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A M YOUNG 03 MAR 86


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STUDENT ESSAY

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POINTS OF HONOR

BY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Anna M. Young, LTC, MP

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This paper is the view of one career soldier on some matters that affect our sense of ethical conduct, such matters being defined as points of honor. The author is not an ethicist but is concerned about some fundamental points of honor: Who should be expected to be honorable, whether we should attempt to codify our expectations, our responsibility for choosing the wars we fight, the effects of semantics on what we think we are, and the effects of fusing honor with religion. There are some suggestions as to what we might do differently with regard to whose honor we should be concerned about, whether we should try to codify and systematize it, how we might better define what it is, and who should help us make it a more conscious factor in our lives.

HONOR AND ETHICS

There are enough definitions of honor and ethics; no new ones are offered here. Generally, honor does not seem to be written about as much, although it is frequently mentioned as another way of referring to ethics.

But honor is something different and something more than ethics. As a discipline, ethics is an analysis of what things are right or wrong, what is meant by the terms "right" and "wrong," and to what extent, if any, there is rational justification for making judgments that things are either one or the other.¹ Many professions, including ours, have a formalized professional ethic, a set of principles that define in general terms things the profession's members must adhere to in order to be right in their actions and be members in good standing. In the simplest terms, the study of ethics tells us how to write the rules and a professional ethic is the rules, the principles that ought to be reflected in our actions.

Honor, according to Merriam-Webster, is a "keen sense of ethical conduct" and "one's word given as a guarantee of performance." It is something we own and something we pledge. It is internal and, if violated, probably harder to live with than the violation of an ethic.

For example: Our military ethic includes the qualities of candor and courage. Each is nudged every time we attend a social event we do not want to attend but can think of no way to avoid without an overt lie to invent an excuse. The covert nudge of going and pretending to enjoy ourselves is no threat to the profession or the ethic, or to our honor. The overt lie, however, is not a nudge but a violation of our sense of ethical conduct (honor)

and diminishes the value we place on our word (also honor). The ethic does not know it has been violated, but our sense of honor knows it has been. This example is a very insignificant one in the context of things that affect the profession or us as its members, but it is an illustration of honor as something different, something more, than ethics.

In this paper the words honor and ethics are central and both are used. But they are not quite used interchangeably, because they are not quite the same.

POINT OF HONOR

The 1983 edition of Webster's unabridged dictionary defines a point of honor as "a matter affecting a person's honor." Matters affecting our sense of ethical conduct, our sense of what is right or wrong, are matters that range from the grin-and-bear-it social function to painting rocks to living with killing. There is an infinite number of such matters, infinite variety, and countless circumstances which could be discussed. In most cases, the point of honor is the pivot point on which we turn one way or another in deciding what we should do and whether or not to do it. It is where we weigh a principle against its possible or actual consequences, and it is something we often do not do well.

The commander of the training center where I went through my officer basic course gave some good advice. She said, "Choose carefully that for which you will be hung." There are two pieces of advice in that.

One, the more significant, is the phrase "will be hung." Not

may be, but will be. It is a reminder that there are things, should always be things, for which we must be willing to be hung. To forget it is to risk slipping into the unthinking obedience, false loyalty, and phony honor of "my country, right or wrong" and "my boss, right or wrong." And, of course, the tempting "me, right or wrong."

The other piece of advice is to "choose carefully," to be responsible in choosing what to be hung for. A couple of examples, one on weight of principle, the other on understanding consequences.

1. The value of realistic training must be what shaped the Army policy of rolling BDU sleeves in garrison as if in war, but in practice this is the current version of painting rocks. In a combat zone with the slightest threat of NBC attack, who's going to take that shirt off long enough to roll up the sleeves so they can be pulled down in a hurry? And when concerned about being detected by some device, most of us would wear our sleeves down anyway rather than risk ourselves and those around us by some flaw in a less-than-perfect roll. Lastly, it's probable that anyone who has time to produce the perfect target-proof roll in a combat zone should have spent his time doing something more important. A lieutenant general recently chose to make an issue of sleeve-rolling. It was a responsible choice for a corps commander who would rather have his soldiers doing other things than rolling sleeves, and there was no real risk of his being hung. A lieutenant colonel, on the other hand, would be told to sit down and shut up, and eventually hung if he did not. As a point of honor, or even of common sense, this one is just not worth being hung for.

2. Some leaders think it is a point of honor to act as though every routine task assigned to their units is a personal insult. Every such task accepted without fighting it all the way is a sign of weakness. That is irresponsible. There are some very monotonous tasks that need to be done and in the long run it is very unlikely that any unit gets more or less than its fair share. A lot of time is wasted in dueling over them, however, and a lot of people get annoyed enough with these leaders that they find ways to get even--not with the leaders but with their soldiers. The one who could use some special help from an agency right at closing time won't get it; the one whose award recommendation is borderline between an MSM or an ARCOM gets the ARCOM, and so on. Our soldiers pay much more for our irresponsibility than we do.

A point of honor exists if we decide it does, is as important as we decide it is, and, if chosen irresponsibly, is a point of another kind having nothing to do with honor.

What follows in this paper is a series of issues that are points of honor, matters affecting our sense of ethical conduct.

THE HONOR OF THE (...?) CORPS

For a long time the concept of "the honor of the officer corps" has generally meant the commissioned officer corps. We aggressively encourage it and look for it among ourselves. It is talked about and written about as if only a commission can confer a proper appreciation of, and requirement for, honor; as if everyone else's conduct is regulated well enough by rules, regulations, the UCMJ, discipline in general, and--the closest we have hinted at a sense of honor--self discipline.

We have been underrating the majority of the profession of arms, though there are some signs that we may be improving a little.

FM 100-1 (The Army) acknowledges that rules, regulations, etc., are not enough. It describes an ethic that admits everyone from "the soldier on point, to the field commander, to the general officer" into the ranks of those who should and can live by it.² The Chief of Staff took it a step further in the article "The Ethical Foundation of Military Leadership" by stating that the components of the Army ethic encompass the "other values associated with character and honor."³ It would be in the best interests of the profession for us to improve still more in the ways we think about who can or cannot, should or should not, be involved in matters of honor. There are at least three good reasons.

One is that all ranks are bound equally by oath to provide the same ultimate service for the nation: die for it, and be prepared to lead others to do the same. Another is that all ranks have their terms of service characterized as either honorable or something else.

Third, while we have more or less codified actions that are conduct unbecoming to an officer, they are equally unbecoming to a non-commissioned officer, to a specialist fourth class, and to a private. Conduct unbecoming to a soldier, in other words.

This is not a suggestion that a dishonorable act by a private should bring the same penalty as that act done by a noncommissioned, warrant or commissioned officer. Clearly the responsibilities of position are different. The consequences of what we do are in proportion to the responsibilities held; the penalties for dishonorable conduct should be commensurate with those consequences, actual or potential.

But levels of responsibility should not lead us to think in terms of levels of honorable conduct. The difference is not how much we trust a person, but how much we trust him with. The private who steals \$10 is neither more nor less honorable than the squad leader who steals \$1, the platoon leader who steals a dime, or the battalion commander who takes his quarter-ton to the PX and barber shop. It is the consequences that are different: the private violates the trust of the one he steals from; the squad leader violates the trust of a dozen; the platoon leader, of forty; the battalion commander, of hundreds. The consequences of the acts are different, and so should the penalties be, but in each case it is not just a matter of discipline--it is a matter of honor as well.

We ought to more forcefully and frequently acknowledge the fact that honorable conduct is an essential quality of service from E-1 through E-9 and WO1 through CW4, as well as throughout the commissioned ranks. The profession and the nation expect it, and have the right to expect it. All soldiers are equally capable of giving it, and the vast majority do.

By paying more attention to "the honor of the soldier," we might sharpen everyone's sense of ethical (not just legal) conduct, including our own.

HONOR CODES

We have debated for years whether there should be an honor code, at least for commissioned officers, to help create a sharper sense of ethical conduct. We have considered "simple" codes as well as some very complex one.

The Military Academy's cadet honor code* is so simple, straightforward and elegant in concept that the identification of violators and enforcement of penalties should be equally simple, straightforward and elegant--unencumbered by lengthy investigations, complex hearings, and laws of due process. Yet it is encumbered by all those things: partly because of the Constitution we are sworn to protect and defend, partly because of the complexities of trying to differentiate between things done for self-interest and things done by error or for courtesy, and partly because the penalties for violation are so heavy.

* "A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do."

Discussions in classrooms at the Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, and written material readily available to the non-ethicist, show that almost nobody agrees on almost anything except that an honor code might be useful, and that producing one is probably impossible. It would most likely develop into another five-pound UCMJ, very lengthy and terribly complex in both conception and enforcement.

A few of the problems:

DUTY. A code would have to define the relationship between honor and duty. For example, we are pledged by our honor to obey orders (Oath of Enlistment) or to "well and faithfully discharge" our duties (officers' Oath of Office). Is it an honor violation to be late for work, to forget being scheduled for Charge-of-Quarters or Staff Duty Officer, to be less physically fit than we could be if we didn't smoke, to be overweight, to miss days or weeks of work due to an injury incurred while playing after-duty sports? Any of these could be violations of an honor code, unless identified and excluded (or perhaps included). The manner in which we do our duty is the major part of our concept of honor.

LOYALTY. We have trouble even now trying to define the relationships between loyalty on the one hand and integrity or courage on the other. FM 100-1 expresses loyalty to the institution as a value which "represents unswerving loyalty directed upward through the chain of command...total adherence to the spirit and letter of the lawful order...obedience and disciplined performance..."⁴ Standing alone, it does not take an artist to translate those absolutes into a portrait of the yes-man. Standing with some of what the FM says about two other components of the Army ethic--candor and

courage--this absoluteness of loyalty is confronted with potentially conflicting words like these: truthfulness, sincerity; straightforward, honest; moral strength; acting correctly in the presence of fear.⁵ Generally, we draw a line between loyalty and integrity or courage at the point of decision on any issue. Competent argument is "right" until the boss makes a decision, and from then on it is "wrong"--disloyal. Does the arguer lose integrity and show cowardice by adherence and obedience if his argument remains a competent one and if, in his professional judgment, the boss' decision is not the best one? Trying to codify the countless variations on this theme would be a pound or so in our five-pound "Uniform Code of Military Honor" and still not give us enough answers to make our lives much simpler or our judgment much better.

PERSONAL. Many of us use legal tax shelters or claim more than the actual number of tax-related exemptions throughout the year in order to profit from interest earned on money held back from the treasury until the last legal minute. If we came out from under our perfectly legal tax shelters, our soldiers could have more tanks, guns or family housing. How far should an honor code go in governing our personal lives? Should financial martyrdom be a component of honor? Is that how far we should go in codifying those things that set us somewhat apart from the rest of society?

A few more things a code could not deal with to our satisfaction:

Spending money on things less than essential, so our budgets are not reduced the next year.

The command to "Do more with less," which amounts to a command to beat the systems that tell us what to do with what we've got.

The principle that honorable leaders expose themselves to the dangers their soldiers face, a principle that does not consider how many of those soldiers might die when the leader is targeted and happens to be too close to them at the time. The principle is fine; the problem is finding a way to uphold it without wasting lives. Sometimes there is more honor in behavior that may be perceived to be dishonorable; more courage in accepting a reason for doing that which may appear to be uncourageous.*

We could not design a code and enforcement system to make every aspect of our lives totally compatible with strict definitions of our professional responsibilities. Our honor, our sense of ethical conduct, is shaped by what we think we can live with and maintain enough self respect to make what we are, worth living with. No honor code could define that for us, or codify all the rights and wrongs so that if we were unsure of what to do, we could look up the right thing. It would be less a guide for honorable conduct than a system of laws and precedents administered by lawyers, obeyed perhaps in letter, and resisted certainly in spirit.

We are better off with FM 100-1 and the efficiency reporting systems, no more and no less. That is as far as we should try to go in our code-building. The ethic is described and there is an in-place enforcement system. Each of us is on his own honor to deal with the inevitable inconsistencies and to rely on our own sense of ethical conduct to choose what is right, to choose carefully that for which we will be hung, and for which we will hang others.

*An officer told me of a general in Vietnam who seemed immune to bullets--and to the fates of aides and others who, lacking that almost mystic immunity, died of bullets aimed at him.

Other paradoxes are senior officers who disdain the basic rules of self-protection against potential terrorist actions, without regard to the lives that could be lost in rescue efforts if they were taken hostage.

CHOOSING THE WARS WE FIGHT

In his graduation address to the Naval War College Class of 1984, General John Vessey said, "You do not choose the wars you fight."⁶

In context with the rest of what he said, the statement is an indispensable part of the definition of service in the armed forces. The words are quoted here out of context to identify an issue so hard to deal with that we avoid it too much: individually, we must in fact choose the wars we fight.

It would be simpler to assume that our national leadership will be correct when it directs us to war, that the war will be what we can believe is a just war, that no other option is more likely to meet the nation's interests or principles, and that those interests and principles will be consistent. But if we hold our personal and professional honor to be as important as we want them to be, every one of us has the responsibility to decide whether to obey an order to war or obey the alternative order to prison. It is a point of honor that the decision not be assumed away by wishful thinking, habit, or oath of obedience.

The wars we fight are not only those fought against the armies of other nations. They include the ones we fight against ourselves, such as when a state's National Guard is federalized to enforce racial desegregation. They include using troops to enforce order on college campuses and during labor strikes. And they could include something like the Polish army whose soldiers would not fire on Polish workers.

In wars against other nations, our principles and interests have not always been consistent. In creating the United States, we

took Mexican lives and territory and we decimated one Indian nation after another, violating most of the principles of our Constitution and Declaration of Independence in the interests of nation-building. More recently, Hiroshima may be justifiable by a combination of incomplete knowledge of effect and legitimate desperation to end the war, but Nagasaki raises questions about the influence of racial differences on national interests and principles.

Having done those things, we as a nation and we as a profession claim the privilege of condemning savagery and aggression in others and swearing off them in ourselves, at least up to a point. We can admire the Polish army that would not fire on Polish workers, despite the probability that the refusal violated an oath of military service. We can appreciate the efforts of the German officers who tried to assassinate Hitler, despite the violation of their oaths and our profoundly fundamental, almost sacred precept that only the most vile, loathsome sort of military leaders would try to murder their publically elected commander-in-chief. But we applied that judgment at Nuremberg to those who upheld their oaths instead of those who chose not to.

We expect other soldiers to choose their wars, and we judge those soldiers along with their causes. If we exercise the privilege of judgment when looking at other soldiers, and leave it idle with regard to ourselves, we risk becoming much less than the honorable profession we claim and want to be. Honor, like any other value, has to be exercised in its hardest applications as well as in its easier ones.

Our honor is as human beings, not Americans. We judged the Japanese and German armies on their responsibilities to mankind, not

to their nations. We can judge the Polish army the same way, even without knowing whether its motivation was nationalism or humanism. What we saw was that they would not kill their countrymen; what we can assume is that they agreed with their countrymen's cause, not their government's. In any case, we are more likely to judge others by our concepts of honor rather than by their obedience or loyalty to their governments. And our concepts of honor apply most of all to us. When a national course of action is chosen, it is still the responsibility of soldiers to decide whether (and whom) to kill in support of it. That decision has to be based on individual judgments as to whether the nation's cause is an honorable one.

Many young men made those kinds of decisions about the war in Vietnam. Then, and always, the profession of arms should especially value its nation's citizens who were responsible enough to make decisions about national and personal honor, and to accept the risks inherent in acting accordingly...the risk of permanent exile or imprisonment by those who refused service; the risk of death by those who served. People who seriously considered those things and then made deliberate, responsible choices are more valuable to the country and to the armed forces than either those who served because they were afraid not to, or those who did not serve simply because they believed nothing at all to be worth such commitment and risk.

This nation prides itself on its declared principles of justice, human rights, self-determination, and others for which elements of the human race have fought each other and died for millennia. They are honorable principles which, like any others, are subject to twisting by rhetoric and sacrifice to more immediate interests. Soldiers owe it to each other and to their countrymen to make

conscious, responsible decisions about whether the nation's cause is worth killing for (not to mention dying for). The national will is essential to winning wars and is not blindly given. The military will should not be, either.

THE NOBLE SAVAGE

"Military will" is shaped by perhaps a hundred things. Among the most important are the professional ethic, each soldier's personal sense of honor, and training.

Training is what helps us survive reality, and is usually better when based on experience than on theory. Each year there are fewer soldiers with combat experience, fewer with the experience of having had to test a sense of ethical conduct in the realities of fear and vengeance, of the infliction and endurance of unspeakable horrors and tragedies.

Maybe it is the growing absence of such collective experience that has allowed so many of us to accept and perpetuate such sanitized descriptions of our profession as "the management of violence."

One of the writings that describes soldiering as a profession makes a neat distinction between confronting horror and directing others to confront it: "...the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself."⁷ This is true enough in the sense of mastering the technical complexities of twentieth-century warfare. But the phrase keeps coming up in contexts that imply a kind of management that removes us some distance from responsibility for the consequences of the acts we manage others to commit. It is almost a new definition of the noble savage, a way to excuse or avoid recognizing the savagery of warfare.

What we do, or train to do, is a combination of high-tech butchery and consequent tragedy inflicted and endured for causes. The Army Chief of Staff says that "warrior-leaders" manage violence, support, and forces on the battlefield, which sounds better.⁸ Missing from the description is managing to live with the sight of a human being in pieces because of what we did from a few yards away, or the confirmation of dozens or thousands killed by a missile or a bomb, or the probability of global destruction if all the nuclear buttons are ever pushed.

Not that the job description should tell us how to live with those things. It should not and could not. But neither should we allow semantics to keep us from recognizing and at least trying to anticipate living with what the words really mean: The more forces we direct and the more means of violence we control, the more people we can kill.

Explicit in our professional ethic is the value of accepting personal responsibility for what we do and for what is done by those we command. Acceptance of that value is what drives us to judge ourselves and others on the nature of an act and on the nature of the cause for which it was done. We can learn to live with the consequences of pre-planned horrors if, among other things, we can judge the cause to have been worth it. We can learn to live with the realities of un-planned tragedies for the same reasons. We can retain something of the sense of honor we started with if, in retrospect, our causes merited the infliction and endurance of horrors we could not have imagined no matter how hard we tried.

In conventional or limited nuclear warfare, we stand some chance of being able to claim the luxury-agony of retrospective judgment.

There is one national cause to which we are pledged for which retrospective judgment is improbable: ruination of continents, perhaps the planet, in total nuclear warfare or as a retaliatory strike after the war is already lost. The most destructive act of which we are capable is the one for which we are least likely to be held accountable.

The issue is not whether there are alternatives to all-out button-pushing; of course there are. The issue also is not the morality or immorality of nuclear warfare as such, or the relative desirability of a short war, or the need to find more discriminate ways to ensure national self-determination. It is an issue that affects our individual sense of ethical conduct: We are willingly sworn to serve a nation committed to destruction of all rather than surrender of any. Notwithstanding the likelihood of it happening, and notwithstanding our responsibility still to choose what to do if the moment comes, our oath says that we support it as national policy. It is the final battle we have chosen, by oath, to fight.

Our ethic, and our sense of honor, are constructed on a foundation that does not openly acknowledge our stated willingness to help ruin the nation we serve. This may be one reason why there are so many of us in responsible positions who do such surprisingly dishonorable things. We are not completely honest with ourselves about what our profession ultimately might require us to do, though we recognize it as individuals. It should not be so surprising that as individuals, we are not as honest with the profession as we ought to be.

An ethic, and a sense of ethical conduct, will take us only so far if we do not learn to acknowledge and agree on how far "so far"

really is. Until we do that, each of us will draw his own line and some of those lines will continue to fall way short of the limit they should go.

Neither honor nor ethics have anything to do with the possibility of total nuclear warfare. It is a possibility that places an absolute boundary on the limits of honorable or ethical considerations. The semantics of "the management of violence" and the ethic of personal responsibility and loyalty to nation offer no redeeming value. The violence will be unmanageable. Personal responsibility will be a moot point, since there is likely to be no one left to accept it or to hold us accountable. Loyalty to nation, for any who survive, will be idolization of a memory.

For this, there is and will be no moral, ethical or honorable justification or excuse. The policy we are sworn to support is simply that if the United States cannot live as it wishes, then it is irrelevant whether anyone lives at all.

To the extent that we avoid this issue, we weaken the ethic we profess, the honor we claim. By acknowledging the absolute boundary on the limits of ethics and honor, we might better define and act like what it is we want to be in the meantime: professionals rightfully expected to act in ways not shameful to ourselves, our oaths, our countrymen, or our nation.

We recognize and practice the training value of stripping away preconceptions of physical and mental strengths and rebuilding them for the unique requirements of military service. We would do well to acknowledge the same kind of value with regard to educating ourselves in the professional ethic, the definition of a meaningful sense of honor. For a soldier, the most peculiar skill is not the

management or infliction of violence, but how to live decently with its consequences, past or predicted. Stripping away our self-imposed avoidances and building something from where nothing remains would be a good place to start defining the boundaries of our honor and then going on to define what we can build inside those boundaries.

HONOR AND RELIGION

If we cross the boundary of total nuclear warfare, we will do so without honor, without ethics, without morality, and without our gods.* Yet increasingly during the past few years we as a profession have turned more sharply toward religion to define for us the basis and boundaries of our ethic.

We have allowed or maybe forced the Army Chaplain Corps into becoming our teachers of ethics. We depend on them to define it for us and to write the definitive things about it. Some of the problems with this:

Chaplains are excluded from command, but we ask them to help us be honorable commanders.

A branch protected from what we used to call additional duties explains to us an ethic of responsibility, while we juggle what would need 25 hours in a day, 8 days in a week, if we were to do all things as they should be done. Selective disobedience is a reality, but not one that we should be asking our chaplains to help us deal with.

Men and women whose professional skill is easily transferable to the civilian community counsel professional infantrymen and artillerymen not to be so concerned with success in their military careers.

Soldiers who cannot bear arms try to teach us how to live with killing.

* Plural because each of us has his own concept and none is less or more sacred for the naming of any.

By design or by default, a branch that is excluded from having to make some of the hardest choices in our profession is expected to help us make them and live with them. There is some value in that as a check and balance, weighing the realistic "is" against the idealistic "ought to be." But with the exception of those chaplains who have served in the armed forces in other roles, chaplains are not particularly well-grounded in the military realities of what is. Military service is not the study of ethics and honor is not a religion. Both have to be firmly based on the conscious acknowledgment that we choose the possibility of global destruction over the idea of national surrender--purposeless vengeance if it comes to that.

In the end, if it does come to that, what ought to be will be irrelevant to what is, and we are unfair to our chaplains as well as to ourselves in expecting them to help us justify that. It cannot be justified. It simply is, and we have chosen to be part of an organization designed to make it happen if all else fails.

We, the designers and managers of violence, should own the responsibility for teaching ourselves how to live with what we do or may do, not just why and when and how to do it.

As the senior Army leader, the Chief of Staff personally and rightfully promulgates our professional ethic--just as all commanders personally promulgate guidance on other things that determine how we operate. The key word being "operate," the most logical agent to bring together general ethical guidance and operational reality is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, not the Chief of Chaplains. It would force us to more often recognize matters affecting our sense of ethical conduct, and put more credibility

into teaching ourselves about the consequences of what we do as well as how to live with those consequences.

SUMMARY

Whose honor. We need to get further away from being exclusive about honor as an officer corps' matter. If we are more inclusive of all ranks, we stand a better chance of putting a sense of honor into what all of us do as members of this profession--reducing, perhaps, the temptation to look at legal penalties as being more significant than betrayals of trust.

Codes and choices. Trying to codify a sense of honor into a code with an enforcement system would create law in lieu of a sense. The sense counts far more than the application of legalities when choosing between right and wrong.

The basis. A professional sense of honor stands a better chance of being more significant in our lives if we acknowledge the realities of what the profession might require us to do. By not acknowledging this clearly enough, we have not done all we should to recognize fundamental inconsistencies between what we try to be today and what we might do tomorrow. Those inconsistencies, if not dealt with, will continue to be convenient excuses for less than honorable behavior. As a profession, we should acknowledge openly that there is one absolute boundary beyond which there is neither honor nor ethics. Being honest with ourselves would add weight to our expectations of honorable conduct in all things preceding that boundary, and resolve the inconsistency: honor is either present or absent, period.

Reality. Commanders set examples, and executors--staffs--fuse those examples into all aspects of what an organization is. Ethics is the foundation of operations and belongs in the operational arena on that basis, not as a special or separate consideration.

ENDNOTES

1. Arthur J. Dyck, On Human Care, reprinted in Readings on Ethics and Professionalism, Vol. 2, pp. 44-45, US Army War College.
2. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1, p. 23.
3. US Department of the Army, The Chief of Staff, Guideposts for a Proud and Ready Army, p. 3.
4. US Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1, p. 24.
5. Ibid., p. 26.
6. General John W. Vessey, Jr., "A Concept of Service," published by the US Naval War College Press, reprinted in Readings on Ethics and Professionalism, Vol. 2, p. 3, US Army War College.
7. Samuel P. Huntington, "Officership As a Profession," from The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, reprinted in Readings on Ethics and Professionalism, Vol. 2, p. 76, US Army War College.
8. US Department of the Army Message, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Date/Time Group 051907Z August 1985, unclassified, Subject: Leadership vs. Management, quoting Army Chief of Staff, para. 2.

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