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<p>The government of South Africa is a divided society that is organized and operated on a policy based on racial domination. The original Whites that settled in South Africa created the racial groups and contributed to the problems by engaging in interracial sex.</p> <p>In 1948, the election of the Nationalist Party officially created apartheid. The government's system of repressive racial laws designed to racially dominate Blacks and divide the races in every way possible. Separateness (continued)</p>			

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As Blacks began to express and demand freedoms, the government developed a policy of violence and torture. Many Blacks have been killed, jailed and their organizations outlawed. In July 1985, a state of emergency was declared which resulted in a worldwide condemnation of South Africa and apartheid. The racial unrest has turned into a race war.

The United States policy of "constructive engagement" has failed and even caused conditions over the past five years in South Africa to become worse. President Reagan's passage of sanctions indicated that he realized his policy had failed. The United States needs to adopt a policy of constructive confrontation which openly criticizes apartheid. With a new bold role, the United States may be able to cause Black majority rule to become a reality without South Africa undergoing a bloody race war.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

ENDING APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

AN INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Arthur T. Dean, AG

**Colonel Robert J. Lilley
Project Adviser**

**US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013
7 April 1986**

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ABSTRACT

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The government of South Africa is a divided society that is organized and operated on a policy based on racial domination. The original Whites that settled in South Africa created the racial groups and contributed to the problems by engaging in interracial sex.

In 1948, the election of the Nationalist Party officially created apartheid. The government's system of repressive racial laws designed to racially dominate Blacks and divide the races in every way possible. Separateness became the way of life and was enforced by the government.

As Blacks began to express and demand freedoms, the government developed a policy of violence and torture. Many Blacks have been killed, jailed and their organizations outlawed. In July 1985, a state of emergency was declared which resulted in a worldwide condemnation of South Africa and apartheid. The racial unrest has turned into a race war.

The United States policy of "constructive engagement" has failed and even caused conditions over the past five years in South Africa to become worse. President Reagan's passage of sanctions indicated that he realized his policy had failed. The United States needs to adopt a policy of constructive confrontation which openly criticizes apartheid. With a new bold role, the United States may be able to cause Black majority rule to become a reality without South Africa undergoing a bloody race war.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose.

The purpose of this research paper is to examine the literature available on South Africa with special emphasis on the apartheid system. The examination addresses the history of South Africa, the apartheid system, the forces working to dismantle the apartheid system, options available to the government of South Africa and the United States' constructive engagement policy. The many disagreements over how to resolve this serious issue will be reviewed.

Problem and Methodology.

This research paper analyzes the apartheid system used by the government of South Africa. The system was established in 1948 and will be studied in great detail. The intent of the research is to explain why apartheid is unjust and unfair. Also, the problems it has created will be reviewed and options available to the government of South Africa to change apartheid will be examined.

A vast amount of research is devoted to the United States' constructive engagement policy. Has it worked? Did it fail? If so, why did it fail? What problems has it created and what policy alternatives are available?

The methodology used to research the subject was a review of many references, ranging from newspapers, magazines and reports to books. The sub-Saharan Africa regional appraisal proved to be helpful.

Scope.

The scope of this research paper covers South Africa from its beginning to the present. Most of the essay covers two areas: the apartheid system and the United States' constructive engagement policy.

CHAPTER II

SHORT HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA

Nature of Conflict.

The written history of South Africa only goes back about 500 years. As you travel backward in its history, confusion develops. It is believed that it has been inhabited for many thousands of years. Black African tribes moved from the North and settled in the 1500's about the same time the Westerners arrived on the scene.¹

The first people recorded history places on the Cape possessed features somewhere between Mongolian and Negroid. They were divided into two groups which we know today as the Hottentots and the Bushmen. In 1652, White newcomers arrived in Cape Town. They ran the refreshment station for the Dutch East India ships. It only took about nine months for the first members of the next class of people, Coloreds, to become members of South Africa. They are believed to be offsprings of the Hottentots and the Whites. Sexual mixing and intermarriages were encouraged and Whites were financially rewarded for marrying Hottentot women. It was felt that this would cause them to stay in South Africa. Sexual intercourse and marrying among the races only became illegal well into the present century.²

The Bushmen did not participate much in the creation of this new class of people. They kept to themselves and continued to hunt. Many of them exist in present day South Africa with almost the exact same habits and traits. The only land available to them are the deserts.

Racial difference has been controversial in South Africa for many years. The problems created by this difference have become greater over the years as the population increased and vast wealth developed. Strict division among the race categories exist as outlined in such laws as the Race Classification Act and the Group Areas Act. Today there are Whites, Coloreds, Asians and Blacks.

Latest population estimates for South Africa total 32.4 million - 22.7 million Black Africans (69.9 percent), 5.7 million Whites (17.8 percent), 3.1 million "Coloreds" (9.4 percent) and 0.9 million Asians (2.9 percent). There are two official languages - English and Afrikaans - with several African languages like Zulu, Sotho, Xhosa and Swazi.³

Modern day government in South Africa was founded in the year 1855 in Pretoria. The Republic of South Africa actually has three capitals: Pretoria, the administrative capital; Cape Town, the legislative capital; and Bloemfontein, the judicial capital.⁴

Divided Society.

South Africa's current ruling party has been in power since 1948. There has not been a coup and the government has been generally stable. In the 1960's, problems began to develop when several national liberation groups emerged with the purpose of overthrowing the White minority government. Initially, the western countries adopted a somewhat hands off policy, because of urgent matters in the Middle East and Asia and substantial trade and investment in South Africa.

The eastern/Communist states, with no special interests in Southern Africa, and realizing the Western states were not getting involved,

seized this opportunity and began supporting the liberation movements. Since most of these movements were anticolonialist, this provided the Soviet Union, China and Cuba a chance to develop their credentials as revolutionary and anticolonialist states.

In the late 1970s, US involvement started growing. The two major issues sparking this increased interest were free elections in Namibia and apartheid in South Africa. The outlawed African National Congress (ANC) began to conduct sporadic guerrilla attacks in South Africa. Political turbulence has developed among the non-Whites and has manifested itself into well-organized protests which include mass demonstrations, industrial actions, sabotage, and urban guerrilla attacks.⁵

The government of South Africa attempts to coopt the support of the non-White leaders by passing minimum reform. This strategy has not proven to be successful. South Africa is a divided state with ever increasing political unrest and violence. External pressures so far have had little influence on the Botha regime. Repressive measures have been taken as a means to crack down on Black leaders. Hopefully, this will not lead to a violent solution in order for the needed change to be implemented.

CHAPTER III

WHAT IS "APARTHEID"

Purpose.

The Republic of South Africa is a state that is organized and governed on the principal that the state exists to uphold the privileges of the White minority. This small population controls politically, economically and socially the huge Black majority. This is accomplished through the use of oppressive laws that sanction a well defined system of racial domination and separation. In recent years it has become commonplace to refer to and treat the system of apartheid as being synonymous with White supremacy. Yet, it is important to know and understand that apartheid is but one form of White supremacy. Therefore, it is possible that apartheid could change and White supremacy continue as a policy of the South African government.

Apartheid ideology was originated in the 1940's by the Afrikaners. In 1948, with the election of the Nationalist Party, the ideology became the official policy and was implemented with the passage of law after law by succeeding Afrikaner regimes. Its theme was the complete separation of Blacks and Whites in South Africa. Apartheid was to protect the privileges of the White minority. The government created a domestic policy designed to enforce race separation in every conceivable way. The laws governed and created separate facilities, separate group areas, separate social and economic organizations, separate educational institutions and separate political organizations. Race classifications were officially created and intermarriages were outlawed. Also, 13

percent of the worst land in the country was set aside for Blacks to become their homelands.⁶

Apartheid then is the South African political system which is composed of all policies and practices, both formal and informal, that affect the circumstances of Blacks. A term that is used a lot that needs to be defined now is separate development. It differs from apartheid in that it is a party-political slogan of the present government, which is reflected in most policies relating to Blacks, but not all. Separate development is accepted as the framework within which current policies can be rationalized and defended. The present government uses separate development as a means for legitimizing continued minority rule and attempts to provide an avenue for some political expression for a few Black leaders.

Apartheid, on the other hand, includes not only policies of the present government, but is the system of inequality maintained by previous governments as well. It has been made even more rigid and pervasive by the present government.⁷

Rules of Apartheid.

Officially, there are four major racial categories: Whites, Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians. The government's racial policy based on the principle of apartheid, which in essence means separateness, is to recognize groupings by race. The official position of the government is that everyone can function best within his own group.

Apartheid was designed to maintain White political domination and protect their privileges by trying to solve the problems of domestic security and international legitimation.⁸

In the area of internal security the benefits were to be:

(1) insulation of the minority White population from potential uprisings by the Black majority and the creation of physical conditions that would allow for the effective repression of such uprisings should they occur; (2) "improvement" in the White-Black demographic ratio in what is officially designated as White South Africa; and (3) elimination of opportunities for effective and autonomous political organization on the part of Black majority.⁹

In order to accomplish these objectives under apartheid, laws were developed and enforced for influx control, pass laws and group areas. These are the primary mechanisms used by the government to insure internal security. Influx control is the many tough restrictions preventing Blacks to immigrate to the cities. Urban life is made unattractive for Blacks by forcing them to live in single sex housing far from their families. They are only given permission to visit their families once or twice a year. This is destroying the Black family. Per the Government of South Africa about 40 percent of all Blacks lived in urban areas in 1980. This percentage is increasing yearly as Blacks seek employment.¹⁰

Next a pass system was created for Blacks. They had to have in their possession all the time a passbook containing a wide variety of compulsory documents which included a tax receipt. The pass system was used to control the movement of the Blacks. Each year there have been hundreds of thousands arrested for violating pass laws. Whites must carry documentation in a lesser amount and there is no criminal penalty if they cannot produce it.

The Nationalist party sought to continue segregated neighborhoods, therefore all land in South Africa is legally controlled under the Group Areas Act which is the pillar of apartheid. Communities were

established for the African, Indian, and Colored populations some distance away from the White residences. This insulated the White population and made it easy to suppress a Black rebellion. The most fertile and mineral rich areas of South Africa, 87 percent of the land, was reserved for the Whites. Blacks can only own land in the poor undeveloped townships.

Blacks were unable for sometime to develop any serious political organizations, because they could easily be removed from the urban areas. Section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 made it against the law for an African to remain in an urban area more than seventy-two hours without meeting certain conditions. Generally, they had to have long term employment or have been granted permission by the government. Belonging to a political organization caused Black Africans to lose this status. In 1968 the Prohibition of Political Interference Act rendered it illegal for anyone to belong to a racially mixed political party; to assist a political party that had members other than from his race; and to address any meeting for political purposes if the greater majority of those present did not belong to his population group. This act was designed to prevent the racial groups from joining together.¹¹

Apartheid laws also struck at Blacks economically. The Native Labour Act of 1953 prevented registration of African trade unions and made it illegal for African employees to strike. Racial unions were also outlawed.

Later, under apartheid came the official creation of homelands where Blacks were forced to become citizens, thereby losing South African citizenship and political representation. This was the government's way

of seeking international legitimation for its separate development policy.

Apartheid not only separated the people of South Africa into groups based on the color of their skin but also dictated every aspect of a Black's life - where he could work and live, what land he could own and where, what shops were available to him, where he could go to school, and with whom he could socialize and marry.

To further create tension among the races as defined by South Africa, Coloreds and Indians were given representation in the government and Blacks were denied any representation in 1983.

Problems Apartheid has Created.

In the last 25 years more than three million Blacks have been forcibly removed from White areas. Another one million Africans were forced to move within the Black homelands. In order to enforce apartheid laws and procedures, the South African government has resorted to such things as bannings, detention without trial, limitations on freedom of speech and assembly, and surveillance by the security police. Also, the government has resorted to violence which includes torture, the imprisonment of antiapartheid leaders and the use of force against Blacks who express their opposition to the system.¹²

Nelson Mandela, now 67 years old and formal leader of the African National Congress (ANC), has been in prison for 23 years. The ANC has been banned, along with other organizations, that are against the apartheid.

The Black Consciousness movement has grown even under such conditions. Black organizations continue to develop as a means to

counter apartheid. Political unrest is at an all time high. Students and young adults are taking to the streets.

The government has declared a state of emergency. The Army and security police have the latest riot control equipment and Blacks are being killed regularly. The total number of deaths are unknown but over 600 have been killed in the last year alone. Thousands have been detained and more than a hundred have mysteriously vanished.

Blacks are still without representation in the government and are forced to live in homelands and ghettos. They are overcrowded and underdeveloped. Black unemployment is reported to have reached 60 percent.¹³ Blacks are poorly educated since the government spends seven times as much on the White school system as on the Black system. Therefore, most Blacks cannot read or write.

Separateness is the way of life. The country is totally polarized by race and fear exists in the hearts of all.

CHAPTER IV

FORCES WORKING TO DISMANTLE APARTHEID

Internal African Organizations.

Afrikaners have not supported a serious attempt to dismantle apartheid since 1948. The only party which supports the abolition of apartheid is the Progressive Federal Party (PFP). PFP is composed primarily of affluent, English speaking inhabitants of East London, Durban, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg. These people, and their number is growing, believe that the federal constitution must give Blacks a share of political power.¹⁴

In the early days, prior to 1960, the African National Congress (ANC) which was started in 1912 was the only voice for Blacks in South Africa. At its peak ANC had a membership of approximately 100,000. At one demonstration in 1952 which was staged by ANC to protest pass laws some 8,600 Africans were arrested. In 1952, the Youth League of ANC broke away and formed the Pan African Congress (PAC) and it reached a strength of 30,000. After Sharpeville, where 69 Africans were killed in 1960 during a protest march, PAC staged a demonstration where 18,000 arrests were made. Because of the wide base political activism displayed by ANC and PAC, they were declared unlawful organizations on 8 April 1960. The "Suppression of Communism Act" was used as the basis for outlawing the organizations. Both PAC and ANC strongly oppose apartheid and want it completely abolished. Since peaceful protests failed and they were forced underground, both PAC and ANC now support armed liberation.¹⁵

In 1943, the nonracial independent Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) was formed. It was composed of African and Colored intellectuals with the purpose of achieving a ten point program with universal franchise and equal rights to all citizens being the most important ones. The apartheid laws passed after the Nationalist Party coming to power in 1948 made mixed racial organizations illegal. This also contributed to the ANC adopting a militant approach.

In the late 1940s the Indians formed the South African Indian Council (SAIC) which opposed apartheid and asked for equal rights and opportunities for all. Many thousands went to jail when they disregarded the segregation laws by allowing Africans to join their demonstration marches.

In 1959 the South African Colored People's Organization (SACPO) was formed. It attempted to bring together as many Black organizations as possible that opposed apartheid and its racial policies. On 1 May 1959, SACPO staged peaceful work stoppages in most cities of South Africa. In Johannesburg that same day, the police killed eighteen people.

Black Consciousness spread to the students in the 60s. Black South African Students' Organization (SASO) was formed and declared itself to be working for the liberation of the Black man from the psychological oppression created by living within a White racist society. The students rejected White or foreign support. They felt that the struggle had to be won alone. SASO efforts led to the formation of the Black People's Convention (BPC), the first Black political party since banning started in the early 1960's.¹⁶

Other Black organizations were created to fight apartheid like the United Democratic Front (UDF). All of these organizations worked hard

to encourage Black Consciousness because they understood that this was necessary in order for Black Africans to continue to support the Black movement as the government increased its repressive acts.

External Forces.

The United Nations (UN) has in some form considered the racial policies of the government of South Africa since the first General Assembly in 1946. The government of India first brought the matter to the attention of the UN at this time.

After violence started in South Africa, the Security Council and the General Assembly declared that the racial policy of apartheid was in violation of South Africa's obligations under the charter to promote the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. The UN has continually called for South Africa to abandon its racial policies. To show its resolve, the UN has established a trust fund to assist the victims of apartheid.

Since apartheid was created in 1948 each president of the United States has asked for its abolishment. President Carter probably took the strongest position against apartheid. He refused to acknowledge South Africa as the leading power in the region.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) developed a strategy for liberation of South Africa. It has tried to ban formal diplomatic ties with Pretoria. The OAU's strategy has brought greater international involvement in South Africa. It caused the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 to be signed by thirteen governments saying in respect to South Africa that:

We wish to make it clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of color, race and religion, or

sex...on the basis of these beliefs, we do not accept that any group within society has the right to rule any society without the continuing consent of all the citizens.¹⁷

The countries of Western Europe have been somewhat vague in their position on apartheid. Their close ties with South Africa and extensive trade make it difficult for these countries to openly ask for the abolishment of apartheid.

CHAPTER V

OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SOUTH AFRICA

The government of South Africa will be forced in the near future to decide upon an option that will reform apartheid. The current course of separate development, while changing some of the more racial policies of apartheid, is not working. What has been seen as a racial conflict between the White minority and the Black majority has turned into a bloody race war. There are basically two general options available: the politics of siege, or the politics of negotiation. The two differ based on the amount of control the White group wishes to retain over any proposed changes.

Politics of Siege.

This option implies the extension of coercive government for its implementation of procedures and policies. Conflict is expected and planned for by the government. This is the course the government of South Africa initially took when the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948. The length of time repressive siege can last depends upon the availability of an adequate police or military force to control the respective groups that are under siege. Repressive siege causes violence because violence is seen as the only means of changing or maintaining the status quo. The Botha government has recently departed from this option because increased repression mainly for ideological reasons would mean returning to the lost past. External pressures and the resistance from the 80 percent Black majority were too great. Yet,

it is possible that the government may feel that it must resort to this option as the only way to maintain control; therefore, it cannot totally be ruled out.¹⁸

Another form of siege politics is when a group of people within the White minority are in control and cannot be dislodged by electoral means, yet they accept the need for change. The group will accept change only on their own terms. The White group realizes that the status quo is untenable and change is required. It is understood that a government based on racial discrimination must be reformed. Yet, the White group insists that it must repress those who challenge the government while allowing limited reforms politically, socially and economically.

This is what is happening in South Africa. The declared state of emergency allows the government to take repressive actions. The Homelands policy, the new constitution that included Coloreds and Asians, and some repeal of apartheid policies are attempts to reform while maintaining White control. This option does allow for some reform, but such changes are normally erratic because the government is trying to decide between total White control and shared control with the Blacks. The longer South Africa continues with siege politics the less is the likelihood for peaceful change and intergroup accommodation. The current unrest and violence support this position.¹⁹

Politics of Negotiation.

Under this option the White regime accepts the position that change is required. Therefore they must give up unilateral decision - making and negotiate an alternative constitution. Every effort is taken to

create conditions in which the crisis of legitimacy can be resolved peacefully.

One method of negotiation is capitulation. This is when the government in control is caught up in a long struggle and has been weakened considerably. Violence is a major part of the conflict. What is negotiated is a peaceful transfer of power from the White minority to the Black majority rather than how power can be shared by all groups. Without greater action on the part of the South African government, it could find itself in this position as did Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.

Negotiating for participation is the other method. Here the White minority and the Blacks work out together an alternative constitution that provides dispensation for all groups and it is acceptable to the majority of White and Black South Africans. Ideological polarization will make it extremely difficult for Blacks and Whites to negotiate a peaceful transfer of power. Black solidarity supports a completely new government, not a changed government. Change via evolution for South Africa can only happen when the White minority is willing to give up power and accept a Black controlled government.²⁰ The longer the Whites hold on and not attempt an evolutionary change, the greater the likelihood that a revolutionary change will occur.

Possible Changes.

The Blacks in South Africa have demanded the following, as articulated through the African National Congress, to solve the issue of apartheid and minority rule. First, they want Nelson Mandela freed and the ANC and other banned organizations reinstated. Next, they insist that the government of South Africa negotiate with ANC leaders and other Black organizations and leaders in South Africa. Apartheid must be

abolished. Majority rule must be established. Redistribution of wealth and the breaking up of large conglomerates are required. Small businesses will be allowed as well as private land ownership. The Blacks agree that Whites may stay in South Africa under majority rule.²¹

President Botha has indicated that he is willing to accomplish the following in order to solve the current state of emergency. A time table has not been established and many doubt if he will follow through. He promised common citizenship to all 32 million South African, regardless of race. Laws restricting the movements of Blacks would be repealed eventually. The 10 Black "homelands" set up under apartheid would be eliminated. Black leaders would be invited to join the government in talks on the future of South Africa. Representatives of all race groups would be invited to participate in a conference to write a new constitution probably along federal lines.²² Yet today, President Botha has stepped up his repressive actions in lieu of making any significant changes to apartheid.

A way to transform the government that may meet the needs of both parties is offered. The government should call a national convention of all racial groups to serve as an advisory committee with the charter to write a new constitution. The membership of the convention should be agreed upon by the Blacks and Whites. At the same time apartheid should be abolished, all racial laws, policies and restrictions should be repealed. Political prisoners should be released. The current government would remain in power with appointed Blacks to assist or work in the government while the national convention is meeting which will probably last 18 to 24 months

Universal suffrage for all people of South Africa is a mandatory requirement. Safeguards for all groups should be built in and a bill of rights published as a part of the constitution. The framework of the constitution should be federalism even understanding that it is difficult for a divided society. A federal type government requires patience from its citizens and the officials must possess negotiation skills. Also a minority veto needs to be built into the constitution. The minority veto would allow a group of 10 to 15 percent to veto a law. This will appeal to the Whites and will force tough issues to be negotiated rather than taken to the public or voted in through block voting. The political system should provide incentives for coalescent rather than adversary politics. Every attempt must be made to insure that the system deny or minimize the payoff to racial or ethnic appeals and, conversely, it must provide rewards to coalescent.²³

The government of South Africa needs to accept negotiation as the method to solve its race war. Until all racial groups are included in the change, violence will continue and decrease the opportunity for the minority to be accepted in the society without losing everything. There is no question that their standard of living will be scaled down. This loss will be insignificant compared to what they stand to lose in a total racial war.²⁴

CHAPTER VI

US "CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT" POLICY

Purpose.

In 1981 the United States' constructive engagement policy was perceived as an attempt to lay the groundwork for limited strategic United States - South African cooperation.

Constructive engagement assumed that, with proper encouragement, a modernizing autocracy could lay the groundwork for negotiated power sharing.²⁵

Mr. Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, spelled out the new policy. The US policy of putting overt public pressure for change on the government of South Africa by the Carter Administration had seemed to promise much more to Black South Africans that could be delivered. "Americans need to do their homework," wrote Mr. Crocker in a landmark article:

A tone of empathy is required, not only for the suffering and injustice caused to Blacks in a racist system, but also for the awesome political dilemma in which Afrikaners and other Whites find themselves...American powder should be kept dry for genuine opportunities to exert influence. As in other foreign policy agendas for the 1980s, the motto should be: underpromise and overdeliver - for a change.²⁶

Constructive engagement was to be a continuing dialogue between the governments, as well as the private sectors, to move toward the abandonment and easing of racial laws. The dialogue with government figures was limited primarily to the country's White minority leaders.

The new constructive engagement promised increased American prestige in Southern Africa with a corresponding decrease in Soviet influence; a solution to the military conflict over Namibia (Southwest Africa); and a withdrawal of Cuban troops and advisors from Angola. These promises were made along with the major goal of constructive engagement which was to steer between the twin dangers of abetting violence in the Republic and aligning ourselves with the cause of White rule.²⁷

In 1981 the US position toward South Africa changed from one that threatened a deterioration of relations if there was no move away from apartheid by South Africa to one that promised improved relations if movement away from apartheid was accomplished.

Methodology.

To put constructive engagement to work, the Reagan Administration expanded the scope of US cooperation with the South African government. American trade with and investment in the Republic of South Africa increased. Many previous restrictions on the export of military related equipment were lifted. The sale of American computers to the police, military and other agencies of South Africa government that administer apartheid was permitted. South African military attaches were allowed to return to the United States and expanded diplomatic, military and intelligence relationships between the two countries were allowed including the establishment of several new South African honorary consulates in the United States. The United States agreed to train members of the South African coast guard and to resume official nuclear advisory contacts.²⁸

In the UN Security Council, the Reagan administration often stood with South Africa - vetoing resolutions critical to South Africa even

when Britain and France abstained, and, in some cases, registering the only abstention when Western allies voted to condemn South African actions.

The Reagan administration sought to rid the United States of being preoccupied with power sharing and full political participation by the Black majority and dealt with the process of getting there. Therefore, the new administration was willing to side with and support the South Africa racist regime as long as the communication process remained open leading to changes in apartheid. Most communication was conducted with the White minority. Black leaders were not consulted concerning reshaping the government.

Why Constructive Engagement Failed.

The United States constructive engagement policy of quiet dialogue with the White minority over the last five years is considered by many to have failed. They point to the administration's recognition of this fact when the President was forced to impose limited economic sanctions in September 1985. South Africa's White leadership simply refused to accept the offers made by the Reagan administration which resulted in embarrassing the United States. The sanctions, limited as they are, do say to the Botha regime that the American president who initially came to their aid has now turned against the White minority. The details of the sanctions are at Appendix A.

The policy of constructive engagement has caused the United States to lose five years of valuable time when it could have influenced South Africa to begin solving its critical and unique racial problems. Yet, this policy probably was a necessary step in the evolution of American attitudes toward the Republic of South Africa, even though it was

extremely expensive and costly. During this timeframe, the situation in South Africa has been exacerbated by constructive engagement by encouraging and indulging the White regime's separate development racial tactics. Regardless of what has been said in Washington, the international community believed, with valid reasons, that America's prestige was on the side of the Pretoria government.²⁹

Washington officials tied South Africa's departure from Namibia, which the United Nations ordered, to the withdrawal of Cubans from Angola. This was done in order to make it easier for South Africa to cooperate. The Botha government was skeptical of any transition to independence in Namibia that would probably leave the country in the hands of the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). The failure of the Botha regime to honor this commitment further embarrassed the United States and undermined constructive engagement.

Black South Africans view the world quite differently from their White countrymen. They are disenfranchised at home and in the international world. Attempts were made to solve this problem during the Carter Administration, but under constructive engagement, the view was to avoid choosing between Black and White. Apartheid policies were considered to be unjust. Talking to Black leaders was seen as destabilizing and aggravating the task facing South Africans. Blacks, including Bishop Desmond Tutu, warned that if the West's most powerful country aligned itself with the White South African government, this would prevent Blacks from achieving a peaceful realization of their political ambitions.

The United States did not express opposition to the new constitution created in 1983 which established separate chambers of parliament for

Coloreds and Asians and completely excluded Blacks. This gesture on the part of the Reagan administration and its support for other divide-and-rule tactics discredited Black leaders; therefore, they lost respect for constructive engagement and its authors.³⁰

Violence in South Africa has increased leading to the killing of many hundreds. Arrests are up and new legal restrictions have been instituted. Over the last 15 to 18 months Blacks have begun to protest, riot and demonstrate in ever increasing numbers. The African National Congress has begun to target the government of South Africa. President Botha declared a state of emergency in July 1985 so he could impose greater repressive actions. This situation sparked Black leaders in the United States, members of the Black Caucus, including other members of Congress, and the American public to say that constructive engagement had failed and that something had to be done to solve the tension in South Africa. Faced with this mounting pressure and the inability to salvage the administration's policy, President Reagan, as stated earlier, imposed limited economic sanctions to prevent a congressionally enacted law which would have been veto proof.

Constructive engagement has failed in every aspect and with all of its constituencies. It can only accept credit for a now shattered Angolan - South African truce and the short lived, now discredited, Nkomati Accord. Unfortunately, South African Blacks now see the United States as a part of the problem and South African Whites see the administration turning its back on them and weakening the South African economy.

Alternatives to Constructive Engagement.

What should US policy toward South Africa be now that constructive engagement has failed? There is much debate and disagreement over what policy should take its place. Most liberals support a strategy of constructive disengagement. This policy advocates recognition that the United States cannot bring an end to the current South African government. The supporters of constructive disengagement believe that selective pressures create problems for the Whites and morally disassociate the United States from apartheid. This is the approach the US Congress started in July 1985 with the passage of antiapartheid legislation. President Reagan does not support this policy; therefore, such a policy would only divide the United States and send mixed signals to South Africa.

Most Republican members of Congress support a policy of ideological engagement which means taking a much stronger stand against apartheid. By taking a more open and stronger position the Republicans believe their image on civil rights will improve and give them a greater chance at capturing Black votes in the United States. Ideologists favor limited sanctions to show US disapproval of apartheid, but do not want their sanctions to hurt or harm South Africa. They are willing to talk to moderate Blacks but not members of the ANC. Further, they only want to talk to those who support and are willing to embrace American conceptions of democracy and capitalism. This will force many African leaders to align themselves with the Soviet bloc. A policy that drives away the Blacks of major Black organizations like ANC, UDF and the Azanian People's Organization runs the risk of failure.

Another group of people support a policy of decent noninvolvement which advocates strong public opposition to apartheid, but generally not

intervention to force change. Strong talk and no action will in the long run prove to be disastrous. The longer it takes for change to come in South Africa, the more bitter, violent, and anticapitalist the revolution will probably be. Therefore no action on the part of the United States runs the risk of the US losing all credibility in South Africa and throughout Southern Africa. Decent noninvolvement would force African leaders to look elsewhere for help and support. When change comes they would not owe the United States anything.³¹

Many believe the most productive practical way for the United States to promote political change in South Africa is to restore a forthright atmosphere of public and private confrontation of relations between Washington and Pretoria. Known as constructive confrontation, this policy would have American officials becoming far more direct and persistent in their condemnation of apartheid. Washington would immediately recognize Angola and begin public support of Black organizations like ANC, UDF and UNITA. This would start the development of a healthier, more vigorous multiracial opposition within South Africa, which will be harder for the current regime to crush if it enjoys outside support from a super power. A new American decision to confront apartheid more strongly and boldly would stiffen the resolve of other Western nations and lead to an international vote of no confidence in President Botha's leadership. As long as the Nationalist Party and President Botha are in power, no major changes will be made. This new tough approach would create conditions conducive to negotiation and compromise. South Africa cannot get from its other friends, such as Israel and Taiwan, what it can get from America.

President Reagan needs to follow the design of constructive confrontation in order to make his new active engagement policy work. To accomplish that, he needs to insure that: (1) Constructive engagement is abandoned. Under it, President Botha only offered cosmetic changes to apartheid while refusing to grant Blacks equal political rights and continuing the separate homelands policy. Also Blacks have become hostile toward the United States. A clear change in policy may cause them to respond favorably to the United States' new position. (2) Negotiation with all the country's Black leaders is stressed. Not only should Washington talk to Black leaders but it should also apply strong pressure on Pretoria to open negotiations with Black leaders. All leaders need to be involved, not just those who are somewhat supportive of Botha's government. ANC and UDF leaders must be included. (3) Nelson Mandela is released. President Reagan has asked for his release but needs to strengthen that demand. Whites and Blacks in South Africa have asked for his release without condition. President Botha has agreed to release Mandela, only if he renounces violence. (4) One man, one vote is the US goal. The United States must make it clear that any reform must produce as an outcome of equal political rights for all South Africans. There is no way the United States can endorse a government that disenfranchises 70 percent of its population. Under apartheid, Blacks can only vote in Black homelands or in local community elections. (5) Tougher sanctions are created and supported. Sanctions are understood by South Africa, and they do have a positive effect. The United States should start with tougher sanctions and threaten to increase them gradually until Pretoria comes forward with significant changes. The proposals made by Congress should be the general starting

point. If progress is not made in 12 months, then the heat should be turned up. The next items should include divestment, closing South African consulates in the United States, and denying landing rights to South African Airways. (6) The White minority and Western interests are protected. There probably would be further violence before any change takes place. Yet, Washington should seek assurances from Black leaders that they will deal fairly with Whites. Also, US officials should try to have Blacks understand the importance of continuing the production of gold and precious minerals.³²

These bold steps will convince Black South Africans that Americans identify with their plight and are willing to help. Further, by following these steps, the United States will once again stand for valuable principles and begin to play a truly constructive role in South Africa.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary.

South Africa is a country built and run on a base of racial domination. A small White minority of about 17.8 percent totally controls the lives of the other 82 percent (Asians 2.9 percent/Colored 9.4 percent/Black Africans 69.9 percent). In 1948, when the Nationalist Party came to power it officially adopted apartheid which is a legal system of racial domination and separation. The goal of apartheid was the complete separation of Blacks and Whites. This evil system has created tremendous racial turmoil. Many deaths and much violence have been a direct result of apartheid.

Internal and external forces have been working to dismantle apartheid. ANC, UDF and many other African organizations have long called for an end to this form of racial injustice. The United Nations and other leading international organizations have attempted to bring about majority rule in South Africa. Yet, the apartheid regime continues to exist, and today is operating under a state of emergency.

The South African government has two basic courses to solve its problems. Either to continue its current course of coercive enforcement of its policies and procedures which bring about conflict or to agree to negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Blacks. Currently it does not look like the Botha regime is willing to give up its political power and accept what negotiation may bring. The approach so far is to offer petty reforms while trying to continue separate development.

The US constructive engagement policy has failed to achieve any significant reforms over the last five years. Many believe it has made the situation worse. In South Africa, the Blacks see the American policy supporting an unjust racial system while the Whites believe the United States has betrayed them by imposing sanctions. It is time for the United States to establish a bold policy. Constructive confrontation is probably the best one to utilize in that it ends quiet negotiation and openly attacks the government of South Africa. Direct communication with Black Africans is a central part of this policy as well as tougher sanctions. Without such a policy the regime in South Africa will not reform itself.

The country is in a racial war that will end in a blood bath if something is not done soon.

Conclusion.

The Black majority in South Africa has experienced some success in its fight for freedom; therefore, the government of South Africa will not be able to end the current violence without abolishing the system of apartheid. Political rights for all is a must. Majority rule in some form is required, and the longer the current regime holds on, the bloodier the resolution will be.

Separation development will not work as demonstrated by the failure of the homeland system for Black South Africans. All forms of racial domination must be eliminated, and negotiations with the leaders of the Black majority must be conducted with to develop a new constitution.

The United States must abandon its failed constructive engagement policy and confront South Africa directly and openly. The world must know that America will not be satisfied until apartheid is ended; jailed Blacks freed; violence ended; and majority rule established.

There is still hope that an extremely bloody resolution can be avoided, but time to accomplish this is limited.

A P P E N D I X A

President Reagan's Sanctions
Imposed on South Africa
9 Sep 85

- Ban exports of US made computers and software to South African agencies that administer or enforce apartheid.
- Ban new loans to South African government, except those for educational, housing or health facilities open to all races.
- Establish an "advisory committee" of distinguished Americans to recommend ways to encourage peaceful change.
- Require US firms employing more than 25 persons to adhere to the Sullivan principles of nondiscriminatory employment and living conditions.
- Authorize increased funds for scholarships to those disadvantaged by apartheid and grants to organizations working to improved human rights conditions.
- State again the US position against apartheid and define US policy promoting peaceful change.
- Ban the importation of South African Krugerrand gold coins into the United States.
- Direct the Secretary of Treasury to study the feasibility of minting and issuing US gold coins.
- Implement a UN resolution banning imports of South African arms.
- Prohibit exports of most nuclear goods or technology to South Africa.

SOURCE: Washington Post, 10 Sep 85, p. A-10.

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