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
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
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
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CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
EGYPTIAN POLICY AND STRATEGY,
TO
CREATE AN EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL TO
ACHIEVE STABILITY IN THE REGION

BY

BRIGADIER GENERAL MOHAMED AHMED GHAYATY

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PROJECT FOR
INDIVIDUAL MILITARY STUDIES
PROGRAM

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EGYPTIAN POLICY AND STRATEGY,
TO
CREATE AN EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL TO
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BY
BRIGADIER GENERAL MOHAMED AHMED GHAYATY
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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Mohamed Ahmed Ghayaty, BG

TITLE: Conflict in the Middle East: Egyptian Policy and Strategy to Create an Egyptian Proposal to Achieve Stability

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the superpowers, have attempted to control the countries of the Middle East, sometimes openly, and often secretly, using slogans, expressions, and theories aimed at the polarization of the regional countries.

The United States, as the leader of the West, has used methods such as petroleum monopolization and bilateral treaties to further its Middle East interests. On the other side, the Soviet Union, as the leader of the eastern bloc, uses ideological methods such as the spread of social doctrine. Russia's first priority is to achieve international communism, by exploiting the low standard of living in most of the countries in the Middle East. Also the Soviet Union acts as the defender of the freedom of the people against colonialism and imperialism, capitalizing for this purpose, on the national aspirations of the people of the region.

In fact, each superpower is working for its own interests, which are unrelated to the hopes of the people for national independence. The Middle East area, according to its strategic position, and high percentage of international petroleum reserves, becomes the target for the plans of the superpowers that aim to penetrate the area in order to influence both the East and West.

It is necessary, at first, to define the geographic area encompassed by the Middle East. The term "Middle East" was not used till the start of the Second World War. Before this war, the geographers admit only the Far East, including China, Japan, Indo-

China, Indonesia, and India. The Middle East consists of Asia Minor, El-sham, and Egypt.

By the start of the Second World War all these definitions were overcome by the establishment of a military unified command, which supervised many countries in North Africa, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Europe. This was called the Middle East Command. Since that time, the new Middle East definition with its military meaning, has been used. We can now say that there are the military Middle East and geographical Middle East.

The military Middle East includes 21 political units: Malta, Tripoli, Barca, Egypt, Eritria, Apyssa, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Arab Gulf Sheikhdoms like (Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait) - Aden and the Ducal trucional states, Yemen, French, Italian and British Somali, and Sudan.

Some have suggested to improve the cohesion of the military Middle East by eliminating Apyssa, Sudan, and the three Somali's, as they are included in tropical Africa. Also Iran is considered to be a country isolated from the rest of southwest Asia. It is considered as a buffer state between the Middle and Far East. On the other hand Turkey should be included in the Middle East.

The Middle East area is at the junction of three continents (Asia, Africa and Europe), so it occupies the main place in every plan that aims at controlling any of these continents. Its position has become a major influence on international policy and the balance of powers principle.

The Middle East area is considered as the center of the international communication nets (radio, naval, air, and land). A vital artery for international navigation (the Suez Canal) passes through this area. It is a simple and short waterway which joins the western countries with the manpower and the raw materials of south Asia, and with the African countries that possess important raw materials for industry like copper, uranium, and manganese.

The Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean increase the strategic importance of the area. The Atlantic Ocean washes the shores of Morocco and the Indian Ocean adjoins the southern coast of Arabian Peninsula. The two oceans have extensions that reach far inside the area. The Atlantic Ocean has the Mediterranean sea, and the Indian Ocean connects with the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf. These strategic waterways enable the Middle East to participate in the activity of international commerce. The following natural naval gates and artificial arteries, like Gabaia Tarek Straits, Suez Canal, Bab El-Mandab Straits, and Hormuz Straits, are considered vital strategic targets, because they control the entrances and exits of these seas.

The length and the depth of the Middle East provide the possibility of military bases, commercial industry, and strategic resource reserves. Also it provides the possibility of strategic deployment for the armed forces to carry out strategic operations at different fronts, and allows for free maneuver between operational theaters in all the strategic directions.

The Middle East area has witnessed the conflict between the two superpowers, the cold war between them, and their attempts to control the countries of the region. The conflict has been aggravated by the existence of Israel as an outside element in the area assisted by the two superpowers. The Western camp supports Israel economically, military, and politically. On the other hand the Eastern bloc supports Israel with manpower in the form of annual immigration. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union declares its support to the national movements of liberation fighting colonialism and Zionist expansion.

The Arab area has witnessed events in which the Arabs lost thousands of martyrs, and the Soviet Union has done nothing for the sake of the area, except to utter slogans and launch verbal declarations, which contain no meaning. This actually explains the brutal, combat actions of Israel.

The roots of the struggle which has disfigured the Middle East with five destructive wars and an endless series of acts of violence and hatred were planted in 1897, when the first Zionist Conference was held in Basel, Switzerland. That conference recommended the colonization of Palestine by Jews and the promotion at the international level of Zionist aspirations.

The Middle East after World War II has been the setting for a complex drama in which several major themes have been interwoven—nationalism, the consolidation of political and economic independence and security, competition for regional power, and finally, the rivalry of external states for influence over Middle East governments and their resources. While each of these factors

has been extremely important, another - too frequently neglected - has also subtly but significantly shaped government behavior: the nature of the regimes and the political culture of the Middle East.

The Middle East - that region verging on the eastern Mediterranean and perennially in turmoil - is likely to remain in that condition for some time to come. A situation involving inimical and dangerous forces contending in that area is nothing new. Great Power struggles for access and empire, the Eastern Question, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Iraq-Iran war, the Lebanon problem, and the problem of oil policies and petrodollars have combined to endanger the peace of the world.

American interests in the Middle East are multiple and complex. These include the maintenance of strategic access to the region and of secure access to its oil supplies, the containment of local disputes, continued economic development and social progress, the protection of American investment and of its contribution to the United States balance of payments, furtherance of American trade, and the preservation and expansion of cultural ties with the peoples of the region.

The United States over the past three decades promoted various regional security arrangements, including the Middle East Command. The growth of Soviet influence in the region lay in the Eisenhower Doctrine of March, 1957. Reflecting and supporting these commitments was the American military presence, notably the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. In addition to a growing interest in the containment of Soviet power, the United States had two other major concerns in the area. One had to do with the survival of Israel -

a matter of major concern to an influential segment of the American public, and therefore a political factor of considerable importance. The second relates to private economic interests, principally those of the American oil companies engaged in the production, refining and marketing of that commodity in world trade.

The Soviet Union's attraction to the Middle East is based on the region's political instability, its economic and social problems and its critical importance to the industrial democracies. Accordingly, it is an area of challenging opportunity for the establishment of new power relationships in the world. Moscow has moved rapidly into the region and in two decades has made impressive gains. In 1954, the Soviets first accorded the Arab states the highest priority in military and economic aid. In June 1967, the Soviet Navy entered the Mediterranean in strength and in 1968 took up a permanent station in the Arabian Sea. By 1971, an American president (Nixon) unfortunately thought it necessary to acknowledge that the Soviets had acquired important "interests" in the region and that a lasting Arab-Israeli settlement would have to take those interests into account.

Soviet policy came to focus preeminently on relations with the Arab states. The Soviets aided themselves immensely by sympathizing with and actively exploiting Arab hostility toward Israel. The entire Soviet effort in the Arab countries since 1955 appeared to be directed mainly at gaining leverage over Iran and Turkey as part of a general thrust in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Turkish Straits, however, Soviet activities could have been seen as directed at the neutralization of the United States Sixth Fleet and

the outflanking of NATO forces in the Mediterranean and Western Europe.

There is little debate today over the seriousness of the present war threat in the Middle East, since it involves the potential for superpower involvement. The United States long has supported Israel, which is ever more dependent on it for financial, military, and diplomatic support. The Soviet Union backs the Arab states, because of their oil-based economic power. The United States is in the more difficult political position. Since it is a democracy, particularly responsive to the efforts of well-organized minorities within its body politic, it must deal with the Arab-Israeli dispute as both an international and domestic political issue.

Egypt's 5,000 years of recorded history is largely the history of the remarkable and sustained civilization of a people rich in God-given and man-made resources. Egypt occupies a dominant position in Northeast Africa amidst the continents of the Old World and at its crossroads. Egypt is located in the heart of the Arab nation. The Mediterranean forms its northern boundaries, and the Red Sea its eastern frontiers; on the northeast it borders Palestine (Israel), it borders on the South with the Sudan, and on the west with Libya. With this geographical situation, it is clear that Egypt enjoys a controlling position in the Arab World and both a regional and global strategic importance.

Not a single day passes without a tragic event taking place in the Middle East. It becomes an ironic habit to read or hear about a new Iranian offensive against Iraq, leaving hundreds dead, fractional fighting in Lebanon, indicating how fragile the ceasefire

remains, and reprisal air attacks launched to punish the perpetrators. This is aside from the brutal treatment of Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli occupation forces.

Such devastating terror and violence make it crystal clear that the problems facing the Middle East today, either on the Iran-Iraq front, in Lebanon, or the Arab-Israeli conflict, are correlated, putting the whole area on the verge of havoc and anarchy.

It thus becomes a necessity to have a coherent policy to comprehensively solve the problems in the area. All the problems have to be addressed now, because we cannot wait any longer for a solution. The Palestinian problem cannot wait until we reach a settlement to the Lebanese problem. And similarly, the war between Iran and Iraq cannot be neglected because its continuation will sooner or later involve the whole Gulf. It could involve the superpowers as well. We do not want the "Day After" to happen in the Middle East, nor for that matter, any place in the world.

We need an active and dynamic policy that has to be candid and decisive. It has to address the roots of the problem. The root of the Palestinian problem for one, lies in the fact that they are homeless and without entity. Any solution disregarding the restoration of their entity and home will be superficial and will not last. By the same token it would be deceptive to concentrate all our efforts merely on reaching a ceasefire here or there. Unless a ceasefire is followed by the settlement of the problem in question it will collapse. That has happened in the past and there is no reason to expect differently in the future.

The study directive that initiated this study is at Appendix 1.

CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES OF CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT

The Historical Background

The roots of the struggle which has disfigured the Middle East with five destructive wars and an endless series of acts of violence and hatred were planted in 1897¹, when the first Zionist Conference was held in Basel, Switzerland. That conference recommended the colonization of Palestine by Jews and the promotion at international level of Zionist aspirations.

These aspirations were boosted in 1917 when Sir Arthur James Balfour, on behalf of the British Foreign Office, wrote to Lord Rothschild:

"His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

This document had no standing in international law, it was binding on the British Government only. And the British Government at that date had no authority over Palestine, then under Turkish rule. Nevertheless the "Balfour Declaration," as it became known, served to unify world Jewry around the objective of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine. In 1919, the Zionist Organization called for recognition of the "historic right of the Jewish people to Palestine."

In 1921 the League of Nations proclaimed Britain as mandatory power for the government and administration of Palestine. The allied powers pledged further that the mandatory power - Britain - should be responsible for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine and also for safeguarding the rights of the existing non-Jewish communities.

Immigration at this period was a mere trickle, but it foreshadowed what was to come. Disturbances between immigrants and Palestinians led the Arabs to request that immigration should end and the Balfour Declaration be abolished. In response, Britain reiterated that she did not intend to make Palestine a Jewish state, but immigration continued unchecked until 1930, when Britain stated that it considered it necessary to regulate the Jewish influx in the light of Palestine's limited economic potential.

In 1936, when over 370,000 Jews had entered Palestine, the Palestinians, with support from other Arab nations, rebelled. The non-Palestinian Arabs had always disliked Jewish immigration, but this flare up was the first to involve the rest of the Arab world in the Palestinian conflict. This involvement was formalized and institutionalized in 1939, when the British Government convened a Round Table Conference between representatives of world Jewry and of neighbouring and distant Arab states. In the same year, Britain again reassured the Arabs on the future of Palestine and stated its intention to end immigration.

In consequence, the Zionist leadership began to transfer its interest to the United States under the influential Dr. Chaim Weizsman. In 1945 the United States Congress issued a unanimous

resolution in support of the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.²

"The United States shall use its good offices with the mandatory power to the end that Palestine shall be opened for free entry of the Jews to the maximum of its potentialities, so that they may freely proceed with the upbuilding of Palestine as the Jewish National Home."

In 1947 the British made a final attempt to settle the Palestinian problem, proposing that Britain's mandate should remain in force for a further five-year period to prepare the country for independence. The Arabs then put forward their proposals for independence, with guarantees for the rights of the Jewish minority. These were not accepted by the British Government, while the Jewish agency rejected the British proposals. In February 1947 the British Government announced its intention to relinquish the mandate, on the grounds that the commitments made the two communities could not be implemented.

The persecution of European Jewry during the Second World War had by now turned the pre-war trickle of immigrants into a flood which the British had found it impossible to contain. The problem now passed to the United Nations, which resolved on the ending of the mandate at Britain's request, the establishment of two states in Palestine, one Arab and the other Jewish, and the establishment of a special international regime for the city of Jerusalem, with a deadline of October 1, 1948.³

On the evening of May 14, 1948, David Ben Gurion, first head of the provisional government of Israel, proclaimed the state of Israel under the 1947 United Nations resolution. This state was to

open its doors to Jewish immigrants while pledging to promote the development of the country for the benefit of all inhabitants, Jews or Arabs, to guarantee freedom of faith and culture, to protect the holy places of all religions and to adhere to the principles of the United Nations.

War was the inevitable result. The Arabs, their interests directly infringed, rallied round the Palestinians who, under the United Nations proclamation, were to lose 57 percent of their territory to the new state. The conflict resulted in the greater part of Palestine becoming the Jewish state of Israel, the Israelis adding considerably to the territory⁴ already assigned them by the United Nations partition by occupying the Negev area, which the Zionist had not claimed. The West Bank became amalgamated with Transjordan to become Jordan, while the Egyptians rescued the Gaza strip. Two-thirds of the Palestinians fled to become refugees in Jordan, Gaza, the Lebanon and other Arab countries.

Palestine was now an international problem. The Palestinians remained unshaken in their demands to return to their own homes and to have their own state, Israel refused to consider their claims and the Arab world refused to recognize Israel.

The 1948 War

Following the overwhelming victory of the new state of Israel in the 1947-1949 Palestine War⁵, most of the Arab states participating in that war went through one or more violent internal upheavals. In each instance local social, political, and economic conditions played a part in the crises, but a common theme was

discontent with the outcome of the war, and dissatisfaction with the governments that collectively had been responsible for the Arab debacle.

Soon after Nasser assumed the leadership of Egypt, he focussed his attention on means of strengthening Egypt's ever-precarious economy. The foremost economic project in his mind at this time was the construction of a new high dam on the Nile River above Aswan, which would not only provide Egypt with a tremendous supply of electricity for industrial and social development, but would also greatly improve the agricultural economy of the country by controlling the annual floods of the Nile River and, through irrigation, adding approximately 20% to the arable land.

The 1956 War

By the beginning of 1956 it was evident to Israelis that time was not healing the wounds of the 1947-1949 War of Independence as they had hoped. There were three principal aspects of the deepening crisis between Israel and her Arab neighbors. The first of these, considered intolerable by most Israeli citizens, was the increasing tempo of Arab guerrilla activity along all of the frontiers of Israel. Apparently confirming the danger from Egypt as the most serious of Arab foes was President Nasser's announcement in September 1955 of the arms agreement with Czechoslovakia. Arab economic pressure, however, particularly from Egypt, was perhaps the most dangerous threat to the future viability of tiny, resource-poor Israel. Egypt, asserting that there was still a state of war with Israel, refused to permit the passage of any

Israeli vessels, or even of goods on foreign vessels going to or from Israel, through the Suez Canal.

Five days after final British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone, on June 18, 1956, the Soviet Union with much fanfare made an offer to Egypt to finance the Aswan Dam. This time Russia agreed to provide about one billion dollars at an annual interest of only two percent. While Nasser had previously made it clear that he would prefer a deal with the United States, Britain, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, rather than with the Soviet Union, he seems to have thought that this Soviet offer might be useful as a bargaining chip for getting better terms from the westerners. This was too much for Secretary of State Dulles, who had already formed a deep personal antipathy for Nasser, and mistrusted his new negotiations with the Soviet Union. Using an unfavorable economic report from the International Bank as a basis for his action, in mid-July 1956 Dulles withdrew the American offer to finance the Aswan Dam.

One week later, on July 26, President Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal by seizing control from the private Suez Canal Corporation, in which the British government had majority control. Nasser said that Egypt would use the funds seized from the corporation and proceeds from Canal toll fees, to go ahead with his plan for the Aswan Dam. At the same time he began to negotiate more seriously with the Soviets, who were probably surprised at this turn of events.

The Egyptian seizure of the Suez Canal gave rise to hot debate in and out of the United Nations. France and Britain, in

particular considered the action a threat to world peace, and more serious from their viewpoint, a threat to their access to Middle East oil. Secretary Dulles, somewhat shocked by this unexpected reaction to the punishment he had inflicted on Nasser, took the lead in negotiations to achieve some kind of mutually acceptable international control over the Canal. This was impossible to achieve within the United Nations, however, since the Communist bloc and many unaligned nations completely supported the Egyptian move.

Early in August Prime Minister Anthony Eden of Britain decided that he would use force if necessary to restore to the Suez Canal Corporation its rightful ownership of its property in and on the Suez Canal. Although he seems not to have expected that it would be necessary to take such drastic action, he ordered military preparations. On August 3 a military planning staff was hastily assembled in London, and began plans to invade and reoccupy the Suez Canal Zone. France, annoyed by Nasser's support of Algerian nationalists, was equally determined to overturn the Egyptian nationalization action, and sent liaison officers to join the British planners in London. Military planning, with a completion date set for early September, was undertaken solely for use in the event that diplomacy failed to cause Nasser to see the light of reason, as reason was viewed in London and Paris.

The conflict escalated in 1956, when Israeli forces attacked Egypt in collusion with the British, in an attempt to reassert their waning influence in the Middle East, and the French, attempting to preserve their colonial empire in North Africa. At the

diplomatic level, the Suez crisis involved the Soviet Union and United States, and it was pressure from the United States in particular which forced Israel to withdraw from an area of the Sinai Peninsula which they had occupied under cover of the British and French military intervention.

The 1967 War

The six-day war of 1967⁶ erupted after Nasser closed the straits of Tiran, Israel's access route to the Red Sea, and ordered United Nations emergency forces to withdraw from the Israeli border, actions which were bound to provide an excuse for a violent Israeli reaction. In a spurt of uncontrollable aggression, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the Gaza strip, the West Bank, and the Golan heights, thus seizing territory from Egypt, Jordan and Syria.⁷ Superpower involvement in the conflict now came into the open, the United States backing Israel with funds and modern armaments while the Soviet Union backed Egypt with obsolescent weapons and diplomatic activity. Despite defeat, the Arab position remained unyielding and was summed up at the Khartoum Arab Summit Conference after the war: "No recognition of Israel, no negotiations, no peace." For the first time, Arab nations set their differences aside to present a united front.

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted the British-formulated Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories; a call which was not heeded.

Years of unproductive diplomacy on the one hand and a war of attrition on the other followed, as both military and diplomatic solutions were tested. United States support of Israel intensified as the Soviet Union attempted to gain a firmer foothold in the Middle East by supplying arms to Egypt on credit. Nasser was concerned to be able to negotiate from a position of strength despite escalating Israeli attacks intended to discredit the Egyptian leader and demoralize Egypt and the Arabs. The Israelis refused to consider limited withdrawal from the Suez Canal and built the heavily fortified Bar-Lev line along its west bank, thus signifying their intention to extend their borders to the Canal and maintain their domination over the whole of the Sinai peninsula.⁸

In increasing fighting in the Canal Zone, Israeli planes went into action not only against Egyptian military installations but against the civilian population of the Suez region and even of the Nile valley. By August 1970, when a ceasefire was achieved, over 600,000 Egyptians had to be evacuated from the Canal Zone. More than 10,000 Egyptian soldiers, and as many civilians, were killed in the three months before the ceasefire alone.

Following the ceasefire, negotiations began through United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring, but the talks were stalled by Israeli obduracy and in September 1970 a fresh crisis emerged when civil war broke out in Jordan between King Hussein and the Palestinians. Nasser's mediation secured an agreement between King Hussein and Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader; but it was too great a strain for a man who had borne the burden of 18 years of conflict with Israel. A few hours after the agreement was signed,

on 28 September 1970, President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and Anwar El-Sadat was elected in his place.

The 1973 War

In June 1967, at the conclusion of the Third Round, the Egyptian armed forces emerged from a painful trial. They had been pushed into an unequal battle without the slightest chance of winning. They had defeated themselves and yielded to Israel an easy victory which it did not rightfully deserve. The setback had the most far-reaching effects on the Arab armed forces. The lesson was heeded; all Arabs decided that such a disastrous setback would not befall them ever again.

The period from June 1967 to October 1973 was characterized by various Arab attempts to pass from the darkness of defeat into the daylight of victory, long before the actual crossing was made from the western bank of the Suez Canal to the sands of the Sinai Desert⁹, and from Syria to the Golan Heights. This was a period of great deeds, sacrifice, self-denial and patient, silent, unceasing work.

The Egyptian armed forces proceeded to reconstruct their military organization from the base up, both materially and morally. Simultaneously they conducted a rigorous program of training and serious planning for a future battle to liberate the land the enemy had taken in a lightning battle, and thus regain their national pride.

Israel's political-military doctrine became one of aggression, with high priority allotted to territorial expansion against a

"yielding environment." This was a doctrine in which, evidently, any injustice inflicted upon the Arabs counted for very little.

Both the 1956 and 1967 campaigns were based on this strategy of expansion. In 1956 the fruits of aggression were denied to Israel by the late United States president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, because, according to his own words, "he wanted to meet his creator with a clear conscience." But in 1967 the climate of opinion in the United States had changed, and Israel was allowed, even encouraged, to launch its aggression and, moreover, this time to retain its illegal occupation of Palestine. But, according to the aggressive ideology of Israel, the Arab lands of Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights, which amount to 65,000 square kilometers, were greedily needed by Israel to provide security for her 20,000 square kilometers.

In other words, greater Israel, though illegal, is considered indispensable for the security of small Israel.

That the Arabs could also evolve their own effective style of war based on their experiences, was discounted by the Israelis. The Israelis' facile victory in the Six Day War of 1967 confirmed them in their assumption of continuing Arab disunity and incompetence. Even the War of Attrition of 1969-1970 failed hopelessly to show the fallacy of the Israeli military establishments assumption of superiority, of the stupidity of relying on the Bar-Lev line or the Golan fortifications as secure borders. The possibility of an early Arab military revival was just not credible to the Israelis, and for this arrogance they were to pay a heavy price in the Fourth Round of October 1973.

Since 1967 the close relationship of Israel and the United States has in effect supported Israel arrogance and brutality in dealing with its neighbors. Accompanying this attitude was a renewed propaganda campaign that portrayed the Arabs as a backward and disinterested people, too inferior and primitive to protect their own interests or defend their lands against a superior civilization.

The main purpose of Zionist propaganda was to confuse the basic facts of the injustice done to the Arabs and to influence international opinion, particularly in the west, in favor of Israel.

Following the defeat of June 1967, the Arabs spared no efforts to reach a just solution for the Middle East crisis. But Israeli arrogance destroyed every initiative that sought peace.¹⁰ By the end of 1972, Egypt had exhausted all means to break the stalemate of the "no war, no peace" situation.

1. Egypt had accepted all resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council.
2. Egypt had accepted all international initiatives for peace.
3. Egypt had supported all endeavors to reach a peaceful solution.
4. Egypt had accepted the two Rogers initiatives.
5. Egypt had accepted the Jarring initiative and replied in the affirmative to his suggestions.
6. Egypt had accepted all the United States peace proposals.

All this Egypt did to break the stalemate, but to no avail owing to Israeli arrogance and insistence on frustrating all proposals and initiatives that aimed for peace in the Middle East. Moreover, Israel exploited the passage of time to escalate its expansionist designs, to frustrate Arab policies in order to achieve supremacy in the Middle East, and to impose a fait accompli on the international community.

On the other hand, Egypt did not waste this time either, it was gathering strength in all political, economic, moral, and military spheres.

October War Strategy

The Decision: The decision to use military power in 1973¹¹ was made in November 1972 when Egypt's political and military commands reached total agreement that Egypt could never escape from the stagnated state of no war, no peace without recourse to armed force. There were two courses of action open to the Egyptian Military Command: either return to the War of Attrition or launch a limited War.

Extensive discussions led to the conclusion that the War of Attrition had exhausted its usefulness. Any attempt on Egypt's part to impose a war of attrition would certainly be met with stronger and broader Israeli reaction. This meant that Egypt was facing the possibility of undertaking limited operations that would be met by the enemy with a larger military and political reaction.

The Political Aim

The political aim of the war was issued by President Sadat to the Egyptian Minister of Defense; "to prepare the armed forces to secure the land in an offensive operation which would break the political stalemate."

The establishment of a Federal Arab Military Command - Egypt, Syria, and Libya - opened new possibilities of launching a joint offensive from two fronts.

The political decision to use military power was taken and the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces prepared to launch a joint offensive operation with the purpose of changing the balance of political and military power in the Middle East.

Proceeding from the political aim and considering all international, regional, and local factors, planning for the October 1973 War was drawn on the basis that it was: a total local war in which only conventional arms would be used, that it would have decisive strategic aims to upset the balance in the region and shatter Israel's theories and strategic mainstays; that it should last long enough to allow the intervention of other Arab potentialities to bring their weight to affect the course of the war.

The Egyptian staff translated the political decision into military terms. They defined the aim in a very clear and concise manner then drafted the operational concept in which were presented the objective, the method, and the means required to achieve the necessary coordination to insure success.

The Military Objective

The military objective was the defeat of the Israeli armed forces deployed in the Sinai and on the Syrian plateau; and the seizure of strategic land areas which would pave the way for the complete liberation of the occupied territories in order to impose a just and peaceful solution to the problem. On the basis of this clear-cut objective, the Egyptian General Command had to plan for the undertaking of a joint strategic offensive operation to be carried out in cooperation with the Syrian armed forces.

Egypt launched an all-out attack against Israeli positions in Sinai on 6 October 1973, and Syria attacked on the Golan heights. In surprise offensive which destroyed the myth of Israeli intelligence infallibility, the Egyptian air force struck at Israeli strongpoints in Sinai while troops crossed the Canal and overran the Bar-Lev line along a 110 mile front. In three days, Israel lost a third of her air force while Egyptian troops had taken the East Bank of the Canal and were advancing deep into the Sinai peninsula, threatening Israel's borders. Without outside intervention, an Israeli defeat seemed inevitable.

On the fourth day of the Liberation War, Israeli premier Golda Meir sent a distress call to the United States which responded by a massive airlift of tanks and weapons to replace those destroyed by Egyptian forces. It became clear to the Egyptian command that the United States was not only compensating for Israel's losses, but also providing new and more modern weapons and equipment. The most important equipment and weapons supplied by the United States were

tanks, modern antitank missiles, Shrike missiles, and television bombs as well as electronic jamming and interference equipment.

After the Egyptian forces succeeded in releasing pressure on the Syrian front and forcing Israel to shift its main military effort from the Golan Heights to the Sinai, it became clear to Sadat that, while Israel could be defeated, America could not be. "I am willing to fight Israel no matter how long" he called Syrian President al-Assad, "but never the United States."

The Arab offensive of October 1973 achieved every one of its political and military objectives. Politically, President Sadat's "spark" did succeed in setting in motion the chain reaction wanted in the Middle East. From the diversity and disunity of the Arabs, unity and effective leadership emerged, and from their success the Arabs reclaimed their pride and honor. Today the Arabs savor a new sense of power, not only because the October War has brought the Middle East problem to the top of the list of international crises, but also because of their oil strategy.

From the strategic point of view, the October War refuted Israel's theory of strategic depth and doctrine of secure borders. By attacking across the Suez Canal and breaking the Bar-Lev Line so quickly, Egypt, in fact, undermined all Israeli arguments about basing security on expansion of territory.

The solution lies not in an expansionist strategy, but in a search for accommodation, and acceptance of a just and peaceful solution for the Middle East problem, and respect for legitimate Palestinian rights.¹²

Mediated largely by the United States, a ceasefire was declared on 22 October. When it was violated within two hours by Israel, relations between the superpowers reached crisis point. The United States Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was put into full battle readiness and America reportedly went onto full nuclear alert.¹³

THE LEBANON CRISIS

The Historical Background

Lebanon's recent history¹⁴ is the more fundamental debate on the nature of the Lebanese state and on the degree of continuity between historic Lebanon and the post World War I Lebanese state. At the end of World War I, present-day Lebanon and Syria fell to the French, just as Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq fell to the British.

France's intervention and European pressure brought about the creation of an autonomous Lebanese province within the Ottoman Empire. The autonomous Lebanon of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had a clear Christian majority and character and a political system that offered representation and a share of political power to minority communities. It was an exceptional entity in its Muslim environment, and its tentative existence owed much to Europe's support. Indeed, when World War I broke out, the Ottoman government abolished the 1861 arrangements and established its direct rule over Mount Lebanon (1915).¹⁵

A sizable segment of the Maronite community refused to reconcile itself to the "smaller Lebanon" of the 1861-1915 period and demanded that all the area united by the Lebanese emirate be included in the new Lebanese entity. Without Beirut and much of its agricultural and commercial hinterland, Lebanon appeared to these Maronite nationalists as a poor and weak version of the nation they aspired to. Some of the authors of French policy in the Levant supported the Maronite militants demands, arguing that Lebanon's Catholic population was France's one reliable ally against the hostile Arab nationalists and Muslims in the hinterland and that Lebanon's economic viability should therefore be bolstered. Thus, when on September 1, 1920, the French added parts of Ottoman Syria to the original territory of the autonomous province of Lebanon, they created a completely distinct state - Greater Lebanon.¹⁶

Indeed, the net effect of the creation of Greater Lebanon was Syrian irredentism and the disruption of the demographic balance in the new state, resulting in discord between the traditional Maronite Christian ethos, which underlay its creation, and the heterogeneous composition of its population. The Catholic banker and intellectual, Michel Chiha, saw the modern Lebanese state as a successor to the ancient Phoenicians, a merchant republic, bearer of a Mediterranean culture, illuminator of its environment, and an interpreter between East and West.¹⁷ Chiha's strong impact on the development of the Lebanese state came from his contributions to the drafting of the 1926 constitution, and to the shaping of the Lebanese republic's political institutions.¹⁸ During most of the

interwar years, Lebanese politics were dominated by the conflict between Lebanese Catholic communities supported by France and the Sunni and Greek Orthodox communities, which rejected the legitimacy of the Lebanese state, objected to the Maronite's political supremacy, and demanded that Lebanon be added onto a larger Arab state.

The political system of post 1943 Lebanon was based on the political institutions of the mandate period and on the National Pact. It was unique, complex, and its inherent flaws were quite evident. It was conservative by definition, as an ascriptive system based on the preservation of the status quo. With confessionalism as a cornerstone of the political system, religious leaders and other traditional leaders and interests kept their prominence within their respective communities.¹⁰

The 1958 Civil War

The challenges to the status quo in Lebanon since the 1940's have come primarily from three sources. First, some Muslims rejected the 1943 compromise and its political system as unrepresentative of its population. Second, a variety of ideologically inclined groups and individuals (Arab nationalists, communists, and other advocates of social and economic change) viewed the existing system as a barrier to the implementation of their ideas. Finally, external forces (such as Syria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union) sought to establish influence in Lebanon and to weaken Western presence and influence.

The first major crisis to threaten the existence of the Lebanese state erupted 1958, under the combined pressure of

domestic and regional developments. Tension mounted after the formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958, and a civil war broke out between Chamoun's supporters and opponents, most of whom were Muslims. This conflict mainly involved Phalangist militias and the Lebanese Syrian Nationalist Party (a radical party advocating a united Greater Syria, but acting at that time to defend the Lebanese entity against the onslaught of Pan-Arabism). The fighting ended with the landing of American marines in Beirut, while the political war subsided after another historic compromise had been devised.²⁰

The Years 1958-70

The lessons of the 1958 crisis and the general regional developments had a salutary influence on the stability of the Lebanese political system. The civil war demonstrated to both Christians and Muslims that extremist policies in the delicate circumstances obtaining in Lebanon were bound to lead to violent crisis. Rivalries among Arab states in the years 1964-67, the rising tension in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and finally the Six Day War forced the Lebanese government to make decisions harmful to the stability of the political system. Still more ominous pressure was felt at the end of 1968, when the presence and activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its constituent organizations became a cardinal issue and a catalyst for other developments.

The Second Civil War, 1975-76

In the spring of 1975, the Lebanese political system finally collapsed under the persistent pressure of rival internal and external forces. The endless demands and ultimatums, acts of political violence, transgressions against the state's authority and sovereignty, and other manifestations of social and political tensions developed into a civil war that lasted eighteen months.

A year and a half of civil war and foreign military intervention resulted in a terrible loss of human life, the wounding of many others, and massive physical destruction. The atrocities committed during the war and the conviction, that Christian Lebanon was destroyed led many, particularly Christians, to emigrate. The flow of money to support various militias and factions and Lebanon's interaction with Syria's black market had preserved, paradoxically, not only a certain affluence in Lebanon but even a stable rate of exchange for the Lebanese pound. But not withstanding this paradox and the rapid rate of rehabilitation, Lebanon lost many of its functions as a financial, cultural, and communications center.

The events of 1975-76 altered the external balance and enabled a foreign power, Syria, to acquire an actual hegemony over Lebanon. The United States demonstrated its unwillingness to interfere militarily on behalf of Lebanon's Christian communities and acquiesced in Syria's intervention. The Syrian and PLO positions in Lebanon stimulated Israel to greater interest and involvement. Syria's implicit recognition of Israeli interests in Lebanon was the quid pro quo for Israel's conditional acceptance of Syria's intervention

in Lebanon. Israel provided military aid to the militias of the status quo coalition and developed a relationship with the population in the Lebanese-Israeli border area.²¹

The settlement of October 1976 ended the Lebanese civil war but not the Lebanese crisis. Both the underlying and the immediate problems that had unsettled the Lebanese political system and had led to the outburst in April 1975 remained unsolved and were in fact exacerbated and compounded by the war and its repercussions. The issues, problems and actors concerned in this ongoing crisis can best be examined in terms of four facets: the continuing domestic conflict, Syria's quest for hegemony, the Palestinian issue, and Israel's policies.

War, June-September 1982

The Fifth Arab-Israeli War, which began on June 6, 1982, departed radically from the patterns of the previous thirty-four years of conflict. The war was fought in Lebanon, to some extent for Lebanon, but primarily by Israel and the PLO and to a lesser extent by Syria. It was the first Arab-Israeli war fought during a period of partial Arab-Israeli peace. Paradoxically, its outbreak was affected by the dynamics of the Egyptian-Israeli peace process of the previous five years. The war was unusually long, and its military dimension was often overshadowed by its political aspects, the goals it sought, the controversies it generated, and the impact it has had on the Lebanese political system, on the Palestinian issue, and on Israeli and Arab politics.

On June 6, 1982, the Israeli cabinet issued a statement explaining the goals of the military operations launched by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).

- To instruct the IDF to place all the civilian population of the Galilee beyond the range of the terrorists' fire from Lebanon where they, their losses, and their headquarters are concentrated.
- The name of the operation is Peace for Galilee.
- During the operation the Syrian army will not be attacked unless it attacks our forces.
- Israel continues to aspire to the signing of a peace treaty with independent Lebanon, its territorial integrity preserved.

Various government spokesmen argued on June 6 and in the following few days that "Israel's sole purpose is to destroy the PLO's infrastructure in southern Lebanon." Defense Minister Sharon and other spokesmen became increasingly explicit during the summer of 1982 about the purposes of the Israeli operation.²² Over the next few months, the growing controversy in Israel and within the cabinet resulted in a deluge of revelations concerning the war's goals as follows:

- Destroying the PLO military infrastructure in southern Lebanon and creating a security zone of some forty kilometers, the effective range of the PLO's artillery and rocket launchers.
- Destroying the PLO's position in the rest of Lebanon particularly in Beirut, to eliminate its hold on the

Lebanese political system and to diminish its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

- Defeating the Syrian army in Lebanon to effect its full or partial withdrawal from that country and to preempt the possibility of a Syrian-Israeli war;
- thereby facilitating the reconstruction of the Lebanese state and political system under the hegemony of Israel's allies - Bashir Jumayyil and the Lebanese Front.²³

In contrast to the long weeks of stalemate that characterized the siege of Beirut, late August and September were marked by a rapid succession of important developments. The evacuation agreement, the arrival of the international force, Bashir Jumayyil's election to the presidency, the gradual evacuation of the PLO from West Beirut, the publication of President Reagan's Middle East plan, Bashir Jumayyil's assassination, Israel's entry into West Beirut, the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, Israel's withdrawal from Beirut, and Amin Jumayyil's election to the presidency.

The Lebanese Crisis after 1982 War

It is ironic that the Lebanese state and political system, for whose sake the 1982 war in Lebanon was fought, at least in part, remained passive almost to the war's end. To some extent this was a consequence of the preceding ten years of crisis. The Lebanese state had been emasculated, particularly in the areas under Syrian and Palestinian control where most of the fighting took place. Then the various political forces in the country had their own reasons for reticence or passivity. Israel's allies, expected

Israel to bear the brunt of the fighting. Some PLO allies among the militias participated in the fighting but most of the organization's political allies in the National Movement, tired of its domination, expected it to leave, and even said so.

In late 1983, a year or so after the end of the 1982 war, a series of developments underlined the continuing acuteness and importance of the Lebanese crisis.²⁴ Israel's withdrawal from the Shuf Mountains was followed by a Druze-Maronite civil war and massacres in the region, the War of the Shuf also fitted into a larger offensive by Syria and its Lebanese allies against Amin Jumayyil's administration and against the May 17, 1983, Lebanese-Israeli agreement. Elements of the same coalition, as part of the effort to drive out of Lebanon all unfriendly foreign forces, staged successful suicide attacks against American and French units of the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) in Beirut and against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. In Tripoli in northern Lebanon, units of the PLO critical of Yasir Arafat and supported by Syria were trying to capture Arafat's last autonomous position. And in Geneva a Lebanese national reconciliation conference was deliberating a fundamental revision of the Lebanese constitution.

Only when all the communities in Lebanon devote much less thought and energy to their own parochial interests and much more to the interests of their motherland, will there be hope to achieve the true independence which Lebanon deserves.

THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

The Historical Background

The Arab Republic of Syria, as it exists today in about 73,000 square miles, is geographically diverse. There is a narrow western littoral on the Mediterranean, but it is arid and sandy where mountain streams run to the sea. The greater eastern part of the country is a gradually sloping desert plateau descending toward the Iraqi border. Between the coast and the desert is a north-south line of relatively low but fairly rugged mountains. On the western side of this range is much of Syria's farmland; on the eastern side, in a valley graced by three rivers, are still more agrarian villages as well as Syria's major cities. In these cities and villages roughly 80 percent of Syria's 9.3 million people live.

Nevertheless, Syria has rarely been a great political power. Its agricultural self-sufficiency and commercial sophistication did not translate into a successful imperium. For much of its history, Syria has been a hinterland of other empires, and often a poor one. It has been ruled at various times from Baghdad, Cairo, Constantinople and Istanbul, and even Paris. Its cities, though rarely destitute, have been provincial in nature, featuring neither great technical, administrative, cultural, nor educational achievement. Syria's relative political weakness may also be due in part to the regional cleavages that have afflicted Syrian society throughout its history. Ironically, these cleavages have been caused by Syria's agricultural prosperity.

The union with Egypt in 1958, created the shortlived United Arab Republic, (UAR). The experiment of the UAR was a bitter one, for Ba'th members, because they found their activities curtailed in their own country by Egyptian political "commissars." The traditionalists, however, had the most to lose; their already dwindling position was about to be dealt a fatal blow by an ambitious land reform program. By 1961, the traditional Sunni elite had engineered Syria's exit from the UAR, though they were unable to prevent some land reform measures in the process. The traditionalists did not last long. By 1963, the process of politicization of Syria's minorities and the infiltration of the military by the Ba'th was well advanced, a Ba'thi oriented military junta seized the government and Syrian politics have never been the same since.²⁵

The Political Structure in Syria

Twenty-two years of Ba'th government in Syria have changed the political system almost totally from what it had been in the two decades following independence. This change is evident in the formal structure of government - a centralized, bureaucratic system with power flowing from the top. It is evident in the people who run government, party, and army, who are of provincial rather than urban background. It is evident even in the nature of contests for influence and of attempts to overthrow the regime, as well as in the people who participate in those struggles.

Hafez Assad, in power since November 1970, has built a mechanism for rule based on a triad: the military establishment, the Ba'th Party, and the government bureaucracy. As commander-in chief

of the armed forces, Secretary General of the Ba'th Party's National (pan-Arab) and Regional (Syrian) Commands, and President, he heads all three. They have been tailored to his style of governing both organizationally and in the people chosen to run them. The armed forces - army, air force, and a small navy - play little direct part in the day to day administration of Syria, but are the regime's ultimate prop. Key positions are filled by men with long records of loyalty to Assad; some are Sunnis, many are from Assad's Alawi sect. The Ba'th Party in Syria has gotten a little overweight and ponderous. Full-time party functionaries have, as bureaucrats will, sought to expand their turf. There is, for example, a layered system of party schools for training cadres. There are party schools at the provincial level and a senior one in Damascus.

Opposition: the Challenge from without

The Muslim Brothers began militant action against the Ba'th regime in February 1976. The Islamic Front, which consists of the Brotherhood and an unknown number of other militants, came into being in 1980. Leaders publicly associated with the Front are all Muslim Brothers. Action took the form of assassination of regime officials and prominent Alawis. The victims were persons of some standing, but not members of the top three or four levels of the structure. February 1982 brought the biggest outburst of anti-government militancy. Catching local officials by surprise, the Islamic Front in Hama proclaimed an uprising. The insurgents were well-armed and, from positions in the stone buildings of the old

city, put up a stiff fight. It took the Syrian forces two weeks to defeat them. This was the largest anti-government move that the Ba'th regime has faced. Beyond that the crystal ball darkens. External affairs, could have great effect. A crushing defeat of Syria by Israel, not unlikely given the relative strengths of the two, should the war which each says it wants to avoid actually occur, might seriously effect the political balance in the country. The time and circumstances of Assad's demise will be of great importance.²⁶

The principal aim of Assad's government has been to maintain Alawi rule in Syria. To accomplish this objective, Assad determined to bring about real economic progress, liberalize political discourse, and end the isolation into which Syria had fallen under his predecessor's control. All of these interim objectives have been met, but Alawi control is less firm today than at anytime in the recent past. The control mechanisms remain intact and indeed are as thorough and ubiquitous as ever. Yet a small minority such as the Alawis cannot indefinitely dominate a larger majority when the latter feels unified in its resentment of the minority in power. Communication links and determination among the anti-Alawi Sunnis have increased and numerous assassinations of Alawis and other violent incidents are the symbol of the growing Sunni consciousness; a sense that an end to their powerlessness is at hand. Of course, the Alawi leadership is also alert to this evolving phenomenon.

Syria's central role in the Middle East is assured by virtue of its leadership of the anti-Israel Arab coalition. While not a

rejectionist state, Syria will not agree to a settlement without Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and a resolution of the Palestinian problem acceptable to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Because Assad has remained convinced that Israel will not withdraw from the Golan, he has maintained a relatively hard-line stance since late 1975. Syria's regional strength and weakness have been demonstrated in Lebanon, where Damascus became a principal factor, and fought on different sides, in the internal conflict devastating that country.²⁷

Syria's involvement in the Lebanese conflict and Egypt's initiative for a peace have now begun to take their toll on Syria and Syria's role in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Syrian army has been unable to bring either the Palestinian or the Maronites to heel, and in place of the Syrian-oriented, unified but weak Lebanon Assad had sought to create, there emerged a Lebanon partitioned into, a virtual Israeli protectorate in the south, a Maronite Lebanon, East Beirut, and a rump Lebanese entity controlled only marginally and unevenly by Muslim/leftist forces, the central government, and the Syrian army.

Syria entered the internal conflict in Lebanon for a variety of reasons treated at length elsewhere. Briefly, Assad sought to control the Lebanon front, including the Palestinians, in order to enhance Syrian bargaining power vis-a-vis Israel; to establish stability and control in a neighboring country with uniquely deep, historical ties to Syria; and to prevent sectarian partition which might have extremely adverse ramifications in religiously divided Syria. Underestimating the strength and capabilities of both

sides, Syrian forces were never able to achieve their strategic military objectives. The war has tied down the Syrian army, sapped its morale, and eroded its discipline. In the process Syrian forces have made enemies on all sides. The army and society have been divided by the conflict and by Assad's policies related to it.

Syria and The Palestinian Factor

Almost three years have passed since Syria banished Yasir Arafat from Damascus and later pushed his forces out of Tripoli.²⁹ Since then Syria's relationship with Arafat has steadily deteriorated. Despite a steady stream of rumors about a possible reconciliation, there has been confrontation on almost every front: in Lebanon, where pro-Syrian Palestinian groups have clashed with Arafat loyalists; in the Palestinian political arena, where Syria has tried to exploit the de facto split within the PLO to undermine Arafat's authority; and in the broader Arab-Israeli arena, where Assad had moved to oppose Arafat's rapprochement with Jordan's King Hussein. While conflict in the Syrian-Palestinian relationship has become a permanent feature of the Middle East's political landscape, the present confrontation seems more bitter on both the personal and political levels than previous rifts.

The Syrian-PLO Roller Coaster

The Historical Context: The current conflict between Syria and Arafat's Fatah organization must be seen in the broader historical context of competition and cooperation that have formed the basis of the Syrian-Palestinian connection over the past four

decades. In fact, nowhere are the ambiguities and complexities of an Arab state's ties with the Palestinian movement better reflected than in the PLO-Syrian relationship. Since the late 1950s, Syria, driven by its self-styled role as defender of Arab nationalism and later home of the Ba'th, has been one of the most consistent supporters of militant Palestinian nationalism. Syria's involvement in PLO politics derived not only from ideological considerations but from the practical value that riding the tiger of Palestinian nationalism carried for the internal legitimacy of various Syrian regimes and their regional aspirations. Syria was one of Fatah's key supporters during the later 1950s and provided a counter-weight against an Egyptian dominated PLO in the mid-1960's.

As the Palestinians would quickly learn, however, Syria's political and military backing would come at an enormous price. The Palestinian issue was invariably reflected in the internal rivalries of Ba'thi politics as Syrian politicians and military leaders became involved in internal Palestinian politics. In 1968, in an effort to help counter the forces of Ba'th's military wing, the civilian Ba'th created its own Palestinian organization Saiga. While this group would at times cooperate with Arafat's Fatah organization, as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Syrian government Saiga sought to protect Syrian interests, which were becoming increasingly conservative in nature. The emergence of Assad, the first Syrian leader to have the power to adopt a cohesive policy toward the Palestinian national movement, foreshadowed an even more bitter conflict in Syrian-Palestinian relations.

Assad and the Palestinian Card

What is striking about Assad's view of the Palestinian issue and what separates it from his predecessors' rather vague conceptions is the degree to which Assad's Palestinian policy is based on a broader strategic goal. Ideology and self-interest mix uneasily in Syrian policies as they do elsewhere in international politics. And Assad's pragmatism and flexibility should not obscure the seriousness with which he views Syria's role in promoting Arab and Palestinian rights.

Nonetheless, Assad has placed the Palestinian issue in the service of Syrian regional goals in a way unparalleled by any previous Syrian regime. And he has a clearer conception of the relationship between these goals and the resources at his disposal to achieve them than his civilian Ba'thi predecessors. Since his accession to power in the early 1970s, Assad has maneuvered skillfully projecting Syria's prestige in a way that is disproportionate to Syria's real capabilities. His success derives not only from his ability to function as pragmatist and brinkman par excellence, but from his understanding of regional power politics. What Assad seeks, however, is Syrian preeminence in what he believes is Syria's rightful sphere of influence - as the Lebanese, Palestinian, Jordanian triangle. Not coincidentally, dominance in this area would allow Syria to ensure that no major decision on peace or war with Israel could be taken by the Arabs without Syrian approval. Indeed, for a regime whose interests might be better served by a no war-no peace situation with Israel, preeminence here would theoretically rule out separate Arab deals which could weaken Syria's

quest for strategic parity with Israel. Nowhere has Assad's determination to define the Arab agenda been clearer than in his efforts to manage the Palestinian issue and the PLO. Here again, ideological tools serve strategic ends. Syria's historical ties to Palestine and its self-defined role as defender of Arab nationalism provide the context and justification for the regime's determination to ensure that Palestinian goals remain subordinate to Syrian interests.

Syria and the Lebanese Crisis

As for the Lebanese crisis, the Syrian approach can be summarized as follows: "Neither emergence into the Arab nor into the international camp."²⁹ Syria is acting as the sole state responsible for Lebanon. It wants to secure Lebanese unity and sovereignty even if this means turning Lebanon into a Syrian protectorate. Syria would not accept any Arab or foreign intervention in Lebanon, whether this intervention is intended to solve Lebanese-Lebanese, Lebanese-Palestinian, or Lebanese-Syrian conflicts. Syria has thus succeeded in demonstrating to the world that the road to Lebanon runs through Damascus. Conversely, it has made the Palestinians and Lebanese realize that the road to the outside world leads through Damascus. Consequently, the Christians in Lebanon have become a Syrian means for pressuring the West, and the Palestinians have become a Syrian means for pressuring the Arab countries. When Syria wants something from the U.S. it puts pressure on the Christians; if she wants to gain something from the Saudis, she

puts pressure on the Palestinian organizations, especially Yasir Arafat.

Assad strongly believes that there will never be any political agreement with Israel because it is an expansionist state, and that the Arabs will not be able to deal with Israel militarily because Israel is a strategic superpower. He does not want a settlement with Israel but neither can he fight it. He has therefore chosen to suspend hostilities. As for the Middle East crisis in general, this means thwarting every possible solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute since the balance of power favors Israel. As for the Lebanese crisis in specific, this means that Assad will be willing to have an agreement with Israel similar to the one that exists between Israel and Syria on the Galan Heights, once the Israelis agree to withdraw from southern Lebanon. Syria will only accept a truce with Israel, not a peace agreement.

Moscow, Damascus Relations

While Moscow has sought to rally the Arab world into an "anti-imperialist" front against the West, Syria has viewed Moscow primarily as a supplier of military equipment and diplomatic assistance, both to enhance Syria's prestige in the Arab world and to aid Syria in its confrontation with its main regional enemy, Israel.³⁰ Relations between the Soviet Union and Syria became close for the first time in 1966 when a left-wing Alawi - dominated, Ba'thist government seized power in Damascus. Since Assad, who favored a more limited relationship, has ruled Syria, a marked cooling of Soviet-Syrian relations has taken place. Soviet aid to Syria during the 1973 war helped to warm relations again, but the

Syrian refusal to attend the Soviet-cosponsored Geneva Peace Conference in December 1973, and the successful shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, which led both to a separation of forces agreement on the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria and the re-establishment of Syrian-American diplomatic relations, again chilled Soviet-Syrian ties. Yet another change in relations occurred in 1975, when Syria again turned to the Soviet Union after the Sinai II agreement, only to clash violently with Moscow the following year when the Soviet Union criticized Syria's military intervention in Lebanon and delayed promised shipments of arms.

Syria, because of its backing of Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, its renewed confrontation with Iraq, its continuing confrontation with Israel, its poor relations with Egypt, and its hostility to Jordan because of its support to Iraq, was now extremely isolated in the Arab world. Given the fact it could no longer count on Arab support for its confrontation with Israel, it had, by 1980, begun to appeal to the Soviet Union to give it the military assistance so that it could, by itself, match Israel's power. In return, Assad became one of the few Arab leaders to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and, even more important, Assad agreed to sign a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Moscow in October 1980, a step he had been resisting for a decade. Yet for Moscow, the signing of this treaty with Assad and the provision of additional military aid posed a number of problems. The Syrian President, beset by internal and external difficulties, might provide an international crisis, either with Israel, or with one of his Arab enemies, and then drag in the Soviet Union. Secondly,

Assad who had demonstrated his independence of Moscow on a number of occasions in the past, might do so again, thus complicating Soviet Middle Eastern policy at a time when, because of the Iran-Iraq war, Soviet policy was already in a state of disarray.

The Syrian-Soviet relationship is extremely complicated, and is fraught with disagreements, even behind closed doors. Syria entered Lebanon in 1976, in spite of Soviet warnings not to do so. Syria has also prevented Lebanese communists and Palestinian organizations - both closely tied to the Soviet Union - from doing whatever they wish. Syria also withstood Soviet pressure to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation for a long time. Assad views the Syrian-Soviet relationship as similar to that of the U.S.-Israeli one. He wants Syria to be the Soviet's major ally in the region, fulfilling the same role that he thinks Israel plays in U.S. Middle Eastern policy. Simultaneously, he strives to maintain his ability to make his own policy decisions unencumbered by Soviet demands, and would like U.S. support for his policies in the Middle East as well. Assad would like the Soviets to back his regional policy, especially as regards Lebanon.

Syrian-United States Relations

Syrian-U.S. relations are fragile and tentative, there is in Syria a substantial reservoir of good feelings toward the American people. Modern Syrian history has not been characterized by shared policy perspectives with the United States, and American intrigues in Syria in the early years of its independence have not yet been totally forgotten. More important than this clouded past is the

U.S. role as the principal external supporter of Israel, Syria's primary enemy and the occupier of Syrian territory.

Syria sees the U.S. as Israel's staunch supporter and therefore cannot neglect the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the same time, Syria will not agree to any solution that does not include Soviet participation. Syria also wants the U.S. to mediate only between itself and Israel, not between itself and other Arab countries, nor between the factions of any one country in the area. Syria recognizes the U.S. special interest in its relationship with Israel. Assad harbors no deep racial feelings towards the West, and he hopes Europe will play a role in finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem independent of the one played by the U.S. But Assad knows quite well that Europe lacks the political will to do anything without the agreement of the U.S. Assad sees two ways in which he can pressure the U.S.: tension in the area, and Saudi Arabia. He applies the policy of tension in order to negotiate with the U.S. because he knows that U.S. policy in the Middle East is based on maintaining stability in the area so as to secure American interests and those of its allies. Whenever Damascus wants to initiate negotiations with the Americans, it escalates its confrontations with Jordan or creates tension in Lebanon, or pressures Saudi Arabia. The Syrians view the Saudis as the mediators between Washington and Damascus, especially in very delicate matters such as when Syria feels isolated from other allies or when dealing with Israel. Syria sees the U.S. role as that of mediator between itself and Israel; it sees the Saudi role as that of mediator between Damascus and Washington.

THE GULF WAR

The Historical Background

The Arabian Gulf is the extreme eastern border of the Arab nation. It extends from the Indian Ocean to separate Iran from the Arab Peninsula. Hormuz Strait is considered the gate of the Gulf opening on the Oman Gulf and the Indian Ocean; and at the same time it is considered one of the Indian Ocean's arms that leads to the Red Sea. The Southern part is known as Oman Gulf extending north to Hormuz Strait then widens to the north forming the Arabian Gulf, over-laying to Arab Shatt. Its length is about 900 Km, and its maximum width east to Qatar peninsula is 300 km., while narrowing to 60 km, at Hormuz Strait. Seven Arab countries lie on the Gulf extending from the north, west and southwest. They are Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman Sultinate; Iran lies to the north and east.³¹

The Gulf War was caused by two types of precipitants - general and specific.³² The general precipitants are the underlying causes of a conflict which usually are rooted in history, while the specific precipitants represent the more provocative and proximate causes for a conflict. In the case of the Gulf War, the general precipitants may be traced to the cultural divide that has separated the Arabs and Persians since at least the seventh century, when the conquering Arab Armies extended Islam east of the Zagros Mountains. Also at that time Islam split into two rival factions. Shiite and Sunnai - a split that still fuels much of the current Muslim unrest in Southwest Asia. Equally buried in antiquity is the ethnic

problem posed by the Kurdish people in their seemingly endless quest for a national state which affects, among other nations, both Iran and Iraq.³³ Thus, the general precipitants of the 1980 Gulf War are legacies of centuries of religious, ethnic, and territorial differences between Arabs and Persians.

A specific precipitant may be either internal or external. In fact, in the instance of the Gulf War, elements of both are present. An external precipitant acting on Iraq was Iran's attempt to export its Islamic Revolution to the Shiites of other Persian Gulf states. Such exhortations posed a danger to the authoritarian, secular Sunni government in Iraq, in view of the large Shiite population in its Eastern Provinces. An internal precipitant that was pertinent to the outbreak of war was the ambition of Saddam Hussein to achieve hegemony in the Persian Gulf region and to lead the Pan-Arab movement.

Even with these serious fundamental differences between Iraq and Iran, something more was needed to ignite the flame of war; after all, these antagonisms had existed for some time. Saddam had a suitable spark readily at hand in the smoldering Shatt al-Arab territorial dispute, a long standing disagreement between Iraq and Iran that often acts as a barometer reflecting the relative power status of these oil rich, contentious neighbors. The important Iranian oil ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr are situated on its banks and, at Basra, the Shatt al-Arab provided Iraq its major outlet to the Persian Gulf. The adjoining Iranian province of Khuzistan (called Arabistan in Iraq) is populated predominately by Arabs and has long been coveted by Iraq.

The Shatt al-Arab dispute was "settled" in 1847, 1913, 1937, and most recently, in 1975, when Iraq agreed to set the boundary in the center or thalweg of the waterway in return for Iran's pledge to refrain from providing further assistance to the Kurdish insurgency then holding sway in the mountains of northern Iraq. The 1975 settlement reflected Iran's ascendancy in the Persian Gulf and remained intact until its power waned following the overthrow of the Shah. The fomenting of religious and political discord in Iraq by Khomeini despite Iran's weakness led to an open split between the countries and may have convinced Saddam Hussein that it was time to act. Saddam must have reasoned that Iran's military weakness, resulting from the chaotic aftermath of the Shah's overthrow, would enable Iraq to dispose Khomeini by defeating Iran in battle, thereby inflicting a severe setback to the militant Islamic revolution, crippling Iran as a Gulf power, and simultaneously establishing Iraq (and Saddam) as the leader of the Persian Gulf area. Consequently, President Saddam unilaterally announced that the 1975 treaty regarding the boundary on the Shatt al-Arab was "null and void."³⁴ To demonstrate Iraq's ascendancy and Iran's deterioration to the world, Saddam demanded recognition of Iraq's complete sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. Other demands were the return of certain border territory in the north allegedly promised to Iraq in the 1975 agreement but never provided, as well as the restitution to the United Arab Emirates of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs - three islands strategically located near the Strait of Hormuz. When these demands were rejected by Iran, the Persian Gulf was on the brink of war.

Objectives, Policy, and Strategy

The Gulf War has now entered its sixth year and neither Iran nor Iraq seems motivated to stop fighting. The front lines remain essentially where they were after all these period of war and the conditions for a cease fire have not budged since the first week. Neither country is sufficiently strong military nor politically willing to take the risks or casualties necessary to end the war. The war has resulted in a stalemate that operational strategists, constrained by the objectives, policies, and strategic concepts of their national leaders, will not soon break. In truth, the stalemate that exists on the battlefield is no more than the validation of the mistakes made by the strategists at the national level.

Iraq's political objectives put demands on the military strategy and its armed forces that were difficult to satisfy. The territorial objectives such as securing the Shatt al-Arab waterway and occupying the disputed territory in Kermanshah and Ilam Provinces were straightforward military missions that required only the occupation of limited amounts of terrain. Less limited and less easily accomplished were the further political aims of using military means to overthrow the Ayatollah Khomeini and to establish Iraq as the strongest power in the Persian Gulf. A dispassionate analysis of these two latter goals demanded nothing less than the decisive defeat of the Iranian army in battle which Iraq apparently was not willing to risk. The return of the United Arab Emirates islands in the Persian Gulf also required a decision on the battlefield in view of the weakness of the Iraq navy vis-a-vis Iran.

Given the disparate demands of the political objectives it was vital that the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council define clearly their war termination goals before committing their army to battle. The objective of overthrowing Khomeini, which then hopefully would lead to Iraqi Pan-Arab leadership, could only be achieved by pursuing security policies and a strategic concept of total war. Nothing less was compatible with the strategic object desired. But the policy pursued by Iraq was designed to keep Iraqi casualties to a minimum. Regardless, if this policy were adopted for humane reasons or, more likely, because the Saddam government could not afford to incur relatively large casualties (particularly among Shiites) without incurring the wrath of the population, the result was the same: a disconnect between the security policy and military strategy needed to achieve the political objective.

Certainly, it is possible that Saddam and his advisors underestimated the capability of the Iranian army to resist even a low intensity attack. They may have overestimated the military effectiveness of their own military forces or have allowed their expectations to place too high a probability on an anticipated uprising of the Arab population in Khuzistan.

The political objective of Iran was to restore the status quo ante. But this straightforward political objective was confused and complicated by the intrigues of Iranian domestic policies. The war struck amid the struggle between the religious fundamentalists and the more moderate faction of Bani-Sadr, which has for the moment been resolved in favor of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This bitter internecine struggle had a tremendous influence on the conduct of

the war, particularly in the besieged cities of Khuzistan, where the policy was to have the revolutionary guards (Pasdaran) bear the brunt of the fighting, and whose success strengthened Khomeini. The hopes of the Iranian religious leaders that the war would not develop in a way that would give the army a central role, and the Iraqi policy of not exposing its forces to a risk of heavy casualties was a prescription for a low intensity war.

The Widening of the War

The war was started on September 22, 1980 by the government of Saddam. He tried to take advantage of the internal disorder in Iran and the weaknesses of the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime to seize border territories that had long been disputed near the Gulf oil ports and in Khuzestan, a region with a restless Arab population. Iraq failed in its first campaign to occupy Iranian territory and to topple the Khomeini clergy, and then the Iranians launched their "human wave" assaults to drive them back to the original frontier.³⁵ In the second stage of the war, Iraq successfully blocked the counterattack against its frontier cities and oilfields (near the northern city of Mosul) but it could not force the Ayatollahs to accept a cease fire. So it chose; in the third phase of the war, to extend the combat zone to the waters of the Gulf and to cut the oil shipping links on which Iran desperately depends. Iraq used its Soviet TU-16s and TU-22s, armed with radar-guided airborne missiles, to blast away at the extensive Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island. But once again military incompetence prevailed. Though the Island was attacked almost daily, and over fifty foreign

ships were hit in the immediate vicinity, the flow of Iranian oil exports was not throttled. Instead the Iranians retaliated with air attacks on foreign shipping in the southern Gulf in an attempt to punish Iraq's oil rich supporters in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Emirates.

I was at that point, in the spring of 1984, that the United States felt impelled to intervene. American AWACS planes had previously been sent, with USAF crews on board, to provide an airborne radar screen for the defense of Saudi Arabia, also the U.S. sent KC-135 aerial tankers so that the Saudi F-15 fighter planes could extend their protection of foreign oil tankers in the lower Gulf.³⁶

In recent months Iraq has acquired a new self-confidence of its military powers. It considerably stepped up its attacks on the tankers that service the Iranian oil ports at Kharg Island, Bushire, and Bandar Khumeyni. The air war has not succeeded, however, in scaring away foreign shipping. The threat to end the war by choking off oil supplies is not particularly credible.³⁷ After five years of exhausting war and inadequate supplies, though, it is questioned whether Iran still commands the resources needed to intensify the war - either the air or on land. In contrast, Iraq's airforce faces no such constraints.

The Outcome of the War

Both sides are clearly demoralized and over-strained after 60 months of war, but neither is willing to give up. Saddam still gives vent to bombastic and militant rhetoric - partly to assuage the fears of his financial backers in the Gulf oil states, and

partly to rally the morale of an Iraqi army that has suffered terrible losses. Iran announced that Mr. Saddam is "a war criminal who must be tried and punished," and that Iraq must pay considerable reparations for the war damage that it created.³⁸ Iran made fewer aerial attacks - because their Phantom F-4s are in poor shape, and also because the Saudi F-15 patrols are supported by U.S. tanker and AWACS aircraft - the Iraqis stepped up their shipping war. The defense ministers of the Gulf Co-operation Council met and determined to protect shipping lanes in the lower Gulf with joint naval and air patrols. They rely almost entirely on the Saudis' defense against Iran's F-4s.³⁹

Diplomatic activity to end the war has apparently ground to a halt. The seven Western leaders meeting in the June economic 'summit' in London were unable to develop any new initiatives. Britain and France moved small naval units to the Gulf but they have not been active in diplomatic negotiation.

If any decisive action should come at all it is most likely to be taken by the superpowers. After two years of vacillation, the Soviet Union has decided to throw its weight behind Iraq - no matter how strongly the Soviet's allies in Syria and Libya protest. It is a measure of some irony that both Russian and American policy now tilts to Iraq and against Iran, even though their long term interests in the Gulf widely conflict. There is some feeling that Iran is the worse evil and that Iraq should therefore not be stopped too soon in its campaign to cut off Iran's oil revenues. Since both combatants aspire to regional power dominance, and that

necessarily conflicts with American interests, it is difficult in fact for the U.S. to encourage or to restrain either side.

Perhaps the only feasible outcome is that the belligerents will fight each other to a point of exhaustion. It is not a humane solution but it is highly probable. Neither side will win economic or political gains of lasting benefit; more important, neither will succumb to internal collapse or to foreign occupation. At the present time, the superpowers cannot bring about a peace - because they refuse to stop buying oil or selling arms, and because they do not trust each other. The regional powers cannot negotiate a peace either, if only because the warring countries draw xenophobic and ideological advantage by prolonging the fighting. Basically there is the hope that the abstinence of the superpowers, together with the continuance of the oil glut, will bring the combatants to their senses. The position would have been far worse if the two superpowers had been supporting opposing sides in the war, as they did in Korea or Vietnam. It might also have been worse if a relatively weak power, like Saudi Arabia, had refused to fly "peace keeping" air patrols to police the Gulf. This is a small solace, since it does not contribute much to world peace and the Middle East's security.

According to the contemporary circumstances prevailing in the Gulf countries, the Arab countries affected by the present local and world conflict have to put an end to the disputes. They have to begin a comprehensive scientific study on the spot to remove such disputes and their causes. They have to plan and jointly coordinate for common effective procedures. We have to put in mind

that these disputes affect greatly the whole Middle East area. This ensures that the Gulf strategy is one indivisible part of the Arab comprehensive strategy in which the Gulf countries play the main part.

THE LIBYAN PROBLEM

The Historical Background

The roots of the society of Libya began with its Berber origins (1900) and developed into the present militant state under Colonel Muammar al Qadhafi. Originally Libya was only a collection of Bedouin tribes and could not be considered a nation until 1952.⁴⁰ In 1854, the German explorer, Heinrich Barth, found members of the tribe in southern Fezzan and Kanem north of Lake Chad. The Egyptians under their ruler, Mohammed Ali, occupied Mersa Matruh and other settlements in the western desert as far as the Gulf of Bomba. The influence of Islam as religion and policy made Libya a nation.

The importance of Tripoli, it was argued, would enable Italy to exclude other powers and to dominate both shores of the central Mediterranean, which had become a waterway of the first importance since the opening of the Suez Canal 1869. The Libyans were against both Turkey and Italy. In January 1939, the four provinces of Tripoli, Misurata, Benghazi, and Derna, became an integral part, and the nineteenth region, of metropolitan Italy.

Before independence was proclaimed on 24 December 1951, one week before the deadline set by the United Nations. The Kingdom of

Libya lasted 18 years with an unexpected resilience in surviving a succession of crisis.

The Libyan Revolution

The first week of September 1969, a small group of junior army officers sized the prize and settled the succession issue in one swift and decisive coup. Before Qadhafi's coup Libya did not play an active role. During most of the monarchical period, 1951-69, Libya was exceedingly poor - one of the poorest countries in the world - and was not inclined toward international activism. Discovery of oil brought about the possibility of building a large army and of supporting, through financial disbursements and arms deliveries, an array of foreign governments and groups.

Qadhafi took power in 1969 as a zealot with messianic pretensions. The mindset that initially guided Qadhafi as he planned and persevered in his coup continues to inspire him. He sees himself as one who has received a special vision of religious, social, and political truth to bring to the people of Libya and which in time will serve as a pattern for global revolution.

Qadhafi's guiding slogan after the coup was "freedom, socialism, and unity." In practice, that slogan has come to mean implacable opposition to the West and the rejection of compromise in the Middle East, instituting a military dictatorship and a thorough and repressive internal security apparatus, and expanding Libyan territory and Qadhafi's power and influence under the guise of "Arab unity" or, in the case of southward expansion, "Islamic unity."

Gadhafi's version of pan-Arabism has little appeal to other Arabs. Indeed, the Libyan Revolution - Gadhafi's so-called socialist Islamic revolution - is confined to his own country. The Libyan people may be thoroughly familiar with the formulas expounded in Gadhafi's Green Book, his "philosophy" of revolution, but the Green Book is almost entirely ignored beyond Libyan borders. In fact, ideology is less compelling than repressive force in mobilizing the population even within his own country.

The Resort to Terror

Gadhafi repeatedly has demonstrated that he is unconstrained by accepted standards of international conduct. He has sought the assassination of many moderate leaders and Libyan exiles by financing known terrorists and by providing terrorist training in Libya on a continuing basis.⁴¹ He has established a series of camps in Libya for training foreign revolutionaries. Some training is in conventional warfare, some is for terrorism in the true sense of the word. Several camps are devoted entirely to instructing terrorists in a range of explosives and arms for use in assassination and sabotage.

Libyan Armaments and Armed Forces

A significant aspect of Gadhafi's policy has been to expand and improve the Libyan Armed Forces. This effort has consumed a major share of Libya's oil income and produced one of the largest armies per capita in the world. Lacking the manpower to operate much of this equipment, Gadhafi apparently intends to use this huge

arms stockpile, procured largely from the Soviet Union, to equip like-minded revolutionaries around the world. The Libyan military buildup poses a particular threat to Libya's neighbors.

Today, Libya military establishment consists of some 85,000 troops. Gadhafi's efforts to recruit additional personnel have been paralleled by the continued acquisition of military equipment. Until 1973, Libya obtained its most significant equipment from Western sources. In 1974, Gadhafi signed his first major arms agreement with the Soviet Union. Subsequent agreements with Moscow were concluded in 1977, 1978, and 1980. By 1983, the total value of revolutionary Libya's arms deals come to \$23 billion. Libya is currently negotiating a new arms deal with Moscow with a price tag of several billion dollars.

As a result of Gadhafi's arms purchases, Libya has become very heavily armed. There is one tank for every 1,300 Libyans compared to one tank for every 19,000 Americans. Libya has approximately the same number of combat aircraft as France and West Germany, yet Libya's population is only about .5% that of either country. Because of personnel limitations, much of this weaponry is not assigned to operational units. Of Libya's 2,500 tanks, for example, only about 900 are deployed with active units. Similarly, 50% of the 550 jet fighters in Libya are in storage. The shortage of qualified Libyan military personnel has to some extent been counterbalanced by the presence of foreign military advisers. At present nearly 4,000 foreigners, about half of them from the Soviet Union, are assigned to air, naval, ground, and air defense forces.

Libya and the Soviet Union

Libya's relationship with the Soviet Union has become increasingly close. Libya is the foremost Soviet arms customer, and in recent years Qadhafi has increasingly provided the Soviet armed forces access to Libyan facilities. Libya serves Soviet aims without a formal relationship, for Soviet arms find their way through Libya to subversive groups and terrorists whose aims serve Soviet interests. A treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and Libya is another step in the gradually tightening relationship between the two states. Moscow has supplied material for beyond Libya's defense needs or capabilities, providing most of the equipment for Qadhafi's role as an arms supplier. No other Middle Eastern state can rival Tripoli in its potential for dispensing weaponry.

Qadhafi has paid a price for his association with the Soviet Union. It has not been easy for him to justify relating to an atheist, imperialist superpower and acquiescing in the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, a sister Muslim state. To the rest of the Muslim world, it has sapped much of the appeal of Qadhafi's "Islamic revolution." But Qadhafi's fundamental ambition is expansion, he has seen that that ambition cannot be achieved without military might, and the Soviet Union has been the only significant military supplier willing to provide arms in the amounts Qadhafi wants.

The Libyan Military Threat and Subversion

The Libyan Armed Forces are greatly superior to those of all Libya's neighbors except Egypt and Algeria. The continuing Libyan military buildup far exceeds Libyan defense needs, and is explicable only on ground of Libya's expansionist aims, as manifested by the invasion and military occupation of the northern third of Chad.

Qadhafi appears increasingly willing to project conventional force beyond Libyan borders. He came to the aid of Idi Amin with an airlift of troops to Uganda in 1979, an operation that was a complete fiasco and very costly in casualties to Libya, he has also dispatched troops to Lebanon and Syria.

Virtually all African and Arab moderate regimes are targets of Libyan-supported subversion. Unable to persuade or bribe other states into submitting to a Qadhafi-led "Islamic revolution," and unable to use his army to force stronger states to submit to his will, Qadhafi has armed, funded, and trained a wide range of dissident groups to achieve his ends. Subversion has become the principal tool by which he hopes to fulfill his ambitions. Virtually every state in African and the Middle East has been the object of Qadhafi's meddling.

In Sudan Qadhafi played a part in an attempted coup against Nimeiri in 1975, in 1980, in 1983 and the recent one in 1985. Qadhafi has played upon inherent Sudanese divisions, aided by geographical factors, to make Nimeiri's control of the country as difficult as possible. Qadhafi has strengthened relations with Ethiopia partly in order to try to bring down Nimeiri. The

Ethiopians in turn have allowed Libya to train and arm thousands of Sudanese dissidents in Ethiopia.

Egypt and Algeria, as states contiguous to Libya, receive much of Qadhafi's attention. His agents were particularly active in Egypt in the 1970's. Qadhafi is implacably opposed to the Moroccan monarchy on principle, but his opposition is exacerbated by King Hassan's pro-Western orientation and moderate role in the Arab community. Libya has been an important financial backer of the Polisario since its founding in 1973 and, in recent years, has been an important source of heavy weaponry for the front.⁴² In the 1980s Qadhafi broadened his activities into Latin America. Nicaragua and El Salvador are Qadhafi's focus, but Libyan arms, funds, and training are becoming available to leftist oppositionists throughout Latin America.⁴³

Qadhafi's Negative Impact

Qadhafi has been frustrated in many of his objectives, and yet he has had an impact. His machinations throughout Africa and the Middle East, and now in Latin America, are a destabilizing force. Disappointment has in no way deterred him. For all this efforts, Qadhafi has not been successful in many of his ventures. He remains dissatisfied even with his relationship with his few allies: The Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, Iran, Ethiopia, Benin, Ghana, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

THE PROBLEM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Historical Background

Within the last decade, the Horn of Africa has emerged as one of the hotbeds of great power rivalry in the continent. By its very location, the region possesses immense strategic and geopolitical features. Situated in the northeast of the African continent, it lies adjacent to the inflammable Middle East and the Red Sea whose entrance it decisively commands. It also borders the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. These sea routes around the Horn have been serving as passages for international shipping long before the completion of the Suez Canal in 1869. In addition, the region is beset by a swirl of irrepressible and deep-seated conflicts within and between its states - notably Somalia and Ethiopia. Therefore, given its strategic position and the turbulent internal political dynamics, the attraction the Horn offers the great powers is virtually irresistible.⁴⁴

At the root of the crisis in the Horn of Africa are the contradictory preceptions of post-colonial national integration by Ethiopia on the one hand and Somalia on the other. Ethiopia's objectives have been to consolidate the territories which have been historically under its jurisdiction. Somalia, on the other hand, had the objective of uniting all Somali speaking peoples of the Horn under one flag in a Somali nation.⁴⁵ These were the Ogaden of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, the former Territory of Afars and Isas (now Djibouti), the former British Somaliland and the former Italian Somaliland, the last two of which

form the present republic of Somalia. Whereas these regions contain Somalis as well as other peoples, the Somali objective of reshaping national boundaries on the basis of ethnic affiliation was rejected by the other countries in the Horn. Another important factor that contributes to the crisis in this region is the strategic importance of the Horn and superpower competition for control of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. Mid-east political dynamics also extend their influence in the region since Somalia is a member of the Arab League whereas Ethiopia has been regarded as an island of Christianity. Although Ethiopia is a country that belongs to both Christians and Moslems, the "Arab factor" in the Horn has partially been responsible for intensifying the polarization between the two countries.

The superpower factor has its background in the historically close friendship between Ethiopia and the U.S. since the 1950s which led to some American military presence in Ethiopia and American defensive military assistance to her. In order to balance this, Somalia became closer to the Soviet Union and eventually allowed Soviet military presence which also came with offer of military assistance.

One final factor of instability in the Ogaden is the center - periphery problem. The Ogaden is on the periphery of centers of settlement and economic development of both countries. The population in the region has not been sufficiently integrated into the mainstream of socio-political and developmental processes that have been going on in the highlands of Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia has made deliberate attempts to extend infrastructure for basic needs

into the region, maybe even at higher level than other provinces in the country, development possibilities based on petroleum potentials and prospects for long irrigation in the Wabe Shebelli and Juba systems have not been realized.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in The Horn

Sino-Soviet competition for friends and influence in the Red Sea area dates back to the early 1960s in the Yemeni Arab Republic. Both had engaged in an aid competition in form of loans and credits but, after the 1962 coup, Soviet arms contribution gave her an edge over China. By 1962, this competition spread to the African side of the Red Sea when the Soviet Union offered Somalia \$35 million in military credits. China swiftly responded with an economic aid package worth \$23 million.⁴⁶ Through these commitments, both sides succeeded in making in-roads into the region. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s, their activities were generally low-keyed. This was due to the predominantly conservative nature of the regimes in the region which constricted the scope of cooperation with these communist powers, and, the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution which led to downward trend in Sino-African relations.

With the gradual radicalization of the states in this region as a sequel to the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the coups in Sudan and Somalia and the echoes of the Cultural Revolution fading away, Sino-Soviet competition gathered increased momentum toward the end of the decade. The first avenue for this was in the Sudan.

Following the May 1969 coup which brought General Jaafar Nimeiry to power, prominent members of the pro-Moscow Sudanese Communist Party were co-opted into the government and this, coupled with Soviet military assistance, helped to strengthen Soviet-Sudanese relations. The Chinese also extended some military assistance to the regime but Soviet presence was more pronounced. However, in the aftermath of the abortive coup of July 1971 in which the Soviets and the Sudanese Communist Party were implicated, the seemingly rosy Soviet-Sudanese relationship took a sour turn and the Chinese were quick to capitalize on this. Thus, while the Soviets staged an outcry at the "barbarity and savagery" of the Sudanese government (over the annihilation of the Communist Party), China sent a letter of congratulations to Nimeiry for surviving the coup attempt masterminded by those she called the "Social Imperialists." She subsequently sent a military mission to Khartoum, supplied a brigade of tanks, Mig-17 aircrafts and extended a 15 million Pound loan repayable over 15 years. These helped the Peoples Republic of China in consolidating and enlarging its foothold in the country. Despite their setback, the Soviets did not completely evacuate Sudan. Rather, they quietly continued with their aid project.

The Soviet Union got her major foothold in Somalia where, apart from the offer of \$35 million in military credits, she was also training a 20,000-man army. After the coup which brought Siyaad Barre to office in October 1969, Soviet-Somali ties seemed to have waxed stronger. This became evident because, by the early 1970's, Soviet assistance, particularly military⁴⁷ and, in the

areas of irrigation, dam-building and fisheries had become tremendous. In 1974, Somalia and the Soviet Union signed a "Treaty of Friendship" the first of its kind between the Soviets and a Black African nation. Despite this development, the Chinese were not deterred. They continued their economic assistance to the country and in June 1970, the Somali Vice-President visited China and signed an agreement providing for the construction of factories to supply Somalia all its requirements of cigarettes and matches, a meat processing plant and technical assistance in building 20,000 kilometers of roads all to the tune of \$125 million. By 1973, Chinese economic aid to Somalia exceeded that of the Soviets and was generally more successful. On the whole, the Somalis were generally enthusiastic about the Chinese aid program.

In spite of their popularity, however, the Chinese, for most of the 1970s, took a rather low diplomatic posture in Somalia while the Soviet Union moved to enlarge and consolidate its presence. In China's case, the influence of the United States in the region correlated with her interests and objectives while the Soviet Union was helped by the fact that Somalia regarded her as a vital source of supplies and training for the 20,000 - man army.

In neighboring Ethiopia, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), had started cultivating its influence since 1970. In November of that year, a joint Sino-Ethiopia communique announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. This development was followed by Emperor Haile Selassie's one-week visit to Peking in October 1971. The later was, in itself, a remarkable event seen within the context of a series of diplomatic successes in which China moved to

renew and strengthen diplomatic relations with several African countries. During the visit, China and Ethiopia signed an economic co-operation agreement under which Peking would provide an interest free loan of 33.5 million pounds for agricultural development. Indeed, an Ethiopian official described it then as the most favorable loan agreement that Ethiopia had signed with any nation.

New Opportunities

With the deposition of Emperor Haile Selassie and the emergence of a radical Provisional Military Administrative Council (Dergue), the stage seemed set for increased Sino-Soviet initiatives. Coupled with this fluid situation in Ethiopia was the fact that by 1974, the United States had decided to scale down its presence in the country. To this end, it started phasing out the Hagan base in Asmara which served as a strategic communications center, an earth terminal for satellite systems and on the whole, symbolized its position in the region.⁴⁰ This development was sequel to the decision taken in the early 1970s to expand the base at Diego Garcia on the Indian Ocean. The diminution of United States interests in Ethiopia and the increasing radicalization of the Dergue created new openings for the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China. Initially, the Dergue seemed to be forging closer links with the PRC and there were rumors of expanding Chinese influence in the country. Between 1975 and January 1977, there was considerable traffic between Addis-Ababa and Peking. Within this period, China beefed up its aid program by sending road building crews, medical personnel, and relief supplies to Ethiopia.

On its part, the Soviet Union had started wooing the Dergue openly since 1966 while its policies were becoming markedly sympathetic toward the new regime. Early in the year, a Soviet delegation visited Ethiopia to praise the country's "correct progressive stand" and by May, the Soviet Union had reversed its previous policy of support for the Eritrean movement and came in support of the Dergue's position.⁴⁹ She also signed a cultural agreement with Ethiopia which provided for cooperation in education, science, technology and fine arts. While all this was going, the Soviet Union remained the major arms supplier to Somalia-Ethiopia's arch enemy. It did not appear, at this juncture, that the Soviet Union had finalized plans to extend her geopolitical umbrella over the entire region by cementing patron-client relationships with both Ethiopia and Somalia. This would, in effect, vitiate Chinese influence in the area.

By March 1977, the picture was becoming clearer. An "armed debate"⁵⁰ had taken place within the Ethiopian Dergue in which key members credited with pro-Chinese sympathy were liquidated. The revamped Dergue came under the chairmanship of Colonel Mengiste Haile Mariam and certain pro-Moscow elements. This was a favorable development for the Soviets.

In the wake of the Ogaden crisis, Cuba's Fidel Castro, apparently acting as proxy for the Soviets, visited Ethiopia and Somalia with a view to resolving the conflict between the two "socialist" neighbors and, at a secret meeting in Aden, South Yemen, he urged both countries to bury the hatchet to form a

"Marxist-confederation" as a "common anti-imperialist front." Somalia refused to be convinced and the initiative failed.

With the intensification of the fighting in the Ogaden, the question of arms supply became crucial to the survival of the Dergue. The United States had cut off its supplies and though it was rumored that the Soviets had earlier offered arms, nothing was forthcoming. Thus, in May 1977, Colonel Mengistu went to Moscow to solicit for arms and after the visit, Soviet tanks and jet fighters began to arrive in Ethiopia. As the Soviet Union started arming Ethiopia, she was, at the same time, urging Somalia not to feel betrayed because of this. Somalia, of course, was not convinced and her relationship with the Soviets became increasingly strained. Failing in its gambit to assuage Somalia and lure her into a "confederation" with Ethiopia, the Soviet Union made a volte-face, and in October, cut off arms supply to Mogadishu. Apparently enraged at the Soviet's posture, Somalia in turn, accused Moscow of "brazen interference in the Horn of Africa" and expelled thousands of Soviet experts. She also withdrew all naval, air and ground facilities, including the sophisticated Berbera and Kismaya ports, which the Soviets enjoyed. On top of these, she unilaterally renounced the treaty of friendship signed with the Soviet Union in 1974. In its response, Moscow denounced her for making "chauvinist, expansionist" moves which "prevailed over common sense" and, on this note, the Soviet-Somali relationship crumbled. The Soviets consequently and quickly moved to consolidate their relationship with the Ethiopian Dergue.

The break-up of Soviet-Somalia relationships was obviously an opportune event for the Chinese. When Soviet arms supply ceased, China was reported to have offered spare parts for Somalia's old Soviet weapons and began to show renewed interest in consolidating its relationship with Mogadishu, and quietly continued with her aid program in Ethiopia. At the end of 1979, Soviet action in Afganistan prompted China to sharpen her criticism of Soviet engagement and to consider more seriously her position in the Horn.

Sino-Soviet Strategic Objectives and the Horn

The expansion of Soviet presence in the Horn, has been a source of concern for the Chinese. As earlier noted, the Horn of Africa occupies a strategic position and, to this extent, it is very relevant to the geopolitical and strategic objectives of China and the Soviet Union.

Up until the early 1970's, Soviet presence in the Horn was counterbalanced by American influence in Ethiopia. Although China also enjoyed some measure of presence, it found solace in the fact that the U.S. could be counted on as a potent and equal rival to the Soviet Union and so long as the U.S. played this "spoiler" role, Peking did not have any pressing need to respond vigorously to the Soviet Union.

However, with the retrenchment of U.S. presence in the region, as was the case elsewhere in the aftermath of the Vietnam war, the enlargement of Soviet activities was seen by China as a serious threat. A predominantly pro-Soviet Horn would be an invaluable

link in the Soviet "cordon." It would also threaten Chinese long-term strategy of developing its sea power as, among other imperatives, an integral part of an evolving "counter-encirclement strategy." This new strategy stems from China's perceptions of threat caused by Soviet naval presence in Asian waters. Within this context, the increased presence of Soviet ships in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea littoral is perceived in Peking as additional links in the Soviet Union's plan to encircle her by sea.

To attain its central objective, therefore, the Soviets have embarked on a variety of efforts to maintain patron-client relationships, reduce Western influence, counter any Chinese initiatives with a view to laying the foundation for a naval presence that can complement its political objectives as well as prepare the way for more significant naval role. With their expulsion from Somalia and the new romance with Ethiopia, the Soviets were reported to have secured naval facilities in the Ethiopian ports at Massaua, Assab and Dahlac Island all of which complement their port facilities in Aden, South Yemen. Those facilities guarantee the Soviets influence among the littoral states of the Red Sea and also provide forward operation lanes for their oceanic operations. In this latter objective which is more significant, the Chinese factor looms very large.

United States policy on the Horn of Africa

The United States sees the situation in the Horn exclusively in Cold War terms, and this has since 1978 contributed greatly to

instability and the lack of peace in the region and so to the absence of justice.

The severe breach in U.S. Ethiopia relations began under President Jimmy Carter. In spite of Carter's effort to present his administration's image as one which put the regional and national interests of African states first in the U.S.'s Africa policy, he ultimately followed a globalist policy in the Horn, based on what were claimed to be vital U.S. interests.

When President Carter entered office, he singled out Ethiopia's new military regime as a test case for his human rights policy in Africa. He set in motion a process intended to withhold and even curtail military aid to Ethiopia. Little consideration was given to how the Ethiopian regime viewed its problems or what options it had at its disposal. Not being able to rely on U.S. military help, the regime turned elsewhere, and found the Soviet Union, Cuba and other countries responsive. The U.S. went so far as to threaten to drop Ethiopia as a client and to embrace its regional adversary, Somalia. This led to nervousness on the part of Ethiopia and eventually, in April 1977, to a virtual complete break of relations between Addis Ababa and Washington.

In the summer of 1977, Somalia decided to make its move to recapture the Ogaden which it claimed as a lost portion of historic Greater Somaliland - allegedly with the complicity of the Carter administration. Carter denied this, and quickly suspended talks on closer Somali-U.S. relations until Somali regular troops were withdrawn from the Ogaden. The Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, South Yemens, and others supplied massive amounts of military aid and

technical assistance to Ethiopia enabling the regime to reestablish control domestically and to repulse external forces. Since then, it has relied upon such aid to help maintain domestic control and secure borders.

By 1978, there was little hope for good relations between Ethiopia and the U.S., at least in the near future. Perceiving this, Carter began to follow an encirclement strategy in the Horn by stepping up military and economic aid to Ethiopia's neighbors. Such events along with the altered strategic balance in the Horn caused deep concern in the Administration. It came to see an "arc of crisis" stretching all the way from Libya to Afghanistan. This was given an evidence between 1979 and 1980 of the need to improve the U.S.'s long range military strike capability, and the ideal of a rapid deployment force (RDF) was introduced.

Capabilities and influence

The relationship between a weak state and a great power is usually founded on a variety of factors. In Africa, the major factors making for alignment are, for all practical purposes, ideological, economic and military and the relative capabilities and performance of the great powers in these respects explain, by and large, their relationship and degree of influence with their weak allies or friends.

In the Horn, all the three factors were present and they account, in varying degrees for the relationships between the superpowers, and the state in the region.

The Horn has, moreover, demonstrated to the communist powers, that the question of nationalism, sub-nationalism and irredentism cannot always be resolved on the platform of "proletarian internationalism."

Due to the parlous economic situation in Africa, the Horn in particular, and the passionate concern of most African regimes with questions relating to development, economic assistance, therefore, is one of the strongest instruments of influence a great power can wield.

Military assistance has been the greatest advantage making for Soviet influence in the Horn, as in other regions within the Third World. The Soviets have been helped in this regard by their standing as the World's leading producer of conventional arms and this combines with their traditional reluctance to discard obsolescent weapons to create huge stockpiles which they off-load in Third World countries.

The political instability in the Horn is being fueled by Big Power ideological competition. This merely exacerbates whatever differences may already exist within and between the various countries of the region. It does not contribute to their resolution. The border difficulties between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the mutual efforts of Sudan and Ethiopia and Somalia and Ethiopia, to subvert one another, could lend themselves to negotiated settlements. The ultimate aim should be peace with justice for the people of the Horn as a whole.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

1. See Safwat El-Sherif, Chairman, Egyptian State Information Service in Sadat Man of Peace, that meant to appear as an incarnation of the message of peace undertaken courageously by President Sadat of Egypt. It is also dedicated to peace-makers and peace-lovers in the world at large wherever they are and whenever they may emerge.

2. In 1955 study of Arab public opinion, 90 percent of those questioned held the United States - either alone or with the other Western powers - responsible for the creation of Israel and the partition of Palestine. The author of the study concluded that "American policy toward Palestine is the principal Arab grievance against the United States." See H. P. Castleberry, "The Arabs View of Postwar American Foreign Policy: Retrospect and prospect." Western Political Quarterly, March 1959, p. 19.

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4. "Israeli's Border and Security Problems." Foreign Affairs, January 1955.

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War (1947-1949), the Sinai-Suez War in 1956, the Six-Day War in 1967, the War of Attrition from 1967 to 1970 and concludes with the October War.

"All wars have political causes, all have historical origins. However, the series of conflicts between the Israelis and Arabs since 1948 have their roots farther back in history than most of the wars of recent times, and their causes are a complicated mixture of political, ideological and religious differences that are not easily susceptible to negotiation and resolution."

6. Churchill, Randolph, and Winston Churchill. The Six Day War. Boston: 1967.

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8. Bell, J. Bawyer. The Long War: Israel and the Arabs Since 1946. Englewood Cliff, NJ, 1969.

9. Badri Hassan, Taha el Magdoub, and Mohamed Dia el-Din Zohdy. The Ramadan War. Dunn Loring, VA: 1977.

10. Bull, Odd. War and Peace in the Middle East. London: 1976.

11. "National Character and Military Strategy: The Egyptian Experience." Parameters, Vol. 5, no. 1, 1975.

12. "The War and the Future of the Arab-Israeli Conflict." Foreign Affairs, January 1974.

13. See Gregory Treverton. "Crisis Management and The Superpowers in The Middle East." (The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Adelphi Library 5). Throughout the post-war

period the Middle East has been the world's most prominent area of crisis. The complicated tangle of interests and relationships in the area that have led to this prominence, and its emergence as a superpower issue, tracing the path of diplomatic effort and military confrontation between 1967 and 1973. The repercussions of the ensuing relations in the Arab world itself and the new role of Egypt.

14. See Itamar Rabinovich. The War for Lebanon 1970-1983. The history of modern and contemporary Lebanon - a history marked by continuing strife and tragedy. A judicious account of Lebanon's sustained domestic conflict, the exacerbating effects that foreign intervention and occupation have had on the Lebanese political order.

15. On the history of the autonomous Mutasarifiyya, see John P. Spagnolo, France and Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1914 (London: Ithaca Press, 1977).

16. On the demands of the Maronite nationalists, see John P. Spagnola, "Mount Lebanon, France David Pasha: A study of some Aspects of Political Habituation," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2 (1971).

17. Compare Salibi, "Lebanese Identity;" N. A. Faris, "Lebanon, Land of Light," in James Kritzeck and R. E. Winder, ed., The World of Islam (London: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 336-50; and Albert H. Hourani, "Ideologies of the Mountain and the city," in R. Owen, ed., Essays on the crisis in Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 33-41; and Itamar Rabinovich, The War for Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 21-22.

18. The standard work on the evolution of Lebanon's political institutions is still Pierre Rondat's, Les Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1947). See Itamar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 22-25.

19. See Arnold Hottinger, "Zuama in Historical Perspective," in Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon, pp. 85-105; and Itamar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 25-26; and Walid Khalidi Conflict and Violence in Lebanon, (U.S.: Harvard University, 1979).

20. On the 1958 civil war, see Sahibi, Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 198-224; and Itmar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 28-33.

21. See The Syrian Invasion of Lebanon: Military Moves as a Political Instrument, Maarachat, July 1977; and Itamar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 34-59.

22. See David Shipler, "Israel Likely to seek Power Shift in Lebanon," International Herald Tribune, June 11, 1982.

23. For a critic of the Israeli government's aims see Yitzhak Rabin's two pieces "The War in Lebanon" (in Hebrew; Tel Aviv, 1983), and "Political Illusions and Their Price," in The Lebanon War - Between Protest and Compliance (Tel Aviv; Hakibhutz Hameuched, 1983), pp. 13-22; and Itamar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 121-152.

24. See Itamar Rabinovich The War For Lebanon 1970-1983, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 174-181.

25. See Adam M. Garfinkle, "The Forces Behind Syrian Politics," Middle East Review, Vol. XVII, no. 1, Fall, 1984, pp. 5-13.

26. See John F. Devlin, "The Political Structure in Syria," Middle East Review, Vol. XVII, no. 1, Fall 1984, pp. 15-20.

27. See Paul A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin, Beyond Camp David, Emerging Alignments and leaders in the Middle East. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp. 11-14.

28. See Aaron D. Miller, "Syria and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Palestinian Factor," Middle East Insight, June-July 1985, pp. 3-29.

29. See Karim Pakradouni, "Assad's Syria and the Politics of Change," Middle East Insight, November, 1984, pp. 3-8.

30. See Robert O. Freedman, "Moscow, Damascus and the Lebanese Crisis of 1982-1984," Middle East Review, Vol. XVII, no. 1, Fall 1984, pp. 22-36.

31. See Guide for Cadets of Military Missions, 1982-83, "Egypt and Middle East," an Overview on Contemporary Problems, Part 2, Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Defense, pp. 74-90.

32. See William O. Staudenmaier, A Strategic Analysis of The Gulf War, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, January 1982, pp. 1-26.

33. For an excellent recent discussion not only of the Shatt al-Arab territorial dispute, but also for many other sources of

conflict in Southwest Asia, see; Robert Litwak, Security in the Persian Gulf 2: Sources of Inter-State Conflict, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Montclair, New Jersey; Allanheld Osman and Co., 1981. For the disputes between Iraq and Iran, see specially pp. 1-24.

34. "Iraq Denounces 1975 Border Settlement with Iran," The New York Times, September 18, 1980, p. A8.

35. See Walter Goldstein, "The War Between Iraq and Iran: A War That Can't be Won or Ended," Middle East Review, Vol. XVII, no. 1, Fall 1984.

36. At hearings of the Foreign Operations sub-committee, both Republican and Democratic senators were critical of the "devious fait accompli" of sending U.S. fight crews on AWAC's planes and selling Stingers to the Saudis without gaining prior Congressional approval. (The Washington Post, June 7, 1984).

37. London insurance agents calculate that the risks are financially worth taking. The oil suppliers are willing to pay for the increased premiums, and even if \$100 million in damage claims is collected as a result of the air attacks, the war zone premium produces a much larger income. In addition, Iran and other states now offer oil discounts below the OPEC agreed price in order to appeal to foreign buyers. (See The Economist, May 26, 1984).

38. The New York Times, June 17, 1984.

39. Ibid. The armaments carried by the Iranian F-4's are too light in most cases to sink an oil tanker; and either the Iraqi pilots or their Exocet missiles perform poorly, too. They have sunk few ships, though damaging many, and their battering of the

Kharg Island oil terminal had left it in working order. Military incompetence, it seems, is still a powerful application of arms control.

40. Libya has been under foreign rule for most of its known history. Ruled through much of the nineteenth century by the Turkish Sultan, and by the Kingdom of Italy in the early twentieth, it achieved real independence only with the collapse of Italian Fascism at the end of the Second World War. For enough information, see John Wright, Libya A Modern History, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 60-115, and The Special Report issued by the Department of State: "The Libyan Problem," (Department of State Bulletin, October 1983), pp. 71-78.

41. "We will not allow any trivial person to give Libya a bad reputation abroad. Such people are charged with high treason because of their collaboration with the Israelis and Americans. They should be killed not because they constitute any danger, but because of their high treason. It is the Libyan people's responsibility to liquidate such scums who are distorting Libya's image" (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], October 12, 1982).

42. FBIS, June 17, 1983. See also Qadhafi's September 1, 1983, speech: "Frankly, the weapons supplied to the Polisario should have been aimed at the hearts of the Israelis and the Americans, the real enemies of the Polisario, the Moroccans, the Libyans, the Algerians, and the Mauritaniens" (FBIS, September 2, 1983).

43. Note, for example, Qadhafi's speech on the 14th anniversary of his coup: "When we ally ourselves with revolution in Latin America, and particularly Central America, we are defending ourselves. This satan (the United States) must be clipped and we must take war to the American borders just as America is taking threats to the Gulf of Sidra and to the Tibesti Mountains" (FBIS, September 2, 1983).

44. See Kola Olufemi, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in the Horn," Horn of Africa, Vol. 6, no. 3, October 1984, pp. 16-23. See for example, Peter Schwab, "Cold War on the Horn of Africa" African Affairs, 77, no. 306, January 1978, pp. 6-20; Gerald Chailand, "The Horn of Africa's Dilemma," Foreign Policy, no. 30, Spring 1978, from p. 110, and John F. Campbell, "Rumblings along the Red Sea: The Eritrean Question," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, no. 3, 1970, pp. 537-548.

45. See Assefa Mehretu, "The Choice Between Cooperation and Confrontation," Horn of Africa, Vol. 5, no. 1, October 1982, pp. 24-28.

46. See Roy Lyons, The U.S.S.R., China and the Horn, p. 9.

47. See Boyer Bell, "Strategic Implications of the Soviet Presence in Somalia," Orbis, Vol. 19, no. 2, Spring 1975, p. 41.

48. See Fred Halliday, "U.S. Policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy Intervention," Review of African Political Economy, no. 10, September/December 1977, p. 10.

49. See Colin Legum, "The Realities of the Ethiopian Revolution," The World Today, August 1977, p. 305.

50. See Olusala Ojo, Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Since the 1974 Revolution, p. 6.

CHAPTER II

THE ROLE OF THE SUPERPOWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Domestic disputes in the Middle East often inflate into regional and then into global disputes, for in the Middle East the strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union intersect.¹ As the concentration of the media on crisis in the Middle East in recent years comply confirms, domestic and regional conflicts in which the superpowers became tangled multiply faster then diplomats and politicians can cope with them.

In the prevailing view of each superpower, its rival and the rival's Middle East clients are responsible for the many recurrent and abiding crisis. As the regional insiders see it, the interstate quarrels basically center on local issues and are aggravated by the interference of either the United States or the Soviet Union or both. Clearly, the superpower and regional rivalries mesh, for the superpowers stir up as much trouble by their competitive behavior as do the Middle East disputants. The patterns of U.S. and Soviet relations with regional governments are changeable, for politics in the Middle East tends to be fluid.

The 1950's-1960's Period

The United States and the Soviet Union have never reached such an understanding on the Middle East. Here the Soviet-United States competition has been characterized by the politics of mutual denial

in defense of perceived strategic interests.² The Soviet Union regards the Middle East states along its southwest frontier as its backyard and views with deep suspicion intimate relations between these states and major powers. To exclude such relations it tried in 1945-1947 to assimilate Turkey and Iran into a Soviet sphere of influence, comparable to the sphere that the Kremlin was creating in Eastern Europe. The Soviet initiatives had exactly the opposite effect of the one it had sought, bringing the United States into the region as the declared defender of Russia's southern neighbors. By the same token, the United States has regarded the Middle East as an area from which Russian influence had been excluded ever since the nineteenth century and has viewed any attempted Soviet political and economic penetration as threatening Western interests, particularly access to Gulf oil. The United States also sees the Arab-Israeli dispute and the recurrent wars to which it has given rise as destabilizing the region. For this reason, and because the United States developed over the years a moral commitment to the survival of Israel, successive U.S. administrations have consistently taken the lead in promoting a peaceful settlement. The United States and its allies reacted with alarm to the Soviet entry into the Arab Middle East in 1955-1956 as arms purveyor to Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, adding Iraq and Algeria by 1963.

Since then, each superpower has sustained favorite friends in the region with generous diplomatic material and technical assistance. In the Six Arab-Israeli wars, the United States, and the Soviet Union have tended to avoid active entanglement. When they have not - in the rival Soviet and U.S. airlifts to the

opposing sides in the Ramadan War of October 1973 - superpower tensions have threatened to escalate beyond control. The United States and the Soviet Union have remained firm in their determination to prevent a nuclear confrontation, sparked by a Middle East war over regional issues.

The Soviet and U.S. strategies of mutual exclusion in the Middle East were thus first put to work in what John Foster Dulles in the 1950s dubbed the region's "northern tier." To its south and west, in the Arab states and Israel, where in the first postwar decade Soviet-U.S. competition was marginal, the United States eschewed direct responsibilities, preferring instead to accept the leadership of Britain and France. Washington lent its prestige to collective policies such as Tripartite Declaration of May 1950, under which the three allies jointly regulated arms exports to the independent Arab states and Israel and guaranteed interstate boundaries and armistice lines against forcible change.

After more than one ~~season~~ project to integrate the Atlantic allies and Middle East states into a single defense system in the cause of blocking Soviet expansion, Britain and the United States alone formed the Baghdad Pact in 1955 with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The creation of the pact infuriated the Soviet Union and upset existing alignments in the Middle East. The inclusion of Iraq and Pakistan alienated Egypt and Afghanistan, opening the way in both countries to the Kremlin's use, for the first time, of arms sales to weaken Western influence and enhance its own. The Soviet penetration of the arms market in the Arab interior ended the Western monopoly and contributed to the 1956 Suez crisis. The

failure of the British-French expedition at the Suez Canal, largely because of U.S. condemnation, left the United States in the position of paramount custodian of allied interests west and north of the canal.

The 1967 War - 1973 War

Largely because of Vietnam, the United States became reluctant after the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967 to continue carrying alone the burdens of curbing the further growth of Soviet influence in the Middle East. For the first time, the United States agreed in 1968 to admit the USSR to a role in the Arab-Israeli peace-seeking process outside the United Nations, along with Britain and France in four-power talks and in bilateral superpower talks over the next two years. While the cumbersome exchanges were under way, the United States carried out its commitment to sell Israel F-4 Phantom jets and other sophisticated equipment. In Egypt's war of attrition with Israel in 1969-1970, the Soviet Union sold Egypt air missile batteries, it also deployed Soviet pilots for reconnaissance in the Mediterranean, to keep track of the movements of the Sixth Fleet. Little wonder that the parallel four-power and two-power talks on an Arab-Israeli settlement yielded no practical results. For all intents and purposes Moscow was opting itself out of the peace-seeking process by its failure to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, which it had severed in June 1967, thereby signaling its preference for partisan rather than a mediatory role in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Many observers of superpower behavior in the October 1973 war believed that the Soviet airlift to the Arab belligerents had virtually demolished U.S. influence in the Arab world. Yet no sooner had the war ended than Egypt turned to the United States, which had airlifted supplies to Israel, as the sole acceptable mediator. Moreover Egypt and Syria restored diplomatic relations with the United States, after an interruption of seven years. The Soviet Union could hardly have welcomed these developments. It stood to lose prestige and influence and to endanger political, strategic, and economic interests in the Arab world that it had so carefully cultivated at such great expense in the preceding two decades. Such an unexpected outcome may be awaited only in a condition of unsettled relations. The inventive U.S. leadership in 1973-1974 was limited to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Because of congressional opposition and the Watergate crisis, the Nixon and Ford administrations failed to do the same in the renewed fighting on Cyprus in 1974 and the Greek-Turkish strife it rekindled. Similarly, the continuing domestic distractions and public uncertainty precluded U.S. leadership from trying to end the civil war that broke out in Lebanon a year later.

Sadat Initiative

The Carter administration in 1977 resumed the U.S. initiative in attempting to set the stage for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement by seeking, with the help of Saudi Arabia, to entice Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and the PLO to the conference table with Israel. But the PLO backed away under pressure from internal

opposition. Besides, the administration in Washington, in its effort to deal the Soviet Union into the process, did so too casually. Its failure to consult in advance the regional parties, notably Israel and Egypt, elicited the hostility of both. At the superpower level, the failed Carter demarche intensified the Soviet-U.S. cold war in the Arab-Israeli zone, once the U.S. became the sole mediator in the direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel.


Meanwhile, for the defense of Western interests in the Gulf after Britain laid down its primary responsibilities in 1971, the Nixon administration had framed the twin-pillar policy to circumvent congressional resistance to a U.S. replacement of Britain as the custodian of Gulf security. The twin pillars, Iran and Saudi Arabia, it was held, would keep unwanted intruders out of the strategic inland sea, in return, the United States would provide the essential diplomatic and implied military backup. Saudi Arabia's oil revenues overtapped those of all other OPEC members, including Iran, but its population did not exceed one-ninth that of Iran's. Moreover, the ruling Saudi Family was much more cautious than the shah. It invested heavily in military and economic modernization, but most of it went into infrastructure.

The United States and the Soviet Union pay close attention to the Middle East, and each is sensitized to regional changes attributable to the other. Whenever a perceived advantage accrues to one superpower, the adversary may be expected to try to check its growth or seek compensation. Thus, by agreeing to direct negotiations for a political settlement, President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt

in November 1977 broke Arab solidarity on the denial of legitimacy to Israel. The United States did a double take at the time by abandoning altogether the proposed joint-superpower sponsorship of such negotiations, announced a few weeks earlier. The Carter Administration then offered its unilateral mediation to the two Middle East governments, leading to an Egyptian-Israeli agreement at Camp David in September 1978 and the signing of formal instruments of peace in March 1979. Throughout this period, the Soviet Union played a spoiler role by discouraging the extension of the Camp David process and even the execution of the Egyptian-Israeli peace terms. Through diplomacy and propaganda the Kremlin aided and abetted the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front of Arab states, which had been formed in December 1977 expressly to frustrate Sadat's plans for direct talks with Israel.

The Iranian Revolution

The overturn of the Shah early in 1979 brought to an inglorious end the U.S. twin-pillar strategy. For lack of an alternative plan to defend Western interests in the Gulf, the United States shifted course yet again by deploying on regular duty in the Indian Ocean two carrier battle groups. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the year convinced many Americans in and out of Washington that the policy planners in the Kremlin had not changed by an iota their perception, going back at least to the mid-1940's, of the prerequisites for the security of the Soviet Union: the conversion of the Middle East into a community of states friendly to itself, in the image of post-Yalta Eastern



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
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Europe. Early in 1980 President Carter warned the Soviet Union that any attempt "to gain control of the Persian Gulf region" would "be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." To make the Carter Doctrine credible, the United States generously advertised the development of the infrastructure for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the Indian Ocean and its Red Sea and Gulf extensions. Far from repudiating the doctrine of the RDF, the Regan Administration in 1981-1982 accelerated the build-up and mounted joint maneuvers with the armed forces of the cooperating governments in the neighborhood.

The Iran-Iraq War

In more than five years of Iran-Iraq war, neither superpower managed to get a handle on either belligerent. The Islamic republic had pulled itself free from all ties to the United States without moving into a Soviet embrace, even though it was accepting Soviet diplomatic, military, and economic favors. Iraq meanwhile, was continuing to wriggle itself loose from the once-tight Soviet hug but was still remote from normalizing its relations with the United States. It did not even restore diplomatic relations, severed in 1967, let alone establish a favored position for U.S. support. The continued uncertainty, many observers felt, helped the Soviets, if so, only in the psychological sense of threatening the future production of oil in the Gulf; but in an oversupplied world market, it did not evoke a sense of urgency. Lacking formal relations with either belligerent, the United States could at least take satisfaction in the self-containment of the Gulf war, even

though U.S. offers of joint maneuvers with one or more of the peninsular states, as a deterrent to Iran, found takers.

The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

The latest Arab-Israeli war by Israel's invasion of Lebanon on 6 June 1982, hardly caught the superpowers by surprise. Both had engaged in brisk rivalry as arms purveyors to the regional adversaries, the United States supplying Israel and from time to time Lebanon; and the Soviet Union, the PLO and Syria. Still unlike the October War, the superpowers mounted no rival airlifts. The superpowers had deposited enough equipment with their friends before the war to diminish the need for emergency resupply.

THE SOVIET UNION STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Soviet Union has been intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East since at least 1955, when arms sales to Egypt propelled it into the politics of the region. Over more than a quarter-century Soviet initiatives have led to both successes and failures, but there has been no slackening of will or commitment to a forward policy. In an area dominated by the European colonial powers up to the Second World War, and by U.S. influence subsequently, the Soviet pursuit of a regional presence has often been perceived as a direct challenge to Western interests.

The Soviet Union Objectives in the Middle East

A key actor in the area is, of course, the Soviet Union. It has demonstrated that it has both short- and long-term objectives in the region.³ Its long-term objective must be assumed to be that of fostering Communist governments in the area and then incorporating them into the Soviet sphere of influence. Such objectives are not stated in quite this way. Ideological constraints change them into statements which support the ideological goal of fostering the worldwide Communist revolution. The People's Republic of China (PRC), struggling for leadership of the Communist movement in the Third World, has accused the Soviets of being more imperial than revolutionary in the Middle East. The Soviets have responded to this charge by professing their devotion to revolutionary principles - placing, in effect, imperialist wine in revolutionary battles. But whatever the rhetoric of the Communist giants, their ideology requires an expansionist stance. To abandon such a stance would be to cast doubt on the stated ideological basis of their governments.

A more discernible objective of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is the desire to exert an anti-Western hegemony over the entire area. This implies an ability to settle conflicts to Moscow's advantage and to insure that governments of the region are receptive to Soviet policy objectives. In the Middle East, this would imply a capability - for use only when most effective - of denying to other powers access to oil, transit rights, or both.

Medium-term policy objectives of the Soviets in the Middle East, judging from their actions and statements, seem to be the following:

- Establish strong military assistance presence in the area.
- Improve existing naval presence as a means of outflanking North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
- Secure mastery over the Indian Ocean and Africa.
- Detach Turkey and Iran from existing Western alliances.

Short-term policy objectives which support the objectives listed above are:

- Encourage limited modus vivendi - an armed truce between Israel and neighboring Arab countries.
- Encourage the expansion of Soviet naval presence in the Indian ocean.
- Discourage pro-Chinese governments in the area.
- Encourage removal of Western influences in the area, particularly that of the United States.
- Develop dependent status amongst the Arab states by encouraging dependence on the Soviet Union for arms repair parts and supplies.

Soviet objectives in the Middle East also indirectly support their objective in Europe. By encouraging use of the Arab oil weapon and by fostering policy splits among NATO members, they quite obviously hope to weaken or emasculate the Western Alliance. Because Germany, a still feared antagonist, has its troops under NATO control, rapid dismemberment of NATO, without neutralization

of Germany, would obviously not be desirable. Thus, the Soviets appear to be moving cautiously in this area.

Two categories of Soviet action can be observed. First, as political realignments occur in various states, the Soviets are active politically and provide military support. Whether they are the instigators or the exploiters of inherently unstable situations is a moot issue. What is important is that they are able to capitalize on these events, and the potential for trouble emanating or radiating from these activities is considerable.

Although Soviet theoreticians are said to proclaim that hegemony over the world is their eventual goal, direct written proof remains inconclusive. Until Afghanistan, this was seen as something to be obtained little by little over an extended period. The Soviets have sought to establish a system of alliances and friendly states strongly tied to the USSR through civilian and/or military assistance programs. It seems clear that the Soviets are looking for radical-activist elements in the region to support, paving the way for an eventual Marxist takeover. Each time the Soviets succeed in achieving such a regime the United States finds its interests threatened increasingly.

Strategic Exposure

The strategic redefinitions occasioned by World War II saw the emergence of the United States as the dominant power in the region. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 was the first enunciation of the U.S. intention to assume a leading role and was accompanied by U.S. intervention in the Greek civil war; the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA) induced fall of Muhammed Musaddig's government in Iran and subsequent U.S. backing for the shah; increasing support for the state of Israel; and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the Baghdad Pact in 1955, as U.S.-sponsored regional alliances in the spirit of containment. The emerging U.S.-Soviet global rivalry was rapidly superimposed upon the Middle East, which became an area of primary Western strategic attention. For its part, and given U.S. strategic predominance, the Soviet Union was drawn almost inevitably into a posture of strategic denial, very much in character with its historical approach to the region, which it has substantially maintained ever since.⁴

To accomplish strategic denial the Soviet Union requires its own military infrastructure capable of projecting power into the region and solid political relationships with strategically placed regional actors. Effective strategic denial would give the Soviet Union several obviously desirable advantages, including: (1) an improved posture adjacent to NATO's southern theater; (2) the ability to protect the southern routes of access to the USSR; (3) a degree of interdictive or retaliatory capacity against a sub or carrier-based nuclear threat in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean; (4) the ability to maintain a containment, or encirclement, posture in relation to the People's Republic of China; (5) enhanced ability to project power into the region with the aim of influencing regional conflicts in such a way as to improve the Soviet Strategic position to the detriment of the United States; (6) an enhanced ability to neutralize, subvert, or intimidate U.S. clients or

alies, when possible at acceptable cost and risk; and (7) in general, an improved strategic posture in the region as a counter to the U.S. presence.

Sources of Involvement - Geographical Proximity

The USSR has reacted to virtually every event of significance in the Middle East over the past thirty years with the ritual phrase "the Near East is a region located in immediate proximity to the southern borders of the Soviet Union, and events there cannot help but affect the interests of the USSR."⁵ Physical proximity does in fact impact upon Soviet policy toward the Middle East in diverse and important ways.

Regional Contiguity

The most important effect of regional contiguity upon Soviet policy in the Middle East lie in the realm of perception. Soviet commentary is infused with the conviction that the Soviet Union is a Middle Eastern power by right of history and geography, with an unchallengeable claim to a voice in local affairs. Moscow has been continuously involved in the area throughout the modern period, and this has arguably left a legacy of attitudes and impulses, including a latent sense of cultural superiority, that continue to condition policy today. The predominantly Muslim Central Asian Republics has given the Soviet leadership a tutorial attitude toward many of the problems of the region.⁶

Sources of Involvement - Economic Factors

One of the key dimensions of the purported Soviet threat to the Middle East is a presumed desire to gain control over the region's vital resources, particularly oil, either as an alternative to cresting or declining domestic production, or to deny them to the West. The influence of the CIA's 1977 misestimates concerning impending oil shortages in the USSR⁷, since revised by the CIA itself and rejected by nearly every independent investigatory source, has created widespread misperceptions concerning this critical issue that are just beginning to dissipate. The Soviet Union does have an economic interest in maintaining or developing access to Middle Eastern energy reserves to allow for the continued exportation of a portion of its own production, but it is not being compelled onto the world market and does not confront an imminent energy crisis.⁸

The true threat to international stability emerging from the Middle East relates not so much to Soviet designs as to dynamics at work within the region itself. The impact of oil wealth upon the economies of the Middle East, the division of the region into wealthy and impoverished states that it has created, demographic restructuring and the emergence of a younger generation with heightened expectations, and attendant problems of development and modernization have been immensely disruptive. Both superpowers have sought to exploit the resultant regional tensions, but neither has succeeded in mastering them. The impact of arms transfers upon the region, fed by petrodollars and unrestrained superpower competition, has become an independent variable with tremendously

destabilizing potential. Oil price increases, excessive levels of military spending, and international recession have combined to create a threat to the viability of the entire regional order, with important global implications as well. The Soviet Union does not stand to gain - quite the contrary, in fact - from major economic dislocations, but the nature of superpower rivalry superimposed upon the Middle East may yet help to provoke them.

Sources of Involvement - Political Motives

Important political manifestations of Soviet involvement in the Middle East include: (1) support for the Arab states in their confrontation with Israel and of "Arab unity" as the means to achieve long-term goals; (2) support for the Palestinian national movement, culminating with the accordance of diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization in October 1981; (3) linkage to a local infrastructure of Communist parties and organizations dependent upon Soviet backing and capable of acting as agents of Soviet policies; (4) the attempt to construct a loose confederation of area states around the principle of anti-imperialism and directed against U.S. regional predominance; (5) the pursuit of stable state-to-state relations under the general rubric of peaceful coexistence; and (6) ideological formulations such as the noncapitalist path of development or the state with socialist orientation defining a progressive role for Arab nationalism and other powerful regional forces. The Soviet Union apparently also uses unconventional diplomacy as a means of penetrating the region, including selective support for terrorist organizations. The bulk

of Soviet diplomatic activity in the region has been cautious and subdued.

A description often applied to the USSR and its political role in the Middle East is that of a non status quo power. According to this characterization the Soviet impact upon world politics has been essentially subversive, predicated upon a restructuring of the international political order in the Soviet image. In pursuit of its goals the Soviet Union encourages instability, "stirs up trouble," and favors a climate of insecurity. As a rising super-power seeking to expand its strategic domain it stands to benefit from a disruption of the current order, and this is particularly true in the Middle East where Soviet proximity coupled with U.S. strategic domination and regional instability provide an excellent context for meddling.

THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INTERESTS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

During the past few years the Middle East has assumed major importance in U.S. strategic thinking.⁹ U.S. concerns for the continued flow of oil to the industrialized West and Japan, solutions to the Arab-Israeli problem, prevention of increased Soviet influence, preservation of the national independence of area states and maintenance of regional stability highlight the importance, complexity, and diversity of U.S. interests and involvement in the region. In the late 1970's a series of events altered the strategic environment and caused the United States to make a searching

reappraisal of its interests and objectives in the region. These events were the overthrow of the Shah in Iran and the assumption of power by a militant Islamic Republic; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; the Iran-Iraq war; the oil price spiral; the declaration of a Marxist state in South Yemen; the Israeli invasion on Lebanon; the disintegration of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO); and the overall deterioration of the U.S. position through the region. Singly each event might have proven manageable, but in concert they pose an unparalleled threat for the United States. These developments set the tone for the strategic environment facing the United States in the region in the 1980's.¹⁰

The United States Objectives in the Middle East

U.S. objectives in the Middle East, are as follows:

- Maintenance of transit rights and access to the Middle East by all peaceful powers.
- Maintenance of oil supplies to U.S. European and Asian allies.
- Accomplishment of a just, lasting and equitable peace settlement between the Arab states and Israel.
- Settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem.

These policy goals are complicated by what has in effect been "knee-jerk" U.S. public support for the cause of Israel. The Arabs correctly perceive the United States as the sole guarantor of the continued existence of Israel. Past U.S. declarations of "even-handedness" for the Arab and Israeli positions are looked upon as

real politic by the Israelis but are looked upon as hypocrisy by the Arabs.

Traditional U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East

Despite catastrophic events which have tormented the region since the end of World War II. U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East have remained relatively constant.¹¹

Foremost among these interests has been the containment of Soviet influence. Since World War II the United States has sought to deny influence to the Soviets in the region. The Baghdad Pact, later known as CENTO, was one such attempt, the post-1973 war shuttles of Kissinger and President Carter's Camp David actions were the latest of such moves.¹²

Closely aligned with the containment of Soviet influence was United States interest in avoiding a direct confrontation with the United States as one of their goals as well, but it took special effort during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars to avoid a major conflagration. Both sides took steps which could have led to war but the two antagonists exchanged sufficiently cooling messages to avoid such a disastrous eventuality.

A third major interest has been access to oil. For years the United States has held that oil must be available at reasonable prices relatively free of restrictions, not just for the United States but for all nations. The oil embargo which followed the 1973 war and the increasing price rises since then have emphasized the vulnerability of the United States in this area and the need to safeguard access to oil.¹³

Another interest of the United States has been its commitment to the survival of Israel. This has been a central theme of United States policy since Israel's birth in 1948. In each of its wars Israel has received strong U.S. support and the strength of the U.S. commitment has been reaffirmed by successive American Presidents. There seems little doubt that the security and well-being of Israel will continue to be a major tenet of U.S. Middle East policy.

United States interest in solving the Arab-Israeli dispute has remained almost inseparable from support of Israel. Each administration has expended extensive energy on this goal. Real progress was not forthcoming until after the 1973 War.¹⁴ Since then there have been the two interim disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel, one interim disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel and finally the Camp David accords, which culminated in the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed in March 1979.

Regional stability has been another consistent interest. The United States has fostered reasonable change, peaceful solutions to the Arab-Israeli quagmire, and support for conservative, moderate, traditional regimes. Similarly the United States has supported regional stability to minimize Soviet influence, confine inter-Arab rivalries, and help in avoiding additional Arab-Israeli wars.¹⁵

Factors influencing U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East

Several matters must influence the United States strategic interests in the Middle East. First, more important, different and numerous U.S. interests converge in the region than probably

anywhere else. Second, fundamental changes are occurring at an amazing pace in virtually every state in the region. The wealthiest (such as Saudi Arabia) and poorest (such as the Sudan and Yemen) nations cope with these changes. Instability is a constant threat, is virtually inevitable and must be addressed. Third, the United States must follow a policy that opts for orderly change, attempts to control the chaotic forces at work, and permits the simultaneous pursuit of its interests without having to sacrifice one at the expense of another in this environment of high stakes and disparate interests.¹⁶

U.S. strategic interests were directly affected. Containment of Soviet involvement, regional stability, support for moderate regimes, and maintenance of access to strategic resources were all involved. Thus, the United States became involved in a regional inter-Arab rivalry due to the broader strategic context and connotations. Other inter-Arab and inter-regional rivalries which affect U.S. interests include the Lebanese Civil War, the Egyptian-Syrian border dispute, the Iran-Iraq quarrel, the Syrian-Iraqi ideological dichotomy, the Morocco-Algerian border dispute and Polisario rebellion, and traditional versus radical ideologies. Each has implications for the U.S. and affects a wide range of U.S. interests.

Numerous factors influence U.S. actions, interests, and objectives in the Middle East. Key factors include Soviet challenges and activities, the change in perceptions about the United States; the rise of Islamic fundamentalism; the effect of Camp David and other U.S. moves related to the solution of the Arab-Israeli

dispute; attempts to grapple with the Palestinian issue, inter-Arab rivalries; oil pricing, "steadfast" front¹⁷ activities; and finally internal U.S. politics. None of these factors is a separate issue, but they are all so intimately mingled.

United States and the Soviet Challenge

At the present time the Soviet challenge seems to weigh most heavily upon interests and the United States is attempting to counter¹⁸ the threat posed by the Soviets in such places as Afghanistan, South Yemen, Libya, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Competition for influence is intense. The Soviets are rapidly expanding the range of their activities in the region. Despite setbacks in Sudan, Egypt, Somalia and elsewhere, the Soviets are engaged in what some observers believe to be an encircling action of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.¹⁹ In Afghanistan the Soviet Union is trying to consolidate its hold on the population following a succession of pro-Soviet coups d'etat and its armed invasion in December 1979. A pro-Soviet Communist movement has proclaimed South Yemen as an Arab-Marxist state and has permitted an influx of Soviet, Cuban, and East German elements to exercise control over significant portions of the society. In addition, there are threats of rekindling the Dhofar rebellion in neighboring Oman and attempts to make trouble for North Yemen.²⁰ The Soviets are selling vast amounts of sophisticated military equipment to Libya, far exceeding legitimate defense needs. Also Libya is acting as the leading exponent of radical terrorism, not only regionally but also worldwide, and has

urged the use of armed force among the Moslem states in the Middle East and North Africa to overthrow moderate, pro-Western regimes.²¹ Syria has become more deeply enveloped in the Soviet arms grasp and in early October 1980 concluded a 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty.

U.S. responses to the Soviet challenge throughout the region have been responsible for the changing perception of the United States by regional states. U.S. positions have been seen as vacillating and uncertain, so that objective views are impossible, and reactive without any long-range positions. Many former U.S. friends and allies in the region find it uneasy to be associated with the United States and, although they will not draw closer to the Soviets, they will distance themselves from the United States.²² U.S. resolve has been questioned and its leadership has been seen as being unable to adequately address Middle East issues with the attention they deserve.²³

The United States and the Palestinian Problem

The resolution of the Palestinian question is the single most difficult issue in the Middle East and has been since the creation of Israel. Autonomy for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is seen by some as the first step toward a solution. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty calls for autonomy with eventual solution to the overall problem waiting for some future resolution. However, May 26, 1980 was the date set for a framework to be arranged for autonomy, but that date passed without making mutually acrimonious statements. The Egyptians and Israelis were further

apart than ever and the problem seemed more intractable than before. Autonomy is only one part of the question. The problems of a Palestinian state, status of East Jerusalem, security rights on the West Bank, and Jewish settlements are all immense. When portrayed as a whole the Palestinian question does indeed seem unsolvable in the near future and is bound to lead to further conflict.

In late August 1982 President Reagan agreed to send 800 Marines to Beirut²⁴ as part of an international peacekeeping force to supervise the evacuation of 7,000 PLO guerrillas, with the understanding that their families who remained in West Beirut would not be attacked. The sending of 800 Marines to Beirut in a peacekeeping role was part of Mr. Reagan's strategy to prevent Israel from using force against the PLO trapped in West Beirut and to encourage PLO leader Yasser Arafat to agree to the evacuation of his forces. The larger goal was to arrange a political settlement within Lebanon that would encourage the Syrians and Israelis to leave the country and permit the Lebanese the opportunity, for the first time since 1967, to govern themselves without foreign interference. Early in 1984, the chaotic political situation in Lebanon persuaded President Reagan that a further peacekeeping role was impossible, and he withdrew the Marines.

SUPERPOWER AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS

Each superpower²⁵ has appeared bent on keeping the other out of areas and activities in which it does not already have a secure

footing - and preferably on easing them out of positions of economic, political, and military advantage. When U.S.-Turkish relations chilled after the reopening of the Cyprus crisis in August 1974 and by 1975-1976 the United States lost access to a complex of military and intelligence facilities in Turkey, the Soviet Union was able to reciprocate the applause of the United States on the souring of Soviet-Egyptian relations after July 1972, culminating less than four years later in Egypt's repudiation of its treaty of friendship with Russia. Containment has also been reflected in the spirited superpower naval competition in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and even for a while in the Gulf where modern naval vessels do not have elbow room to maneuver. Similar considerations also condition Soviet and U.S. arms-transfer policies.

The Two Superpowers and the Belligerents in the Middle East

The two sets of belligerents in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war, which will be considered subsequently, have practiced diplomacy comparable to that of the superpowers. In both regional instances, they have pushed mutual denial to its logical extreme of mutual regime destruction. Moreover, the two wars share this in common: the weapons of the combatants have come primarily from the superpowers or their allies, and the suppliers have used arms to compete for political influence in the region. The Soviet Union has been the paramount supplier to Syria and the PLO, and the United States, to Israel. The United States also impressively built up Iran's arsenal in the final half-dozen years

of the shadow. After the outbreak of the war with Iraq, the religious leaders, forgetting about the "tainted" past, rehabilitated the armed forces for the defense of the homeland.

Without the flow of arms from the superpowers, neither war could have been fought on a grand scale. Yet regardless of the military consequences of either contest, the political benefits, if any, to the military victors and their superpower patrons were certain to be short-lived. Despite the risks of such wars, fought with increasingly sophisticated equipment, there is no evidence to show that the superpowers or their regional friends are about to modify their practices in the arms-transfer game.

The utter confusion arising from the wars in Lebanon and at the head of the Gulf epitomizes the pervasive instability in the Middle East. The superpower Cold War in the Middle East in mid-1982, as reflected in the two regional wars, showed no signs of early abatement. A contrary judgment might be suggested by the relative Soviet passivity in Lebanon and the unilateral U.S. crisis management. But these were no more than appearances. Behind the scenes the superpowers were engaged in their accustomed rivalry and might be expected to continue, visibly and invisibly, their politics of mutual exclusion. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the United States and the Soviet Union have both been partisans. The United States has refused to talk with the PLO since 1975, and the Soviet Union with Israel since 1976. Nonetheless, Washington has enjoyed a significant advantage over Moscow in the mediatory process since it has been able to negotiate with concerned Arab governments no

less than with Israel, as reaffirmed in the Habib missions of 1981-1982.

The agreed-upon Habib plan, which related exclusively to the Beirut area, stipulated a ceasefire in place, charged the PLC leaders with responsibility for organizing and managing the evacuation - to be carried out in daylight only - of its guerrillas, and empowered a small observer group already stationed in the capital to remain in service, as the only and undeclared link to the United Nations. The PLO undertook to transfer to the Lebanese armed forces "as gifts all remaining weaponry in their possession, including heavy, crew-served and spare weaponry and equipment, along with all munitions" abandoned in the capital and its environs. All Palestinian civilians left behind, the evacuees' families included, were made "subject to Lebanese laws and regulations," with "appropriate guarantees" of the governments of Lebanon and the United States that they had procured "assurances (of nonmolestation)....from the Government of Israel....and from the leadership of certain Lebanese (and other armed) groups," especially the Maronite Phalangists, though not mentioned by name. An estimated total number of evacuees approaching 10,000-11,000 to 12,000 PLO guerrillas and some 2,700-3,600 associated Syrian troops (among the latter a majority were assumed to be Palestinians attached to Syria's Arab Deterrent Force) were relocated in eight Arab states: Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and the two Yemens. A multinational force, outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations, consisting of some 2,000 troops from France, Italy, and the United States, monitored the PLO departure.

Speculation on such questions would be idle, since much depended on whether or not the U.S. crisis manager might reach a negotiated arrangement with the concerned parties, with or without further fighting. Nor could the possibility of some other form of mediation than the unilateral U.S. effort be dismissed entirely.

The inability of either the Soviet Union or the United States, as of the time of writing, to persuade the belligerents at the head of the Gulf to accept mediation, after five years of war, confirms the inability of the two superpowers to shape developments in this contest. The pace of the Iraq-Iran war, however, clearly differed from that in Lebanon, and it appeared more likely that regional, Islamic, or United Nations diplomacy in the end might prove more acceptable to both parties than direct superpower brokerage.

The low superpower arms-transfer profile in both wars, as contrasted with the high profile of rival airlifts during most of the October War twelve years earlier, was misleading. All the belligerents in the Gulf and Lebanon had stockpiled massive amounts of sophisticated equipment, most of it manufactured by the superpowers or under their license. Without the steady and generous flow of equipment from Russia over the preceding seven years, the PLO could hardly have held out as long as it had. Nor could Israel have kept up its coordinated heavy assaults by land, air, and sea on the targets in Lebanon without the prior accumulation of materiel from the United States to supplement its own domestic arms production. Even in the more leisurely Gulf war, Iraq and Iran had benefited from the swollen arsenals built up over the preceding decade, although both sides found it necessary, and possible, to

replace their diminishing stock through purchases in the open international market. On the basis of the past record, it would be realistic to assume that, with the continuance of the Cold War, the belligerents would not have to wait too long after the end of the wars to replenish depleted supplies and to add new weaponry of even higher sophistication than those used in the past.

The PLO fought the war in Lebanon essentially unaided by the Arab states. None of the hardline partners of the PLO - not even Syria, which faced the same enemy - went to the rescue of the Palestinians. The steadfastness coalition, it became apparent, had already been shattered by its inability to develop a viable consensus on the Iraq-Iran war. Nor could the nonbelligerent Gulf oil states be immediately helpful to the PLO because they were directed by common fears of Iran and political importance in a glutted world oil market.

The latest Arab-Israeli war, like the five that preceded it, had already created more problems than it solved. In the Gulf, in mid-January 1986, it appeared that neither side would be capable of eliminating its opponent's regime by resorting to an inconclusive, drawn-out, costly war. So, here too, new difficulties were compounding their troubled legacy. It would thus seem that politics as usual in the exercise of mutual denial in the regional and international systems and their interconnections in the Middle East would persist into the postwar future of the Arab-Israeli zone and the Gulf.

Cold-War Competition for Influence

Post-World War II experience²⁶ has shown that a regional presence by one superpower almost inevitably provokes some reciprocal involvement by the other, exclusive of any specific set of interests that might draw the latter independently into the region. This logic now extends to superpower competition for client-states throughout the Third World. In its simplest form it is power politics in its crudest form; influence being a sine qua non power. Each superpower has attempted to extend its sphere of influence over any state of region it can as such an extension, by definition, deprives its opponent of similar influence in the given sphere.

The extent of mutual superpower involvement obviously depends on the political sensibility of the region in question. The Middle East, where the stakes are high but where neither Moscow nor Washington is dominant, has understandably become the principal focus of their rivalry.

The relative ascendancy of the U.S. presence in the core area of the Middle East has excluded the Soviet Union from the Arab-Israeli negotiating process for the time being, but it has not dampened Soviet resolve to counterbalance that U.S. predominance. On the contrary, it must be seen as a factor contributing to Soviet determination. Of course, the Soviet Union does have separate and specific interests in the Middle East, it would be simplistic to assume that Soviet foreign policy is driven solely by a need to meet an established U.S. position. In strategic terms, by simple

reason of its geographical proximity, the Middle East has long been a region vital to Soviet security.

Importance of Raw Materials

While competition for influence may of itself be a spur to push the superpowers into the Middle East, it is also a feature heightened by other more specific interests. The most significant of these interests in recent years has been the growing importance of the region as a source of raw materials, most especially of course, energy.

Since the October 1973 war, the problem of ensuring a constant supply of oil to the industrialized West has been well documented. Economic security has been a byword of the Western democratic system since World War II and the 1970's oil crisis underlined the vulnerability of the Western economies in this regard. That the largest part of the West's imported oil arrives from the Middle East automatically defines the area as one of vital interest.

For the Soviet Union the importance of the Middle East as an energy source has, until recently, been a peripheral consideration. As the world's largest oil producer, the Soviet Union turned economic entrepreneur in the mid-'70's to take best advantage of the OPEC price rises. The important factor that kindled the Soviet drive for Middle Eastern energy sources was a related one, based upon the recognition of an imminent decline in her own export in the next two decades.

Domestic Political Pressures

The strength of the Jewish lobby in the United States has long been recognized as an important consideration in Middle Eastern policy assessment for successive U.S. governments. Even more important and generally overlooked has been the strength of non-Jewish public opinion, sympathetic to Israel since its creation. It may, however, be premature to regard this as a permanent factor in U.S. politics. Not bound by the limitations of democratic public opinion, the Soviet Union has not felt the same constraints of domestic ethnic lobbies. Nevertheless, the USSR's substantial and growing Muslim population in her southern provinces constitutes a potential danger to the impermeability of centralized decision making.

Strategic Factors

Much to superpower dismay the credo that posits political influence as an automatic adjunct to military strength does not always stand up to close scrutiny in the case of their involvement in the Middle East. The Soviets, for example, have found the task of imposing their political will by means of military coercion a difficult one in Afghanistan. Alternatively, the threatening presence of the U.S. fleet in the Arabian Sea during the Iranian hostage crisis did nothing to expedite the release of the American hostages from the Tehran embassy.

This again underlines divided perceptions of political reality in the Middle East, which - rather than warn them off - tend to draw the superpowers deeper into the arena. At one level their

military presence is a direct response to the indigenous instability of the region. At another level is a function of the reciprocal Cold War logic we have already mentioned. The failure to consolidate political goals at the first level, as in the example, of Afghanistan or the hostage crisis, does not deter the superpowers from further involvement, but becomes instead the motivation at the second level for greater commitment.

The step-up in U.S. military resolve is also, of course, a response to the Soviet military build-up. Though the combat capability of the Soviet navy, for example, may be questioned, its increased size and mobility forewarns a greater deployment into forward positions in the Indian Ocean that the Americans do not believe they can ignore. Similarly, the Afghanistan invasion gave the U.S. the opportunity to play at geopolitical opportunism; finding themselves sharing some common interests over the issue, China and the U.S. were both vociferous in their condemnation of it.

The irony of this increased build-up is that it does not serve the long-term objectives of either superpower. Post-shah anti-Westernism is not going to diminish with the threat of Rapid Deployment Force activity ready to impose so-called stability in the region. But neither can the USSR translate that into Soviet benefit. The quagmire of Middle Eastern politics threatens to overwhelm the superpowers: the harder they struggle the deeper they seem to sink.

Indigenous Instability

If the weakness of a state's political system can be identified as a reason for an aggressive foreign policy, and thereby a source of regional instability, the causes of such weakness have proved relatively impervious to treatment. It is an uncomfortable dilemma for the superpowers. Insufficient and uneven economic development has always been an important source of unsympathetic Arab nationalism in the 1950's and 1960's, but where, as in the case of Iran, the pace of economic modernization outstripped the ability of traditional authority structures to adapt to it, the consequences were even more dramatic and destabilizing. The only certainty in Middle Eastern politics seems to be that governments will continue to be overthrown, and new political alignments established.

Antisuperpower feeling

Muslim fundamentalism, and its concomitant anti-Westernism, has erected a further barrier to superpower influence in the region. It is an autonomous, local force, virulently anti-Communist and anticapitalist. Its influence has spread beyond those states, like Iran, in which Muslim fundamentalism is the dominant political force, to more moderate states whose leaders are concerned about not antagonizing a growing fundamentalist constituency. The attack on Mecca and later the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat provided a vivid demonstration of the disruptive potential possessed by even a small but fanatic coterie of fundamentalists.

Events like these have made all Arab leaders just that much more cautious about too open and close ties with either superpower.

Burden of Past Actions

Over 35 years of inconsistent policymaking has tarnished the credibility of both superpowers in dealings with their clients at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather than having consolidated their positions in the Middle East, past duplicity or inconsistency has bred mistrust of the United States on the part of the Israelis, and of the USSR by the Arabs.

The U.S. commitment to Israel, in the long term in both country's interests, has often generated short-term frictions. These have become more acute in recent years. Israeli political and military policies have frequently proven embarrassing to Washington and counterproductive to her own expectations in the region. The differences between Israel and the U.S. became even more apparent during the recent war in Lebanon and led U.S. leaders for the first time to speculate openly about the possibility of an arms embargo directed against Israel.

In contrast, the USSR's approach to the Arab states has been more reliable, if also more heavy-handed, but no more successful. In a region where local turbulence makes alliance-building difficult at the best of times, the USSR's clumsy dealing with Iran, the Horn of Africa, and of course Egypt, have labeled her as an arrogant and self-interested patron, keen to establish her own foothold in order to counterbalance the U.S. rather than to serve local

interests, or even the Communist ideal. The result of her frustrations and failures within the core of the Arab world has led her to turn toward geographically peripheral states.

Ideological Incompatibility

U.S. problems with traditional authority structures in the Middle East have already been mentioned and have been most clearly manifest in the experience in Iran. Washington may now be courting another disaster in Saudi Arabia, where it has been making a similar political - military investment.

Ideological incompatibility is a problem Moscow faces as well. The anti-Western denominator that provided a link between Marx and Islam after the Second World War has proven to be a shallow foundation upon which communism might have built a power base in the Middle East. The failure of Arab socialism to provide the social and economic reconstruction it promised has possibly pushed communism still further away as an alternative ideology. The rise of fundamentalism in the last decade, which has confounded U.S. aspirations, is by no means a cause for Soviet rejoicing. It might even have closed the door on Marxist influence for the foreseeable future.

Policy Implications

This brief sketch of forces that limit superpower influence should indicate a corresponding degree of caution and reserve in Moscow and Washington despite the obvious attractions for an

even-deeper involvement. In this regard three general policy conclusions emerge from the preceding discussion.

1. For a variety of reasons superpower influence in the Middle East is destined to be highly qualified. Any assumption that influence is an automatic by-product of involvement has to be reviewed. Even the heaviest of investment in terms of economic or military aid - the Soviet Union in Egypt in the late 1960's, the United States in Iran, Saudi Arabia, or even Israel - does not pay the anticipated dividends. A host of autonomous regional forces seem fated to frustrate superpower aspirations. At the same time, the costs, actual and potential, rise precipitously as superpower involvement deepens.

2. It is common misapprehension in Washington that the Arab-Israeli dispute is the only major obstacle standing in the way of the spread of U.S. influence throughout at least the Arab part of the Middle East. Camp David, a notable achievement in its own right, is of course, inadequate in Palestinian eyes. But even the successful conclusion of an Arab-Israel settlement, not that that is likely, would lift only one of the storm clouds from the region. The resolution of the Palestinian problem and the acceptance of Israel's existence and borders by neighboring Arab states are necessary ingredients for Middle Eastern peace, but they are not sufficient.

3. The U.S. tendency to exaggerate the extent and danger of Soviet influence in the area is not necessarily in her interest. Politically, the Soviet Union faces at least the same barriers that confound attempts by the U.S. to influence events. Her record in

the area reveals weaknesses not strengths. Technically, her aid, economic and military, is second-rate compared to the U.S.; ideologically, communism is antipathetic to the Islamic dynamic; military, her heavy-handedness reached its ugliest peak in Afghanistan where the invasion set a precedent that her neighbors will watch with circumspect curiosity.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

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3. See Major General Frank J. Schober, Jr., The Middle East: Averting Armageddon, (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, 1975), pp. 2-3.

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5. The citation, a recent example in a long series, is taken from a front-page editorial commenting upon the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. "Mir-Blizhnemu Vostoku," Pravda, 6 July 1982, p. 1.

6. See Mark V. Kauppi, and R. Craig Nation, The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980's: Opportunities, Constraints, and Dilemmas, (United States of America: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Company, 1983), pp. 41-62; and Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, "L'experience sovietique en pays musulmans: les lecons du passe et l'Afghanistan," politique etrangere 4 (1980) pp. 881-890.

7. Prospects for Soviet Oil Production ER-1977 (Washington, D. C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1977).

8. For balanced views of the problems see "Energy in Soviet Policy," (Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress) (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981).

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10. See James R. Schlesinger, "American Power and the Survival of the West," Parameters, Vol. 10, June 1980, pp. 19-25.

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14. Perhaps the most cogent discussion of U.S. activities can be found in Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976.

15. Ample evidence for this position exists. Can be found in: David D. Newsom, "U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf," (Current Policy no. 160, Washington: Department of State, April 11, 1980); and in Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "Protecting U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf Region," (Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, May 1980), pp. 63-67.

16. See the November 7, 1979, Statement of Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold H. Saunders, "Defining U.S. Interests in the Middle East," (New Outlook, Vol. 23, January/February 1980), pp. 30-35.

17. Members of the "steadfast" front include Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Iraq, and the PLO.

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22. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Saudis Are Trying to Maintain a Safe Distance from the United States," The New York Times, March 9, 1980, p. E3.

23. Examples of this can be seen in: Christopher S. Wren, "Hussein Visit to United States Viewed as Sensitive," The New York Times, June 16, 1980, pp. A1-A8; and James Dorsey, "Arab Image of U.S. Tarnished," The Christian Science Monitor, February 13, 1980, p. 6.

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CHAPTER III

THE EGYPTIAN ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Historical Background

Egypt's 5,000 years of recorded history¹ is largely the history of the remarkable and sustained civilization of a people rich in God-given and man-made resources. While most other great nations experienced a permanent decline and fall after rising to their zenith, the people of Egypt have demonstrated a unique capacity to rebuild their civilization in every age and to remodel it within a new framework even after centuries of foreign occupation.

The total area of Egypt, including territorial waters and deserts, is about 1,002,000 km², but its inhabited area covers only 35,189 km², or 3.6 percent of its total area. Thus 96.4 percent of Egypt is uninhabited. The Western Desert has an area of 680,000 km², Sinai 60,714 km², the Eastern Desert 223,000 km², and the Delta 30,000 km². Egypt is divided into the following four main geographic regions:

1. The Valley and the Delta:

The Valley extends 1500 kilometers lying between two high land elevations. In some southern areas, the Valley is only as wide as the Nile itself. The Valley and the Delta represent 4 percent of the total area of Egypt.

2. The Western Desert:

It extends westward from the Nile Valley and Delta to the Egyptian-Libyan borders on the west; and it is bordered on the north by the Mediterranean and on south by the Sudanese borders covering 68% of the total Egyptian area, and with an average altitude of 500 meters above sea level.

3. The Eastern Desert:

It extends from the Nile Valley eastward to the Red Sea, covering 28% of the total area of the country. Its elevations overlook the Red Sea with an almost vertical slope, leaving a narrow coast line. Gradually as it nears the Nile Valley, its elevation decreases.

4. The Sinai Peninsula:

It lies eastward from the Suez Gulf, west and eastward to the Aquaba Gulf and covers 60,714 km . South Sinai is a hard rough terrain with crystal volcanic rocks and high mountains, such as St. Catherine Mountain (2637 meters); the highest in Egypt. Wells and minerals abound in south Sinai, and rain turns into torrents that flow into Aquaba or the Suez Gulf. Central Sinai, or El Tayeh Plateau, occupies two-thirds of the total area of the peninsula and rises 800 meters above sea level. Most of its soil is calcareous, with lime ionic rocks. Rain and vegetation are scarcer than in south Sinai. The rain water flows from south to north towards the Mediterranean, and El-Arish is its most important valley. At the extreme north of the peninsula, a plain gradually slopes towards the Mediterranean. Its soil is composed of sand layers that date back to the quaternary era and are interspersed with sand dunes.

Rain waters are absorbed by the dunes, and emerge at their base, in the form of springs. The plains are crossed by lime mountains or hills rising over rocks. There are numerous wells in these plains, and consequently oases, such as the Nakhl Oasis, which in ancient times was the capital of the Sinai Peninsula.

Foreign Policy

Egypt's foreign policy, results from certain constants and variables. The constants can be summed up by the fact that Egypt is an Arab country located on the northwestern corner of Africa, tied to the Muslim world with bounds of faith, sharing the problems and prospects of the Third World and, finally assumes a central role in the world strategic movement with the Suez Canal as part and parcel of the Egyptian soil and an active part in the world politics aiming at peace and prosperity for all nations.

Thus the first and foremost domain of the Egyptian foreign policy is the Arab circle. Facts and figures of history and geography have proved the solid constant that Egypt is the very leader, the real heavyweight of the Arab world.

Egypt is mostly an African country (the Sinai Peninsula being the extreme western corner of Asia). The Nile ties Egypt to a good number of African countries. The historic affinities and the common interest of survival, as well as prosperity, have been the core of Egypt's African policy. That, combined with ties of cooperation with the rest of Africa, constitutes the second, inter-related domain of Egypt's foreign policy -- The African circle.

Common faith with the rest of the Muslims has always entrusted Egypt with a central role and a cardinal responsibility towards Muslims the world over. Deeply bound by Islam's ordinances, Egypt has shared all in thick and thin, with her Muslim brethren, a fact that has placed Egypt in the heart of the Muslim circle and consequently established the wider domain of Egypt's foreign policy that is the Islamic circle.

The common interests of economic development and prosperity, of the freedom from fear and want, of the keenness to play a moral appeasing role in a world plagued by cold war and world-wide rivalries between the two superpowers necessitated that Egypt along with a number of other equally enthusiastic countries should gather to establish a forum to achieve those sublime goals. Thus was created the non-alignment movement circle of the Egyptian foreign policy.

It was natural that Egypt as one of the original signatories to the United Nations Charter should play an active role towards the cause of peace and development of the world community at large. Egypt's efforts stand witness to her strong attachment to and advocacy of peace and development, detente and better future for mankind.

Factors Affecting the Egyptian Foreign Policy

1. The geographic location:

The most important shipping route connecting the East with the West crosses Egypt through the Suez Canal. Moreover, its location in northeast Africa renders it a natural crossroad to Asia, Africa and Europe.

2. The civilization profile:

Just as Egypt's geographical location connects it with Asia, Africa and Europe, its civilization patrimony comprises various elements, that confirm this connection. Its soil witnessed the dawn of the most ancient civilization ever known in history; in Sinai, nearby in the Arab Peninsula and in Palestine were revealed the three divine religions. This profile of culture and civilization underlies the Egyptian foreign policy which is founded on the belief that Egypt is Arab in heart and language, Muslim in heart and sentiments, African in location and relatedness; believing in peace for itself and its neighbors, well aware of the message of its civilization and seeking to develop relations among the people of the world and fulfill the aspirations of contemporary man in terms of progress and prosperity.

3. The River Nile:

The River Nile is in absolute terms, the most important natural resource of Egypt. Although Egypt was shaped by Egyptians, it is also the gift of the Nile, which is the life-blood of the Egyptian people who depend on the continuous flow of its waters unimpeded by any man-made obstacle. This explains the strong relations binding the countries of the Nile River Basin.

4. Economic development:

The fourth factor that underlies Egyptian Foreign policy is the economic development and the improvement of the lot of man in Egypt and related needs.

Bearing this factor in mind the most important objective is to increase production for a higher national income and a better per

capita income by individual revenue which in turn makes it incumbent to ensure that peace and cooperation prevail in international relations and in the Arab region.

Principles Guiding the Egyptian Foreign Relations

High on the list of issues which we should consider with utmost care is the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war, because such war can wipe out the "civilization of mankind."

1. Non-interference of internal affairs:

Egypt objects to foreign interference in its internal affairs, and in those of other countries as well, a principle upheld by all charters of international organizations.

2. Mutual cooperation:

Cooperation among nations is a basis for a new international economic order.

3. Adherence to the principles and aims of the United Nations.

4. Adherence to non-aligned policy and, consequently refuses to become party to military pacts or grant military bases to any of the superpowers, as it strongly opposes international polarization and spheres of influences.

5. Peace:

For Egypt, the Arab world and the world at large. Abiding by that principle Egypt rejects the feverish nuclear armed confrontation between the big nations; warns against the outbreak of a nuclear war, and calls for the rapid holding of negotiations for the limitation of nuclear weapons. Hence it signed the treaty on

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on 1 July 1968 and ratified in February 1981.

Aims of the Egyptian Foreign Policy

Egyptian diplomacy seeks to achieve the following:

1. To strengthen Egypt's political and diplomatic relations with all countries of the world;
2. To give momentum to the peace process which is a stable strategic line of the Egyptian policy;
3. To ensure an effective interaction with international events, be involved in them and influencing them, directing them, in order to achieve international peace, which matter enhances Egypt's status and position in the world;
4. To endeavor together with friendly nations to promote the development of the Egyptian economy, through direct and indirect assistance for financing development projects that need foreign aid;
5. To reactivate Arab solidarity in order to arrive at a minimal consensus on the positive aspects of joint action that would result in a coordinated Arab stand founded on loyalty to the common objective.

Course of the Foreign Policy

The Egyptian policy follows various courses.

1. Egypt and its Arab Role.

President Hosni Mubarak set out in detail the Arab role of Egypt in the speech he delivered on 6 November 1983, before the People's Assembly and the Shura Council. He said:

"The ancient and modern history of the region reaffirm that the role of Egypt was imposed by fate and realities. It is the first line of defense that protects its nation and sanctifies. It never spared any sacrifice or hesitated to stand by its sister countries whatever circumstances and dangers. It has never failed to assume its basic responsibility in claiming Arab rights and defending regional causes, primary the cause of the Palestinian people whose sufferings it feels and whose rights it always endeavors to recover. The peoples and leaders of Egypt have never, not even for a day, relinquished their Arab responsibilities and, to this end, Egypt has sacrificed thousands of its youth, who fell martyrs on the battlefield. To this end, also, it exerted political efforts to recover rights and by the bases for a just and lasting peace for itself and its neighbors. The premises of any action taken by Egypt and its motivations have always been a determination to secure supreme regional interests, based on an objective vision at the developments, a conscious realization of international and regional variables and adherence to historical and civilizational realities which leave no shadow of a doubt that Egypt is Arab in fate and destiny. Egypt deems that the Arab brethren should reconsider their stands in order to arrive at a minimal solidarity and consensus on the positive aspects of the joint Arab action that are needed for a coordinated Arab stand seeking the common objective. Egypt is ready and willing to participate in that joint Arab action which is the logical approach needed to recover the legitimate Arab rights and stand up to the challenges presently faced by the Arabs."

To return to the folds of Arab solidarity is a strategic aim of the Egyptian foreign policy. 1984 witnessed an improvement in Egyptian Arab relations confirmed by a real approachment between Egypt and some Arab countries and the resumption of total relations with Jordan. Thus 1984 and 1985 witnessed an effective resumption of Arab relations with Egypt the elder sister, relations that will hopefully gain momentum until Arab ranks are united once more.

2. Egypt and the Arab-Israeli Conflict:

a. The Palestinian Cause:

Egypt never stopped exerting utmost efforts in favor of the Palestinian question since 1949, and Egypt is still exerting efforts more than any other country in this regard. Moreover, Egypt has turned the Palestinian question from a refugee issue into a cause of a state and a people deprived of national homeland. Egypt has greatly sacrificed during the 1973 October War, which overburdened our economy, in addition to over one hundred thousand casualties between injured, killed and paralyzed. 100,000 billion Egyptian pounds were spent on this question since 1949 until this very day. Egypt demands that Israel relinquish its policy of the "fait accompli" and of imposing "peace by force."

b. Relations with Israel:

The Camp David Accords constitute the basis for Egyptian Israeli Relations (see appendix 2). President Mubarak says:

"Peace for us is a strategic aim and not a tactical move. We therefore respect all our obligations and will continue to call for peace without ever reneging on it. It should be clearly understood that peace and normalization do not provide any of the two parties with a special position. The essence of normalization is that relations between the two parties will be similar to their relations with other third parties, no more and no less."

We deal with Israel as we deal with any other country with which we have diplomatic relations. However, there are many factors that do not militate in favor of proceeding with the normalization process, include:

1. Israel's persistence in setting up settlements in occupied Arab territories;

2. Lack of any progress with respect to the Taba Problem;

3. Israel's invasion of Lebanon, in addition to Israeli practices in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that emanate from a belief in the supremacy of force. Such acts have aroused the ire of the public opinion in Egypt, bringing about the recall of the Egyptian Ambassador from Israel for consultation. Egypt has declared that the return of the Egyptian Ambassador depends on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon according to a time schedule to be scrupulously implemented, reactivation of pending bilateral issues between the two countries and promotion of the climate propitious to the solving of the Palestinian question.

c. The Lebanese Crisis:

The starting point in the solution of the Lebanese problem is securing total Israeli withdrawal from all the Lebanese territories without relating this withdrawal to factors external to the will of Lebanon because the Israeli obligation to withdrawal stems from the illegitimacy of its invasion, from Security Council Resolution 509 of 1982, from Israel's pledge to seek a comprehensive peace with all its neighbors that wish to live in peace with it and its commitment to refrain from using force to solve disputes and settle conflicts. Egypt demands that all parties respect Lebanon's sovereignty and its legitimate authority and it also demands that a formula be found for national reconciliation between all Lebanese groups and insists that an end be put to all forms of foreign intervention in Lebanese affairs and the countering of attempts at dividing the country and turning it into spheres of

influence and control because an independent and unified Lebanon is a force that gives momentum to peace, stability and progress.

3. Egypt and the Iraq-Iranian War:

The Egyptian leadership deems that the war between Iraq and Iran is "a meaningless and aimless war" and that an end should be put to it so as to save the lives of tens of thousands in the two countries, which share strong bonds of civilization and culture, and the resources of which should be directed to construction and development instead of squandered on a struggle that serves no one.

This is the basic stand of Egypt and moreover, the support of the Arab to his Arab brother is another principle that Egypt believes should be applied in the particular case, especially that Iraq has withdrawn its forces from Iranian territories and proposed to Iran to terminate military operations and resort to negotiations.

4. Egypt and Sudan:

a. Integration with the Sudan:

Egypt and the Sudan have signed an Integration Charter on 21 October 1982 seeking to set up an overall economic unity, with the progress and prosperity of the two countries and peoples exclusively in view. The two countries established the following Integration Institutions:

1. The Supreme Integration Council.

The Supreme Authority as regards integration issues, chaired by the two countries on a nation basis;

2. The Nile Valley Parliament.

The Parliament considers and expresses its viewpoints on issues referred to it by the Supreme Integration Council as well as on the general annual report submitted by this Council. It approves the draft budget, the closing accounts and the draft plan for joint coordination, as regards socio-economic development.

b. The Integration Fund:

A body enjoying financial and administrative independence, entitled to communicate with institutions and organizations in the two countries or abroad in order to attract companies and banks to finance integration projects. A joint committee was established to coordinate the foreign policies of the two countries, and the two countries agreed to remove all customs duties and additional taxes on goods exchanged between them on 18 January 1983, as reaffirmed by the Decree of the President of the Sudan issued on 27 April 1983. The Presidents of the two countries consult with each other within the context of the Integration Charter and exchange visits to coordinate the common policy of the two countries.

5. Egypt and the Organization of the Islamic Conference:

At the Islamic Conference held in Casablanca in January 1984, the Arab countries supported the reinstatement of Egypt in its membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, thus in directing the desire of Arab countries to see Egypt resume its place within Arab ranks, and emphasizing the importance of Egypt's return to the Arab scene. This decision had come as an expression

of the will of the Islamic people and a recognition of Egypt's considerable weight in Arab and Islamic arenas.

6. Egypt and the Third World:

Egypt follows neither East nor West; its policy is neutral and independent; it refuses to be party to military pacts, does not authorize military bases on its soil, or spheres of influence, positively participates in international politics and seeks to promote international peace and cooperation.

At the Non-Aligned Conference, held in the Indian Capital, New Delhi, in 1983 which grouped 100 countries, President Mubarak called for the unity of the movement and its protection against its turning into another rigid international organization. The essence of non-alignment is positive and effective participation in world events in order to secure the rights of the Third World countries and urge the contending superpowers to alleviate the tension through disarmament or, at least, limitation of nuclear arms.

7. Egyptian-European Relations:

The Egyptian Foreign Policy seeks to secure a role by the European Community in the efforts exerted to solve the Middle East conflict and achieve peace in the region. In this connection President Mubarak visited France, and Britain in January 1983, and in February 1983 visited Rumania and Yugoslavia in June 1983, and Greece in January 1985.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl visited Egypt and there was an exchange of visits between the Egyptian Ministers and their counterparts in Western European countries.

Egypt and Britain have signed an agreement for economic cooperation on 15 March 1983, and on 23 March, Egypt signed three agreements with Portugal for economic and touristic cooperation. The Protocol for Economic and Technical cooperation between Germany and Egypt was signed on 15 April 1983.

Egypt further signed with Rumania a Protocol for Economic Cooperation, and agreed to cooperate with Yugoslavia in the field of military industrialization, as it had done with Rumania in July 1983. The joint communique issued at the end of the Mubarak-Ceausescu talks in Cairo, indicated that the two countries intended that their economic and trade cooperation would involve dealings amounting to U.S. \$1 billion in 1985.

Egyptian relations with Eastern European countries have continued to improve in 1983. A trade protocol for 1984 was signed between Egypt and the Soviet Union on 26 May 1983, with an increase by 50% over the volume of trade of the preceding year. A number of protocols have also been signed between Egypt and several Eastern European countries for an exchange of visits by cultural and technical delegations.

8. Egypt and Africa:

Egypt has strengthened its relations with the African countries at bilateral and collective levels through the Organization of African Unity. Believing in the role of the Organization of the African Unity, Egypt participated in the African Summit Conference, held in June 1983, and censured the alien invasion of Chad, considering it a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity.

It maintains its political support to the legitimate government in Chad, and continues to support SWAPO, the legitimate and sole representative of the people of Namibia in their legitimate struggle against the government of South Africa to accede to independence. Egypt has also participated in the meeting of the African Summit Conference and attended the five member African Ministerial Conference, held in Khartoum. It mediated between the countries of the horn of Africa and provided assistance to some African countries in various fields such as technical cooperation especially to the countries of the Nile Basin and exchanged visits with a number of African countries.

9. Egypt and Asia:

President Mubarak's visits to China, North Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Pakistan aimed at strengthening Egyptian relations with these countries. As a result of these visits, Egypt signed a number of technical agreements with China, a new protocol for trade exchange and agreement for joint economic, technical and cultural cooperation.

President Mubarak's visit to North Korea has brought about an increase in the volume of trade exchange between the two countries. Egypt concluded with Japan agreements for technical technological cooperation.

10. Egypt and United Nations and its Specialized Agencies:

Egypt became a member of the Security Council for 1984 and 1985.

The election reflects an international support of Egypt by African, Asian, and European countries as well as by the United States.

On 12 May 1983, the World Health Organization froze its decision to transfer its regional office from Cairo and on 22 November 1983, Egypt was elected a member of the Food Agency Organization (FAO) Council for four years as a representative of the Middle East region. Egypt participated in the Sixth United Nations Trade and Development Conference held in Belgrade, with a delegation headed by the President in June 1983, where he delivered an historical speech. Egypt also submitted a draft resolution to the Political Committee in November 1983, asking that the Middle East region be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Egypt supports the United Nations and abides by its Constitution and by legitimate solutions to international problems.

THE EGYPTIAN PEACEFUL SOLUTION

The Middle East after World War II has been the setting for a complex drama² in which several major themes have been interwoven - nationalism, the consolidation of political and economic independence and security, competition for regional power, and, finally, the rivalry of external states for influence over Middle East governments and their resources. While each of these factors has been extremely important, another - too frequently neglected - has also subtly but significantly shaped government behavior: the nature of the regimes and the political culture of the Middle East.

Stability and change

Observers are often wont to choose wars as the chronological markers for new eras, but alignment patterns usually fit poorly war or interwar periods if the conflicts themselves are not decisive. In many respects both the June (1967) and October (1973) wars were decisive, but neither achieved the long-term political goals of any of the parties. This is not to argue that wars without total victory are unimportant: the 1967 and 1973 conflicts, for example, were the single most important factors in bringing about fundamental changes in Middle East politics and alignment structure. We argue only that inconclusive wars produce long-term effects rather than immediate ones.

The June 1967 War laid to rest all remaining doubts that Israel was able to defend itself against any combination of Arab states. The military results of the war included the virtual destruction of the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armed forces; and the political results of that destruction included the serious weakening of the political control and security of those three governments. This weakening, in turn, gave rise to the growth of a new force inside territory under the nominal sovereignty of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria-Fatah and other Palestinian commando organizations.

Indeed, no direction reemerged in Arab politics as a whole until about 1970, an extremely important year in Middle East history. In Jordan, the Bedouin army, which had increasingly chafed under restrictions on its interactions with Palestinian groups on Jordanian soil, finally forced King Hussein to authorize

a military strike to eliminate once and for all PLO power in the Kingdom and to reestablish the primacy of the throne and its security forces. In Syria, Salah Jadid, the strongman who had lost much of his power to fellow Alawi Hafez Assad, head of the Syrian Air Force, decided to move against Assad only to lose out in a quick turn of events. Between Egypt and Israel sporadic firing across the Suez Canal gave way to the War of Attrition, which in turn led to an influx of an unprecedented number of Soviet advisors, and within Egypt, near the end of the year, Nasser died.

Syria's interaction with Lebanon took on a very different tenor, as Assad's ties to some of the leading Maronite figures were good, quite in contrast to the period when Jadid ruled Syria. Taking Syria away from the Rejectionist camp, Assad accepted Resolution 242. Notwithstanding some initial questions about Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor, Assad and Hussein both found relations with Egypt more stable. Sadat, after extricating himself from the War of Attrition, pursued two tracks to achieve movement in the stalemated Arab-Israeli situation. The first consisted in a variety of initiatives designed to reopen negotiations at some level. Recognizing the importance of the United States as the only outside power able to mount effective pressure on Israeli policy-making, Sadat endeavored to demonstrate a new Arab openness to America and to encourage the United States to take an active role in reopening and conducting negotiations. The second Sadat path, admittedly less desirable, was that of war. In case movement could not be sparked through the first approach, Egypt's new President concentrated as well upon the preparation of the Egyptian armed

forces for a limited objective military operation that would likely compel U.S. involvement. Such a strategy required cementing relations with other Arab regimes especially Syria, Jordan, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

What had happened by the early 1970's, and this was a result of the 1967 war - was that the reality of Israel's existence and ability to ensure that existence had gained acceptance by the political elites of the Arab World. What we call "rejectionism" or the politics of the Arab irreconcilables, were believed to be required by domestic political exigencies and by the necessity to maintain some bargaining leverage in a situation in which Israel had a sufficient margin of military superiority to guarantee its security. Arab leaders had by the early 1970's come to grips with reality and recognized the need for a modus vivendi, but one that met some of their needs, too. They had, in other words, reached the stage long sought by Israel - readiness to accept a negotiated settlement including recognition of Israel's existence - at the same time that Israel was no longer willing to spend much political capital to achieve only this end.

Thus Egyptian policy focused on overcoming the rivalries and enmities that plague the Arab world, while preserving the appearance of business as usual. Egyptian planners, believing the magnitude of the Israeli victory of 1967 to be attributable to the effect of surprise, recognized the importance of this element in their own plans. Consequently, elaborate alliance structures and threat patterns were achieved. Yet, a retrospective appraisal of

the prewar period shows that attentive fence-mending and uncharacteristically vigorous exchanges of visits were effective Arab - especially Egyptian - tools for the construction of a utilitarian wartime Arab coalition. By late 1972 and early 1973, there remained no insuperable obstacles to a broad Arab participation in the war.

Towards Peaceful Solution

At Nasser's death in 1970, Sadat was elected President of the Republic of Egypt. Sadat came to the Presidency of a country impoverished and partly devastated by nearly 25 years of conflict with Israel. It was his prime objective as President to see Egypt back on the road toward civil freedom and independence, to make her a prosperous nation living in peace with her neighbors.

First Phase 1970-73

Sadat's first years in office were, internationally, marked by two major events: the freeing of Egypt from Russian influence and, following the failure of his first peace initiative in 1971, the victorious Ramadan, October War, a major boost for Egyptian morale and prestige.

On November 22, 1967, the UN Security Council adopted the British-formulated Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories; a call which was not heeded.

Years of unproductive diplomacy on the one hand and a war of attrition on the other followed, as both military and diplomatic solutions were tested. United States support of Israel intensified

as the USSR attempted to gain a firmer foothold in the Middle East by supplying arms to Egypt on credit. Nasser was concerned to be able to negotiate from a position of strength despite escalating Israeli attacks intended to discredit the Egyptian leader and demoralize Egypt and the Arabs. The Israelis refused to consider limited withdrawal from the Suez Canal and built the heavily fortified Bar-Lev line along its west bank, thus signifying their declared intention to extend their borders to the Canal and maintain their domination over the whole of the Sinai peninsula.

In increasing fighting in the Canal Zone, Israeli plans went into action not only against Egyptian military installations but against the civilian population of the Suez region and even of the Nile valley. By August 1970, when a ceasefire was achieved, over 600,000 Egyptians had had to be evacuated from the Canal Zone. More than 10,000 Egyptian soldiers, and as many civilians, were killed in the three months before the ceasefire alone.

Following the ceasefire, negotiations began through UN mediator Gunnar Jarring, but the talks were stalled by Israeli obduracy and in September 1970 a fresh crisis emerged when civil war broke out in Jordan between King Hussein and the Palestinians. Nasser's mediation secured an agreement between King Hussein, and Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader; but it was too great a strain for a man who had borne the burden of 18 years of conflict with Israel. A few hours after the agreement was signed, on 28 September 1970, President Gamal Abdel Nasser died and Anwar El-Sadat was elected in his place.

His first concern was to attempt to end the conflict which was draining Egypt of her lifeblood. On February 4, 1971, the day before the ceasefire was due to expire, he offered to extend it in return for an Israeli withdrawal from the East Bank of the Suez Canal, as a first step towards implementing Resolution 242. If Israel responded, he announced, he would reopen the Suez Canal for the benefit of the international community. Israel denounced the offer as "propaganda." Less than a fortnight later, Sadat took his peace initiative a step further. He offered to recognize the legal existence of the state of Israel if it withdrew from the occupied territories. Again, the Israelis response was negative; but international opinion began to swing against them as Sadat's sincerity became apparent. For the first time a flaw occurred in the strong U.S. links with Israel as U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers favored Egypt's position rather than that of Israel.

Aware that Israel's imperviousness to his offers of peace sprang in part from a conviction of military invincibility, Sadat sought a military method of breaking the deadlock.

Egypt launched an all-out attack against Israeli positions in Sinai on 6 October 1973, with a Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. In a surprise offensive which destroyed the myth of Israeli intelligence infallibility, the Egyptian air force struck at Israeli strongpoints in Sinai while troops crossed the Canal and overran the Bar-Lev line along a 110-mile front.

Sadat had offered Israel a second chance of peace. Speaking before the Egyptian People's Assembly on October 16, 1973, at the height of Egypt's victory, he promised to attend a United Nations

peace conference once the Israelis had withdrawn from the occupied territories and to open the Suez Canal.

The October War and Postwar Changes

The October 1973 war was the symbolic "end of an era" in the Middle East. This conflict is the only one of the several Arab-Israeli wars that did not erupt after a period of building tensions. It was a "planned" war, preceded by a careful and effective deception campaign and coordinated at the strategic level by the two principal allied Arab governments of Egypt and Syria. The war can be viewed as the result of realism and consequent frustration in the Arab world. Before and after the October War, Israel military superiority was accepted, but the parameters of that superiority changed significantly. Until 1973 Israeli regional power seemed limitless and without cost. After 1973 Arabs and many Israelis as well recognized that Arab forces could at least exact a high price for a political stalemate.

The importance of the October War can be viewed in three contexts - military, domestic political, and regional political. We shall consider the first and third of these contexts only. The second, domestic political impact, is limited to Israel - where the war produced political scapegoating, hastened the decline of the Labor Alignment³, created a new determination to retain high degrees of military readiness⁴, resuscitated the credibility of the Arab threat, and breathed new life into the desire for a general settlement⁵ - and Syria, where poor military performance

also led to scapegoating, in this case to buttress the legitimacy of the minority - dominated Assad government.

The military results of the war were more clear cut, at the strategic level, than many observers have suggested.⁶ Israel remained the only confrontation state capable of sustained offensive operations. Both Syria and Egypt showed their capacity to defend fixed, fortified positions. Air defense suppression and the combined arms terms were more important than Israel had recognized, but warfare of this intensity demanded too much of Arab command, control, and communications as well. The military outcomes of the war are associated with resupply. Once again, the Israelis received materiel one or more generations in advance of that of the Arab states, and the war resulted in United States approval for the transfer to Israel of numerous high-technology systems theretofore embargoed. Even without the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israeli regional military superiority is clear.⁷

More complex are the regional political results of the conflict. The apparently effective application of the petroleum embargo ended the low profile Saudi Arabia had maintained with regard to its increasing influence in the Arab world.⁸ Principal financial source for the Arab confrontation states, and the only major oil producer with immense, untapped reserves the leadership was prepared to exploit, Saudi Arabia is also the only Arab oil exporter consistently providing substantial quantities of oil to the United States.

Sadat's strategy of war had been designed to lure the United States into a more active role in the Arab-Israeli situation. The

pressure and threat implicit in the Arab oil embargo, the orchestration and moderation of stated Arab goals, and the personal attitudes of the new foreign policy team conducted to realize Sadat's objective: the United States actively inserted itself into the confrontation even before the guns of October fell silent. The ceasefire left Arab and Israeli forces dangerously interlocked in dispositions from which continued firing seemed assured. Fearing the re-ignition of general hostilities, United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initiated intensive negotiations designed to disengage opposing forces, first on the Sinai front, then on the Golan.⁹

The discussions on disengagement were conducted separately on each front. Kissinger hoped that from these tactical talks could emerge a trust that might in turn lead to momentum toward a general settlement. The preliminary and discrete nature of the process, as well as the nature of its relationship to the ultimate objectives, resulted in the term "step-by-step" diplomacy.

Few would take exception of the necessity of disengagement. By contrast, the applicability of the approach to the general settlement issue is highly questionable given the complex inter-relationships involved. Predictably, separate negotiations led to heightened inter-Arab conflict, and the second-stage agreement on the Sinai played a major role in regionalizing and broadening the Lebanese civil war. Syrian President Assad sought to ensure the solidarity of Lebanon, Jordan, and the PLO under Syrian influence, so he intervened politically to help promulgate a new national pact that would restore substantial power to the established political

leaders and forces. When this accord proved unacceptable to the leftist/Palestinian alliance, Syrian military forces intervened. From the inception of Damascus' engagement in Lebanon to the present, Syria's objectives have been as constant as its alignment has been inconstant. Yet, partly because of the threat of Israeli counterintervention, Syrian forces have been unable to wholly control the conflict with the result a stalemate.¹⁰

The confrontation states were then divided - Egypt on the one hand, Jordan and Syria on the other - over the approach to and acceptance of a major U.S. role in the negotiations for a general settlement. Hussein, optimistic, felt Jordan had little role until invited to participate, he also felt such an invitation to be inevitable. Assad, pessimistic after late 1975, saw little point in step-by-step diplomacy for Syria. Sadat, optimistic, felt - in contrast to his two counterparts - that Egypt and the Arab would have much to gain from throwing in their lot with the United States, in trying to encourage the latter to become a full and active partner in the settlement process.

The newfound Saudi power inevitably broke down the insulation between the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf subregions of the Middle East with the result that Israel and Saudi Arabia for the first time figured directly in each other's strategic planning. The only direct external threats to the Saudi monarchy had been seen in Baghdad and, over a longer term, in Iran. Suddenly, Israel, which since 1967 occupied two Saudi islands (Sanafir and Tiran), was the single greatest military threat in Saudi eyes.

Israel, too, was a country in change after the October War. Once the initial shock of the war had worn off and scapegoats had been identified, Israeli leaders determined to maintain a posture of military readiness higher than previous levels. In particular, military force modernization and training efforts were upgraded and extremely ambitious procurement plans developed. Economic constraints meant that procurement programs would depend upon unprecedented levels of American grant military assistance.¹¹ Notwithstanding the greater degree of military readiness and the substantial technological development in post-October War Israel, disenchantment with national leadership under the Labor-led coalition grew apace with catastrophic rates of inflation. Economic stagnation and a series of political and financial scandals cast a cloud over the coalition, but even more fundamental processes were eroding Labor's attractiveness to the electorate.

Israel was not alone in suffering through inflation, although its inflation rate was several times that of other Middle East countries. Yet, the boom economies of the oil producers were regionalized to an extent. In addition to the subsidies, the oil producers extended development loans and paid for military hardware. Equally important in some cases was the employment offered in the oil producers economies: one of the largest sources of capital in countries like Jordan rapidly became the receipts from expatriates working in the Gulf. Moreover, many Western firms viewed all Arab markets as vehicles for the penetration of the oil producers' market, so substantial amounts of technology were

transferred, and significant numbers of commercial visits were common across the region.¹²

Second Phase 1974-76

The Liberation War changed attitudes not only in the countries directly concerned, but in the world as a whole.¹³ Egypt's morale was restored; Sadat was now able to negotiate from a position of strength. Israel, on the other hand, had become aware of her vulnerability and of the determination of Egypt and the whole Arab world to seek the implementation of Resolution 242 and a just settlement of the Palestinian problem. Sadat signed a disengagement agreement, mediated by Kissinger, in January 1974.

The U.S., profoundly affected by the Arab use of the "oil weapon" in the form of an embargo, realized that the Arabs had might as well as right on their side. Its support for Egypt was obtained because, following the war, Sadat severed his links with the USSR - the outcome of his realization that Soviet policy in the Middle East was best served by a state of continuing hostility and inconclusive wars, making Arab nations dependent on Russian military assistance, a situation fraught with the risk of Soviet domination of the area.

Nevertheless, despite desperate attempts by Kissinger to soften Israeli attitudes, diplomacy over the next 18 months was unsuccessful. Kissinger's efforts to negotiate a further disengagement agreement bogged down in Israeli intransigence.

To break this new deadlock, Sadat took the pre-emptive step of announcing that he would reopen the Suez Canal on 5 June 1975 and allow the evacuees back into the Canal towns.

"When I open the Suez Canal," Sadat told U.S. President Gerald Ford at the beginning of June 1975, "I want to say to Israel and to the whole world that I don't fear peace. I am ready to work out peace." The Israelis could no longer hold back, and on 2 September 1975, the second forces disengagement agreement was signed, and the resumption of the Geneva Conference became possible.

Third Phase 1977-79

The Middle East conflict could not be solved solely by military means had been clear to Sadat since he took office. The failures of orthodox diplomacy were by now apparent and became more so as the Geneva talks, conducted through third parties by Egyptian and Israeli representatives who refused to acknowledge each other when they met in person, ran into a dead end.

The Shadow of an Egyptian-Israeli Peace

Seeking once again to break the stalemate into which the Arab-Israeli situation had devolved, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made a direct and personal plea to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in November 1977, volunteering to go to Jerusalem if that would contribute to a settlement.

Such was the situation when Sadat took his historic decision to visit Israel and speak directly to its people from the rostrum of the Knesset.

On November 19, 1977 Sadat told Israel that he accepted their right to live in peace and statehood, her right to secure borders backed by international guarantees, and offered a peace agreement based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, and achievement of the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and statehood. "We welcome you among us," he told a nation whose right to existence had never before been recognized by her neighbors, "in all sincerity." Yet in doing so, as the London Guardian said, "He did not derogate by a word from the full demand for a restoration of Arab Lands or from the rights of the Palestinians."

If the Liberation War of 1973 had shaken the Israeli's conviction of military superiority, Sadat's 1977 Peace Initiative similarly caused them to doubt their hitherto unswerving belief in the moral superiority of their cause. World opinion was now fully behind the Sadat Initiative, and the international community looked to Israel for a matching gesture.

Sadat wasted no time in translating the powerful impetus of his Jerusalem visit into a practical struggle for peace. Early in 1978, he invited Begin to Ismailia for talks which established the machinery with which to work on the terms of a settlement: two ministerial committees, a political one meeting in Jerusalem and a military one convening in Cairo. But Israel's determination to hold onto its settlements in the occupied territories proved a major stumbling block - the more so when Begin authorized the establishment of further communities.

By early May, despite major efforts by Sadat aided by U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance with support from the UK and other Western countries, the talks seemed deadlocked. And peace prospects receded still further two months later when Israel explicitly affirmed its determination to hold onto the occupied territories even at the price of losing the chance of peace which Sadat offered.

A July meeting of the Egyptian and Israeli Foreign Ministers, with Cyrus Vance, at Leeds Castle in England followed. Once again, Egypt put forward Sadat's proposals for the return of the West Bank to Jordan and the Gaza Strip to Egypt, an effective role for the UN, an Israeli withdrawal from the two territories, and Palestinian participation in the administration during the five-year transitional period.

Events now took a dramatic new turn as Sadat's long struggle to bring the U.S. into the peace process as a full partner at last succeeded. He met Begin at Camp David, USA for a fortnight of intensive talks in which President Carter wholeheartedly participated. A news blackout ensured, as Carter said, that they could work together in privacy, "without the necessity of political posturing or defense of a transient stand or belief." The formula worked. Some 23 draft agreements later, Sadat obtained Begin's signature on the accords which were to pave the way towards the peace treaty.

The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, signed in Washington on 26 March 1979 and witnessed by President Carter, is a

crucial landmark in the achievement of a vision which had driven Sadat since he came to office in 1970 - the vision of a comprehensive settlement in the troubled Middle East. At an afternoon ceremony on the lawn of the White House, Egypt and Israel solemnly vowed to establish a relationship of friendship and trust to work with goodwill towards a just solution of the Palestinian problem.

The Middle East Relationships

Sadat's visit to Israel, initiating a new era in the Arab-Israeli dispute and fundamentally affected inter-Arab relations. Syria and the PLO, fearing the conclusion of a separate peace that might remove Egypt - the most powerful Arab state from the anti-Israel coalition, undertook with the support of the extremists (Iraq, Algeria, Libya) vitriolic attacks on Sadat's new approach.

The Egyptian strategy allowed more than adequate time for a constructive Arab alternative; but none was forthcoming. Sadat's opponents seemingly could agree on nothing save opposition to his policies. Even opposition was to some extent muted by Sadat's insistence that he would never settle for a "separate peace." Thus Saudi criticism was centered not so much on the nature of the Egyptian approach as upon the fact that it was undertaken without prior consultation with and among the Arabs. Two monarchs - King Hassan of Morocco, much at the periphery of the Arab-Israeli problem, and King Hussein of Jordan, just as much at its core - seemed to offer limited support, although Hussein was increasingly skeptical concerning Israeli intentions.

The new Egyptian strategy fundamentally altered Middle East relations. The most important changes occurred between Egypt and its erstwhile allies, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria; between Jordan and the PLO; between Iraq and Saudi Arabia; and temporarily between Iraq and Syria (see appendix 3). The discontinuity of the figures results from the distinction between Arab perceptions of Egyptian strategy before and after the Camp David summit meeting and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

Ultimately, and predictably, the other Arab states were unable to act to effectively counter Egypt's new strategy. However, events in the Middle East in late 1979 and early 1980 - the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran¹⁴, attacks on Americans and American property and embassies elsewhere¹⁵, and especially Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan¹⁶ - rekindled U.S. strategic fears and submerged what had been widespread public and congressional opposition within the United States to overseas commitments and to U.S. military action abroad.¹⁷ The fact that Camp David and its "peace process" roughly coincided with the Iranian revolution and the events of 1979-80 further reduced the ability of the Arab states to respond effectively by diminishing the relative importance of the Levant vis-a-vis the Arab/Persian Gulf, and by increasing the salience of the Arab countries only insofar as they cooperated with new Washington views on a U.S. military presence in the region.

After all, Israel continued to be the strongest military power in the Middle East, secure from attacks by any combination of Arab states and doubly so now that a peace had been concluded with

Egypt. In the Arab view only the United States, as Israel's principal supplier of military hardware and technology, could mount sufficient effective pressure on Israel to bring about more conciliatory policies. The United States could in turn be pressured by Arab governments and the PLO through manipulating the superpower rivalry, through threatened oil embargoes, and through petroleum price escalation. However, such a strategy was based upon the relatively reserved behavior of the United States during and after the Vietnam War and on the tendency of both superpowers increasingly to react to regional events in terms of regional interests rather than their global competition. When American attitudes abruptly changed in 1980 after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, it appeared that local governments might once again be seen as useful only in terms of their contribution to U.S. global strategy. While this attitude may not endure, Middle East governments have already been forcefully reminded of how little control they have over regional developments when the superpowers determine to act.

The result of the foregoing has been a deemphasis of the Egyptian-Israeli "peace process," as other Arab governments:

- (in the Gulf) recalled how peripheral the Arab-Israeli conflict was to them; or
- recognized the degree to which they sought American support as well as the degree to which their opposition to Camp David had weakened the support; or
- realized that their security under the new circumstances was much less assured outside than inside the peace process; or

- in the face of their inability to effect Egypt and Israel came to the conclusion that limited benefits within the Camp David formula might be preferable to being left behind by the developments issuing forth from it.

An important result, then, of the various developments in the late 1970's and early 1980's has been to move toward a return to the previous insulation between the various subregions of the Middle East. As the countries of the Gulf have felt the repercussions arising from the Iranian revolution and the Iraqi-Iranian war, their governments have been too concerned with internal and Gulf problems and issues to further subdivide attention and resources to address the Levant. Similarly, political changes in the eastern Mediterranean and the domestic impact of regional (including Gulf) developments have had such fundamental and far-reaching ramifications on Levantine states that their governments have tended to be less concerned with the Gulf than at any time since 1973.

EGYPTIAN AMERICAN RELATIONS

The Historical Background

Since World War II American Middle East policies have been driven by two conflicting approaches - on the one hand, to view the region in terms of the strategic U.S. competition with the Soviet Union; on the other, to deal with the Middle East on its own terms and for its own sake. This ambivalence in American policy has weakened both interests and is particularly lamentable at a time when direct U.S. interests in the Middle East have become vital.

Few aid relationships in the last three decades can match the drama and significance of the United States-Egyptian experience.¹⁸ The Eisenhower Administration's cancellation of its offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam in July 1956 triggered the Suez Crisis, and has been called "a turning point in the political relationship of the West and the Arab peoples."¹⁹ Between 1958 and 1965, Egypt was the world's largest per capita consumer of U.S. food aid.²⁰ With the demise of the food aid program in the mid-1960's, U.S. relations with Nasser's Egypt reached their nadir. But his successor, Anwar Sadat, proved far more cooperative than Nasser ever had. By the mid-1970's, the United States had unveiled a multi-billion dollar economic assistance program in Egypt, the largest of its kind since the Marshall Plan.

The situation did not change until President Anwar al-Sadat assumed office in late September, 1970. Sadat had come to recognize more clearly than his former chief that the prostrate Egyptian economy needed American help and that this could be obtained only through the medium of some kind of constructive diplomatic dialogue with the United States, aimed at achieving a Middle East peace and United States-Egyptian cooperation in the area. It required patience and mutual understanding by the American and Egyptian sides to do this, but, happily, the leaderships in both Washington and Cairo were prepared to work together to achieve common objectives. The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the exclusion of Soviet influence in Egypt were the results.

The United States and Egypt's Search for Military Aid, 1952-55

Gamal Abdel Nasser's announcement of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal in September 1955 was in many ways a watershed in United States-Egyptian relations. In the first few years after the Egyptian revolution, many American policymakers had regarded Nasser as a potential ally; after the Czech arms agreement, he was regarded increasingly by the American government as a potential enemy. The Egyptian decision to purchase weaponry from the Soviet block, which was to have a profound effect not only on U.S.-Egyptian relations but on the entire course of the Cold War, was bound up with the Eisenhower Administration's ill-fated attempt to use the lure of American military aid to entice Egypt into the Western alliance system. The tangled story of the U.S.-Egyptian military aid negotiations in the early 1950's reveals a great deal about the difficulties involved in using aid as a political lever in Egypt and sets the stage for discussion of the Aswan Dam affair.

The Egyptian revolutionary regime's quest for modern weaponry grew partly out of a perceived need to give credibility to an activist Egyptian foreign policy. Without a well-equipped army and air force, it was unlikely that Egypt would ever wield much influence in regional affairs. Moreover, the creation of a modern military force was an important symbol of independence and sovereignty in Egypt, contributing to the development of a sense of national identity as well as reinforcing the authority and legitimacy of the ruling elite.²¹ Of perhaps even more fundamental importance in the Revolutionary Command Council's (RCC) thinking was the fact that the Egyptian officer corps, the only real power base that the

regime had, demanded rapid acquisition of advanced military equipment. Having failed to broaden the political base of the regime, largely because there was not yet a middle class or a peasantry or an industrial proletariat aware of its group interests, the RCC was compelled to pay close attention to the needs of the military.²² And what the professional officer corps wanted above all, in the aftermath of Egypt's disastrous performance in the 1948 Palestine War, was modern military equipment.

The Eisenhower Administration's interest in deferring military aid to Egypt until after some progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement was reinforced by widespread domestic hostility to the idea of providing arms to Egypt which might someday be used against Israel. Although the Israel lobby was not nearly the political force in Washington in the 1950's that it was to become in the 1960's and 1970's, Israel's backers in the United States made their presence felt during the Eisenhower era, particularly when the issue of aid to Arab governments surfaced. Consideration for the great body of private opinion in the United States favoring Israel was a large factor in every governmental decision on Middle East issues.²³

The Lessons of the American Experience in Egypt, 1952-55

It seems clear in retrospect that there was a huge gap between what the Eisenhower Administration hoped to achieve with its military aid program in Egypt in the early 1950's and the projected size of the program itself. Between 25 May 1950 and 31 December 1955, the United States exported only \$1.2 million in arms and only

\$6.1 million in spare parts and aircraft to Egypt. Although the American government supplemented these sales with a \$20 million military aid offer in 1954, in the end the Eisenhower Administration tried, "to convince the Egyptians to do too much with too little benefit for the already suspicious Free Officers." Compromise on the Suez Base and Palestine issues, and on the issue of regional defense, entailed tremendous risks for the Nasser regime. Although Foster Dulles's understanding of the pressures facing Nasser was greater than he has usually been given credit for, he ultimately misjudged the strength of Arab nationalism, the urgency of the Egyptian government's need to obtain military aid, and the ability of the U.S. to shape events in the Middle East with relatively small quantities of aid.

Several other factors served to diminish what leverage the Eisenhower Administration did manage to derive from its promise of military aid. In the first place, the emergence of the Soviet bloc as an alternative source of arms decreased the value of U.S. military aid as a political lever in Egypt. Once competitive bidding for Egypt's favor began, the American bargaining position deteriorated rapidly.

The complexity of America's aid machinery was another anchor on U.S. efforts to use the lure of military assistance as a means of controlling Egyptian behavior. The nature of the American political system made delays, restrictions, and uncertainties an unavoidable part of the aid process, much to the chagrin of the Egyptian government. The three years of unsuccessful U.S.-Egyptian arms talks suffered by comparison with speedy conclusion of the

Czech arms deal. Moreover, Soviet bloc aid programs were unburdened by legislative requirements for military assistance advisory groups and uninhibited by annual public reviews of aid policy. The United States may have missed a chance in the first few years after the revolution to build a durable, mutually satisfactory relationship with the Nasser regime; to a considerable extent, the complicated story of America's attempts to use military aid as a political lever in Egypt in the period 1952-55 remains a tale of lost opportunities.

The United States and the Aswan Dam, October 1955 - July 1956

"The Aswan Dam affair," observed one former American diplomat²⁴, "is probably the single most important episode in the whole history of American attempts to use economic aid as a political lever in the Third World." In the glare of mounting Soviet-American competition in the developing world, the significance of the Eisenhower Administration's offer - in conjunction with the British government and the World Bank - to help finance construction of the Aswan High Dam was magnified far beyond the size of the offer itself. Alarmed by the Czech arms deal, Foster Dulles hoped to use aid for the High Dam project as an inducement to discourage the Nasser regime from further involvement with the Soviet bloc and to encourage the Egyptians to seek a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a more general sense, Dulles sought to use the Aswan offer as a means of demonstrating American strength in the escalating East-West struggle for influence in the Third World. American efforts to mold Egyptian behavior with the lure of

High Dam aid did not, however, meet with much success in late 1955-early 1956. By the end of March 1956, the Eisenhower Administration's frustration with the Nasser regime's conduct, coupled with increasing foreign and domestic pressures, had produced a major shift in American tactics. Having failed to pacify Nasser with promises of economic assistance, Eisenhower and Dulles set out after March 1956 to punish him by suspending those promises.

At the end of March 1956, the Eisenhower Administration began a major shift in its Aswan Dam aid policy. Disturbed by the Nasser regime's apparent unwillingness to cooperate with the American government, Eisenhower and Foster Dulles jettisoned the policy of using High Dam aid primarily as an inducement and set out to use the suspension of the Aswan offer as part of a general campaign to bring Nasser to heel. By attempting to isolate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world, the Eisenhower Administration hoped to contain the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East, to temporarily defuse the Arab-Israeli issue, and more broadly, to demonstrate that Nasser's tactic of playing off East against West did not pay.

Informal suspension of the Aswan offer, however, seemed to have no more effect on Egyptian behavior than the earlier policy of inducement had had. Beset by Congressional pressures, and convinced that the dangling High Dam offer had become more of a liability than an asset of American interests, Foster Dulles formally cancelled the U.S. government's proposal of aid for the High Dam on 19 July 1956. It is important to emphasize, first, that Dulles's cancellation of the Aswan offer was not the sudden decision that it is sometimes alleged to have been, but was rather a product of the

gradual shift in American policy toward Egypt that had begun in late March 1956, and second, that the British government was not completely excluded from the deliberations which culminated in Dalles's cancellation of the Aswan offer, as has sometimes been suggested, but was rather kept fairly well informed about American thinking on the Aswan issue.

The immediate consequence of the Anglo-American withdrawal of the High Dam offer was Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, and the subsequent Suez Crisis, which in turn had a powerful effect upon the course of international politics. Never before or since has America's use of economic aid as a political lever had quite the same impact that the cancellation of the Aswan offer had.

Instead of becoming an object lesson for Third World governments on the unprofitability of attempting to use Cold War rivalry for their own ends, the Aswan affair became an object lesson for the American government on the unprofitability of attempting to use economic aid too blatantly as a political lever in relations with developing countries. American governments, however, have marvelous propensity for forgetting, ignoring, or simply misinterpreting historical lessons; within a decade, the threat of economic aid cut-offs would once again be brandished in U.S.-Egyptian relations.

Aid Policy in the Twilight Years of the Eisenhower Era

There was, as Raymond Hare later put it, a "false glow" over U.S.-Egyptian relations in the wake of Suez. The brief period of U.S.-Egyptian amity created by Eisenhower's opposition to the

tripartite attack on Egypt was more apparent than it was real; far from seeking to build a better U.S.-Egyptian relationship on the foundation of Suez the Eisenhower Administration set out at the beginning of 1957 to isolate Nasser and block the spread of his influence in the Arab world. The keystone of the Administration's effort was the Eisenhower Doctrine, to extension of the anti-Nasser campaign. Another feature of the post-Suez drive to curb the Nasser regime was the suspension of America's modest program of technical and commodity aid with the outbreak of hostilities in October 1956, the several dozen American technical advisers then working on Egyptian development projects were evacuated. At the same time, shipments of surplus wheat under a \$19.2 million aid agreement reached early in 1956 were curtailed. Egypt received no economic aid from the United States during 1957.²⁵ When pressed about the chances for a revival of the aid program in Egypt, a State Department spokesman observed laconically in May 1958 that economic aid might be resumed after a "decent interval."²⁶

That interval proved to be shorter than many people in Washington had anticipated. After the Iraqi revolution in July 1958 torpedoed the Baghdad Pact and revealed the bankruptcy of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Eisenhower Administration launched a cautious effort to ease U.S.-Egyptian tensions. A gradual improvement in U.S.-Egyptian relations and a gradual increase in Public Law (PL) 480 shipments to Egypt went hand-in-hand in 1959-60. By the end of the Eisenhower era, the stage was set for the Kennedy Administration's dramatic effort to build a cordial U.S.-Egyptian relationship with American food aid.

American aid - or the lack of it - was a key issue in U.S.-Egyptian relations throughout the 1950's, most dramatically during the Aswan affair of 1955-56. In the slow climb out of the valley of mutual differences in 1959-60, American food aid served as a crucial bilateral bond. In the ambitious plans of Eisenhower's successor, food aid was to play an even more crucial role.

Food Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1961-63

Encouraged by the gradual improvement of U.S.-Egyptian relations in 1959-60, John F. Kennedy and the "best and the brightest" who accompanied him to Washington in 1961 made a major effort to build a friendly relationship with the Nasser regime on a foundation of American food aid shipments. By 1963, Egypt had become the world's largest per capita consumer of American food aid.²⁷

The central objectives of Kennedy's aid policy were variations on the familiar themes of the Eisenhower era: the Kennedy Administration sought to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict "in the icebox;" to limit Soviet influence in Egypt; and to restrain Nasser from attacking Western interests in the Arab world and in the rest of the developing world. In addition to these immediate security concerns, Kennedy and his advisers placed new emphasis on the importance of promoting Egyptian economic development, which they believed would result eventually in a durable, amicable U.S.-Egyptian relationship.

The initial aid tactic favored by the Kennedy Administration was a continuation of the Eisenhower Administration's practice in 1959-60 of offering incremental inducements to the Nasser regime,

usually in six-month installments. Buoyed by the apparent success of "continuous negotiation," to moderate Nasser's behavior in 1961-62, the Kennedy Administration concluded a large, three-year PL 480 agreement with the Egyptian government in October 1962, in hopes that such a commitment would reinforce the Nasser regime's interest in cooperating with the United States. Unfortunately, U.S.-Egyptian friction stemming from Egypt's involvement in the Yemeni civil war and its rapid military build-up caused a steady deterioration in bilateral relations in 1963, even as the American government poured unprecedented quantities of food aid into Egypt. By the time of Kennedy's death in November 1963, much of the early promise of the Kennedy-Nasser relationship had evaporated, as had much of the New Frontiersmen's confidence in their "great unseen weapon."²⁸

Nasser made it quite clear to Kennedy and his advisers in 1963 that economic development was not the only, or even the most important, goal of his regime, and that Egypt's interest in ensuring the continued flow of food aid through cordial relations with the United States was a far less crucial concern in Cairo than Egypt's interest in protecting and advancing its prestige in the Arab world.

Food Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1964-67

For Lyndon Johnson, diplomacy was essentially an extension of the game of national politics. As an instrument of diplomacy, food aid was bound - in the Johnsonian scheme of things - by the cardinal rule of national politics: never do something for nothing.

Johnson shared many of Kennedy's convictions about the long-run political benefits for the United States of economic development in poor countries, but he had far less patience than his predecessor had had with recipients of American largesse who created short-run difficulties for the American government, and for Lyndon Johnson. Economic development was a slow and uncertain process, and in the meantime Johnson wanted something to show for his efforts. Johnson wasted little time in making his philosophy clear to aid recipients.

Distressed by Nasser's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, by his growing economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, and by his increasing attacks on Western interests in the Arab world and in Africa, Johnson grew more and more frustrated in 1964 with the three-year American commitment to provide food aid to Egypt. In a year in which PL 480 aid accounted for 92 percent of Egyptian wheat imports and 53 percent of Egypt's net supply of wheat, Johnson thought it incredible that Egypt could show such disregard for American interests. Finally, after the United States Information Service Library in Cairo was burned to the ground in November 1964, after Nasser denounced the Johnson Administration and its aid programs in a particularly vituperative speech in December 1964, and after intense pressure had begun to build on Capitol Hill for abrogation of the three-year agreement, Johnson stepped in and shortened Nasser's leash, suspending delivery of the last installment of aid under the October 1962 accord. After a period of more restrained Egyptian behavior in the spring and

summer of 1965, the Johnson Administration resumed food aid shipments to the Nasser regime, completing the 1962 agreement and then, at the end of 1965, negotiating a new, six-month PL 480 agreement. But when U.S.-Egyptian relations again began to deteriorate in 1966 - at a time when the American agricultural surplus had diminished considerably - Johnson again turned off the spigot of PL 480 aid. From the points of view of both the Johnson Administration and the Nasser regime at the beginning of 1967, continuation of the PL 480 program in Egypt cost more in domestic and regional political terms than it was worth. By May-June 1967, any political leverage that economic aid had once produced for the U.S. in Egypt had long since dissipated.

Sadat's Peace Dividend

Anwar Sadat is remembered by the American public he captivated in the 1970's as a great historic figure. Just as Nasser's villainous image belies the complicated nature of his relationship with the U.S., Sadat's heroic image is in some ways a distortion of reality and an oversimplification of the impact that his achievements and his failures have had on Egypt and on American interests in the Middle East.

Few foreign leaders have ever captured the imagination of Americans as completely as did Anwar Sadat in the years after the October War of 1973. Henry Kissinger, in a moment of humility rare for a man who fancied himself the heir to the great European diplomats of the nineteenth century, described Sadat in 1979 as "the greatest [statesman] since Bismarck."²⁹ Kissinger's praise was

echoed by his colleagues in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, by his successors in the Carter and Reagan Administrations, by the American news media, and by legislators on Capitol Hill who embraced Sadat as they had rebuffed Nasser.

One tangible sign of the popularity of Sadat and his policies in the United States was the rapid resumption of American economic aid to Egypt after the October War, on a scale unparalleled since the Marshall Plan era in Western Europe. This multi-billion-dollar assistance program, at heart an act of faith in Sadat himself, was designed to help make the political risks the post-1973 peace process entailed for Egypt worth taking. Sadat promised Egyptian compatriots that his commitment to a diplomatic resolution of Egypt's differences with Israel and his close association with the United States would produce a "peace dividend," in the form of social and materiel progress for all Egyptians. The American government realized early on that failure to underwrite Sadat's pledge would jeopardize its evolving special relationship with Egypt, and as a consequence, its hopes for a general Middle East peace settlement. Perceiving an historic opportunity to establish a strong American position in Egypt and to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Nixon Administration and its successors plunged enthusiastically into the task of bolstering the Egyptian economy.

Sadat's soaring rhetoric, coupled with the rapid growth of the U.S. economic aid program, created dangerously inflated expectations in Egyptian populace would derive from U.S. largesse. When collaboration with the United States failed to produce the quick

economic solutions that many Egyptians had come to expect, some of the old frustrations and resentments that had dominated the Egyptian view of the American government in the Nasser era began to resurface. To be sure, the U.S.-Egyptian relationship was on far firmer political footing in the late 1970's and early 1980's than had ever been the case in the Nasser years; nevertheless, it had become clear by the time of Sadat's death in October 1981 that American economic assistance was not the political panacea that some Americans and Egyptians had thought it to be in the first heady days of the post-1973 U.S.-Egyptian rapprochement.

Retrospect and Prospect

By 1982, the goals that the Eisenhower Administration had sought to achieve with its Aswan offer - and Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and a diminution of Soviet influence in Egypt - had been realized. They had been realized not through the barter of economic assistance for political concessions, as some of Eisenhower's advisers had anticipated, but through careful diplomacy and cultivation of shared interests. In the early 1980's, as in preceding years, economic aid served as an important inducement to cooperation with the U.S., but it did not give the American government a stranglehold on Egyptian policies.

"Don't expect miracles from me," Mubarak said, "I have no magic wands."³⁰ Mubarak began the slow process of rebuilding Egypt's ties to its Arab neighbors, to the nonaligned movement, and to the rest of the Islamic world. Mubarak's moves in 1982-83 to demonstrate that Egypt was something more than an American client

were more subtle. He refused to allow the United States to establish a permanent air force base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea, although he made it clear that the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force could make use of the military facilities at Ras Banas for training or during an actual emergency. He voiced staunch support for the Reagan Peace Initiative but continued to advocate a direct U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization. He insisted upon greater Egyptian control over the disbursement of American aid funds, and obtained it.

Economic Aid and the Limits of Influence

What lessons does the American experience in the Nasser and Sadat eras hold for current aid policy? Such lessons are: unclogging the aid-pipeline, linking aid to reform, and reducing the size and visibility of the American presence applicable not only to the American aid relationship with Mubarak's Egypt, but also to U.S. aid policy toward other developing countries. Inflated American expectations, coupled with deep Egyptian anxieties about foreign encroachment, produced a highly combustible aid relationship.

In the Sadat era, inflated Egyptian expectations, publicly fanned by Sadat himself, posed real dangers for American policymakers. Again, it is clear that no sensible aid policy could be developed without taking Egypt's domestic mood into account. The political influence that one country derives from the provision of economic assistance to another is not the neat mathematical product of a simple calculus of economic costs and benefits; it results

from the complicated interaction of the needs, perceptions, and ambitions of the donor with those of the recipient.

The provision of economic aid can reinforce an interest in mutual accommodation derived from more fundamental shared political objectives. The promise, threatened withdrawal, or actual withdrawal of aid can also, if discreetly applied, earn modest political concessions from the recipient. But the political value of economic assistance must not be overestimated. A large aid program even one as extensive as the current program for Mubarak's Egypt, cannot effectively be used as a political bludgeon; moreover, the sheer size of such a program creates considerable risks for both donor and recipient. For those who may be tempted to think that the Mubarak regime's dependence on American assistance gives the United States government a vice grip on Egyptian policies, the lessons of Nasser and Sadat eras are worth remembering.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

1. For more information, and the historical and cultural background, See "Egypt: Facts and Figures 1985," (Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Information, State Information Service).

2. See Paul A. Jureidini and R. D. McLaurin, Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and Leaders in the Middle East, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1981, pp. IX-XXII.

3. Labor's power has traditionally been used upon the voting strength of the generally older Ashkenazi Jews. The demographic realities are that this constituency has less and less numerical strength. Liked, by contrast, are attractive to the younger and less European Jews who make up an ever-increasing portion of the Israeli electorate.

4. See Steven Rosen and Martin Indyk, "The Temptation to Pre-empt in a Fifth Arab-Israeli War," Crisis, 20, 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 265-85.

5. We do not mean to leave the impression here that either Egypt (and Syria) before the war, or Israel afterwards, sought "peace at any price." Indeed, although the shock of the personnel losses to Israel caused an immediate postwar interest in settlement, popular attitudes on the retention of eastern and northern territories captured in 1967 seems to have hardened somewhat within five years. The point we are making here is simply that many in Israel considered the status quo both acceptable and

stable - hence desirable - before the October War. Few could argue persuasively for that view in retrospect.

6. Among the many books on the war, the reader may wish to consult the following: Hassan al Badri, The Ramadan War (Dunn Loring, VA: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1978); Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory, "Book Five;" Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan; Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974); and London Sunday Times Insight Team, The Yom Kippur War (London: Times of London, 1974).

7. See Steven Rosen, "What the next Arab-Israeli War Might Look Like," International Security 2, 4 (Spring 1978), pp. 149-74.

8. Whether the "effect" was psychological or physical it was real. There is a persistent argument - supported by some substantial supply data - to the effect that the embargo was not effective in reducing supplies of oil to the embargoed countries but that it was very effective in changing consumer purchase and storage behavior and in inducing control interventions. These changes taken together, it is averred, produced the "oil shortage" phenomenon, an appearance brought about by recipient - caused disruptions rather than a reality caused by supplier behavior.

9. See Edward R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger: A Secret History of American Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976); and William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

10. C. F. Haley and Snider, Lebanon in Crisis, passim; Adeed I. Dawisha, "Syria in Lebanon: Assad's Vietnam," Foreign Policy, no. 33 (Winter 1978-79), pp. 135-50.

11. Israel has received substantial amounts of grant military support from the United States over the last several years. U.S. security assistance to Israel has taken a unique form: virtually 100 percent "loan" with half of the loan "forgiven." Technically, this is not, then "grant" aid; in fact, it is just that.

12. R. D. McLaurin, "The Transfer of Technology to the Middle East," in The Political Economy of the Middle East, ed. R. Kaufman and J. Wooten (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Library of Congress, 1980).

13. For more information, see: Safwat El-Sherif, Sadat Man of Peace, Egyptian State Information Service, pp. 23-43.

14. On November 4, 1979, following days of demonstrations near the U.S. embassy, a number of "militants" entered the compound and seized the building, the grounds, and more than 60 U.S. diplomats and others then in the embassy.

15. In the aftermath of the embassy seizure in Tehran and the subsequent attack by Saudi dissidents on the Grand Mosque in Mecca, several U.S. embassies and other buildings in Muslim countries stretching from Libya to the Philippines came under attack.

16. On December 27, 1979, Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan, deposed the president, Hafizullah Amin, and installed a new regime under Babrak Karmal which then "requested" Soviet assistance. This military intervention had a significant psychological effect in Washington, D. C., and in the Middle East region as well.

17. The American retreat can be traced to the Vietnam period and has its roots even further back in history, around 1960 when the decolonization movement had gathered substantial momentum and a Western military presence, or ties between Western and Third World regimes, were viewed as prima facie evidence of neocolonialism.

18. For more additional information see: William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy Toward Egypt, 1955-1981, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 1-35.

19. For a thoughtful analysis of Egyptian foreign policy in the 1950's, see Malcolm Kerr's unpublished paper entitled "Egyptian Foreign Policy and the Revolution," found in the Egyptian press clippings file of the Middle East Center Library, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

20. Nasser suggested in a series of articles in the Egyptian weekly Akher Sa'a in the latter part of 1953 that Egypt was destined to play a leading role in three geopolitical "circles": the Arab circle, the African circle, and the Islamic circle. See Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution, translated by Richard E. Nolte (Cairo: American Universities Field Staff, March 1954), pp. 31-43.

21. See Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy Towards Egypt (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 178-79.

22. See Cairo Embtel 1352, 12 January 1955. Washington National Records Center, Record Groups 84, Box 264.

23. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report (New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 247-48.

24. For additional information see: William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985, pp. 36-75.

25. The United States Treasury also froze about \$40 million worth of Egyptian assets in the United States, pending settlement of compensation claims made by Suez Canal Company stockholders. See The New York Times, 13 August, 1 October 1956, 1 May 1958, and Glenn Earl Perry, U.S. Relations with Egypt, 1951-63: Egyptian Neutralism and American Alignment Policy (University of Virginia: PhD thesis, 1964), pp. 340-356.

26. The New York Times, 1 May 1958.

27. Food for Peace was the great unseen weapon of Kennedy's Third World policy. See Williams J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt, 1955-1981, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1985. Pp. 121-148.

28. See Ibid, pp. 149-173.

29. Gail Sheehy, "The Riddle of Sadat," Esquire, 30 January 1979.

30. Mohamed Hakk1, p. 12.

CHAPTER IV

EGYPTIAN STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE STABILITY IN THE REGION

POLITICAL POLICY AND STRATEGIC ELEMENTS THAT AIMS AT ACHIEVING STABILITY IN THE REGION

For 5,000 years Egypt has played a critical role in shaping the security and stability of the region that includes the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Red Sea. This role is a function of both Egypt's strategic position and the skills and independence of its people. Egypt not only determines the security of one of the world's critical strategic waterways and great trade routes, it makes up more than 40 percent of the total population of the Arab world. Egypt's strategic position is as important today as it has ever been in the past.

Economic Growth and National Security

The twin foundations of Egypt's National Policy.

Modern Egypt has shown leadership, and moral and political courage. In 1952, Egypt led the emergence of the Third World and the struggle against colonialism. In 1973, Egypt demonstrated it had the military strength and modern technology to wage war against one of the most effective and best armed forces in the world. In 1978, Egypt showed it had the courage and foresight to take the initiative in bringing peace to the region, and the will to negotiate an initial peace settlement in the face of what initially

seemed to be overwhelming obstacles. In 1984, Egypt demonstrated that it had become a mature democracy in which every citizen could vote and in which six sharply different political parties could compete for office.

Today, Egypt is an essential power for peace, democracy and moderation in a region which has vital strategic importance to Western trade and security. It is a state which combines Muslim and Christian alike. It is the intellectual center of the Arab world. It is the friend of every moderate state in the Middle East and North Africa. It shares broad common goals with the United States, and is its natural partner in maintaining regional stability and security.

Egypt is also widely considered to be a main axis shaping the balance between states in the region because of its capability to shape the course of events, and its dedication to building stability in a region which suffers from many problems and which must be regarded as the most tense region in the world.

The statements of Egypt's political and military officials, as well as Egyptian policy, reinforce the fact that the peace Egypt initiated came out of Egypt's complete conviction that peace was the only way the area could end its many conflicts and struggles, and that peace is a strategic position from which there can be no withdrawal, regardless of Egypt's many difficulties and sacrifices.

Egypt strives in a balanced manner to push forward peace efforts and to acquire the military strength necessary to protect the peace process, since this process cannot be moved forward by good will alone. The arms race in the region and the constant

political pressures from the enemies of peace, ensure that no peace can be broadened or maintained without national security.

These policies create a natural unity of purpose and interdependence with the U.S. The United States has vital economic, political, and military interests in the region. The region's security is one of the main considerations shaping United States strategy, and this creates a strong mutual bond between Egypt and the U.S., in their efforts to build peace and security. While the methods of achieving given goals may sometimes differ, both sides agree on the critical priorities: military security and economic development, ending terrorism, and finding a solution to the Palestinian problem that ends in a just and comprehensive peace settlement for all parties.

It is this clear mutual vision, and understanding between Egypt and the United States which has upgraded their relationship to the close ties that now help shape Egypt's regional position. This relationship emanates from the conviction of both sides that they must cooperate both in the civil efforts that strengthen the search for peace, and the military areas vital to securing peace and creating regional stability.

Egypt is building this regional role, and national policy, on twin foundations: economic growth and national security. The first foundation ensures the welfare of Egypt's people and steady improvements in their living standard. It involves the modernization of each major sector of the Egyptian economy, the development of a modern economic infrastructure, the modernization of state industry, and the steady growth of the private sector.

This foundation is essential to the hopes and living standard of every Egyptian. It is essential to Egypt's development as a democracy, and it is essential if Egypt is to play a major role in helping to bring peace and stability to a troubled region.

The second foundation is national security. Egypt's firm commitment to peace with Israel has eased the strain of defense expenditure and allowed Egypt to shift resources to economic development. It is reducing the size of its armed forces, and trading force quantity for force quality. Egypt, however, still confronts serious threats from other nations in the region. It faces a unpredictable and well-armed Libya. Moreover, Egypt finds itself in an unstable and tense region characterized by complicated problems of different levels and types. It may be forced to provide support to other moderate Arab and African states.

Egypt cannot build on these twin foundations, however, without external aid. It cannot improve the living standards of its own people, carry the burden of economic development, and help maintain regional security with its present resources. The Egyptian economy not only must grow and diversify, Egypt must compensate for the cost of decades of war. It must compensate for the loss of Arab aid as the result of its peace with Israel, most especially for the total loss of funds for the Arab Organization for Industrialization.

Egypt's Economic Goals

Egypt's economic plan emphasizes the increase of the productive capacity of its various economic sectors, the improvement of

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
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
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living standards, and greater equity in income distribution. The essence of Egypt's economic planning is to ensure interdependence and integration among the various sectors and variables. The main feature of planning in the coming era will be the integration between physical and human factors, and among the components of each category.

The key to providing the level of Egyptian economic growth that will meet the needs of Egypt's people, and eventually allow Egypt to finance both its economic development and national security, lies in increasing its standard of living at least twice the rate of its population growth. Egypt's economic planning directs the course of the public sector. As for the private sector, planning does not interfere in its operation. On the contrary, the government charts its broad course and shapes the framework for its activities, to ensure the proper coordination and integration between the two sectors.

Egypt plans to improve the focus of its human resources development and manpower training. Education and training are being focused on modern technical skills.

Reducing Egypt's balance of payments deficit remains a major priority. Egypt's persistent balance of payments deficit has increased its debt to the outside world to the point where this is interfering in both economic development and national security. The solution lies in a mix of outside aid and a consistent and integrated set of Egyptian measures and policies in such critical areas as the selection of major development projects, the rationalization of imports and consumption, increased domestic saving, more

efficient pricing and fiscal policies and more efficient use of foreign aid and loans. It was planned that Egypt's exports would steadily increase at a rate exceeding the increase in its imports and Gross Domestic Product. This will help restore internal and external balance to the Egyptian economy.

Egypt is also encouraging Western, Arab, and other foreign investment. Egypt is rationalizing the use of foreign loans and aid and is directing them to the most productive sectors and projects. Further, Egypt is improving its cooperation with Arab and other friendly neighboring countries to enhance development and improve regional economic integration. In addition, Egypt needs intensive outside aid to complement the projected financial resource availability and to relieve project implementation constraints.

Egypt's National Security Goals

Egypt's national Security goals are based on a policy of peace and deterrence. Egypt can only meet its goals for economic development and improving the standard of its people if it can avoid war and limit its participation in the arms race that dominates the economy of so many other states in the region. This is one reason Egypt has so strong a commitment to peace to Israel and to eliminating the suffering and waste of past conflicts.

At the same time, Egypt must create a strong deterrent and convert its forces from large masses of Soviet-supplied equipment to smaller high-technology forces equipped by the West. Egypt not only is surrounded by a regional arms race, it faces tangible

threats from unstable states like Libya. It can only maintain the peace if it clearly possesses the ability to counterattack against Libya, and have the ability to aid other moderate states, as well.

Egypt's national security goals flow logically from these needs, and may be summarized as follows:

- To maintain the peace, and find a just solution to the Palestinian problem as an essential step in reaching a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East.
- To create a strong deterrent that will check any covert or overt aggression against Egypt.
- To help preserve the independence and self-determination of its Arab and African neighbors.
- To maintain modern forces that will help bring the region stability in the face of a major arms race and many sources of conflict and political unrest.
- To provide the military capabilities that Egypt needs in a way that will allow Egypt to pursue the path of economic development and raise the living standards of the Egyptian people.

It is important to note that Egypt and Tunisia are the only two powers in the region which have recently cut their defense establishments and which plan such moderate rates of future increases. This is illustrated by the latest data the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has issued on total defense spending in the Middle East. The total for the Middle East has increased from \$48 billion dollars in 1977, in constant 1981 dollars, to \$60 billion in 1982. Egypt's share of total regional

defense expenditures has dropped sharply since its peace with Israel and the beginning of close military relations with the United States.

It is also true that Egypt has benefited greatly from U.S. defense aid, and could not meet its goals without this aid. Without extensive future grant aid from the U.S., Egypt would have no way of reducing its foreign debt and of funding both security and development. One again, however, ACDA data helps put this in perspective. Egypt imported \$4.2 billion worth of arms from all sources during 1978-82. Israel imported \$4.4 billion, although it has a much larger domestic defense industry. Sudan, Egypt's ally, imported only \$650 million. Syria imported \$9.6 billion. Libya imported \$11.5 billion. Iran imported \$6.7 billion. Iraq imported \$13.6 billion, and Saudi Arabia imported \$9.6 billion.

More recent U.S. Department of Defense estimates of Syrian and Libyan arms imports indicate that these two nations are the world's largest consumers of Soviet arms: Libya received a total of \$15 billion worth of arms from the USSR as of the end of 1983, and Syria received \$13.8 billion. In contrast, Egypt has received a total of \$3.4 billion worth of arms deliveries or commitments from the U.S. These figures dramatize not only the need for U.S. arms and aid, but why Egypt must improve its national security as well as develop its economy.

Strategic Elements that Aims at Achieving Stability

This need for security is clearly illustrated by the events of 1984 and 1985. The regional military arms race continues and

further wars between Egypt's neighbors remain possible. Both national and terrorist threats are serious. The most prominent of these threats and problems may be summarized as follows:

- The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement is still the best possible opportunity for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, the prolongation of barriers to open talks on the part of Israel is a major obstacle to the exploitation of this chance. It has resulted in the distrust of Arab nations in Israel's interest in peace and could push other Arab moderates towards extremism.
- The escalation of the Iranian struggle, and its expansion to new forms of conflict (shelling of cities and economic targets, attacking oil tankers) now threatens neighboring areas as part of Iran's efforts to export its revolution through the Shi'ite elements in the Gulf and Africa.
- Several regional states have stepped up their aggressive policy. Their support of, and involvement in, terrorist activities has increased sharply and constitutes a threat to the security and stability of Africa and the Arab world.
- Terrorism and the use of terrorist violence constitute an exceedingly dangerous threat which must be countered by all possible means.
- The failure of regional and international efforts to achieve a reconciliation in Chad creates the constant possibility of renewed struggle between the conflicting factions.
- The most prominent threats share the common factor of Libyan activities directed towards Egypt, either directly or

indirectly, through confrontation with those countries which
from Egypt's security zone and secure its vital interests.
Libya is taking the lead in trying to form a belt around
Egypt (Libya, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Aden) which is capable of
controlling vital targets concerning Egyptian national
security (e.g., the sources of the Nile, the entrance to the
Red Sea). Moreover, this belt is linked and, except for the
Sudan, moves according to the strategy of the Soviets, which
makes the situation more critical and dangerous.

There is nothing theoretical about the threats Egypt faces and
the region's many sources of instability. Libya, Chad, the Sudan,
Ethiopia, and South Yemen have been headline news in both the
United States and Egyptian press. The arms race in the Middle East
and the Gulf dominates the total volume of arms transfer to the
Third World. According to recent figures from the U.S.
Congressional Research Service, the Middle East and Southwest Asia
received 73% of all world arms transfers to developing states
during 1976-79 and 77% of all transfers during 1980-83. During
this same period, the total volume of arms transfers to the area
rose from \$72 to \$115 billion, while Soviet bloc arms transfers
nearly doubled from \$24 to \$44 billion.

The Need for Interdependence

All of those goals, common interests, and regional realities
shape the need for interdependence between Egypt and the United
States based on the similarity of U.S. and Egyptian interests.

This is a function of the need for both economic and military interdependence.

1. Economic Interdependence:

Egypt's developing economy is heavily dependent on imports of technology and foreign investment to make Egypt a self-sufficient world trading partner. Since 1974, Egypt has actively sought investment from the United States that will create the kind of economic interdependence that will help Egypt develop both its economy and technology base.

This encouragement is exemplified in investment Law 43 of 1974, which established Egypt's "Open Door" policy, and subsequent amendments to this law. Foreign investors have been provided with exemption from certain customs duties, guarantees against nationalization, exemption from public sector laws, exemption from taxes for five to eight years, and repatriation of capital and earnings. These incentives encourage the formation of joint ventures with either public or private sector entities. Private sector and investment activities make up 25% of all the projects in Egypt's five year plan.

This has helped make Egypt the second largest market for United States goods in the Near East and Africa. In 1982, United States exports to Egypt totalled \$2.9 billion, a rise of 34 percent over 1982. In contrast, Egypt exported \$547 million worth of goods to the U.S., some 90 percent of which consisted of oil. This is roughly one-eighth of all of Egypt's exports.

In 1983, United States exports to Egypt declined somewhat to \$2.8 billion while Egyptian exports to the U.S. dropped to \$303

million, thus registering a deterioration of the United States at the rate of 7.6%. These trends have continued in 1984. They reflect the overall deterioration of the Egyptian balance of payments conditions, and they are highly likely to continue beyond the current Five-Year Plan. They will result in steadily increased indebtedness to the United States, and we are becoming a powerful rationale for increased aid levels.

2. Military Interdependence:

The United States and Egypt are already well on the way to achieving military interdependence. Defense cooperation between Egypt and the United States has grown continuously since 1973, and has demonstrated that Egypt's military goals agree in broad terms with those of the United States. This is especially true of the effort to achieve peace and stability in the Middle East and Africa, and to ensure that each nation in the region can pursue its own political and economic destiny without outside interference.

The military interdependence between Egypt and the United States is illustrated by America's use of Egypt's facilities, and by recent progress in joint training activities and exercises:

- Support for United States transshipment of ammunition to Lebanon in September 1983.
- Overflight and landing privileges for a United States joint exercise in the territory and local waters of Oman during March 11-April 4, 1984.
- Providing fueling and base support of U.S. forces when the United States reacted to the Libyan air raid on the Sudanese capital and radio station at Um-Durman.

- Security for U.S. ship transits through the Suez Canal.
- "Sea Wind" maneuvers with the United States Sixth Fleet.
- Overflight and landing privileges for U.S. aircraft on their way to the Gulf and Far East. Fuel is provided in the air and on the ground.
- Services for U.S. aircraft carrying back-up crews, technicians, and spare parts for the repair and maintenance of United States ships in the Mediterranean Sea.
- Privileges for U.S. helicopters carrying out sorties from United States aircraft carriers for tests and training within Egyptian airspace.
- The "Bright Star" series of biennial exercises in Egypt, and combined airlift exercises, during which United States forces can train elements of all fighting services, share military doctrine, and develop new concepts for desert war.
- The series of E-3A AWACS joint operations in Egypt. Three of these deployments are normally scheduled each year. They provide for joint operations and give U.S. crews and technical personnel experience in operating in the region.

These demonstrations of the need for interdependence include United States and Egypt cooperation in helping the Sudan reduce the threat of Libyan air attacks. In addition to reacting to crises of this sort, Egypt and the U.S. have long cooperated in joint contingency planning, however, and in major exercises like the "Bright Star" series. Both nations have shown that their forces can cooperate in a crisis, and learned the value of their respective capabilities.

Egypt has cooperated with the United States in its efforts to bring peace to Lebanon and reduce the level of tension between Israel and Syria. Egypt provided transshipment bases during a critical phase of the United States effort to bring unity to the Lebanese government and army. Egypt continues to work closely with the U.S. in trying to end the crisis in Lebanon and to reduce the risk of a war or confrontation between Israel and Syria.

Continued Egyptian and U.S. cooperation is vital to ensuring the security of naval passage through the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. While the United States Navy is the key to the security of the Mediterranean, Egypt must secure the Suez Canal and work with other friendly states to ensure the security of traffic through the Red Sea. As has been mentioned earlier, Egypt will be the strategic pivot of the defense of the new oil pipelines being built to ports in Jordan and the southwestern coast of Saudi Arabia.

The recent mining in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea clarifies the necessity for a strong Egyptian Navy, and highlights the strategic importance of these waterways. This shift in Egypt's strategic orientation is typical of the future need for closer military interdependence. There are few prospects for improved stability in North Africa, the Middle East, the Red Sea region, the Horn, or the Gulf. The U.S. and Egypt will almost certainly have to cooperate closely in the development of forces, in deterrent demonstrations like the use of the E-3A AWACS, in providing arms transfers and military assistance, in exercises designed to show the deterrent strength of both nations. Both Egypt's "twin

foundations" and the security of the West's oil supplies and merchant shipping depend on such military interdependence.

At the same time Egypt can only play its proper role in achieving such interdependence if it receives sufficient U.S. support to keep a deterrent force strong enough to provide for Egypt's own security, and strong enough to offer support to neighboring Arabian and African countries. There is no doubt about Egypt's value to the United States as a strategic asset, but this value is dependent on the strength and prestige of armed forces.

3. The Problems of Interdependence:

The broad coincidence of strategic interest between the U.S. and Egypt dominates the relations of the two countries. Nevertheless, there are areas where this interdependence raises special problems for Egypt. They include the benefits and costs of Egypt's peace with Israel, the problems raised by Egypt's foreign debt to the United States, and the defense burden Egypt faces during its one-time conversion to a force structure built around United States military equipment and technology.

a. The Benefits and Costs of Peace:

There is no doubt that Egypt's peace treaty with Israel has brought immense benefits to Egypt. It has offered it a higher degree of military security, it has allowed it to shift resources from the defense to the civil sector, it has eliminated the risk that Egyptian lives will be lost in another conflict while ensuring that Egypt's territory, with the sole exception of the disputed territory of Taba, still being held by Israel, is under full sovereign control.

Peace, however, imposes high transitional costs. Egypt's historic decision to take the first step towards a general peace between Israel and the Arab world has forced Egypt to replace virtually its entire military inventory 5 to 20 years earlier than would otherwise have been the case. It has led to attempts to isolate Egypt in the Arab and non-aligned world, and radical pressures on Egypt's friends which have meant massive cut-backs in Arab aid, trade, and investment.

Egypt's sacrifices in the cause of a just peace have been as real as those during its past struggle to regain its territory and serve the Arab cause, and have further slowed Egypt's development efforts and hindered its progress towards self-sustained growth. They have forced Egypt to reduce or sacrifice its political ties to other Arab states at a time these ties are critical to the security of the entire Arab world as well as the West.

Unlike Israel, which cannot play a regional role until it achieves a full peace with the Palestinians and other Arab states, Egypt has the capability to provide its Arab and African neighbors with the critical support necessary to achieve regional peace and stability, and to do so without any of the inevitable complications of introducing a major U.S. presence to deal with low or moderate level conflicts and tensions. It has taken years of intense effort to restore Egypt's relations with friendly Arab states to the point where it can begin to fully exercise this capability.

There is no way to put a full price tag on the cost of peace, but the premature retirement of Soviet systems and the risks that Egypt must run until it can replace such Soviet Systems with United

States equipment have been immense. It is also clear that much of the cost of Egypt's FMS purchases from the U.S. have been caused by the cancellation of the support of other Arab states for the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), and that this was a direct result of the Camp David Accords. If the AOI had proceeded as planned, Egypt would have been in a position to sharply cut its FMS needs by the late 1980's, and would have made substantial profits from sales to other moderate Arab states that would offset the cost of servicing the debt on its prior FMS purchases.

Similarly, rough estimates of the "opportunity cost" of peace in terms of cuts in investment by other Arab states, and their purchase of Egyptian goods and services, approximate \$5 billion annually in 1982 dollars through at least 1985. Even if one ignores the human cost in terms of income to Egypt's people, and the "compound interest" effect of such expenditures in expanding Egypt's industrial base and infrastructure, this represents a sacrifice of more than \$50 billion.

Most importantly, the opportunity costs of peace will continue and many of the benefits will be lost, if a full peace cannot be negotiated between the Arab States and Israel. Egypt and the United States must not diminish their efforts to bridge the gap between Israel, the Palestinians, and the other Arab states. The full implementation of the Camp David Accords and the Reagan peace initiative remains a vital and urgent goal.

This is a matter of basic human values, but it also has major strategic implications. Until this goal is achieved, neither Egypt nor the United States can ever be free of the political, economic,

and military risks inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further neither Israel nor its Arab neighbors can ever be free of the risk of war.

b. The Question of Sovereignty:

The final problem which Egypt faces in establishing a sound structure of interdependence with the United States is the problem of sovereignty. While Egypt maintains exceptionally close strategic relations with the U.S., Egypt remains a non-aligned nation. It also must seek to strengthen its ties to the Arab world, and Egypt must continue to support Palestinian rights. Egypt must also retain full control over its military bases and facilities. Egypt's interdependence with the United States is dependent on mutual respect for each nation's sovereignty, and for the fact that Egypt has clear regional priorities that it must meet.

Interdependence is also dependent upon the recognition that Egypt must maintain full control over its economic and military development. This highlights the need for the kind of joint planning which gives Egypt the maximum possible discretion over the use and administration of foreign aid funds. It highlights the need to solve Egypt's foreign debt problem, and of keeping such debt payments at an affordable level. Finally, it highlights the need for the kind of joint planning and dialogue that will eliminate any "micromanagement" of U.S. aid.

A WORKABLE PROPOSAL FROM THE EGYPTIAN PERSPECTIVE

Not a single day passes without a tragic event taking place in our area, the Middle East. It becomes an ironic habit to read or

hear about a new Iranian offensive against Iraq, leaving hundreds dead, new Israeli attacks against the Arab countries, factional fighting in Lebanon, indicating how fragile the ceasefire remains, and reprisal air attacks launched to punish the perpetrators. This is aside from the brutal treatment of Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza by Israeli occupation forces.

Such devastating terror and violence makes it crystal clear that the problems facing the Middle East today, either on the Iran-Iraq front, in Lebanon, or the Arab-Israeli conflict are correlated, putting the whole area on the verge of havoc and anarchy.

We need an active and dynamic policy that has to be candid and decisive. It has to solve the roots of the problem. The root of the Palestinian problem for one, lies in the fact they are homeless and without entity. Any solution disregarding the restoration of their entity and home will be superficial and will not last. By the same token, it will be deceptive to concentrate all our efforts merely on reaching a ceasefire here or there. Unless a ceasefire is followed by the settlement of the problem in question, it will collapse. That happened in the past. There is no reason to expect differently in the future.

The Main Characteristics of the Situation in the Middle East

1. The continuation of the tension in Lebanon will deepen the policy of polarization in the region and will create a suitable situation for the Soviets to widen their presence and influence in the area at the expense of peace efforts and stability.

2. The arms race between the pro-Soviet countries and Israel, will no doubt increase the tension in the area on one hand and

increase the probable threats to the Egyptian security on the other hand.

3. There is an increase in the Soviet influence in Syria, Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen.

4. There is a continued increase in the Iranian threats, not only against Iraq but also against the Gulf states and the stability in the entire area.

The Political Challenges and a Workable Proposal from the Egyptian Perspective

We do believe that the Middle East is witnessing a very critical phase, which would affect the future of the area for several years. And that we have to give more attention for studying and analyzing deeply the situation in the area and spare no effort for calming down the tension there, and accelerate the efforts that aim at solving the existing issues such as the Lebanese problem, the Palestinian question, together, with the problem of the occupied territories, the Iraqi-Iranian war and the tension in the African Horn.

1. The Foreign Power in the Area:

When we say the foreign power in the area, we mean the Soviets, especially they are against the Egyptian political line and its close relations with the United States.

Soviet interests in the area focuses on:

- a. Controlling the naval routes in the Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and around the African Continent.

- b. Existing with a military power near the vital and important areas for the U.S. and the West such as the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean. With the aim to encircle the Middle East beginning from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan (aiming to establish a pro-Soviet entity), Oman, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Sudan and Libya (here comes up loud and clear the importance of Sudan as a main target for Soviet threats).
- c. Supporting the Soviet economy by obtaining financial revenues and available raw materials in some countries in the area in return of meeting their defensive needs.
- d. Preparation for the long term in order to spread the social doctrine whether in its extremist terms or other flexible terms which suit the special conditions of the area societies.

We believe that the following factors help the Soviets in achieving their aims in the area:

- a. The Arab disunity and the isolation of Egypt from the Arab countries.
- b. The Israeli hard stand towards the peace process such as Reagan's initiative, autonomy talks, its policies in the occupied Arab territories and the Palestinian question.
- c. The slow reaction of the West and its limited economic, and military support for the moderate countries in the area.

2. Iran-Iraq War:

The war has dragged on wastefully for more than five years, without any foreseeable hope for a settlement. Thousands have been killed, injured or crippled. Over 100 billion dollars have been wasted on destruction, instead of the much-needed development for the masses in the two countries and the region. These immense losses cannot be afforded much longer.

No one can truly find a rational explanation for the continuation of this war. If it is a boundary problem, then negotiations are the way.

In fact, Iraq declared that it is ready for negotiations directly or through mediation or arbitration. And the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Group, and the Islamic Group are ready to lend their good offices. However, Iran makes the situation very complicated by insisting on overthrowing President Saddam Hussein as a pre-condition for a peace settlement.

Obviously, therefore, the rhetoric of war is heightening. It threatens the Gulf countries and the interests of the West. No wonder the United States and the West warned Iran that they will take the necessary measures to secure freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran must get the message loud and clear. The world cannot accept to become Iran's hostage. As a superpower concerned with the stability of the area, the United States should find ways to help end the war. Any arms supplied to Iran - and the suppliers are known - should be halted in order to stop Iran from continuing the hostilities.

We do believe that Iran represents dangerous threats to the security and stability in the area due to:

- a. Its intention for exporting the extremist ideologies to neighboring countries.
- b. Its ambitions towards Iraq and other Gulf states.
- c. And the possibility of hampering the navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

Our point of view regarding the conflict are:

- a. The importance of increasing the international efforts to end the war.
- b. It is important to support Iraq in order:
 - 1) To deter Iran from invading the Iraqi territories.
 - 2) To prevent the Soviet Union from widening its relations with Iraq.
- c. It is important that Iraq possess enough defense capabilities to prevent Iran from enlarging the scope of the military hostilities.

3. The Situation in Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli Conflict:

The Lebanese problem is extremely complicated. It involves ethnic and religious rivalries and conflicts. Unless a formula for peaceful coexistence among these warring factions is found, the chance for peace there is remote. We have to be candid. The constitutional formula for 1945 is no longer valid. It cannot meet the demands of the Druse, the Shi'ites, and the Sunnis, who are looking for a fair share of power. We cannot live in the past. President Gemayel is to be commended for his wisdom in urging all to come to an agreed formula.

The solution there is based on two interesting principles:

- a. Inter-settlement between the various factions to secure fair power shares in the decision-making process within all the various institutions.
- b. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon - Israelis and Syrians.

Moreover, it is vital for Israel to get out of Lebanon totally. Just look at the huge loss of life Israel has suffered since the invasion. Look at the inflation running at 130 percent. The Israeli people are asking their leaders why should they pay such a heavy price for so little gain. There is growing concern among Israeli public opinion and Jews in the world at large about the growing image of Israel as an oppressor. The cry among them is loud, what has happened to the Israel they knew and fought for. The resignation of Prime Minister Begin explains the trauma Israel faces. Israel's continuing occupation of Lebanon will only cause more losses, again without gain.

We hope that the steps which had been taken lately (cease fire and sharing of power in the new Cabinet, etc.) will be the first step to solve the conflict and encourage Israel and Syria to withdraw from Lebanon.

4. The Syrian Situation:

Syria tries to connect the Lebanon problem with that of the Golan. It is very important:

- a. To attempt to soften the Syrian opposition and that could be achieved by hinting to a possible discussion

of the Golan problem, a thing which could calm down Syria.

- b. To increase the role of the United Nations Forces.
- c. To achieve a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, in a way that encourages Syria to do the same.

No doubt that the passive actions carried out by Israel in the Arab area have a negative effect upon our relations with the Arab world.

The United States and Egypt were convinced that the conclusion of the Camp David agreement would lead to comprehensive peace in the area. While Israel decided to honor only her commitment on withdrawing from Sinai, she decided to ignore, indeed, violate, the second part of the agreement covering the West Bank and Gaza. She remains determined to annex that Arab-occupied land. Throughout the autonomy talks, which continued for more than four years, we tried all logical methods to remind Israel of the illegal and detrimental position she took.

When the United States came out in September 1982, with its plan for a solution to the Palestinian question, we considered it an encouraging step, because it was initiated by President Reagan himself, and supported by the Congress and the American people. It pinpointed the basis for the solution - the exchange of land for peace. The Palestinians are entitled to the restoration of their land in the West Bank and Gaza. In return, they must live in peace and harmony with Israel.

Israel outrightly rejected the plan. Meanwhile, the Arabs, particularly Jordan, and the Palestinians, welcomed it. They were

not sure that the United States would throw its weight behind its initiative. We urged them to grasp such a golden chance.

The Israeli attitude towards Taba problem has an effect upon the Egyptian citizens.

No doubt that achieving a comprehensive peace in the area is a mutual benefit for both the United States and Egypt, because it serves our mutual interest along with the interests and stability of the whole area.

5. The Libyan Situation:

We still believe that Libya is a threat to security and stability in the Arab and African areas, in the light of the Libyan leader's ambitions for achieving a leading role and its military capabilities.

In the past and during this stage, Libya is concentrating on the following aims:

- a. Attempting to lessen its differences with the moderate Arab countries in order to end its isolation, to improve its image on the regional and international levels, calm down external hostilities, so that it may resolve the Chadian problem in its favor. This is a tactical situation and we fully understand it.
- b. The Libyan relations were consolidated with Ethiopia, Syria and Iran.
- c. A great development was achieved in Libyan connections with the Warsaw pact countries, and communist countries.

- d. Libya assumes a principal role in threatening Sudan and Somalia especially through supporting the opposition elements with all the aids they need.
 - e. Several camps are devoted entirely to instructing terrorists in a range of explosives and arms for use in assassination and sabotage.
 - f. There is no doubt that the Libyan strategy and Libyan military power constitute a dangerous threat to all neighboring countries especially Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Tunisia.
 - g. We believe that the availability of adequate defensive capabilities to insure the balance of power between Egypt and Libya on one hand and to deter Libya on the other hand is a cornerstone in the Egyptian strategy for security.
6. The Horn of Africa:
- a. We estimate that there are no changes in the Soviet strategy towards this area, and they continue to deepen their influence and presence in Ethiopia.
 - b. There is a growing cooperation between Libya and Ethiopia, thus Libya has increased its economic and military aid to Ethiopia. In return, Ethiopia has agreed to support the Sudanese opposition in their activities against the Sudan's regime.
 - c. We continue to believe that Ethiopia represents a threat to security and stability in the area for the following reasons:

- 1) Its relations with the Soviet Union and the communist military and political presence there.
 - 2) Its ties with Libya.
 - 3) Its policies towards Sudan and Somalia.
 - 4) Its possibility of threat to Sudan, directly or indirectly and Somali as well.
- d. In the light of the continuation of Soviet threats and aims towards the African Horn countries through the presence of Soviets and Cubans in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and in coordination with some of the Arabian regimes in the area (Libya, Syria) we consider that Ethiopia is the principal threatening source in this area.

7. Afghanistan:

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan since 1979 creates instability in the region, and is one of the main threats to it. The Soviet troops in Afghanistan now number about 105,000. Egypt along with the United States and some other countries including the Persian Gulf states are supporting the rebel groups in Afghanistan. Egypt does not accept any violations of the security of the Arab countries in the Gulf area seeking the safeguarding of their territories. It stands steadfast towards the threats and the actions aiming at diminishing the rights of their friendly peoples to be able to lead a safe and prosperous life.

Egypt's Role in Achieving Regional Peace and Stability

Egypt has had an important role in regional peace and stability since the beginning of recorded history. The written records

of Egypt's relations with its neighbors are older than the pyramids. Egypt built its first Canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea during the reign of King Senusert in 1874 B. C., more than 3,600 years before the completion of the modern Suez Canal.

Egypt continued to be a dominant actor in world affairs throughout its own millenia of empire, the history of the Roman Empire, the rise of Christianity, and the rise of Islam. It played a critical role in determining the trade routes and politics of the 19th century, and was the scene of the pivotal defeats of Nazi Germany in World War II.

The contemporary situation reflects these same historical forces. Egypt cannot stand aside from the tensions and conflicts that threaten the area. Egypt is also a symbol of moderation in the Third World, and has long ties to other moderate states. It must use its military, economic, human, and scientific capabilities to help neighboring Arab and African countries, and offer support in a way which both supports its neighbors and enhance Egyptian national security.

This is not simply a matter of military strength, it helps deter threats to its African neighbors like the Sudan and Chad, and is vital to the security of moderate Arab states like Jordan and Saudi Arabia and all the other moderate or pro-Western states in the Red Sea region. Egypt also provides the moderate states in the region with millions of workers and thousands of teachers, managers, doctors, engineers, and scientists. Egypt plays an important human role in achieving regional economic development, which is the key to limiting radical forces and Communist influence.

Egypt is a major force for peace. Its treaty with Israel is still the only positive step reducing the risk and cost of war and moving towards the comprehensive peace that is essential for the security of both Israel and all neighboring states. Egypt's struggle to achieve a just peace, and the right of self-determination for all the peoples in the region, remains the best hope of both Israel and the Palestinians.

Egypt-United States Relations

There was cooperation between Egypt and the United States when the new Egyptian regime came to power in 1952. United States-Egyptian relations began to improve late in 1953, then deteriorated again in 1964.

Egypt accused the U.S. of being actively involved in the Israeli aggression in 1967. Formal diplomatic relations were re-established on February 1974, and since that time U.S. economic assistance has grown followed by the military assistance in 1979.

The Mutual Interests and Strategy

The United States-Egyptian relationship has grown increasingly close during the past several years based on shared goals and perception on the Middle East peace, regional security and development needs.

United States Interests in the Middle East

- Demonstrated the ability to counter the influence of the Soviets and their allies.

- Ensure continued Western access to the oil of the Persian Gulf in adequate quantities and at a reasonable price.
- Ensure the continued existence and strength of U.S. friends and allies in the region.
- To advance the Middle East peace process.
- To promote stability in the region.

Egypt's interests in the Middle East

- Keep Soviet influence out of the region.
- Main efforts for achieving a comprehensive peace for the region not only between Egypt and Israel.
- Concentrating on development.
- Secure environment to allow development.

United States-African Strategy

- Maintain U.S. influence and access.
- Support stable moderate governments.
- Encourage and support economic and human development.
- Limit Soviet and Soviet surrogate influence.

Egyptian-African Strategy

- Security of Egypt.
- Security of the River Nile the most important natural resource of Egypt, and the lifeblood of the Egyptian people who depend on the continuous flow of its waters.
- Defend the Suez Canal.
- Assist and support friends.

- Limit Soviet and Soviet surrogate influence.

Although all interests and strategy do not coincide, the United States and Egypt share some vital mutual interests such as:

- Keeping Soviet influence out of the region.
- Achieving peace and stability in the area.

Concerning the rest, the United States and Egypt can work together as equals to achieve the other mutual objectives.

Threats to Egyptian-American Mutual Interests

Current threats to the Egyptian and American interests in the Middle East and Africa could be:

- The Soviets and their influence and interests in the area.
- Soviet allies, especially Libya.
- Instability in the region which creates favorable conditions for Soviet interference.
- The Palestinian problem - is a central element - if that can be solved, then all parties in the region will benefit.

Egypt's Security Requirements

Because the dangers facing Egypt are to a large degree, the same dangers that face the United States strategy, and because our strategic objectives are shared with the United States, we look to the United States to help Egypt in building the military forces necessary to meet the threats and to serve our strategy.

Egypt has the experience, the manpower and the technical ability to absorb new weapons technology. The problem of building the military strength of Egypt, which is rich in technical skills

and military experience, is that we must have large quantities of arms and financial assistance from our friends. The objective of the F.M.S. program is to help enable Egypt to replace its deteriorating Soviet defense inventory. At the same time, Egypt is ready to provide the United States with the facilities it needs to meet its military objectives in the region. However, we believe that U.S. bases with a full time military presence are not needed in the region.

Defending the Region and the Arab Gulf

The countries of the region want to defend themselves. Arab sensitivity to foreign troops is such that full-time United States forces would create more instability than deterrence.

United States deterrence strategy must first of all be to deter any Soviet moves before they reach the region by having the rapid mobility to meet any threat anywhere, not to rely on large forces based in the region.

United States Strategy for achieving this goal could be:

- United States needs to upgrade its own capabilities.
- United States needs to build good relationships with the countries in the region.
- United States needs to upgrade these Arab countries in the Gulf.
- To have facilities in the important strategic places in the area.
- To have close military cooperation with its Arab friends, especially Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Egypt is in a better position than Israel to serve United States strategic interests in the region because forces in its territory would be more acceptable to other Arab countries than emergency forces deployed from Israel.

Finally our estimate to achieve stability in the region depends on:

- Ensure security to all the countries in the region.
- Resolve the conflicts and disputes by political means.
- Achieve economic, political and social stability in each country.
- The major causes of instability in the region are the failure to solve the Palestinian problem and the Soviet presence around the borders of the area. The Soviet Union is not interested in peace in the region or resolution of the Palestinian issue.
- The present priority of United States policy is first to confront the increasing Soviet influence and to find a solution for the Palestinian problem. We believe that the United States must deal with them as one international problem.

There will be no internal stability in the region without a just solution for the Palestinians and Jerusalem.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the importance of the Middle East area, the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, its bad effects, together with the slowness of the Western reactions in general towards the local and regional conflicts in the area, have assisted to a large extent the Soviets in achieving its aims in that area.

We are obliged to fulfill the peace agreements and we have fulfilled all of our treaty obligations, but concerning the second part of the peace treaty, the Palestinians and their legitimate rights, we shall do our best and focus all our efforts to help them at the negotiating table.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon gave ammunition to those who had claimed that Israel was not interested in a peaceful solution. The invasion and the tragedy of the massacres of the Palestinian civilians in the refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila also played into the hands of those who claimed that Israel was determined to destroy the Palestinian people, and not interested in peace with Egypt. Critics also charged that Israel had certain designs to neutralize Egypt, and then by using its military superiority, would attack the rest of the Arab countries one by one; today Lebanon, tomorrow Syria or Jordan.

Egypt's Position Towards the Crisis in the Region

The Soviets

The Soviet Union and Cuba have deployed more than 60,000 combat troops who can be sent to the battlefield on Egypt's borders or any other country in Africa or in the Middle East within a few days.

The Soviet military equipment pre-positioned in Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen can be secretly mobilized for these troops within a short period of time, (creating about five armored divisions and more than two mechanized ones and a substantial Air Force).

In the creation of new buffer zones, the Soviet foreign policy transactions in the region have involved money, men, goods and ideas applied through political, military, economic and ideological forces. By these efforts, the Soviets have gained access to air and naval facilities stretching from Vietnam to Ethiopia, the Arab-Israeli conflict offered a good opportunity for Soviet advances in the area.

If the Soviets were able first through Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia and then through Libya, to dominate Sudan, then it would completely enclose the Arab Gulf and the Red Sea, thereby encircling Arab oil. If this happened, the Soviet Union could dictate terms to the world, especially against the Western countries, either to control the oil or for other political objectives through access to facilities, force presence, security assistance, military advisors, Cuban surrogates and other supports.

Now the Soviets are acting to achieve more gains through:

- Increasing the military assistance to the countries in the area, especially the petroleum countries, and doing their best to establish commercial relations with them.
- Changing the policy of military support by means of military sales instead of military loans.
- Pressuring some of the Arab countries in the area to fulfill their financial obligations to the Soviet Union.
- We have to bear in mind that the Arab countries in the Gulf area have no capabilities to defend themselves against any external aggression.

Lebanon

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 changed the situation again in the region. This invasion which started only six weeks after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, demonstrated the reality of Israeli expansion and aggression against its neighbors, instead of resolving the problems peacefully. This invasion was condemned by the whole world in the United Nations.

It was hard to believe, after more than seven years of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and after the brave actions of our late President Sadat, followed by President Mubarak, that Israel once again has turned to the policy of wars, aggression and expansion. They have chosen that path, instead of looking for the peace of the region and the peace of Israel itself. They are showing to the world that they feel they have the right to do whatever

they want to, including military actions. They do this on their own, and are answerable to no one for their actions, not even to their benefactor, the U.S.

Egypt is supporting President Reagan's initiative. It offers a very timely opportunity for peace in the region and it must not be lost. A solution to the Lebanese problem has to be realized during the next few months to create the favorable conditions for the resumption of negotiations on the Palestinian problem. Egypt stand firmly beside the legislative authority in Lebanon.

Efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem are reflected in the many ideas presented by various parties which aim to change the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These ideas represent a search for Palestinian autonomy and self-determination in the occupied area, in association with Jordan plus other Arab countries. Both Egypt and the United States share strong hopes in achieving the goal.

Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq war is the largest, most destructive war in the world today. It is also the largest local war in the modern history of the region, and is now in its sixth year (started September 1980). It has deeply affected the entire region, and the regional balance between the countries. The two sides are the big losers in this continuing war of attrition.

Egypt supports all efforts to stop this war through international organizations and the Arab and Islamic ones. In addition, Egypt is doing its best to convince North Korea to stop supplying

Iran with weapons and ammunition, in order to create favorable conditions for ceasing hostilities. Egypt is asking that first of all, the fighting stop between the two countries, and then through diplomacy, to find a peaceful solution to their conflict.

Practical measures have to be taken to stop this war, without taking any position for the favor of one side against the other. Egypt is ready to support both sides to reach a reasonable solution to stop the fighting, putting or taking into consideration that Iraq has done her duty when she agrees without any condition to end this war. Iran has to make the same agreement, to congest Arab and Islamic blood, and to preserve security and stability, and to eradicate the corrupt foreign attempts in the area.

Our estimate of the role which must be played by the Arab Gulf countries to face this conflict:

- Hastening to construct developed armed forces and establishing a complete coordination and cooperation with the other Arab countries.
- Establishing a joint Arab force to secure the Gulf countries and the whole Arab area to be able to face any foreign aggression without having the need for Rapid Deployment Forces from other countries.
- Developing and improving the political, social, and cultural relations among the Gulf countries.
- Creating balanced relations with the superpowers and the European countries group.
- Planning an oil policy accepted by the consuming countries to get their support.

- Working together to put an end to the Iran-Iraq war and come upon a peaceful solution satisfying the two parties.
- Strengthening the Arab and Islamic solidarity between the Gulf countries and the other Arab and Islamic countries.

Libya

Libya is the hard-line rejectionist Arab country in the region. Qaddafi had turned east to Egypt, then west to Tunisia then further east to Syria looking for Arab unity, but in each case he failed to forge an alliance. At least he succeeded with Morocco. He maintains strong links with the Soviets, and has signed a joint military treaty with them. The quantities of Soviet arms in Libya far exceed its national security needs.

Libya is a military storehouse for Russian objectives in Africa and the Middle East. Libya does not have a trained crew to utilize these weapons, nor does she have future training capability for her crews.

Libya was and is still threatening its Arab and African neighbors. We can call it a problem-exporting center in the area.

Many observers called Qaddafi the new "enfant terrible" (the new bad boy) of the Middle East.

Horn of Africa

Since the new Marxist regime of Mengistu acquired power, Ethiopia has taken a threatening attitude, with the help of the Soviet Union, against her neighboring countries. Backed by Cuban

troops, Ethiopia is fighting against separatist Eritrean guerrillas in the northern province of Eritrea.

In the southeastern section, Ethiopia has launched many attacks on Somalia's borders, and still holds some territory as deep as 30 miles inside Somalia. This gives a new dimension and complexity to the region in the Horn of Africa. Along its north-west border, Ethiopia threatens Sudan. Ethiopia could be the second Soviet arsenal in Africa after Libya.

South Yemen is a Marxist state closely aligned with the USSR and has an informal alliance with Ethiopia, Syria and Libya. They are threatening North Yemen directly, and serious clashes occurred between them in the last few years. Indirectly, South Yemen is a threatening country to Saudi Arabia and Oman.

The Soviets maintain many air and naval facilities in South Yemen. These facilities allow the Soviets a power hold in the country, and this factor could directly affect any conflict in the region.

Achieving stability in the Middle East, according to our estimation, depends upon the solution of the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. If the United States and the Western Powers will succeed in resolving this problem, this would bring good results to the interests of these countries in the area. So, our view is that it is necessary to place more effective pressures upon Israel and make a parallel move towards the Palestinian Liberation Organization, especially towards its moderate elements in order to assist the Palestinians in self-determination. This would also help to settle the conflicts in the Arabian area which,

it turn, will achieve stability, freeing some countries from following the Soviet Union and enabling them to direct their efforts to internal development and to establish closer ties with European countries.

It is not enough to come up with a good proposal. It is more important to find the ways and means to see it through.

It is an established fact that the United States has significant leverage upon all parties concerned. We are confident that United States peace efforts will find significant response in the area, particularly when both Arabs and Israelis are fed up with war. Recognizing that military force will never lead to a decisive victory, the Arabs, including the Palestinians, now accept the reality of Israel and her right to exist.

What we actually need are extensive efforts, particularly on the part of the United States, to create the appropriate atmosphere for negotiations. Measures by Israel on the West Bank and Gaza to create confidence among the Palestinians there, as Egypt has suggested since 1979, could still make the difference between despair and hope. As a sign of good faith, Israel has to stop establishing new settlements, even while the negotiations are on. It is time that the U.S. take a decisive stand towards this issue by telling Israel enough is enough.

I would like to point out the following:

1. We are aware and understand that Egypt is an essential obstacle in the Soviet ambitions in the area, therefore, it will be a permanent target to its threats.

2. We have to be alerted continuously against direct or indirect Soviet threat to provide the best conditions for our national security.

3. We do believe that the basis of our security lies in stability and development, to achieve the welfare of the Egyptian people through the political, economical, social development, our efforts to achieve peace and stability in the area stems from this fact, and that due to these threats we are obliged to continue developing our Armed Forces.

Today there are approximately 40 major and minor conflicts in the world, and the Middle East, Persian Gulf region is the politically and military dangerous area on earth (roughly 66 percent of all weapons exports to the Third World go to this area).

What can the United States do in this Decade in the Middle East?

Caught in a quandary between support for Israel and a commitment to Arab-Israeli peace, a reasonable solution to the Palestinian issue seems further away than it did some time ago. Increased Soviet actions, decreased U.S. credibility, and increased dependence on oil indicate that the United States must assume a more vigorous posture in the region and turn from a reactive posture to a more active, preemptive posture.

Many courses of action are available for the United States. Some will be counterproductive, but some will be able to assist in furthering interests and objectives. No longer is the old adage, "What's good for the United States is good for the rest of the world," true. The United States must recognize that the world

has changed dramatically and that these new realities must be factored into our relations with area states. The United States should attempt to place its concerns and objectives in terms understood in the context of a locally meaningful syntax. The United States must tailor solutions to problems to the local situation, and not suggest that the solution rest on a U.S. model. Also the United States must be prepared to emphasize the mutuality of interests that exists on such issues as ideology, containment of Soviet influence, solution to the Arab-Israeli question, regional stability, and continued access to a ready oil supply.

Specifically, what measures should the United States follow in the Middle East to further interests?

First, the United States should make every effort to enhance its relations with moderate pro-Western regimes Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, Israel, and Egypt. The United States should identify those states in the area that are its friends, and clarify the extent and limit of mutual interests and concern in undertaking guarantees and cooperative action.

Second, the United States must open dialogue with the Palestinians. So many U.S. concerns rest on the promise of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem that without the direct involvement of the Palestinians there can be no solution, not only to the Palestinian question but to other issues such as regional stability, offsetting Soviet influence and the security of Israel.

Third, the United States must improve its military credibility in the region to include use of facilities, presence, overflight rights, port visits, military assistance, joint exercises, and

training. Creation of an independent Indian Ocean Command; agreements with regional states such as Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and Egypt on basing, training, and staying facilities, and providing the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) with a capability that is real and perceived as credible to regional states would provide renewed U.S. posture in the region, help enhance U.S. prestige, and support U.S. interests and objectives in the area.

Fourth, the United States must continue to pursue a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement. This includes the whole range of issues such as border questions with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, Jerusalem; and the Palestinians. The United States must show it can deal with the issues objectively and devoid of undue pressures from special interests, as well as in terms of U.S. national interests.

The United States must help the countries of the region defend themselves against external threats.

Egypt is the power most capable of undertaking this task.

Egypt is the key to the Middle East. A strong Egypt will make the Soviet Union think twice before using Libya or Ethiopia as a base against Sudan or any other country in the region.

Egypt has the experience, the manpower and technical ability to absorb new weapons technology, and the Armed Forces are using this experience successfully to update their personnel capabilities.

Egypt is in a better position than Israel to serve United States strategic interests in the region, because forces in its

territory would be more acceptable to other Arab countries than emergency forces deployed from Israel.

We are still hopeful that it is not yet too late, but the political time is approaching midnight, so let us keep our fingers crossed.

APPENDIX I

ENCLOSURE 1 TO APPENDIX IV
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP STUDY PROJECT OUTLINE

STUDENT (LAST NAME, INITIALS)
GHAYATY, BG M. A.
27/9/85
(Date)

PART I

MEMORANDUM THRU: COL STAUDENMAIER, FACULTY ADVISER

WOS
(Initials)

COL STAUDENMAIER, PROJECT ADVISER

WOS
(Initials)

FOR: COL E. C. KIELKOPF, DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Project Outline for Individual/~~Group Study project~~, Military
Studies Program

1. Proposed Title: Conflict in the Middle East: Egyptian Policy and Strategy.
2. Study Purpose:

The purpose of the study is to examine the various contemporary conflicts in the Middle East in the context of Egyptian policy and strategy to create an Egyptian proposal to achieve stability in the region.

The objective of the project is to influence US and Egyptian policymakers.

The form of the final product will be an unclassified research report-- Individual Study Project--that could be circulated to those policymakers involved in Middle East issues.

3. Study Description:

a. Statement of Problem. Although the conflict between the Arab nations and Israel antedate the creation of the Jewish state in 1948, the proximate causes of the current problem is the Arab unwillingness to recognize the state of Israel and the Israeli refusal to peacefully resolve the Palestinian refugee problem which was caused by the creation of Israel. The problem is compounded by the existence of terrorist organizations that are dedicated to a violent solution of these problems.

b. Outline. The study will first examine the sources of conflict in the Middle East. The current conflicts in the area will be analyzed to include the Gulf War, the Arab-Israeli wars, the Syrian and Libyan situations and the problems in the Horn of Africa. The situation in Lebanon will also be examined, as will the role of the superpowers in the region. After the contemporary crises have been reviewed, the role of Egypt in the region will be studied. This will include the political and economic aspects of Egyptian foreign policy, its security requirements and its relationship with the United States, with special emphasis on the Camp David Accords. Finally, a workable proposal from the Egyptian perspective that includes both political policy and strategic elements will be presented that aims at achieving stability in the region.

PART II

THRU: COL STAUDENMAIER, FACULTY ADVISER

WES
(Initials)

COL STAUDENMAIER, PROJECT ADVISER

WES
(Initials)

TO: BG Ghayaty, Student

Your Individual Study project outline for the Military Studies Program is approved (as modified below).


COL E. C. KIELKOPF, DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR

Copy Furnished:
Dir, MSP
Department MSP Coordinator

{ Faculty Adv.
{ Project Adv.

c. This topic is one that must be resolved at the highest levels of government and includes major elements of political, economic and military policies and strategies that are central to the curriculum of the Army War College.

d. Since Israel and Egypt are friends of the U.S. and the U.S. has military interest in both, the resolution of conflict in the Middle East should be in the national interests of each of the nations involved.


Student Signature

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX A

Camp David Agreements

Text of Agreements Signed September 17, 1978*

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.†

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented

**The Camp David Summit, September 1978*, Department of State Publication 8954, Near East and South Asian Series 88 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978).

†The texts of Resolutions 242 and 338 are annexed to this document.

APPENDIX A

opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

APPENDIX A

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions

APPENDIX A

and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the

APPENDIX A

signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel.

M. BEGIN

APPENDIX A

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

ANNEX

Text of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:*

(i) *Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;*

(ii) *Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;*

2. *Affirms further the necessity*

(a) *For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;*

(b) *For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;*

(c) *For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;*

3. *Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Repre-*

APPENDIX A

representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.

4. *Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.*

Text of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1747th meeting, on 21/22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;*

2. *Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;*

3. *Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.*

**FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A
PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL**

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them

It is agreed that

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

- (a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
- (b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

APPENDIX A

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

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Interim Withdrawal

Between the three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt

A. SADAT

Witnessed by:

For the Government
of Israel.

M. BEGIN

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JIMMY CARTER

*Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America*



APPENDIX B

Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty*

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel:

Preamble

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the

**The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979, Department of State Publication 8976, Near Eastern and South Asian Series 91, Selected Documents no. 11 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1979).*

APPENDIX B

principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel":

Article I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

Article II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

Article III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;

b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;

c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from

APPENDIX B

within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

Article IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex 1, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex 1. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex 1.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Article V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

APPENDIX B

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Article VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

Article VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

Article VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

Article IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

APPENDIX B

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

[Facsimile of signature page of Treaty as executed]

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

הודעת לי ואשען די - ס. ס. 26 מרץ 1979, 27 במרץ 1979, מן תלת נסח באלף האנגלית והערבית והעברית וכל נוסח אחר נוסח אחר, כל נוסח של הנדלי המהימה, וכל חלק האחר של הנוסח יהיו הנסח האנגלית הוא אשר יעמוד בה.

נעשה בוושינגטון, די. סי. כיום זה כיום באחד לשנת השליש, 26 במרץ 1979, בלוש עותקים בנסח האנגלית, הערבית והעברית וכל נוסח אחר נוסח אחר, כל נוסח של הנדלי פרטנור, יכריע הנוסח האנגלי.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

من حكومة
جمهورية مصر العربية :

בסם ממשלת הרפובליקה הערבית
של מצרים :

For the Government of Israel:

من حكومة
اسرائيل :

בסם ממשלת ישראל :


Witnessed by:
شهد التوقيع:
מועד על-ידי :

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

جيمس كارتر، رئيس
الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية


ג'ימי קארטר, נשיא
ארצות הברית של אמריקה

SINAI PENINSULA




Representation of original map included in treaty.

SINAI PENINSULA




Representation of original map included in treaty

SINAI PENINSULA



Representation of original map included in treaty

SINAI PENINSULA



Representation of original map included in treaty

APPENDIX III

FIGURE 1
KEY MIDDLE EAST RELATIONSHIPS, 1975 - 78




FIGURE 2
KEY MIDDLE EAST RELATIONSHIPS, 1978 - 79





FIGURE 3
KEY MIDDLE EAST RELATIONSHIPS, 1980 - 85



END

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