the South separating from the North." [Ref. 4:p. 170] On the eve of the Abboud

coup, many southerners felt that federation was in their reach. Southern politicians had worked hard towards obtaining the support of many northern politicians in their push for autonomy. When Abboud abolished all political parties in Sudan, effectively limiting the power of the northern politicians, the Southerners saw their chance for autonomy slip away.

The banning of political parties in Sudan may at first seem detrimental to Southern goals of autonomy. This is true in the short term. However, in retrospect, the banning of political parties fostered a spirit of unity among those leaders in exile and in fact prompted the formation of the Sudan African Closed District National Union (SACDNU). SACDNU's declared policy was "to obtain complete independence for the South, through diplomatic and political means." [Ref. 3:p. 53] In 1963 SACDNU changed its name to the Sudan African National Union (SANU).

This newly formed political organization represented the core of southern leadership. They pursued this peaceful strategy because of two main factors. First, during this initial phase the South's guerrilla force was just starting to form. Small sporadic resistence movements had sprung up throughout southern Sudan, and it would not be until 1963, when the Land Freedom Army (LFA) organized these diverse groups into a single coherent military force that the South could challenge the North militarily. The military option during the first phase was infeasible.

Second, the perception that parliamentary means could still be used to obtain autonomy for the South persisted. Even with the setbacks imposed by Abboud's regime, many southern politicans still believed that they could press the North into agreeing to autonomy using internal and external political pressure. The resurgence of political activity following the 1964 "October revolution," gave many political leaders one more opportunity to seek autonomy through political means.

During this phase, the South had a limited number of resources. The political cohesion within Khartoum that the South enjoyed in the late-1950's would not be repeated in 1964 when Sudan returned to party politics. However, a grass roots political movement was growing in the South, and many southern politicians formed provisional governments in exile throughout the three southern provinces. In addition, the South was expanding three resources during this period that would shape its strategy in the second phase. First, career resentment and dissatisfaction with the North was continually growing among a wide cross section of Southerners. This would provide southern leaders with a broad base with which an organized resistence movement could be formed. Second, aside from being dissatisfied with the North, a real political consciousness was developing in the South. "Alongside a tribal identity, a Southern identity was rapidly developing, and with it inchoate but real political aspirations for the future of the Southern

people as a whole." [Ref. 4:p. 175] Third, the LFA which
by 1963 had become the Anya-Nya (snake poison) guerrilla
organization, was increasing its support and gaining in
strength.

Thus, by 1964 the Southern push for independence had
evolved from a movement originally supported by southern
intellectual politicians, with limited resources, to a move-
ment that was supported by a majority of the Southern peoples,
with increasing support and the growing will to seriously
challenge the North. The next phase in the Southern strategy
reflects these changing resources and the reorientation of
southern perceptions.

Phase Two. The shift in the South's strategy at the
start of phase two was based on an important perception--that
the only way the South would obtain independence was through
military force.

The first Anya-Nya guerrilla campaign occurred in Janu-
ary 1964. Due to a number of factors, the first campaign ended
in failure. The leader of the Anya-Nya force, Captian Berdan-
dino, and sixty of his men were captured. This operation had
shaken the confidence of the Anya-Nya and would make them
timid about attacking northern troops for some time to come.
[Ref. 3:p. 60] However, the South was now committed to a
military solution and it would be difficult to turn back from
this course of action.

During this period the effectiveness of the South's
strategy was limited by a number of factors. First, the

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Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) which was formed in 1967, had claimed, without foundation, authority over the Anya-Nya. In reality most Anya-Nya guerrillas were loyal only to their local commanders. Without the coordination between political and military efforts, the South would be unable to maximize its impact in the North, and would not be able to increase the costs to the North of standing firm on autonomy.

Second, from 1968 to 1969 the SSPG itself was riddled with factionalization. Three splinter groups were formed from the SSPG: The Anyidi Revolutionary Government, the Sue River Revolutionary Government, and the Azania-Sudan Government in East Africa. This division only served to weaken the Southern cause and made a political settlement much harder to coordinate.

Third, with the degeneration of the political effort, the Anya-Nya became the primary resource for the South. And while, as noted earlier, the Anya-Nya was able to obtain arms and ammunition from Congolese rebels fleeing across the Congo-Sudan border, problems with obtaining the necessary arms to seriously challenge northern troops persisted. By the end of 1964 the Anya-Nya had roughly 5,000 troops, but only 10 percent had firearms. [Ref. 3:p. 79] And by 1969, when Anya-Nya troop strength doubled to 10,000, only about one-fifth had firearms of any type [Ref. 3:p. 97].

A continuing resource that the South could rely upon to resist northern pressure was the North's political instability. This factor had long prevented the North from focusing

on the Southern problem. Had the North been able to concentrate earlier on the Southern problem, the course and outcome of the conflict may have been different. Between 1964 and 1969, the Sudan had undergone six changes in government. The North's inability to clearly address the Southern problem allowed the South to develop its guerrilla force and provided southern leaders with the time necessary to build a political consciousness. The result of this was that the goals of both the North and the South had shifted. For the North, pursuing a policy of Arabization in Sudan had taken a back seat to the paramount goal of maintaining a united Sudan. The South had also shifted its goals. No longer satisfied with obtaining autonomy in the form of federation, complete independence became the minimum acceptable goal.

The third and final phase of the South's strategy is really an extension of the second. What occurred in the third phase was not so much an adjustment in strategy, as a consolidation and reorientation of resources.

Phase Three. The principal factor that distinguishes phase three from phase two is the ability of southern leaders to strengthen the organization and the discipline of the Anya-Nya, and to unite the political and military efforts of the South. The individual primarily responsible for this was Colonel Joseph Lagu [Ref. 3:pp. 132-141]. Lagu was able to consolidate all effective military and political power in the three southern provinces. In August 1971, Lagu announced the

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formation of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM).
This was the first time since the beginning of the conflict
that political and military power was formally linked in the
South.

During this phase the South relied on two sources of
external support. First, as a result of Nimeiri's militant
policy towards Israel, "Israeli support for the Southern
Sudanese cause was translated into military supplies for the
Anya-Nya." [Ref. 2:p. 139] The Israelis gave the Anya-Nya
arms that they had captured during the 1967 war. These arms
boosted the morale of Anya-Nya troops and improved their fight-
ing capability. They were now "able to effectively control
the countryside and render the northern Sudanese soldiers
ineffective." [Ref. 2:p. 139]

Second, Idi Amin in Uganda, in retaliation against the
northern Sudanese support of his rival Milton Obote, became a
strong supporter of the South. Amin threatened to give mili-
tary aid to the Anya-Nya. And this, coupled with Israeli
military support to the guerrillas, was a factor in prompt-
ing Nimeiri to seek a settlement with the SSLM. [Ref. 2:
p. 165]

By the time the Addis Ababa meetings convened, the
South had developed an effective military force capable of
controlling many areas in the South. Perhaps more importantly,
the political liability this force posed for any northern
political regime would seriously threaten the stability of

that regime. This would force those northern leaders in power
to actively seek a settlement with the South.

F. THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT

By mid-1971, both sides seemed ready to talk. Working
through the WCC, Alier had arranged to meet with leaders of
the SSLM. The eventual outcome of these talks was a settlement
to the Sudanese conflict--the Addis Ababa Accords. What were
the principal factors that made each player perceive the con-
flict as variable-sum? Why was the North and South willing
to reconcile their differences and accommodate one another
after such a long and bitter struggle? Why was the conflict
"ripe for resolution" in 1971?

First, both sides realized that neither could win mili-
tarily. Northern troops controlled the towns in the South
and the southern guerrillas had command of the countryside.
Anya-Nya strength had increased since 1970, but their future
growth was uncertain, and this coupled with the military stale-
mate forced southern leaders to reevaluate their strategy.
[Ref. 2:p. 162] For the North the war with the South was in-
creasing in cost. The southern provinces had great economic
potential for Sudan, but as long as the war continued the
South would remain a liability.

Second, each side could negotiate as a unitary actor.
Nimeiri had firm control in the North. The abortive coup in
May 1971 had shaken his authority, but by late-1971, he was
clearly the unchallenged leader in Khartoum. The South could

also speak with one voice. The SSLM, under Joseph Lagu, had the wide support of the southern people. Thus, each side could focus its negotiating efforts in one direction, without the problems often posed by multilateral negotiations.

Third, Abel Alier was able to convince key southern leaders that their best chance for a peaceful settlement was with Nimeiri [Ref. 2:p. 155]. The South's efforts at obtaining a settlement with northern regimes since independence had consistently proven fruitless. And with the possible exception of the Khalifa regime, northern rulers had never seriously negotiated with the South. Even when Nimeiri had granted a system of autonomy for the South, most southern Sudanese remained skeptical of northern sincerity. However, with the great trust that Alier enjoyed among southern Sudanese, he was able to convince the southern leaders that Nimeiri's government was sincerely moving in a positive direction.

Fourth, Alier also played a key role in convincing Nimeiri to recognize the Anya-Nya as a force that must be included in any settlement. When Lagu realized that his troops would be part of a settlement, he supported the WCC negotiating efforts.

Fifth, after the attempted coup, Nimeiri realized that he must consolidate his power and broaden his base of support. For the moment he was in complete control and he took the initiative to solve the Southern problem.

Sixth, of special note is the role that Emperor Haile Selassie played in the negotiations in Addis Ababa. Although

Ethiopia had remained neutral in the conflict since the late-1960's, Selassie intervened in the negotiations at crucial times, when major stumbling blocks developed. [Ref. 3:p. 142 and Ref. 2:p. 165] He used his impressive reputation to ease the apprehension both sides were experiencing and opened the way to accommodation.

The final step (VI) in the negotiation checklist is to identify the outcome of the conflict and to examine the solution. The Addis Ababa Agreement, signed on 28 February 1972, represents a crossroad in the conflict between the North and South. This negotiated settlement addressed the objective and subjective issues of the conflict and includes concessions and reconciliation moves from both players. The provisions of the Addis Ababa accords are provided below, followed by a brief review of each provision.

1. Upon ratification between Nimeiri and Lagu, a cease fire would come into effect.

2. Following the cease fire, the three southern provinces would be united under its own regional President.

3. The regional President would be chosen by an Executive Council appointed by the Sudanese Head Council upon recommendation by a Regional Assembly. The Council would control all aspects of southern policy except defense, foreign affairs, currency and finance, and economic and social planning. These would remain under the control of the central government in Khartoum, which included the South.

4. The Regional Assembly would be elected through universal adult suffrage.

5. The Anya-Nya would eventually be incorporated into the Sudanese Army Southern Command. The South would set up its own armed police force to maintain law and order.

6. The official language in Sudan would be Arabic, the common language would be English and would be taught in the schools in the South. [Ref. 3:pp. 163-164]

How closely do these provisions mirror the initial goals of each side? Were any of the goals that were modified as the conflict continued met by the settlement? The following is a brief review of each of the provisions.

The first provision calls for a cease fire. This is in both sides best interest. Although there were times in the conflict when military force was the preferred strategy for both sides, the military stalemate that had developed only increased the costs incurred by each side without providing any significant additional benefits. The first priority of this type of settlement is to stop the fighting and to build an atmosphere of trust and security. Following this, the other articles of the agreement can be implemented.

The second provision grants regional autonomy for the South. This fulfills the South's initial goal first articulated in the late-1950's. However, as the conflict developed the South began to push for complete independence. This goal is not met by the settlement and represents a measure of accommodation by the South.

The third provision coupled with the second reinforces the South's goal of autonomy, and satisfies the North's goal of unifying Sudan. Here each player seems to realize that the conflict is variable-sum, and that a settlement in which both the North and the South have confidence, will ultimately be in each player's best interest.

Provisions four and five are really designed to win the confidence of the South. Agreeing to universal adult suffrage and incorporating the Anya-Nya into the Sudanese Army, elevates the South to a position of equality with the North. This legitimizes the South's struggle and builds southern self-respect. This gives the South the opportunity to make concessions to the North from a position of perceived strength and equality.

Provision six is based in reality. The desire of the North to Arabicize the Sudan is officially recognized by making Arabic the official language. In some respects this places the Arabic culture in Sudan above the African culture in the southern Sudan. However, by recognizing English as the common language, it takes into account the resistance the South would have to universal adoption of Arabic.

G. CONCLUSION

The Addis Ababa accords represent a successful settlement to a long and violent conflict. The cultural, ethnic, religious, and political differences that divide the North and the South are unlikely to allow Sudan to become a homogeneous state. Since the Addis Ababa Agreement was signed, Sudan has been plagued by continuing fierce political factionalization and persistent religious and ideological rivalries. In the 1970's Nimeiri faced repeated coup attempts, and by the 1980's tensions between the North and South had resurfaced. In an April 1985 bloodless coup, the Nimeiri regime was

overthrown by a military junta led by General Abdel-Rahman Swareddahab. The General faces many of the same problems that Nimeiri himself confronted in the late 1960's and early 1970's. [Ref. 13] Politics in the Sudan have continued to be volatile, a volatility which cannot be altered by an Agreement.

Yet in a very real sense, the Addis Ababa settlement was a success. The accords represent true accommodation by both sides. Settling the conflict allowed Nimeiri to consolidate his power in the North and allowed for some economic and social development in Sudan. Most importantly the settlement brought together two very divergent groups, each with their own goals and perceptions, and allowed each to come away from the conflict with the perception that each had fulfilled its goals.

ZIMBABWE

Source: Nelson, Harold D. Zimbabwe: A Country Study.
DA PAM 550-171. Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1983.

III. THE RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE CONFLICT

In December 1979, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed ending the fourteen year conflict in Rhodesia. Similar to Sudan the Rhodesian conflict was also resolved by a negotiated settlement. The settlement came after many years of violence and after many failed attempts to obtain a negotiated resolution. However, unlike Sudan where there was a relative absence of external players, the Rhodesian conflict involves several external players.

The Rhodesian conflict was well documented in the world press. Because of the abundance of information and analysis about the Rhodesian conflict, the conflict resolution checklist was especially useful in identifying those key elements which had the greatest impact on the course and outcome of the conflict. This chapter applies the negotiation checklist to the Rhodesian conflict from the time of the Rhodesian Unilateral Declaration of Independence in November 1965 until the Lancaster House Agreement fourteen years later. Using the framework of the conflict resolution checklist, this chapter first identifies the key elements, then analyzes subsequent adjustments in strategy, goals, and resources. Appendix B provides a chronological history of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwe conflict.

A. THE PLAYERS

The Rhodesian conflict involved several primary and secondary players, both internal and external to Rhodesia. The initial conflict developed between Rhodesia's white settlers who had control of Rhodesia and the British government, which exercised a form of sovereignty over the colony. The white minority had settled in Rhodesia in the late 1880's under a Royal Charter granted to Cecil John Rhodes' British South Africa Company. The white settlers set up their own administration and effectively controlled Rhodesia and its black African population. Rhodesia was never administered directly by the British despite the fact that it was considered a British colony in Africa. Britain had retained certain legislative options in Rhodesia but never effectively exercised them. [Ref. 14:pp. 5-6]

At the time of UDI Rhodesia's Prime Minister, Ian Smith, was the symbol and leader of the white settlers. Throughout this chapter, Smith's perceptions mirror those of the white community in general. Smith remained Prime Minister and leader of the dominant white party in Rhodesia (the Rhodesian Front), until April 1979, when Able Muzorewa, a black Rhodesian bishop, became Prime Minister in Smith's internal settlement. Smith retained effective control in Rhodesia until after the Lancaster House settlement. The continuity of leadership provided by Smith's tenure as Prime Minister contrasts with that of Britain's where six British Prime

Ministers had to address the conflict in Rhodesia. These
changes in British administrations will be a resource for
Smith.

The third primary player in the conflict is the Rhodesian
Black nationalists. Comprising roughly 97 percent of the total
population, the African population is dominated by two main
ethno-linguistic groups, the Shona (75 percent), and the
Ndebele (16 percent). [Ref. 15:p. 16] Although the main
objective issue centered around the role the black majority
should play in Rhodesia, they did not become effective influ-
ential players until the mid-1970's. The two major political
parties, the Shona-based Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe, and the Ndebele-dominated
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) led by Joshua Nkomo,
were not united until 1974 when the two groups formed the
Patriotic Front (PF). But it would not be until the end of
1978 that each organization's military wing would be consoli-
dated under a single command. However, by the early-1970's
the black nationalists had assumed the role of primary player
in the conflict, and supported by a number of external players,
the PF became a major party in the final settlement in Rhodesia.

The Rhodesian conflict is filled with secondary players.
At the time of UDI, the most important were South Africa and
Portugal. South Africa always has been the dominant regional
power. Linked spiritually to the Rhodesian white settlers,
South Africa's interests are tied to the entire region. Thus

throughout the conflict South Africa took an active role in the conflict, pushing for an outcome that would be in its best interests.

Portugal's role as a secondary player stems from its pre-1974 colonial holdings in Mozambique and Angola. It will be Portugal's exodus from the region as a colonial power that will mark a major turning point in the conflict. A third secondary player that emerged early in the conflict was the United Nations. While the UN did not actively participate in direct negotiations with Rhodesia, UN-sponsored sanctions were a primary resource for the British.

By the mid-1970's, two additional secondary players emerged. From the time of UDI until 1970, the United States played a passive role, preferring to keep free of direct responsibility in the region. In 1970, the Nixon administration adjusted US policy in southern Africa. National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 39 outlined a policy that gave tacit support to white minority regimes in southern Africa . [Ref. 16] The new policy was designed with South Africa in mind, but the white settlers in Rhodesia also benefitted [Ref. 17]. By 1974, following the military coup in Lisbon that prompted Portugal to relinquish control in the region, the US began to reevaluate its policy in southern Africa. The US, headed by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, became a principal secondary player.

Following their independence Mozambique and Angola, along with other states in the region (Tanzania, Botswanna, and

Zambia), joined together to form the Frontline States. The Frontline States became a secondary player in the conflict, lending active support to the black nationalists in Rhodesia and in many cases urging them to negotiate a settlement. The Frontline States will play a major role in the Lancaster House negotiations.

The Rhodesian conflict involved several players, and as in all conflict each player has its own goals and interests defined by the issues. What then are the objective and subjective issues in the Rhodesian conflict?

B.   THE ISSUES

To put it simply, the main objective issue of the Rhodesian conflict is who will control Rhodesia following independence. By 1965 Great Britain had granted independence to virtually all its colonies in Africa. Rhodesia posed a unique problem for Great Britain since it had to deal with a white settler population firmly in control of the government in Salisbury. For Great Britain, the subjective issue was how to grant independence to Rhodesia based on majority rule to appease black Africans in Rhodesia and throughout Africa, while avoiding a prolonged military struggle between British and Rhodesian forces. The initial catalyst for Great Britain's program of decolonization was that the costs of holding African colonies were outweighing the benefits. However, Great Britain was not prepared to lose those benefits gained from established relations with its former colonies in Africa. Antagonizing

black elites in Africa by not recognizing black rights in an independent Rhodesia would reduce some of the benefits gained from decolonization.

The subjective issue for Rhodesia's Whites was how to insure their security following independence. As settlers, the white Rhodesians were physically and psychologically bound to the land, and they controlled nearly all of the country's economic resources. For them, their continued security was threatened by a black African government in Rhodesia. The white community perceived their security as being dependent upon control of the government and all of the administrative apparatus in Rhodesia. Through a series of acts and proclamations they had secured White domination in Rhodesia. Moreover, control equaled security in their view. The costs of allowing black majority rule in Rhodesia were higher than the costs of standing firm.

Like the conflict in Sudan, the subjective issues will define each player's goals. What goals did the white community, led by Ian Smith, hope to achieve? What were Great Britain's goals at the time of UDI?

C. GOALS

For Smith and the white Rhodesians the initial stated goal is expressed in the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), which called for complete independence from Great Britain. Here the stated goal and the perceived maximum goal possible are the same. Most white Rhodesians did not believe

that UDI would be an end in itself. Instead UDI was a tool

for ensuring White control. The minimum goal that they would

accept would be independence based on the 1961 constitution.

The constitution did incorporate the principle of majority

rule, however, the white minority controlled the rate in

which majority rule would be achieved. The constitution was

"rigged with loopholes that negated any possibility that it

would serve to curb the authoritarian propensities of the white

government." [Ref. 18:p. 40] In addition, the constitution

relinquished Britain's right to veto legislation that affected

Rhodesia's black population [Ref. 15:p. 40]. The 1961 con-

stitution guaranteed continued white control in Rhodesia, and

as stated earlier, control equaled security in white Rhodesian

minds.

Great Britain's maximum goal was a quick transfer of power

in Rhodesia from the white minority to the black African

majority at the time of independence. The minimum the British

would accept would be the safeguarding of black rights, the

expansion of black political participation, and the eventual

transition to majority rule. Initially put forth as conditions

for independence, the so-called five principles, made public

in October 1965, reveal the essential British goals in Rhodesia.

The principles are:

1. The principles and intention of unimpeded progress to
   majority rule, at least as outlined in the 1961 Con-
   stitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.

2. There would also have to be guarantees against retro-
   gressive amendment of the Constitution.

3. There would have to be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.

4. There would have to be progress toward ending racial discrimination.

5. The British government would need to be satisfied that any basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. [Ref. 16: p. 19, and Ref. 18:p. 75]

These five principles formed the basis for negotiations between Rhodesia and Great Britain. They were in effect the minimum goals that Great Britain would accept.

In sum, for the white Rhodesians, their maximum goal was complete independence from Great Britain with no immediate concessions regarding the black majority. The minimum they would accept would be the maintenance of white control in Rhodesia. For Great Britain its maximum goal would be the expedient transition of power in Rhodesia. The minimum the British would accept would be the expansion of black political rights and the guarantee of an eventual move to majority rule in Rhodesia.

D. CONFLICT OR CONCESSION

At the time of UDI, British and white Rhodesian goals did not overlap. Thus there was little chance that an agreement would be reached. For the white Rhodesians the situation was zero-sum. Every concession made to Great Britain would translate directly to reduced security. Their perception was that the costs of standing firm were low compared to the costs of conceding power to blacks in Rhodesia. For Great Britain, the

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conflict was also zero-sum. The British could not be seen

by other black African states to be relinquishing their respon-

sibility to blacks in Rhodesia. In 1965 they were unprepared

to adjust their stated goals as embodied in the five princi-

ples. While each side believed that the conflict was zero-

sum, neither believed that a direct military confrontation

would result. This is partially attributed to the strong

cultural and ethnic ties between white Rhodesia and Great

Britain. The white community in Rhodesia also realized that

the use of military force would "endanger the Labour Party's

slender one vote margin" in the British Parliament. [Ref. 19:

p. 9] Initially the British would respond to UDI by imposing

economic sanctions. The Whites in Rhodesia perceived that the

economic pressures resulting from sanctions could be managed,

and were a small price to pay for their continued political

and economic hegemony in Rhodesia. What were the initial

strategies employed by Great Britain and Rhodesia to obtain

these goals?

E. INITIAL STRATEGIES

In order to obtain their goals the white Rhodesians needed

to either eliminate the British from the independence process

or force Great Britain into accepting terms more favorable to

the white settlers. UDI was the strategy that Smith and the

Rhodesian Front used. From a Rhodesian viewpoint, UDI

eliminated Great Britain from the independence process even

though the declaration was considered illegal by Britain and

the majority of the international community. In fact Great

Britain was still very much involved in the conflict, and UDI

helped the British pass some of the responsibility for Rhodesia

onto the UN. Moreover, UDI was a gamble by Smith that even-

tually Britain would offer better terms. In effect UDI bought

time for Smith, and since his administration was under no

internal pressure they could sit and wait until London was

ready to resolve the conflict on Rhodesian terms.

The British strategy in response to UDI was to internation-

alize the conflict. London attempted to deflect pressure

caused by the Rhodesian conflict by requesting that the UN

impose economic sanctions against Smith and the white regime

in Rhodesia. In November 1965 the UN Security Council adopted

Resolution 217 which called for a selective embargo on petroleum

products and in May 1968 UN Security Council Resolution 253

imposed mandatory comprehensive sanctions on Rhodesia. [Ref.

20:pp. 409-410]

By requesting support from the UN, Great Britain was able

to diffuse some of the pressure created by the Rhodesian con-

flict. However, the UN sanctions initially had marginal

political effect and in fact strengthened the white community's

resolve. The sanctions did not increase the costs of standing

firm beyond the point acceptable to most white Rhodesians.

What resources did each player have to support its strategy

and resist pressure from the other side? What limitations did

each side possess?

F. RESOURCES

At the time of UDI, the white Rhodesians were in a command-
ing position. They had five main resources they could tap to
resist British political and economic pressure and to carry
out their strategy. First, the internal cohesion among the
Whites in Rhodesia was solid. Smith could rely on the complete
support of the Rhodesian Front (RF). He was unencumbered by
internal political division and was able to act without having
to address demands from several divergent sectors. He only
had to satisfy the concerns of one group. As noted, the ex-
ternal pressure leveled against Rhodesia unified the white
community, and the shared perception that they were standing
firm against the entire world in order to secure their present
way of life reduced almost all traces of division. "What
little liberal opposition existed within the white community
was politically powerless." [Ref. 19:p. 10]

However, once it was clear that the white community could
handle the sanctions, the urgent necessity for unity eased.
Shortly after UDI, some disagreements emerged over which tac-
tics should be used to ensure white security. But the support
for the Rhodesian Front remained very strong and the white
community, under Smith's leadership, maintained a high level
of unity throughout the conflict.

Second, Rhodesia was able to dampen the effect of economic
sanctions. South Africa and Portugal did not comply with UN-
imposed sanctions and became major conduits for Rhodesian

imports and exports. Part of the reason that South Africa

did not comply with the sanctions was that it, "Could not

admit the use of sanctions or boycotts for political aims any-

where because of its own sensitivity to such pressure."

[Ref. 21] In fact Rhodesian trade with South Africa steadily

increased between 1966 and 1975 [Ref. 20:p. 413]. In addition,

Rhodesia was able to circumvent certain trade restrictions

and developed alternative markets. [Ref. 16:pp. 158-270]

Although economic pressures would seriously build later in

the conflict, for several years following UDI economic sanc-

tions had only minor political effect on Rhodesia, and in

some sectors stimulated the Rhodesian economy.

Third, "South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia allegedly

had plans for a common defense of the entire region against

'communism' and 'nationalism'." [Ref. 19:p. 14] While South

Africa may have not believed that UDI was the best strategy,

Rhodesia could rely on South African and Portuguese support

in maintaining white domination and resisting British politi-

cal and economic pressure.

Fourth, at the time of UDI, the black nationalist movement

was underdeveloped; it posed little threat to the white regime.

Existing nationalist organizations were banned and sent into

exile. The immediate threat of a black military uprising did

not exist. However, the white Rhodesians perceived the need

to tighten further their control over the black community.

The two most important developments in increasing white control

were the new constitution, and the Land Tenure Act, both introduced in 1969. The 1969 Constitution explicitly introduced tribalism into Rhodesian politics which the whites believed would divide the African population, making white control easier. The Land Tenure Act further reinforced the racial segregation defined by the 1940 Land Apportionment Act, and further restrained movement by black Rhodesians. [Ref. 18:p. 142]

Maintaining political and physical control over the black population allowed the white Rhodesians: (1) to identify potential nationalist leaders (who could then be forced into exile), (2) to break up dissident groups by forcibly separating members by sending them to different areas of the country, and (3) to limit blacks from gaining economic stability and influence. Controlling the black community will not prevent the nationalist movement from growing in Rhodesia, but will forestall its development.

The fifth resource that the Whites possessed was time. A main feature of the UDI strategy is that it stalled any decisive action on the part of Great Britain. Smith was confident that while Prime Minister Wilson's government would oppose UDI, it would not make a resolute move to settle the conflict. UDI allowed Rhodesia to wait for a time when a new administration would accept terms of independence more favorable to the Whites in Rhodesia. Thus, time became a resource as provided by the UDI strategy.

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The resources that Great Britain possessed were limited.
As noted earlier, Great Britain sought to internationalize
the conflict, and did so by asking the UN to impose sanctions.
Great Britain found wide support among members of the UN.
However, Rhodesia was still primarily Britain's responsibility,
and other states, including the US, were reluctant to become
more involved in Rhodesia by broadening their efforts there.

Internationalizing the conflict was a strategy aimed more
at deflecting pressure than it was at forcing Rhodesia into
accepting British terms. Great Britain was operating under
two main limitations. First, domestic political opinion was
divided over how to deal with Rhodesia. Wilson's Labour Govern-
ment was constrained in the British Parliament where they
enjoyed only a one-vote majority. [Ref. 19:p. 9] Wilson could
not act decisively for fear of severe criticism that would
weaken his political position domestically.

Second, the use of military force to coerce the white
Rhodesians into accepting British terms was unlikely. While
Britain was receiving pressure from several African states to
use force against the white regime, military intervention
would have threatened British economic interests in the region,
and a move to use the military option in Rhodesia would have
met strong domestic opposition. However, Prime Minister Wilson
did not even need to propose the use of military force to
Parliament, just make its use uncertain. Had Wilson encouraged
the perception among white Rhodesians that use of force was

being considered, he may have been able to use this as a "stick" to gain concessions. Instead the use of military force was not a viable option and could not be used as a credible threat against Smith and the white regime in Salisbury.

Wilson continued to negotiate with the white regime in Rhodesia throughout the late 1960's. His attempts at coercing Smith into a settlement based on British terms was unsuccessful. In 1970 two new administrations were in control in London and Washington. The new Conservative Prime Minister, Edward Heath, and his Foreign Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, had vowed to resolve the Rhodesian conflict.

British perceptions had changed, and both Heath and Douglas-Home perceived that a quick resolution of the conflict was in British best interests, even if the settlement highly favored Rhodesia's white regime. A settlement under Smith's terms would weaken British credibility and perceived resolve. However, swallowing this pill was made easier for the British for two reasons. First, Smith had tacitly agreed to proposals that satisfied British interpretation of their previously proposed five principles. Thus, Britain could be seen as obtaining its initial goals in Rhodesia. However, the proposals agreed upon supported a liberal interpretation of the principles and ensured the continuation of white domination in Rhodesia. Second, Britain had correctly sensed that the Nixon administration had made a shift in US policy that favored the

white regime in southern Africa. This shift in policy would later clear the way for the passage of the Byrd Amendment, which while its primary intention was not to support the white regimes in Rhodesia, did in fact have that effect. Thus in November 1971, perceiving the need for a quick resolution of the conflict, and armed with the promise of US approval, Douglas-Home and Prime Minister Smith concluded an agreement which highly favored the white regime in Rhodesia. However, a key element of the settlement, one that Smith had to capitulate on, was that the Smith-Home Agreement be acceptable to the entire Rhodesian community, including Blacks in Rhodesia. In January 1972, a commission headed by Lord Pearce was dispatched to Rhodesia to assess the acceptability of the settlement.

The Pearce Commission would be the first substantial resource the black African nationalists in Rhodesia could exploit. Up until this time Blacks were not directly involved in the negotiations, and although they had been previously consulted, they had not yet become a primary player in the conflict. The blacks in Rhodesia had already received resources in the form of international (UN) and Frontline State support. However, the black community had not coalesced into a "unitary actor" and thus could not take complete advantage of these resources. The Pearce Commission affirmed and highlighted Great Britain's realization that the blacks must be an active participant in any final settlement in Rhodesia.

The Pearce Commission marks a watershed in the conflict and as a result of the findings of the commission, Great Britain cancelled the Smith-Home Agreement. From this point on, the British, though closely involved in the negotiations, will become a secondary player, and the conflict will evolve into a black nationalist-white community conflict vice a British-Rhodesian conflict. What then was the black nationalist's strategy as they stepped forward as a primary player opposing Smith and the white regime in Rhodesia?

G. THE BLACK NATIONALISTS

As early as 1957, black nationalist groups were forming in Rhodesia. As noted earlier, there were two main black nationalist groups--ZANU and ZAPU. Their primary goal was to overthrow the white regime in Salisbury and replace it with a black African government. Both groups had been banned and forced into exile, and while the Pearce Commission elevated the black Africans to a primary position in the conflict, they were not yet able to assert any pressure on Smith and the white community.

The guerrilla forces of ZANU and ZAPU were the main resource held by the black nationalists. The strategy employed by the nationalists centered around this resource. Their principle option was to engage in a guerrilla war in Rhodesia. This strategy had three operational goals. First, in order to unseat the white regime that was firmly entrenched in Rhodesia, both ZAPU and ZANU required mass support. Therefore, their

immediate goal was to "win the support of the black rural population." [Ref. 22] Second, the strategy was designed to change the white community's perception of invulnerability. Bringing violence to the white settlers' doorstep in effect increased the perceived costs of standing firm. And third, the guerrilla attacks would further increase the economic pressures already being absorbed by the white community.

During the late-1960's to mid-1970's the black nationalists were deeply divided. This was their main limitation. The split had occurred in the early 1960's and seems not to have been based on tribal or political lines but was caused by Nkomo's leadership [Ref. 18:p. 55]. The two groups that survived the split, ZAPU and ZANU would not unite until 1974, when they formed the Patriotic Front (PF). However, throughout the 1970's, the individual efforts of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), ZANU's and ZAPU's military wings respectively, were able to increase the costs to the white community of standing firm. Deep animosity existed between these two groups and this division most certainly limited their ability to coordinate action, and essentially retarded their military effectiveness. In light of their individual successes, one can only speculate on their potential to increase the costs of the white community had they united sooner.

While ZANU and ZAPU were waging the guerrilla war, the African National Congress (ANC), headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa

was reformed in 1971 to articulate the African opposition to the Smith-Home Agreement. [Ref. 18:p. 137] The ANC was able to draw upon the intense anger most blacks felt toward the white regime and build a nationalist consciousness among black African Rhodesians.

In sum, the nationalists were a growing force in Rhodesia. Their main resource was the guerrilla forces of ZANU and ZAPU, and the strategy they used centered around these guerrilla forces. Limited by factionalization, the nationalists were still able to increase the costs to the white regime of standing firm.

H. EVOLUTION OF PERCEPTIONS

The growing guerrilla insurgency coupled with the increasing political consciousness of blacks caused Smith and the white community to change their perceptions. Smith now realized that he must deal directly with the nationalists, however, virtually no one in the white community was ready to accept a Rhodesian government dominated by Blacks. Smith's strategy reflected the change in primary players and altered perceptions. The new strategy was to gain acceptance of the Smith-Home Agreement by black nationalists and to make only minor concessions that would have limited effect on white Rhodesian power and security.

The costs of standing firm were increasing but not to the point where Whites in Rhodesia were willing to make any significant concessions. Two elements kept the cost from rising

further. First, as noted, the nationalist groups were still divided. Had the blacks effectively united earlier in the conflict they might have been able to raise the cost to Whites sooner. Second, passage of the Byrd Amendment in November 1971 eased some of the economic pressures placed on the white regime by allowing the US to import $212 million of ferro-chrome and other strategic minerals from Rhodesia [Ref. 20: p. 410]. In addition, the Byrd Amendment was a signal to Salisbury that the new administration in Washington was sup-portive of white regimes in southern Africa, and was a boost to the morale of the white community.

In 1974, the coup in Portugal would alter perceptions and resources for both the Whites and the nationalists in Rhodesia. Following the coup, Portugal relinquished control of its colonies in Africa. As a result, the black nationalists in Rhodesia gained a resource when black nationalist groups in Mozambique and Angola gained control of the governments in those countries. First, Mozambique, under the control of the Frente de Liberatacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO), opened up its entire eastern border with Rhodesia to ZANU and ZAPU guerrillas. Second, prior to the coup, ZANU and ZAPU received aid from Zambia and the OAU, now they could look to Mozambique for additional support. Third, black states in southern Africa gained leverage in the region as a result of Mozambique's independence. While black African states in the region could not dominate South Africa, the balance of power was beginning

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to shift in their favor. It is clear that Mozambique's independence brought additional support to the blacks in Rhodesia, and changed the perceptions held by the white community.

Prior to the coup, South Africa had given substantial assistance to Rhodesia to suppress the nationalist movement. Their goal was to forestall the "communist" and "nationalist" tide in Rhodesia before it reached South Africa. However, events in Mozambique and Angola, and the subsequent shift in black influence in the region changed South African perceptions.

The government in Pretoria now believed that a prolonged guerrilla struggle would only jeopardize South Africa's security. They now realized that the white regime in Rhodesia could not expect to win a protracted guerrilla struggle, and that a continuation of the war was damaging South Africa's relations with other black states in Africa. South Africa was willing to accept strained relations so long as its security was assured. This no longer being the case, they opted for a swift termination to the war. South Africa pressed Smith into negotiating with the blacks hoping that a negotiated settlement, under South African encouragement would improve Pretoria's political standing with other states in Africa. In addition, they believed that there was a greater possibility that a more moderate black government would be installed in Salisbury under a negotiated settlement.

South Africa could get Smith to the negotiating table, however, he still would not bargain seriously. Smith came to

the table to demonstrate to the West his government's "reasonableness," and if he could be certain that the talks would break down because of division among the nationalists, there would be little possibility that he would have to make serious concessions. [Ref. 20:p. 16] In addition, Smith wanted to show the West that Rhodesia was battling the ground-swell of communist influence in Mozambique and Angola. All of these tactics were designed to gain Western support.

In August 1975, talks between Smith and the black national-ists were held in a railway car parked over Victoria Falls, halfway between Zambia and Rhodesia. Smith's goal was to make minor concessions to appease blacks and deflect pressure from Western states. The talks ended in stalemate but reinforced the white perception that they could make conciliatory reforms in Rhodesia, while retaining their overall control. [Ref. 23] This perception will later be the basis for Smith's "internal settlement" strategy.

As noted earlier, division among the nationalists was a primary limitation for them. This division widened even further. When the PF was formed in 1974, ZAPU and ZANU did not fully integrate. In theory, both groups had united under the PF banner, but in practice, each operated semi-autonomously with only minimal cooperation between them. ZANU's leader, Robert Mugabe, was attracting more militant nationalists, and his preferred strategy was to continue the war. For him, conflict, not negotiation, was the way to gain control in Rhodesia.

ZAPU's leader, Joshua Nkomo, had a different view. Nkomo

preferred negotiation, and he and Smith had conducted a series

of talks in 1976. However, it is unlikely that Nkomo would

have been able to end the conflict since Mugabe, and his mili-

tant followers, would have continued the war. Thus while both

Nkomo's and Mugabe's goal was to gain control of the government

in Rhodesia, their respective strategies for accomplishing

this were quite different. Without a unified strategy and a

pooling of resources, the possibility that the nationalists

could force Smith into making substantial concessions was

unlikely.

Throughout 1976, ZANU and ZAPU increased the level of

guerrilla activity. In April ZANU guerrillas cut a rail link

between Rhodesia and South Africa at the Beit Bridge. This

attack altered white perceptions of invulnerability. [Ref.

19:p. 18] However, this change in perception still did not

raise the costs of standing firm above the point where Smith

was willing to make serious concessions.

The conflict in Rhodesia is as much about changing resources

as it is about changing perceptions. In 1976 several other

factors altered white perceptions. First, South Africa was

pressing Smith to negotiate. And while it was almost certain

that South Africa would not stand by idly if there were in-

creased threats to white lives in Rhodesia, they did make it

clear that they would not lend Rhodesia any further military

support. [Ref. 21:p. 3]

Second, as a result of the civil war in Angola, the US had readjusted its policy in southern Africa. US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, in a speech delivered in Lusaka in April, stated that the US was clearly opposed to the white regime in Salisbury, and that the US was committed to supporting a negotiated settlement based on majority rule. [Ref. 19:p. 21]

Previously, white morale had been buoyed by the perception that they could count on US support by promising to beat back the wave of communism that was spreading in southern Africa. Kissinger was successful at altering Smith's perceptions by declaring US intentions to support majority rule. While this change in perceptions was still not great enough to prompt Smith into handing power over to blacks completely, it did get him to the negotiating table. This was something that the blacks could not do by themselves.

In October 1976, Smith, Mugabe, Nkomo, and representatives from the US and Great Britain met in Geneva to work out an agreement. Again a meeting between the primary and secondary players failed to result in a resolution of the conflict. The principal reason that the talks failed was that both the white community and the black nationalists believed that each could get the best terms by standing firm. For Smith, the cost of standing firm was rapidly rising, but the cost of conceding was still higher. The nationalists had two options, they could either lower the costs that Smith and the white community faced if they were to concede, or they could raise white costs

of standing firm. The nationalists chose the later. Thus conflict, not negotiation, was preferred by both sides.

February 1977 marks a turning point in the Rhodesia conflict. It is here that Smith, with the encouragement and support of South Africa, announces his plans to proceed with an internal settlement in Rhodesia. The internal settlement is a major shift in Smith's strategy. Up until this point Smith had participated in talks sponsored by external actors. The internal settlement was an attempt by Smith to eliminate external actors from the negotiation process and to deal with those black leaders over whom Smith perceived he had the greatest leverage.

The tactical goal of the internal settlement was to show the West that a majority-rule elected government was in control in Salisbury. The hope was that once the West was convinced that solid progress was being made, they would be inclined to drop the sanctions and provide assistance to Rhodesia. In addition, Smith had reason to believe that Bishop Muzorewa would be the likely winner of any open election in Rhodesia. He realized that the election in itself would not end the guerrilla war since Muzorewa did not have the support of a guerrilla organization. However, Smith believed that the US and Great Britain, seeing that free and fair elections had been held would be forced into supporting the new government and would provide aid to suppress the guerrilla movement.

By mid-1977 Smith realized that the cost of the war was increasing. Gaining the support of the Western powers as soon

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as possible was becoming crucial. In March 1977, the Byrd
Amendment was repealed, signaling US resolve to support the
black nationalists and majority rule. This also increased the
economic costs absorbed by the white community. Smith had
come to the conclusion that he would have to deal seriously
with blacks, and his main goal was to limit the concessions
he would have to make.

In September, the US and Great Britain put forth a plan
to resolve the conflict in Rhodesia. Both Smith and the black
nationalists approached the plan with caution. Nkomo and
Mugabe decided to commit themselves to at least the first step
of the plan, while Smith's reaction to the plan was negative.
[Ref. 24] The US and Great Britain had little direct leverage
in bringing Smith and the black nationalists to the negotiat-
ing table. It was clear that any UK-US proposals must have
the support of South Africa and the Frontline states. Only
the former was in a position to pressure Smith effectively and
the latter was the key to bringing the Patriotic Front to the
negotiating table.

Smith rejected the UK-US plan and forged ahead with his
internal settlement. The response of the Patriotic Front to
the internal settlement was to step up the guerrilla war. By
this time the PF had the active support of the Frontline states
and the OAU. This was their major resource for carrying on
the war. However, the Frontline states led by Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania and Mozambique's Samora Machel were pressuring the

PF into negotiating within the framework of the UK-US plan
[Ref. 25]. While they clearly wanted the PF to obtain control
of the Rhodesian government, a quick end to the conflict was
in their best interests. In December Smith engaged in talks
with Muzorewa, Sithole, and with two traditional leaders,
Chiefs Jeremiah Chirau and Kayisa Ndiweni.

In March 1978 a settlement was reached between Muzorewa
and Smith. Both Nkomo and Mugabe denounced the talks. Nkomo
called the resulting settlement, "the greatest sellout in the
history of Africa," while Mugabe reaffirmed his preference for
direct military confrontation stating that, "the only way for
the restoration of the dignity of the Africans is armed
struggle." [Ref. 26] The settlement highly favored the Whites.
The new constitution was based on universal suffrage, but out
of the 100 seats in Parliament, 28 were guaranteed for Whites.
This provided Whites with a veto over changes to the constitu-
tion, and ensured continued White control. Smith had the sup-
port of both South Africa and the moderate blacks. All that
was left was to gain the support of the Western powers.

In July 1978, the US Senate adopted the Case-Javits Amend-
ment to the International Security Assistance Act of 1978.
This provided a major resource for Smith. The amendment called
for the removal of sanctions against the white regime in Rho-
desia when the President determines that: (1) the government
of Rhodesia demonstrates its willingness to negotiate in good
faith with all parties. (2) that a government has been

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installed, chosen by free elections in which all political
parties participate, and is monitored by impartial international
observers. [Ref. 27]

The amendment was a resource for Smith and the white com-
munity for two reasons. First, the morale of the white com-
munity was given a boost by this amendment and another amendment
passed by the US House. The promise that economic sanctions
would be lifted after free elections were held provided a
light at the end of the tunnel. The increase in white morale
helped Smith stand firm against mounting pressure.

Second, the Case-Javits Amendment provided Smith with a
tool to ensure white security. Smith was pushing ahead with
his internal settlement, and as noted earlier, he felt confi-
dent that Muzorewa would win a free election. Smith believed
that he had enough leverage over Muzorewa to ensure continued
control of the government. Later in December, white Rhodesian
security was secured when Muzorewa and two other tribal leaders
agreed to an arrangement whereby Whites had a veto power in
the Parliament and held the largest single block in the Cabinet.
[Ref. 28]

On 29 April 1979 elections were held in Rhodesia. Muzorewa
was the clear winner, capturing 67 percent of the vote. In
elections held earlier in the month, Smith's party, the Rho-
desia Front secured all 28 of the white seats in the cabinet.
[Ref. 15:p. 65] The elections were boycotted by the PF. How-
ever, it should be noted that the voter turnout for a country
that was deeply involved in a guerrilla war was relatively

high (64.5 percent). In this context Muzorewa's victory would seem to signal the willingness of many blacks in Rhodesia to accept the internal settlement. But it appears that many blacks were voting not so much for Muzorewa than they were for an end to the war. Had they realized that Muzorewa's election would not end the war, the voter turnout would probably have been much lower.

A new coalition government was formed with Muzorewa as Prime Minister. However, his power was limited by the structure of the Parliament and the Cabinet. Why was Muzorewa willing to accept this arrangement? First, he had no guerrilla force to challenge the white regime or to secure a prominent role in a settlement that was dominated by the PF. Second, once elected, Muzorewa's position as Prime Minister depended upon the Rhodesian Army's ability to combat the PF guerrillas. Smith's main leverage over Muzorewa here was the threat that Whites, seeing their security diminishing, would flee Rhodesia, adding to the already large number of Whites that had left Rhodesia. [Ref. 29] This would leave no one to help Muzorewa hold back the PF, and the last thing that he wanted was a violent overthrow of his government by other black nationalists.

Following the elections the Whites were gaining confidence, and they perceived that their situation in Rhodesia was secure. First, the elections had turned out as planned and with the built-in guarantees, the white community believed that its political position in Rhodesia was secure. Second, with the

election of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party victory in British Parliamentary elections held in May, many white Rhodesians believed that this new government in London would be more sympathetic. Third, five bills and resolutions had been introduced in the US Congress, calling for the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia [Ref. 19:p. 42]. Most white Rhodesians believed it was only a short time before they would be relieved of the economic hardships that had developed since sanctions were first imposed.

There was one element that prevented the white Rhodesians from becoming too buoyant in their morale. In May 1979, ZIPRA and ZANLA forces united to coordinate their activities. This unification was a major resource for the black nationalists and a primary factor in raising the cost to Whites of standing firm. From the start of the conflict the subjective issue for white Rhodesians concerned their physical and economic security, and the increase in guerrilla activities focused pressure on this issue. With the unification of guerrilla forces and the increased difficulty the white Rhodesian Army was having combatting them, the threat to white Rhodesian physical security increased drastically. And while the guerrillas could not control the urban areas, they had made substantial gains in rural areas where many white Rhodesian farmers lived and worked. This forced many in the white community to reevaluate their goals so that the principal goal now became ending the war. Seeing that the internal settlement

MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

and the April elections had not ended the war, a new strategy had to be followed.

A new Anglo-American posture was formulated in May 1979 by British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. On 1 August a Commonwealth Conference was held in Lusaka. The Conference produced a basic outline for a comprehensive settlement involving all parties. The PF and Smith agreed to meet in London in December to attend an all parties conference. What then were the factors that brought Smith and the PF to the negotiating table?

Smith and the white community had three basic reasons for negotiating. First, the war had reached a stalemate, and was continuing to be a financial burden to the regime. The only options the white regime had were to either step up the war effort in the face of growing support for the PF by the Frontline states or hope to end the war through negotiation. Second, decreasing morale and increasing economic pressures were pushing the regime into negotiating. Without a lifting of sanctions, the Rhodesian economy would continue to stagnate. The belief that the US was ready to lift sanctions was shattered when Cyrus Vance was able to convince the US House that the premature lifting of sanctions would not be in the US best interest. Legislation abandoning the Case-Javits Amendment was adopted by the House on 28 June. [Ref. 19:p. 45] Third, Smith was now facing severe pressure from Western states and South Africa to negotiate. Great Britain and the US were committed to an

all parties settlement, and would have gone ahead with the conference with or without the white regime. Most certainly any settlement over Rhodesia in Smith's absence, that is without the white community's agreement, would be quite shallow and have little impact. This was Smith's last resource. However, had Smith not attended it is likely that this would have fostered the impression that the black nationalists were willing to compromise and that no amount of political or diplomatic pressure could sway the white regime, and that other forms of coercion were necessary.

There were two elements that brought the Patriotic Front to the Conference. First, as noted earlier the war had reached a stalemate. One of the tactical goals of a guerrilla war is to increase your opponent's cost of standing firm so that he will be forced to resolve the conflict on terms favorable to your side. It was unlikely that the PF guerrillas would win an outright military victory in Rhodesia. Thus, getting Smith to seriously negotiate under terms acceptable to the PF and supported by Great Britain and the US was desirable. They believed that the Conference would put both themselves and Smith's white regime on equal footing, and that from this position an acceptable settlement would be hammered out.

Second, the leaders of the Frontline states continued to pressure the PF to negotiate. The guerrilla war was becoming very costly for the Frontline states, and economic progress in the region as a whole was tied to peace in Rhodesia. The Frontline states were able to exercise leverage on the PF

primarily because they were their main source of military assistance and their primary source of legitimacy. When the Lancaster House Conference was held in December 1979, both Smith and the PF, "were in the weakest position to resist external pressure to negotiate." [Ref. 19:p. 47] The cost of standing firm had become very high for Smith and the white community. The PF perceived that the gains obtained by continuing the war were offset by the threat of potential costs of standing firm and the gains obtained in a negotiated settlement. This was the first time that both sides perceived the conflict as variable sum, and it is here that both sides will be motivated to negotiate in good faith.

I. THE LANCASTER HOUSE SETTLEMENT

The history of the Lancaster House Conference is an example of third party negotiation [Ref. 30]. Great Britain assumed the role of mediator, and aided by the US and the Frontline states was able to pressure both Smith and the PF into progressing through the talks to a final settlement.

Lord Carrington assumed direct control of the negotiations, and he was committed to producing an agreement from the start. He used primarily four tactics as a third party mediator. First, he induced each side into committing themselves to the negotiating process. The idea here was to get both parties deeply involved in the talks so that the gains obtained by each side if a settlement was agreed upon would offset the desire to pull out of the talks. This tactic was designed to

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gain enough momentum in the talks to carry each side through
to a settlement.

Second, Lord Carrington used a series of carrots and sticks
on both sides. He publically praised them when they made a
move that contributed toward a settlement, and openly criticized
them when their actions threatened the success of the negotia-
tions. He pulled "together all the strings that each party
brought to the conference table." [Ref. 31]

Third, he used the "train is leaving the station" ploy to
maintain each party's interest in the negotiation. This was
especially true when dealing with the PF. Towards the end of
the conference, when the PF hesitated over the exact terms of
the ceasefire, the British threatened to go ahead with the
settlement, leaving the PF behind. Fearing that they would
lose out completely, the PF agreed to the settlement.

Lastly, throughout the conference Great Britain relied on
support from the US, the Frontline states, and South Africa.
It was the combined pressure from all these external players
that moved the negotiations toward a successful conclusion.

It is important to remember that while Lord Carrington had
executed a well-designed strategy through skillful use of
diplomacy, the bottom line is that the costs of standing firm
were now unacceptable, and negotiation, not conflict would
secure for them the most advantageous outcome. In other words,
the ingredients for resolving the conflict were already
present, it just took the British recipe to bake a settlement
palatable to both parties.

On 21 December, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed ending the fourteen year conflict in Rhodesia. The settlement included an arrangement for a general ceasefire and agreement on a draft constitution. How did the agreement reflect the goals of each player?

The constitution that was agreed to at Lancaster House addressed many of the subjective issues of the conflict. The constitution ensured majority rule in Rhodesia, and this fulfilled Britain's initial goal of granting independence based on majority rule. The constitution also fulfilled the nationalist goal of gaining control of the government in Rhodesia. Provisions in the constitution ensured African control of the 100 member House and the 40 member Senate. [Ref. 32:p. 257] However, certain provisions did give the white community a disproportionately large share of the available legislative seats. Smith's party, the Rhodesian Front, obtained all 20 of the "European" seats in the House.

Initially, the white community could not conceive of relinquishing any real power to the black Africans. They had stood firm in the face of tremendous political and economic pressure, only to have to concede in the end to majority rule. However, it is important to note that the issue that had defined the white community's goals was the need for security, and the agreement did address this issue. Provisions in the constitution maintained the administrative and legal status quo of the white community, and safeguards built into the constitution

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protected the rights of the white community. In addition, provisions in the constitution and declaration of rights make it difficult for the government to substantially change the Constitution in areas concerning land resettlement, nationalization of commerce and industry, and property and pension rights. [Ref. 32:pp. 288-289] Change to the constitution in the first 10 years requires a unanimous vote in Parliament. Thus, the white community is assured of their lifestyle at least until 1990.

Lastly, the Lancaster House Agreement established a cease fire between Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front guerrillas. This was a goal that each side implicitly sought by coming to the negotiating table.

J. CONCLUSION

There have been two underlying themes to this chapter. The first has to do with the role of external players in a conflict. It is clear that several external players have had a role in the Rhodesian conflict. Each has, at different times, had direct influence on the primary players in the struggle and each had influenced the eventual outcome of the conflict.

South Africa was able to exert pressure on the white regime in Salisbury because of their military, economic, and psychological ties with Rhodesia. When Pretoria realized the futility of Smith's persistent course of action, they actively pressed him into negotiating a solution. The US also influenced the conflict. Its most effective resources were both its ability

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to bring economic pressure on Rhodesia, and perhaps more importantly, to influence the white community's perception of their own diminishing legitimacy and purpose. Without strong moral support from the West, Salisbury had a difficult time maintaining the will to resist outside pressure over the long run.

The black nationalists in Rhodesia received the majority of their support from the Frontline states and, without this aid, it is unlikely that they would have been able to substantially raise the costs to the white community of standing firm. Thus, when most leaders of the Frontline states realized the need to end the war and proceed with reconciliation, the PF was pushed into negotiating with Smith and the white regime.

And lastly, the skillful diplomatic influence displayed by Lord Carrington and the British mediating team had great impact on the Lancaster House negotiations, and then steered both players down the path to a settlement.

It is likely that without the pressure applied on Smith and the black nationalists, from these external players, the Rhodesian conflict would have been prolonged even further.

The second theme of this chapter has been that the Rhodesian conflict ended with a successful negotiated settlement. The settlement was successful in that it addressed the immediate issues of the Rhodesian conflict. First, it ended the violence that had begun to increase steadily over the course of the conflict. Both players were deeply affected by the war, and its

termination benefitted each side. Second, the settlement satisfied the subjective issues of Great Britain, the black nationalists, and the white community in Rhodesia. Great Britain and the black nationalists were satisfied in that the settlement established majority rule. This satisfied Britain's desire to grant independence based on majority rule and allowed black nationalists to express their right to self-determination. For the white community their primary subjective issue--security--was addressed. The settlement guaranteed their security, but the white regime had to concede the sub-issue of relinquishing control in Rhodesia to the Blacks.

The Lancaster House Agreement, like the Addis Ababa Accords, is an impressive accomplishment and represents true accommodation from both players. However, in the five years following independence, the situation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe has not been ideal. Following his overwhelming victory in the 1980 pre-independence elections, Robert Mugabe sought reconciliation in Rhodesia. Mugabe again reaffirmed his leadership and ZANU secured its domination in the Zimbabwe Parliament by winning 63 of the "common roll" seats in the 1985 elections [Ref. 33:p. 572]. Ironically, the greatest threat to Mugabe and the most serious source of insecurity for Zimbabwe does not come from an external force, nor from disgruntled white Rhodesians, but instead comes from Joshua Nkomo and ZAPU.

Resistence to a one-party state and ZAPU's resentment of ZANU's increased dominance in Zimbabwe, has the potential to

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expand into a conflict that would again place Zimbabwe in a state of turmoil. It should be stressed that the Lancaster House Agreement addressed only the issues of the original conflict. It was not designed to be a comprehensive document to address all future problems in Zimbabwe.

Relations among and within states are characterized by series of negotiated agreements which overlay the changing political and economic realities that exist. The Lancaster House settlement is a strong link in the chain of agreements that have defined Zimbabwe's domestic relations. For the Lancaster House Agreement to have continued positive impact on Zimbabwe, other solid agreements (a Zimbabwe Constitution, agreement among black nationalists and between blacks and whites) need to be strengthened. If Zimbabwe fails to live up to its potential or if conflict again becomes the pre-ferred road, it will be because the links on either side of Lancaster House have given away.

Source: Konig, Barbara. Namibia: The Ravages of War.
London: The International Defense and Aid
Fund for Southern Africa, 1983.

IV. <u>NAMIBIA: A CONTINUING CONFLICT</u>

The forty year dispute over Namibia is a case in which
active diplomacy has failed to produce a negotiated settlement.
This chapter will examine the current conflict in Namibia by
applying the conflict resolution checklist to this case in
the same manner as was done for the Sudan and Zimbabwe con-
flicts. However, unlike Sudan and Zimbabwe where the con-
flict was resolved, the Namibia conflict continues. Therefore,
in place of an analysis of a settlement, this chapter will
end with a brief analysis of the possible elements that have
prevented a settlement in Namibia. In addition, Appendix C
provides a chronological history of the key events in the
Namibian conflict up to 1985.

A. THE PLAYERS

The Namibia conflict involves several internal and external
players. The initial dispute over South West Africa (SWA),
as Namibia was formerly called, was between the United Nations
(UN), and the Republic of South Africa (RSA). The UN and
RSA were the initial primary players in the conflict. In the
early 1960's they were joined by the black African nationalists
in Namibia, and they will come to play a more central role as
the conflict develops.

The growth of African nationalism in Namibia began in the
1950's. The early nationalist groups were organized along

tribal and ethnic lines. Most notable were the South West
African National Union (SWANU), the Heroro Council, and the
Ovamboland People's Organization (OPO). In 1960, the South
West African People's Organization (SWAPO) was founded by
Herman Toivo ja Toivo. In 1967, Sam Nujoma became leader of
SWAPO when Toivo was placed in jail in Robben Island. [Ref.
34:pp. 155-156] SWAPO is generally considered the most power-
ful and influential nationalist organization in Namibia. It
draws support and membership from the Ovambo tribe, the
largest single ethnic group in Namibia, comprising over half
of the territory's total population. By the mid-1970's,
SWAPO became a primary player in the conflict, and will mirror
the goals and aspirations of most blacks in Namibia.

The whites in Namibia will also become important players.
In 1975 they will form the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA).
In November 1983 the DTA expanded its membership and reformed
as the Multi-Party Conference (MPC).

Several external players will have a role in the Namibian
conflict. The two most influential have been: (1) the Western
members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, West Ger-
many, and Canada) commonly referred to as the Western Contact
group headed by the US, and (2) the Frontline states (Angola,
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswanna). Both the US
and Angola have been very influential operating separately
from their respective groups.

In sum, the Namibian conflict has centered around three primary players, the Republic of South Africa, the United Nations, and the black nationalists, mainly represented by SWAPO. The external players in the Namibian conflict have been primarily the Frontline states, the Western Contact group, the US, and Angola. What then are the objective and subjective issues of the Namibian conflict?

B. THE ISSUES

The conflict in Namibia initially centered around the objective issue of whether Namibia would be incorporated into South Africa or whether it would become an independent state through the UN trusteeship system.

South West Africa was colonized by Germany in 1884. At the end of WWI all former German colonies were placed under the newly found League of Nations mandate system. The mandate system had three classes of mandates: class A, B, and C. Class A countries were deemed to be the closest to achieving independence from the mandatary and required little supervision. Class C countries needed the most assistance at establishing an infrastructure and mechanism leading to independence. SWA was designated a class "C" mandate territory under article 22 of the League Covenant, and the Union of South Africa was appointed the mandatary. [Ref. 35:p. 62] SWA was administered as an integral part of South Africa and the government of South Africa was required to submit annual reports to the League on the status of SWA.

By 1933, South Africa was seeking to incorporate the
territory of SWA into the Republic. The League however,
consistently opposed this move. In 1946 the League of Nations
was dissolved, and its successor, the United Nations set up
the trusteeship system. Article 77 of the UN Charter states
that all territories formerly held under the mandate system
would be placed under trusteeship agreements. [Ref. 36:
p. 1192] Even though South Africa became a member of the
United Nations in November 1945, it refused to sign a trustee-
ship agreement over SWA.

In 1966 the UN decided that the mandate over the territory
should be taken away from South Africa and resolved that the
responsibility for SWA should be assumed by an 11 nation, UN-
appointed Council for Namibia. The council was to arrange
for the transfer of the administration of the territory and
in June of 1968 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution
to rename the territory Namibia.

There are two subjective issues for South Africa in this
conflict. First, South Africa perceives that control in
Namibia is crucial to its regional security. This perception
was reinforced in 1975 following the independence of the
former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Surrounded
by hostile states, South Africa's white regime believes that
Namibia is integral to its security for two reasons: First,
from a tactical viewpoint, Namibia serves as a buffer between
South Africa and Angola. Pretoria would prefer to hold back

what it perceives as the nationalist onslaught at the Cunene
rather than the Orange River. Second, because of its domestic
policies toward blacks within its own territory, South Africa
is fearful that a black nationalist victory in Namibia will
demonstrate to South African blacks the efficacy of armed
struggle in obtaining political goals. In addition, Pretoria
perceives, "the installation of a hostile regime in Windhoek
would make the maintenance of order in South Africa more
difficult." [Ref. 37:p. 101]

The second subjective issue for South Africa involves
their right to annex Namibia. Pretoria believed that Namibia
was not ready nor would be ready in the near future to become
an independent state. Furthermore, since South Africa had
administered Namibia for 26 years under the League of Nations
mandate, they believed that it was their right to incorporate
Namibia into the Republic once the League was dissolved. This,
coupled with the large number of South African whites that
had already settled in Namibia, reinforced their perception
that Namibia should become the fifth province.

There is also a subjective sub-issue for South Africa, this
involves the status of Walvis Bay--Namibia's major port and
rail center. South Africa believes that since Walvis Bay
was not a part of the original German colony (it was adminis-
tered under British authority), it should not be considered
part of the territory. Thus they assert that any dispute over
Namibia should not include Walvis Bay. Walvis Bay is important

to South Africa because it is the key to Namibia's economic growth. And to control Walvis Bay is to control Namibia's future. [Ref. 35:p. 72]

For the UN the subjective issues centered on its credibility and authority as the premier international organization. As the successor to the League of Nations, the UN believed it had full authority to assume the activities and responsibilities of the League. This extended to its responsibility for the League's former mandate territories. As long as South Africa refused to accede to UN requests, UN authority was challenged. If South Africa had succeeded early in the dispute in incorporating Namibia into the Republic, UN credibility would have been damaged. Throughout the 1950's, the UN was measuring the extent of its practical authority, and its dispute with South Africa was one of the yardsticks with which it measured this authority.

Like the Sudan and Zimbabwe cases, the subjective issues will define each player's goals.

C. GOALS

South Africa's initial goal was to incorporate Namibia into the Republic as a territory. This goal was both their stated and the perceived maximum goal obtainable. Their minimum goal was to maintain de facto control of the territory. South Africa's perception was that maintaining the status quo in the region was the next best option to establishing international recognition for Namibia's incorporation into South Africa.

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Both the minimum and maximum goals addressed South Africa's subjective issues.

The initial goal of the UN was to bring Namibia under UN trusteeship, leading to independence based on majority rule. This goal is an extension of the original League of Nations' mandate and is a stated goal of the UN trusteeship program. The initial maximum and minimum goals of the UN coincide, and there is little latitude on either side of this position.

Was conflict or negotiation preferred early in the dispute? The goals of the UN and South Africa clearly do not overlap and there was little common ground with which to negotiate. South Africa preferred conflict since the cost of standing firm was relatively low. There was limited danger at this point of armed conflict, and the UN's only realistic option was to push for a settlement through diplomatic means. What were the initial strategies of each player?

D. STRATEGIES

South Africa's strategy was to continue its occupation of Namibia, ignoring UN requests to submit reports required by the mandate on the status of the territory. South Africa further tightened its control of the territory by passing the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1949 to transfer control of native affairs from the Administration for SWA to the South African Parliament. This had the practical effect of incorporating Namibia into the Republic and tied the territory to South African politics. [Ref. 35:p. 63]

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In 1962, South Africa established the Odendaal Commission to define the aspects of apartheid as it pertained to Namibia. The report issued by the commission recommended that separate homelands (Bantustans) be established to isolate, by tribe, the black Africans in Namibia. The Bantustans would occupy roughly 40 percent of the territory for about 91 percent of the total population. [Ref. 38:p. 627]

In 1969, South Africa further expanded its control of the territory by enacting the South West African Affairs Act of 1969. This act allowed South Africa to take control of revenue, social services, commerce, mining, and other indus-tries, and coupled with the existing South African adminis-tration over Namibia's foreign affairs, defense, police, immigration and customs sealed its control over the territory. [Ref. 38:p. 627]

The UN's strategy was to challenge the legality of South Africa's occupation of Namibia and to apply diplomatic pressure on South Africa. In 1950, the UN sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), asking what was the international status of Namibia and what were the international obligations of South Africa in this case? In its advisory opinion, the ICJ stated that, "South Africa con-tinued to have international obligations under the (League of Nations) mandate and was obliged to submit reports and transmit petitions to the United Nations." [Ref. 39:p. 221] The court also declared that South Africa was not under legal obligation to place Namibia under the UN trusteeship system.

However, the court also made it clear that South Africa could not unilaterally alter the status of the territory. The practical effect of this ruling was that it made South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia illegal and clearly reinforced the UN's claim over the League mandate. However, in the 1960's a series of contradictory ICJ rulings weakened the UN's position. In 1960, Ethiopia and Liberia (former League members), with the encouragement of the UN, filed a case against South Africa for not complying with the welfare clause of the original League mandate. They hoped to transform the earlier 1950 ruling into judicially binding orders.

South Africa countered with four preliminary objections. "It claimed specifically that the Namibian mandate was no longer a treaty in force; that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had standing to sue; that Ethiopia and Liberia lacked material interest in the conflict; and that the alleged dispute was one which could 'be settled by negotiation'." [Ref. 39: p. 222]

In 1962 the Court ruled on South Africa's second and third objections stating that Ethiopia and Liberia had sufficient standing and proceeded to consider the merits of the case. The review of the case was inordinately lengthy and the case was not disposed of until 1966. In its decision the Court ruled that neither Ethiopia nor Liberia had sufficient legal interest in the case; in effect, the Court reversed its 1962 ruling and dismissed the case. [Ref. 40:pp. 67-68] This

reversal runs contrary to the "well established legal princi-
ples of res judicata, which for all practical purposes would
require the court to be bound by its earlier pronouncements."
[Ref. 39:p. 222]

The reversal of the Court is attributed not to any inade-
quacy of the UN/Ethiopia-Liberia legal brief or on the strength
of South Africa's legal efforts, but instead is found in the
"judicial conservatism of the court and the fortuitous circum-
stances surrounding the proceedings." [Ref. 39:p. 222]

The cumulative effect of these non-definitive ICJ rulings
was that they weakened the UN position and made it easier for
South Africa to resist UN pressure. The General Assembly was
dismayed over the Court's decision and in fact opposed the
ruling by passing UNGA Resolution 2145, which terminated South
Africa's mandate over the territory.

In sum, South Africa's strategy was to ignore UN demands
and to further tighten its control of Namibia. The UN coun-
tered by attempting to build international pressure on South
Africa and to challenge the legality of South Africa's occupa-
tion of the territory. What then were the resources that
aided South Africa in standing firm against UN pressure, and
what were the UN's limitations and resources for dealing with
South Africa?

E. RESOURCES AND LIMITATIONS

South Africa had three main resources it could use to
implement its strategy. First, South Africa is the undisputed

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power in the region. All other states in southern Africa are economically dependent upon South Africa and are weak militarily when compared to the South African Defense Force (SADF). [Ref. 34:p. 160] Thus direct challenges to South Africa by neighboring states, in support of UN policies, were not sufficient to significantly raise South Africa's cost of standing firm. It would not be until the mid-1970's when black nationalist groups, with the aid of surrounding states, will be able to effectively confront the white regime in South Africa.

Second, South Africa was able to resist economic pressures brought on by sanctions. The use of sanctions against South Africa was still being debated during the early-1960's and the threat of sanctions was not yet credible. However, when sanctions were applied from 1963 onward, they did not have significant impact. "South Africa has demonstrated remarkable skill over 20 years in circumventing and defying sanctions. . . . Most sanctions have been relatively mild, enforced only loosely." [Ref. 20:p. 357]

Third, the South African government has been united on the question of Namibia. The cohesion among white South Africans is high, and their perceptions that Namibia is essential to their security is a major resource for resisting outside pressure. Similar to the Zimbabwe case, external diplomatic and economic pressure further united the white population.

The UN's strategy was to apply diplomatic pressure on South Africa. As noted earlier the use of the ICJ back-fired,

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and the ruling had in effect diluted the UN's authority. The ICJ ruling on Namibia from 1950 to 1960 was a major limitation for the UN. A second limitation facing the UN was their inability to pressure the white regime in Pretoria with the threat of military intervention. There was no support in the UNSC for this option, and therefore the UN had little hope of coercing South Africa into conceding. The only option open to the UN at this time was to try to bring the full force of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) upon South Africa.

As noted, in October 1966, the UNGA passed Resolution 2145 which terminated the original mandate, and established the UN Council for Namibia. By 1970, frustrated in its attempts to pressure South Africa into conceding, the General Assembly referred the issue to the Security Council hoping to focus its diplomatic resources through the lens of the council. The Security Council adopted Resolution 264 which recognized the General Assembly's termination of the mandate and stated that continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa was illegal, and accordingly requested that South Africa withdraw from the territory.

To support its resolution, the Security Council again asked the ICJ for an advisory opinion, hoping to clarify the illegality of South Africa's continued presence in Namibia. In June 1971, the ICJ's decision was in favor of the UN. The court concluded, "that the mandate was revocable and that the United Nations possessed the necessary authority to do so." [Ref. 39:

p. 224] In effect, the Court reaffirmed its earlier decision
of 1962 and strengthened the UN's overall position.

While this resolution and subsequent ICJ rulings did not
immediately alter South Africa's willingness to concede, it
did have the effect of building support for the UN and added
momentum to the UN effort to resolve the dispute. It was
clear that up until 1966, UN pressure alone was insufficient
to force South Africa into conceding, and that the costs of
standing firm for South Africa were still relatively low.
However, with the growing political activity of Namibia's
black nationalists, the costs to South Africa will change.

F. THE BLACK NATIONALISTS

The black nationalist movement, started in 1959, had begun
by 1966 its campaign of organized violence in Namibia. Both
SWAPO and SWANU had been unsuccessful at pressuring South
Africa through political means and they decided their only
option was to launch a guerrilla war against the white regime.
From the late-1960's to the early-1970's neither SWAPO nor
SWANU was able to seriously increase the cost to South Africa
of standing firm. There were two main reasons for this.
First, the SADF is a well-equipped, highly trained organization
capable of confronting any force or combination of forces in
the region. For any group to challenge the SADF, intense
training and support would be necessary, and SWAPO and SWANU
could not at this point, obtain either of these resources.

Second, tribalism and factionalism among the nationalists

prevented them from consolidating their power and resources.

In 1973, SWAPO will emerge as the most influential organiza-

tion and will receive the most support from both the Organi-

zation of African Unity (OAU) and the UN. UNGA Resolution

2145 recognizes SWAPO as the "sole and authentic representa-

tive of the Namibian people" and granted it permanent observer

status in the UN. [Ref. 38:p. 629]

The UN and SWAPO have a synergistic relationship. SWAPO

through UN recognition is given legitimacy and can use the

forum of the UN to gain support from other states. Conversely,

the UN uses SWAPO as a resource to pressure South Africa into

negotiating. Through mutual support each organization's posi-

tion in the conflict is enhanced, while singly their ability

to influence South Africa is reduced.

1974 marks a turning point in the Namibian conflict. The

April coup in Lisbon prompted Portugal to relinquish control

of its colonies in Africa, and Mozambique and Angola became

independent states in 1975. The changing realities in the

region influenced South African perceptions and affected

its resources.

South Africa was beginning to reconsider its strategy

based on several changing perceptions. First, Great Britain

decided to accept the ICJ ruling that South Africa was illegally

occupying Namibia. This combined with increased pressure from

the other Western states was forcing Pretoria to rethink its

strategy. Second, "Angola's independence had shattered the aura of invincibility that had bolstered the self-confidence of whites in southern Africa." [Ref. 35:p. 67] Third, Angola's independence not only had a psychological effect but a practical one as well. SWAPO now could use bases within Angola, with the support of the MPLA government in Angola, to train its guerrillas and stage raids across the border into Namibia. As a result, the level of violence in the region increased and further polarized the conflict.

The combination of these perceptions will influence Pretoria to adjust its strategy. South African Prime Minister, B. J. Vorster agreed in principle to the OAU and UN positions on Namibian independence. He claimed that Pretoria was now committed to transferring power in the territory. However, he stated that South Africa would not accept the UN's authority and that his government would transfer power directly to the participants of the upcoming (South African sponsored) constitutional conference. [Ref. 35:p. 68]

This was the beginning of South Africa's strategy of resolving the question of Namibia through an "internal solution." Between September 1975 and March 1977, representatives from various political and ethnic groups attended the Turnhalle Conference. The makeup of the conference did not accurately reflect the political composition of the territory and highly favored the white regime in the region. In March 1977, the conference produced a draft constitution and set 31 December

as the target date for independence. Dirk Mudge, the leader
of the white delegation stated that South African troops would
remain in Namibia following independence, and that Walvis Bay
would remain a part of South Africa. [Ref. 41:p. 695] SWAPO
denounced the conference and declared that all of the proceed-
ings were illegal. Following the conference, the groups that
had participated formed themselves into the Democratic Turn-
halle Alliance (DTA), with Dirk Mudge as their leader.

The primary goal of this strategy was to eliminate the UN
from the independence process in order to ensure South African
control over the government in Windhoek. Since any white
government in Namibia would rely heavily upon Pretoria's
assistance in maintaining its security and developing its
economy, continued South African control of Namibia was assured
and South Africa's security maintained.

By 1978 the UN had also adjusted its strategy. In order
to forestall South Africa's internal settlement, the UN
stepped up its diplomatic efforts. The Western members of the
Security Council formed the Western Contact group, whose main
objective was to promote negotiations between South Africa
and the UN. In 1978, the contact group presented the South
African government with a draft proposal of a settlement based
on Resolution 385 which was adopted earlier by the Security
Council. The resolution and the subsequent proposals called
for: (1) One-person, one-vote elections to be supervised by
the UN. (2) Withdrawal of South African administration and

its military forces. (3) Transfer of power to the Namibian people. [Ref. 36:p. 782]

In April, South Africa accepted a revised form of the proposals. They agreed to the general provisions of Resolution 385 but added that the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia would occur only after SWAPO completely ceased all hostilities in the territory. [Ref. 38:p. 630] In September 1978, the UN formalized the "Western plan" by adopting UNSC Resolution 435 which (1) reiterated the illegality of South African occupation in Namibia, (2) established a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to ensure early independence for Namibia, (3) declared that unilateral action by South Africa in relation to the electoral process was illegal, and (4) welcomed the preparedness of SWAPO to cooperate in observing the ceasefire provisions. [Ref. 36: pp. 915-916]

There is one major flaw in both Resolution 385 and 435, in that neither contains a timetable or deadline for South African compliance. In this way South Africa is under no real pressure to take positive action and can go through the motions of fulfilling the provisions while not actually doing so. Pretoria can use the resolutions to deflect pressure, and stall for time in order to pursue its internal solution.

From 1977 until about 1981, South Africa followed a two-pronged strategy. This strategy involed negotiating with the UN while simultaneously laying the framework of an internal

solution. In September 1978, South Africa conducted internal elections in Namibia. The DTA won 41 out of 50 seats on the advisory assembly. The new assembly agreed to UN-supervised elections to be held in 1979, and in May, the advisory assembly was reconstituted as the National Assembly. South Africa proceeded to consolidate the internal government, centralizing the civil service and edging the territory towards complete independence. However, the important areas of defense, foreign affairs, police, and national security were not handed over to the transitional government of the DTA. [Ref. 38:p. 631] During this period, South Africa was also negotiating with the UN. South Africa had agreed in principle to Resolution 435, however, there were still three main issues preventing implementation of a settlement: (1) the mechanisms of the electoral process and the UN role in those elections. (2) the conditions of the ceasefire, including the composition of the UNTAG, and (3) the structure of the government following independence [Ref. 37:p. 105]. These issues would be difficult to resolve even under ideal circumstances. And given the hostilities felt on both sides, along with South Africa's unwillingness to make any serious compromise, it is not surprising that efforts at obtaining a settlement failed.

While these issues prevented further movement towards a settlement, there were two more fundamental elements that prevented a settlement. First, the UN by recognizing SWAPO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian

people, has clearly displayed its partiality. Pretoria's perception that the UN cannot be an impartial judge in the conflict is not unfounded. South Africa's lack of trust in the UN is a primary factor in preventing a settlement. Second, as a result of the poor showing of Bishop Abel Muzorewa in Zimbabwe's January 1980 election, South Africa was fearful that the DTA would suffer the same fate if put up against SWAPO in free elections in Namibia. Thus, South African perceptions for the need to steer clear of UN-supervised elections was reinforced. [Ref. 42]

In January 1981, talks were held in Geneva, and although both South Africa and SWAPO agreed to the terms of Resolution 435, the talks ended within a week in total failure. It is evident in retrospect that South Africa had attended the talks as a logical extension of its two-pronged strategy. In fact the talks were a small victory for Pretoria in that the DTA's role as a central political player in the conflict was firmly established with little cost to South Africa. Moreover, any future all-party talks would include the DTA. [Ref. 43: p. 702]

During this entire period, SWAPO was continuing its guerrilla effort. While the conflict had intensified it did not reach the level of violence that occurred in Zimbabwe. SWAPO's strategy has been to apply steady pressure on South Africa, and build its own strength rather than push for a decisive military victory over South Africa. [Ref. 34:p. 167]

The size and strength of the SADF would make an outright
military victory for SWAPO unlikely, and attempting to win
militarily against such an overwhelming foe would be an
impractical expenditure of resources.

SWAPO receives much of its support and aid from the
Frontline states. They desire a quick settlement in Namibia
for self-interest reasons. First, the Frontline States are
in a dilemma with regard to South Africa. On the one hand,
they are all individually linked to South Africa economically,
while on the other hand they are openly supporting nationalist
movements in Namibia and among South Africa's own black
nationalists. A quick resolution to the conflict in Namibia
will result in an overall decrease in the level of hostility
in the region and will free up some of the resources that they
are currently diverting to SWAPO. Second, establishing an
alliance with an independent Namibia under SWAPO control, the
Frontline States could begin to tip the balance of power in
the direction of the black African states in the region.
Third, the sooner a stronger regional alliance among black
states is established, the sooner the Frontline States will
be able to diminish their economic reliance on South Africa.

The Frontline States have been effective at pressing SWAPO
into negotiating. Realizing that its principal lifeline is
connected to the Frontline States, SWAPO has acceded to their
requests to negotiate and have supported the Frontline States'
negotiating effort. In fact, the Frontline States have

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displayed a remarkable flexibility, and have been a positive contributor to the negotiating process.

However, Frontline pressure to resolve the conflict quickly reduces the latitude that SWAPO has in negotiating with South Africa. In effect, Frontline pressure is a resource for South Africa in that they can make more aggressive proposals knowing that Frontline pressure will induce SAWPO to consider them seriously.

In sum, while SWAPO is able to apply steady pressure on South Africa, it has not raised substantially South Africa's costs of standing firm.

G. "THE BIG STALL"

1981 marks the second major turning point in the Namibian conflict. Based on evoling perceptions and changing resources, South Africa adopted a policy that is designed to forestall a settlement in Namibia. This new strategy was based on three perceptions.

First, domestic unrest among South Africa's blacks was a primary concern for Pretoria. A SWAPO victory in Namibia might further encourage political militancy within South Africa. In addition, negotiating with SWAPO has set a precedent, and has encouraged nationalists within South Africa to push for serious negotiations with the white regime. Defeating SWAPO in Namibia would slow down the nationalist momentum within South Africa.

Second, from June until September 1981, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker, put forth a set of proposals for Namibian independence. A key element in Crocker's proposals involved the simultaneous withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia and Cuban troops from Angola. The de facto linkage between the resolution of the conflict in Namibia to Cuban troop withdrawal has caused an impasse in the negotiating process. South Africa has claimed that its security is threatened by the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Whether this is actually the perception held by Pretoria or whether it is just a negotiating tactic, the result is the same--the negotiations are stalled and South Africa gains more time to implement an internal settlement.

Third, South Africa has used the "threat of communism" in the region to gain US support. In May 1981, South African and US officials "began bilateral talks about the relaxation of restrictions on the sale of arms and the extension of the long term cooperation in atomic energy developments." [Ref. 43:p. 703] In addition, the US veto of a UNSC resolution that attacked South Africa for a SADF raid into Angola [Ref. 43: p. 703] further strengthened South African perceptions that US support was increasing. This increased support boosted the morale of the white regime and influenced Pretoria in pursuing a more aggressive policy. In 1982, taking into consideration these perceptions, South Africa embarked on a new strategy

specifically designed to stall any progress in Namibia. The primary goal of this strategy is to avoid SWAPO control of an independent Namibia. This is a notable adjustment in goals and reflects the changing perceptions of South Africa.

As noted, South Africa jumped on the linkage bandwagon as a tactic for stalling the negotiations. There were two main reasons for this. First, South Africa needed time to strengthen the internal parties in Namibia. Pretoria was discontented with the DTA's ability to construct a credible non-SWAPO national political organization [Ref. 44]. If South Africa is to pursue an internal solution, they must develop a broader-based party in order to gain recognition for the new government. Having failed to accomplish this, South Africa requires additional time. South Africa also sought to boost the DTA's credibility by attempting to obtain from the UN the same status for the DTA that the UN confers upon SWAPO [Ref. 35:p. 82].

Second, South Africa attempted to weaken SWAPO's military and political base of support. Even though the war was beginning to slow down, disengaging SWAPO troops would allow the guerrillas to regroup and strengthen. It was still in South Africa's interest to maintain a low level of conflict in order to check the growth of SWAPO. From 1981 to 1984 South Africa continued the war effort through the SADF and UNITA, and have maintained a presence inside Angola. [Ref. 45:p. 114] There are two aspects to this strategy. First, continued South African military pressure can galvanize the nationalist spirit

in Namibia and in fact provide SWAPO with increased recruit-
ment and support. Second, increased attacks on SWAPO inside
Angola threatens the MPLA's sense of security and may rein-
force their perception that retaining Cuban troops in Angola
is necessary to ensure their security.

Taken at face value, this increases the threat to South
Africa's security in the region. However, if part of Pretoria's
strategy is aimed at forestalling a settlement in Namibia, then
the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola, within the
context of the linkage issue, provides South Africa with an
"acceptable" excuse to maintain the SADF in the territory.
In turn this continues to reinforce the stalemate over a
settlement.

Thus far South Africa's strategy has been successful in
preventing SWAPO from gaining control in Namibia. From 1983
to 1985, the UN has been unsuccessful at pressing South Africa
into implementing a settlement based on UN terms. By 1984
Pretoria had already accepted the provisions of Resolution 435,
however, South African Prime Minister Botha was clearly un-
happy with the arrangement and was looking for a way out of
implementing a final settlement in Namibia. [Ref. 46]

In February 1984, a ceasefire agreement was reached in
Lusaka. The accord called for the withdrawal of South African
troops from Angola, and in turn, Angola was to ensure that
neither SWAPO nor Cuban troops would move into the areas
vacated by the SADF. Although the ceasefire was to be completed

by 31 March 1984, South African troops remained inside Angola after this date [Ref. 41:p. 697]. SADF attacks in Angola and Namibia persist, and South Africa shows no signs of forfeiting its most reliable resource in the region--the SADF.

In November 1984, Angolan President Dos Santos conceded the linkage issue following a phased South African withdrawl from Namibia--prior to independence under UN Resolution 435. This put the diplomatic ball "squarely in Pretoria's court." However, South Africa is mainly concerned with advancing a "coordinated regional maneuver to rid the sub-continent of foreign troops . . . and (Pretoria's) plans have little to do with Resolution 435." [Ref. 47] South Africa forged ahead with its internal solution and established an interim government in Namibia. It is clear that a pattern had developed in the negotiations: the UN would put forth a proposal, South Africa would then agree in principle to the proposals but would object to the specific terms of the agreement. Then either the UN or SWAPO would make an adjustment to the proposals to make them more acceptable to South Africa, and Pretoria would counter by pushing ahead with its own strategy and plans. This pattern characterizes the Namibian negotiations in the early 1980's.

By April 1985, South Africa had established the interim government in Namibia. The MPC was to take over the administrative functions of the new government. The MPC received support from several ethnic groups, however, it generally

lacks credibility primarily because of its link with the DTA and its inability to attract Ovambo support [Ref. 41:p. 698]. The main task of the interim government is to draft an independence constitution that will be presented to the Namibian people in a national referendum [Ref. 48]. South Africa is hoping it can generate enough support for the new constitution, including those Ovambos who are ready for a constitution with or without SWAPO approval. In this way they may be able to build some momentum in gaining international recognition for an internal solution in Namibia.

What has been SWAPO's response to this and what has been their main strategy? SWAPO, like South Africa, has carried out a two-pronged strategy. First, they have continued the guerrilla war, applying steady, though low level, pressure on South Africa. Second, they have pursued a diplomatic course by supporting UN efforts to implement Resolution 435. By following the diplomatic road they have been able to deflect a good deal of Western criticism stemming from their Cuban/ Soviet connection in Angola.

By the end of 1985, the conflict had evolved from the initial objective issue of whether Namibia would be incorporated into South Africa or whether it would become an independent state through the UN trusteeship system, to a question of who would have control and the greatest influence in an independent Namibia. A sub-issue over who will control Namibia during the transition period is key to controlling the territory following independence.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, one element of the Namibian conflict is that it is similar to Zimbabwe in that several external players and forces are involved. The most influential external player up until this point clearly has been the US. It is appropriate to briefly examine the impact this player has had on the conflict.

First, the US has been a key player in supporting UN Resolution 435. The US has continued to reaffirm its commitment to resolving the conflict within the framework established by 435. Chester Crocker has stated that, "As originator and sponsor of Resolution 435, the United States has no intention of backing away from it." [Ref. 49:p. 2]

Second, although supportive of 435, the US has constructed a major stumbling block to resolving the conflict by introducing the "linkage" of Namibian independence to Cuban troop withdrawal in Angola. The linkage issue has been a continuing source of criticism for the Reagan Administration, but it has remained firm on this issue. The word from Washington is that, "the main issue is now resolving the practical question of the timing of Cuban troop withdrawal in relation to Resolution 435." [Ref. 48:p. 2] This points to the increased influence US goals in the region have on the Namibian conflict.

The introduction of the linkage issue has had three principal effects. These include: (1) This issue has reduced the cohesion and effectiveness of the Western Contact Group. In fact, France's dissatisfaction with US intransigence on the

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linkage issue has caused that state to withdraw from the group. In addition, the role of other states in the group have diminished. (2) By minimizing the role of other states in the Contact Group, the US has become virtually the sole Western arbiter in the conflict. (3) In a larger context, the linkage issue elevates the regional nature of the conflict to the arena of East-West competition.

In sum, the US has expanded its role as an external actor in Namibia, and by doing so has added another dimension to the conflict. In fact, the US has occupied a unique position in the conflict, balanced on the line separating primary and secondary players.

It is clear at this point that conflict, not negotiation, is preferred by both SWAPO and South Africa. What then are the elements that have thus far prevented a settlement in Namibia?

H. FACTORS PREVENTING A SETTLEMENT

There are five principal factors that have contributed thus far to preventing a settlement in Namibia. The following is a brief review of these factors.

1. South Africa faces a dilemma in Namibia. On the one hand, by agreeing to a settlement in Namibia, South Africa could appease other black states in Africa and improve its relations with those states. This in turn would relieve some of the external pressure directed at South Africa for its domestic apartheid policies. On the other hand, a settlement in Namibia, that included SWAPO would encourage South African nationalists, and would serve as an example of the efficacy of employing violence as a tool for obtaining political goals. Since South Africa's domestic

security takes precedence over its relations with
other black states, it is difficult to see Pretoria
accepting a settlement that included SWAPO. In addi-
tion, while a SWAPO victory in a weak Namibia would
not pose in itself a threat to South Africa, the
perception that the walls were closing in on South
Africa's white regime would prevent Pretoria from hand-
ing over control of Namibia to a black regime. In
all, the costs of conceding a SWAPO victory (military
or electoral) in Namibia are still quite high to South
Africa.

2. SWAPO's military strategy has not been completely
    effective. SWAPO military pressure (the stick)
    coupled with UN inducements (the carrot) would appear
    to be an intelligent strategy, however, neither
    SWAPO pressure nor UN inducements have been great
    enough to either increase South African costs of
    standing firm or decrease the cost of conceding.
    Either the UN would have to make the terms of a
    settlement more attractive or SWAPO would need to
    intensify the guerrilla war before it is likely that
    South Africa would agree to a settlement.

3. As cited earlier, the linkage issue is a main barrier
    to a resolution of the conflict. US and South African
    intransigence on the issue, coupled with continued
    South African objections to the practical implementa-
    tion of Resolution 435 has been a key factor in pre-
    venting further movement toward a settlement. In
    effect, the US has through the introduction of linkage,
    provided South Africa with an "excuse" to avoid the
    main issues in the Namibian conflict and further
    strengthen its own position in the region.

4. The fourth element preventing a settlement has been
    South Africa's basic distrust of the UN. The UN has
    tried to be the mediator, primarily through the Western
    Contact group. However, the overwhelming support for
    SWAPO and the implied contempt displayed toward South
    Africa by the General Assembly only reinforces Pretoria's
    perception of the partiality of the UN. Thus it would
    be difficult for the UN to assume the role of an
    effective third party mediator. The US has tried to
    assume this role but also has been unsuccessful mainly
    because of its intransigence on the linkage issue.

        Although the linkage issue has been cited as a
    major stumbling block of producing a settlement, it
    really represents the fundamental element of South
    Africa's deep distrust for the other players involved
    in Namibia. Until trust is built between all of the

players, it is unlikely that the Namibia conflict will be resolved by a negotiated settlement.

5. The fifth element preventing a settlement in Namibia is the inability of any player, or group of players, to substantially raise the costs to South Africa of standing firm. "In fact, almost every major change in South African policy toward the territory has been the result of changes in the international political climate. [Ref. 35:p. 84] It would follow that one of the factors that has prevented a settlement is the inability of external players to apply focused pressure and in sufficient quantities on South Africa to produce the desired result. South Africa has been remarkably resilient in resisting external pressure by making only small concessions and by adjusting its strategy. And although there have been concerted efforts in the UN to pressure South Africa, this has not been the right kind of pressure. Diplomatic and economic measures are the only realistic options open to the UN for pressuring South Africa. Diplomatic pressure is relatively ineffectual on a pariah state such as South Africa. Larger doses of diplomatic force must be applied to South Africa to produce results similar to those cases where states are concerned with maintaining a positive international reputation. As noted earlier, economic sanctions also have not produced substantial political results in South Africa. Therefore it would seem that the UN is simply not equipped with the necessary tools to deal with South Africa in the Namibian case.

These five elements together have prevented further progress in resolving the conflict in Namibia. The amount of influence that each of these elements have on preventing a settlement varies over the course of the conflict, but combined, they build a formidable barrier to a settlement in Namibia. Thus any concerted effort to resolve the conflict must first address each of these elements.

I. SUMMARY

The Namibian case involves several actors both internal and external. The initial objective issue in this case has

evolved, but the subjective issues have essentially remained the same. Unlike the guerrilla insurgence in Zimbabwe, the guerrilla war in Namibia has not raised South Africa's costs of standing firm high enough to induce concessions from Pretoria. South Africa has established a general pattern in its two-pronged strategy. Pretoria agrees in principle to the provisions of a settlement while disagreeing with the specifics. This in turn has stalled the negotiations on several occasions, and has enabled South Africa to strengthen Namibia's internal parties and press on with an internal solution.

The bottom line is that South Africa is still very much in control in Namibia, and only when South African costs of standing firm increase or the costs of conceding decrease, will there be a resolution of the Namibian conflict.

V. <u>COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THREE CONFLICTS</u>

Thus far this thesis has examined three conflicts in Africa: the Sudan civil war, the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe independence conflict, and the continuing dispute in Namibia. Each case has been analyzed through the framework of the conflict resolution checklist, and the key elements that have defined the course and outcome of each conflict have been identified. This chapter will provide a comparative examination of these key elements and will attempt to draw some conclusions that relate to conflict resolution in general, and as it applies to the unique political and military environment of Africa.

The various elements will be reviewed in the same order as they are presented in the checklist. Several questions arise during each step of the checklist and each segment of this chapter will examine the key questions posed in each step.

A. PLAYERS

Several questions regarding the role of players as unitary actors and the role individuals play in a conflict immediately arise in the first step. As a note of reference, at various points in this chapter for the purposes of analysis, players are sometimes referred to as the "weaker" or the "stronger" player. In general, the black nationalists in Zimbabwe and in Namibia, along with the southern rebels in Sudan have been grouped into the former category, while the white Rhodesians,

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the North in Sudan, and South Africa in Namibia, have been placed in the latter. This grouping is based on the overall relative position of the primary players in the early stages of each conflict. This does not reflect the changing positions of the players as each conflict developed.

The determination of weak and strong players was based on five principal factors. They are: player cohesion, military ability, external support, legitimacy of action, and leadership. This chapter closes with an examination of these factors, but a brief review of each of the conflicts studied would indicate that in the Sudan conflict, the North had a high degree of military ability and a moderate amount of external support, and possessed low player cohesion and minimal leadership. Conversely the South had insignificant external support and legitimacy and only a moderate degree of military ability, player cohesion, and leadership. In Zimbabwe, the white Rhodesian government possessed strong player cohesion and leadership, and held only a minimal degree of external support and legitimacy. ZANU/ZAPU on the other hand had a great deal of external support, leadership and legitimacy, and held only a moderate amount of military ability and player cohesion. In Namibia, South Africa is strong in player cohesion, military ability, and leadership, but it is very low in legitimacy and external support while SWAPO suffers mainly from a lack of support and low military ability.

In sum, this relative determination of factors applies to the initial phase of each conflict in indicating stronger

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and weaker players, and as each conflict progresses, these variables change. In each of the conflicts, these variables will contribute to the course and outcome of the conflict. In addition, it will become clear that the relative importance of each specific factor will vary between each player. This variance will in part account for the resolution of the conflicts in Sudan and Zimbabwe and will contribute to the failure of producing a settlement in Namibia.

In each conflict players initially assumed either primary or secondary roles. In both the Zimbabwe and Namibia conflicts secondary players (in both cases the black nationalists) assumed the role of primary players as the conflict developed. What elements contributed to this adjustment? In both conflicts a nationalist movement had been forming. However, in both cases the shift to primary player was preceded by an event prompted by an external force. In the case of Zimbabwe this external force was the 1972 Pearce Commission, which sought to measure the acceptability of the Smith-Home Agreement among Blacks in Zimbabwe; and in Namibia this external force was the ICJ rulings that weakened the UN's overall position and changed the perceptions of the black nationalists.

In Namibia the frustration that the black nationalists were experiencing with obtaining a political solution was magnified after the ICJ had, in effect, strengthened South Africa's hand. Up until 1965 the conflict in Namibia was being fought outside the territory in the forum of the UN. Here

South Africa was at its weakest and was in the worst position to resist external political pressure. However, South Africa was able to stand firm and the effectiveness of external political pressure had limited value. In October 1966, following the ICJ rulings, SWAPO announced it would launch an armed struggle against South Africa [Ref. 38:p. 628]. The guerrilla war was a long time coming and the perception that political means were ineffective reinforced the need to carry the conflict directly to South Africa.

In Zimbabwe the Pearce Commission had the effect of politicizing blacks throughout the country in response to the Smith-Home Agreement. Just after the Pearce Commission reported its findings, ZANU and ZAPU announced they would launch a major armed offensive against the Rhodesian government [Ref. 19:p. 12]. While these plans had been previously drawn, the politicizing of blacks created "an environment more receptive to guerrilla activity [Ref. 19:p. 13].

In both conflicts external forces added to the momentum and sharply changed the course of development of each player. This is not to say that these nationalist movements would have been unable to assume the role of primary player without this external influence, but instead points to the catalyzing effect these externally generated forces have on secondary players.

Because of the relative absence of external players in the Sudan conflict and because the secondary players never assumed greater roles, the Sudan case does not provide us

with an appropriate example of external force. Instead, the growth of the Anya-Nya in Sudan indicates that even without an external force, an indigenous nationalist movement can develop. But in retrospect, the Anya-Nya may have been able to develop into an effective organization much sooner had external support been available.

All three cases provide us with some insight into the role that individuals play in a conflict. The role individuals have in a conflict can take two basic forms. First, individuals can mirror the perceptions, goals, and ideals of the group with which they are identified. Second, and perhaps a more central point, individuals can also become an active force within the conflict itself. That is to say, because of the influence they carry over their respective groups and due to their individual perceptions and goals they hold which differ from that group, they are able to alter the course and outcome of the conflict.

In Sudan the perceptions that Colonel Jafar Nimeiri held toward the "Southern Problem" coupled with his specific need to solve the conflict to consolidate his power and solidify his control in Sudan were elements that directly contributed to the timing of a settlement in that conflict [Ref. 9:p. 4]. Whereas previous Sudanese leaders--Khalifa, Magoub, and Abboud neither had an urgent need to solve the problem, nor possessed first-hand experience fighting in the South, Nimeiri brought to his office a unique set of beliefs and requirements that set the stage for a settlement.

Two other key individuals had direct bearing on the conflict in Sudan. First, Colonel Joseph Lagu, who effectively united southern political and military power, played a key role in the resolution of the conflict. As noted in Chapter II, by 1972 the South's goals had evolved to where they were seeking complete independence. Lagu perceived Nimeiri's efforts to resolve the conflict as a sincere attempt at reconciliation and Lagu was pleased with the role his Anya-Nya guerrillas would secure in Sudan's armed forces. This enhanced role of the Anya-Nya, coupled with his position as a central leader, in a south Sudan previously plagued by incohesion, were decisive elements influencing the South's acceptance of Nimeiri's offer. It should be noted that many southern leaders at first balked at Nimeiri's attempts, and it is quite possible that without Lagu's individual leadership at this critical moment, the Sudanese conflict would have continued past 1972.

Although Colonel Lagu played a key role, another individual, Abel Alier was also a critical figure in the Sudan conflict. Alier was Joseph Garang's replacement as Nimeiri's Minister of Southern Affairs. Highly respected and widely trusted among many southern leaders, Alier was able to convince many skeptical southerners of Nimeiri's earnest intentions in the South. Alier was also a key figure in the Addis Ababa Conference and was directly involved in establishing the talks through the World Council of Churches.

In addition, although he did not have great bearing on the course of the conflict itself, Ethiopian Emperor Haile

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Selassie had direct impact on the negotiations, intervening
at critical points to ensure the success of the talks.
[Ref. 2:p. 165]

The Zimbabwe case also provides examples of key individuals
influencing the conflict. Here two key individuals had as
much to do with guiding the conflict to a conclusion as they
did with preventing a settlement. As noted in Chapter III,
the split between ZANU's Robert Mugabe, and ZAPU's Joshua
Nkomo had occurred not because of any intense tribal or
political differences, but was based in part on Nkomo's indi-
vidual leadership of ZAPU [Ref. 18:p. 55]. This division had
been a principal factor preventing the black nationalists in
Zimbabwe from raising the costs to whites of standing firm
in that country and from obtaining a resolution more favorable
to the nationalists.

In addition, Mugabe's ability to rally tremendous support
in the 1980 pre-independence elections in the face of great
electoral pressure from Nkomo and Bishop Muzorewa, had for
the time being, averted a potentially divisive situation from
developing that would have threatened the nationalists' hard-
won victory in Zimbabwe. However, in the post-independence
period, Mugabe again will be faced with the political dissen-
sion among the nationalists.

The role that Rhodesia's Prime Minister Ian Smith played
in the conflict was that of a mirror of white Rhodesian
aspirations and perceptions, and functioned as central rallying

figure. And his own unique personal perceptions and solid leadership skills greatly influenced the conflict. Throughout the dispute, right up until the Lancaster House Settlement, Smith was continually seeking to influence the course of events to gain the most for the white community. In retrospect, the ability of the white Rhodesian government to sustain its position over a great period of time is a reflection of Smith's skill as a leader, however, the outcome in Zimbabwe reflects the realities of the conflict.

Two other individuals in the conflict had peripheral influence. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was very effective at changing Prime Minister Smith's perception of the costs of standing firm in the conflict [Ref. 19:p. 24]. As noted in Chapter III, changing perceptions were a key element in the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Smith's implicit trust in Kissinger, in part, paved the way for an acceptance of the white Rhodesian's declining position. However, Kissinger's ability to sway Smith's perceptions was grounded in the realities of the conflict.

A brief mention of the Chief mediator in the Lancaster House Conference, Lord Carrington, is appropriate. As noted, Carrington displayed exceptional diplomatic skill during the course of the negotiations, but his ability to exert leverage over both the Patriotic Front and the white regime stemmed from the relatively weak position each of these players had in resisting external pressure from the Frontline States and

South Africa respectively. Carrington is an individual who exploited the realities of the environment and reflected the concerns of his respective group. In Lord Carrington's case, he represented the cumulative interests that Great Britain held for 14 years following UDI.

Lastly, the Namibian conflict is interesting in that it points out the limits even dynamic individuals have in a con- flict. Of specific note is the role of SWAPO's leader Sam Nujoma. Nujoma is an effective leader and his ability to unite the Namibian nationalists would suggest his leadership ability matches that of Nimeiri, Lagu, Mugabe and Smith. Why then is it difficult for him, through his individual efforts, to push the conflict closer to a settlement? Put simply, the realities of the conflict and the strength of South Africa's overall position overshadow any substantial impact that Nujoma may have. The relative ethnic cohesiveness of SWAPO may in part account for Nujoma's ability to unite the nationalists. And Nujoma's inability to spark a forceful surge in the nationalists efforts in Namibia may be a factor preventing a resolution of the conflict. This points to the limits that an individual can have on a conflict. That is, an individual's personal ability must fit the realities of the situation to have a great impact on the conflict. However, in the case of Nujoma, it can be said that his individual efforts have been critical in maintaining SWAPO's position in a conflict where it is obviously the weaker player. It is clear that

an influential individual can shape the realities of the con-
flict and guide that conflict along a course that best reflects
his respective group's goals.

In sum, three general points can be drawn from the role
that individuals play in a conflict. First, individuals can
have substantial influence on the course and outcome of a
conflict. Second, this influence can have both a positive
and a negative effect on the process of conflict resolution.
Third, there is a limit to the influence an individual has on
a conflict based on the realities of the situation.

The last element to examine in the "player" section is
the role that external players as unitary actors have on a
conflict. Both the Zimbabwe and Namibia conflicts contained
elements of external forces influencing the conflict. And
although there was a relatively low level of external involve-
ment in the Sudan conflict, there are a few examples from
this case as well.

When examining the three conflicts together it is possible
to formulate a general conclusion as to the effect of external
players in a conflict. There are three main ways in which
external players influence a conflict: (1) they influence
perceptions, (2) they contribute resources and limitations to
the primary internal players, and (3) they can pressure other
players from the outside.

First, in each case the actions and statements of external
players can directly influence the perceptions of the primary

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players. Angola's independence, the US's initial "Tar Baby" policy, then later its shift to support majority rule, passage of the Byrd Amendment, and South African withdrawal of military support--each of these contributed to the changing perceptions of Ian Smith and the white community in Rhodesia. In Namibia, the US policy of "constructive engagement" and its promotion of the linkage issue, increased South Africa's perception of its ability to deflect continued pressure from the UN and the Frontline States. In both instances, external players influenced the course of the conflict through their contribution to the primary players' perceptions.

Second, as noted later in this chapter, resources had tremendous impact on the relative strengths of each primary player. Often external players bring to the conflict outside resources that are not intrinsic to the conflict itself. The resources that the Anya-Nya received from Chad, the Congo, and the OAU bolstered the South's position in Sudan. In Zimbabwe, both ZANU and ZAPU would have been limited in their ability to increase the costs to whites in Rhodesia without the resource of Frontline State support and Soviet and Chinese arms and assistance. And in Namibia, a key element maintaining SWAPO's position in that conflict is the support they receive from the MPLA in Angola. It is clear that without these resources, the tenor of each conflict would have been different.

Third, a key element external players bring to a conflict is their ability to pressure primary players. The most

notable example of this was the ability of both South Africa
and the Frontline States to pressure Smith and the black
nationalists respectively, into serious negotiations at
Lancaster House.

In Namibia the situation is somewhat different. Here it
is the inability of the UN, the Frontline States, and Angola
to pressure South Africa coupled with the US's unintentional
role in aiding South Africa in deflecting pressure that has
contributed to the failure to resolve this conflict. Inas-
much as external players can exert pressure on primary players,
they can also contribute to the ability of primary players
to deflect other outside pressure.

It is difficult to judge in which way external players
have the greatest impact on the conflict. However, it would
appear that an external player's ability to influence percep-
tions has the most value. For example, the white community's
position in Rhodesia had been steadily declining, however it
was not until both South Africa and the US convinced Smith
of the gravity of this fact that he adjusted his strategy in
the conflict. The UN's acknowledgement of SWAPO's leadership
of the black Namibian nationalists in that territory influ-
ences the perception of SWAPO's legitimacy among other players
in the international community. This perception is a key
element in maintaining SWAPO's morale and perseverence in
this conflict. Without SWAPO the conflict in Namibia would
be quite limited.

In sum, external players can have great influence on a conflict. This influence stems from their ability to alter perceptions, provide resources, and pressure the primary players. In general, the ability to alter perceptions has the greatest impact.

B. ISSUES

Did the objective or subjective issues change in the conflicts examined? Was there a common element among the three that prompted any changes? In both the Sudan and Zimbabwe conflicts the objective issues remained unchanged. However, in the Namibian conflict the objective issue has evolved. Initially the objective issue centered on whether South West Africa (Namibia) would be annexed by South Africa or would gain its independence under the UN trusteeship program. Over the course of the conflict the objective issue has shifted to--who will have control in an independent Namibia--the black nationalists or a South African-sponsored white regime? Why then did the objective issue shift in Namibia and not in the other two conflicts?

It is difficult to identify one specific element that sets the Namibia conflict apart. However, there are two elements that can provide some insight into how the issues of the Namibia conflict differ from Sudan and Zimbabwe. First, both the Sudan and the Zimbabwe conflicts were resolved in a period of time that did not span all of the

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changes their respective regions underwent, whereas, the
dispute over Namibia has its beginnings in the mid-1940's
and over this time period the character of the southern
African sub-continent has changed. As such, the issues have
also undergone a change. Unlike Zimbabwe where the initial
issues of the conflict contributed to the shifting realities
of the region, the issues in the Namibian conflict were
formed prior to this period. In addition, Sudan had remained
relatively isolated during the conflict, and the elements
that did change the tenor of the conflict originated in the
country itself and most often in Khartoum.

Second, in Namibia there is an interesting shift in the
subjective issues for South Africa. The shift in South African
perceptions has influenced their subjective issues and goals,
which in turn has affected the objective issue of the conflict.
For all practical purposes, South Africa has retained control
in Namibia, and control vice complete annexation is the new
goal for Pretoria. In the face of mounting external pressure
South Africa has in effect adjusted the objective issues of
the conflict. This deflects some external pressure and pro-
vides them with another tactic for retaining control--the
"internal solution."

Therefore, this would suggest that the changing objective
issue in Namibia is attributable in part to the shifting fac-
tors that were not present when the conflict developed. How-
ever, the point can be made that in any instance where the

overall political, military and social environment is shifting, there exists the possibility that the objective issues will also shift. The second part to this section addresses the nature of shifting subjective issues.

In the introduction to this thesis, it was assumed that because of the nature of subjective issues they would be "subject to several adjustments." However, this has not been the case. The subjective issues of the primary players in each conflict have remained stable. Even in the case of Namibia and Zimbabwe, where black nationalists assumed the role of primary players, the subjective issues were only slightly adjusted to reflect their change of position in the conflict. The only case where subjective issues were altered substantially for a single player is again in Namibia. Here South Africa's initial subjective issue of its right to annex the territory evolved to an issue of security-through-control for South Africa in the region.

Thus, the subjective issues have remained relatively stable, and did not undergo drastic alterations in two of the conflicts studied. The next section will relate the role of issues in defining goals and will examine the formation of goals.

C. GOALS

In Chapter I it was assumed that each player's goals are defined by his subjective issues. It was also assumed that within a player's range of goals, his maximum goals would

reflect an optimistic viewpoint and that his minimum goals would reflect a realistic point of view.

Following an examination of the three conflicts two conclusions can be drawn. First, the initial goals coincide with the maximum obtainable goals sought by each primary player. In addition, as stated in Chapter I, maximum goals generally reflect an optimistic point of view. For example, in Sudan the North's desire to Arabicize the entire country, including the African-oriented South, did not take into consideration the immense problems this policy would encounter. In Zimbabwe, UDI as an operational goal was for the white regime the maximum goal obtainable, based on an optimistic view of the realities in the region. South Africa's goals in Namibia also reflect optimism on the part of Pretoria.

It is interesting to note that the goals of the weaker player were far more realistic, and with the exception of the southern Sudanese rebels, remained relatively unchanged. This appearance of a realistic point of view may be the result of analyzing the conflict through the advantage of hindsight, and it is easy to see the South's goals in Sudan and ZAPU/ ZANU goals in Zimbabwe as realistic since they managed to obtain them. The black nationalists in Namibia and Zimbabwe sought the establishment of majority rule as both their maximum and minimum goals. These goals remained constant throughout the Zimbabwe conflict and persist today in Namibia. The exception is that the Sudanese rebels shifted their goals

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roughly halfway through the conflict from obtaining autonomy based on a Federal structure to obtaining complete independence from the North. However, in the end, the rebels accepted the Federal structure--something less than independence.

The second conclusion is that there was a greater adjustment in the stronger players' initial goals. In Sudan, the North had to amend its goal of Arabicizing the entire country, and in the end settled for a united Sudan based on a Federal structure. In Zimbabwe, the white community had to relinquish control and had to accept black nationalist rule in the country. However, the white community's minimum goal of maintaining their security has been obtained for the time being. South Africa has had to adjust its goals in Namibia. The goal of annexing the territory is no longer a realistic goal; maintaining practical control is the new goal, and even this goal is evolving.

In sum, the greatest adjustment in goals was made by the player that was in the stronger position at the start of the conflict. And by comparison the goals of the weaker player had remained relatively unchanged throughout the course of the conflict. This is in part attributable to the ability of the "weaker player" to strengthen each of the five factors affecting his relative position in the conflict. For example, the black nationalists in Zimbabwe were weaker in military ability and player cohesion, and by increasing the level of these two factors strengthened their position relative to the Rhodesian government. Conversely, the white community found

it very difficult to gain external support and legitimacy.
The result was that by comparison, the nationalist's position
improved, and the white Rhodesian government's position declined.

D. STRATEGY

As noted in the first chapter, strategy is the way in which
a player employs his resources to obtain his goals. A com-
parative analysis of the three conflicts reveals several common
strategic patterns. At the start of each conflict, each of
the primary players employed a strategy that emphasized politi-
cal and diplomatic efforts. In Sudan, the North used only
limited military force to contain the immediate effects of
the 1955 Equatoria mutiny. In fact the South had also relied
on a political strategy, and when Sudanese political parti s
were banned in 1958, southern political leaders carried on
in exile, establishing the political roots of Sudan African
National Union (SANU). It was noted earlier that southern
political leaders even as late as 1962 were still seeking to
obtain autonomy through political means.

In the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict, both Great Britain
and the Rhodesian government looked to resolve their dispute
through political means. And in fact, Wilson specifically
ruled out the use of military force. It is possible that had
Great Britain used force in Rhodesia, the government in Salis-
bury would have responded in kind. In Namibia, political and
diplomatic strategies were used by both South Africa and the
UN for 20 years in an effort to resolve that conflict.

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Why were political strategies first used? First, none
of the primary players had the tactical need, nor second,
the will to use military force in the conflict. Moreover,
each player believed that he could obtain the best settlement
through political means. In the Namibia conflict, South
Africa was in its weakest environment dealing with the UN
in the international political arena. This is attributable
to South Africa's realization that it had already established
effective control of the Namibian territory, and that what
it now required was the international political recognition
of this fait accompli.

The second common pattern in strategy is that in each con-
flict a military strategy was employed by one and then both
primary players. Two main elements promoted this shift.
First, in each case the weaker of the two primary players
(the South in Sudan, and the black nationalists in Zimbabwe
and Namibia) initiated the shift in strategy. This shift can
find its roots primarily in the changing perceptions of these
"weaker players." In Sudan, the South frustrated by its
attempts to gain a political settlement used the growing Anya-
Nya force to pressure the North. In Zimbabwe, the nationalists
had consistently pressed for a political settlement with the
white regime, and like southern leaders in Sudan began to
sense the futility of using a political strategy. However,
in the case of the black nationalists in Zimbabwe, the after-
effects of the Pearce Commission had provided them with a

resource by fostering a nationalist consciousness. As noted earlier in this chapter, SWAPO's choice to launch a guerrilla war against South Africa was in part based on the perceptions generated by the non-definitive ICJ rulings on Namibia in 1966. Thus one element prompting a shift to a military strategy was the changing perceptions of the weaker player.

Second, in each of the three cases examined, the player that initially occupied the stronger position responded to this shift in strategy by also employing military force. In an effort to curtail the activities of the southern Anya-Nya guerrillas, the North, at that time under the leadership of General Abboud, responded by actively pursuing a military solution in the south. The response by the Rhodesian government and South Africa to guerrilla movements in their individual conflicts was much the same as Northern Sudan's. Unlike the shift to a militant policy by the weaker player, which was prompted by changing perceptions, this shift by the North Sudan, the white government in Rhodesia, and the government of South Africa in Namibia was based on a change in its opponent's strategy. Moreover, this adjustment was based on changing realities rather than on changing perceptions.

The most striking aspect of these shifts in strategy is that the initial shift was initiated by the weaker primary player (especially in a military sense) in each conflict. One conclusion that can be drawn from this observation is that perceptions have tremendous effect on the course of a conflict.

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As a guide to policy, this would suggest that the stronger player should adopt a policy that includes influencing the perceptions of the weaker player. This holds true for these conflicts set in the African environment, and should also be valid for conflicts that possess the same dynamics of the three cases presented here.

The final shift by each primary player is to a balanced "dual strategy." This is not to say that during the military phase political means for resolving the conflict had been abandoned, but instead military means were the primary strategy used by the weaker player to increase the costs to his opponent of standing firm. In the unresolved conflict in Namibia, SWAPO and South Africa continue to exercise a military strategy in conjunction with pursuing a political settlement. For SWAPO political strategies are carried out within the framework of UN Resolution 435, and for South Africa a political settle- ment assumes the form of an internal solution in Namibia. In both the Sudan and the Zimbabwe cases a settlement was reached through political vice military means.

In sum, a general pattern had been established in all three cases. First, political means are used by primary players to obtain goals. Second, as a result of shifting per- ceptions among the weaker primary player, a military strategy is employed. Third, from this shift in strategy, the stronger player responds in kind. Fourth, the conflict comes full circle and a political settlement becomes possible.

One observation that might be drawn from this is that in Sudan and Zimbabwe (cases where the conflict was resolved) the shift to a balanced strategy incorporating military and political means was employed. This would suggest that since the unresolved Namibian case has also followed this pattern, movement toward a solution may be forthcoming. However, this presupposes two factors: first, that SWAPO guerrillas have increased the cost to South Africa of standing firm; second, that South African political moves are a genuine attempt at resolving the conflict and are not designed to forestall a settlement under the framework of Resolution 435. If one believes that these two factors have been fulfilled, then this pattern would indicate that the stage should be set for a settlement in Namibia. Also, new developments injected by external players, most notably the US and Angola, may well establish new conditions that will require an additional phase in strategy to reset the stage one more time.

Thus far an opponent's strategy and the perceptions of each player have been examined for their role in defining strategy. But what role do resources have in this equation, and what type of resources were the most effective in the three cases examined?

E. RESOURCES AND LIMITATIONS

Chapter I presented resources as any political, psychological, economic, or military means that a player possesses to either implement his own strategy, or resist the strategy

of his opponent. In each of the conflicts examined a variety of resources were used by each player. This section will briefly review several types of resources that the three conflicts have in common.

One resource used in the three conflicts was that of player cohesion. The degree of unity attained by several players in the conflict affected their ability to implement an effective strategy. What impact did this resource have on the course and outcome of that conflict?

In Sudan, the tremendous factionalization and the political divisiveness among northern leaders prevented the North from concentrating on the "southern question," and limited their ability to implement an effective strategy in the South. Only when Nimeiri united the North, and brought the divergent political parties under the control of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) did the North have the cohesiveness to press ahead with a settlement in the South.

The Sudan case points to the limitation imposed on a player who suffers from a lack of cohesion. Division among the southern rebels had long prevented them from substantially raising the costs to the North. The divisiveness among the South was in part attributed to the tribal composition of the rebels. However, it is interesting to note that within seven months of Colonel Lagu's political and military unfication of the South, the Sudan conflict was resolved. As noted earlier, the individual concerns and perceptions held by Nimeiri

influenced the timing of the settlement, but assuredly southern
unification contributed to Nimeiri's perceptions.

This is even more striking when the unification of ZANU
and ZAPU military forces (ZIPRA and ZANLA) is considered. It
is true that ZANU and ZAPU had been politically united in
1974, however, it was not until May 1979 that their respective
guerrilla forces were combined. It is interesting to note
that here too, within seven months the conflict ended in Zim-
babwe. This is not to suggest that increasing player cohesion
was the principal catalyst in resolving these conflicts. In-
stead the unification may have acted as a resource that
altered the perceptions of the opposing player, which in turn
prompted him to reconsider his position. Conversely, continued
failure to obtain their goals may have prompted these players
to become unified and drew each of the competing factors to-
gether by necessity.

In Namibia, both the nationalists under SWAPO and South
Africa have exhibited strong cohesiveness. Thus, the effects
of increased cohesiveness may not have the same effect. Al-
though it is quite possible that an increase in the cohesive-
ness among secondary players, most notably the Western contact
group, may have an effect on the conflict in Namibia by alter-
ing the perceptions of South Africa.

The cohesiveness displayed by the white community in Rhodesia
and by South Africa in the Rhodesia and Namibia conflicts
respectively, demonstrates that player cohesion is a valuable

resource.   The solid cohesion within the white community in

Rhodesia contributed greatly to its ability to stand firm in

the face of tremendous international pressure.   This helped

Smith limit the concessions he would have to make in a settle-

ment in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

In sum, player cohesion is a key factor that strengthens

a player's position and abilities, and the lack of cohesion

can function as a principal limitation.   Thus, taking steps

to limit the cohesiveness within an opposing player, and to

bolster one's own cohesiveness, would be a viable tactic for

strengthening one's overall position in a conflict.   Thus the

old dictum, divide and rule is still significant.

Military forces were another resource utilized by the

primary players in each conflict.   Earlier in this chapter it

was noted that the weaker player initiated a shift in strategy

from one based on political means to a strategy that emphasized

military force.   However, this strategy shift would have been

meaningless without a military resource to support it.   How

did military force affect each player's strategy?

Two conclusions can be drawn by comparing the three con-

flicts examined.   First, those players in each conflict that

were initially in a stronger position primarily used their

military resource to deflect the pressure directed at them

from their opponent's military strategy.   That is, the mili-

tary resource was used defensively to contain the actions of

an aggressor.   For example, some analysts would argue that

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in Namibia, South Africa is continuing to employ this resource in this manner. Pretoria is not seeking an outright military victory, but instead is limiting the ability of SWAPO to increase South Africa's costs of standing firm, while simultaneously pursuing a political solution.

Second, those players in each conflict that were initially in a weaker position used their military resource to increase the costs of standing firm to their opponent. The Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe, and the southern rebels in Sudan used their military resource to pressure their opponents into making concessions and into altering their perceptions. What prevents the stronger opponent from employing this resource in the same manner?

This is partially attributable to the nature of the conflicts examined. The black nationalists in Rhodesia and Namibia, and the southern rebels in Sudan have very little to lose. There are few costs that these players have not already incurred in their respective conflicts. However, for South Africa, the white Rhodesian community, and the North in Sudan, to employ their own military resources to increase the costs to their opponents would have been more difficult. Finding appropriate targets and crushing the guerrilla movement is defensive in nature and winning a conclusive military victory is unlikely.

Thus the way in which each player employs his military resource depends upon his relative position in the conflict.

What this suggests is that resources have different uses in the hands of different players. And that the value of a specific type of resource varies among players. In every conflict there is a shifting of resources. Players periodically gain and lose resources as the conflict progresses. What effect do shifting resources have on the course of the three conflicts examined?

When a player gains or loses a resource, there is a corresponding shift in either his (or his opponent's) strategy or perceptions or both. However, the shift in perceptions and strategy does not usually occur immediately following a change in resources. For example, in Sudan the unification of the North under Nimeiri, coupled with the relatively calm relations Sudan was experiencing with its neighbors provided Nimeiri with the opportunity to pursue a political strategy in the South. In addition, the factionalization in the North had long been a southern resource. When the North was unified, this resource for the South evaporated, and as a result the South's perceptions of the North began to change.

Changing resources were also a factor in Zimbabwe. The white Rhodesian government slowly began to wane as it began to lose resources in the form of external support from South Africa. As the black nationalists received additional military support from the Frontline States, their position improved. This simple correlation of resources to relative strength is easy to recognize. However, simply gaining a resource is not

in itself enough to change a player's position. The way in which a player employs a resource has more effect on his relative position.

In Namibia, the US policy of constructive engagement is, in effect, a resource for South Africa in that it can utilize US support and the "linkage issue" to pursue its internal strategy. As noted in Chapter IV, the UN provides SWAPO with one of its most valuable resources--legitimacy through recognition.

In sum, resources can affect both a player's strategy and perceptions. It is clear that one player's limitation is his opponent's resource, and that a player can lose and gain resources over the course of a conflict.

F. TIME AS A DYNAMIC ELEMENT

The last element to be examined in this chapter is the effect of the passage of time in the three conflicts. Time can often serve as a resource for a player. For example, in Zimbabwe, UDI was a strategy used in part by the Rhodesian government to provide it with more time to both wait for a more favorable administration in London, and to give it time to formulate an alternative solution. In Namibia, one side effect of the linkage issue is that it allows South Africa the time to expand white political power in the territory, and to implement its internal solution.

Two general observations can be made concerning the effect of time on the weaker players in each conflict. First, the

cohesiveness of the black nationalists in Namibia and Zimbabwe, and the southern rebels in Sudan, improved with the passage of time. Second, these players' military capability also improved. In the case of the Anya-Nya, and of ZANU and ZAPU, their military effectiveness was increasing right up until the time that a settlement was reached. In Namibia, SWAPO's ability to challenge the SADF had increased in the late 1970's and early 1980's, however, in the past few years this trend has diminished.

The effect of time on the stronger primary player seems to have been the reverse. Although it is difficult to identify a pattern in the cohesiveness of these players over time, in general their military capability decreased as the conflict evolved. Again the exception is in Namibia where the SADF has remained in control of the territory.

Where the UN and Great Britain were involved as initial primary players, in Namibia and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe respectively, their roles varied over time, whereas the role of the black nationalists steadily increased. For the UN its role in the Namibia dispute diminished and has since leveled off. Great Britain's role in the Rhodesia conflict diminished during the 1970's and then increased toward the conclusion of the conflict. This may be due in part to the responsibility that Great Britain realized it had toward its former colony. This pattern may be unique to the African environment and the dynamics of decolonization. However, this pattern could

possibly occur in any instance where an indigenous group has not yet reached maturity as a political and military force in the conflict, and where an external force shared the same interests and has the will to represent them in the early stages of the conflict.

In sum, as the Sudan and Zimbabwe conflicts progressed those players initially in a stronger position found their strength diminishing over time, and conversely, those weaker players found that as the conflict progressed their position generally improved. In Namibia, this is not the case. South Africa has retained a commanding position over both the UN and SWAPO. This may be attributable to the fact that the two weakest variables for South Africa—external support and legitimacy, have only marginal impact on their position. South Africa's need to increase these factors is inconsequential. Conversely, SWAPO's inability to substantially improve its military ability and cohesion, coupled with the problematic leadership among SWAPO's ranks may be preventing it from strengthening its position.

G. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Each of the conflicts presented here are complex and each contain several dynamic elements that contributed to the over-all course and outcome of each conflict. But there are a few general observations that can be made about the three conflicts taken as a whole.

Perceptions played a fundamental role in each conflict. The role that Nimeiri's perceptions played in Sudan, and the shifting perceptions of the white community in Rhodesia directly led to a resolution of those conflicts. South Africa's perceptions in relation to Namibia is a primary factor preventing a settlement in that conflict.

Perceptions have had great impact on the selection of strategy and goals of each player. As adjustments to perceptions occurred, adjustments in goals and strategy followed. Perhaps the primary area where perceptions had the greatest impact on each of these conflicts, and is perhaps the central element in all three cases, is in the cost-benefit relationship of standing firm or conceding.

In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the cost-benefit relationship for each of the primary players was similar. In Sudan had Nimeiri not conceded a form of autonomy to the South, it is quite possible that his ability to consolidate his political power would have been decreased, and he would have found it difficult to retain control in Sudan--a high price to pay. Relief from the economic burden of war, the relatively high level of country-wide political cohesiveness, and the strengthening of Sudan's regional position are just a few of the benefits the North received as a result of its compromise with the South. The South had also benefitted from the settlement. The tremendous increase over the control of southern affairs that Southerners received under the Addis Ababa Agreement is a

primary benefit for them. Southern costs of standing firm in order to gain greater concessions from the North are high compared to relatively small increases in benefits. Had the South succeeded in breaking from the North, new problems brought on by a sudden shift to independence might have out-weighed the benefits gained in a Federal structure with the North.

In Zimbabwe, the costs of standing firm for both the white community and the black nationalists, were magnified through the lens of outside influence. Prime Minister Smith and the white community, stood firm in the face of mounting external and internal pressure. Only when they perceived the costs of standing firm as outweighing the benefits were they forced to concede control of the territory to the Blacks. It is important to note that the main issue of the white community was security. Continued inflexibility would have further eroded their security past the point acceptable to most Whites. Once they perceived that their physical and economic security would be maintained, they began to realize the advantages of conceding. Those Whites that felt that their security would be threatened under black rule left the country. In addition, a player's ability to resist the strategy of his opponent is an important factor. The Rhodesian government's diminishing ability to resist external pressure and contain the PF's guerrilla forces influenced their perception of standing firm. Once they recognized this reduced ability they began to

reassess the costs and benefits of standing firm and linked this to their ability to stand firm. This in turn forced them to reevaluate the benefits gained by conceding.

Lastly, this chapter has pointed out many of the similarities between the two conflicts that have been resolved (Sudan and Zimbabwe) and the continuing conflict in Namibia. However, many critical dissimilarities exist between these two groups of cases. Many of these differences occur in the five factors that defined each primary player's initial position. Table 2 is a matrix of the five factors determining each player's initial position. The factors in the matrix are as follows: [1] Player cohesion, [2] Military strength/ability, [3] External support, [4] Legitimacy of action, and [5] Leadership capabilities. The factors for each player were ranked in relation to his opponent and a player was either stronger (+), weaker (-) or roughly equal (=) in each factor.

As indicated in the matrix, among the weaker players one common factor that is at a relatively lower level than the stronger player in the initial phase of the conflict is their military ability. In Sudan and Zimbabwe, the weaker players were able to increase their military ability and either match or surpass the military ability of the stronger player. In the case of SWAPO, they have clearly been unable to meet the SADF with the same force and effectiveness.

Also in each conflict the initial leadership capability among each player varied. However, at the end of both the

TABLE 2

	Player Cohesion	Military Strength/ Ability	External Support	Legitimacy of Action	Leadership Capability
I. Sudan:					
The North	+	=	+	+	=
The South	−	=	−	−	=
II. Zimbabwe:					
Rhodesian Government	+	+	−	−	+
ZANU/ZAPU	−	−	+	+	−
III. Namibia:					
South Africa	+	+	−	−	+
SWAPO	−	−	+	+	−

Sudan and Zimbabwe conflicts the leadership on each side was roughly equal. In Namibia Nujoma's efforts and the efforts of his leadership cadre have not been able to match the skillful political and military leadership in South Africa.

It is important to note that SWAPO in Namibia and the PF in Rhodesia possessed a great deal of legitimacy of action, whereas the southern rebels in Sudan did not have this same moral legitimacy. However, in the case of ZAPU/ZANU they were able to exploit this resource and in Sudan the Anya-Nya effectively circumvented this limitation. In Namibia SWAPO has been unable to use this resource in the same manner as ZANU

and ZAPU, and conversely South Africa has ignored its lack of international, moral and legal legitimacy.

The quantitative aspect of each factor is a subtlety that is not found in the matrix. For example, in Sudan the Anya-Nya did receive some external support but this was only slightly less than the support rendered to the government in Khartoum. However, since the conflict operated in relative isolation, external forces were not a critical factor. In Zimbabwe external forces played a significant role and the mustering of external support from the Frontline States and the OAU for the black nationalists was a great asset for them. However, in Namibia, SWAPO has from the start received the largest amount of external support, but in comparison to the amount of resources that South Africa is able to generate for itself, this support is not enough.

As a final point, it was noted earlier that the pattern in strategy among the primary players in Sudan and Zimbabwe ended in a "dual strategy" and that this shift in strategy signaled that the conditions for a settlement were perhaps met. At several times in the late 1970's and early 1980's there seemed to be positive movement toward a settlement in Namibia, however, external realities prevented a final resolution. Most notably the linkage issue has been a major stumbling block to such a settlement.

What this points to is that SWAPO is unable to raise the costs to South Africa of standing firm. SWAPO's inability to do this is the result of a number of factors previously

reviewed in Chapter IV. Moreover, in order for the conflict in Namibia to be resolved, either South Africa or SWAPO will have to adjust its goals. For without common ground on which a settlement can be negotiated, a resolution of the conflict is remote.

Common ground is the area on which all conflicts are resolved.

APPENDIX A

SUDAN CHRONOLOGY

1930 - "Southern Sudan" policy established by the British
Civil Secretary. The Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal,
and Equatoria provinces adminstered separately from
the North.

1946 - "Southern Sudan" policy reversed. The North and the
South now bound together.

1948 - Legislative Assembly Ordinance enacted. Legislative
Assembly created in Khartoum, out of 93 seats, 13 go
to the South.

1951 - March--Governor General appoints Constitutional Amend-
ment Commission. Composed of 13 Sudanese, only 1
representative from the South included.

1952 - May--Conference held in Cairo between Britain, Egypt,
and northern Sudan political parties to discuss nature
of Sudanese independence. No southern representatives
present.

1953 - February--Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Recognition by
Egypt of Sudanese right to self-determination.

1954 - January--First Sudanese Parliament established. Ismail
el-Azhari elected Prime Minister. The National Union
Party (NUP) dominates the Assembly.

1955 - July--Trial of a southern Liberal party member of
parliament opens in Yambio. Demonstrations and riots
with the police break out. Workers strike in Nazra,
in Equatoria province.

August--Mutiny of soldiers in the Equatoria Corps.
Soldiers refuse the orders given to them by their
northern commanders. Many armed soldiers disperse
into the surrounding countryside.

1956 - January 1--Sudan becomes an Independent Republic. At
this time southern representatives given assurances
that greater autonomy for the south would be considered.

June--Members of the Khatmiya sect defect from the
NUP to form the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The

PDP and the Umma Party join to form a coalition
government headed by Abdullah Khahil. He received
support from the Ansars and Khatmiya.

1951 - April--All missionary schools in the South taken over
by the government.

June 30--National Assembly dissolved to make way for
new elections.

1958 - February--National Assembly elections held. Umma
party receives 63 seats. The Umma-PDP coalition
dominates the assembly. Stanislaus Paysama was able
to organize southern members of the assembly into an
effective voting bloc. The south won 37 out of 173
available seats.

During 1958 the Umma-PDP coalition became strained
over the issue of Egyptian influence in Sudan. The
idea of federation for the South was rapidly spreading
and begins to find favor in certain groups in the
North.

November 17--General Ibrahim Abboud leads a military
coup. The assembly is dissolved. Abboud claims that
his government is only transitional. Supreme Council
established to conduct government business. Council
consists of 7 military officers and 5 non-party
civilians.

1962 - February--Sudan African Closed Districts National Union
(SACDNU) formed in Kinshasha, Zaire; Joseph Oduho,
president, and William Deng, secretary-general.
Policy of SACDNU is to obtain complete independence
for southern Sudan through diplomatic and political
means. SACDNU changes its name to the Sudan African
National Union (SANU) in 1963.

May--'Missionary Societies Act' enacted.

November--Expulsion of missionaries in the South starts.
Missionaries accused by Khartoum of encouraging southern
hostilities towards the North.

November/December--Members of the old "southern corps"
regroup and prepare to attack northern troops.

1963 - September--Anya-Nya guerrilla force formed. First
serious guerrilla attacks occur in Pachola in Kajo
Kaji.

1964 - February--The government forces all missionaries to
leave the South.

September--Throughout 1964 Anya-Nya movement develops
into an effective guerrilla force. By September
SANU, realizing the potential of Anya-Nya, retracts
its "peaceful policy." At this same time, Abboud
appoints a commission of inquiry to study factors
affecting the southern problem. The government allowed
open debate in the hopes that a solution to the
"southern problem" would be found. The open debate
led to general criticism of the government.

October--General strikes spread throughout the country.
Political parties that had been banned began to
resurface.

November 15--Abboud resigns, replaced by Mohammed al-
Khalifa, this marks the return to party politics.
Two major parties dominate in the South, SANU led by
William Deng and Saturnino Lahure, and the Southern
Front, headed by Gordon Abiei.

1965 - March 16--Representatives from the North and the South
meet at the Round Table Conference to work out a
resolution over the conflict in the South. Only an
interim agreement over minor issues reached.

March--Elections held in the North. Southern poli-
ticians boycott the elections. Election results:
Umma Party 75, NUP 54, Communists 11, Beja Tribal
Association 10, Islamic Charter 5, PDP 3, and inde-
pendents 15.

June--The Southern Front, now headed by Clement Mboro,
becomes a formally registered political party.

July--Increase in Anya-Nya guerrilla activity. The
Umma Party and the NUP establish a coalition government
led by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. The new government
launches a major military counter-offensive against
the guerrillas in the South.

July--Sudan's border with Ethiopia secured. Kenya and
Tanzania promise to crush any secessionist activity.

During 1965, factionalization in SANU resulted in the
formation of two additional political parties in the
South, the Azania Liberation Front (ALF), and the
Sudan African Liberation Front (SALF).

1966 - January--The Sudan war begins receiving increased
attention in the British press. Throughout 1966 the
Anya-Nya increases the scope and force of its guerrilla
activity, however, the group is still limited in its
ability to obtain arms and ammunition.

July--Split in Umma party between the traditionalists and the moderate wings. Sadiq al-Mahdi selected new Prime Minister.

1967 - March--Parliamentary elections held in 36 constituencies in pacified areas in the South. The Sadiq wing of the Umma party gained 15 seats while SANU won 10.

May--Further division in Sadiq's Umma wing coupled with the withdrawal of NUP support causes the Sadiq government to fall. Mahgoub is renamed Prime Minister.

August--Southern leaders meet in eastern Equatoria and form the Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG). The SSPG has difficulty assuming control of Anya-Nya.

1968 - April/May--Elections held throughout most of the South. William Deng assassinated by government troops. The Democratic Unionist Party (formed from a merger of the NUP and the PDP) and the Umma party form a coalition government, with Mahgoub retaining his leadership. Throughout the rest of 1968 Mahgoub's government is weakened by continual division among the major parties in the North.

1969 - Several splinter groups emerge from the SSPG: Anyidi Revolutionary Government, Zande Separatists, Sue River Revolutionary Government, and the Sudan-Azania Government in East Africa.

May 25--General Jafar Nimeiri heads a quick, bloodless coup.

June--New government announces plan of regional autonomy for the South. A ministry of state for southern affairs is created. Nimeiri forms the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) in order to establish a single national political movement.

August--Nimeiri acknowledges that there is no military solution to the problem in the South.

1970 - March--Nimeiri attempts to visit Abu Island to talk with Immam al-Hadi. He is blocked by rioting Ansars. Throughout 1970 Nimeiri is preoccupied with controlling communist influence in his government.

1971 - March--Nimeiri announces that the SSU will subsume all other political parties in Sudan.

May/June--The World Council of Churches and the All African Conference of Churches begin exploring the possibility of opening North-South talks.

July 19-22--Nimeiri survives an abortive coup. The Sudan Communist Party blamed for the putch. Nimeiri's Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) rounds up more than 100 communists and dissident officers in an effort to crush the communist influence in Sudan. Former minister of southern affairs, Joseph Garang is executed for his part in the coup attempt, he is succeeded by Abel Alier.

August--Colonel Joseph Lagu consolidates all military and political power in the South. Creates the Southern Sudan Liberation Front (SSLF), which gains the support of nearly all exiled southern politicians.

October--The SSU established as the only legal political party in Sudan.

1972 - February--Meeting between Abel Alier and high-level delegations from the SSLM begins in Addis Ababa. Initially, many SSLF leaders were opposed to the agreement reached between the government and the SSLM. However Joseph Lagu approved of the arrangement and a cease-fire operation was put into effect.

March 27--The Addis Ababa agreement ratified.

APPENDIX B

RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE CHRONOLOGY

1923 - Southern Rhodesian settlers were given the choice of
either becoming incorporated into the Union of South
Africa, or becoming a separate entity in the British
Empire.

October 1--Constitution of the Crown Colony of Southern
Rhodesia went into effect.

1930 - Land Apportionment Act of 1930 designates specific
areas for whitesettlers and black Africans.

Late 1940's - During the last half of the 1940's an average of
10,000 white settlers arrived annually.

1950 - All blacks that were previously allowed to live in
white designated areas were forced to move to areas
designated as Native Reserves.

1955 - George Nyandoro and James Chikerema (black activists)
form the Youth League. The League demands direct
representation for blacks on municipal councils.

1957 - The Youth League combines with the African National
Congress to form the Southern Rhodesian African National
Congress (SRANC).

1959 - The SRANC is banned by the White Rhodesian government.

1960 - The Black political group, the National Democratic
Party (NDP) formed.

1961 - December--The NDP banned by the Rhodesian government.

1962 - September--The NDP is reformed as the Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU), under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo.

1963 - The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) is formed
by members of ZAPU who split from Nkomo.

1964 - Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland become the independent
states of Zambia and Malawi.

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April--Prime Minister Winston Field replaced by Ian
Smith. Smith's Party, the Rhodesian Front, dominates
the 1965 elections, winning 50 of the first roll
seats in the Assembly.

1965 - November 11--Southern Rhodesian government issues a
Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

1966 - April--First encounter between government troops and
Black guerrillas.

December--The UN Security Council imposes mandatory
selective sanctions on Rhodesia.

1968 - Almost all guerrilla activity ceases due to factionali-
zation among black nationalist groups.

May--The UN passes a resolution that calls for compre-
hensive mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia, this
bars all trade except for medical supplies. South
Africa and Portugal do not comply with the UN resolu-
tion and continue to trade with Rhodesia.

1971 - November--The US passes the Byrd Amendment which per-
mits the US to import certain strategic minerals from
Rhodesia.

November--The British reach a settlement with Smith.
The settlement known as the Smith-Home Agreement included
a large number of British concessions.

1972 - The British government dispatches the Pearce Commission
to Rhodesia to ascertain public opinion on the terms
of the Smith-Home Agreement. The commission reports
that the overwhelming majority of blacks in Rhodesia
oppose the settlement.

1974 - ZANU and ZAPU unite to form the Patriotic Front (PF).

April--Military coup in Lisbon topples the Portuguese
government.

1975 - Revolutionary government in Portugal begins decoloni-
zation, Angola and Mozambique gain independence.

January--UK and US warn Rhodesia that if the war
continues that they would not provide aid.

August--Talks between Smith and black nationalists
convened at Victoria Falls. Talks break down in their
second day.

1976 - April/September--The US becomes active in Southern
       Africa. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able
       to change some of Smith's perceptions. Smith's govern-
       ment agrees in principle with majority rule.

       October--An all-party conference held in Geneva; Smith,
       Mugabe, Nkomo, Sithole, Muzorewa, and representatives
       from the US and Great Britain attend.

1977 - Bilateral talks between Smith and Muzorewa begin.
       Smith is seeking his "internal settlement" in Rhodesia.

       March--Byrd Amendment repealed.

       September--A detailed Anglo-American plan proposed.
       Neither the nationalists nor the Smith government re-
       jects the proposals.

1978 - Smith announces his internal settlement. Elections
       are to be held based on the newly adopted constitu-
       tion. The internal settlement and the new constitution
       are denounced by the PF.

       July 27--The Case-Javits Amendment adopted by the US
       Congress.

       December--By the end of 1978 ZANU's and ZAPU's military
       arms, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
       (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
       (ZIPRA) have become effective guerrilla organizations
       capable of confronting government forces.

1979 - April--Elections held, Muzorewa elected Prime Minister.
       Effective control of the government still retained by
       Smith and the white regime.

       May--ZIPRA and ZANLA unite to coordinate guerrilla
       activities.

       September--Talks convened in London at Lancaster House.
       The Zimbabwe/Rhodesian government was represented by
       Smith, Muzorewa, Sithole, and Peter Walls; and the
       nationalists were represented by PF leaders Nkomo and
       Mugabe- The conference was headed by British Foreign
       Secretary Lord Carrington.

       December--Lancaster House Settlement reached. UN
       Security Council endorses the settlement and calls
       upon member states to remove sanctions against Zimbabwe.

APPENDIX C

NAMIBIA CHRONOLOGY

1880 - Walvis Bay colonized by Great Britain.

1884 - South West Africa (SWA) colonized by Germany.

1915 - SWA invaded by South Africa on behalf of the Allies.

1920 - League of Nations founded after Versailles. SWA placed under class "C" mandate, administration supervised by the League.

1933 - South Africa pressed for SWA incorporation into South African territory. This was never agreed to by the League.

1945 - UN founded, mandate system superceded by UN Trusteeship system.

1946 - Dispute between UN and South Africa over SWA begins.

1949 - SWA incorporated into Republic of South Africa under the South West Africa Administration Act.

1950/1955/1956 - International Court of Justice (ICJ) asked for an advisory opinion on South West Africa. The court found that South Africa was not legally obliged to place the territory under the UN trusteeship program, but that it was not competent to unilaterally alter the legal status of South West Africa.

1960 - Ethiopia and Liberia argued in the ICJ that apartheid, the system under which South Africa governed South West Africa, was inconsistent with the League mandate.

1961 - South Africa refuses to submit reports on South West African administration. Council of 24 set up to compile reports.

1963 - Britain ends utilization of port and base facilities in Republic of South Africa. RSA withdraws from the Commonwealth.

1966 - The ICJ decided that apartheid was not in question and that Liberia and Ethiopia had no standing before the court even though in 1962 the court had acknowledged their standing.

South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) announces it will launch an armed struggle for the liberation of the territory.

UN revokes South Africa's Mandate/Trusteeship over SWA. South Africa is now considered to be illegally occupying SWA.

1967 - Creation of "Bantustans" in Ovamboland.

1968 - UN General Assembly renamed South West Africa, Namibia.

South Africa in complete control of Namibia's defense.

1969 - South West Africa Affairs Act authorized South Africa to take control of mining, labor, revenues, industries, etc.

1970 - August--Creation of Okavangoland.

1971 - June--Advisory opinion by ICJ, "the continued presence of South Africa being illegal, it is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately . . . members of the UN must refrain from any actions or dealings which might imply recognition of legality of South African administration or presence in Namibia."

1972 onward - Confrontations between guerrilla groups and South African troops increase. Namibian border with Angola is the area of heaviest fighting.

1972 - January--South African troops into Namibia to break up strikes in the Tsumeb mine area, Walvis Bay and Windhoek.

February 4--UNSC Resolution 309, Directs Waldheim to initiate contacts to resolve the conflict.

March--Dr. Alfred Escher, on a 17-day tour of Namibia, meets with 74 delegates: outcome--Escher believed that the majority called for end to South African rule and for the complete independence of Namibia.

October 30--Escher meets with B.J. Vorster (South African Prime Minister) and Dr. H. Muller (South African Foreign Minister). The outcome of this meeting was that progress on Namibia required settling of 3 points: (1) South Africa's unequivocal clarification of a policy for independence of Namibian people. (2) Discontinuation of the homelands policy. (3) Abolition of the discriminatory measures in the territory.

November--Vorster portrayed that the discussions with Escher represented an agreement. Waldheim issued a statement denying this.

November--SWAPO and SWANU declare that the advisory
council is unacceptable, however, they would accept
a consultative body on an interim basis provided it
was supervised by the UN.

1973 - February--South Africa said it would proceed with the
Constitution of the advisory council.

March 23--Advisory council meets, mainly pro-government
chiefs and headmen (two whites). Basters, Kaulovelders,
and majority of Heroro refused to nominate representa-
tives. David Meroro (national chairman of SWAPO) did
not attend.

March--The National Convention (9 political parties
including SWAPO & SWANU) states that its nine member
organization would fight for the total and complete
freedom of the people of the territory.

April--Waldheim reports to UN Security Council: South
Africa has still not provided unequivocal clarification
of its policies and South Africa's position did not
coincide with the UN. Muller issued a statement that
South Africa would not delay any action for self-
determination.

1973 - Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, rejects further diplo-
matic contact with South Africa.

May--OAU voted to end talks with South Africa.

December 11--UN Security Council votes unanimously to
end the attempt to establish meaningful talks with the
South African government. Following this the General
Assembly voted to recognize SWAPO as the authentic
representative of Namibia. UN Security Council set
May 1975 as the time for South Africa to announce its
withdrawal.

1974 - South Africa proposed a new plan that would subdivide
Namibia. Ovambos would be free to mingle across the
border in Angola. Others would be grouped into smaller
states. UN and black nationalist movements denounce
this effort. 1974 overthrow of Caetaro government in
Portugal brought new problems. Border conflict required
the stationing of South African troops in northern
Namibia.

1975 - UN Security Council establishes the Western Contact
Group as a negotiating mission with a specific time-
table to discuss free elections. The African states
in the UN call for an immediate mandatory arms embargo

to South Africa. Britain, France and the USA vetoed this resolution.

1975 to 1977--SWAPO was pushed back by South African troops. SWAPO linked in the north with the MPLA, South African troops with UNITA. Jonas Savimbi (UNITA president) had underwritten requests by Zaire and Zambia for South African military intervention. When the MPLA starts gaining ground, South Africa announces a withdrawal of forces.

1975, September to March, 1977--Turnhalle Conference convened. SWAPO does not take part.

1976 - August--Turnhalle Conference designates 31 Dec 1978 as target date for Namibian independence.

1977 - By this time 45,000 South African troops mobilized to fight in the north.

March--Turnhalle Conference produces a draft constitution. Includes the provision that South African forces would stay in Namibia, Walvis Bay would remain part of South Africa. This was denounced by both the UN and the OAU.

1977 - Mandatory UN arms embargo adopted.

September--South Africa indicated it would still seek an internal settlement. The newly drafted internal constitution supported by DTA (Democratic Turnhalle Alliance), but is rejected by SWAPO.

1978 - April 5--The Western members of UN Security Council propose UN supervised elections of a Namibian constitution and assembly but carried the proviso that South African troops would remain in country pending complete cessation of SWAPO hostilities. Walvis Bay excluded from proposal.

September--South Africa announces that it is going ahead with its own internal solution and is going to hold elections in December. Out of 50 seats, 41 went to the DTA. This new assembly agreed to UN supervised elections in 1979.

September--UN Security Council Resolution 435 adopted. The resolution called for UN sponsored elections, established a UN Transition assistance group, and declared that unilateral actions taken by South Africa in Namibia are illegal.

1979 - May--Advisory assembly reconstituted as National Assembly based on December South African sponsored elections.

1979 - Duel strategy followed by South African government. Internal Namibian government was to be consolidated while at the same time South Africa agreed to plans for a settlement under Resolution 435.

1981 - November--SWAPO accepts a settlement proposed by the UN.

1982 - February--DTA loses support of Ovambo constituent group.

1982 - April--Most effective guerrilla operations by SWAPO against South African troops.

1983 - April--UN conference on Namibia criticizes Contact Group for US position on the "linkage issue." France withdraws from Contact Group.

August--UN Security Council visits Namibia holds talks on implementation of Resolution 435.

November--Multi-Party Conference (MPC) formed. SWAPO refuses to join.

1984 - February--Talks between *US Assistant Secretary of State* Chester Crocker and South Africa called for joint commission to monitor withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola. Angola would assure that neither SWAPO nor Cuban troops would occupy area vacated by South Africa.

March--Herman Toivo ja Toivo, founding father of SWAPO released by South Africa.

March--Talks in Lusaka, Zambia. Disagreement between SWAPO and MPC. Talks failed.

June--Talks held in Rome. South Africa's attitude about linkage are unchanged.

1983 to 1985 - US/Angola/South Africa/SWAPO involved in discussions on a settlement. Other western groups are noticably absent.

1985 - South Africa establishes an internal government in Namibia. It turns over the administration of Namibia to the new government headed by the MPC. However, South Africa retains control of defense, police, and foreign affairs.

APPENDIX D

A REVIEW OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION CHECKLIST

It is appropriate at this point to examine briefly the effectiveness of the conflict resolution checklist. The following is a review of some of the positive and negative aspects of the checklist.

There are three positive aspects of the checklist. First, it was an invaluable tool for analyzing the three conflicts presented in this thesis. The checklist provided a central frame of reference and made it easier to distinguish similarities and differences among these conflicts. Second, the checklist was useful in examining unfamiliar conflicts. That is as a negotiator facing a conflict that is new to him, or a conflict in which he has only a passing familiarity, obtaining a working understanding of each of these somewhat complex conflicts is made easier through application of the checklist. Third, as an adjunct to this, the checklist assisted in identifying only the most salient elements in each conflict.

There are also three drawbacks to the checklist. First, there is no substitute for judgment. The checklist does not provide a formula for determining the value of the various elements in each conflict. It is up to the analyst to apply his own values to the framework of the checklist. In this project assigning values to different factors was made easier

through a comparison of the three conflicts. In this way a relative value for each element was established and the most important variables surfaced. Second, once the initial and main elements of the conflicts were established, the checklist did not function very well as each conflict evolved. The checklist was not effective in identifying adjustments made in a player's goals, strategy, and resources. And third, it has limited value as a guide to negotiating. However, it is useful as a tool for identifying key elements in a conflict so that a negotiator can attempt to influence these elements to his advantage.

In sum, without the checklist the problems with undertaking this type of comparative analysis would have been magnified. As an academic tool it is of value, and can contribute an overall understanding of conflict resolution on a case by case basis.

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
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