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VOLUME I

LEADERSHIP HANDBOOK FOR THE ARMOR OFFICER

THOUGHTS ON LEADERSHIP

Leadership Branch
Leadership & Training Division
Command and Staff Department

U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
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COMMAND AND STAFF DEPARTMENT
US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121

VOLUME I

THOUGHTS ON LEADERSHIP

INTRODUCTION

This handbook has been created as an aid for today's Armor Leader. The many articles and extracts have been assembled in the hope that the collection will serve as a reference and guide for NCOs and new lieutenants as well as captains approaching their first command.

Some material is of particular use for new officers in defining their roles and relationships with other soldiers and their unit.

The chapters focus on the challenges of training, maintenance, leading, and caring for soldiers.

The second chapter reviews leadership in combat from both a modern and a historical perspective. Examples of successful officers in combat are provided to generate thought and consideration of what you might expect and how you might want to exercise leadership in a combat environment.

Chapter three emphasizes the particular demands of leadership in garrison and provides some assistance for the leader to survive in a peacetime environment.

The bottom line is that there are many useful examples and guidelines for successful leadership in this handbook. Hopefully this handbook will become a handy guide for developing your own leadership style, for counseling your soldiers and for mentoring those new officers whom you command in the future.

Should anyone have questions or comments on this material, or wish to submit additions, we encourage you to contact the Leadership and Training Division (Telephone 624-5450/4948 or Autovon 464-5450/4948 - Boudinot Hall, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121). We are always interested in new or different methods of leadership and want to provide the best instruction and support possible.

The Command and Staff Department (Leadership Branch) wishes each Leader the utmost success in their individual endeavors.

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THOUGHTS ON LEADERSHIP

FOR THE ARMOR LEADER

CHAPTER 3, LEADERSHIP IN GARRISON Page

Take A Minute:

Look At Your Goals

Look At Your Performance

See If Your Behavior Matches Your Goals

CHAPTER 1

THE COMBAT ARMS OFFICER

"A START POINT"

The next war will be won by the side which can best create tough, disciplined, resourceful teams who can operate independently and kill targets with amazing speed!

General Bruce C. Clarke

BUILD ME A SON,

O Lord, who will be strong enough to know when he is weak, and brave enough to face himself when he is afraid; one who will be proud and unbending in honest defeat, and humble and gentle in victory.

Build me a son whose wishes will not take the place of deeds; a son who will know Thee - and that to know himself is the foundation stone of knowledge.

Lead him, I pray, not in the path of ease and comfort, but under the stress and spur of difficulties and challenge. Here let him learn to stand up in the storm; here let him learn compassion for those who fail.

Build me a son whose heart will be clear, whose goal will be high, a son who will master himself before he seeks to master other men, one who will reach into the future, yet never forget the past.

And after all these things are his, add, I pray, enough of a sense of humor, so that he may always be serious, yet never take himself too seriously. Give him humility, so that he may always remember the simplicity of true greatness, the open mind of true wisdom, and the meekness of true strength.

Then, I, his father, will dare to whisper, "I have not lived in vain."

GENERAL DOUGLAS McARTHUR



CODE OF AN OFFICER*

I am an officer of the Army of the United States and I am proud of this fact. I recognize the rich heritage behind the corps of officers, of which I am a part, that has been built up by those who have marched before me at Saratoga, at Chapultepec, at Gettysburg, at the Meuse-Argonne, at St Lo and on the Naktong.

This rich heritage has been built on a code—the code of an officer. This code is simple and easy to remember... Duty...Honor... Country. But it is not so simple to execute and requires a lifetime devoted to work, self-discipline, and courage.

DUTY

The word duty means to me that...

When I am assigned a mission, I accomplish it thoroughly, efficiently, and quickly.

I accept all of my responsibilities even when not assigned them.

Within my field, I hold myself responsible to be aware of everything that occurs and to take positive action to correct what is wrong or improve that which is merely possible.

I do my job regardless of danger to me personally.

HONOR

Honor to me means that...

As an officer of the Army of the United States my personal integrity is irreproachable.

I will never degrade myself by lying, cheating, or stealing.

I hold myself personally and unequivocally responsible to ensure the preservation of the honor of the officer corps of the United States Army.

COUNTRY

Country means to me that...

In addition to being an officer of the Army, I am an American citizen.

I am an official representative of my country and will so comport myself.

I will endure any hardship, any sacrifice, for the welfare of these my United States.

This is the code I will live by... Duty...Honor... Country...all these I put above myself whatever the cost.

OATH OF COMMISSION

I,_____ HAVING BEEN APPOINTED AN OFFICER IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, AS INDICATED ABOVE IN THE GRADE OF SECOND LIEUTENANT, DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR (OR AFFIRM) THAT I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST ALL ENEMIES, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, THAT I WILL BEAR TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE TO THE SAME; THAT I TAKE THIS OBLIGATION FREELY, WITHOUT ANY MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION; AND THAT I WILL WELL AND FAITHFULLY DISCHARGE THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE UPON WHICH I AM ABOUT TO ENTER; SO HELP ME GOD.

AN OFFICER'S CREED

I will give to the selfless performance of my duty and my mission the best that effort, thought, and dedication can provide.

To this end, I will not only seek continually to improve my knowledge and practice of my profession, but also I will exercise the authority entrusted to me by the President and the Congress with fairness, justice, patience, and restraint, respecting the dignity and human rights of others and devoting myself to the welfare of those placed under my command.

In justifying and fulfilling the trust placed in me, I will conduct my private life as well as my public service so as to be free both from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, acting with candor and integrity to earn the unquestioning trust of my fellow soldiers--juniors, senior, and associates--and employing my rank and position not to serve myself but to serve my country and my unit.

By practicing physical and moral courage I will endeavor to inspire these qualities in others by my example.

In all my actions I will put loyalty to the highest moral principles and the United States of America above loyalty to organizations, persons, and my personal interest.

A. Values - basic fundamental concepts held by individuals which provide the standards for governing behavior.

B. Ideal Army Values

1. Any listing of ideal Army values can stagger the imagination. They include courage, candor, honesty, commitment, loyalty, competence, respect for others, and fairness. The list goes on and on. In his speech to the Military Academy's Corps of Cadets, Douglas MacArthur listed "Duty, honor, and country" as the three ideal Army values the officer corps must live up to. The ideal Army values in this discussion are used not because they are considered to be the only ones but because they express important ideas that the professional can demonstrate. When an officer practices these values, he is building a case for himself as a person of integrity. It must be stressed that these values are ideals which all military professionals strive to achieve. We realize that people are human and will make mistakes that can be costly to themselves, to others, and to the profession. While one slip in behavior does not necessarily destroy a leader's integrity, it can damage his credibility. This credibility can be rebuilt only over a period of time. We must remember, however, that the more responsibility we have, the more damage we can do with one error.

2. Honesty. This is a universal value that has particular significance for the miltiary professional. The officer's word is his bond. Dishonesty is disfunctional to the military profession and can cost the lives of others.

3. Loyalty. Unit cohesiveness, which is fundamental to an effective fighting unit, is based on loyalty. Loyalty is a two-way street. As professional officers you will be in a position to give loyalty to your superiors and subordinates and to receive loyalty from them. Trust and confidence between soldiers and in units is firmly integrated with loyalty.

4. Competence. Competence is not a value that may be of critical importance in some civilian occupations, but in the military it is of ultimate importance. The armor lieutenant who is not tactically competent, for example, can cause the unnecessary death of his own fellow soldiers or innocent noncombatants.

5. Selfless Service. This value is considered to be the most importnat of the ethical values of the military professional. Subordination of self-interest to the larger group is absolutely essential to military service. It is an important part of the Constitution. Our society is based on the active subordination of self-interest for the common good. In the Oath of Commission, we are voluntarily entering a profession in which we place obligation to the service ahead of obligation to our own needs. The military only operates as a group; individuals must therefore be prepared to consider group needs as very important.

6. Respect for Others. This value is closely tied to the basic national value of human dignity/human worth. Its particular importance for the military is in balancing the depersonalizing forces of the technological/-bureaucratic system. While most of us subscribe to the value of demonstrating respect for others (at least we want it for ourselves), we must be aware that bureaucratic systems are amoral; that is, there is no inherent moral perspective in them. It is only in practicing the ethical values which we espouse, expressing them in our daily lives, that this human dimension is added.

7. Fairness. Fundamental of American life is the concept of justice. As lofty as it sounds justice has application in the simplest events in the military because it is interpreted as fairness. The 1SG's duty roster is not popular, but as long as it is properly executed its fairness will not be called into question and soldiers will respect it as the fairest means of accomplishing an objective. Soldiers expect their leaders to be fair. Failure to meet this expectation can be the leader's quickest downfall.

8. Honesty, loyalty, competence, selfless service, respect for others, and fairness are concepts generally esteemed in our society and, as we have seen, important to the military profession. We have not produced an exhaustive list, but we have identified some core values for the military officer. The leader who fails to respect others will find it difficult to win their respect. If a leader is not honest and fair in dealing with others, his military effectiveness (and personal prestige) will suffer. The incompetent officer can be the cause of waste, injury or needless death. The professional must temper his natural concern for personal success and well-being with a sense of loyalty to others and unselfish commitment to the needs of the service and the welfare of the nation. The philosophy of the Army Officer Corps is the Army's effort to link ideal Army values with officer management.

C. Personal Values:

1. Ideal Army values have been discussed in the reading already. How do these values fit with your own personal values? Further, how are your personal values tied to the values important to our nation? These are issues that we will consider in this lesson.

Vital to our heritage as Americans is the notion of moral pluralism. This means that we come from many different ethical backgrounds. Archie Bunker has expressed well the way in which a narrow viewpoint can separate us as human beings. As we begin to discuss a matter of importance to each of us--our own personal values--we would do well to heed the lesson that Archie teaches us. There are different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds represented in the Army. It is in the spirit of the American Way of Life that each's position be respected. For example, some of us might feel strongly that our religious beliefs are a most important part of our lives as military professional; for others, this might not be an important issue at all. Discussing these personal values, which may include religious beliefs, involves revealing a very intimate part of ourselves to others. This calls for us to respect these views and not to belittle others for holding them.

2. Several things might happen to a value when an individual becomes a member of the military profession.

*A personal value might be enhanced and become more important. For example, dishonesty between individuals in civilian life may dissolve a relationship or cost a number of lives in the worst case. In the military, simple lies can cost a great loss in resources and lives.

*A value which may not be critically important in much of civilian life can become extremely important to the military (for example; competence).

*A value can be redefined or circumscribed by new and specific rules when entering a profession. For example, it is not acceptable to kill as a citizen except under extreme circumstances. In the military, we are trained to kill but in accordance with prescribed rules.

3. Integrity is the capstone of personal values.

a. Integrity might be defined as:

The unit of moral belief and moral action.

The unity of moral belief and moral action involves strict adherence to a code of values. If this is true, an officer of integrity must understand his values, adopt the values of his profession, and take responsibility for his actions--in other words, be sure that they are consistent with this collected body of professional values.

b. Integrity is expected of the officer by his peers, subordinates, superiors, and most importantly by the American people. It is the basis for the affirmation of the special trust and confidence placed in us as officers. Integrity also forms the capstone for the values which are important to military life.

4. Personal values often coincide with ideal Army values. In other cases, however, there can be conflict. The personal value of "free time" may conflict with the ideal Army value of selfless service. The young military officer must think about similarities and differences between his/her personal values and ideal Army values. What is their impact on the student's ability to be a professional military officer?

D. Basic National Values:

1. Basic to the values of military are the values upon which our nation is founded. These are found in the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and Declaration of Independence. Everything that we do as soldiers, as well as the Army values we hold, ought to be consistent with these national values. Chapter 1 of FM 100-1 refers to the Constitutional basis of the Army. It is clear that there is a legal reason for the Army's existence written into the Constitution itself, as it "provides for the common defense" of our nation. Beyond this however, there are certain moral principles written into the founding documents that provide for a stable and just community in which we all can live.

2. *Individual and Community:* A Balance.

a. We hear much about the rights of the individual. These are indeed precious. The Bill of Rights, made of amendments to the Constitution, clearly establishes the desire of the American people to guard the status of the individual in our society. It was self-evident to the signers of the Declaration of Independence that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" are "inalienable" rights; they are undeniable to the individual. On the other hand, the statement "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union..." assumes that we are individuals and that we also constitute a community of people living together as a nation. We have a responsibility to the group. In a real sense, we are asked voluntarily to give up some personal interests for the good of the community. In a very real way, the whole becomes more than the sum of its parts.

b. In a practical way, this is an attempt to create a community with the most possible personal freedom. At the same time, there is the realization that there must be some way to keep your freedom from interfering with mine. This calls for something outside of each of us to be the reference point when community and personal interests conflict. That something is the principle of justice or fairness.

c. The tension between individual and community is increased in the military. Respect for the individual is upheld in terms of due process and consideration of the welfare of the troops, etc.; but the unique mission of the military calls for a more stringent adherence to group needs. Cohesion is a word used to highlight the importance of teamwork and togetherness in accomplishment of the mission "to support and defend the Constitution." In combat, the leader may be told by his superior that a tactical post must be held. The leader organizes his subordinates in the best possible way to hold the position. Unless there is clearly immoral or illegal objective in the order, there is no room to question. Obedience is paramount. Such obedience requires teamwork and places group welfare above personal goals. It is the type of discipline that can mean the difference between winning and losing of the battle, which of course impacts on the larger activity—the war.

d. Specific individual values. Although it is frequently necessary and appropriate that group values be given primary consideration, as a leader, you must be sensitive to the individuals in your charge. The fact that the profession asks the soldier to commit himself to a life of discipline makes it necessary for the military to create a moral obligation on the part of the leader to keep the welfare of the individual soldiers high on the list of priorities. This situation is refected in several import constitutional values. They are: human worth and dignity, individual freedom, and equality.

- o Human worth and dignity
  - People are more important than systems.
  - People need, however, to recognize the importance of the system. Personnel needs often must be subordinate to Army needs.
  - The concepts of human worth and dignity apply not only to Americans, but extend to the victims of war and even to the enemy.
  - Every person, both friend and foe, must be respected as a human being.
- o Individual freedom.
  - Liberty is one of the "inalienable" rights in the Declaration of Independence. The "blessing of liberty" is secured in the Constitution.
  - Personal freedom must always consider other persons. I cannot do what I please if it violates the rights of another individual.
  - In a special sense, some personal freedom must be voluntarily given up if we are to have an effective Army that is to protect

the system that established the freedom in the first place.

- o Equality.
  - Different training, maturity, responsibility, and experience place people at different places in the military hierarchy. This however, does not contradict their fundamental equality as individual persons.
  - Equality is institutionally recognized in the equal opportunity program.

E. Summary and Conclusion:

In the preceding materiel ideal Army values, personal values and basic national values have been discussed. These values are all interrelated. All of these values may come into play as reason about the moral/ethical problems which you face in your assignments. As a professional, you take on many new responsbilities. Among these are the responsibilities to develop your understanding of the values of your profession and the ability to make mature judgements based on these values.

"To create great Armies is one thing;

to lead and to handle them is another."

Winston Churchill

TAKING OVER YOUR PLATOON

by

General Bruce C. Clarke, USA, Retired

The most important few minutes you will exercise early in your career as of officer, is when your Platoon Sergeant introduces you to your platoon as their new Platoon Leader and says that the platoon would like to have you say a few words to them.

I have seen platoon leaders respond generally as follows:

"Men, I am happy to be with you in this Platoon
"I intend to make this Platoon the best in the _____.
"I expect to do that by raising the Platoon standards in all things starting at once-
"I shall have more to say on this program in the near future.
"Thank you for your attention."

I have heard other Platoon leaders say generally the following:

"Platoon Sergeant _____, Squad Leaders and men! I am proud to be assigned on my first duty with troops to this platoon and this fine Battalion. I am aware of your unit's history and accomplishments over its many years.
"I expect to use and support your Non-Commissioned Officers in our training, work, recreation and other activities.
"I am aware that I do not know each of you at this time. I will accomplish that as quickly as I can.
"In the meantime I shall have our Platoon Sergeant carry on for the next two or three weeks while I observe you individually and as a platoon. I shall get to know each of you by name and capabilities by then.
"At the end of that time I shall speak to you further and take over the active leadership of the Platoon with Platoon Sergeant_____, my important, principal assistant.
"Platoon Sergeant _____, take charge and carry on.
"Thank you."

I commend this latter approach to prospective Platoon Leaders. If you do this, you will, I believe, see good results in three months and you will have coached a winning platoon team.

Why do I suggest the Second Solution?

There are six reasons:

1. I start out by recognizing the four key Non-Commissioned Officers in my platoon.

2. I say a good word about my new unit. If it were not a unit with an overall good historical record it would not still be on the active list of the Army. I want my platoon motivated to add to its record.

3. I stress that I will use and support my non-commissioned officers. This should motivate them to do even a better job in the platoon.

4. I do not rush with instructions and changes until I can base them on knowledge.

5. I establish the important position of my platoon sergeant.

6. I have, I believe, established favorable policies in the minds of my non-commissioned officers and the good men of the platoon. This will enhance the growth of Peer Discipline in the platoon. I expect to rely on this to help solve my problems as a Platoon Leader.

BRUCE C. CLARKE

"All successful leaders have one fundamental

quality which stands out--the quality of

human understanding."

Unknown

THE PLATOON LEADER

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The Army theme of "Leadership" for 1985 has called upon each leader to focus on his obligation to inspire and develop excellence in individuals and organizations. Within that obligation we must produce leaders who understand the bond between the leader, the lead, and the organization. Looking back on my own "bonding" into the Army, I find one, primary individual, who is two thirds responsible for my development, both as an officer and as a leader. That individual was my platoon sergeant.

One of the major questions that confront newly assigned 2nd Lieutenants is what their roles and responsibilities are in regard to their platoon sergeant. The teamwork that a platoon leader and his platoon sergeant develop will become the focal point of the entire platoon's cohesion.

Well, it wasn't always smooth sailing when my new platoon sergeant and I first got together. It was more like two men in a rowboat who couldn't agree on which side to paddle from, or on which direction they were supposed to go. Needless to say, we spent a lot of time going around and around in circles. But, as we figured out how each other worked, we gradually came to agree on our mission and eventually the direction we needed to take.

Many of these concepts are universal in regard to officer, noncommissioned officer relations. They can be applied at the company level between the commander and his first sergeant or on staff positions between the staff officer and his operations NCO.

As it turns out, there is a lot of material to aid in the new 2LT in developing this platoon leader, platoon sergeant relationship. One of the most useful and yet most overlooked is FM 22-600-20, "The Army Noncommissioned Officers Guide." Now, if a platoon leader can read, study and understand that little pamphlet, it stands to reason that the should have a better understanding of the responsibilities of his subordinates. Then the platoon leader can better focus on his responsibilities and requirements. In developing the direction that your "team" should take both you and the platoon sergeant should have some mutual expectations. So what are these expectations?

You command the platoon. Officers command. Not just in the field but both in garrison and in the field. When at home or away, you alone are responsible to the company commander for the training, maintenance, discipline and welfare of the platoon - everything the platoon does or does not do. Remember, you are OJT in this assignment, the platoon sergeant is your chief advisor and it's his expertise that you need to tap.

Within the company, the platoon leader is the communication link, up to the company commander, and down to his subordinates. You act both as a buffer, or shield, and as a translator of messages which are essential to the mission. As the downward link in this communication chain you have to assert yourself and be firm in enforcing the commander's guidance.

As an upward link for your people you have to know your people well, be available to your soldiers and be able to find out what's going on before it happens. You must be "people" oriented. Keep in close touch with the company commander and the company executive officer. Understand their wants, and their priorities. Your commander should keep you informed. Likewise this "two-way street" requires that you keep the commander informed of problems or needs that you and your soldiers have.

You should monitor standards within the platoon, including appearance and maintenance of living areas and equipment. However, the platoon sergeant is the enforcer. You should inspect your platoon at least twice a week, if not more often. Not every nut and bolt, but areas which you and the platoon agree upon. Areas which the two of you think need improvement. When you conduct an inspection, it should, as a minimum, be conducted with accountability, cleanliness and serviceability in mind. The platoon sergeant should pre-inspect and ensure that personnel and equipment are ready at the time of the inspection.

The motor pool - all the dust and mud and sweat, and cussing, and busting knuckles, that goes on there. Your platoon will probably be in the motor pool more than anywhere else, except the field, and you should be there too. Your time should be oriented to the platoon if you're not with it. Your time should be oriented to the platoon, observing and learning as well as supervising.

As the platoon leader you should already have a basic understanding of how maintenance is to be conducted and what to check for. The platoon sergeant should brief you into the system that the company and battalion is using so that you can grasp a good understanding of your platoon's maintenance posture as soon as possible. The platoon sergeant should point out problem areas and let you know what to do, at the platoon level, to solve it.

Your platoon owns a lot of different specialized equipment. Advice on the best way to inventory, inspect and maintain that equipment is expected from the platoon sergeant. He should tell you what to look for or to check. Before going into an inspection or inventory, the platoon sergeant should let you know what the unit SOP is, to ensure that the platoon is in compliance. Again, if a problem exists, it's your responsibility to attempt to rectify it through the company commander.

As a new platoon leader, when you are in your local training area for the first time, hanging in your tank commander's hatch, a lot of questions will be going through your head as you listen to the chatter of yet unfamiliar voices on your platoon net. What training do I need to focus on? How am I going to accomplish that training? What do you have to concentrate on? Which missions do you need to improve on? Everything, and I mean everything you do, should focus on combat. Everything else is secondary. Develop the mentality that everything you do, or do not do, is driven by the fact that tomorrow, you may find yourself deploying. Not for another exercise, but for battle. This "warrior spirit" will help you and your platoon survive.

You and the platoon sergeant need to jointly define where the platoon is going and agree on where you want the platoon to be in a given time frame. The platoon's training priorities and sustainment programs will be developed accordingly. You are the planner. You should receive an honest opinion of the platoon's training status and assistance from the platoon sergeant, in

balancing available time, equipment, and personnel assets within your allocation of crew and individual training time. Remember your focus should be on your platoon's combat effectiveness and readiness, with teamwork as a constant modifier of your focus. Your platoon sergeant will concentrate on each subordinate NCO and individual to ensure that each is well trained and motivated. Don't neglect your own training. Leadership by example is paramount. Tankers have to be able to shoot, move, and communicate. You should be among the best. Prior to gunnery, ask you platoon sergeant to run you through a complete checkout on what you will need to know as a tank commander and for advice on what you and your crew need as additional drill. Again, emphasis on combat. A "warrior spirit."

The platoon leader should be involved in decisions concerning any member of the platoon. You have to know who is expecting leave, and who wasn't promoted, etc. Maintenance of the soldier. Your soldiers have to know that you and the platoon sergeant are jointly concerned about each individual's advancement and personal welfare. Don't be the one who is surprised.

Your have to be involved with promotions, awards, punishments, assignments, and re-assignments. When interacting with the soldiers in your platoon, ask your platoon sergeant or other NCOs who are acting platoon leaders, for guidance in handling the situation. The skill of "dealing with people" can only be acquired through experience. Don't try to be everybody's friend. Burn them if they deserve it, congratulate them if they deserve it.

The platoon sergeant is your administrator and your contact with the informal NCO support channel and the company 1SG. Don't forget to delegate authority and let the NCO's lead. Trusting your subordinates helps them to grow professionally and does wonders for developing teamwork and cohesion. You should expect to be kept informed on anything and everything dealing with the platoon. You in turn should react in the same manner to your platoon sergeant. Don't ever promise anything that can't be delivered. Have a platoon meeting at least once a month and tell members of your platoon where they really need improvement.

NCO and officer business should be kept separate, yet you and the platoon sergeant need to be aware of the others actions, trusting each other as teammates. The platoon sergeant should keep you closely advised as to what he defines as NCO business and let you know why. At the platoon level both the officer and NCO must be of one mind to accomplish the mission.

By working closely together, you and the platoon sergeant can stay ahead of the problems which may be blocks to the platoon's success; moreover, your own transition into the platoon will be smoother. You have to create the conditions for things to get done, and get done right. Train like you expect to fight tomorrow. Care enough, to insist on the high standards. Trust enough, in your subordinates, to get the job done.

MARK W. MAIERS
CPT, AR
Fort Knox, Kentucky

GAINING CREDIBILITY

One of the most frequent complaints of platoon sergeants about new lieutenants is that they come into their new unit and in a well-meaning attempt to establish their position of leadership, they fail to listen and learn from those about them. Remember, no one is expected to know all there is to know about any job. In most cases, subordinates are happy to impart their knowledge for it makes them feel important, and they DO have much to offer. Your task is to take what they have to say and weigh it along with other factors as you make your decisions.

One tank commander was asked about the attributes of the best lieutenant he ever served with. He answered with a story about a field training exercise. The platoon had the mission of moving from point A to point B through some difficult terrain as a part of a larger exercise. When he wanted to be sure about what action they should take next, the lieutenant gathered the tank commanders and platoon sergeant around the map and said "this is where I think we are and this is how I think we ought to proceed. What do you think?" One of the tank commanders who was especially good at map reading offered what amounted to a minor correction, which the lieutenant checked out with the rest of the group. When all agreed, they made the correction and moved on to accomplish the objective. The tank commander was asked if the honest question lost credibility by showing lack of expertise. He replied "No." It helped. We did not feel that the lieutenant was lost, but he did make us feel that he appreciated our opinions. He was both teaching us and leading us at the same time. He made us feel important.

A very important observation at this point is that you as a leader have to discriminate as you receive information. Much of the information that you will receive will be worthy of consideration, but you will have to weigh it. The decision is yours. You have to determine if it is accurate and straightforward. In short, you have to decide on the credibility of the source.

Listen and observe at all times. In so doing, you will gain credibility. Three other aspects of military professionalism are foundations for gaining credibility. They are summarized below.

- PROFESSIONAL ATTITUDE:

  (1) Respect superiors and subordinates as fellow professionals.
  (2) Give the benefit of the doubt to others unless and until they prove themselves untrustworthy.
  (3) Be loyal to superiors and subordinates.
  (4) Never demean or ridicule a subordinate.
  (5) Do not run down a subordinate behind his back.
  (6) Do not undercut a leader with criticism. Deal with him or her one-on-one.

(7) Do not talk down to a subordinate. Treat him/her as a fellow professional and expect professional behavior from him/her.

- PRACTICE POSITIVE HONESTY:

(1) Be honest and expect honesty.
(2) Question orders, directions, and policies that cannot be complied with legally and ethically.
(3) Never issue orders, directives, or policies that cannot be complied with legally and ethically.
(4) Be collaborative rather than competitive--seek to establish win/win situations rather than win/lose.
(5) Be more interested in finding right than in judging wrong.
(6) Don't be a "yes-man." You do yourself and your unit no favors.

- BE YOURSELF:

(1) Soldiers will determine very quickly if you are pretending to be something that you're not.
(2) Is your leadership style consistent with your personality?
(3) This is an important basis of trust--if soldiers have questions about what they see, they will find trust more difficult.

"And is there anything more important than

that the work of the soldier should be done well?"

PLATO

"THE REPUBLIC"

THE NCO AND JOB SATISFACTION

The NCO is the backbone of the Army. It falls in his lot to do much of the actual day-to-day close supervision of the men in the platoon, particularly in garrison situations. Many of the fatigue and housekeeping details are accomplished during periods when the platoon leader is not present in the platoon area for he is engaged in administrative duties, which tend to be especially heavy in garrison. Although the platoon leader will check the work in progress and the proper accomplishment of the assigned duties, the detailed supervision will often, of necessity, be left to the NCO's. If the platoon's NCO's are well motivated and capable, platoon performance will generally be good. With poor NCO's, platoon performance is likely to suffer, regardless, in most cases, of what the platoon leader does. One of the platoon leader's most important tasks, therefore, is to build his NCO's into a capable team, both interested in their work and motivated to do good work.

In earlier sections, many factors were discussed in terms of their effects on the performance of one's men. In quick review: All men look for certain satisfactions in their work. When they find these satisfactions, they like their jobs and are likely to do good work. However, when they do not find these satisfactions, they generally are discontented, and do no better than they must to get by. It is basic that a man will work willingly to keep something he wants, but not for something he does not want. This principle applies in a straightforward way to the NCO. If his job is attractive and he really likes it, the understanding that he must do good work to keep it will result in a hard worker.

What things, then, lead the NCO to be satisfied with his job? In this culture, perhaps the most fundamental goal for persons in all walks of life, including the NCO, is self-respect and the respect of others. This need is basic to the persistent desire to do good work, and is also important in the satisfaction of a second basic need, security. These are related, primarily because a man will feel more secure in his job if he feels that others respect him for his work. While other factors lead to a feeling of security, this is probably as important as any.

These needs lead most persons in this society to aspire to positions of leadership or influence over others, and of increased responsibility within an organization. Such positions are generally considered to be marks of recognition by the organization. They indicate that the person so rewarded is skilled in his trade and is sufficiently more capable than the others in his group that he can be entrusted with the responsibility for supervising their efforts. This recognition is an important indication to a man that he is esteemed by others and that his position in the organization is secure.

However, holding a position of leadership is not enough alone. The actions of higher leaders can do much to enhance or detract from the meaningfulness of a position of leadership as an indication that the leaders is a valuable and respected man. This is particularly true with regard to the relation between a platon leader and his NCO's. Depending on how he interacts with them and uses them within the platoon, he can increase or decrease their feeling of achievement and value to the Army, and, in turn, their satisfaction with their jobs.

AMOUNT OF RESPONSIBILITY GIVEN THE NCO

One of the most important problems the platoon leader faces in deciding how to use his NCO's is the amount of authority he should give them in handling their various units (squads) within the platoon. It is obvious that even though the platoon leader is responsible for all his platoon does or fails to do, responsibility for running the squads is inherent to the squad leader by virtue of his assignment as squad leader. However, to insure the job is accomplished by those responsible for accomplishment, authority must be delegated commensurate with responsibility. In other words, the platoon leader must delegate to his squad leaders the authority to run their squads as the company commander must delegate authority to the platoon leader to run his platoon. It is clear, therefore, that the NCO's must be given some independent authority for which their squads are held responsible. The question, then, is not whether they should have authority, but, rather, how much.

Two important factors tend to confuse this problem: The first is a much misunderstood saying in the Army that responsibility cannot be delegated. Confusion on this issue has tricked many inexperienced leaders into robbing their NCO's of responsibility rightfully theirs. These points can be illustrated by example.

If a squad leader fails on an important assignment, the company commander will generally hold the platoon leader responsible; only rarely, if ever, will he involve the squad leader. However, if the assignment is completed in an outstanding manner, the company commander generally will consider it appropriate for the platoon leader to identify the responsible squad leader to him. In particular, the platoon leader would not claim sole responsibility for the excellence of the job. The question of "delegating responsibility" then is clearly addressed to the fact that the platoon leader cannot "pass the buck" and not to how he divides the work load in his platoon and/or supervises the work. While he is responsible for the quality of the work done by his unit, he also has a great deal of freedom to create responsibility within the platoon for each of his subordinate leaders. Of course, as discussed above, this requires the delegation of authority in accordance with the responsibility inherent in the assigned task or position.

The second issue clouding this general question is that under routine garrison conditions, or even under conditions of field training, the inexperienced platoon leader may feel that he can obtain better results by personally shouldering a large part of the direct supervision involved in "running" the platoon. The trap is that, under combat conditions, the work load will be considerably heavier. In addition, he will not be able to move about the battlefield freely enough to be able to personally direct the operation of individual soldiers within the platoon. At the same time, he will not easily be able to restructure his control of the platoon to give the NCO's greater freedom and responsibility, because he will have missed his chance in the less hurried training situation to learn to work with them as a team and to determine the upper limit of authority each of them could assume.

TWO TASKS FOR A PLATOON LEADER

These considerations are directly relevant to how the platoon leader forms his NCO's into a chain of command, and the amount of freedom and support he gives them within his framework. This poses two important tasks for the platoon leader. One is to determine the degree to which each of his NCO's can successfully accept authority; the second is to give increased freedom and responsibility for the decision-making activities to those who profit from it. Implicit in this is the need to provide authority which is appropriate to the responsibility inherent in the performance of the assigned positions, especially in regard to the NCO's interactions with his own men as a function of that responsibility.

Support within a chain of command may take many forms; one of these is restraint by higher leaders in bypassing lower leaders to assign or approve work tasks.

BYPASSING A SUBORDINATE LEADER

Bypassing subordinate leaders can be quite dangerous because it reinforces a desire most men share to gain approval for their work at the highest level possible. This desire is a function of the expectation that approval of an immediate senior may not be "final." Approval of a next level senior is often required. When this is the case, it "makes sense" to look to him for the initial approval, rather than to the immediate senior. This, of course, works to the detriment of the organizational structure. Therefore, if a leader higher in the chain of command constantly bypasses an intermediate leader, both in issuing work assignments and in approving work performance, he tends to eliminate the need for the intermediate leader. This will promote an inclination on the part of the men to bypass the intermediate leader, particularly on matters of which they disagree with that leader. The result will be lowered group morale, conflict, and decreased effectiveness.

This does not mean that a leader is always committed to rigid adherence to a chain of command. Quite to the contrary, one of the earmarks of a good organization is flexibility, the ability to adapt to changing conditions.

Thus, the leader's actions should be oriented toward the best functional approach to unit effectiveness, rather than toward unreasoning adherence to rules. There are good functional reasons why the platoon leader should use his subordinate leaders to their maximum when ongoing activities are routine and time pressure are low, as in garrison. This will (a) increase the NCO's standing with their own subordinates (by demonstrating that the platoon leader considers them sufficiently capable that the can delegate work, etc., to them without the necessity for subsequent close supervision), (b) increase their effectiveness--especially of junior NCO's--with their subordinates (by giving them practice in the independent exercise of authority that will be of great subsequent value if the unit is ever used in combat), (c) free the platoon leader from the necessity for undue concentration on matters which they can handle as well as or better than he can, and (d) teach both the platoon leader and his men the interaction skills required for effective teamwork so that the unit can operate well as a team under considerations in which time pressures and the total work load are heavy.

On the other hand, when time pressures are so great, as under field conditions, there may be good functional reasons for the platoon leader to issue instructions, guidance, or orders directly to a subordinate leader's men, if that leader is absent. However, he should realize that in so doing he stands a chance of creating more and possibly greater problems than the one he is trying to remedy. He must be careful not to damage the status of the subordinate leader with his men, and to preserve unity of activity and purpose between himself and the NCO. Specifically, he should (a) first inquire as to the instructions the men are acting on, (b) state that he wishes them to proceed otherwise and that their immediate leader will be notified, and (c) then, above all, immediately notify that leader of his action.

The exercise of discretion when bypassing a subordinate leader will always pay dividends. Constantly bypassing an intermediate leader will destroy the need for that man, his consequent authority over his subordinates, his feeling of value to the unit, and his self-respect.

GENERAL SUPERVISION

This helps to define the kind of working relationships a platoon leader should develop with his NCO's. One of the most important satisfactions a man can get is that of feeling that he is doing something important in his job, and that his job is worthwhile. Similarly of value is the feeling that his superiors are aware of the quality of the work that he is doing, and are appreciative. One of the best ways a platoon leader can indicate this to his senior NCO's is by using the most general level of supervision compatible with the ability and motivation of the NCO involved. This applies both in giving assignments and in checking ongoing work.

The specificity level at which he gives assignments must, of course, be tempered by the routiness of the task. Greater specificity of detail is naturally required in assigning unique tasks. However, this also is a function of the NCO to whom the task is assigned. The more capable he is, the

less will be the need for detail, even when the task is unique.

The primary reason for giving assignments at a general level is that the NCO is then permitted to formulate for himself the details of how the task is to be done, and to assign parts of the over-all task to his own subordinates in terms of his judgment of their ability. This personal involvement in planning and executing the assignment will generally lead him to feel that he has a personal stake in successful completion of the task. This, in turn, will increase his motivation to complete the task well, give him better overall control over his men, and support his conviction that the is making an important contribution to the unit.

Close supervision of ongoing work will have the same detrimental effect as when making assignments. Because overly close supervision is interpreted thusly, it will decrease the motivation of most good NCOs and men to do good work. Of course, if the NCO actually is deficient in either ability or motivation, the platoon leader will have no choice; he will be forced to exercise close and detailed supervision in order to get the work done. It should be obvious that each NCO will respond best to a level of supervision appropriate to his own ability and motivation. However, it is probably best to give him a chance to work under a more general level of supervision before assuming that close supervision is required.

There is some danger involved in general level supervision. Many NCOs will interpret lack of detailed guidance and supervision as a lack of interest in the quality of their work. However, this danger is minimized if the platoon leader:

(a) Emphasizes initially that performance is highly important, and that each man will get a fair deal in terms of how well he works.

(b) Checks carefully and in detail on the quality of the completed work in every case. Contrary to some beliefs, none but a very exceptional work group in any context will do well those things which senior officers do not check. If they do not check, this is interpreted as an indication that the task is unimportant to the unit.

(c) Recognizes good performance, taking corrective action in every case when performance does not meet or exceed standards.

NCO'S NEED FOR THE PLATOON LEADER'S SUPPORT

One other important topic should be included in the discussion of NCO responsibility—the kind and amount of control the NCO is free to exercise over his men. This is a touchy problem, primarily because it involves the question of how the NCO can reward his men for excellent work, or chastise them for poor work. While the problems faced by the platoon leader in this area are knotty, the problems faced by the NCO are worse. He generally has a great deal of responsibility for direct control of the men during the accomplishment of platoon assignments, but little or no authority to dispense

rewards, and none to dispense punishment. However, effective motivational methods include both promises of positive rewards for good work and threats of disciplinary action for failure to do well, provided failure is the result of inadequate motivation. When these promises or threats are made, they must be kept. To promote the use of effective methods of motivation and control, the platoon leader therefore must make desirable incentives available for his NCOs to dispense to those men who do good work. Similarly, he must back up requests by NCOs for punitive treatment for those of their men who will work only to avoid punishment.

Of course, the platoon leader is limited in this respect also. Most of the rewards and all the legal punishments must be given within the authority of the company commander. However, there still are certain actions the platoon leader can take on his own, particularly with regard to privileges. For example, particularly in training companies, he can identify the squad in his platoon that will be first in the mess line. If all squads have an equal chance to earn this privilege, giving it to the squad that has performed best on assigned tasks, as a part of a well-conceived over-all program of positive incentives, will help to increase the motivation of all squads to do well. This principle applies equally well to other desirable privileges, such as (a) passes--when passes are scarce and cannot be given to everyone, they should be given to those who have done the best work, (b) extra details--when extra details are assigned to the platoon, but only part of the platoon is needed for the work, the men who have done the best prior work should be excused as a reward, and (c) extra training--when a man in training has mastered the required skill, excusing him further training in his skill, in those few cases in which this is possible, will serve as a powerful incentive for all to work harder during regular training. When the use of these and other positive incentives can be determined by the NCO--always with the knowledge and concurrence of the platoon leader to ensure the determination is just--the NCO will be more likely to make use of them and will therefore both command more respect from, and enjoy better control over, his men.

In contrast, if the platoon leader does not provide the required support, the NCO may then be reduced to the position of bargaining with his men for their performance or of resorting to various sub rosa methods for maintaining control over them. The latter may take the form of harrassment, derogatory treatment, the illegal use of physical force, and so on, with the end result that the men perhaps are forced to work solely to avoid illegal coercion, rather than for desirable goals.

In summary, the closeness of the platoon leader's supervision over his NCOs, the level of detail of his assignments to them, and his support of them in controlling their men will all affect the NCO's feeling of responsibility and value to the unit. This, in turn, will affect both his ability to do good work, and his satisfaction with the job and the unit. All worthwhile NCOs want to be given real responsibility, provided that they have authority commensurate with that responsibility, and are assured that their good work will then be recognized. This is a very basic formula for advancement. The big step in attaining the first position in which capability for handling

responsibility can be demonstrated; beyond this, chances for upward mobility are good for the capable man.

THE NEWLY COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT

Discussion of a second area of importance will complete this chapter. It is directed primarily to the recently commissioned lieutenant with no prior troop experience.

An officer's first assignment with troops is generally a cause for great personal concern. He typically wonders what to expect, what problems he will face, how adequate his skills will be to solve them, and what, in general, will be expected of him by his NCOs and his company commander. His concern generally is complicated by a realization that he will be working with NCOs who know more about running a platoon than he does, especially where technical matters are concerned. This, of course, is an especially realistic concern. It has a great deal to do with the kind of working relationship he will develop with his NCOs.

In actuality, however, this is less a problem than it would seem to be, if the platoon leader makes a good first impression on his NCOs. NCOs have seen many platoon leaders come and go. A few will try to make life miserable for any newly commissioned officer, and a few others will do nothing constructive unless made to do so; but most are able, conscientious men with a fairly high degree of maturity. They have a personal interest in their platoon, and will help to make it a good one if given half a chance. If their initial impressions convince them that the new leader is a tolerant, emotionally mature officer who is interested in learning his job and doing it well, their cooperation is virtually assured. If they believe him to be a "gung ho" know-it-all who is out to "shape up" the platoon, they will tend to withdraw into protective shells.

This strongly implies that the leader should have a well thought out strategy for developing an effective working relationship with his NCOs, and that he should be guided by this strategy from the moment he meets the first NCO. The development of this strategy requires analysis of the elements of a good working relationship. Perhaps the most important is willingness to delegate authority. This was discussed in the first part of this chapter. Nearly as important are actions that reflect his estimate of their competence relative to his own. These actions can be categorized into two types, one dealing with how formal, or informal, he is with his NCOs, and the other with how he treats or elicits their suggestions on the technical matters of running the platoon.

FORMALITY AND INFORMALITY

Formality probably can best be defined as the requirement by the leader that his subordinate, in a given situation, render those military courtesies that normally would be rendered in the presence of the leader's senior officers and his subordinate leader's men, regardless of who actually is

present. Informality, then, can be defined as a relaxation of formality, each depending on how many formal restraints the leaders does relax, in comparison with those formal restraints normally demanded by their difference in rank.

It is important also to define familiarity, because this is often confused with informality. Familiarity probably is best defined as an aspect of the working relationship that develops between peers; it is characterized by the use of first names on an equal rank basis, and so on. This is a different dimension from formality-informality. Obviously, the platoon leader should never want or permit a subordinate to interact with him on an equal rank basis. Indeed, the better NCOs would generally reject such a relationship, particularly if permitted by an inexperienced platoon leader.

However, the capable and well-motivated NCO does want a working relationship that permits him to operate with maximum effectiveness in achieving platoon goals. Formality becomes an important factor when it prevents this. The process through which formality can become a barrier to effective teamwork is quite subtle, particularly so to the officer. The analysis of this process is a fine lesson in group dynamics.

Subordinates view formality as a reminder of rank differences that exist between themselves and their seniors. These rank differences are associated with differences in power. Specifically, the senior is given a certain degree of power over the subordinate by his senior rank. Awareness of this power differential is usually a source of discomfort for the subordinate, because he always will question, to some small degree, when this power may be turned against him if he ever were to forget to comply with a formal requirement. This is like living next to an atomic reactor. One day he might do something wrong and make it blow up.

Because requirements for formality in interaction thus generate tensions--that is, the subordinate feels he must be continuously on guard to be certain he conforms--they tend to make interaction unpleasant. The inevitable result is that the subordinate will avoid interaction as much as he comfortably can. This is his way of avoiding tensions. However, when interaction decrease, the flow of information between the two ranks also decreases, and this will lead to a critical reduction in shared information on issues relevant to accomplishing mutual goals. In extreme cases, insistence by the leader on formality can result in his ignorance of important platoon problems--because no one wants to go to the bother of telling him.

To this point, the discussion of formality and formal requirements has been rather general. It is meaningful now to ask the question of what formal requirements the platoon leader can relax, and what this relaxation means at the level of everyday actions. This can be illustrated by an example contrasting two different platoon leaders interacting with their platoon sergeants.

I

Platoon Leader:	"Afternoon, sergeant. The clerk said you were looking for me earlier.
Platoon Sergeant:	Yes, sir.
Platoon Leader:	Well, come on in and sit down. What's on your mind?
Platoon Sergeant:	Private Wright fouled us up again.
Platoon Leader:	What this time?

II

Platoon Leader:	Good afternoon, Sergeant_____. Did you want to see me?
Platoon Sergeant:	Yes, sir.
Platoon Leader:	What's your problem, sergeant? (seating himself, but leaving the platoon sergeant standing).
Platoon Sergeant:	Private Wright fouled us up again.
Platoon Leader:	What:
Platoon Sergeant:	Private Wright fouled us up again, sir.
Platoon Leader:	What happened this time, sergeant?

In the first conversation, the platoon leader's manner would encourage his platoon sergeant to talk, and to seek advice on future matters. It emphasizes easy accessibility and willingness to listen. These are highly important to the subordinate. In contrast, the platoon leader in the second example was cold and aloof. His manner could not have endeared him to his platoon sergeant. Leaving the sergeant standing, and requiring the "sir" to be added to a spoken line--which the sergeant, of course, should not have forgotten--were rebuffs that would have produced a bit of reluctance on the part of the sergeant to initiate subsequent interactions.

Of course, more than mere formality is involved here. The platoon leader who is comfortable with his NCOs will reflect this by his actions with them; the leader who is not will be equally transparent. He who must for his own peace of mind continously remind others of his felt superiority will do little for their peace of mind; for, by so doing, he reminds them that he considers them inferior.

LIMITS FOR RELAXING FORMALITY

However, there are obvious limits to which the platoon leader can and should relax requirements for formality. These limits are determined by several considerations.

One is the subordinate's rank and formal position within the platoon. Because informality of interaction does increase the accessibility of the leader, the leader must exercise discretion in deciding the men with whom he can be informal. For example, he cannot be informal with privates to the same extent as with squad leaders, and not as informal with them as with the platoon sergeant. Permitting privates equal access to himself would (a) tend to encourage them to bypass their NCO leaders, and (b) clutter his own time with a lot of low-level matters his NCOs should handle instead.

A second important consideration is the NCO's competence at his own job. It is customary among competent men of different rank to use informality of interaction as an indicator of mutual respect for that competence. Thus, in combat, if one listens to the conversation between a company commander and his most respected sergeant, one might hear:

Company Commander:	Where would you guess their main strength is, sergeant?
Platoon Sergeant:	Probably over there, captain.
Company Commander:	Do you think you could get through along that draw and lay down a flanking base of fire for use to move in on them?
Platoon Sergeant:	It would depend on how quickly you could take the pressure off once we get there. We sure could try, sir.
Company Commander:	Good, let's do it that way. Use your platoon and . . .

With a less competent NCO, the commander might simply have given an order for the desired movement.

This, interestingly, can work both ways. Especially in combat, where a man's competence may be a matter of life or death for the men who fight with him, an outstandingly competent NCO may consider his own status within his platoon higher than that of an inexperienced platoon leader replacement. Importantly, so will the rest of the platoon. In this case, the sergeant may be unwilling to be informal with the lieutenant, because he is not willing to admit the lieutenant to a similar status, competence-wise. The platoon leader's first big step toward gaining effective leadership over his platoon may be the willingness of the sergeant to step into an informal working relationship with the lieutenant. Such willingness, in a case like this, will be a function of the platoon leader's demonstration of ability and willingness to learn; that is, capability. It cannot be "courted," or solicited by "being pals."

Another important constraint is the platoon leader's estimate of the subordinate's ability to recognize situational requirements for formality. There are some situations in which the platoon leader can be informal and others in which he cannot-but only if his subordinate can recognize the

different formality requirements of these different kinds of situations and react accordingly. If the subordinate cannot tailor his behavior to the requirements of the situation, he will eventually embarrass both of them. Consequently, the leader cannot, with safety, be informal with that man under any conditions.

One final constraint on the platoon leader in relaxing formal requirements is that he generally should be equally formal with all subordinates of equal rank in a given situation. To do otherwise is to differentiate among them publicly. It would indicate to the group that one of them is a "favored" person. This would be dangerous. To be more informal with one man than with the others can work to the good of the unit if it is clearly recognized by all that the informality is based on the person's superiority in performance, motivation to perform, etc. This will be accepted, because the others will already have accorded that man their respect for his greater ability. However, if this superior ability and this motivation are not clearly visible to all the men present, they may assume that the platoon leader is really playing favorites.

It is important to emphasize that relaxing the formal rquirements is the prerogative of the senior officer. The subordinate may never violate an established formal barrier between the two. If he does, it is an indication that he cannot be trusted with an informal working relationship.

In summary, the more informal the working relationship between the platoon leader and competent NCOs, up to a certain point, the more efficient the working of the unit will be in general. However, perception by the unit that the leader has come to favor some men more than others, as a consequence of something other than performance, will result in a loss of control and a loss of respect both for the leader and for the subordinate with whom he was "too informal." This is a thin line for the platoon leader to walk. His ability in this respect will determine in a large part the motivation and ability of his platoon to operate together and with him as a team.

PLATOON LEADER'S REACTION TO NCO SUGGESTIONS

Another difficult problem inevitably faced by the inexperienced platoon leader is that of how to react to suggestions from his NCOs, especially (a) when he thinks he knows the way the current task should be done, because of relevant training he received in his branch school, and (b) when he has not had the chance to evaluate the NCO's technical competence. Whose judgement does he trust? He knows, of course, that he has both the prerogative and the responsibility for making the final decision, and that he should act decisively, but he also knows that he can be decisively wrong.

Suppose, for example, he tells one of his tank commanders to occupy in a given location, and is met with the suggestion that they could better be placed in a different spot. This has all the elements of the dilemma. In his branch school, the platoon leader received some training on how to emplace

machineguns. But he also knows that the weapons squad leader has had a great deal of practical experience. Further, the tank commander may have based his suggestion on the existence of a company SOP. What to do?

The answer is not a simple one, but there are certain guidelines that will almost always work. First, he should ask why the NCO thinks the other location would be better. Comparision of the tank commander's reasons with his own will resolve most of these situation, especially if the platoon leader does not start such discussions with the general attitude of, "I'm the boss here."

However, there will be some situations which cannot be resolved in this manner. The reasons may look equally good. The best approach then is to consult another NCO. In this case it would be the platoon sergeant, never a subordinate of the tank commander. If there is no time to consult another NCO, the decision should, of course, be made on the spot. If spot decisions go against the NCO, this can and should be eased by a remark such as, "I think your idea is a good one, but we had better do....because..." If the "because" is followed by a good reason, the decision more than likely will be well accepted.

Perhaps the most important single caution is that suggestions from subordinates should always be given courteous attention. Completely aside from the fact that this will probably result in better unit performance, suggestions generally are indications that the NCO cares enough about his unit's performance to speak up. It shows personal interest in what is going on. If the platoon leader does not give suggestions courteous treatment, whether or not they are good suggestions, he will destroy the man's interest, and cut off future suggestions to the eventual detriment of the platoon.

It is important also to emphasize that suggestions from subordinates pose no real or implied threat to the platoon leader's control over the platoon. Even the newest private can recognize the existing differences in rank and legal authority, and will act accordingly when the chips are down. It should be obvious that unthinking and initiativeless obedience is the thing to be feared, and not disobedience.

HOW TO DEAL WITH UNSOUND NCO DECISIONS

Another problem that frequently concerns the inexperienced leader is generated when an NCO makes an unsound decision or takes ineffective action as a result of an unsound decision. Should the platoon leader support a poor decision by an NCO? Which will have the more serious effect, letting the decision stand or reversing it with the likelihood the NCO's men will learn of the reversal?

The answers to these questions depend on the platoon leader's judgement on four factors: (a) his best estimate as to the reason for the ineffective action or decision--this is the question of distinguishing between

motivational and ability failures, (b) his estimate of the consequences of the decision or action on platoon performance and/or morale, (c) his evaluation of the NCO's past record in the platoon, and (d) the relation he has built with the NCO during the time they have worked together.

If the NCO is a good man and the consequences of his ineffective action are judged to be trivial, correction by the platoon leader may be seen as "nitpicking" and can do more harm than good. A highly motivated NCO with a lot of initiative may make more minor "errors" than an NCO with little or no initiative, because he does more work and makes more decisions within the platoon. However, these minor "errors" will not keep him from being of far greater value to the platoon than a man who does little or nothing he has not been told to do. The platoon leader who seeks perfection and is therefore intolerant of small errors may find that he eventually suppresses the initiative of his subordinate leaders. This is a predictable outcome because a man who does only what he is told, that is, a man with little initiative, will make few small errors, and thus will not be criticized so often.

However, in many cases, the consequences of an ineffective NCO action or decision are not trivial, and correction must then be made whether the NCO is a good man or not. Here, the manner of correction must be based heavily on consideration of the NCO's past record. An NCO with a good record will generally have adequate motivation. He consequently will correct his faults if given a chance to do so. He will generally react well to private correction, which includes specific information as to why past actions were ineffective and alternative kinds of action would have been superior.

A more complex problem exists when the NCO's past record is not good. There are accidents of promotion in any organization. Consequently, there will be some NCO's who are definitely not worth their salt, some because of a lack of ability and some because of either inadequate or perverse motivation. The platoon leader cannot afford to let poor NCO leadership go uncorrected. It will work hardships on his men, and also will jeopardize his own record by producing an inferior platoon.

An NCO who is deficient in ability but nevertheless well motivated is relatively easy to handle. If he is well motivated, his men will usually go to fairly great lengths to "cover up" for him; too, he may be able to compensate to a large extent for his lack of ability by trying harder. The platoon leader's best role in this case probably is that of providing the man with all possible opportunities to better himself through his hard work. Further, and perhaps of greater importance, he should concentrate on rewarding the NCO and his men as a group to encourage the NCO to rely on the abilities of his men for the good of the group. The contrast here is in basing the NCO's rewards on good group work rather than on how sharp the NCO is judged to be and how he measures individually in comparison with other NCOs.

THE UNMOTIVATED NCO

It is not so easy to help an inadequately or perversely motivated NCO. Motivational failures occur when a man's values lead to depreciation of the rewards offered by his work environment. In a number of cases, the consistent use of a just system of rewards and punishments may lead to acceptance of an appropriate set of values, and thus may rebuild the man's motivation. If this is attempted, tasks assigned him should be particularly clear-cut in nature with definite target dates for completion, where possible, so there can be little subsequent doubt as to whether the task was completed according to expectations. Completed tasks should be closely inspected and judged in terms of standards of excellence specified when the task was assigned. Failures in any respect should be pointed out objectively and clearly, so that subsequent disciplinary action is unmistakably related to the performance itself.

If the NCO does not respond, it will then be necessary to take more drastic action to protect the unmotivated NCO's subordinates and the platoon as a whole from his disturbing influence. If it is clear that he cannot be rehabilitated, he must be removed from his rank and leadership position to make room for more highly motivated men to advance. This kind of decision is difficult for the leader to make.
It is much easier to "ride out the storm" or "close one's eyes" and thus let a successor inherit the problem. Nonetheless, it is amply clear that, in this case, the difficult course serves the over-all good of the Army far better.

However, in these and in other cases, the platoon leader should exercise care to avoid either public correction of the NCO's, or public countermanding of their instructions, unless, of course, the situation is such that more undesirable consequences will follow if he does not take immediate action. Fortunately, there almost always will be time to consult the NCO privately about questionable actions or decisions. Both the NCO and his men will appreciate the consideration shown by this treatment.

HANDLING THE "SHARPSHOOTER"

Another kind of problem for the inexperienced platoon leader is a "sharpshooter" who gets perverse pleasure from demonstrating to all that his platoon leader is inept. This man can be recognized by the fact that his suggestions will almost always be given publicly, so others can hear, and in a manner calculated to embarrass the platoon leader. He rarely will make suggestions in private. This poses a problem, particularly if the public suggestions are constructive and good.

The decision that a man is "sharpshooting" must be made with a great deal of care. If the embarrassing comments rarely contain any constructive content, the decision is much easier; that is, there is less doubt about the man's purpose. However, if the comments, as suggested above, are constructive and good, there may be considerable doubt over a fairly long period of time. The alternative possibility always exists that the man is sincere but either tactless or grossly unconcerned with the feelings of others. Inexperienced platoon leaders may incorrectly judge such a man to be malicious because they

tend to be defensive about their lack of experience and technical knowledge in running a platoon. The result of an incorrect judgement in this case will be to eliminate a source of good, constructive suggestions when a more appropriate course would be to teach the man to behave tactfully.

However, if the platoon leader is convinced he has run into a "sharpshooter," he must act quickly to correct the situation, or he will run the chance of losing the respect of the other NCOs. While they may personally hold the "sharpshooter" in contempt among themselves, they probably will view the whole thing as a contest between him and the platoon leader, and will be equally contemptuous of the platoon leader if the "sharpshooter" wins. The principle is that, if the platoon leader is not clever enough to find out what is going on, and to do something about it, he does not deserve their respect. Perhaps the best first step to stop a "sharpshooter" is to tell him privately that the reasons for his behavior are known, that his behavior is having a disruptive effect on platoon morale, and that future suggestions must be made more discreetly. However, the leader should avoid a display of uncontrolled emotion at all times, because this probably would actually please the "sharpshooter."

This talk may solve the problem because a large part of the "sharpshooter's" pleasure is usually derived from the thought that the platoon leader does not know what is going on, that is, is being made a "fool," or that he has made the platoon leader lose some of his self-control. When the game gets into the open, a part of the pleasure will be gone, and only the more perverse "sharpshooter" will continue. Of course, if he does, further measures will be necessary. One might give perfunctory replies to the man's future suggestions in a manner implying little actual consideration, as, for example, "That might be interesting," while reacting favorably to good suggestions from everyone else. However, the platoon leader should be careful not to "pull rank" on the man, as, for example, by assigning this man to the "dirty" jobs in the platoon. This would be resented by the rest of the NCO's. Fortunately, this is about the only thing that would be resented. All they want is a "fair fight." If the platoon leader can win this fight by skill rather than by rank, which they may feel he has not yet "earned," he will generally win their respect at the same time.

A METHOD FOR LEARNING

The next question the new platoon leader probably will raise is, "If suggestions are not given, how do I go about learning?" The answer is simple: Ask. There are two important sources of information available to the new platoon leader. One consists of the other platoon leaders in the company. They will often have greater experience, and through this experience will have "learned the ropes" sufficiently well to be able to offer good advice about problems the new leader faces. It is best to learn the small, but important details of running a platoon from them, if at all possible.

However, it will not always be possible to consult another platoon leader. In these cases, such as in the field, a second important source of information is the platoon sergeant. It does not lower the dignity of an officer to ask his platoon sergeant what he should say to his men at a given time, or what he should do next in a given situation, provided he is really interested in learning. This cannot be interpreted as a revealing ignorance because they already know how "ignorant" he is. Quite to the contrary, they will respect a leader who asks because this reveals the inner strength to admit a lack of knowledge. Further, it builds their confidence in him, because they will, over time, come to expect that he <u>will</u> ask when he does not know, thereby keeping both himself and his platoon out of the various kinds of trouble he could, in ignorance, cause for it.

SUMMARY

In summary, the NCO is a small work-group leader in every sense of the definition. As such, he should be an example to his men, a teacher of skills they need, and a source of accurate technical guidance as to how assigned tasks can best be done. The importance assigned to these functions by the platoon leader, and the manner in which the platoon leader provides supervision and support will determine how well he can perform these functions, and how much he will value his job in the platoon. This, in turn, will determine, in large part, his motivation to do good work. The importance of a satisfied and well-motivated staff of NCO's cannot be overemphasized. They can make or break the platoon.

"Communication - superiors attuned to problems

faced by subordinates."

Unknown

Introduction

The men and women serving in today's Army are part of a proud profession long in history and rich in heritage and tradition. The military profession, one of the oldest known to history, has over the long sweep of time been profoundly affected by great changes in human and scientific affairs--changes which have had dramatic impact on the nature and substance of the military professional's role. These swift and broadbased advances, hallmarks of the human race, have compelled the military profession to constantly adapt to new realities--not only on the field of battle, but also in this profession's relationships to the society it serves.

It is true that the fundamental principles which have served to guide fighting men at the pivotal edge of battle have remained relatively constant. It is also true that these timeless principles of war are essential ingredients of victory in battle. However, these alone are insufficient for an Army charged with as awesome a responsibility as is ours--they cannot alone support the foundation of a modern US Army in service to the nation. These principles must be harnessed to a set of values and ideals--a professional ethic--consistent with our nations's heritage and linked to our national goals and objectives.

The Professional Army Ethic

As a profession--a calling which demands of its members specialized knowledge and skills, and intensive preparation--it is imperative that the military profession embrace a professional ethic. In this ethic should be set forth those values and principles of conduct which govern our behavior both as a group and as individuals. Furthermore, such a professional ethic must be understood and accepted in its totality by individuals at every level of military operations--from the soldier on point, to the field commander, to the general officer testifying before Congress. It is true, therefore, that while personal value systems or ethics may vary from individual to individual, professional integrity demands of each soldier an uncompromising commitment to those institutional values which form the bedrock of our profession--the Army Ethic.

Conceptually, the professional ethic of our Army is subordinate to, but supportive of, the American national purpose, and the national ethic which flows therefrom. This national purpose, formally codified in our Constitution, is an expression of the enduring values in which our nation is rooted. Due to the dynamic nature of the world in which we live, formal

expression of the national ideal sometimes lags behind the current ebb and flow of society's aspirations and values. At the same time, our professional ethic is not totally immune to these societal pressures. This is especially true since the Army ethic is in a very real sense also a composite of the myriad individual value systems and personal consciences of its members.

Nevertheless, the Army ethic must strive to set the institution of the Army and its purpose in proper context--that of service to the larger institution of the nation, and fully responsive to the needs of its people. Our ethic must convey the moral framework and the ultimate sense of purpose necessary to preserve and continually renew an Army which plays a significant role in the maintenance of our free and democratic society. It is from this Constitutional charge, and from the harsh realities of the battlefield--where our lives and the lives of those around us may be hazarded to shield the Republic--that the Army ethic holds resolutely to four fundamental and enduring values.

Loyalty to the Institution. The first fundamental value imbedded in the Army is loyalty to the institution. This value implies recognition that the Army exists solely to serve and defend the nation. It represents unswerving loyalty directed upward through the chain of command, and accepts as proper and fitting the subservience of the military to civilian control. It demands total adherence to the spirit and letter of the lawful order, to the fullest of one's comprehension of that order.

Loyalty to the institution is the value which permits application of the power derived from the Army's "grass roots"--units working in harmony toward individual and collective goals--and applies it to the larger goal of service to the nation. Obedience and disciplined performance, despite difficulty or danger, are its hallmarks.

Loyalty to the Unit. The second fundamental value is loyalty to the unit. This value implies a two-way obligation between those who lead and those who are led; an obligation to not waste lives, to be considerate of the welfare of one's comrades, to instill a sense of devotion and pride in unit-- to the cohesiveness and loyalty that meld individuals into effective fighting organizations.

Personal Responsibility. Essential to the proper expression of loyalty to institution and unit is a deep sense of personal responsibility, the third fundamental value of the Army ethic. Personal responsibilities equates to the individual obligation to accomplish all assigned tasks to the fullest of one's capability; to abide by all commitments, be they formal or informal; and to seize every opportunity for individual growth and improvement. This value also requires of each of us a willingness to accept full responsibility not only for our own actions, but also for the actions of those in our charge.

Selfless Service. The last, and perhaps most important, of the fundamental ethical values is that of selfless service. Selfless service to the nation in general, and to the Army in particular, requires each of us to

submerge emotions of self-interest and self-aggrandizement in favor of the larger goals of mission accomplishment, unit esprit, and sacrifice. In a profession where life itself is ultimately at stake, there is little tolerance for motives of self-interest or personal gain. Service in the professional Army requires teamwork in its most literal and ultimate sense--teamwork which unfailingly emphasizes the collective and greater good of the institution.

The Army ethic thus provides each of us with a superstructure of values designed to assist us in carrying out our duties and functions as Army professionals. Unquestionably, we will sometimes find ourselves in circumstances in which personal and institutional value systems conflict: it is in such instances that the Army ethic must provide guidance and assistance.

Professional Soldierly Qualities

The Army ethic attempts to formalize the soldiers' philosophy and provide the value base for military service in the professional sense. It helps clarify how we differ from the broader society which we serve, and how our Army differs from the armies of other societies. The Army ethic does not displace, but rather builds upon those soldierly qualities which have come to be recognized as absolutely essential to success on the battlefield. It is our collective task as Army professsionals to imbue these soldierly qualities into ourselves and our units. This must be the focus of our efforts; for us to be successful, we must clearly recognize and understand the four qualities essential to soldiers and their leaders as they strive to do the nation's will within the framework of the constitutional, legal, and political imperatives which provide the governance of their ultimate task--the direction of violence.

Commitment. Commitment is the first of these soldierly qualities. Military service for the American soldier represents a commitment to some purpose larger than himself. It is this commitment--the willingness to recognize and embrace it at the outset and the willingness to continue to uphold the idea as a military professional--that sets the soldier apart from his nonmilitary peers. While this commitment, in its broadest sense, represents an avowed willingness to lay down one's life in the service of one's country, the immediate focus of that commitment varies in degree and scope as soldiers advance in tenure, rank, and responsibility. For generals, especially those serving at the highest levels, this commitment translates into a day-to-day concern for the broadest national goals and military aims and strategies; soldiers of lower ranks, on the other hand, most often focus their immediate commitment on the unit which they belong--their platoon, company, troop, battalion, or squadron. However, it is the efficient functioning of these small units that usually wins in battle, thereby insuring attainment of the broad national goals. The effectiveness of the aggregate effort is a function of the strength of mutual commitment among and between soldiers. The Army seeks it from training at initial entry, and pursues it

determinedly thereafter. And so commitment in both contexts--to the idea of military service in general, and to the unit to which one belongs--is the first essential soldierly quality which must be embraced and nurtured.

Competence. Finely tuned proficiency is one of the oldest soldierly qualities required for success on the battlefield. However, the increasing complexity and sophistication of modern weapon, support, and organizational systems makes its attainment ever more difficult. Hence, tough and demanding training deserves--indeed requires--increasingly more of the Army's time. Each of us has a responsibility to strive for, and maintain a thorough knowledge of our job, in both an individual sense and as a team member in those all-important small groups and units upon which the success of the Army in battle depends so heavily. Competence also serves to instill in our individual soldiers and units a sense of confidence--that firm belief, trust, and reliance on one's own abilities and on the abilities of superiors and subordinates. The confidence which flows from competence is an essential ingredient of success. Without it, morale, esprit, and pride of unit suffer. With it comes the willingness to grasp the initiative--to be bold in thought and deed.

Candor. Soldiers have no time or use for untruths or double meanings. Especially under battle conditions, truthfulness and sincerity among soldiers have no substitutes. All communication must be at once accurate, straightforward, and honest--the stakes in battle are too high, and the time too short, for anything less to be acceptable. In the larger sense, the whole success of military operations and the accomplishment of national aims may turn on this kind of candor. In a more limited sense, candor evokes trust, which cements the bond of brotherhood between men under fire.

Courage. The American soldier symbolizes today, as always, the word "courage." This is so because courage is an essential ingredient of the soldier's overall makeup. In the military context, as in many others, courage is not simply the absence of fear. It is rather the willingness to recognize that in battle, as in other circumstances where danger threatens, fear or apprehension are everpresent realities. Courage is the further ability to persevere with physical and moral strength, and to prepare and condition oneself to act correctly in the presence of danger and fear. Courage, then, is what finally defines the work, "Soldier."

The Army's task is a complex one. It serves the nation, but in doing so, it must serve the soldier as well. It is a value-centered institution, which constantly strives to understand and practice the qualities it must bring to that ultimate test, the battlefield. The challenge facing the Army today is that somewhere, sometime, the success or failure of critical national policies will once again rest in the hands of a few good, well-led soldiers, who trained well in time of peace to fight well in time of war. The professional Army must stand ready to meet that challenge.

THE ESSENCE OF ARMY LEADERSHIP

Colonel Dandridge M. Malone, US Army

The very essence of leadership is its purpose. And the purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task. That is what leadership does--and what it does is more important than what it is or how it works. The purpose of leadership is to accomplish a task.

Individual Leadership

Political leaders, community leaders and scout leaders are all similar to some extent. All try to put people, things, time and effort together to accomplish a task. The big difference with Army leaders is the "Army" part, and that is a big difference.

Being an Army leader means that in the final analysis, that leader must be ready someday, somewhere, to lead soldiers to accomplish an ultimate task that no one else wants to do, under conditions that no one else wants to tolerate. Those intolerable conditions exist with an Army at war in combat--killing and dying. Small-unit leaders will usually lead this ultimate task, but any of us might someday get the call, no matter what rank, branch or military occupational specialty.

This ultimate task is what makes an Army leader so different from all those other leaders. It is also the essence of being a "soldier." And it is the essence of "service" as well, and the underpinnings of the whole idea of military "duty." All these things mean being ready to give up freedom, and even life, for the sake of our nation and its people in what has been called "the noblest act of mankind." At bedrock level, that is what Army leadership is all about. And that is why Army leadership is so important and so different.

To accomplish a task, that is the purpose. Army leaders have done or will do this a thousand times in response to orders direct, implied or trained into them. These orders will come down through the one thing that links all of our leadership together--the chain of command. This chain of command controls, coordinates and supports. It also challenges. Think about that time when the essence of leadership, soldier, service and duty will all come together, when the chain of command speaks of that ulimate task and when it says "Attack!"

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The artillery shifts, small arms crack, men tremble and the platoon tenses for the final assault up the hill. An Army leader gives the signal, and they go. Why is it that John T. McFerren, soldier US Army, obeys the leader's order? Leadership or followship? Neither. It is both.

John T. McFerren assaults up into his kill-or-die situation because:

- o His buddies are counting on him to do his job.
- o He thinks his buddies will call him a coward if he does not attack.
- o He has learned that his leader knows the right thing to do.
- o He wants to please his leader.
- o He believes he will be court-martialed if he does not attack.
- o He thinks he will be left alone if he does not attack.
- o He believes that following orders is the right thing to do.
- o He believes he will be rewarded for attacking.
- o He believes that attacking is less dangerous than not attacking.
- o He believes he will feel guilty if he does not attack.
- o He wants to prove his manhood, his worth as a soldier.
- o He hates the enemy.
- o He enjoys the excitement and thrill of combat.
- o Following orders has become an automatic habit.

McFerren assaults for any, or all, or some combination of the above reasons, or for some other reasons not listed. If the leader had the expertise and the time, he might somehow figure out the "why" for McFerren, but, next to him, there is Johnson, Allen and Brown. They go too, and each for some different pattern of reasons which neither the leader nor they will ever know--but they go.

They go because at the critical moment in time, when each will wrestle briefly with the decision of whether to attack or hide, attacking is their best choice. The Army leader, first out, first up and out front, shows them that this is so. And, so, they go. They follow him. He leads soldiers. That is his task.

The incident about the assault, McFerren and the leader up front also represents, in simple terms, the essence of Army leadership. All the bedrock elements are there, all the basic mechanics and the ultimate task. Listen to Army leaders talk leadership, and, sooner or later, this situation, or one just like it, will always come up. They will argue about the whys and the hows. They will tell war stories about what worked and what did not, and, every time, they will point out exceptions.

What all this means is that there is no set of absolute rules or procedures, learned from experience, that will tell us exactly how Army leadership works or what Army leaders should do step by step. Nor is there any psychological "model," learned from scientific research, that has all the answers or that can tell a leader how to turn a soldier on and off like some machine. Our Army knows more about leadership than any other institution, and what it knows it has learned from both the wisdom of experience and the findings of scientific research. Army leaders have no choice but to learn the same way.

Years ago, some wise Army leaders, at a time and place unknown, sat down, thought out and wrote up "the principles of leadership." These principles represent, better than anything else, the essence of what our Army has learned from experience. Just like the principles of war, they are basic tools for analysis and understanding and basic guidelines for what to do. These principles are present in McFerren's assault. They are in the leadership stories that Army leaders tell. They are found in the leadership schools and in the manuals. They are working wherever Army leadership is. They are basic tools and basic guidelines. They are simple, plain and straightforward. They are experience and wisdom. If you aspire to be a leader, you must know practice and live them. You must:

o Know yourself and seek self-improvement. You must be honest with yourself about your strengths and weaknesses as a leader. By knowing yourself, and your soldiers, you should be able to tell how your actions will affect the actions of your soldiers.

o Be technically and tactically proficient. As an Army leader, you must show your troops that you have the knowledge and capability to lead them. Your rank and your position do not ensure that your soldiers will follow or trust you in battle. When the chips are down, they follow the man who knows. You must learn in detail all the technical and tactical aspects of your job.

o Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your action. After you have found your strengths, overcome your weaknesses and become technically and tactically able to do your job, you must take the initiative to accomplish your unit's mission. You now must be ready to accept the responsibility for what the unit does or fails to do. Rank has its privilege, but responsibility comes first. You must also conduct yourself in the manner your rank requires.

o Make sound and timely decisions. As a leader, you must be able to make a rapid and true estimate of the situation and, from that, make sound decisions. A leader needs to be decisive. A soldier works well when his leader is quick to adjust to changing situations. A good decision, made now, is far better than the best decision made too late.

o Set the example. The standard for your unit is set by your example. "Follow me and do as I do" must be your guide to the way you act. This applies to all aspects of what you do as a leader, particularly in the face of hardship and danger. Your good example will produce good results in your unit.

o Know you soldiers and look out for their welfare. As a leader, you need to know and understand your soldiers. You must get to know your subordinates and be aware that they come from different backgrounds and that each is different. If your subordinates know you are concerned about them, they are more likely to become a unit that can be depended upon.

o Keep your soldiers informed. A well-informed soldier will have a better attitude toward his leader. As a result, he will be a better soldier, and you will have a better unit. Your soldiers need to know the situation to make a decision if you are gone. If your soldiers know the unit mission and their role in it, then they can set their own goals.

You will not always be able to give your soldiers the reason for every task because you may not know it or there may not be enough time to tell them. Let them know that, when possible, you will tell them the reasons why you are

doing what you are. They will trust you when there is not enough time to give all the facts because they know you will do so later. Soldiers usually fear the unknown. By keeping them informed, rumors and fears will be reduced.

o Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates. Give your subordinates enough authority to do their jobs. This creates trust and respect between you and your subordinates. This also encourages your subordinates to take the initiative when doing their jobs. By giving your subordinates authority, you are showing you trust them to do their jobs. Keep in mind that too much supervision is as bad as not enough supervision. Delegate.

o Ensure that the task is understood, supervised and accomplished. Give clear and concise orders so your soldiers will know what they are to do. Soldiers usually respond quickly to orders they understand. Do not give too many details; let your soldiers develop their own ways for using their skills to do their tasks. You must make it clear that you are available for help. You must also check to see your orders are being followed.

o Train your soldiers as a team. Each soldier must know what his job is within the unit and how important he is to the unit. Make your subordinates feel they are a part of a team effort. Work to keep the morale of the soldiers high to aid in getting better teamwork. The team spirit also helps your men to feel safe.

o Employ your unit in accordance with its capabilities. Good training gets a unit ready for its mission. You must know what your unit can and cannot do. Employ your unit within its capabilities. Your soldiers will lose their spirit if they are continually given tasks that are too easy or too hard. You must use sound judgement in assigning tasks to your unit. If the unit fails time after time, your subordinates will lose trust in themselves and in you as a leader.

So where and how does a leader use these time-honored principles? He uses them wherever and whenever he is leading, and he uses them to put together the two great factors that underlie all that we know about Army leadership: mission and men. Leaders are always working with these two basic factors.

Wherever and whenever possible, a leader tries to balance so that the needs of the mission and the needs of the men are both met. But there are times, sometimes in peace and oftentimes in war, when the needs of both cannot be met. When leaders cannot balance, they must choose one over the other. In these situations, and the leader must make them few, mission must come first. The ultimate task tells us so and so does the meaning of "soldier," "service" and "duty."

The mission side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the job--weapons, gunnery, maintenance, tactics--in excruciating detail. This is most of what "professionalism" means--technical competence. Without it, an Army leader can never lead for long. Just talk will not work.

The other side of the scale requires, simply stated, knowing the soldiers, not merely their hat size, birthday and where they are from, but what is inside of them--what makes them do things or not do things; what turns them on or off; what they can do and what they will do under stress; when they are afraid, tired, cold or lonely; how they feel as individuals and as teams; and where their will and spirit lies.

It is precisely here, here in this "balancing" business, where leaders most frequently fail. It is here where young leaders have their greatest difficulties and where even old leaders, despite their wisdom, sometimes lost sight of the ultimate purpose of leadership. The problem arises because of the relationship that exists between soldiers' "happiness and satisfaction" on the one hand and their "mission accomplishment and productivity" on the other.

Common sense would tell us that happy, satisfied soldiers will get the job done better. From this, a leader, especially if he is new, might well assume that if he can somehow keep his soldiers happy and satisfied, they they will be more productive--get the job done better. A thousand scientific studies of leadership and a thousand lessons of leadership experience show that this natural, common-sense assumption is precisely wrong!

In simple terms, task or mission accomplishment drives morale and esprit far more often than the other way around. When soldiers and units get done those things that soldiers and units are supposed to do, that is when morale and esprit get highest. That is why the individual soldier's morale and "motivation" are usually at their peak right after basic training. That is also why unit esprit and "motivation" are usually at their peak when the unit is training in the field. Mission accomplishment drives "job satisfaction" far more often than the other way around.

If an Army leader does not know both sides of this mission-men scale in detail, he will be forever getting it tilted the wrong way at the wrong time. Tasks will not get accomplished, and soldiers' time will be wasted.

Organizational Leadership

The preceding discussion has covered the cornerstones of individual leadership--primary purpose, ultimate task, basic principles and fundamental mechanics. All that has been said so far about the essence of leadership is sound, but it is incomplete. It is not all of the essence. There is one more thing--a whole additional aspect of leadership that leaders all too often overlook. To do well what our Army must do, Army leaders must understand this final essence.

Leadership must be more than the sum of its parts. It is analogous to an electrical connection. Take a battery, a piece of wire and a flashlight bulb. Lay them out on a table. What you have is three pieces, three individual things. That is all. Now, hook those three things all together. What you get is one thing composed of three pieces. Each piece does something different, but, if each piece functions as it is supposed to, and if you get them all hooked together right, you get something extra. You get a fourth thing that you did not have before, something extra--in this case, light.

This simple word picture explains the final essence of leadership. Most of what I have said so far about the foundations of leadership concerns the individual leader--personal, individual leadership. Individual leadership is absolutely essential, critical and of the utmost importance. But, by itself, the idea of individual leadership is not enough to explain what Army leadership is and what it can be.

Go back to the word picture, back to where we had the three individual things, three individual pieces. Army leadership will work just like that example. Each individual leader in an organization, of whatever size, does something different, but, if each individual leader functions as he is supposed to, and if the commander gets them all hooked together right, something extra is created that was not there when there were only individual pieces.

In the example, the extra was light. In our Army, the extra is highly effective, high-performing units--the kind of units that have drive and killing power on the battlefield; the kind that get the right things done right, without a lot of hassle, down in the motor pool; the kind that have esprit, high standards and a reputation for solid performance. That is the extra.

Getting that extra is not easy, but it is not magic, charisma or luck. It is doable. The formula lies foremost in the competence of individuals, then in how communications flow throughout the unit and, finally, in the teamwork and cohesiveness of individuals and teams. Training hard, together, on the job and in the field, in all the individual and team tasks related to the unit's mission, that is what puts these three critical factors together to produce the extra. That is the formula, plain and simple. There is no other way.

It is not the tooth fairy that comes in the night and brings that extra that every soldier would like. It is the leadership of the unit, not the individual leaders by themselves, but the whole leadership of the organization, each piece functioning properly, and all hooked together right, developing the individual and unit skills needed to fight and win.

Our Army has always understood this notion of "organizational leadership." At least one of the principles of leadership gets at it straight out. But only recently have we begun to study our experience and our research so as to be able to put this idea into words, into our training and into the essence of how we lead.

To understand the practical value of this idea of "organizational leadership," go all the way up the chain of command to the top of our Army's leadership, up to the chief of staff's level, up to where the task to be accomplished is "defend this nation." If you start coming back down the chain of command, breaking that big task into subtasks, those into sub-subtasks, and so on down the chain, you can work all the way down to the point where section leader in the motor pool says, "Get that generator fixed so we can get this tank running."

In between those two tasks to be accomplished--defend the nation and fix the generator--there are a hundred million others, up and down and sideways. All come from that first one, all are related and all get accomplished, for better or worse, by the leadership of our Army.

It is easy to see from this example that leaders at different levels have different tasks to get accomplished. Leaders who are generals, leaders who are colonels and leaders who are captains all need different leadership skills--leadership skills that best fit the level where they work and the kinds of tasks that are found there. They need a basic load of basic individual leadership that applies at any and all levels, but, then, they also need the particular leadership skills required to accomplish the tasks at their particular level.

What all this means is that if we can really understand this notion that leadership varies by level and if we can, from our research and experience, put into words just what the differences are, then our Army, our whole Army, is on the way to getting some of that "extra." This idea of "organizational leadership"--not just talked about, but studied and tried--gives us the key for how to get the individual pieces hooked up right and how to get that extra.

What all this also means is that if we can get this new piece of our leadership doctrine working, our chain of command will work better. We will see less and less cases of company officers trying to do sergeant's business, generals and colonels in helicopters trying to fight rifle companies in combat or captains and majors trying to pass judgment on how the chief of staff should defend our nation.

To make this happen, the lower, middle and upper levels of our Army's training system must each teach the additional and particular leadership skills required at each level. And that means that every leader, as he moves up through the levels of our Army, will always have something more, something new and something extra to learn about leadership.

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ON
LEADERSHIP

o An organization does well only those things the boss checks.

o There never has been a good army without a good noncommissioned officer corps.

o It is the job of the commander to get adequate instructions to the company commanders; it is not the company commander's job to go get them.

o When you have to interpret instructions from your commander, think of what he wants to accomplish most; then carry out your instructions in such a way to help him to accomplish this mission.

o When things go wrong in your command, start searching for the reason in increasingly larger concentric circles around your own desk.

o You must be able to underwrite the honest mistakes of your subordinates if your wish to develop their initiative and experience.

o When all the noncommissioned officers in an organization understand and enforce "what is done" and "what is not done," this unit becomes outstanding with a minimum of oral or written instructions.

o There are no poor companies in the Army--only poor company commanders.

o Leadership is primarily a company level activity. It can only flourish to full realization in an environment of good "commandership" on the part of battalion and higher commanders and their staffs.

o Do not expect to get squad, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, or corps commanders as replacements who are fully trained. If such people are available in the replacement system, they will probably be promoted before they arrive. Plan to coach them as needed in your standards and way of doing things.

o As a division and lower commander, assume the attitude of that of the "coach" of your winning team. Use the attitude of the "commander" very sparingly and only for unusual situations.

o An ordinary commander can make good decisions if he knows all the facts.

o You have to go after the facts; they won't come to your office.

o The successful commander in battle is at the critical place at the critical time.

o Ten pats on the back for each kick in the shins is a very good ratio for a commander.

o You may be able to get good statistics and act quicker by bypassing those in your chain of command, but if you do so, your organization will fail you in a critical situation.

o Rank is given you to enable you to better serve those above and below you. It is not given for you to practice your idiosyncrasies.

o If a division commander did not have problems to solve, his rank would be much lower than that of Major General.

o When a staff officer does not understand soldiers and does not understand the environment of the battlefield, he can be very dangerous to the troops.

o Trained commanders produce the best results under mission-type orders.

These need only three things:
—What is to be accomplished.
--The coordinating factors necessary.
--What help he can expect from you and others and how to get it.

o The techniques of "leadership" and "commandership" are far different. An officer should learn to use each early in his career.

o Every $25 paid to soldiers over the pay table, which is not really needed by them, contains the ingredients of a DR. Encourage your soldiers to save or use surplus funds wisely.

o Carry out your responsibilities through channels of "suggestion," keeping channels of "command" in reserve.

o The time to start reenlisting a good man is when he first joins your unit.

o Every commander should keep a jacket containing important information needed at once if he is succeeded by someone else.

o You owe it to your men to require standards which are for their benefit even though they may not be popular at the moment.

o Soldiers will go all out for an officer who does not waste their time through poor management when he has a tough job to do.

o Learn to be a good and competent inspector. Those things not inspected are neglected.

o Tactics and logistics require about equal attention of a commander in modern battle.

o I am mistrustful of a commander who points with pride to the number of casualties his unit has taken in battle. When the men brag about the few casualties their unit has taken in taking tough objectives, their commander is made.

o Letters from you to the parents of your soldiers pointing out their good accomplishments encourage others in their home town to enlist and increase the army's image.

Similarly, favorable letters from soldiers to those friends in their hometown are a great help to recruiters.

The army has relied on the draft for replacements for a long time. It is now faced with getting them itself.

A good unit attracts good men. There is no excuse for a soldier to write home and say that he is bored.

Gen. Bruce C. Clarke

THE
NONCOMMISSIONED AND
COMMISSIONED OFFICER

- The Lieutenant and his NCO's have assumed a leadership role - a role associated with honor and tradition. They can never again be "one of the troops." Learn this lesson well.

- The basis of any relationship with Enlisted men or women must be MUTUAL RESPECT.

- Since sergeants have many of the same duties, there seems to be an overlap in the duties and responsibilities of officers and sergeants. The truth is that while responsibilities may be shared, the tasks necessary to accomplish them should not be

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

The following are some duties and responsibilities of commissioned officers They ---

- Exercise command (in the strict sense defined in AR 27-10).
- Are accountable for mission accomplishment, unit mission readiness, and unit performance.
- Establish and interpret policy, set standards, establish unit procedures and guidelines.
- Manage and allocate unit personnel and resources.
- Plan, provide resources, conduct and evaluate collective training.
- Delegate authority.
- Make proper use of the chain of command, providing accurate and timely two-way communication.
- Develop and train subordinate officers and NCOs. Establish and maintain professional standards of the officer corps; administer the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
- Support the noncommissioned officer.

THE OFFICER/NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER RELATIONSHIP
(FM 22-600-20)

OFFICER	NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER
The officer commands, establishes policy, plans and programs the work of the Army.	The NCO conducts the daily business of the Army within established orders, directives, and policies.
The officer concentrates on collective training which will enable the unit to accomplish its mission.	The NCO concentrates on individual training which develops the capability to accomplish the mission.
The officer is primarily involved with unit operations, training, and related activities.	The NCO is primarily involved with training individual soldiers and teams.
The officer concentrates on unit effectiveness and unit readiness.	The NCO concentrates on each subordinate NCO and soldier and on the small teams of the unit--to insure that each is well trained, highly motivated, ready, and functioning.
The officer pays particular attention to the standards of performance, training, and professional development of officers as well as NCOs.	The NCO concentrates on standards of performance, training, and professional development of NCOs and enlisted personnel.
The officer creates conditions--makes the time and other resources available --so the NCO can do his job.	The NCO gets the job done.

"High performing commanders know that they get power

- by giving it away."

COMMAND AND OTHER CHANNELS

EXTRACT FROM AR 600-20, CHAPTER 2

2-1. **Chain of command.**

a. The chain of command is the most basic and important organizational technique used by the Army. It is the succession of commanders, superior to subordinate, through which command is exercised. This chain is also known as the command channel. It extends from the President, as Commander-in-Chief, down through the various grades of rank to the enlisted persons leading the smallest Army elements and their men. Staff officers and administrative noncommissioned officers are not in the chain of command.

b. A simple and direct command channel helps send orders from the highest to the lowest levels in a minimum of time and with the least chance of misinterpretation. As used in this regulation, no distinction is made between the terms of commander and leader since the basic policies of command and leadership apply at all echelons of the chain of command. The command channel extends upward in the same manner for matters requiring official communication from subordinate to superior.

c. It is Army policy that each person in the chain of command is delegated enough authority to accomplish assigned duties. Every commander has two basic responsibilities. To this end, commanders will (in order of priority) accomplish the mission and care for personnel and property. Normally, accomplishing the mission efficiently will help satisfy the responsibility for personnel welfare.

d. A superior in the chain of command holds subordinate commanders responsible for everything their command does or fails to do. Thus, in relation to a superior a commander cannot delegate responsibilities. However, in relation to subordinates, a commander does subdivide responsibility and authority and assigns portions of both to various commanders and staff members. In this way, a proper degree of responsibility becomes inherent in each command echelon. The need for a commander or staff officer to observe proper channels in issuing instructions or orders to subordinates must be recognized.

e. Constant and continuous use of the chain of command is vital to the readiness of any Army unit. Every effort must be made to acquaint all personnel with its existence and proper functions.

2-2. **Staff or technical and noncommissioned officer support channels.** Another important Army organization technique for communication is the staff or technical channel. The term "staff" or "technical" channel is used to describe the vertical or horizontal channel between a staff section at one headquarters and a similar staff section at another echelon (or at a parallel headquarters). The staff or technical

channel is sometimes used for routing reports and instructions which do not involve variations from command policies and directives. The noncommissioned officer support channel begins with the commander of a major unit, post, or State headquarters. It then extends from the commander's command sergeant major through subordinate unit command sergeants major to unit first sergeants and then to other noncommissioned officers. The support channel supplements the chain of command and is responsible for accomplishing the important tasks below.

a. Administering the noncommissioned officer development program.

b. Setting up and maintaining the professional standards of the noncommissioned officers and their job performance.

c. Supervision of unit operations within established policy guidelines.

d. Care of individual soldiers and their families.

e. Training of the enlisted components of the unit in their individual MOS related skills as well as in basic skills and attributes of a soldier.

f. Proper wear of the uniform.

g. Appearance and military courtesy of enlisted personnel.

h. Care of individual arms and equipment of enlisted personnel.

i. Care of living quarters of enlisted personnel.

j. Area maintenance tasks.

k. Operation of recreational and other facilities for the primary use of enlisted personnel. Each commander required noncommissioned officers to perform these duties and defines their responsibilities and authority to his staff and subordinates.

"Decide what and how you want your unit to be--

your vision is a long term goal

that must be <u>shared</u> as much as possible."

Unknown

Everyone
Is A Potential Winner

Some People
Are Disguised
As Losers,

Don't Let
Their Appearances
Fool You.

CHAPTER 2

THE ARMOR LEADER IN COMBAT



Wars may be fought by weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and the man who leads that gains victory.

General George S. Patton, Jr.

LEADERSHIP IN COMBAT: AN HISTORICAL APPRAISAL

Conducted by History Dept., USMA, under the direction of LTC K. E. Hamburger

SUMMARY

The OPMS Study Group asked the History Department at USMA to study successful combat leadership to identify the trends and characteristics that should be institutionalized in the development of officers. There were only two restrictions: that the actions studied be in actual combat and that it must clearly involve leadership not management. The characteristics found were indispensible to combat leadership, but not necessarily vital or sufficient to accomplish other essential military tasks.

The USMA study unit, organized under LTC Kenneth E. Hamburger, examined over 200 American and foreign examples in all periods. Both successful and unsuccessful examples were intensively analyzed and discussed to sift out desirable, undesirable, and neutral characteristics. In addition, pre-service experience, upbringing, education, service record, physical condition, personal temperament and morality, and life following the incident were studied.

There was surprising consistency among successful combat leaders regardless of historical period, country, or condition of combat. Early in their lives, the traits that made them successful were discernible in some form and were enhanced, but could not be induced, through experience. *In no case did a unit in combat overcome* the deficiencies of its leader; in almost all cases the leader overcame startling unit deficiencies and incredible problems in mission definition, enemy forces, physical and moral strength, troop training, and equipment obstacles, weather and terrain conditions, bad luck, poor timing, misinformation, unreliable superiors and subordinates, and his own anxiety.

CHARACTERISTICS OF SUCCESSFUL COMBAT LEADERS

There were five personal characteristics that were present in every case and disaster ensured in their absence. They were terrain sense, single-minded tenacity, ferocious audacity, physical confidence, and practical, practiced judgment.

Terrain sense: the ability to quickly, almost intuitively, tactically judge terrain. This was the most essential characteristic and improved the most through experience. Often successful combat leaders made a fetish of personal reconnaissance, including repeated infiltration to view their own position from an enemy perspective. This understanding was a combination of technical appreciation and terrain analysis: it was one thing to see a landscape and know the

range of the weapons, it was another to visualize the battle and how those weapons would be used.

Single-minded tenacity: Typical of all successful leaders was an imaginative, driving intensity to complete the mission with all the assets that were available or could be created, rather than an inflexible adherence to a plan or even an objective. Although there were numerous examples of a refusal to surrender, more often surrender was an option that simply did not occur to the commander. This was almost always tied to an unusually strong sense of moral courage and scrupulously ethical conduct in all things regarding combat or warfare.

Audacity: The willingness to take reasoned but enormous risks was always present. Frequently, successful commanders would say it was the only thing they could do. In retrospect, their actions were inspired desperation. This was closely linked to a self-image, a feeling of certitude about themselves and their mission. Self-doubt was a rare thing and was usually a kind of anxiousness, almost never regarding previous decisions, and never revealed to even the closest subordinates.

Physical confidence and health: Vigorous, demanding physical acitivity was either a part of regular duties or a pastime. Athletic ability was not as important as was the sense of physical well-being and the self confidence engendered by regular physical activity regardless of age. Physical confidence also enhanced the self-image and the projected image of a successful combat leader.

Practiced, Practical Judgment: The most uncommon of virtues, common sense, was always present in the successful combat leader. This was marked by an ability to determine the vital from the unimportant, the immediate from the casual, and truth from deception, whether deliberate or accidental. It was improved by experience, but as with all other critical characteristics, was discernible at an early age.

Two characteristics commonly considered to be a part of the American leader's character (strong religious conviction and emotional attachment for the soldiers) were not vital to successful combat leadership, though often present.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM:

In general, the USMA study verifies a "conventional wisdom". That is, most of the findings appear to agree with the present doctrinal concepts in leadership and personnel management, with minor exceptions. Once again it should be stressed that these conclusions apply only to combat leadership and that they were drawn without regard to other military tasks.

Among the more important implications as determined by USMA:

- o Some individuals appear to be "born leaders", while other individuals can be developed, but a solid foundation of "character" is essential in any successful leader.

- o A variety of assignments in areas unrelated to troop leadership had little effect on the abilities of a combat leader. Successful performance on high level staffs and in "high visibility" assignments were not effective gauges of successful leaders.

- o Native good judgment, or "common sense", is an absolute requirement for successful combat leadership. The ability to perform well in formal schooling, while not a negative characteristic, is a less important factor for a combat leader. In particular, the leader must have a well-developed and practiced ability in making decisions under pressure.

- o Successful combat leadership at one level of command is not a solid guarantee of success at higher levels. If however, failure at a lower level is attributable to the individual's failings as a leader, it may be an indicator of likely failure at a higher level.

- o Physical fitness and good health are prerequisites for successful command at every level.

- o Solid grounding in leadership early in service is required for later success.

- o Technical competence is important for any combat leaders; however technical skills themselves are not as important for a combat leader as is an appreciation of the capabilities of all the technological devices at his command.

- o Short assignments in succession were negative factors.

- o Officers who had avoided service with troops were generally not successful as combat leaders.

- o The most salient predicator of successful combat leadership was successful leadership in peacetime, particularly of a tactical unit. Longer service before combat with the unit he would lead in combat appeared to improve his performance, probably by increasing unit cohesion and improving mutual trust between the leader and the unit.

CPT Zacheri
OPMS Study Group
#35002/57160

Study Goals

The ultimate functional role of any armed force is to engage in combat. For this reason, successful leadership in combat should be the aim of the system used to manage officers' careers in any army, and the production of combat leaders must be one of the most important goals of that system. Nonetheless, there is no unanimity of opinion as to what characterizes good combat leadership (other than the obvious criterion of success), and there is no accepted and verified method of producing leaders who will be successful in combat. The purpose of this study is to gain insights into what has historically characterized successful combat actions and combat leaders, and to try to determine what factors in the individuals' backgrounds caused them to develop into successful combat leaders.

In the course of study, the committee searched for and analyzed examples of successful and unsuccessful combat actions, seeking answers to two specific questions:

- What have been the characteristics of leadership in successful combat action and how have they differed from those traits observed in unsuccessful actions?
- What personal, experiential and institutional factors appear to have contributed to developing individuals into successful or unsuccessful leaders in combat?

Study Population

Over two hundred examples of combat leadership were initially gathered and screened. These included incidents in warfare throughout the recorded history, from all areas of the world. Examples were gathered from all wars the United States has engaged in from the American Revolution through Vietnam. Initial screening involved several criteria: estimated worth of the event to the overall study; availability of detailed and reliable information on the events; availability of similar background information on the leader; and, in the case of foreign examples, an additional criterion of the estimated applicability of the incident to the leadership of American soldiers.

The final population which was more intensively researched consisted primarily of officers of the United States, in the twentieth century. Except for a few examples from Great Britain, Israel, and Germany, foreign examples were rejected either because there was not enough information readily available on the background of the leader, or because the committee felt that the cultural milieu of the example was so different from that of the U.S. Army today that "lessons" derived from the incident would not have applicability for OPMS.

The Nature of Successful and Unsuccessful Combat Leadership

Although no two combat actions are identical, salient characteristics of successful combat leadership tend to be generally identifiable, and in virtually every example of leadership studied, the successful leaders possessed certain common qualities to one degree or another.

Successful leaders were firmly in control of their units and were recognized as such by all concerned. They were almost always physically fit, in the sense of being conditioned for strenuous exertion. This fitness enhanced their image of being "the man in charge." The successful leader somehow had the ability always to be at the decisive point on the ground at the time he was most needed to influence the action. This was probably a function of his knowledge of terrain, as an appreciation for the ground on which he engaged in combat was a strong point in almost every success story, and a failure to appreciate terrain was the ingredient which led to disaster on more than one occasion. The successful leader made a fetish of properly conducted personal reconnaissances, to the extent of more than once moving into enemy-held territory to view his own lines as the enemy would see them.

The successful leader had a particular facility for planning in detail, assesssing a changing situation, and continually assimilating large quantities of often conflicting data. Facility in this regard appears to be a function of intelligence, experience, and moral courage.

Successful leaders required aggressiveness, audacity, and vigorous execution from their subordinates, and both they and their soldiers refused to accept defeat. They were ingenious in overcoming obstacles, and in desperate situations, they often took irrational, even foolhardy action to forestall failure. They and their units continued with their mission in spite of casualties, wounds, lost equipment, and shortage of supplies.

The units commanded by successful leaders keyed on the leader and took on the leader's confidence and spirit. This point deserves emphasis, for it is one of the most commonly commented-on features of the study. It is not exaggeration to say that the leader was the most decisive factor in buidling unit cohesion. Although this process of building unit cohesion took various lengths of time, depending on variables such as individual experience, whether combat was imminent, and how long the members of the unit had been together before the new leader arrived, the leader was the key to the process. Some units in wartime or undergoing intensive and extended field training achieved such a state in a few months, while some peacetime units who did not train rigorously never achieved it. If the unit were engaged before it had developed the cohesion necessary to funciton efficiently, even

the best and most positive leadership could not overcome the lack of cohesion. In more than one instance, a leader who had previously been successful first met failure when he was ordered to lead a unit without cohesion in combat. Conversely, a unit which had attained the cohesion brought by good leadership over a period of time could survive and succeed for a limited time without their leader. A successful leader was able to establish full efficiency in a unit which was already cohesive in a remarkably short period of time.

The characteristics of unsuccessful leaders were, in many respects, the opposite of those of their more successful counterparts. An indecisive leader, particularly one who was "prisoner of his fears" infected his unit and his soldiers were often mentally defeated before being engaged by the enemy. Here, any deficiencies in the will and fortitude of the leader were vividly evident and assumed particular importance; his unit quickly adopted the mental attitude of its leader as well as his confidence or lack thereof.

An unsuccessful leader was often one who waited for orders and did nothing until higher headquarters ordered him to; inaction was the partner of his indecisiveness. Ironically, the leader's indecisiveness had the same effect as if he had made an important and fateful decision: indecisiveness was, in effect, a decision to do nothing. Instead of constantly preparing for the unexpected, he allowed events to take him by surprise. He showed a marked inability to react to changing circumstances, in dramatic contrast to his successful counterpart. Sometimes this shortcoming appeared to be from a lack of intelligence or training, but occasionally the commander appeared to magnify every threat until he was finally paralyzed by the fear produced by an overactive imagination.

It appears that the Army maxim that "the commander is responsible for everything his unit does or fails to do" has usually been quite literally correct in historical terms: the unit has depended on the commander for its spirit, its drive, and its direction. When the commander was decisive, vigorous, and in control, the unit usually succeeded; when he was unsure, inactive, and inept, the unit often faltered.

Character Traits of Successful and Unsuccessful Combat Leaders

Character traits of combat leaders have varied widely, as might be expected, and there was probably no single individual who ever possessed all the "positive" or "negative" traits discussed below. Nonetheless, there has often been a remarkable similarity in characteristics shared by leaders who have been successful in combat. Similarily, unsuccessful combat leaders also shared their own group of character traits.

The "sine qua non" ("without which not," indispensable) of almost every successful commander was unquestioned integrity concerning his duties, coupled with a solid ethical foundation on matters dealing with combat or warfare. His self-image was unfailingly positive and he refused to take counsel of his fears. The good self-image may or may not have translated into an inflated ego; successful leaders can be found with egos of every size. The positive self-image was probably a product of, or at least enhanced by, the individual's physical fitness and good health. Additionally, physical fitness enabled them to overcome fatigue and minor infections which often seemed to plague the unsuccessful commander. There have been successful commanders who were out of shape and there have been ones who were gravely ill, but they have never been the norm.

Successful leaders invariably commanded the unqualified respect of their subordinates and peers. Paradoxically, they did not always command quality respect from their superiors. More than once, an ultimately successful commander was overlooked within an organization because he did not have the reputation with his superiors that he enjoyed with his peers and subordinates.

"Leading by example" almost invariably characterized the "leadership style" of the successful combat commander. He was usually cool under fire, often to a fault—many good commanders have been killed in the line of duty, as dozens of Medal of Honor citations attest. The successful commander seldom showed any indication of inner fears or doubts; often his own memoirs or autobiography make it clear in retrospect that he had second thoughts or worries, but during the action he suppressed them, often consciously. This imperturbability had a substantial steadying effect on the units led by successful commanders, for many of the accounts of the participants in combat actions mention how the soldiers of the unit watched the "old man" for indications that everything was going according to plan—if he showed signs of breaking, the unit often disintegrated quickly. More than once commanders commented on their awareness of this responsibility to maintain a facade of calm through inner doubts and the force of will required to accomplish it.

As mentioned previously, a successful commander usually refused to admit defeat, and his men followed his lead. Instead of conceding victory to his opponent, he marshalled every skill and resource, often in desparate and unprecedented action to accomplish the unit's mission. Sometimes such action was taken because "there was nothing else I could do," out of desperation. The fact remains that surrender was almost never an option for these commanders; if such a course was taken, it was only in an attempt to save their men after all hope was lost—more often, it was never considered. The tenacious doggedness with which many successful leaders pursued their goals is remarkable; their singlemindedness of purpose is overwhelming.

By contrast, the commander who was unsuccessful in combat appears to have been less intense than his successful counterpart. In a West Point annual, one cadet was described as "indifferent, easy going, happy-go-lucky"; he later lost half of his regiment and surrendered the rest without seriously engaging the enemy. Such a leader may have been out of condition or ill (as this example may have been) or he may have been merely moody and indecisive. He may have lacked the intelligence or "common sense" of his more capable counterpart. Whatever the cause, these unsuccessful leaders imprinted themselves on their units with disastrous results. No case was found where a unit overcame a leader with these characteristics and prevailed; this is not to say that such a case does not exist, but it is not the norm.

Some character traits were found about equally in successful and unsuccessful combat leaders, leading to the conclusion that they are neutral and do not, of themselves, influence success or failure. These are religious feeling and belief, emotional attachment to his soldiers, and a sense of humor. Although at least the first two of these characteristics are usually thought of as "traditional values" of the American officer corps, the degree to which the range of possible temperaments in these areas prevents the conclusion that there is an inherent advantage in any single temperament which guarantees success or failure in combat leadership.

Two special categories of commanders should be mentioned: the first is the "one man show." The leader who runs everything himself, directing all facets of his unit's activities, is not particularly uncommon in history. Often, such a leader could be spectacularly successful over a long period of time; certainly he could imprint his own strong personality on his unit as effectively as any other leader. The most serious drawback to this leadership style, from an institutional standpoint, is that it can create a unit which is paradoxically very capable and at the same time very fragile. That is to say, a unit whose leader insisted on doing everything himself was often a unit which could do little without him physically present and in top form. If he were absent for whatever reason, if he were operating at reduced capability because of illness or fatigue, or if he became a casualty, the unit faltered; in the most spectacular cases it virtually disintegrated.

The second special category of leaders is the "driven man", that is, a leader who was performing for reasons of a different nature than his counterparts. Although both successful and unsuccessful leaders were motivated by a variety of drives, occasionally a leader was found who seemed motivated almost entirely out of a desire for glory, a craving for success, or overwhelming ambition to the exclusion of all other motivations (such as service, duty, or partriotism). While, like the "one man show," he could enjoy spectacular success on occasion, if his goals were not met or if he were tested beyond his moral strength derived from his limited value system, he was likely to fall.

Experiencial Background of Successful and Unsuccessful Combat Leaders

Because the experiences of individuals in military service have varied so widely through time and within any given period, the differences in the experiences of successful and unsuccessful leaders are less striking than the differences in their character and their institutional development. Nonetheless, there were enough differences to draw tentative conclusions regarding those experiences which were desirable, one which was undesirable, and several which were neutral in developing successful combat leaders.

The successful combat leader had, by the time he was tested in action, built a solid background of professional judgment in every area of his responsibility. This was true whether he first entered combat as a lieutenant or as a general: he had assimilated the necessary tactical skills and had developed an appreciation for the technology of war in his era for him to function at full potential in his position.

Throughout his career, the successful leader had maintained his physical condition, had preserved his health, and had participated regularly in some sort of physical activity. The nature of the physical activity was not important; during many of the periods examined, merely performing the duties of an active officer was adequate to maintain his condition, as they are in some units today. In most cases, however, the leader resorted to recreational activities to maintain his conditioning - team sports, individual fitness routines, or strenuous field duty.

Finally, a pattern of being able to adapt to changing circumstances had developed in the successful leader by the time he was tested in combat. This was probably a function of varied assignments throughout his career, but not all officers possessed this ability; unsuccessful leaders were less adaptable. A leader's adaptability was likely to receive its greatest test in decision making under the pressures of combat. When his unit was being engaged, casualties were mounting, and the "fog of war" made everything unsure, the unadaptable leader more than once went into funk and the command function fell by default to a subordinate. If there was no subordinate equal to the task, disaster ensued.

The only significant shortcoming found in those leaders who were unsuccessful in combat which could be, at least in part traced to their experiences, was that they had poor tactical competence. They did not seem, as a group, as able to deal with the complex details of tactics as well as their successful counterparts—terrain analysis and organization for combat seemed to be a particular shortfall.

Several experiences were found to be present about equally in the background of both successful and unsuccessful leaders, and they are

therefore considered to be neutral. Pre-service social class, area of the country in which reared, ethnic group, formal education, and athletic ability (as opposed to participation) were not discriminators between the groups.

Surprisingly, prior combat experience was not an important factor in whether or not a leader was successful. Although a leader who had prior combat experience was likely to do well in later combat, all did not. There were enough instances in which a combat-experienced leader later failed that it was not considered a significant discriminator.

Likewise, the relative age of successful and unsuccessful combat leaders was not a discriminator, with one important caveat. Probably because younger leaders are more likely to be engaged in combat than older ones, the prime age for combat leaders appeared to be under thirty-five, while the minimum age is probably the late teens. Successful combat leaders were more likely to be found within this range of ages. Successful combat leaders were found past age sixty, but unsuccessful leaders tended to be older rather than younger. Young leaders (under thirty-five) were found who were successful at all combat leadership positions through division command level.

Institutional Development of Successful and Unsuccessful Combat Leaders

To assess the effect of the system which managed the careers of combat leaders in history, the study committee tried to determine what the analogue to the current OPMS was in the given historical period in which they performed, and then to see how that system groomed the developing leader for his responsibilities in combat. Often such a system was only rudimentary, amounting to little more than word of mouth - the "old boy network." Nonetheless, the committee attempted to determine what sort of formal and informal military education the leader had received, what assignments and duties he had had, at what levels he had commanded and in what geographic area, whether he had spent unusually short or long periods in any particular grade, and whether he had any mentor of high rank looking out for his welfare.

Successful combat leaders tended to seek duty with troops while some of their less successful counterparts tended to avoid such duty. Obviously, such avoidance could not always be determined, as a leader in the past would probably not advertise an avoidance of "troop duty" any more than an otherwise successful officer would today; however, it occurred often enough to be worthy of note.

Successful combat leaders often had been assigned as instructors in service schools or academies, particularly in such areas as tactics, leadership, or technical branch skills. Whether before or after the leader had initially experienced combat, the instructor duty appeared to improve his capabilities.

A succession of different short assignments of less than one year in a given job was a recurring event in the files of unsuccessful combat leaders. Whether this occurred because of the individual's inefficiency or as a result of "needs of the service" could not be determined.

Several factors traditionally used in personnel management roles and as indicators of quality in officers were found about equally in the records of successful and unsuccessful officers. These include class standing at service academies and branch schools, a variety of assignments differing in character, performance in high-level staff assignments and such "high-visibility" assignments as aide-de-camp, and below-the-zone promotions. An unmeasurable variable, of course, is that both successful and unsuccessful leaders may have been given the position of leadership in which they succeeded or failed as a result of service in one of these important positions.

Variations in Time and Cultures

Although only a few foreign officers (from Great Britain, Israel, and Germany) were studied in depth (no unsuccessful foreign combat leaders were studied), some tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning differences in successful leaders in each of those countries compared to successful American combat leaders.

Each of the successful foreign combat leaders tended to have more time in tactical units than his "typical" American counterpart. British and Israeli leaders tended to have spent more time in a single unit than almost any American studied. All three countries had a "lead from the front" style of leadership which was often, but not always a feature of successful American combat leadership. All three countries had extremely cohesive tactical units, to a degree seldom found in American units studied, with the exception of units which had been engaged in combat for some time.

At the inception of the study, the committee expected to find successful combat leadership styles evolving from generation to generation. This expectation proved false: American combat leaders have led soldiers in a remarkably consistent way throughout the two centuries of the study. Although there are a variety of different leadership styles exhibited among the Americans examined, they follow a common central thread that has changed little in the history of the U.S. Army. Put another way, a successful combat leader could be found in Vietnam who used a leadership style shared by his forebears in the American Civil War or World War I.

Implications for OPMS

In general, the current study verifies "conventional wisdom." That is, most of the findings appear to agree with present doctrinal concepts in leadership and personnel management, with minor exceptions. Once again, it should be stressed that these conclusions apply only to combat leadership and that they were drawn without regard to other military tasks.

Important conclusions include the following:

- Some individuals appear to be "born leaders", while other individuals can be developed into leaders, but a solid foundation of "character" is essential in any successful leader. That is, there appears to be an aggregate of qualities in an individual's makeup, particularly those concerning his integrity and ethical foundation which are absolutely essential in the potential leader, and which cannot be added through schooling or experience.

- The qualities of an individual's personality which set him apart from other men and make him a leader whom soldiers will follow are probably present, to one degree or another, at every point in a successful combat leader's career, with only an evolutionary change over time. Those essential qualities of personality which make a General Officer a successful leader in combat are discernible, if less developed, early in his career.

- A variety of assignments in areas unrelated to troop leaders had little effect on the abilities of a combat leader. Successful performance on high level staffs and in "high visibility" assignments were not effective gauges of successful leaders. Officers can be extremely successful at a variety of demanding assignments unrelated to leading soldiers in combat and be abject failures as combat leaders.

- Native good judgment, or "common sense", is an absolute requirement for successful combat leadership. The ability to perform well in formal schooling, while not a negative characteristic, is a less important factor for a combat leader. In particular, the leaders must have a well-developed and practiced ability in making decisions under pressure.

- Successful combat leadership at one level of command is not a solid guarantee of success at higher levels. If, however, failure at a lower level is attributable to the individual's failings as a leader, it may be an indicator of likely failure at higher levels.

- o Physical fitness and good health are prerequisites for successful command at every level.

- o Solid grounding in leadership early in service is required for later success.

- o Technical competence is important for any combat leader; however, technical skills per se are not important for a combat leader as is an appreciation of the capabilities of all the technological devices at his command.

- o Short assignments in succession were negative factors.

- o Officers who had avoided service with troops were generally not successful as combat leaders.

- o The most salient predictor of a successful combat leader was successful leadership in peacetime, particularly of a tactical unit. Longer service before combat with the unit he would lead in combat appeared to improve his performance, probably by increasing unit cohesion and improving mutual trust between the leader and the unit.

"Be just and fear not. Let all the ends thou aim'st at be thy country's, thy gods', and truth's."

Shakespeare
"King Henry the VIII"
(1612)

MISSION-TYPE ORDERS

General Bruce C. Clarke, United States Army

In World War II, those who served in armored divisions—and probably in other units as well—learned that mission-type orders were a requirement if the most was to be obtained from a command. Since then, we have had to consider the control of operations in the fluidity and unpredictability of nuclear battle. As battle becomes more complex and unpredictable, responsibilities must be more and more decentralized. Thus mission-type orders often will be used at all echelons of command and probably will be the rule at the division and higher levels. This will require all commanders to exercise initiative, resourcefulness, and imagination—operating with relative freedom of action.

In our tactical forces we have built-in organizational flexibility. We must recognize this and capitalize on it in our orders. To get maximum combat power, we must have plans flexible enough to meet rapidly changing situations, but careful planning is not enough. This must be coupled with the readiness to change and adapt to situations as they are, not as they were expected to be.

To train commanders and staff officers for operations in war, where mission-type orders will be widely used, it is necessary that tactical courses in our schools teach the use of such orders, and that we widely employ mission-type orders in our peacetime operations.

Basically, a mission-type order needs to cover only three important things:

o It should clearly state what the commander issuing the order wants to have accomplished.

o It should point out the limiting or control factors that must be observed for coordinating purposes.

o It should delineate the resources made available to the subordinate commander and the support which he can expect or count on from sources outside of his command.

There is a strong reluctance at every headquarters to relinquish the authority to direct the details of an operation. This reluctance is clearly seen in the embellishments added to an order as it threads its way down to company level. Careful judgment must be used at every echelon of command in stating the limiting and control factors in a mission-type order. Confidence must be placed in the judgment and ability of the subordinate commander. Too often, what starts out as a broad mission-type order at a high echelon ends up with voluminous,

minute, detailed, and restricting instructions specifying "how to get the job done" when it finally gets down to company level.

Many officers hearing this may think they would like to have a command functioning under such a system. Others who may say they would like to work under such a system really are disturbed by the thoughts of it. There are some officers who require something "in writing" before they will take significant action.

A mission-type order requires the subordinate commander and his staff to make basic decisions and plans based upon a careful analysis of the situation. If the basic decisions or plans are not successful, there is no paper foxhole into which they can crawl. Mission-type orders require initiative, promptness, and resourcefulness which are not always forthcoming. Problems in service schools, based upon such orders, bring forth a variety of solutions which are difficult for the faculty to grade. This sometimes looms as a very important problem.

I have said many times that a commander has two channels within which to operate. He has the "channel of command" and the "channel of suggestion." I believe that a good commander who has subordinates who are trained and have the confidence to use mission-type orders can operate almost exclusively using the "channel of suggestion," reserving the "channel of command" for use only when he wants to give special emphasis to an order, to relieve someone, to take disciplinary action, or like cases.

I went to *Leavenworth over 20 years ago*, so it is difficult for me to remember all the things which I must have learned then at the Command and General Staff School. The one thing that I have never forgotten and which has stood me in good stead was the teaching of General McNair, then Commandant, when he stated:

When you receive an order or a directive from your next higher commander do everything you can and in the best way you can to further the mission which he wants to accomplish.

An officer who follows this advice will find that he can act promptly and aggressively with confidence. He will have no problem in operating in an environment of mission-type orders.

"BATTLE DOCTRINE FOR FRONT LINE LEADERS"

Originally published and distributed as an official training guide during World War II, this article contains in pure form the formula for positive combat leadership. The essence of its fundamentals applies both on and off the field of battle to all leaders, at all times, regardless of rank, specialty, or duty assignment. I commend these truths to your careful study. Failure to follow them can cost your professional credibility in peacetime, and in war, the lives of those dependent upon your leadership.

INTRODUCTION

The senior commander of a force plans the battle in its broader sense and is responsible for ultimate success. Committed to action, he must, for the time being, limit his activities to providing the necessary support and insuring the coordination of all components. Regardless of how well conceived the Senior commander's plan may be, it can be nullified if his front line platoons are incapable of carrying out the mission assigned.

The conduct of the front line rests with the company commanders, and their platoon and squad leaders. The front line leader must plan and execute his own battle. He must know his enemy, his own men, and must aggressively employ all of his weapons in coordinated fire and movement. He must personally lead his unit to success. The paramount importance of front line leadership cannot be overestimated.

1. The prime factor in a successful fighting unit is esprit de corps. This needs no explanation. It simply means that no soldier ever lets another soldier down.

2. Of almost equal importance to a fighting unit is discipline. This applies to all activities at all times. It must never be relaxed, particularly during times of hardship, discomfort, or danger. It spells the difference between a "mob" and a "unit". Discipline is obtained mainly through diligence of the leader in insisting that things be done "right," and aided by the judicious daily application of rewards and punishments. Justice, consistency, firmness, and respect are the roots of discipline. Men like to serve in a well-disciplined unit. Mob methods disgust them.

3. Be neat in your person; habitually wear your insignia of rank on all uniforms and have all your subordinates do the same. Insignia may be dulled or blended just before entering close combat—but not before.

4. Exercise and display absolute loyalty toward a superior, particularly when he is absent. This is not only morally correct, it is the only sure footing in any military organization. It also enhances your personal prestige among your subordinates.

5. Refrain from "blowing up" under stress or when irritated.

6. Always show enthusiasm - it is infectious.

7. Never allow yourself to be unduly rushed or stampeded. There is usually ample time for considered judgment, even during battle. Dignity and poise are invaluable assets to a leader.

8. In the field, practice the habit of making daily inspections (using the "sample" method) and insist on: (1) clean weapons, (2) presence of arms, ammunition, mess gear, helmets and other items of individual equipment, (3) care of the feet, (4) alertness while on watch. See that rewards and punishments are promptly awarded.

9. At the front, visit all of your men frequently - talk to them - be sure they know what you want them to do at all times, and where you can be found.

10. Do not get your unit lost - nothing destroys confidence quicker.

11. As a general rule do not call for volunteers to do a dangerous or distasteful job. Pick out the individuals yourself and assign them to the job clearly, and in the presence of others.

12. Give your orders positively and clearly at all times. Avoid vagueness.

13. Never allow cruelty, it undermines the natural courage and manliness of the perpetrator.

Be respectful to the dead - even the enemy dead. Bury the dead quickly.

14. Be prompt and accurate in making reports. Send back information at least once each hour during an action. The commanding officer can't help you unless he knows your situation.

15. If anything goes wrong, do not be too quick to blame our artillery, aviation, engineers, supply services, or any other organization. They can be depended upon always to do all they can with the information and means at hand. They, too, have a job which requires courage and determination, and they are doing their best to back you up.

16. Take active charge of all activities on the front which lie within your sphere of responsibility.

17. A front-line soldier demands little from his leader, namely: (1) a clear conception of what he is expected to do, (2) ammunition, (3) drinking water, (4) rations, (5) medical service, and eventually (6) cigarettes and mail. These items must be your continuous concern.

18. Always arrange for the comfort of your men before you do your own.

19. Maintain your leadership. Nothing is more humiliating to a nominal leader than to see his men naturally turning to a subordinate for direction in times of danger.

20. Arrange continuously for your men to get as much rest as the situation will allow. Avoid unnecessary harassments, such as "standing by." Unless your unit is on the move, or unless you or the enemy are actually attacking, you can usually arrange for at least two-thirds of your men to sleep at night.

21. Do not tolerate any evidences of self-pity in your men. It makes any difficult situation worse.

22. Keep to yourself alone any concern you may have as to your general situation, and do not let it be reflected in your countenance or actions.

Remember that all situations look critical at times.

23. Encourage common decency - do not tolerate vulgarity or filthy language in your presence.

24. Insist on carrying out all rules for field sanitation, even in the front lines.

25. Do not encourage rumors - they are usually disturbing - most of them are entirely without foundation. Find out for yourself and be the first to tell your men the truth.

26. Win a reputation for moving your outfit promptly. Depart and arrive on time.

27. Be "time and space" conscious. By practice, know the average time it takes: (1) to issue your orders, (2) to assemble your unit, (3) to move it a hundred yards over varied types of terrain, (4) to deploy it for battle. Always have your watch set at the correct time.

28. Keep your men informed as to the enemy situation and your plans. Devise and execute plans for taking prisoners.

29. Offensive tactics, briefly summarized, may be stated as follows: Hold the attention of your enemy with a minimum of force, then quickly strike him suddenly and hard on his flank or rear with every weapon you have, then rush him when his fire slackens. Any plan that accomplishes this will usually win if it is driven home quickly. Be slow to change a plan - the reason for the change should be obvious.

30. Remember the supporting arms seldom destroy. They paralyze temporarily. Take quick advantage of their support before the enemy "comes to." Act suddenly.

31. In a surprise meeting of small forces, hit the enemy immediately while he is still startled; don't let him get set, be persistent, and "keep him rolling."

32. Be prepared always. Anticipate your action in case of an emergency. Ask yourself what you would do immediately in case the enemy should suddenly appear. If you have to hesitate in your answer, you are not sufficiently prepared. Keep thinking, and at all times be one jump ahead of the immediate situation.

33. Never permit men to remain inactive under machine gun fire. Give orders quickly.

34. Do not permit the slightest rearward movement of any individual while under heavy fire, except to get wounded out, or when openly directed by you. It is usually best to go forward, or dig in until the fire ceases.

35. Always endeavor to confront your enemy with a superior volume of accurate fire. This may be accomplished at any given point by means of maneuver and coordination of the fire of all weapons. Use every weapon you have - they are all especially effective if used together.

36. A great and successful troop leader said that there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that he is defeated. The leader who carries on, wins.

37. It has been recently observed that an enemy often slackens or ceases his fire right at the time he appears to be getting the upper hand. He then simply crouches in his hole. This means that he cannot sustain a fire fight. Stick to your plan and hit him harder.

38. Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.

39. Beware of daylight withdrawals. They may appear logical in a classroom but they are always dangerous in practice. In a tight spot hold on, at least until nightfall.

40. Nothing on this earth is so uplifting to a human being as victory in battle; nothing so degrading as defeat.

41. "Battles are won during the training period."

DISTRIBUTED BY: LTG A.A. VANDEGRIFT
MARINE COMMANDANT
DURING WWII.

"Battle is the ultimate to which the whole life's labor of an officer should be directed. He may live to the age of retirement without seeing a battle; still, he must always be ready for it as if he knew the hour and the day it is to break upon him. And then, whether it come late or early, he must be willing to fight—he must fight."

Brigadier General C. F. Smith, USA;

To Colonel Lew Wallace,

September 1861

"FEAR IN BATTLE"

The study of fear in battle is not new. Below are some results of a study based on the experiences of 300 Americans that fought in the Spanish Civil War. Their experiences are reasonably valid since they experienced the dive-bomber, the blitzkrieg, and the modern tank.

Their findings in brief:

1. Fear is useful to the soldier when it drives him to learn better in training and to act sensibly in battle.

2. The commonest symptoms of fear were: pounding heart and rapid pulse, tenseness of muscles, sinking feelings, dryness of mouth and throat, trembling, sweating. Involuntary elimination occurred infrequently.

3. Seven of ten men reported experiencing fear when going into first action.

4. Fear is greatest just before action.

5. Sixty-four men out of a hundred agreed that they became less afraid the more times they went into action.

6. Fear "of being a coward" diminished rapidly after the first action.

7. Wounds most feared were those in abdomen, eyes, brain and genitals.

8. Enemy weapons most feared were bombs, mortar shells, artillery shells, bayonet and knife, and expanding bullets.

9. Fear of bombs centered in the sound of the bomb dropping and on the concussion of the exploding bomb.

10. The presence of hunger, thirst, fatigue, ignorance of plans, idleness increases the danger from fear.

11. Eight out of ten say it is better to admit fear and discuss it openly before battle.

12. Seventy-five out of one hundred believe that all signs of fear should be controlled - in battle.

13. Experienced men who crack up should be treated leniently, deserters shot, and green men made to stay and face the music.

14. The most important factors in controlling fear are: devotion to cause, leadership, training and material.

15. Only one man in four thought that feelings of fatalism or belief in luck were of much importance in bearing fear.

16. Veteran soldiers learn that to be busy means to be less afraid: "When fear is strong, keep your mind on the job at hand."

17. Thinking that the enemy is just as scared as you are is helpful in controlling fear.

18. Eight out of ten men believe that hatred is important to the effective soldier—but hatred of the enemy's cause, not of him personally.

19. Fear may stimulate a soldier to fight harder and better, if danger to the self also suggests danger to the outfit or cause.

20. The best discipline is based on the willing acceptance of orders by purposeful and instructed men.

The residents varied as to age, region, social status and political conviction. They had in common the belief that by volunteering they were fighting for democracy. Different as they may have been from a cross-section of the American Army, their experience made hardened soldiers of them all, and soldiers, in whatever army, have much in common. As the conditions of battle are similar, so the men who fight wars learn the same lesson. The testimony of these men seems sensible and soldierly.

ONLY TEN DAYS

Dandridge M. Malone

This side of the battlefield, there is no man in your crew, squad, platoon, or company who is more important than "the new guy" who just arrived. Why? Because he is the future of your unit. He is the one who will be there after you're gone—someone to tell the leader who comes to replace you how good a leader you were. Furthermore, what you do with, to, and for that new guy in the first 10 days will have a major effect of how well you get your tasks accomplished for as long as you remain in the unit.

Today, virtually every major unit has a sponsorship program of some sort, but the formal program prescribed by Army regulations and memorandums gets the new guy to the unit. What happens after that, in the unit, you can't do with a program and some poopsheets. It is a leader's job, and you, as a leader, have to get it done in the first 10 days.

The first 10 days are critical. The scientists tell us that's about how long it takes a person to get oriented to an entirely new situation and a new bunch of people. Think back to the last time you changed stations. It took you about 10 days to get the lay of the land, didn't it?

"What kind of an outfit is this? Do people seem to give a damn about what they're doing, or not? Are they hard-core soldiers or candy-butts? What kind of leaders do we have? Which ones are good? Which ones are sorry? How's mine? Who knows the real skinny about what's happening around here? What are people going to expect of me? What are the rules of the game about working, eating, uniforms, formations, haircuts, PT, barracks, loud stereos, and off-duty time? Which people around here will help me? Which ones do I like? Which ones can I trust? Which ones are going to be my buddies?"

Where did you get your answers? You got some from mimeographed welcoming letters and routine new guy briefings, but most of your answers you got from people of about your same rank that you come in contact with during your first 10 days. And the answers to your questions probably came far more from informal, grapevine talk than from written-down, spelled-out, formal policy and welcome letters. You were new and trying hard to get squared away, so you had all your antennas run out. Being the new guy can be uncomfortable, even embarrassing. You wanted to fit in as soon as you could. You listened—close, for what you thought were the true answers for each of your questions. Then, in a week or so, that was it—you got most of your questions answered. You were oriented.

The new guy coming in tomorrow, dragging that duffelbag, gets oriented the same way you did. You can welcome him to the unit, run him through the chain, and let him sort of drift naturally through the first 10 days, or, knowing what's going to happen, you can put some knowledge of the getting oriented process to work to make your job of developing soldiers far more effective. You only got 10 days, remember? After that, it's normally too late. Here's why.

There are, in any unit, small groups of people who hang around together. Groups of buddies, Cliques. They won't usually parallel the organizational lines of the unit, but they will usually have some sort of natural, informal leader. some of these groups are aimed toward the same objective as the unit. They're good—a source of extra strength. Other groups aren't. They're aimed somewhere else, sometimes even against the objective of the unit.

There are far more of the good groups than there are of the sorry groups, so the sorry groups, naturally, are always trying to recruit more strength and power. Now, when you let the new guy just drift, guess who it is that's going to get to him first, answer his questions, and get him oriented? Your task as a leader is to get his questions answered right—in the first 10 days.

Give the new guy your extra effort and special attention. Assume right off the bat that he is able and willing, or at least willing but unable. Round up two of your own able and willing soldiers and lock them on the new guy like a leech for at least a week. Your able and willing soldiers are your *living criteria, or standards;* they are what good soldiers ought to be.

You want the new guy, who's trying to get oriented, to take his cues from them. You want your able and willing soldiers answering the new guy's questions and getting him moving into the able and willing informal groups. What this does is two things: It gets the new guy's orientation questions answered right, and, just as important, it starts to dry up the sorry informal groups by wiping out their recruiting program. In time, therefore, you build a better future for your unit in two ways.

Thus far we have focused mostly on the new soldier coming right out of basic and advanced individual training, which is mostly "sergeants' business." But the same general principles will apply whether the new guy is a sergeant or a lieutenant—he will need close and special attention from an "able and willing," and from you. The FIRST TEN DAYS are critical and require the investment of extra effort on your part. Do the right things right, and you'll have more than double the return on your investment. Let him drift, and you're making more work for everyone.

The formal "Sponsorship Program" prescribed by regulations and memorandums gets the new guy to the unit. What happens after that, in the unit, is a leader's job, and you have to get it done in THE FIRST TEN DAYS.

"All men are frightened. The more intelligent they are, the more they are frightened. The courageous man is the man who forces himself, in spite of his fear, to carry on. Discipline, pride, self-respect, self confidence, and love of glory are attributes which make a man courageous even when he is afraid."

Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.

COMMAND AND STAFF DEPARTMENT
US ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL
Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121

"First in Armor: Advance Guard"

On 12 September 1918 the 1st US Army launched the first major operation by an American Army in World War I. The reduction of the St Mihiel Salient included the first employment of American armor. The 304th Tank Brigade commanded by COL George S. Patton and consisting of the 326th and 327th Tank Battalions was attached to the IV US Corps. The 326th Tank Bn commanded by MAJ Sereno Brett was assigned to support the 1st Infantry Division during the St Mihiel operation. During the battle MAJ Brett kept a diary, recording his actions and those of his battalion. On the third day of the offensive, the first employment of US armor in an advance guard, cavalry-style role occurred.

"14 September 1918"

As the 1st Division had turned-in, closing the salient on the night of the 13th, and my battalion receiving no orders to attack with or stay in support of that Division, I found myself at Vigneulles at sunrise with nothing to do. It became necessary for me to decide on my own initiative what action to take — to withdraw or attack with the nearest unit attacking outward from the salient. At this time Vigneulles itself was on our outpost line, but there were no signs of the enemy. As my motor equipment had not yet arrived, due to the road conditions in the rear, I took a solo motorcycle which we captured from the Germans on the 12th and rode up the Vigneulles-St Maurice Road, which was the outpost line of the 26th Division, to reconnoiter the situation in person, to enable me to decide on the plan of action for the day. At Hattonville, I ran into an abandoned Hun food dump and made a hasty breakfast on Hungarian apple butter and some German hard tack.

On interviewing the outposts of the 26th Division, I found that they had completely lost contact with the enemy, so on reaching St Maurice I passed through our lines and rode out in direction of Woel. When very near the town, my motorcycle stalled. On inspecting it, I found I had just about sufficient gas to return to my battalion, so I decided to return, get the battalion, return over the same road and feel to the front in an endeavor to gain contact for our Army at this point. Up to the time I turned back I saw no signs of the enemy, although I had penetrated their lines to a distance of about five

kilometers. There was, however, quite a little machinegun and rifle firing to my right and a little to the left.

On returning to my battalion, I got 38 tanks under way in the direction of St Maurice by 7:30 AM. COL Patton, the tank brigade commander, came up in a car just as we were starting and accompanied the column on foot. Hattonville was set on fire by the Germans before they left, and huge heaps of coal at the railroad station were still smoking. A couple of German planes attacked my rear echelon on this march, but no one was hurt, except one man who was shot through the arm by one of our antiaircraft shrapnel balls. At St Maurice I took the battalion through our outpost line into the enemy's territory, much to the surprise of the outpost there. On the run from St Maurice to the vicinity of Woel, we took two prisoners (Austrians) who happened to be wandering down the road, thinking it was perfectly safe. They did not put up any fight and seemed to be quite happy to be taken prisoners. They were sent to the temporary prisoner cage at St Maurice. I finally halted and camouflaged the battalion in vicinity of Woel at 11:30 AM.

From Woel I sent out a patrol of three tanks and five riflemen, under 2LT Edwin A. McCluer, in the direction St Benoit in an endeavor to establish liaison with units on the right and to gain contact with the enemy. After fulfilling his mission in the direction of St Benoit, LT McCluer retraced his steps part way and then penetrated as far as Jonville and there encountered an enemy battalion debouching from the town in close column. The enemy were demoralized and scattered by fire from the tanks and accompanying men, and retreated into the town. After this action the patrol started to return to the battalion under heavy shell fire, but two tanks went out mechanically. Rather than abandon his two tanks, LT McCluer coupled them together and dragged them, at the same time sending in for help by COL Patton, who was wounded through the arm by a rifle bullet. On receiving word, five more tanks were sent out under 1LT Gordon Grant to support LT McCluer. LT McCluer and two men were wounded during the above action. Both patrols returned with all tanks and men by 5:00 PM. During the afternoon, I also sent out several foot reconnaissance patrols and went out once with COL Patton and twice alone. On receiving information as to the location of the enemy, a message was sent to 301st Tank Brigade for transmittal to those concerned.

LT Morrison arrived during the afternoon with ten more tanks which he had unditched.

Heavy artillery, assisted by German airmen, started registering on my tanks at about 6:00 PM. A little later, under cover of the dusk, I moved the battalion about one-half a kilometer south to avoid the shelling. The enemy did not realize we had moved for he concentrated on the old positions just after we pulled out.

At 9:05 PM I received orders from COL Patton, who had left early in the afternoon, to proceed immediately to the Bois de Thiaucourt — a distance of 22 km. The men were nearly dead with fatigue and loss of sleep, but they responded with splendid spirit and the entire battalion was again on the march at 9:20 PM. Just as we were leaving, thousands of troops of all descriptions began to move into the positions we had held all day."

In this account of the 14th of September 1918, we see a tank force used to cover the advance of a larger force and in the process conducting reconnaissance to establish contact with the enemy and friendly tank units. Combining tanks and dismounted infantry to form a combat patrol, much like a modern Armored Cav platoon, this patrol was able to successfully engage a superior force.

Further details of the St Mihiel Offensive and the role of the 326th Tank Battalion can be found in A Tank Battalion at St Mihiel. Vol XV The Mailing List 1938.

Contributed by: CPT Axel E. Borg, AOAC 3-81

LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

In battle, when soldiers die—and in battle, some must—they cannot be managed to their deaths. They must be led there. You manage machines and programs and budgets. You lead men. Managers don't take those battlefield risks. Leaders do. Managers work with things and numbers. Leaders work with people and feelings.

"Command," at any level, will always be a mix of leadership and management, but the proportions will vary. At the GENERALS' level, more management than leadership. At the CAPTAINS' level, far more leadership than management. Look next at some of the reasons why Army leadership is different from any kind of civilian leadership.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP IS DIFFERENT

The difference between military leadership and any other kind is because of your soldiers: why they are, where they come from, what they do, and how they live—as soldiers. Our Army is not a "corporation." Preparing for and defending this nation is not an "occupation." And being a soldier is not a "job." Think about the differences:

o YOU DON'T SELECT, AND THEN HIRE, YOUR "EMPLOYEES." Soldiers are assigned to you by grade and MOS. If you don't have enough or the right skills, then you do the best you can with what you have. You can't run a want ad in the classified section. If you're short on soldiers, it means that at some time, some place, some colonel or some general or some civilian official in those levels up above you has made a mistake. Just as you do. Somewhere that teamwork among levels broke down.

o THE WORKERS IN YOUR "LABOR" FORCE HAVE SIGNED A CONTRACT. You can't fire them on the spot or lay them off during hard times. And they can't quit, go on strike, carry signs around, or stage a walkout.

o YOU MUST DEAL WITH A HIGHER TURNOVER OF PEOPLE THAN ANY BUSINESS COULD TOLERATE. A civilian leader has some turnover problems, but he also must worry about stagnation in his work force. Your worry is about the chaos of soldier turbulence.

o YOUR SOLDIERS ARE MUCH YOUNGER THAN THE MEN IN MOST BUSINESSES. Most of your men have never worked before. Many have never been away from home. All of them have to learn and adjust to an entirely new way of life when they join our Army.

o YOU HAVE MORE POWER OVER YOUR MEN THAN ANY CIVILIAN BOSS. Soldiers can be fined or put in jail for doing things that would be ignored on the job in civilian life.

o YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO YOUR SOLDIERS DOESN'T END WHEN SOME WHISTLE BLOWS. You have certain responsibilities for what your soldiers do off duty as well as on duty. No civilian foreman gets telephone calls in the middle of the night when one of his men has been in an accident or a fight or is in jail. Additionally, you have certain responsibilities toward your soldiers' families and where and how they live.

o YOU CONTROL YOUR SOLDIERS' TIME--24 HOURS A DAY WHEN NECESSARY. For soldiers, there are no automatic eight-hour days, forty-hour weeks, and weekends off. When their leaders feel it's necessary, soldiers must work until the mission is accomplished to standards. With no extra pay for overtime.

o YOUR SOLDIERS ARE EXPECTED TO ACCEPT THE RISK OF DEATH ON THE BATTLEFIELD IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR MISSION. There is no civilian "job description" for the kind of work done by (a soldier), or for the conditions under which he did it.

All these differences are important as you try to think about and learn about leadership. It is easy to compare yourself with the civilian foreman or supervisor or middle manager or young executive. In many respects, you two look the same. But leadership lessons and techniques developed in the business world and in the universities, though they are often valuable and instructive, must be given careful thought. Inside our Army, they may not "fit." And that's because of the differences--in you, in your soldiers, and in the tasks, conditions, and standards of Army leadership. There is no business firm or civilian university anywhere that has as its foremost objective the requirement to fight and win the land battle.

SLEEP AND THE SOLDIER

For some must watch, and some must sleep

- Hamlet

IN ANY POSSIBLE nuclear war, as in past wars with conventional weapons, loss of sleep by soldiers--especially those in key staff and command positions--can seriously affect the result. Science has produced fantastic new weapons, but it has found no substitute for judgment and other human abilities in the men who use those weapons--and those abilities can be seriously damaged by loss of sleep.

In peace and in war the lack of sleep works like termites in a house: below the surface, gnawing quietly and unseen to produce gradual weakening which can lead to sudden and unexpected collapse. The Walter Reed Army Institute of Research puts it this way: "The daily experience of sleep constitutes one of the major cyclic events in man and ranks with food and water as a major need demanding satisfaction.

In our Army the importance of food and water is constantly emphasized during training, yet the need for sleep by all ranks gets little attention. Apparently this is so because that vital need goes largely unrecognized as the basic cause of many "human error" failures and weaknesses.

This is a curious omission, and the results can be devastating. The careers of some brilliant officers have been irreparably damaged because they were deprived of sleep; battles have been lost by soldiers worn out by loss of sleep; and men have died needlessly when leaders without enough sleep made errors in judgment. In fact, many experts believe an error in judgment by one man, when his mind was dulled by lack of sleep, had a major effect on one of the greatest defeats of World War II. But I am ahead of my story.

WHAT IS SLEEP?

Just what sleep is does not appear too important to us as soldiers. What we need to know is this: How much does a man need? What happens if he doesn't get enough? Then we can apply this knowledge to our military activities and operations.

We can safely base our inquiry on the statement by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research: "The nature of the phenomena of sleep and the defect produced by its deprivation remain matters of controversy."

A distinguished doctor once said, "One sleepless night can raise havoc with our disposition, and with the effectiveness of our work."

Any observant and experienced officer or noncommissioned officer can vouch for the truth of that statement. Yet, to recognize the fact does not always solve the problem it creates; the average man will be the first to say when he is thirsty or hungry, but often will not realize he is dangerously short of sleep. Some delicate intangibles are involved in dealing with this, including a feeling about invasion of privacy.

Every combat veteran remembers how exhausted soldiers, kept awake for long periods during battle, collapsed in sleep at the first opportunity—wherever they happened to be. Even civilians on the home front know this from war pictures that showed soldiers sprawled asleep in ditches, trucks—all kinds of places. Not so obvious is the fact that sleep exhaustion usually results from failure to sleep when there was a chance, and the loss in combat effectiveness from this cause is beyond measurement or calculation.

There should be a place on training schedules for instruction in the facts of life concerning sleep and the results from the lack of it, just as we train in the use of drinking water. Knowledge about sleep is an Armywide need for soldiers of all ranks, and we should stress that it is the duty of each man to get enough.

EFFECT ON MEMORY

Perhaps the most spectacular demonstration I saw of the damaging effect on a man from lack of sleep took place before World War II.

Not long before Pearl Harbor, all staff and field grade officers of the Hawaiian Department were assembled in a post theater for a briefing by a general officer on one aspect of the defense of Oahu. He got along well until he was halfway through, when he began to stumble and flounder for words. He shuffled his papers and looked at us with a puzzled expression. He then said, "I am sorry, but you will have to excuse me," and left the stage.

As hundreds of officers sat in stuneed silence, the department commander rose and said, "We will take a ten-minute break while the general gets his notes straightened out."

The speaker's aide rushed up to check the notes (they were in perfect order) and the talk was resumed. But the general soon got to a sentence he could not finish so he left it hanging and started to discuss a visual aid—and got stalled on that. It wasn't stage fright; he just looked intensely puzzled.

Finally, he turned to his audience again: "I designed this aid myself, but I can't seem to remember how it goes. You will just have to excuse me." He left the stage again, abandoning the briefing. An amazed audience left the theater in uncomprehending silence.

When the general was hospitalized for observation, it was quickly determined that he was simply suffering from acute fatigue—not enough sleep.

All experiments prove beyond question that loss of sleep heavily affects memory. One authority states: "A startling effect of sleep deprivation was its attack on human memory and perception. Many sleep-deprived subjects were unable to retain information long enough to relate it to the task they were supposed to perform."

LOSS CAN BE CUMULATIVE

Most of us think of sleep starvation as something that happens after one to several days of heavy loss. But it can inch up on you over weeks and months—even years—and you can be completely unaware of this insidious damage to mind and body. One sleep researcher reports that, if long continued, even a daily shortage of fifteen minutes can built up serious effects.

The result of cumulative sleep loss was brought home to me in painful fashion when, at my request, I was permitted time off from my job as a division chief of staff in the early spring of 1943 to attend a general staff course (a nine-week wartime quickie) at Fort Leavenworth. In the war urgency to get things done, I had been building up (without knowing it) what researchers call a "sleep debt." At Leavenworth I promptly set to work to study everything in sight, burning my sleep candle at both ends.

The payoff on my sleep debt came quite suddenly one night about ten days after my arrival. As I was reading a manual in studying the next day's assignment and turned a page, my mind went blank. I could not remember what I had just read on the preceding page! I turned back, read it again, turned the page—another blank.

After the fourth or fifth unsuccessful try, I recalled the general who had looked so puzzled when he said, "I can't seem to remember."

That's what happened to me, too, but—thanks to the fact that I had seen it happen to him—I understood what was wrong. So I placed the manual aside, went for a hard walk, and then to bed. The start of a pressure-packed course at Leavenworth is an awkward time for the sleep-bill collector to say, "Pay up—now!"

Fortunately, by rigidly limiting my study and making a serious business of going to bed, I managed to get through the course—thankful to have learned my lesson in school rather than in combat.

One writer for a national magazine said, "By depriving themselves of needed sleep, many Americans are piling up a regrettable record of irritability and inefficiency; they are taking chances on losing their jobs, their marriages, even their lives. Those 'Sleep Cheats' are not to be confused with insomniacs...because Sleep Cheats can sleep, but won't." For soldiers, this underscores again the importance of teaching about sleep during training, emphasizing sleep as a personal duty and a command responsibility.

JUDGMENT CAN BE IMPAIRED

Scientists have clearly established that judgment—a vitally essential element in command and leadership—is severely impaired by loss of sleep. I recall taking part in a large field maneuver of several days duration when, about 1900 hours one evening, the division chief of staff said to the division commander, "Nothing is going to happen for at least five hours, so I recommend that you get some sleep, sir."

The general insisted on staying awake, and nothing happened for seven hours. But when things did break loose, time was a factor, the general's brain was fogged by sleep fatigue, and he made a serious error in judgment which became so evident he was relieved of this command.

A wartime parallel in reverse occurred during the Normandy campaign in France, and was described to me by an eyewitness. At a critical stage in the operation the commander of the 101st Airborne Division (Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, later Army Chief of Staff, and still later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) called in his second in command after supper and said: "Tomorrow is going to be a big day, and I want to be ready for it. You take over while I go to bed and get some sleep."

He did just that, and my eyewitness says: "It happened as he had predicted. He got a good night's sleep, and the next day when things really popped, General Taylor was on top of the action and every decision was right on the nose. It was the most inspiring thing I've ever seen."

One of the serious damaging effects of sleep loss is the high and sometimes almost irrational degree of irritation it causes in dealing with others. In all the publicity about the "slapping incident" in which General Patton was involved after his brilliantly successful invasion of Sicily, it was generally agreed that while his action could not be excused, it had been "provoked." Little was said of the fact that it came after six weeks of furious and violent activity by a combat leader who had driven himself relentlessly. The battle won, he visited his hospitalized men instead of taking the rest he so desperately needed.

I think there is little doubt that an incomparable battle career was nearly terminated prematurely by an incident resulting primarily from heavy and long-continued loss of sleep.

One researcher concludes that "disturbances in behavior from lack of sleep closely resemble disorders from certain narcotics, alcohol and oxygen starvation...Values slip out of focus. We are literally 'not ourselves.'" How and why is this so? Well, it is a lot like being hungry, where the frustration of going without food makes us irritable and aggressive—which is why people on a diet are often ill-tempered. But you can do without food much more easily than without sleep. In fact, animals have lived twenty days without food, yet have died after five sleepless nights.

SLEEP WHENEVER YOU CAN

Of course, not only generals are affected by lack of sleep. When I was with an infantry division in Germany during postwar field exercises—the "100-hour battalion tests"—I walked through the tests behind all nine battalions of our division. Only once did I see a battalion commander take firm steps to see that his command got sleep when the chance came. His battalion scored highest on the tests, while other appeared fatigued in the final stages and performance at all levels deteriorated. Yet they seemed unaware of this, even less aware that it resulted from lack of sleep they could have had by planned daylight sleeping.

One battalion commander not only failed to consider any sleeping plan (though he gave meticulous attention to his feeding plan), but he also needlessly moved his men about in such a way that it was virtually impossible for them to get adequate sleep. The result was quite amazing, for in the later stages of the exercise his whole command was flopping down to sleep at every pause, exhausted—and he made two serious errors in judgment. As a result his unit, which began the exercise as a heads-up-on-the-ball outfit, on the fourth and final day staggered about half out of its feet, putting on such a miserable exhibition that only high grades in the early part of the exercise saved it from an unsatisfactory rating.

We must note here, however, that in real combat "good grades" in the first part of the battle would not have saved that unit from getting thoroughly shot up, perhaps even destroyed. You fail only once when the score is written with steel and blood.

An experimental laboratory found that "with increasing sleep loss the individual takes fewer events into account in arriving at a decision. This indicates deterioration in the ability to make an estimate of the situation which takes account of all possible courses of enemy action." Or, as one research expert expressed it, "They were

befuddled in situations requiring them to hold several factors in mind and act on them."

I know a fine decorated and dedicated battalion commander who, during a campaign in the Philippines, went to his regimental commander and requested relief from his command. He said:

"Something has happened to me. I am making poor decisions, have lost confidence in myself, and want to be relieved before I make a serious error that will cost lives of my men."

The colonel told me that battalion commander had driven himself day and night, and was simply suffering from exhaustion—massive loss of sleep. He was taken out of combat and given a chance to catch up. But something had indeed happened in his heart, for he was never the same again, destroyed by his own energy and conscientious determination—and loss of sleep.

During the Leyte campaign, I commanded the 34th Infantry Regiment. Several days after landing, while we were still trying to break out of the narrow confining beachhead, I was called to the phone late one night to hear this message: "This is a warning! Major elements of the Japanese fleet are entering Leyte Gulf, and bombardment of the shore may be expected momentarily."

It is a matter of history (in one of the most controversial major sea battles of all time) that the Japanses naval attack plan had worked to the point where central striking force (with four battleships, including the great Yamato) had penetrated San Bernardino Straight, rounded Samar Island, and by daylight was heading directly toward our crowded beachhead and the thin-skinned invasion fleet. On the bridge of one of the greatest battleships ever built, a small admiral stood on the threshold of immortality as he engaged lighter US forces—until he made one of the most amazing decisions of the war.

With orders to go in at all costs, and facing the chance to strike a devastating blow—the Japanese admiral ordered a retreat!

Not all naval experts agree as to what would have happened, but there seems no doubt the decision was a colossal error of judgment. Many of those who have studied the great battle and the events leading up to it (including myself) are convinced that the apparently inexplicable error of judgment by the Japanese admiral was the direct result of his failure to get enough sleep during the preceding tense days and nights.

CAUSES OF SLEEPLESSNESS

From private to general, loss of sleep becomes cumulative, and no man can stand against its effects. Because sleep is such a vital need, here is a summary of useful information about it.

Worry is the greatest enemy of sleep—after you are in bed. But the single biggest reason for not enough sleep is simplicity itself: those who need it do not spend enough time in bed to get it—by their own choice.

People stay up late for various reasons--even just to have a little time of peace and quite—and, unaware, pay the hidden cost of unnecessary sleep loss. It is ironic, particularly for able, conscientious staff officers, that some men stay awake because they are not satisfied with what they have done during the day. With enough sleep they would have had more efficient and effective days. So it is the old "vicious circle" pattern in action.

Others stay awake because of worries and anxieties, about which one doctor said: "First take care of your sleep. Then most of your worries will take care of themselves."

A curious contradiction sometimes leads hard-working staff officers on, like a seductive Lorelei: experiments at Yale showed there was a temporary improvement in speed and accuracy after initial sleep loss! You feel hopped up and exhilarated by a kind of tension spur. There are two hidden jokers: the same results required nearly three times the expenditure of energy; and after several nights the trend is reversed, and there is a big letdown in work output.

HOW MUCH DO YOU NEED?

To find the amount of sleep you need, note how many hours elapse from the time to go to bed until you wake, refreshed, without an alarm clock. (Average need for most people is generally accepted as eight hours.)

Also, remember that the amount needed will vary not only with individuals, but with what they do. The more physically tired you get, the more sleep you need.

Sleeping pills are dangerous—and are especially undesirable for soldiers who, in an emergency, could be awakened while still in a drugged condition. Besides, regular use of such pills can make you more irritable and difficult to work with.

Lack of sleep lowers the attention span in tasks that require constant alertness, such as on sentry duty or scanning a radarscope.

After you have reached the threshold of sleep exhaustion, your determination to stay awake is not in itself enough to keep you awake.

You can make up lost sleep. While it does not have to be hour for hour, neither can a large loss of sleep be made up in one night or several nights.

If you can't go to sleep, it is important to know that merely lying in bed is almost as helpful as sleep, especially so because you are getting more sleep than you think.

When anxiety, exhaustion, and compulsion are added to pure sleep loss, it follows logically that a person will break down more quickly under strain—and that many cases of so-called battle fatigue are little more than victims of cumulative loss of sleep.

In general, loss of sleep causes these direct harmful results: it dulls the memory, sometimes spectacularly so; it can seriously affect judgment; it produces added tension and irritation; it blurs perception and mental acuteness; it reduces accuracy and speed of performance; it impairs physical and mental health.

Finally, it creeps up silently. Look out for it!

Here are some pertinent summary comments:

- Whether or not you get enough sleep is not accident, but the result of effort on your part and the determination to have it. However, it does not generate the same inborn desire like the need for food and water. Therein lies its danger!

- Having looked at lessons of the past resulting from loss of sleep in wars with conventional weapons, it is important to realize that danger from sleep deprivation will be even greater in a nuclear war. Few will think of sleep then.

- In such a war time will be foreshortened, and pressures increased beyond all past experience, yet the mental and physical need for sleep will remain the same. Further, not only should the facts of life about sleep be included in our training schedules, but they should be integrated into our civil defense program as an essential element to ensure sound decisions by leaders at all levels, and as a measure to avert panic by peopel under strain everywhere.

- We now come to this final conclusion: Knowledge about the vital importance of sleeping habits is needed in military and civilian life, as a duty, as a command responsibility, and as a matter of stern self-discipline.

"TANKS IN SUPPORT OF INFANTRY--HILL 609"

Commanders of tank units must keep an open flexible mind. Too often the situation demands the employment of armor in a role totally different from the normal school of thought.

In April, one of my medium battalions was in division reserve near Beja. The 34th and 1st Infantry Divisions had been battling for days in a fortress-like range of mountains against crack, determined, German infantry. Losses were running high and progress was slow. One particular terrain feature, known as Hill 609 and held by the Germans, was the key to the hostile position. It was imperative that we take this hill. The slope of the hill was abrupt rim-rock.

On April 29th, the tank battalion commander received orders to alert one company and have the company commander report to the commanding general of the 34th Infantry Division. Following is an excerpt from the report of the battalion commander:

"We found General Ryder at a forward OP from which he could plainly see the hill, held by the enemy, which was holding up his advance. (Hill 609). He explained the situation fully and pointed out accurately on the map and on the ground, the locations of his own and the enemy troops."

"He gave the tank commander his mission and stated that his own infantry would support the tanks in driving the enemy from the hill."

"The tank officers then went forward to the friendly infantry positions and made a deliberate and thorough study of the terrain. Their plan was submitted to General Ryder, who assembled his artillery and infantry commanders to coordinate the details. The smallest details were worked out--from the construction of a wadi crossing to the identification signals to be used. After agreeing on the time of attack, Captain Gwinn and his officers returned to their company and explained to the men the plans of the operation in detail."

Here is Captain Gwinn's own story of the battle that followed:

"April 30th--Company X, X Armored Regiment, arrived at an assembly area behind Djebel El Kerh at 0230 hours. In order to get to our defiladed positions, we had to descend a very steep hill, cross-country, and cross a wadi at the bottom. This would have been difficult but 'Jerry" obligingly shot a flare which made our task easier."

"We got into our defiladed assembly area, arranged a stand-to for 0400 hours, and then the men got some sleep. At 0415 hours we jumped off after contacting our supporting infantry. Lieutenant Adams was to move the 1st Platoon forward and gain a position on a rim-rock to the company's left, from which he could cover by fire the entire operation of the company. On reaching the vicinity of his objective, he found it was inaccessible, so he moved his platoon to an alternate position, where he covered our advance."



"The other two platoons then advanced rapidly—leap frogging as they neared the objective. Quite near Hill 609 the terrain narrowed, so that there was maneuver room for only one platoon. Lieutenant Riggsby led the 2d Platoon into a defiladed position, while Lieutenant Ruppert continued the forward advance with the 3d Platoon. Thus, although the entire company was under rather heavy fire, Lieutenant Ruppert was protected on both flanks from hostile tank counterattack."

"The infantry advanced with our tanks and on many occasions tried to designate targets. The noise, however, made this almost impossible."

"The CP was just forward of the 1st Platoon and came under direct antitank fire from the right. Before any damage was done, Lieutenant Adams located the gun, a ground-mount 75mm, and knocked it out by fire from his own tank. The 2d Platoon ran into difficulties, and Lieutenant Riggsby's tank was knocked out. Platoon Sergeant Neal then took charge of the platoon and covered Lieutenant Ruppert. At this time, one of the 3d Platoon tanks, that of Sergeant Kaschak, was knocked out and set afire by a 50mm antitank gun which scored five penetrations out of six rounds, at about 300 yards."

"Lieutenant Ruppert withdrew his remaining three tanks about ten yards to a defiladed position, from which he continued to fire on enemy infantry and guns withdrawing to his front and right front. His further advance was denied by hostile antitank fire from his right flank. The mission, however, was accomplished as our infantry came forward and took possession of the hill and we were ordered to withdraw to our assembly area."

"Our losses were two tanks completely inoperative, and two tanks which were repaired and put back into operation a few days later."

It is worthy of note that when his tank was knocked out, Liueutenant Riggsby remained in his tank and, firing until his ammunition was exhausted, materially assisted the advance of the other tanks and infantry.

The attack started at first light and by 0930 hours, the tanks had reached their objective. Because of the hill's rim-rock faces, some 20 feet in height in places, the summit of Hill 609 was inaccessible for tanks, but they beat down the hostile automatic weapons fires and allowed the infantry to close with the enemy on the objective.

The attack of Company B against Hill 609 is an example of the completely successful employment of tanks in support of infantry. Neither the tanks nor the infantry had had previous experience in this type of action, nor had they operated together before. Success was due primarily to three things:

First—Complete, careful, and thorough reconnaissance was made prior to planning the operation.

Second—Surprise was obtained because movement was made during darkness, and because the terrain was so unsuited to the employment of tanks.

Third—There was complete cooperation between the tanks and the infantry.

BREAKTHROUGH TO BASTOGNE

Into the Ardennes. Bigonville was rough. With intelligence of advancing German armor, Reserve Command (CCR) had been committed on the right flank, as the other two combat commands of the American 4th Armored Division continued to slug north toward Bastogne and the beleaguered paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division. Colonel Wendell Blanchard, commander of CCR, had the 37th Tank (Tk), 53d Armored Infantry (AIB) and 94th Armored Field Artillery (AFA) Battalions, when the command jumped off on 23 December 1944. The Reconnaissance Platoon of the 37th Tk preceded the advanced guard-Team B (B/37 Tk and B/53 AIB)-as far as the 25th Cavalry's outpost, where Lieutenant Marion Harris pulled the platoon aside and waved the column on.

The approach march to contact, along the sheer, ice-covered secondary road was difficult, and tanks and half-tracks skidded out of control. Initially, Team B received no fire, nor observed any enemy, save an awesome pair of very large enemy tank tracks looming before it in the new-fallen snow.

But as the team approached Flatzbourhof-the Bigonville-Holts railroad station-it began to receive tank, antitank, and machinegun fire from the railroad buidling and adjacent woods. Captain Jimmie Leach, commander of B-37 Tk and of Team B, deployed his force along the railroad embankment, while the artillery pounded the nearby woods and German positions beyond the railroad station.

As expected, the Germans were quick to counterattack, with white-clad paratroopers, reinforced by two self-propelled guns and a captured M-4 Sherman tank. Just as quickly, B/37 tanks, firing from their positions behind the railroad embankment, dispatched all three German vehicles, halting the counterattack. During the fight, it was Sherman against Sherman, with Captain Leach's gunner coming out a winner.

As darkness fell Team B was ordered to hold its position, while Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., commanding the 37th Tank Battalion, attempted to maintain the momentum of his attack by sending the tanks of A Company through Team B, and those of C Company around its right flank. However, stubborn resistance by tank-reinforced troopers of the German 13th Parachute Regiment, mines, and casualties, brought the attack to a standstill a full mile away from Bigonville, the CCR objective. The A/37 Tk's passage of the B/37 Tk's lines was aborted due to numerous vehicles lost to snowcovered mines, including Lieutenant John Whitehill's command tank; and the C/37 Tk attack was

likewise aborted because of the loss of nine tank commanders, including the CO, Captain Charlie Trover, who was killed.

During the cold, clear night with outposts alert, the CCR tankers, redlegs (artillerymen) and doughs (infantrymen) received some badly needed replacements. They repaired their vehicles and reorganized their troops and crews for the next morning's attack.

On the 24th, Team B's tanks and doughs attacked again, fighting their way into the very center of Bigonville, where the tough troopers of the German 5th Parachute Division had to be blasted out house by house. Small arms and Panzerfaust fire continued to take its toll. Lieutenant Bob Cook, B/36 Tk's executive officer and 3d platoon leader, went down with a rifle bullet in his chest. He was briefly captured by the Germans while he was attempting to find the accompanying medic jeep, but abandoned as the B Company doughs advanced.

As the Bigonville battle continued, Colonel Abrams ordered a blocking and screening position, without its infantry, to the north of the town. No sooner had its tanks moved into positon, than a flight of four American P-47 "Thunderbolt" fighter-bombers, thinking them enemy, made two bombing and strafing attacks on them. Captain Leach and his tank crews tossed out red smoke grenades, and frantically attempted to uncover the red recognition panels for identification, while the battalion S-3, Captain Bill Dwight, radioed Colonel Abrams to call off the "friendlies." There were no casualties-luckily the US fliers had missed everyone and everything.

When the mopping-up was over, Bigonville and the surrounding area yielded some 400 prisoners of war (POW) and 100 enemy dead to the tenacious CCR attackers.

With Bigonville secured, CCR looked forward to spending a restful Christmas Day, feasting on a turkey dinner. The battalions were much understrength, and the 37th Tk in particular, had just completed a 160-mile road march up from Lorraine and the Saarland, where it had been supporting the newly-arrived 87th "Golden Acorn" Infantry Division in the Westwall fighting.

Bastogne "Fire Call." When alerted for the "fire call" run to the Ardennes, the 4th Armored Division had just been pulled out of line in Lorraine after a month of slugging from the Seille valley to the German border. Mud and mines had restricted the tanks, overcast had grounded the tactical air support, and the revitalized German defense had skillfully parried every thrust-all of which combined to deny Patton a breakthrough. Having achieved a brilliant reputation as it slashed across France after the Normandy breakout, the 4th Armored was bitter about the casualties it had suffered in the November offensive. Knocked-out tanks were strewn along the way in what was considered an

atrocious misuse of armor; and after a shouting match with his corps commander, Major General John S. Wood, the 4th Armored's beloved commanding general, was relieved by Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., 3d Army Commander.

But Patton gave the 4th his own chief of staff, Major General Hugh Gaffey, who had commanded the 2d Armored in Sicily. "Gimlet-eyed Gaffey", the laconic Texan with immaculate riding breeches and "boots you could use as a mirror," had a style completely unlike the bluff, good natured "P" Wood. But he was coolly efficient, and the 4th was an experienced war machine.

On 22 December 1944, the 4th Armored, under Milikan's new III Corps in Belgium, jumped off to drive on Bastogne where the 101st "Screaming Eagles" Airborne Division was surrounded by the German offensive of the "Battle of the Bulge."

The counterattack cut into the still expanding torrent of the German offensive, and resistance stiffened north of the Sure River. Patton, who had promised to reach Bastogne "by Christmas," found his advance stalling. On the 24th, Miliken decided to regroup his forces to concentrate more power for the relief of Bastogne. Two battalions of the 80th "Blue Ridge" Infantry Division were trucked over to reinforce the armor, and the boundary of the 26th "Yankee" Division



was extended to include the Bigonville area, thereby releasing CCR to the 4th Armored Division.



By doctrine and practice, CCR was not employed tactically. Its TO&E headquarters was much smaller than those of Combat Commands A and B, (CCA, CCB) and it was only intended to administratively control units not in the line. But Gaffey employed the reserve tactically, to meet the threat to the right flank at Bigonville, and now he intended to shift it around to the left, to seek a weak spot in the German front.

Night Road March. CCR had just turned in on Christmas Eve, when it received orders for a 27-mile night road march from Bigonville around to Neufchateau highway leading to Bastogne. Attended by appropriate griping, the column crossed the initial point (IP) an hour after midnight under radio listening silence, with the reconnaissance platoon jeeps and lights tanks of the 37th Tk battalion leading as the point.

Then came the advance guard, comprising the light tank company (D/37 TK (-)), B/53 AIB mounted in halftracks, and a squad of C/24 Armored Engineers to clear obstacles.

Five minutes back came the main body of the combat command, with the rest of Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. (Abe) Abrams' 37th Tk and Lieutenant Colonel George Jaques' 53d AIB; the M-7 105-mm "Priest" SP Howitzers of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Parker's 94th AFA with C Battery of 155-mm towed howitzers attached from the 177th FA; two gun companies of the 704th TD, and other attachments. Service and supply elements came separately, under CCR Trains command.

The Christmas Eve night was clear and cold, lit by a nearly full moon, while flares and explosions illuminated the northern horizon at Bastogne. As the column twisted through the dark forest areas, bleary-eyed drivers tried to focus on the cat-eye blackout markers of the vehicle ahead. In the open halftracks, armored doughs dozed fitfully and stomped their frozen feet to regain circulation. There were some 400 vehicles in the column that stretched over 16 miles of road space. Standing operating procedures called for an 8-mph rate-of-march at a 50-yard closed interval at night (15 mph at a 100-yards open interval by day), with a 1 minute interval between company march units and 5 minutes between battalion march groups (serials), giving a time length of about 2 hours. Thus, the vanguard of the column had already pulled into its assembly area south of Vaux while the rest of the column was still closing on the release point (RP) at Molinfaig.

Tactical organization and commanders. As the troops topped off their vehicles and got a cat-nap their commanders attended a conference for planning the Christmas Day attack. If there were prayers, they were silent and individual. CCR's mission was flank protection, with the main drive still to be mounted by CCB, in the center. The three combat commands were deployed abreast, each comprising a tank battalion, an armored infantry battalion, a direct support armored field artillery battalion, and the normal attachments; a company each from the tank destroyer, engineer, medical, ordnance-maintenance, and antiaircraft artillery battalions, a troop from the cavalry/reconnaissance squadron and the MP platoon, as well as supporting III Corps Artillery.

In Lorraine, each combat command had operated with two battalion-sized task forces, the tank and armored infantry battalions cross-reinforcing each other. But because of the constricted terrain in the Ardennes, there was only one ridge-running road on axis of advance of each combat command: the Arlon-Martelange highway for CCA; a secondary road through Chaumont for CCB, bounded by the Strainchamps and Burnon Creeks; and the Neufchateau highway for CCR-a zone of advance 8-miles wide. Thus, the tank and armored infantry companies

were paired as teams to leap-frog from village to village, with the infantry and tank battalion commanders working closely together. Normal practice for the three company teams was to leap-frog from assault to reserve, to support, with a team's turn to lead coming up every third turn.

The 37th Tk had three medium tank companies and one light tank company, supported by the M-4 105-mm assault gun and 81-mm mortar platoons of Headquarters Company. Since each of the 37th's three medium companies were down to 9 or 10 tanks instead of 17, they often maneuvered as one unit (rather than in three platoons), deploying from column into line, wedge, echelon, or line of sections formation, depending on terrain. If serious resistance was expected, the armored doughs left their thin-skinned halftracks and "married up" with the tanks in the attack position just short of the line of departure (LD), mounting a squad on the rear deck of each tank. The platoon leaders mounted their counterparts' tanks to facilitate control by using the tank company radio frequency. The tank company CO commanded the team's assault until the infantrymen dropped off and went into action on their own.

Each team advance would be preceded by direct fire from the supporting team, a sharp artillery concentration on call by the forward observer in his tank, and tactical air support by P-47 fighter planes, if available. The few air controllers were normally at combat command headquarters.

The commander of the 37th Tank Batttalion was chunky, 29-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Creighton W. (Abe) Abrams, who was already making a fighting name for himself. In 1944 campaigns, Abrams' aggressive leadership of the 37th Tk, under the skillful direction of Colonel Bruce C. Clarke of CCA, did much to establish "P" Wood's 4th Armored as Patton's favorite division. (When German Ardennes offensive began, Clarke had gone to CCB of the 7th Armored with a brigadier general's star and was blunting the German drive in the St Vith sector as the 4th fought toward Bastogne.) Abe's combat philosophy was simple: "Our operations are all based on violence," and "Go East, it's the quickest way home."

Abrams had developed the 37th Tk as a finely-honed fighting unit. His staff not only functioned well as such, but he often used his staff officers to direct his attacks. They would monitor both battalion and company radio frequencies, leaving the company commanders free to handle their units, yet the battalion CO was kept in close touch with the situation.

"Abe led by courageous example, and the 37th's motto was "Courage Conquers."

As the 105-mm assault gun tank of each company was frequently grouped with the battalion assault gun platoon, so too did Abe take the seventeenth tank from each of the medium companies and give them to his S-2, S-3, and liaison officer (LNO). These HQ tanks, with those of the CO and XO, received names beginning with "T", just as the company tank name began with the company letter. Thus, Abe rode in "Thunderbolt VI" (he would wear out seven M-4s during the war), with its name painted on its flanks in letters 8 inches high on a background of billowing white clouds punctured by jagged red streaks of lighting. "We can always spot his tank," said A/37's CO Lieutenant John Whitehill, "because it doesn't roll ahead like others. It gallops." And in the hatch was Abe, his long, black unlighted cigar clenced in his teeth, aggressively jutting forward, looking like "just another gun." He led by courageous example, and the 37th's motto was "Courage Conquers."

The 53d AIB was still absorbing replacements from the Lorraine fighting. The armored infantry had long since discarded their 57-mm antitank (AT) guns as useless against German panzers, and the AT platoon of each of the three rifle companies was used as a fourth rifle platoon or as replacements. Though badly under their TO&E strength of 10 men (excluding the halftrack driver), the three rifle squads of each platoon augmented their firepower by mounting an additional machinegun on their halftrack, and by trading tanker jackets for Browning automatic rifles (BAR) and Thompson submachineguns (Tommy guns). The rifle platoon leaders each had a 60-mm mortar squad and a light machinegun (LMG) with two .30 caliber LGMs to provide fire support, backed up by the battalion assault gun, mortar, and machinegun platoons.

The commander of the 53d AIB was Lieutenant Golonel George L. Jaques, "Jigger Jakes," whom his fellow Bay Stater, Abrams, addressed over the radio as "Sadsack." In fast-moving armored combat, nicknames were preferred to the daily changing SOI call signs, and voice recognition as authentication. More orthodox than the tanker, "going by the book," Jaques was ably seconded by his battalion executive officer, Major Henry A. Crosby. The 53d AIB was an experienced outfit.

Both battalion commanders had more tactical experience and expertise than their CCR commander, and it was Abe who headed the final drive to Bastogne.

Armored Assault. At 1100 on Christmas Day, the drive began. The German combat outpost line was quickly scattered as CCR tanks roared down the highway, firing as they went. In fact, the only obstacles encountered were those implaced earlier by American engineers withdrawing from the onslaught of the German offensive. The 37th's S-3, Captain Bill Dwight, had hit a mine on the night road march in his tank "Tonto." It was an American mine, "fortunately," and only

broke a track block, which was soon replaced. While returning to his CP the next day, Abe hit another mine that tossed him out of his jeep-unscratched-but totalled the jeep and crippled his driver. "Another lesson about marking minefields," wrily observed the 37th Tk XO, Major Ed Bautz.

As Baker Company of the 53d AIB cleaned out Vaux-les-Rosieres, the armored spearhead continued up the highway toward Bastogne, 10 miles ahead.

The German main line of resistance was probably astride the highway itself, covering the primary armor approach. But the available intelligence, such as it was, was not of much help. Red-penciled enemy symbols cluttered the situation maps, many with question marks. (It is now known that it was the 5th Parachute Division that had responsibility for protecting the German southern flank, while the 26th Volksgrenadier Division invested Bastogne, launching attacks in conjunction with the 15th Panzergrenadier and Panzer Lehr Divisions.)

"Radio contact with battalion was lost, but Lieutenant Boggess acted on his own initiative and continued the attack."

To avoid possible minefields astride the highway, the armored attack swung off the hardtop beyond Vaux into a secondary road that might be less defended. The terrain was fairly open-snow-covered fields, patches of dark woods, and stone-built farm villages dotted the countryside. D Company's light tanks and M-18 Hellcat TDs outposted the flank beyond Petite Rosiers, while C/25 CAv Sqdn screened the open flank to the west. Now, the main attack began to pick up momentum. Team A tanks and infantry drove into Nives

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"Gunner! Kraut Bazooka! Barn! HE! Traverse Right! Steady!... On! Eight hundred! Fire!"

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supported by Team C, and then Team C passed through the town before it was cleared, on its way to Cobreville. There radio contact with battalion was lost, but C/37 Tk's commander, Lieutenant Charles Boggess, who had taken over the tank company only 2 days before, acted on his own initiative and continued the attack. While his team cleared the town, Boggess dismounted from his tank around 1400 to reconnoiter an area where the road crossed a small creek, and found the bridge had just been blown. Colonel Abrams called up his tank-bulldozer, which crumbled a nearby stone wall and pushed it into the gap so the drive could continue-it was moving again by 1530.

Since the Cobreville bridge had been prepared for demolition, it was likely that Remoiville would be defended. Four artillery

battalions pounded the town for 10 minutes, while the supporting Shermans blasted the stone buildings: "Gunner! Kraut Bazooka! Barn! HE! Traverse Right! Steady!... On! Eight Hundred! Fire!" Then Team A charged into the dust and rubble, with the tanks firing high explosive rounds and spraying machinegun fire everywhere. B/53 AIB came in to help in the house-to-house fighting-it was toss a grenade through a window, kick open the door, leap in and to the side, and spray the room with Tommy gun fire! High-velocity tank shells screamed through the upper floors, sending plaster dust flying. By 1800, 327 POWs had been rounded up from the 3d Battalion, 14th Parachute Regiment.

The advance had already rolled through Remoiville, but leading elements encountered a crater in the road as dusk fell. B/37 Tk worked around to the left and took up positions in and around Remoiville overlooking Remichampagne, while infantry screened the woods to the west. CCR was now abreast of CCB, which was in sight across the gorge of Burnon Creek, after having finally driven the German paratroopers out of Chaumont. CCA had likewise slugged ahead up to Arlon highway, but now the Germans were reinforcing their front to stop the 4th Armored.

Change in mission. On Christmas night, the infantry line companies dug in fronting on the Bois de Cohet and Remichampagne, 6 miles from Bastogne. The 94th AFA had displaced by battery up from Juseret to just south of Sure, from where its 105-mm SP howitzers could range to 12,000 yards, or almost to the outpost lines of the 101st Airborne Division.

During the evening, a German counterattack came down the highway from Sibret, but was warded off by tank destroyer and artillery barrages.

The 37th Tk and 53d AIB CPs moved into Cobreville, and the CP of CCR relocated to Vaux. The CPs were set up in towns now, with the stone buildings providing both warmth and protection from shell fragments, and the radios from the headquarters tracks were remoted inside.

Colonel Blanchard came forward to meet with Abrams, Jaques, and Crosby. CCB was still slated to flank onto the Arlon highway and enter Bastogne. Accompanying CCB was a fretting Major General Maxwell Taylor, who had been on leave in the States when his 101st Airborne entrucked for the Ardennes. Now, he was impatient to rejoin his command.

CCR was to cover the left flank, advancing through Remichampagne and Clochimont, then turning left toward Sibret, which was held in strength. The battalion commanders were vehemently opposed to attacking Sibret. Instead they urged a drive directly to Bastogne. Blanchard was concerned about the left flank thus being exposed, but finally gave in at about 0300 stating, recalls Major Crosby, "that if we failed it was on our heads and not his as he was refusing to take any responsibility." The battalion commanders then issued oral attack orders to their company commanders-armored units didn't take time to draw up five paragraph field orders.

As dawn broke on December 26, CCR moved over frozen ground with Team B under Captain Jimmie Leach, in "Blockbuster III," in the lead. Teams A and C laid down a base of fire into the Bois de Cohet and Remichampagne. Lieutenant Don Guild, in his FO tank, prepared to lift fires as the attack went in. Suddenly P-47 fighters, probably from the 362d Fighter Group, appeared overhead. They had not been called in, and there was no forward air controller to coordinate their actions, but they flew in, bombing and strafing only a few hundred yards ahead of the tanks, and sent the Germans diving for cover. Nonetheless, house-to-house fighting gave Team B a 2-hour fight before the town was secured at 1055.

Meanwhile the armored column passed through Remichampagne and, finding the Burnon Creek bridge intact, continued on up the road to the crossroads to Clochimont. There, Lieutenant Gild dismounted from his FO's tank, and personally captured about a dozen Germans who were cowering in their slit trenches from the fierce assault.

Moments after joining Leach at the crossroads and reviewing the situation, Colonel Abrams and A/37 Tk arrived on position, its tanks received several rounds of AT fire from a position down the road to the right front of Abrams in "Thunderbolt." "Gunner! Steady . . . On! Twelve Hundred! Fire!" Once again Abrams proved he had the best tank crew in the 37th. "Target! Cease Fire!"

By now, the 37th Tk was down to 20 of its 53 TO&E medium tanks, and the 53d AIB was short 230 riflemen. While Abrams and Jaques were coordinating their planning, hundreds of C-47 transport planes thundered low over them, heading for Bastogne like flocks of fat geese. Red, yellow, and blue parachutes with supplies began blossoming out over the town. But so did ugly bursts of German flak, and several planes arched down streaming flames. Since Leach's Team B had gotten this far rather easily, Abrams was ready to drive for Bastogne, and radioed the division commander directly. The other two combat commands had made less than a mile each on the 26th. At 1400, Gaffey telephoned Patton who quickly gave his approval for Abrams to move on Bastogne.

CCR artillery prepared to fire on Assenois. A and C Batteries, which had displaced forward to Nives, would fire on the woods north of the town, B Battery on the south edge of the town, and the 155s of C/177 on the center. Additionally, the three artillery battalions with a neighboring CCB were also tied in, to give a total of 13 batteries to annihilate any enemy force in Assenois. D and A/37 Tk were to overwatch the Sibret road on the left flank and give warning of any German tank movements.

Abrams then called his S-3, Captain Bill Dwight, to bring up Team C from reserve. Lieutenant Boggess mounted the battalion commander's tank for a briefing at the Clochimont crossroads. There had been no reconnaissance up the road, but the area was known to be strongly defended. Abe told him simply, "Get to those men in Bastogne." The Charlie Company commander called his eight tank commanders together and told them he would lead and set the speed of the attack. "You all know we've got to get to those men in the town. All you've got to do is keep'em rollin' and follow me. It won't be any picnic, but we'll make it."

Final breakthrough. At 1620, Abe gave the familiar hand signal, "Let 'er roll," and the tanks moved out. Boggess picked up speed, tracks squealing, and charged right through Clochimont toward Assenois, guns firing. Three miles to go. Boggess in C-8, "Cobra King," fired straight ahead, Lieutenant Walter Wrolson in the second tank fired to the right, the third tank to the left. The Shermans pumped fire in all directions, firing on the move, with their gyrostabilizers enabling them to maintain the momentum of the attack. "I used the 75 like a machinegun," said "Cobra King's" gunner, Corporal Milton Dickerman. Boggess had instructed him to choose his own targets. "Murphy was plenty busy throwing in the shells. We shot 21 rounds in a few minutes and I don't know how much machinegun stuff."

As soon as he had cleared Clochimont Boggess called Abe for artillery fire on Assenois. Abrams radioed, "Concentration Number Nine, play it soft and sweet." Almost immediately the town seemed to

erupt in a chaos of explosions. At the edge of the town, Boggess called for the artillery to lift 200 yards, and barrelled on in without pausing. But there was German fire, even if erratic; Lieutenant Chamberlin's FO jeep was hit and he went into a ditch, and it was Lieutenant Billy Wood in a Cub plane overhead who finally got the fire lifted.

Leaning into friendly artillery fire cut losses from enemy resistance, but Assenois was a murky haze of shell bursts and the dust of collapsing houses. Tank commanders in combat usually rode with head and shoulders out of the hatch because visibility through the periscope was too limited; but Boggess had to pull his hatch down to 3 or 4 inches above the turret roof because shell splinters were singing off the armor. Dirt from an earlier enemy shell burst had smeared the driver's periscope, and Jubert Smith "sorta guessed at the road." In addition the left brake locked and the "Cobra King" swerved up a side street. Two other tanks also took wrong turns.

Walt Green's C Company infantrymen had been following in their halftracks, but artillery fire was still coming in and they piled out of their open-topped, thin-skinned vehicles to seek any shelter they could find in the town. Simultaneously, the defenders emerged fighting from the cellars, and the armored doughs mixed it up with the German paratroopers and Volksgrenadiers well into the night.

Nineteen year-old Private Jimmy Hendrix went swinging into two 88-mm guns crews with his M-1 rifle, forcing them to surrender. He then silenced two machineguns and dragged a dying GI from a burning halftrack, all of which earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor. Abrams followed into the confusion that was Assenois, and even dismounted his tank to help wrestle a fallen telephone pole off a tank to keep the attack moving.

Boggess cleared Assenois with three tanks as dusk fell. A gap in the column had opened that gave the Germans a chance to throw some Teller mines onto the roadway from a dark treeline and blow up a following halftrack. Dwight was right behind in his Sherman, "Tonto", and helped clear the wreckage and toss the mines aside. The column moved forward again, running a gauntlet of Panzerfausts, mines, and small arms fire. Four more halftracks were lost. Dwight was simultaneously trying to raise Brigadier General Anthony McAuliffe and the 101st Airborne- "Tony, this is one of Hugh's boys, over" -on channel 20 assigned the command, but to no avail.

"Suddenly the tanks debouched from the woods into an open field where multicolored supply parachutes dotted the snow."

Up ahead "Cobra King" led the spearhead. Dickerman slammed three main gun rounds into an old camouflaged concrete pillbox, and the bow gunner, Harold Hafner, traversed his machinegun through a chow line of appalled German soliders standing under the snow-covered fir trees, knocking them over like bowling pins. Suddenly the tanks debouched from the woods into an open field where multicolored supply parachutes dotted the snow. Boggess slowed as he approached a line of foxholes, and called, "Come on out, this is the Fourth Armored." No answer from the wary GIs. Finally a khaki-clad figure emerged to shake his hand. "I'm Lieutenant Webster of the 326th Engineers, 101st Airborne Division. Glad to see you." At 1645, CCR logged in its journal: "Hole opened to surrounded forces at Bastogne. . ."

"One of the paratroopers asked the veteran tank battalion S-3 if all tanks were commanded by officers."

"Tonto" was the fourth tank to arrive, followed by more halftracks and the other tanks, as paratroopers gathered around, beginning to realize the seige was finally over. Noting the clean-shaven faces Dwight muttered, "Well, things don't look so rough around here to me." The airborne felt that discipline and morale were closely related. One of the paratroopers asked the veteran tank battalion S-3 if all tanks were commanded by officers, rather like the Air Corps, as there were three officers in the first four tanks. Dwight said no. But it was a significant observation; leadership in the 4th Armored was up front. Dwight then met McAuliffe who had come up to the perimeter.

To his salute, the general replied, "Gee, I am mighty glad to see you." Abrams joined them shortly thereafter.

Back at Assenois B/53 AIB under Lieutenant Robert "Potsi" Everson was committed to help clean out the town. Some 500 POWs, and heavy artillery pieces including four 88-mm guns and a battery of 105-mm

howitzers finally were taken. A/53 AIB passed through to clear the dense woods northeast of the town. Lieutenant Frank Kutak, though wounded in both legs, nonetheless directed the company from his jeep as the armored doughs worked through the fir trees. A and B company tankers of the 37th Tk defended the left flank of the corridor. That same night the division G-4, Lieutenant Colonel Knestrick, led a column of supply trucks and ambulances through to Bastogne, escorted by D/37 Tk light tanks. Wrote Patton happily-if with hyperbole-to his wife, Beatrice, "The relief of Bastogne is the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed and is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of this war."

CCB widened the corridor on 27 December, even as CCA of the 9th Armored came up on the left flank, and the 35th Infantry Division came up on the right. The Germans had already called off their Ardennes offensive. The high drama of the breakthrough to Bastogne had passed into a bitter struggle of attrition in the winter snows.

Critique of operations. The breakthrough to Bastogne vividly demonstrated what an elite armored unit in action can do.

- Though understrength and fighting under less than favorable conditions of terrain and weather, the 4th Armored Division brought overwhelming force to bear at the decisive point.

- The battalion task force organization was modified to one of joint infantry-tank company teams that leap-frogged one another in a column of companies to maintain the momentum of the attack.

- The reserve company passed through to attack the next objective even before the first objective had been secured, keeping the enemy off guard.

- The tanks' gyrostabilizers enabled them to smother the defense with fire while moving across the battle area, and leaning into friendly artillery fire gave the defenders no chance to recover.

- Preplanned and hip-shoot artillery concentrations, air strikes, and organic supporting bases of fire further overwhelmed the defenders.

True, such cavalier tactics would be less successful against a well-prepared defense; but in this instance, the Germans were not given time to prepare. Nonetheless, the principle of bringing the full force of infantry, armor, artillery, and air power to bear at the point of the main effort remains valid today, and is exemplified by the Combined Arms Team.

Of particular note is the quality of personal leadership, both in direction and by example. The company and even battalion commanders

were well forward or leading in their combat vehicles, providing leadership up front at the decisive point. Orders were oral, simple, and of the general "mission-type." This encouraged initiative on the part of junior officers who knew where to go and were confident their commanders were with or right behind them.

Lastly, at a time when many were bewailing the inferiority of the American Sherman tank, the 4th Armored maintained unbounded confidence in themselves and their equipment. For "armor" was a concept, of a combined arms team, and when all elements were brought to bear, they were bound to prevail.

Written by: A. Harding Ganz, Professor of Modern German and Military History, Ohio University, Newark, Ohio.

RESPONSIBLITY OF COMMAND

CAPTAIN WASKOW, ITALIAN CAMPAIGN, 1944

A few days after the cross-channel invasion of France in World War II, General Marshall flew across the ocean for a conference with General Eisenhower and General Bradley. We are told that they went over the military situation, as commanders do. Then, in a more relaxed way, they fell to talking about war and military leadership. They talked about historic commanders since Gideon. And they put up the question, what is the indispensable quality for the leader who must order other men to face death. The answer they agreed on came in one word provided by General Marshall. The word was selflessness.

That word is surprising. We expect of commanders a certain kind of self-assurance, a flair, an ability to dramatize themselves, a capacity to project a decisive image. What the three Generals meant, I suppose, was that the commander's concern for himself and his status must be less than his concern for the cause he upholds and the troops he commands, leads, and serves. I suggest another word that may help to interpret their word. My word is responsibility.

Responsibility flows both upwards and downwards in the hierarchy. The commander has a responsibility to his superior officers, as they exercise their lawful duties. He has a responsibility to the Constitution of the United States. As Maj Knight told a U.S. Senator in testimony, "Sir, I didn't take an oath to support the military. I took an oath to support the Constitution." It is a responsibility to international laws of war. It is, for many of us, a responsibility to God.

If responsibility--and particularly accountability--are most obviously upwards, moral responsibility also reaches downward. The commander has a responsibility to those whom he commands. To forge it is to vitiate personal integrity and the ethical validity of the system. In Lord Acton's famous words, "All power tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts absolutely." I don't know how often these days you hear the old slogan, RHIP. Rank has responsibilities. As the Bible puts it, "Everyone to whom much is given, of him will much be required; and of him to whom men commit much they will demand the more." (Luke 12:48).

There are commanders who understand that. In 1944 Ernie Pyle filed a story from the bruising Italian campaign. It was about the death of a company commander. I, a company commander in training for battle, read the story and aspired to be the kind of troop commander that Ernie Pyle described. I want to read part of that dispatch.

Captain (Henry T.) Waskow was a company commander in the Thirty-sixth Division. . . .He was very young, only in his middle twenties, but he carried in him a sincerity and a gentleness that made people want to be guided by him.

"After my father, he came next," a sergeant told me.

"He always looked after us," a soldier said. "He'd go to bat for us every time."

"I've never known him to do anything unfair," another said.

I was at the foot of the mule trail that night they brought Captain Waskow down. The moon was nearly full, and you could see far up the trail. . .Dead men had been coming down the mountain all evening, lashed onto the backs of mules.

The Italian mule skinners were afraid to walk beside dead men, so Americans had to lead the mules down that night. Even the Americans were reluctant to unlash and lift off the bodies. . ., so an officer had to do it himself and ask help of others.

I don't know who that first one was. You feel small in the presence of dead men, and you don't ask silly questions. . . They laid him on the ground in the shadow of the low stone wall beside the road. We left him there beside the road, that first one, and we all went back into the cowshed. . . We talked soldier talk for about an hour or more; the dead man lay all alone, outside in the shadow of the wall.

Then a soldier came into the cowshed and said there were some more bodies outside. We went out into the road. Four mules stood there in the moonlight. . . The soldiers who led them stood there waiting.

"This one is Captain Waskow," one of them said quietly.

Two men unlashed his body from the mule and lifted it off and laid it in the shadow beside the stone wall. Other men took the other bodies off. Finally, there were five lying end to end in a long row. You don't cover up dead men in the combat zones. They just lie there in the shadows until somebody comes after them.

The unburdened mules moved off to their olive grove. The men in the road seemed reluctant to leave. They stood around, and gradually I could sense them moving, one by one, close to Captain Waskow's body. Not so much to look, I think as to say something in finality to him, and to themselves. I stood close by and I could hear.

One soldier came and looked down, and he said out loud, "God damn it!"

That's all he said, and then he walked away.

Another one came, and he said, "God damn it to hell anyway!" He looked down for a few last moments and then turned and left.

Another man came. I think he was an officer. It was hard to tell officers from men in the dim light, for everybody was bearded and grimy. The man looked down into the dead captain's face and then spoke directly to him, as though he was alive, "I'm sorry, old man."

Then a soldier came and stood beside the officer and bent over, and he, too, spoke to his dead captain, not in a whisper but awfully tenderly, and he said, "I sure am sorry, sir."

Then the first man squatted down, and he . . . took the captain's hand, and he sat there for a full five minutes holding the dead hand in his own and looking intently into the dead face. And he never uttered a sound all the time he sat there.

Finally he put the hand down. He reached over and gently straightened the points of the captain's shirt collar, and then he sort of rearranged the tattered edges of the uniform around the wound, and then he got up and walked away down the road in the moonlight, all alone.

The rest of us went back into the cowshed, leaving the five dead men lying in a line, end to end, in the shadow of the low stone wall. We lay down in the straw in the cowshed, and pretty soon we were all asleep.

I give you Captain Waskow, a soldier who understood the responsibilities of command.

"WAR'S FORGOTTEN MEN"

THE OUTCOME OF BATTLES IS OFTEN CREDITED TO GREAT GENERALS AND CRACK UNITS. SUCH LEADERS AND FORCES DO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE. YET SMALL OUTFITS - SOME ORGANIZED, SOME MAKESHIFT - EVEN LONE SOLDIERS OR OFFICERS MAKE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS, TOO. THESE FORGOTTEN MEN RECEIVE NO GLORY IN THEIR OWN TIME AND LITTLE MENTION IN HISTORY. SOME SUCH MEN WERE THE GI'S AND JUNIOR OFFICERS WHO TRIED TO CONTAIN THE INITIAL GERMAN BREAKTHROUGH IN THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE IN 1944. THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE IS FROM THE CONTRIBUTOR'S BOOK, THE ARDENNES: BATTLE OF THE BULGE IN THE SERIES US ARMY IN WORLD WAR II:

On the morning of 16 December General (Troy) Middleton's VIII Corps had a formal corps reserve consisting of one armored combat command and four engineer combat battalions. In dire circumstances Middleton might count on three additional engineer combat battalions which, under First Army command, were engaged as the 1128th Engineer Group in direct support of the normal engineer operations in the VIII Corps area. In exceptionally adverse circumstances, that is under conditions then so remote as to be hardly worth a thought, the VIII Corps would have a last combat residue - poorly armed and ill-trained for combat - made up of rear echelon headquarters, supply, and technical service troops, plus the increment of stragglers who might, in the course of battle, stray back from the front lines. General Middleton would be called upon to use all these "reserves." Their total effect in the fight to delay the German forces hammering through the VIII Corps center would be extremely important but at the same time generally incalculable, nor would many of these troops enter the pages of history.

A handful of ordinance mechanics manning a Sherman tank fresh from the repair shop are seen at a bridge. By their mere presence they check an enemy column long enough for the bridge to be demolished. The tank and its crew disappear. They have affected the course of the Ardennes battle, even though minutely, but history does not record from whence they came or whither they went. A signal officer checking his wire along a byroad encounters a German column; he wheels his jeep and races back to alert a section of tank destroyers standing at a crossroad. Both he and the gunners are and remain anonymous. Yet the tank destroyers with a few shots rob the enemy of precious minutes, even hours. A platoon of engineers appears in one terse sentence of a German commander's report. They have fought bravely, says the foe, and forced him to waste a couple of hours in deployment and maneuver. In this brief emergence from fog or war the engineer platoon makes its bid for recognition in history. That is all. A small group of stragglers suddenly become tired of what seems to be eternally

retreating. Miles back they ceased to be part of an organized combat formation, and recorded history, at that brief point, lost them. The sound of firing is heard for fifteen minutes, an hour, coming from a patch of woods, a tiny village, the opposite side of a hill. The enemy has been delayed; the enemy resumes the march westward. Weeks later a graves registration team uncovers mute evidence of a last-ditch stand at woods, village, or hill.

"THIS KIND OF WAR"

E Company, 7th Marines were dug in on Hill 1282 overlooking the Changjin Reservoir, Korea. Captain Walt Phillips had positioned his unit as best he could under the circumstances.

Marines and Army were spread over many miles of bleak mountainous terrain, joined only by a fragile thread, the road. There was no one on their flanks. Eighty miles beyond the horrendous peaks they were guarding lay the Eighth Army. What lay in between no man knew.

The enemy consisted of three combat experienced Chinese divisions. Their commander, General Sung Shik-lun, was by far one of their most successful and experienced leaders. He had planned for a complete annihilation of the American units.

The November of 1950 was the worst winter in a decade. Water froze solid in canteens; rations in their cans. Plasma froze; medical supplies could not be stored more than eight feet away from a roaring stove at any time. Vehicles once stopped, would hardly run again. Guns froze, solid-all oil had to be removed from them; and many automatic weapons would fire but one shot at a time. The ground froze eighteen inches down. To dig a hole with chapped, numbed hands was prolonged agony; each night, each man had to dig his shelter nonetheless, and lie shivering in its shallow length through thirteen hours of darkness. The cold would destroy as many American fighting men as enemy bullets.

Each foxhole, painfully crabbled out of the frozen shale, held two men, and machineguns protected the flanks. First Lieutenant Yancey's platoon was in the middle of the hill, with Lye's to his left, Clements' to his right. Behind Yancey's position the company skipper, Captain Phillips, was positioned with his exec, Lieutenant Ball, to fight the company.

The moon came up, huge and swollen, rising clear and bright over the swirling ground mists. It came up behind Easy Company, silhouetting the company positions for the enemy, but not throwing enough light along the dark corridors to reveal the lurking Chinese. On the hill, the temperature had dropped to twenty below.

Easy's men heard monstrous shuffling sounds through the dark, as of thousands of boots stamped in the snow. They heard sounds, but they could see only ghostly moon shadows.

Yancey asked Ball, on the mortars, to fire star shells.

Ball had little 81 ammo, but he tried. The flares wouldn't work. Lifted from crates stamped "1942," they fizzled miserably.

Support from the 57th Field Artillery became nonexistent early in the fight. The artillery unit was also engaged in close-in fighting and was unable to support forward units.

The ranks of the Marines were now diluted with reservists, at least 50 percent. Few of them were mentally prepared to fight, or physically hardened to war.

But now, on the frozen hills, the Marines, regular and reservist alike, faced reality.

Because their officers were tough-minded, because their discipline was tight, and because their esprit-that indefinable emotion of a fighting man for his standard, his regiment, and the men around him, was unbroken-weak and strong alike, they would face it well.

The enemy mortars fell first, bursting with pinpoint precision among the foxholes on the forward slope of Hill 1282. Then, in the northern hills, bugles racketed; purple flares soared high, and popped. The Chinese suddenly became men, running at Marine lines.

The Chinese did not scream or shout, like North Koreans, they did not come in one overwhelming mass. They came in squads, yards apart, firing, hurling grenades, flailing at the thin line across the hill, probing for a weak spot across which they could pour down into the valley beyond.

Again and again they were stopped; again and again Chinese bugles plaintively noised the recall. The icy slopes were now littered with sprawled figures in long white snow capes.

Again and again, while the Marines' guns grew hot, they came back to flail at the hill. Looking down in the shadowy valley, John Yancey could see hundreds of orange pinpoints of light, as the enemy sprayed his hill with lead.

The night seemed endless. A grenade exploded close to Yancey, driving metal fragments through his face to lodge behind his nose. Many of his men were hit. Those who could stand continued fighting; those badly hurt were dragged some twenty yards behind the company position, where a hospital corpsman worked over them in the snow.

There was no shouting or crying. Now and then a man gasped, "Oh, Jesus, I'm hit!" or, "Mother of God!" and fell down.

The attacks whipped the hill. By the early hours of morning, most of Easy's men had frozen noses or frozen feet in addition to their

combat wounds. Yancey's blood froze to his moustache, dried across his stubbled face. Snorting for breath through his damaged nose, he had trouble breathing.

Slowly, painfully, day began to spread over the bleak hills. Now, Yancey thought, surely it must get better, with daylight.

Instead, things grew worse.

A fresh wave of Chinese, in company strength, charged the hill. Yancey's men fired everything they had - rifles, carbines, machineguns. The Chinese fell in rows, but some came on. At his lines of holes, John Yancey met them with as many of his men as he could muster, including many of his wounded. Somehow, he threw them back.

The platoon, all Easy Company, was in desperate straits. Captain Phillips, who had carried ammunition to Yancey's platoon during the night, and who had said again and again, "You're doing okay, men; you're doing okay!" took a bayoneted rifle, and ran out to the front of Yancey's platoon.

"This is Easy Company!" Walt Phillips said. "Easy Company holds here." He thrust the bayonet deep into the snowy ground; the rifle butt waved back and forth in the cold wind, a marker of defiance, a flag to all.

The wounded lay helplessly behind Easy Company; there was no way to get them out. And Easy Company was not going to leave its own.

The Chinese came again. Now they stumbled over their own dead, scattered like cordwood a hundred yards down the slope. And on the hill, Americans also fell over their own dead, moving to plug the leaks in the line. Small leathery-skinned men in quilted jackets leaped into the perimeter, overran the command post.

For over an hour, close-in fighting raged all over the hill. The Chinese wave was smashed, but Chinese dropped behind rocks, in holes, and fired at the Marines surrounding them.

John Yancey realized that some sort of counteraction had to be taken to push them out. He ran back of the hill, found half a dozen able men coming up as replacements. "Come with me!"

With the new men, he charged the breach in Easy's line. His own carbine would fire only one shot at a time; the weapons of two of the replacements froze. The other four dropped with bullets in their heads-the Chinese aimed high.

Beside the CP, Lieutenant Ball, the exec, sat cross-legged in the snow, firing a rifle. Several Chinese rushed him. Ball died.

Now Yancey could find only seven men in his platoon. Reeling from exhaustion and shock, he tried to form a countercharge. As he led the survivors against the broken line, a forty-five caliber Thompson machinegun slug tore his mouth and lodged in the back of his skull. Metal sliced his right cheek, as a hand grenade knocked him down.

On his hands and knees, he found he was blind.

He heard Walt Phillips shouting, "Yancey! Yancey!"

Somebody he never saw helped Yancey off the hill, led him back down the rear slope. He collapsed, and woke up later in the sick bay at Yudam-ni, where his sight returned.

Behind him, on 1282, Captain Walt Phillips stood beside his standard until he died. Late in the afternoon, a new company relieved Easy; of its 180 men only twenty-three came off.

But they held the hill.

This desperate action, like so many others in the surrounding areas, led to an orderly retrograde operation that prevented the annihilation of the UN Forces. This aggressive action allowed for future successful offensive operations that turned the tide of the Korean War.

Source Document: This Kind of War, T. R. Fehrenback, 1963, The McMillan Company, New York.

"Absolute good faith with the enemy must be preserved as a rule of conduct. Without it war will degenerate into excesses and violences ending only in total destruction of one or both of the belligerents."

Rules of Land Warfare
US Army, 1914

THE WRITTEN AND CUSTOMARY LAWS

1. The Hague and Geneva Conventions state that we, as American soldiers:

a. Will not inflict unnecessary destruction or suffering in accomplishing our military mission.

b. Will treat prisoners of war, other captured and detained personnel, and civilians humanely.

c. Will not obey an order whose exectuion is a crime in violation of the law of war.

d. Are personally responsible for unlawful acts.

e. Are entitled to humane treatment if captured or detained.

2. Customary laws (in summary):

a. Never destroy or seize enemy property unless military necessity requires seizure or destruction.

b. Regardless of military necessity, never destroy undefended towns, villages, or dwellings.

c. While we can attack defended places or military targets, we must strive to spare schools, churches, hospitals, and similar institutions from destruction. We must avoid causing suffering out of proportion to the performance of the military mission.

d. Rights of POWs:

(1) Food and housing.

(2) Medical care.

(3) Religious freedom.

(4) Personal property.

(5) Send and receive mail.

(6) Prisoner's representative - Senior Officer.

(7) Interrogation - name, rank, date of birth, military serial number.

(8) No method of torture (mental or physical).

(9) Observance of camp regulation.

(10) May be compelled to do noninjurious work.

3. By order of the Secretary of the Army:

"A commander may not put his prisoners to death because their presence retards his movements or diminishes his power of resistance ...It is likewise unlawful for a commander to kill his prisoners on grounds of self-preservation..."

THE LAWS OF WAR

HISTORICAL EXAMPLE

MALMEDY MASSACRE

DECEMBER 1944

Background Information:

On 17 December 1944, during the Battle of the Bulge, elements of the 291st Engineer Battalion under the command of LTC David Pergrin had taken up defensive positions in Malmedy, Belgium and were anticipating an attack from German units known to be driving westward. Around 1230 hours a convoy of artillery vehicles of Battery B, 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion passed through Malmedy heading southward to St. Vith. Although warned by the engineers that there were reports of German armor units in the vicinity, the convoy continued on their mission. Several miles south of Malmedy the convoy was hit by an advancing German armor column, the spearhead of the 6th Panzer Army, an elite SS unit commanded by Joseph Peiper. Totally outgunned and with their vehicles destroyed, the men of the 285th Artillery Battalion faced surrender or certain death. The 120 survivors chose to surrender. The account of what happened after their surrender is reprinted from The Damned Engineers, by permission of the publisher.

The prisoners were lined up in the field in a small space perhaps fifty feet square. The effort was made to use the big gun of a half-track to guard them, and failed, and then the officer in charge stopped two tanks. He wanted some heavy weapons to guard the Americans, he explained.

The tank commanders were not anxious to obey, but did. The first tank flagged down was Tank No. 731. This meant 7th Company, Third Platoon, Tank No. 1. The commander was M/Sergeant Hans Siptrott. The tank was a Mark IV. The driver was Corporal Gerhard Schaeffer. The rest of the crew consisted of a Corporal Wetengel, gunner, Private George Fleps, assistant gunner, and Private Arnhold, radioman. Fleps stood in the tank turret with his pistol in his hand, guarding the prisoners.

The other tank was No. 732. It was a Mark IV also. The commander was Sergeant Clotten, whose driver was Corporal Koewitz. Another member of this crew was a Private Vogt.*

*Deposition of George Fleps, War Crimes Branch Report, USFET, 1946.

There was now a long lull in affairs. The prisoners stood in the field and waited. They were cold and they were apprehensive, but they were behaving correctly. As has been said, they believed the long wait was for transportation to come up and take them to some POW camp.

Actually the wait was for rear elements of the column to come up.

The first rear unit to come up was a company of combat engineers, the 3d SS Pioneer Company. Major Peotschke conferred with their commander, then left.

Shortly after he left, one of the Pioneer officers approached the first tank, No. 731. "The prisoners are to be killed," he said to Siptrott, the commander, "and it must go quickly. Everybody is needed up ahead and there is not time to waste."

Siptrott said, "I don't have much ammunition."

The officer told him to do as he was ordered. Siptrott turned to Private George Fleps, who had his pistol out already, and told him to start shooting. Fleps raised his pistol and selected a target in the first row, took deliberate aim and pulled the trigger. The pistol shot sounded like a short, explosive pop. The bullet slammed into the driver of Lieutenant Lary's jeep, who was standing immediately beside Lary. To Lary it looked as if Fleps had aimed directly at him. The man fell, toppling backwards, so that he knocked down several men behind him.

Inevitably there was a reaction among the prisoners. The men started yelling, and at least two men standing in the front row swiveled about and began bulldogging their way through the group to the rear. One of them was Private James P. Massara of Battery B, and the other was the medical corpsman, Samuel Dobyns. Lary called out, fearing the men would break and run and call down further fire, "Stand fast! Stand fast!"

Fleps's pistol popped again and a medical officer, standing next to Sergeant Kenneth Ahrens, in the front row went down. Immediately after this shot was fired, within seconds, the machine guns of both tanks opened fire. The prisoners screamed and yelled, many of them instinctively throwing themselves on the ground, others milling about. Methodically, the guns raked across the group, left to right and back again, over and over, and again, mowing the men down like ranks of tenpins, until the who group, except one man, were sprawled on the ground. Fleps has said that one man remained standing, by some miracle, and that he raised his pistol again and shot him. Then his tank, No. 731, started moving. The driver jerked the tank unevenly as he moved off and Fleps was thrown against the edge of the turret, hurting his hip. He swore and rubbed his leg.

The machine gun in tank No. 732 continued to spray the fallen figures. Screams, cries, shrieks and groans filled the air at first. but slowly, gradually, as the machine gun played back and forth over the fallen figures, all sounds ceased. It had taken perhaps five minutes. The time was now about ten minutes after two. Tank No. 732 moved on down the road.

Up the road from the slaughter pen which the field had now become, Henri Lejoly had witnessed the entire scene.

The prisoners fell singly and they also fell in piles and heaps, and miraculously when the machine guns ceased their chatter, not all of them were dead. One who still lived, though he was badly wounded in the back, was Sergeant Ahrens. In the front row, Ahrens had been hit immediately, as he whirled about and flung himself onto the ground.

Another who still lived was Lieutenant Lary. Lary had thrown himself to the ground when the machine guns opened fire and he was not hit until on one of the later burst a bullet went through his foot, and another bullet hit in the fleshy part of the calf of the same leg. Both Lary and Ahrens had the wit to lie absolutely still and draw no further fire to themselves.

The MP, Pfc. Homer Ford, was not dead. He had thrown himself to the ground and had been hit in the arm. He, too, lay perfectly still and played dead.

Others still living were Private James P. Massara and William Reem who were not even wounded. Like a football tackle Massara had butted his way to the rear when Fleps fired the first time. There he had flung himself down and was shortly protected by the bodies in front of him. Still others living were T/5 Theodore Paluch, Kenneth Kingston and Carl R. Daub, a man named Smith and one named Profanchik. The medical corpsman named Samuel Dobyns had found wounds in four different places, but he was alive. Four different times as the machine guns traversed left to right a bullet had plowed into him. His companion, Roy Anderson, was also living.

There were others, more than one could have believed, who had lived through the brutal execution. Some lived through the first stage only to be killed a short time later. For as the column continued to roll by on the road, machine guns on the vehicles raked the bodies, and any man with a pistol or rifle who felt like it took a potshot at the figures lying in the field.

But now began the worst of the horror. Soldiers of the Pioneer unit came into the field and walked around among the piles and heaps of massacred men. If there was a sign of life the men were shot in the head, or had their heads bashed in with rifle or pistol butts.

When a head was bashed in with a gun butt there was a sickening thump of crushing bones.

Private Jacob Weiss, of a communications platoon, arrived during this mop-up. He stopped his half-track and saw most of it. He took no part in it but he watched as the Pioneers went among the men looking for a live one. He saw one Pioneer testing for death by kicking men in the testicles. A live one invariably reacted. He was then shot.

As Weiss watched he saw another Pioneer find a live one. He jerked the wounded man to his feet and stripped him of his field jacket, then his shoes and pants. Then Weiss heard the Pioneer say, "You can go back to sleep now," and he put a bullet in the man's head.

Another member of the mop-up party Weiss watched was Private Gustav Sprenger, who was eighteen years old at the time. Sprenger found five Americans piled together, too badly wounded and in too much pain to lie perfectly still. As Weiss watched, Sprenger put one bullet into each man. When he finished, he turned back to the first man and shot them all again. Six times he did this. When he finally stopped, he had fired thirty-two bullets into the five men. His pistol barrel was too hot to touch. He was aglow with killing! Excited and laughing.*

To Sergeant Ken Aherns, who made himself lie still where he had fallen, all the Germans seemed to be laughing. They were having a very good time with their killing. Only a few bodies away from him Ahrens watched as one of the Battery B medics, unable to bear the sounds of pain from a man beside him, raised up one knee and took his first-aid kit from his pocket and plugged the man's bullet hole with a wad of bandaging. In spite of the machine gunning, the medic evidently believed the Red Cross on his helmet would be honored. Ahrens watched as one of the Pioneers walked over and stood beside the medic, watied for him to finish the bandaging, then shot the bandaged man and the medic. He was joined by another Pioneer and the two men turned about, laughing together.

The two walked toward Ahrens and he though his time had come. He breathed as faintly as he could. "Dead," they said, and walked on Ahrens guessed that the wound in his back had soaked his uniform with so much blood it was easy to believe he was dead.

One of the German soldiers approached Lieutenant Lary and stood beside him while he loaded his pistol. His heavy boots were right beside Lary's head. Then a bullet went through the head of the man next to Lary, and Lary lay tense and waited, expecting to be next. "Todt," the German said, "dead," and moved on.

*Deposition of Jacob Weiss, War Crimes Branch Report, USFET, 1946.

Lary was apparently the only officer to escape death. Private Massara watched four of the Pioneers, lead by one of their officers, carefully search out the American officers and make certain they were dead by putting additional shots into them. Lary escaped because he had removed his insignia and smeared mud on his helmet.

Eventually it all stopped. Either the Germans were sated with killing or they were satisfied all the Americans were dead. And now the long column passing on the road had all gone by. No more vehicles were passing to take potshots at the men in the field. Lary was not absolutely certain but he later told Colonel Pergrin that he had counted around fifty tanks and about the same number of half-tracks that passed, after the massacre.

The men in the field still living lay still for perhaps twenty or thirty minutes after the long column stopped rolling by, but they were whispering to each other. "Anybody else alive?"

"Me."

"And me."

"Here."

"And here."

How many men were still livng and spoke up is not precisely known. But when they began to talk about making a dash for it, some fifteen or twenty thought they were not too badly wounded to try. And they wanted to do it right now.

Lary urged the group to wait until dark. A unit of Germans was still about the crossroads. They knew it. They could occasionally hear them talking. "We'll have a lot better chance to make it after dark," Lary insisted.

But the men also had good reasons for not waiting. "More Krauts may come along and finish us off."

It was finally Private James P. Massara, one of those not wounded at all, who stood up and said, "Let's go!" and led the men in the sprint. In a more or less solid pack they ran northward, up the field, toward Malmedy.

After one dumbfounded moment the Germans left to guard the crossroads recovered and turned their machine gun on the fleeing men. Lieutenant Lary, who had decided to make the dash when the men did, saw one of the men drop. The others kept going.

Massara and a man running neck and neck with him reached the woods safely and hid.

William Reem, Smith, Profanchik, and one other man also made the woods safely and hid.

Pfc. Homer Ford and three men with him fled straight up the field, reached the woods and were safe.

Sergeant Ken Ahrens and the men with him reached the safety of the woods and hid.

But about twelve men swerved toward Madame Bodarwe's cafe when the machine gun opened fire on them, Lieutenant Lary among them, and T/5 Theodore Paluch. Lary yelled at the men not to go inside, to follow him. Paluch and three men did follow Lary around behind the cafe. Six or seven of the men, however, could not resist ducking into the cafe. Lary ran around behind it, saw a small shed and dived into it. It held a pile of straw and other debris in one corner and he hid in it, pulling the straw over him. Paluch and the men with him evidently did not see where Lary had gone, for they remained behind in the cafe.

The Germans guarding the crossroads had seen the men run into the cafe, of course, and shortly they turned their attention from the fleeing men to those who had gone into the cafe. They dismounted their machine gun and approached. When they could not flush the Americans out with threats, they set fire to the cafe, and they did a thorough job. Before long the men were smoked out and as they tried to crawl out of the windows and doors, the Germans turned the machine gun on them and mowed them down. Behind the building Paluch and the men with him had played dead once more, in case the Germans came prowling. But they did not, and when the building began to burn the men crawled off, partially hidden by clouds of smoke, and made it safely to the woods.

From his hiding place in the shed, Lieutenant Lary heard the screams of his men as they were burned out and shot down.

INCIDENT AT MY LAI

The assault of My Lai was subordinate to a larger operation, commanded by LTC Frank Barker. Task Force Barker was conceived to destroy VC supplies, equipment and to entrap VC personnel. Son My Village, Quang Ngai Province, was the operations area. During the movement through My Lai, American soldiers massacred scores of Vietnamese civilians.

Available intelligence reported the presence of the 48th Local Force (LF) Battalion and 2 Local Force companies of VC in Son My. Estimated strength in surrounding areas was 200. Villagers in Son My and the subhamlets were considered VC and VC sympathizers. Strings of mines and booby traps harassed American troops in outlying areas. Members of guerrilla units often farmed during daylight, only to don the black pajamas after darkness to conduct assassinations, acts of terrorism, and sabotage.

Several hamlets comprise Son My. These include Ta Cung, My Hhi, Co Lucy, and My Lai. These hamlets were assaulted by A/3-1 Infantry, B/4-3 Infantry, and C/1-20 Infantry. Assignments for TF Barker varied, but Charlies Company drew the My Lai mission. LTC Barker gave orders to entrap and eliminate the 48th LF battalion and the two LF companies including logistical support basis and stores of heavy equipment.

On 16 March, TF Barker moved to action at 0735. This gave villagers time to clear out and move to the market as they did daily by 0700. For this reason, assault forces were told only VC would be present in the village. Following an artillery preparation, Charlie Company was dropped in by helicopter and assaulted My Lai at 0800.

Following his orders, CPT Medina, commander of Charlie Company, instructed his men to burn structures, kill livestock, destroy food, and prevent villagers from retrieving weapons from dead VC.

First platoon, led by LT William Calley, swept through the village searching for VC. Finding none, they began shooting down villagers as they ate breakfast. Members of the platoon burned huts and destroyed food and grain. Calley and his men rounded up two groups of inhabitants. One group of 70-80 men, women, and children was taken to a ditch east of My Lai and later shot. Another group of 20-25 was taken south on a trail, lined up and machine gunned.

Members of 2nd platoon also killed 60 to 70 Vietnamese inhabitants, and similarly burned and destroyed. Several soldiers in this platoon raped village women.

After having secured the landing zone, 3rd platoon moved through the village, burning and destroying what was left in the wake of LT Calley's and LT Brooks' platoons. Third platoon reportedly shot and killed 7-12 women and children and raped several women.

By early afternoon, Charlie Company had killed 175-200 men, women and children. Only 3 or 4 dead were confirmed VC. No enemy opposition was encountered and casualties were limited to those incurred by mines and booby traps.

Later on, reports of the carnage surfaced. Warrent Officer 1 Hugh Thompson, a pilot with the aero-scout team supporting Charlie Company, reported "needless and unnecessary killing" of villagers to his commander. In fact, he landed his helicopter several times in an attempt to prevent more bloodshed.

Subsequent investigations revealed that several orders went out to cease fire and stop the killing.

Following press coverage of the massacre, the Department of the Army ordered an investigation into the matter. Responsibility for this inquiry fell on Lieutenant General William Peers.

Post investigation actions followed. LT Calley and CPT Medina were both implicated. CPT Medina was acquited of all charges involving killing of civilians and later resigned from the Army with an honorable discharge.

LT Calley was the only man convicted of crimes, although as many as 25 officers and NCOs had been implicated. Calley was found guilty of premeditated murder of at least 22 civilians in connection with My Lai. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. Later, the sentence was reduced to ten years and after serving 39 months, LT Calley was released on parole.

SURRENDER

Note: CPT Charles B. McDonald commanded Company I, 23d Infantry during the Allied march across Europe in the Second World War. The following case study illustrates some of the ethical complexities of war. Company I had just completed night attack and had taken a prisoner. Charles McDonald recounts what happened on the night in January 1945.

Actual Account

The column started forward and then stopped abruptly. A slow, moaning voice came from the patch of small firs growing beyond the narrow ribbon of white that was the firebreak.

"Help! Help!" the voice cried, each word slow and deliberate. "Save me. Save me."

Every man stopped as if each had dropped an instantaneous anchor, and rifles dropped to the ready position as if by instinct. Darkness was almost completely upon us, and the men peered in vain toward the patch of firs to determine the source of the voice.

"Help me," the voice continued, the words heavily accented and spoken so mournfully that I could have sworn I felt the hair bristle on the back of my neck. "I am wounded." Help me."

"Come on out with your hands up," someone yelled.

"I cannot come," the voice said slowly, as it it were torture to utter each word. "I am blind. I cannot see you."

We continued along the edge of the trees until we crossed the northsouth firebreak. I halted the column and sent a patrol from the 1st Platoon to continue to the west until they contacted the left flank of L Company. I reported our location to battalion and assigned defensive sectors to the three rifle platoons. Our main defense would face to the south, but the 3d Platoon would defend our flank along the north-south firebreak, facing east. Numerous abandoned slit trenches filled the area, and the men begain improving them for the night.

I turned my attention to the prisoner, directing the two men who were with him to take him to the A Company positions. I had lost contact with the rear CP group by radio and wanted them to contact Lieutenant Smith, who should be at the A Company positions now. The men were afraid they could not find the positions. Our circuitous route through the woods had confused them, but they said they would try.

"Would you be kind to give me cigarette?" the prisoner asked.

"Why you Nazi, sonofabitch," one of the guards answered, kicking the prisoner in the rear, "of all the god-damned nerve. If it wasn't for you and all your ——— kind, all of us could be smoking now."

The patrol from the 1st Platoon returned. L Company's left flank was fifty yards beyond the right flank of the 1st Platoon. They were digging in for the night.

K Company reported by radio that they contacted the left flank of my 3d Platoon and were setting up their defense along the north-south firebreak. The night was quiet except for the scrape of shovels upon frozen ground and the distant pounding of artillery.

The two men who had taken the prisoner to the rear returned. They had made a quick trip.

"Did you get him back OK?" I asked.

"Yes sir," they answered and turned quickly toward their platoons.

"Wait a minute," I said. "Did you find A Company? What did Lieutenant Smith say?"

The men hesitated. One spoke out suddenly.

"To tell you the truth, Cap'n, we didn't get to A Company. the sonofabitch tried to make a run for it. Know what I mean?"

Help People
Reach Their
Full Potential

Catch Them
Doing Something
Right

CHAPTER 3

LEADERSHIP IN GARRISON

AN OUTSTANDING COMMANDER SHOULD HAVE TWO GREAT ABILITIES:

1. To know what needs to be done.

2. To know how to accomplish it.

—GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE

LEADERSHIP

WHAT OUR SOLDIERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT FROM THEIR LEADERS.

- Honest, just and fair treatment.
- Consideration due them as mature, professional soldiers.
- Personal interest taken in them as individuals.
- Loyalty.
- Shielding from harassment from "higher up."
- The best in leadership.
- That their needs be anticipated and provided for.
- All the comforts and privileges practicable.
- To be kept oriented and told the "reason why."
- A well thought-out program of training, work, and recreation.
- Clear-cut and positive decisions and orders which are not constantly changing.
- Demands on them commensurate with their capabilities - not too small, not too great.
- That their good work be recognized, and publicized when appropriate.

GEN BRUCE C. CLARK

WHAT BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO EXPECT FROM HIGHER COMMANDERS AND THEIR STAFFS --

- That their honest errors be pointed out but be underwritten at least once in the interests of developing initiative and leadership.
- To be responsible for and be allowed to develop their own units with only the essential guidance from above.
- A helpful attitude toward their problems.
- Loyalty.
- That they not be subject to the needling of unproductive "statistics" competitions between like units.
- The best in commandership.
- That the needs of their units be anticipated and provided for.
- To be kept oriented as to the missions and situation in the unit above.
- A well-thought-out program of training, work and recreation.
- To receive timely, clear-cut, and positive orders and decisions which are not constantly changed.
- That the integrity of their tactical units be maintained in assigning essential tasks.
- That their success be measured by the overall ability of a unit to perform its whole mission and not by the performance of one or two factors.
- That good works by their units be recognized and rewarded in such a way as to motivate the greatest number to do well and to seek further improvement.

CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD REASONS AND DECISIONS

1. The decision does not indicate partiality or favoritism to your own position. It does not benefit only you or a specific individual or subgroup.

2. The decision is universalizable. It applies to (is a good alternative) for anyone else in a similar situation.

3. The reasons or justification for the decision must be consistent with other standards, rules, regulations, guidelines, policies, principles, and organizational values. The decision does not undermine these principles, standards and values; rather it promotes professional Army values.

4. The decision will produce some action aimed at resolving the predicament. Not deciding or doing nothing still indicates a decision, and it has consequences for which you are responsible.

5. The decision sets an example for others. It enhances your integrity and credibility as an officer. It encourages others to have trust and confidence in you. It teaches a principle to others.

6. The decision shows an appreciation for moral rules and principles (e.g., honesty, fairness, justice, trust, loyalty, responsibility, obligation, wefare of the community).

COMMAND CLIMATE MODEL

ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION



COMMAND CLIMATE MODEL

INTERPERSONAL DIMENSION



Sergeant Wiley Fox

"No man is indispensable"

Wiley Fox was hardly the Hollywood ideal of a lean, mean Army sergeant. He was of medium build, bespectacled, with gray, receding hair and an ample, but not corpulent, girth that provided living testament to the rich food and European beer he loved so well. On leave in his small southern hometown he would have easily passed for a middle aged shop-keeper. Dressed in his black suit, white shirt, and tie he looked like a parish pastor. Puttering in his yard wearing bermuda shorts and a sport shirt transformed him into a recently retired courthouse clerk whose only passion was photographing roses. In Army fatigues he looked a bit like the good soldier Schweik who would have marched more smartly if the quartermaster had only issued him boots a size larger. In his dress uniform he appeared every inch the mild mannered General Omar Bradley who looked after his men with fatherly concern. His unassuming manners probably contributed to his effectiveness in his careeer specialty of military intelligence, for few would imagine that such an innocuous fellow could pose much of a threat until it was too late.

Yet Wiley Fox was a warrior, who was prepared to be absolutely ruthless in carrying out the professional duties that he described simply enough--killing people. He had been severely wounded in Vietnam, but immediately returned to the war zone upon his recovery. He exulted in war not because of the killing and carnage, but for the intellectual and emotional thrill of pitting himself against an equally cunning adversary. Listening to his war stories was like listening to the tales of a big game hunter, even down to the one that got away...

He also loved the Army and his country with a passionate, old fashioned patriotism that sounded strange amid the cynicism of his contemporaries. He became unabashedly misty-eyed when he talked of flag and country, and the sincerity and rhetorical style of his speech transformed the trite, jingoistic cliches of politicians into profound, inspirational truths. He transferred into the unit from Korea where he had suffered a series of mild heart attacks, but his determination to "go down fighting" was such that he managed to re-enlist for another six years without having a medical examination...

When he came into the unit he worked as the company operations sergeant, but quickly grew bored with the paperwork. He desperately wanted to have a platoon of his own, but none was available. After considerable conniving, wheeling, and begging he convinced the company commander and first sergeant to give him recent transfers and cast-offs from the existing platoons. He was ecstatic at the prospects, but confided:

"All they would give me is 34 men. That's not many, but it's a start. Damn, if I only had 60 men I could set this battalion on its ass."

Casual inspection revealed that the platoon looked no different than countless others. The uniforms ranged from neat to disheveled, and hair cuts

from evenly trimmed to ragged. The physical appearance of the bay was undistinguished in muted institutional greens and grays with a tile floor that was usually scuffed. The men spent their days as most others in the unit doing chores in the motor pool, cutting grass, shoveling snow, going to the field for training, and occasionally getting a job for which they had been trained.

Yet, to the observer familiar with other barracks, there were striking differences. The bay was partitioned off in cubicles by wall lockers like other bays, but here each area housed four to six men instead of the usual two or three. Bunk beds were the rule, and there seemed to be more wall lockers than residents. A quarter of the bay was a lounge area with a carpet, easy chairs, and a few magazines. The barracks orderly had a desk immediately inside the door, and Sergeant Fox kept his desk near the lounge area rather than in the platoon sergeant's office.

Wiley Fox orchestrated all of the platoon movements from his desk in the bay. He was always soft spoken with his mild southern drawl, and referred to the men by their first names or their last prefaced by "mister." The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox greeted each man as he made his way through the bay on his morning tour. "Morning Robert, how are you today? Have a good leave?...Barry, got some work for you today; hurry up with your breakfast...Kenny, you had an appointment with the JAG; was that today or tomorrow? Mister Dixter, top 'o the morning; you were late coming off leave, but don't worry about it; I covered for you...William, did you call your folks?..."

From his desk he only needed to mutter to himself, "Now where is so and so," and one of the men would go scurrying off to summon the man requested. It was not that he could not assume "command presence," but that he usually chose not to. The observer notes:

> At the end of the picnic only half a dozen or so men remained to kill the keg. Sergeant Fox suggested they police up the area, and I reached under the table to retrieve a cigarette package. Fox snapped out in a tone that permitted little argument, "Captain, leave the goddammed paper where it lies." "Sergeant Fox, how do you know I wasn't responsible for putting it there?" "Leave it lie! In my Army, officers don't pull police call."

In addition to his gentle speech, he had the habit of touching men when he addressed them individually such that their attention was riveted on him as he spoke. The observer notes:

One man requested that he be allowed to go get snow tires for his car. Sergeant Fox granted the request, but grasped the soldier gently

on his upper arm and counselled, "Now, whatever you do, drive carefully. In this snow, drive very slowly, and if some damned fool follows you too closely, just pull of the road and let him by. You read me? OK, son, see you when you get back."

Later in the morning a similar touch accompanies a routine inquiry:

As we approached the truck a black private was brushing snow from the hood. Sergeant Fox laid his hand on the private's arm and asked, "You get it started alright? God, I'm counting on you to have it ready to go at any time. How are your ears? Don't let them get too cold; if they get too cold you be sure and go inside." Listening to the sergeant, I got the impression this was the most important man with the most important job in the entire battalion, and judging from the private's expression as he listened, he had the same impression.

Like his gentle speech, his gentle touch could be modified to suit the occasion. The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox talked about handling each man as an individual. "Now you take Noble, he must have had a rough time growing up, and I'll bet his father beat him plenty. You can't talk to him like the other men; you first have to get his attention and make him afraid." "How do you make him afraid?" "I slammed him up against the wall and tapped him in the stomach a few times; that's all it took; now he listens when I talk to him."

Given the nucleus of an in-group, the structure grew by continual infusions of distinctive activities. There was always something going on in the platoon ranging from sitting in the lounge being quizzed for the promotion board, to planning a fifty-mile hike to recon the river, to building wash stands and showers for the next field exercise, to showing up the other platoons by shoveling all the walks before the others were up and dressed. The objectives of these activities were to fill time, allow each individual to contribute his skills, and most important, to provide a means for the men to know each other. The observer notes:

Sergeant Fox talked about keeping up morale during inclement weather. "You gotta do something with them or they start bickering and squabbling amongst each other. When we were on that temporary duty assignment it rained one afternoon, and they immediately commenced to grumbling. I loaded them on the truck and drove to the local historical society museum. You should have heard them moaning on the way, "This won't be any fun. Who wants to go to a boring old museum." When they came out they were singing a different tune, "Gosh, I didn't know this area went back to the revolution. Did you see that old cannon? Yeah, and can you imagine farming with them

wooden tools?" They grumbled, but they talked about that museum all through supper that night."

The out-groups were usually the other platoons in the company, and could be defined as an amorphous, sinister "they." An armed robbery in a neighboring company provided such an occasion. As Sergeant Fox told the story:

"That desk at the door is for the barracks orderly and a CQ in the evening. It's extra duty, but the men don't object. After the robbery I told them that nothing like that would ever happen in our platoon. If anyone comes in here with a gun, someone just distracts him while others get behind him, jump him, and stomp him into the ground." He then added with a chuckle, "I think the round the clock barracks guard was their idea."

The platoon was also remarkable for the absence of the usual grumbling about having no real mission. For Sergeant Fox, the mission was "whatever the company commander orders us to do," and he had the ability to endow the most mundane tasks with the drama of combat...

If the task at hand could not be accomplished with a combat motif, other strategies were employed. Fox continues:

"Whenever possible, I always say, have some fun. When I was operations sergeant I got a piddling little two man detail to pick up some trash in a long ravine. Well, I went to the stable and got a horse so one man could ride and carry the sacks while the other filled them. Hell, I had men volunteering for that detail." "How about mowing grass?" "Grass details are the most fun of all. I organized drag races with the riding mowers. Even persuaded the MPs to ticket a man for going three miles an hour in a two-mile zone. Company commander then called him out in front of the formation, read the citation, and told him not to get caught next time. Everybody laughed, and the man felt right good for being recognized as a fast worker."

In another sense, however, Wiley Fox defined his mission more broadly and more aggressively than simply waiting for an order from the commander:

"Most of these younger sergeants have spent their careers in Vietnam or in getting ready to go to the war zone. They don't realize that in garrison there really isn't very much for a soldier to do. Garrison is mostly just sitting around maintaining equipment that is seldom used. The most important job of a platoon sergeant is to aggressively seek out work for his men. If I can find only two hours of work a week that is in line with a man's interests, I have a better soldier. You always have to study the individual and then play to his strong side. I remember one unit in Germany I had a man who was

interested in photography. They were planning a new darkroom at the hobby shop, so I got him a job every afternoon designing and installing the darkroom. Another man was mechanically inclined, so we would scour the city on garbage hauling days for discarded bicycles. He fixed them up and we would lend them to anybody in the unit who wanted to borrow them. We got so many that we damned near had a platoon on bicycles. Then there was the Puerto Rican who didn't speak English very well. I didn't know what to do with him; all he ever showed much interest in was music. Then I hit on the idea of training him to modify American electrical appliances to work on the European circuits and vice-versa. It wasn't long until he was one of the happiest people in the unit. The Army doesn't like to admit it, but most of our "work" can be done in three or four hours a day."

Wiley Fox approved of drinking, but strongly disapproved of drug use. Every two weeks or so the sergeants in the platoon chipped in to buy a keg of beer that usually lasted two days before it was gone. He would buy anyone a case of beer on anything reasoning, "The important thing is that the men talk to each other. Makes no difference who buys the beer; just so we have a reason to get together." When asked how many of his men used drugs, he answered quickly, "none." He believed he had eradicated drug use by the conventional means:

"First, I got some films from the education center; you know, showing what happens to people on drugs. Then I took all five of them to the emergency room in a city hospital, and we watched the addicts come in all drugged up with scars running all over their arms. I also arranged for a marijuana sniffing dog to come through the barracks, and I let everyone know that I won't tolerate that stuff in my platoon. I tell them, "Go ahead and use whatever you want, but I'm going to catch you; it's only a matter of time, and when I do, you'll know you've been had. They quit using quite directly, and I haven't had any problem with drugs in the platoon at all."

A more likely explanation for his success is that he supplanted the role of drugs in the barracks with his own strategies for bringing men together, giving them things to talk about and issues on which to align themselves. In addition, his relationship with each man in the platoon was so personalized, and so intense that to be caught in disapproved behaviors would have betrayed a trust that each man was committed to maintaining. The personal concern began at the first meeting, with Sergeant Fox interviewing the new man about his hometown, family, friends, interests, girlfriends, and talents. The observer notes:

I asked him why he collected so much personal information. "I need it to be effective. Take Richards over there; he comes from a large family, his father ran off, and he has to send most of his pay home. Now when something goes wrong with the family, he'll go AWOL if he has to help them out. He likes mechanics, so I got him a part-time

job at a filling station; he sends his pay home, but makes enough at the station to get along here in the barracks. Donohue just broke up with his girl--happens every two weeks--so he'll probably need a little extra time off this weekend. Keefer lives in California; he needs a little help getting a military hop if he is to get home."

Each introductory interview was followed up with a letter to the man's family expressing the sergeant's delight in having their son in his platoon, advising them to be sure to contact the Red Cross if their boy was needed at home in an emergency, and requesting that they write or call him with any questions or concerns. Furthermore, although the company policy forbade accepting collect calls, Wiley Fox left standing orders that all such calls from members of his platoon were to be transferred to his home phone and that he would accept the charges...

Not only did the men have his phone number, but they were also encouraged to visit him and his wife at their apartment for fresh baked apple pie, milk, and cookies. Thus, Wiley Fox was never off duty. whether it was through telephone calls from the barracks orderly or through visits of the men to his home, he was always apprised of what was happening in the platoon and was likely to appear on the bay at any time. He was in constant motion picking up rumors, praising the men, counselling, joking and planning out loud the activities for tomorrow.

Wiley Fox did not last very long as a platoon sergeant, about six months at most. The unit was in the field for the annual graded exercise. He had prepped his men for weeks on ambush tactics, security precautions, and the grading procedures, yet he felt the unit was not really ready...

The first day of the exercise dawned clear, but with light snow. Sergeant Fox had worked all night preparing the men for loading the equipment. In the field, the snow melted and turned the area into sticky mud. By ten in the morning the tents were in place, the foxholes dug, and Wiley Fox had completed his first tour of the area. He stopped at a jeep to talk with one of other squad leaders, complained that he feared his angina "hisses" were acting up again, and then slumped to the ground. The squad leader knelt in the mud and slipped the nitro tablet under Fox's tongue as he had been instructed. The field ambulance would not start. Slowly, the nitro took effect and Wiley Fox was helped to a jeep for the ride to the hospital.

When he returned to duty, his request to return to the platoon was denied, and he went back to a desk job in the intelligence office. The platoon quickly reverted to the typical patterns of behavior described for other units. Wiley Fox could not comprehend why his platoon fell apart:

"It's not supposed to work that way. In the Army no man is indispensable. I set it up; I showed them how to work it; but when I left they forgot everything. Why? It's supposed to just keep going with new men and different faces. The parts are interchangeable in the Army, yet the platoon fell apart when I left. Why? No single individual can be that important. Why, Doc, why?"

"THE FOUR C'S THAT MOTIVATE"

By GENERAL DONN A. STARRY

More than any other single factor or combination thereof soldier performance is a function of motivation. Motivation, which makes training possible, comes from sound values, shared hardships and solid leadership. In the Army, the values that motivate soldiers must differ significantly from many of those held by society as a whole.

Since the soldiers entering our Army reflect the attitudes and biases of the society from which they are recruited, it will be necessary to train into the soldiers some higher order of values than those held by society. For example, the trend in our society is towards less and less discipline. Yet, if we are to retain our freedom, it is becoming more and more obvious that we will need more, not less, discipline. It is also certain that in modern battle, soldiers must display a yet higher order of discipline.

In the end, the values which the military profession must embrace if it is to serve the nation well are the same ones that soldiers must develop if they are to be effective. Slogans, themes and trendy advertising campaigns will not develop values. These spring from the heart of an Army--from its traditions, shared hardships and its leadership. The battlefield is the ultimate stage upon which the evaluation of values takes place. Sociologists speak of values; soldiers know and live values. On a battlefield, soldiers have a way of quickly discarding the worthless and unimportant and getting down to basics.

The first is professional competence. For a soldier, competence includes a superior sense of discipline and professional responsibility; it acknowledges willingness to sacrifice. It involves, among all other details of a soldier's job, developing the ability to live by and to train with the requisite values. It means the soldier's ability to do a job as a member of a team. Soldier competence is not talked about, it must be demonstrated.

Competence establishes who the leaders are; it cannot be faked, it quickly singles out the phonies. Professional competence is what makes XM1 Abrams tanks work perfectly, no matter how many or how few diplomas the crew may have. Competence makes radios work; it causes squads and companies to maneuver properly, no matter what may be their collective average ASV-AB or SAT scores. Without the professional competence of all ranks, effective military organization - large or small - is not possible.

Commitment is the second important soldier value. The profession of arms represents a commitment, an obligation - a word not often used

in our society. We seem more and more reluctant to make a commitment, for it means sharing hardships. Soldiers make few commitments - their world is small. If we train them properly, their first commitment is to their buddies, then to their crew or squad, then perhaps to their platoon or company.

Soldier commitment to larger units or to the nation is always much less than to Co. B or to the "Bandit Battalion." There is nothing wrong with that; in good Armies it has always been thus. Commitment builds on competence - one cannot exist with the other. Commitment on the battlefield is backed by a shared danger in which life is the stake; there is no higher bond. It is a pledge to something larger than self and there is no room for careerism, "what's in it for me," "look out for old number one."

Third among our soldier values is candor - truthfulness. Characteristic of today's changing society is the way in which the language is used to diffuse the truth. It may be we do not tell the truth very much anymore because it is often unpleasant. It may be that it is harder today to discern truth because modern issues are so complex. In any case, the military profession must hold in high merit the value of candor, the willingness and ability to discern and tell the objective truth.

In politico-miltary deliberations, candor, with regard to the capabilities and limitations of military force in pursuit of political objectives, is essential. Had we more of it, perhaps the legacies of Korea, the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam would not today be so burdensome. A willingness to tell the unvarnished truth is similarly an essential ingredient of soldiers and units on a battlefield.

The candor of the battlefield is why lies told there are punished not with gossip, but with action. In battle, it is always necessary to tell the truth; someone's life usually depends on it.

Finally, there is courage - the courage necessary to tell the unpleasant truth, to make a commitment to something larger than self, to insist on that higher order of values essential to a successful military profession and to understand and articulate convincingly the extent to which military force has utility in the pursuit of national objectives.

Courage is a very much talked-about value. In the young soldier's world, courage is not the absence of fear, for everyone has fears, all the time, every day. On the battlefield, they become all too real. Courage is the willingness to admit and the ability to control fear. Risk is the daily environment of soldiers, yet they alone decide how much risk they can endure. When they make that choice, they control their fear even to the point of total risk.

Courage is the embodiment of the other three values. Courage makes things happen and sees actions through the finish. Courage is the most simple display of competence, candor and commitment. Courage is contagious - it spreads rapidly. That is why soldiers will follow leaders into impossible situations. They recognize the courage of their leaders and it awakens their own, built on candor and commitment and competence.

The sum of all the values is military professionalism, and the real, honest definition is "quality." It is the only definition that counts. No amount of arguing about diplomas, grade points or test scores can describe soldier quality. It is finally the cumulative impact of those four values - competence, commitment, candor and courage - and the motivation to abide by them in peacetime as in battle.

In times of peace, values lose clarity in the haze of other matters of priority. But if we agree that an Army must prepare well in peace to do what it must do better in war, then it follows that the Army must abide by these values in peacetime and use them to measure soldier quality. Unless we practice, live and judge ourselves against these values today, they will not be operative on the battlefield.

If our Army is to be allowed but a few soldiers, then they must be good ones. And for the sake of the nation, their goodness must be measured not in terms of ambiguous scores, norms and averages, but rather in terms of their motivation, their values. Our experience is that successful leaders and soldiers at all levels do hold fast to these values.

Uniquely, they are values that fit well in our open society. They are the Army's "bottom line," "where we are coming from." It is also true, however, that we have not been entirely successful in instilling these values institutionally. Nor have we convinced either our supporters or our critics that they represent the "quality" by which they must judge us.

But convince them we must; we must reject any attempt to measure our quality on any basis other than the four values for which we exist. In peacetime, we practice tactics, strategy, weapons firing; we must do the same with our values, our quality.

Only from this perspective can we have an objective debate about a quality Army - one which numbers a few good soldiers.

SOLDIER MORALE

The one question most frequently asked by visitors to military units is: "How is the morale?" This question usually leads to a discussion of many things and usually ends in an agreement that the morale is "Excellent." I am aware of no commander who ever rated the morale of the men in his unit as anything but "Excellent." But I am sure that the morale in some units is "more excellent" than in others.

What is morale? Our manual on leadership defines morale as the mental and emotional state of the individual. As such, it is naturally influenced by many factors.

THE BASIS OF GOOD MORALE

Although morale is a complex and intangible quality, it must have a solid basis of these three factors which lead to a general feeling of confidence, well-being and accomplishment. Military leadership and management play a large part in providing the three factors, although the military commander alone cannot provide them all to the full extent needed:

1. Doing well,

2. An important job,

3. And receiving recognition.

ADJUNCTS TO MORALE

During the course of this article I will refer to these elements, but first let's consider the several adjuncts to morale which have an influence on units but which in themselves alone do not produce good morale if the basis of good morale is missing.

Good Management. We all like to be in a unit where there is good management, where things run smoothly, where things are planned, where men do not have to "hurry up and wait." The basis for good management is prior planning, thorough organization, and continuing supervision.

Well Informed. Men like to be kept informed ahead of time as to things that affect them or are apt to affect them. It is far better for the commander to keep his men informed, than to have them seek to get such information from rumors. Most soldiers enter into training programs and other military activities with vigor and enthusiasm if they know their purpose and the reason.

Well Trained. This is an important part of factor one. If a unit is not well trained, its men know it. This fact adversely affects their confidence, especially if they anticipate there is a possibility

of using that training in a critical situation. Every soldier likes to feel that he is playing on a winning team--he knows he can't win if he isn't well trained.

Chances for Advancement. Making progress is morale raising to all men. Knowing that there is an opportunity for advancement and that only excellent performance and preparation lead to promotion in a unit helps the morale.

Good Physical Condition. Good physical condition goes hand-in-hand with good mental condition. These two elements are basic to achieving good morale.

Good Administration. Men like to know that the administration in their unit is good, that their pay accounts and individual records are correct, that the date they are due for rotation home will not be overlooked, that their allotments are going through on schedule. These matters are very personal to a man and affect his confidence in his unit.

Confidence in their Equipment. We are the best equipped Army in the world. There is always better equipment under development than is in the hands of troops. There would be no progress unless that were true. The talking down of our equipment as being obsolete, the statements that we do not have the latest and best are detrimental to morale.

Confidence in their Leaders. Men expect their leaders to know their jobs, to share the hardships with them and to take a personal interest in their problems. The men like to see their leaders where things are going on--where the weather is bad or the night is dark and wet.

Comfortable Quarters. With a little encouragement men will fix up comfortable quarters under most any condition. They should always be made as comfortabble as the circumstances permit.

Good Mess. The food issued to the American soldier is the best that any Army ever received. There is no excuse in the Army for other than a good mess. Where messes are not good, command attention is lacking.

Good Mail Service. The importance of this should be apparent to all. The soldier counts on his mail--he looks forward with anticipation to every mail call.

Good Medical Attention. Confidence in the medical service is of tremendous importance to any unit, especially to a combat unit.

Post Exchange Facilities. The Post Exchange gives the man a source of small necessities and little luxuries so that he can vary the routine of issue items and have some things in accordance with his own wishes.

Leaves and Passes. A constant and well-implemented policy in such matters provides breaks in routine which are most beneficial. The leave program should be planned so that each individual knows approximately when he is going. He can then plan for it.

Religious Services and Character Guidance. It is especially important that an Army made up mostly of young soldiers be provided with facilities for religious services in accordance with their preferences and a program of character guidance with a view of continuing in the service the wholesome influence of home and community life.

Awards and Letters of Commendation. These means of recognition of good work play a most important part in factor three of the basis of good morale. A good commander is ever alert to detect and recognize good work.

Diversions. There are many important activities that fill up spare time, thereby keeping the soldier pleasantly and profitably occupied and adding to his contentment. Among these are:

Movies
U.S.O. Camp Shows
Dayroom and library facilities
Athletics
Well-equipped Hobby Shops

Standards. Soldiers like to be in a "sharp" unit. They appreciate the achievement of high standards in discipline, dress, housekeeping, police, maintenance, training, and athletics. The lift in morale that comes from impressive military ceremonies is an important factor.

Most of the various adjuncts to morale are expected by troops as a matter of course. Therefore, the presence of them does not necessarily add to morale but the absence of any of them is quickly noticed and adversely affects the morale substantially.

EVIDENCES OF MORALE

In discussing the subject of morale with visitors, I often ask and am asked: "What do you look for in a unit in order to gauge the morale?" Since morale is influenced by so many factors, there are naturally many indications of the state of morale in a unit. The

things I look into and note in making a quick size-up of a unit include:

Saluting. Is it well done? Do the men speak? Do they seem pleased to greet you? Do they come forward to report?

Dress. Is it uniform, neat, clean, worn smartly?

Good Housekeeping. Is the area neat, orderly, clean? Are offices cluttered up? Are bulletin boards neat? Are signs clean, neat, uniform? Are barracks neatly arranged? Has there been an effective effort to make the unit attractive?

Price. Are they eager to show their accomplishments? Are they eager to point out their history? Do they have something good to sell and try to sell it?

Participation in Charities and Unit Improvement Projects. These extra-curricular activities indicate the unit spirit in an organization.

Athletic Program and Support of their Teams. An athletic program, enthusiastically supported, on the small unit level so that many men actually participate,is always a favorable indication of morale as is the support of unit teams in competitions. Competition between platoons is most beneficial.

Church Attendance. This is a good indicator.

Soldiers Deposits and Other Savings. A man who is saving his money each month is "banking on his future" and is usually a well adjusted and confident soldier. When there are many such soldiers in a unit, there is a depth of stability in the organization.

Enlistment and Reenlistment Records. Except where unusual conditions exist, the records of enlistment and reenlistment are good indices of the relative morale in the units.

AWOL's. Where situations exist to make such offenses on the part of the man reasonably easy to commit, this item is an indicator of morale.

Size of Sick Call. Unless there are special reasons for it, a continuing large sick call is a danger signal in a unit.

Courts-Martial Rate. This often indicates morale in a unit, but it must be analyzed carefully for extraordinary influencing factors. For example, a very low court-martial rate may indicate not good morale, but a lax discipline.

Incidents and Accidents. Usually these occur in sizeable numbers only as a result of conditions existing over a period of time which set the stage for them. Because of this, they are an indication of the soundness of the basic structure of a unit which include the state of morale of its members.

Complaints to the Inspector General. These come about when men are not well informed and properly handled. Thus, they are an indication of morale.

OUTSIDE INFLUENCE ON MORALE

The factors, adjuncts and indications of morale covered so far have to do with those things that are generally within the abililty of military leadership and management to influence. But there are influences on the morale of soldiers, especially those on duty in a far-off land, which stem from attitudes of officials, members of Congress, the press, radio commentators and the public at home. These factors have to do with the last two elements of the basic premise:

2. An important job.

3. And receiving recognition.

It is necessary that the soldier feel that he is needed where he is in an important mission, that his sacrifices are of both immediate and of long range benefit to his country, his home, his family and himself. He will feel that importance so long as the people at home feel it. He is very sensitive to public opinion at home and, because of good television, radio, newspaper, and mail facilities, is constantly abreast of the attitude at home toward the importance of his job. The "home town" and other releases by Information Officers play an important part in the attitude at home. Unless the people at home help maintain in him the feeling that he is doing an important job for them, the heart of the basic premise upon which good morale is built is eliminated. Then the several adjuncts to morale cannot fully fill the void regardless of the efforts made.

The third element--"receiving recognition"--generally follows from the second, insofar as the attitude of the public is concerned. Visits, speeches and actions of officials, articles by newspaper correspondents and contents of letters which the soldier receives from home all affect morale. Because of this, every citizen shares with the military leaders the responsibility for the morale of the service personnel.

SUMMARY

The morale of a man in a military organization comes from many factors. It may well be summed up in one word, "Confidence." Confidence in his training, equipment, leadership, in himself, in his unit and in the support from home. The military commanders play a big part in it but so do civilian officials, members of Congress, the press, radio commentators and the general public at home. Together they must insure that the soldier does well an important job and receives recognition for it. So long as this is accomplished there is a general feeling of confidence, well-being, and progress in a military unit; and the report which states that the "morale is excellent" will be sound.

COMPANY LEVEL MENTORING

The process of taking brand new second lieutenants and turning them into experienced, capable company grade officers is a critical one. Yet suprisingly little attention is paid to developing lieutenants once they reach their unit. In many cases today it occurs on a hit or miss basis.

The responsibility of training new lieutenants in units falls clearly to the company commmander. A recent article in Infantry provides evidence that commanders and lieutenants have conflicting views on how well this critical task is being accomplished. Commanders have the perception that they provide sufficient feedback, but lieutenants are almost universally critical of their commanders in this regard. New lieutenants are often left to flounder on their own, even though commanders have good intentions and may believe they are giving enough guidance and attention to their subordinate officers. When questioned, most commanders confirm that they had the same problems when they were lieutenants. It is almost a parody of the vicious cycle of child abuse: the commander perpetuates the system under which he was developed.

Why is the system apparently perpetuating itself? Two reasons from the commander's perspective are 1) That's the way he was trained, and 2) he is usually so busy with daily requirements he doesn't recognize the need to work with a system which doesn't usually have command emphasis.

From the lieutenant's perspective, examine some of the difficulties that he faces:

o Not only is he new to the unit, he is new to the system. Even the simplest tradition, most basic task and regulation can be perplexing. Virtually everything is being done for the first time.

o There is a myriad of tasks the basic course only teaches once, or covers only minimally. Resource and time constraints do not provide excess training time for the new officer. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a new officer to be fully proficient as he graduates from the basic course.

o His self-esteem and confidence are continually assaulted as he copes with the difficulty of being a leader and a learner at the same time.

o He will likely be apprehensive of the "boss." Regardless of how often the commander tells him "the only stupid question is the unasked one," he is unlikely to ask a fraction of those he has. No one likes to look dumb in front of his boss.

o His relationship with his platoon sergeant can be positive or negative. A weak platoon sergeant may cloud the new officer's comprehension of the way officers and NCOs should interface.

o Finally, he is most likely alone, without any of his previous friends and in a strange geographic locality, often for only the second time.

As can be seen, the new lieutenant faces a demanding, complex, and (for him) uncharted environment. Yet his morale is probably high, and according to Col. Malone, he could be placed in the "willing but unable" category. He is a fresh slate upon which can be etched the lines of professionalism or scrawled the graffiti of ticket-punching careerism. All depends on how the chalk is wielded. Poorly performing lieutenants can be coached, guided and developed into meeting acceptable standards. Lieutenants who perform acceptably from the beginning can be molded into outstanding officers. Some company commanders have been known to label less capable lieutenants as "hopeless" (most commanders will swear they had to put up with at least one). However, there is a danger in lumping good lieutenants with an initial poor performance in the hopeless category. The poorly performing lieutenant is the one who most desperately requires development. Immediately classifying him as a "dud" is taking the easy way out.

Obviously something more than just occasional performance counselling is needed. The concept of mentoring may prove to be at least a partial solution to the problem. Mentoring/coaching has been well received at CAS3 and is currently a subject of hot debate in the Army. But what is a mentor?

Webster's Ninth Collegiate defines it as "1 cap: a friend of Odysseus entrusted with the education of Odysseus' son Telemachus. 2a: a trusted counselor or guide b: TUTOR, COACH."

Another definition, used by a recent survey of officers, explains mentor as "an older, more established member of an organization who establishes a personal relationship with a new member and actively assists the individual in a professional way to become oriented to the organization and to achieve within the organization." This definition is fairly succinct and about on the mark for our purposes.

"Leaders as Mentors" in the July 1985 issue of Military Review draws on civilian management ideas and studies for one concept of mentoring, which stresses some of the longer lasting aspects. Additionally, they cite the typical civilian age difference of 8 to 15 years between mentor and protege and voice concern over the lack of age differential between company commanders and their subordinates which may hinder the mentoring effort.

For military purposes, we need to acknowledge two subcategories. Personal mentoring is more the one-on-one relationship discussed in the traditional sense. Command mentoring focuses on the development of one's immediate subordinates. At the company level, the age difference is not as critical as the experience difference. The concept of command mentoring needs to be refined for implementation at company level. It cannot be a panacea; yet it can go a long way.

Specific ideas for developing subordinates (mentoring):

o Ensure the new officer knows how he stands. Counsel him frequently and, more importantly, coach him. The requirement for counselling via DA Form 67-8-1 is a step in the right direction, but more is needed. The new lieutenant needs feedback often, both positive and negative. Remember that one pat on the back is worth 10 kicks in the pants. Don't assume he can read your mind; he can't. Often an implied task that would be obvious to a more experienced officer or NCO will not be recognized by the new lieutenant.

o The new lieutenant needs to be constantly and increasingly "stretched" to act on his own but based on your guidance. Just as subordinate leaders need to understand the "commander's intent" in an operations order, new lieutenants need to understand the "commander's concept of garrison duties". This will assist his development by giving him a framework around which to base his decisions. Supervision and feedback will get him back on track or fine tune his actions. The key is direct, positive, and active involvement by the commander and not just letting the new officer learn by his mistakes. Each commander's duty is to develop each of his subordinates to be better than the commander himself.

o The XO (or senior lieutenant) needs to be fully involved. He is in a non-threatening position and is the perfect springboard for the new lieutenant's questions. Make it part of his formal duties and ensure he is not just passively assisting. There is every reason he should assist in mentoring the new officer.

o Establish a company level Officer's Professional Development Program that is more than just lifting beers at the O-Club. Practice, discussion, and training in technical and professional skills will be invaluable in giving the lieutenants a polish to their Basic Course training. Make time to talk with subordinates. Schedule time to leave the company/battalion area to ensure the OPD training will be uninterrupted and to lend variety to the training site.

o Ensure a healthy "command climate" is estabished so that the new lieutenant understands he will be allowed to make mistakes. The lack of such an atmosphere will kill any attempts at mentoring. The lieutenant must not be afraid of trying for fear of failing.

o Ensure that both you and your XO are good "role models" for the new lieutenants. Whether or not they accept you as such is up to them, but the example set must be positive and consistent with the ideals you verbally espouse.

Further on up the chain, the battalion commander can aid the effort by letting the company commanders know he holds them responsible for the development of their subordinate officers. As General Bruce C. Clarke said, "an organization does well only those things the boss checks or causes to be checked." This would certainly be additional motivation to commanders to pay more than just lip service to the development of their new officers.

The battalion XO's role must be one of mentoring the staff (since he is their rater). If desired by the battalion commander, he could be tasked with monitoring the companies' development programs by close coordination with the company commanders. His non-threatening position could help the company commanders better understand the battalion commander and provide an unofficial, experienced source to assist them in evaluating and implementing their own programs.

Finally, the most important aspect of mentoring--caring. As noted by others, mentoring is a two-way street. The mentor must care as a parent cares--intently, realistically, with an eye to the future of both the individual and the "family" (unit). He must be willing to take the risk of disappointment and face the reality of subordinate failure. On the other hand, the mentor may realize the satisfaction of seeing his subordinates develop and mature. The company commander must show genuine care in the development of his subordinates.

Command mentoring of subordinates is an idea which is in desperate need of implementation. New officers deserve feedback, a meaningful Officer Professional Development Program at the company level, and a healthy command climate in which they can develop. Without command emphasis and acknowledgement of the problem by commanders, the vicious cycle of poor officer development will not be broken.

The chalk is in your hands.

"A PROFESSIONAL ETHIC FOR THE MILITARY" (EXTRACT)

By GENERAL MAXWELL D. TAYLOR

I have set forth below a condensation of the principles illustrated in the behavior of the ideal officer. They reduce to six primary obligations which devolve upon any officer who would attain his standards; such an officer owes it to his country, his profession and himself:

- To dedicate his active life to the military profession and the fulfillment of its role in national security.

- To strive constantly for self-improvement with the ultimate goal the achievement of total fitness - professional, physical, intellectual and moral - for the duties of an officer in peace and war.

- To set a model of excellence in the performance of duty capable of evoking the confidence and respect of his comrades of all ranks.

- To demonstrate in word and deed the possession of the cardinal military virtues of competence, reliability, justice, courage and determination.

- To make his highest concern the discipline, training, and well-being of his men.

- To conform to the judgment of military experience that the ultimate measure of the professional worth of an officer is his ability to carry out difficult and dangerous tasks successfully at minimal cost in accordance with the decisions of his superiors.

COURAGE

By 2LT Richard S. Johnson Jr.

There is one challenge facing the junior officer that is with him always. That challenge is himself. It is the challenge to be better than the rest, to give his men and his mission the leadership they deserve and look for. To dare to give an extra measure of work when one's fellows want him to join them in doing the bare necessity. A challenge for each job--not just to do it, but to do it well, to do the outstanding.

We are given the responsibility of other men's lives and if we cannot control our own life--can we control theirs? Can we ask of our men something that we cannot give ourselves? Can we expect them to be followers if we are unable to justify the special trust and confidence of those who lead. The position of leadership is given to only a few; it is our task, our opportunity to mold men to accomplish a mission. We must do our best to make ourselves capable and worthy of this position. Leadership in its highest form is a thing that many strive for but few gain. Not enough young officers are willing to sacrifice for their jobs. They too often feel that the service owes them somthing and need not be given 100%. A diploma and a commission are not the guarantees of an education or a leader--they are merely keys with which to strive on farther--to enter new fields and achieve new goals. Thus an officer must continually strive to keep himself at least informed of, if not ahead of, current problems and situations. A job is not finished unless it has been given every effort at our command. Diligent study and hard work are as much the marks of a successful career as are the few moments of conflict--the "payoff"--that highlight of our lives.

Self discipline should be the mark of a junior officer and as much a part of him as his uniform. He must guide himself as surely as he would guide others. He must be ready to accept adversity and shoulder responsibility without hesitation.

Patience with the "system" is only the beginning; he must stand ready to improve it. But to ignore the way things are done because one does not agree is to admit defeat and to ignore a direct challenge.

Persistence to knuckle down and hang on when the going gets rough; not to be "bullheaded" but rather to never give up until every approach is tried. Small set backs, properly faced, build bigger men and better officers. To "give up" is to defeat the purpose for being an officer--that is leading men to the accomplishment of a mission.

Courage is a thing that can be displayed in many places and ways, before enemies or friends, juniors, seniors and comtemporaries. It takes courage to persist and to be patient. It takes courage to receive a reverse and then improve. Courage to go that extra mile, to work a little harder after others "knock off", courage to rise above the status quo. Courage just to do the right thing, to do the job properly while others go only half way. Courage to do what you think is right but courage also to admit that you are wrong.

Patience, Persistence, Courage--these three--but the greatest of these is Courage.

What is the rank and measure of an officer?

HIMSELF!

Lt Johnson's comments on the obligations of leadership were submitted by his father, Col Richard S. Johnson, with the following letter of explanation:

"I am forwarding for your consideration an essay written by my son, 2dLt Richard S. Johnson, Jr., USMC, in the spring of 1966, just before being commissioned in the Marine Corps.

An honor graduate of the University of North Carolina, he was commissioned on 6 June 1966 in the regular Marine Corps, the same day on which he graduated from college.

While at UNC he was a Morehead Scholar (the highest scholarship awarded for all four years) and was midshipman battalion commander in the NROTC unit. He graduated at the top of his class at The Basic School, receiving the Lemly Award.

He arrived in Viet-Nam in February 1967 and became platoon leader of the 3rd Platoon, Company D, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion. In the few weeks he was there he earned a reputation for fearless composure under fire in directing his platoon.

He was killed in action on 26 Mar 1967 (Easter Sunday) leading his platoon on a deep reconnaissance mission near An Hoi (2), Quang Ngai Province.

The rough draft of this essay was found among his personal effects by his wife."

When the Rangers jumped in at Point Salinas on the morning of Oct. 25, 1983, they met and rapidly overwhelmed substantial resistance by Cuban and People's Revolutionary Army elements. Those of use who have long been single-minded in pursuit of good training were quite proud of their achievements. Training, not superior numbers or overwhelming firepower, was the critical ingredient of success in this action.

Training is the element which needs continuing attention for all our ground forces, since we can never be sure that we will outnumber or outgun our enemy.

But, how do we emphasize training? What is good training? When is a unit fully trained to be fully ready?

In 1941, the 4th Armored Division was activated. I was a battalion commander in the new Division; I later was its chief of staff and then the commander of Combat Command "A", until I was transferred on Nov. 1, 1944, after we had won the Battle of France.

Just prior to the activation of the Division, I was sent by the Chief of the Armed Forces with three others to England to see what we could learn from British troops who had recently come out of Dunkirk. I spent two months with the British 1st Armored Division, observing training, talking to the officers and men, and thinking how we should be trained to force a crossing of the Channel, break out of the beachhead and drive the Germans out of France.

It was obvious that that would be the mission, in cooperation with the British, two or three years hence, of the American Army in England. The new 4th Armored Division would be a part of this operation. As we started to train the 4th Armored Division, we knew the enemy, the terrain, the probable weather, the problem of crossing the English Channel and the logistics problems involved.

We trained at Pine Camp, NY, in the desert, in Texas and in large maneuvers. We trained in hot weather and in cold. From basic training to advanced training we trained under commanders who emphasized perfection.

We arrived in southern England several months before "D" Day. We had an opportunity to conduct combat command exercises on Salisbury Plain with combat commands of various compositions of rank, infantry, FA, combat engineer and service units. We practiced our tactical concepts in the attack, pursuit, but little in the defense. That was probably an error in our training, as the "Bulge" pointed out to our Army in December 1944.

What were the details of training that made the Division outstanding?

1. It was excellent in the basic fundamentals of soldiering.
2. Each training period was introduced with the statement of the purpose of the training.
3. Each training period was terminated with a "critique" of the exercise.
4. Training was well-prepared and conducted.

5. Wasting training time was a crime.

By the way, these are also the details reflected in the Rangers' accomplishments, particularly excellence in the fundamentals such as marksmanship and fire and movement.

What is the single purpose of all training in the Army?

It is to replace the bad habits of officers, men and units with good habits. Bad habits in battle increase casualties and often lose battles.

In discussing the problems of "training," Vince Lombardi emphasized basic training, good habits, and the critique after a game; he stated very emphatically:

"Practice does not make perfect; only perfect practice makes perfect."

The keys for officers and NCOs during all this process are:

"Preparation" and "Motivation."

Rating a unit by its good and bad habits is pretty valid.

An outstanding commander should have two great abilities:

1. To know what should be done.
2. To know how to accomplish it.

This applies to training in all units, not just the Rangers!

ON
LEARNING/INSTRUCTION

- Unless someone learns, you didn't teach.

- Giving instructions so they can be understood is not enough. They must be given so they can't be misunderstood.

- When an organization is sound, it approaches being superior by the accumulation of a lot of "little pluses."

- An organization that is reasonably well trained can be kept well trained by less than 20 hours of good "training" a week.

- Do not dignify other activites by calling them "training."

- Curtail the written instructions to the company level -- replace them with oral instructions to company commanders by the battalion commander and his staff.

- Our schools should train leaders and commanders in how to train for battle, not just for battle.

- Start off each period of instruction with two statements:

  -- Tell them what they are going to learn today.
  -- Tell them why they need to know it.

- The principal job of the army in the next 15 years appears to be training individuals and the producing of units of all kinds, ready to carry out operations. The commander who can do that will rise in the army.

- Good training starts with good training management. Battalion, regiment, brigade, and division commanders and their staffs should be well qualified in this. Our professional Army schools, to include career, C&GSC, and AWC, should stress this and the techniques necessary to carry out good training plans.

THE TECHNIQUES OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN AN

OUTSTANDING COMMANDER (Managers also)

- They were practical and advanced planners.
- They issued good, timely and adequate directives to staffs and subordinates that not only could be understood but that could not be misunderstood.
- They adequately coached their staffs and subordinates in how to play on the teams they commanded.
- They were good and constant observers of situations and results, using their staffs to assist.
- They critiqued their staffs and subordinates periodically; pointing out the good and the not-so-good actions, and giving more coaching when needed.
- They were able to motivate their people to carry out well their instructions and duties.
- They were skilled in performing effectively the techniques of command.
- They did not procrastinate in carrying out their responsibilities.
- They did not fail to recognize outstanding results produced by their subordinates and to publicize them as appropriate.
- They constantly remembered that their commands did well only those things which they checked.

Of course, these characteristics apply to all levels of command from company on up; similarly to all levels of management.

-- General Bruce C. Clarke

ABLE AND WILLING

Dandridge M. Malone

A really good soldier is both able and willing. But that's not really news. You probably already know that developing soldiers means building skill and will. And you know that building skill, or training, is the primary task and the principal responsibility for any company-level leader this side of the battlefield. You know, too, that every time you build skill, you automatically build will.

In general, these things apply to developing all soldiers. But because each soldier is different, you may need some how-to's for developing the individual soldier, because what works well for building skill and will in one soldier may not work at all for the next. (It would if soldiers were machines, but they're not.)

Your goal, then, is a simple one--to produce a man who is both able and willing. Some soldiers are always able and willing. They have the skill and the will no matter what task you give them to do. Others, of course, have the will (they try very hard) but not the skill (whatever they touch turns to mud). Still other soldiers have the skill to do a task you give them, but not the will--you have to stand over them and make them do the task.

So if you want to develop soldiers as individuals, you have to start by sizing each one up in terms of how able he is and how willing he is. In short, make an estimate; check his headspace with an "able and willing gage." This simple basic estimate works, and it can save you time, help, you do the right things right, and--in addition to that--it's logical. It makes good sense for a leader to come down hard on a soldier who has the ability to do a task but won't do it. On the other hand, it makes no sense at all to come down hard on a man who is trying his best but has never really been taught the skills he needs to do a given task. Knowing how to judge a soldier in terms of "able and willing" is the first step in developing soldiers as individuals.

Listed below are some traits and characteristics of soldiers in each of the four different categories of "able and willing." As you study these, think about the immediate subordinates you have right now, about each one as an individual. Few individuals will fit clearly and completely in any one category. But if you'll think about a man, you'll see that one of these four categories seems to describe him better than the others.

An able and willing soldier

- Has done the task right before.

- Does many other tasks without being told.
- Never seems satisfied until a job is done "right."
- Accepts the need to put in extra time when necessary to get the job done.
- Works out ways to get the job done better.
- Has been satisfactory in his performance recently.

An unable but willing soldier

- Has never performed the task before, or can't recall it if he has.
- Has been enthusiastic, particularly in performing tasks similar to what you want him to do now.
- Pays close attention to your instructions.
- Watches others doing same task; asks questions.
- Spends some of his own time learning or practicing.

An able but unwilling soldier

- Has performed recently off and on—sometimes to standard, sometimes below standard.
- Has done the job right before, but keeps asking for instructions and assistance.
- Doesn't appear to be concentrating; work is sporadic, poorly planned.
- Lacks confidence in himself and his work.

An unable and unwilling soldier

- Has never performed the task to standard.
- Has performed below standard recently, even when he has received a lot of assistance and instructions.
- Seems satisfied with below standard results.
- Pays little attention to instructions; half-listens.

Go ahead and try it. In which category does Smith fit best? And Jones? And so on down the line. If you know your man, as the Sixth

Principle of Leadership requires, you'll get the right man in the right category about 90 percent of the time.

The descriptions under each of these four categories are only rough indicators, of course, because each soldier is different. A big part of your job is knowing the differences, then using that knowledge to be a better and smarter leader. The ability to judge a subordinate on how well he measures up on both sides of the "able and willing" scale is another of those basics that you have to learn, practice, think about, and turn into an instinct.

But once you have decided generally which category each soldier fits into, how do you work with different types?

QUARTERBACK

A soldier who is fully "able and willing" should be your living standard in the task of developing soldiers. You should work with an able and willing soldier as if you were a coach with a good quarterback. He can operate with mission-type orders and probably call most of his own plays. He does the right things right. He should not be given close supervision. What this soldier does best is to get your job done and save you time. He earns your trust. This is the kind of man you want to start growing to bring into the leadership ranks. And, finally, if you want to do the tricky business of developing your soldiers right, delegate important jobs only to soldiers like him--to the men you feel are able and willing. The others will seldom get the job done.

The "willing but unable" soldier is the one who usually comes to you in the replacement stream, the new guy. You work with this man as if you were a teacher. There will be a lot that he doesn't know. His initial entry training will have given him only two-thirds of the skills that his MOS calls for. And he has probably never seen an operational unit. This soldier needs careful handling. He believes most of the rumors he hears, and can easily become discouraged and frustrated. He can be led off on the wrong track. He needs patient instruction and a lot of feedback. He will eat up much of your time but, in this case, putting in the extra time is like putting money in the bank.

The "able and unwilling" soldier is your main challenge. You know you have a good horse, but when you take him to he water, he just won't drink. You work with this man as if you were a father. His unwillingness may be only a lack of confidence. If so, all he needs is a nudge--an opportunity and some encouragement. On the other hand, that able and unwilling soldier may have a real problem--maybe with a young wife, or with a big debt, or with himself. The best thing you can do is let him tell you about it. Listen to him carefully. About five percent of the time, the able but unwilling soldier may just be

shirking. In either case--the man with the problem, or the shirker--insist that he complete the task, and make him do it to your standards. The man with the problem will feel he has done something worthwhile; the shirker will learn that, with you, the "shirk" won't work.

The "unable and unwilling" soldier shouldn't be in your unit in the first place. But somewhere along the line, the poor leader knowingly passed him on, or just let him slip through. You work with this man as if you were a warden. He doesn't know how to do his job, and he doesn't care about learning. He is a "quitter." But you don't punish him. If you punish a quitter, that means he's smarter than you are. Why? Well, if he doesn't want to do his job, and you punish him instead of making him do it, then he gets what he wants--he gets out of doing the job. You are actually rewarding him. He has outsmarted you. So, instead of punishing him when he quits on you, make him complete the task.

Making the unable and unwilling soldier complete a task to standards has another advantage. Maybe you'll lead him to something he's never learned much about--success at some skill. And maybe that success will build a little more willingness, and he'll try another skill. And there he goes, a finally turned-on soldier.

The Commanding Officer Can't Win

Reprinted from Infantry Magazine
July-August 1970

If he has just taken command, it will be sometime before he gets to know the unit.

If he has commanded the unit for some time, it is time for a change.

If his previous assignment was staff duty, he has been away from troops too long.

If he has had a lot of command experience, he is in a rut and needs to go back to school.

If he is a five percenter, he is too green to carry his rank.

If he made his rank with his class, he is no genius.

If he questions the judgement of higher headquarters, he is fighting the problem.

If he concurs with the higher headquarters, he is a bootlicker who lacks guts.

If he tries to make the system work for him, he is not practical and does things the hard way.

If he cuts corners, he will get is fingers burned if he hasn't already.

If he makes immediate decisions, he is impulsive and doesn't consider the ramifications.

If he studies before making a decision, he is indecisive.

If he supervises his subordinates closely, he doesn't trust them and has them running scared.

If he leaves his subordinates alone, he is not interested in their work and encourages them to goof-off.

If he leaves his subordinates to work through the chain of command, he makes himself too inaccessible.

If he takes charge, he should delegate more authority.

If he delegates authority, he is a shirker.

If he emphasizes training, he neglects maintenance.

If he emphasizes maintenance, he neglects training.

If he supports his officers and NCOs, they have him snowed.

If he questions their judgement, he undercuts their morale.

If he has an open-door policy and makes himself accessible, he is probably allowing his personal feelings to interfere with his better judgement.

If he has a lengthy meeting to discuss details, he underestimates the intelligence of his subordinates and wastes their time.

If his meetings are brief, they are too general.

If his unit has a low court martial rate, the troops are getting away with murder.

If his unit has a high court martial rate, it is a reflection of his inability to command.

If he is a Spartan with his troops, he is a sadist.

If he is considerate of his troops, he coddles them.

If he ... well, whatever he does, it is wrong, it's a miracle that he has been retained in the Army. He ought to retire while he is ahead.

SOLDIER LORES

This section is a list or sampling of "SOLDIER LORE" items learned through experience.

A. SOLDIERLY APPEARANCE.

1. Use a black Magic Marker for quick touch-ups on subdued brass.

2. Use pencil erasers to replace lost clutch fasteners on brass.

3. Use a quarter (25¢ piece) to measure the proper distance for enlisted brass when applying to Class A uniform.

4. Soak the helmet camouflage cover in hot water prior to stretching over the steel pot to insure a snug fit.

5. Heat Kiwi brand polish prior to applying to shoes or boots and then shine with cold water for a quicker shine. Be careful of fire!

6. To remove lacquer from uniform brass, soak the items in a small quantity of Liquid Plumber and rinse thoroughly with cold water (avoid smelling fumes).

7. "US is always right"--the rule for putting on the enlisted brass.

8. After cleaning brass, wipe with tissue and lighter fluid for cleaner brass and longer lasting shine.

9. Carry a paper clip in the pocket of your green blouse to attach a button hole when the thread breaks unexpectedly.

10. Loose threads on fatigue uniforms should be burned off with a match or lighter, not pulled off.

11. Use toothpaste or cigarette ashes to polish brass when out of Brasso.

12. Don't be caught with worn-out uniforms. Set aside a small amount of your pay each month to make needed repairs or to replace worn-out items.

13. Keep one set of uniforms for special occasions and guard mount. Be the "Soldier of the Day."

B. GARRISON LIVING.

1. Use a dollar bill to measure the white collar when making bunks.

2. Use small boxes (shoe boxes, cigar boxes) to store items in wall lockers and footlockers.

3. To avoid being locked out of wall lockers and footlockers, place duplicate keys in sealed envelopes and turn them in for storage in unit safe.

4. Always shine boots and shoes immediately after wearing to save time later and protect leather during periods of nonwear. Before polishing, use shoetrees to keep their proper shape; also, clean periodically with saddle soap and water and then let dry before applying polish.

5. Mark all personal and high value items with last name and last four digits of SSN.

C. PACKING FOR THE FIELD.

1. When packing equipment, place like items in separate plastic trash bags. This keeps equipment dry and handy and will aid in flotation of rucksack (an additional plastic bag is useful for dirty clothes or wet items).

2. Carry "Wash and Dry" towelettes for quick clean up.

3. To reduce bulk, put MRE items in a sock and dispose of packing materials.

4. Carry only the portions of the meals you desire to eat.

5. For short trips, leave tents behind. Ponchos make great shelters when set up as lean-tos.

6. Carry extra toilet paper or paper towels in a plastic bag between helmet liner webbing and top of liner.

7. A large plastic trash bag can be used as a raincoat by cutting holes for neck and arms and slipping on like a tee-shirt. It can also be cut down the side to make a waterproof ground cloth.

8. Tape loose web gear straps for security and to ensure noise discipline.

D. FOOT MARCHES.

1. Rub inside of boot socks (side next to skin) with soap prior to road march to prevent blisters.

2. During tactical road marches/tactical movement, the pace-man should have a shoelace on his LBE to tie knots in to keep track of distance covered (one knot per 100/1,000 meters).

3. Attach Velcro fasteners to underneath side of LBE harness to avoid slipping, scratching, or scraping the shoulder area (particularly useful for thin shoulders).

4. To reduce the possibility of incurring shin-splints, strains, and blisters, walk on ground adjacent to road rather than pavement, especially on hot, sunny days.

5. Put distinctive markings inside boots to insure proper daily rotation.

6. Use dummy cords on weapons during road marches. This will substantially reduce searching for lost weapons.

7. Apply Vaseline on the bottom of feet before a road march to cut friction and prevent blisters. Also good for feet and between toes before long runs.

8. Carry extra socks on road marches. Remove boots during breaks, dry feet, apply powder, and change socks.

9. Moleskin on high friction areas, such as heels, will help prevent blisters on road marches.

10. On long road marches, carrying something in your mouth, such as gum, a small pebble, etc., to prevent a dry mouth.

11. Wear only one pair of socks at a time while on a road march. Recent studies indicate that wearing two pairs of socks will increase friction on certain parts of the foot and thus increase the chance of blisters. Two pairs of socks also increase the chance of stress fractures when walking on hard surfaces.

12. Carry your wallet in the upper shirt pocket to keep from rubbing a "hot spot" on your hip.

13. Use the buddy system to avoid both heat and cold injuries. Teach one another to observe for signs of injury to each other.

14. A "cat hole" is a method of depositing waste when on a march. Dig a small hole 1 foot deep, deposit the waste, and cover the hole.

E. COOKING IN THE FIELD.

1. Use heat tabs or liquid insect repellent to start fires with wet wood.

2. To aid in fire starting, light a sugar packet under kindling.

3. To make the fire on kindling wood flare up, sprinkle MRE cream substitute on the flame embers.

4. To keep matches dry in wet weather, paint wooden matches with fingernail polish or dip in warm wax.

5. Mix MRE peanut butter with liquid mosquito repellent to make an expedient fuel for cooking.

6. Use a small can for a stove by removing both ends and then punching air holes around the rims with a P-38 can opener. Fuel can either be heat tabs or cardboard and wax.

7. If the canteen cup is used for heating meals, soap the outside of the cup before placing on the fire. This will aid in removal of soot and carbon deposits.

8. Rations can be heated by placing cans on the exhaust manifold or an M113 or tank.

9. Utilizing empty No. 10 cans, a small stove and frying pan can be constructed. These items can be used several times before throwing them away.

10. Onions, hot sauce, lemon pepper, salt, salad dressing packets, etc. can be carried in a small plastic bag to help spice-up meals.

11. Cheese spread can be added to spaghetti, bean, or meat entrees.

12. Cream substitute and sugar can be added to hot chocolate to improve consistency and flavor. Cream and sugar or hot chocolate can be mixed into a paste to make icing for cake or nut roll.

13. To make fruit cobbler, divide fruit between two cans, break up crackers into each, heat, and add sugar to offset the salt on the crackers.

14. All meats can be improved by frying and adding lemon pepper.

15. To make fruit cobbler, add several packets of sugar, a couple packets of cream substitute, and two crushed crackers to hot fruit and stir.

F. FIELD LIVING.

1. If duties require reading a map, punch a small hole in the red filter of a flashlight near the edge. This will enable you to see the brown contour lines that are invisible when viewed under a red only light source. Also, don't write on a map with a red grease pencil.

2. To aid in using camouflage sticks, rub your face with an oily substance first (Vaseline, mosquito repellant, or Noxema). This will aid in application and clean-up.

3. When camouflage sticks are unavailable, burnt cork or wood, ashes, or carbon from vehicle exhausts will do the job.

4. Use colored plastic sheets in traffic cone flashlights for unit color coding.

5. To signal aircraft or distant ground units at night, place a white-lensed flashlight in the breech end of an M203 grenade launcher barrel. The result is a thin beam of light that can't be seen from the sides on the ground.

6. Waterproofing material used in packing mortar canisters can be broken open to use as candles. Twist tightly together, light the top, and it will burn slowly.

7. Tie a knot in the end of a boot lace to use in cleaning rifle bore. Cleaning patches can be used by threading on the lace.

8. Take 6 feet of nylon parachute cord in your rucksack. This can be used to set up a clothesline from pole to pole in a pup tent, to make tripods for washstands, etc.

9. Two sticks can be placed in the ground and boots slipped over them at night to keep insects and small animals out of them.

10. If using a sleeping bag without a tent, set bag up underneath low hanging vegetation to prevent dew and condensation from forming on your bag.

11. Pencil lead rubbed on rusty weapon barrels will remove rust and protect metal from moisture.

12. Place your wallet, maps, or other documents in plastic bags to protect them from moisture.

13. Shave and bathe before going to bed for better sleeping and more time in the morning.

G. DO'S AND DON'TS FOR COLD WEATHER.

1. The key to keeping warm in cold climates is to wear the correct clothing, keep it clean, keep it dry, wear it in loose layers, and avoid overheating.

2. During extreme cold, pull your fingers out of the fingers in the black leather gloves and into the palm of the hand. In this way you use the glove as a mitten, which will keep your hands warmer. Do this for short periods of time until your hands are warm.

3. Always have an extra pair of black leather gloves and wool inserts in case you lose the first pair or get them wet.

4. Your feet are the hardest part of your body to keep warm. Try to keep your feet dry. When they become wet, put on dry socks. Massage your feet before putting your boots on. Use foot powder. If your feet are still cold, do exercises such as stomping your feet, wiggling the toes inside the boots, doing deep knee-bends, or running in place.

5. Wear your cotton trousers over your fatigue pants. The trousers should be loose-fitting. To keep the full cargo pockets from rubbing and irritating your legs, tie the tape that runs inside each cargo pocket around the thigh. For added warmth, tie the drawstrings around the legs. Tuck the bowknots under the trouser legs.

6. Use the wool Army scarf to keep your neck warm. It may also be used to cover your face to protect it from the cold and the wind. The scarf may also be used as a stocking cap by placing the open end over your head.

7. A blanket between the mattress and the sleeping bag will keep you warmer by preventing your sleeping bag from getting wet from outside moisture. Avoid sweating inside the bag by wearing the least amount of clothing to keep warm. DO NOT keep face inside the bag. Water vapor (breath) escaping from your mouth will cause your bag to become damp. If your face is cold, cover it with your scarf or towel. When your bag is not being used, open it so that fresh air can get into it. Always carry your sleeping bag in the waterproof bag.

8. Make sure too much clothing is not worn. Too much clothing will cause you to sweat, which will in turn cause you to become cold once you are wet. Before you start to sweat, loosen your clothing. Open your uniform to allow cool air in next to your body. If you continue to sweat, remove a layer or layers of clothing.

9. If you develop a cold, use a handkerchief when coughing or sneezing to prevent infecting fellow soldiers.

10. Always remove your field jacket and gloves when entering a warm building.

11. Do not use "blousing bands" as they will restrict the flow of blood in your legs. Blouse your trouser legs inside your boots.

12. Always keep your clothes clean. Dirt and grease will clog the air spaces in your clothing and reduce the natural insulation.

13. Use the buddy system by watching what your buddy does and how he wears in his uniform. If you see a cold injury develop, take immediate first aid measures.

14. Dehydration occurs rapidly when exercising or doing heavy work in extreme cold. Liquids should be sipped on a regular basis.

15. Use of alcohol should be avoided in cold weather. The false sense of warmth felt from using alcohol actually accompanies a lessening tolerance to cold and could contribute to overexposure.

16. Keep clean. Clothing dampened by sweat will contribute to trench foot or more severe cold weather injuries. Change socks and underwear regularly.

17. Damp socks can be placed in underarms between field jacket and shirt during cold weather hikes. This will assist in drying the socks so that they can be rotated. (When carrying a rucksack, damp socks can be placed on shoulders between the shirt and outer garments for the additional benefit of cushioning.)

18. Carry extra pairs of socks.

19. Place clean clothing in the sleeping bag and position it so as to support the small of the back, or use as a pillow (inside). This will add to sleeping comfort and provide warm clothes to put on in the morning.

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THE SERGEANT
MAJOR OF THE ARMY

COMMAND
SERGEANT MAJOR

SERGEANT MAJOR

CODE OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER

NO MAN IS MORE PROFESSIONAL THAN I, A NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER, A LEADER OF MEN. AS A NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER I REALIZE THAT I AM A MEMBER OF A TIME HONORED CORPS WHICH IS KNOWN AS "THE BACKBONE OF THE ARMY".

I AM PROUD OF THE CORPS OF THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND WILL AT ALL TIMES CONDUCT MYSELF SO AS TO BRING CREDIT UPON THE CORPS, THE MILITARY SERVICE AND MY COUNTRY. REGARDLESS OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH I FIND MYSELF, I WILL NOT USE MY GRADE OR POSITION TO ATTAIN PLEASURE, PROFIT OR PERSONAL SAFETY.



FIRST SERGEANT

MASTER SERGEANT

COMPETENCE IS MY WATCHWORD. I WILL STRIVE TO REMAIN TECHNICALLY AND TACTICALLY PROFICIENT. I AM AWARE OF MY ROLE AS A NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER. I WILL FULFILL MY RESPONSIBILITIES INHERENT IN THAT ROLE. ALL SOLDIERS ARE ENTITLED TO OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP; I WILL PROVIDE THAT LEADERSHIP. I KNOW MY MEN AND I WILL ALWAYS PLACE THEIR NEEDS ABOVE MY OWN. I WILL BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL WHEN RECOMMENDING BOTH REWARDS AND PUNISHMENT.

OFFICERS OF MY UNIT WILL HAVE MAXIMUM TIME TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR DUTIES; THEY WILL NOT HAVE TO ACCOMPLISH MINE. I WILL EARN THEIR RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE AS WELL AS THAT OF MY MEN. I WILL BE LOYAL TO THOSE WHOM I SERVE; SENIORS, PEERS AND SUBORNATES ALIKE. I WILL EXERCISE INITIATIVE, BY TAKING APPROPRIATE ACTION IN THE ABSENCE OF ORDERS. I WILL NOT COMPROMISE MY INTEGRITY, NOR MY MORAL COURAGE. I WILL NOT FORGET, NOR WILL I ALLOW MY COMRADES TO FORGET, THAT WE ARE PROFESSIONAL NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, LEADERS OF MEN.

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS

SERGEANT

STAFF SERGEANT

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SMA