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
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
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John Van Oudenaren

February 1986

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Prepared for

The United States Air Force

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The Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties of Western Europe have always presented special opportunities and difficulties for Soviet foreign policy. From the Soviet perspective, these parties are important for three reasons, all of which must be considered in making policy toward them and toward Western Europe in general: (1) most of these parties are actual or prospective governing parties; (2) they represent that part of the West European public that Soviet analysts regard as "realistic" in its attitudes toward the USSR and "progressive" on other issues; and (3) the parties of the non-Communist left, at least according to Soviet ideology, are potential partners in the revolutionary struggle. This Note examines Soviet policy toward the non-Communist left in Europe in light of the three roles these parties play in Soviet eyes. It reviews Soviet strategy toward the non-Communist left as it has evolved in recent years, analyzes trends within the parties of the non-Communist left and the way in which they are responding to various Soviet initiatives, and considers the implications for the Atlantic alliance of these trends and of Soviet efforts to exploit them. (Continued)

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PREFACE

This Note was produced as part of a Project AIR FORCE research project on Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe, directed by Harry Gelman. It examines Soviet policy toward the Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties of Western Europe, trends within those parties, and the overall implications of those trends for the Atlantic alliance.

The Note is intended to be of assistance to Air Force officers and planners concerned with the political and strategic environment that will confront the Air Force in Western Europe in the coming decade. It should be of interest as well to a wide range of readers concerned with Soviet policy toward Europe.

Research for the Note was completed on August 30, 1985.

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SUMMARY

Since the early 1970s, the Soviet Union has intensified its efforts to develop contacts with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe. In 1978, the Soviet Union also initiated contacts with the Socialist International. By cultivating the non-Communist left in Western Europe, the Soviets hope to further specific objectives such as discouraging the West European countries from participating in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), preventing successful completion of NATO's plans to deploy 572 intermediate-range missiles in Europe, and gaining support for Soviet proposals such as the creation of nuclear-free zones in parts of Europe.

Trends within the West European Socialist and Social Democratic parties justify optimism on the Soviet side, but only up to a point. The Socialist International and its various study groups have condemned the NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, opposed the SDI, and endorsed Soviet positions on other security issues. In northern Europe, all of the parties have become critical of NATO and U.S. policy. The opposition northern parties affect NATO in three ways. First, they make it difficult for the alliance to undertake any major new defense initiative without running into strong domestic political opposition. Second, they are beginning to question, implicitly or explicitly, the accepted NATO doctrine of flexible response and forward defense. Third, they are undercutting alliance political strategy toward the East by allowing the Soviets and East Europeans to deal with the West European Socialists, over the heads, so to speak, of elected governments. On balance, however, the parties remain committed to the alliance and skeptical of Soviet intentions. In southern Europe, the picture is mixed. Parties in Spain and Greece retain their traditional suspicion of U.S. "imperialism," but in Italy the Socialists have become more critical of the Soviet Union and more supportive of a strong Italian role in NATO.

If the northern Socialist and Social Democratic parties return to power in the late 1980s, as seems likely for at least some countries, their effect on NATO will be substantial. While avowing continued membership in the alliance, these parties are likely to oppose major new initiatives, both nuclear and conventional, to favor lower defense spending, and to try to conciliate the Soviet Union on some issues. Developments in France and southern Europe are difficult to predict, but it is likely that Socialist parties in these countries will remain skeptical of U.S. policy outside Europe; however, with the exception of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Greece, they will probably be wary of Soviet overtures in Europe and generally supportive of the alliance.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	iii
SUMMARY	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD THE NON-COMMUNIST LEFT	3
The Evolution of Soviet Strategy	3
Current Objectives	12
III. TRENDS IN THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES	17
The West German SPD	17
The French Socialist Party	23
The British Labour Party	26
The Italian PSI	29
The 'Scandilux' Parties	30
Parties in Spain and Portugal	36
The PASOK in Greece	37
The Swedish and Finnish Social Democrats	40
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE	43
Appendix: MEMBER PARTIES OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL	47

I. INTRODUCTION

The Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties of Western Europe have always presented special opportunities and difficulties for Soviet foreign policy.¹ From the Soviet perspective, these parties are important for three reasons, all of which must be considered in making policy toward them and toward Western Europe in general.

First, most of these parties are actual or prospective governing parties. Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties share or are in power in Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and France. In Britain, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark, these parties are the main opposition and are likely to come to power at some point in the future.

Second, these parties represent that part of the West European public that Soviet analysts regard as "realistic" in its attitudes toward the USSR and "progressive" on other issues. Whether in power or in opposition, the parties of the non-Communist left attract leaders, activists, and voters who support (usually for reasons of their own) policies that the Soviets view as preferable to those of Conservative and Christian Democratic parties.² The parties of the non-Communist left thus are seen not only as actual or potential governing parties,

¹The distinction between Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties is less clear today than it was in the 1920s when the terminology was first used. At that time, the Communists occupied the far left of the political spectrum (although they were later outflanked by the Trotskyites of the Fourth International). To their right were the radical Socialists, including the Independent Socialists (USDP) in Germany and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). To the right of the Socialists were the Social Democrats, who themselves were often divided into leftist, centrist, and right-wing factions. Labor parties are generally Social Democratic in orientation. See Trond Gilberg, "The Soviets and the Noncommunist Left," in Herbert J. Ellison (ed.), *Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe*, University of Washington, Seattle, 1983, p. 131.

²There are exceptions to this general rule. For example, in France, the Soviets traditionally have preferred the Gaullists to the Socialists.

but also as domestic pressure groups that can advance Soviet interests on some issues.

Third, the parties of the non-Communist left, at least according to Soviet ideology, are potential partners in the revolutionary struggle. Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy teaches that the Communist and Socialist parties, which together usually command the majority of "proletarian" support in Western Europe, share a fundamental interest in the transformation of "bourgeois" society, even though pursuit of this interest is said to have been frustrated by the "opportunism" of the "right-wing" Socialist leaders. The task for the local Communist parties is to combat the "right-wing" and "opportunistic" elements in the non-Communist left and to achieve a position of "hegemony" over the left as a whole.³

This Note examines Soviet policy toward the non-Communist left in Europe in light of all three of the roles these parties play in Soviet eyes. Section II briefly examines Soviet strategy toward the non-Communist left as it has evolved in recent years. Section III analyzes trends within the parties of the non-Communist left and the way in which these parties are responding to various Soviet initiatives. The concluding section analyzes the implications for the Atlantic alliance of these trends and of Soviet efforts to exploit them.

³Soviet usage of the term "right wing" does not correspond to standard Western usage (as in footnote 1). From the Soviet perspective, even Social Democratic leaders such as Willy Brandt are technically "rightists."

II. SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD THE NON-COMMUNIST LEFT

THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET STRATEGY

In the early postwar period, Soviet policy toward the Socialist parties¹ of Western Europe was heavily influenced by these parties' attitudes toward cooperation with local Communist parties and, by implication, the Soviet Union. The Soviets maintained warm relations with the Italian PSI and consistently tried to improve relations with the French Socialists. Both parties had shared power with the Communists in coalition governments between 1945 and 1947. In West Germany, Austria, Britain, and other countries where all non-Communist parties spurned cooperation with the Communists, the Soviets often were more hostile to the Socialists than to their Conservative and Christian Democratic rivals.² The Soviets also campaigned against the Socialist International, which had been reorganized in 1951 under the leadership of the British Labour party and which discouraged its member parties from maintaining ties with the Soviet Communist party (CPSU) and cooperating with local Communists.³

Throughout the cold war period, the Soviets saw the Western and particularly the British and West German Socialist parties as potential threats to their control in Eastern Europe and as a block to the further expansion of Soviet influence in Western Europe. In the late 1940s, West European Socialists unsuccessfully tried to intervene on behalf of Socialist parties in Eastern Europe.⁴ In Western Europe, Socialist

¹Unless otherwise indicated, in this Note the term "Socialist" is used in a generic sense to designate Labor and Social Democratic parties as well as those that call themselves Socialist.

²In West Germany, even the possibility of Social Democratic cooperation with the Communists was ruled out when, in 1953, the Constitutional Court banned the German Communist party (DKP) as an anticonstitutional organization.

³For background on the Socialist International, see Julius Braunthal's classic *History of the International, 1945-1968*, Vol. 3, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1980.

⁴The Socialist International later granted membership to parties-in-exile representing Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, as well as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These parties later became consultative members of the International. For a complete list of the member parties of the Socialist International, see the Appendix.

support for the Marshall Plan was decisive in defeating opposition to American aid mounted by the Communists, who isolated themselves and lost electoral support by adopting the Soviet position on this issue.

Throughout the 1950s, the West German Social Democrats continued to pose a particular threat, as they called for a dismantling of the East German state and a revival of the once-powerful Social Democratic party (SPD) in that part of Germany.

Soviet attitudes toward the non-Communist left began to change in the 1960s, as the Socialist threat to Communist control in Eastern Europe grew less credible and as the Soviets began to look for indirect ways to challenge American influence in Western Europe. As West German Social Democratic leaders such as Willy Brandt gradually accommodated themselves to the division of Germany and accepted the need to deal with the Communist regime in East Germany, the Soviet leaders increasingly saw the West European Socialists as a potential force for change in East-West relations.

The Soviets were gratified by the emergence of what they called "realism" on the part of Social Democratic leaders such as Brandt, and they were intrigued by the radicalization of the SPD's youth organization and the rise of an "extraparliamentary opposition" in Germany that began in about 1966. While the Soviets had mixed feelings about the rise of the "new left," with its Maoist and anarchist currents, they were gratified to see West European Socialists criticizing the U.S. role in Vietnam and moderating their long-standing anti-Soviet attitudes.

An unmistakable sign of the changing Soviet attitude toward the non-Communist left was the call for cooperation issued by the 1969 International Conference of Communist Parties. In the words of the concluding conference document,

Communists, who attribute decisive importance to working class unity, are in favor of cooperation with the Socialists and Social Democrats to establish an advanced democratic regime today and to build a socialist society in the future. They will do everything they can to carry out this cooperation.⁵

⁵*International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Progress, Moscow, 1969, p. 24.

By 1971 and Brezhnev's first "peace program," the Soviets were showing an interest not only in cooperation between the Western Socialist parties and their local Communist counterparts, but in direct ties between those parties and the CPSU. As Brezhnev stated in his report to the 24th CPSU Party Congress,

In accordance with the line laid down at the 1969 International Meeting, the CPSU is prepared to develop cooperation with the Social Democrats both in the struggle for peace and democracy and in the struggle for socialism, without, of course, making any concessions in ideology and revolutionary principles. However, this line of the Communists has been meeting with stubborn resistance from the Right-wing leaders of the Social Democrats.⁶

Although Brezhnev's 1971 appeal referred to the "line" established by the 1969 international meeting, a shift in emphasis had in fact occurred in the two years leading up to the 24th Party Congress. Whereas the 1969 appeal stressed establishment of an "advanced democratic regime" as a transitional stage to a socialist society, the 1971 appeal implied that foreign-policy considerations--i.e., the "struggle for peace"--were now more important than the revolutionary transformation of Western society (euphemistically referred to as the promotion of "democracy" and "socialism").

Following the trend established in 1971, Brezhnev's reports to the 25th (1976) and 26th (1981) Party Congresses reaffirmed the Soviet interest in direct ties with the Western Socialists, but placed progressively more emphasis on cooperation in "defense of peace" and less emphasis on the "struggle for socialism." The 1976 report did not reproach the parties of the West for their overall neglect of revolutionary principles, but only for the specific faults of "anticommunism and anti-Sovietism." The 1976 report also was the first Party Congress document to single out particular Western non-Communist parties with which the CPSU was said to be expanding contacts in an

⁶*Pravda*, March 31, 1971.

exemplary manner. Endorsement of high-level contact with these parties, all of which were led by technically "right-wing" elements, also implied a shift from domestic to foreign-policy concerns:

In accordance with the guidelines of the 24th Congress, we have continued to deepen our ties with *progressive non-Communist parties*--with revolutionary-democratic parties and left-wing Socialist Parties. Contacts with the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of a number of countries, including Finland, Belgium, Japan, Great Britain and France, have expanded noticeably. We appreciate what has been achieved here, and we shall continue to work along these lines.

Certainly there can be no question of ideological convergence between scientific communism and the reformism of the Social Democrats. There are still a good many Social Democrats who build all their activity on anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. There are even parties that punish their members for communicating with Communists. We shall combat such phenomena, because they only play into the hands of reaction.

However, as far as Social Democrats who are conscious of their responsibility for the cause of peace--and especially Social Democratic workers--go, we can and do unite with them in concern for the security of the peoples and in endeavors to curb the arms race and to repulse fascism, racism and colonialism. In this respect, we have shown and shall continue to show initiative and good will.⁷

Brezhnev's allusion to the five Western parties acknowledged a trend that began in 1972, when the CPSU initiated formal bilateral contacts with these and several other parties. Under pressure from member parties who were already cooperating with the Communists at home, the leadership of the Socialist International was forced in that year to adopt a resolution stating that "the parties which are members of the International should be free to decide questions of these parties' bilateral relations with other parties."⁸ This resolution freed the member parties to develop their own bilateral links with the CPSU. The first party to do so was the Belgian, which in 1972 signed a joint

⁷*Pravda*, February 25, 1976 (italics in original).

⁸*Socialist Affairs*, No. 5, 1972, p. 92, quoted in V. V. Zagladin (ed.), *Mirovye kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie*, Politizdat, Moscow, 1982, p. 209.

communique on disarmament with the CPSU. Other parties, including the Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, French, and Spanish, soon followed the Belgian lead.

In the period between the 25th and 26th Party Congresses, the CPSU also attended two conferences of European Communist parties, both of which issued appeals for cooperation with the Western Socialists. The 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties proclaimed the Communists' "readiness to contribute towards cooperation, on the basis of equality, with all democratic forces and in particular with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties in the struggle for peace, democracy and progress for society."⁹ The October 1980 Paris Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe called for the cooperation of Communists, Socialists, and "other democratic forces" in the struggle for peace and disarmament.

Brezhnev's report to the 1981 26th Party Congress basically followed the lines of his 1976 report and the 1976 and 1980 appeals. Once again the emphasis was on peace, although support for the "cause of peace" was now cast in negative terms--as participation in the "struggle against the danger of war." This rhetorical shift reflected the line adopted at the June 1980 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which had declared that the danger of war was increasing. The 1981 report also singled out five individual parties but varied the list somewhat. As in 1976, it praised the development of relations with parties in Belgium, Finland, and Japan, but parties in Spain and Sweden were substituted for those of Britain and France. This report also was the first to mention the Socialist International:

In the review period there has been a strengthening of the CPSU's cooperation with other democratic forces. In particular, our links with the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Spain and a number of other countries have received further development, chiefly on questions of the struggle against the danger of war.

Of great importance have been the contacts with the leadership of the Socialist International's conference on disarmament, the contacts with the working group created by it on this

⁹TASS, June 30, 1976.

problem, the reception of its delegations by the CPSU. Contemporary Social Democracy has considerable political weight. It could do more to defend the vital interests of the peoples, and, primarily, to strengthen peace, improve the international situation, rebuff fascism, racism and attacks of reaction on the political rights of the working people.

In practice, however, the Social Democratic leaders are far from always acting in this direction. Many of them are infected with the virus of anticommunism. Some allow themselves to be drawn into the campaign against the Socialist countries organized by imperialism and, citing so-called Atlantic solidarity, justify the arms race. It is clear that such a policy is not in keeping with the interests of the working people. We resolutely condemn it. However, we will actively support all steps which further the cause of peace and democracy.¹⁰

Brezhnev's 1981 report marked the beginning of an intense Soviet effort to enlist the Socialist International and individual member parties in the campaign against the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. On May 14, the CPSU Central Committee sent a ten-page letter to the Socialist International and to the West European member parties calling for their support in freezing the number of nuclear missiles in Europe.¹¹ In July, the CPSU Central Committee went a step further by making a formal offer of cooperation to the European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The offer was made in the form of a long letter that was delivered by the Soviet ambassador in Rome to Bettino Craxi, secretary of the PSI. After reiterating Soviet positions at the Geneva INF negotiations and at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) review meeting in Madrid, the letter concluded: "We proffer our hand to the Socialists, Social Democrats and Laborites for a joint struggle aimed at freeing mankind from further wars of extermination and to salvage peace. To achieve these aims of vital importance to mankind, we are willing to cooperate with you in forms mutually acceptable to both sides."¹² Among the forms

¹⁰*Pravda*, February 24, 1981.

¹¹"Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1981, p. 161.

¹²"CPSU Addresses European Socialists," *Avanti*, July 5-6, 1981.

of cooperation specifically mentioned in the CPSU letter were institutional contacts between appropriate CPSU bodies and the Socialist International's Advisory Council on Arms Control and Disarmament (SIDAC).

Soviet efforts to cultivate the Socialist International were encouraged by changes that had taken place in the organization since the late 1960s, and especially since 1976 and Willy Brandt's election as president. In 1969, the International had endorsed the convening of a European security conference, which was high on the list of Soviet foreign-policy priorities. In 1971, the leadership of the International suggested abolishing the voting rights of the consultative parties-in-exile. Although this proposal was blocked by "right-wing" member parties, it won high praise in Moscow.¹³ As noted, in 1972 the International lifted the ban on member party contacts with the Communists.

Despite these changes and the development of contacts with individual member parties, the CPSU did not make formal contact with the International itself until April 1978, when a delegation led by Boris Ponomarev, the head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, attended a conference in Helsinki sponsored by the International's Study Group on Disarmament. The Study Group, which was chaired by Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister of Finland and head of the Finnish Social Democratic party, later made several trips to Moscow to meet with Brezhnev and other Soviet officials. The Study Group's October 1979 fact-finding mission was the first visit to the Soviet Union by representatives of the Socialist International.¹⁴

The Study Group enhanced its position in Soviet eyes when, in November 1980, it submitted its final report to the Socialist International's congress in Madrid.¹⁵ Appearing just as the Soviets were launching their campaign against INF, the report came close to

¹³See Dimitr Dimitrov, "Notes on the theory and policy of the Socialist International," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 18, No. 9 (1975).

¹⁴"In the Interests of Peace and Disarmament," TASS, October 3, 1979.

¹⁵"Peace in the 1980s and Beyond: The Final Report by the Socialist International Study on Disarmament," in *Socialist Affairs*, No. 5, 1981. For a favorable Soviet assessment of the report, see Alexander Weber, "Socialist International: Guidelines for the Eighties," *New Times*, Nos. 49 and 50, 1980.

endorsing Soviet objections to the missiles, stating, for example, that "on the medium-range level, new procurements tendencies are accompanied by the emergence of dangerous doctrines concerning nuclear wars with a limited geographical scope and lowered threshold of escalation into the nuclear sphere." This assessment implied support for the Soviet claim that INF deployments are intended to wage "limited nuclear war," rather than for the NATO position that the 1979 decision was intended to shore up deterrence by strengthening the "coupling" of U.S. and West European security.¹⁶ Having fulfilled its mandate with submission of its report to the October congress, the Study Group technically ceased to exist. However, the International decided to set up a permanent Advisory Council on Arms Control and Disarmament. The Council, which is headed by Sorsa and has essentially the same membership as the old Study Group, has initiated an active program of exchanges with the Soviet Union as well as with U.S. officials.

High-level ties between the CPSU and the top leaders of the Socialist International and the individual parties are only the most visible element in a ramified network of contacts that is being forged at middle and lower levels between party specialists, regional and local party organizations, and state and local governments. At the regional level, the Soviets have encouraged contacts and institutionalized cooperation between state and local governments in Western Europe headed by Socialists and Soviet republican, *oblast*, and city governments and party committees. The Communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) are conducting exchanges and a series of seminars on

¹⁶The report also tacitly rejected Western claims that the Soviet Union was engaged in a huge defense buildup. Using data provided by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it estimated 1980 Soviet defense expenditures at \$107 billion (just below the \$111 billion spent by the United States), even though the CIA placed these expenditures at from \$165 to \$180 billion as of 1979. (See *The Military Balance, 1981-1982*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981, p. 15.) Another indication of bias was the report's use of preferred Soviet terminology for discussing international issues. The Cuban missile crisis, for example, was referred to as the "Caribbean crisis," and the MBFR negotiations as the "Vienna talks," while the Study Group's own activities were described as part of "the struggle for peace based on international solidarity and cooperation."

international issues, at which they have issued joint condemnations of various aspects of U.S. policy and called for European and world disarmament.¹⁷

CPSU-Socialist exchanges on specialized areas have increased in frequency since the late 1970s. For example, in August and September 1979, a delegation of Spanish Socialist Workers' party (PSOE) officials interested in health toured the USSR as guests of the CPSU Central Committee, meeting with members of the Soviet medical workers' union, members of the Central Committee, republic and *gorkom*-level officials involved in health policy, and representatives of the Ministry of Health.¹⁸ The Soviet state and party press is forging contacts with its counterparts in the Western parties. The editorial board of *Kommunist*, the theoretical journal of the CPSU Central Committee, now has exchanges with its counterparts from the SPD's *Neue Gesellschaft*.¹⁹ Similarly, in June 1984, a group of journalists from the Finnish Social Democratic party toured the USSR, meeting with their counterparts from *Pravda*, TASS, Novosti (APN), and other organizations.

The Soviets also appear to be encouraging contacts between the East European Communist parties and the West European Socialists. While it is difficult to prove that the CPSU assigns particular tasks to the East European parties for carrying out Soviet policy toward the non-Communist left, some evidence suggests that it does. In December 1979, the Hungarian Communist party hosted a conference of East and West European Communist parties to "exchange views on topical questions of relations and possible international cooperation between Communists and Social

¹⁷"Socialist-communist youth seminar," *Socialist Affairs*, No. 4, 1982. Socialist-affiliated youth organizations took part in the July 1985 Moscow youth festival. The West German groups threatened to withdraw in protest when the festival youth organizers arranged to have a West Berlin delegation led by the city's East German-controlled Socialist Unity party of West Berlin march separately in the opening parade rather than as part of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) contingent. The Soviets ultimately backed down and allowed non-Communist groups from West Berlin to march with the FRG delegation; they were thus able to secure continued participation by non-Communist youth organizations from West Germany.

¹⁸*Pravda*, September 8, 1979.

¹⁹*Pravda*, November 4, 1984.

Democrats."²⁰ The Soviets have tolerated and probably to some extent encouraged the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) to respond positively to SPD overtures for party-to-party links.

All evidence suggests that Gorbachev intends to make the development of ties with the West European Socialists a key element of his foreign policy. In March 1985, shortly after his elevation to the post of CPSU General Secretary, Gorbachev met with a delegation from SIDAC and praised its work.²¹ In May 1985, he received Socialist International president and SPD chairman Brandt and effusively praised Social Democratic stands on many issues, including the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). As Gorbachev remarked in his toast at a dinner in Brandt's honor,

I want to note with satisfaction, Mr. Chairman, that your party, the Social Democrats, plays a prominent role in the struggle for resolving questions of war and peace. This is evidenced by your positions, presented in documents of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and in your statements, against the "star wars" plans and in favor of containing the arms race, reducing weapons, primarily nuclear weapons.... We highly appreciate the firm position of your party, which stands for preventing another war from emanating from German soil.²²

CURRENT OBJECTIVES

The Soviet leaders see the development of relations with the Western Socialist parties as at least potentially helpful in accomplishing multiple objectives. These include:

1. Enlisting influential Western political forces to block NATO and U.S. defense programs.
2. Eroding the overall basis of popular and political party support for NATO in Western Europe.
3. Giving the Soviet Communist Party added levers of influence over the West European Communist parties.

²⁰*Pravda*, December 12, 1979.

²¹*Pravda*, March 23, 1985.

²²*Pravda*, May 28, 1985.

4. Helping to foster alliances and cooperation between West European Communists and the extreme left wings of the European Socialist parties, and thus laying the basis for eventual cooperation in "the struggle for advanced democracy" and ultimately "socialism."
5. Enhancing the credibility of the Soviet "peace program" inside the Soviet Union by demonstrating broad areas of seeming agreement between the CPSU and influential non-Communist groups and individuals in the West.

The Soviets can thank the West European Socialist parties for some minor victories in the campaign against the SDI, or at least against European participation in the project. At its June 1985 meeting, the Socialist International condemned the SDI and urged all countries not to take part in projects intended to develop space-based defenses.²³ In Denmark, the Social Democrats and three allied left-wing parties have combined to outlaw Danish participation in the SDI and to instruct the Danish government to oppose the SDI in NATO forums.²⁴ In Norway, a similar motion that was supported by the Labor party failed by one vote but clearly contributed to the Conservative government's decision to decline participation in the project.²⁵ Elsewhere in Western Europe, Socialist opposition has had less effect. The Socialist government of France has rejected the offer, but less out of Socialist conviction than because the SDI is seen as a potential threat to France's independent deterrent and its ambitions to lead Western Europe's high-technology efforts. Italy, which is now led by Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, probably will participate in SDI research in some way. But Social Democratic opposition to the SDI in Germany has affected the government's position, helping to encourage Free Democratic (FDP)

²³"Socialist International Shuns President's 'Star Wars' Plan," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1985.

²⁴Ole Dall, "New Footnote Conflict," *Berlingske Tidende*, April 13, 1985.

²⁵Einar Solvoll, "Dramatic War of Nerves," *Aftenposten*, June 5, 1985.

Foreign Minister Genscher to adopt a less positive stance toward the SDI than Chancellor Kohl, a Christian Democrat. Encouraged by developments in Denmark, Norway, and to a lesser extent West Germany, the Soviets can be expected to persist in efforts to enlist the West European Socialists in their campaign against the SDI.

The Soviets have less reason for optimism on the INF issue, although they do not appear to have completely abandoned the idea of trying to prevent completion of the deployment plan or removing, over the long run, those missiles already deployed. The Soviets cannot realistically expect the deployments to be reversed, at least in the short run. But Soviet policymakers seem to have concluded that the struggle over INF has eroded the domestic base of support for NATO in Western Europe in ways that will make it difficult for governments of any political coloring to proceed with difficult defense initiatives. For example, Georgi Arbatov characterized the West German decision to accept deployment of the Pershings as "very probably a Phyrhic victory" for President Reagan "and the European governments that have fallen in with him." He placed particular emphasis on the effects the INF controversy had had on the Social Democratic parties:

Merely take the SPD, which just like Den Uyl's party [the Netherlands Labor party] before it, has done a turnabout. It is clear what a difference there is between public opinion in the West European countries on the one hand and parliaments and governments on the other hand. This process of deception on the part of those governing West Europe is at the same time creating great political power among the people....

Kohl and his people must realize, must have realized, that the fact that they are liked by Reagan does not contribute to their own stability in the FRG. That they must pay a price. I have already said: In Western Europe--the Social Democrats have done a turnabout. It will be very difficult for a Den Uyl or a Vogel to change this decision.²⁶

Confident that divisive issues such as the SDI and INF help to polarize Western electorates and parliaments, the Soviets can be expected to try to keep these issues at the forefront of East-West relations, even if

²⁶*De Volkskrant*, December 6, 1983.

doing so makes it more difficult for them to conclude arms-control agreements with the United States.

Apart from its obvious relevance to security and arms-control issues, the development of ties with non-Communist parties has given the Soviets added levers of influence over occasionally recalcitrant Communist parties such as the Spanish and the Italian. In the late 1970s, for example, when relations between the CPSU and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) were extremely strained, the Soviets made overtures to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and received party leader Gonzalez in Moscow with great honors.²⁷ By dealing directly with the Socialists, the Soviets blunted "Eurocommunist" attacks on Soviet society and certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy, while also threatening to isolate the West European Communists at home and internationally.

At the same time that Soviet leaders look to ties between the CPSU and the West European Socialists to exert pressure on the local Communists, they exhort the Communists to forge "united action" with the Socialists in the "struggle for peace," "democracy," and ultimately "socialism." From the Soviet perspective, "united action" between local Communists and the Western Socialist parties is both an objective in its own right and a means to other objectives. It helps to increase Communist and hence Soviet influence over the policies of the Socialist parties, and confirms the Marxist-Leninist claim that Socialists and Communists share a fundamental interest in struggle against the "bourgeois" parties.

In recent years, most of the northern Socialist parties have moderated much of their previous opposition to cooperation with the local Communists. The waning of hostility toward the Communists is partly a product of these parties' own poor electoral prospects. But it is also a product of changing international conditions, in particular of the East-West detente of the early 1970s and its sudden deterioration at the beginning of the next decade. As Pierre Hassner has remarked, in the early 1970s, "the Soviet-American dialogue at the top legitimized

²⁷See Pierre Hassner, *The Left in Europe: Security Implications and International Dimensions*, The California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, April 1979, p. 26.

the communist-non-communist dialogue within countries."²⁸ At the end of the decade, many West European Socialists suspended whatever reservations they still had about cooperation with the Communists out of a sense of urgency and common purpose in the "struggle" against INF and to save detente. CPSU officials now would like the local Communist parties to use their newly found prominence in the anti-INF struggle to increase their influence with the West European workers. A 1983 editorial in *Kommunist* urged the West European Communists to link the "struggle for peace" with traditional working class concerns such as jobs.²⁹ So far, however, there is little indication that Socialist toleration of the Communists in the "peace" struggle has led to greater receptivity to Communist views on economic issues.

Finally, relations with the Western Socialists have domestic uses for the Soviet leadership. As the CPSU has progressively downplayed the USSR's self-proclaimed role as the vanguard of the world Communist revolution and played up its role as the chief defender of peace in the world, cooperation with influential Westerners in "defense of peace" has become both more possible and more useful to the CPSU. Ties with the Socialist parties appear to be playing the role formerly played by the international Communist movement in legitimizing to the Soviet people the rules and policies of the CPSU. Confident that West European Socialist leaders such as Brandt, Sweden's Olof Palme, and Britain's Neil Kinnock will not offend their hosts by criticizing Soviet policy, the Soviets have even given these men access to the Soviet media. During his May 1985 visit to Moscow, Brandt appeared on Soviet television for twenty minutes. At the time of his November 1984 visit to Moscow, Labour Party leader Kinnock even appeared on the Moscow World Service.³⁰ For Soviet audiences, these media appearances probably lend some credence to the leadership's claim that vast numbers of people in the West support the Soviet Union in its foreign policy.

²⁸Ibid., p. 8.

²⁹*Kommunist*, No. 12, 1983. See also Elizabeth Teague, "Kommunist Editorial on Western Peace Movement," Radio Free Europe, *RFE-RL Research*, RL 334/83, September 2, 1983.

³⁰For Brandt's appearance, see *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, May 29, 1985; for Kinnock's, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *FBIS Daily Report, Soviet Union*, November 23, 1984.

III. TRENDS IN THE WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES

As was shown in the previous section, Soviet attitudes toward the non-Communist left in Europe have been evolving in response to what the Soviets see as favorable trends in the non-Communist parties. Most of these parties have adopted foreign and defense policies that are at variance with those of the Conservative and Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe and of both major parties in the United States, as well as with the previous policies of the Socialists themselves. In virtually all of the West European countries except France and Italy, the 1979-1983 controversy over the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe coincided with and in part helped to cause a leftward shift in the Socialist parties. In four of the five countries in which NATO missiles have been or are scheduled to be deployed, these parties were and remain opposed to deployment. With the relative decline of INF as an issue, these parties have begun to focus on other issues, including NATO conventional defense efforts (e.g., Follow-On Force Attack (FOFA), chemical weapons, the possibility of creating nuclear-free zones in parts of Western Europe, and, above all, the SDI).

This section examines the trends within the West European parties and assesses the extent to which the Soviets are likely to be pleased or disappointed by them in the next several years. Table 1 shows the results of recent elections in Europe and the relative positions of the Socialist parties in their national settings.

THE WEST GERMAN SPD

Since leaving office in late 1982, the West German Social Democratic party has shifted to the left on defense and foreign-policy issues. How significant and enduring this shift is likely to be is a subject of speculation throughout Europe and in the party itself.

Unlike the British Labour party, whose policies are heavily influenced by nuclear pacifism and anti-Americanism, the SPD is chiefly motivated by a desire to preserve relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the USSR, and the rest of Eastern Europe. Developments

Table 1

RESULTS OF MOST RECENT ELECTIONS

Party	Popular Vote (%) [a]	Next Scheduled Elections
Austria, 1983		1987
Socialist[b]	47.65	
People's Freedom	43.22 4.98	
Belgium, 1981		October 1985
Christian Social (Flemish)	19.3	
Christian Social (French)	7.1	
Flemish Socialist	12.7	
French Socialist	12.4	
Reformed Liberal	8.6	
Communist	2.3	
Freedom and Progress	12.9	
People's Union	9.8	
Others	14.9	
Denmark, 1984		1987
Social Democratic	31.38	
Conservative People's	23.27	
Liberal	11.98	
Socialist People's	11.43	
Radical Liberal	5.45	
Center Democratic	4.56	
Progress	3.56	
Christian People's	2.71	
Left Socialist	2.64	
Others	3.02	
Finland, 1983		1987
Social Democratic[b]	26.71	
National Coalition	22.12	
Center	17.63	
Finnish People's Democratic League	13.46	
Finnish Rural	9.69	
Swedish People's	4.61	
Finnish Christian Union	3.03	
Others	2.75	

Party	Popular Vote (%) [a]	Next Scheduled Elections
France, 1981	(Seats) [c]	1986
Socialist [b]	285	(1988, presidential)
Rally for the Republic (Gaullists)	85	
Union for French Democracy	65	
Communist	44	
Other right-wing	8	
Other left-wing	4	
FRG, 1983		1987
Social Democratic	38.2	
Christian Democratic Union	38.2	
Christian Social Union	10.6	
Free Democratic	7.0	
Greens	5.6	
Communist	0.2	
Others	0.2	
Greece, 1985		1989
Panhellenic Socialist Union (PASOK) [b]	45.8	
New Democracy	40.8	
KKE-Exterior	9.9	
KKE-Interior	1.8	
Others	5.3	
Italy, 1983		1987
Christian Democratic	32.9	
Communist	29.9	
Socialist [b]	11.4	
Italian Social Movement--National Right	6.8	
Republican	5.1	
Social Democratic [b]	4.1	
Liberal	2.9	
Radical	2.2	
Others	4.7	
Netherlands, 1982		May 1986
Labor	30.36	
Christian Democratic Appeal	29.32	
People's Party for Freedom and Democracy	23.05	
Democrats '66	4.32	
Communist	1.79	
Others	11.14	

Party	Popular Vote (%) ^[a]	Next Scheduled Elections
Norway, 1981		September 1985
Labor	37.6	
Conservative	31.3	
Center	9.3	
Christian Democratic	6.7	
Socialist Left	4.9	
Progress	4.5	
Liberal	3.9	
Others	1.7	
Portugal, 1983		October 1985 (1986, presidential)
Socialist ^[b]	36.3	
Social Democratic ^[b]	27.0	
United People's Alliance	18.2	
Center Democratic	12.4	
Others	6.1	
Spain, 1982		1986
Socialist Workers' ^[b]	46.0	
Popular Alliance/Popular Democratic	25.3	
Communist	3.8	
Others		
Sweden, 1982		September 1985
Social Democratic Labor ^[b]	45.6	
Moderate (Conservative)	23.6	
Center	15.5	
Liberal	5.9	
Left (Communist)	5.6	
Others	3.8	
United Kingdom, 1983		1987
Conservative	42.4	
Labour	27.6	
Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance	25.4	
Others	4.6	

^aLower house parliamentary elections. France and Portugal also have direct presidential elections.

^bSocialist or Social Democratic party in power.

^cFrench citizens vote on successive Sundays for candidates, and may vote for a different party each week.

in the East always have been important to the SPD. As was noted, during the cold war the SPD tried to defend the interests of the suppressed Socialist parties in the East and especially in the GDR. In the 1960s, the SPD moderated its position toward the Communist regimes of the East, seeking to promote "change through rapprochement." After taking power with the FDP in 1969, the SPD settled upon a dual-track policy of deterrence and detente, stressing the need for West Germany to maintain strong defense forces and to remain anchored in the Western alliance, but also to pursue accommodation with the Eastern bloc through compromise and negotiations. In the early and mid-1970s, this policy was broadly accepted within the SPD and tacitly accepted by all West German political forces as being in the country's fundamental national interests.

But as East-West relations deteriorated in the late 1970s and NATO sought to respond to the Soviet military buildup with programs of its own, consensus within the party and within Germany began to break down. Party leaders, including Brandt, his foreign-policy adviser Egon Bahr, and Herbert Wehner, the chairman of the SPD parliamentary group, in effect demanded that the Schmidt government subordinate defense policy to the requirements of detente with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the party's inability to agree on INF deployments led to the loss of power, as FDP leader Genscher broke up the coalition rather than see Chancellor Schmidt lose control of foreign policy to opponents in his own party.

After going into opposition in late 1982, the SPD came into conflict with the United States and NATO on a growing list of security and arms-control issues. At its March 1982 Congress, the party endorsed the Soviet view that British and French nuclear missiles should be counted against Soviet totals in the Geneva INF negotiations. In late 1983, the party voted overwhelmingly to oppose the deployment of INF in West Germany. Subsequently, the SPD came out against the SDI, against tightened Western restrictions on technology transfer to the East, and against new operational concepts such as FOFA. SPD defense thinkers such as Andreas von Buelow also are searching for alternative defense concepts to replace nuclear deterrence and flexible response.¹

¹In a recent *Bundestag* debate on "alternative strategies," SPD representatives revealed that the party is working on a new "security

While opposing much of Western defense policy, the SPD has launched an active policy toward the East by upgrading bilateral party-to-party contacts that were established in the 1970s and by working through the Socialist International and regional governments still controlled by the SPD. SPD policy toward the East German SED has been particularly active. After several years of intense negotiations, in June 1985 the SPD and the SED announced that they had reached agreement on a proposal for a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, which they then presented to their respective governments.² In 1985, the SPD also initiated exchanges with the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, hosting Central Committee Secretary Vasil Bilak in Bonn.³ But the focal point of SPD policy toward the East remains the Soviet Union and the key party, the CPSU. In addition to high-level contacts such as those between Brandt and Gorbachev in May 1985, the SPD is seeking to engage the CPSU in a dialogue on a whole range of security issues. In March 1984, Soviet leader Chernenko accepted a proposal by SPD leader Vogel that the SPD and the CPSU establish a joint working group to study "how the arms race between the military blocs can be ended and the money saved used to combat hunger and for the further development of the third world."⁴ As a result of this proposal, a working group was established and plans were made to present a joint paper in the fall of 1985. The SPD also has established joint working groups with the SED and the Polish United Workers' party to discuss cutting arms budgets to benefit world development.

concept" that may contain the following elements: stationing of all tactical nuclear weapons at sea; supplementing forward defense with "deep-echeloned area defense"; greater use of reserves; West German naval missions concentrated on the Baltic, with other areas left to other allied navies; and what is described as a "radical change in the air force," with a shift to an exclusive air-defense role. (Ruediger Moniac, "SPD Signals Retreat from the NATO Strategy of Deterrence," *Die Welt*, June 14, 1985.)

²"SPD and SED for Chemical Weapon-Free Zone," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, June 20, 1985.

³Hamburg Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), March 11, 1985.

⁴"Soviet Delegation to Visit Bonn in the Fall," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, May 29, 1985.

After the SPD's fall from power in 1982, most political observers in Germany, and indeed within the party, predicted that the SPD would be relegated to an opposition role until perhaps well into the 1990s. But recent successes in state elections, what is seen as a weak performance by the Kohl government, and the relative popularity of Johannes Rau, the SPD's candidate for Chancellor, have raised the prospect of an SPD return to power in 1987. To maximize its chances of winning in 1987, the SPD must be able to blunt Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) charges that the Social Democrats are anti-American and the "party of Moscow." The SPD therefore seems to have toned down some of its anti-U.S. rhetoric. However, younger activists in the party and many members of the parliamentary group remain opposed to most aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy and are likely to assure that a future SPD government will be less cooperative with the United States on defense matters than the SPD governments of the 1970s--perhaps less cooperative than any West German government since the founding of the FRG.

THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY

The French Socialist party (PS) is one of the most complex and internally diverse parties of the European left. The PS was founded in 1971 by the merger of several elements: the old SFIO (*Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere*), the French member of the Second International and a partner in many Fourth Republic governments; the political clubs, including the left-wing *Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Socialistes* (CERES); and Francois Mitterrand's organization of non-Communist resistance veterans, the *Union Democratique et Socialiste de la Resistance* (UDSR). The party was enlarged in 1974 when a faction of the *Parti Socialiste Unifie* (PSU), a far-left party attracted to many of the ideas of the striking students of May 1968, followed PSU leader Michel Rocard in joining forces with the PS.

The leaders of the new party hoped to reverse the declining electoral fortunes of the non-Communist left and in 1972 concluded a Common Program with the French Communist party (PCF), with which they hoped to win power in the 1974 elections. Throughout the 1970s, the foreign and defense policies of a future PS government were largely a

mystery to observers in France. At one extreme within the party were the SFIO traditionalists--Atlanticist in orientation, suspicious of Gaullist claims of "grandeur," favorable to Israel and opposed to France's pro-Arab policy, and largely devoid of anti-American or anti-German sentiments. At the other extreme was the "Gaullo-Marxist" wing composed of CERES and ex-PSU elements. This group, which included Regis Debray and Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the leader of CERES, proclaimed its sympathy for national liberation movements, Cuba, and the Palestinians, and its opposition to the alleged political, economic, and military imperialism of the United States. Mitterrand sought to placate both of these groups, not only for political reasons, but because he himself appeared to hold eclectic and in some cases internally inconsistent foreign-policy views, on the one hand showing great distrust of the USSR and all Communists, on the other clearly attracted to Castro and eager to challenge perceived U.S. "imperialism."

Although Mitterrand reportedly always has been skeptical of the Soviet peace appeal, the PS followed the lead of other Western parties in developing bilateral contacts with the CPSU centered on the peace theme. In a move that infuriated critics in France, Mitterrand led a PS delegation to Moscow in 1975 to meet with Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev. The two parties signed a joint communique which included the following assessment of international conditions:

The French Socialist Party delegation expressed its appreciation of the Soviet Union's constructive contribution to the process of international detente. ... the two delegations declared that the imperialists and reactionaries are continuing their attempts to revive the spirit of the cold war.⁵

When, with the help of the Communists, the Socialists finally won power in 1981, the PS partially resolved its internal foreign-policy dilemmas by pursuing an anti-Soviet and, in the view of some,

⁵Quoted by Jean-Francois Revel, a severe critic of the Socialists, in *How Democracies Perish*, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1984, p. 192. Mitterrand's own account of the meeting with Brezhnev suggests that he did not believe much of what he signed. (See Francois Mitterrand, *L'abeille et l'architecte*, Flammarion, Paris, 1978, pp. 27-31.)

excessively Atlanticist policy in Europe, while aligning itself with Third World causes and against the United States outside Europe and in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. The PS was also highly critical of Soviet human-rights violations and of the crackdown on Solidarity in Poland. Although the French government, reflecting the traditional French practice of separating morality from *Realpolitik*, was mild in its response to developments in Poland, the Socialist party reacted to the imposition of martial law more strongly than many of its Social Democratic counterparts in northern Europe. In late 1981, the PS suspended party-to-party contacts with the CPSU because of Soviet support for the declaration of martial law in Poland. But in October 1982, the PS decided to resume contacts and to send Jacques Huntzinger, the party's national secretary responsible for foreign relations, to the December 21 celebration of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.⁶

Like other European Socialist parties, the PS would like to avoid the appearance of endorsing either American or Soviet approaches to international issues by stressing its commitment to a "European security identity." In July 1985, the PS published its "Statement on Europe's Security," which went further than any French government has done in tying France's security to that of West Germany. According to the document:

France's security is broadly linked to the security of Germany and the whole of West Europe. Can we still say that strategic areas are separate and that the French circle is separate from the West European circle? We do not think so. To be more specific, France has an essential interest, which will increase, in its global deterrent and its defense being effectively used to help West Europe. And primarily to help the security of Europe's most forward-based and vulnerable territory, which also borders on France, namely the territory of the FRG. The French nuclear forces, alongside and independently from the U.S. umbrella, will have an increasing role to play in West Europe's security.⁷

⁶Reported by TANJUG, October 8, 1982.

⁷"PS Publishes 'Statement on Europe's Security,'" *Le Monde*, July 4, 1985.

This expression of interest in German security is part of a continuing effort by the PS to influence the security debate in Germany and especially in the SPD. To some extent, the PS's attacks on the SS-20 and its support for the NATO two-track decision were in response to concern about suspected "nationalist-neutralist" tendencies in West Germany. But the PS is also open to influences from the SPD. After years of strain over INF and related issues, the West German SPD and the French PS are beginning to rebuild cooperation on security issues by focusing on their joint opposition to the SDI. At a meeting in Paris in May 1985, French Socialist party First Secretary Lionel Jospin and SPD Chairman Brandt issued a joint statement condemning what they called "destabilizing technology" and urging "an end to the arms race in space."⁸

In addition to these changing international developments, the policies of the PS and of the French government will be heavily influenced by domestic political considerations as France approaches the 1986 elections to the National Assembly and the 1988 presidential elections. Mitterrand may want to blunt Communist attacks and detract attention from the government's austerity program by pursuing an active foreign policy. The Gorbachev visit to France in October 1985 is one indication of a warming of Franco-Soviet relations that may occur over the next several years.

THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY

On defense and especially nuclear issues, the British Labour party is regarded by European specialists as perhaps the most extreme Socialist party in all of Europe.⁹ At its October 1984 annual

⁸Reported by Agence France Presse (AFP), May 21, 1985. There are nuances in the positions of the two parties on the SDI, some of which are paradoxical. In its "Statement on Europe's Security," the PS argued that the deployment of defensive systems over both superpowers "would make a selective, graduated, U.S. strike even more difficult," despite the fact that French governments, including Mitterrand's, have always disputed the value of "graduated" and "flexible" response doctrines. The SPD rejects the SDI chiefly because of its implications for East-West detente.

⁹See, for example, "Who's the leftist of them all?" *The Economist*, June 11, 1983.

conference, Labour reaffirmed its stance, first adopted at the 1980 conference and then strengthened in 1982, in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament. The conference adopted a detailed document, "Defense and Security for Britain," which called for unconditional opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles in Britain and pledged their removal by a future Labour government. It also called for immediate cancellation of Trident, a phasing out of Britain's independent deterrent, and the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from British soil. This last provision would apply to Diego Garcia, the British-owned Indian Ocean island on which the United States has a large air and naval base.¹⁰

While Labour's position is literally one of "unilateralism," party leaders are attracted to the idea of formalizing Britain's nonnuclear status in a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union and, it is hoped, eliciting parallel steps toward disarmament by the Soviets. In May 1983, the party's National Executive Committee sent a letter to the Central Committee of the CPSU asking whether the USSR would cut its medium-range missiles and warheads "by an equivalent amount in return for the phasing out of the British Polaris nuclear missiles."¹¹ Although the Labour party hoped that a favorable Soviet response to this request would win support for it in the upcoming elections, the Soviets offered only vague and noncommittal replies to the Labour proposal. With French and British systems playing such a large role in the Soviet anti-INF campaign, the Soviets probably were wary of directing attention to or too strongly supporting a phasing out of British systems, lest this weaken the all-out Soviet campaign against deployment of additional American missiles in Europe.

But having lost the anti-INF struggle, at least in the short run, in late 1984 the Soviets were in a position to offer a more positive response to Labour's initiative. In talks in Moscow with Labour party leader Neil Kinnock, General Secretary Chernenko announced that "the Soviet Union would be prepared to reduce and physically liquidate a part

¹⁰See Christopher J. Bowie and Alan Platt, *British Nuclear Policymaking*, The Rand Corporation, R-3085-AF, January 1984, p. 55.

¹¹Jonathan Steele, "Labour leaders seek nuclear peace treaty with Andropov," *The Guardian*, May 6, 1983.

of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR that would be equal to the number of nuclear missiles liquidated by the British side."¹² In announcing the Chernenko offer, the Soviets also raised the prospect of a bilateral USSR-UK pact guaranteeing Britain's security. According to *Pravda*:

Implementation of complete nuclear disarmament by Britain with liquidation of corresponding foreign bases would create the conditions under which the USSR would guarantee that its nuclear weapons would not be targeted on the British territory.

In case of Britain's official decision on nuclear disarmament, the entire range of questions arising in this connection, pertaining to Soviet-British relations in the military sphere, could become a subject of discussion and appropriate agreement between the USSR and Britain.

Conclusion of such an agreement would be consistent with long-standing Soviet efforts to obtain a complete or partial *droit de regard* over the defense policies of European countries. It would also make it difficult for governments elsewhere to resist Soviet overtures for the conclusion of similar agreements purporting to guarantee their security. Despite the hidden and not-so-hidden agenda underlying Chernenko's reply, Kinnock returned to Britain claiming that he had made a breakthrough in dealing with the Soviet Union.¹³

Despite this apparent naivete in dealing with the Soviets, Kinnock is seen in Britain as a moderate intent on cutting back the influence of people such as Tony Benn and Arthur Scargill, the head of the miners' union, both of whom reject NATO and the European Community (EC) and favor steps such as the unification of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the eventual "reunification of Europe" through the dismantling of NATO.¹⁴ If Labour is elected in

¹²*Pravda*, November 27, 1984.

¹³Martin Walker, "Kinnock claims nuclear triumph," *The Guardian*, November 27, 1984.

¹⁴See Tony Benn, "Labour must not be in the Market for Capital's benefit," *The Guardian*, July 25, 1983.

1988, Kinnock will be under intense pressure from within the party to carry through all elements of Labour's current program. This might in turn precipitate a severe crisis with the United States.

THE ITALIAN PSI

Unlike the Socialist parties of northern Europe, the Italian PSI continues to support the deployment of new American missiles in Europe, including those at Comiso, Sicily, and to support the U.S. negotiating stance at Geneva. The PSI has not condemned the SDI, in which Italy is likely to participate under the leadership of Socialist Prime Minister Craxi. The position of the Italian Socialists is ironic in view of the fact that in the 1950s, the PSI was the most pro-Moscow of the European Socialist parties and its leader, Pietro Nenni, was the recipient of a Stalin Prize.

PSI foreign and defense policies can be understood only in the context of the party's long postwar decline and its efforts over the past decade to make a new start. The PSI emerged from World War II roughly equal in size to the Italian Communist party, winning almost 21 percent of the vote in the 1946 elections. But Nenni's decision to retain his electoral alliance with the Communists even after their removal from the governing coalition in 1947 proved to be a disaster for the Socialists. One-third of the party's rank and file broke away from the PSI to set up the Italian Social Democratic party (PSDI).¹⁵ Suspected of being a Trojan horse for the Communists, the PSI did not assume governmental responsibility until the mid-1960s, when the ruling Christian Democrats (DC) made their "opening to the left." But becoming a coalition partner just as Italy was entering a prolonged period of social upheavals and economic recession did nothing to reverse the fortunes of the PSI, which continued to lose ground to the Communists.

The real turnabout for the PSI finally came in 1976, when the youthful Craxi assumed the party's leadership just as the PCI's popularity was nearing its peak and that of the Socialists had hit a low

¹⁵For background on the PSI, see Leo J. Wollemborg, "Italian Socialism and Peace," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1985). For a detailed account of the PSDI breakaway, see Chap. 3 of Braunthal, *History of the International*, 1945-1968, op. cit.

point. Under Craxi's leadership, the PSI has abandoned its doctrinaire Marxism, adopting the red carnation as its symbol in place of the hammer and sickle. The party became a strong supporter of an active role for Italy in the alliance and of concrete NATO initiatives such as INF deployments, which were opposed by the PCI. In supporting NATO in this way, the PSI has capitalized on a somewhat more self-assertive Italian national mood and has tried to contrast its own concrete support for NATO with the positions of the PCI, which rhetorically accepts the alliance but opposes most of its policies. Meanwhile, to preserve its bargaining power with the DC and to blunt PCI attacks from the left, the PSI has continued to govern regions and municipalities in coalition with the Communists.

But precisely because PSI support for U.S. positions is so much (although not entirely) a product of Italian domestic politics, this support remains vulnerable to shifting political currents in Italy and in the party. According to Giorgio La Malfa, president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies' foreign affairs commission, in Italy "all parties would be in favor of a moratorium" on INF deployments that would leave NATO short of the goals it set in 1979.¹⁶ Prime Minister Craxi was reflecting the Italian political climate when, during a May 1984 trip to Portugal, he suggested that a moratorium might be useful if it helped to relaunch U.S.-Soviet arms-control talks. In Moscow in May 1985, Craxi raised the INF issue with Gorbachev and made statements that implied some sympathy for the Soviet view that French and British systems must be taken into account in calculating the European nuclear balance.¹⁷

THE 'SCANDILUX' PARTIES

The Socialist parties in the smaller countries of NATO northern Europe are highly differentiated by national tradition and their differing domestic political situations, but they share a certain basic outlook on defense issues. This common outlook was given an

¹⁶William Drozdiak, "Missile Freeze Idea Divides NATO," *Washington Post*, November 29, 1984.

¹⁷Referring to French and British forces, Craxi stated, "Those missiles are not on the moon," *Corriere della Sera*, May 30, 1985.

institutional framework in 1980, when six parties--the two Belgian Socialist parties, the Danish Social Democratic party, the Dutch Labor party, the Luxembourg Socialist party, and the Norwegian Labor party--founded the "Scandilux" forum for the discussion of defense and arms-control issues.¹⁸ The immediate impetus to the formation of Scandilux was the INF issue. At their meeting in Helsingor in March 1983, the Scandilux parties called for a halt in preparations to deploy INF missiles and urged that no deployments take place as long as the Geneva talks continued.¹⁹

In Belgium, the Walloon (French) and Flemish Socialist parties (which split off from a united party in the early 1970s as a result of interregional tensions) differ somewhat in their approach to security issues. Partly because of the influence of the Socialists in France, along with different local conditions, the Walloon Socialists have been relatively restrained in their opposition to INF. In contrast, the Flemish Socialists, led by Karel van Miert, have been among the most vocal anti-INF groups in Europe. At its November 1984 congress, the Flemish Socialist party adopted a resolution enjoining it from entering a coalition with any party that does not agree in advance to the removal of all cruise missiles deployed under the ruling center-right government. While the party eventually may moderate this position, its self-proclaimed leadership of the Belgian peace movement gives it leverage over the other parties in Flanders, where, because of memories of World War I and the influence of Dutch television, pacifist sentiment is strong in the general population.²⁰

Before deciding in early 1985 to accept deployment of cruise missiles in Belgium, the government of Prime Minister Wilfried Martens tried to strike a separate bilateral deal with the Soviet Union that, by providing for the dismantling of some Soviet missiles, would have

¹⁸See Nikolaj Petersen, "Das Scandilux-Experiment," *Europa Archiv*, No. 16, 1984. The SPD, the British Labour party, and the French PS have observer status in this organization.

¹⁹Terje Svabo, "Wait for Missile Results," *Aftenposten*, March 22, 1983.

²⁰Hans-Josef Strick, "Belgium Between Pacifism and Loyalty to the Alliance," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, February 4, 1985.

allowed Belgium to avoid deployment without appearing to make unilateral concessions. When the Soviets rejected the Belgian offer, the Martens government reaffirmed its support for the 1979 decision and chose to go ahead with the deployment of 16 missiles in the spring of 1985. The Soviets may be counting on a future government, possibly one including the Socialists, that will be less committed to the deployments and will work to reverse them, or, at a minimum, will block the deployment of the remaining 32 missiles, scheduled for 1987.

The Dutch Labor party (PvdA) is now making a last-ditch stand to prevent the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands. In June 1984, the center-right coalition of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers insured its political survival by postponing any decision on the deployment of cruise missiles in the Netherlands until November 1, 1985, and pledging that it will agree to deployments only if no U.S.-USSR agreement on INF has been concluded and only if the total number of Soviet SS-20s exceeds 378. Because a U.S.-Soviet INF agreement is unlikely and Soviet deployment levels exceed the minimum stipulated by the Lubbers government, the Dutch are expected to deploy.

Aware that it lacks the power to compel the government to make a negative decision, Labor is demanding that the government conclude an agreement with the United States that allows for renegotiation of the deployments and a quick withdrawal of the missiles should Labor return to power in 1986.²¹ In what appears to be a bid to sway the Dutch government, the Soviet Union has announced a moratorium on its own deployments that is scheduled to expire just before the November decision date.

Despite its opposition to cruise missiles, the Dutch Labor party is one of the few Socialist parties in Western Europe that may be moving back toward the center on defense and foreign-policy issues. The PvdA has been led for many years by Joop den Uyl, who has been described as "an old-style pacifist, totally opposed to nuclear weapons and determined to keep conventional weapons to a minimum."²² Under den Uyl,

²¹"De Ruiter Statement on Missile Agreement Creates Obstacle," *De Volkskrant*, June 20, 1985.

²²Walter Ellis, "Mighty arsenal for a pacifist people," *Financial Times*, January 21, 1985.

Labor has joined with the churches and the peace movement in a struggle to prevent the deployment of cruise missiles on Dutch soil. But den Uyl is not expected to lead Labor in the 1986 elections, and his successor may be less anchored in the party's pacifist traditions. Any change in the party's orientation would manifest itself in greater interest in improving Dutch conventional defenses and is unlikely to affect the party's stand on nuclear weapons.

With the possible exception of the Flemish Socialists, the Danish Social Democratic party is the Scandilux member most opposed to existing U.S. and NATO policies. The Danish party operates in an extremely complex domestic political environment that makes its real views on some issues difficult to distinguish from its domestic political maneuverings. Since 1982, Denmark has been governed by a four-party minority coalition led by the Conservatives. To stay in power, the government must seek the support of at least one of the Folketing's five other parties. It therefore relies on the Radical party, which supports the governing coalition on domestic policy but sides with the opposition on security issues. In addition to the Radicals, the security majority in the Folketing includes the three Socialist parties: the Social Democrats, and two parties that favor Denmark's withdrawal from the alliance, the Socialist People's party and the Left Socialists. Together, the four parties virtually dictate foreign and security policy to the country's Conservative Prime Minister and its Liberal Foreign Minister.

In 1982, the Danish parliament voted to withhold Denmark's contribution to the costs of INF deployment that are paid out of NATO's Common Infrastructure Fund. Danish ministers are required by parliament to reserve Denmark's position on NATO communiques that deal with INF. The parliament also instructs the government on how to vote on UN resolutions, and it forced the government to vote in favor of a Swedish-Mexican nuclear-freeze proposal in the UN General Assembly that the other NATO states opposed.

At its September 1984 party congress, the Danish Social Democratic party adopted resolutions that come close to demanding that Denmark repudiate NATO's flexible response strategy, which allows for the possibility of using nuclear weapons against a Warsaw Pact nuclear or

nonnuclear attack. The party has demanded that Denmark extend its policy of not having nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime to an absolute renunciation of the nuclear option in times of war or crisis as well. The Danish Social Democrats also support the creation of a Nordic nuclear-free zone, and in October 1984 held party-to-party discussions with the Soviets on this subject.

Although the Danish government suffers considerable embarrassment in NATO and EC forums from having no control over its own foreign policy, it assigns priority to its economic austerity program and thus has chosen not to break with the Radicals and call for new elections.²³ For their part, the Danish Social Democrats hope to humiliate Prime Minister Schlueter sufficiently on security issues that his government will fall, thus paving the way for a Social Democratic return to power and a dismantling of the economic austerity program. The Social Democrats are therefore eager to place the government in difficult positions by helping to pass resolutions in parliament that conflict with the policies of other NATO governments.

The opposition Norwegian Labor party has changed its views considerably since its last stint in power, when it supported the 1979 dual-track decision and joined the Carter administration's boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Like its counterparts in Denmark, the Labor party in November 1983 voted in parliament to withhold Norway's contribution to the common infrastructure costs of the INF deployments. Unlike in Denmark, however, the ruling coalition in Norway prevailed, but only by a one-vote margin.

The Norwegian Labor party has called for a study of possible adoption by NATO of a no-first-use policy and in 1981 came out in support of a Nordic nuclear-free zone.²⁴ Labor's decision to support such a nuclear-free zone represented a sharp break with the party's postwar policy, a break that cannot be understood without reference to the wave of anti-nuclear sentiment that swept Europe in the early 1980s.

²³Horst Bacia, "The Danish Recovery Has Priority," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 25, 1985.

²⁴Johan Jorgen Holst, *Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980s*, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, Oslo, December 1982.

While supporting Norway's long-standing policy of not allowing the deployment of foreign troops or nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime, the Labor party traditionally has spurned Finnish and Soviet proposals for the creation of a contractually regulated nuclear-free zone. Following past practices, the party did not respond when Finnish President Kekkonen in May 1978 reactivated an old proposal for creation of such a zone.

But circumstances changed unexpectedly in October 1980 as a result of a speech to a trade union conference by Jens Evensen, a senior party official who then had governmental responsibility for negotiations with the USSR on various bilateral matters. Speaking without authorization from the government or the Labor party, Evensen proposed that Norway officially endorse the Nordic nuclear-free zone. Evensen's proposal, which took the Labor government by surprise and led to angry demands from the Conservative press that he resign for not supporting government policy on an important issue, quickly caught on among Labor party activists, who demanded a change in government policy. In the face of a groundswell of support, the government chose not to censure Evensen but to submit its own plan for a nuclear-free zone. The plan, which was submitted to the Storting in 1981, supported creation of such a zone, but only in the context of an agreement to limit nuclear weapons in a broader European framework.²⁵

While the government successfully diffused pressures for endorsement of a Kekkonen-like zone, in doing so it effected what many observers in Norway saw as a subtle shift in Norwegian policy on nuclear matters. Unlike earlier policy statements which stressed that Norway retained the option of allowing nuclear weapons to be deployed on its soil in wartime, the proposal that was passed by the Storting declared that Norway's nonnuclear policy was all but unconditional and applicable in wartime as well as peacetime:

Norway will not permit foreign troops to be stationed in our country in peacetime. Nuclear weapons and chemical weapons will not be stored or stationed in Norway. Norway will base

²⁵This account is based on Robert K. German, "Nuclear-Free Zones: Norwegian Interest, Soviet Encouragement," *Orbis*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1982).

itself on conventional defense. The Norwegian military will neither be trained nor equipped for conducting atomic warfare. The goal must be to prevent the use of atomic weapons on or against Norwegian territory. Norway will work for an atomic-weapon-free-zone in the Nordic area as a part of the work for reducing nuclear weapons in a broader European context.²⁶

The Labor party's enthusiasm for the nuclear-free zone was dampened somewhat by the "Whiskey on the rocks" incident in Sweden in late 1981, when a Soviet Whiskey-class submarine ran aground in Swedish territorial waters. It was weakened further when it was revealed in January 1984 that one of Evensen's aides, Arne Treholt, had been arrested on charges that he was a Soviet agent. Many in Norway surmised that Treholt, who was later convicted of espionage and sentenced to 20 years in prison, had influenced Evensen at Soviet behest. With the nuclear-free-zone issue relegated somewhat to the background, the opposition Labor party has shifted its attention to INF, and more recently to the SDI.

PARTIES IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

The Spanish PSOE is marked by many of the same internal contradictions and inconsistencies that characterize the Socialist parties of France and Italy. After the death of Franco and Spain's transition to democracy, the PSOE, which was helped financially and given organizational support by the West German SPD and by the Democratic Action party of Venezuela, became active in the Socialist International and very much preoccupied with securing Spain's place in democratic Europe. But somewhat like the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Greece, the PSOE also sought to appeal to anti-American and pro-Third-World sentiments in Spain by condemning U.S. "imperialism," cultivating Castro, and affirming its ideological affinity with Algeria's ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). The PSOE also responded to Soviet calls for direct party-to-party ties with the CPSU. In December 1977, party leader Felipe Gonzalez met with Mikhail Suslov in Moscow and signed a joint CPSU-PSOE communique calling for the

²⁶Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 466.

dissolution of the blocs and warning against the enlargement of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

As was the case with Mitterrand, the PSOE did not adhere to the wording of this bilateral communique in its policies when it came to power. Upon becoming prime minister in 1982, Gonzalez decided not to reverse the previous government's decision to join NATO, but to abide by the results of a popular referendum on the issue. The referendum is now scheduled for the spring of 1986, shortly after Spain's accession to the EC, which, unlike NATO, is highly popular in Spain. The PSOE is now fighting an uphill battle to win public acceptance of continued membership in NATO, but not without dissent from within its own ranks. In 1985, Gonzalez dismissed Foreign Minister Moran, who was perceived as too anti-American to hold his post during the run up to the referendum. Gonzalez is also taking steps such as negotiating a reduction in the number of U.S. forces in Spain in hopes of placating PSOE critics of NATO membership.

On foreign and defense matters, the two Portuguese Socialist parties--the Socialists and the Social Democrats--are among the most moderate in Western Europe. As partners in the two-party coalition that has governed Portugal since 1983, these parties have strongly supported NATO policies and have enjoyed good relations with the United States. But in June 1985, the coalition broke up over domestic issues, and the outlook for the parties now is clouded. The Socialists may be tempted to adopt positions somewhat more critical of the United States in an effort to distinguish themselves from the Social Democrats and to protect their electoral base from Communist inroads.

THE PASOK IN GREECE

At the opposite extreme from the moderate Portuguese Socialists is Greece's PASOK, the party of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. The PASOK was founded by Papandreou in September 1974, two months after the fall of the Greek military junta. The party has always identified itself in terms of its self-proclaimed affinities with "national liberation movements" in the Third World rather than with the Socialist

parties of Europe. It is not a member of the Socialist International, and in its early years it had strained relations with the West German SPD, which Papandreou once branded an instrument of "American imperialism."²⁷

The PASOK defines itself as a non-dogmatic Marxist party that rejects both Social Democratic and Eurocommunist patterns and propagates what it calls an authentically Greek path to socialism.²⁸ The characteristics of this path are said to be national independence, popular sovereignty, social liberation, and democratization. According to the party, achievement of the first of these objectives, national independence, is a prerequisite to the other three and requires Greece to free itself from all alleged sources of foreign domination: NATO, the EC, the United States, and the CIA.

Papandreou claims that entry into the EC, reintegration into NATO, and the bilateral base agreement with the United States--steps taken by the Conservative governments that ruled Greece after 1974--impose intolerable restrictions on Greece's national independence. But as the 1981 elections approached, Papandreou increasingly moderated his stance on these issues, promising only a gradual process by which U.S. bases would be removed, proclaiming withdrawal from NATO as a long-term goal, and announcing that he intended to keep Greece in the EC. After taking power, Papandreou made this pragmatic line the basis of his foreign policy.

But while retaining his ties with the United States, NATO, and the EC, Papandreou has caused difficulties for his economic and security partners. Within NATO, Greece has refused to support the INF deployments or to participate in NATO exercises that it claims will

²⁷John C. Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (1984/85), p. 379.

²⁸This analysis is based on Heinz Richter, "Die PASOK unter Andreas Papandreou," *Aktuelle Analysen*, Nos. 3 and 5, Bundesinstitut fuer ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Cologne, 1985. See also Gregor M. Manousakis, "Griechenland--der schwierige Partner des Westens," *Beitraege zur Konfliktforschung*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1985).

prejudice its positions in various territorial disputes with Turkey. In the EC, Greece has undermined efforts to forge common foreign-policy positions. Greece has concluded a new base agreement with the United States but has promised to fully eliminate the U.S. presence by 1988.

The most visible, and to his Western allies most irritating, element of Papandreou's policy has been his statements on the Soviet Union. According to Papandreou's version of Marxist analysis, because the Soviet Union's economy does not depend upon capital accumulation and international expansion, it cannot properly be labeled imperialist. He does acknowledge that as a superpower, the Soviet Union sometimes behaves in ways similar to the United States, which he identifies as the main imperialist power. But while the actions are similar, Papandreou maintains that the motives are different. While the United States is said to be motivated by an offensive, capitalistically driven expansionism, the Soviet Union is motivated solely by defensive security concerns. Based on this analysis, Papandreou has gone so far as to assert that "the USSR represents a factor that restricts the expansion of capitalism and its imperialistic aims."²⁹

Observers differ over the extent to which the PASOK's foreign policy is influenced in a pro-Soviet direction by internal pressure from the pro-Moscow Greek Communist party (KKE) and the trade unions it controls.³⁰ The Communists' influence has probably diminished since Papandreou's resounding electoral victory in June 1985. A much greater influence on Papandreou is exerted by PASOK activists, many of whom are strongly anti-American. This group and many of Papandreou's own convictions will assure continued dissent by Greece from NATO and U.S. policies and perhaps continued tensions with the United States on some issues. However, on balance, Papandreou continues to oppose a total break with the United States and NATO, and with the elections behind him, he may take steps to improve relations with them.

²⁹Quoted in Loulis, "Papandreou's Foreign Policy," p. 375.

³⁰Greece has two Communist parties, the Moscow-oriented KKE-Exterior and the independent, "Eurocommunist" KKE-Interior.

THE SWEDISH AND FINNISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

Although Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, Social Democratic parties in these countries maintain close ties with and influence the policy discussion in the parties of NATO Europe. Most of the Scandilux parties maintain close ties, both bilaterally and in the Socialist International, with the Social Democratic party of Sweden (SAP), which enjoys prestige as a wealthy party that has served in government for much of the postwar period. The SAP is in turn somewhat influenced by its brother party in Finland, which, as has been noted, plays an active role in the Socialist International and has a long history of dealings with the Soviets.

The leaders of the Swedish Social Democrats are reported to be divided among themselves in their attitudes toward the Soviet Union and especially over how to interpret and react to the violations of Swedish territorial waters by Soviet submarines. According to an analysis by *Dagens Nyheter*, a leading Stockholm daily, "there is a gulf running through the government and the Social Democratic Labor Party."¹ On one side of this gulf are the "pessimists," who include Defense Minister Anders Thunborg and Stig Malm, the head of the powerful Swedish trade union federation. They are reported to hold very skeptical views about the Soviet Union, which they see as an offensive power intent on taking advantage of indecisiveness in Sweden and the relative decline of Sweden's armed forces to turn the Baltic into a *de facto* Soviet sea. The pessimists are reported to be in the minority in the party and careful not to voice their views in a way that would offend the more powerful "optimists," who include Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom and the leaders of most of the SAP's auxiliary organizations, including the party's youth wing. The "optimists" believe that the Soviet Union is motivated by defensive concerns and that the violations of Swedish waters can be attributed to the general deterioration of international relations (and thus by implication can be blamed as much on the United States as on the Soviet Union). Prime Minister Palme tries to placate both groups, but he clearly is more sympathetic to the "optimists."

¹Harald Hamrin, "Split in Views of the Soviet Union," *Dagens Nyheter*, October 14, 1984.

These intraparty differences in part explain why the Swedish government has appeared divided and inconsistent in its position on the Nordic nuclear-free zone. Palme has stated that the nuclear-free zone must include the Baltic; Bodstrom has stated that the Baltic does not have to be included as long as the Soviet Union unilaterally withdraws its nuclear submarines from the Baltic; and Thunborg has called for as wide a nuclear-free zone as possible, thus implying support for inclusion not only of the Baltic but of Soviet territory as well.³² While not fully satisfied with the attitude of the Swedish government on the nuclear-free zone, the Soviets generally have high praise for Olof Palme and the Swedish Social Democrats, who are said to have "increased their efforts on the international stage for the maintenance of peace, disarmament and the development of relations with the East."³³ One facet of Palme's "active" policy is his involvement in the Palme Commission, an independent disarmament group that has proposed a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe. The Soviets, who participate in the work of the Palme Commission, have welcomed its proposal as a first step toward full denuclearization of Europe.

As has often been the case with Finland's actions at the intergovernmental level, within the international Socialist movement the Finns have tried to urge others in Western Europe to develop closer ties with the East. In the early 1970s, the Finnish Social Democratic party (SDP) took the lead in pressing within the Socialist International for the development of contacts between the Western Socialist Democrats and, as a Finnish SDP spokesman delicately phrased it, "the leading parties of the Socialist countries in Eastern Europe."³⁴ The term "leading" rather than "Communist" respects the fiction that the East German SED, in which Communists absorbed a once-powerful Socialist party, is not

³²Mats Johanssen, "Socialist Sweden Pushes for a Nuclear-Free Zone," *Wall Street Journal*, February 16, 1983.

³³Aleksandr Poliukhov, "Now the Northern Social Democratic Parties Are Choosing Their Future," *Aktuelt*, November 22, 1982.

³⁴*Suomen socialdemokratii*, May 30, 1971, quoted in Zagladin, *The World Communist Movement*, Progress, Moscow, 1973, p. 210.

technically Communist, and that "national fronts" in Czechoslovakia and Poland contain several autonomous parties. In 1978, the Finnish SDP jointly sponsored, along with the Socialist International, the Socialist International Conference on Disarmament that was attended by Ponomarev.

Finnish Prime Minister Sorsa's active role in the disarmament activities of the Socialist International may help to legitimize what some in Finland perceive is an eastward drift in Finland's neutrality policy. In his capacity as a party official, Sorsa criticizes most aspects of U.S. policy, including the SDI, Central America, and defense spending. But unlike prominent Social Democrats such as Brandt and Palme, who at least partly counterbalance their criticisms of the United States with complaints about Soviet arms programs, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and human-rights violations, Sorsa is unable, because of his position as Prime Minister of Finland, to voice the slightest criticism of the Soviet Union. Apart from these potential effects on Finland's own orientation, Sorsa's active role in the Socialist International's disarmament activities provides the USSR with a useful indirect channel to the International, as the Soviets have numerous opportunities to confer with Sorsa in the course of conducting their bilateral relations with Finland at the state-to-state level and with the Finnish Social Democrats at the party-to-party level.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE

As was shown in Section III, in the early 1980s virtually all of the Social Democratic parties of northern Europe became more critical of the United States and of NATO than they were in the previous decade. In southern Europe, the pattern is mixed. The Italian and Spanish Socialist parties have discarded much of their previous anti-Americanism, and the French PS remains divided and ambivalent, while Greece's PASOK is less hostile to the United States and NATO than it was in its "ultra-radical" period of the mid-1970s but is still clearly opposed to many U.S. and alliance objectives. Despite the complexity of the current situation, it is probably safe to conclude that the changes that have occurred in the Socialist parties in recent years will have profound effects on the alliance. These effects will be seen in three areas.

First, the attitudes of these parties will make it difficult for the alliance and the United States to undertake *any* major defense initiatives without running into strong domestic opposition. As has been seen, these parties, many of which had a role in NATO's 1979 two-track decision (i.e., British Labour, the West German SPD, Norwegian Labor, and the Danish Social Democrats), once in opposition became committed opponents of INF deployment. The parties also generally oppose European participation in the SDI and new operational concepts such as "air-land battle" or follow-on-force attack. While they purport to be for greater conventional defense efforts, these parties generally oppose increases in defense budgets and in some cases call for substantial cuts.

Second, the Socialist parties are now going beyond mere opposition to new NATO initiatives such as INF and FOFA and are beginning to chip away at flexible response and forward defense, which have been accepted alliance doctrine since 1967. In Norway and Denmark, Social Democratic parties have worked to transform the policy of not hosting nuclear weapons on national territory in peacetime to a near-absolute prohibition on their introduction even in wartime or crisis. To some

observers, such a prohibition would be incompatible with flexible response. In West Germany, the SPD is searching for a new strategy that will move away from nuclear deterrence and forward defense, both pillars of existing NATO doctrine. In Britain, the Labour party supports not only denuclearization of the British Isles, but conclusion of a bilateral pact with the Soviet Union whereby the USSR would pledge not to attack Britain with nuclear weapons, while Britain would forgo the option--clearly central to NATO doctrine--of supporting nuclear first use against a Warsaw Pact conventional attack.

Third, these parties tend to undermine the basis of the alliance's political strategy toward the East. While most of them complain that the United States and the Conservative governments of Europe have abandoned the political component of the dual political-military strategy outlined in the 1967 Harmel Report, a strong case can be made that these parties' activities undercut the very ability of national governments to conduct their own policies with the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Although the policy of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in West Germany toward the East is surely not identical to the policy that would be followed by an SPD or an SPD-FDP government, the current government has pursued an active detente policy, providing credits, expanding trade, maintaining political contacts, and so forth. But in what is clearly an effort to undermine the military component of NATO strategy, the Soviet Union and the Honecker regime in East Germany have chosen to pursue a harsh policy toward the Bonn government, while maintaining and expanding contacts with the SPD. To the extent that the SPD has cooperated with the Soviets in their campaign to isolate the government and portray its actions as unreasonable, it has undermined the ability of an elected government to pursue a coherent political strategy toward the East. In Belgium, Denmark, and other countries, direct links between Socialist parties and the CPSU place similar restrictions on the maneuvering room of governments that must negotiate with their counterparts in the East.

While the Soviet Union benefits from and clearly welcomes these effects on the alliance, it is unclear how much credit Soviet policy can claim for shaping the policies of the Western Social Democrats or how much latitude the USSR has for encouraging trends that are seen as

favorable in Moscow. On one level, the whole of Soviet policy toward Western Europe over the past fifteen years has had a profound effect on the Western parties. The Soviet policy of what might be called "talking softly and carrying a big stick" has given all West European governments and parties an incentive to search for accommodation with the Soviets while at the same time fostering hopes that intensive political and economic contact will induce the USSR to become more accommodating toward Western Europe. On another level, the Soviets have developed tactics, trained individuals, and created organizations explicitly for the purpose of influencing the non-Communist left in the West and especially Western Europe. Ponomarev and Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Head of the CPSU Central Committee, oversee an enormous effort aimed at influencing the West European Socialists.

But despite clever tactics on the part of the Soviet foreign-policy establishment and determined political and military efforts to create an overall strategic environment conducive to an active policy toward the Western Socialists, the Soviet Union cannot really claim more than partial credit for the recent trends in Western Europe's non-Communist left. The dynamics of local politics have played a much more important role. The turn to the left in many of the Socialist parties of Western Europe has been accompanied by and is itself a partial product of an overall drift to the right in Europe that has been occurring since the mid-1970s (and that may now be coming to an end). In the face of economic recession, worries about Europe's global competitiveness, and popular resistance to the unconstrained growth of the welfare state, voters in Britain, West Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium turned to Conservative or center-right governments that were prepared to impose austerity programs and in some cases promised to cut taxes.

The public's turn to the right on economic and social issues caught the left off guard, tarnishing the electoral value of its self-proclaimed role as the champion of economic equality and state intervention in the economy.¹ Under these circumstances, the opposition

¹For a discussion of these parties' problems in Nordic Europe, see Erling Olsen, "The Dilemma of the Social-Democratic Labor Parties," *Daedalus*, Vol. 113, No. 2 (1984).

left parties have emphasized the other element in their policies of the 1970s, detente with the East, in an effort to win votes and to score points off ruling conservatives. This tendency to use security policy as a weapon against conservative governments has reached an extreme stage in Denmark, but it affects the politics of most other countries to some degree.

If, as many experts suspect and many polls tend to confirm, Western Europe's drift to conservatism is coming to an end, it is possible that the European electorates and the opposition Socialists will reverse the paths they have followed for the last several years. The electorates will become more willing to elect Socialist parties committed to fiscal reflation and government intervention to lower unemployment, while the parties may moderate some of the unpopular foreign and defense policies they have adopted in recent years. If this happens, left-wing parties are likely to return to power in many countries in the late 1980s.

In power, these parties probably would be cautious about translating their party programs into action. Some would try to moderate their party programs, or would be forced to accommodate to the demands of "swing" coalition parties such as the West German FDP or the Dutch Christian Democrats. But on balance, a return to the *status quo ante* INF is most unlikely. New generations of leaders less committed to NATO and more suspicious of the United States have risen to positions of power and are unlikely ever to see issues in the same light as they were seen by Helmut Schmidt and James Callaghan. Moreover, in parties such as Labour in Britain, grass-roots activists, many of them very hostile to the United States, have consolidated their power and exercise close control over their parliamentary representatives. When these parties return to power, the United States is likely to face some difficult choices in its military and political policy toward the Western alliance.

Appendix

MEMBER PARTIES OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL¹

Western Europe

Socialist Party of Austria (SPOe)
Socialist Party (PS), Belgium
Socialist Party (SP), Belgium
Social Democratic Party, Denmark
Social Democratic Party of Finland (SDP)
Socialist Party (PS), France
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Federal Germany
The Labour Party, Great Britain
Social Democratic Party of Iceland
The Labor Party, Ireland
Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI)
Italian Socialist Party, PSI
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party (LSAP/POSL)
Malta Labor Party
Labor Party (PvdA), Netherlands
Northern Ireland Labor Party (NILP)
Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), Northern Ireland
Norwegian Labor Party (DNA)
Socialist Party (PS), Portugal
Unitarian Socialist Party (PSU), San Marino
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE)
Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
Social Democratic Party of Switzerland
Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey

Africa

Socialist Party of Senegal
Progressive Front of Upper Volta (FPV)

Asia and Oceania

Australian Labor Party (ALP)
Israel Labor Party
United Workers' Party (MAPAM), Israel
Japan Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ)
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), Lebanon
Democratic Action Party (DAP), Malaysia
Mauritius Labor Party
New Zealand Labor Party

¹Adapted from *Socialist Affairs*, January 1985.

Western Hemisphere

Barbados Labor Party
New Democratic Party (NDP/NPD), Canada
Radical Party of Chile (PR)
National Liberation Party (PLN), Costa Rica
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), Dominican Republic
Party of the Democratic Left (PID), Ecuador
National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), El Salvador
New Jewel Movement, Grenada
Democratic Socialist Party of Guatemala (PSD)
People's National Party (PNP), Jamaica
Revolutionary Febrerista Party (PRF), Paraguay
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)
Social Democrats USA (SDUSA)
Democratic Action (AD), Venezuela

Fraternal Organizations

International Falcon Movement/ Socialist Educational
International (FM-SEI)
International Union of Socialist Youth (USY)
Socialist International Women

Consultative Parties

People's Electoral Movement (MEP), Aruba/NA
New Antilles Movement (MAN), Curacao/NA
EDEK Socialist Party of Cyprus
Siumut, Greenland²
Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA)
Puerto Rico Independence Party (PIP)
Progressive Labor Party of St. Lucia (PLP)
People's Electoral Movement (MEP), Venezuela

Consultative Parties-in-Exile

Bulgarian Social Democratic Party
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party
Estonian Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party of Hungary
Social Democratic Party of Latvia
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
Polish Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party, Romania
Yugoslav Socialist Party

²Recommended for membership.

Associated Organizations

Asia-Pacific Socialist Organisation (APSO)
Confederation of the Socialist Parties in the
European Community (CSPEC)
International Federation of the Socialist and Democratic
Press (IFSDP)
International Union of Social Democratic Teachers (IUSDT)
Jewish Labor Bund (JLB)
Labor Sports International (LSI/CSIT)
World Labor Zionist Movement (LZM)
Socialist Union of Central and Eastern
Europe (SUCEE)

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