NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT STUDY
FINAL REPORT

VOLUME I
FEBRUARY 1986

PREPARED BY
A STUDY GROUP FOR THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-0200
DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the study group author(s) and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

The words "he," "him," and "men," when used in this report represent both masculine and feminine genders unless specified otherwise.
Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) Final Report

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Approved for Public Release; distribution unlimited.

The study results were briefed to the Chief of Staff, Army on 4 December 1985. CSA decisions are documented in DACS-NCOPDS Memorandum dated 10 Jan 86 and incorporated into an NCOPDS Implementation Action Plan (see DACS-NCOPDS Memorandum dated 7 Feb 86).

See attached
The objective of the NCO Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) was to evaluate NCO professional development. The study group defined professional development as the sum of training, education and experiences.

The study group concluded that the Army's requirements of the NCO Corps are:

1. Job Proficiency,
2. MOS Competency,
3. Physical Fitness and Military Bearing,
4. Basic Educational Skills,
5. Leadership Skills,
6. Training Skills,
7. Commitment to Professional Values and Attributes,
8. Responsibility and Accountability for Actions.

The study group concluded that the components for an NCO Professional Development System are in place and functioning well. Some of the systems require fine-tuning. Forty-five recommendations to improve NCO professional development fall into the following categories:

1. NCO Professional Development Philosophy,
2. Noncommissioned Officer Education System,
3. Civilian Education,
4. NCO Professional Development Program,
5. Assignments,
6. Promotions,
7. Evaluation,
8. Reclassification,
9. Individual Training Evaluation Program,
10. Reserve Components,
11. Integration.

The major accomplishments of the study were:

1. Provided a macro evaluation of NCO professional development.
2. Created a mechanism for continuous evaluation of NCO professional development.
3. Created an architecture for NCO professional development.
4. Created an awareness of NCO professional development.

The study results were briefed to the Chief of Staff, Army on 4 Dec 85. The approved actions were incorporated into an NCOPDS Implementation Action Plan.

NOTE: A special edition of Sergeants' Business (Feb 86) entitled "NCO Professional Development: A Report to the NCO Corps" provides a summary of the study effort.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The objective of the NCO Professional Development Study (NCOPDS) was to evaluate NCO professional development in light of the Army's needs and identify systemic strengths and weaknesses, develop findings, and provide recommendations to the Chief of Staff of the Army which are applicable during the period 1986 to the year 2000. The study began on 17 June 1985 and the CSA was briefed on the results on 4 December 1985.

The starting point for the study of NCO professional development was to determine what the needs of the Army are with respect to the NCO Corps. The underlying principle is that NCO professional development is not an end in itself. Rather, its purpose is to ensure that soldiers have the skills, knowledge, and attributes required to perform their duties in support of the Army's mission. Thus, the focus of the analysis of the various systems which contribute to NCO professional development was on how well those systems support the needs of the Army.

The study group defined professional development as the sum of all the training, education, and experiences which the Army provides NCOs to better enable them to carry out their duties.

In order to determine what the Army requires of its NCO Corps, the study group researched Army regulations, legal documents, and other materials which direct and imply NCO duties and responsibilities. Based on those duties and responsibilities, and the skills, knowledge, and attributes which NCOs must have to perform those duties and responsibilities, the study group concluded that the Army's requirements of the NCO Corps are:

- Job Proficiency
- MOS Competency
- Physical Fitness and Military Bearing
- Basic Educational Skills
- Leadership Skills
- Training Skills
- Commitment to Professional Values and Attributes
- Responsibility and Accountability for Actions

These eight requirements were key to the remainder of the study because each mechanism in the Army which contributes to NCO professional development was measured in terms of how well that mechanism supported one or more of the requirements. The result was a list of issues which required indepth study.

The study group used various methods to gather the information needed to evaluate the NCO Professional Development System. Group members visited 85 separate units and conducted individual and group interviews with more than 3,800 officers and NCOs. An NCO Professional Development Questionnaire was also completed by 2,768 NCOs from the combat arms, combat support, and combat service support career fields in schools and units around the world.
Based on its research, the study group concluded that the mechanisms or components for an NCO professional development system are in place in the Army and that they are basically functioning well. However, some of the systems can better meet the needs of the NCO Corps and the Army with some fine-tuning. As a result, the study group developed 45 recommendations to improve NCO professional development. Those recommendations fall into the following categories:

- NCO Professional Development Philosophy
- Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)
- Civilian Education
- NCO Professional Development Program (NCODP)
- Assignments
- Promotions
- Evaluation
- Reclassification
- Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP)
- Reserve Components
- Integration

Of the 45 recommendations, the Chief of Staff approved 34 and disapproved two. Action on the remaining nine recommendations, all of which pertained to ITEP, was deferred pending TRADOC's completion of their own ITEP study and subsequent briefing to the CSA. The approved recommendations have been incorporated into an NCOPDS Implementation Plan and tasked to the DCSPER and DCSOPS for action.

The approved actions to fine-tune NCO professional development are:

- Philosophy. That the Chief of Staff endorse an NCO professional development philosophy that states the Army's goals and directions for the program. The philosophy says that professional development enhances Army readiness by fostering individual and collective excellence. Professional development includes all the training, education, and experiences which an NCO receives in the Army. Responsibilities for professional development are shared at all levels in the Army. The philosophy establishes an Army goal that NCOs should be trained first, then promoted and utilized, thereby linking successful completion of NCOES courses to promotions. The goal will be implemented in phases so that training capacity problems do not preclude otherwise qualified NCOs from being promoted. Last, it says that the various systems which contribute to professional development should be linked, to the extent possible. Such linkages help set standards and motivate soldiers to strive for excellence.

- Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). NCOES should be mandatory, sequential, progressive, and linked to promotions, i.e., train, then promote and utilize. There are some problems that preclude full implementation of this recommendation now. Mainly, there is insufficient capacity in basic and advanced level NCOES courses to fully link them to promotions to staff sergeant and sergeant first class, respectively. However, the study group proposes a strategy that will lead us to the goal. First, the system must be fine-tuned, then pointed in the correct direction. This will require expanding NCOES capacity and then sending to school only those who will be promoted.
-- Civilian Education. Civilian education beyond high school level should not be required for promotions. However, education beyond the high school level should continue to be pursued as an individual goal. One recommendation was to incorporate duty-related civilian education into NCOES courses.

-- NCO Development Program (NCODP). There was some confusion in the field about NCODP. AR 350-17 should be revised to better define the program and responsibilities for it. HQDA should review all supplements to the regulation to ensure they comply with basic policies and intents of the program and officers should be made more aware of NCODP.

-- Assignments. The first priority of the assignment system must be the needs of the Army. However, professional development should receive a higher priority among the other assignment considerations. Assignments outside an NCO's PMOS/CPMOS should be restricted. Back-to-back assignments outside the PMOS/CPMOS should be precluded and NCOs should be retrained upon reassignment to PMOS/CPMOS duties.

-- Promotions. Efforts should be increased to further reduce MOS overages and shortages, and provide additional training at MOS career progression merger points.

-- Evaluations. A new enlisted evaluation report (EER) should be prepared which would include the eight Army requirements for NCOs discussed earlier and which would dampen the current rate of inflation.

-- Reclassification. Recommendations include limiting involuntary reclassifications to correct MOS imbalances to staff sergeant or below, or to NCOs with less than 10 years service, formalizing retraining requirements for reclassified NCOs, and not requiring reclassified NCOs to take an SQT for a minimum of one year after the date of reclassification.

-- Reserve Components (RC). Recommendations include development of a long range, comprehensive training strategy for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), restructured RC NCOES that includes MOS-specific training, improved quality of USAR school training, additional training aid devices and facilities, and the development of nonresident courses in tandem with resident programs to ensure they are maintained current.

Although the study group came up with many recommendations to fine-tune the professional development system to better serve the Army and its NCO Corps, those recommendations do not constitute the group's major accomplishments. The NCOPDS major accomplishments are:

-- Provided a macro evaluation of NCO professional development. The study group evaluated the system from the Army's perspective and based on the Army's needs. It was not a study from the perspective of any particular proponent or group of soldiers.

-- Created a mechanism for continuous evaluation of NCO professional development. Through the DA NCO Professional Development Committee, the Army will have a mechanism that will continuously evaluate NCO professional development to keep it on track. Policies and procedures governing the committee have been promulgated in Chief of Staff Regulation 15-10.
-- Created an architecture for NCO professional development. The architecture consists of the elements outlined in the philosophy, with emphasis on standards of excellence. And it consists of all of the study group recommendations which include the concepts of linkage and integration. The architecture provides a structure for professional development now and into the future.

-- Created an awareness of NCO professional development. The study has helped focus the attention of senior commanders and leaders, and soldiers worldwide on NCO professional development. Through publications such as the special issue of "Sergeants' Business" and news releases to various military and civilian media, awareness will be maintained.

In addition to its major accomplishments, the study group completed the following tasks:

-- Developed a Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Guide (DA PAM 600-X) which will be published in FY86.

-- Provided recommended changes to update FM 22-600-20, The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide.

-- Provided recommendations to strengthen and clarify AR 350-17, The Noncommissioned Officer Development Program.

In response to secondary missions, the study group provided conclusions and recommendations concerning the TRADOC Review of EPMS (June 85), and reviewed and commented on the 1984 MACOM CSM Conference Issues.

Although the study revealed some professional development problems, most of the group's findings were very positive. Based on field findings and other research, the study revealed that we have a good Army, a strong NCO Corps and a basically sound professional development system. Today, the NCO Corps is confident and positive -- as assessed by both officers and NCOs. The Army and the NCO Corps have come a long way. And the NCO Corps has great potential to get even better with the input of bright, young soldiers who have been recruited in the last five years. They are tomorrow's NCOs.

It is against this perspective that the NCO Professional Development Study Group report is presented.
CHAPTER 1
GENESIS

CHARTER

The Noncommissioned Officers Professional Development Study (short title: Soldiers Study) was chartered by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) for the period 17 June to 17 December 1985.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Soldiers Study was to evaluate the NCO Professional Development System in light of the Army's needs and identify systemic strengths and weaknesses, develop findings and provide recommendations to the study sponsor, the CSA. The study group considered recommendations applicable during the period 1986 to 2000. (Figure 1-1)

MISSION

1. Evaluate Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development in terms of
   - Education
   - Training
   - Experiences
   - Supporting Systems
2. Focus on Schools & Units
3. Identify Strengths and Weaknesses
4. Develop Findings
5. Recommend to CSA

Figure 1-1
STUDY GROUP

The study group consisted of the following members:

SGM Leon A. Andrews  
SGM Oscar L. Barker  
LTC Clifford H. Bernath  
LTC Samuel A. Blank, Jr.  
LTC John E. Brown  
SFC Jonn L. Byrnes  
SP4 Virginia I. Cruz  
SP4 Lori B. Davis  
COL Jerry L. Dollar  
SGM William R. Field  
BG William G. Ganey  
MSG Rudy Garza  
COL Jacques B. Gerard  
SGM Gary L. Gohde  
SGM Brenda V. Hernandez  
SGM Carolyn B. Holland  
LTC Steven R. Hooker  
CSM Donald R. Ingram  
SFC George D. Jarvis  
SGM John F. Loney  
SGM Nazario Lopez, Jr.  
LTC Kenneth Loudemilk  
SGM Clifford L. Mathis  
MAJ Rodney B. Mitchell  
CW2 Michael J. Molnar  
LTC James A. Moore  
MAJ Bruce T. Murphy  
CSM Mack F. Rice  
LTC Robert N. Riviezzo  
COL Dominic W. Ruggerio  
COL Kenneth W. Simpson  
1SG Hazel L. Stanton  
SP4 Kristine Van Vliet  
MSG E. nie N. Waters  
CSM George J. Yip

STUDY PRODUCTS

The study group produced the following (Figure 1-2):

1. NCO Professional Development Study Report.
4. Review and recommendations concerning the TRADOC EPMS Study.
5. Review and recommendations concerning the October 1984 CSM Conference Issues.
6. Public affairs products to disseminate the study group findings to the field. These products include a special Command Information publication on the subject, and articles in Soldiers Magazine and the Army Times.
7. Chief of Staff Regulation (CSR) 15-X, which establishes an NCO Professional Development Committee. The committee will be discussed later in this report.

**PRODUCTS**

**Primary**
- The Army Noncommissioned Officer Guide

**Secondary**
- Review TRADOC EPMS Study
- Review CSM Conf Issues

**Info**
- CDRS Call
- Soldiers
- CSA Weekly Summary
- Army Times

*Figure 1-2*
The study group used the methodology depicted in Figure 1-3 (Delphi Process) to gather the information needed to evaluate the NCO Professional Development System. The Delphi technique is a procedure that uses key informants to obtain consensus among identified sources through face-to-face encounters and the use of questionnaires.

1. Technical Advisory Net (POCs): The Technical Advisory Net included individuals with detailed, technical knowledge about some facet of NCO professional development. Examples are points of contact in proponent offices for evaluations, promotions, assignments and NCOES courses.
2. CSM/SGM Sounding Board: The sounding board consisted of command sergeants major and sergeants major located primarily in the Washington D.C. area. The TRADOC CSM was also a member. The sounding board was chaired by the study co-director who was the FORSCOM CSM. The sounding board met twice during the course of the study. Members were not selected for special expertise but rather for their collective knowledge and broad experiences. They provided additional depth on selected issues and an opportunity to scrub sensitive issues before entering the formal arena.

3. Letters to General Officers and Command Sergeants Major: The group solicited and received comments from selected MACOM, corps, division and separate brigade commanders and their command sergeants major; and from selected Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve commanders. Of note, every active corps and division commander and their command sergeants major responded, as well as selected MACOM commanders and their command sergeants major. A total of 104 responses were received.

Question 1. From your most recent observations and experiences, do you feel our noncommissioned officers are adequately trained and educated to support your mission?

Answer: Yes - 67%  No - 23%

"We have made much progress in recent years. I see NCOs throughout this division who are technically qualified in their MOS but are still lacking in areas such as programming time, counseling techniques and writing."

Division Commander

"Yes, but the Army may not be fully capitalizing on the newly acquired knowledge once the NCO returns to the unit. Units must require NCOs to maintain proficiency in their MOSs by actively using their new skills."

Post/School Commander

"It is incumbent upon the unit commander to insist that a structured and comprehensive training program be formulated, supported and strictly adhered to so that NCOs remain up to speed."

MACOM Command Sergeant Major
Question 2. Army Regulation 350-17 lays out the NCO Development Program (NCODP) which is designed to strengthen the leadership of NCOs and to assist in the continuing development of NCOs. What is your opinion of the effectiveness of the NCODP? What improvements would you recommend?

Answer: Effective - 68%  Not Effective - 32%

“Programs vary from unit to unit depending on the motivation of senior NCOs and commanders.”  
MACOM Commander

“AR 350-17 gives all the guidance that is needed. We don’t need a checklist. The problems with NCODP have to be fixed in the field.”  
MACOM Command Sergeant Major

“NCODP is an invaluable training tool; however, many units use the NCODP training as make-up for required training. This trend needs to be reversed.”  
Corps Command Sergeant Major

Question 3. What are your thoughts concerning the effectiveness of NCOES? What are the costs/benefits to unit readiness for sending soldiers to PLDC, PTC, BNCOC, ANCOC, First Sergeant Course and Sergeants Major Academy?

Answer: Effective - 91%  Not Effective - 9%

“It costs us, but we need it. Any reduction of unit readiness is totally offset by the long-term gain to the unit.”  
MACOM Commander

“It is essential that units send the right soldiers to the right courses at the right times.”  
Division Commander

“NCOES is the most cost effective program in the Army, bar none. There should never be an excuse for not sending soldiers to PLDC, BNCOC, ANCOC, etc.”  
Corps Command Sergeant Major

“The system is very responsive to the needs of the NCO Corps and is continually changing to fit the needs of the Army.”  
Division Command Sergeant Major

“Get all SQTs operating and then link SQT with promotion.”  
MACOM Commander

Question 4. What are your thoughts about delinking SQT scores from promotion? Could the SQT remain viable without the link to promotion?

Answer: Link now - 63%; Link when current problems with SQT are resolved - 23%; Delink - 14%

“Whether it is linked or de-linked, a good and valid SQT system must be developed in support of NCODP.”  
Division Commander

“We need soldiers that will take the initiative to study, be receptive to training, and retain what they have learned. The only problem I have with SQT scores is that we allow commanders to waive the scores.”  
Division Command Sergeant Major

“...put into promotion system and school selection system and any other system that is considered to be career enhancing.”  
Post/School Command Sergeant Major
Question 5. The Total Army concept requires that the Reserve Components maintain a viable program of professional development for their NCOs. What problems, if any, do you see with this requirement?

Answer: Some - 73%  None - 27%

Question 6. What are your thoughts about linking NCOES with promotion?

Answer: Link - 94%  No Link - 6%

Question 7. What is the value of civilian education to NCO professional development?

Answer: Some - 77%  Little/None - 23%
Civilian education is not only a key to learning facts and figures, but is the tool used to refine those thought processes and reasoning abilities that are vital to leadership.

Division Command Sergeant Major

A concerted effort to properly align our MOS structure would be beneficial. Too many highly deserving soldiers are deprived of promotion because of high MOS cutoff scores. The new promotion point worksheet has not helped.

MACOM Commander

When a soldier is classified or reclassified, he/she should be given formal training before performing duties in the assignment MOS.

Division Commander

Assignments outside the mainstream of the Army need close management to preclude back to back or repetitive assignments in such jobs at the degradation of the soldier's ability to perform in his PMOS.

Post/School Commander

Classification procedures by and large have never produced the quality NCO needed to do the job in a unit. NCOES is not set up to support reclassified NCOs.

MACOM Command Sergeant Major

At the present time, we can promote a soldier who is not eligible for retention or we can retain a soldier who is not eligible for promotion. We have to change this.

Division Command Sergeant Major
4. Literature Search. The group conducted an exhaustive search of Army regulations, field manuals, guides, and previous studies and professional articles related to the subject of professional development. The group also studied how the other U.S. military services and selected foreign armies conduct their professional development programs.

5. Stake Holders. The so-called "stake holders" include the Army organizations that have regulatory responsibility for the NCO Professional Development System. They are Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER); Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS); Commander, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); CG, Forces Command (FORSCOM) which has regulatory responsibility for the Reserve Components; and the Sergeant Major of the Army. The co-directors maintained close liaison with each of the stake holders.

6. NCO Professional Development Study
Teleconferencing Net: All proponent schools, selected field units and representatives from the stake holder's organizations were invited to participate in this computer net which was used to present and assess new ideas.

7. Field Visits to Units and Schools: Study group members visited 85 separate units and conducted structured individual and group interviews with more than 3,800 officers and NCOs. A questionnaire was also completed by 2,768 NCOs from the combat arms, combat support, and combat service support career fields in schools and units around the world. A summary is shown in Figure 1-4. An analysis of data is shown at Figures 1-5 through 1-9.
FIELD VISITS

Germany
Korea
Conus
Hawaii

Table 1-4

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<th>Units Visited</th>
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<th>Questionnaires</th>
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<td>12 Divisions</td>
<td>44 Cm.OFF.</td>
<td>2,764</td>
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<td>32 Non Division</td>
<td>345 Officers</td>
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<td>17 NCOAs</td>
<td>3,412 NCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Propostment Schools</td>
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<td>16 RC Units</td>
<td>8 Total</td>
<td>3,803 Total</td>
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WHO RESPONDED:

Figure 1-5

NCOs of all Ranks

NCOs of Varied Ethnic Backgrounds

NCOs of all Branches of Service

Background Code

A. White, not of Hispanic origin
B. Black, not of Hispanic origin
C. Hispanic
D. Asian/Pacific Islander
E. American Indian/Alaskan native

Figure 1-5
A. THE NCO CORPS IS IN GREAT SHAPE

Confident
Confident in Ability to Train Soldiers 98% Agree

Competent
NCOs Strive for Technical Competence 89% Agree

Committed
NCOs are Committed to Unit Mission 87% Agree

Concerned
NCOs Concerned About Soldiers 79% Agree

Professional
NCOs Show High Degree of Professionalism 82% Agree

B. NCOES IS A STRONG, EFFECTIVE PROGRAM
WHICH CAN BE MADE EVEN BETTER BY:

Linking Promotion to NCOES Attendance
NCOs Should not be Promoted Without Appropriate NCOES 75% Agree

and

Emphasizing Communicative Skills
Writing and Communication Skills Should be Emphasized in NCOES 95% Agree

Figure 1-6
Figure 1-7
C. EPMS IS GENERALLY A GOOD SYSTEM

Confident that EPMS is Helping Career

63% Agree

Pleased with Career Progress

83% Agree

But There is a Problem with the EER

EER Provides Accurate Picture of Soldier

44% Agree

D. ITEP CONTRIBUTES TO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ITEP has Been Useful in Professional Development

61% Agree

But Soldiers Have Reservations About the Current SOT.

SOT Accurately Measures Soldiers' Ability

43% Agree
The study group did not conduct a formal field survey which meets all the statistical tests required to generalize the findings to the entire NCO and officer population. The individuals and groups interviewed were not selected by an approved random sampling method. That said, the group did talk to and get opinions from some very significant people -- commanders and command sergeants major -- and from a large cross section of the NCO Corps. The information derived from this research provides valuable insights on how NCOs assess themselves, their peers and their professional development needs. It also provides insights and recommendations from senior commanders in the field.

It is important to point out that this was a Chief of Staff directed study. The study group consisted of officers and NCOs with varied backgrounds in field and staff assignments. The study group did not represent any of the stake holders and did not claim initial expertise in any of the many aspects of NCO professional development. Group members looked at NCO professional development from the general perspective of the system as a whole and how to ensure it best meets the needs of the Army. Although many people were contacted during the course of the study and their opinions and guidance were carefully considered, the findings presented in the report are those of the study group and may or may not represent the opinions and recommendations of the proponent offices.
AN EVALUATION OF NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

CHAPTER 3
The Army's Mission

CHAPTER 4
Army Requirements
For the NCO

CHAPTER 5
Today's NCO PD System
THE MECHANISM

CHAPTER 6
Evaluation of Today's System

CHAPTER 7
CORRECTING THE SYSTEM

CHAPTER 8
The Future

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Keeping On Track
Integration
CHAPTER 2
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL

DEFINITION OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The study group defined NCO professional development as the sum of all the training, education and experiences which the Army provides noncommissioned officers to better enable them to carry out their missions.

THE MODEL

In order to evaluate the professional development of NCOs, the group had to first develop a framework against which the many contributing mechanisms to professional development could be analyzed (See model at Figure 2-1). The model described in this and subsequent chapters of this report provided that framework.

In each chapter, a specific portion of the model will be discussed in detail. In this chapter, an overview of the entire framework will be presented.

MISSION

The premise of the entire study is that professional development is not an end product. The end product is the accomplishment of the Army's mission. Professional development is one factor which contributes to that end. Therefore, the study began with an analysis of why the Army exists -- its mission and role in society. Based on what the nation wants the Army to accomplish, the study group then looked at how the Army organizes its people to accomplish the mission. That organization includes commissioned officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers -- all of whom contribute to mission accomplishment. Each has related, but different, methods of contributing. Officers have
different responsibilities than noncommissioned officers and noncommissioned officers have different responsibilities than lower ranking enlisted soldiers. And, since their requirements are different, so must the professional development systems which support each group be different, yet all the systems must be directed toward the same goal -- the requirements of the Army.

REQUIREMENTS
The Army, through regulations, legal documents and tradition, has set forth the duties and responsibilities of its NCO Corps. Based on its research, the study group compiled a list of what the Army requires its NCOs to be, know and do. Based on that list, the group further analyzed each duty in terms of the skills, knowledge and attributes which an NCO must have to successfully perform each duty. From that list of skills, knowledge and attributes, the study group derived the Army's requirements for NCOs, which in turn formed the basis for the rest of the study.

MECHANISM
Once the Army's requirements for NCOs were determined, the next step was to examine how the Army professionally develops its NCOs, i.e. what training, educational and experience mechanisms provide the skills, knowledge and attributes which NCOs need to successfully carry out their missions. This was accomplished by looking at each requirement separately and determining what mechanisms exist at the institutional (DA and other high level headquarters), unit and individual levels to instill/enhance that requirement in the NCO. The study group also examined the measurement mechanisms at each level to determine how well individual proficiency in each requirement is measured.
Moving on in the model, the next phase was to determine how well each mechanism was actually working to instill/enhance each requirement in the NCO. This evaluation was based upon the research described in Chapter 1.

The evaluation, as might be expected, showed that some mechanisms are very effective while others are less so. Problems identified by analysis were grouped into categories which the group called the "Study Group Issues." Most of the issues deal with specific mechanisms in the professional development system, such as the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), the Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP), and the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). The remainder deal with problems that pertain to NCO professional development as a whole. In all, there are 12 issues which the group dealt with in detail.

As part of the evaluation process, each problem was analyzed to determine if the problem was due to a faulty mechanism (Is there a problem with the way NCOES contributes to job proficiency?) or a problem with the requirement itself (To what degree does the Army need an NCO to be proficient in his or her job?). Each analysis led to findings and recommendations as to how to better meet the Army's needs today and into the future.
FUTURE
It is difficult to correct today's system without also correcting for the future. By definition, any recommended changes to a current system are future changes. However, the group did identify certain social, political, economic, technological and military trends which are likely to have an impact into the year 2000 and beyond. Many of those trends may require adjustments to the NCO Professional Development System in the coming years.

INTEGRATION
The last item in the framework -- integration -- is critical. The Army, indeed anything that wants to survive, must adapt to change. Planning for change must be an active process, not a passive one. There must be some mechanism by which the Army can regularly review its missions and its requirements and either revalidate them or change them to meet new demands and situations. There must also be a mechanism that regularly analyzes the many components of the professional development system to ensure they are meeting current needs and are on track for the foreseeable future. This is what the group calls integration.

The remaining chapters will examine each element of the model in detail.
CHAPTER 3 - THE ARMY - WHO WE ARE AND WHY WE'RE HERE

The Army’s Mission

- Army Requirements For the NCO

- Today’s NCO PD System

- THE MECHANISM

- Evaluation of Today’s System

- Meet?

- The Future

- Evaluation for Future

- Meet?

- Keeping On Track

- Integration

CORRECTING THE SYSTEM

Faulty Mechanism

Faulty Requirement

Bad Mechanism Or Requirement?
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the NCO Professional Development Study Group was to evaluate the adequacy of the Army's NCO Professional Development System as it exists today and out to the year 2000. But professional development, be it for officers or NCOs, is not an end in itself. It must be examined in the larger context of the Army's need to accomplish its overall mission. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the broader subjects against which the professional development questions must be weighed.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The study group defined professional development as the training, education and experiences that prepare a person to perform his or her duties. (Figure 3-2)
The Army and its sister services comprise the nation's defense establishment. The Army is charged with missions related to national defense and is one factor in determining courses of action which implement our national strategy worldwide. (See Figure 3-3) The Army is charged specifically with organizing, training, and equipping forces to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations on land. The Army's ability to do so gives the President additional options to execute the nation's foreign policy. Landpower can help avoid nuclear confrontation, respond to conflicts across the entire spectrum of violence, and deter conventional conflict by raising to an unacceptable level the risks to a potential enemy.

Figure 3-3
The Army must be prepared to cope with a broad spectrum of threats to the nation's security. These threats range from terrorism and low intensity conflict to general war. Although the most likely threats to national security interests, according to a joint statement by Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh and Chief of Staff of the Army General John A. Wickham, Jr., in the DA Budget Estimates for FY 1986, are conflicts of low intensity, the major security problem facing the U.S. is the threat posed by the military power of the Soviet Union.

U.S. global policy supports the maintenance of peace and political stability in the third world. A growing cause for international concern is the increasing offensive use of chemical weapons in the Third World countries.

Barring major changes in U.S. security commitments, the range of threats the Army must prepare for is wider and greater than at any time since World War II. It promises to remain so for the remainder of the century.

TOTAL ARMY GOALS

In order to ensure the Army is ready to carry out its mission, the Army's leadership has established the following Total Army goals:

1. Readiness. A Total Army prepared for the "three days of war": to deter the day before war; to fight and win on the day of war; and to terminate conflict in such a manner that on the day after war, the United States and its allies have an acceptable level of security.
2. Human. A Total Army composed of military and civilian professionals who loyally serve their nation in rewarding careers.

3. Leadership. A Total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates.

4. Training. A Total Army of professionals prepared to mobilize, deploy, fight and win anywhere in the world.

5. Materiel. A Total Army equipped and sustained to win any land battle.

6. Future Development. A Total Army sensitive to innovative approaches to accomplish its mission.

7. Strategic Deployment. A Total Army organized, manned and equipped so as to be capable of deploying, with transportation assistance, to any part of the globe to counter a wide spectrum of threats.

8. Management. A Total Army which efficiently and effectively uses the resources made available.

In their joint statement, Secretary of the Army Marsh and General Wickham state that "... as the Army moves to the future, strong leadership will be necessary to provide direction and focus. We must ensure that the warrior spirit, the determination to fight when called upon, includes a strongly held conviction that good leaders care deeply about soldiers and their
families. The human dimension must undergird all of our efforts -- it is the essential ingredient that will make the difference in peace or in war."

The common thread in the Army goals and the "essential ingredient" in all the Army's efforts, then, is PEOPLE. And the responsibility for people, as well as the responsibility for accomplishing the Army's goals and missions, lies with the Army's leaders -- its commissioned, warrant and noncommissioned officers.

HISTORICAL BASES
FOR OFFICER AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER CORPS

One tradition that has withstood the test of time is the complementary relationship and mutual respect between the NCO and the officer in the U.S. Army. Since the Army's beginning in 1775, their duties have been separate but necessarily related. There are traditional, functional, and legal reasons for the particular duties of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. In addition there are customs and courtesies that exist because armies require links with their past in order to bind soldiers together in the profession of arms. In order to determine how to professionally train each group, it is first necessary to know what is expected of each.

THE OFFICER

The "commission" is a legal instrument by which the President of the United States appoints and exercises direct control over qualified people to act as his legal agents and assist him in carrying out his duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is this direct tie with the Commander-in-Chief which serves as the basis for commissioned officers' legal authority, and their placement in the Army's organizational structure in positions of authority. Each commissioned officer's appointment and each promotion stems from the President's recommendation and approval by Congress.
DEFINITION OF "NCO"

Noncommissioned officers are soldiers who are selected from the ranks to be leaders. They are responsible for mission accomplishment to include fighting, training and caring for soldiers, and maintaining equipment entrusted to them. (Figure 3-4)

Figure 3-4

ORIGINS OF THE NCO CORPS IN THE U.S. ARMY

The Army's early organization was patterned after the British model which had officers appointed (or elected) to command and serve on staffs. Sergeants were appointed (or elected) from the ranks to serve as subordinates to commanders and to assist staff officers. Until the appointment of Baron Von Steuben (Figure 3-5) as George Washington's Inspector General,
there was little uniformity in terms of qualifications, duties, responsibilities, authority and standards. Von Steuben's "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States" was the Army's official manual for the next 33 years. It contained about 100 pages which set forth the fundamentals of guard duty, organization, field operations and drill.

Today, noncommissioned officers continue to be promoted from the ranks and charged with duties which assist and complement commissioned officers in the discharge of their duties. NCOs serve as the agents of the officers. Their authority comes not from a commission, but rather from commissioned officers and higher ranking NCOs as required to get the job done.
THE RELATIONSHIP

No strict rule can (or should) be established which covers every relationship between officers and NCOs. In general, the officers set the overall policies and standards of the organization and are concerned with the entire range of duties. Officers are responsible for commanding, leading, supervising, and ensuring that NCOs carry out their responsibilities. Officers should not do NCOs' work for them; however, they must ensure that NCOs have the guidance, resources, authority and assistance necessary to do their duties.

By the same token, NCOs are responsible for assisting and advising officers in carrying out their duties. There is no clear, sharp line that distinguishes officer and NCO responsibilities and duties. The commander of an organization must determine the exact division of responsibilities for officers and NCOs by considering the mission, the situation, and the abilities and personalities of the leaders on that particular leadership team. Mission accomplishment demands that officers and NCOs advise, assist, and learn from each other to insure coordinated accomplishment of their respective, complementing responsibilities.

GUIDELINES ON FM 22-600-20, The Army NCO Guide, outlines the types of tasks which normally fall to the commissioned officer and which normally fall to the noncommissioned officer. According to the guide:

1. The officer commands, establishes policy, and plans and programs the work of the Army; THE NCO CONDUCTS THE DAILY BUSINESS OF THE ARMY WITHIN ESTABLISHED ORDERS, DIRECTIVES AND POLICIES.
2. The officer concentrates on collective training which will enable the unit to accomplish its mission; THE NCO CONCENTRATES ON INDIVIDUAL TRAINING WHICH DEVELOPS THE CAPABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

3. The officer is primarily involved with unit operations, training, and related activities; THE NCO IS PRIMARILY INVOLVED WITH TRAINING INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS AND TEAMS.

4. The officer concentrates on unit effectiveness and unit readiness; THE NCO CONCENTRATES ON EACH SUBORDINATE NCO AND SOLDIER AND ON THE SMALL TEAMS OF THE UNIT TO INSURE THAT EACH IS WELL TRAINED, HIGHLY MOTIVATED, READY AND FUNCTIONING.

5. The officer pays particular attention to the standards of performance, training, and professional development of officers as well as NCOs; THE NCO CONCENTRATES ON STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE, TRAINING, AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF NCOs AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

6. The officer creates conditions, makes time and other resources available so the NCO can do the job; THE NCO GETS THE JOB DONE.

LEADERSHIP AND THE NCO

By definition, NCOs are leaders; and the primary distinction between NCOs and other enlisted members is the leadership requirement. All soldiers must know and do their jobs but not every soldier is a leader. NCOs ARE LEADERS.
NCOs lead Normally, commissioned officers lead commissioned and noncommissioned officers; and NCOs lead other NCOs and enlisted soldiers. That means NCOs provide the leadership which is most apparent to soldiers on a day-to-day basis. NCOs outnumber commissioned officers by a ratio of 3 to 1, and directly supervise 80 percent of the soldiers in combat divisions. NCOs LEAD SOLDIERS DAY-IN, DAY-OUT, EVERY DAY.

Ultimately, As stated earlier, the U.S. Army is charged with the execution of land combat in defense of the nation and national interests. NCOs lead the small units—teams, squads, crews, sections—that are the "sharp end of the stick" when national objectives are translated into action on the battlefield. NCOs ARE THE ULTIMATE EXECUTORS OF THE ARMY MISSION.

DEFINITIONS The following terms will be used throughout this report:

-- Professional Development Professional development is the training, education and experiences that prepare a person to perform his or her duties.

-- Professional Development System A professional development system is the organized and integrated mechanism which ensures that people receive the right training, education and experiences at the right times in their careers to perform their duties.

-- Training Training enhances knowledge required to perform specific job skills and critical tasks.
-- Education

Education enhances academic skills, general knowledge, discipline, socialization and citizenship. It should be noted that there is no clear distinction between training and education -- the two overlap.

-- Experiences

Experiences embody what a person learns from actually performing his/her duties and other formal and informal interactions. The opportunity for many experiences is directly affected by the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). EPMS components, such as assignments, promotions, and reclassifications, have a significant impact on professional development.

OFFICER/NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Once the similarities and differences between officers and NCOs are understood and it is clear how each group supports the Total Army missions and goals, it is necessary to look at the professional development systems which are designed to prepare each group to perform its respective duties. It is clear that the officer leads on a different level than the NCO. The officer's mission is to plan, prepare, resource, and lead organizations to support the Army's mission. The NCO's mission is to train, prepare, coach, teach, lead and discipline soldiers in achieving job proficiency and MOS competency, and acquiring/maintaining basic soldiering skills and attributes in support of mission accomplishment. As officers progress, they move in the direction of higher level plans, operations, staff and command. As NCOs progress, they remain, primarily, responsible for soldiers. Figure 3-6 helps portray the differences:
In developing professional development systems for officers and NCOs, the question that must be answered is: What training, education and experiences must the professional development system provide so the NCO or officer can perform his respective duties? It is logical to predict that the answers will be different for officers and NCOs. The professional development systems required by each will be different since their missions are different.
In analyzing the professional development needs of the NCO Corps, in addition to knowing what the Army's requirements are, it is necessary to also know who today's and tomorrow's NCOs are -- their capabilities, beliefs, backgrounds -- so the system can better support the NCO.

In considering what the NCO of year 2000 will be like, it should be kept in mind that the master sergeants, first sergeants, sergeants major and command sergeants major of that year are on active duty today. They came in the Army in the late 1970s. A look at these NCOs' demographics (statistical characteristics) and psychographics (their attitudes and beliefs), can give a pretty good idea of what their training, education and experiential needs will be to enable them to carry out the Army's mission.

The following is a picture of today's enlisted and NCO Corps:

1. The average NCO is 35 years old, male (90%), married (81%) and has one or more children (78%).

2. Minority groups comprise 48% of the NCO Corps. Blacks and Hispanics are the largest minority groups.

3. Ninety-eight percent of all NCOs have high school diplomas or equivalency. Of those, 58% have actually completed high school; the rest have GED certificates. The percentage of non-prior service accessions who are high school diploma graduates has risen steadily over the past years. In FY84, 91% of those accessions were high school diploma graduates, as compared with 81% in FY81.
4. Forty-seven percent of NCOs are in the upper mental test score categories (Categories I, II and IIIa).

5. The enlisted force strength by grade is:
   -- E1/3: 30%
   -- E4: 29%
   -- E5: 18%
   -- E6: 13%
   -- E7: 8%
   -- E8: 2% (less than 2%)
   -- E9: 1% (less than 1%)

MILITARY-RELATED DEMOGRAPHICS

The following statistics apply to the enlisted and NCO Corps as a part of the Army:

1. Sixty-nine percent of NCOs have a secondary MOS. Fewer than 20% have Additional Skill Identifiers.

2. Combat Arms, Combat Support and Combat Service Support strengths are as follows:
   -- Combat Arms: 28%
   -- Combat Support: 20%
   -- Combat Service Support: 52%

3. Average time in service at time of promotion to the ranks indicated is as follows:
   -- Sergeant: 3.5 years
   -- Staff Sergeant: 7.0 years
   -- Sergeant First Class: 11.0 years
   -- Master Sergeant: 17.0 years
   -- Sergeant Major: 22.0 years
Psychographics describe the values, beliefs, attitudes and perceptions which people hold. This section will describe how these characteristics are influenced and what effects they can have on the NCO Professional Development System.

Values are described by Dr. Morris Massey in his book, *The People Puzzle* (1979 by Reston Publishing Company, Inc.), as "Those processes which determine relationships with family, products you buy, voting preference and job performance ..." While the demographics associated with profiling the NCO Corps are readily derived from available hard data in the Enlisted Master File, values are somewhat conjectural and more difficult to document. The study group used Dr. Masey's work and the results of the Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (Defense Data Management Center), to describe those psychographic characteristics which define the values of the NCO Corps. Assumptions were made that the values of people who join the Army generally reflect the values of society; and the Army is generally composed of a cross section of people similar to the civilian population.

Dr. Massey's premise is that values can be divided into two separate categories, "instrumental values" (honesty, freedom, cleanliness, etc.) and "terminal values" which represent the things people seek (success, exciting life, world at peace, etc.). A person's value system develops over a period of twenty years with ten years usually being the lock-in point for "gut values" (those most difficult to change). Values do change, but deeply held values normally require a "Significant Emotional Event" to change them.
The major sources of individual programming are family, friends, education, geography, religion, money (affluence), media, and formal and informal teachers. The chart below indicates Dr. Massey's approach to value programming.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE PROGRAMMING</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERIODS</td>
<td>O</td>
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<td></td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEARS</td>
<td>0-10-20-SEE-SEE-SEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPRINTING, SOCIALIZATION</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND MODELING</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHANGE VALUES/BEHAVIOR</td>
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</table>

Figure 3-7

Figure 3-7 shows that values basically develop through age 20 as a result of the influence of family, other role models and various socialization mechanisms. However, most values are determined by age ten. Using this premise and given the demographic profile of the NCO Corps, particularly age, ethnic origin and gender, it is possible to further profile the NCO Corps by joining the demographic characteristics with the psychographic profile.
As previously stated, the average age of the NCO Corps is 35 years. However, the average age of a sergeant is 26 years, while the average age of a sergeant major is 45 years -- almost a 20 year difference. Since there is a wide age variance between the various NCO grades, it is doubtful that a sergeant would have the same value system as that of a sergeant major. The table below indicates the average age by rank and the estimated time period when the value systems of most of the current NCOs were "locked-in."

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>AVERAGE AGE</th>
<th>YR AGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Sergeant</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant Major</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3-8 shows that most NCOs are products of the 1950s and 1960s as far as their value systems (instrumental and terminal) are concerned. The 1950s were characterized by the following Significant Emotional Events according to Dr. Massey.

1. The rate of change was phenomenal in knowledge, technology, experiences and the economy.

2. "Minor" disruption from the Korean War.

3. Americans wanted to live to enjoy - a wave of affluence swept the nation.
4. The fear of atomic warfare first hung over the nation. The Soviet Union started to become more powerful.

5. Sixty percent of all American families were moving into the middle-class income brackets.

6. Even with growing inflation, income rose forty-eight percent since the 1940s.

7. Old economic values began to collapse. Living on the installment plan became the norm over the traditional value of "cash on the barrel-head."

8. Values became more defined by the possession of material objects.

9. Movement was to suburbs.

10. Lower income people could not move to the suburbs but participated in trend toward materialism by purchasing more consumer goods.

11. People were on the move - the country "shrank."

12. Traditional sex roles began to change.

13. Children raised to "get along" with other people resulting in adolescents knowing a great deal about achieving popularity.

14. Children were no longer told what they must learn but allowed to take electives.
15. Television assumed the role of the baby sitter—children became molded by media.

16. Television created new heroes.

17. The Civil Rights Movement began.

18. Some adopt the value that it is all right to do something wrong as long as you don't get caught.

The 1960s contained a myriad of conflicts and idealism as characterized by:

1. Kennedy Years—assassinations.

2. A misunderstood war—"live and in living color."

3. Civil rights explode in the cities and elsewhere.

4. Internal communist parties.

5. Hippies and love children.


7. God dies?

8. New morality (the pill, fatherless children, abortions).


10. The value of trying to "work things out" dies.
11. Man goes to the moon.

12. Great expectations and frustrations.

13. "Why?" became the most popular question of the day.

All of these events helped shape the value systems of the NCOs in today's Army to some extent. Understanding the impact of these events is a fundamental step in understanding who the NCO is and how to develop a professional development system which trains and motivates the individual to be, know and do what the Army requires. Inasmuch as "Values" is the 1986 Army theme, it will be important for professional development planners to assess the gap between the current values of the men and women in the NCO Corps and the values which the Army wishes to instill in them. In their joint statement announcing the Army theme, SA Marsh and CSA Wickham said, "The senior leadership and soldiers throughout the Army have become increasingly concerned about the apparent erosion of values in our society. The morning paper tells us daily about Americans who, as spies, are selling their national loyalty and our future ... . We in the Army must have rock solid, ethical underpinnings that help us resist pressures to shade the truth, to cheat, or to debase patriotism for material gain. The vital tasks of national security must be executed by soldiers and civilians whose character is solidly based on traditional and professional values."
The Youth Attitude Tracking Study (YATS) published by the Defense Manpower Data Center in conjunction with Army Research Institute is designed to provide DOD with current information concerning the backgrounds, attitudes, and motivations of young men and women and their intentions to serve in the military. YATS, which began in 1977, examines the intentions of youths 16 to 21 years old.

Some of the insights gained as a result of YATS include:

1. The decision to join the Army is a matter of weighing the attractiveness and availability of certain military and nonmilitary alternatives. In other words, the availability of employment or plans to acquire additional schooling are both relevant factors in the decision to join a branch of the service.

2. Most of today's youth were not opposed to draft registration. Neither were they overwhelmingly in favor of it.

3. About half the men and women favored a one-year national service program for males.

4. Enlistment incentives (bonuses, college fund etc.) have a major impact on the decision to enlist.

5. The primary reasons for not planning to join the military were:

   -- Civilian job
Lack of personal freedom (Dr. Massey's "me" generation)

Separation from friends and family (Family was the primary influence for ages 16-21; friends were the primary influencers for ages 21-24)

Continue in school or college

6. The majority of those indicating a high propensity to serve in the Army were in the lower mental categories.

TODAY'S VALUE

PROGRAMMING

Born in the 1960s, today's 17 to 19 year olds were value programmed in the mid- to late 1970s. According to Dr. Massey, many Significant Emotional Events took place during the 1970s which impacted on the values and attitudes of today's primary recruiting market.

1. Women adopted a new spirit: more active, children less the center of their attention, more self-centered and self-indulgent, less dependence on relatives.

2. Men's roles continued to change at home; attitudes towards work changed.

3. Parents began to demand a return to the basics of education.

4. Competence test scores continued to drop. Teachers demanded more money and teacher strikes became common.
5. A significant increase in "latch-key children" resulting from more working parents.

6. Television became even more dominant in shaping loves, hates, likes, dislikes, beliefs, and opinions.

7. Some movements began and continued to gain momentum: human rights, women's rights, gray rights, gay rights, equal employment opportunity, ecology, health foods, physical fitness, consumer rights, handicapped rights and anti-smoking campaigns are just a few.

8. Living beyond one's means became commonplace.

9. Self-centeredness was cultivated: "I don't have to put up with this hassle. I gotta be me. I did it my way."

10. America no longer "invincible."

11. Clearly defined value systems evolved: the traditionalists versus the new challengers.

12. The military institutions yielded slowly by allowing more informality off duty and by being less structured.
The real challenge will be to mold those who entered the service from 1981 on into what the Army believes the future NCO should be. Joining the Army represents a significant emotional event since family ties (financial and emotional) are severed and a new job situation is involved. However, the changes in values and perceptions which result from military service may be difficult to identify. Once the Army defines what it expects from its NCOs, then perhaps the attributes required to achieve desired characteristics can be aligned to ensure the Army continues to have professional soldiers with the "warrior spirit."

The increasing number of minorities, particularly Hispanics, will result in USAREC recruiting more minorities in the future. This will change the profile of the NCO Corps beyond the year 2000.

The role of women in society will continue to expand. Women working outside the home will be the norm in the mid- to late 1990s. This will undoubtedly impact on the demographics of the NCO Corps of the future.
CONCLUSION

The Army has a special role in its service to the country. In order to fulfill that role, the men and women in the Army must be properly led, trained and motivated to fight and win, and possibly die, in defense of the country. It is incumbent on the Army's leadership to ensure that all soldiers are professionally developed, i.e. given the training, education and experiences which will enable them to carry out their duties. In the case of NCOs, that means training them to train others and then to lead them during peacetime and in combat.
CHAPTER 4 - ARMY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE NCO

The Army's Mission

Army Requirements For the NCO

Today's NCO PD System
THE MECHANISM

Evaluation of Today's System

Meet?

NO

YES

The Future

Evaluation For Future

Meet?

NO

YES

Keeping On Track
Integration

CORRECTING THE SYSTEM

Faulty Mechanism
Faulty Requirement

Bad Mechanism Or Requirement?
CHAPTER 4
REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION
Key to analyzing the Army's current system of professional development and making needed adjustments, is a clear understanding of what the Army expects of its NCO Corps.

DEVELOPMENT OF REQUIREMENTS
In order to determine what the Army requires of its NCO Corps, the study group researched Army regulations, legal documents and other materials which direct and imply NCO duties and functions. That list includes defending the constitution and the country, obeying and executing orders, developing subordinates, adapting to changing situations, performing under stress, communicating effectively, setting and enforcing high standards, making sound and timely decisions, accounting for personnel and equipment, training, looking out for the welfare of soldiers and their families, and many more.

But knowing the responsibilities was only the first step in analyzing professional development. The next step was to analyze each NCO responsibility and determine what requirements an NCO must have to carry out that responsibility. For example, NCOs must train soldiers to competency in their MOS. In order to do that, NCOs must first be competent in the MOS. They must also know how to train and communicate. Further, they must be able to read the manuals and write lesson plans. This type of analysis was conducted for each directed NCO responsibility. The result was a list of requirements that NCOs must be and know to meet their responsibilities and do their jobs. Once redundancies
in the list were eliminated and similar items grouped under more general topics, the eight requirements described in this chapter emerged. They are:

- Job Proficiency
- MOS Competency
- Physical Fitness/Military Bearing
- Basic Educational Skills
- Leadership Skills
- Training Skills
- Commitment to Professional Values/Attributes
- Responsibility and Accountability for Actions

Figure 4-2

There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lists of leadership traits and professional attributes which leaders "must" possess in order to lead successfully. The intent of the study group was to create a list based on the Army's actual requirements (as found in written directives and based on tradition) as opposed to lists which are based on more subjective criteria.

Each requirement will be discussed in detail in this section. These requirements are key to both this study and to the NCO Corps. They are important to the study because the group measured each of the professional development mechanisms against how well the mechanism supported the requirements. They are important to NCOs because they define what NCOs must be, know and do; and because one of the study group's recommendations was to incorporate these requirements into a revised Enlisted Evaluation Report (EER).
JOB PROFICIENCY

Job proficiency means that NCOs must be expert in all aspects of their current assignments. To be successful, NCOs must have a wide range of military knowledge about both the technical and nontechnical aspects of the job. They must also be able to perform effectively anywhere, any time and under any circumstances. Other aspects of job proficiency include:

1. Professional knowledge is essential to sound teaching and to improving the proficiency, as well as readiness, of units. Quality training and maintaining cannot be done without solid professional knowledge of responsible leaders.

2. Total competence in waging war is the job of every soldier, regardless of MOS.

3. Tactical and technical competence should be a primary pursuit of every leader.

MOS COMPETENCY

NCOs must be competent in the skills required by their MOS, regardless of whether or not all of those skills are practiced in their current assignments. The Army's readiness to wage war is based, to a great extent, on how well each soldier can perform the skills expected in war, i.e. the MOS skills which the Army requires in combat. Therefore, those skills must be kept current.
On the other hand, it would be unreasonable, given the realities of special Army needs and MOS imbalances, to presume that all NCOs are assigned duties in their MOS and are practicing those skills on a daily basis. In fact, many NCOs are not working in their MOS but are doing other things which contribute to the Army's mission. For this reason, the goal is for MOS "competency" as opposed to "proficiency" -- with "competency" implying a lower level of expertise but still having adequate skills and knowledge to perform in the MOS when called upon to do so.

Basic educational skills include the ability to read, write, speak and have basic reasoning skills necessary to carry out the myriad responsibilities assigned to the NCO. Basic educational skills do not equate to college degrees but rather to the acquired skills NCOs need to successfully do what the Army requires of them. They are duty-related and far reaching. An NCO's ability to learn, teach, train, mentor, solve problems, act independently, have and inspire confidence, and motivate others are all dependent on these types of basic educational skills. Some other ideas concerning basic educational skills are:

1. Basic educational skills increase capacity and motivation to learn more. They encourage vision, imagination and originality.

2. These skills emphasize how to think rather than what to think. They provide a systematic process for proceeding through the details of mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time to arrive at a sound decision.
Increases Job Satisfaction 3. Education enhances competence and normally leads to job satisfaction and retention.

Increases Technical Skills 4. Academic achievement usually indicates that a soldier is more liable to be receptive to the technical training.

Increases Overall Performance 5. Educated soldiers understand tasks better than uneducated soldiers.

Helps NCOs Train Others 6. These skills allow NCOs to communicate their knowledge in the training of their subordinates. Knowledge (job proficiency and MOS competency) is not enough. Having the ability to impart what they know to others is all important.

TRAINING SKILLS NCOs must be skilled trainers and leaders, training soldiers to high performance standards, demonstrating technical and tactical proficiency, radiating confidence in all they undertake and constantly seeking responsibility. Training skills include learning the subject matter, communicative skills for formal and informal instruction, innovativeness, concern, ability to motivate others and an awareness of soldiers' abilities and personal and professional needs. As GEN Wickham said at the 1985 Armor Conference, 8 May 85, "It is up to NCOs to teach and coach. Picking up where the schoolhouse leaves off, the NCO is tasked with developing NCO leaders."
Other training-related concepts include:

1. Training must be tough, realistic, and challenging. It has to be directly related to battlefield requirements.

2. We must train in peace as we would train in the event of war. All training should stress that every soldier, regardless of assignment, has as his primary duty the obligation to fight.

3. Training at the platoon level is key to winning because combat at the small unit level has enormous impact on the operational level of warfare. NCOs are responsible for individual training. Leaders at all levels must be capable of presenting a well-thought-out concept of operations.
4. Training ability relates to professional knowledge and the teaching, as well as the training of soldiers. Only by teaching can leaders truly prepare soldiers to be successful and to survive in combat. Only by teaching can leaders make the Army better across-the-board.

5. Training includes "footlocker" counseling. The counseling should cover observations about performance, but more importantly, it should convey to the younger soldier the experience, the values, and the historical knowledge of the senior.

6. Success in a training and education environment is a predicator of success in the profession.
Train the
trainer

7. Leaders must train their subordinates, they, in turn, their subordinates, and so on down the line.

Mentoring

8. Senior leaders have the responsibility to be mentors, training and teaching their subordinates, and they are no less obligated to see that professional dereliction and incompetence are not tolerated.

PHYSICAL FITNESS, MILITARY BEARING

Physical fitness and military bearing refer to an NCO's physical and mental ability to accomplish the mission. It also means that NCOs, as leaders, must exude confidence so that those they lead will have confidence in them. NCOs must be fit to fight and fit to train for and lead others in combat.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower added another dimension of strength to this requirement. "Leadership cannot be exercised by the weak. It demands strength -- the strength of this great nation when its people are united in a common purpose, united in a common fundamental faith, united in their readiness to work for human freedom and peace. This spiritual and economic strength, in turn, must be reinforced in a still armed world by the physical strength necessary for the defense of ourselves and our friends."

RESPONSIBILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY

NCOs are charged with maintaining and accounting for personnel and equipment. They are also accountable for their own actions and for those of the soldiers under them.
Taking Care of Equipment

PROFESSIONAL VALUES AND ATTRIBUTES

Professional values and attributes embody a wide range of characteristics. Lists of these attributes are virtually endless, but generally they include those characteristics which men and women in the Army know to be integral parts of being professional soldiers and leaders.

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, states that beliefs, values and ethics are the foundation of competence as a leader. The manual defines values, beliefs and ethics as follows:

Values

1. Values are ideas about the worth or importance of things, concepts, and people. They come from beliefs. They influence priorities.

Beliefs

2. Beliefs are assumptions or convictions that a person holds as true regarding things, concepts or people. Beliefs usually cannot be proved.
3. Four values that comprise the Army ethic are:

a. Loyalty to the ideals of the nation. Deep belief in serving and defending the ideals of freedom, justice, truth, and equality. Being a professional leader means being selfless, honorable, and committed to serving the ideals of the nation. Soldiers must be willing to risk their lives so others can live in a free and just society.

b. Loyalty to the unit. Obligation to save lives; be considerate of the well-being of one's subordinates and comrades; instill sense of devotion and pride in unit; develop cohesiveness and loyalty that mold individuals into effective fighting organizations.

c. Personal responsibility. Equates to individual obligation to accomplish all assigned tasks to the fullest of one's capability; to abide by all commitments; seize every opportunity for individual growth and improvement. Leaders accept full responsibility for their actions and those of subordinates. Personal responsibility includes duty and honor. Leaders have honor if they morally and courageously do their duty to the best of their ability.

d. Selfless service. Putting the needs and goals of the nation, the Army, the unit, and soldiers ahead of personal needs and interests. Leaders are given authority, status and position so they may be of greater service to subordinates, units and the country.
FM 100-1, The Army, says that as a profession -- a calling which demands of its members specialized knowledge and skills, and intensive preparation -- it is imperative that the military profession embrace a professional ethic. In this ethic should be set forth those values and principles of conduct which govern our behavior both as a group and as individuals. Furthermore, such a professional ethic must be understood and accepted in its totality by individuals at every level of military operations -- from the soldier on point, to the field commander, to the general officer testifying before Congress. It is true, therefore, that while personal value systems or ethics may vary from individual to individual, professional integrity demands of each soldier an uncompromising commitment to those institutional values which form the bedrock of the profession -- the Army ethic.

Going back now to values, FM 22-100 defines the four soldierly values as:

1. **Courage.** Physical courage means overcoming fear of bodily harm. Moral courage means overcoming fears other than bodily harm while doing one's duty. Moral courage is the courage to stand firm on values, moral principles, convictions.

2. **Candor.** Being frank, open, honest, and sincere. Candor is an expression of personal integrity.

3. **Competence.** Possess and demonstrate required professional knowledge, judgment and skills.
4. Commitment. Dedication to carry out all unit missions and to serve the values of the country, the Army and the unit.

**Character**

Professional beliefs, values, and ethics are the foundation of a leader's character. Character is the sum total of all personality traits. A person's visible behavior is an indication of his character.

**Traits of Character**

According to FM 22-100, traits of character include:

1. Integrity. Utter sincerity, honesty and candor.
3. Will. Perseverance to accomplish a goal.
4. Self-discipline. Forcing oneself to do one's duty, regardless of how tired or unwilling a person may be.
5. Flexibility. Capability to make timely and appropriate changes in thinking, plans, or methods when needed.
6. Confidence. Assurance that leaders and soldiers will be successful in whatever they do.
7. Endurance. Includes mental, spiritual, and physical stamina.
8. Decisiveness. Ability to use sound judgment and make good decisions at the right times.
10. Initiative. Ability to take actions that will accomplish unit goals without waiting for orders or supervision. Includes boldness.
11. Justice. Fair treatment of all people regardless of race, religion, color, sex, age, national origin. Award according to merit and performance.

12. Self-improvement. Working to improve/strengthen beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills.

13. Assertiveness. Taking charge when necessary. Making one's ideas known. Getting others to do the right thing.

14. Empathy/Compassion. Sensitive to the feelings, values, interests and well-being of others.


16. Creativity. Thinking of new and better goals, ideas, programs, and solutions to problems.

17. Bearing. Posture, overall appearance and manner of physical movement. Outward display to others of a leader's inner feelings, fears, confidence, etc.


19. Tact. Sensitive perception of people, their values, feelings and views which allows positive interaction.

Additional concepts related to professional values and attitudes include:

1. One does not develop character in the heat of battle or a moment of crisis. Character grows out of the steady application of moral values and ethical behavior in one's life.
2. High standards, sound discipline, and performance under stress are preconditions for proper character and leadership development.

3. When leaders become uncertain about their values, confused about their purpose, and lead in ways scarcely sanctioned by their traditions, soldiers, units, and the country are poorly served.

**LEADERSHIP**

Military leadership, as defined in FM 22-100, is a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission. A soldier carries out this process by applying leadership attributes (beliefs, values, ethics, character, knowledge, and skills). The basis of effective leadership is honorable character and selfless service to one's country, one's unit, and one's soldiers.

It is clear from FM 22-100 that the concepts of leadership are closely linked to those of professional values and attributes. The two cannot be separated.
Leadership FM 22-100 discusses four major factors of leadership:

1. Follower. Know your soldiers. Have a clear understanding of human nature (needs, emotions, motivations). Leaders need the trust, respect, and confidence of followers. Leaders are also followers who must meet the needs of their leaders.

2. Leader. Know yourself. Know who you are, what you know, and what you can do.

3. Communication. Communication includes verbal (what you say) and nonverbal (the message your actions convey to others). Leaders must set the example. They must teach, coach, counsel, persuade, punish.

4. Situation. Situations differ and so do leadership requirements needed to meet those situations.

Leaders must: BE: Committed to the Professional Army Ethic and possess professional character traits.

KNOW: The four factors of leadership.

DO: Provide direction. Implement (communicate, coordinate, supervise, evaluate) and motivate (includes teaching, counseling).

FM 22-100 also offers the following guidance on leadership:

1. You must respect your soldiers and have their respect. Soldiers respect you when you demonstrate character, knowledge and professional skills.

2. Show sincere concern for all subordinate leaders and troops in your unit.
Other leadership-related thoughts include:

1. Good leaders possess the spirit of victory.

2. Leaders must create and sustain a leadership climate where fighting skills, innovation, competence, character development and caring are rewarded -- a climate where young people can grow to the fullest of their natural talents, where young people can make mistakes and still survive.

3. Leadership includes caring for families and caring for soldiers. Leaders must make every effort to improve the lives of soldiers and their families and thereby contribute to an Army that feels better about itself.

4. NCOs and officers are inherently leaders. At the same time, they manage resources. A soldier must have some managerial skills to be a great leader. And managers must have the same ethical and moral frame of reference that a leader does. There is no clear distinction between leaders and managers.

5. Good leaders are standard-bearers; they set examples of personal and professional excellence.

6. Leaders are made, not born.

7. Valor, patriotism, and fidelity all are tied to the development of character, leadership by example, and selfless service.

8. Leaders must teach excellence to those entrusted to their care.
9. Good leaders are not "careerists." They are not ruthless with regard to young people.

10. Leaders ought to be able to translate character and knowledge into practice; to exert the leadership that makes for success in situations that are mentally and physically stressful; to apply skills and insights to reduce confusion to predictable patterns; and to apply judgment and improvisation in order to exploit fleeting opportunities, react promptly to changes and take necessary action.

11. High standards, sound discipline, and performance under stress are preconditions for proper character and leadership development.

12. The most difficult task facing any leader is to inspire and engender the courage needed to overcome the uncertainty and fear, the death and destruction, of war.

13. Leaders must issue clearcut and positive decisions and orders that are not constantly changing. (George S. Patton once said "A good solution applied with vigor now is better than a perfect solution ten minutes later.")

14. General of the Army Omar Bradley summed up leadership this way: "Leadership in a democratic Army means firmness, not harshness; understanding, not weakness; justice, not license; humaneness, not intolerance; generosity, not selfishness; pride, not egotism."
Before departing the subject of requirements, it should be noted that during the course of the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development Study, the noncommissioned officer professional development systems of several allied armies (Great Britain, Canada, West Germany and France) and of the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps were examined.

In analyzing the information concerning allied armies and the other U.S. services, a comparison was made with respect to the requirements or attributes that the U.S. Army expects from its NCOs. In almost all cases, with the exception of physical fitness, the requirements that our allies and sister services expected were quite similar to those requirements that the U.S. Army desires in its NCOs. Figure 4-3 compares U.S. Army requirements and attributes to those of selected allies and the sister services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements/Attributes</th>
<th>US Army</th>
<th>U.S. Army</th>
<th>German Army</th>
<th>British Army</th>
<th>French Army</th>
<th>Canadian Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job Proficiency</td>
<td>Knowledge/Performance</td>
<td>Regular Duties</td>
<td>Performance of Duty</td>
<td>Regular Duties</td>
<td>Performance of Duty</td>
<td>Complete in Military Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS Competency</td>
<td>Knowledge/Performance</td>
<td>Regular Duties</td>
<td>Performance of Duty</td>
<td>Regular Duties</td>
<td>Performance of Duty</td>
<td>Complete in Military Tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Education Skills</td>
<td>Self Expression (speaking, writing)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Executing Ability/Training</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Civilian Occupational Training</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Skills</td>
<td>Management (includes training skills)</td>
<td>Training Personnel</td>
<td>Training Supervision</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Training Skills</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Fitness</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Endurance</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Physical Fitness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility and Accountability</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Economy of Management</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Attributes</td>
<td>Personal Traits</td>
<td>Personal Traits</td>
<td>Reading and Behavior</td>
<td>Personal Traits</td>
<td>Personal Traits</td>
<td>Personal Traits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Knowledge (customer, courtesies, etc.)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4-3
ALLIED ARMIES

The study group's investigation into the NCO professional development in allied armies, particularly the British, Canadian, French and German systems was facilitated by TRADOC.

British Army

1. The British Army has an educational system that is mandatory in order to obtain promotion. The British system in many respects is similar to that of the U.S. Army. For example, the commanding officer is responsible for training all NCOs under his command and NCOs are required to take and pass annual individual proficiency tests.

Canadian Army

2. Canadian Army NCOPD is also similar to that of the U.S. Army. Promotion is based on a combination of performance, trade (MOS) qualifications and leadership. NCO rank is equated to leadership and responsibility. Training at each rank is designed to qualify the NCO for the next higher rank. In the Canadian Army, training is emphasized over education. Civilian education is not stressed in the Canadian Army. Paramount importance is placed on military training. The Canadian Army does not conduct annual proficiency or skills tests.

French Army

3. The French NCO only has two levels of NCOES as compared to five levels in the U.S. Army. Additionally, the majority of French NCOs are enlisted directly from civilian life without an apprenticeship in the lower enlisted ranks. At level 1, the French NCO is trained to be a squad leader and at level 2 a platoon leader. French NCOs are not specifically charged with training more junior NCOs, however, they are in charge of educating their direct subordinates,
some of whom are junior NCOs. The company commander has responsibility for training NCOs. The French NCO may enroll in an eight-month correspondence course, unlike any in the U.S. Army, which includes subjects such as French, math, current events, contemporary issues, world history and military subjects.

German Army

4. Unlike the U.S. Army, the German Army places a great deal of emphasis on the integration of specialized civilian occupational training with military training.

SISTER SERVICES

U.S. Air Force

1. Similar to the U.S. Army, the USAF has four levels of NCO education. Although the four levels are not officially linked to promotion, the vast majority of NCOs attend at the lower levels as indicated:

   LEVEL 1 - NCO Preparatory Course - 100%
   LEVEL 2 - NCO Leadership School - 95%
   LEVEL 3 - NCO Academy - 89%
   LEVEL 4 - Senior NCO Academy - 50%

U.S. Marine Corps

2. The USMC NCOPD system is very similar to that of the U.S. Army; however, attendance at USMC professional development schools is not linked to promotion and the USMC does not have a skill qualification test.

U.S. Navy

3. The USN education system consists of five courses. As indicated in Figure 4-4, some of the courses are linked to promotion while others are not. It should be noted that leadership and MOS testing are linked to promotion.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSE</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
<th>PROMOTION LINKAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petty Officer Indoctrination Course</td>
<td>E4</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Management, Education &amp; Training Course</td>
<td>E5 &amp; E6</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Petty Officer Indoctrination Course</td>
<td>E6(P)</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Management, Education and Training Course for Chief Petty Officers</td>
<td>E7 to E9</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Enlisted Academy</td>
<td>E8 and E9</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4-4**

**CONCLUSIONS**

As stated earlier, there are many lists about what leaders should be and do. The study group's list was built upon what the Army, both in its written regulations and mission and in its traditions, requires of its noncommissioned officers. These requirements are critical to the rest of the report because the analysis of each supporting system was based on how well those systems support these requirements.
CHAPTER 5 - THE NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

The Army's Mission

Army Requirements
For the NCO

Today's NCO PD System
THE MECHANISM

Evaluation of Today's System

Meet?

YES

The Future

Evaluation For Future

Meet?

NO

Bad Mechanism
Or Requirement?

Faulty Requirement

Faulty Requirement

Keeping On Track
Integration
CHAPTER 5
MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS (NCOPD MECHANISMS)

INTRODUCTION
Thus far in the NCOPDS model, the study group has analyzed the Army's mission and defined the role of the NCO in accomplishing that mission. As seen in Chapter 4, the study group then identified the eight requirements which NCOs must have in order to successfully carry out their missions.

The next step in the model (Figure 5-1) is to determine what mechanisms exist in the Army that help provide NCOs with those eight requirements, so that the study group could analyze how well each of those mechanisms meets the requirements.

METHODOLOGY
Two factors were seen as being key to whatever technique was used in the analysis. First was a realization that NCOPD takes place at several levels in the Army. Some types of development are the results of actions by relatively high level commands or headquarters. The group called these high level Institutional activities "INSTITUTIONS." Institutions include NCO academies, TRADOC schools, MACOMs and HQDA or its field operating agencies. Other types of professional development are conducted by or are a result of actions of the Army TOE or TDA "UNITS" and job sites. Finally development depends on programs keying on the abilities and efforts of the "INDIVIDUAL."
The second factor is a realization that professional development consists of all the TRAINING, EDUCATION and EXPERIENCES that NCOs receive during their Army careers. And in order to assess how the institutional, unit and individual mechanisms can better provide training, education and experiences which help NCOs meet the requirements, there must be some MEASUREMENT of how well NCOs are actually meeting the requirements.

The two factors -- the various levels of responsibility for professional development (INSTITUTION, UNIT, INDIVIDUAL) and types of development (TRAINING, EDUCATION, EXPERIENCE) -- were then used to identify the mechanisms which exist to satisfy each requirement. A matrix answering the following questions (Figure 5-2) was prepared for each requirement.

**EXAMPLE**

**REQUIREMENT: JOB PROFICIENCY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>TRAINING AND EDUCATION</th>
<th>EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>MEASUREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What training and education provided by institutions develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>What experience gained in institutions develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>How does the Army as an institution measure job proficiency?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>What training and education conducted by units develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>What experience gained in units develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>How do units measure job proficiency?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>What training and education done by individuals develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>What experience at an individual level develops job proficiency?</td>
<td>How do individuals assess their own job proficiency?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-2
To ensure consistency and completeness, this procedure was performed in several iterations for each requirement. The completed matrices and the related issues are shown in Figures 5-3 through 5-11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>MEASUREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCOES</td>
<td>Assignments</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Functional</td>
<td>Reassignment</td>
<td>ITEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Courses</td>
<td>Resident course</td>
<td>Promotion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civ School</td>
<td>attendance experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NCOOP</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>ARTEP (FTX)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BSEP</td>
<td>in NOS (OJE)</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>ITEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>in FTX/ARTEP</td>
<td>AGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OJT</td>
<td>Service in</td>
<td>Unit certifica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>leadership programs</td>
<td>tion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| INDIVIDUAL    | ACES      | Daily job | Coaching by others |
|---------------|-----------| performance|               |
|               | Correspondence| Service in leadership | |
|               | Courses    | positions  | coaching and counseling by others | |

**RELATED NCOOPS ISSUES:**
- Who should be responsible for NCOOP at the various levels?
- How can NCOOPS be made more effective?
- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCOOP?
- How can the assignment system better support professional development?
- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?
- How can the promotion system better support professional development?
- What should the NCOOPD philosophy be?
- How can all these questions be answered for NC?
### Related NCOEDS Issues:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATED NCOEDS ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Who should be responsible for NCOEDP at the various levels?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How can NCOEDP be made more effective?</td>
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<td>- What should be the role of ITEP in professional development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How can NCOEDP be strengthened?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How should reclassified NCOs be retrained?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCOEDP?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How can the assignment system better support professional development?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?</td>
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<tr>
<td>- How can the promotion system better support professional development?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- What should the NCOEDP philosophy be?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- How can all these questions be answered for RC?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Physical Fitness 
& Military Bearing

(Figure 5-5)

#### RELATED NCOEDS ISSUES:

- Who should be responsible for NCOEDP at various levels?
- How can NCOEDP be strengthened?
- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?
- How can the promotion system better support professional development?
- How can all these questions be answered for RC?
TRAINING AND EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>ACES NCOES</th>
<th>Opportunity for Ed. by assignment</th>
<th>EER ASVAB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NCOFP BSEP</td>
<td>Writing (EER, counseling statements, etc) &quot;Power Down&quot;</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>AET Civ Ed GED - PHD</td>
<td>Writing Teaching Counseling</td>
<td>Diagnostic Testing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BASIC EDUCATIONAL SKILLS
(Figure 5-6)

RELATED NCOPOS ISSUES:
-- Who should be responsible for NCOFP at the various levels?
-- How can NCOES be made more effective?
-- How can NCOFP be strengthened?
-- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCOFP?
-- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?
-- How can all these questions be answered for RC?

LEADERSHIP SKILLS
(Figure 5-7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>NCOES Selected functional courses Selected Civ Ed</th>
<th>Assignment (to leadership positions)</th>
<th>EER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NCOFP CPX/FTX</td>
<td>Participation in FTX/ARTE Daily Performance of job &quot;Power Down&quot; Assignment to leadership posn</td>
<td>EER ITET (C-E) Unit Promotion Boards ARTE/FTX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>ALT Civ Ed Nonresident instruction</td>
<td>Daily job Performance Being mentored Experimentation &amp; risk taking Counseling others</td>
<td>Feedback from others Self critique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELATED NCOPOS ISSUES:
-- Who should be responsible for NCOFP at the various levels?
-- How can NCOES be made more effective?
-- How can NCOFP be strengthened?
-- How can the assignment system better support professional development?
-- How can all these questions be answered for RC?
### Training and Education Experience Measurement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>NCORPS</th>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>EER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>Functional courses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NCODP</td>
<td>Training Assignments (leadership &amp; instructor positions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TMS</td>
<td>Conducting Training Participating in Training &quot;Power Down&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>Self-studies</td>
<td>Conducting training Participating in training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AET</td>
<td></td>
<td>Feedback from students &amp; others Self-critique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Training Skills**

(Figure 5-8)

**Related NCOPDS Issues:**
- Who should be responsible for NCODP at the various levels?
- How can NCORPS be made more effective?
- What should be the role of ITEP in professional development?
- How can NCODP be strengthened?
- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCOPD?
- How can the assignment system better support professional development?
- What should the NCODP philosophy be?
- How can all these questions be answered for RC?

### Committed to Professional Attitudes

(Figure 5-9)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>NCORPS</th>
<th>Socialization/ &quot;Soldierization&quot;</th>
<th>EER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACES</td>
<td>Adverse UCMJ reaction</td>
<td>UCMJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>NCODP</td>
<td>Unit in-brief Counseling Socialization FTX/ARTEP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUAL</td>
<td>Self-study</td>
<td>Civ Education Pre-induction Socialization Being mentored</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Related NCOPDS Issues:**
- Who should be responsible for NCODP at the various levels?
- How can NCORPS be made more effective?
- How can NCODP be strengthened?
- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCOPD?
- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?
- What should the NCODP philosophy be?
- How can all these questions be answered for RC?
### RESPONSIBLE AND ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACTIONS & PROPERTY (Figure 5-10)

#### TRAINING AND EDUCATION EXPERIENCE MEASUREMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL</th>
<th>NCOES</th>
<th>EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>MEASUREMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NCODP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assignments (to progressively more responsible positions)</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TMS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Power Down&quot; responsibility and accountability to appropriate level Inspections</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BSEP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assignment in leadership positions Participation in FTX/ARTEP</td>
<td>EER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th></th>
<th>ACES Non-resident courses</th>
<th>EER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service in leadership positions</td>
<td>ITEP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### RELATED NCOPDS ISSUES:
- Who should be responsible for NCODP at the various levels?
- How can NCOES be made more effective?
- How can NCODP be strengthened?
- To what extent should civilian education be included in NCODP?
- How can the evaluation system better support professional development?
- How can the promotion system better support professional development?
- How can all these questions be answered for RC?

The completed matrices yielded a list of mechanisms which currently exist in the Army to meet the professional development needs of NCOs (Figure 5-12). From that list, and based on preliminary research, the study group selected certain mechanisms for further evaluation and discussion. This selection was also based upon the nearly universal application of those mechanisms to NCOs of all MOS/GRADE and component (Active and Reserve) and the direct impact the mechanisms have on NCO professional development.
The selected mechanisms are:

Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES)
Civilian Education
Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP)
Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP)
Enlisted Promotion System
Enlisted Assignment System
Enlisted Evaluation System

It should be recognized that these selected mechanisms do not encompass the whole of NCO professional development. For example, EPMS alone contributes in many more ways than will be discussed in this report. This chapter describes those portions of the systems that pertain to the group's findings and recommendations (which will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this report).
The NCOES, in both its Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) versions, provides training opportunities for NCOs throughout their careers. The RC version of NCOES is described later in this chapter. The objectives of NCOES are to train NCOs to be trainers and leaders, provide job proficiency training, and improve unit readiness and collective mission proficiency through individual proficiency of NCOs and subordinate soldiers. Each MOS is assigned to a proponent service school which develops and maintains the Individual Training Plan (ITP), from Skill Level (SL) 1 through SL5. NCOES courses focus on tasks in the next higher skill level except for specific MOSs where merger training is a consideration. Merger training exists when NCOs are promoted into an MOS for which they have had no supervisory experience. In such instances, training is limited to that which is necessary to correct shortcomings.
The NCOES currently includes four levels: Primary, Basic, Advanced, and Senior. Extension training, with respect to the NCOES, includes the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) and the Training Extension Courses (TEC).

**Primary Level Education**

-- Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC): The PLDC is a non-MOS-specific leadership course. Its emphasis is on how to lead, train, and perform the duties and carry out the responsibilities and authority of an NCO. It is a four week course with emphasis on leadership in a combat environment. The course is presented in twenty-nine noncommissioned officer academies (NCOA) worldwide. PLDC trains selected SL1 soldiers for leadership duties at SL2 (SGT). Effective 1 July 86, PLDC will be prerequisite for promotion to SSG (E-6).

-- Primary Technical Course (PTC): Effective 1 Jan 86, all PTCs were discontinued as part of a TRADOC initiative to streamline NCOES. The courses were in effect, however, at the time of this study and are described herein.

PTC focuses on training for critical tasks listed in the SL2 Soldiers Manual for a given MOS. PTC is offered in both the resident service school and extension modes. It is also taught in those MACOM troop schools which meet TRADOC accreditation requirements. Not every MOS has a PTC, and the course lengths vary for those that do.
The PTC selection procedure has been changed by a recent MILPERGEN initiative to manage training quotas by linking the Enlisted Master File (EMF) to the Army Training Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS). This initiative establishes an automated centralized management system to identify eligible soldiers by priority and assign training seats by name. The EMF will provide data to ATRRS on all soldiers in pay grades E4(P), E5, and E6, quarterly. Based on DA DCSOPS guidelines, ATRRS will generate an Armywide order of merit list, review available class seats, and allocate MACOM quotas based on the percentage of MACOM eligibles. Automated selection was effective July 1985.

Basic Level Education: The basic level of training prepares sergeants (SL2) for staff sergeant (SL3) duties. It includes the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) for the combat arms MOS and Basic Technical Course (BTC) for the combat support and combat service support MOS.

-- Basic NCO Course

The BNCOC stresses performance-oriented training techniques. Soldiers are trained in MOS-critical job tasks to specified standards. This course is approximately five weeks long and is presented to sergeants and staff sergeants. The program of instruction provides the opportunity to perform in leadership positions and exercise training skills. The course produces squad leaders, section leaders, tank commanders, and weapons/equipment experts who can train and lead soldiers in the combat environment. The course is MOS specific for Armor, Field Artillery, Engineer, Air Defense and Infantry sergeants. It is presented in 17 NCOAs worldwide. Students are selected to attend by their commanders utilizing the guidelines in Chapter 6, AR 351-1.
BTC focuses on training MOS-specific SL3 critical tasks. However, in some cases, BTC may train critical SL1 and SL2 tasks when an MOS merges at SL3. BTC may be taught in resident service schools or via the extension mode. It may also be taught in MACOM troop schools provided the schools are accredited by TRADOC. Soldiers selected for promotion to staff sergeant, and staff sergeants who are performing in or being assigned duties at SL3 are given first priority for attendance. Sergeants performing duties at SL3 are given second priority. Soldiers in pay grades E4 through E6 are eligible for enrollment in extension (ACCP) BTC. BTC attendance has also been brought into the automated EMF/ATRRS management system described for PTC.

As noted earlier, on 1 Jan 86, TRADOC implemented a revision of NCOES that directly impacts on Primary and Basic levels. The revised NCOES training strategy eliminates PTC and changes "BTC" to "BNCOC." The intent is to standardize the enlisted education system by bringing the combat support and combat service support career management fields in line with the combat arms, i.e., PLDC - (SL2), BNCOC - (SL3), ANCOC - (SL4), etc. This system is similar to the officer system in that it requires mandatory formal training at designated career points.

The intent is that training at PLDC (SL2 level) will focus on leadership training. BNCOC will provide standardized (i.e., common core developed by the Sergeants Major Academy) leadership training and MOS critical job tasks to specific standards (proponent developed). ANCOC will provide advanced leadership
training and MOS skills needed to train and lead soldiers. This is a sequential process with each level building on the foundation of the previous level. TRADOC will accredit all BNCOCs to enforce standardization.

Although the proposal is to "eliminate PTC," in reality, it will not change the proponents' ability to provide MOS specific critical task training to SL2 soldiers whose job descriptions place them in supervisory/leadership positions at that level. For example, SL2 MOS-specific, critical task training will be required for those MOSs that merge at E5, thus creating a capper supervisory MOS. Soldiers in these special categories will attend BNCOC at the E4(P)/E5 level. The majority of BNCOCs, however, will be targeted for soldiers in pay grades E5(P)/E6.

Advanced Level Training

The advanced level of training prepares NCOs for duties as sergeants first class. This level consists of MOS-specific Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Courses (ANCOC). ANCOC for the AC is a SL4 career progression course that emphasizes technical and leadership skills needed to train and lead other soldiers at the platoon and comparable levels. Staff sergeants are selected by a DA selection board to attend ANCOC. Additionally, soldiers selected for promotion to sergeant first class who have not already attended ANCOC will be scheduled to go.
Soldiers are scheduled to attend resident ANCOCs by MILPERCEN in either a TDY-and-return status or a TDY enroute status. ANCOC for the RC is an MOS immaterial course that stresses leadership training at the platoon and comparable levels. It is taught in USAR schools and ARNG academies. Candidates must be staff sergeants or sergeants first class (no waivers), recommended by their first sergeant, and meet Army height and weight standards.

ANCOC is also offered through the ACCP. Sergeants (with their commanders' approval), and staff sergeants and above may enroll in the appropriate ACCP ANCOC course. Individuals who complete ANCOC via the nonresident program may not attend the resident course. Those who complete ANCOC through ACCP are given resident course credit.

**Senior Level**

Senior level training prepares sergeants first class and master sergeants for duties as master sergeants and sergeants major (SL5). The U. S. Army First Sergeant (1SG) Course and the U. S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) are currently the only two senior level courses.

The 1SG Course offers the education and training needed for individuals to perform effectively and efficiently as first sergeants. The student body is composed of sergeants first class and master sergeants with varied MOSs who have been selected for or serving as first sergeants. This resident course provides a detailed study of contemporary leadership subjects and
educationally broadening experiences through peer association. The curriculum creates an opportunity for individual and group study of problems encountered by today's first sergeant. The course is eight weeks long. Students are selected by their commanders (90%) and MILPERCENT (10%) based on their duty positions, and attend in either TDY-and-return or TDY enroute status. The course is conducted at the USASMA and in USAREUR.

The USASMA is the capstone of senior noncommissioned officer training. The course trains carefully selected NCOs for positions of highest responsibility throughout the Army and Department of Defense (DOD). Students are selected by a DA selection board. The course is 22 weeks long for NCOs of all MOSs. Major subject areas include leadership, national security affairs, resource management, military studies, research projects, physical training and appearance, professional development and a college electives program. Emphasis throughout the course is on the assigned and inherent duties, responsibilities, and authority of the senior NCO in today's Army.

DoD Directive 1322.8 states that educational programs shall be established to set educational, vocational, and career goals to enable military service members, as citizens in uniform, to share the same opportunities for education that are provided all eligible citizens. The Army Continuing Education System (ACES) fulfills this responsibility by providing on-duty, job-related educational programs and off-duty educational opportunities for professional and personal
development. ACES benefits Army units and commanders by supporting readiness through improved professionalism and skill proficiency, providing an incentive for the enlistment and retention of highly motivated and qualified soldiers, and providing the degree of expertise needed by the Army to use advanced technology. ACES supports the individual by enhancing the soldier’s professional development, military effectiveness, and leadership abilities. It prepares soldiers for positions of greater responsibility and increases self-esteem and motivation for continued learning.

AR 621-5 states that enlisted service members' educational goals should consist of the following:

1. Master basic educational skills needed to perform duties of Primary Military Occupational Specialty (PMOS).
2. Earn a high school diploma (or equivalent) before completion of first enlistment.

3. Earn an associate degree or complete 60 semester hours toward a college degree in a field related to one of their specialties before their fifteenth year of service.

Educational requirements for promotion are outlined in AR 600-200. For promotion to sergeant, a soldier must complete eighth grade or general education development (GED) equivalent, or higher education. For promotion to staff sergeant, a soldier must have a high school diploma, or GED equivalent or higher degree. Effective 1 March 1987, a high school diploma/GED equivalent or higher degree will be required for promotion to sergeant. Additionally, education is one of the factors that is considered when classifying, reclassifying, training, and assigning soldiers.

In addition to providing opportunity to meet promotion requirements and educational goals, ACES provides second language soldiers English language training necessary to accomplish military duties.

The components of ACES are:

1. The Basic Skills Education Program (BSEP) I and II. BSEP I is designed to provide enlisted soldiers with the basic academic competencies necessary to successfully complete Initial Entry Training (IET). BSEP II provides privates through sergeants with job-related, basic, academic competencies necessary to improve skills required for proficiency in military duties.
2. The Career Soldier Education Program (CSEP) I and II. CSEP I is designed to provide specialists 4/corporals through sergeants major with the basic academic competencies necessary to perform successfully in the Noncommissioned Officers Education System (NCOES). CSEP II provides staff sergeants through sergeants major with job-related basic academic competencies necessary to improve skills required for proficiency in military duties, or to meet reenlistment requirements.

3. The High School Completion Program (HSCP). HSCP gives soldiers a chance to earn a high school diploma or state-issued equivalency certificate. All soldiers with less than a high school education must have the opportunity to attain a high school diploma or its equivalent. HSCP courses are conducted during off-duty time.

4. Lower level college, i.e., Associate Arts degree, allows a soldier the opportunity to earn an Associate Arts degree from a community or junior college for an academic or technical course of study. Many four-year colleges also award Associate degrees. The Servicemembers Opportunity Colleges Associate Degree (SOCAD) program, assists soldiers in their efforts to earn a degree. SOCAD guarantees transfer of credits within each area of study. This program provides for common curriculums in specific disciplines related to Army MOS and career-specialty programs. College credits are awarded by accredited colleges for NCOES, and service school courses.
5. Upper level college and graduate level college, i.e., four year baccalaureate degrees and masters degrees, may be earned by soldiers. These components of ACES offer an incentive for professional development, personal growth, and post-service preparation. Each installation should have at least one bachelors and one graduate-degree program available to soldiers on post or within reasonable commuting distance. These programs must be offered by a school that is accredited by a regional accrediting association.

6. The Army Apprenticeship Program provides enlisted members an opportunity to document specific work experiences gained while on active duty. Each Army apprenticeship program is registered with the Department of Labor (DOL), Bureau of Apprenticeship and Training (BAT). Upon completion of the required number of hours of work processes and related instruction, a DOL Certificate of Completion may be awarded.

7. The Army/American Council on Education Registry Transcript System (AARTS) is an automated system that provides transcripts to active duty enlisted members. The transcripts document military training and selected educational achievements of soldiers while on active duty.

8. Tuition assistance is authorized for active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel on active duty, and for military personnel of other services who are provided support by an Army Education
Center (AEC) under provisions of an interservice support agreement (ISSA). Tuition assistance payment is authorized only for soldiers who attend off-duty classes at schools that are accredited by regional accrediting agencies.

9. English-as-a-Second Language (ESL) programs are designed to provide second language service members with skills needed to perform military duties and to communicate with superiors, subordinates and peers. These programs are conducted at the Defense Language Institute, English Language Center (DLIELC) before Initial Entry Training (IET) for non-prior service accessions and at permanent duty stations for eligible non-DLIELC ESL graduates.

10. ACES counseling and testing services are available to all soldiers. Counseling helps soldiers grow professionally when they take part in education programs.

Army Extension Training (AET) The major areas of AET that affect NCOPD are the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) and Army Training Extension Course (TEC) Program. ACCP is the only AET program that is linked directly to NCOES, i.e. completion of BNCOC and ANCOC ACCP courses currently equate to completion of resident training. AET also includes the Army Audiovisual Graphic Training Aids (GTA) programs, the Armywide Training and Doctrinal Literature Program (ATLDP) and other extension programs designed specifically for the Reserve Components.
The ACCP provides a variety of exportable training courses. The courses are composed of individual subcourses on specific topics. The final test is contained in the subcourse booklet. These subcourses are developed by the proponent schools and may be taken individually. Soldiers can be enrolled in ACCP via a self-enrollment and self-study program or in the group enrollment program. Group enrollment allows a supervisor to utilize the ACCP to supplement individual training. Soldiers are awarded promotion points for successful completion of each subcourse.

The Army Training Extension Course (TEC) Program is a self-paced training tool for individuals and groups. The training is oriented toward common skills and critical MOS tasks. TEC courses are developed by the proponent schools. They are used in the group method as part of unit training, or by individuals for self-study. TEC is usually placed in unit learning centers based on assigned MOS; however, individual TEC lessons can be requisitioned. TEC lessons are in various formats: printed, audiovisual, audio and job performance training aids.

Many of the problems with AET can be linked directly to the diversity of subject materials and the size of the force to be served. Current initiatives to correct problems include:

1. The Institute Management Information System (IMIS) is anticipated to be implemented in FY 86-87. It is an automated system designed to provide ACCP with faster response time, new abilities to manage the program, and timely, up-to-date information for telephonic and written student inquiries.
2. The Army Authoring Project is a data base of technical information which the Army Materiel Command (AMC) updates constantly. This data base is then drawn on by training developers to produce training products. Currently, the publication of training materials for newly fielded systems lags by more than 18 months. This system will automate and accelerate the development of those training materials. In addition, it will require resident and nonresident courses to be developed and revised concurrently with the revision of training products.

3. The School of the Air (SOA) is a televised training medium which uses satellites. The SOA mission is to examine the use and effectiveness of video-teletraining through teleconferencing, live interactive teletraining, and support in conducting map and interservice exercises. This program is envisioned to provide a direct training medium from the proponent school to the soldier and, through standardization, to narrow the gap between AC and RC training.

4. The Electronic Information Delivery System (EIDS) is an automated delivery system used to deliver self-paced total job training packages, refresher training, and individual or on-the-job training to soldiers in the active and reserve components. The basic EIDS consists of a microprocessor controlled video disc player and TV monitor display. It uses a variety of input/output devices to permit delivery of instructional, simulation, testing, and training management materials.
5. PLATO Computer-Based Instructional System (CBIS): PLATO is the name (not an acronym) of an instructional delivery system. It is a series of mainframe computers owned by Control Data Corporation that contains libraries of instructional courseware, authoring capabilities, and computer-managed instructional capabilities. PLATO is the foundation for the Army Computer-Based Information System, a network of three mainframes and 500 terminals. First quarter FY86 plans call for a CBIS net of five mainframes and 1,880 terminals located at FORSCOM and TRADOC installation learning centers. CBIS will support institutional and extension training.

The Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP) was established to formalize the role of individual training evaluation throughout the Army. Evaluation of the individual soldier is a critical part of the training process. It provides feedback which is essential to the effective management of training. The ITEP is designed to:

1. Evaluate individual proficiency as a part of the Army training system.

2. Promote standardization of individual training.

3. Improve unit cohesiveness through evaluation of individual tasks which support the unit mission.

4. Provide information to commanders and military occupational specialty (MOS) proponents on the effectiveness of individual training.

5. Provide objective indicators of a soldier's MOS knowledge for use in career management decisions.
Components of The ITEP consists of three components (Figure 5-12), each of which is designed to evaluate individual training from a different perspective. They are:

**ITEP INDIVIDUAL TRAINING EVALUATION PROGRAM (AR 350-37)**

![Diagram showing components of ITEP]

- Army-Wide
  - Skill Qualification Test (SQT)
  - Annually
    - Written
    - MOS-Specific Task
    - Personnel Management
    - Training Management

- Unit
  - ITPE Commander's Evaluation
  - Year Round
    - Commander Selected Tasks
    - Training Management
    - Local Personnel Actions

- Common Task Test (CTT)
  - Annually
    - Hands-On
    - Training Management
    - Local Personnel Actions

Figure 5-12

a. Commander's Evaluation (C-E). The C-E is a locally administered, hands-on test or assessment of soldier proficiency in those MOS tasks or common tasks determined to be critical to the unit's mission. These evaluations can be conducted at any time and place by the chain of command, and should be integrated into a
soldier's training. Evaluations are conducted using evaluation guides in MOS-specific soldier's manuals (SM) and FM 21-2 and FM 21-3, which are two volumes of the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT). The evaluation results remain within the unit chain of command and provide training diagnostic information. The results for skill levels 1 and 2 should be entered in soldiers' job books. Results are used by supervisors for local personnel actions and to develop training depending on "Go" or "No Go" results.

b. Common Tasks Test (CTT). The CTT is a performance-oriented test designed to measure individual soldier proficiency in combat and survival skills. The test consists of 17 tasks taken from the SMCT prepared by TRADOC. CTT evaluations should be administered annually to all active duty soldiers in ranks private through sergeant first class, regardless of MOS. The tasks are tested and scored in the unit. The results are reported to TRADOC. Commanders and supervisors use the results when considering SP4/CPL advancements, when preparing enlisted evaluation reports, and when making recommendations for promotions to sergeant and staff sergeant. A written test is provided for situations in which equipment needed for hands-on testing is unavailable.

c. Skill Qualification Test (SQT). The SQT is a written test intended to evaluate a soldier's ability to perform tasks or apply the knowledge necessary to perform tasks in a particular MOS and skill level. The tasks chosen for testing come from the MOS-specific Soldier's Manual. Each selected task is tested with a set of multiple choice questions. All active duty
component soldiers, skill levels 1 through 4, in MOS for which an SQT has been developed, should be tested annually. SQTs are designed to be approximately two hours long. However, the rule may be modified if a highly technical MOS requires a longer test period. SQT results are entered into the Enlisted Master File (EMF) for use in the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS). Reserve Component soldiers are tested every two years and the results serve both as an evaluation tool and as a means to stimulate individual training. SQT can provide an indicator of MOS knowledge and provide a source of objective information for the commander on soldier strengths and weaknesses.

Related Documents

The ITEP uses three documents to identify and report individual strengths and weaknesses:

a. Unit Summary Report (USR). The USR is produced for each SQT and the CTT. It provides commanders with the total number of soldiers tested and a percent by score range (100-80, 79-60, etc.). It also provides the "Go" and "No Go" rates for the unit. Commanders can use this report to help plan future training or to address poor performance. Tasks with performance rates below 60% should get priority for training.

b. Individual Soldiers Report (ISR). The ISR contains each soldier's SQT score and lists those tasks in which the soldier is weak. Soldiers are counseled by their commanders on weaknesses and referred to their first-line supervisors for additional training.
c. Job Book (JB). The JB is a record of individual MOS/common tasks each soldier must be able to perform. This booklet allows the supervisor to keep on hand a current record of each soldier's ability to perform critical MOS/common tasks.

NCODP is a leadership development program used at battalion or equivalent level in both TOE and TDA units. NCODP is not merely a system of structured classes, but part of a continuous daily training process. NCODP is a major tool in developing NCOs. It should stress the "whole person concept."
The NCODP encompasses the principles of the Army's Training Management System (TMS). Training is developed at unit level to meet the unique needs of the unit. The goals of the program are:

- To strengthen and enhance leadership development.
- To assist and provide guidance in the continuation of leadership development.
- To increase the confidence of NCOs.
- To realize an NCO's full potential.
- To improve unit effectiveness.

Regulatory Guidance

Army Regulation 350-17 stipulates that:

- The NCODP is a command responsibility. It is the responsibility of the NCO support channel to train subordinate NCOs.

- NCO development training will be scheduled and reflected on unit/organization master training programs and schedules. Such training will be appropriately structured to meet the needs of the unit as assessed by the commander.

- All soldiers who demonstrate the potential for, or are performing duties in leadership positions, or are designated as acting noncommissioned officers will participate in NCODP.

- Separate periods of instruction may be conducted for NCOs of separate ranks.
The objectives of the promotion system, according to AR 600-200, are to:

a. Fill authorized enlisted spaces with qualified soldiers who have demonstrated potential for increased responsibility.

b. Provide for career progression commensurate with ability and potential.

c. Attract and retain high-caliber soldiers for careers in the Army.

d. Preclude promoting unproductive or unqualified soldiers.

e. Provide an equitable system for all soldiers.
Who the Army Promotes

The Army's goal is to promote soldiers with demonstrated skills, abilities and performance. The Army only promotes soldiers who are eligible for and will accept Armywide assignments. Potential for promotion is also an important factor. The rater's assessment of potential for promotion is indicated on the Enlisted Evaluation Report (EER) and it is reviewed by centralized promotion boards. Without access to EERs, semi-centralized boards assess potential during the board appearance. (The terms "centralized" and "semi-centralized" will be explained later in this section.)

When the Army Promotes

The Army promotes soldiers to fill authorized vacancies by MOS and grade. For a soldier to be promoted, there must be an "opening" in his or her MOS at the next higher pay grade.

Who the Army doesn't promote

AR 600-200 prohibits advancement or promotion of soldiers who are:

a. AWOL, in confinement, in desertion, under arrest, or ill or injured not in the line of duty.

b. Under court-martial charges.

c. Serving a court-martial sentence, to include suspended sentences.

d. In proceedings that may result in other than honorable discharge.

e. Under a Suspension of Favorable Personnel Actions.
f. Pending reclassification for inefficiency or disciplinary reasons.

g. Being punished under Article 15, UCMJ.

h. Ineligible for reenlistment. Soldiers who have a record of court-martial conviction, AWOL, or time lost on current term of enlistment require a reenlistment waiver before being eligible to compete for promotion to sergeant or staff sergeant.

i. Ineligible for a security clearance if required for the next higher rank.

j. Fail to take an SQT test due to the soldier's own fault.

k. Under a bar to reenlistment.

l. Approved for voluntary retirement.

m. Removed from a recommended promotion list.

n. Not qualified in their MOS.

o. Exceed the body fat standard or maximum allowable weight established in AR 600-9 and no underlying or associated disease has been found to cause the overweight condition.
How the Army Promotes The enlisted promotion system is divided into three subsystems. The decentralized subsystem is used to advance soldiers up to and including specialist 4. The semi-centralized subsystem is for promotions to sergeant and staff sergeant. The centralized system is for promotions to sergeant first class through sergeant major and appointment to command sergeant major.

Decentralized The decentralized system is used for all advancements through paygrade E4. Advancement authority rests with battery, troop, company, and separate detachment commanders. The decentralized system recognizes that soldiers in these lower ranks do not have sufficient time in service (TIS) for their official files to portray an accurate picture of their service and potential which can be used as a basis of comparison with their peers Armywide. At this point in these soldiers' careers, their local commanders are in the best position to judge their performance and potential. Soldiers are advanced unless there is cause shown for not advancing them.

Advancement to Private (E2). Unless prevented by the local commander, advancement to E2 is indicated by the custodian of the soldier's personnel records at the time the soldier completes six months active federal service (AFS). The TIS computation is based on the soldier's basic active service date (BASD). Time spent in a delayed entry program is not counted in the TIS computations. Local commanders may waive up to two months of the TIS requirement for outstanding soldiers; however, no more than 20 percent of the command's assigned and attached E2 strength can have less than six months TIS.
Advancement to Private First Class (E3). At the commander's discretion, privates (E2) may be promoted to private first class (PFC) on completion of 12 months TIS and four months time in grade (TIG). Commanders have the flexibility to recognize outstanding achievers by waiving up to half the TIG and TIS requirements. Commanders are limited, however, in that they may not grant waiver promotions that would cause more than 20 percent of the command's assigned and attached E3 strength to be made up of soldiers promoted with less than 12 months TIS.

Advancement to Specialist Four. Commanders may, without constraints, advance PFCs with 24 months TIS and six months TIG to the rank of specialist four. Commanders can also accelerate advancement by waiving half the TIG and TIS requirements. Accelerated advancements cannot, however, cause more than 20 percent of the total assigned E4 strength in the unit to have less than 24 months TIS.

Semi-Centralized Promotions. Promotions to sergeant and staff sergeant may be delegated to a field grade commander of any organization authorized by TOE/TDA to be commanded by a lieutenant colonel or higher. In some commands, authority may be withheld by a higher level commander. When this is the case, the restriction does not affect the reduction authority. The criteria for promotion are specified in Chapter 7 of AR 600-200. In addition, effective 1 March 1987, a high school degree or GED equivalent will be needed to be eligible for promotion to sergeant. Soldiers on a recommended list at that time who do not meet these
educational criteria will be removed from the list. Effective 1 July 1986, completion of Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) will be mandatory for promotion to staff sergeant.

These criteria may not be supplemented by adding or deleting criteria at the local command level. Local commanders are allowed, however, to grant waivers to soldiers who have demonstrated an outstanding level of performance and also are deserving of promotion. Currently, the promotion authority may waive two of the promotion criteria.

The semicentralized promotion system combines predetermined administrative points (from information contained in the soldier's files) with both the commander's recommendations and the recommendations resulting from a promotion board interview. This system allows a number of promotion points to be accumulated, based on a full evaluation of the soldier's past and of his potential for future performance.

Administrative points are computed for each soldier prior to the soldier's appearance before the promotion selection board. Points for weapons qualification, APRT, duty performance, skill qualification test results, awards and decorations, and civilian and military education are combined to offer a total of 800 possible promotion points.
Each soldier who is eligible and recommended for promotion must appear before a promotion selection board for evaluation. The board may consist of all officers, headed by a field grade officer; or it may consist of all NCOs, headed by a command sergeant major; or the board can consist of officers and NCOs. A total of 200 promotion points may be awarded by the board based on the soldier's personal appearance, conversation and oral expression skills, knowledge of basic soldiering skills, self-improvement, and other achievements, and on the board members' subjective appraisals of the soldier's attitude, leadership ability, and promotion potential. These boards are held at least once a month, unless there are no soldiers recommended for board action. Each board consists of at least three voting members, plus a recorder who does not vote.

The promotion board's final report is forwarded to the promotion authority. If the promotion authority finds a discrepancy in any part of the board's report, makeup, or conduct, the whole report may be disapproved. In that case, the authority may convene a new board and select all new members. If no discrepancies are found, the promotion authority will approve the recommendations and a "recommended list" will be published and posted on appropriate unit bulletin boards. Soldiers competing for promotion to sergeant must achieve a minimum of 450 promotion points to reach recommended-list status. Soldiers competing for staff sergeant must attain at least 550 points to attain recommended-list status.
On gaining recommended-list status, the soldier's promotion point total is compared to promotion point cutoff scores determined monthly by the Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA). HQDA promotion point cutoff scores are determined based on the number of soldiers Armywide who are already in a grade and MOS as compared with the number of soldiers authorized for that grade and MOS. Soldiers who equal or exceed the established promotion point cutoff scores are then ranked by the point totals, dates of rank are assigned, and the soldiers are promoted.

Soldiers who maintain recommended-list status and who remain otherwise eligible for promotion may request reevaluations. A soldier may request reevaluation at any time if administrative promotion points have increased by 50 or more points (Items 2-6, DA Form 3355). In these cases, soldiers also have the option of appearing again before a promotion board. The new points will be effective three months from the first day of the reevaluation month. If administrative promotion points have increased by less than 50 points, a soldier can request reevaluation six months after the latest board appearance, reevaluation or recomputation. In these cases, soldiers must also appear before another promotion board. Whether board appearance is voluntary or mandatory, the results of each reevaluation (administrative and board-awarded points) are final, even if overall scores are decreased.
During May (for staff sergeant) and February (for sergeant) of each year, soldiers with valid recommended-list status will have their administrative point totals automatically recomputed. The recomputation process does not require the soldier to go before a promotion selection board.

Centralized Promotions. Since 1 January 1969, all promotion selections to sergeant major have been made through the DA centralized board selection process. In March 1969, promotions to master sergeant came under this system, and on 1 June 1970, promotions to sergeant first class were included.

The centralized promotion system relies completely on information contained in the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) and on personnel qualification records (DA Forms 2A and 2-I). The file and records must portray an accurate profile of the soldier's ability and potential. Although the OMPF is used for other personnel management actions throughout a soldier's career, its importance becomes most obvious to soldiers when they realize that the condition of their OMPF may determine whether or not they are selected for promotion. The board also reviews each soldier's file in conjunction with the Qualitative Management Program (QMP).

Centralized promotion selection boards are convened by HQDA and are held at the U.S. Army Enlisted Records and Evaluation Center (USAEREC), Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. Each board consists of officers and senior NCOs who are organized into panels. Because of the
large number of records normally voted by some panels, the number of members per panel varies.

Each selection board is issued a letter of instruction (LOI) which prescribes the oath each board member must take, reports to be prepared, maximum number from each zone of consideration to be selected, and other administrative guidance for each board member to follow while reviewing soldiers' records. This guidance is also included with each list announcing the names of those soldiers selected for promotion.

Before the convening date of each selection board, HQDA establishes and announces zones of consideration. These zones define the date of rank (DOR) requirements for both primary and secondary zones of consideration. The primary zone includes all those soldiers whose DOR falls between specified dates. The secondary zone extends the primary zone so that outstanding soldiers with later dates of rank may compete for promotion ahead of their contemporaries.

In addition to meeting these zone criteria, each soldier must have at least a high school diploma or GED equivalent, at least 8 years of cumulative enlisted service for pay purposes for consideration for master sergeant, or 10 years for consideration to sergeant major (prior service as an officer is not computed in this figure), and the soldier must be serving in an enlisted status as of the board's estimated adjournment date.
Each soldier competes for promotion with all other eligible soldiers in his or her MOS. The number to be selected from each MOS is determined by HQDA based on the number of soldiers in that grade and MOS as compared with the number authorized. For this reason, the number of allowable promotions in overage MOSs generally would be lower than that for shortage MOSs.

During the selection board proceedings, each member considers each soldier's entire record. The intent is that no one success or failure, in itself, should be an overriding factor in determining a soldier's standing in relation to his peers. Viewing soldiers in this manner, the board evaluates potential for increased responsibility at the next higher grade and identifies those soldiers best qualified in relation to their peers. The number to be selected—established in the LOI—is then applied, and soldiers within the established limits are recommended for promotion. The results of any selection board can be no more valid than the information upon which the board bases its judgments. For that reason, it is important for each NCO to personally ensure that his own file is current and accurate before it is reviewed by a selection board.
The primary goal of the Enlisted Assignment System, according to AR 614-200, is to satisfy Army manning requirements through the worldwide distribution of trained soldiers. The Army Authorization Documentation System (TAADS) provides an accounting for all duty positions in the Army by MOS/Grade. It is against this listing of duty positions which the automated assignments, nomination, distribution and requisition systems work to satisfy the goal of "right soldier, right time, right place." Secondary goals of the system are to:

1. Equalize desirable and undesirable assignments by reassigning the most eligible soldier from among those in like MOS and grade.

2. Equalize hardships of the military service.

3. Meet personal desires of the soldier.

4. Assign each person so that he/she will have the greatest opportunities for professional development and promotion advancement.
Responsibility

The actual process of matching a soldier to an assignment involves actions by several agencies at different levels in the Army. These include:

MILPO

1. Field Military Personnel Offices (MILPO). MILPOs coordinate with units and compare authorized and projected positions with current assigned strength, along with known or projected gains and losses to determine requirements. Requisitions for personnel requirements are prepared and submitted to the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN).

MILPERCEN

2. MILPERCEN then edits and validates the requisitions. After personnel requisitions are validated, they are processed through an automated nomination and assignment system called the Centralized Assignment Procedure III (CAP III). The CAP III produces nominations of eligible soldiers to match requisitions. Soldiers become available to be applied against requisitions for various reasons. Soldiers who enlist in the Army are available for assignments on completion of training and award of an MOS. Other soldiers are available for reassignment when they have:

a. Volunteered for reassignment.

b. Completed an overseas tour of duty.

c. Completed schooling or training.

d. Completed stabilization.

e. Completed normal time on station in CONUS for MOS (turnaround time).
Primary qualification factors considered in the nomination process are grade, MOS and skill level, SQI, ETS, months since last PCS, months since return from overseas, ASI, soldier's availability month compared with requirement month, and soldier's area of preference.

The CAP III-generated nominations are passed to the MILPERCEN assignment managers for consideration and decision. Based on a review of all available information, (updated personnel management documents, Enlisted Data Base, the Career Management Information File and any other communication from the nominated soldier), the assignment manager either accepts or rejects the nomination. A qualified soldier may also be selected manually to match a requisition. Unfilled requisitions are returned to the selection process for new nominations.

Losing MILPO c. After a soldier has been nominated and selected for a position, assignment instructions are transmitted to the losing and gaining commands or installations by the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). The losing commander notifies the soldier. Because of delays in reporting and errors in the data bases, selected soldiers may not qualify for the assignment. The MILPO verifies the soldier's qualification and eligibility, interviews the soldier, and reviews his or her records. If the soldier is qualified, necessary orders are issued. If the soldier does not qualify or cannot qualify in time to meet the requirement, then a deletion or deferment must be submitted. The deletion and deferment program is used when a soldier is placed
on assignment instructions (AI) by the CAP III system and he/she cannot comply. Additionally, it allows commanders to request cancellation of AI on a soldier due to operational mission reasons.

Gaining MILPO

d. Once soldiers arrive at the new duty station, post/unit assignment personnel assign them to the positions in which they will work.

Special Considerations

The procedures outlined in this section are designed to meet the system's primary goal of meeting personnel requirements for most types of assignments. The following special assignment techniques are used to satisfy secondary goals and special assignments such as:

1. Personal considerations. To address the goal of meeting the personal needs and desires of the soldier, a variety of off-line programs/procedures are used. Some of these are:

   a. Exceptional Family Member Program.

   b. Homebase and Advance Assignment Program.

   c. Married Army Couples Program.

2. Special assignments. Special assignments include, but are not limited to the following: recruiting duty, drill sergeant duty, reenlistment NCO, enlisted aide program, U.S. Army Parachute Team, U.S. Army Marksmanship Team and Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) counselor. Special assignments are normally MOS immaterial. Soldiers may

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be selected for these assignments regardless of their
PMOS (except as noted below). Because these are
"special" requirements, they are handled by MILPERCENT
differently than other requisitions. Normally,
specific guidance is prepared addressing whether
voluntary or involuntary selection will be used;
specific selection criteria which must be met; and the
amount of time which can be spent in the special
assignment tour. Certain MOS are precluded from
special assignment consideration if they meet three of
the following circumstances:

a. In a shortage status (less than 85% fill).

b. A low density MOS (500 or fewer soldiers).

c. Require costly, highly specialized training of 20
weeks or longer.

d. Space Imbalanced MOS (SIMOS).

e. Impact on unit readiness (based on analysis of
Unit Status Reports and critical MOS reports).
The Enlisted Evaluation Reporting System (EERS), as described in AR 623-205, is designed to support the Army's personnel management program and the career development of enlisted soldiers (See Figure 5-13). The EERS applies to all noncommissioned officers in the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and the US Army Reserve (USAR).

![Diagram of EER process]

Figure 5-13

AR 623-205 specifies that Enlisted Evaluation Reports (EER) are designed to provide:


2. A measurement of professional and personal traits.

3. A basis for counseling by leaders on career progression and professional development.
Communication between senior and subordinate is key to an effective evaluation system and is a necessity if the Army is to maintain high standards. The information provided in the evaluation reports is used in determining such favorable personnel actions as promotions, school selection, assignments, MOS classifications, and command sergeant major designation. The EER is also used in unfavorable personnel actions such as the Qualitative Management Program (QMP). No single report should, by itself, wholly determine the soldier's career.

Types of Reports. There are seven primary types of evaluation reports:

1. First Report - Once a soldier becomes eligible to receive a report, the first report received will be determined by the date of the event requiring a report (such as change of rater). The beginning month will be the month of the effective date of promotion to sergeant, or the month of reentry on active duty after a break in service.

2. Annual - These reports will be submitted 12 months after the ending month of the last report submitted.

3. Change of Rater - These reports will be submitted when:

   a. There is a normal change of the designated rater.

   b. The rated soldier is on extended temporary duty or special duty and is not responsible to rating officials in the parent organization during the period of TDY or special duty.
c. The rated soldier reaches expiration of term of service (ETS), except for discharge and immediate reenlistment.

d. There has been relief or incapacitation of rater.

4. Complete the Record - At the option of the rater, a complete-the-record report may be submitted on a soldier who is about to be considered by a DA centralized board for promotion or schooling, providing the report meets the criteria outlined in paragraph 2-9, AR 623-205.

5. Special Report - Each special report must be approved or disapproved by the first colonel (commander), general officer or U.S. civilian of SES rank. That individual must be in the direct line of supervision of the rated soldier, and will act as reviewer of the report. Special reports will be submitted only to:

   a. Recognize a deed, act, or series of deeds that are so outstanding that they should not await recognition through the normal reporting schedule.

   b. Reveal a performance deficiency so serious that it should not await reporting through the normal reporting schedule.

6. Relief for Cause Report - A report is required when a soldier is relieved for cause.

7. Directed Report - When there is a requirement for a report not covered by the other types of reports, MILPERCEN may direct that a report be submitted.
The current EER is divided into seven parts: Part I - Administrative Data; Part II - Duty Description; Part III - Evaluation of Professionalism and Performance; Part IV - Evaluation of Potential; Part V - Authentication; Part VI - Score Summary and; Part VII - MILPO Certification (See Figure 5-14).

Parts II through IV form the "guts" of the evaluation and are described as follows:

1. Part II (Duty Description) provides the rates, the rater and selection board members with a description of the tasks, conditions, and standards for the particular job.
2. Part III (Evaluation of Professionalism and Performance) is broken down into numerical and narrative portions for completion by the rater and indorser. Under the numerical portion, the rater and indorser enter subjective evaluations (on a scale of 0 to 5) for each of ten measures of "professional competence" and seven measures of "professional standards."

3. Part IV (Evaluation of Potential) requires both rater and indorser to subjectively evaluate the potential of the individual on a scale of 0 to 40. Narrative comments are solicited in the areas of "potential for higher level school, assignment and supervisory responsibility."

RECLASSIFICATION According to AR 600-200, the purpose of reclassification is "to provide for the movement of qualified, trained personnel to meet force modernization changes and force structure requirements."
Reclassifications assist in maintaining MOS balance and controlling migration across MOS. Reclassification of soldiers is targeted from overstrength MOS to shortage MOS. The CG MILPERCEN is the reclassification authority for all centrally managed soldiers (E6 and above).

The following conditions warrant mandatory withdrawal of MOS:

1. Erroneous award of MOS. Sometimes, through some error, an MOS shows up on DA Form 2A or 2-1 which was never really awarded and for which a soldier is not qualified.

2. Disciplinary action taken under UCMJ, if the action affects a soldier's ability to perform in the MOS. For example, if an MOS requires a security clearance and the UCMJ action results in withdrawal of the security clearance, the individual must be reclassified.

3. Loss of qualifications that make a soldier incapable of satisfactorily performing in the MOS. The commander can recommend mandatory reclassification for failing the SQT on 3 consecutive occasions. Any condition that renders one incapable of performing the MOS, such as a medical problem, can result in reclassification.

4. Lack of security clearance if required for MOS.

5. Promotion to or reduction from a rank that is not in line with, or authorized for, the MOS.
6. Direction of HQDA. In order to realign certain MOSs, HQDA can direct reclassification from overage to shortage MOSs.

7. On promotion in an MOS other than primary, the MOS in which promoted will become the primary.

Training Requirement. AR 351-1 requires that all soldiers who are reclassified will receive formal resident training to the appropriate skill level, will complete an appropriate Army Correspondence Course Program, or demonstrate competency on the job before the new MOS is awarded.

Reclassification Impact on Promotion. Soldiers on a recommended promotion list who are either voluntarily or involuntarily reclassified (other than for misconduct or loss of qualification) will compete against the DA promotion point cutoff scores in the new PMOS. If otherwise qualified, they can be promoted in the new PMOS on the first day of the month following reclassification.
While, for the most part, RC professional development parallels AC NCOPD, some differences do exist. These differences are largely due to the different environment in which the RC operates. The RC NCO is a civilian whose main income comes from the civilian sector. Yet, as a citizen-soldier, the RC NCO must be professionally qualified and ready to mobilize at a moment's notice. This situation requires simultaneous refinement of both civilian and military skills. Time must be wisely used. RC personnel are authorized a minimum of 39 days for training per year (24 days in Inactive Duty Training status and 15 days for Annual Training.)

Competing for the RC soldier's time are civilian occupation commitments, conflicts between individual and collective training requirements, excessive travel distance to training sites and family responsibilities which are compounded by dual occupations. It is therefore necessary that the Army system for NCO professional development take into consideration the RC noncommissioned officers limited available time and ensure that the design of the professional development system takes full advantage of this limited commodity.
RC NCOES

In addition to participation in AC NCOES (PLDC/BNOCOC/ANCOC/USASMA), RC soldiers also utilize RC NCOES. The RC NCOES is a career development program specifically designed for the enlisted members of the Reserve Component of the Army who are unable to attend the AC NCOES. The RC NCOES currently consists of three courses in three levels of training: the Primary Leadership Development Course - Reserve Components (PLDC-RC), Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course - Reserve Components (ANCOC-RC), and the Senior Noncommissioned Officers Course - Reserve Components (SNCOC-RC). The RC NCOES is designed to instill in ARNG and USAR NCOs an understanding of the responsibilities of the NCO and a willingness to accept those responsibilities; confidence to apply technical knowledge, leadership skills and techniques; high personal and professional standards and a thorough knowledge of how to train and lead soldiers.

The RC NCOES programs of instruction (POI) are approved by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and define the minimum training objectives of each course. The POIs contain the required core subjects and minimum hours of instruction. The courses developed from the RC NCOES POI are available at either the ARNG State and Regional Military Academies or the USAR schools. With the concurrence of the State Adjutant General or Major United States Army Reserve Commander, as appropriate, ARNG students are authorized to attend USAR schools, and USAR students are authorized to attend ARNG State Military Academies. State Adjutants General/CONUSA commanders may also expand training as desired, however, the core POI training objectives must be taught. All RC selectees for AC or RC course of instruction must meet the standards of AR 600-9 and AR 350-15.
1. PLDC-RC is a leadership development course for RC soldiers in the combat arms (CA), combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) branches. PLDC-RC was developed on the premise that there is a definite requirement to extend combat skills training to the CS and CSS soldiers. The course is conducted along the lines of the Active Component PLDC. The instructional concept is the small group method where the cadre trainers act as role models, and the soldiers are able to share their experiences and ideas about motivation, leadership styles, and technical skills. The course is the first level of RC NCOES and is developed to provide training at Skill Levels (SL) 2 and 3. It is a 15-day course consisting of 123.5 hours of instructions. During the course, there is a 48-hour field training exercise where the soldiers conduct defensive and offensive operations. All soldiers receive training on the same defensive/offensive tasks; however, the scenario differs for the CS/CSS and CA soldiers. The scenario for the CA soldier orients on squad and platoon operations. The CS/CSS scenario is structured around rear area and training area operations.

2. The purpose of the ANCOC-RC is to develop leadership skills and techniques for the RC staff sergeants and sergeants first class (SL 3 and 4). The course provides training for soldiers in varied MOS in the CA, CS, and CSS branches, and provides career development instruction for RC soldiers to ensure accomplishment of the "train-the-trainer" concept. Evaluation, analysis, and critique are continuous processes. Training is performance-oriented to the maximum extent possible. The determination of satisfactory completion rests with the cadre and course commandant, based upon satisfactory completion of each subject area.
3. The purpose of the SNCOC-RC is to develop leadership skills and techniques in RC master sergeants and sergeants major (SL 4 and 5). The course provides training for soldiers in varied MOSs in the CA, CS, and CSS branches, and provides career development instruction for senior RC soldiers to ensure accomplishment of the "train-the-trainer" concept. Evaluation, analysis, and critique are continuous processes. Training is performance-oriented to the maximum extent possible. The determination of satisfactory completion rests with the cadre and course commandant, based upon satisfactory completion of each subject area.

4. In an effort to provide additional training opportunities for RC NCOs, the National Guard Bureau has developed a regional program. Five regional academies have been established and resourced to conduct a series of PLDC-RC courses on a continuing basis - Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Utah. The ANCOC-RC is conducted in only one regional academy, the Louisiana Military Academy. In addition, Army area schools have been established at active Army installations using the assets of the USAR schools to conduct PLDC-RC for members of Troop Program Units (TPUs) and the IRR. These regional programs and Army area schools will enhance the RC's ability to overcome the shortfall of RC NCO required training.
In addition to NCOES, AC and RC, other courses of instruction which are more functional in nature have been developed to guide NCOs throughout their careers. The training which the NCO receives is designed to complement the train-to-train skills taught in the NCOES and RC NCOES.

1. The Army National Guard (ARNG) Noncommissioned Officer Battle Skills Course (BSC) was developed by ARNG NCOs and the Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course branch of the NCO Academy, Fort Benning, Georgia. The ARNG BSC is designed to provide instructions in the technical aspects of squad and platoon weapons and their tactical employment, live fire familiarization, and the use of nonorganic supporting weapons. The training is designed to complement the train-to-train skills taught in the (RC NCOES). The BSC is primarily a field training exercise utilizing the squad training methods based on current tactics and doctrine for small units on "how to fight and survive on the battlefield." The course is conducted in a centralized mode on a year round basis at Camp Robinson in North Little Rock, Arkansas -- 17 iterations, 144 students per iteration. This course can produce 2,448 trained RC soldiers per year. The course lasts 15 days with 152 hours of field training. It is based on a go/no go system for all instruction. Training is very intense and becomes progressively more demanding during the course as responsibilities shift from cadre trainers to students, and from daylight to night operations. Successful mastery of all task clusters is a prerequisite for graduation.
2. The Reserve Component Tank Commander's Course (RCTCC) prepares RC soldiers for the duty position of tank commander (TC) in a tank company or cavalry troop. The course complements the RC NCOES. Prior to the implementation of the RCTCC, there was no comparable training available for RC units to train their tank commanders. Training conducted at the U.S. Army Armor School is oriented to equipment issued to the AC, such as the M60A3 and M1 Main Battle Tank and systems. RC soldiers who attend the AC course of instruction must be retrained on the equipment issued to their respective units whether by supervised on-the-job training (SOJT) or other means that time and resources allow. The RCTCC is taught at Gowen Field, Boise, Idaho, on a recurring basis -- 17 classes per year, 48 students per class. The Tank Commander Training Detachment is staffed by RC soldiers. The training is specific for equipment assigned to the RC, thereby allowing graduates to return to their respective units prepared to train their tank crews on their assigned tasks. The RCTCC trains students to SL 3 proficiency and provides them the necessary knowledge to train their crews in SL 1 and 2 tasks and in crew drill. Eventually, a majority of all ARNG and USAR soldiers assigned to Armor or Armored Cavalry units will receive training at the RCTCC, with the exception of those in units which have been issued the M60A3 or M1 tanks. Additional funding has been made available for attendance at the RCTCC for the RC.

3. The First Sergeants Course. The ARNG and USAR are each allocated quotas for each 8-week course conducted
at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas. Those RC soldiers who cannot or were not selected to attend the 8-week AC 1SG Course can attend an RC version of this course. The First Sergeant Course Reserve Component (FSC RC) consists of 74 hours of instruction taught in a resident mode by RC personnel from ARNG academics or USAR schools. The course POI has been approved by TRADOC. Coordination between the ARNG and USAR maximizes training resources.

4. Reserve Component soldiers are encouraged to enroll in the Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP) for MOS/job-related training. Supervised on-the-job training and self-study are two other types of training which may also be utilized for this purpose and which support extension/nonresident training programs. Although, some NCOES courses do exist in the ACCP, completion of these courses by the RC soldier will not satisfy the individual's military education requirements for promotion. RC NCOES is predominately leadership-oriented, and substitution of leadership correspondence courses in lieu of attending RC NCOES courses is prohibited by AR 351-1. Army Regulation 140-158 further directs that satisfactory completion of NCOES for the RC soldier is achieved only through attendance at RC NCOES or AC resident NCOES.

RC EVALUATION SYSTEM

The principal tool of the evaluation system in the RC is the Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP). As an evaluation tool, SQT in the RC follows generally the same model as in the AC; however, personnel management differences and time and equipment limitations require differences in SQT policy. SQT is administered on a two-year cycle and is not formally linked to EPMS in the RC.
Promotion of the RC soldier in the troop program unit occurs when the soldier has demonstrated technical proficiency in the MOS for which he/she is being considered for promotion, has demonstrated leadership abilities or potential, is classified in a TOE/TDA unit vacancy for which promotion is being considered, has been recommended for promotion by the unit commander and has received favorable selection board consideration. The commander's recommendation is contingent upon the soldier having completed the required time-in-grade and time-in-service, having met minimum civilian education requirements and having successfully completed NCOES at the appropriate skill level (promotion of RC soldiers to the grades E6 through E9 was linked to successful completion of NCOES, AC or RC, at the appropriate skill level in the ARNG on 1 June 1984 and in the USAR on 1 Jul 1985). Members of the RC are not required to have an SQT qualification score for promotion purposes.

Enlisted members of Inactive National Guard (ING) are not considered for promotion while in an inactive status; however, enlisted members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) are promoted without regard to vacancy (sergeant through sergeant first class) and completion of NCOES is not a requirement. Promotion to the ranks of master sergeant and sergeant major is limited to NCOs serving in Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) positions and is vacancy dependent.
The policy and procedures for the identification, classification, and reclassification of enlisted personnel not serving on initial entry training (IET) or active duty (AD) in an Active Guard Reserve (AGR) status are outlined in Chapter 4 of National Guard Regulation 600-200 and in Chapter 2 of Army Regulation 140-158. Personnel serving on IET status will be classified or reclassified, if necessary, in accordance with Chapter 2 of AR 600-200. Additionally, NGR 600-200, AR 135-18, and AR 600-200 address RC soldiers serving in an Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) status. Reclassification of Reserve Component noncommissioned officers is necessitated primarily as a result of the following actions:

1. Reorganization of RC units.

2. Incompatibility of prior service MOS with existing unit vacancies.

3. Geographic relocation of RC member.

4. Merger MOS training for career progression within Career Management Fields.

5. Occupational qualifications for award of MOS may be attained through satisfactory completion of advanced individual training, service school training, on-the-job experience, and on-the-job training programs or on the basis of civilian education or work experience. A verification score of 60 percent attained on the SQT denotes minimum verification of the current duty MOS and skill level evaluated.
CHAPTER 6 - EVALUATION OF THE STUDY

The Army's Mission

Army Requirements For the NCO

Today's NCO PD System

THE MECHANISM

Evaluation of Today's System

Meet? NO

YES

The Future

Evaluation For Future

Meet? NO

YES

Keeping On Track Integration

CORRECTING THE SYSTEM

Faulty Mechanism

Faulty Requirement

Bad Mechanism Or Requirement?
CHAPTER 6
EVALUATION OF MECHANISMS

INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter identified the NCOPD systems that the Army uses to help NCOs meet the requirements identified in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 also described how each of these systems is supposed to work. This chapter examines how the systems actually function with respect to meeting requirements, and identifies problems which need correction to improve NCO professional development.

EVALUATION OF NCOES
The field interviews and commander/CSM letters show overwhelming support for NCOES and indicate that it is a significant contributor to NCO professional development. Commanders and command sergeants major stated that the benefits to unit readiness far outweigh the costs to units of short term loss of soldiers attending schools. The overwhelming majority of senior commanders and CSMs said that those NCOs who attend NCOES are better qualified than those who do not attend. They are more technically and tactically proficient, confident, well rounded and capable of training soldiers. Professional interface with peers was also considered an important benefit of NCOES attendance. Many commanders/CSMs strongly favored NCOES attendance because of the long term readiness benefits associated with the skills obtained at the service schools and NCO academies. Commanders, CSMs and other NCOs were almost unanimous in support of making each level of NCOES a prerequisite for the next level of promotion. The only caveat was that the system must provide the opportunity to attend each of
these courses in a timely manner, i.e., commanders must ensure qualified NCOs are given the opportunity to attend and the system must ensure that sufficient training seats are available.

**IDEALLY, NCOES SHOULD:**

- Be Sequential, Progressive and Mandatory
- Provide Training Prior to Promotion
- Apply Equally to CA, CS & CSS Soldiers
- Not Include Functional Courses Such as ISG Course
- Offer Sufficient Capacity for Soldiers to Attend or...
- Provide Credible Non Resident Instruction

**Figure 6-2**

Although NCOES received high marks, problems were found to exist in the following areas:

1. NCOES is neither sequential nor progressive. An individual could attend courses out of sequence, e.g., attend a basic level course after an advanced level course. Since there is no sequential requirement, course developers sometimes create redundancy between various levels of courses for an MOS/CMF. This repetition reduces the system's efficiency and can contribute to student boredom.

2. Courses are created that are inserted into the NCOES structure that are functional as opposed to universal (such as the First Sergeant Course).
3. Resident credit can now be received through completion of ACCP courses that are not equivalent and that do not ensure the same level of expertise. While nonresident instruction offers a potential alternative to resident instruction, the current ACCP is deficient in the following areas:

a. Program of Instruction (POI): In many cases the resident and the nonresident NCOES course POIs are different. In other cases, although the subjects taught are the same, the nonresident lesson materials and examinations are outdated.

b. Lack of "hands on" training: Resident training was seen as critical because of the opportunity for "hands-on" learning and demonstration of expertise. This requirement was seen as being particularly important for combat skills in CA BNCOCs and in highly technical aspects of CS/CSS courses.

c. Testing: The current ACCP system has no controls on end-of-subcourse testing. This causes the program to lack credibility.

4. Although PLDC is now a prerequisite for promotion to SSG, there is no formal requirement for an active component NCO to attend any other level of NCOES in order to be promoted.

a. With no linkage of NCOES to promotion, the possibility exists for NCOs to progress through the ranks with no formal military education. While most soldiers try to attend NCOES, some "slide through the system" and are rewarded by promotion in the same manner as their counterparts who have received the training.
b. With no mandatory requirement for NCOES attendance, it is likely that, when faced with a decision to either send an NCO to schooling or retain the NCO in the unit for an upcoming mission/training exercise, a commander will retain the NCO by deferring or deleting him from school attendance. Soldiers in the field generally supported the commander's need to delete soldiers from scheduled attendance due to mission requirements; however, some soldiers also expressed concern about not being allowed to attend courses that would prepare them to better do their jobs. Many senior commanders/CSMs emphasized that NCOES is an integral part of NCOPD and that the Army must do better in educating its officers about the importance of NCOES attendance.

EVALUATION OF ACES

Using a wide variety of programs, ACES is meeting its goal of providing an opportunity for soldiers to continue their educational development, and soldiers are taking advantage of that opportunity. The program does have some problems, however.

1. Civilian education beyond 12th grade level or equivalent is not currently an Army requirement for promotion or requirement. However, approximately 64% of noncommissioned officers contacted perceive civilian education beyond high school as being a requirement for promotion. That perception has been reinforced by the profile analysis that is published as a part of selection board results. On the other hand, the majority contacted (74%) believe that a college degree is not necessary to be an effective NCO. Interviews with senior commanders and senior noncommissioned
officers, 94% indicated that some civilian education beyond high school should be a goal, but not a requirement for noncommissioned officers. The overwhelming consensus was that commanders wanted NCOs who were competent in their MOS, knew how to train soldiers, and were good leaders.

2. Approximately 95% of the NCOs interviewed indicated a need for courses which enhance their ability to communicate (read, write, speak) as they progress through the ranks. Other subjects deemed important to an NCO's professional development were mathematics, behavioral and social sciences and management courses. They believed that further training and education in these areas would assist them in accomplishing their duties as NCOs in counseling and managing their soldiers. Senior commanders/CSMs indicated similar educational needs for NCOs.

3. While the overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that some advanced civilian education is needed to better enable NCOs to accomplish their duties, many also indicated that not all NCOs may be able to capitalize on the benefits of ACES. Many NCOs said that certain mission requirements and the day-to-day duty requirements of some jobs make it extremely difficult to attain college courses and almost impossible to earn college degrees. Commanders and senior NCOs are concerned that if civilian education beyond high school is made a requirement for promotion, good NCOs may be penalized by the promotion process. Most senior commanders and CSMs did not believe that the Army could afford to send all of its NCOs to school.
during duty hours. They stressed that NCOs who did not possess college level credits should not be automatically penalized when being considered for promotion.

EVALUATION OF ITEP

Two of the requirements for NCOs established in Chapter 4 are JOB COMPETENCY and MOS PROFICIENCY. Chapter 5 discussed a number of systems which help NCOs develop these requirements and which also measure individual performance in them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Proficiency</th>
<th>MOS Competency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Currently Evaluated Using EER</td>
<td>• Should Involve Both:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CE and CTT Job Site Related</td>
<td>• MOS Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Current Policy: CDR &quot;Encouraged&quot; to Consider CE &amp; CTT in Developing EER</td>
<td>• Hands-On Skill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Current Measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SQT - MOS Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CE - Hands-On Skill/Job Site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• SQT Link to EPMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EMF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promotion Worksheet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(But Not Enforced!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-3

The three components of the ITEP are key to the measurement and reporting of these two requirements. ITEP in general, and SQT in particular, were found to be controversial subjects among soldiers and commanders.
Problems identified which detract from the current ITEP's ability as a measurement mechanism are:

**SQT: PERCEIVED AS UNFAIR BECAUSE...**

- Not All MOS Have SQT
  121 of 348 MOS
  402 of 1115 SL

- Not All Who Have SQT Take SOT
  (30% Waived or Excused)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who Took the SQT?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOS Levels 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excused 123,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No SQT 124,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrelevent 127,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took/Passed 245,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Discrete Score Gives Undue Weight Relative to Other Components

- Scores Not Posted Promptly
  (11% More Than 24 Months Old)

- Tested on Tasks Not Performed in Unit

Examples
- 1B (Mech and Non Mech Tasks)
- 11C (3 Mortars)
- 12B (4 Bridges)

- CTT: Not Being Administered Universally
  (40% Did Not Take FY 84)

- CE: Ill-Defined and Loosely Administered
  34% of Units Have Weak or No C-E
  C-E Not Used to Evaluate SM Tasks

Figure 6-4
1. The current ITEP has real and perceived inequities in the program.

   a. About 46% of Skill Level 1-4 soldiers are not required to take all or parts of the current ITEP. This includes soldiers who are excused from testing, plus those for whom an SQT is not available. Of the 348 MOSs, 121 MOSs do not have a SQT. It is estimated that 50,000-80,000 soldiers per year are exempt from taking their SQT for this reason. Other exemptions include or are created by initial entry trainees, low density MOSs, force modernization, and MOSs which include skills and knowledge which is changing due to changes in doctrine. The fact that there are so many exemptions contributes to negative perceptions about the equity and utility of the program.

   b. All eligible soldiers with an SQT are not being tested. In FY 84, from a population of 410,999 eligible soldiers, only 287,769 (70%) were actually tested.

   c. Many of the commanders/CSMs/NCOs contacted felt that the present SQT was not fair because it tested people on tasks that are not performed in their present duty assignments. For example, 12C Bridge Crewmen who are in airborne units do not have access to all of the bridges on which they are tested.

   d. The least understood ITEP component is the Commander's Evaluation. This part of the program is used to assess individual job proficiency on tasks critical to the unit mission. The assessment can be
made by the commander or the soldier's supervisor. Since the C-E is commander/unit-tailored, it is not subject to the same degree of standardization found in the other two components. This lack of standardization gives rise to inequities in several ways. First, if soldiers are not in an assignment in which C-E is administered, then some soldiers are subject to the evaluation and some are not. Even if two soldiers are serving in units which do conduct C-E, the standards and rigor of each C-E may vary considerably between units. Finally, the results of C-E should be considered by commanders/supervisors in preparation of Enlisted Evaluation Reports. Again, the amount of "consideration" C-E is given varies from unit to unit.

2. The SQT validation process is questionable. The current validation procedures involve having soldiers actually take a prototype or "soldier validation test" to ensure soldiers understand the test questions. This is a reasonable technique for validating this type of test. The problems arise in the procedures used to select soldiers to take part in the validation phase. Current procedures call for one MACOM (FORSCOM) to provide soldiers to take the validation tests. These procedures are subject to question from two standpoints:

   a. The soldier who takes the test is likely to be the "most available" rather than the "best match," i.e. a statistically valid, randomly selected match for skilled and unskilled soldiers of that MOS/skill level worldwide.

   b. Even if that sample of soldiers does happen to be statistically valid, a perception exists in the field that MACOM/installation-unique circumstances could
influence results or contribute to making the test invalid. Adopting procedures to better randomize the selection of individuals to take the soldier validation test would improve the effectiveness of ITEP.

3. The results of the ITEP are not reported or used equitably. If properly used, the ITEP components can be an important part of the evaluation of the "whole person." MOS knowledge and job proficiency can be evaluated in part by using the SQT and CTT/C-E. These components, combined with other information available to commanders, personnel managers and selection board members, can aid in the evaluation of a soldier's ability and potential. The SQT has the potential to be an effective evaluator of MOS knowledge. Linkage of SQT to EPMS has also created an incentive for soldiers to study their Soldier's Manuals. This incentive motivates the soldier to become and remain competent in MOS areas beyond those practiced in a current assignment. The CTT and C-E deal with job proficiency. Unlike the SQT, however, these components are not used in the centralized management systems. The EER is the official tool for evaluating job proficiency. Specific concerns about the use of ITEP for other than training purposes are:

a. Deficiencies exist in posting SQT scores to the Enlisted Master File (EMF). However, there are deficiencies related to the posting. According to statistics from the FY94 SFC Promotion Board, of the 49,715 personnel considered for promotion, 19.9% had a current SQT score. The data from the FY85 board showed a dramatic improvement (86.4%), but the problem remains.
b. Also, in June 1985, data indicated that 11% of the posted SQT scores were older than two years. SQT scores older than two years are of dubious value and contribute to the perception that some soldiers deliberately evade taking a test once they have a "good" score posted.

c. The numeric SQT score is the only portion of ITEP reported to the EMF and used directly in centralized and decentralized EPMS decisions. The results of C-E and CTT do not generate similar numeric scores, are not reported to DA, and are subject to widely varying use by local commanders. These differences in scoring, reporting and usage of results tend to inflate the relative importance of the SQT compared to the other two components.

d. ITEP is currently linked to EPMS in degrees which vary by component. SQT is directly linked by results being posted to the EMF and by use on promotion work sheets. C-E and CTT results are informally linked to EPMS in that they can be included as factors for consideration by commanders in evaluations and promotion actions. The field's opinion about the linkage of ITEP to EPMS varies. Nearly 84% of senior commanders and command sergeants major who responded to the study group favored linkage (63% favored linkage under current circumstances; another 21% favored linkage if current inequities were eliminated), while a majority of the lower ranking NCOs tended to favor delinking ITEP from EPMS.

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EVALUATION OF NCODP

NCODP is an effective program which makes a positive contribution to the overall professional development of the NCO Corps, according to general officer commanders, CSMs and other NCOs in letters, field interviews and responses to questionnaires. All groups pointed out that a unit's NCODP is only as effective as the emphasis placed on the program by commanders and senior NCOs. Areas in which some weaknesses were found were:

1. Awareness of the program and confusion between NCODP and NCOPD.

   a. Instruction on NCODP is currently included at USASMA, the ISG Course and precommand courses; however, there is no instruction on NCODP in officer advanced or basic courses. Therefore, most unit commanders and officers upon whose support the program is dependent, do not learn about the program until they are responsible for it.

   b. NCODP is sometimes viewed as a series of periodic structured classes or weekly training sessions. While the governing regulation (AR 350-17) does state that portions of the NCODP may be formalized into periods of instruction, the goal of the program is to encompass all forms of leader training from individual coaching and counseling to formal instruction for groups of NCOs.

2. Proliferation of supplements to the program. AR 350-17 is currently supplemented by many intermediate commands. A review of selected MACOM and division supplements revealed that most attempt to provide helpful guidance and direct the programs into areas
considered important to the command. However, potential problems arise when the supplements restrict the battalion commander's flexibility, or when levels of supervision and responsibility are established which are inconsistent with NCODP in general. While the AR requires ODCSOPS's prior approval of supplements, some supplements are not being forwarded for approval. In addition, some local commands are issuing training SOPs which, in effect, supplement AR 350-17. While well intended, these SOPs do not require HQDA approval and, therefore, can inadvertently introduce detractors to subordinate unit NCODPs.

3. Clarity of AR 350-17 concerning responsibilities for NCODP. AR 350-17 does not clearly define the role of the noncommissioned officer in the program. It assigns commanders, command sergeants major, and first sergeants the same responsibilities for NCODP -- which leads to confusion as to who is really responsible for what. The NCODP regulation does not give guidance on how the commander and command sergeant major assess the professional needs of the NCOs in order to develop an NCODP within the unit.

EVALUATION OF PROMOTION SYSTEM

Currently, the Army has approximately 100 percent of the NCOs authorized in each grade; however, overages and shortages exist within some MOSs. Force Alignment Plan I (FAP I) actions are being initiated to help correct this problem. In the meantime, MOS imbalance has a direct impact on promotion opportunities. While promotion by MOS is in accordance with Army requirements, it is also important to ensure the best qualified soldiers are selected. The semi-centralized and centralized systems allow soldiers to compete for
promotion within Armywide overages and shortages, as opposed to a decentralized system which would be based on individual command overages and shortages. This allows qualified soldiers to be promoted against Armywide vacancies even if there is not a vacancy at the soldier's command. But even centralized selection boards are unable to select all the "fully qualified" soldiers because promotion opportunity must be dictated by Army requirements.

The promotion system is currently working to provide the leadership needs of the Army. However, several areas of concern were voiced from the field. These areas include lack of standard selection criteria for promotion, problems with the promotion worksheet and inequity of promotion opportunities in some MOSs.

1. Standardization of Selection Criteria for Promotion. In relation to semi-centralized promotions, research showed criteria by which commanders determined who would be recommended to appear before a promotion board did vary from unit to unit and command to command. Examples of requirements which exist in some commands but do not exist Armywide include attendance at Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC), passing score on the Skill Qualification Test (SQT), and demonstrated Common Task Test (CTT) proficiency. But, regardless of these variances, the majority of commanders/CSMs stated that the current semi-centralized system is meeting Army requirements and the best qualified soldiers are being promoted.
Confidence in the centralized promotion system was not so clear-cut. The data indicate that the majority of commanders and senior NCOs feel that centralized promotion boards recommend those soldiers best qualified to serve at a higher level of responsibility. However, only 46% of junior to mid-level NCO respondents agreed. One significant area of disagreement among these NCOs was the perception that college courses are required in order to be competitive for promotion, and that more college credits meant greater promotion probability. This perception is probably the result of viewing the education breakout provided with promotion board results.

Another hindrance to promoting the "best qualified" is the nonavailability of data contained in the restricted fiche of the OMPF. Under current policy, Article 15s, letters of reprimand, and other adverse actions may be filed on the restricted fiche, making them unavailable to promotion boards to weigh into the "total person" equation. The decision as to whether these types of documents are filed in the performance fiche or the restricted fiche is made by the appropriate authority at the time of filing. In making the filing decision, the prime concern is the best interest of the Army and the soldier. For example, a commander's decision to place an Article 15 in the performance fiche or the restricted fiche is based on the intended purpose of the Article 15 and the soldier's overall record. Opening the restricted fiche to promotion boards defeats the commander's original intent for placing the Article 15 in the restricted fiche. Some comments were received proposing the elimination of the restricted fiche and providing all personnel records to promotion boards.
2. Promotion Worksheet. The promotion worksheet was generally considered to be a good document. Soldiers and commanders understand the use of the 1000-point worksheet and are basically satisfied with its use. But a few field responses pointed to some dissatisfaction. Sections of the worksheet which evoked the strongest comments during field interviews are:

   a. Civilian Education. Some soldiers complained about the awarding of 10 points on the promotion point worksheet to non-high school graduates who obtain a General Education Diploma (GED) while in the service; while soldiers who graduated from high school prior to entering the service get no points. This complaint indicates a misunderstanding of the purpose behind these points. The intent of awarding these 10 points is to motivate soldiers to improve themselves through education. These same 10 points are awarded to high school graduates for the first college class or College Level Entrance Placement (CLEP) exam they successfully complete. There is no inequity in this point award since it is not the high school diploma (HSD), per se, which merits the points, but the demonstration of improvement which is available to all soldiers. As of 1 March 87, when promotion to sergeant will require HSD/GED, the award of 10 points for GED completion will be discontinued since completion will be mandatory.
b. The second problem with the worksheet is also connected with civilian education. Some soldiers expressed concern regarding the difficulty in acquiring additional civilian education. The concern is based largely on the fact that points are awarded on the promotion point worksheet for civilian education, and on the perception of NCOs, as stated earlier, that some civilian education beyond high school level is required to be competitive for promotion. The concern comes primarily from combat arms soldiers who normally participate in extensive field exercises. The degree to which this opportunity for additional civilian education is limited depends primarily on how well classes are scheduled to accommodate field requirements. All respondents agreed that mission and military training requirements take priority. However, most also said that over the course of a career, the opportunities for additional civilian education should be present for all soldiers. Because different MOSs have different duty requirements, parity of educational opportunities between MOSs may never be achieved, however, this lack of parity should not negate the positive motivational inducement resulting from the award of educational achievement points.

c. Weapons Qualification. Currently, soldiers can receive up to 50 points on their promotion point worksheets for weapons qualification scores in the expert range. Lesser points are awarded for scores in the sharpshooter (30 points) and marksman (10 points) ranges. A soldier's latest weapons score is used to award points. There are, however, a number of soldiers who cannot improve their point total because they have no requirement nor opportunity to fire for
qualification. Soldiers in duty positions in organizations which are not assigned individual weapons are not required to train or qualify with a weapon (AR 350-4). In addition, resource constraints (time, money, and facilities) prohibit other personnel from firing. Upcoming changes to AR 350-4 will also make the weapons qualification program more restrictive by requiring more preliminary marksmanship instruction prior to record firing. Based on visits to the field, the study group found that a few senior soldiers in TDA positions have not fired a weapon since their AIT.

3. Promotion Opportunities by MOS. In the initial development of the EPMS, MOS/CMF were designed to provide promotion opportunity for each MOS and a logical progression path leading to the rank of sergeant major. Factors such as MOS grade structure, design norms and standards of grade authorizations are used to maintain an MOS's promotability. Even with this, there are several reasons why promotion opportunity may be limited in an MOS such as overstrength in the MOS or grade in question, a decrease in projected requirements for the MOS due to a restructuring or modernization action, or a constrained structure for the MOSs (limited requirements at higher grades). Promotion opportunity is severely restricted in some MOSs. Many overstrength MOSs have high promotion cutoff scores. That means that soldiers in those MOSs, even if highly qualified for promotion, cannot be promoted. As a result, the Army may be losing highly qualified soldiers because of limited advancement opportunity. As has been indicated, the first priority of the promotion system is to meet Army requirements. This means that the Army cannot promote
beyond its current and projected space authorizations and budget. By comparing current inventory by grade, current and projected authorizations, and the number of people on the recommended promotion list, promotion cutoff scores and objectives are established to allow the number of promotions in each MOS that will equal the number needed to fill Army requirements.

Proponents are aware of the potential problems of limited promotion opportunity and are tasked to review their MOS/CMF and initiate action when they determine this limiting of opportunity is occurring. Efforts to correct the problem are ongoing. Force structure and modernization actions are examined to project the impact these actions may have on an MOS's grade structure and ensure this is considered in the resulting decisions. ODCSPER has initiated a program to issue Program Budget Guidance (PBG) by skill level and grade in order to control authorization changes and move to more feasible grade structures. In the final analysis, Army requirements are the first priority and it is possible a personnel management issue such as promotion opportunity within an MOS will not be the deciding factor. In these cases, limited opportunity may continue to exist and the individuals affected will have to recognize this fact and take the appropriate individual action, such as attempting to reclassify to another MOS, or continuing to work in the MOS and compete for the available promotions even though they are somewhat limited.

Another problem associated with MOS is promotion opportunity for soldiers in MOSs that exist at the
lower ranks but not at the higher ranks (capped MOS). Career management fields are groupings of related MOS which, ideally, provide visible and logical progression from entry into the training base to retirement as a SCM. However, career progression within some CMF does not lead all the way to sergeant major. Instead, they "cap" out at the E5, E6 or E7 levels. In order to be promoted beyond the capped grade level, an NCO must be reclassified to a Career Progression MOS (CPMOS) or other MOS. In theory, a CPMOS is related to the previous MOS, but in actuality, that is not always the case. Paths in some CMF are not logical. (For example, the transition from 51N40 SFC -- Water Treatment Specialist -- to 76W50 MSG/SGM -- Petroleum Supply Specialist -- appears to be illogical. The water treatment specialist primarily supervises or performs installation, operation and maintenance of water supply and treatment equipment and systems. The petroleum laboratory specialist supervises or receives, stores, accounts and cares for, dispenses, issues, and ships bulk or packaged petroleum, oils and lubricant (POL) products.) This puts the NCO in the position of performing duties and competing for promotion in an MOS with which he may be unfamiliar. While prior experience may provide some leverage, that is only true if the CPMOS is related to the prior MOS of the soldier.

EVALUATION OF THE ASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

The primary goal of the assignment system is to meet Army requirements by assigning qualified soldiers to positions requiring their rank and skills. For the most part, the current system meets this goal. But the study group research revealed some problems. In structured group interviews, 31 out of 37 groups
interviewed expressed concerns with the negative impact of assignments on NCOPD. The most frequent comments included: NCOs are wasting their formal training by not working in their PMOS, NCOs should not receive back-to-back MOS-immaterial duty assignments, and NCOs should alternate assignments between TOE and TDA units.

Malassignments and duties outside of PMOS significantly detract from NCO professional development. If NCOs are not working in their PMOS, their training and expertise in the PMOS may deteriorate. A better method of tracking assignments of NCOs is needed to ensure they are properly rotated between assignments which allow the NCO to maintain skills and knowledge required in his or her PMOS.

The following recently approved policy changes in the deletion/deferment program will have a positive impact on NCOPD since it will be more difficult to cancel orders to schools or other professionally developing assignments:

1. As of 1 Oct 85, CONUS commanders no longer have approval authority for operational deletions and deferments.

2. Effective 1 Jan 86, USAREUR commanders no longer have authority to approve foreign service tour extensions (FSTE) for soldiers who have already been placed on assignment instructions.

Prior planning will allow enough time to be allocated to update key data elements such as DEROS and ETS on the EMF, thus decreasing the number of deletions.
generated by erroneous data base entries. The assignment process should, in turn, flow much smoother at the MILPERCEN and MILPO levels because short-notice notifications should be the exception rather than the rule. Only those bona fide and documented reasons should precipitate a deletion/deferment. The policy changes represent a major effort toward disciplining the assignment process.

Assignment Utilization. According to Chapter 3, AR 600-200, authority for assignment and utilization of soldiers ultimately rests with the commander. The regulation gives commanders a great deal of latitude in utilizing soldiers to best meet the needs of the unit. It provides commander with the authority to use soldiers out of their PMOS and places no limits on how long they can remain malassigned. The regulation provides no specific guidance as to what circumstances justify MOS malutilization. While such latitude may be necessary, it also contributes to MOS malutilization. First, the existence of undocumented requirements often causes NCO malassignment. These are requirements the commander determines are valid and necessary even though unresourced. These positions, whether in the unit (operations NCO, training NCO, reenlistment NCO) or post/community support (protocol NCO, sports NCO, operations NCO), if not documented, may cause NCOs to work outside their PMOS. While the formal documentation system assumes these duties can be accomplished on a part-time basis, the reality is that most are filled on a full-time basis. A second and related factor contributing to MOS malutilization is personnel being used for undocumented garrison support requirements. Examples include post drivers and ground
maintenance functions. The TRADOC EPMS Study found soldiers working in 2,000 of 7,000 civilian positions. Third, local MOS shortages cause positions to be unfilled and commanders must assign soldiers to do these jobs even though their PMOS does not match the job (11B SSG serving as a supply SGT because no 76Y SSG is available, or as a 34E — Nuclear, Biological, Chemical NCO).

Special Assignments. Special assignments are normally MOS immaterial. Special assignments include, but are not limited to, the following: recruiting duty, drill sergeant duty, reenlistment NCO, enlisted aide program, U.S. Army Parachute Team, U.S. Army Marksmanship Team, and Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program (ADAPCP) counselor. Presently there is no written policy prohibiting back-to-back special assignments. Each program has a limit on the amount of time which can be spent in that special assignment tour. For example, a soldier may remain on drill sergeant status for a maximum of 36 months. However, upon completion, there is no policy which precludes assignment to another special assignment if he/she qualifies. MILPERCEN normally precludes involuntary back-to-back special assignments, by using "ir-branch" controls enforced by the professional development NCO (PDNCO).

EVALUATION OF THE ENLISTED EFFICIENCY REPORT (EER)

The EER is a viable tool for the measurement of duty performance and potential. However, major areas of concern surfaced during the course of the study. These were inflation of the rating instrument, lack of developmental communication, and linkage with other evaluation mechanisms.
I. inflation. The EER numerical ratings are highly inflated (average scores by grade as of month end July 85: SGT 121.18, SSgt 122.92, SFC 123.88, MSG/1SG 124.17, and SCM/CSM 124.56, -- maximum score is 125). The majority of the soldiers interviewed said that because of the high degree of inflation, as well as poorly written narratives, a true performance picture cannot be obtained from the current EER.

Several factors have contributed to the inflation. The first contributor is the length of time since the implementation of the current system. Historically, the longer a system is in effect, the greater the chance for increasing inflation. Second, the EER weighted averages were published by rank until 31 December 1983. Raters believed that they needed to rate the soldiers they felt should be promoted higher than the published averages. Eliminating these statistics in 1983 did not eliminate inflation. Third, the current EER system has been unable to correlate the narrative comments or lack of narrative with the numerical portion.

Since the numerical inflation is so high, the narrative portion becomes a critical discriminator on the report itself. Comments obtained during field visits indicate a perception by NCOs that many raters do not take the required time, some aren't capable of writing well, and still others do not understand the importance of the narrative and duty description. In these cases, soldiers perceive the rater's ability and willingness to write, as well as the rater's understanding of the system, to have a greater impact on promotion and selection board decisions than the actual job performance of the rated soldier.
Despite the problems of inflation and narrative completeness, comments from promotion/school selection board members indicate that the EER provided them a means to discriminate among soldiers and make selection decisions. Comments from commanders and CSMs to the effect that the best NCOs are being selected for promotions and other favorable personnel actions, tend to support the board member evaluations of the EER as a useful selection tool. However, the negative perceptions of the validity of the EER must be addressed.

2. Developmental Communications. One purpose of the evaluation instrument, according to AR 623-205, is to generate communication between rater and ratee on job requirements and provide feedback on performance and professional growth. Communication should lead to improved job performance. Nearly one-third of the groups interviewed expressed concern about the lack of communication between the NCO and the rater. Counseling, in general, was perceived to be non-existent, and seldom were job performance objectives discussed until the EER was written. Some soldiers did say the EER provided a communication tool, but usually in a negative manner, such as a threat.

The current EER, in Part III, Section A (Professional Competence), identifies areas related to professional development (such as seeks self-improvement and develops subordinates). But, based on the research described in Chapter 4, the study group determined that the EER does not assess performance of the eight requirements developed by the study group which the Army places on the NCO corps. Those requirements are
training skills, MOS competency, physical fitness/military bearing, basic educational skills, leadership skills, job proficiency, responsibility and accountability for actions, and commitment to professional values and attributes. The EER should reinforce these requirements and serve as the instrument to be used to measure and report attainment of standards.

3. Linkage to Other Evaluations. ITEF provides information on individual job proficiency and MOS knowledge. Currently, the only portion of ITEF directly linked to the personnel system is the evaluation of MOS knowledge provided by the SQT. This evaluation is reported directly to the Enlisted Master File and is considered during EPMS decisions. The other portions of ITEP, i.e., Common Task Test (CTT) and Commander's Evaluation (C-E), conducted at the unit level, are used to determine the soldier's duty performance/job proficiency. There is no requirement for the results of the C-E and CTT to be formally reported for consideration in promotion and EPMS-related decisions. Commanders may elect to specifically mention performance in these areas on an EER, but there is no requirement to do so.

Soldiers in the field offered a number of suggestions to counter the problem of inflation. Most of the groups interviewed favored eliminating the numerical scores and proposed a methodology of "yes/no" in Part III, in lieu of the current "1 through 5" numerical scores. The use of check marks was also suggested. Although mentioned only a few times, another recommended change voiced during the structured
interviews was a possible senior rater profile similar to that used in the officer system. The profile could be beneficial in restricting inflation. However, the administrative burden (there are significantly more NCOs than officers) may make it impractical unless restricted to selected ranks. Although a few soldiers in the structured interviews suggested possible use of an EER support form similar to that used in the officer evaluation system, the suggestion did not generate much dialogue and was perceived by most to be an administrative burden. Most soldiers were not aware of the purpose of the support form, but a few did indicate that their units were using locally developed support forms. The underlying interest generated by the support form was that it provided another mechanism for senior/subordinate communication. Further, input at the end of the rating period could ensure a more accurate and complete narrative preparation.

EVALUATION OF HQDA policy is to utilize soldiers in positions in line with their military qualifications and to foster an atmosphere which motivates all members to attain their full potential. Reclassification is one method the Army uses in its efforts to most effectively align its work force with personnel requirements. According to the study group questionnaire, more than half of the NCOs agreed that in order to balance MOS strengths, involuntary MOS reclassifications are necessary. Most personnel who responded to the study group questionnaire indicated that voluntary reclassifications and involuntary reclassifications for medical reasons and due to MOS disqualification are justified. However, reclassification was found to
often cause professional development problems for the individuals involved, and training and utilization problems for commanders of reclassified NCOs.

1. The reclassification of senior personnel who have invested a considerable portion of their adult lives working in a given field gives rise to considerable frustration.

2. Training for reclassified NCOs varies widely in type and quality. OJT/OJE programs are perceived in the field to be ineffective. Ideally, NCOs should be afforded full skill level institutional training in the new MOS. Most respondents favored validating the new MOS but indicators are that reclassified NCOs are not being given sufficient time and training before being required to take the SQT.

3. Once reclassified, an NCO may not be used in the new MOS if still assigned to the same unit. Additionally, if a reclassified NCO is reassigned immediately following reclassification to an MOS immaterial position (such as drill sergeant or recruiter duty), the NCO has little or no opportunity to gain vital experience to build proficiency in the new MOS. Another area of concern is the assignment of newly reclassified personnel to instructor duties, especially in TRADOC branch schools. These NCOs are put in the uncomfortable position of attempting to be subject matter experts in an area in which they have little or no practical experience and often are instructing students with equivalent or higher MOS knowledge, especially in the cases of BNCOC/ANCOC.
RESERVE COMPONENT ISSUES

RC NCOES contributes significantly to professional development of the RC NCO. The system prepares the RC soldier for career progression, greater responsibility, and a diversity of assignments. RC NCOES strengthens and broadens the leadership qualification of the RC NCO and provides the commander an inventory of skilled, knowledgeable soldiers who possess leadership abilities. The soldier develops a career interest in the RC by being provided continued training and education opportunities, and a "road map" for career enhancement and upward mobility.

However, some problems do exist. RC NCOES in its present form contains virtually no MOS training. Individual training opportunities in RC units are often restricted by the lack of facilities and equipment. Resource support to provide for training aids, devices, simulations and simulators historically lags the Active Component. To further complicate the issue, sufficient dedicated quotas in the AC service schools and MACOM NCOAs are not available. Development of RC courses is, quite often, an afterthought or adaptation of AC courses to try to meet the needs of the RC. To provide the best possible system for the RC, development must be based on a front end analysis of needs and alternatives required. All systems, AC and RC, must be developed and managed on an integrated basis with equal priorities. Changes to one will almost always impact on the other and therefore, cannot be made in isolation.

The Army Training Plan has generated a list of initiatives that are requiring a restructuring of RC NCOES to make it more compatible with the AC version of
NCOES. A Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) and a First Sergeant Course Reserve Component (FSC RC) have already been developed and implemented for use in the RC. The ANCOC RC course, which is currently exclusively leadership-oriented, is being restructured to include MOS-specific subject matter. Also, a MOS specific BNCOC RC course is being developed. These last two actions, although ongoing, are moving rather slowly. The restructuring of RC NCOES courses so that they will include MOS specific training is critical to the professional development of the RC NCO and the future readiness of RC units. Additionally, a Prior Service (PS) training program was implemented in August 1983 that was designed to provide retraining for PS personnel whose primary skill does not match that of the position to which he is being accessioned into the RC. This program is expected to increase unit personnel readiness and reduce retraining requirements by the RC units.

Current Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (MOSQ) programs in the RC are inadequate. The use of supervised on-the-job training (SOJT) as a key source of MOSQ does not meet the training needs of the individual soldier requiring reclassification. The Army Correspondence Course Program (ACCP), which has great potential to provide MOS training, has not been adequately maintained. Outdated course materials do not provide for the RC soldier's needs. Insufficient resourcing in TRADOC service schools for course maintenance precludes simultaneous development of ACCP courseware.
The effectiveness of USAR schools is not being maximized due to a failure to accurately identify training requirements in a timely manner, delays in developing appropriate courseware for use by USAR schools, and the turbulent nature of USAR school TDAs. Army National Guard (ARNG) academies and USAR schools are not staffed with sufficient members of permanent staff to accomplish the number of classes required to train the RC soldiers.

Lastly, the training experiences and professional development requirements of the noncommissioned officer assigned to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) differ significantly from that required of the NCO in the troop program unit. A comprehensive, long range training strategy for the professional development for members of the IRR does not currently exist.

1. The professional development requirements of the NCO in the IRR do not parallel those of the NCO in the TPU in that the IRR NCO is not required to complete any NCOES courses and the training and assignment experiences are also very limited. At best, the IRR NCO is encouraged to attend NCOES courses. Since there is no direct link between NCOES and NCO promotions in the IRR, most of the incentive to complete NCOES courses is absent.

2. Ideally, if NCOES were required as a condition of promotion eligibility in the IRR, the training opportunities, like those for the TPU NCO, should parallel and build upon NCOES experiences and in turn, additional NCOES opportunities would build upon
training experiences. Critical to this pattern of professional development are the actions of the Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate at ARPERCEN. This directorate, through its enlisted career advisor, coordinates all personnel, finance, training and logistic actions that pertain to the entire Individual Ready Reserve. Currently, there are about 250,000 enlisted personnel in the IRR of which about 47,000 are NCOs. Yet there are less than 100 enlisted career advisors to manage this force. The problem of force management of the IRR is further compounded by the fact that the military personnel records of the IRR are retained by RCPAC and are still paper based. During FY 85, about 5% of the IRR NCC enhanced their readiness and professional development by performing at least one tour of active duty with an AC unit, RC unit, or as a student in pursuit of military education. About 40% of these same NCOs performed more than one tour of active duty. The results of the 1984 DA promotion selection board for the IRR at RCPAC further attested to the problems of professional development for NCO in the IRR where less than 200 E6 through E9 were selected for promotion out of approximately 3,000 who were considered.

Members of the ARNG and USAR are not required to possess a valid SQT qualification score as a condition for promotion consideration. In the ARNG, however, occupational qualifications for an MOS award may be obtained by attaining a verifying score on the SQT authorized for that particular MOS. A verification score of 60 percent attained on the SQT denotes minimum verification of the current DMOS and skill level evaluated.
The SQT is used in the RC for the purpose of evaluating individual training proficiency. The SQT is administered every two years, however, the unit commander may administer the test on an annual basis if desired. The SQT for the RC is quite inequitable in that a test is not available for every MOS in the inventory. Additionally, several tests are invalid for the RC because of the lack of compatible equipment.

The RC continues to maximize use of the SQT and plans for potentially linking of the EPMS to the SQT is being considered.
CHAPTER 7 - CORRECTING THE SYSTEM - RECOMMENDATIONS

The Army's Mission

Army Requirements For the NCO

Today's NCO PD System
THE MECHANISM

Evaluation of Today's System

CORRECTING THE SYSTEM

Meet ?

The Future

Evaluation For Future

Bad Mechanism Or Requirement ?

Meet ?

Keeping On Track
Integration
General. Based on the evaluation of the Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System outlined in Chapter 6, the study group developed a series of recommendations to improve the system. Of great importance is the fact that most of the recommendations are for improvements to existing mechanisms rather than creation of entirely new ways of doing business. Only those recommendations approved by the Chief of Staff are listed in this report; however, a complete listing of recommendations, to include those which were deferred and disapproved, is an appendix in Volume II to the NCOPDS Final Report.

**Recommendation Categories**

The study group recommendations fall into the following categories:

1. Philosophy
2. NCOES
3. Civilian Education
4. Noncommissioned Officer Development Program (NCODP)
5. Assignments
6. Promotion
7. Evaluation
8. Reclassification
9. Individual Training Evaluation Program (ITEP)
10. Reserve Components
11. Integration

**NCO Professional Development Philosophy**

In order to insure that recommended changes to any system are in synch with each other, those changes should be in accordance with some master plan that defines and sets the direction of the system. The study group's research revealed that although there are many regulations which pertain to the various systems...
which comprise the NCO Professional Development System, there is no document that spells out what the overall system should be and how the contributing systems should support it. Therefore, the study group recommended that the Chief of Staff of the Army approve for dissemination a statement of philosophy which will serve as a guide to Army planners and leaders as they develop policies and make decisions concerning the many aspects of NCO professional development.

A PHILOSOPHY

TRAIN-PROMOTE-UTILIZE

ENHANCEMENT OF ARMY READINESS THROUGH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE EXCELLENCE

MANY PLAYERS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY

LINKING IS GOOD

TRAINING/EDUCATION/EXPERIENCES

Figure 7-2

That philosophy is:

* * * *

Understanding professional development requires an understanding of our profession. The Army is an organization
dedicated to serving our country. The key word is SERVING — selfless service and total commitment. Noncommissioned officers are the backbone of our Army. There has never been a good Army without a good Noncommissioned Officer Corps. The Noncommissioned Officer's orientation is taking care of soldiers and training soldiers to perform their role in defending the country.

Professional development is not an end product. It is a means to an end — that end being to meet the requirements of the Army.

All training and personnel management systems must support professional development of NCOS who are capable of meeting those requirements. The commander has a great responsibility for the professional development of Noncommissioned Officers. Commanders and their senior NCOs fulfill this responsibility by selecting soldiers to be NCOs; by coaching NCOs in their jobs; by giving them responsibility and the authority to carry out their responsibility; by observing and critiquing them and by permitting them to learn from their mistakes. In addition to the responsibilities of commanders and senior NCOs, each individual in the Army is responsible for maximizing his or her own professional development opportunities.

Professional development is the sum of all the training, education and experiences the Army provides NCOs to better enable them to carry out their missions. These components must complement each other. The ideal professional development sequence is to train, promote and utilize. The reality of resource constraints sometimes deters us from fully utilizing this sequence, but it is the Army's long range goal.

The key to being developed professionally is to keep in focus that being an NCO demands a commitment and dedication to one's country.
and to fellow soldiers. All training, education and experiences which maintain that focus and which better equip a noncommissioned officer to apply that dedication constitute professional development.

PD enhances Unit and Army Readiness

This type of professional development does not detract from unit readiness -- it enhances it. This type of professional development is an investment in the Army's future.

* * * *

NCOES CONCLUSIONS

While the current NCOES is making a great contribution to NCO professional development, the overall system can be improved. The study group determined that an ideal NCOES system should:

1. Be sequential, progressive and mandatory.

2. Provide training prior to NCOs being promoted.

3. Be equally attainable to all soldiers, regardless of MOS.

4. Not include functional courses (such as the First Sergeant Course, which is currently included in NCOES).

5. Have sufficient capacity for qualified NCOs to attend prior to being promoted; or,

6. Provide a credible non-resident instruction program if capacity problems cannot be resolved.

Capacity Problems

Consideration of capacity problem. Before NCOES can become mandatory and linked to promotion, the capacity issue must be resolved. Figure 7-2 illustrates the current training capacity problems for resident attendance at NCOES.
Figure 7-2

At any given time, there are about 88,000 soldiers in paygrade E-4 who are eligible for promotion to sergeant. The current capacity of PLDC is about 50,000 training seats. Since only about 34,000 specialists 4 and corporals are actually promoted each year, it would not be practical to increase PLDC capacity to accommodate all eligible soldiers. However, one possible solution to the capacity problem at this level is to restrict NCOES attendance to those specialists 4 and corporals who have been screened by a semi-centralized promotion board and have attained promotion list status. Only those soldiers who have been recommended for promotion would be scheduled for training.
attendance at PLVC. Then they must in fact complete PLDC before they could actually be promoted. If this were the case, even after allowances are made for Reserve Component personnel to attend, fluctuations in promotion rates, and for soldiers who have missed their primary attendance dates to attend in a make-up status, the current PLDC capacity would still be adequate.

2. The capacity problem becomes more difficult for the Basic NCO Courses (BNCOC) and the Advanced NCO Courses (ANCOC). Even after tying attendance to the Army's annual promotion requirement, these courses would still have capacity shortfalls of approximately 5,500 for each course. Therefore, the study group concluded that a long range goal of linking each level of NCOES to promotions will require:

   a. Changing the method of selection for attendance by linking selection more closely to the Army's annual promotion requirements (i.e., personnel attend NCOES after selection for promotion but prior to actual promotion).

   b. Increasing the capacities of the BNCOC and ANCOC by approximately 5,500 each per year. Or;

   c. Developing a credible nonresident program to augment resident course capacity.

NCOES RECOMMENDATIONS

The study group recommended that the Chief of Staff establish a long range goal of an NCOES that is mandatory, sequential, progressive and linked to promotions. This goal would support the philosophy of adopting a clear professional development sequence of Train - Promote - Utilize. The strategy for accomplishing this is summarized at Figure 7-4:
1. Fine-tune the current system by:

a. Deleting the First Sergeant Course from NCOES (but retaining it as a functional course) and making appropriate changes to AR 351-1 and 672-5-1.

b. Change AR 351-1 to discontinue awarding resident course credit for BNCOC and ANCOC ACCP effective the end of FY86 until they can be made more credible.
c. TRADOC continue with its initiative to eliminate Primary Technical Courses (PTC) and incorporate Basic Technical Courses (BTC) in BNCOC for Combat Support and Combat Service Support MOSs in FY86.

2. Point NCOES toward the long-range goal by:

a. Requiring ANCOC completion for promotion to Master Sergeant effective the end of FY87.

b. TRADOC examine the feasibility of developing generic BNCOCs for Career Management Fields that do not have a BNCOC. Provide basic level training to all NCOs should be developed by end FY86.

3. Provide for the 1990s by having TRADOC:

a. Conduct a feasibility study to determine the earliest implementation date for the long-range goal.

b. Develop BNCOC and ANCOC nonresident corresponding studies courses with a resident phase similar to the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) corresponding studies course for proponent specified MOSs.

Based on the literature search, field findings and other research, the group concluded that:

1. Civilian education beyond high school is not a requirement for promotion.
2. Advanced degrees in and of themselves do not make NCOs more effective. More proficiency in the basic education skills (reading, writing, speaking, mathematics) is required.

CIVILIAN ED.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to clarify the role of civilian education in NCO professional development and enable civilian education to better serve NCO needs, the study group recommended that:

1. The Chief of Staff of the Army reaffirm the policy that civilian education above high school is not a requirement for promotion; however, continuing education does enhance overall NCO effectiveness and performance and should therefore be pursued as an individual goal.

2. TRADOC evaluate NCOES programs of instruction to determine adequacy of instruction in reading, writing and other basic educational skills.

NCODP

CONCLUSIONS

NCODP is an effective program that is contributing to NCOPD. However the quality of the program varies from unit to unit depending upon the degree of command emphasis on the program. The implementing regulation, AR 350-17, is considered adequate, but some improvements can be made. A related problem is the proliferation of supplements to AR 350-17. There was some lack of clarity in the field as to what the program is and who is responsible for it. There is a lack of education among officers as to the purpose of NCODP.
The study group submitted a revised AR 350-17 to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS) for approval. The revision better defines NCODP and responsibilities for it. Other recommendations were:

1. TRADOC include a block of instruction on NCODP in Officer Advanced Courses by end FY86.

2. ODCSOPS conduct a critical review of all supplements to AR 350-17 to ensure consistency with basic policies and intent of the regulation.

3. Chief of Staff of the Army provide added emphasis to NCODP by endorsing the Sergeant Major of the Army's Annual Review of NCODP to Major Commands (MACOM) for information.

While, for the most part, the assignment system does meet Army requirements, it also has a negative impact on the professional development of some NCOs. NCOs are assigned to duties outside their PMOS and CPMOS (Career Progression MOS). NCOs are receiving back-to-back special assignments, such as recruiting duty, drill sergeant duty or ROTC duty, which do not permit them to maintain currency in their PMOS. Many are also not getting a proper mix of TDA and TOE type assignments.

In order to correct these problems, the study group made the following recommendations:

1. Professional development should be an assignment qualification factor in Centralized Assignment Procedure III. This would help preclude NCOs from
being selected by the computer for back-to-back special assignments and for repetitive tours in TDA organization. In addition, duty position titles should be placed on requisitions (currently only MOS and grade required are shown) so assignment managers can better meet professional development needs of NCOs. (ED NOTE: Again, I don't think we ever present a logical argument that says TDA assignments are less professionally developing than TOE assignments for all soldiers. I think the distinction is greater for CA soldiers than for CS and CSS soldiers and that we can't generalize, therefore to the whole Army.)

2. HQDA should impose a time limit on soldier assignments in non-PMOS/CPMOS or undocumented positions.

3. HQDA should revise AR 600-200 to restrict the definition of "proper utilization" to assignments in PMOS or CPMOS at the appropriate grade or higher.

4. CAP III Gains Rosters should be forwarded to gaining units after they are verified by losing units. In addition, losing units should forward a copy of the individual's Personnel Qualification Record (DA Form 2-1) to the gaining unit.

5. Personnel records audits should be a unit, rather than an individual, responsibility and units should ensure personnel records are audited by the end of each fiscal year. This would help reduce data errors on the PQR which contribute erroneous assignment nominations and, thereby, to assignment deferments, deletions and related problems.
6. Back-to-back special assignments (those outside PMOS/CPMOS and normal career pattern) should be precluded. Professional development refresher training should be emphasized upon reassignment to duties in PMOS/CPMOS.

**PROMOTIONS**

**CONCLUSIONS**

Slightly more than half the NCOs who responded to the study group questionnaire indicated some dissatisfaction with the promotion system. The group concluded that a major problem is the fact that promotion opportunity is restricted in overstrength MOS which causes good soldiers in the lower grades to leave the Army. Even though some soldiers perceived that points awarded for GED completion were unfair, the study group concluded that the perception results from lack of knowledge about how points are awarded and why rather than from an actual system inequity. The fact that all soldiers do not have the opportunity to improve weapons qualification scores and thereby increase promotion points represents an actual inequity.

**PROMOTIONS**

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. HQDA explore ways to correct the weapons qualification inequity on the promotion point worksheet.

2. HQDA, through existing CMF review, adjust the MOS structure/inventory to continue reducing promotion and capper MOS merger bottlenecks. Required training should be conducted at MOS merger points.
ENLISTED EVALUATION SYSTEM

CONCLUSIONS: The current EER does not support professional development as well as it could because it is extremely inflated, there is inadequate communication between raters and ratees, and it does not address those skills and attributes which the Army requires of NCOs.

EERS

RECOMMENDATIONS

The study group recommended that:

1. HQDA develop a new EER which incorporates the eight NCO requirements identified by the NCO Professional Development Study Group and initiate regulatory guidance for implementation in June 1987.

2. HQDA EER developers specifically consider state-of-the-art techniques to dampen inflation.

RECLASSIFICATION

CONCLUSIONS: Reclassification, although a necessary personnel management tool which usually contributes to professional development, often causes professional development problems, as well. Commanders often do not utilize NCOs in the reclassified MOS. Training for reclassified NCOs is not standardized and may not provide sufficient knowledge for the NCO to function in the new MOS at the appropriate grade level. This affects ability to lead, train and perform many of the other duties of an NCO, which in turn, affects promotion opportunity and overall job satisfaction. Furthermore, reclassified are often required to verify the new MOS, i.e. take an SQT, before they are adequately trained in that MOS. This causes further problems in career progression. The study group concluded that these negative effects increase as the rank and time-in-service of the reclassified NCO increase.
RECLASSIFICATION

Study group recommendations concerning reclassification are:

1. HQDA should establish a policy limiting involuntary reclassifications to correct MOS imbalance to staff sergeant or below, or to NCOs with less than 10 years of service.

2. HQDA should:
   a. Establish policy that reclassified NCOs not be required to take the SQT in the new MOS earlier than one year after the new MOS is awarded.
   b. Formalize and standardize reclassification training requirements.
   c. Establish policy allowing OJT/OJE reclassification training only if all other forms of formal training are unavailable or impractical.

ITEP

The study group's recommendations concerning ITEP were not briefed to the Chief of Staff of the Army pending a briefing by TRADOC on the results of their study.

RESERVE

CONCLUSIONS

The current reliance on the RC and their importance in mobilization scenarios mandate that the RC NCO receive the best possible professional development. At the same time the Army must recognize the unique considerations of the RC NCO in that proficiency must be maintained in two careers (civilian and military). Education and training requirements must be based on active needs, held to the absolute minimum, and offered in multiple modes to make it possible for RC NCO to fit military duties into an already demanding schedule. The current system and on-going initiatives meet the
needs of the RC NCO fairly well. Several options are available to RC NCO to accomplish required training and education.

The professional development requirements and opportunities for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) soldier do not parallel those of the RC soldier in a Troop Program Unit. The IRR NCO is not required to complete any formal military training and assignment opportunities are very limited. Professional development for the IRR NCO is inadequate.

MOS reclassification of the NCO in the Reserve Component will continue because membership in the TPU for most NCOs is voluntary, assignment is vacancy dependent and the soldier's residence is dictated by his civilian occupation (as opposed to membership in the RC). The procedures for reclassification are understood and are not an undue administrative burden upon RC units or individuals. Training and educational opportunities are readily identified and numerous options in both resident and nonresident modes are available to qualify the reclassified NCO. The ACCP has been used by large numbers of RC soldiers as a means of qualifying for MOS reclassification; however, this program has not been adequately maintained and its value and usefulness have not been fully realized.

The Army Training Plan establishes definitive goals for the Army Training System. This document describes an objective training system to meet those goals. One of those goals is readiness. "Total Army" readiness for war demands that increased priority be given to the training needs of the RC. RC NCOES significantly
contributes to providing the RC NCO the tactical and technical competence needed to lead, train, and supervise the operators and maintainers of new weapons systems and support equipment. Additionally, RC NCOES provides a cohesive program that produces NCOS who "lead, train, maintain, and fight" in the unit environment.

RC NCOES will be expanded over the next five years to improve leadership training and provide technical MOS training. MOS training will provide NCO technical competence in the RC. Maximum use of modern communicative technology will be made to improve training management and to help overcome the lack of time, equipment and facilities which restrict training in RC units, ARNG academies and USAR schools. With both the additional and the improved existing training facilities, the RC NCO will be provided ready access to learning/training centers equipped with "state of the art" instructional material which will provide additional time for individual training and MOS specific training programs.

Within the area of noncommissioned officer training, the two major subsets are the Reserve Component Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) and training for full-time unit support noncommissioned officers. In the former, a serious shortcoming exists. The weakness is that current courses are exclusively leadership-oriented, lack Military Occupational Skill (MOS) level of detail at the various skill levels, and do not provide for acquiring the technical skills essential to be effective trainers. This weakness fosters a competency gap between Active and Reserve noncommissioned officers which must be closed.
The full-time unit support program has significant potential to improve Reserve training. In order to maximize the effectiveness of the full-time noncommissioned officers, it is necessary both to prepare them to be effective trainers and to provide them follow-on sustainment training. In the near-term, all full-time manners who have not attended resident service school NCOES will be required to do so. Subsequently, future selection of full-time manners will require them to be graduates of an appropriate skill level NCO Course. Sustainment training of full-time manners will be directed by the Reserve Component unit commander in light of the unit mission, deployment priority, and geographic and equipment constraints, drawing upon the full range of training support resources available. As a minimum, a program of formal refresher training will be required for AGR personnel.

With the increasing role of Reserve Component institutions, close ties are needed among ARNG academies, USAR schools and the TRADOC service schools in order to make the Reserve Component schools an extension of the TRADOC service schools. The recent initiative by TRADOC which established the TRADOC USAR School Affiliation Program appears to be a beginning to this process and should be continued.

The SQT is used in the RC for the purpose of evaluating individual training proficiency and will continue until SQT tests are available for all MOS.

RC RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Restructure RC NCOES to include MOS-specific training to the appropriate skill level.
2. Develop courses of nonresident instruction in tandem with resident programs and ensure they are maintained current.

3. Develop a long range, comprehensive training strategy for the IRR.

4. Identify and resource training areas, sites, and facilities for the Reserve Components.

5. Improve the quality of USAR school training.

6. Identify RC requirements for Training Aids, Devices, Simulations and Simulators (TADSS) and develop a fielding plan.

Chief of Staff approve a Chief of Staff Regulation establishing an NCOPD committee, co-chaired by the DGSPER and the DCSOPS, to review NCO Professional Development at least biennially and report findings to the Chief of Staff.
CHAPTER 8 - THE FUTURE

The Army's Mission

Army Requirements For the NCO

Today's NCO PD System
THE MECHANISM

Evaluation of Today's System

Meet?

The Future

Evaluation For Future

Meet?

Keeping On Track
Integration
"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country." Abraham Lincoln

The foundation of the NCOPD study has been the needs of the Army. The eight requirements discussed in Chapter 3 were based upon the Army's mission and what the Army requires of the NCO Corps in executing that mission.

But the Army's mission is not static. It is subject to change as the world changes and as the United States government adjusts its policies accordingly. And, as the Army's mission changes, so may its requirements for the NCO Corps. And as the requirements change, the Army's NCO Professional Development System must be capable of preparing NCOs to meet the challenges of those new requirements.

In this chapter, the study group examines changes outside and inside the Army which can affect the way the Army will operate in the future and which may affect the Army's requirements of its NCO Corps. As indicated in Figure 8-2, those changes fall, primarily, into five categories: political, social, economic, technological and military (those changes brought about from within the Army).
The purpose in reviewing some of these changes is to indicate how many and varied they are and to illustrate how such changes can impact the Army. The possible changes discussed in this chapter do not require a crystal ball to discern. They have their foundations in the present, even though their main impact will be in the future.

FUTURE FRAMES OF REFERENCES
The world is changing. Massive Soviet and Warsaw Pact armies confronting NATO pose a longstanding and continuing challenge. Increasing Soviet aggressiveness and improved power projection capabilities extend the threat of conflict to every part of the world. The Soviets operate increasingly through Third World surrogates and terrorist groups. Thus, the threat is becoming more complex and diverse.

The world is increasingly violent, dangerous, and unstable and will continue to be plagued by terrorism and low intensity conflict. Under the umbrella of rough nuclear parity between East and West, flexible conventional forces play a key role in preventing the escalation of minor crises and low intensity conflicts into superpower confrontations. The U.S. Army is deployed worldwide to accomplish its missions in support of the national defense strategy of flexible response. The nature of the threat today is changing and the Army's ability to respond worldwide takes on special significance. Compounding these situations is the country's dependence on key foreign natural resources.

The U.S. is more than 50 percent dependent on foreign sources for 23 of 40 critical materials essential to its economy and national security, to include: manganese, cobalt, bauxite, chromium, asbestos, nickel and zinc. Key U.S. strategic mineral and metal sources are in the Third World -- often close to potential flash points. For example, Latin America produces columbium, strontium, manganese, tantalum, bauxite, alumina, tin antimony and graphite. The Middle East, Africa and Southwest Asia produce mica, titanium,
manganese, chromium, cobalt, platinum, asbestos, graphite and diamonds. Asia produces columbium, tantalum, tin, titanium, antimony and graphite.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is independent of foreign sources for 35 of these same 40 critical materials.

Since many of the sources of these materials are near the trouble spots of the world, passage to and from trading partners is frequently through choke points, some in our own hemisphere (Panama Canal and the Straits of Florida). For example, nearly one-half of all U.S. foreign trade transits the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Sea. (Oct 85 AUSA Green Book article by SA John O. Marsh, Jr.)

At the time that U.S. dependence on foreign sources for strategic materials is increasing, the country is simultaneously confronted with a growing projection of Soviet power.

The Army must be prepared to respond to a broad spectrum of threats to the nation's security. These threats range from terrorists activities to low intensity conflicts to general war. The most likely threats to the national security interests will be terrorism and low intensity conflicts. However, the major security problem facing the United States remains the threat posed by Soviet military power, the basis of the Soviet Union's superpower status. Soviet power is manifest in strategic power, quantitative and qualitative improvements in their general purpose forces, and geopolitical challenges heightened by a growing Soviet ability and willingness to project military power beyond their borders.
In Europe, Soviet and Warsaw Pact theater forces continue to modernize and expand. Although the likelihood of war in Europe is low, the potential risk to U.S. national security of such a war remains high. Unanswered, increasing Warsaw Pact military capabilities result in a serious imbalance of nuclear and conventional power and increase the chances the Soviet's could attempt to accomplish of geopolitical goals without resorting to war.

Growing Soviet military power in the Far East and North Korea's increasing military strength will demand a continuing strong U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia to support treaty commitments with Japan and the Republic of Korea.

Ongoing Arab-Israeli conflicts, the dangerous Soviet-Syrian connection, and the Iran-Iraq war continue to make the Middle East/Persian Gulf an area of precarious regional balance and a volatile and dangerous region to allied and U.S. interests.

Soviet and Cuban initiatives in Central America and the Caribbean basin have created a threat which affects U.S. military policy in three aspects: effect on U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, disruptive effects on regional stability, and effect on East-West competition in Africa and other regions where Soviet-Cuban power projection continues.

Africa will also remain volatile for the foreseeable future. Internal antagonisms and perennial regional tensions occasionally flare into violence, frequently
without warning and from unexpected quarters. Most African nations will continue to try to walk the nonaligned path and benefit from superpower competition for regional interest.

In Southeast Asia, Soviet-supported Vietnamese expansionism threatens friendly ASEAN countries, especially Thailand. In the Philippines, popular discontent with economic conditions and the declining political legitimacy of the central government, both complicated by a growing Communist insurgency, could lead to increased instability.

The threat of terrorism will continue to increase in frequency and severity. Terrorist actions are global and can be expected across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Heavy Threat The growth of Soviet military power and geopolitical challenges will continue to increase U.S. Army requirements to maintain deterrence in three interrelated strategic zones: Europe, Northeast Asia, and Southwest Asia (SWA). These interrelated zones mark not only expanded requirements for U.S. ground forces but also a qualitative change in the strategic relationships among the three. The vital nature of oil supplies from SWA to Europe and allies in the Far East means that a successful defense of Europe and the Far East depends on retaining access to SWA. The growing Soviet capabilities in these zones, combined with the inter-zonal strategic relationships, create both a larger threat for U.S. Army missions and a qualitatively more challenging one.
The Soviets have had large military forces deployed for operations in Europe, SWA and the Far East for many years. The armor, mobility, and firepower of these forces have risen steadily over the past two decades. These "heavy forces" presently can be employed only in theaters contiguous to the USSR. They exceed U.S. general purpose forces in most categories. They have grown from 181 active divisions in 1981 to 199 in 1985. The focus of Soviet ground force development efforts is on the reorganization and modernization of these heavy forces, with priority in Central Europe. It has involved developing new doctrine for larger, deeper, and faster combined arms operations under both nuclear and conventional conditions. The goal is a capability to execute "Theater Strategic" Operations, which call for a single high command to conduct successive, multiple front operations for 20-30 days, to depths of 1000 to 1200 kilometers, across frontages of 500-750 kilometers. This goal is unprecedented in history, but it is the Soviet force development goal facing the U.S. Airland Battle in Europe, and, with variations, in the Far East and SWA.

Light Threat

Three Third World theaters have been the locations for U.S.-Soviet competition in regions noncontiguous to the USSR. These are: Southeast Asia, Central America and Sub-Saharan Africa.

These are regions where neither heavy indigenous forces, nor heavy Soviet forces are anticipated. To support their global power aspirations, the Soviets have a number of power projection options in these areas. They demonstrate the ability to project
military power beyond the periphery of the USSR through the provision of arms, dispatch of advisors, acquisition of access to overseas facilities, support to client states, and deployment of Soviet forces. Both the size and quality of Soviet forces for projection and their associated strategic lift have greatly improved over the last decade and continue to improve. These forces include Soviet naval forces, naval aviation, amphibious forces, airborne troops, strategic aviation and client state forces.

Future Impacts of Political Change

U.S. and foreign political situations and decisions will impact on tomorrow's Army. Although there is no way to predict those changes with absolute certainty, some possibilities can be predicted. First, based on the current political scene, it is likely that Congress will maintain current end-strength ceilings on the active forces. That means that in order to meet current and future objectives, the size and role of the RC will expand. Concurrently, the training needs of the RC must also increase. With the increase in political hot spots throughout the world, the possibility of more short tour assignment requirements exist. Additional short tours would have to be weighed against other personnel and economic considerations. The increase in hot spots could also result in an increase in ad hoc alliances between the U.S. and other nations. Such alliances could have military impact.

Note: Most of this section of the report was extracted from the following article: Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. and Chief of Staff of the Army John A. Wickham, Jr., "The Posture of the Army and Department of the Army Budget Estimates for Fiscal Year 1986."
SOCIAL CHANGES

The true test of the NCO Professional Development System lies in its ability to enable NCOs to train and lead subordinates to victory in combat. The increased complexity, lethality, and accuracy of modern weapons and the decreased preparation time this country has should a major conflict develop, demands a healthy and prepared NCO Corps. The processes of education, training, and other experiences must ensure the development of that Corps. Numerous environmental factors influence our NCO Corps and its ability to carry out its assigned missions. Following is an examination of several of those factors.

Demographic changes constitute a known reality of the future in that the senior NCOs of the year 2000 are already on active duty. According to the Bureau of the Census, the most likely population estimates for the next 15 years show a significant increase in population growth, as shown on Table 1.

Table 1: Population Trends, 1985-2030 (in thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Black Pop.</th>
<th>Hispanic Pop.</th>
<th>18-24</th>
<th>18-24</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>238,648</td>
<td>28,876</td>
<td>28,739</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>259,631</td>
<td>32,506</td>
<td>23,702</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>267,955</td>
<td>53,753</td>
<td>30,300</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the overall figures seem favorable for enlisted recruiting, the reality is somewhat different. The available manpower in the 18-24 year-old cohort declines until the mid-90s and does not reach the levels of the 1970s at any point in the next 15 years. This reduction in the size of the labor force at the entry ages of Army soldiers will invariably increase the competition between the Army, the other services and the private sector for the most capable young people.

Moreover, the median age of the U.S. population will rise over the entire period 1985-2000. One of the more pervasive population trends is the median age of the U.S. population reaching an all-time high of 30.6 years in 1982. This will increase to 36.3 years by the year 2000. This means that the population is constantly growing older and will be increasingly dependent upon public services.

One aspect of the demographic pattern is favorable to the military. Those in the population group which follows the "baby boom" cohort are likely to find that an aging population decreases the advancement opportunities of younger workers in the civilian world. On the other hand, with the military services' emphasis on youth, physical fitness and early retirement, chances for advancement and challenging opportunities for younger persons constitute an important inducement for accessions if exploited by the military services.
Another aspect of this population trend is the growing importance of Hispanics and Asians in the American population pool and the decreasing numerical importance of people of European and African origin. If present immigration trends continue, before the end of this century, Hispanics could constitute the single largest minority group in the country.

Another demographic factor influencing the world of the year 2000, will be the tremendous increase in world population. By 2000, there will have been a 70% increase the population of lesser developed nations over what it had been a mere quarter century earlier. The world population will be 6.35 billion by then and more than 5 billion will live in the lesser developed nations. For instance, if Mexico's rate of growth continues, its population will exceed one billion within the next century. The projected increase in world population will have a great affect on the global consumption of food, forest products and mineral resources, and may rank as one of the most critical international issues. The result will be a veritable flood of people demanding opportunities, resources, power, space and prestige on a crowded planet.

For the United States, this may mean a tremendous increase in the rate of immigration. The influx of people from Latin America and Asia could increase in the next 20 years, radically changing the ethnic structure of the nation.
Along with the ethnic diversity in the Army, there emerges the continuing social issue of the role of women (both in and out of the military). With the declining number of available men, the Army could meet its NCO needs by increasing the number of women in its ranks. This involves more than mere numbers and employment opportunities. The military social system may have to face such issues as the compatibility of assignments of dual-officer and dual NCO households, growing numbers of single parent households, fraternization among officers, NCOs and enlisted personnel and a host of other problems.

A related issue is the obligations of employed spouses. The "two-breadwinner" family is now the norm in the United States. In fact, the growth in the employment of women may be the most significant social phenomenon of the twentieth century. The Army is caught on the horns of a dilemma in these situations. On the one hand, the spouse employed outside the Army desires and sometimes demands that her (or his, as the Army is finding more male "dependent" spouses) employment be a serious consideration in any family move. The Army may have to assume an increasing obligation in finding employment for reassigned spouses or may need to consider other inducements to offset this negative aspect of a PCS. The Army may have to develop a whole new career pattern involving long-term assignments in order to satisfy the needs of Army families. This is increasingly becoming the case among American corporations. On the other hand, the demands of military service often require moves in order to meet national obligations.
A final social factor is the trend toward ethical relativism and situational ethics which has been in progress for the last several decades and which may continue well into the next century. Embodied in this gradual erosion of traditional values is an apparent de-emphasis on guilt, increased tolerance of pluralistic behavior patterns, disenchantment with traditional institutions and values, a decline in public civility, and a growing sense of immediate gratification and entitlement without being obliged to follow the traditional "work ethic." Particularly important to the soldier is an increase in international terrorism and low-intensity warfare by people who totally disregard the traditional norms of warfare. The development of such factors constitutes an important ingredient in the value system that recruits bring with them into the military and also looms large in the value systems of those whom the U.S. government may have to face in battle in the future.

At the same time, this trend will periodically be challenged by a significant counter-trend towards "traditional values" embodied in worldwide religious movements like the Christian fundamentalists, the Muslim fundamentalists and various Orientally-based communitarian and cultic movements. Such revivalism is a natural reaction of societies to rapid social and economic change and constitutes a series of forces that will impact upon the military in a variety of internal and external ways during the next four decades.
Future Impacts of Social Change

The increase in world hot spots, discussed previously, also impacts on the social aspects of the Army. For example, increased short tours (due to increased hot spots) could disrupt assignment patterns. The ad hoc alliances could result in some personnel assignment restrictions -- such as restrictions against women in some countries. The demographic and psychographic trends point toward more 2-service-member marriages, a need for more emphasis on spouse sensitivities and more leader awareness of "people" needs. The Army may have to reexamine its "up or out" policies in light of the rising median age of the population. And the trend toward ethical relativism may cause problems in a profession based on dedication, honor and selfless service to the country.

ECONOMIC CHANGES

Several economic factors affecting the U.S. military future will impact upon professional development of the NCO corps in the next 15 years.

First, the relatively high cost of energy impacts considerably upon training and other military activities in the short run. In the late part of the next century, technological developments may reduce costs. Second, in a national security sense, dependence upon international trade for critical raw materials will continue. A third factor is the shift in employment patterns from public service and industry to the service and information sectors. These white collar jobs will attract the growing female portion of the labor force, but will leave out many of the minority youths who lack the educational skills to compete in this highly literate growth area. Thus, along with the reduced numbers of people in the age...
18-24 year cohort, there will also be increased competition with civilian markets for women. Fourth, as the nation becomes increasingly involved in the service and information businesses, its industrial base will decline and even more global manufacturing interdependence will result. The long-term strategic implications of this industrial interdependence may be more important than energy and mineral dependency.

Other factors critical to the economic development of the nation in the next two decades are the rate of worker productivity, the degree of innovation, workplace automation, capital investment and plant modernization, the impact of multi-national corporations upon the availability of jobs, international debt and taxation levels.

Two previously mentioned demographic developments impact also in the economic arena. The declining labor pool reaches its low point in the next decade but does not reach levels comparable to that of the 1970s during the next two decades. There will be a rising incidence of aged dependents whose demand upon the public purse for care will increase as the "baby boomers" begin to retire.

What most people hope are short-term economic problems could become chronic thorns in the American economic scene and be of considerable consequence to the long-term interests of the military. These involve the high federal budget deficit, the growing imbalance in international trade deficit and high interest rates. A key component in the national security policy is a robust economy. Without it, the country's ability to
finance the necessary military expenditures cannot be sustained. Therefore, national economic development policy as carried out through both fiscal and monetary policies on the one hand and world-wide commercial exchange on the other constitutes an important ingredient in military preparedness.

Future Impacts of Economic Changes

As the nation reacts to decreasing world resources, increasing population and dependence on foreign resources, the trend has been to enter into Host Nation Support Agreements with countries in which U.S. forces are based. Such agreements call for host countries to provide certain types of support which can be provided more economically than if that support had to be provided from the U.S. Typically, host country nationals are hired whenever practical to perform duties and services required by the U.S. forces. But the hiring of host nation expertise may affect the upward mobility of the forces and their MOS competency. Of course, the economic necessity of getting "more bang for every buck" will continue to exist.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES

The aftermath of Vietnam was a 10-year technological decline in capability in most areas. During the decade of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Army's primary firepower weapons systems were approaching obsolescence. The Army's focus was internal as it moved to reconstitute itself after the Vietnam experience.

That recovery is nearing completion. The Army is now fielding the needed mobility and firepower platforms and is making significant efforts to further develop joint warfighting capabilities. In a speech at the
1985 Armor Conference, GEN Wickham emphasized the importance of technology as a force multiplier when he said, "We're going to replace support manpower with productivity enhancements and technology, and convert that manpower into combat power."

The incentive to look for a technological solution to military problems is increased by the threat itself. Facing a Soviet numerical preponderance in every component of conventional combat power, many leaders see advanced technology as the only practical force equalizer. The U.S. currently has an advantage in microchip technology and biotechnology, both of which have applications across the spectrum of conflict and operational capabilities necessary to execute the AirLand Battle.

In support of key operational capabilities, a number of areas exist in which the technological base appears to yield high payoffs. The following is a brief discussion of some of these areas:

1. Automated decision-making aids: The enormous amount of data collected on the battlefield cannot be quickly and efficiently analyzed without some form of automation to help sort the data so commanders can more efficiently and effectively use the data to make better and more timely decisions.

2. Robotics: Robotics assist in reducing the number of personnel required for weapon systems. Robotics also increase survivability of manpower and equipment, are more responsive under many conditions, and facilitate the use of other technology
3. **Composite materials:** New materials help reduce system weight and improve crew protection as the Army continues its efforts to make combat forces lighter without sacrificing lethality. Composite materials also enhance survivability, deployability and mobility.

4. **Advanced seekers/sensors:** Major efforts are required in the area of smart munitions which can identify friend or foe, defeat enemy countermeasures, and see through foliage.

5. **Advanced communications:** Efficient, jam-free communications systems are essential to optimize the utility of future intelligence, weapons, and command and control systems. New communications systems must be jam free, survivable, efficient, long-range and light weight.

6. **Very High Speed Integrated Circuits (VHSIC):** VHSIC will provide compact-sized computers and processors capable of automatic recognition and battlefield information management. New semi-conductor materials will permit these capabilities to be realized with smaller systems that have lower power and cooling requirements.

7. **Advanced visible and infrared technology:** This technology will greatly improve capabilities to passively detect and identify targets at night and under adverse weather conditions.

8. **Millimeter wave technology:** Millimeter wave technology will permit sensors to "see" and terminal homing missiles and artillery rounds to engage targets through battlefield smoke, fog, and dust.
9. Chemical and biological detection systems:
Research is underway to develop chemical and biological detection systems, vaccines, antidotes, and other compounds for prevention and treatment of casualties.

10. Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Systems (STARS): STARS will permit the exploitation of computer technology through the disciplined development of software.

11. Computer-aided increased reliability design, manufacturing, and inspection techniques will help produce much lighter weight combat vehicles which will provide enhanced mobility and require less logistic support.

The impact of technological change on the military will continue to be immense. Probably, no area may cause more immediate change to NCO professional development than this one.

Most of these technological changes require both monetary expenditures and educational programs to fully implement them into the military environment. The rapid obsolescence of weapons, counterweapons and advanced technological equipment, as well as the diverse options in design and procurement that confront the military, constitute critical problems in the future. The short-term need for computer literacy will become the accepted norm in the same way that "automobile literacy" became a national norm early in this century.
The education and training needs of the future should include the demand for self-training, role modeling by subordinates, and effective mentoring by superiors with emphasis on maximizing the time needed to stay current, even ahead, of the tremendous changes that technology imposes on military leadership as the Army approaches the 21st century. The accelerating rate of technological change requires the military to avoid training too many soon-to-be-obsolete specialists and not enough NCOs with broad enough backgrounds to adapt to the changes.

At the same time, the Army may find that its potential missions in low-intensity conflicts may not require a significantly different level of combat skills than presently exists within the military. The key to success in low-intensity conflict will be improved communication, intelligence and movement, but not novel tactical technologies. Too great a reliance on technology to replace the physical and mental toughness needed to close with and engage the enemy could be particularly detrimental to combat effectiveness.

Moreover, no amount of technological expertise can replace the ethical elements of leadership which build on soldierly qualities so essential to battlefield success. There exists an intense need for a senior cadre of leaders with broad backgrounds and concerned awareness of the relationships between economic, social and political realities on the one hand, and the application of force on the other hand.
Future Impacts of Technological Changes

Technological changes may have great impact on how the Army will operate in the future and what the Army will require of its NCO corps. Increased technology may require increased specialization and, consequently, longer training times. In addition, the rapid pace of technological change may cause equally rapid outdating of skills, thus requiring more frequent training. So at the same time that technology may be increasing the combat power of the soldier (thereby possibly allowing fewer combat soldiers to have more power than a greater number of soldiers using present-day technology), it may also require a higher ratio of technical to combat soldiers. Technology can also increase the strength of female soldiers, which could cause the Army to have to reexamine the roles of women in the Army. The reliance on computerization to aid in decision-making could carry its own inherent dangers if leaders become too dependent on such aids.

MILITARY CHANGES

Today's NCO serves in an Army characterized by transition. Programs are in place to bring about changes in organization, doctrine, equipment, manning and training. The changes, while building a more effective Army, present NCOs with leadership challenges of great magnitude. In remarks at an AUSA Sergeants Major Luncheon, 17 Oct 83, GEN Wickham discussed the magnitude of changes. "We need strong, ethical leadership -- ready for war, caring for people, and exercising stewardship. You and the rest of the NCO corps are beginning to feel the effects of some very complex events sweeping across the Army. For example, our huge modernization and equipping program is the most pervasive since WWII and will leave no sector of
the Army untouched. We are beginning the transition to a new manning system -- one that will focus on the unit, rather than the individual and we will have to redirect our way of handling the affairs of people. Fast-paced technological innovations in our training and in our war-fighting capability is another event of broad magnitude."

Faced with diverse threats in an increasingly complex world, virtually every aspect of our military capability is undergoing significant improvement. The Army has adopted a flexible and imaginative battle doctrine, AirLand Battle. The Army is on the crest of unprecedented modernization program in the Army's history, a program which capitalizes on advanced technology and innovation. It is balancing force structure so that landpower, the decisive arm of our national military power, has utility across the entire spectrum of conflict. And substantial improvements are being made in the Army's ability to sustain its forces on the battlefield.

The need for quality NCOs, however, is not to be based solely on the demands of sophisticated weaponry, but also on the requirements of sophisticated warfare. The effectiveness of maneuver, fire power, and protection depends on how well leaders combine tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet the realities of mission, enemy, terrain, and troops available. Leaders must recognize inherent advantages and disadvantages in order to think ahead, develop alternative courses of action, evaluate those courses of action, and take the initiative.
The noncommissioned officer is key in this thought process. He is the first line leader charged with not only leading soldiers in battle, but also fighting the battle himself. Due to the fluidity of the AirLand Battle doctrine, the NCO may be called upon to operate beyond the command and control of the officer chain of command. The new Light Infantry Battalions also emphasize small unit actions. Because light units will be employed in urbanized terrain, mountains, and heavily wooded areas, squads will be separated from their parent units and will be expected to function independently. The ability of the NCO to make timely decisions within the intent of his mission as stated broadly by his commander will be critical to the success or failure of the unit. GEN Wickham said in a speech at the 1985 Armor Conference, Ft. Knox, Ky, "As we move toward the future, strong leadership will be necessary to provide direction and focus to our efforts. We'll have to operate without positive control on a chaotic battlefield, but always acting with disciplined initiative, within the intent of the next higher commander."

In a perfect world, doctrine emerges from revised threat estimates and new technology. In turn, materiel is designed to harness that new technology to the doctrinal requirement. Finally, the newly equipped force must be organized to make the most efficient use of the equipment and doctrine. In practice, this flow becomes blurred as doctrinal, materiel, and organizational changes interact one with another.

Materiel development is an integral part of shaping the future force. It is successful when new equipment arrives at a unit, works properly and soldiers are properly trained.
Emphasis on ground mobility, ballistic protection and anti-armor munitions has had to be balanced against affordability, serviceability, signature on the battlefield, rapid strategic deployability, NBC protection, and the prospect of operations at the end of hostility-established lines of communication.

Because of the lengthy R&D cycle, materiel fielding during the next 15 years will be accomplished by systems already in the research and development system. Few major new systems or systems incorporating technological breakthroughs will be fielded before the end of the century unless they are already in the POM.

**Doctrine**

The Army must continue to prepare for battle across the entire conflict spectrum, and probably against a numerically superior enemy. The Army will continue to use the AirLand Battle doctrine during the remainder of this century and transition to a 21st century warfighting concept.

The present and future use of the AirLand Battle doctrine is based on the following assumptions:

-- The U.S. and USSR will continue to compete but will avoid direct military conflict.

-- Mid-level and high-intensity conflicts are the most dangerous, but will remain the least likely, provided that the U.S. and its allies continue to maintain a credible deterrent force.
National authorities will attempt to avoid committing military forces; however, once military forces are committed, the authorities will seek to end conflict quickly and limit the geographical scope and number of participants.

Early phases of conflict will be critical and fought with existing forces.

Differences between programmed and required forces will continue to be significant.

Synchronization of available resources in battle is the principle means for offsetting quantitative disadvantages.

The basic tenants of the AirLand Battle doctrine include an offensive spirit characterized by initiative; depth in time, distance, and resources; and the agility of quick minded leaders and flexible organizations -- all synchronized to achieve maximum combat power whenever and wherever needed.

The present U.S. advantage, principally in micro-chip technology and biotechnology can be used to operationalize and achieve synchronization of the AirLand Battle with a deep attack capability. That advantage also has application across the spectrum of conflict and operational capabilities necessary to execute the AirLand Battle.
Tomorrow's battlefields will be more lethal, intense, and complex than ever before. This increased lethality and heightened intensity result in large measure from significant technological advances in weapons and target location systems. Success on tomorrow's battlefield demands a peacetime training program in which the individual soldier and the unit are trained to an edge of excellence. Training excellence provides the soldier with the requisite skills and confidence to cut through the confusion of the battlefield and accomplish the mission. Today's NCOES is designed to help units provide that excellence through progressive, continuous training from the primary to the senior level in each specialty (MOS). The men and women of today's Army are better trained than ever before. In a 1983 speech at the AUSA Sergeants Majors' luncheon, GEN Wickham discussed some of the manning-related challenges the Army can expect. "A significant challenge is the fact that our endstrength will remain at 780,000 people. We will be a level 2 Army. That impacts in several areas. Division 86, for example, at that level is unaffordable and we'll be looking at ways to cut back to an acceptable structure. One way is by locating some elements at corps instead of division level. Another way -- and one that I'm greatly enthused about -- is light divisions. They'll give us the capability to deploy quickly and still be within our 'lift' means, without decreasing the combat power of a full size division. A constrained structure also means that our reenlistments, promotions, and assignments will be critical. You must select skilled, quality people and you must not misuse trained skills. The effects of no end-strength growth will also be felt.
personally by the NCO corps. You must provide sound programs for development of follow-on generations of the NCO corps. The technology infusion crossing at all skill specialties shows that we'll have to work harder at NCO development so that the NCO corps can keep pace with the new soldiers. Another challenge is that turbulence both in people and equipment will continue to be significant. We are an Army that is 43% forward deployed. That creates problems not only for soldiers but for their families. Family issues are an important part of our readiness. You must be attuned to the stress put on the soldier by problems in his family life and find ways to alleviate that stress where possible. Stress will also be felt as a result of our new equipment. Over 450 new items will enter the inventory during the next decade, bringing with them the attendant training, maintenance and tactics problems. The success of this part of our modernization program depends on the NCO corps. You are the ones trained to perform it. You must motivate and insist on high standards, adequate planning, and top notch instruction. A third challenge is found in the fact that we can't go to war without the Reserve Components. Forty percent of our combat strength, and 70% of our CS/CSS strength is in the Reserves. We must continue to help improve the Reserves. The NCO corps, the soldier, everyone should make the RC feel that they truly are part of the Total Army. Finally, there is challenge in the attitudes of the Congress and the public. There is in our country an underlying ambivalence toward the use of the power we possess. Despite that conflict of ideas, support for the military as a profession is growing. We must continue
to demonstrate that we are able guardians of the people's trust -- the dollars -- the national values -- and the lives of our soldiers."

NEW MANNING SYSTEM

The New Manning System, which currently affects armor, infantry and cannon field artillery units, has two subsystems: the COHORT Unit Movement system and the U.S. Army Regimental system.

COHORT

HQDA DCSPER Policy Letter—COHORT Battalion Rotation, 4 Jun 85, established the policies to be followed under Battalion Rotation, and highlights actions for the eight battalions to be initially involved in rotation. COHORT is a program designed to increase stability in combat arms units. It establishes a 3-year life cycle for companies and batteries. First the soldiers are recruited for a specific COHORT unit and undergo initial entry training as a group. Then they are assigned to a combat unit in the U.S. where they join their officer and NCO leaders. After initial duty in CONUS, most COHORT units deploy overseas on an established schedule. The stable unit environment allows leaders to establish a greater sense of cohesion, belonging, and unit pride.

— Regimental System

The Regimental System allows soldiers to belong to a single regiment throughout their careers in order to further the development of greater sense of loyalty, esprit, and belonging, for both soldiers and their families. Regiments consist of a group of similar CONUS and OCONUS battalions under a single regimental designation. Troop assignments of officer and enlisted members are limited to units sharing the same
regimental designation. These groupings are for management purposes only and do not affect current division-brigade tactical structure.

"PEOPLE" ISSUES

Management of Female Soldiers

The number of women in the Army has increased substantially in the last two decades. Since FY70, the female strength has grown from 4,200 officers and 8,300 enlisted soldiers to about 10,200 officers and 66,700 enlisted soldiers. RC figures show the same trend. The objective for women soldiers is to provide the maximum opportunity to succeed. Enlisted women may serve in 86 percent of all specialties. Within this framework, Army policy is to provide women the greatest possible number of meaningful career opportunities. Toward that goal, the Army projects steady and healthy end strength growth to approximately 13,100 officers and 69,300 female enlisted soldiers by the end of FY89.

The total annual female accession goal is divided among the MOS open to women, by the Womens' Enlisted Expansion Model (WEEM), which is based on existing or projected shortages. This technique should provide an even distribution throughout the MOS. However, expected leveling may not be realized because of the tendency of the female soldier to move toward the traditional MOS. Currently, 68% of the females are concentrated in 79 of the MOSs open to women.
There are a number of controversial issues related to the management of women that revolve around the Direct Combat Probability Code (DCPC) and professional development opportunities. The DCPC consists of P through P7 positions. P1 represents the highest probability of engaging in direct combat, and P7 the lowest. Four dimensions were considered when coding each position. They were unit mission, MOS duties, doctrine and location on the battlefield. Soldiers serving in P1 positions are required to be routinely located forward of the brigade rear boundary. Currently, only P1-coded positions are closed to women. For management purposes the Army only uses two DCPC codes, P1 and "all others."

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**Importance of Families**

In their joint statement "Posture of the Army and DA Budget Estimates for FY 1986," SA Marsh and CSA Wickham point out that "Readiness is inextricably tied to soldiers' morale and discipline, and to sustaining their families' strength. It's been said that the Army enlists soldiers but retains families. To the extent that the Army has cohesive units and families that feel good about Army support, the Army also has soldiers who will go the extra mile for readiness and for combat. The men and women serving in the Army today are excellent. This quality must be maintained because, with the small Active Army, soldier quality is important as 'seed corn' for mobilization and for meeting the broad spectrum of missions short of mobilization. Greater efforts will be required to recruit and retain quality soldiers and their families as the body of potential enlistees declines and the economic vitality of the nation returns."
When the Study Group analyzed today's NCO Professional Development System, it determined that the system is a good system that just needs some fine-tuning. The same can be said of the system as the Army adjusts for the future. Major changes to the system are not required. The Study Group determined that the mechanisms required to deal with the changes are already in place in the Army. As changes occur, the appropriate mechanisms will undoubtedly require further fine-tuning to continue to meet the needs of the Army and its NCO corps.

The study group's recommendation to form an NCO Professional Development Committee to integrate the various systems which contribute to professional development provides a mechanism for periodically analyzing the system to ensure it is on the right course, now and into the future.
CHAPTER 9
REPORT CONCLUSION

The objective of the NCO Professional Development Study was to evaluate the NCO Professional Development System in light of the Army's needs, and identify systemic strengths and weaknesses in the current system, as well as the system which will have to meet the Army's needs in the year 2000.

During the course of the study, the study group examined not only the health of the systems which support the NCO Corps, but also the health of the NCO Corps, as it pertains to professional development. The results of the study were very positive. As noted in Chapter 2, responses from the field concerning EPMS, NCOES and other related systems were generally favorable. And the responses from NCOs concerning their own assessment of the professionalism of the NCO Corps were particularly positive.

The study group concluded that the professional development systems in the Army today are capable of meeting the Army's present and future needs. However, the systems will require the types of fine-tuning which are enumerated in Chapter 8. Such fine-tuning must be a continuing process.

But the fine-tuning which the study group recommended is only a part of the real significance of the study effort. The group identified its major accomplishments as follows:
First of all, the study provided a look at the NCO Professional Development System as a whole and as it relates to the Army's mission and what the Army requires of its NCO Corps. This was not a detailed examination of any particular system. Nor was it a vertical look at a particular MOS or Career Management Field. And the study group members themselves were from varied backgrounds and assignments. Their findings did not reflect the perspectives of any particular proponent or staff agency. The question pursued by the study group was "How can the NCO Professional Development System best meet the needs of the Army?"
Second, the study group created a mechanism for continuous evaluation of the NCO Professional Development System. The DA NCO Professional Development Committee is of key importance in keeping the system on track to ensure it continues to meet the Army's needs in the future. As envisioned, the committee would meet at least once every two years to take a macro look at the system and make recommendations for fine-tuning to the CSA. But, equally as important, the committee members (DCSPER, DCSOPS and SMA) would be charged with continually examining policies within their areas of operation to ensure that the various systems which contribute to NCO professional development are complementing each other and all working toward the common goal.
Third, the study group created an architecture which can be used to continuously assess NCO professional development. That architecture consists of various elements. Its foundation is the NCOPD philosophy which firmly establishes that NCOPD is driven by the needs of the Army, which is a profession based on selfless service to the country. The philosophy also defines NCOPD and addresses responsibilities for it. Last, it sets the professional development sequence goal as TRAIN-PROMOTE-UTILIZE.
The architecture also consists of the eight Army requirements of NCOs as outlined in Chapter 4. The requirements must drive the system, and the system must be measured in terms of how well it meets the requirements.

Next, the architecture consists of the study group recommendations to fine-tune the system. Those recommendations address not only today's system, but also the system out to the year 2000 and beyond.

Last, the architecture consists of the DA NCO Professional Development Committee, which will oversee the system and provide a formal, periodic review to ensure the system remains fixed to Army requirements.

- CREATE AN AWARENESS OF NCO PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Army Times

Last, the study effort helped create an Armywide awareness of NCO professional development system. The questionnaires and interviews conducted around the world caused leaders at all levels to think about the system and their roles in it. Through internal and external media coverage of the group efforts, many
articles have appeared on the various aspects of NCO professional development. And media coverage should continue as approved study group recommendations are implemented. Maintaining awareness helps focus leaders' thoughts and efforts in support of NCO professional development.

Overall, the study confirmed that the Army is manned with good people -- people who want to be as professional as possible and do the best job they can. It is the function of the NCO Professional Development System to help each NCO be all he or she can be in support of the Army's mission.