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SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM(U) FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF CIVIL


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U.S. Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

AD-A169 813

Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Security Program

July 1-December 31, 1985

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Washington, D C 20591

May 1986

Report of the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration
to the United States Congress
pursuant to Section 315(a)
of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958

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86 7 8 024

Technical Report Documentation Page

1. Report No. DOT/FAA-ACS-85-2(23)	2. Government Accession No.	3. Recipient's Catalog No.	
4. Title and Subtitle Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program		5. Report Date May 30, 1986	
		6. Performing Organization Code -	
7. Author(s) Aviation Security Division		8. Performing Organization Report No. -	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address DOT/Federal Aviation Administration Office of Civil Aviation Security 800 Independence Avenue, SW. Washington, D.C. 20591		10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)	
		11. Contract or Grant No.	
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address DOT/Federal Aviation Administration Office of Civil Aviation Security 800 Independence Avenue, SW. Washington, D.C. 20591		13. Type of Report and Period Covered Recurring Report July 1 - December 31, 1985	
14. Sponsoring Agency Code			
15. Supplementary Notes This report is required by Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended.			
16. Abstract This report provides details on the effectiveness of security screening of passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. It also provides a statistical summary of aircraft hijackings and alleged violations of Federal Aviation regulations pertaining to security screening. In addition, the report presents a summary of the assessments conducted to determine the effectiveness of the security measures at foreign airports served by U.S. air carriers and certain other foreign airports as required by Section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended.			
17. Key Words		18. Distribution Statement	
19. Security Classif. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED	20. Security Classif. (of this page) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 22	22. Price



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

MAY 30 1986

The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period July 1 through December 31, 1985, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

During this reporting period, there was one attempt made to hijack a U.S. air carrier aircraft. This attempt was made by a mentally disturbed individual and was unsuccessful. This one U.S. air carrier hijacking in this reporting period and the total of four which occurred during 1985 are the lowest semiannual and annual totals since 1976. There was one U.S. general aviation aircraft hijacked during the reporting period. Thus, the total U.S. hijackings in 1985 were five or 14 percent of the 36 hijackings which occurred worldwide. This is the lowest annual United States percentage of worldwide hijackings since 1973. It is apparent that, at least in the United States, the passenger screening procedures and other safeguards which have been implemented to prevent criminal acts against civil aviation continue to be highly effective.

The measures implemented in 1985 to expand and improve civil aviation security systems in the United States and worldwide have been very successful. These measures and the foreign airports security assessment program, which was implemented during this reporting period pursuant to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83), are designed to reduce vulnerable areas in domestic and international civil aviation security programs and to prevent criminal acts against civil aviation.

A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House.

Sincerely,

Donald D. Engen
Administrator

Enclosure



50 Years of Air Traffic Control Excellence
— A Standard for the World



U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

MAY 30 1986

The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

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Sincerely,



Donald D. Engen
Administrator

Enclosure



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50 Years of Air Traffic Control Excellence
A Standard for the World

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I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1985.
2. OVER 511 MILLION PERSONS WERE PROCESSED THROUGH U.S. PASSENGER CHECKPOINTS. THERE WERE 1,539 FIREARMS DETECTED WITH 707 RELATED ARRESTS.
3. WORLDWIDE, 10 HIJACKINGS OCCURRED (3 SUCCESSFUL) AGAINST SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS. ONE WAS AGAINST U.S. AIRLINES (UNSUCCESSFUL).
4. ONE U.S. AND NINE FOREIGN GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT WERE HIJACKED DURING THE PERIOD.
5. ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS BY AIR CARRIERS, AIRPORTS, AND INDIVIDUALS TOTALED 1,827.
6. OF THE 1,827 ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS, 176 RESULTED IN CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING \$145,106.
7. ASSESSMENTS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECURITY MEASURES WERE CONDUCTED AT 50 FOREIGN AIRPORTS.
8. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES WERE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY TO PREVENT OR DETER TERRORIST AND OTHER CRIMINAL ACTS AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION.

II. INTRODUCTION

This 23rd Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This section requires that a semiannual report be submitted concerning the effectiveness of screening procedures. This report covers the period July 1 - December 31, 1985. It presents a concise picture of the nationwide effectiveness of the procedures used to screen passengers and their carry-on items prior to boarding scheduled and public charter flights as well as visitors desiring access to sterile air terminal passenger boarding areas. This report also presents a summary of the assessments conducted to determine the effectiveness of the security measures at foreign airports served by U.S. air carriers, foreign airports from which foreign air carriers serve the United States, foreign airports which pose a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and such other foreign airports as the Secretary of Transportation may deem appropriate. These assessments were conducted pursuant to the International Security and Development Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83) which amended section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act. In addition, this report includes a summary of the changes in security measures which were instituted during 1985 to prevent or deter terrorist and other criminal acts against civil aviation.

III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

A U.S. citizen engaged in public charter and/or scheduled passenger air operations must hold an operating certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Technically, that person is a "certificate holder." In this report, such certificate holders are referred to as air carriers in order to differentiate them and their aircraft from general aviation operators and aircraft.

There was one attempted hijacking of a U.S. scheduled air carrier during this period. This unsuccessful hijacking attempt was perpetrated by a man with a history of mental illness. After causing a disturbance aboard the aircraft, he deplaned at the request of an airline official. Before the door was closed, however, he ran back aboard saying that he was hijacking the plane. He was overpowered by airline employees.

There was one U.S. general aviation helicopter hijacked during the reporting period. This successful hijacking was carried out by a woman who chartered the helicopter for a local area sightseeing flight. While en route, she pointed a pistol at the pilot and required that he land the helicopter in a prison exercise yard. A prison guard was shot as he tried to prevent prisoners from boarding. The helicopter with the hijacker and three prisoners was flown to a point about 4 miles from the prison where they fled in a waiting automobile. They were apprehended by police several days later.

The one air carrier and one general aviation hijacking of U.S. aircraft compare to nine hijackings (three successful) of foreign air carriers and nine hijackings (all successful) of foreign general aviation aircraft

during the same period. These hijackings coupled with the three United States and thirteen foreign air carrier hijackings which occurred in the first half of 1985 have resulted in the lowest annual United States percentage (14 percent) of worldwide hijackings since 1973. Eight of the foreign general aviation hijackings occurred in Colombia. All of these hijackings reportedly were the result of anti-government insurgent activity.

(See Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)

In addition to compiling records and reporting on actual hijackings, the FAA has attempted to identify, record, and report incidents in which it appeared that individuals intended to hijack an aircraft or commit other crimes against civil aviation but were prevented from doing so by airline and airport security measures in effect. Section V of this report provides a summary of firearms which were detected at screening points under suspicious circumstances during this reporting period. It is very possible that in some of these instances, the persons carrying firearms may have intended to hijack an aircraft; however, sufficient additional data were not developed to fully support this determination. While the number of incidents wherein the perpetrator of an action intended to commit a crime against civil aviation cannot be determined with certainty, there were three incidents where the facts tend to support that possibility during the last half of 1985. This raises the number of hijackings or related crimes believed prevented since 1973 to 116.

(See Exhibit 4)

IV. BASIC POLICIES

Operating on the concept of shared responsibilities among airlines, airports, local communities, the Federal Government, and the aircraft passengers, the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program has continued to be highly effective in preventing aircraft hijackings and other criminal acts against civil aviation. The spirit of cooperation which characterizes these mutually beneficial working relationships has been very helpful in making the system work well. In furtherance of assuring safe air travel, the Federal Government establishes and enforces regulations, policies, and procedures and in general provides overall guidance and direction to the program. The policies of the program recognize the airlines as responsible for the safety of passengers, baggage, and cargo in their care as well as for the safeguarding of their aircraft. Similarly, airport operators are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing local law enforcement support for airline and airport security measures. Finally, the passengers--the ultimate beneficiaries of the security program--pay for the costs of the program through security charges included in airline ticket price calculations and through the inconveniences of voluntary screening and searches.

(See Exhibit 5)

V. PASSENGER SCREENING--SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The current U.S. airline passenger screening system, which has been in operation since 1973, has proven to be highly effective in preventing and deterring aircraft hijackings. Since the initiation of these strengthened security measures, almost 7 billion persons have been screened and over 8 billion carry-on items have been inspected. This screening and inspection activity has resulted in the detection of over 34,000 firearms with over 14,000 related arrests.

(See Exhibit 6)

The change in the anti-hijacking program brought about by the strengthened security measures in 1973 has borne some remarkable results. For instance, on the average, there were 27 U.S. aircraft hijacked per year over the 5-year period preceding 1973. During the 13-year period since, however, there have been a total of 100 U.S. aircraft hijackings, or an average of less than 8 per year. This decrease would be even more substantial except for the rash of hijackings to Cuba in 1980 (17) and 1983 (13) committed largely by homesick Cubans who arrived in the U.S. during the exodus of several hundred thousand people from Cuba in 1980. Substituting the usual 1 to 3 hijackings per year of this type for the inflated figures of 1980 and 1983, the yearly average of U.S. hijackings would drop to less than six. The lone unsuccessful air carrier hijacking recorded during this reporting period combined with the three air carrier hijackings which occurred during the first half of 1985 brings the total number of air carrier hijackings in 1985 to four. The demand to be flown to Cuba was made in only one of the four incidents. The four hijackings in 1985 are well below the yearly average number of hijackings, and down from 1984's total of five. This represents the lowest number of air carrier hijackings recorded since 1976.

Passenger screening activity at U.S. airports concentrates on the greatest threat to civil aviation security, specifically the detection of firearms and explosives or incendiary devices. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the recording and study of the number of firearms and explosives or incendiary devices detected, false threats received, and certain other offenses, as well as related information received concerning arrests and disposition of cases.

During this reporting period, over 511.5 million persons were processed through security screening checkpoints at 392 airports involved in the FAA's Civil Aviation Security Program. As a result of this screening activity, a total of 1,539 firearms were detected, of which 1,452 (94 percent) were detected by X-ray inspection of carry-on items; 38 (2 percent) were detected by use of metal detectors and 49 (4 percent) were detected as the result of physical search. The 6 percent increase in the number of weapons detected over the 1,448 weapons detected during the first 6 months of 1985 is in direct proportion to the increase in number of persons screened during the same periods of time. In addition, there were 7 explosive/incendiary devices detected by X-ray inspection during this reporting period.

There were a total of 708 persons arrested for carriage of firearms/ explosive devices during this reporting period. This represents an increase of approximately 18 percent over the 602 arrests recorded during the first half of 1985 and a 10 percent increase over the average of 642 arrests for the preceding eight reporting periods. The 708 arrests were made at 85 airports of various sizes throughout the United States.

Airports are categorized, in regard to screening activities, according to the number of persons screened per year. Categories I, II, III, and IV are defined as follows: Category I - 2 million or more persons screened annually; Category II - 500,000 to 2 million; and Categories III and IV - under 500,000. Of the total persons arrested, 612 (86 percent) occurred at 51 Category I airports (e.g., Los Angeles, California; and Boston, Massachusetts); 60 (9 percent) occurred at 21 Category II airports (e.g., Syracuse, New York; and Oakland, California); and 34 (5 percent) occurred at 14 Categories III and IV airports (e.g., Mobile, Alabama; and Santa Barbara, California). Security screening at Category IV airports is conducted only when deplanement into a sterile area is desired.

Individuals, who without proper authorization attempt to carry firearms or explosive/incendiary devices through screening checkpoints, may be subject to criminal prosecution by Federal and local jurisdictions as well as civil penalties imposed by the FAA.

Screening checkpoint equipment consists primarily of walk-through weapon detectors and, at high volume screening checkpoints, X-ray inspection systems for carry-on articles. At most stations, hand-held metal detection devices are used as backup support for the walk-through weapon detection devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, has ongoing research and developmental projects geared toward producing new screening equipment which will improve capabilities to detect weapons and explosives and minimize passenger inconvenience.

(See Exhibit 7)

VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program is implemented through a series of Federal Aviation Regulations and, as with any law, the regulations are subject to both inadvertent and deliberate violations. The basic purpose of these requirements is to assure safety and security for airline passengers and crewmembers. The FAA approach is to prevent violations, to the greatest extent possible, by fostering an atmosphere of voluntary compliance and cooperative actions to correct promptly any deficiencies and weaknesses detected.

When alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements do occur, they are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal action is taken. These actions take the form of warnings, letters of correction, or assessments of civil penalties.

During the last half of 1985, 1,827 investigations of alleged security violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 176 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$145,106 were collected, and in 1,554 cases, administrative corrective actions were taken. In the remaining 97 cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated. The total number of investigations closed during the second half of 1985 represents a 2 percent increase over the 1,791 investigations closed during the first half of 1985. The number of cases which resulted in civil penalties, however, increased by 17 percent and the amount of the civil penalties increased \$93,311 or 180 percent over the number and amount of civil penalties which occurred in the first half of 1985.

During the calendar year 1985, 3,618 investigations of alleged violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 326 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$196,901 were collected, and in 3,068 cases, administrative corrective actions were taken. In the remaining 224 cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated. During 1985 the number of cases which resulted in civil penalties increased 3 percent over 1984. The amount of the civil penalties, however, increased \$42,422 or 27 percent.

VII. ASSESSMENTS OF SECURITY MEASURES MAINTAINED AT FOREIGN AIRPORTS

Public Law 99-83, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 was enacted on August 8, 1985. Title V, Part B of the Act amends section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and directs the Secretary of Transportation to assess the effectiveness of security measures at those foreign airports being served by U.S. air carriers, those foreign airports from which foreign air carriers serve the United States, those foreign airports which pose a high risk of introducing danger to international travel, and at such other airports as the Secretary may deem appropriate. The Act provides for measures to be taken regarding airports which do not maintain and administer effective security measures.

The FAA has been delegated the responsibility for the implementation of certain legislative requirements in Public Law 99-83. These include: (1) assessment of security measures at foreign airports, (2) consultation with the Secretary of State concerning threats, and (3) the inclusion of a summary on foreign airport security in the Semianual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program.

Guidelines and standards have been developed for the assessment of security measures, the foreign airports to be assessed have been identified and the assessments of the security measures at the identified airports have been initiated. During this reporting period, assessments of the security measures maintained by 50 foreign airports were conducted by FAA. These assessments included all major international airports served by United States air carriers and those from which foreign air carriers serve the United States. Of the total assessments, 32 were conducted at airports in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, 13 in South and Central America, and 5 in the Asia and Pacific area.

Assessments consist of an indepth analysis of the security measures at the airports, using a standard which is based upon, at a minimum, the Standards and appropriate Recommended Practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. If FAA obtains information indicating that an airport may not maintain and administer effective security measures, these findings are reported to the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. The law provides for notification to the foreign country involved when a determination is made by the Secretary of Transportation that a foreign airport does not maintain and administer effective security measures. Notifications include recommended steps to remedy the problem. It also specifies when and how the public is to be notified of that determination. Public notice need not occur unless the foreign government fails to bring security measures up to the standard within 90 days of being notified of the Secretary of Transportation's determination. If the Secretary of Transportation at any time determines, after consultation with the Secretary of State, that a condition exists which threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a specified airport, the Secretary of Transportation must apprise the Secretary of State, who must issue a travel advisory.

Of the initial 50 assessments of foreign airports conducted during this reporting period, none resulted in a Secretarial determination. There were security concerns noted at some airports, but none were so serious as to support a determination that they were not maintaining an effective security program, and, thus, did not require a formal 90-day notice to the affected governments or notification to the public.

Also, in response to a threat that surfaced during the December 1985 meeting of the Organization of African States (OAS) in Dakar, Senegal, FAA special agents were dispatched to Dakar at the request of Senegal officials to assist in an intensive 2-week effort to bring the level of security at the airport to a level well above the International Civil Aviation Organization minimum Standards cited in Annex 17.

VIII. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY INITIATIVES

Due to the upsurge of terrorist acts against civil aviation in certain areas of the Middle East, President Reagan directed the Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with the Department of State and other members of the Cabinet, to undertake several important initiatives. That direction prompted the following:

- ° On June 27, 1985, the Secretary of Transportation urged the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to embark immediately upon an intensified program aimed at responding to the need for enhanced airport security. As a result, the ICAO Council convened on an accelerated schedule and on December 19, 1985, strengthened its airport security requirements by adopting Amendment 6 to the International Standards and Recommended Practices - Security (Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference - Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation). Eleven new specifications were introduced into the Annex and 19 specifications were adopted as standards.

- ° In July 1985, two emergency amendments to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) were effected. Part 108 of the FAR was amended to require the carriage of Federal Air Marshals in the number and manner specified by the Administrator on designated scheduled and public charter passenger operations. The second emergency amendment to Part 108 of the FAR requires each certificate holder to provide a ground and an in-flight security coordinator for each international and domestic flight. It further requires that all crewmembers be provided with expanded security training.
- ° In September 1985, the FAA began hiring additional Civil Aviation Security Inspectors. Part of their duties required that they be trained to act as Federal Air Marshals. Their hiring and initial training were completed in December 1985, and they have been assigned to FAA regional offices throughout the United States and to the FAA Washington headquarters. In addition to general security matters, they received very intense training in both the inflight and ground aspects of their duties as Federal Air Marshals to prepare them to deal appropriately and safely with any situation which might jeopardize the safety of the passengers. Federal Air Marshals are currently being assigned to flights of U.S. carriers to designated areas. They are monitoring all security aspects of the flight, including surveillance of the passenger screening operations, preflight inspection of aircraft, and checking of the cargo and baggage.
- ° During the period mid-August to early November 1985, an interim cadre consisting of 84 law enforcement officers from 6 Federal agencies assisted the FAA in 39 inspection trips. During these trips, the teams inspected U.S. air carrier security operations in place at a total of 79 foreign airports, and, where appropriate, or upon request, they conducted security training.
- ° To assure implementation of security procedures to protect all U.S. civil aviation and U.S. citizens traveling in the United States and throughout the world, the FAA issued a number of emergency amendments to the airport operators' and air carriers' FAA-approved security programs. One such amendment to the security programs required extraordinary or enhanced security procedures to be implemented at several foreign airports served by U.S. air carriers. The security measures which are in effect at those designated airports are, as a rule, far more stringent than those currently in effect in domestic airports. The reason for the variation is to ensure that the established procedures for U.S. civil aviation at a particular airport coincide with the level of threat.
- ° Another amendment to both airport and air carrier security programs requires that procedures be established to verify employment history for all persons employed after November 1, 1985, by the airport, its tenants, or its contractors, including air carriers who are permitted unescorted restricted area access. An immediate need for this action was recognized as the actions of these people can critically impact the safety and security of the traveling public.

- ° The implementation of these initiatives often required increased efforts and additional resources. The evaluation of foreign airports and the special evaluations of domestic airports were successfully conducted. While no airport was ignored, the first priority regarding the evaluation of domestic air carrier and airport security procedures was given to Category I airports (airports where annual screening exceeds 2 million persons) with foreign departures and all other international airports. During those evaluations, special emphasis was given to the carriers' passenger screening, checked baggage profile, cargo area, and airplane security procedures, as well as the airport's law enforcement operations and manner of protection of the air operations areas. Other domestic airports were also evaluated. Effective monitoring and enforcement are being accomplished for the special emphasis items.
- ° The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-83) authorized \$5,000,000 to be appropriated from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund for research on and the development of airport security devices or techniques for detecting explosives. The FAA has accelerated its research and development program for the detection of explosives in checked baggage, air cargo, and on passengers. Major efforts have been undertaken in two areas to develop explosive detection systems. The first involves a system using vapor analysis to detect explosives being carried on a person. The second involves two different systems to detect explosives in checked baggage and cargo, each using a form of thermal neutron activation. Contracts have been negotiated to build prototype operational systems. The FAA plans to obligate \$11,800,000 in fiscal year 1986 and has requested \$12,700,000 for fiscal year 1987 for this accelerated research and development program.


IX. OUTLOOK

With the steady and continuous increase in terrorist activities worldwide, it is reasonable to expect that terrorist attacks against civil aviation may increase proportionately. Recognizing this very real threat to the security of air transportation, most Governments have taken action to improve substantially security procedures at their airports. The United States program of conducting periodic assessments of the security measures at foreign airports is expected to assist the airports involved in developing and maintaining efficient and effective security measures. These measures, in turn, will assist the airports in successfully protecting personnel and property against terrorist acts. The extensive security measures being utilized by United States airlines and airports are being continually assessed to ensure that they meet the rapidly changing nature and intensity of the terrorist threat. In conjunction with other elements of the Department of Transportation and executive agencies, the FAA will take appropriate actions to meet the threat and will implement additional measures as the situation may warrant.



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft^{1/}



^{1/}Effective September 1981 - Includes All Certificate Holders as Defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 108.

^{2/}Hijacking in Which Hijacker Is Apprehended/Killed During Hijacking or a Result of "Hot Pursuit".

U.S. Aircarrier Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1985


Date 1985	Airline-Ftl/ Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination/ Objective
1/4	PA-558/ B-727	27	Cleveland, OH	Brazil
1/18	EA-403/ A-300	132	Newark, NJ	Cuba
6/14	TW-847/ B-727	151	Athens, Greece	Prisoner Release
11/19	HP-261 B-737	63	Phoenix, AZ	To Control Aircraft



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Administration

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. And Foreign Aircraft*



*Includes General Aviation Aircraft


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EXHIBIT 2



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft



^{1/} Hijacking in Which Hijacker is Apprehended/Killed During Hijacking or as a Result of "Hot Pursuit."

U.S. General Aviation Hijackings Since Jan. 1, 1985

Date	Airline Flight Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination Objective
12/19	Palmetto Helicopter Hughes 300 C	2	Greenville, SC	Prisoner Release


As of: 1/1/86

EXHIBIT 3



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Actual Hijackings & Prevented Hijacking Attempts — 1974 to Present ***(U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft)***



PREVENTED ATTEMPTS: Incidents in which it appeared the individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft but were prevented from doing so by security procedures.

EXHIBIT 4

As of: 1/1/86



U.S. Department
of Transportation
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Administration

Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
AIR CARRIERS	SECURE TRAVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS• SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS• SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES• PROTECT AIRCRAFT
AIRPORTS	SECURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS• PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA• PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
FAA	LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT• PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS• COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS• PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE• ENFORCE REGULATIONS
USERS	PROGRAM COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Civil Aviation Security Scope and Effectiveness 1973-1985

- Almost 7 Billion Persons Screened
- Over 8 Billion Pieces of Carry-on Items Inspected
- Over 34,000 Firearms Detected
- Over 14,000 Related Arrests
- 116 Hijackings or Related Crimes May Have Been Prevented by Airline and Airport Security Measures

EXHIBIT 6

As of: 1/1/86



U.S. Department
of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results January 1980-December 1985

	1980	1980	1981	1981	1982	1982	1983	1983	1984	1984	1985	1985
	Jan	June	July	Dec	Jan	June	July	Dec	Jan	June	July	Dec
Persons Screened (Millions)	288.9	285.1	294.4	304.1	319.5	310.7	313.9	385.2	367.4	408.2	481.1	511.6
Weapons Detected												
Firearms	1002	1020	971	1284	1286	1390	1363	1421	1325	1632	1448	1539
(1) Handguns	940	938	915	1209	1243	1316	1303	1331	1265	1501	1385	1438
(2) Long Guns	17	19	7	37	16	41	22	45	31	69	38	52
(3) Other	45	63	49	38	27	33	38	45	29	62	25	49
Explosive/Incendiary Devices	1	7	8	3	0	1	4	0	4	2	5	7
Persons Arrested												
For Carriage of Firearms Explosives	520	511	534	653	651	663	633	649	585	720	602	708
For Giving False Information	11	21	34	15	21	6	7	27	6	21	17	25

Source: Reports of Passenger Screening Activities at U.S. Airports

As of: 1/1/86

EXHIBIT 7



U.S. Department of Transportation
**Federal Aviation
Administration**

Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions

	1973 through 1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
U.S. AIR CARRIERS								
Warnings	1,141	283	154	465	164	231	191	426
Letters of Correction	768	102	100	52	98	51	104	101
Non Enforcement Actions	399	49	55	38	44	52	33	39
Civil Penalties (Amount)	314 (\$300,700)	26 (\$18,075)	48 (\$42,875)	35 (\$72,547)	28 (\$10,508)	37 (\$26,861)	56 (\$62,300)	42 (\$105,296)
Investigations Closed	2,622	460	357	590	334	371	384	608
Investigations Pending	109	80	112	115	91	163	88	145
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS								
Warnings	0	14	4	3	2	3	5	11
Letters of Correction	34	6	4	0	2	1	0	3
Non Enforcement Actions	10	3	15	1	2	2	3	4
Civil Penalties (Amount)	0	0	0	2 (\$25,000)	0	0	3 (\$6,000)	0
Investigations Closed	44	23	23	6	6	6	11	18
Investigations Pending	14	15	5	2	4	4	1	7
AIRPORTS								
Warnings Issued	571	80	83	63	59	57	43	53
Letters of Correction	377	53	91	14	21	9	14	24
Non Enforcement Actions	93	12	23	19	9	18	16	10
Civil Penalties (Amount)	73 (\$43,600)	19 (\$15,150)	13 (\$15,600)	23 (\$21,675)	8 (\$6,300)	8 (\$7,250)	7 (\$6,750)	6 (\$10,900)
Investigations Closed	1,114	164	210	119	97	92	80	93
Investigations Pending	52	69	48	25	18	14	12	25
INDIVIDUALS								
Administrative Corrections	177	617	1,469	2,168	2,267	2,474	1,964	2,450
Non Enforcement Actions	85	87	162	209	161	207	173	171
Civil Penalties (Amount)	15 (\$4,350)	70 (\$11,300)	155 (\$27,210)	231 (\$49,410)	114 (\$28,095)	270 (\$84,190)	251 (\$79,429)	278 (\$80,705)
Investigations Closed	277	774	1,796	2,608	2,542	2,951	2,388	2,899
Investigations Pending	59	392	475	398	483	550	662	508

END

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