

AD-A170 373


TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND REPNSE(U) ARMY WAR COLL
CARLISLE BARRACKS PA C FULLER 07 APR 86


1/1

UNCLASSIFIED

F/G 5/11

NL





MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM	
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
	AD 4170 373		
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)		TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED	
Terrorism: Challenge and Response		STUDENT ESSAY	
7. AUTHOR(s)		5. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER	
LTC Cornell Fuller			
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)	
U.S. Army War College Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050			
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS		12. REPORT DATE	
SAME		7 April 1986	
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES	
		29	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)	
		UNCLASSIFIED	
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)			
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)			
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)			
<p>Terrorism as a means of political and social influence has been, and continues to be, a serious problem in the U.S. But effective law enforcement and changing political and social conditions have kept it from getting out of hand. International terrorism directed against U.S. citizens and property abroad will continue to be a major problem for the foreseeable future. International terrorist organizations, supported by totalitarian states, are engaged in declared war against U.S. and the west. The initial phases</p> <p>(continued)</p>			

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

BLOCK 20 (continued)

of which have been decisively won by terrorists as a result of: (1) apathy in the west; (2) lack of unity; and (3) the cowardly response to terrorist attacks by most western governments. Although terrorists have heretofore been successful, this essay identifies vulnerabilities which can be exploited through a coordinated western response. These vulnerabilities are examined in light of specific responses that should be taken using national elements of power. Within this context, the author concludes that regional, international, and bi-lateral cooperation to facilitate pursuit of a pro-active campaign against terrorists will quickly isolate and render ineffective international terrorists and their supporters.

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

1. This is the paper and is
2. the only copy of the paper
3. and is not to be
4. distributed outside
5. the program.
6. If you have any
7. questions, please
8. contact the program
9. manager.

TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Cornell Fuller

Professor Gabriel A. Marcella

Project Advisor

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013-5001

7 April 1986

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

UNCLASSIFIED

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Cornell Fuller LTC, IN
TITLE: Terrorism: Challenge and Response
FORMAT: Individual Essay
DATE: 07 April 1986 Pages: 30 Classification: UNCL

Terrorism as a means of political and social influence has been, and continues to be, a serious problem in the US. But effective law enforcement and changing political and social conditions have kept it from getting out of hand. International terrorism directed against US citizens and property abroad will continue to be a major problem for the foreseeable future. International terrorist organizations, supported by totalitarian states, are engaged in declared war against the US and the west. The initial phases of which have been decisively won by terrorists as a result of: (1) apathy in the west; (2) lack of unity; and (3) the cowardly response to terrorist attacks by most western governments. Although terrorists have heretofore been successful, this essay identifies vulnerabilities which can be exploited through a coordinated western response. These vulnerabilities are examined in light of specific responses that should be taken using national elements of power. Within this context, the author concludes that regional, international, and bi-lateral cooperation to facilitate pursuit of a proactive campaign against terrorists will quickly isolate and render ineffective international terrorists and their supporters.

TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

Three times during this century western democracies have banded together in common cause against what was considered a universal threat. This coalition of nations, united in purpose, were able to prevent German domination of Europe during World War I, destroyed Hitler's vaunted Third Reich in World War II and prevented the enslavement of the world under the yoke of Axis hegemony. A decade later on the underbelly of Asia, the United Nations coalition was called upon to stem the tide of the communist menace on the Korean Peninsula.

The historical response of democratic nations to common threats has been so successful that coalitions and alliances have become the modern cornerstones to the protection and safeguard of democracy and peace.

Today, world order is once again threatened. Although not in the manner of columns of jack-booted soldiers blitzkrieging across the face of Europe, this menace is far more subtle, but equally as vicious in its attack upon open societies. Deriving their name from the methods they employ, these terrorists are engaged in a new and modern form of war that has proven exceptionally difficult for open societies to respond to. Operating within the low-intensity spectrum of conflict, they target unarmed civilians in order to draw attention to a particular social or political cause. Terrorism as a form of war has so paralyzed the nations of the west that many now question

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>
ity Codes
and/or
Special
A-1



their ability to defend themselves.

The focus of this paper is to examine the challenges presented to open societies by international terrorism and the means available to them to respond.

History of Terrorism in the US

Violence has been no stranger to the US culture. Our history is replete with the use of force, terror and intimidation resulting from labor strife, ethnic conflicts, organized crime and anti-social behavior by abnormal individuals. Although contemporary America thinks of terrorism as something spawned by the disenchanting against modern governments that have failed in their social, political, and economic responsibilities, this modern day scourge also has roots deeply embedded in American History.

Prior to the tumultuous '60s and '70s, the only recognized terrorist organizations active in the United States were the various factions of the white supremacy organization, the Klu Klux Klan, and since the late 1930s, various factions of Puerto Rican Separatist organizations.

The Klu Klux Klan:

From the earliest years of the Klan, immediately after the Civil War, its hooded members used fear and violence to maintain white supremacy. The Klan dropped out of sight in the late Nineteenth Century but reappeared in the 1920s, when the new Klan expanded its targets to include not only blacks, but Catholics,

Jews, evolutionist, pacifist, radicals, adulterers, and any other faction of society different from themselves. School desegregation beginning in 1954 and widespread activism on behalf of civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s again provoked violence. Public revulsion at the murder of three civil rights workers in 1964 and aggressive action by the Department of Justice caused Klan membership to decline in the '70s, but current assessments indicate the Klan membership is gradually increasing. The "new Klan" of the late '70s and '80s is more politically sophisticated and certainly more media conscious than its predecessors. Klan leaders officially disclaim any hand in violence, but persons identified as members of the Klan allegedly have been involved in a number of shootings in the last couple of years, the most recent one occurring in Greensboro, NC where four anti-Klan demonstrators were killed on 3 November 1979.¹

Puerto Rican Separatism:

Historically the first act of terrorism in Puerto Rico goes back as far as 1931, when a member of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party (PRNP) attacked a judge of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico at a Fourth of July US Independence Celebration. Numerous acts of violence have occurred since that date by a variety of Puerto Rican terrorist organizations resulting in considerable death, injury and destruction both in the US and Puerto Rico. Two of the more spectacular incidents were the attack on "Blair House," then the temporary residence of President Harry S. Truman, by Puerto Rican terrorist in October

1950, and the March 1954, attack on the US House of Representatives by four Puerto Rican Nationalist terrorists. Over the years, police agencies have identified no fewer than 15 terrorist groups which have operated for varying periods of time both in Puerto Rico and the continental US.²

The decade spanning the years 1965-1975 saw a number of new terrorist oriented organizations surface within the United States. This was the decade of the Civil Rights Movement during which many young, angry blacks became disenchanted with the painfully slow response of American society to their quest for a greater share of the American dream. The non-violent approach which had been so effective during the early days of the Civil Rights Movement began to be questioned by young activist who could see no visible gains being made by the more passive civil rights organizations such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Urban League, and others. This disenchantment gave rise to individuals who openly opposed continuing the peaceful approach of the Civil Rights Movement. These were angry young men who had been exposed to the writings of noted revolutionaries like Frantz Fanon, Malcom X, Marx, Engels, and Che Guevara who advocated violence as a means of moving the oppressed closer to their goals. The middle and late sixties gave rise to young revolutionaries like H. Rap Brown, Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton, Bobby Seals, and others who openly advocated violence and became synonymous with slogans like "Burn Baby, Burn!" This new approach to the civil rights issue

gradually shifted away from the peaceful demonstrations of the first decade of the Civil Rights Movement to violent confrontations between armed revolutionary groups, such as the Black Panther Party³, and the law enforcement agencies of large metropolitan cities. The assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968 by a white radical signaled the end to non-violent protest and ushered in a new era where confrontation was the chosen strategy. Few large American cities between 1967 and 1973 were spared the ugly specter of urban riots, massive destruction of property and armed confrontation between black radical groups and police. Two of the radical groups that attracted widespread attention and were elevated by the media and law enforcement agencies as Americas own terrorist were the Black Liberation Army and the Symbionese Liberation Army.

The Black Liberation Army

In New York City in 1973, two police patrolmen, one white and one black, were gunned down in the East village in a particularly brutal and apparently senseless act of murder. Two days later the United Press International received a Black Liberation Army (BLA) letter of explanation that ended with the warning that there was more to come. This new group had evolved out of the splintered remains of the Black Panthers. They were a collection of tiny, fluid groups of militants, continually merging and dissolving. Most were angry young blacks, generally school drop-outs who had had early brushes with the law. Often recruited to black nationalism in prison, they had drifted on the

edge of the Civil Rights Movement and the emerging thrust for black pride that was so strong during the late sixties and early seventies. Partially educated or self-taught in revolutionary rhetoric, they had become outlaws even from the large urban ghettos from which they came. They were violent outcasts of the urban jungle and the prisons, driven by hatred of the system and outraged at their own limited prospects. They claimed that the American system had destroyed them, that the prisons, not the prisoners, were at fault for what they had become. They had no future and their here and now was characterized by desperation. For these frustrated men, the Black Liberation Army was an acceptable self-rationale for violent revenge against authority. And the most visible pillar of the system was the police. They saw patrolmen, whether black or white, only as symbols of authority, the enemy that had preordained them their lot in life. And so they killed, made minor converts from among the growing number of disenchanting youth who embraced the ideas of armed revolution, killed again, and in turn were killed or captured.⁴

The Symbionese Liberation Army

An even more bizarre "revolutionary movement" surfaced in California in 1973, when another urban revolutionary army calling itself the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) claimed responsibility for the murder of Oakland, California superintendent of schools, Marcus Foster. After two suspects were arrested and subsequently convicted on first-degree murder charges, the nature of the SLA organization became clearer. The

SLA was part cult and part ultra radical conspiracy composed of a dozen men and women from diverse backgrounds - white university students caught up in the popular university idealism of social revolution, escaped convicts, confused drifters, and outright criminals. Their leader was a Donald Defreeze, a 30 year-old escaped convict who went by the revolutionary name of "Cinque". Defreeze in a taped message sent to Oakland officials stated that "we are savage killers and madmen... willing to give our lives to free the people at any cost."

The people they sought to free could be found in themselves. They were angry, frustrated and totally alienated from society at-large. Loathing their way of life or feeling guilty for imagined wrongs or as a result of having grown up as part of the privileged class, they had sought relief and ultimately an end to their suffering by fashioning their own "liberation front" patterned after the growing number of liberation fronts that were springing up throughout the Third World to challenge the status quo of the privileged.

During 1973 their simple conspiracies and crimes were of interest largely to only law enforcement agencies in the San Francisco area. Then in February 1974, the SLA kidnapped Patricia Hearst, heir to the Hearst Newspaper fortune. The SLA-Hearst episode became the media event of 1974. Unlike the past instances of terrorism that was mostly a confrontation between people on the very fringe of society, or between terrorist groups and law enforcement agencies which, although newsworthy, didn't

capture the interest of the general society. The kidnapping for ransom of this blonde, attractive and well-bred member of society captured for the first time American society's attention to what had been happening at an alarming rate in countries throughout the world. The first communique after the kidnapping was a patchwork letter filled with revolutionary jargon which warned that "should any attempt be made by authorities to rescue the 'prisoner' or to arrest or harm any member of the SLA, the 'prisoner' would be executed." Little did we know in 1974 that these same words would be repeated over and over throughout the decade of the seventies and eighties by armed thugs who would terrorize innocent people while using them as pawns in their revolutionary fight against those they perceived as the capitalist enemy. At first the Hearst family, with the cooperation of the FBI, attempted to placate the SLA. An attempt was made to accommodate the SLA demand for free food for all people receiving Social Security or participating in the Food Stamp Program. The Hearst family eventually put up two million dollars, and agreed to fund additional food distribution if Patricia were released.

Then on April 3, to the amazement of all, Patricia Hearst sent a tape to her parents announcing her conversion to the SLA. Media interest intensified. It was a live drama with no foreseeable final act. The Hearsts' repeated pleas over television increasingly took the tone of psychiatric sessions, plea bargaining with the demented.

The final act in the SLA "revolution" was a spectacular shootout in Los Angeles between most of the SLA members and the Los Angeles Police. Much of America practically closed down in order to watch the SLA go up in flames under the fusilade of the police. Patty Hearst was not inside the flaming building. She and two other members were still at large and were not captured until later. Overall, the Symbionese Liberation Army's war against the "capitalist class" had consisted of the murder of a local school official, the kidnapping of a wealthy 19 year old newspaper heiress, a bungled bank robbery, and a tragically-comic shoplifting attempt. In retrospect, it is plain to see that the SLA members were not revolutionaries in the true sense of the word. They were only violent, eccentric, driven men and women living on the margin of rationality, functioning only by resorting to risk and violence that although proved destructive to them, awakened America from its stupor and forced it to come to grips with the realities of terrorist activities that were paralyzing the countries of the middle east, Latin America, and the modern industrialized countries like Germany, Italy, England (Ireland), and Japan.⁵

Any depiction of US terrorist activity during the late sixties would be incomplete without some mention of the politically active university-based student organization known as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Loosely organized, but with chapters on major college and university campuses across the nation, the SDS attracted students that were opposed to US

participation in Vietnam. Growing out of the increasing youth resistance to the military draft, the SDS had become such a political force by mid-1968 that it drafted its own democratic platform built around the extension of voting rights to 18-year olds and ending US involvement in what they considered the unjust and illegal war in Vietnam. The SDS' attempt to participate in the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago resulted in a bloody and violent confrontation between SDS members and Chicago police. The American public was stunned as they witnessed on prime time tv the harshness with which the Chicago police officers beat and manhandled young and idealistic American college students. As a result of this confrontation in Chicago and the resentment created by not being able to influence change through the political process, the more militant and idealistic members of SDS broke away from the SDS mainstream and formed a splinter group that was called the WEATHERMAN UNDERGROUND. Although its adherents spoke in bitter marxist rhetoric, this organization of the "new left" was not so much ideologically motivated as it was oriented on a single issue: The War in Vietnam. Their principle terrorist activity involved attacks against the symbol of the war in Vietnam, ROTC detachments and university research programs that were funded and sponsored by the government. Occassionally, they would bomb local selective service offices, other federal agencies and even committed several robberies, but violence directed at people or resulting in injury to innocent bystanders was minimal.⁶ The abolition of

the military draft and the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam during the early seventies deprived the small group of bomb throwers and anarchist within the Weatherman Underground of a constituency. Although a few members achieved national exposure by making the FBI's Most Wanted List, they became fugitives from the law and disappeared into the social underculture of criminal misfits. The Weatherman Underground had ceased to exist as a terrorist threat by the mid-70s.

Terrorist activity in the United States prior to the early 1970s was almost exclusively the work of domestic US groups who were attempting to achieve uniquely American social and political objectives. Most of these groups had ceased to exist by the early '70s, or due to the effect of criminal prosecution and recruiting problems, they had largely become ineffective. However, terrorist activity in the US was not dead. Almost as if to fill the void created by the demise of US terrorist groups, a new and more deadly form of terrorism emerged in the US as exile groups from other countries adopted the tactics of terrorists in drawing attention to grievances harbored against their home countries.⁷

Two of the earliest of the international groups operating in the US were the Armenian exiles from Turkey and the Croatian exiles from Yugoslavia.

These two terrorist organizations and others elevated terrorism in the United States to the international level. Although their grievances were against Turkey and Yugoslavia,

respectively, the violent expression of those grievances was directed largely against innocent Americans and US property. For a number of years there had been active terrorist organizations such as the Red Brigade in Italy, the Baader-Mienhoff Gang in Germany, the PIRA in Ireland, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the notorious factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization which were active in several Arab countries of the Middle-East; but similiarly to the terrorist organizations that had been active in the United States, their agendas had largely been domestic and generally confined within national borders.⁸ The west was to witness a climatic change in terrorism during the 70s as major terrorist organizations sought to capitalize upon their ability to manipulate the internationally influential US mass media by engaging in acts involving the taking of hostages and the threat of the gun and bomb against innocent civilians in a strategy designed to make governments submit to their demands.⁹

The shift from national to international terrorism was essentially an escalation of a nation-bound struggle waged internationally for either tactical or ideological reasons. Two examples of which were: (1) The 1972 Olymic Village incident in Munich, West Germany where 8 Black September terrorist broke into the Israeli Olypic dormitory, seized nine Israeli athletes, killing two in the process, and gained the attention of the world for two days on their grievances against Israel,¹⁰ and their demand for a Palestinian Homeland and; (2) the Palestinian Fedayeen commando group that seized and killed two American diplomats in

Khartoum because they viewed the United States as the patron of Israel and felt an attack against the Americans was a blow struck against Israel. The media coverage and world attention given their cause in both instances proved to be a hundred-times more effective than what could have been achieved previously by isolated attacks inside Israel.

ANALYSIS

The success of terrorist organizations, and especially the various factions of the Palestinian Liberation Army during the decade of the '70s can be attributed to many reasons, to include the following:

1) Terrorism posed a number of unique problems for western democracies. The terrorists didn't act according to any established rules of warfare or diplomacy. Government officials had heretofore known what to expect from other governments; even unrecognized-insurgent-shadow governments, and knew how to deal with them. But coming to grips with a band of terrorists proved to be altogether a different matter. Because terrorists did not limit their attacks to any particular class of targets or to any specific locale (national or international), or to any period of time, defense proved difficult and costly to provide. Because they were weak militarily, they seldom engaged law enforcement or military forces. The exception being when they held an advantage. Terrorists exhibited no compunction to targeting noncombatants; both for the terror effect gained, and to maximize the survivability of the terrorist agent(s). Because they had no

borders, cities, or population to protect, the terrorist had fewer vulnerabilities.

2) The variety of social, economic and political conditions around the world created not only a variety of causes for terrorist activity, but also provided a constant pool of terrorist recruits. The popular notion that terrorists were Marxist involved in some type of insurgency similar to the Viet Cong in Vietnam belied the fact that throughout many countries in the emerging Third World, and to some extent in modern democracies, there existed gross societal inequities, economic disequilibrium, political disenfranchisement, and varying degrees of neo-colonialism that transcended the simplistic arguments of ideological left versus right. All of these factors, collectively and individually, ushered in a new age of warfare that used the increasingly successful publicity-catching tactics of airplane hijacking, bombings, assassinations and intimidation.

3) The extent to which the media assisted terrorist organizations in accomplishing the intended purpose of their terrorist actions. A major goal of most acts of terrorism is publicity. The terrorist group seeks to publicize its cause among the population in whose interest it claims to be acting and secondly, to the international community of nations or to some part of that community.

4) Liberal democracies frequently displayed a lack of resolve to deal with terrorists in spite of the realization that their societies were threatened. Most Western societies faced with international terrorism during the '70s and early '80s preferred to give-in to the demands of the terrorists, and even

in those few instances where government forces were able to subdue or otherwise capture terrorists, in most cases they received either no punishment or very little punishment.¹¹ Once the terrorist crisis had been eased the trend was to extradite the terrorists out of the country in the belief that by putting them in prison it merely created the basis for a future hijacking or kidnapping in which the demands made upon the government would be for the release of the previously captured terrorists.¹² Most European governments viewed terrorism as political acts rather than as a violation of criminal codes, therefore few international terrorists were even tried for criminal violations of laws.¹³

Increasingly during the mid-late 70s and the early 1980s international terrorism has been directed against American tourist, US diplomatic personnel and property, officials of American International Companies, and members of the US Armed Forces. During the period 1973 to 1984 there has been recorded a total of 2,854 separate incidents in which kidnappings, bombings, assassination, armed attacks or hi-jackings were inflicted upon US personnel and property.¹⁴ The principle sources of the attacks almost without exception are thought to be the work of various Arab terrorist groups who have declared war against the United States because of its long-standing support of the State of Israel.

If the United States indeed had exhibited a sort of cavalier attitude towards terrorism prior to the mid-1970s, a series of events beginning in the late '70s and continuing into the mid-

'80s were to make the issues of terrorism and international terrorists matters of prime concern to the US administration and the American people.

The terrorist bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April, 1983 and the subsequent attack of the US Marine Barracks at the Beirut International Airport in which 241 marines were killed underscored the fact that terrorist warfare could have significant political impact and demonstrated that the United States and other western countries were inadequately prepared to deal with the ominous threat posed by this new dimension of warfare in which fanatical terrorists gave little pause in sacrificing their lives for martyrdom. They also showed we were in fact losing this strange and deadly war.¹⁵

The June 85 hi-jacking of a TWA jet airliner from Athens to Rome during which a US serviceman was brutally murdered and 39 American passengers were held hostage for 17 days by Arab terrorists in Lebanon produced an outcry in the United States to do something about the continuing attacks on Americans in the Middle-East. In response to the question of what could be done, the general assessment was that nothing could be done to totally eliminate terrorism, given the legions of men and women harboring unredressed grievances, real, as well as imagined, against Israel, the United States, and various other nations around the world.

The mood of many in the US Government and the general public has been for the use of military reprisals against terrorist organizations. The former US National Security advisor, Robert McFarlane stated on the CBS news program "Face the Nation," that

it was imperative that terrorist acts not be allowed to continue without the terrorist paying a cost. Although reprisals serve a function in assuaging the damaged national will that often follows terrorist acts, there are several drawbacks to military reprisals:

1) Although reprisals make the necessary point that terrorist acts will not go unpunished, they historically have not reduced the level of terrorist activity. The ping-pong violence between Arabs and Israelis over three decades has yet to rid Israel of terrorism.¹⁶

2) The United States has always followed a policy founded in the precepts of Jus in Bello that retaliatory strikes must be based upon proportionality and come as a clear association between the target and the terrorist act.¹⁷ Although there has been an abundance of circumstantial evidence, rarely has there been clear-cut and irrefutable evidence linking a specific terrorist act with a target that could be struck militarily.

3) Reprisals aggravate relations between nations undertaking the reprisal and usually friendly states because the current international system accords little legitimacy to the right of reprisal. The United States, dependant as it is on good relations with a number of countries in the Middle-East in its effort to foster peace in the region can ill-afford to have moderate Arab states unite behind the "Moslem Brotherhood" in support of another Moslem country that was retaliated against without first producing irrefutable evidence showing collusion between the state and the terrorist act.

The formulation of adequate responses to counter state-sponsored terrorism presents a dilemma to all free-world nations. To be effective, the response should neutralize terrorism not only by preventing the terrorist act when possible but also by imposing some kind of penalty or punishment on the successful terrorist to deter him from acting again. Of course, if intelligence about terrorists is good enough to permit pre-emption, then the best time to move against them is before they have committed the terrorist act.

As a principle target of terrorists, and the major power in the world capable of imposing cost on terrorists for their conduct, the United States must take the lead in organizing the strategy against terrorists and terrorist states.

-Range of Countermeasures for State-Sponsored Terrorism

1) Intelligence: Terrorist experts in nearly all the threatened countries agree that the key to an effective response to terrorism is good intelligence. Current information about menacing world situations, violence-prone groups, the movements of known terrorists, the known activities of states supporting terrorism, along with intelligence on the movement of arms and explosives across international borders must be collected, evaluated and quickly disseminated to threatened countries. This more often than not is a difficult chore in view of the many laws of open societies that restrict unwarranted intrusion into the privacy of citizens. It has been made even more difficult in the US as a result of the reduction in the operational capability of the Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁹ The continuing constitutional

debate over primacy between the requirements of national security and the rights of the individual must be revisited if the war against terrorism is to be won.

2) Political and Diplomatic Pressures: The granting of diplomatic recognition to another government and the inauguration of diplomatic relations gives one country a means of influencing the decisions of another by opening a direct communications channel with its top officials. The suspension or breaking of diplomatic relations with another country has historically been viewed as being just short of declaring war.²⁰ The collective use of this element of power by the nations of the west against states that have been proven to be supporting terrorism would be very effective in isolating and branding them as renegades among the international community. The US' break in diplomatic relations with Iran following the 1979 seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran, and the 1982 break in diplomatic relations with Libya have had impact upon both countries, but much less than desired as a result of the continuation of normal relations with both countries by other nations of the Atlantic Alliance. In that a break in diplomatic relations also entails the expulsion of students and diplomatic personnel and imposition of travel restrictions, these potential effects were lost as a result of a failure to gain the support of other industrialized countries that have suffered at the hands of Iranian and Libyan trained terrorists.

Economic Sanctions:

If political and diplomatic initiatives do not produce the

desired responses from the targeted nations, the use of the economic element of power is the next graduated step up the scale of influence available to the US and other major powers in the west. The use of the economic element of power can take the form of embargoes on trade, freezing the assets of the targeted country, the giving or withholding of financial aid, and the prudent use of the foreign military sales program. The 1980-81 embargo of Libyan oil in response to intelligence reports of Libyan "hit squads" sent to the US to assassinate public officials resulted in the loss of Libyan trade to the US which had reached a high of 7.6 billion in 1980. This loss represented almost 50% of Libya's total 1982 exports of 13.9 billion.²¹ Had Libya's other major trading partners of Italy, West Germany, Japan, Britain, and France joined with the US, Libya's current role in support of international terrorism would be significantly different.

A superb example of how the economic element of power can be used to counter terrorism was the successful capture of Arab terrorists who had hijacked a plane from West Germany in 1977 and forced it to fly to Mogadishu, Somalia where the terrorists thought they would be beyond the reach of any western retribution. However to their surprise, Somalia, a Moslim, and at that time Marxist government, allowed West German forces to operate on Somalian territory and successfully ended the hijacking. Somalian cooperation was obtained as a result of British and West German promises to provide Somalia with military equipment with which to pursue its on-going war with Ethiopia.²²

Military Element of Power:

The use of military forces to strike back at terrorists, or the countries suspected of supporting them, invariably becomes a heated and emotional issue following each gruesome act of terrorism. In the face of popular opinion, President Reagan's restraint on military retaliation against Libya for its part in the December 1985 attack on the Rome and Vienna airports underscore the difficulty of employing this element of power in the war against terrorism. The United States and most western democracies must consider a number of constraints prior to using force. Including the following:

1) Because most terrorist acts involve bombings, assassinations or hi-jackings, surprise is invariably on the side of the terrorist.

2) Terrorists have the advantage of choosing location, which usually creates a problem of immediacy in military force employment.

3) Terrorism often involves hostages whose lives would be threatened by the use of military forces.

4) Most western nations are committed to abiding by codes of behavior appropriate to democracies.

5) Conventional and/or air attack against countries that support terrorist will invariably involve friendly force casualties which may be politically unacceptable, or cause civilian casualties which exposes the attacker to world condemnation and risk a shift in world order.

To be effective, military forces should be tailored to suit the peculiar nature of terrorist warfare. In most instances

conventional forces are not organized or trained for this type operation. The success of specialized anti-terrorist forces like the US Delta Team, the West German Greunz-Schutz-Gruppe Nein (GSG-9), the British SAS, and others, offer a far greater chance of success in the covert style of war that has proven so effective against terrorists.

Socio/Psychological Element of Power:

US national will—including congressional judgement - must be mobilized to support the US Armed Forces for as long as it takes to win the battle to which they are being committed. This requirement is valid whether it is a hostage rescue mission, a pre-emptive or post-incident attack on identified terrorists, or in the worst case protracted counter-insurgency or counter-military operations...!²³ The governments of the west must stop allowing terrorists to pass themselves off as soldiers of God on sacred missions in His name, or as "freedom fighters" engaged in an international crusade for a new world order. The resources of the west, to include the media, must show them for what they are -- cunning, merciless and rabid criminals dedicated to destroying open and free societies.²⁴

Cooperation Among Allies:

The recent US experience in not being able to gain the support of its Atlantic Allies for sanctions against Libya for its role in support of terrorists reflects a major weakness in the west's response to the menace of international terrorism.

In spite of the damage that has been inflicted upon the

social fabric of France, England, West Germany and Italy, they have shown that they are still reluctant to make the hard choices so necessary in the war against terrorism. Although the US has been unable to gain European support for sanctions against terrorist states, the recent passage of the United Nations Resolution on terrorism after more than a 13-year debate, gives pause for hope that finally the civilized nations may be on the verge of closing ranks against terrorists and their state supporters. The US must create a feeling of harmony with its allies. It must show its support for allied cooperation by providing resources to those countries who because of their economic or resources dependency are reluctant to take bold steps. The United States because of its dominant role in the world order and its abundant resources must take the lead in fashioning covenants in the areas of: (1) Intelligence sharing (2) use of economic sanctions (3) extradition of terrorists (4) denial of sanctuary (5) joint counter-terrorism training programs (6) commercial trade agreements (7) foreign military sales (8) anti-hijacking pacts and; (9) alliances with nations actively opposing state-sponsored terrorism.

CONCLUSIONS

It has only been in the last few years that terrorism has become a major issue to the US Government and the American people. Although varying forms of terrorism have always been a part of the American social and political landscape, we as a country have taken a head-in-the-sand attitude towards it because heretofore terrorism affected only small segments of US society. The internationalization of social and political grievances held by a variety of people, and their identification of the US as being either the source of their grievance, or at least a party to maintaining the conditions from which their grievances were spawned has brought the issue of terrorism squarely to the forefront of US Domestic and Foreign Policy concerns.

The continuing attacks upon US citizens and property overseas has created a groundswell of national emotion that clamors to strike back. This emotion has been at the heart of the question--why continue to spend the billions of dollars on defense if we are incapable of protecting US interest from what amounts to groups of armed thugs? The American psyche is hard put to understand, much less accept, the premise that military force is not always the most appropriate means to resolve conflicts - even against unquestionably weaker adversaries. International terrorism almost always involves the selective use of surprise bombings, assassinations or hi-jackings. There

invariably is no warning, hostages are held as a leverage, or there is not a clear link between the terrorist act and those responsible. The use of military force under these conditions means that the US would be assuming a reactive rather than the more effective proactive response. Although the elements of surprise, choice of target and location, and the value of hostages accrue immeasurable benefit to terrorists, terrorism can be challenged through a set of national and international arrangements designed to: (1) Collect timely information about the identity, movements, tactics and support of terrorists to enable security forces to prevent terrorist acts or to bring terrorists quickly to justice; (2) deny terrorists sanctuary in any country opposed to terrorism; (3) improve security at airports so as to deny easy international travel to terrorists; (4) drastically improve the static protective measures at US embassies and other government structures, especially in the Middle-East; (5) encourage self-restraint on private travel into countries apathetic to the problem of terrorism; (6) apply concerted diplomatic and economic sanctions, and military persuasion against regimes that abet terrorism; (7) counter the propoganda that terrorists are freedom fighters and ; (8) marshall the resources and goodwill of the world body of nations in forthrightly resolving the glaring injustices that spawns the seeds of terrorism.

Cornell Fuller

Cornell Fuller, LTC Infantry
USAWC, 1986

ENDNOTES

1. Brian M. Jenkins, "Terrorism in the United States," TVI JOURNAL, Vol. I, Number 4, March 1980, p. 16.
2. Thomas E. Burns, Jr., UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPEAN TERRORIST GROUPS-CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES, p. 18.
3. Phillip S. Foner, THE BLACK PANTHERS SPEAK, p. 60.
4. J. Bowyer Bell, A TIME OF TERROR, p. 44.
5. Jenkins, p. 1.
6. IBID., pp. 2,6.
7. Bell, pp. 34-35.
8. Edgar O'Ballance, LANGUAGE OF VIOLENCE, pp. 135-136.
9. Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," in COMTEMPORARY TERRORISM, SELECTED READINGS, ed by John D. Elliott, ET AL, p. 235.
10. Bell, p. 89.
11. George Shultz, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," US State Department Current Policy, Number 783, p. 2.
12. Bell, p. 88.
13. Ibid., p. 153.
14. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, TERRORISM AS STATE-SPONSORED COVERT WARFARE, p. 89.
15. Department of Defense, "Executive Summary, Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, Oct 23, 1983," dated 20 December 1983, pp. 7-15.
16. Bell, pp. 79-80.
17. James Turner Johnson, CAN MODERN WAR BE JUST?, p. 18.
18. Robert B. Oakley, "Terrorism: Overview and Developments," US State Department Current Policy, Number 744, p. 5.
19. Ray S. Cline, "The Strategic Framework," in INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM, by Benjamin Netanyahu, p. 99.

20. Donald E. Nuechterlein, AMERICAN OVERCOMMITTED, pp. 32-33.
21. Rolf Manning, Deadline Data on World Affairs, "Libya."
22. O'Ballance, p. 323.
23. Cline and Alexander, p. 75.
24. Paul Wilkinson, TERRORISM:INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS, p. 21.

END

DTIC

9-86