
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


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TITLE THE CONCEPT OF COMMAND LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY CLASSICS: ANTOINE HENRI JOMINI

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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

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PREFACE ____

This paper is written to be incorporated in a new Air University book on leadership. This book will look at command leadership through a review of the military classics.

The author would like to thank the staff of the Air University Library for their help locating and obtaining many of the listed references. The author gratefully acknowledges the indispensable editorial efforts of Dr. Donald D. Chipman, Squadron Officer School, and Major Rodger Tunnell, Air Command and Staff College.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Donovan R. Cumbie wrote this article while a course officer at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Before attending this school, he served two Base, Alabama. years in the Republic of Korea, first, as a Combat Support. Aviation Company Commander and later as the Aviation Group Operations Officer. Prior to that assignment, he served three years at the Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama. While there, he was instrumental in developing the training program and flight simulator for the Advanced Attack Helicopter--the AH-64. later served as the Aviation Brigade Operations He Officer. In previous assignments, Major Cumbie served as an Area Commander in Recruiting Command, an M-60 Tank Company Commander, the Adjutant and Supply Officer of a Tank Battalion, and the Executive Officer and Platoon Leader in a Combat Aviation Company. Major Cumbie holds a B.S. Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Texas A&M University and a M.S. Degree in Systems Management from The University of Southern California.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Leadership, an elusive term, is defined by Webster as "...the quality of a leader" (13:653). Implicit in this definition is the notion that a successful leader possesses certain qualities or traits which followers respect and admire, therefore, causing them to accept the person in charge as their leader. The beckoning question is then, are these qualities or traits inborn or may they be learned. Count de Montecucculi wrote in 1740:

The first quality of a general in chief is a great knowledge of the art of war. This is not intuitive, but the result of experience. A man is not born a commander. He must become one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease. These are the proofs of valor in a general (2:130).

This quote states that commanders are made, not born, and it also implies that a general must possess leadership to command an army. More specifically, it narrows the types of leadership to the one with which this paper will deal--military or command leadership. This type of leadership may be further defined as the ability of an individual to cause forces assigned to him to close with an enemy, engage him in battle, and win.

This concept of command leadership has long been taught at professional military education schools from every angle. It has been debated as having only a fine line of difference from the concept of management. Regardless of the terminology used, leadership in the military should be studied from the sources which most readily keep it in the context in which it has been developed. These sources primarily include the military classics. Therefore, this paper will develop the concept of command leadership in the military classics through a specific study of the writings of Baron Antoine Henri Jomini.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the military writings of General Jomini and determine what he perceived as the recurring traits contributing to effective command leadership. To accomplish this purpose, the author will examine a series of objectives in four chapters.

This first chapter serves to establish the need for the study of command leadership and develop a methodology for that study--a look at command leadership in the military classics.

The second chapter focuses on the biographical background that molded General Jomini's perceptions of military leadership.

The third chapter enumerates the traits General Jomini considered to be fundamental in establishing an individual as an effective leader. Examination of these traits will be accomplished by a detailed review of the major works published by General Jomini throughout his lifetime.

The final chapter will review the current system for teaching and developing leadership in the military officer corps of today. In addition, the chapter will identify points in the present system where improvement is necessary. Points will be identified where the leadership traits noted by General Jomini should be used to enhance the leadership abilities of these contemporary leaders.

General Jomini was a common man who came from a simple background. Let us examine how he was able to place himself in a position to serve at the side of Napoleon---the most powerful man of his era.

Chapter Two

BIOGRAPHY

Antoine Henri Jomini was born on March 6, 1779 in the small town of Payerne in the Canton of Vaud, French Switzerland (14:8). His parents, a middle-class family, had emigrated from Italy several generations earlier (1:81). After receiving the usual education afforded the son of a middle-class family, he began his life's work in a quite unexciting manner by entering the banking business in Paris in 1796. Soon, Jomini convinced himself that the tedious life of a banker could not compare with the glamorous lifestyle of a French soldier under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte, the new champion of French arms (3:3).

Inspired at the age of seventeen by the glory of General Bonaparte's campaign in Italy, Jomini succeeded in getting himself an unpaid, and almost unofficial, staff position in the French Army. He possessed a knack for administrative matters and quickly worked his way from the service of supply to other minor staff jobs (1:81). One biographer assessed him at this stage as:

...an ambitious man, burning with curiosity, and he had ability--a winning combination in any line of endeavor...Jomini took a dim view of his chances of finding a marshal's baton in a private's knapsack... There were more important positions in the Army, and [he] set his sights on them. In addition to his ardent ambition, his self-confidence [that at times made him many enemies], and his obvious ability, Jomini possessed one of the most penetrating military minds of his era (3:3).

In 1798 Jomini returned to his Swiss homeland to assist his neighbors in resisting French aggression, rising to the grade of chief-of-battalion at the age of twenty-one (11:581). In the six years he had spent mixing with military men, Jomini had begun to talk and think a great deal about the art of war. He had often desired to discover "...the fundamental principles ...on which great victories rested...independent of the kind of weapons, of historical time, and of place" (12:132). And it was then that he began to put his thoughts to work with the help of his future mentor, Marshal Ney, a rising French Army Commander.

In 1801, with Ney's advice, he began to write his first significant military work, <u>Traite des Grandes Operations Mili-</u> <u>taires</u>, (Principles of Large Military Operations) (14:8). He completed this book after he returned to civilian life during the false Peace of Amiens. This writing was a heavy treatise dealing with the campaigns of Frederick the Great (3:3). In this work (detailed in Chapter 3) Jomini generalized military thought and made many favorable comparisons between Frederick's generalship and that of Napoleon (1:81).

In 1805, while working as Ney's aide-de-camp, he was allowed to draft daily orders of march during the Ulm and Austerlitz campaigns. Following these campaigns he was dispatched to Vienna with Ney's reports to Napoleon (12:132). Jomini managed to include a copy of his own work with these reports. When Napoleon had Jomini's book read to him, he was so "...impressed with the author's intuitive understanding of the Napoleonic

touch, he had Jomini...report to him at Mainz in September 1806" (1:81). Jomini was at last appointed as a Colonel in the French Army. This position afforded him the opportunity to use his considerable skills as a military officer.

Jomini was a brilliant staff officer who was able, by most accounts, to accurately divine the intentions of Napoleon. During his later years Jomini often reminisced and told the story that at the end of a planning conference for the 1806 Jena campaign against Prussia, he asked if he could join Napoleon in four days at Bamberg. Napoleon, who thought his plans were secret, asked, in an angry manner: "Who told you that I am going to Bamberg?" "The map of Germany, Sire, and your campaigns of Marengo and Ulm," Jomini replied (1:81). This story illustrates that Jomini had a clear understanding of Napoleon's strategic thoughts (14:9).

This story also points out that arrogance was one of the clear weaknesses of Jomini. This characteristic would later create insurmountable problems resulting in his defection to the Russian Army. In his book, <u>The Theory and Practice of War</u>, the noted historian Howard points out that "...any contribution that he [Jomini] may have made to the success of French arms must have been counterbalanced by an intellectual arrogance and an inability to co-operate with his colleagues which would have made his presence at a busy headquarters almost intolerable" (4:13). While Jomini was certainly human, with all the accompanying

strengths and weaknesses, he clearly was still an asset to the French Army.

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Jomini served as chief-of-staff under Marshal Ney at the battles of Ulm (1805), Jena (1806), and Eylau (1806) and accompanied him to Spain in 1808. During these campaigns he acquired a brilliant reputation as a staff officer and as a strategist; however, this further recognition created additional animosity among the hierarchy of the army. In particular, Major General Berthier, the Chief-of-Staff of the Imperial Army, was incensed at the praise received by the extremely self-confident, young Swiss officer (6:16).

In 1809 when Napoleon decided to personally direct the campaign in Spain, jealousy within Marshal Ney's staff caused Jomini to be relieved of his duties (6:16). Napoleon refused to lose the talents of this brilliant officer so he ordered him reassigned to his staff serving in Paris under General Berthier (6:16). Jomini refused to accept duty under Berthier and tendered his resignation. The Emperor then assigned him to special duty in Paris to write a history of the Italian Campaigns and promoted him to general-de-brigade (3:16).

His work in writing the military histories was impeded throughout 1811 by the Chief of the Depot of Archives. This was overcome in time and he continued to work on these documents for the next year (6:18).

It was also during this time that the Emperor Alexander of Russia offered Jomini a commission as a brigadier general in the Russian Army, but Napoleon refused to let Jomini accept (14:10).

In early 1812, Jomini was appointed Official Historian of the Grande Armee at the Imperial Headquarters. When the War of 1812 broke out between France and Russia, Jomini refused to serve because of the previous offer from the Russian Emperor. As a result, he was appointed to the Governorship of Wilna. Later he served in the Government of Smolensk, where he played a key role assisting Napoleon in the retreat from Moscow (6:18). He played an important part in selecting bridge sites for the Berezina river crossing and in scouting road conditions and supply sources (14:10). It was during this river crossing that he fell ill and was unable to serve again until 1813.

Jomini finally rejoined Marshal Ney as his chief-of-staff on the day of the 1813 battle of Lutzen. Having been appointed to the position by Napoleon, this initial meeting after their previous difficulties was embarrassing to both Jomini and Ney since neither had asked for the assignment. However, they soon renewed their old relationship. In addition, "...Jomini distinguished himself at the battle of Bautzen, by the judicious advice which he gave to move on the enemy's right, instead of the left, an opinion subsequently confirmed by the receipt of orders from the Emperor, which had been miscarried" (6:18-19). This was yet another example of the insight which Jomini had in divining Napoleon's strategy. Marshall Ney immediately recommended Jomini for promotion to the grade of general of division. General Berthier, instead of rewarding him with a promotion, ordered him

placed under arrest for failure to submit certain reports on time. This proved too much for the proud spirit of Jomini, and he vowed never again to serve under an ungrateful flag (6:19).

Although he rose to the position of general de brigade and served as chief-of-staff to one of the leaders of Napoleon's army, Jomini never achieved his goal of an independent command. Many biographers of Jomini point to the personal dislike of Berthier as the cause for his failure to attain command. However, "...even if such an element was present, it is not difficult to sympathize with the attitude of Berthier, wrestling with the multifarious problems of a huge and swiftly moving army, towards the dogmatic oversimplifications of the young Swiss theorist" (4:13).

As a result of these and other events, Jomini tendered his resignation on at least six different occasions. In each case Napoleon refused to accept and Jomini withdrew the offers. Finally, when his promotion was denied, he rode off to the Allied lines in August 1813 and offered his service to Alexander of Russia (1:82). He was accepted at the grade of lieutenant-general and was appointed aide-de-camp in the Russian Army, a commission which he had been offered some years before (3:7).

Many opinions exist on the legality of this switch in loyalties by Jomini. One school of thought considered him a traitor to the French cause, as did many French soldiers and statesmen of the day. Others contended, as did his friends, that he was under no patriotic or legal obligation to the French since he was Swiss by birth and he was acting as a soldier of fortune (6:19). After entering the Russian Army, he was asked by the King of Prussia to reveal classified information concerning the disposition of French men and positions; he refused and was defended by the Emperor of Russia in this position (11:582). In addition, Jomini was later absolved of any charges of treason by Napoleon himself, when he wrote, "...The author of this book is wrong in charging General Jomini with having conveyed to the allies the secret of the operations of the campaign, and the situation of Ney's corps....The Emperor never accused him of the crime which is here imputed to him. He did not desert his flag like some others" (6:21).

After his entry into Russian service, he refused to take part in the violation of Swiss territory, and the ultimate invasion of France itself. Later, in 1815, he risked his position in the Russian army when he used his power to save Marshal Ney from execution (10:108). Following his return to Russia with the Emperor, Jomini was promoted to the rank of general-in-chief. In addition, he received three major decorations and assisted the Emperor in two major Congresses (6:22).

Once again, Jomini retreated into the academic world to devote himself to military writing for several years. However, he was recalled to act as military tutor to the Tsarevitch, future emperor of Russia (10:108). He was appointed president of a committee which organized the Nicholas Military Academy in Moscow in 1832. He was also placed in charge of preparing plans for fortifying and defending the frontiers of the empire.

In his later years, he was appointed aide-de-camp general to the Czar Nicholas. Although he continued to write, his health was much too poor for the harsh Russian winters. He was given permission to reside in Paris and the south of Europe for much of the time (6:23). However, in 1853-1856 he returned to St. Petersburg to advise the Czar during the Crimean War (14:11).

Jomini had two sons and three daughters, but only one of his sons served in the military. (6:23) Jomini died in Paris in 1869 at the age of ninety having been recognized in his own lifetime as both a great military historian and strategist. According to Edward Earle, the author of <u>Makers of Modern</u> <u>Military Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler</u>, "...Jomini's systematic attempt to get at the principles of warfare entitles him to share with Clausewitz the position of co-founder of modern military thought" (1:80).

With this basic understanding of General Jomini's background and his place in history, let us take a look at what he observed, in terms of leadership, from the foremost military leaders of his time.

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Chapter Three

LEADERSHIP OBSERVATIONS OF GENERAL JOMINI

Throughout his life Antoine Henri Jomini was a student of the military and of those who practiced that fine art. He was fortunate enough to be alive and in a position to observe some of the great leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From his vantage point he was able to capture in his writings some of the traits which he believed caused the men at the head of their armies to be great leaders.

From the time of his first published work, <u>Treatise on</u> <u>Grand Military Operations</u> in 1804, Jomini's writings included comments on the positive and negative leadership traits exhibited by those he observed. Through a chronological review of Jomini's works, this chapter tracks these observations and determines if they changed over time.

In his first work, Jomini took a serious look at the successes and failures of Frederick the Great. Using Frederick as an example, he noted many characteristics which he believed were necessary for a person to be successful in command leadership. He often stated that a general must first be successful in battle to be called a great leader. In Jomini's words, "...the courage of the troops is certainly the surest guarantee of victory; but it is only when they are well directed. An army less brave, less numerous, but conducted by a greater captain ...will conquer the best army in the world commanded by ...lesser captains* (8:163).

After much reflection, Jomini decided the principal trait necessary for success was to know your opponent or enemy. "It can hardly be repeated too often, that the first quality of a general is to be able to judge...the talents and character of his adversary, to penetrate his most secret views and comprehend the aim and drift of his operation" (9:78). He later provided an example of this knowledge when he described the actions of one of Frederick the Great's subordinates, saying, "...[Marshall Browne's] conduct during the battle merits equally the greatest praise. Whatever appeared rash in the manoeuvres which preceded, it ought undoubtedly to be attributed to the state of his affairs, and the knowledge which he had of the enemy's generals" (8:147).

Jomini studied the traits he observed in Frederick and his subordinates and related them to those he had seen first hand in Napoleon. This comparison included knowledge of the enemy. Jomini, in this book on Frederick, said, "...the greatest secret of war consists in becoming master of the communications of the enemy. (Napoleon expressed himself thus in an audience at which the writer was present, at the opening of the campaign in 1806)" (9:59). Later, in a battle which Frederick lost by failing to adhere to the principles of war as seen by Jomini, he noted, "...What would not Napoleon have accomplished with the advanta-

geous position of Frederick? How widely different would have been the results of the application of his principles in this position" (9:172). This comparison of Frederick and Napoleon indicated Jomini believed mere possession of leadership traits was not enough. A leader must apply these traits.

Leadership by example stems from a leader's ability to project those basic qualities into an action scenario. Jomini saw this principle exhibited often in his study of Frederick's campaigns and said:

All troops are brave when their leader sets the example by a noble emulation and a true, heroic devotion. It is not well that a soldier should remain under fire from fear of discipline alone, but from pride and self-esteem, not yielding to being outdone by his officers in honor and bravery and, above all, from that confidence which should exist in his mind in the sagacity of his leaders and the courage of his companions in arms. A general should be able to rely upon the devotion of his lieutenants for the honor of the national arms. He ought to feel that a vigorous shock will be given wherever he orders one to be made. The first means of securing this end is to make himself loved, respected, and feared (9:458-9).

As noted, some of these personal qualities which should be projected include pride, self-esteem, honor, bravery, sagacity, courage, loyalty, and honor.

Jomini also felt that Frederick exhibited a high degree of resiliency and was often able to turn a temporary defeat into a great victory. He noted:

Never did he appear greater, nor did his genius exhibit itself with more splendor, than at the moment in which his moral faculties ought to have been paralyzed by the prospect of inevitable ruin. Success, which emboldens most men, seems to have had an entirely contrary effect upon him, and it was his reverses which rendered him daring, enterprising, and indefatigable. This sublime virtue, the worthy appanage of great men, has been often taxed with rashness and folly by the vulgar; incapable alike of appreciation, feeling, or judging. But, this freedom of the mind independent of events, belongs only to superior beings, whose genius enchains results, and whose great sentiments acquire more elevation from danger (8:246).

This ability to overcome adversity coupled with his willingness to seize the initiative saved many a day for this great leader. He often disguised his offensive intentions from the enemy. Jomini (8:187) said it this way:

The conduct of Frederick was altogether different; he observed the movements of the enemy all the morning without being disconcerted, and as soon as he had penetrated their design, made his dispositions with the coolest indifference...When they formed their plan of attack, they were far from imagining that the king would see through it at the first glance, and take measures to thwart it with the same promptitude, it being contrary to his habit to await an attack, but to anticipate it, by taking the initiative.

Even with the ability to turn a defeat into victory by taking the initiative, Jomini felt Frederick would not have been successful if he had failed to execute his plans with vigor. "...After all, it is not combinations guaranteeing success to which the talent of great captains is limited. It extends to the vigor with which they gather up the fruits of their original plans" (9:181). He also said, "...the fruit of a victory depends upon knowing how to profit by it, which is...[a] desirable talent in a general; since the greatest progress can be made in this in our day, and many generals have left us splendid examples" (8:423).

Jomini also saw that great leaders had to have the ability to see the big picture in any military undertaking. He wrote: It will not suffice for a general officer to know the dispositions of his commander-in-chief. Neither will it suffice to be fully able to execute the required measures; it is necessary for him to have a coup-d-oeil [the ability to understand at a quick glance], to embrace the plan as a whole; to seize the true gist of the projected operation; to take all measures in such a way, that each movement and each manoeuvre of the division, which he commands, shall be in perfect accordance and keeping with the main design (8:125).

Leadership applies at all levels and thus each leader must know his part in the overall scheme of manoeuvre to ensure success on the battlefield.

Jomini also detected examples of what <u>not</u> to do as a leader--particularly in the role of command leadership. One involved the Marquis de Contades. Jomini (8:307) said:

In spite of the qualities which distinguished him from the generals who had preceded him, he is open to reproach for essential faults, and for possessing an inconceivable timidity. His plans embraced great views; but like most of the French generals at that time, he was deficient in energy....But of what use are the best matured plans, when there is a total absence of activity and energy in their execution? It is not the want of personal courage which is here alluded to; but that greatness of soul, that force of mind, energy, and strength of character.

The reason he was able to detect what a leader should not do was because he was a well read military critic. Jomini was, therefore, able to use his knowledge of the world environment to place the actions of each leader into their proper context. Jomini was further able to link these personal leadership traits to the command environment through his knowledge of the military art.

As previously noted, Jomini sought all his life to develop and refine a set of rules which would lead to success in battle. He believed these rules defined the essence of the art of war and were totally independent of the players. For example, "a general commanding an army which is superior in the skill of manoeuvring ought, whenever it is possible, to attack the enemy, whether he be superior in numbers or not, when he is in march" (8:190). He strongly believed a similar set of traits existed which paralleled these rules of warfare which great leaders should follow dogmatically. Jomini said: "...the bravery, the devotion even, of an army, avail nothing when there is, in the first dispositions, or in their execution, an essential violation of the rules of the art" (8:163).

Jomini often noted the manner in which adherence to the rules of warfare would lead to success by tying them to traits of leadership. He said:

It is in some similar circumstances, that a general can appreciate a theory based upon the true principles of the art. An ordinary man, who has for his guide only his long experience, will always be surprised and embarrassed when it is announced to him that the head of his columns is attacked by a line, or that one of his flanks is overturned, but if he knows the true value of the position in which he is situated, and the counter-manoeuvres which he can oppose, he will give the orders for their execution with that calmness and composure which inspire confidence, and communicate to his army all his assurance" (8:209).

Again he believed these rules, like the traits of leadership, were something which could be learned and were not inborn in a leader. He felt these rules of warfare should be learned in peacetime so they would be ready for use in war. "In time of peace, generals ought to study and practice evolutions which facilitate the great manoeuvres of armies; and in time of war

to choose fields of battle which partially shield their movements" (8:252).

Jomini did believe, however, that his rules could be perfected over time. He saw the reason for Frederick's success on at least two occasions was his innovation in the development and precise execution of a new manoeuvre. "...His line was then in an oblique direction, relative to that of the Austrians....Up to this time, the idea of it, as well as its applications and the dispositions it requires, was very imperfect; no general had ever made use of all its advantages" (8:235). This innovation was acceptable, but, only to the extent that the basic rules were not violated. Jomini held true to his belief that the basic rules were above reproach:

Undoubtedly, genius has a great deal to do with success, since it presides over the application of recognized rules, and seizes, as it were, all the subtle shades of which their application is susceptible. But in any case, the man of genius does not act contrary to these rules. An unskillful general may gain victories contrary to the rules of the art, which we sometimes see; for when two parties are engaged, one must generally gain the victory. But a similar event does not prove anything but mutual incapacity, or a total want of tactics in the two chiefs. Such were the battles of the middle ages, where the quality of the troops and the bravery of the chiefs were the ordinary causes of success (8:254).

In the mind of Jomini, adherence to the rules of warfare coupled with the positive application of the personal traits of leadership would result in victory in any battle.

As a side note, Jomini took great umbrage with previous military historians who had written on the campaigns of Frederick the Great. He truly believed they had incorrectly interpreted

the rules of warfare that existed at the time. "...Lloyd, forgetting the principles upon which he grounds his best observations, praises the measures taken by Frederick to raise the siege of Prague, and deduces from them the most erroneous maxims" (8:166). And later he noted: "...It will thus be seen that Bulow has set out from a principle entirely false; his work is therefore necessarily based upon and enforced by erroneous and dangerous maxims" (9:13). This book on the campaigns of Frederick was written by a young Jomini. Let us now examine some of his later works.

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In his next major work, <u>Vie Politique et Militaire de</u> <u>Napoleon</u> (Political and Military Life of Napoleon), published in 1827, Jomini chronicled the entire life of Napoleon. He included a detailed account of each military campaign and battle. Sprinkled throughout the entire four volumes are numerous examples of those leadership traits which Napoleon highlighted and Jomini recognized as essential.

In comparison with his first work there were no major shifts in thought from what Jomini had earlier espoused as fundamental in the art of command leadership. He still believed strongly in the principle of leadership by example and total involvement in the task at hand. This was noted in the campaign of 1796 in Italy during the second battle of Castiglione:

It has been said that during these extraordinary six days, Napoleon never once took off his boots, nor lay down upon a bed. He was almost constantly on horseback, and...he killed five horses with fatigue. He would not intrust anyone with the execu-

tion of his orders, he was determined to see everything, to verify everything, to animate all by his presence (6:119).

This dedication to the task at hand and his personal involvement were keys to all the successes of Napoleon and verify his knowledge of the basic requirements of command leadership. Napoleon knew what it took to win a battle and Jomini helped point it out.

This book repeated other points made previously which were considered essential to be a successful leader. Napoleon once described General Charles Kilmaine as "...an excellent cavalry officer, possessing coolness and coup-d'oeil, and was well suited to command on parties of observation, and all such delicate commissions as required discernment, sagacity, and presence of mind" (6:127). This ongoing keen analysis of his subordinate leaders enabled Napoleon to select the right men for command leadership positions.

In the campaigns of 1802-1804, Jomini reported that Napoleon took great pains to describe the men he chose as marshals to command the corps of his army. These descriptions included positive and negative traits he observed in them as his subordinate leaders. Jomini quoted him as saying:

I gave the command of the several corps-d'armee to men tried in many battles...Bernadotte had the first corps; he was a man of shrewdness, and a brilliant exterior...Davoust was placed at the head of the third corps. This man had received a good education, had a well-regulated mind, and very correct ideas of war...Severe, but just, toward his subordinates... The fourth corps was given to Soult. This general, of a masculine frame, and a mind capacious, laborious, active, indefatigable, had given proof...of superior talents....Ney commanded the sixth corps....nothing equaled his boldness, his coup-d'oeil and his aplombMassena had received from nature everything that can make an excellent warrior; endowed with great character, tried courage, and a coup-d'oeil which inspired him with resolution..." (7:54).

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These descriptions also serve to remind us, those superior in command are constantly scrutinizing their subordinates, as well as themselves, for leadership traits.

Napoleon served to remind Jomini of the principle of knowing your enemies and their weakest leadership traits. In the Campaign of Jena, Napoleon described the leaders of the Prussian Army which he was about to face. "...The duke of Brunswick was...a good administrator, valiant in combat, but timid in council....Mollendorf, not less brave, was equally unskillful...but age had not given him genius; genius is never the fruit of age or of experience" (7:205). This work was written by Jomini during the middle-aged years of his life. Let us now review his later volumes.

Jomini's last major work was the <u>Precis de l'art de la</u> <u>Guerre</u> (Summary of the Art of War) published in 1838. In this book, acclaimed by many historians as his greatest work, he devoted an entire portion to a description of the traits of command leadership. He began the section on command leadership by saying:

The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:--First, A high moral courage, capable of great resolution; Secondly, A physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the

above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. It is not necessary that he should be a man of vast erudition. His knowledge may be limited, but it should be thorough, and he should be perfectly grounded in the principles at the base of the art of war (5:56).

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Again, Jomini has referred the primary traits of leadership to the knowledge and adherence to the principles or maxims of war.

However, he did follow this introduction with a continuation of personal leadership traits he believed were essential. He said:

Next in importance come the qualities of his personal character. A man who is gallant, just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in others instead of being jealous of it and skillful in making this merit conduce to his own glory, will always be a good general, and may even pass for a great man (5:56).

Thus, Jomini acknowledged the requirement for a person in a command leadership position to possess and exhibit traits which cause those entrusted to his command to follow him.

Jomini believed, as he had stated in his previous books, a military leader must study the principles of war in peacetime to permit them to complement his natural genius and flair for the prosecution of war. Jomini said:

Natural genius might, doubtless, by happy inspiration apply the principles as well as could the most well-versed theoretician. But a simple theory, one free of all pedantry, going back to first causes but eschewing absolute systems, based in short on a few fundamental maxims, may often supplement genius and may serve to develop it by augmenting its confidence in its own inspirations (5:29).

This serves to affirm the fact Jomini altered his views little with the additional passage of time.

In summary, Jomini believed a basic set of principles of

war or maxims coexisted with a basic set of leadership traits. This basic set of leadership traits included such personal qualities as gallantry, justness, firmness, moral and physical courage, devotion, and sagacity. In addition, he included pride, self-esteem, honor, loyalty, resiliency, genius, and initiative. And finally, he listed force, calmness, composure, innovation, personal involvement, and the ability to overcome adversity. There also exists a set of qualities of command leadership which includes knowing your enemy, mastering your enemy's communications, knowing, practicing, and adhering to the principles of war, leading by example, executing a plan with vigor, knowing how to profit from a victory, and seeing the big picture. Jomini believed the individual who possessed these personal and command leadership traits and dogmatically followed the maxims of war espoused by Jomini would be virtually assured success on the battlefield.

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This was the view presented by Jomini, the leading military historian of his time. Since his prominence in the first half of the nineteenth century, over one hundred years have elapsed. The next chapter will examine the relevance of Jomini's views of leadership for today's leaders.

Chapter Four

APPLICATION OF CLASSICAL LEADERSHIP TRAITS TO CONTEMPORARY LEADERS

Military leaders of the twentieth century are faced with a myriad of problems, the magnitude of which Jomini and his contemporary leaders could not have imagined. With the lethality of modern weapons the prospect of a global nuclear war looms over every man, woman, and child. In addition, the science of war has evolved into a continuum ranging from low intensity unconventional conflict to global nuclear holocaust. With this diversity of capabilities the combat leader of today must be adept in all aspects of the art of his profession.

The military profession of today must rely, as it always has, on the strength of its leaders. These leaders must be continually developed through a systematic approach to ensure there are capable individuals available at every level of responsibility in the military. To fill the demanding leadership roles required by the diverse nature of today's geopolitical environment, the leaders produced by this system must be able to fully develop a basic set of personal traits similar to the ones described by Jomini over one hundred years ago. In addition, they must develop a set of command leadership traits to complement their personal traits. These sets of traits must be initially taught to our potential junior leaders and then

reinforced by our senior leaders and our institutions.

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The starting point for development of command leadership is with the evolution of the individual. In the military we begin this process by extensive pre-commissioning education programs such as the Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, and the military academies. In these programs numerous courses are designed to fulfill the goal of teaching basic leadership traits to potential leaders. This is accomplished through classroom instruction, role playing exercises, field training exercises, and summer encampments which intensify the learning environment. In the course of the pre-commissioning program each candidate is continually screened for demonstration of the leadership traits he has been taught. Failure to demonstrate these basic traits could result in failure to award a commission. In addition, all commissioned officers today possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree prior to their commission being effected. Many of the basic leadership traits are put to the test by the time an individual has successfully completed his degree and commissioning requirements.

Once an officer is commissioned and enters the active force, he is subject to evaluation, on a periodic basis, against demonstration of a number of leadership traits. The most influential of these traits is a catchall term called leadership. The ability of the individual to be selected for promotion and advanced schooling is based upon these evaluations. Thus all junior leaders are expected to begin to exhibit the basics

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of leadership from the day they are commissioned. This early requirement is usually aimed at the personal leadership traits.

This is the point where senior leaders must fulfill <u>their</u> leadership responsibilities and help to develop junior leaders. First, they must take the time to counsel their subordinates to reinforce the learning process begun earlier. Each individual must know when he is and is not exhibiting the proper leadership traits. Second, the senior leaders must insist that junior leaders continue their individual education process in leadership. This is accomplished by means such as insisting on an ongoing professional reading program, to include readings in the military classics; conducting officer professional development classes; and conducting realistic training exercises in which their junior leaders are placed in leadership positions and are allowed to make mistakes.

The Professional Military Education system in place in the services today has a large portion of the curriculum devoted to the study of leadership. All services have formal in-residence education programs which occur at the company and field grade levels. Historically, it is only in this academic environment that the formal study of the military classics has taken place. This is another place where the study of leadership traits distilled from these same historical references should be infused. This paper is an attempt to meet these perceived needs.

The Professional Military Education system affords one additional opportunity that is often overlooked. The time for taking a hard look at where a person is in his quest to become a leader. This is the time to study leadership traits and compare where you stand in relation to those who have succeeded in the past. Only by the recognition of individual shortcomings can a person determine a course of action to correct the deficiencies. It is then time to rededicate oneself to the attainment of those noble ideals.

In the complex, interdependent world in which we exist today there are many examples of leaders. The author believes every member of the military should constantly be searching for people who exhibit these same characteristics of command leadership which Jomini described in his famous works and are outlined in this paper. The next step is to attempt to emulate these leaders in those traits which have made them successful. Command leadership is usually most visible during wartime, but it certainly exists and is recognized in peacetime as well and we should be constantly on the outlook for it.

Finally, the author believes the history of war since Jomini has proven two things. First, the traits of command leadership are the basic tenets that would make a man successful no matter what his chosen profession. These traits, when they are present in any given individual, act in a synergistic manner to produce a man known to his subordinates, peers, and superiors alike as a leader. And second, each member of the military should endeavor to learn more about his profession and the art of leadership, throughout his life, so he may apply them in every situation with

which he is confronted. The attainment of higher rank should not be his only goal, but instead he should strive to be the best . leader possible at the rank he presently holds.

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