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
P W BOTHA AND THE SPACE RESEARCH CORPORATION:
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Corporation: Clandestine Operations and the Rise of a New
Order in South Africa

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ABSTRACT

Title of Thesis: P.W. Botha, Military Intelligence and the Space Research Corporation: Clandestine Operations and the Rise of a New Order in South Africa

Robert J. Rae, Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence,
January 1986

Thesis Committee Chairman: Arthur L. Prickett, MAJ, USA

→ To maintain its military advantage, South Africa has employed subterfuges to circumvent U.N. arms embargoes. In most instances, the South Africans have relied upon the largesse and cooperation of nations with similar interests or on the venality of individuals, corporations and states. Political prudence as well as the availability of alternatives have encouraged the white regime to avoid clandestine action which directly violates the laws of the United States. While wholesale disregard for international law has not occurred, South Africa has employed clandestine organs of the state, on occasion, to fill urgent requirements.

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
On one occasion, South Africa elected, reluctantly, to

"operate" in and against the United States. The fact that South Africa chose to do so and proved successful is a significant measure of that state's ability to project power beyond its border. The existence of a national capability and the specific circumstances under which it may be employed must be addressed by U.S. decision makers. South Africa has used this capability only under circumstances suggesting national desperation.

CONT 12
This study defines the threshold at which the South African government's use of clandestine agencies to procure arms becomes acceptable. Analysis of South African action in contravention of the 1963 arms embargo reveals that the availability of alternative sources of supply, limited capability to operate overseas and the absence of an external threat served to limit South Africa's need to circumvent clandestinely prohibitions prior to 1976. It is shown that the state was driven to acquire arms not by the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo in 1977 but by the press of events occurring in Southern Africa in 1975. South African military vulnerabilities exhibited in Angola, however, did not precipitate widespread use of clandestine operations to acquire weaponry. Nevertheless, in the case of South African involvement with the Space Research Corporation (SRC), clandestine activities were undertaken to obtain 155mm howitzers and their attendant technology to overcome specific military vulnerabilities made evident on the fields of battle.

The SRC episode, as revealed in this study, is significant not only as a reflection of the mechanics of South African intelligence operations but of considerable value to analysis of dynamics in South African domestic politics to include the rise of a reformist coalition under P.W. Botha.

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P.W. Botha, Military Intelligence and the Space Research
Corporation: Clandestine Operations and the Rise of a New
Order in South Africa

by

Robert J. Rae

APR 28 1986

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INTRODUCTION

On August 2, 1963, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson announced, at the United Nations, the intent of the United States Government to impose voluntarily an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to the Republic of South Africa (RSA). [1] This announcement preceded, by several days, the adoption of a resolution calling upon all U.N. member states to take similar action. [2] This was a call that was to go virtually unheeded for over a decade by several European states. The U.S. action itself came to be viewed by many as more symbolic than effective. On November 4, 1977, following the brutal suppression of black opposition movements in South Africa, the U.N. Security Council moved, albeit reluctantly, to impose a mandatory arms embargo against the white ruled regime in Pretoria. [3]

South Africa's response to the tightening of restrictions was quick and unequivocal. P.W. Botha, then serving as Defence Minister, affirmed the intent of the government to "put up a fight that will astonish" opponents, threatened to place the country on a "war footing", and dismissed the concept of a total boycott as a "dream". [4] Botha claimed that, "As long as we have money, there will always be supplies." [5] Was this

reaction merely the blustering of a people long engaged in a love-hate relationship with the rest of the world or did it constitute a harbinger of actions that would invoke the entire power of the state in the commission of clandestine acts in defiance of the international community? If so, would South Africa be prepared to challenge directly a superpower like the United States by conspiring with its citizens and corporations? Is there any credible evidence to suggest that the South Africans had resorted to such techniques prior to the 1977 embargo? Moreover, could they be expected to do so in the future? If so, under what conditions?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and extent of RSA governmental involvement in the illegal flow of conventional military arms and technology from the United States during the period leading up to the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo by the U.N. in 1977. To this end, the capabilities of the South African government to effect, on an international scale, national security objectives through the employment of its small, but highly effective, security services are examined. Throughout the paper, the capabilities of this African state, whose powers are oft-times more exaggerated by its foes than its friends, are demythologized and objectively analyzed.

To facilitate the attainment of this objective, a clear understanding must be achieved regarding the inherent

capabilities, as well as limitations, of both the RSA and the U.S. in their relationship with one another and the world at large. A number of cases involving the shipment of arms and military related technology from the United States to South Africa will be examined to better highlight the Republic's need for such equipment, its national capacity to arrange clandestine procurement of such equipment and its proclivities to do so. It is assumed that states resort to clandestine action principally when diplomatic or other open means do not result in satisfaction of objectives. Moreover, both the need and the choice to employ clandestine organizations of the state imply that national interests at stake are vital and that failure to attain these objectives places the nation itself at risk.

What are the risks to South Africa if it becomes public knowledge that it had conducted or is presently conducting clandestine activities in the United States to acquire embargoed munitions or related technology? Further, what value does the white regime place on maintaining a correct, if not always cordial, relationship with America? American investment in South Africa is sizeable from the South African perspective. Over three hundred major American firms actively trade and profit from business arrangements with the Republic. [6] Considerable pressure exists on these companies to divest or otherwise sever their financial relationships with Pretoria. [7] To

date, the economic loss resulting directly from such pressure has been absorbable by the RSA.

It is fortunate for the minority government that the body politic in the United States has not yet been moved to support wide-ranging economic sanctions against the regime. Such a decision could ultimately spell disaster for a nation dependent upon outside markets for its strategic minerals and as a source for critical petro-chemicals. [8] Moreover, it is the financial well being of the state which provides a sense of progress and contributes, in part, to forestalling domestic unrest. The ultimate success of the black homelands policy, for example, is directly keyed to sustained economic growth. But perhaps most important is that the nation is bound psychologically by a need to achieve acceptance among the developed nations of the West and with its leader, the U.S. The Afrikaners, rhetoric aside, have no real desire to "go it alone."

The Afrikaners, considered by many to be a uniquely African tribe, perceive of themselves as Europeans carrying the mantle of civilization in Africa. Internally, the white society embraces western values of democracy. The whites see themselves as woefully misunderstood and conceive of their problems with the rest of the western world as emanating not from any immoral adherence to racism but, rather, from the failure of the west to grasp the true nature of communist expansion in Africa. [9] The white South African wants to be accepted and needs outside

assurances that he is, indeed, the defender of the faith; in religious, political and cultural terms.

Certainly, the Afrikaner elite recognizes the precarious nature of its position vis-a-vis the rest of the world. It must be logically assumed, then, that national security policy decisions are characterized by practicality, rationality and intense assessment of risk albeit colored by uniquely Afrikaner views of the contemporary world environment. Bearing this in mind, illegal munitions shipments to South Africa which suggest tacit or active official South African involvement must be closely examined in an attempt to clearly delineate the nature and scope of that government's complicity, if any. The political ramifications for both the U.S. and South Africa are considerable given the ultimate commitment of the United States to full black political participation as well as the desperate position of Pretoria which such actions suggest.

Considering the possible scope of adverse reactions, the South African government would logically be reluctant to involve routinely state organs in the commission or fostering of activities illegal under U.S. law. This is not to infer that either the scope or enforcement of U.S. embargoes have been uniformly successful in preventing military equipment or technology from reaching South Africa. Clearly, as the evidence reveals, this has not been the case. The intent, rather, is to define the

threshold at which the South African government would accept the risks, forsake a variety of other alternatives and directly challenge the United States by disregarding its laws and conducting clandestine operations within its territory. It is important, before examining more closely specific instances in which this may have been the case, to examine briefly the alternatives available to the South Africans to meet national defense objectives shy of clandestine activity.

CHAPTER ONE

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 1963 ARMS EMBARGO

Alternatives to Clandestine Operations

The imposition of economic sanctions by a state or group of states against another nation is a complex operation even in its simplest form. Both the value and the utility of embargoes in international relations have invariably been difficult to assess since their effectiveness is, by its nature, limited. This is due, in part, because direct results can most often only be measured, not in lost capabilities, but rather in terms of added costs borne by the target state. These increased expenses are a direct result of the need to develop alternative, often less cost-effective, means of acquiring embargoed commodities. This situation is no more true than in the case of the arms embargoes imposed upon the Republic of South Africa. Moreover, not only does the imposition of an embargo adversely impact on the target state but such action frequently results in loss to the imposing nation. Perhaps most important, however, is that the use of embargoes encourages independence and self-sufficiency in the target country and results in an erosion, over time, of the very influence enjoyed by the imposing states.

Sanctions, then, are a two way street extracting costs not only on the target country but on the nations imposing the embargoes. Secondary effects may also occur resulting in the solidification of the very attitudes which the sanctions are designed to change by providing the target government with a focus for channeling, in a positive fashion, domestic frustrations. Unless the embargoing states are willing to support a comprehensive embargo which escalates costs to an unacceptable level then the sanctions may be viewed as merely symbolic, useful only as a political statement and treated as such by their critics. Certainly, this has been the case with the 1963 U.N. embargo on the shipment or sale of military goods and equipment to South Africa.

Nevertheless, in spite of the seemingly blatant disregard of these voluntary sanctions, particularly on the part of several major Western European nations, the United States made a conscious effort to abide, through several administrations, with the spirit of the 1963 embargo. [1] Critics may rightfully point to the political maneuvering of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and others prior to the imposition of the sanctions in an effort to limit the impact of the embargo on their interests. [2] Yet, there is scant evidence to support the position that the United States intentionally disregarded the resolution once adopted by the U.N.

The United States and its citizens, perhaps more than

any other nation in modern times, adheres to an overly optimistic view of the effectiveness of economic sanctions and embargoes. This is partially due to America's misconception that she enjoys a greater market share of the world economy than is actually the case. There are basic forces at work in a global marketplace such as the availability of alternative suppliers, price, degree of self-sufficiency and, of course, demand (the hopes of many political and social scientists notwithstanding) which play a greater role in limiting the effectiveness of economic sanctions than do moral imperatives regardless of their inherent correctness. This is not to imply that sanctions have no place in the lexicon of the politician but rather to suggest that they must be used with an objective view as to what they can accomplish either singly or in combination with other political actions.

Thus, it was both for moral and political reasons that the United States announced in August of 1963, its intent to impose voluntarily an embargo on the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa. This announcement was followed a few days later by the Security Council's passage of U.N. Resolution 181. This resolution called upon all member states to "voluntarily" impose an embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa. [3] Interestingly enough, Great Britain and France abstained from voting on this issue but subsequently agreed, with caveats covering the exemption of pre-1963

sales deals, to expansion of the resolution to include the sale of equipment which could be used in the manufacture of arms and military equipment. [4]

With relatively few exceptions, over the next decade or more, the United States, Canada and West Germany complied with the provisions of the resolution. During this same period, the United Kingdom, which had long enjoyed a special economic, cultural and historic relation with the African state, decreased its military relationship with South Africa. [5] Other European nations such as France and Italy, however, made little pretense of their blatant disregard for the act and moved instead to take advantage of an expanding RSA governmental market for Western arms. In addition, U.S. equipment and technology filtered into South Africa through arrangements with a number of third parties. Italy, in particular, became a major source of U.S. arms technology. [6]

South Africa, for its part, moved to establish relationships with other U.S. "friends" whose politico-military relationship with Washington had deteriorated principally as a result of authoritarian internal policies. [7] It is important to examine some of these arrangements in order to gain an appreciation for the relationship which was to develop between the U.S. and South Africa and to gain a clearer understanding of any actions during this timeframe which indicate the use of South African intelligence services in the United States for the specific

purpose of acquiring embargoed materiel.

During the years preceding the 1963 resolution, Great Britain served as Pretoria's major source of foreign military equipment. [8] In 1963, Britain specifically voiced, along with France, its intent to fulfill existing contracts as well as proposed contracts negotiated and signed with the white regime before the 1963 embargo. [9] The British felt that it was not in their national interest to precipitously sever their longstanding relationship with the South Africans given the economic realities of the situation. Even today, for example, Great Britain relies upon South Africa for nearly fourteen percent of its foreign earnings. [10] British military planners were also concerned with the impact on national defense of any loss of influence over Pretoria given its strategic proximity to important British as well as global sea routes. [11]

Yet, as haphazard as the British enforcement of the 1963 resolution may have been, it was characterized by a gradual lessening of British military involvement with South Africa. By 1975, for example, the British had terminated a significant naval presence at Simonstown. [12] In the early seventies, the British arranged to transfer to the South African Navy a few anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters and some British firms remained significant investors in local ammunition producing firms. [13] Nevertheless, the British government's increased adherence to the arms embargoes is estimated to have cost the United

Kingdom some \$240 million in additional sales. [14] With the gradual tightening of British policy and a stricter adherence to the embargo by the United States, the South Africans turned elsewhere to meet their needs.

The South Africans found France to be a willing source of western arms during this period. From 1965-1974, the sub-Saharan state spent an estimated \$360 million for foreign arms with some \$225 million of that sum paid to the French. [15] The French not only made direct sales to the South Africans but agreed to license production of small arms, missiles and aircraft in the country. [16] All the while, the French justified such sales to black African nations by stating that sales to the RSA funded French assistance in other areas of Africa. [17] France's close and continuing relationship with the South Africans precipitated speculation, during the Nigerian civil war, that France was using South Africa as a processing point for the clandestine transshipment of arms to friendly black African states as well as opposition movements in support of French political aims. [18] By 1968, the RSA had become France's third largest weapons customer following Israel and Belgium. [19]

The French also served as a convenient route for South Africa's acquisition of both U.S. and British technology. In 1966, France sold nine TRANSALL transport aircraft to South Africa. The planes were equipped with British Rolls-Royce engines made by Hispano-Suiza in France and by

Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnberg in West Germany. [20] That same year, the U.S. successfully blocked the sale of several MYSTERE-20 executive jets which were equipped with General Electric produced engines. [21] It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of the quantity of the French sales, the RSA continued to opt, whenever possible, for U.S. or British equipment. [22] By far, their most lucrative source of such equipment was the Italians.

South African arms dealers established and maintained a close relationship with Aeronautic Macchi of Italy, an aircraft firm which is partly owned by Lockheed International, a subsidiary of the U.S. Lockheed Corporation. [23] Lockheed owns a twenty percent share in the Italian firm but does not have a controlling interest. [24] Since 1966, the RSA has produced the MB-326 close air support aircraft under license from the firm. [25] Some of these planes were originally purchased outright from the Italians and were equipped with Bristol-Siddeley engines made under British license by Piaggio, another Italian firm. [26] Piaggio also sold the white minority government nineteen P-166 Albatross coastal patrol craft made under license by the firm. [27] In 1968, the U.S. Department of State ruled that the Piaggio P-166 and the Aeromacchi AM3C fell outside the embargo. [28] In 1974 or 75, some twenty-five Italian-made Huey helicopters are believed to have reached Rhodesia through the South Africans. [29] In addition to the Italians and the French, others also sold

military equipment to the South Africans.

In 1967, approximately \$20 million dollars in illicit arms trafficking was conducted through Switzerland with some sixty percent of the transactions managed by firms doing business with the RSA. [30] In November of 1963, the Berne government itself agreed to the sale of several Oerlikon anti-aircraft batteries and ammunition. [31] The deal was subsequently cancelled due to public outrage over the incident. [32] There is also some speculation that, from 1966-1969, West German intelligence was involved in shipping arms to South Africa. [33] U.S. designed V-150 Commando armored personnel carriers (APCs) may also have made their way to the RSA through an unlicensed firm in Portugal. [34]

From 1963 to the imposition of mandatory arms embargo by the U.N. on South Africa in 1977, a large quantity of military equipment was transferred both directly and indirectly to South Africa. Yet, in spite of the large dollar amounts of the sales, a closer examination reveals that much of the equipment, particularly aircraft, actually more readily fits in the category of dual-use equipment. The South Africans were, in fact, turning, during this period, from the outright purchase of military equipment overseas towards the acquisition of production technology. [35] The Afrikaner regime, conscious of the long-term consequences of the arms embargo, were moving, as quickly as possible, towards self-sufficiency in arms production.

Although South Africa continued to purchase arms and equipment from the Western European states, the government realized that this link was very tenuous and subject to interruption given the vagaries of superpower politics. [36] The potential also existed for a waning of French or Italian interest in dealing with South Africa based, as it tended to be, on short-term profit taking. Nevertheless, from Pretoria's perspective, the flow of Western arms and technology remained vital and needed to be preserved to the greatest extent possible until self-sufficiency might be achieved. Flagrant disregard of the arms embargo, however, would have a counter-productive effect and might well endanger fragile links with Western firms willing to narrowly define the limits of the U.N. embargo particularly in the dual-use arena. The resultant policy for the South Africans was a logical one - increase self-production rapidly and ally with other nations whose long-term interests were more compatible with those of the Afrikaner state. The second goal gave impetus to the establishment of what has come to be known as the Fourth World.

Also known as the "international outcasts league", this group of nations with seemingly disparate national interests, developed, in the late sixties and early seventies, a bond based upon a shared alienation from the United States. [37] This bond resulted directly from the growing concern among the U.S. voting public that America

had allied itself too closely with "repressive" regimes. Originally composed of South Africa, Israel, Taiwan, South Korea and the Shah's Iran, this loose amalgamation of states began to explore areas of mutual interest. The growing RSA lobby in the United States, for example, sought closer ties with the powerful Taiwan lobby and the two governments discussed the possibility of arms sales. [38] Scholars even philosophized about the logic behind such an alliance and speculated about its potential power given South Africa's control of substantial mineral reserves, the technological prowess of the Israelis, and the manufacturing potential of Taiwan and Korea. [39] Although relations between these states, with the exception of Iran, remain strong today, a binding alliance has yet to reach fruition. Nevertheless, South Africa established and maintains vital connections for its military and defense industry particularly with the state of Israel. [40] The Israeli-South African relationship has blossomed and Israel now stands as a principal source of U.S. military equipment and technology. [41] This relationship was cultivated and subsequently nurtured by both governments in the early seventies.

It is readily apparent that the Israeli-RSA military link extends well beyond the mere provision of dual-use equipment. In 1975, the Israelis, with U.S. permission, sent counter-insurgency trainers to the African state. [42] The Israelis have sold the South Africans missile patrol

boats, U-21 aircraft, SHAFIR missiles and nuclear related technology. [43] The relationship is not solely limited to the defense arena and is, by no means, one-sided. Thousands of Israelis have emigrated to the Republic including specialists with military skills. [44] South Africa's Jewish population, which exceeds an estimated 120,000, has contributed over \$20 million dollars to the state of Israel. [45] Pretoria sells some 40,000 tons of coal to Israel per month and supplies steel which is used to make armor for the Merkava (Chariot) tank. [46] By 1978, Israel was modernizing the South African Defense Force (SADF) armor branch by armor plating some 150 Centurion tanks. [47] Israel has also provided a variety of sophisticated electronic equipment to include electric fences, radar, alarm systems, communications gear and computer equipment. [48]

Although Israel stated that it would honor the 1977 mandatory arms embargo, there is evidence to suggest that the Israeli government violated this pledge. In 1978, Israel sold twenty-five AB205A helicopters produced by Construzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta to a helicopter chartering firm in Singapore following approval by the U.S. State Department. [49] The helicopters, manufactured in the United States by Bell Helicopters and powered by AVCO-LYCOMING T-53 engines, subsequently turned up in South Africa. [50] Of the five breaches of U.S. end-user regulations from 1976-1978, four were traced to the

Israelis. [51] The Israeli connection also meshed well with internal developments in the Republic's arms industry leading towards self-sufficiency.

In May 1968, the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) was established by the South African government at an initial cost of R100 million (U.S.\$100 million). The firm was founded ostensibly as a private corporation in which the government would be the major shareholder. [52] In 1977, ARMSCOR and the government Armaments Production Board were integrated with ARMSCOR assuming primacy over all arms production activity in the nation. [53] By 1981, ARMSCOR had developed into a parastatal organization employing some 25,000 people and consuming approximately \$1.8 billion (70% of the defense budget) in contracts with over 800 domestic firms. [54] By late 1984, assets had grown to R1,400 million with 33,000 employed in nine subsidiaries dealing with over 1,000 domestic subcontractors to produce equipment for the SADF. [55] ARMSCOR, through various licensing arrangements with foreign governments, presently produces assault rifles, small planes, ammunition, armored personnel carriers (APCs), heavy artillery, missiles and a wide range of spare parts. [56]

By the early 1980s, ARMSCOR had become an arms exporter marketing artillery in Europe and shipping combat support equipment (e.g. HF radios) to Third World buyers such as Argentina. [57] Although today some 70 or 80% of

South Africa's arms needs can be met by ARMSCOR, this was not always the case. Moreover, South Africa continues to remain one of the largest importers of arms in sub-Saharan Africa. [58] South Africa must still rely on others as sources for the acquisition of warships, fighters/long-range support aircraft, sophisticated communications equipment and military related computer support systems. [59] Indeed, much of the importation of equipment in the sixties and early seventies fell into these categories.

South Africa, then, diligently sought to meet its military shortfalls through a dual approach. Equipment and technology was imported from countries with liberal interpretations of the 1963 arms embargoes while a domestic production capability was concurrently developed. All the while, the RSA retained its proclivity to acquire western arms primarily of U.S. origin and design. When South Africa purchased abroad, the deals remained confidential for obvious reasons. However, there is little evidence to suggest that the South Africans were engaged in any massive, clandestine effort to acquire illicitly the equipment. There existed no real need to resort to illegal means given the willingness of foreign governments or firms to discretely sell their arms and hardware. In addition, South Africa faced no significant military threat. The loopholes inherent in the 1963 embargo and the absence of a national security service capable of efficiently developing overseas operations to acquire foreign materiel further

CHAPTER TWO

THE UNITED STATES AND THE EMBARGOES

Legal Avenues

The United States has observed, since 1963, a voluntary arms embargo on the shipment of military equipment and related dual-use technologies to the Republic of South Africa. President Carter extended the ban to include the export of all types of defense material and equipment to the South African military and police forces pursuant to mandatory arms embargoes imposed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 418 in 1977. [1] Although logically it would seem that the passage of the compulsory arms embargo in 1977 was the critical historical event prompting the RSA to adopt illegal arms acquisition policies, in reality, events occurring two years prior had prompted the Afrikaners to conclude that the conduct of clandestine operations would be necessary.

The 1977 arms embargo, like its 1963 predecessor, did not precipitate a wave of international illegality and impropriety on the part of the South Africans. Rather, the South Africans used clandestine operations to acquire arms and technology only when faced with the absence of other

viable alternatives and only when the state considered itself in a position of long-term vulnerability. In addition to evaluating characteristics of U.S.-South African arms trade during the years following the 1963 embargoes, it is also useful both to examine and categorize the nature of these sales. Michael T. Klare, in his 1981 article in the Journal of International Affairs entitled "Evading the Embargo: Illicit U.S. Arms Transfers to South Africa" categorizes arms transfers under three headings: Third Country Transfers, "Gray Area" sales, and Illegal Corporate Sales. [2]

Third Country Transfers refers to those transactions in which U.S. designed equipment, or foreign equipment with American components, is sold to South Africa by foreign firms producing under U.S. license. [3] To a large measure, this type of sale has been addressed above in the analysis of alternative suppliers available to the African government in Europe and elsewhere abroad. Gray Area sales encompass the shipment of what has, in recent years, come to be known as dual-use equipment. [4] Such equipment, often not specifically designed for military use, may have military applications and, at a minimum, directly contributes to the strategic power of the state. Generally speaking, such equipment or technology consists of transport planes, helicopters or other vehicles, communications systems, computers and related technologies. [5] As one might expect, it is within this broad category

that the vast bulk of transfers to South Africa fall. To find concrete evidence of South Africa's use of its national security establishment to circumvent directly the arms embargoes within the U.S., it is necessary to examine the third category - Illegal Corporate Sales. But first it may be useful to review briefly the evolution of U.S.-South African trade in the arms arena.

Following the imposition of the arms embargoes, the U.S. Commerce Department promulgated, in 1964, specific guidelines covering the sale and shipment of military materiel to white South Africa. [6] The 1964 regulations banned the sale of combat systems to the military, paramilitary and police as well as limited the sale of equipment specifically designed for the production or maintenance of arms and ammunition. [7] Nevertheless, as Klare among others points out, U.S. companies remained free to sell other equipment not specifically addressed by the regulations which could still be used "predominantly...by military forces." [8] Over the next decade, ambiguity in these regulations allowed each administration "to tighten or loosen the embargo selectively in response to changing national policies." [9] The 1964 guidelines, for example, allowed for the sale of all types of marine equipment as well as exempted many previously existing contracts from compliance, an action which accounted for some \$30 million in sales from 1963-1973. [10] On the other hand, U.S. business lost some \$60 million in orders which the Commerce

Department turned down. [11]

The U.S., during the same period, sold some \$27 million in spare parts for C-130 aircraft which were contracted for prior to the 1963 embargoes and also assisted in the installation of a military communications system at Simonstown, South Africa's largest naval installation. [12] President Johnson insisted on close scrutiny of the trade in dual-use equipment during his tenure in office. [13] President Nixon, following the advice of Henry Kissinger, relaxed controls over the sale of dual-use commodities. [14] The Nixon policy toward Southern Africa, embodied in National Security Study Memorandum 39, often referred to as the "Tar-Baby Option", foreshadowed the present-day Reagan "constructive engagement" approach to relations with South Africa. [15] It should, nevertheless, be pointed out that every U.S. administration since Kennedy has adhered to the letter of the UN arms embargoes, the sale of dual-use equipment notwithstanding. Secretary of State Rogers, in his 1970 statement on U.S. policy towards Africa outlined the Nixon administration policy as follows:

"Our relations with the Republic of South Africa have been a matter of particular attention. We do not believe cutting our ties with this rich, troubled land would advance the cause we pursue or help the majority of the people of that country. We continue to make known to them and the world our strong views on apartheid. We are maintaining our arms embargo. We oppose their continued administration of Namibia (Southwest Africa) and their implementation of apartheid and other repressive legislation there. We will continue to make clear that our

limited governmental activities in South Africa do not represent any acceptance or condoning of its discriminatory system." [16]

In actuality, then, even under the Nixon administration, an administration which took a more conciliatory approach towards relations with South Africa, the U.S. refused to license the sale of military aircraft or large transport planes. [17] But, as administration spokesmen were to point out, the government would consider granting licenses for the sale of limited numbers of small, unarmed executive aircraft. [18] Others, outside the administration, however, took the government to task for "sub-rosa alliance with forces of racism" as well as for the "relaxation of the arms embargo to permit the sale of light aircraft to the South African military..." [19]

According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, dual-use aircraft sales doubled from a 1960's average of \$30 million to almost \$60 million a year between 1971 and 1973. [20] By 1974-1976, such sales averaged some \$170 million. [21] Klare indicates that, by 1978, some 152 of South Africa's 352 frontline aircraft were of U.S. design with only 42 of these received prior to the imposition of the embargoes. [22] Although these statistics include aircraft acquired through third country arrangements, the figures nonetheless support the contention that South Africa has consistently sought and

succeeded in acquiring Western equipment to serve as the mainstay for its forces. A principal point here, however, is that the U.S. should not be held fully accountable for such third country sales or transfers given the impracticalities of enforcing its laws extra-territorially, a problem that continues to plague present-day enforcement efforts designed to restrict the flow of dual-use equipment to the Communist bloc.

During this period, then, U.S. firms did sell aircraft with dual-use capabilities to the RSA. In 1973, the Export-Import Bank guaranteed loans for the sale of a number of Beechcraft twin-engine planes to South African buyers. [23] The U.S. Army uses a military version of the plane to train its pilots. [24] In March 1976, the Export-Import Bank similarly guaranteed a loan in the amount of \$163,000 for the purchase of Helio-Aircraft Model 295 Super-Couriers by South African purchasers. [25] This aircraft is a small STOL craft suitable for operations in rugged terrain. [26] The argument against the sale of such aircraft is that South Africa maintains a very large reserve force known as the Commando. The Commando is, in essence, a militia force with roots in the Boer War. [27] The aircraft, even in private hands, can be used in counter-insurgency operations or otherwise nationalized by the state in a declared emergency. [28] The point has some merit. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that South Africa has a highly developed economy and that the principal use of such

aircraft is normally that for which they were designed, the shuttling of senior executives and other business or personal uses.

Such sales constituted only a small part of the growing trade relationship between the United States and South Africa during this period. From 1960-1976, U.S. exports grew from some \$288 million to \$1,350 million. [29] The book value of U.S. investments doubled from \$411 million to \$868 million. [30] Well over three hundred U.S. firms, including one-half found on the Fortune 500 list, established local offices to conduct business in South Africa. [31] From South Africa's perspective, U.S. investment has grown to account for nearly 17% of all foreign holdings in the country. [32] There, U.S. firms presently employ over 100,000 South African citizens and the U.S. has developed into South Africa's second major trading partner following the United Kingdom. [33]

With the exception of the transfer of clearly military equipment such as the delivery of C-130 Hercules aircraft exempted from the 1963 embargo by President Kennedy, the subsequent authorized sale of 15 Lockheed L-100s (civilian version of the C-130), and the sale of executive type aircraft, U.S. sales of military equipment to South Africa during the 1963-1975 period were negligible. [34] Trade between the two countries did expand briskly. But, unless a very liberal interpretation is applied to the term dual-use, the South Africans did not acquire large quantities of

military equipment directly from the United States. Nor is there any credible evidence to suggest that a massive South African campaign was underway to acquire equipment through clandestine means.

There was no pressing need for the South Africans to undertake widescale clandestine actions since the acquisition of most equipment could be effected discretely through third parties, principally in Europe. [35] In the case of Gray-Area Sales and Third-Country Transfers, the conditions existed which allowed the South Africans to amass a considerable arsenal as well as develop an indigenous capability to support most of the country's military needs by the mid-seventies. [36] Gray Area Sales and Third Country Transfers suited the South Africans well up to and even beyond 1975 for all but its most critical needs. In 1975, however, a cataclysmic series of events occurred which would drastically shake Afrikaner confidence and make clandestine acquisition of specific weaponry a virtual necessity from the South African perspective. Before addressing these events and their causes, it is necessary to examine evidence that the South Africans did, indeed, mount a clandestine operation against and through the United States to acquire specific weapons systems and ammunition.

Illicit Arms Transfers in the United States

As has been illustrated, the South African government had a number of options available to acquire requisite munitions and related technologies short of direct illegal activities in the United States. On occasion, however, incidents appear to have arisen where the RSA government may have believed that the risk was minimal or that the gain far outweighed the possible consequences. Several cases involving the illicit transfer of arms to South Africa have occurred in the United States which have been cited by some as evidence not only of the inherent weakness of the U.S. arms embargoes but as reflections of a nefarious willingness on the part of the white South African regime to employ its national capabilities in flagrant violation of international standards of behavior. [37] It will be shown that, in reality, few of these cases actually reflect concerted clandestine efforts on the part of the South African regime as might logically be expected given the inherent political risks of such an undertaking.

The United States implements its control over the export of embargoed items, enumerated on an annually updated munitions control list, under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 and in accordance with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). [38] The

State Department's Office of Munitions Control manages the munitions list. This office is assisted in its tasks relating to the granting of valid export licenses for the shipment of arms and related materiel by the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Defense and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Coordination is accomplished pursuant to the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 and various Export Administration Regulations (EAR). [39] Under the EAR, Commerce maintains a commodities control list covering both military as well as non-military goods and technologies for which a valid export license is required. [40] In general terms, even prior to the actual implementation of some of the legislation cited above, a corporation or individual wishing to export controlled items had to first obtain an export license for the commodity and, in the case of munitions, certify that the final destination and use of the items conformed to U.S. law and regulation. [41] This is accomplished through the execution of an end-user's certificate.

Investigative responsibility for violation of these various rules and regulations rests primarily with the U.S. Customs Service although Commerce maintains a very small enforcement staff. [42] In recent years, enforcement efforts have been strengthened with all branches and departments of the government enjoined to assist the Customs Service in its effort to stem the flow of defense

and defense-related technology from the United States. [43] It is these laws and regulations that the South Africans, or individuals acting in their behalf, must violate to acquire military arms and ammunition in direct contravention of U.S. arms embargoes.

A large market exists in the Republic of South Africa for a wide variety of firearms. A white population of some 4.2 million possesses over 1.25 million registered weapons, most of which command two to three times the U.S. retail price. [44] A combination of high prices, a seemingly ever-expanding market and perceived lax enforcement of regulations has fostered violations of U.S. law by individuals and corporations seeking profits. In March 1978, the Olin Corporation, parent to Winchester International, pleaded nolo contendere, over strenuous objection by government prosecutors, to a 21 count federal indictment charging the firm with filing some 20 fraudulent statements and illegally shipping 3,200 sporting rifles along with 20 million rounds of ammunition to the RSA. [45] Olin employees knowingly entered into arrangements with a South African gun dealer to ship weapons to brokers in Greece, Austria, Mozambique and the Canary Islands. [46] The guns were subsequently transshipped to the African nation for sale to retailers. [47] Olin executives later claimed that they were unaware of the acts which took place from 1971-1975 under the aegis of employees in the company's Winchester Division. [48] These employees were

fired in 1976 following an internal company investigation.
[49]

On March 30, 1978, Olin was fined \$10,000 and required to establish a local charitable organization for the distribution of \$500,000 in tax-deductible donations, an arrangement which was questioned in light of company profits on the arms deals which are estimated to have reached \$700,000 per year. [50] Additional objections were raised when the Treasury Department granted Olin a special Treasury Department waiver allowing convicted felons to continue the production and sale of firearms. [51] In 1976, a Colt Industries export manager, Walter S. Plouman, was similarly charged with illegally exporting, in 1974 and 1975, 135 handguns to South Africa using dummy firms in Greece, the Canary Islands and West Germany. [52] Mr. Plouman received a one year prison sentence for his actions. [53]

Evidence exists to suggest that smaller firms were also involved in supplying the seemingly unquenchable thirst among the white minority for non-military small arms. In August 1978, a South African gun dealer, Richard Beck of Aimcom Ltd, Bryanston, South Africa and Seymour G. Freilich, Secretary Treasurer of Concealable Body Armor of America, Inc., a supplier of police equipment in Oak Park, Michigan, were indicted for attempting to smuggle \$310,000 in small arms from Chicago's O'Hare International Airport in crates marked playground and underwater equipment. [54]

In the cases discussed above, export documents were falsified and all parties concerned knew that they were dealing with South African gun dealers. The Americans claimed that the U.S. State Department routinely "winked" at such transactions and, certainly, RSA customs officials turned a blind eye to the importation of the goods. [55] No evidence exists, however, to suggest that the South African government, in any way, masterminded the effort. Greed, not politics, served as the principal motivator. It is interesting to note, however, that in the Olin and Colt cases, the actual recipient of the arms was a large South African dealer in Durban, Joan Taylor Enterprises, an innocuous sounding company if ever there was one. [56] American firms were not the only ones to supply this huge market. Soviet and Czechoslovakian shotguns and handguns, for example, also flooded into the South African marketplace and continue to do so. [57]

The mere fact that the full power of the state is not brought to bear to acquire arms for the civilian marketplace does not suggest either an innocence or naivete on the part of the South African government. Sufficient evidence exists to infer that Pretoria has used a variety of subterfuges in dealing with U.S. corporations so as to indirectly circumvent the arms embargoes. Polaroid Corporation severed its business links with a South African distributor, Frank and Hirsch, when it learned that, in

violation of a 1971 agreement, its film was being placed in unmarked cartons, loaded in unmarked vans and delivered to military headquarters outside Pretoria. [58] There, the film was used for identity passes designed to control the movement of blacks under the notorious Pass Laws. [59] Billing and payment for the film was handled through a Johannesburg pharmacy with no overt connections with the government. [60]

Other U.S. firms, in contrast, appear less noble than Polaroid in their dealings with the South African government. Internal company memorandums acquired by the news media suggest that Control Data Corp. of Minneapolis may have knowingly supplied, in 1978, computer subsystems to a British firm. The systems were subsequently included in a computer system destined for South African Police use. [61] The British firm, International Computers Ltd., was fined \$15,000 by the U.S. for including two Control Data disk drives in its sale of equipment to the RSA. [62] During the same timeframe, the U.S. government blocked the shipment of a Sanders Associates ocean surveillance computer system. Nevertheless, the system turned up in South Africa, perhaps shipped into the country in parts. [63] None of these deals, save for the Polaroid action, attest to a high level of corporate ethics. Yet, none offer concrete evidence of the loss of advanced U.S. military equipment or technology with the concurrent complicity of the South African government. In other

cases, however, the hand of the RSA government is more apparent.

In 1978, the RSA possessed few heavy mortars. [64] Yet, two years later, it had acquired some 200 122mm guns, 15 M7105 self-propelled systems, 40 155mm towed weapons, 50 M109A1 howitzers and several FMC Corp. M113 APCs, probably obtained through Oto Melara in Italy. [65] What drove the South Africans to concentrate on the acquisition of heavy, mobile artillery equipment and armored vehicles? Evidence shows that specific events, which South Africa viewed as a major threat to national security, propelled the Afrikaner regime to obtain specific weapons systems in these categories. Moreover, additional data suggests that the South African government acted not merely as the passive recipient of these systems but rather orchestrated their acquisition abroad and, in at least one instance, entered into clandestine arrangements with an American corporation to circumvent illegally the U.S. arms embargoes. It is also clear that, in that incident, the South African government acted in a rational manner seeking to limit any possible damage to fragile U.S.-South African relationships had South African involvement in the operation become apparent. Other events occurring before and after this incident serve to highlight its significance.

In 1981, U.S. customs agents arrested six individuals in connection with a scheme to smuggle \$1.2 million in military equipment out of the United States. [66] Customs

Agents seized, at a privately owned terminal at Houston International Airport, a Boeing 707 belonging to an Austrian charter firm containing 1,140 M-16 automatic rifles, 89 9-millimeter automatic pistols, 111 .45 caliber handguns, 40 smaller pistols, 100 grenade launchers and some 15,000 M-16 magazines. [67] Export documents, later proved to be false, indicated shipment of mechanical parts to the Sudan. [68] Yet, a flight plan had been filed for a Houston-Johannesburg run. [69] Customs arrested four airline crewman and two British nationals, Peter Towers and John Parks, described as "middlemen who came to the United States to buy firearms." [70]

The air charter firm, Montana Austria, claimed to have been commissioned by Servotech, a company registered in Lichtenstein and Khartoum, Sudan. [71] The investigation was initiated when a former Border Patrol Agent working as an international arms dealer informed Customs that he had seen a false end-user's certificate. [72] Montana Austria executives claimed that they had requested proper documents for a shipment of "rifles" but had received assurances from Servotech that the cargo consisted only of "harmless steel fabricates." [73]

Whether the arms were ultimately destined for the South African Defense Forces, or more likely for the use of such groups as the Mozambique National Resistance, widely known to be covertly aided by the RSA, remains speculative at best. [74] Yet, the circumstantial linkages of false

documents, British nationals, European dummy firms and final or transit destination of Johannesburg strongly suggest some degree of sub rosa RSA involvement. [75] A few years earlier, an even more ambitious clandestine transfer of arms occurred in which South African government complicity was clearly evident. In fact, by late 1984, RSA officials, well within the confines of the country's strict security disclosure rules, admitted to the orchestration of the operation. [76]

In 1978, the United States, Great Britain and Canada investigated the charge that a Canadian-American firm, Space Research Corporation (SRC), had shipped to the Afrikaners, over a period of several years, some 40,000 special long-range howitzer shells, 155mm weapons systems and auxiliary radar systems via ports in Canada, Antigua and Spain. [77] The British television program "Panorama" initially uncovered the story which led to the indictment of SRC corporate officers on charges of knowingly circumventing Canadian and American laws. [78] On March 25, 1980, SRC President Gerald V. Bull pleaded guilty to violating the arms embargo in U.S. court. [79] Bull and Rodgers L. Gregory, the company's chief operating officer, could have, but did not, receive prison terms. [80] In August 1980, SRC of Quebec was fined \$55,000 for violations of Canadian law. [81] The company pleaded guilty to the shipment of 33,000 shells and parts to the RSA from October 1976 through September 1978. [82] False documents had been

filed with the Canadians on shipments originating from Canadian ports listing Spain, Antigua and Barbados as ultimate destinations. [83]

Not only had the systems and shells been transported, it came to light, but the corporation also provided the South Africans with R&D data which eventually led to the production, in 1981, of their own gun system, a field system designated the G-5 howitzer and its follow-on the G-6 self-propelled system. [84] In 1983, ARMSCOR fielded prototypes of the G-6 system which carries a G-5 155mm gun mounted on a six wheel chassis capable of high maneuverability at speeds of up to 60 mph. [85]

Initially, the company denied all charges with its spokesman declaring,

"The company does not ship and never has shipped any military material to South Africa or to any other African state. Nor, in fact, does it ship shell casings to any state anywhere in the world except under export permit by the government." [86]

Spokesmen later admitted to the possibility that 13,000 "inert" shells sent to Spain in 1977 could have ended up elsewhere. [87] In spite of company denials, events proved a somewhat different story.

Investigation revealed that from March to May 1977, two shiploads of shells left the Canadian port of St.

John's in New Brunswick bound for Antigua aboard the Tugelaland, a West German registered vessel under contract to SAFMARINE, the South African government controlled merchant marine organization. [88] In August 1977, the Tugelaland picked up some 10,000 shells in St. John's and transported them directly to Cape Town. [89] In addition, the investigation subsequently showed an elaborate use of falsified U.S. Army documents from Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, documents which permitted the overland shipment of shells, first to Florida and then to Antigua for transshipment to South Africa. [90] In January 1978, 4,500 shells were trucked from SRC's facilities in Vermont to Cape Canaveral in Florida using the Aberdeen documents which exempted the shipment from normal customs procedures. [91] The ammunition was loaded on the Inagun Cloud and the Star Trek, U.S. merchant vessels under Navy contract. [92] Supposedly, the shells were to be used at SRC testing and firing ranges on Antigua. [93] Some apparently were. [94] However, the bulk of the shells were loaded on a ship bound for South Africa. [95] In March 1978, 21,000 shells left St. John's for Barcelona, Spain on the Dutch ship Breezand. [95] In fact, the ship was destined for Durban where the shells were off-loaded. [96]

In 1968, SRC had received special permission from the US-Canada Border Commission to operate its own customs point which facilitated the shipment of goods from SRC facilities in Canada to the United States without

submission to normal customs procedures. [97] This was a logical request given the fact that SRC properties in North Troy, Vermont actually straddled the border into Highwater, Quebec. [98] Customs ordered its inspectors to stay off SRC property giving rise to speculation that SRC had "special" contracts with the U.S. government. [99] In 1972, SRC and the Societe General de Belgigue (Belgium's Fabrique Nationale) formed SRC International to market 155mm shells abroad. [100] In addition, there are accusations that the CIA may have used the firm to smuggle shells to the South Africans during the Angolan conflict. [101] During the investigation, Antiguan officials warned U.S. Customs officers not to inquire too deeply into SRC business on the island and intimated that the CIA was involved. [102] The CIA was alleged to maintain several facilities on Antigua. [103] Such accusations gave rise to charges of CIA complicity in the schemes. [104]

Further investigation showed that a Mr. John J. Frost, a "defense consultant" with offices in Belgium and the United States had directly recommended SRC to ARMSCOR as a source for 155mm weaponry. [105] It seems that Mr. Frost had previously been employed by the CIA to procure surplus weapons in Europe for shipment to CIA supported anti-communist forces in Angola. [106] The CIA categorically denied assisting the South Africans in any way, a not altogether illogical possibility in light of their previous record in Angola of unwittingly sharing sources with RSA

intelligence. [107] Mr. Frost may well have been employed by the South Africans without the knowledge of the CIA. A CIA spokesman, in denying charges of involvement, stated that,

"(The CIA) did not directly or indirectly give, sell, or otherwise transfer to the Republic of South Africa any such equipment, did not encourage or facilitate others to do so and did not have any advance knowledge of such matters." [108]

However, it is clear that, throughout this effort, the impression was engendered that the activity was CIA sanctioned. [109] It is a virtual certainty, considering the scope as well as the elaborate nature of the SRC scheme, that the entire operation was fully coordinated and controlled by the highest levels within the South African government. Additional speculation, for example, suggests that South Africa may have owned upwards of twenty percent of SRC. [110] The plausibility that the South African government had indeed operated in, or at least through, the United States in these instances was subsequently reinforced by the success enjoyed by U.S. Customs Service agents in sting operations in which they purported to be representatives of the South African services. Although the RSA was not the instigator in one such operation run in 1981 by the U.S. Customs Service in New York, the techniques used and the details of the operation provide interesting insights into the clandestine arms trade.

A New York Times article published in July of 1981 outlines the specifics of a five month "sting" investigation by the U.S. Customs Service into the realm of illegal aircraft shipments to the RSA. [111] The case is illustrative of how such deals can be arranged with U.S. persons or corporations to circumvent the arms embargoes. The opportunity for this operation arose in 1979 when an informant agreed to cooperate with New York city law enforcement officials in exchange for leniency in his own criminal case. [112] Initially, the informant provided introductions for police officials to such notable gunrunners as Frank Terpil. [113] Subsequently, the informant agreed to assist federal agents. [114] Two Customs officers began to pose as representatives of South African intelligence interested in the purchase and shipment of helicopter gunships to the RSA. [115]

In September, 1980, the Customs agents were introduced, at the World Trade Center, to Mr. Jack Holiday, President of Sky Control Incorporated, a Sun Valley, California firm which possessed surplus Augusta Bell UH-1 helicopters. [116] Holiday had purchased the choppers in 1976 for \$150,000 apiece. [117] At the World Trade Center meeting, Holiday agreed to sell the airships and spare parts for the "paltry" sum of \$2.2 million. [118] Later in the deal, Holiday agreed to ship the equipment to the RSA, under false documentation indicating a final destination of

Sumatra, Indonesia where they would purportedly be used to "ferry personnel and logging equipment." [119] By December 1980, Customs had seized the helicopters and by April-May of 1981, had charged Holiday with conspiracy. [120] Holiday pleaded guilty to the charges and received a \$5,000 fine. [121] The informant also provided introductions to two other individuals on the periphery of the international arms black market.

In September 1980, the agents met with one Gideon Schiff, again at the World Trade Center. [122] Schiff, a Toronto resident, holds both Canadian and Israeli citizenship. [123] Schiff agreed to ship the same helicopters mentioned above to the RSA under false documents declaring the goods to be "machine parts" consigned to Switzerland and Portugal. [124] Schiff, for his efforts, sought \$500,000 and claimed boastfully that he had engineered such shipments previously. [125] In May 1981, Schiff was indicted and placed on probation for a year. [126]

Omar Aly Khan, a 64 year old businessman from India carrying a British passport and maintaining residences in London and New York, was also approached by Customs' informant. [127] Khan desired the entire \$2.2 million dollars to smuggle the choppers to the white minority regime. [128] Khan was passed a \$5000 downpayment and promptly arrested. [129] He was subsequently given four years probation. [130]

The Customs case is important, not only for what it shows about the mechanisms of arranging clandestine transfers of arms, but for what it reveals about the plausibility, within the arms trade, of South African intelligence or governmental involvement. Customs officials involved in the operation had little trouble sustaining the plausibility of their cover story. As with the SRC case and the Houston transfer, certain linkages occur notably that of the use of British nationals or Commonwealth residents. Moreover, according to the New York Times article on the investigation,

"...(T)hree other investigations involving arms deals to South Africa and to rebels opposing South Africa in Namibia were aborted when other weapons traders became suspicious of the Government's undercover informant." [131]

In late 1984, the specific question of South African governmental involvement in the SRC case was clarified when, in an interview with International Defense Review magazine, Piet Marais, Chairman of ARMSCOR, the South African government arms combine, outlined the extent of his organization's involvement with the firm. [132] In confirming the involvement of the para-statal arms combine with SRC, Marais stopped short of suggesting that the operation was anything other than an ARMSCOR initiative, an improbable claim considering the nature of South African

security decision making procedures, ARMSCOR's position as a "captured" defense industry combine, and the political situation at the time. [133] Nevertheless, Marais' statement is both important and revealing when viewed as an official statement made in a nation which is extremely sensitive to any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or security related information. Marais recounts the story by addressing both the need for a reliable artillery system and the recognizable RSA concern that such a system was required as soon as possible in light of regional events.

"...In 1975 our people were fighting in Angola using old 5.5-inch artillery pieces which had a range of only about 17km. They were being outgunned by quite a few Russian weapons, and they came back and told us: 'Look, we need a new-generation artillery weapon.' So we started scouting around the world to see what we could buy. We had quite a number of offers, but they were all very long-term to produce the numbers we required, sometimes 10 years, and in many cases the suppliers were frightened off by the compulsory arms embargo which was in the offing. Most importantly, the Army told us they wanted something which could shoot beyond the 26km that the Russian weapons were capable of." [134]

The South Africans were not without their own indigenous capabilities to design theoretically the requisite system but they lacked the sophisticated computer equipment necessary to assist in the development of extended range artillery. [135]

"Then we came across this man Gerry Bull [a dual-national US-Canadian citizen], who had a company called SRC in

Canada and who also had new concepts for long-range artillery. We got Bull to do the theoretical calculations in their computers, which we hired, for our own concepts, and that was how the two were fused together." [136]

Bull was in terrible financial straits and wanted the South Africans to pay him some \$5 million as a downpayment. [137] Instead, the South Africans bought shares in the firm and went so far as to place a manager in the company to watch over their interests. [138] Bull, under the watchful eye of the South Africans, developed prototype gun barrels and manufactured them along with new projectiles in the firm's Canadian-American factories. [139] Tests were then conducted by SRC and South African personnel at SRC test ranges on Antigua. [140]

"Following the tests, we brought all that stuff back to South Africa in bits and pieces: the gun barrels, the mounts on which they had been tested and some of the test equipment. From then on, we started developing an artillery system and the G5 grew out of that. Gerry Bull's people gave us assistance with certain calculations again, but from 1976 onwards we worked in South Africa." [141]

Bull's concept proved to be flawed and the South Africans had to develop a modified system.

"Now, Gerry Bull's original ideas for the projectile, the gun barrel and the gun itself did not work out at all. We built two prototypes of his design here in South Africa and they did not work. So we re-designed the whole thing again, including the propellant..." [142]

Marais' account of the events generally confirm

outlined earlier and lend credence to some of the legally specific statements attributed to SRC spokesman regarding the shipment of "inert" shells to Spain in 1977. Clearly, Marais is not recounting the full story particularly with regards to the massive shipment of shells which occurred in 1976 and 1977. Moreover, he makes little reference to the specifics of the contacts with third parties in the affair. Marais, it should also be remembered, is now recounting events which took place over five years previously and is not fully relaying either the seriousness of the political and military developments of the day or the urgency of the SADF needs.

On only one or two occasions, then, does any concrete evidence exist to suggest that the South African government employed elements of its security establishment to transfer, blatantly and illegally, military equipment out of the United States. This is certainly not indicative of a haphazard or widespread use of the security services in this manner. What it is indicative of, however, is the carefully orchestrated use of a service as a selective means of last resort to acquire specific equipment. The mere possibility that a case can be made to support the selected use of intelligence assets in operations targetting U.S. firms or using U.S. soil to acquire embargoed military equipment argues for the need to examine more closely the details of the SRC incident. In particular, it suggests the need to ascertain what such

actions suggest about South African decision making and capabilities in the national security sphere. Why is it probable that a decision was reached to employ the intelligence services in this capacity, which service actually oversaw the operation, and how does this entire process reflect on U.S.-South African relations now and in the future?

CHAPTER THREE

THE DECISION ENVIRONMENT

Internal Events

No incontrovertible evidence exists regarding the specific use of South African intelligence services to secure the illicit transfer of arms in the SRC and other cases described above. However, a wealth of circumstantial evidence, when coupled with analysis of political events occurring within and around South Africa at the time, supports the conclusion that at least one South African service was involved. It is evident, in the SRC case, that the South African government had both the opportunity and motive to acquire the howitzer systems. Furthermore, they perceived a desperate need for modern long-range artillery. Evidence links the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) as well as the RSA military-industrial complex to the actual acquisition of the arms. Moreover, data confirms that the SRC operation contributed directly to the emergence of the DMI as the senior service in South Africa as well as fostered the rise of P.W. Botha to the office of Prime Minister.

In 1975, a convergence of internal, regional and international events led the South African government to

conclude that the very fabric of the nation was in danger. The effects of the arms embargoes and related international pressures, Soviet support for the newly emerging black-ruled states in the region, the impending fall of the white regimes in Rhodesia and Mozambique, and recognition of limits to the state's power all contributed to a growing sense of isolation and frustration. Hopes for Western recognition of the dangers, so evident to the Afrikaner, were dashed in Angola when the U.S. withdrew covert aid. South Africa was left to go it alone. From the South African perspective, the threat was not only regional or external but internal as well. Moreover, these "cataclysmic" events of 1975 were rooted in the past. They represented the culmination of years of political struggle among the peoples of both South Africa and surrounding states.

In 1948, the National Party representing the conservative white Afrikaners in South Africa wrested political control from more moderate elements in the nation. [1] Of paramount political concern to this segment of the population was the institutionalization of a system of strict racial segregation. That system has come to be known as apartheid. By the early sixties, the Afrikaner government had, through the imposition of rigid, strictly enforced edicts, contributed significantly to the creation of conditions conducive to the development of a major insurgency. [2] The African National Congress (ANC), a

multi-racial, anti-apartheid organization with a long history of non-violent opposition to the regime turned toward violence as the only possible solution to their political problems. [3]

In the face of the government's intransigence on race matters, stirred by the revolutionary spirit of the times and knowingly influenced, to some degree, by the radical leadership of the Moscow oriented South African Communist Party (SACP), the ANC formed a military wing called Umkhonto We Sizwe or Spear of the Nation (SON). [4] Within two years of the creation of the SON in 1961, the South African Police (SAP) had captured and imprisoned the founding father of the movement, Nelson Mandela and forced the ANC into exile. [5] Operating from bases in neighboring black states, the SON organized a campaign of sabotage in the RSA which led to a twenty-year cycle of attack, government reprisals and increasingly spectacular SON acts of sabotage.

The African National Congress (ANC), formed in 1912 as the South African Native National Congress, emanated from an effort by prominent black labor and tribal leaders to achieve political representation for blacks. [6] The ANC sought to achieve its aims through direct negotiation with the white central government. In the twenties and thirties, the organization developed ties with a number of other organizations to include the SACP. [7] In 1949, a new cadre of younger leaders arose in the ANC. This group

avored a more militant approach which was inspired, in part, by the nonviolent campaigns espoused by Ghandi. [8] Led by men such as Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Robert Sobukwe, the ANC assumed a more aggressive posture. [9] The government responded with the imposition of the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950 outlawing the SACP and providing the security forces with wide authority to detain, incommunicado, individuals suspected of communist links. [10] In 1951, the ANC called for demonstrations against both the notorious pass laws and the Suppression of Communism Act. [11] Nationwide protests led to the arrest of some 8,000 blacks and spurred the evolution of the ANC into a popular mass political movement. ANC rolls swelled to over 100,000. [12]

In 1955, a Congress of the People composed of a number of groups seeking the abolition of the apartheid system adopted the Freedom Charter which advocated the end of all forms of segregation in the RSA. [13] This document has since become symbolic of ANC aims. In 1958, however, a split occurred in the ANC ranks. Robert Sobukwe, favoring a more militant approach, walked out of the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). [14] PAC later called for massive demonstrations in 1960 which deteriorated into violent confrontation with the police and resulted in the shooting death of 68 blacks by security force personnel at Sharpeville. [15] The ANC called nationwide strikes to protest the killings. The government moved to ban both the

ANC and the PAC. In 1961, Nelson Mandela formed the ostensibly independent Umkhonto We Sizwe to oversee the organization of a militant underground while the PAC moved to establish its own militant wing called Poqo. [16] Shortly thereafter, SON began to engage in limited sabotage activities within the country, hitting economic and other targets symbolic of white oppression.

The SAP reacted swiftly and, in July 1963, managed to surprise SON leaders in conference at Rivonia, a small town on the outskirts of Johannesburg. [17] Mandela was arrested, tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for acts of high treason. [18] Nationwide arrests followed on the heels of the Rivonia episode forcing ANC activists into exile where they were subsequently organized as a black revolutionary movement in exile by Oliver Tambo and others. [19] In exile, closer ties were developed with the SACP, a group with the organizational experience to oversee the development of a viable resistance movement. [20] ANC and SON links to the SACP, as perceived and portrayed by the white minority government, are critical to understanding the development of militant confrontation in South Africa. Appreciation of "communist" organizational membership by the Afrikaner elite is based, to some degree, on first-hand experience. The Afrikaner leadership, in the twenties and thirties, competed with the fledgling SACP for the affections of the Boer populace. This "respect" for communist capabilities is also key to an understanding of

the development of a national, white paranoia with regard to the concept of impending "black onslaught" which reached its zenith during 1975-1976.

Although the ANC receives significant financial and logistical support from the communist bloc, it also enjoys legitimate recognition by many Third World nations. [21] The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and western nations such as Sweden, for example, have lent support to the group. [22] Tambo has sarcastically commented, on a number of occasions, that in spite of such assistance, no one ever refers to the ANC as "the Swedish-backed ANC." [23]

Nevertheless, once in exile, leadership of the SON quickly passed to Joe Slovo, a white member of the SACP. [24] Slovo was married to Ruth First daughter of the founder of the SACP until her untimely demise in 1982 caused by a letter bomb forwarded to her office in Mozambique from South Africa. [25] Slovo himself has been the target of extra-territorial RSA commando action but has eluded capture to date. [26] He is, in fact, considered to have masterminded a wave of bombings in South Africa in mid-1984. [27] Senator Jeremiah Denton, conservative Chairman of the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, concluded in a 1983 report that "the original purposes of ANC and SWAPO ((Namibian guerrillas)) have been subverted, and the Soviets and their allies have achieved alarmingly effective control over them." [28]

Denton's investigations substantiate, in the mind of many conservatives, earlier RSA assertions regarding the continuing close association between the ANC and the SACP as well as ANC reliance on the Soviet bloc for weapons and training. According to testimony provided by former SON members, selected ANC members have received extensive training in Africa, East Germany and the Soviet Union from Soviet and Cuban experts.[29] The training, according to testimony presented during Denton's hearings, is equally applicable to rural and urban environments. [30] Another witness at the Denton hearings indicated that the SON was the "brainchild of the SACP". [31] Today, perhaps as many as 7 out of 22 of the ANC's ruling National Executive Committee are SACP members. [32] In addition,

"The post of the Deputy Chief of Umkhonto We Sizwe is now held by the veteran SACP Central Committee member, Mr. Joe Slovo. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the ANC. Mr. Hlapane ((a witness)) revealed that during the time he himself acted as treasurer of the SACP that party acted as the sole source of funds for Umkhonto We Sizwe." [33]

From its inception in the early sixties until the late seventies, SON operations were characterized by selective targetting and timing of attacks to minimize loss of life. [34] Railroads, police stations, military installations, industrial facilities and government buildings were hit, often by small uniformed bands of six to ten individuals

infiltrated from neighboring states. [35] The mere fact that the saboteurs carried out their raids in uniform further exacerbated uneasiness among the white elite. The wearing of military garb constituted a calculated psychological ploy by the ANC to engender the impression that full-scale insurgency was at hand.

After 1976, however, a change in the pattern of attacks began to emerge. The brutal suppression of riots in the black township of Soweto in 1976 and subsequent crackdowns on a number of black organizations encouraged a flow of younger, more militant blacks to ANC camps reinforcing in an already psychologically besieged Afrikanerdom the belief that Armageddon was at hand. [36] New cadre, well trained and highly motivated, was clandestinely infiltrated into South Africa to conduct sabotage and expand resistance. By 1975, many South Africans had come to believe that all-out insurgency supported by the Communist bloc was at hand. General H.J. Van Den Bergh, then head of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), was but one influential member of the government who was convinced that the RSA found itself in the classical stages of pre-revolutionary action. [37] This fear was further exacerbated by the SADF's poor performance in Angola, the residual effects of the violence in Soweto in 1976 and Pretoria's political isolation from the U.S. during the same period.

In the early sixties, the SADF was trained and

equipped to perform internal security missions supplementing traditional law enforcement responsibilities of the South African Police (SAP). [38] The SADF possessed only a limited capability to defend the country from outside aggression, particularly if such a threat emanated from a well trained fighting force armed with modern weapons. A successful effort to counter such a threat, moreover, depended upon the state's ability to quickly mobilize its sizeable Commando militia force. [39] In the early seventies, in response to the growing threat of black guerrilla warfare, the SADF actively developed a counter-insurgency capability. [40] In addition, the growing success of the black liberation movements in surrounding states and the dissolution of friendly white buffer states awakened the Afrikaners to the need for a fighting force capable of projecting power beyond South African borders. [41] Angola, however, dispelled Afrikaner belief in the invincibility of their forces. [42] The South Africans would find themselves particularly vulnerable if such a conflict was openly backed by Moscow using Cubans as surrogates and with South Africa's plight largely ignored by the West. In Angola in 1975, the worst of white South Africa's fears appeared to have materialized.

Regional Events

For the Afrikaner, then, the events which were to unfold in Angola in 1975 and 1976 proved the most

unsettling of modern times. The Angolan war came to be viewed as "the most traumatic in ((South African)) history since the Anglo Boer war..." [43] The Angolan experience forms the foundation upon which South African involvement in the SRC incident rests. By late January 1976, South Africa's outlook had deteriorated from one of mild euphoria following a relaxation of tension between Washington and Pretoria to a state in which the nation's long-term existence was at question. [44] Angola represented the first major commitment of Nationalist South African forces outside the confines of its borders against a well-equipped and disciplined non-white force. The state found itself unprepared for the results.

In Angola, the RSA fought a conventional conflict allied with black Africans against Africans supported by a superpower state. [45] The unexpected defeat, which left white Afrikaners as POWs in black hands, proved humiliating for the government of John Vorster and ultimately contributed to his political eclipse by a new order, conservative in its defense of the nation but decidedly more practical in its approaches to the problems of the past. [46] Angola provided the catalyst for P.W. Botha's eventual rise to power and contributed to increased military influence in the formulation of national security decisions. Angola and the SRC case are intertwined in this process reflecting a transfer of power from the old guard to the new.

In January 1975, the National Front for the Liberation

of Angola (FNLA) headed by Holden Roberto held the military edge over the socialist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in the protracted political and military struggle for control of Angola. [47] As early as 1961, the FNLA enjoyed encouragement from the United States which viewed the FNLA as the more moderate of three principal groups contending for political control in the Portuguese territory. [48] By 1963, the FNLA had received recognition from moderate African states as the sole legitimate Angolan nationalist group. [49] Under the Nixon-Ford administration, however, U.S. succor for the FNLA was curtailed to some \$10,000 for "intelligence collection" as a political concession designed to win closer ties with the Portuguese to ensure the continuation of strategic basing rights for American forces on Portuguese territory. [50] In spite of this temporary lapse in American involvement in Angolan politics, the events following the coup d'etat in Portugal in 1974 and the subsequent rise to power of a clique of young, socialist military officers in Lisbon reversed the situation in Angola and rekindled American interest.

In the wake of the 1974 coup, the new Portuguese government committed itself to the precipitous independence of Portugal's colonies in Africa. [51] Angola became a battleground, not only for the independence movements themselves but for the superpowers as well. Angola represented the first superpower confrontation in what was to become a trend, the use of surrogates in East-West battles.

In January 1975, each of the three major guerrilla organizations possessed some limited claim to power. However, no group was powerful enough to seize effective control in the absence of large scale outside assistance. FNLA was the most powerful force militarily. [52] MPLA, with its socialist leanings, remained politically astute and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) commanded the most legitimate popular support. [53]

U.S. policy in the region remained ambivalent to the complex political and social roots of the conflict. American aims were limited to countering Soviet expansion through covert support of Zaire and Zambia, moderate black states in the region around which long-range U.S. policy was to be based. [54] The task of implementing this policy fell to the smallest division in the Central Intelligence Agency, the 300 man strong, almost totally Caucasian Africa Division. [55] In late January 1975, the 40 Committee authorized some \$300,000 to be channeled to the FNLA, by then, a principal in the transitional government in Angola. [56] By February, the groups once again found themselves in the field with the FNLA bolstered by three thousand troops of the formerly dissident FNLA Chipenda faction. [57]

Between March and July, the USSR shipped over 100 tons of light arms to the MPLA in seven shiploads. [58] By the end of 1976, this aid reached \$200 million and included some 400 advisers. [59] UNITA, in contrast, possessed only 3000 small arms in mid-1975. [60] The popular group, abandoned by

its benefactors in Peking who had originally seized the opportunity to challenge their Soviet brethren in Africa, was gradually forced, by America's inattention, into a de facto alliance with South Africa. [61] The South Africans, during this period, were not content merely to follow events transpiring to the north.

Occasionally, South African forces conducted forays into southern Angola against bases used by the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), a socialist guerrilla organization seeking independence for the South African controlled Namibia. [62] SWAPO, in fact, posed an increasing threat to RSA interests in uranium rich Namibia. Operating from safe havens inside Angola, SWAPO could muster upwards of 2,500 armed men for guerrilla activity in Namibia where the organization found support from 10,000 - 12,000 Ovambo followers. [63] South African forces had even engaged in firefights with the UNITA forces in the region. [64] UNITA, like SWAPO, derived its support among the Ovambos in the region. By Spring 1975, the South African military had organized a "Zulu" or black contingent for operations in black states. Speculation abounded that the South Africans had assisted UNITA in the organization of its first effective combat elements. [65] Jonas Savimbi, the charismatic UNITA leader, secretly traveled to South Africa and Namibia for consultations with South African officials. [67]

Cooperation also increased between the South African Bureau for State Security (BOSS) and the CIA. [68] This was

to become an interesting relationship for both governments for eventually each administration and service was to be held accountable, by political enemies, for their intelligence liaison. The South Africans were surely encouraged by 40 Committee decisions in July which resulted in appropriation of some \$14 million in aid to the FNLA and UNITA. [69] The money, later increased to \$25 million, totalled \$32 million by year's end. The funds facilitated the acquisition of arms by the groups, allowed them to hire professional mercenary soldiers (not controlled by the CIA), and provided them with the means to challenge the MPLA. [70] Intelligence collected on the region, particularly that collected by the CIA station in Luanda, was passed to the FNLA for its use in the field. [71] By mid-August, the Portuguese were forced to re-establish control in Luanda. [72] Unfortunately, Portuguese officials overlooked the continuing supply of the MPLA by the Soviets allowing the offloading of weaponry to continue unabated. [73]

Perhaps encouraged by its new found relationship with the Americans as well as driven by strategic military imperatives of their own, the South Africans moved into southern Angola in August 1975 to secure vital hydro-electric power facilities at Ruacana on the Cunene River. [74] August also saw the first shipment, by the Soviet Union, of sophisticated arms for operation by non-African troops. [75] At this time, only three hundred Cuban advisors were in country. [76] In September, one thousand more

arrived to assist the MPLA confining their activity to rear echelon support. [77] In September, 800-1000 SADF troops moved some 25 miles into Angolan territory to secure a buffer zone ostensibly to protect themselves against SWAPO cross-border attacks into Namibia. [78] In October, however, the South Africans made a fateful decision.

On the 23rd of that month, a South African column composed of some 1500-2000 troops supported by 50 armored personnel carriers and combat vehicles crossed the Namibian border into Angola. [79] Joined by some 1000 troops from UNITA and the Chipenda organization, the tanks, helicopters and APCs rolled north covering 400 miles in less than three weeks. [80] At the same time, some 2-3,000 FNLA troops attacked from Zaire driving the MPLA back in the direction of Luanda. As the pincer closed, the MPLA found itself in mortal danger. [81] The presence of Pretoria's troops served to strain the already tenuous FNLA-UNITA alliance. The situation became politically delicate with the introduction of some 2-3,000 Cuban troops at the front in a desperate bid to forestall the military collapse of the MPLA. [82] Subsequently, however, the MPLA received a much needed political boost on November 11 when Portugal declared the colony independent and passed the reins of power in Luanda to the MPLA. [83]

South Africa's commitment of forces also took the U.S. by surprise and left America with some rather unpleasant choices. By the end of October, the South Africans had

captured the coastal town of Mocamedes and by November were in control of Benguela and Lobito. [84] The U.S. could remain committed and face a defacto open alliance with the South Africans, covertly support expansion of mercenary recruitment, dispatch forces, or abandon the effort. [85] Haunted by events leading to the fall of Saigon, the U.S. chose to back out entirely.

On 19 December 1975, the U.S. Senate passed the Tunney Amendment which urged the withdrawal of all covert support to factions fighting in Angola. [86] In early 1976, the House followed suit. [87] In the field, the modestly equipped South African force was no match for over 12,000-15,000 fresh Cuban combat troops equipped with deadly "Stalin organ", 122mm artillery pieces for which Pretoria had no comparable countermeasure. [88] Offshore, Soviet naval vessels steamed toward Luanda with aid for the MPLA while Soviet sea-borne intelligence collectors appeared in South African waters. [89] Out of momentum and "abandoned" by the United States, the South Africans withdrew on January 22nd. [90] From 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976, 29 South Africans were killed in action along with 14 others lost in accidents associated with the incursion. [91] Adding to the trauma was the fact that the South African public was not officially informed of the extent of involvement until December 1975. [92]

South Africa's defeat at the hands of the Cubans, the mounting success of black movements in Rhodesia and Mozambique and it's bitterness over what it viewed to be

betrayal by the U.S. was further exacerbated by internal events which took place in June 1976 in the black township of Soweto. Soweto exploded. On June 16, 1976, riot police confronted school children in the streets carrying signs protesting unequal education. [93] For unexplained reasons, the police opened fire. By the end of the day, 23 people, including 3 whites, were dead. [94] Violence spread to East and West Rand, north to Natal and to Cape Town. [95] By the end of 1976, the death toll stood at close to 500. [96] For many Afrikaners, Armageddon appeared to have been at hand as they prepared for Swartgevaar, the "black onslaught".

Besieged from within, threatened from the outside and isolated in the international community, the South Africans prepared to go it alone. The internal situation could be handled expediently enough but the matter of acquiring advanced weaponry capable of matching that in the Soviet and Cuban arsenal was another consideration entirely. Angola pointed up deficiencies in South African military command and control and also highlighted the pressing need for more helicopters, heavy artillery, and anti-tank weaponry. [97] If the SADF was to win decisively in any future confrontation, this equipment was essential. Prime Minister Vorster, lamenting the defeat in Angola, stated,

"Only big powers can offset this arsenal, above all the 122mm rockets. It is certainly beyond our limits." [98]

In a more personal vein, Vorster found himself

politically vulnerable. The ruling elite within the National Party had proven themselves incapable of providing the leadership necessary to resolve a life-threatening situation. Casting about for role models, the younger generation, long associated with the military, turned toward its new friend, the State of Israel, and found a role model to emulate. Decisive action, patterned on the Israeli model, was required to obtain the requisite arms which would minimize the risk of severing remaining ties to the West. In addition, more practical approaches were required to resolve political problems at home. In both cases, it was the military, with its international connections and its untarnished political reputation, which offered salvation to the state.

Much as it was with Israel, in South Africa, a new leadership would emerge with close ties to the military. The nation was in danger and the mantle of leadership would be passed in a new correlation of political forces. A Vorster-Botha split occurred within the ranks of the National Party as the Prime Minister and his own Defence Minister jockeyed for control over the direction of the nation. [99] Vorster may have believed that South Africa could win in Angola with a blitzkrieg on Luanda and he undoubtedly had the support of the military in such a course. However, Vorster overestimated the U.S. commitment. In December 1975, Vorster informed Jonas Savimbi that, in the absence of more definitive U.S. support, South Africa would have to withdraw from Angola. [100] It was an action that others would not

soon forget nor forgive.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Emergence of the Military

Following the election of P.W. Botha as Prime Minister in 1978, there has been a notable growth in the influence of the military in the formulation of national security policy within South Africa. This trend towards greater military involvement is, in fact, but one facet of a more general trend towards the consolidation of power and authority in the office of the Prime Minister (now State President). This reliance on the military professional to balance more conservative elements in South Africa such as the civil service and police forces reflects Botha's comfort with the military technocrat and is a natural outgrowth of his fourteen year term as Minister of Defence. [1] This trend manifests itself in the consensual decision making processes which occur within an expanded and more powerful State Security Council (SSC). Under the aegis of the SSC, "total national strategy" is formulated, coordinated and implemented in a manner designed to both concurrently harbor and marshall, in the most efficient fashion possible, precious state resources. [2]

The SSC is chaired by the State President and includes

the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, and the Defence Minister. [3] High ranking civil servants and other key officials are also represented to include the Chief of the SADF, the head of the police forces, the Director of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and the Secretary to the Office of the State President. [4] The day to day business of the SSC is managed by a Secretariat currently headed by Lt Gen H.J. Van Deventer. [5] The Secretariat is heavily staffed with military personnel. Recent estimates place military participation as high as 70% with some 20% of the positions filled by NIS staffers. [6] The remaining 10% is filled with professionals from from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [7] The efforts of the defense community are similarly coordinated by a Defence Planning Committee consisting of members of the Defence Staff Council, the senior manager of ARMSCOR and other members appointed by the Defence Minister. [8]

The activities of the security services are fully integrated into this system, in principle within the greater SSC structure, but, in practice, by the dominance of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) over the National Intelligence Service (NIS). [9] The NIS is the organizational successor to the Bureau of State Security (BOSS), an organization previously endowed with both a domestic and overseas mission comparable in scope to the combined missions of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA). [10] The NIS is presently headed by a young Afrikaner scholar and member of the secretive Broederbond cultural organization, Dr. Neil Barnard. [11] Under the direction of President Botha, the BOSS/NIS organization has undergone more than a cosmetic name change. The NIS, reflecting the current needs of the state and the personality of its head, emphasizes analysis and has rejected the heavy-handed methods of BOSS with its legacy as an oppressive internal security apparatus. [12]

Like their Israeli counterparts, whom they greatly admire, the interests of the South African intelligence services are surprisingly wide-ranging. As reported by L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan,

"South Africa is said to maintain an extensive internal and external intelligence network that has sources not merely within South Africa, but also apparently within states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Warsaw Pact, and Western Europe." [13]

The government, presumably through a close working relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the intelligence services, also uses extensively the RSA business community in both the acquisition of information and the exploration of sensitive political and economic contacts abroad. [14] The ostracism of the South Africans within Black Africa has, over the years, fostered the need to employ sub rosa diplomatic and commercial international

contacts. [15] This requirement has provided the national security establishment with experience in the conduct of sensitive operations and has led to a very close working relationship between big business and government. Businessmen, for example, are encouraged to seek non-resident British passports, whenever possible, to facilitate transit through black Africa. [16] The process is strictly controlled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is presumably available to the security services for their exploitation as required. [17] The availability of such devices as well as the traditional link to Great Britain explains, in large measure, the common perception that London serves as one of the largest overseas stations for South African intelligence.

Today, as stated, Botha relies on the SSC as a coordinating and implementing body on all matters relating to national security. This reliance makes it a virtual certainty that all intelligence collection operations, covert activities or efforts to acquire advanced weaponry discretely overseas are accomplished neither in isolation nor in the absence of high-level approval and management. However, this was not always the case.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister John Vorster, national security decisions were far more personalized. Vorster relied on the advice and expertise of his old friend General H.J. Van Den Bergh and his tight-fisted control of the national security apparatus through BOSS.

[18] BOSS's traditional obsession with internal security and counter-intelligence, however, served to hasten its eclipse by the DMI. The military defeat in Angola and the nation's need to acquire artillery and advanced weaponry as quickly as practical forced the solidification of an already close working relationship between ARMSCOR and the Ministry of Defence. [19] Related to this development is the emergence of the DMI as the service principally responsible for the conduct of intelligence collection and materiel acquisition overseas. [20] Little is publicly known about the internal workings of South Africa's intelligence and security services. However, a collation and analysis of available data provides an appreciation for the dynamics of this small but effective national security establishment.

Faced with an incipient insurgency supported by a major superpower and all but ostracized from the West, Pretoria was forced to develop, from its internal security police, an intelligence organization capable of countering the activities of the KGB. It is now evident that this task fell to H.J. Van Den Bergh, the Tall Man or "Long Hendrik", then head of the South African Security Police and an associate of conservative Afrikaner politicians since World War II. [21]

Van Den Bergh organized Republic Intelligence in June 1963 keeping the organization secret from the public until its formal establishment as the Bureau for State Security

(BOSS) in 1969. [22] This organization developed a foreign counter-intelligence collection effort capable of penetrating the ranks of the ANC, the SACP and their backers in Moscow. Van den Bergh was, from time to time, assisted in his efforts from abroad. In the early sixties, Sir Percy Sillitoe, a retired head of MI-5, was hired by Sir Enerst Oppenheimer. [23] The South African industrialist asked the former head of Britain's counter-intelligence force to structure a private security apparatus for his combine. [24] Sir Percy, while in the RSA under contract to Oppenheimer, also contributed to a secret study prepared for H.J. which detailed an optimum organizational structure for a national counter-intelligence service. [25] The study was used by Van den Bergh as a model for Republic Intelligence.

Following its creation, Republic Intelligence and its successor, BOSS, worked diligently to penetrate and neutralize black opposition groups at home while extending influence abroad. [26] With the 1967 arrest of Yuriy Loginov, a Soviet illegal agent, this fledgling service first came to the attention of the world. [27] The Loginov case provides a basis for understanding the origins of the high stakes intelligence game which transpired in Southern Africa between Pretoria and the rest of the world and ultimately between a Vorster/BOSS coalition and Botha and the DMI.

In July 1967, the South African Security Police

arrested Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov. He had been posing for several months as a Canadian citizen using the alias, Edmund Trinkka. [28] During interrogation, Loginov admitted that he was a KGB illegal in the process of building a suitable legend (cover story) to support eventual entry into the United States. [29] Loginov, unlike most of his predecessors captured in the West, provided detailed information regarding his training and mission. He detailed completely the nature of his training as well as outlined the purpose and scope of previous missions. In 1969, Loginov was exchanged for eleven West German nationals held in East Germany as western support agents. [30]

Loginov was born in 1933 and like many KGB operatives was considered a member of that elite class of Soviet citizens known as the "golden youth". [31] He was recruited by the KGB and trained in Czech and English as well as in operational techniques prior to his dispatch on a variety of training and support missions in both the Soviet Union and the West. [32] The Russian's activities and contacts spanned twenty-three countries. His confession provided valuable insights into KGB operations in each locale as they related to the "maintenance" of illegals. [33] Such information, of immeasurable value to the Western security services, undoubtedly facilitated BOSS's entre into the inner circles of Western intelligence.

Once established in South Africa, the KGB provided Loginov with requirements which reflected the Center's interest in determining the feasibility of using that country as a transiting point for illegals destined for other nations in the West. [34] Given South Africa's historical policy of welcoming diverse emigrant populations and recent increased white flight due to the threat posed by impending insurgency, the Soviets probably believed that this African nation offered an ideal base from which to infiltrate agents into the West. [35] Loginov reported as much and, under South African interrogation, hinted at his own belief that his reports were valued not only on their own merits but as substantiation of other reports from a number of Soviet agents operating in the region. [36] Obviously, KGB interest in Southern Africa was expanding.

Initially, the KGB may have underestimated the capabilities of the local security service perhaps believing that it was preoccupied with the ANC and PAC. However, as Loginov began to develop his own capabilities as an intelligence collector, priding himself on his abilities to provide Moscow with substantive political and military intelligence on his new environs, his efforts certainly encouraged a growing perception in the Kremlin that Southern Africa was ripe for exploitation. [37] The Soviet illegal was directed to plan for a longer stay in South Africa and encouraged to collect intelligence information in direct support of Moscow's advances in the

region. [38] South Africa offered an extremely inviting target for the KGB.

South Africa's handling of this case contributed to the warming of relations between the South African security services and major Western services including the CIA. BOSS retained its primary counter-intelligence mission but took advantage of its new relations to expand its overseas collection, targetting black exiles in London and elsewhere abroad. [39] BOSS, although openly repressive at home, could be quite adept at the game of espionage overseas. Black nationalists living outside the country were sometimes contacted using a false flag approach which duped them into believing that they were cooperating with the CIA or other Western services. [40] Unfortunately, Van den Bergh eventually corrupted his service by allowing his superior to use it for blatantly political purposes at home.

Vorster relied heavily on BOSS not only to monitor the activities of external enemies but also to watch the political opposition at home, black and white. BOSS enjoyed easy access to the secretive Afrikaner cultural organization, the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB). [41] The AB exercised a powerful influence, along with the Dutch Reformed Church, in Afrikaner decision making. [42] It deems itself, in many respects, the conscience of the white minority. Indeed, most political decisions of any consequence made within the RSA, at least prior to the

assumption of power by Botha, were coordinated with the AB. So close were the links between the government and the AB that, first, Special Branch and then BOSS were used to "snuff out anti-Broederbond plots." [43] Botha, however, as early as 1968, criticized AB influence on national politics and referred to it as merely an outside organization not a political party. [44] Nevertheless, Botha was, and continues to be, a member.

By the early seventies, then, BOSS was being used by Vorster to spy, both physically and electronically, upon other members of the AB. [45] During that same period, a conservative group of Afrikaners split with Vorster, leaving the AB and the National Party to form the right-wing Herstigte Nasionale Party. [46] Although Vorster was incarcerated in the Second World War for expressing anti-British and pro-Nazi sympathies, he was a politically pragmatic man. [47] He represented that group of Afrikaners who have come to be known as verligte or moderates (as opposed to verkrampste or conservatives). [48] However, his political success was marred by a haphazard approach to governing characterized by virtual autonomy within each major ministry. [49] It is evident in the "Muldergate" scandal of the late seventies, for example, that Vorster preferred to remain aloof from the obvious misuse and abuse of government power by his close friend, and heir apparent, Connie Mulder. [50]

P. W. Botha as well as the military establishment also

constituted a center of growing verligte strength. [51] However, this faction of the National Party eventually became frustrated with the inadequacies of the Vorster regime to include its internal security abuses and the threat which those actions posed to democratic traditions within the ruling white elite. [52] It was not until 1975-1976, however, that Botha and his political allies were able to forge a binding alliance capable of challenging Vorster for the leadership of the nation. [53] From 1976-1978, Vorster and his supporters suffered one political loss after another. The SRC case and the involvement of the South African security establishment in the transfer of artillery serves as a reflection of the first effective working of the political coalition that today dominates South African politics.

The Botha approach to national security decision making differs markedly from that of John Vorster. Kenneth Grundy in his article "South Africa's Domestic Strategy" offers a succinct breakdown of the organizational entities comprising South Africa's security establishment. [54] Grundy refers to six components in the structure which ally or vie for control of foreign policy in this troubled African nation. [55] The first, and currently most powerful, of these elements is composed of Ministry of Defence officials, senior SADF personnel and Permanent Force officers, most of whom obtained their combat experience in Angola. [56] Secondly, the NIS, the DMI and

the South African Police (SAP) exert influence in decision making with the DMI clearly holding the dominant position. [57] Additionally, a community of professional consultants and academics exert a rapidly expanding degree of influence on conceptual policy formulation under Botha. [58]

The arms industry and the other para-statal organizations such as SASOL, the energy combine, also exhibit growing influence within the inner circles of power. [59] In addition to the SAP, Grundy also mentions a distinct role for the SAP paramilitary forces which operate along South Africa's borders and in Namibia. [60] And finally, the SSC itself, through its permanent Secretariat, wields considerable power particularly in its ability to determine precisely what issues are raised and discussed in SSC session. [61] Viewed from the perspective of each of these key national decision making elements, it is readily apparent that the Angolan conflict served as a catalyst. This catalyst precipitated the forging of an alliance between Botha and the defense establishment in toto. The SRC clandestine acquisition solidified, in a single concrete act, their mutual interests. Moreover, Botha found, in the DMI, a counterbalance to Vorster's control over BOSS. [62]

In Angola, a wary relationship based on mutual suspicion existed between the DMI and BOSS. Although the DMI and BOSS reluctantly cooperated with one another, particularly in supporting UNITA, DMI officers sometimes

denigrated BOSS operatives referring to them as "criminal peeping toms." [63] BOSS probably reserved for itself the prerogatives of direct contact with the CIA while DMI principally confined itself to tactical intelligence collection. [64] This is not to imply that DMI was, in any way, less adept at conducting sophisticated operations. DMI, for example, controlled operations in support of the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or RENAMO). [65] In the summer of 1975, SADF reconnaissance commandos trained this group of Portuguese settlers and black anti-communists to fight the socialist FRELIMO organization. [66] In fact, RSA special forces remain suspected of greater involvement than the government has officially admitted. South African operatives may have engaged directly in combat operations inside Mozambique, for example. [67] Additionally, the DMI moved to establish links with Rhodesian Intelligence and eventually assisted the resistance to black rule in that country. [68]

By 1977, Botha and Military Intelligence had openly broken with Vorster. BOSS was accused of selling out to the CIA in Angola and Botha may even have leaked the details of the Muldergate scandal in an attempt to further undermine Vorster. [69] The DMI and the SADF also moved to establish closer links with the Israelis. [70] In fact, the DMI patterns itself on Israeli intelligence taking pride in its own operational independence. BOSS, on the other hand, sought respectability through liaison with the

major Western services. [71] How then does the SRC case come into play?

Neither Botha, nor the military establishment in general, could have attained preeminence in the national security sphere riding solely on the mistakes of their predecessors. The coalition needed to prove to itself and to other centers of political power in Afrikanerdom that they could best serve the national interest. Significant success was required and that success came through control of the events surrounding the spiriting of Gerry Bull's artillery concepts and equipment out of the United States.

The Space Research Corporation

And

Botha's Rise to Power

It is clear from available data that P.W. Botha did not rise to power overnight. In any democracy, the South African "variety" not excluded, change manifests itself over time in the subtle shifting of centers of power from political coalition to coalition. In the early seventies,

Vorster clearly controlled South African politics. [72] The events of the seventies, however, loosened that rigid grasp and the Angola experience facilitated a shift to the left orchestrated by a new coalition. As with President Nixon's rapprochement with the Chinese, the moderation of South African politics was to emanate from an unexpected quarter. Kenneth Grundy's analysis of the power groupings in the Botha national security establishment aptly serves as a reference point from which analysis of the motivations and interests which coalesced, at this time, can be made. [73] It was a coalition of like-minded elements within the government that condoned the use of clandestine means to meet national defense needs. Moreover, Botha's involvement in this episode in South African history directly contributed to his solidification of a political base, a base from which he maneuvered to replace Vorster.

Under the Botha regime, strategy formulation rests with senior officials in the military and Ministry of Defence. [74] These officials, many of whom served in Angola, could only have been dismayed by the events which unfolded there. South Africa's vulnerability to an armed force equipped with modern weaponry was clearly displayed by South Africa's defeat at the hands of the Cubans. [75] These same strategists recognized the long-term dangers to the state if conventional heavy artillery could not be secured and fielded. [76] These strategists also knew

that, within a few years, the RSA could easily find itself outgunned on a hostile, black continent. Based upon this group's evaluation of the international environment and the urgency of the situation, it is likely that they saw no choice but to commit the state to the clandestine acquisition of both the weaponry and related technology deemed necessary to ensure the long-term viability of the state. [76]

However, it was not merely technology or a few systems that was required. The military also recognized the need for time to both acquire and field weapons systems in quantity. This could only be accomplished through the adoption of a new national strategy, a strategy which acknowledged that reliance on adjacent friendly white regimes to serve as a buffer along South Africa's borders was no longer practical. [77] From within this element of society, as well as from within certain schools in South African academia, a new strategic concept developed which was to become the hallmark of the Botha approach to regional developments. This was the concept of reliance on a "constellation of states" bound by mutual economic if not always political interests. [78] Undoubtedly, this approach appealed to other elements within the national security establishment as well. [79]

This concept required the formation of a buffer zone of neutral states and implied an important role for both the SAP and its paramilitary arms. At home, internal

political pressure was maintained to limit the growth of a viable black political opposition. Along the borders, close cooperation with the military resulted in increased cross border actions and accompanying political campaigns, covert and diplomatic, to destabilize newly emerging black regimes. [80] Black regimes were to be cajoled into accepting the benefits of economic dependence on Pretoria. This strategic initiative was reflected in covert support for organizations such as the MNR and conservative elements in Zimbabwe. [81] This regional political effort was spearheaded by the South African military with the DMI at its vanguard.

The safeguarding of the state, then, would rest with a multi-tiered politico-military approach managed by a revitalized national security structure in which the defense establishment would command the dominant role, a role which they were content to perform under civilian control, with minimal danger to white democratic political processes. [82] Indeed, under Botha, defense's role, although a powerful and seemingly pervasive one, is carefully orchestrated and managed in a manner that ensures that civilians retain complete control. [83] This is a "balancing act" which attests to the inherent strengths of South African democracy as it applies strictly to the white minority.

Conceptually, then, the effort was embodied in a strategy designed to develop a buffer zone comprised of

politically compliant states. [84] The incentive for the surrounding states was economic with South Africa enticing its neighbors with access to its sophisticated transportation infrastructure, expanding marketplace, and outlets to the developed world. [85] Practically, the effort was intended to buy time for the defense establishment to acquire the requisite military hardware to counter any consolidated black military move against the state. [86] It is important to note the Botha regime recognized that, if the nation was to continue to exist as a unitary state, it would have to rely on conventional armaments and tactical prowess.

Inherent in this analysis is a recognition that nuclear developments which occurred between 1977 and 1979 represented not merely evidence of considerable progress in that arena but assume greater significance when viewed perhaps as an orchestrated deception effort designed to buy time for the acquisition of conventional strength. [87] The South Africans did not, at the time, possess a nuclear arsenal capable of posing any viable threat to the region. [88] Yet, much like their Israeli friends, upon whom they may have relied to stage various tests, the South Africans were able to take advantage of the mere suggestion that a capability existed and that the state would be willing to use that capability in a last ditch defense of the nation. [89] This effort, however, was of secondary importance, a mere sideshow to the principal goal at hand - the

clandestine acquisition of heavy artillery and armor necessary for the state to defend itself effectively from outside aggression. [90]

The military establishment, through a variety of efforts, allowed the para-statal ARMSCOR to work feverishly to develop an indigenous capability to produce and subsequently field requisite military systems. A prerequisite for successfully completing this task, however, was the acquisition of the technology. This was accomplished through clandestine activity to obtain both artillery systems and technology from SRC. The SRC caper brought together the intelligence community, under the direction of the DMI, and ARMSCOR.

Anthony Sampson, an expert on international arms trafficking, speculated that ARMSCOR itself may have maintained a secret fund with "money for bribes and commissions." [91] The fund, purportedly, "was far bigger than Mulder's slush fund." [92] The Department of Information's activities included covert efforts in the United States and elsewhere to influence policy makers to adopt positions favoring South Africa which would lead to the lifting of the embargoes. [93] Certainly, Sampson's speculation is supported by Marais' admissions that weapons experts and managers were insinuated into the SRC corporate structure to support South African objectives. [94] However, the role of ARMSCOR within the defense establishment and the relative strength of other

organizations during this period, such as BOSS and the DMI, argue for an important but probably secondary role for ARMSCOR in the orchestration and conduct of actual operations overseas.

Indeed, it is logical to assume that entre to Frost, the gunrunner with the CIA connections, and ultimately to SRC itself developed through BOSS/DMI channels. [95] It should be remembered as well that, in spite of the growing animosity between the two services, they did cooperate in Angola. [96] Moreover, Botha did not totally emasculate the NIS following his assumption of power. Rather, he reorganized the intelligence service denuding it only of its internal security functions. [97] The South African government also made it plain that, following the disclosure of the Muldergate scandals, although the Ministry of Information was to be downgraded some of its more sensitive secret operations would be reviewed for retention by the newly reorganized security services. [98] In the SRC case, then, it is likely that BOSS did play a role. However, it was the defense establishment that retained control.

The emergence of the DMI during this period and the probability that the Houston arms smuggling case was a military operation in support of the MNR suggests DMI control of the SRC operation as well. [99] Indeed, the Houston case may be viewed as a natural extension of the SRC case. Bureaucracies have a tendency to repeat

activities deemed to be successful and intelligence services are no different. SRC was a major success despite the fact that Bull's designs are now claimed to have been of limited value. [100] They did stimulate the creation of the G-5 by ARMSCOR and, again, the entire operation proved to be even more successful in its shortcomings. [101] ARMSCOR, as Marais does in his interview, is able to somewhat chauvinistically claim responsibility for the actual creation of the G-5 and G-6. [102] Marais, by denigrating Bull's role, is able to make the claim that ARMSCOR developed the G-5, not Gerry Bull. [103] In effect, then, the success of the SRC endeavor spawned its own successors and those successors exhibit military characteristics not political ones as would have been the case had BOSS been the principal. [104]

It is important to note, nevertheless, that the SRC operation was completed, not during the Botha stewardship of the nation, but rather under the Vorster regime. This itself was possible only through the Botha coalition's manipulation of the political system. The military and expanded defense strategic community developed the strategy required to counter enemies, internal and external, arrayed against the state. [105] Integral to that undertaking was a cooperative effort among the DMI, ARMSCOR and perhaps even like-minded verligte elements within BOSS to acquire arms abroad clandestinely in order to correct conventional military vulnerabilities brought to light in Angola. [106]

The entire effort was facilitated, however, through the infusion of new political life into the moribund SSC. [107]

The SSC provided the only forum from which Botha could successfully challenge Vorster at this stage in his political career. By arraying the forces in his incipient coalition within the SSC structure, Botha was able to win support for a clandestine effort on the scale of the SRC operation. In fact, Vorster probably viewed the entire effort as a possible means of salvaging his own political misfortunes. After all, Botha remained, in spite of an increasingly independent political mind rivaling that of Connie Mulder, a trusted member of the Vorster cabinet. Success in the SRC caper could have bolstered Vorster's sagging political fortunes. Unfortunately for Vorster and his hand-picked successor, the Information Scandal came to light. [108] The degree to which Botha may have involved himself in ensuring that the scandal gained national attention at just this time remains unclear at best. [109] Yet, undeniably, the result was that he now possessed a unchallenged claim to proprietorship of the SRC operation and its attendant glory, a claim no doubt wholeheartedly supported by the defense establishment.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The South African Government, over the past two decades, has attempted to develop an indigenous capability to produce the arms it deems necessary for an adequate national defense. The strategic military situation in Southern Africa and the political isolation of the RSA has necessitated the maintenance of a military force capable of fighting alone against a potential alliance of several black states. Although no effective alliance has emerged to date, political rhetoric as well as conservative white views of socialism as infectious and monolithically controlled from Moscow serve to heighten Afrikaner preoccupation with the need for a strong national security establishment.

Self-sufficiency in arms production, a cornerstone of that philosophy, permits the Botha regime to reform domestically while using its commitment to a strong defense to hold the allegiance of both the military and politically moderate, but socially cautious, Afrikaners. This approach continues to remain a hallmark of the Botha administration's national security decision making process even in the face of growing political unrest, the

imposition of a limited state of emergency and increasing international support for expansion of embargoes.

Practically, however, the South Africans must face reality; declining white manpower will not permit the maintenance of a quantitative military advantage over all possible combinations of enemies - enemies who increasingly possess access to modern military hardware, growing tactical expertise and external military support. From a purely military perspective, the only practical solution to this dilemma lies in greater involvement of non-whites in the defense of their homeland. Yet, the level of commitment required by the military will exist only when additional political rights are granted. In the absence of an external threat to the interests of both blacks and whites, however, prospects remain dim that the military can become the vanguard in integration as was the case in the U.S.

In order to maintain its military advantage while simultaneously nurturing the capability to fight alone, South Africa has employed a variety of subterfuges to circumvent arms embargoes thus ensuring a continued flow of modern arms and technologies from the West. In most instances, the South Africans have relied upon the largesse and cooperation of other nations sharing similar political constraints or on the venality of individuals, corporations and states. Political prudence as well as the availability of viable alternatives have encouraged the white regime to

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
P W BOTHA AND THE SPACE RESEARCH CORPORATION:
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS AND T. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE
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
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avoid clandestine action which directly and unequivocally violates the laws of the United States. While wholesale disregard for international law and practice has not occurred, South Africa has felt the need to employ clandestine organs of the state on selected occasions to fill urgent requirements.

On at least one occasion, South Africa has elected, albeit reluctantly, to "operate" in and against the United States. The fact that a "friendly" foreign power would have the audacity to do so sadly comes as no surprise. That South Africa chose to do so and proved itself successful is a significant measure of that state's ability to project power well beyond its own border. Both the existence of such a national capability and the specific circumstances under which it may be employed must be addressed objectively by U.S. decision makers. South Africa has used this capability sparingly under circumstances suggesting perceived national desperation. What is the likelihood, however, that a similar course might be resorted to by Botha, or a successor regime, in the near future?

This study has defined more clearly the threshold at which the South African government's employment of clandestine agencies to procure arms becomes acceptable. Analysis of South African government action in contravention of the 1963 arms embargo reveals that the availability of alternative sources of supply, limited

national capability to operate overseas and the absence of an immediate external threat served to limit South Africa's need to circumvent clandestinely arms prohibitions prior to 1976. Moreover, it has been shown that the state was driven to acquire arms not by the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo in 1977 but by the press of events occurring in 1975. Strategic military vulnerabilities exhibited in Angola did not precipitate widespread use of clandestine operations to acquire additional weaponry. A single weapons system was acquired solely to overcome specific military vulnerabilities made evident on the fields of battle.

Both the imposition of the 1977 ban and the Carter Administration's approach to dealing with South Africa probably reinforced an impression among senior South African politicians that the choice to mount operations through the U.S. was a correct one. The decision to employ the security services clandestinely, however, was made previously, probably in mid-1976, in direct response to threats to vital national interests to include, in South Africa's view, threats to the continued existence of the state.

It is significant as well that the principal service in this action was not the civilian intelligence organization but rather the military, an element of society with narrow political interests. The position of the South African military in society and the decision by

civilian leaders to use the military security establishment posed minimal risk to democratic institutions in Afrikanerdom. The military view encompasses firm allegiance to the state and to the principle of non-interference with constitutional process. The influence of the defense establishment in decision making has increased further under Botha and Military Intelligence has gained stature both at home and abroad. [1] However, this has occurred in the absence of any corresponding military threat to democracy. Nor, it seems, is the military threatened by political reform. In fact, it supports the Botha approach to reform preferring that it occur in an "orderly" fashion.

The SRC episode, then, becomes significant not only as a reflection of the mechanics of South African intelligence operations but of considerable value to an analysis of dynamics inherent in South African domestic political change to include the rise of a "reformist" coalition. In spite of Vorster's position as head of state at the time, the SRC case is illustrative of Botha's approach to national security decision making and should be viewed in those terms. Certainly, it is difficult, as well as impractical, to make widespread judgements solely on the basis of a single incident or operation. Nevertheless, the apparent uniqueness of this case aside, it provides insights which are useful in assessing South African reaction to recent events.

A definable set of circumstances existed prior to the Space Research Corporation operation which drove the South Africans to employ clandestine organs of the state to acquire 155mm howitzer technology from the United States. To be sure, such circumstances were historically unique. Nevertheless, it is assumed that, if similar conditions occur that greater value may be placed on the employment of the clandestine services as a viable response to the imposition of economic sanctions no matter how mild. This is particularly so in light of success enjoyed in the SRC case and the nature of the political alliance which keeps the Botha regime in power. In the SRC operation, the clandestine services were employed when internal discontent approached pre-revolutionary stages (by South African definition) and the Republic was vulnerable to an outside military threat as a direct result of a lack of embargoed equipment. In addition, relations with the U.S. had deteriorated initially following "abandonment" in Angola and subsequently as a result of increased political pressure to "radically" alter the internal structure of the Afrikaner state. Do such conditions exist today or are they once again being approached?

In a dispatch from Johannesburg, Glenn Frankel of the Washington Post wrote that on July 20, 1985,

"President Pieter W. Botha declared a state of emergency, the first in 25 years, throughout vast sections of riot-torn South Africa ... to crack down on a wave of

violence that has killed about 450 persons in the country's black townships during the past 10 months." [2]

Hopes were raised, then dashed, in August 1985 following a much heralded speech by Botha which foreign affairs officials had categorized as designed to reaffirm commitment to reform and the eventual dismantling of apartheid. [3] Rioting among blacks continued, the death count rose (and continues to rise), and calls in the U.S. for the imposition of tighter sanctions ultimately resulted in the imposition of limited economic sanctions through executive order by an otherwise friendly and sympathetic U.S. administration. [4] The key aspects of this action is that U.S. made computer and software exports are prohibited to South African agencies administering or enforcing apartheid - a ban which extends to the armed forces. [5] The presidential order also prohibits the export of nuclear goods and technology other than those required to meet nuclear safeguards. [6] Although considered mild by Congressional standards, the implementation of the bans has led to reassessment and reappraisal in South Africa of relations with the U.S. [7]

Although no short-term external military threat exists, the SADF appears to be taking no chances regionally. In mid-September, SADF forces pushed into Angola ostensibly to strike at SWAPO enclaves but perhaps actually to bolster the position of UNITA forces recently subjected to increased pressure by the success of Cuban-

backed Angolan government attacks. [8] UNITA plays a pivotal role in RSA defense policy serving as a buffer against Angolan support to SWAPO and any attendant "Marxist" victory in neighboring Namibia. It is apparent that the military has also continued clandestine support of RENAMO in Mozambique in spite of the Nkomati Accords. [9] SADF preventive actions of this nature serve to highlight continuing military preoccupation with regional security and the willingness of the Botha regime, in concert with military strategists, to act in manners calculated to prevent the circumstances which existed in 1975 from reoccurring. Moreover, there are enough similarities with those events today to suggest, in the mind of South African security planners, the need to act decisively. Such decisiveness could well include, or at least give credence to, alternatives encompassing clandestine action.

The South African military needs sophisticated computers for research, weapons development and C3 (command, control and coordination). [10] The defense establishment has also assigned high priority to military nuclear developments. In both instances, the South Africans have committed themselves to the acquisition of U.S. technology. [11] As has been the case in the past, the availability of alternative suppliers exists. The South Africans can obtain computers from the Japanese or through the outcast community. [12] The same holds true in the nuclear field. [13] Nevertheless, patience is growing

thin in the West with Botha's piecemeal approach to dismantling apartheid.

South Africa may well find that future attempts to circumvent embargoes will prove more difficult. The only option may be to employ the intelligence services. There is evidence to suggest that the South Africans have recognized this possibility. Investigation into the diversion of Krytons (devices used in nuclear research) by Israel reveals the involvement of an individual in the U.S. with previous ties to South African covert propaganda action. [14] Surely, the South Africans recognize the necessity for advance planning in the development of human source operations. A decision to resort to clandestine operations could well be made prior to the actual development of a significant military vulnerability. In point of fact, the South Africans would have learned from the SRC case that it is better to act sooner rather than risk vulnerability later. The use of clandestine action to negate short and long-range military vulnerabilities may well be an increasingly attractive option to South African decision makers in light of recent events. The question becomes, then, not one of passing moral judgement on a South African decision to use its services in this manner but rather whether the U.S. is prepared not merely to condemn such action but to counter it.

This paper has highlighted South Africa's capability

to conduct sophisticated clandestine foreign materiel acquisition operations not merely abroad but in and through the United States. The South African military intelligence service, ARMSCOR and NIS comprise a formidable force, a force, due to a number of factors, which the U.S. may be unable to match. Principal among these is that the U.S. assigns a higher priority to efforts to block the flow of military materiel and technology to the Eastern bloc. This leaves a gap in U.S. capability to respond in any secondary effort to stem the flow of military technology elsewhere. Such a posture serves to weaken the effectiveness of U.S. policy in other regions, policies which possess long-term implications for global balance of power.

The growth of the South African DMI and its capability to assimilate lessons learned in the SRC and other operational activity overseas will make any effort to detect future clandestine activity in the U.S. difficult at best. Clearly, the South Africans possess considerable operational expertise. U.S. agencies charged with the responsibility of enforcing present and future sanctions must not denigrate these capabilities. South African intelligence is a force to be reckoned with not only regionally but on a global scale. There is a need to bring maximum U.S. influence to bear to prod South Africa towards fair and equitable solutions to domestic problems. Such influence can only be maximized, however, if South African decision makers clearly understand that America will not

tolerate the conduct of clandestine operations to acquire
U.S. defense materiel or technologies.

NOTES

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47. Howe, p. 724, Cahn et al, pp. 80-81.

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77. Jaster, pp. 17, 32-33; Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," pp. 112, 114.

78. Jaster, pp. 17, 33; de St Jorre, pp. 66-7; Gann and Duignan, p. 273.

79. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy", p. 114.

80. Jaster, pp. 10-11, 33.

81. Winter, p. 545; Thomas H. Henriksen, "Mozambique: The Enemy Within." Current History, Vol. 81, No. 473 (March 1982) p. 113.

82. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," p. 110; Nelson, pp. 227-28; Coker, p.59.

83. Grundy, "South Africa's Domestic Strategy," p. 110; Nelson, pp. 227-28.

84. Jaster, p. 33; Kenneth Grundy, "Namibia in International Politics." Current History, Vol. 81, No. 473 (March 1982) p. 103.

85. Carter and O'Meara, p. 6; Grundy, Confrontation and Accomodation in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence, pp. 87, 119.

86. See Robert Furlong, "Industry Interview With Commandant Piet Marais, Chairman of South Africa's Armscor." International Defense Review, Vol. 17, No. 10/1984 8(October 1984) pp. 1565-67 for evidence that South African officials recognized both vulnerabilities and the absence of short-term militay solutions.

87. Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa." International Security, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Fall 1979) p. 107. A few years later, however, the South Africans had no need to bluff. See Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, "U.S. Knew in Advance of Mystery Blast." Washington Post, 26 April 1985, p. E11 for indications that Israel and South

Africa may have cooperated to test a nuclear device in the Indian Ocean in September 1979.

88. Betts, pp. 96, 107.

89. Howe, pp 307-08, 723; Zoener Cervenka and Barbara Rogers, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa (New York: New York Times Books, 1978) pp. 408-10, Anderson and van Atta, Washington Post, p. E11.

90. Betts, p. 107. This is not to imply that the South Africans were not working to develop a capability. For further details on just such an effort see Cervenka and Rogers, The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa.

91. Michael T. Klare, The Corporate Gunrunners: South Africa's U.S. Weapons Connections." The Nation, Vol. 229, No. 3 (July 28 - August 4, 1979) p. 78.

92. Ibid, p. 78.

93. Foltz, p.291; John F. Burns, "High South African Official Quits in a Scandal Over Secret Activities." New York Times, 8 November 1978, p. 10, col. 3. For additional information regarding South African lobbying efforts in the U.S. see, Russell W. Howe and Sarah H. Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America's Foreign Policy (Garden City: Doubleday and Co. 1977).

94. See Furlong, pp. 1565-67.

95. Charles Mohr, "Panel Links C.I.A. to Arms Shipment." New York Times, 25 March 1982, p. 7, col. 1.

96. Winter, pp. 542-58.

97. "South Africa Abolishes Agency Involved in Secret Spending Abroad." New York Times, 16 June 1978, p. 8, col. 1.

98. Ibid, New York Times, 16 June 1978, p. 8, col. 1.

99. "Agents Arrest 6 in \$1.2 Million Houston Arms Sale." New York Times, 14 May 1981, p. 22, col. 4. The quantities of weapons seized in this investigation were enough to arm a small force but certainly not enough to supply the SADF. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable that the South Africans would be unaware of such a cargo transiting Johannesburg given internal security concerns. Most likely, the arms were destined for the MNR or other insurgent groups supported by the South Africans.

100. Furlong, p. 1566.

101. Furlong, p. 1566.

102. Ibid, p. 1566.

103. Furlong, pp. 1565-66.

104. Lelyveld, New York Times, 10 May 1982, p. 2,

col. 3 details cabinet-level decisions which were made in one operation passing control from NIS to MID.

105. Winston Nagan, "The U.S. and South Africa: The limits of "Peaceful Change." in LeMarchand, p. 247.

106. de St Jorre, pp. 24-25; Gann and Duignan, p. 95.

107. Gann and Duignan, p. 179.

108. Winter, p. 558; Nagan, p. 245.

109. Winter, pp. 557-58.

CHAPTER FIVE

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2. Glenn Frankel, "South Africa Imposes State of Emergency: Sweeping Order Aims at Unrest In Townships, 1st Since 1960." The Washington Post, 21 July 1985, p. 1.

3. Glenn Frankel, "Botha Speech Undercut Allies, Moderate Blacks: South Africa Appears at War with Itself." The Washington Post, 18 August 1985, p. 1.

4. John M. Goshko, "Limited Economic Sanctions Imposed on South Africa: Presidential Action Restricts Bank Loans, Technology Exports." The Washington Post, 10 September 1985, p. 1; Bernard Weinraub, "An Executive Act: President Bans Sales of Computers and Halts Gold-Coin Imports." New York Times, 9 September 1985, p. 1, col. 6.

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6. Goshko, The Washington Post, 10 September 1985, p. 1.

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8. Karen DeYoung, "Angola Gaining in Fight Against UNITA Rebels." The Washington Post, 20 September 1985, p. 1.

9. Ibid, p. 1.

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11. Richard K. Betts, "A Diplomatic Bomb for South Africa." International Security 4, no. 2 (Fall 1979) p.112; Rick Atkinson, "Reactor Operators Suspected of Working for South Africa." The Washington Post, 20 January 1985, p. 1.

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13. Thomas F. Dorian; and Leonard S. Spector, "Covert Nuclear Trade and the International Nonproliferation Regime." Journal of International Affairs 35, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1981) pp. 44-45; Betts, pp. 95, 103.

14. Mark Hosenball; and Dewey Gram, "Hollywood

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