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A JOINT GENERAL STAFF: HOW VIABLE AN OPTION?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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by
RONALD W. PAMPERL, MAJ, USA
Virginia Military Institute, 1972

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1985

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the following statement.)

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ABSTRACT

A JOINT GENERAL STAFF--HOW VIABLE AN OPTION? An analysis of the effectiveness of the JCS system from a command and control perspective, by Major Ronald W. Pamperl, USA, 131 pages.

→ This ^{thesis} ~~study~~ is an examination of how the present JCS system evolved in U.S. history. By reviewing the character of U.S. colonial heritage and implications of past command structures, the uniquely American rationale for the current system can be more readily understood.

The present JCS system itself is analyzed in terms of 9 subjective areas of organizational effectiveness. Each of these areas is discussed and analyzed for optimum performance, efficiency, and historical success.

Next this ^{thesis} ~~study~~ examines key debates which are now or have recently been raised. Each of these examinations of the JCS command structure is compared against historical trends and previous organizational difficulties--real or perceived. The purpose of this effort was to determine the validity of



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current criticisms as well as to determine their basis, if any, in historical fact.

The conclusions ~~of this study~~ are that the United States has failed to organize a national command structure that would optimize military support of the national interests. The reasons for this conscious decision are many and complex. However, the present JCS system will not adequately address the present and future security needs of the United States. Only the establishment of a centralized Joint General Staff will rectify the problems of high echelon command within the current Department of Defense.

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First, I would like to acknowledge the patience and tireless efforts of my wife, Sandy Pamperl. As my typist, proofreader, and cheerleader, she invested many hours of her time in improving the quality of this document. Her editorial ability and constructive criticisms have been only surpassed by the many long hours spent in typing this paper.

Secondly, LTC (P) Chase, my committee chairman, has provided his extensive expertise and guidance to this study of the JCS. His direction and effort kept this study properly oriented.

LTC Nixon, my first reader, provided outstanding historical perspective and assistance to this study. His objectivity and interest was encouraging throughout the entire effort.

Fourth, I would like to acknowledge the extra efforts of COL E. F. Vitzthum, the committee second reader. His patience in translating my frustrating attempts at communicating an idea is nothing short of laudatory.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

The historical development of warfare has shown three characteristics which have organizational and command significance today.

The first is nationalism and the gradual evolution of war from "the game of kings" to a massive struggle for survival between nations and coalitions of nation states. Over the centuries the result of this transition has been the decline of a comparatively isolated caste of professional soldiers and small armies with a corresponding rise of large national armies. These organizations were augmented by complex mobilization systems geared to maximize all of a nation's resources for war. Nations today are capable of fielding millions of men equipped with the means to project power across the globe. The ramifications of this growth and capability of modern armies presents a command and control problem of the greatest magnitude for top echelon leaders, military and civilian alike.

Second is the impact of technology upon the face of war. Since World War II and the advent of atomic weapons,

numerous nations now possess the capability to generate destruction which a century ago would have been beyond the comprehension of the most perceptive leaders. War has evolved into an event with the potential of becoming the end itself. Furthermore, non-nuclear technology, especially in the last century, has vastly increased the capability of nation states to more quickly project power anywhere around the world. This greatly reduces the decision and reaction time available to the National Command Authority (NCA). Enormous quantities of men and materials can transit the oceans of the world in days. Cities can be attacked and destroyed by intercontinental missile systems which require only minutes to transit the globe from the time the order to initiate a nuclear strike has been given. This multinational capability requires a command authority for control which is cohesive, decisive, responsive, and well trained. Decisions are required in minutes for situations which deny the luxury of deliberation.

A final key characteristic of warfare today is the sustained requirement for the conduct of joint-service operations. Historically, although these operations are not new to the armed forces of the world, the requirements were temporary and generally limited to movement of troops and fleets. Today, virtually all military operations are characterized by their joint nature: air, land, and sea. This multi-faceted operational problem is, of course, much

more complex. Leaders at all levels must understand the different capabilities of the "sister" services, not only to enhance their own operations, but also because of the technology involved. These operational systems integrate joint combat power and make the application of force more effective. Add to this requirement the nature of coalition warfare and the problem becomes even more critical. Procedures between nations are compromises of national operations systems, such as tactical air support. These compromises, although certainly necessary, further complicate the command, control, and action reaction time so vital on today's battlefields.

Clearly, these key facets of modern warfare pose a significant threat to United States security in the event of a major war. How can we train our officers to operate effectively in such a complex environment? Can the nation be assured of a "system" of defense which is staffed with the highest caliber of qualified officers, and which operates in an efficiently organized command structure? Does this command structure integrate the different services effectively and responsibly in times of crisis?

The military command structure of any nation has always required a system which generates unity, decisiveness, expertise, and responsiveness. These characteristics the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) must possess in order to retain its validity as the top military staff of our nation. In

past wars, time has been our ally and deliberation our forte. In today's nuclear age, however, they have become our greatest enemy.

Historically, the armed forces of the world have required staffs to ease the burden of command, increase the span of control, and maximize the combat power of the fighting force.

Not until the early 1800's, however, was there a need for nations to begin developing an effective means or model for controlling a national capacity for waging total war. The Napoleonic Wars introduced a new complexity to the art of war, and with it, the birth of the general staff system. Both the French and Prussian General Staffs were specifically organized to provide expertise, order, and a guiding hand to their respective armies. The success of these general staffs in providing the expertise required for planning, mobilization, and command and control enabled warfare to be conducted more efficiently and effectively at a national level. This enhanced the capabilities of the "Great Captains" and field commanders in implementing the national will.

In the United States, however, the use and spread of the two major European general staff systems were viewed with a jaundiced eye. Since before the Revolutionary War, Americans have harbored an instinctive distrust and fear of a powerful, professional military. The premise of civilian

control, as well as the value of the citizen soldier, were deeply imbedded in American thought and ideals while still a colony under British rule. The establishment of our decentralized militia system, and the lack of a formal, permanent military command system is a direct reflection of our British lineage and our unique geographical and military situation.

The dismal performance of America's national military command mechanisms in the 19th century contrasted with the rise and successes of Prussia and its general staff led to a recommendation by Major General Emory L. Upton, in his book The Armies of Europe and Asia, that such a system be established in the United States. The furor and debate since that recommendation has not ceased and continues today at the highest echelons of American government and military command circles.

The significance of these historical attitudes has formed the cornerstone of this issue for over a century. How to resolve the internal conflict between an efficient military command structure while insuring that the nation is protected from that very power, still has significant emotional ramifications. The issue is no longer simply one of civil-military control, but an issue which involves the independence of the services themselves.

Today the United States possesses global interests and allies. It is also faced, for the first time, by a threat

which is its near equal in war potential, mobilization, military power, and national will.

In this age of nuclear weapons and technological achievement, it is the ability of our national military command structure that will be tested first. The capability of the JCS to rapidly acquire, assimilate, and accurately assess enormous amounts of intelligence and recommend unified operations of joint commands is critical to national preparedness and survival. That capability is suspect and could yet prove to be the decisive factor in a major war of the future.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Critics of a strong general staff, joint or otherwise, have repeatedly testified before Congress that the organizations which have characterized America's top military staffs are a necessary evil; that disunity and inefficiency are acceptable and even necessary in our highest military staffs to insure civil control. Yet is this really true? Can we afford to assume any longer that a unified, efficient, national military command structure is not feasible in a democracy?

The objectives of this research study were:

1. To analyze the validity of the current Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system in terms of command, control, and operational ability.

2. To examine the viability of replacing the JCS with a joint general staff system, operating within the current organizational structure of the Department of Defense.

ASSUMPTIONS

Since the War of 1812, civil and military officials have increasingly condemned our various national command structures as unwieldy, inefficient, and unresponsive to the national security interests of the United States. As wars have continued to broaden in scope and complexity, this charge has increased in frequency and intensity. The United States has never fought a war in which it was not forced to reorganize or circumvent the national military command structure first.

In an age of mass destruction, the United States is facing a potential threat with enormous military and technological capabilities. Today there is not time for reorganization as the first battle may be the last. Therefore the organizational and operational capabilities of our highest staff must be optimized. To insure our immediate and effective response in war, the efficiency and unity of peacetime preparedness, unity and command as critical before the first shot has been fired.

This study examines the feasibility of achieving a proper balance between two fundamental military requirements; unity and efficiency. These requirements must

be measured against several fundamental assumptions of major significance which have been made in the latter part of this chapter.

For purposes of this study it will first be assumed that by reason of political necessity the JCS must continue to be subordinate to U.S. civil authorities.

Secondly, the organizational characteristics of the staff must clearly support the demands currently being met by the JCS system.

Thirdly, the question of sustainability must be considered. It is not enough to establish an organization which does not possess the credibility to insure the support of all of the services which will provide the personnel to run it. This must be assumed as being in each of the services' best interests to assure effective representation and to insure that the highest standards of professional competence are maintained.

Fourth, it must be recognized that no staff system would prove a viable alternative to the current JCS system if its establishment would jeopardize the very institution it was chartered to protect. Since most of the great European staffs developed in environments which are fundamentally dissimilar to American institutions, it is unlikely that a "carbon copy" of these staffs would support national requirements while simultaneously safeguarding

American ideals of individual liberty and our democratic system of government as a whole.

Finally, the interface of a joint general staff or any modification of the JCS must be readily adaptable to fit within the current organization of the Defense Department and the military services as a whole. Because each of these organizations are uniquely American in character, so too must be the staff that commands, coordinates, and supports it.

If these conditions cannot be met, then the ability of the JCS or joint service general staff to operate effectively over time is doubtful.

LIMITATIONS

This study will be limited in scope to the overall process of command, control, and functional needs of the military service; the unity of command necessary to implement those needs, and the training, personnel and functional areas necessary to establish this required control.

DELIMITATIONS AND METHODOLOGY

Although numerous general staff systems have been in existence for over a century, it should be recognized that the United States military as an institution has

peculiarities which do not readily lend themselves to the adoption of any specific system past or present.

Therefore, the intent of this study, although certainly drawing from the examples of history and other nations' experience, will concentrate primarily on the organization and operational needs of the United States in particular.

The unique aspects of our military system will be examined in broad overview and measured against the requirements levied on the current JCS system. The views of many chiefs of staff, past and present, which address aspects of this issue pro and con have been presented to Congress and Presidential committees. It is these views which will be analyzed in detail, and against which the viability of the JCS or a joint general staff will be measured.

The research methodology used in this study was fourfold:

First, an examination of the historical development of the United States command and control structure was conducted. The intent of this aspect of the study was to analyze those key aspects of U.S. national character which formed the basis of the civil military relationship over two centuries. Significant changes in U.S. military command structure were reviewed to uncover underlying patterns of U.S. thought and debate on the merits of military command and control.

The second phase of research consisted of an analysis of the JCS structure itself. Selected principles of staff organization were used in determining the effectiveness of the JCS system. These principles are the opinions of recent participants in the organization as well as political and civilian analysts who are considered experts in the field of civil-military command, control, and interface.

Third was a comparative analysis of current issues versus historical problems. The United States has repeatedly changed its national military organization in both peace and war. This aspect of the study was to identify present criticisms of the JCS system as it exists today with the historical problems of command and control experienced by the United States in its history.

The volatility of the debate concerning the JCS system provided a wealth of personal opinions both for and against reorganization. In an absence of historical precedence, the conclusions in this thesis were reached by corroborating the opinions of experts. These opinions from the past and present were compared for the purpose of identifying problems which have historically reoccurred within the U.S. national command structure. By using the staff evaluation guide offered by Colonel Dupuy, a format was obtained for orderly presentation.

The final phase of this study examined the feasibility addressing those key issues through the creation of a joint

general staff system. Additionally, every effort was made to safeguard principles of democracy without sacrificing military efficiency.

In brief, the research methodology utilized in this study examines the need, if any, for the establishment of such a staff within the confines and limitations of uniquely American institutions and requirements. For it is only against these very limitations and requirements that the viability of a joint general staff can be judged.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Since the inception and formalization of numerous European general staff organizations, the United States military community has debated the desirability, adaptability, and applicability of these or similar organizations to the American military services and the requirements of the United States political system as a whole. The achievement of unified purpose, command, control, and organization could improve planning, management and organization of the military establishment. This improvement would support national objectives if properly balanced and safeguarded.

This study will compare the historical needs and criticisms of our nation's command structure to the current issues and debates. This comprehensive review of the concept, intent, and operational capabilities of the

American JCS system will provide a better understanding of the unique character of American national command and control.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Further terms and definitions are available in Appendix II, pages 1-10 of the Joint Staff Officers Guide¹, 1 January 1984, published by the National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia.

1. National Command Authority--The President and the Secretary of Defense or their deputized alternates or successors.

2. Combined--Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies.

3. Joint--Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.

4. Joint Staff--a. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, or of a joint task force, which includes members from the several services comprising the force. b. The staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

5. Component Command--The component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organization, or installations under the component commander's military

command which have been assigned to the operational command of the commander of the unified command.

6. Joint Task Force--A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, which is constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified or specified command, or an existing joint task force.

7. Joint Deployment Community--Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. The JDC usually consists of the OJCS, Services, certain Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistic commands), unified and specified commands (and their Service component commands), DLA, TOAs, JDA, Joint Task Forces (as applicable), and the Defense agencies (e.g., DIA) as may be appropriate to a given scenario.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A great deal of literature exists which examines not only the history and development of the European "Great Staffs", but also the American military hierarchy. However, a problem arises from the term "general staff" and a misperception as to its origins, structure, and intent. In

short, not only is there no historical precedent for a joint general staff among European nations, but the characteristics of these staffs, unique to each nation, do not "fit" into the American culture or manner of government. These facts were not readily apparent during the initial course of research and the entire direction of the study on European staffs has to be relegated to background information. Emphasis then was placed on the unique character of the American military system, how it developed, and the specific problems, historical and otherwise, which have affected the effectiveness of the JCS/Joint Staff system. Almost all of the factual data available comes in "testimonial" form from various studies, articles, and congressional hearings which have occurred over the past 40 years.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Although a massive amount of information exists which discusses American military history, comparatively few works analyze command and control as a discrete topic. Books on the lives of key individuals, such as Elihu Root, did little to discuss why the establishment of a general staff was important. Emphasis was general in nature, directed specifically to what he accomplished and the difficulties encountered achieving his goals. Other works such as Brigadier General J.D. Hittle's The Military Staff, were

generally helpful in understanding the difference between the national military staffs of various countries, but did not discuss the "joint" issue specifically and tended towards a historical bias in justifying the present JCS system.

Many of the German authors such as General Schellendorf author of Duties of the General Staff, provided excellent detail in describing organizational function and intent. Again the joint issue was not addressed and the intent was Army-specific.

Current works of analytic value to this study centered around a collection of historical readings published by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, entitled Twentieth Century War: The American Experience. This collection of readings covers the gamut of American military development from the Revolutionary war to the post World War II era.

Trevor Dupuy, author of A Genius for War: The German General Staff, provided the evaluation tool used in analyzing the effectiveness of the JCS. His "ten areas of staff analysis" are an excellent format although his documentation or proof of the German staff system is highly subjective. Russel Weighley's American War of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy was also of considerable historical value, especially in evaluating the evolution of American military thought. The most significant

work on the JCS utilized in this study was Lawrence Korb's The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years. This book deals specifically with the United States military command structure.

TESTIMONIAL SOURCES

The vast majority of current analysis used in this study was obtained from periodicals and congressional hearings. These sources provide recent analysis from personnel who are experienced in dealing with, or have actually served on, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Recent debates (1982), were covered in depth by Armed Forces Journal in the April, May, June, and August editions and provide the best initial starting point. These issues provide interviews with former chairmen, present both favorable and unfavorable arguments on the present system, and provide information as to other sources and governmental studies.

The Steadman Report (1978), a JCS funded research document is an excellent source of documentation and was a source of major importance to this study. This document is still current, relevant, and is a major source of first hand testimony from subject matter experts.

The most significant source for an examination of the JCS concept, organization, and effectiveness came from the congressional hearings of 1982 (H.R. 6828) known as The

Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982. These hearings, chaired by Congressman White, extended over four months and resulted in over 900 pages of testimony, pro and con. Virtually every aspect of this volatile subject was debated. Not only are the positions of numerous subject matter experts clarified and debated, but present and historical perceptions of the issue, both personal and professional, are readily apparent to the researcher.

Other periodicals of general significance included articles and reprints from the Kansas City Star, U.S. News and World Report, and the Army Times.

Two final sources in this category contributed significant information to this study. The first, LTC Arthur Wermuth's article A General Staff for America in the Sixties (Military Review, February 1960), provided some excellent historical insight into the problems of joint warfare. The second document is The Joint Staff Officer's Guide (July 1984). This is the "purple book" and provides current JCS organization, joint doctrine, procedures, and is written specifically for officers serving in the joint environment.

INTER-RELATED SOURCES

Any study of the JCS system will require an understanding of non-topic related subjects in order to achieve a clear picture of how the system functions. An example of these "outworks" are government and contractual

publications on the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). Neither the Budget nor the JSPS is directly related to the JCS staff organization in terms of subject matter. However, a clear understanding of the interrelationships of each with our joint system is critical in order to achieve an accurate picture of how and why the organization truly functions in the manner it does. Implications into staff design, system complexity, as well as historical changes and proposals are more readily appreciated.

SUMMARY

While the literature mentioned in this chapter and within the bibliography is by no means all inclusive, all major arguments were examined on both sides of the issue prior to the final analysis.

Each of the research areas yielded significant characteristics of national military command and control which can be readily traced to its historical roots in U.S. history. This study will address these key areas in detail and, under the parameters previously identified, carry them to their logical conclusion.

CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

GENERAL

The years preceding the outbreak of World War II saw the United States feverishly reviewing a variety of strategic options should America eventually become involved. Blitzkrieg received its baptism of fire with the German invasion of Poland in September of 1939. In just five short weeks, Poland was devastated and Europe once again went to war.

The United States was ill-prepared in terms of national command and control for the prospect of fighting another world war. True, our military structure had been designed, redesigned, and designed still again. Although a variety of contingency plans existed in anticipation of future conflicts, no centralized command structure existed to effectively coordinate and implement these joint plans. Now over 150 years from its founding, the U.S. would again go to war feeling the impact of this disunity.

EARLY INFLUENCES

Unlike most nations, the lack of a true "general staff" in the United States, joint or otherwise, is no historical

accident. It is a conscious decision periodically reviewed over almost two centuries. The system is the direct result of intended compromise; that is, between military efficiency balanced against the three primary factors of our heritage which relate to this issue: the citizen soldier concept, the dual strategic requirements of a continental and seafaring nation, and finally, civil protection from and control of the military institutions of a democracy.

The colonial environment stressed reliance on the armed individual for protection. Due to time, distance, and the enormous size of the colonies, reliance on regular troops was untimely, costly, and generally unsuited to the nature of the battlefield threat--the Indian.

British excesses and the American Revolution infused the myth of the value of the "embattled farmer"¹ indelibly, if incorrectly, on the American psyche. When combined with the conduct of British regulars and mercenaries during the war, a deep distrust and fear of professional military institutions was all but preordained. So deep did this intensity run that even George Washington could not prevent the Continental Army and Navy from being reduced to a pittance after the war.² More significantly, the administration and control of state militia by the federal government was prevented; establishing, in effect, a "compartmentalizing" of the services which plagues to this day.³

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE 19TH CENTURY

The second factor of historical significance was the evolving strategic requirements of the young, growing republic. Throughout the 19th century, as the United States expanded westward, so did its involvement in international affairs. Unlike most European nations, however, the United States was an anomaly: it was both a seafaring as well as continental state with all of the strategic requirements of each. The result of this undesirable predicament was the gradual development of two uncoordinated, autonomous military strategies: sea power as required by the Monroe Doctrine and later advocated by Mahan, and a continental military strategy of ground warfare influenced by westward expansion and jominian concepts of the total war of annihilation.⁴ Although the United States did conduct small "joint" operations in the war of 1812 and the Mexican War, the national command "systems" were not stressed enough to justify unification of the services. Consequently, national policy, military strategy and resources continued to develop in "dual mode," with ever expanding Army/Navy bureaucracies placed in Washington to "protect" their interests and ideology.

The Civil War has often been called the first of the "modern wars," and for the United States this was certainly true. Millions of men were committed to battle during 1861-1865, and hundreds of thousands of casualties were

sustained in the bloodiest war in our history. Perhaps more significant, however, was the fact that for the first time the United States (and hence its military command structure), was required to lead and fight as a nation mobilized for sustained conflict in a joint environment against a competent and credible foe. The result was victory, but at an agonizing cost. Repeatedly the command and control system failed and the tuition for learning the lessons of joint warfare was paid in blood.

After the war, field experience demanded change. Reinforced by the Prussian victories of 1866 and 1870, respected advocates of a general staff system, such as General Emory Upton, pressed for reorganization;⁵ but the impetus was gone, whereas the fear of militarism was not.

In his book The Armies of Asia and Europe, Upton stressed the importance of centralized professional education, centralized organization, and competitive selection in support of a strong general staff system military from staff to line.⁶

Internal reorganization of the Army and Navy were made within the loose confederation of a "War Department" and the rise of "the Bureaus" began.⁷

T. Harry Williams, in his book Americans at War, discusses the disasterously embarrassing war with Spain. Not until the conclusion of the war in 1898, would serious concern over the national command structure again arise. The

war was fought by each service scrambling to "fix" its internal organization while simultaneously fighting a predominately unilateral action on short notice; the result was predictable.

Williams noted the rapid mobilization of over 200,000 men in a few months which overwhelmed the small War Department's capabilities. This resulted in massive training, supply, and transportation shortfalls which lingered throughout the war. Williams states that the specific causes of these problems were inadequate staff size, and their inability to assert effective command and control.⁸ One army critic of the time quoted by the author described the shortfalls as follows:

The staff departments failed to pull together...In a thousand ways there was lack of coordination which not only led to miscarriage of plans but to extravagance in expenditures and lack of harmony in administration.

The post war period resulted in an extensive period of political "gnashing of teeth" and bureaucratic "bloodletting" under the Dodge Commission, established to determine the causes for such a dismal failure. The commission cited a general lack of War Department administration, as well as an inadequate grasp of the true situation in the field, as the primary cause of the Army's disgraceful performance.¹⁰

The Spanish-American War was, without doubt, the most poorly conducted military operation since the Seminole Wars in the early 1800's. Phillip Semsch, in his article "Elihu Root and the General Staff," notes the fact that this "splendid little war" had, oddly enough, so embarrassed the United States as to have several positive and lasting effects on our archaic military structure.

THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE WORLD WARS

The first of these effects was the demonstration to the government and people that the command structure could not effectively wage a truly modern war. America, a young expanding nation, was rapidly asserting her might on the world stage through trade and expansion. The American people, exhibiting confidence and vitality, were ill prepared to accept the impotence of a command and control structure which could not enforce their will.

As this came to pass, the second factor--key leadership-- took office. President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root were ideally suited for the demanding, difficult tasks of forcing institutional change. On 14 February 1903, a bill creating the army general staff was signed into law--marking the most significant change in the national command structure in our history. The bill, or "Root Reforms" as they came to be called, revamped the War Department, and replaced the ineffective position of

Commanding General with a Chief of the General Staff. This action gave the United States a centralized army staff responsible for administration, logistics, and strategic planning. The importance of this hard won political battle is more fully described in the Semsch article. Basically, the act reasserted Presidential control over the senior army officer, and destroyed the political power and influence enjoyed by the Bureaus with Congress. Finally, the rotation of officers from Washington, D.C. to Army units in the field--restored the contact of the senior military staff with the Army as a whole.¹¹ The Army Regulation of 1905 first reflected the concept and duties of the new general staff and outlined the parameters of the authority for the army's new chief of staff.¹²

Unfortunately, as significant as these changes were, the "Root Reforms" failed primarily for political reasons, to address two key issues; 1) the need for a joint command and control headquarters, and 2) it did not establish the position of Army chief of staff as the top ranking Army official. Both omissions were to have grave ramifications which continue to affect the command and control structure even today.

The first issue simply reflects the fact that the Root Reforms dealt primarily with internal Army organization and command and control. The Department of the Navy was not affected organizationally or operationally, and continued to

pursue its own independent strategy and service objectives. As a result of this act; no specific military headquarters organization was established to control and direct both services.

Louis Morton, in an excerpt from his book Command Decisions, discussed this disparity in joint operations at great length. To summarize, it is true that in 1903 the Army-Navy Board was created between the services. It was not, however, a directive authority, but an organization designed to provide intra-service coordination. Even when reorganized in 1919, the attempt to correct these deficiencies by involving the service chiefs and their primary planning agencies failed. Both of the boards did manage to create contingencies of considerable merit (Color and Rainbow Plans), but no directive authority was possessed by either organization to implement these plans. The boards were the first of the "consensus" organizations and as a result the United States did not possess unity of strategic thought on the eve of World War II.¹³ The historical strategic differences between the Army and Navy created a rift between the services and their advocating of a "Germany versus Pacific first" strategy. This rift was suppressed by British needs and presidential decision and directive, but would remain a constant issue throughout World War II.¹⁴ For example, shipping needs were repeatedly delayed by Pacific resource requirements and the Army and Navy (led by

MacArthur and King respectively), would disagree within theater on the advance to Japan through the Philippines or towards Formosa.¹⁵

Secondly, although the seniority of the position of Chief of Staff was certainly intended and implied by the authors of the Root Reforms, it was not specified in the Army Regulation of 1905.

765. The Chief of Staff is charged as limited and provided by law with the duty of supervising, under the direction of the Secretary of War, all troops of the line...He performs such other military duties not otherwise assigned by law as may be assigned to him by the President.

766. The supervisory power vested by statute in the Chief of Staff covers primarily duties pertaining to the command, discipline, training, and recruitment of the Army, military education and instruction, and kindred matters, but includes also, in an advisory capacity, such duties connected with fiscal administration and supply as are committed to him by the Secretary of War.¹⁶

Future operational custom would deviate from this intent, again generating command and control problems within the Army. This issue centered around the role of the chief of staff upon commitment of the Army to the field during war.

The problem was not long in surfacing as a major factor impacting on Army operations. In an article by Donald Smythe, entitled "The Pershing-Marsh Conflict in World War II" the rift between General Pershing as American Expeditionary Force (AEF) commander during World War I and

General Peyton C. Marsh, his replacement as chief of staff in Washington, D.C., is well documented. Basically, General Marsh, though junior in grade, argued that he was technically in the senior position of authority. The result was conflict concerning administration, logistics, redeployment priorities, and even general officer promotions.¹⁷

Historically, this conflict of rank versus position would be repeated again and again once the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system was established. MacArthur and Marshall were the same rank during World War II; MacArthur outranked all the members of the JCS during Korea, and both Westmoreland and Abrams were of equal rank to the members of the JCS during Vietnam. Today the present theater commanders (CINCs) also carry equal four-star rank with the JCS. Although this problem was generally "sorted out" by the participants, the JCS did not (and still does not) possess command authority over any theater commander, nor do they possess senior rank to the CINC's. In short, the commonly accepted premise of command authority, rank, and position is absent from the JCS system as it relates to both operational and service matters.

The pressures of World War II and the nature and complexity of coalition warfare resulted in the formation of the JCS by Executive Order in 1942. The United States' success in prosecuting that war was in no small part due to

the ability of this body to carry out its functions to achieve the end result. To be sure, the extraordinary abilities and professionalism of the individual members of the JCS made the system work--for serious problems and debates consistently were raised, battled to a consensus, and overcome or circumvented by the urgency of the time.

For example, the Navy's "Pacific first" strategy was initially shelved in favor of the Army's "Germany first" strategy (with substantial British lobbying).¹⁸ The Pacific strategy was eventually implemented anyway by the necessity of checking Japanese successes. The Army's "Overlord" amphibious shipping requirements for the Normandy invasion of France in 1944, were unable to be filled and repeatedly were delayed in large part because of de facto operational requirements being executed in the Pacific. (Here the British lined up with the Navy, as British eagerness for a campaign in northern France was at best less than enthusiastic.)¹⁹

Clearly, strategy by consensus was difficult to achieve and more often than not was overtaken by events. Fortunately, the massive superiority of U.S. resources combined with the severe strategic/resources limitations of the Axis powers minimized the potentially disastrous effects of this division. The Philippines-Formosa controversy, previously mentioned was resolved not by a command and control system, but was overcome by events; i.e.

the United States fortunately possessed the resources to conduct both operations simultaneously.²⁰

The gradual evolvement of the United States Air Force into a separate service also began to further compound the problem, although until the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was not significant during the war.

COLD WAR REORGANIZATION

The drive for reorganization of the War Department began in earnest after V-J Day, culminating in the National Security Act of 1947. This act completely reorganized the national military heirarchy into the National Military Establishment. The Air Force was formally established as a separate service and the role of the Chief of Staff, USAF, was formally revised to that of co-equal with his Army and Navy counterparts within the JCS.

The National Military Establishment began operations on 17 September 1947 as Russell F. Weighley describes in his book The American Way of War, and immediately ran into trouble. The atomic age had begun and almost instantly the services clashed over their respective strategic roles and missions, the possession of nuclear weapons, and of course the resources and priorities required to implement those air versus naval power roles.

Secretary Forrestal, with no staff of his own and lacking the power to direct the services, attempted to resolve these disputes in the traditional manner of democracy: compromise.²¹ The culmination of this effort was the Key West conference in March of 1948 which resulted in the publishing of Executive Order 9950:

...each service is charged with collateral functions, wherein its forces are to be employed to support and supplement the other services...the Navy will not be prohibited from attacking any targets, inland or otherwise, which are²² necessary for the accomplishment of its mission.

In reality the conference accomplished little except solidify parochial service positions and obscure any intended boundaries between service areas of responsibility. Budget and resource battles continued culminating in the resignation of Secretary Forrestal. On 10 August 1949, an ammendment to the National Security Act gave the Secretary greater authority over the services. The battles continued, however, and when Secretary Johnson cancelled a Navy "supercarrier" in an effort to balance budget responsibilities with congressional support of an Air Force appeal for greater funds, the infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" occurred.

Admiral Louis Danfield, CNO, and several leading active duty and retired admirals leaked accusations of fraud, favoritism, and disregard for national security to the press

and public.²³ The significance of this furor dramatized the serious extent of the rivalry which has long since existed within the military. According to Lawrence J. Korb, author of The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, the "revolt," combined with budgetary dissent during the Eisenhower Administration, visibly demonstrated to the president the impotence of the JCS in achieving the "consensus" approach. This erosion of trust was reflected in the gradual encroachment of advisors and the State Department into the strategic arena. In turn, this heralded the early beginning of the rise of civil servants and "think tanks" in the formulation of U.S. strategic policy, and continues even today.²⁴

KOREA AND VIETNAM

The war in Korea would deal still another blow to the credibility of JCS command and control. In his work on the JCS, Korb notes that strong differences existed between the presidential policy of the Truman Administration and those recommendations espoused by General MacArthur. As a five-star general of immense prestige, he was too accustomed to operating in the Far East with virtual autonomy. The JCS was hesitant to clash with the field commander over differences in strategy as directed by the President. The unwillingness of the JCS to direct MacArthur was perhaps

understandable, for technically it was not within their charter to do so. This inertia actually encouraged MacArthur's often outspoken positions regarding the war, China, and Taiwan. When the support of the JCS for President Truman finally came to a head over the "insubordination incident", MacArthur's dismissal was assured. Their inactivity, vacillation, and failure to "keep their house in order" exacerbated a problem which, if not unavoidable, could certainly have been delayed or lessened in its impact. The public and congressional furor over the MacArthur dismissal further discredited the JCS as a viable institution and did the Commander-in-Chief great political harm at an extremely critical period.²⁵

During the 1950's under President Eisenhower, two separate reorganization plans were submitted to Congress for approval; one in April of 1953 and one again in April of 1958. Extensive lobbying, political infighting, service rivalry and dissent preceded both. The contention of President Eisenhower, who was personally involved in each, was that the historical consensus approach was inefficient, wasteful and inherently dangerous to the national defense. President Eisenhower argued that the weakness of the chairman's authority seriously degraded the fundamental purpose of the JCS by drowning key joint issues of importance in interservice parochialism.

Further, the realities of congressional-service budgeting and resource management did not enhance joint warfare capabilities, but instead actually contributed to the diluting of interoperability.

The passage of the 1958 reorganization plan was hailed as a new breakthrough in the search for effective military command and control. Unfortunately, in reality the bill had been so diluted that little actual change was truly accomplished. The Joint Staff, though expanded, still did not exert the desired authority to provide unity to the command structure. The chairman's position within the military and governmental community was enhanced, but control over the services was denied. The services still retained control over administration, training, logistics, budget, and remained powers to be reckoned with in key matters of service interest.

Significantly, if perhaps indirectly, the real "winner" emerged as the Secretary of Defense. The new Department of Defense was greatly strengthened in terms of budgetary authority; the OSD staff was gradually expanded and began playing an ever increasing role in service affairs.²⁶

A further reorganization under Secretary MacNamara during the Kennedy Administration ushered in the civilian-military analyst. Although DOD had always utilized civil servants to make up (or circumvent) manpower shortages necessitated by law, the implementation of "cost-analysis"

management greatly enhanced the position of OSD at the expense of the JCS.

For example, the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) authorized during this era, extended the budget allocation process, emphasizing cost-effectiveness and management--the area of expertise of the OSD.²⁷

While at first glance this transfer or erosion of JCS authority would seem insignificant, it should be realized that in America strategy is driven by fiscal requirements rather than the reverse. The Joint Staff retains the requirement for publishing the Joint Military Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), which assesses the direction in which the U.S. should go in order to provide adequate forces to protect U.S. interests. Where the U.S. will go, however, is dictated by resources available--in short, money. This function is not Joint Staff responsibility, but a product of Congress, OSD, and service staff procedure hammered out under PPBS. The disparity is obvious and the impact on U.S. military capability and national strategy has been enormous.²⁸

²⁸ A detailed discussion of the relationship between the Joint Strategic Planning System, the PPBS and their influence on budgeting procedures is shown in R.C. Williams, J.C. Childers, H.T. Bartell and M.L. DeVoe, Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Handbook (Washington, D.C.: Program and Analysis Directorate, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, 1982).

Colonel William O. Staudenmeir, a strategic analyst at the U.S. Army War College, described in his article "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's", the two fundamental approaches used by the United States in balancing fiscal and strategic requirements. He describes these methods, in vogue over the past three decades, as the "remainder" and "national goals" method of budgeting. In the first method, used after World War II, an amount was allocated to national defense and requirements were tailored to fit that budget ceiling. The second method, never fully implemented, creates a military strategy and force structure to meet the identified national strategy and then funding is committed in support of the goal.²⁹

The Vietnam years reflected a JCS operating in the ever increasing shadow of the OSD and an army of Presidential advisors.³⁰ Generally, military operations and policies were in fact controlled directly from the White House through the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of U.S. Forces, Vietnam. Operations planning and coordination were performed by the ranking commander of each service, generally fighting their own independent war against North Vietnam while JCS resigned itself to pushing resources to the battle area. Joint operations were really service operations loosely coordinated "in country" to achieve a tactical short term objective. The management of strategic operations such as the bombing of Haiphong Harbor, and for that matter, the

entire air war in general, were decided primarily by President Johnson at his "Tuesday Lunches". Although the chairman provided input and recommendations during Vietnam, they were lackluster in character and generally held in low regard. So seriously had the prestige of our top military advisors ebbed in the late 1960's that President Johnson and his advisors personally picked each bombing target that would be engaged within the north. In fact, until August of 1967, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was not even an invitee to President Johnson's "Tuesday Lunches".³¹

RECENT EVENTS

With the election of President Nixon the JCS, and indeed the military in general, had begun the long road to recovery from the stigma of Vietnam.

Today the nation is blessed with a highly professional force led by capable leaders, generally regarded by Congress as competent, if not individually brilliant.³² Yet the systemic shackles resulting in the fiasco of the Spanish-American War of 1898 haunt us to this very day. The highly touted Grenada operation, labeled a resounding military success, was fraught with internal "glitches" and "knee jerks" which were not news to the military establishment. Ineffective joint planning, operating procedures, equipment interoperability failures due to uncoordinated service procurement programs, and the lack of

familiarity with joint tactical doctrine were overcome only by the quality and initiative of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines on the ground.

In the past years, concern over the impact of service parochialism on joint combat operations has generally been limited to selected groups within Congress, the military, and the defense establishment itself. After Grenada, however, both public and congressional concerns are becoming more vocal, more frequent, and more widespread. For example, the numerous changes to the original plan for invasion to incorporate each service into the operation has received much criticism--especially where hindsight has revealed that a Naval/Marine task force could have probably handled the job alone. Additionally, the slow development of CENTCOM's deployment capabilities can be attributed to intra-service rivalries for resources and strategy since the inception of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) concept.³³

Although still classified in much of its specific content, the Grenada operation reflected the century old problems of joint command, control, and policy which is a product of the system itself. Prior to his retirement, General Meyer, the Army Chief of Staff, was interviewed by Armed Forces Journal in April of 1982. Regarding the changes to the JCS proposed by ex-chairman General David Jones, USAF (Retired), the Journal reminded its readers that the historical tendency in dealing with the JCS/reorganization

issue is to refer the motion to a study group because of its political volatility. Armed Forces Journal cited 20 studies on JCS reorganization from the inception of JCS until 1982 when the article was published.³⁴ Although differing in content and recommendations, the issues of these studies were generally the same. Appendix 1 to this chapter provides a list of these studies, the dates of their completion, and the futility of such action. In the words of Armed Forces Journal "...the need to restructure the JCS has been studied to death. We don't need any more studies, we need action."³⁵

The JCS today remains the controversial enigma that it has always been; a product of democratic compromise. But in an age of nuclear technology, faced with an ever increasing threat to its security, the nation and its leaders still face a long recognized challenge which has yet to be resolved: how to balance the requirement for effective joint command and control with the need to insure the retention of civil, democratic control.

Since 1945 there have been 10 structural reorganizations of the JCS (an average of one every 3 years).³⁶ Some of these changes have been cosmetic, some substantive, but all designed to "fix the system." None of these efforts were casual undertakings but were results of serious study and debate on how best to achieve an improved capability. The names of the actors and key players have changed, as have their techniques and recommendations;

however, the problem--now almost two centuries old, remains the same--adequate command and control of U.S. military forces in peace and war.

CHAPTER II: END NOTES

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⁴Russell F. Weighley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1975, pp. 88-127.

⁵T. Harry Williams, Americans At War, as quoted in U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, pp.65-70.

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¹⁶ U.S. Army, Regulation of 1905, pp. 112-113.

¹⁷ Donald Smythe, "The Pershing-Marsh Conflict in World War I", from Parameters--Journal of the U.S. Army War College, (Dec 81), as cited by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 88-95.

¹⁸ Morton, Germany First, pp. 158-170.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Robert W. Conkley, World War II: The War Against Japan, from American Military History, as cited by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, p. 237.

²¹ Russell F. Weigley, The Atomic Revolution, from The American Way of War as cited by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, pp. 273-279.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, (Indiana University Press, 1976) Chapter 4, pp. 13-21.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 39-48.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 13-21.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 22-29.

²⁸ Williams, Richard C.; Childers, J.C.; Bartell, H.T.; DeVoe, M.L. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Handbook. Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army, 1982.

²⁹William O. Staudenmeir, "Strategic Concepts for the 1980's", Military Review, Part I, (March 1982) p.37.

³⁰Korb, The JCS, Chapter 4, pp. 48-65.

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³²Robert S. Dudley, "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?", U.S. News and World Report, (February 27, 1984) pp. 27-31.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS: How Much Reform Is Needed?", Armed Forces Journal, vol. 119, #8, (April 1982) p.88.

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CHAPTER III: THE JCS: ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION

CONCEPT AND MISSION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were organized by Presidential directive during American involvement in World War II. Its intent and purpose was to fulfill an urgent need for a military headquarters to plan and coordinate the military services effectively at the national level in order to assist the President in accomplishing national military objectives. Officially sanctioned by the National Security Act of 1947, the JCS organization, although modified several times, has remained basically unchanged in concept since its inception in World War II. The mission of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components" is described as follows:

FUNCTIONS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF--The Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chairman, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and supported by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, constitute the immediate military staff of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."

A list of 19 specific missions for which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have responsibility can be found in DOD Directive 5100.1.

The significance of this concept and intent when compared to the actual missions is its incongruity. Intended as an advisory body and empowered on to fulfill that function, the JCS has simultaneously been tasked in the same document, with requirements to "prepare, execute, establish and perform...." This fact is not a mere exercise in semantics but the crux of the entire issue--the heart of the debate. For if the JCS organization is intended by Congress to be only an advisory body as the concept clearly implies, then it is probably staffed, equipped, and supported far in excess of what is necessary. On the other hand, if the mission statement reflects the true intent of Congress, then the JCS seriously lacks those essential elements of command and control and directive authority to insure success.

Since 1942 this fundamental disparity between concept and mission has been debated before Congress and Presidents. The disparity represents power--power to advise vs. power to direct; civilian control vs. military efficiency.

This chapter will examine this disparity in terms of JCS organization and staff characteristics. The testimony of "key players," each thoroughly familiar with the JCS system, will be examined in an effort to shed some light on this

basic question. For until the issue of exactly what is expected from the JCS can be decided, it is doubtful whether an acceptable resolution of the debate can ever be achieved.

STAFF STRUCTURE

Under its current organization the Joint Chiefs of Staff consists of the heads of each of the three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) as well as the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Additionally, the group is chaired by the Chairman, of the JCS (C,JCS) a position which is rotated among the three main services and usually consists of the senior military member of the staff. As a non-voting member of the group, the C,JCS does not represent his parent service organization, but instead is the only member of the organization with a full time joint responsibility.

The Joint Staff, limited by law to 400 officers drawn equally from each of the services, is designed to support the JCS in accomplishing its primary function of advising the National Command Authority on military matters. It performs a secondary role of augmenting the staff of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on matters requiring military expertise and experience. At present the Joint Staff is organized into the four "J-Staff" directorates and two supporting directorates shown on the following page.

DIAGRAM OF ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF²




FIGURE 1

Since 1958 when the Department of Defense underwent its last major reorganization, the OJCS has included the Joint Staff, within its organization, the Joint Staff is the only part of the OJCS which is regulated by law in terms of manning. For clarity in this study, the OJCS will refer only to those supporting agencies and special offices depicted in the diagram at Figure 1 not already included in the JCS or Joint Staff specifically.

GOVERNMENT INTERFACE

Since its inception, one of the primary criticisms of the JCS has been the dual nature of the organization and the impact of this characteristic upon the highest echelon of American government.

First, the JCS is an advisory body for the NSC and as an organization has no command authority. The intent of the organization, as first established, was for each service chief to run both his service and function as a member of the JCS. Procedure and custom have delegated the service responsibilities to the vice chiefs. This is done simply to address the multitude of requirements occurring in both areas adequately. This was finally incorporated into law under the 1958 Reorganization Act.

Secondly, although the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (C,JCS) usually attends meetings of the National Security Council, he is not a voting member of the organization. As a

subordinate of the Secretary of Defense, the C,JCS cannot participate without de facto raising his status to equal that to the Secretary of Defense.

As previously stated, the dual nature of the JCS requires each service chief to represent his service in the joint area as well as independently. Thus, although "independent" of his service, the C,JCS does provide cursory review and recommendations to Congress and other government agencies, the services (and hence the service chiefs), deal direct and independently with other agencies of government on many vital issues. The military budgeting process for example, is done independently by each service staff. It is justified (as necessary) to Congress by each service chief independent of JCS control and coordination. Priorities and tradeoffs are accomplished not by the JCS, but instead by the Congress and OSD working through each service secretary with the services.

The significance of this major disconnect as a chain of command may at first be deceiving. The fact is that the NCA relies on strategic policy recommendations of the JCS, forwarded in a document known as the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD). However, the means (i.e. resources) to implement those very same strategic recommendations are planned, recommended, funded, and procured, not by, or even through, the JCS, but instead through each separate service.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth, in his article "A General Staff for America in the Sixties," further illustrates the impact of this disparity between the joint staff responsibility for strategic assessment and service staff responsibility for procurement. He also discusses the inability of the Joint Staff to implement its responsibilities without service staff concurrence. He also notes the disparity between authority and responsibility in examining Joint Staff actions and operations. Additionally, Wermuth recommends a unified multi-service staff working for the Secretary of Defense as a substitute for OSD. His justification for this is based on unity of command, military expertise, and simplification of the bureaucratic chain of command at that level.³

The military services also retain, even without the operational commands (CINC's), the authority and responsibility for training, administrative, and logistical support. This, in effect, is an extension of the "dual-hatting" process into the operational arena. Service forces deployed around the world in eight different commands receive support in these areas directly from their service staffs, the JCS becoming involved only if priorities or support cannot be resolved between the CINC's of the operational commands and the supporting services.

General Gavin, the famed ex-commander of the 82nd Airborne Division in World War II and later a member of the JCS, described the situation in 1958 as:

....The fundamental shortcoming: the Chiefs wear two hats...in a larger sense they should keep the national interest paramount. The record will show that (Service) interest usually prevails, though entirely in a patriotic sense...the responsibilities must be separated.

Finally, the JCS, although consisting of the senior service representatives in the United States, exercises only "operational command" authority over field forces deployed afield. This rather ambiguous term basically defines the JCS role as the "filter" through which the unified and specified commands request and receive operational guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the President. Although certainly involved in the command and (to a lesser extent) the control process, the C,JCS has no directive authority as the senior military officer. The Joint Staff also exercises only limited control over the planning, executing and support of military operations worldwide.

Thus, in terms of mission and concept, the JCS as an entity can only receive mixed reviews at best, as far as organization and authority is concerned.

The JCS as a "Great Staff"

Although the intent of establishing the JCS was never to imitate the general staffs of Europe, certain parallels can be drawn in its charter as the highest national military

staff. Both the accessibility of the JCS to the key policy and decision makers of American government, and the rank and structure of the Joint Chiefs themselves, certainly lend credence to the argument that the JCS is not functioning as a staff in the manner in which it was originally intended.

Trevor DuPuy, in his book A Genius for War, establishes a set of criteria by which he has "measured" the effectiveness of the German General Staff. These criteria, as stated by Colonel DuPuy may be summed up under 10 overlapping headings, nine of which have significance and are of use in this study. These nine criteria are as follows:

"SELECTION
EXAMINATION
SPECIALIZED TRAINING
HISTORICAL STUDY INITIATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
TECHNICAL-TACTICAL PERFECTION
OBJECTIVITY IN ANALYSIS
REGENERATION
LEAVENING PROCESS"⁵

Although a direct comparison with the JCS is not relevant for historical, political, and structural reasons (the German General Staff was not a Joint Staff), the

criteria for evaluation of the staff itself is nonetheless excellent and will be used in this study to analyze the internal mechanisms of the JCS as they apply to its founding concept and in terms of mission accomplishment.

SELECTION

The first criteria for analysis of the JCS is that of the selection process. Interestingly, there are no specific formal procedures for selection to a post on Joint Staff which vary from the normal selection criteria reserved for the service staffs themselves. The Joint Staff informs the respective services of its needs and requirements, requesting, of course, high quality personnel to fill the various roles. The Director of the Joint Staff reviews service recommendations, but has no real mandate to direct or specifically select personnel.

This is not to say that the service staffs do not recommend or send quality personnel to duty at JCS, they do; poor performers are "embarrassing" to their parent services. But, in fact, they are not the best available; those personnel being reserved for the service staffs themselves with rare exception. This "procedure" is common knowledge within the officer corps of all the services, and as a consequence, joint duty is not sought by the majority of officers in any of the services. General Jones points out that the statutory limitations on joint staff duty, do not

apply to the OSD or service staffs. This results in a significant disparity in experience and familiarity which Joint Staff officers find difficult to overcome.⁶

Strong service affiliations, going to and coming from a Joint Staff assignment also affects the quality, willingness, and availability of officers from all services to seek joint assignment. General Jones feels that the promotion system gives little encouragement to serve in such an assignment and states that in many cases such assignments are in fact actually discouraged. To emphasize his point he noted that only one Director of the Joint Staff, Army General Earle Wheeler, ever became chief of his service or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁷

Under such constraints it is not surprising that the long-term effectiveness and potential of the Joint Staff is undermined. Without a clear priority and strong emphasis on obtaining only the best quality, the Joint Staff in all likelihood will continue to operate at a severe disadvantage in addressing key joint issues vis a vis the service staffs.

EXAMINATION

A second important criteria to staff effectiveness is that of examination. DuPuy in his book A Genius for War, contends that the German General Staff was successful in "institutionalizing genius" partially because of a dynamic series of examinations along an officer's career pattern

which were designed in conjunction with commander performance evaluations in the field as well as service school performance. This earmarked the finest minds in the German officer corps for General Staff duty. Whether or not this was correct, the fact is that the U.S. system in all services provides for no such "competitive elimination" per se. Service school academic performance is judged only from three aspects: first, the fact that an officer was selected to attend the service resident course identifies him as a superior performer of exceptional capability. Second is successful course completion. In this area greater emphasis is placed on differentiating between graduates and nongraduates than on differentiating between degrees of success. Last is the Academic Efficiency Report (AER) itself. While this report is intended to, and does, state the level at which a student has performed, very few officers consider the AER of equal weight with performance reports on promotion and selection boards.

SPECIALIZED TRAINING

Specialized training is an area which the U.S. military historically has placed great emphasis and spared no expense to implement. Within the joint arena there are numerous schools which emphasize training within the joint arena (such as the Air-Ground Liaison School at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida). In fact, the Armed Forces Staff College, the

Navy "equivalent" of Command and General Staff College, is specifically designed as the joint staff officer's training course.

Unfortunately no "weight" or service encouragement is given to sending the best and brightest of young officers to these schools with the intent of later duty in joint staff assignments. In fact, most joint duty and inter-service liaison duty is considered to be a "career risk" as noted previously in this chapter and therefore an assignment that is to be avoided, if possible.

The Steadman Report, in presenting its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in 1978, cited this same difficulty. The report recommended that the chairman be empowered to obtain the assignment of any desired officer, subject to normal rotation and career development patterns, required by each service.

The Steadman Report did continue to acknowledge a significant voluntary improvement in the quality of personnel assigned to the Joint Staff by each of the services. However, the same report recommended that exceptions and waivers for avoiding Joint Staff assignments be retained by the Chairman, JCS for the Secretary to insure continued quality.⁸

Moreover, no effective centralized personnel management vehicle exists within the services to regularly rotate the assignment of these specially trained and qualified officers

to joint staff assignments of ever increasing responsibility. It is common for an Armed Forces Staff College graduate to return to his service and never serve in a joint assignment for the remainder of his military career. The impact of this upon the Joint Staff is that personnel assigned may or, more likely, may not ever have served within a joint arena previously. Yet in spite of significant training and experience shortfalls, these same personnel are expected to operate successfully on the nation's highest joint staff.

General Jones, in an interview with Armed Forces Journal, described his own career as "lacking a fully rounded experience" and "unfortunately far from unique." He further contends that the knowledge of service tradition, doctrines, and strengths and weaknesses is essential for true effectiveness. This in depth knowledge or experience is not presently offered nor encouraged by any of the Services and a lack of proficiency in joint procedure is the direct result.⁹

HISTORICAL STUDY EMPHASIS

In the Armies of many nations, historical analysis and self evaluation use a much revered procedure which directly affects the organization, operations, and training of the military force.

Within the United States, however, the importance of emphasizing historical studies is generally considered an "extra duty" of G-3 or operations personnel in peacetime and consists primarily of after-action reviews and reports with minimal analysis. At major staff levels these studies more often than not are accomplished by civilian contract or by "committee organizations" established specifically to study a given problem or operation.

In wartime, the services do mobilize reservists qualified to fulfill historical analysis, but there is no permanent cohesion to their efforts. Neither the Joint Staff nor any of the service staffs maintain a significant number of officers assigned to the full-time historical analysis staffs for the purpose of critical review and analysis.

The importance of this omission is that many of the historical problems of national command and control are addressed short term by each of the independent services with no coordinating effort or control from "the guiding hand" of the Joint Staff. As a result, historical problems of command, control, and coordination continually reoccur (such as in Grenada), and are "quick fixed" rather than addressed as a long term problem of inter-service interoperability and organization.

This unfortunately is not a recent problem and has directly influenced the whole concept of joint operation in the United States even prior to the creation of the JCS.

Lieutenant Colonel Anthony L. Wermuth, in his article "A General Staff for America in the Sixties," cites the following testimonial from Commander John Rodgers before the Morrow Board in 1925:

...we did our best to coordinate the Army and Navy air forces, which was our principal job. And we were perfectly honest, and perfectly willing to concede something--that is, a little bit, each of us. And we talked more and accomplished less than anybody I have ever been associated with....I wore out six pairs of pants sitting on that board.

And later Army testimony continued:

...I believe we must develop a general staff who are skilled in the handling of armies, navies and air forces, and who are capable of laying out a campaign, and of using all these forces, either separately or with one another.¹⁰

Both testimonials condemn the substitution of cooperation for unified command in military operations. The present "CINC" system has done much to rectify this command and control discrepancy in the field. We still continue to believe, however, that cooperation at an even higher level (the JCS) will somehow function effectively even though the issue becomes significantly larger and more complex.

The Joint Staff has had little authority or charter to direct equipment compatibility, budget priorities, and joint training procedures to insure that these problems are addressed to achieve long term, coordinated, solutions to

operational problems. The impact of this shortfall not only affects the joint operations and interoperability of the regular forces, but profoundly impacts the readiness and effectiveness of our reserve forces and operations with allied nations.

INCULCATION OF THE INITIATIVE AND RESPONSIBILITY

Two additional shortfalls of the JCS system with extremely serious implications are inculcation of the initiative and responsibility. As previously stated, the JCS as an entity is an advisory group and has no command authority over operational forces in the field. This fact has two significant ramifications which have historically characterized the operation of the JCS and the Joint Staff:

First, because the CINC's are responsible for military operations in the field, the Joint Staff has tended to react to the operational requirements and the needs of the unified and specified commands as opposed to initiating the planning coordination and direction for these commanders busily engaged in the field. The result according to Lawrence J. Korb in his book The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, has been that the JCS has failed to become a dynamic and positive institution; relying more often on maintaining the status quo.

Korb explains this by citing two areas of continuing institutional weakness:

First, the Joint Chiefs, have consistently allowed themselves to be intimidated by political leaders into supporting policies to which they were or should have been opposed.

...Second, for the most part, the Joint Chiefs have not shown themselves to be innovators in the policy process, even in military areas. The chiefs have generally been reactors rather than initiators...Even when a situation cries out for change, the JCS remains addicted to the status quo

Moreover, even when field commanders have disregarded specific JCS or Presidential directives, the JCS still would not be budged into action. Such was the case repeatedly in Korea while MacArthur commanded allied forces. Only when they were faced with disaster, would the JCS finally commit themselves to a definitive stand. Mr. Korb describes the inaction and impotence of the JCS in their unwillingness to control General MacArthur, or even attempt such an action until far too late. This intransigence occurred despite the "harmonious relationship" Korb describes as existing between the JCS and their "civilian counterparts". Yet no attempt was made by the JCS to control or discipline the field commander until after he had made a series of widely publicized public statements questioning presidential policies in the Far East.

During the Vietnam years the JCS again displayed the intransigence and lack of leadership that has characterized this uniquely American institution. In this war, the two primary field commanders--Generals Westmoreland and Abrams--

each directed widely different tactical counterinsurgency campaigns virtually devoid of JCS input and guidance. A lack of initiative and strategic direction was so pronounced during this period, that President Johnson, searching desperately for effective measures against the North Vietnamese, directly controlled the bombing of North Vietnam personally through a small committee of advisors--to which the C,JCS was not included.

This is not to say that the JCS had no input or say in either the Kennedy or Johnson administrations, for that would be incorrect. However, their unimaginative support for continuous escalation increasingly fell on less sympathetic ears. As a consequence, credibility of the JCS was viewed with disdain by more and more of the Presidential advisors; changing to open hostility and contempt in the tough struggle for a strategy.¹²

GOAL OF TECHNICAL-TACTICAL PERFECTION

The JCS and the Joint Staff regrettably have contributed little to assisting the services in achieving technical and tactical perfection for this has not been within their capability. In actual fact, responsibility for developing joint doctrine, a stated JCS mission, has been delegated by the JCS to Readiness Command (REDCOM), one of the subordinate unified commands and the services themselves. An excellent example of this is the high

technology light division (HTLD) concept. This effort is directed at developing a light motorized infantry division capable of withstanding a determined armored assault, while simultaneously improving deployability by reducing MAC transport requirements. The major effort was conducted by a provisional headquarters, High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) now Army Development Experimental Agency (ADEA), under the direct supervision of the 9th Infantry Division Commander, REDCOM, and the DA staff.

Under the present system, the possession of no command authority by JCS is perhaps, nebulous at best, given the parameters under which these "JCS-directed" exercises actually take place. The actual responsibility for planning, controlling, and evaluating these exercises falls directly on the unified commands or "CINCS". Considering present assets, that is certainly understandable from a Joint Staff point of view.

The tradeoffs, however, are that it relegates the top military leadership with its supporting staff to a spectator role while the services coordinate laterally to "make it happen". Exercise evaluation occurs at the CINC or REDCOM level, and despite the unquestioned professionalism of the officers involved, often lacks the objectivity that is desperately needed for training effectiveness. These "operator-level" after-action reviews, coupled with the lack of trained military historical analysts at all levels and

the inability to command and control from the highest echelons significantly reduce the opportunities for achieving more proficient and coordinated doctrinal concepts--especially in the area of joint operations.

OBJECTIVITY IN ANALYSIS

This requirement for objectivity in analysis has far reaching ramifications within the U.S. military infrastructure and is one of the key arguments used by past chiefs to praise or indict the current JCS system.

A reality of military service in the United States is that the services must compete fiercely against each other for limited shares of the defense budget. Indeed this is true in all areas of resource allocation. The nature of the "dual-hatting" concept places each of the service chiefs, as well as the Joint Staff, in the unenviable position of addressing their service interests and joint issues which may in fact be diametrically opposed.

The results of this dual responsibility have at times been dramatic. As previously described in Chapter III, a recommendation by the JCS to cancel building a nuclear powered carrier for the Navy, was followed by the infamous "Revolt of the Admirals" in 1949 and eventually forcing Admiral Louis Dunfield to resign his post as Chief of Naval Operations.¹³ Since that time, the JCS have been understandably reluctant to risk alienating their services.

In the words of former Chief of Staff General David C. Jones:

A Service Chief finds himself in a very tough position when asked to give up or forego significant resources or important roles and missions both because his priorities have been shaped by his Service experience and because he must be the loyal and trusted leader of a Service whose members sincerely believe their service deserves a greater share of constrained resources and of military missions--and the control thereof."¹⁴

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs likened the JCS to "corporate America" with all of the advantages and disadvantages of that organizational example. His analogy continued by explaining why it was so difficult for the Services to change major positions on key issues:

Since fresh approaches to strategy tend to threaten an institution's interests and self-image, it is often more comfortable to look to the past than to seek new ways to meet the challenges of the future. When coupled with a system that keeps Service leadership bound up in a continuous struggle for resources, such inclinations can lead to a preoccupation with weapon systems, techniques,¹⁵ and tactics at the expense of sound planning.

Far less dramatic, but of much more significance is the tendency to achieve consensus of all the services prior to the JCS taking a position on an issue. The Steadman Commission in describing the practice known as "staffing to the lowest common denominator" describes the process of

unanimity as a primary indictment of the effectiveness of the JCS system. The report cites a consistent inability to transcend service issues in the common (joint) interest. Perhaps more significantly, the report acknowledges that these same joint positions are the staff's primary "raison d'etre." The Steadman Report further states that these joint positions are of fundamental importance not only in deterring war, but in maintaining adequate preparedness. Because of these facts, these very issues and decisions are the most difficult for the President, Secretary of Defense and Congress to make. The Joint Staff, without unified direction and singleness of purpose cannot adequately staff the volatile issues to a successful conclusion.¹⁶

As can clearly be seen, the "dual-hatting" issue, combined with the lack of command and control, seriously weakens the JCS, but it does not stop here. This degradation of the principles of leadership and chain of command permeates the very institutions it has been designed to support.

For example, Congress deals directly with both the JCS and the services on the same issues, primarily because the credibility of the JCS/Joint Staff is so low. Ambassador Robert F. Ellsworth, formerly the Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Ford, described the quality of work normally received from the Joint staff in an interview with the Armed Forces Journal in May 1982:

Among the failures of the present system, moreover, is the inability of the nation's top military to properly influence force planning...but it produces formal staff work that has aroused the dismay of every senior civilian who has been forced to read it. It is laborious, cumbersome, and hopelessly compromised. It ignores real-world resource constraints.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), once a small management body designed to provide civilian leadership to the military services, has grown to over 1,800 civilians and military personnel. This fact is certainly not a direct result, nor can it be directly attributed entirely to, the Joint Staff's limited capabilities per se. Nevertheless the ineffectiveness of the Joint Staff is a major contributing factor in the growth of the OSD.

The significance of this enlargement of OSD is not so much the growth of an additional (and in large part unnecessary) bureaucracy; rather, it is one of experience and training in fulfilling tasks which require an extensive military background. As Lieutenant Colonel Wermuth explains:

To run the Department of Defense, the Secretary must have a staff. And, in fact, he does have one. Since the law says it cannot be a military staff, the Secretary has been forced to establish a civilian staff...the 1,500 and more civilian incumbents of the staff layers of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Upon further reflection, it can be argued that the OSD does in fact, fulfill certain comptroller and management

functions of a "General Staff". This has arisen out of operational necessity, in circumvention of the law of the land, because of the small size and ineffectiveness of the Joint Staff.

On the other hand, this very requirement for consensus has often been cited, especially by the Department of the Navy, as the only effective procedure in arriving at true objectivity. Admiral James L. Holloway III (USN Ret.), himself a former member of the JCS has argued:

Elimination of the Service Chiefs in favor of a two-man Chairman and Deputy entity has two dangerous if not fatal flaws. The availability of the most knowledgeable and experienced military advice on the readiness and capability of our military forces is turned off; there will exist a separation of responsibility and authority for the readiness of our military forces.

As can be concluded from Admiral Holloway's statement, the arrival at consensus is viewed by many proponents of the status quo as the only way of achieving a true multi-service position on critical issues. The JCS, by maintaining the approach, has allegedly offered our civilian leadership alternatives which are broader in scope, thoroughly coordinated, and thereby truly representative of all divergent views taken by the services on any particular action.

REGENERATION

The effectiveness of any organization or institution can most accurately be assessed over time. This implies that any organization must possess not only the flexibility to change with different sets of circumstances, but must also have the capability to "regenerate itself". This regeneration process, as applied to the JCS consists of five factors: selection criteria, examination, specialized training, selected personnel management, and finally the stature and credibility of key individuals. The first four factors have previously been discussed in preceding pages of this study and so will not be reiterated here. The last factor, personnel stature is of particular significance to the effectiveness of the JCS/Joint Staff organization. So important has the credibility factor been, especially regarding the effectiveness of the Chairman of the JCS, that it has been considered the single most important ingredient in making the system function.

The significance of this aspect is extremely important especially when the absence of a system to cultivate future chiefs of the JCS is taken into account.

America has been fortunate over the last century by enjoying a long list of capable "emergent leaders" of the stature of Generals Marshall and Bradley and Admirals Leahy and King. Whether their leadership in crisis was enhanced by the JCS system is debatable and in a major sense not

relevant. What is important is the fact that circumstance dictated the right man, at the right place, at the right time, and not the system intentionally regenerating itself. Each of these military giants was a product of an independent service selection system rather than a system designed to develop leaders trained to command at the highest levels in a joint environment.

Not surprisingly, in the absence of these charismatic leaders the whole military infrastructure suffers. Both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts reflected the wavering policies of a government supported by a weak and vacillating JCS. The results, although certainly not the sole responsibility of the JCS, are history for which the Joint Chiefs must certainly share a measure of responsibility.

THE LEAVENING PROCESS

The last criteria used by this study, offered by DuPuy in his criteria for measuring staff excellence, is termed the leavening process. This procedure he describes as a conscious, continuing effort to avoid the "ruts of convention, practice, and custom."²⁰

As previously stated, a direct correlation between the German General Staff system and the JCS is not intended. What is of value, however, is the process by which general staff training was permeated throughout the German Army structure.

The scarcity of joint training, education, and service opportunities for our officer corps as a whole, places a high premium on the expertise and quantity of those officers of all branches fortunate enough to have experienced it. Under present service personnel management systems, little if any consideration is given to the "strategic" placement of these individuals to maximize their abilities. Even the Joint Staff and JCS itself does not influence the assignment of officers with these rare qualifications.

Considerable argument, pro and con, has been offered by top civilian and military officials who recognize that a valuable and perishable experience is regularly lost to the military community as a whole because of this process.

A major recommendation of the Steadman Commission, after studying the nation's military command structure was to give the C,JCS authority to direct assignments of personnel to the Joint Staff, an authority he does not now possess.²¹

The retention, distribution and proper management of these uniquely qualified personnel is a much larger challenge than that faced by the German General Staff. Because of the joint nature of the modern battlefield, retention of this experience is critical, yet no procedures exist within the military system to capitalize on this ability.

SUMMARY OF EFFECTIVENESS

The effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been the subject of heated debate almost from its inception. Uniquely American in character, the JCS interfaces well with the institutions peculiar to the government it was designed to support. It is the quality of that integration which is suspect for reasons which have been discussed above.

The JCS, as currently structured, certainly presents no threat to the American principle of civilian control. But the trade-off has been heavy in the critical areas of intra-service coordination, command, and control. The JCS has literally been chartered to do all things to all people and as a result falls far short of expectations in every mission area.

The capabilities of the JCS clearly reflect the ambiguity which surrounds the intent of its creation. It consists of the five senior officers of all the services, yet as a group commands nothing.

The JCS and the Joint Staff are technically the senior planning staff in the military community. Yet the Joint Staff is limited by law to just 400 personnel. The size of this staff is totally inadequate to accomplish this function and is heavily "augmented" by the service staffs and OSD to fulfill its missions. Additionally, many JCS functions are delegated to the Unified and Specified commands (such as

development of joint doctrines) simply because the resources available at Joint Staff level will not support the mission.

Compounding the lack of resources and the absence of authority is the purely administrative problem of staffing procedures. This laborious process, is termed the "flimsy, buff, green" procedure. It was developed to achieve consensus among the services on joint issues and is almost incredible in its complexity and lack of direction. General Jones briefly describes the intent of the procedure:

...The pressures at this point create a greater drive for agreement than for quality: the process usually results in extensive discussion and careful draftsmanship of a paper designed to accommodate the views of each Service--²² at least to the extent of not going anyone's ox...

As for the quality produced by such a system, General Jones could only depict it as "watered down" in content and "well waifled"--a severe indictment for a product of our highest military staff.

A more detailed description of these current staff procedures is described by General Jones in testimony provided to the Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee during 1982. This description was received with a considerable amount of concern.²³

The "dual-hatting" role previously discussed in this chapter, also causes great problems in efficiency and singularity of purpose for the JCS. The chiefs are expected

to represent the common interest in their joint role while simultaneously representing their respective services. For the best of men this is a difficult proposition. With few exceptions, this results in official JCS positions which avoid the crux of key issues.

The ambiguity of the "dual-hatting" system has also had significant impact on management efficiency. Service positions are often diametrically opposed to joint positions offered to the NCA by the Joint Staff. Almost powerless to direct and coordinate, the JCS positions are often perceived as having little worth by members of Congress:

...the formal position papers of the JCS, the institutional product, are almost uniformly given low marks by their consumers--the policymakers in OSD, State, and the NSC Staff... In formal papers argumentation and recommendations usually have had such extensive negotiation that they have been reduced to the lowest common level of assent.²⁴

Perhaps the most interesting peculiarity of the JCS system, however, is its complete dependence upon the services for sustenance in terms of personnel, assignment, education, and rewards. The Joint Staff relies completely on independent service selection criteria for personnel assignment and possesses no authority to direct or control the training or career patterns of those officers once designated for joint assignments. Further, once trained, experienced personnel revert to service control upon leaving the joint staff or unified commands and may or may not ever

return to joint duty. Hence, "staff or line" assignment procedure is more a "hit or miss" proposition than a service management objective.

Finally, the services' education and reward systems do not encourage the officer corps to seek joint duty assignments. This parochial attitude restricts the quality of personnel assigned to joint headquarters while reserving the service's best for duty on service staffs. Further, awards and efficiency reports received while on joint duty are generally not held in high regard and hence contribute little if anything to the progression of an officer's career pattern. This fact is all the more significant when taken into consideration with the lack of management procedures governing schooled and experienced joint staff personnel.

In summary, evaluation of the JCS must focus on two basic issues prior to reaching a conclusion. First, does the JCS under its current structure fulfill the role for which it was intended? If the intent as reflected in the conceptual design of the JCS was to form a military advisory body for the NCA then it certainly fulfills this role and more. If, however, the intention of the JCS either initially or through evolutionary change, is to perform as a military staff per se then it has been a failure. For it is deficient in virtually every area required of a military organization.

The second basic question is simply one of cost effectiveness and efficiency. If its role as an advisory

body is desired and intended then surely the commitment of 400 officers and the senior representatives of each service to this and is excessive.

On the other hand if the JCS is to perform as a "Great Staff", and its mission statement certainly implies this as reflected in DOD directive 5100.1, then the authority, and characteristics and additional resources discussed in this chapter must be delegated to it.

CHAPTER III: END NOTES

¹DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (16 January 1980) p. 3.

²U.S. Army, Joint Staff Officers Guide, (National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia, 1 July 1984, p. 2-7).

³Anthony L. Wermuth, "A General Staff for America in the Sixties", Military Review (February 1960), p. 11.

⁴Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS: how Much Reform Is Needed?", Armed Forces Journal, vol. 119, #3, (April 1982), p. 84.

⁵Trevor N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1977) p. 303.

⁶David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change", Armed Forces Journal, (March 1982) pp. 67-68.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure, (July 1978) pp. 62-63.

⁹Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change", p. 67.

¹⁰Wermuth, "A General Staff in the Sixties", p.11.

¹¹Lawrence J. Korb, The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1976,) Chapter 4, pp. 42-71.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Weighley, The Atomic Revolution, pp. 273-279.

¹⁴Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change", p. 68.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Steadman, Report, pp. 57-58.

¹⁷W. Graham Clayton, Jr., "JCS Reform: Necessary, but in Moderation", Armed Forces Journal, (May 1982,) p. 69.

¹⁸Wermuth, "A General Staff in the Sixties", p. 11.

¹⁹ Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms Most Others Tell Congress Are Long Overdue", Armed Forces Journal, (June 1982,) p. 66.

²⁰ Dupuy, A Genius for War, p. 305.

²¹ Steadman, Report, p. 64.

²² Jones, "Why the Joint Chief Must Change", pp. 65-66.

²³ U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, 1982) H.R. 6828, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 97th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 94-95.

²⁴ Steadman, Report, p. 52.

CHAPTER IV: THE CURRENT DEBATE

GENERAL

The renewed emphasis on defense by the current Reagan administration has intensified both interest and debate over JCS effectiveness and reorganization.

A congressional hearing on JCS reorganization has generated a flurry of studies supporting or opposing this action. Newspaper editorials, special study groups, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff themselves have become embroiled in the new wave of controversy and lobbying intensified to influence the congressional hearings.

RECENT ACTIONS AND ARGUMENTS

In 1982, the House Armed Services Committee conducted an extensive investigation under the leadership of Congressman Richard White (D-TX). These hearings amassed over 900 pages of documentation and testimonials from some of the most distinguished representatives of the U.S. defense establishment available over the last 20 years. The conclusion of HR6828, "The White Bill," recommends that Congress strengthen the JCS. The bill would place the chairman in the military operational chain of command as

well as establish him as a full member of the National Security Council.

Additional reform measures included the stabilization of joint staff tours for three years and the opportunity to extend any officer's tenure for an additional tour of duty. The chairman would also be empowered to manage the activities of the Director and Joint Staff in support of his efforts.

Unfortunately, the bill stops far short of the desired goal. The Joint Staff would be denied executive authority over the services and is forbidden from operating as an armed forces general staff.¹ Congressman White described the effort as a "compromise effort at best" and stated that he would have supported stronger language if he thought it had a chance of passage.²

A separate study was recently conducted over an 18 month period at Georgetown University and completed in January 1985. This committee also recommended strengthening the JCS to facilitate military operations, reduce inter-service rivalries, and economize budget and procurement procedures. The significance of this recommendation reflected the committee's principle finding: that the natural tendency of the multiservice "consensus" system was to create an overlapping, uncoordinated bureaucracy incapable of interoperability. Service rivalries for budget dollars, separate programs funding similar

training and equipment, and the lack of centralized control, all contributed to the major aspects of disunity and inefficiency. In fact, the committee cited the current military organization as: "the single most important cause of the grave problems that now confront the United States in managing its national defense efforts." Further, it was recommended that the role played by Congress in the current military budgeting procedure be reduced; changing the annual Congressional budget review under PPBS to every other year in order to facilitate planning.³

Current trends toward reorganization are not without substantial criticism, however, and major efforts have been launched to defend the present system. The Hudson Institute's Committee on Civil-Military Relationships, released a study on 17 September 1984 warning that the passage of HR6828 would: "effectively abolish the corporate principle established during World War II and substitute a Prussia-style staff system."⁴

These primary issues outlined above, and in previous chapters are not new, but nonetheless deserve reiteration.

First, to effectively examine any reorganization argument, a fundamental understanding of the intended concept of the JCS must be achieved. Opponents of reorganization argue that as an advisory body the JCS is not intended as an instrument of command and control. Because of this, each of the services may freely voice its position to

governmental officials thereby allowing the maximum amount of information and debate on critical issues. Further, critics state that because of the existence of the unified and specified command system the need for a strong, centralized joint staff is nonexistent. These critics, led primarily by the Navy, argue that the unified commands are already joint in nature, possess full operational authority and have direct access to the highest levels of the National Command Authority, up to and including the President.

The stated capabilities and effectiveness of the specified/unified commands are themselves not above criticism from the advocates of change. Samuel Huntington, director of Howard University's Center for International Affairs and a former National Security Council aide, in an interview with U.S. News and World Report stated:

Unified Commands are not really commands, and they certainly aren't unified...What the nation suffers from is not militarism, but serviceism.

A serious indictment of the effectiveness of the unified command system surfaced in the Pentagon's investigation of the infamous bombing of the Marine contingent in Beirut in 1983. The contingent was placed under the operational control of the European Command, one of the unified commands historically led by the Army. Because of the unusual nature of the mission, questions over who in fact had command responsibility for the Marines

permeated the entire Army chain of command. Additionally, EUCOM's unfamiliarity with the area, the terrorist threat, and its primary mission of deterring war in Europe all served as major contributors to the atmosphere of indecisiveness. The following statement, cited by U.S. News & World Report, was extracted from the findings of the Pentagon's investigative panel headed by Retired Admiral Robert Long. It graphically portrays the general attitude of many officers at EUCOM regarding their authority over the Beirut task force:

...it would somehow be improper to tell (the Marine commander) how best to protect his force.

Further, the missions assigned to JCS in DOD 5100.1 clearly indicate the intent to establish a joint operational headquarters at the national level to manage, plan, and "fight" the services in peace and war. However, the JCS has insufficient authority, size, and structure to properly perform the missions; furthermore, reorganizations during crisis have consistently occurred due to operational failures generated by the ineffectiveness of command and control.

Additionally, there is a "command and control gap" between the civilian decision-making authorities and the "CINCs" who are responsible for operational plans and execution within an assigned theater. This "gap," supposedly

addressed by the joint and service staffs in the Pentagon, exists in many critical areas. Strategic planning, policy interpretation, resource allocation, and intertheater coordination are directly affected by the absence of a unified staff. Many senior Defense Department officials argued during the Congressional hearings of 1982 that only a strengthened JCS can adequately fulfill this void. Congressman Stratton (NY) reiterated this position during the hearings:

...I have never really been able to find anybody over in the Pentagon who appeared to have spent any time actually thinking about military strategy.

Historically this issue is rooted in the independent development of the two dominant services (Army and Navy) and their perception of strategy. Not surprisingly the Air Force generally maintains a supportive position of its parent organization (the Army), while the Marines avidly support the Navy position of status quo. Thus, as has been the case for almost two centuries, the United States must balance its options between two strategies--one Army and the other Navy.

A second key factor which has defied resolution is the specter of the "General Staff." Oddly enough, the disputing factions here again generally line up along traditional service lines rather than pitting civilian versus soldier as one might ordinarily expect from an issue of this nature.

Proponents of the "corporate system" contend that the creation of a Joint General Staff would place too much power in the hands of an individual supported by a highly select group. In the words of the Hudson Institute committee cited above, strengthening the JCS would give the chairman, "powers no good Chairman needs and powers no bad Chairman should have."⁸

Additionally, it is argued that military positions recommended by a strong joint staff would lack the range of options and broad perspectives which are features of the current "consensus" approach. USMC Commandant Robert H. Barrow (retired) in a June 1982 interview with Armed Forces Journal, condemned the system as unsupportive of the critical divergent views sorely needed by civilian authority. General Barrow maintained that these views are vital to a proper understanding of the complexity of national military strategy and would be stifled by a "supreme chief of staff/general staff system."⁹

Advocates of a strong JCS or Joint General Staff contend that these arguments are based on historical misperceptions and service desires to protect their independence.

In his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in December 1982, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown addressed the issue of comparing a strengthened JCS with the German General Staff of World War II face:

I speak next about the so-called German general staff objection that is often made, and made in my judgment on a complete misreading of history. The German general staff was an army general staff, it wasn't a unified one; and, in fact, the problem was that it dominated in the Kaiser's day but not in Hitler's, the civilian authority,¹⁰ so that is a red herring in my judgment.

This argument has been reiterated constantly by supporters of change within the military infrastructure, who are quick to point out that a comparison of the society, history, and Officer Corps of pre-war Nazi Germany is totally incompatible to the American environment and cultural heritage. General David C. Jones, testifying earlier before the same committee, had also interpreted the historical role of the German General Staff in much the same way. He re-emphasized not only the subordination of the General Staff to civilian control (Hitler), but also cited its failure to integrate service efforts as a primary cause for defeat in World War II.¹¹

Whether or not these fears of resurrection are justified would require some insight into the future which is, of course, impossible. This uncertainty added to the understandable inability of any advocates of change to guarantee civil control which creates much cause for alarm. Interestingly, General Upton and Secretary Root would both be quite familiar with this particular argument were they living participants in current debates. For though Prussia

passed from history after the German unification of the late 1870's, the fear of her military staff and legions is very much alive and well today. It has been one hundred and nine years since General Upton's book was first published. Yet the standard of efficiency he so admired in that long dead state, still conjures an emotional fear that is extremely difficult to quell.

The suppression of independent service views on military issues is also hotly debated by supporters of a strong joint staff. Secretary Brown emphatically discounted this argument in his testimony before the White Commission. His rationale was that a President or Secretary of Defense could always get divergent views if they wanted them, simply by exercising their legal position of authority within the Defense Department.¹² Although this admittedly circumvents the military chain of command, the civil authority is there to demand it if required.

In regard to the key issue that a Joint General Staff would become a rigid structure enforcing a strict, singular conformity of view, Secretary Brown raised another important point and also addressed this key issue in his testimony before the White Commission:

It is my experience that enforced conformity of view is much less likely in a joint general staff than with a military service. The latter's strong traditions and sense of cohesion and community make the headquarters staff of a military service more monolithic than any other

organizational unit of the U.S. military; plenty of argument goes on, but it is kept inside.¹³

The fear and relevance of a "resurrected German General Staff" in American uniforms is significant, not because of its probability, nor even because of its possibility. The perception of that threat is of import because it is supported by a fear that is as real as our past. From minuteman to astronaut, the American people have long cherished the ideal of the citizen soldier just as they have cherished their liberty. From these early ideals, fear has evolved and justified or not, that fear is real.

As important as this perception may be politically to the future outcome of events, the subordination of service prerogatives is no less significant. For the advent of a Joint General Staff, or even a lesser strengthening of the current JCS, will have significant impact upon the ability of any one service to control its own destiny.

This loss of authority is more than a simple loss of command and control, as each of the military arms is fully aware. A centralized national military command structure will have substantial impact, especially over the long term, on areas which have always been considered traditional service "fiefdoms". Strategic planning, resource allocation, and configuration of operational forces would immediately be absorbed by a powerful joint staff if reorganization were to be accomplished. Moreover, substantial impacts would, of

necessity, be felt in personnel management, administration, logistics, and procurement.

These areas cut to the heart of each service's understandable and natural desire to sustain itself. Numerous and sweeping changes would be needed in varying degrees to effectively support a centralized staff; as such, they represent the real threat to the services. It is this fact perhaps, which makes the JCS debate so volatile among senior military officials.

A closely related issue to service prerogatives is the role of the Joint Chiefs themselves. For it is through their dual role as JCS members and service chiefs, that control over the system is maintained.

This "dual hatting" renders the system nearly impotent by subjecting the chiefs to undue pressures on key issues. While required by the Reorganization Act of 1958 to place joint duties ahead of other considerations, a service chief nonetheless risks the de facto alienation of his own service if he subordinates its interests on key issues. In 1978, Senator John Culver, reflecting on the inherent conflicts engendered by the "dual" system and the difficulties it fostered, stated:

If the Congress perceives shortcomings in the work of the Chiefs, it is perhaps because their present organizational structure forces them to wear two hats simultaneously. What we in Congress desperately need from the Joint Chiefs are military judgments and recommendations free from

Service bias. Then we can make informed judgments about cutting or adding to a budget.¹⁴

Further, a chief's duties in JCS are significant and time consuming, yet he is still expected to actively and simultaneously provide leadership to his "alma mater"--even though the vice chiefs are technically charged with this responsibility under law. Ambassador Robert W. Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in a June 1982 interview with Armed Forces Journal, described the dual hatting system as a "major institutional failing." He reiterated the concept that one man performing two full time jobs that possess inherent conflicting interests was an impossible situation.

Advocates of the current structure, however, argue that this affiliation is critical to "keep the chiefs in touch" with the realities of service needs and requirements. The loss of this affiliation, it is argued, would create stagnation within the JCS and insulate the services from key decisions where their input might be critical. General Lyman L. Limnitzer (USA retired) defended this consensus by arguing that a strong central staff would deny civilian leaders access to the varied talents and broad service experience of the service chiefs.

Also, defenders of the current JCS maintain that the "dual hatting" situation is not a problem at all. They argue that supposed organizational failures are merely a

reflection of poor leadership and inability to effectively prioritize and delegate authority. Critical and time consuming service responsibilities, if handled correctly, would provide the chiefs sufficient time to adequately perform their dual role. This action, if implemented, would "solve the problem" without legislation or generating unneeded and potentially harmful reorganization.¹⁵ As Admiral Thomas H. Moorer explains:

...if an officer cannot find time to handle both his Service duties as well as his joint duties, then he is not qualified for either job.¹⁶

The role of the chairman has also been the object of dissent although the perceptions and extent of his powers varies widely--even among proponents of a strong JCS.

1. Should the chairman "own" the Joint Staff?
2. Should the chairman be placed in the operational chain of command?
3. Should the chairman have command and control authority over the services?
4. Should the chairman be the ranking military officer within the Department of Defense?

Under the present system, the joint staff as a functional part of the OSD works under supervision of the Director for the JCS as a body--not for the chairman. While the consequences of this seem insignificant, this lack of authority tends to reduce the chairman's ability to provide

direction to the services as a whole. Additionally, the staff tends to prioritize naturally along historical service lines thereby greatly reducing efficiency and cohesion.¹⁷

Historically this issue also has several parallels in U.S. Army organization prior to 1903 which can be drawn-- although the similarities are admittedly no more significant than the differences.

Prior to 1903, the Commanding General of the Army was the head of all Army forces. He did not, however, possess command authority, dealing instead through the various Bureaus for administrative and logistics matters, and the Military Departments for operational requirements.

The Bureaus represented the Commanding General's "staff" in a loose semi-autonomous arrangement whereby he was provided support. He could not, however, directly control the coordinated actions of the various agencies. Although it is obvious that this "system" failed miserably in the Spanish-American War, it was an Army system, not a joint system. Because of this fact opponents of a strong JCS do not consider the model relevant. They contend that because of the inherent differences between the services no amount of centralization that took place in the interest of efficiency could possibly justify the inevitable loss of expertise and diversification provided by the present system.

On the other hand, the "committee" approach to military planning and decisionmaking is diametrically opposed to any accepted principles of military leadership and chain of command, therefore should not be expected to work efficiently. The importance of unity of command, a key principle of military leadership, can be more readily appreciated by understanding why it is needed, what it achieves, and how it achieves it.

In 1962, the U.S. Army described these aspects in its Field Manual 100-5, Operations:

The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be attained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting¹⁸ a single commander with the requisite authority.

The importance of differentiating between the levels at which command is exercised is also addressed in the same work. Tactically, singular military command is emphasized whereas at the strategic or national level the fusion of military and political requirements are acknowledged as paramount to success.¹⁹

The United States has never entered a war without having to restructure its highest level of military command in order to provide the President effective leadership and advice. Moreover, almost semi-annually the JCS modifies its basic organization (expanding or contracting), in order to

accomplish what is needed or requested by the NCA and the services. This fact alone is evidence of inherent faults within the structure and will be resolved only by a major legislative revision of its charter.

The incorporation of the chairman into the operational chain of command and its effect on the CINCs and services has already been discussed at some length. An adjunct of this is the fact that the relative position of the JCS chairman must be strengthened and that his current role as "first among equals"²⁰ is clearly and sometimes decisively, inadequate.

Many operations currently are characterized by sketchy information which is only available at a variety of agencies (many nonmilitary) at the highest levels of government. The presence of a strong, unified joint staff, led by a chairman within the operational chain of command would capitalize on this information in minimal time. A U.S. News and World Report article, dated 27 February 1984 entitled "Can't Anybody Here Run a War?" amplified the widely held concerns over the operational capability of the U.S. national command structure. The article describes the Pentagon's failure to support CINCLANT and the assaulting troops with maps of Grenada. The inability of the unified command to effectively control and coordinate Army and Marine ground maneuver is also cited as a major deficiency, attributed directly to a lack of direct communications between services.²¹

Admiral Thomas B. Haywood, CNO of the United States Navy and a member of the JCS, demonstrated the sensitivity of this subject for all the services in his testimony to the Armed services Committee on 12 December 1982:

So, it is I am deeply offended by the slanderous criticism which one frequently and commonly hears about the Joint Chiefs of Staff being an ineffective group of parochial service chiefs who spend most of their time bickering among themselves, or trading to preserve turf and what is best for their service.

Leaders of the United States are again involved in serious and heated debate over the concept, organization, and authority of the national military command structure. As can be seen from the arguments above and in previous chapters none of the basic premises are new--only the players, technology, and times have changed.

SUMMARY OF THE PRESENT ISSUES

That the JCS system can and does function is undeniable--one look at American military power stationed around the world shows even the most casual observer that some system of command and control is present. The key question then becomes how well, and is this enough to insure U.S. survival? This study evaluated the JCS capability in terms of three key factors: 1) concept and mission 2) historical performance and 3) the threat.

The role of the JCS within the national command structure is not simply an ideological argument of civil versus military power, but more a pragmatic function of need. Does the United States need an advisory body; or instead, an operational command element at that level?

Experts in international relations and indeed the leaders of the Communist Bloc themselves have consistently stated since the 1960's that the gravest threat to democracy in the world today is not nuclear war, but low intensity conflict. Granted "brush-fire wars" and "international incidents" requiring military force are not new, but in the words of Premier Leonid Brezhnev:

...In today's conditions new opportunities are opening up for the cohesion of the socialist countries, the Communist movement and all progressive forces in the struggle for the people's interests.

Since World War II, the United States has found itself responding to ever increasing acts of terrorism, insurgency, and international instability with the projection of military power. Since 1956, 51 incidents have resulted in the activation of the JCS Crisis Action System.²⁴ While differing in size, scope, and location, several common characteristics were exhibited by each: all occurred with little time available for planning; intelligence was limited, generally available only at the highest levels and agencies. The military response, if initiated, was conducted

as a joint operation over extended distances. One needs only to review a few key instances such as Lebanon or Grenada to reach the conclusion that there is a definite need for strong, decisive joint command and control at the highest level. This command and control organization must be able to gather and analyze intelligence, coordinate, recommend, and plan for contingencies. Additionally, the ability to execute military operations efficiently with minimal turbulence and maximum political interface is vital for future success.

As for the performance of the JCS itself--can it provide this role as structured, and if not, why not? The key here lies in our own history. Since its inception, the JCS has never been viewed as anything more than an advisory body and has only been empowered to function in that role. It is true that the chairman in a crisis can recommend without consulting the other JCS members, but recommendations are not actions. Previous chapters discussed the "operational arm" of the U.S. military, the CINCs. This is where execution takes place; where military power is projected within the chain of command. Unfortunately, many experts agree with the position of Samuel Huntington quoted earlier in this chapter--that the effectiveness of the specified and unified commands is questionable.

Additionally, because most crises today are so closely controlled by the civilian agencies of government, the temptation to use the JCS operationally (as in Grenada) has

occurred more frequently than ever. Further, these U.S. applications of force are considered and executed at the highest levels of government. Yet the CINCs, due mainly to factors of time and space, are generally not able to present their views in person--technology aside. Nonetheless, it is they who must implement these plans, often without adequate intelligence or support. In Grenada, CINCLANT conducted a highly successful joint operation, over extended distances, against light opposition. There were problems, however. Key, fundamental problems which given greater enemy capability, could have spelled disaster.

In a sense the Grenada operation could possibly perform much the same role for joint command and control, as did the Spanish-American War for justifying the Army's internal reorganization. Advocates are increasing their efforts to strengthen the role of the chairman and create some type of general staff system to negate this inter-service rivalry.²⁵ This movement is a positive sign, but nothing less than a comprehensive, carefully balanced reorganization will accomplish the goal. Major revisions are necessary, but some aspects of the structure do function and with a little modification their effectiveness under a Joint General Staff would be retained or even enhanced.

Clearly the CINCs are an effective method of controlling joint operations. Just as clearly, they cannot do the job alone--especially with vague and changing

guidance. The unified and specified commands must have a centralized military headquarters which can provide them with functional, decisive direction. Intelligence, interagency coordination, policy interpretation, administrative and logistical support are all vital requirements which can only be provided to the CINCs by a strong centralized headquarters. These were not present at Grenada in 1983 and CINCLANT could not correct those deficiencies before the order was given to move. Who could? Under the present system, no one. The Joint Staff as an advisory body is an institution without the two most important elements in any command and control issue: singular directive authority and a corresponding responsibility for its actions.

The impact of technology on present and future military operations is the third key factor in demonstrating the need for a strong centralized command structure. Technology, for all its wonders has placed two substantial burdens on all military command structures today which were not present in the not-so-distant past: time and the threat of mass nuclear destruction.

Today, complex satellite communications can bring world events into the public's living room almost instantly. International crises, which once allowed months or weeks for complex decisionmaking, now must be acted upon in days or even hours. Commanders, once delegated broad powers due to

distance and time, are now in communication with the highest authorities virtually instantaneously. The significance of this is that command and control must be as responsive as the systems and units which support it. Unlike the past, the lives of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are no longer entrusted solely to the delegated authority at the scene. For in this very dangerous nuclear world, mistakes made locally could get out of hand with disastrous results. yet, at the same time the JCS which has such incredible reach and potential in terms of command and control is encumbered by an organizational structure and charter of authority which is a relic of a bygone era.

Much has been said about nuclear war and it is not within the parameters of this thesis to add to the topic. What is of significance to the point at hand is the fact that it is possible. However unlikely, the consequences of nuclear defeat is such that it presents a stark military reality: how to deter, if possible; fight, if necessary; survive and win. The complexity of the nuclear issue presents the highest levels of any government with many harsh issues: how to control one's own capabilities or detect an aggressor's; how to determine the scope of a nuclear attack and respond effectively; how to survive and reconstitute. These are obviously no mean tasks for any nation, nor any national military command. The right

decisions must be made quickly. The results of error can range from accidental first use to total defeat.

The flight time of an ICBM from continental Russia to the United States can be less than 30 minutes; from a submarine less than 10. Clearly this is no environment for a "corporate system" of military command. True, our nuclear systems are "fail-safed" to the degree that it is possible, but their use is still command-dependent upon the President or his designated representative(s). Without doubt, in those few desperate minutes, should they ever occur, our President will require as much intelligence and guidance as precious time will allow; for to initiate a first strike due to miscalculation will bring the same result as retaliation in kind--total war. This intelligence will come from a variety of sources--some civilian, most military. The assessment, when made, will be made with joint advice. The command, when given, will initiate joint retaliation.

Little more need be said about the threat to U.S. national security today, although certain key points should be re-emphasized. Never before has the United States faced a potential enemy with the capability for waging war that the Soviet Union possesses. Never before has the United States had to face the prospect of fighting a war with a substantial numerical inferiority in virtually all theaters of operations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, never before has the United States seriously had to consider the

possibility of defeat. Today, when the risks of defeat are far greater than they have ever been, can the United States chance contributing to its own demise by accepting a less than optimum capability in their highest military staff? The ghostly specter of a general staff is a shadowy threat indeed when compared to the realities and likelihood of a nuclear battlefield.

Arguments pro and con have been offered by some of the finest minds this country has been able to produce for well over a century. The issue remains.

CHAPTER IV: END NOTES

¹Deborah M. Kyle, "DOD Deadline on JCS Reform Recommendations May Delay Reorganization Bill", Armed Forces Journal, (September 1982) pp. 17-19.

²Ibid. p. 18.

³The Kansas City Times, "Experts Say Cnage Needed In Military", (22 January 1985) sec. A p. 5.

⁴Rick Maze, "Study Group Assails JCS Reorganization Bill", Army Times, (8 October 1984) p. 37.

⁵Robert S. Dudney, "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?", U.S. News and World Report, (27 February 1984) p. 37.

⁶Ibid.

⁷U.S. Government Printing Office, (Washington, 1982) H.R. 6828, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1982, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 97th Congress, second session, p. 132.

⁸Maze, Study Group, p. 37.

⁹Deborah M. Kyle and Benjamin F. Schemer, "Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms Most Others Tell Congress Are Long Overdue", Armed Forces Journal, (June 1982), p. 62.

¹⁰H.R. 6828, Hearings, p. 112.

¹¹Ibid., p. 93.

¹²Ibid., p. 112.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS--How Much Reform Is Needed?", Armed Forces Journal, (April 1982), p. 87.

¹⁵Kyle and Schemmer, "Navy, Marines", p. 65-66.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷David C. Jones, "Why The Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change", Armed Forces Journal, (March 1982) pp. 65-66.

¹⁸Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Contrast, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 23 March 1982) p. 87.

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Meyers, "The JCS", p. 87.

²¹Dudney, "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?", p. 37.

²²H.R. 6828, Hearings, p. 255.

²³The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, "L.J. Breshnev's Friendly Visit to the German Democratic Republic", vol. XXV, No. 19, June 6, 1973, as cited by Harold W. Rood, Kingdoms of the Blind (Carolina Academic Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1980) p. 250.

²⁴David F. Barrenson, "Why A CAS", slide #84-6928, from the Armed Forces Staff College resident course of instruction, as provided by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

²⁵Dudney, "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?", p. 39.

CHAPTER V: THE ALTERNATIVE: A JOINT GENERAL STAFF

GENERAL

It is an unfortunate legacy of democracy that military preparedness is often sacrificed for political expediency.

In the words of Major Guy du Maurier:

Democracy is the best system of government yet devised, but it suffers from one grave defect--it does not encourage those military virtues upon which, in an envious world, it must frequently depend for survival.

Assuming this is true, the alternative is clear: command and control must reflect the battlefields of the future and not the past. The only organization which can give the United States this advantage is a Joint General Staff.

It is clear that the difficulties in JCS concept, intent, command, and control are critical to U.S. security. Yet these same problems are historical in nature, remaining unresolved by over a century of debate and reorganization.

In the past, the United States has had months - even years to prepare, train, and organize for war. Today this

¹Armed Forces Journal, (March 1982) cover page

luxury is gone. The United States must be prepared to fight the next war now; in a joint environment, with a strong, unified national staff. Each of the services in some measure has acknowledged this need in its present training, doctrine, and inter-service affiliations. Yet paradoxically, each has also fought to retain its autonomy. The services cannot voluntarily solve this volatile issue by themselves--and they cannot reasonably be expected to do so. The time has come for Congress to lay this issue to rest by directing the establishment of a Joint General Staff and the system to support it. The approach advocated in this study utilizes the creation of a U.S. Joint General Staff organization as one method of achieving optimum command and control at the national level. The ability of this staff to transcend both present and historical obstacles would depend upon careful organization and proper allocation of power by senior civilian authorities. This critical action must encompass all key aspects of command and control discussed below. These issues form the root of the problem, as well as the key to the solution.

THE ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN

The first critical step in resolving this historical dilemma lies in acknowledging the operational role of the

JCS in general, and the chairman specifically. By changing the concept of the JCS from "advisors to players" is certainly a step in the right direction. But the chairman, now Chief of the Joint General Staff, would rotate between the services every 3 years (or as directed by the President). As the senior military official, the Chief of the Joint General Staff must be empowered by law to command. Promote him to the rank of five stars and expand his authority to direct and control. This would include not only the unified and specified commands, but each of our services in peace and war. In this manner a singleness of purpose can be attained that has never before been possible. Planning, resource allocation, and military direction would be enhanced without endangering civilian control. The Secretary of Defense would then be free to deal with one single military recommendation on any given issue instead of three competitive ones. His staff could be correspondingly reduced as the Joint General Staff assumed the functions and battles that will most likely continue between the services. The service secretaries would be retained at this level for balance. Yet the advice, the priorities, the recommendations and alternatives he would be presented would be joint positions from a unified staff adequately trained and empowered to accomplish these functions. The chairman, as the ranking military officer (five stars), would insure the support of civil policy requirements. He could now

prioritize military strategy correctly and in total--for the mechanism and authority of command would finally be there to enforce it. Additionally, response to the needs of the National Command Authorities and National Security Council would be singular and decisive, with proper military options prepared by a joint commander and staff in support of national needs.

Finally, because the Chief of the Joint Staff works for the President through the Secretary of Defense, the principle of civilian control would be retained.

ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT OF THE STAFF

To be effective the Joint General Staff must not only be effectively organized from an operational point of view, but must also possess the necessary capabilities to address the gamut of specialized requirements common to and characteristic of a multi-service headquarters. Although a tall order, this can be readily achieved by redefining and reducing the responsibilities of the OSD and service staffs while expanding and broadening those of the existing Joint Staff.

It would not be the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and small specialized OSD to attempt to solve inter-service issues; those should be settled for him by the general staff. These "turf battles" should be "fought" internally by the military before reaching the OSD. 41s

responsibility would be rightly placed on approving or disapproving the feasibility or infeasibility of the general staff's recommendations, providing civil interface with governmental agencies and budget management from a cost analysis point of view.

The Joint General Staff, as the immediate subordinate of the Secretary of Defense must absorb the necessary prioritization, management, and operational requirements necessary for true joint command and control. Since the Secretary of Defense is a member of the NCA and NSC while the chairman is not, his role in the chain of command remains intact, enhanced by retention of joint budget approval authority.

The Joint General Staff, however, would gain control of all issues affecting military forces as delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The personnel to run this organization initially would come from already existing positions within the OSD and service staffs. This internal reorganization would have several impacts.

First, the services, if denuded of a large portion of their staffs, will be forced to rely upon the Joint General Staff for support. This support would be readily available due to the assets being transferred.

Secondly, the services would be free to concentrate on managing themselves--a formidable task in its own right. No longer required to directly staff joint and service issues,

each service could concentrate on internal requirements unencumbered by the complexities of national level staff actions and "dual-hatting" requirements.

Finally, the unwieldy joint coordination and staffing system would be destroyed. Each of the services would be free to address its own positions to the Joint General Staff unencumbered by the "concensus" requirements. The Joint General Staff in turn, would be responsible for deciding these volatile military issues internally, before presentation to the Secretary of Defense. Service reclamation to the Secretary would be permitted for balance through the service secretaries, but congressional interface should not. Here only the Secretary of Defense/OSD and the Chief/Joint General Staff would provide defense interface because of their joint interest.

The CINC's would maintain their current role and responsibilities with only slight modifications. Specifically, the need for "directive authority" would be eliminated and replaced by the command authority of the Joint General Staff. Administrative and logistical support, previously directed from the CINC via subordinate components to the service staffs, would now be corrected. Requests for CINC support would be received by the Joint General Staff, analyzed, prioritized, and service support directed as appropriate. Thus simultaneously conflicting priorities between theaters can be adequately addressed without

distracting the CINC's from their primary purpose: warfighting.

Secondly, the elimination of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) concept could be accomplished. The Joint General Staff, in absorbing its functions would determine and direct these issues in the course of normal staff operations, with further interface as necessary between the service chiefs and the chairman as required.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

While the scope of these recommendations is admittedly large, it is feasible, with no increase (and in fact a probable decrease) in assets. More importantly, a Joint General Staff could be effectively organized within the current DOD structure. It should be recalled from previous chapters, however, that establishment of the staff is only the first step (albeit the most difficult). Sustainment and refinement of the system would, of necessity, have to occur over time until optimum performance of the system could be reached. The significant aspects and considerations of this effort are generally identified and discussed below. Although detailed analysis is not within the realm of this study, the following areas should be studied in order to adequately support these command and control recommendations for institutionalizing a U.S. Joint General Staff.

Staff Structure

This study has dealt with the specifics of concept, intent, command, and control at the national level. To institute a Joint General Staff properly, however, the organization must be efficiently imposed in the chain of command between the OSD and the service staffs. Consequently, the Joint General Staff would have to be organized efficiently and yet provide effective interface with four widely differing organizations--one civilian and three military.

Establishing an organization of this complexity will require considerable study to insure responsiveness, control of vital staff views, and proper service interface.

Personnel

For a Joint General Staff system to be truly effective over time, the integration of each service's personnel system must be effected in support of staff sustainment. This would require an identification and selection criteria system which could identify superior performers in each service, and account for differing standards of personnel selection and management. Additionally, the specific needs and career patterns of joint general staff officers would have to be met and managed. Joint schooling and general staff assignments would, of necessity, have to be balanced with alternating service assignments to maintain proficiency

in the "parent" organizations.

Next the general staff would have to track and control those personnel through their careers to insure those needs were adequately met in a timely manner.

One final thought concerning personnel is in order. Much has been made of the lack of quality available to the JCS under the current joint system. This would be extremely unlikely under the Joint General Staff. The services would have to provide their best people in order to "share" in the powerful new organization. While not ideal motivation for supporting the system, the impact of not providing one's best would surely be regarded as an unaffordable option over the long term.

Education and Training

As mentioned before, the long term sustainment of a Joint General Staff would be as critical, if not more so, to overall success than its initial establishment. For if the system cannot self-perpetuate high quality, the product ceases to be a desirable goal for which to strive.

A key factor in this area would be education and training, and the manner in which our services train and select their officers would have to be coordinated carefully. Officers would need to be selected early-on in their careers (just prior to field grade promotion) and special schooling in joint warfare and staff procedures

added to their career patterns, in addition to normal service training. This pattern would be repeated throughout the officer's career, provided his performance remained high; broadening and deepening his expertise as rank and responsibility increased. Only a separate Joint Service College could emphasize and perform this function adequately and then only in addition to present service schooling.

It is not enough to "familiarize" service officers with other services and joint procedures, for expertise is the goal; and true expertise can only be fostered by extensive training, repetition, and the healthy competitive examination and familiarity with all services over the course of a career. So important are these first two issues in the ingredients for success that I believe the full effectiveness of a Joint General Staff would not truly be felt until the first and possibly second generation of joint service selectees have passed into retirement.

Budget Controls

Perhaps the single most critical item which the Joint General Staff must control are service budgets. As Secretary Forrestal soon discovered during the Truman Administration, control of the budgetary process is critical to true effectiveness within the United States organization.

By retaining the powers of approval and prioritization, the Joint General Staff would possess the single most

important weapon against the rise of "serviceism". Strategic direction and programming, procurement, and the priorities in which the services support the national goals and policies of the NCA will have finally been achieved--and the impact in terms of cost effectiveness alone would justify its existence within the span of one PPBS cycle (about 8 years).

Additionally, improved coordination and equipment interoperability could be achieved by single agency management. Duplication of effort (an always present factor under today's system) could be eliminated. For example, one helicopter training center could be maintained for all services to train helicopter pilots and crews instead of maintaining separate Army and Navy schools. Instruction could be tracked, if determined desirable and efficient, but only one school would be required, tailored to meet all needs.

The budget system as it is presently constructed could be maintained in support of the Joint General Staff. True modifications of procedures would be necessary but certainly not a major overhaul. Ultimately, a considerable reduction in staff personnel would be realized from OSD level through CINC. By eliminating duplication and fixing a single control staff of responsibility, major cost efficiencies would be realized long term.

Administration and Logistics

The services must, of necessity, retain execution and planning authorities over the support of their components worldwide. Under any system the services would always remain the subject matter experts within their fields and rightly so. However, the directive authority to prioritize and quantify that support should be retained by the Joint General Staff. The measure of priorities is a strategic question that cannot be addressed from a singular viewpoint. Both CINCEUR and CINCPAC may have valid competing requests which are militarily critical and sound. But the priority of support should be balanced and directed from the strategic level. Balanced against NCA desires and the scarcity of resources we are likely to continue to have in the future, only a Joint General staff can provide essential command and control. For the natural self interests and perspectives of such a staff are broad, joint and indeed, national in character.

SUMMARY

Each of the points briefly mentioned above are critical in my judgment to the success of this proposal. There are others of perhaps lesser significance that run the full gamut of military organization and responsibility.

It should be remembered that the intent of a Joint General Staff is not to replace the OSD or the service

staffs. Each has now, and would retain, a critical and important role within the military command structure. The role of the Joint General Staff, however, would center on the direction, control, and coordination of military effort; applied with a singleness of purpose in support of the national will. Civil authority would be retained as described in this chapter--yet simplified into manageable positions and options prepared by the Joint General Staff.

The importance of this proposal has been argued for one hundred years without success. Yet the issue has never been so critical as it is today. In a period of rising military budgets, worldwide military commitments, and rising threat capability, the adoption and support of a Joint General Staff system should be the single most important defense issue. For the subject and the goal is effective, joint command and control worldwide. If history should remind us of anything regarding this debate, it is that effective command and control is combat power, and its efficient application in the world of today may make all the difference in national survival.

APPENDIX 1¹

Major Studies on Reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

INEVITABLY, there will be some impetus to turn the proposals by General Jones and General Meyer over to a group for study. If done, the exercise should be a very brief one, for as the following list of 20 studies over 38 years reveals, the need to restructure the JCS has been studied to death. We don't need any more studies, we need action.

Apr 1944--McNarney Plan

Mar 1945--Richardson Committee Majority Report

Sep 1945--Eberstadt Plan

Oct 1945--Collins Plan

Jan 1947--Army-Navy Compromise Plan (Norstad-Sherman Plan)

Nov 1948--Eberstadt Committee (of the Hoover Commission) Report

Feb 1949--Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (Hoover Commission) Report

Apr 1953--Rockefeller Committee Report

Apr 1953--President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan

Jan 1958--Wheeler Committee Report (prepared at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Apr 1958--President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan

Dec 1960--Symington Study on Reorganization of the Department of Defense (prepared for President-elect Kennedy)

Jul 1970--Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh) Report

Jun 1978--Ignatius Report on Defense Reorganization

Jul 1978--Steadman Committee Report on National Military Command Structure

Feb 1979--Defense Resource Management (Rice) Report

¹Edward C. Meyer, "The JCS: How Much Reform is Needed?", Armed Forces Journal, Vol. 119, 8, (April 1982) p. 88

Sep 1979--National Security Policy Integration (Odeen)
Report

Dec 1981--Joint Planning and Execution Steering Committee
Report

Feb 1982--Two Separate Reports of the Chairman's Special
Study Group

Feb 1982--Jones' Reorganization Proposal

APPENDIX 2

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
2. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
3. LTC(P) Michael T. Chase
CSI
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
4. LTC John A. Hixon
CSI
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
5. COL E. F. Vitzthum
Institute of Agriculture and Natural Resources
University of Nebraska
Lincoln, Nebraska 68506
6. MAJ Gilbert A. Bernabe
DJCO
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
7. LTC Everett C. Grantham
DCS
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
8. LTC Ben Ingram, Jr.
DJCO
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
9. Mr. Bradley
Directorate of Leadership and Ethics
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. BOOKS

1. Concord Hymn. Quoted by Jon Stallworthy, ed., The Oxford Book of War Poetry, Oxford University Press; New York 1984

This book is a collection of war poetry. Use was limited solely to the extraction of a term within Emerson's poem.

2. DuPuy, Trevor N. A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1607-1945, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentiss Hall, 1977

DuPuy's book is a comprehensive study of the origins, function, and design of the German General Staff. Although his analysis is subject to debate, this book did provide the analytic vehicle for evaluating the JCS in this thesis.

3. Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1952

Guderian's book is a fascinating account of German Army operations in World War II. References to the General Staff were indirect, and of little use as a source.

4. Hittle, J.D. The Military Staff. The Stackpole Co., Harrisburg, PA, 1961

BG Hittle discusses each of the major staff systems in existence today. The functions and an analysis of the French, German, British, Soviet, and U.S. JCS are discussed at length.

5. Korb, Lawrence J. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976

Korb's work provided a primary source for this thesis. His in depth study of the JCS covers virtually every aspect of the concept, development and effectiveness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. Leach, Barry. German General Staff. Ballantine Books, Inc., New York, 1973.

This book emphasizes the organizational, political, and personality aspects of the German

General Staff in World War II. Although interesting and well illustrated, it was of limited value.

7. "L.I. Breshnev's Friendly Visit to the German Democratic Republic," vol. XXV no. 19 of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press Cited by Harold W. Rood, Kingdoms of the Blind, p. 250. Carolina Academic Press, Durham, NC, 1980.

This work is not directly related to the subject of this thesis. A specific reference to Soviet strategic intent was used from this source in supporting a secondary argument.

8. Schellendorf, Bronsart Van. The Duties of the General Staff. Harrison and Son, London, 1905.

General Schellendorf's work is an exceedingly detailed examination of the internal elements and functions of the German "Great Staff." Not directly related to the subject of the thesis it did provide extensive background material in preparing for the research.

9. Summers, Harry G. Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War In Contrast, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1982.

This book was used solely as the source for a specific reference on unity of command.

10. Upton, Emory L. The Armies of Asia and Europe. Greenwood press, New York, 1968

Historically, this book is one of the standard bearers recommending a General Staff System. Written before the inception of the JCS, it is Army oriented, but still had some utility as an historical reference.

11. Weighley, Russell F. The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy, MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1975

Comprehensive in scope, this book traces the development of American strategic thinking from colonial times into the nuclear age. The discussion of the differences between developing naval and army strategies were of specific value during the course of this study.

12. Wilkinson, Spencer. The Brain of An Army. Westminster A. Constable and Co., 1895.

Another work advocating the Prussian General Staff system, this book is oriented to the Army command structure.

13. Williams, Richard C.; Childers, J.C.; Bartell, H.T.; DeVoe, M.L. Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) Handbook Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.

This document provides an in depth explanation of the Army budgeting system. The discussion of the interrelationships between joint force planning, strategy and the service budget processes were of major importance to this thesis.

B. PERIODICALS

1. Clayton, W. Graham Jr. "JCS Reform: Necessary, But In Moderation." Armed Forces Journal, May 1942, pp. 68-76

This article is basically a debate in interview format between two government officials regarding JCS reorganization. The arguments were useful and the discussion emphasized the civil-military interface at national level.

2. Desjockey, LTC. "Suasion for Shillelagh." Infantry Journal. September 1949.

This article is a rebuttal of a previously published prior article advocating a General Staff. It is Army oriented and does not provide useful data to this study.

3. Dudley, Robert S. "Can't Anybody Here Run A War?" U.S. News & World Report 27 February 1954, pp. 35-42

Heavy emphasis on the current problems of joint warfare made this article valuable. Broad in scope, the issue of U.S. command and control is discussed at length. Good information is provided on the

present issues concerning the effectiveness of the JCS system.

4. "Experts Say Change Needed In Military." The Kansas City Times, 22 January 1985, Sec. A p. 1-5

This article refers to the recent publication of a study advocating JCS reorganization. General in scope, it provides no specific information regarding the issues.

5. Halloran, Richard. "Study Criticizes a Proposal to Strengthen the Joint Chiefs." The New York Times, 23 September 1984.

This newspaper report cites the publication of a recent anti-reform study. Also general in scope, it does emphasize the fear of a "German General Staff," although no other key issues are discussed.

6. Jones, David C. "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change." Armed Forces Journal March 1982. pp. 62-72.

In this interview with Armed Forces Journal General Jones discusses his perception of the current problem with the JCS command structure. Detailed in content, it provided a major source of material for the discussion in Chapter IV.

7. Kyle, Deborah M. "DOD Deadline on JCS Reform Recommendations May Delay Reorganization Bill." Armed Forces Journal, September 1982, pp. 17-19.

This is a short article describing the unsupportive position of the DOD on the proposed JCS reorganization bill. It does address pro and con arguments of the proposals in general and was used as a source in this study.

8. Kyle, Deborah M. and Schemmer, Benjamin F., "Navy, Marines Adamantly Oppose JCS Reforms Most Others Tell Congress Are Long Overdue." Armed Forces Journal, June 1982, pp. 61-67.

This interview is an in depth discussion of the present Navy/Marine Corps position on the JCS debate. Used as a source for this study, the article provides key information from military authorities against any proposed reorganization.

9. Mathews, John A. "Let's Condense For a Better Defense." Military Review. March 1953, pp. 48-62.

The author discusses at length many of the same issues being discussed today. He advocates centralizing service logistics, administration, and also the formation of an Armed Forces General Staff with a singular chief of staff.

10. Maze, Rick. "Study Group Assails JCS Reorganization Bill," Army Times, 8 October 1984, p. 37.

This is a small article referring to the opposition of numerous groups to the JCS Reorganization proposals.

11. Meyers, Edward C. "The JCS: How Much Reform Is Needed?" Armed Forces Journal, April 1982, pp. 82-90.

In a follow-up interview, Armed Forces Journal discusses both General Jones' reorganization proposals as well as General Meyers' own recommendations. The article is thorough, lengthy and addresses most key aspects of the issues. The interview is a major source of material for this study.

12. Shaw, Samuel R. "The Bad Penny or The Case For the Supreme General Staff." Marine Corps Gazette, September 1959.

This article refutes the arguments favoring a single general staff. The weaknesses of the JCS system, although acknowledged, are viewed as in the best interests of the United States.

13. Schillelagh, Colonel. "The General Staff." Infantry Journal. March 1949, pp. 15-19.

The author advocates the establishment of a true General Staff system for the army. Most of the information is service oriented and has little applicability to the joint arena.

14. Staudenmeir, William O. "Strategic Concepts for the '80's Part II." Military Review. April 1982, pp. 38-59.

Colonel Staudenmeir discusses U.S. national strategy at length and the impact of the JCS and budget process upon U.S. national objectives. The

author provides significant, if indirect, arguments for centralizing resources in the pursuit of national interests.

15. "Tangled Chain of Command--And It's Intentional."
U.S. News & World Report, 27 February 1984.

This article explains the rationale behind the "consensus" approach which guides JCS functions. It favors the maintenance of the present system, though acknowledging certain organizational problems.

16. Wermuth, Anthony L. "A General Staff for America in the Sixties." Military Review, February 1960, pp. 11-20.

LTC Wermuth's article discusses the national military command structure in considerable depth. The article supports a joint (armed forces) general staff and has applicability to the present debates.

C. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

1. Americans at War. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, pp. 66-70, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Willaims' article describes the Army performance during the Spanish-American War and during the turn of the century. It also discusses the ramifications and proposed reforms generated by those campaigns.

2. Armed Forces Staff College, Resident Course of Instruction. Slide #34-6928. As cited by MAJ David F. Barrenson, "Why A CAS?" U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1985.

This slide used as a reference in this study identifies a list of international events which have resulted in the initiation of the JCS Crisis Action System.

3. Arms and the Constitution. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat

Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, p. 12-29, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This reading has been extracted from Weighley's History of the United States Army. He discusses the early colonial influence on the formation of a standing army as well as the militia system.

4. The Atomic Revolution Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience. pp. 363-381, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

An excerpt from Weighley's book The American Way of War, the author discussed the post-war transaction of the Army to the current day. The issues of strategy, formation of the Defense Department, and the effects of nuclear weapons capabilities are also analyzed.

5. Elihu Root and the General Staff. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, pp. 72-83, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This article, reprinted from Military Officers, discussed the career and impact of Secretary of War Elihu Root on the United States Army. It provides an in depth discussion of the birth of the Army's General Staff concept as well as the political conflict surrounding it.

6. Germany First: The Basic Concept of Allied Strategy in World War II. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience. pp. 140-170, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Morton's article discusses the evolution of joint warfare in the United States prior to and during World War II. Also discussed is the disparity in strategic thought between the Army and Navy, and its impact on combat operations.

7. Global War 1941-1945. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, pp. 196-222, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Taken from his book History of the United States Army, Weighley discusses the national command structure during World War II. The author also discusses World War II strategy and Army/general staff organization.

8. Hearings Before The Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services by Congressman Richard White, Chairman. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982.

Held in April through September of 1982, the congressional hearing forms the most important source of current debate to this study. The hearings consist of over 900 pages of testimonials from U.S. government and military officials concerning the proposed JCS Reorganization Bill of 1982.

9. Steadman, Richard C. Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Command Structure. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 1978.

Published in 1978 at the request of the JCS, Mr. Steadman's report is a comprehensive study of the current JCS structure. He discusses all of the current issues and their ramifications and provides recommendations to solve them.

10. The Pershing-Marsh Conflict In World War I. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, pp. 88-95, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This article describes the inherent conflict in Army General Staff organization prior to the establishment of the JCS. Seniority of the position of the chief of staff versus the Army Commander in the field form the crux of the issue.

11. The Post War Army: Command, Staff and Line. Cited by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 20th Century War: The American Experience, pp. 34-55, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

This reading is an excerpt from the author's book Frontier Regulars. It discusses the evolution of the Army after the Civil War and the structure of