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
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VOLUME I

NOVEMBER 1983 - OCTOBER 1985

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FORWARD

ExcelNet, part of the U.S. Army Forum, is a think-tank of volunteer soldiers and private citizens who contribute useful, innovative perspectives and alternative solutions to complex, wide-ranging LEADERSHIP issues. ExcelNet is an interesting mixture of the Old Guard, the New Guard, and the avant-garde. They have diverse educations, experiences, and views. What they all have in common is the energy and desire to make this a better Army.

This volume is a collection of ideas and recommendations from ExcelNet. Some of these papers have already appeared in professional journals. Others soon will. In total, this thought-provoking anthology questions some of our fundamental assumptions about leadership and provides some interesting perspectives on the future.

We encourage you to read the entire collection. You probably will not agree with everything that you read. But, these thoughts will make you pause, reflect, and form your own opinion about leadership in our Army. As you reflect, you will have to call on your own education and experience. Because of this encounter, you will move one step closer to becoming a better leader and a better soldier.

Please feel free to provide your comments, criticism, and support directly to the individual authors.

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Director, U. S. Army Forum
Management Directorate

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*

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WHO WE ARE
&
HOW WE THINK

WELCOME TO EXCELNET

OUR HISTORY

In November 1983, ExcelNet was created as a subnet of the US Army Forum. We started out as ExcelOps ... a net for discussing leadership issues in operational units.

OUR GOAL

ExcelNet's goal is an Army of Excellence, as articulated in ARI Research Paper 83-1, whose leaders at all echelons are professionally competent in the affective, cognitive, and psycho-motor dimensions ... BE-KNOW-DO ...

OUR FOCI

- * Leader Development
- * The Mentor
- * Command Climate
- * The Future

OUR VALUES

- * Courage ... we say it.
- * Competence ... we know what we are talking about.
- * Candor ... we are responsible.
- * Commitment ... we are active.

OUR OPERATION

We strive for our goal through free-flowing discussions on ...

Research -- Assist HQDA, the Army Research Institute (ARI), the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), the Combined Arms Center (CAC), and the Soldier Support Center (SSC) in researching leadership issues.

Doctrine -- Assist CAC and service schools in creating, modifying, and evaluating doctrine ...

Policy -- Assist HQDA, MACOM HQs, and subordinate HQs in the formulation of coherent policies ...

Operations -- Assist field units with any issues related to leadership.

OUR CONTRIBUTION

We contribute to Army readiness by processing ideas, concepts, and discussions for consumption by the Army at large ... widely sharing our thoughts and planting the seeds for positive change. In this manner, we influence the thinking in our Army on the wide ranging, complex, and most crucial element of combat power ... LEADERSHIP.

* * *

HELP WANTED: Fools, Wits, and Navigators

Our Army is evolving, changing, getting better. And we're doing it at a traditionally geological pace. In this "Age of Discontinuity," we should be moving faster . . . warp factor six. That's because Heraclitus' 6th century BC pronouncement that "Nothing endures but change" is truer today. Change is enduring . . . at light speed.

Time compression.
Information explosion.
Future shock.
Megatrends.

Good decisions can no longer be solely based on good information. The information must fit into a mental framework, a new and everchanging paradigm of recognition and significance. We need special people who can mold and fit into this new and unstable paradigm . . . people with unbiased, open cognitive maps, possessing the ability to think in four dimensions or more. We need them because the battlefields of the future will eat up anyone less. That threatens our national survival.

Help Wanted: Fools, Wits, and Navigators

BASIC FUNCTIONS

To disturb our Army by offering glimpses of those truths that elude rational formulation. To challenge all that is sacred and all that the savants, and idiot savants, have proven true and immutable. To shatter truths that aren't.

NATURE & SCOPE

Applicants must be experts in some field. Demonstrable excellence is required but a perfect record is not. Must be able to speak to and out of quite different orders of apprehension and comprehension.

PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTABILITIES

Able to think creatively and perceive in unhabitual ways.

Able to think holistically and intuitively rather than sequentially and logically.

Stir up controversy.

Fear no authority.

Attack issues, not people.

Pose solutions, not problems.

Resist pressures to engage in detailed analyses.

Avoid overutilizing terms like study, analyze, plan, develop, and refine.

Rely on verbs like associate, explore, synthesize, and stimulate.

Exploit intellectual carte blanche.

Ask outrageous questions and challenge basic assumptions.

Seek accuracy, not precision; originality, not consistency; insight, not completeness.

REQUIREMENTS

Broad horizons -- an orientation on the future and a sense of history.

A Renaissance mentality, involving experience in many areas.

A conviction that the Dark Ages must be left behind.

No preconceptions, e.g. parochialism or dogmatism.

Inviolable allegiance to our nation's ideals and our Army.

Gone is the need for droves of traditional, logical, left-brain thinkers. Their's was the "Age of Continuity" and environments of stability. Now is the "Age of Discontinuity," with its demand for "illogical," associative, right-brain thinking that is superior in challenge environments of abrupt change.

Do you tolerate mistakes? Do you encourage creativity and daring? Do you seriously consider controversial, "off-the-wall" opinions and proposals? Or, have you surrounded yourself with people who probe for your opinions and then nod approving support? Can you change the fabric of your thought and thereby change reality and the future?

Santayana said "Those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it." Maybe what he meant was "Those who do not anticipate the future may never experience it."

Our Army needs people who are the classical sage-fool paradox . . . people who can navigate in the future.

No limit on the number of applications. *CALL*

* * *

Inspired by an article in New Management Magazine by D. Verne Morland.

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AV 588-2441/3297

ON COMMAND CLIMATE

JAZZ MUSICIANS AND ALGONQUIN INDIANS

by

Colonel D. M. Malone, US Army (Retired) and Major M. L. McGee, US Army

Leadership ...

A hard topic to study and discuss ... much less agree on.

Sure gets confusing.

Much of our past confusion and failure in teaching "leadership" arises from unintentionally mixing up the concepts, research, applications, dynamics, and analogies of the two most basic types of leadership -- individual and organizational.

We've been aiming at the wrong one.

*

WHY WE'VE BEEN MISSING THE TARGET ...

Army schools, Army doctrine, and Army institutions have, in the past, focused on the individual concept of leadership.

Attributes. Traits. Competencies. Behaviors.

Our efforts to teach individual leadership have been, for the most part, incomplete or ineffective ... for about four reasons. First, we have, in our research, thinking, and conceptual development of what to teach, tried to sort through, and then, boil down to that Golden Screw of Leadership ... some package of "teachables" that will work for almost everyone, in almost any situation.

Surprise!

There ain't none! We simply can't, or haven't been able to, reduce all the intangibles to a single all-powerful, algorithmic, doable list. Our reductionist logic just hasn't worked. The impotence of our efficiency report system -- our institutional two-page measure of "leadership" -- reflects the failure of our search for the Golden Screw.

The second reason for ineffectiveness and incompleteness of the individual approach also explains why reductionist logic can't work. The situations, with their infinite number of problem components and myriad combinations and recombinations, quickly render ineffectual any across-the-board application of any bundle of Golden Screw leadership skills, attitudes, attributes, or whatever. We simply can't reduce the complexity of the world and the human beings who inhabit it.

A third reason why the individual approach hasn't worked is that it attempts to mess with the personality of the individual ... to make some fundamental changes in how the individual thinks, feels, and behaves. But, by in large, we don't have a teacher or school system, the expertise and time required to do it right. It takes a real pro ... licensed and credentialed. Intentionally messing around with a person's personality in some way that is "other" is dangerous. And unethical.

And, the fourth, and perhaps ultimate, reason why the individual

approach to "leadership" hasn't worked derives from a "fundamental fact of life," a baseline, viciously in-bred characteristic of our Army -- the short half-life of policy, doctrine, philosophy, and conceptual anchoring brought about by a "must" of our Army's culture that changes each boss with bewildering frequency. Operating, under the bureaucratic imperatives of a corporate-minded system, our bosses often either focus on short-term programs and results, or else, create dissonance with, static in, distortion of, or breakdown of the larger, long-term programs.

Whatever we teach, or try to teach, as "leadership," the process appears to be constrained to following a developmental path that is time-consuming as hell when we're looking at a whole Army. Invariably, just about the time we've followed the developmental process downriver about three turns from the conceptual start point, a new boss comes aboard and redefines the original concept. The long-term relatedness of the whole process falls apart. The laborers downstream become confused, lose sight of the desired end product, offer up a lot of patchwork, feathers, smoke, and fertilizer, and produce an end result that bears little or no resemblance to what was originally intended. Then the laborers go back to the new boss' concept, and start all over. There are inefficiencies in that kind of system ... economic inefficiencies ... not to mention ineffectiveness, pain, apathy, and sense of hopelessness.

We would have long ago abandoned this futility were it not for the fact that our Army's culture has worked this short-term chaos number on so many of us that, in aggregate, and lacking institutional memory, we begin each "new" concept as the "original," and embark once again on our short, sure-to-be-truncated trip downriver.

We are fooling ourselves.

We have never had an anchoring concept for teaching individual leadership simply because each new boss, himself a product of this willy-nilly process, has a different idea of what "leadership" is.

Don't give up! There is more than one avenue of approach to teaching leadership.

*

LET'S REALIGN THE AIMING STAKES ...

Maybe we should just quit messing around with the individual approach to "leadership," and instead look at "leadership" as an organizational phenomenon ... something, some set of processes, that occurs within, and at the same time is a property of, an organization, rather than an individual. Going with this organizational perspective of leadership is somewhat of a no-lose situation, since, if we stick with the individual approach, our Army's fundamental "concept of leadership" is going to change soon anyway ... again.

This organizational leadership approach exists, today, at least conceptually. The creative aspect of the concept comes not from its content, but from its contextual proposition that "leadership" is a thing of the organization rather than of the individual.

This concept says that "leadership" is a process which must occur within the organization, if the organization is to be effective. This process activates, sustains, integrates, aims, and synchronizes the

smaller parts of the whole system, which might be the Army, or the division, or the depot, or the squad ... depending on where you are standing. It is therefore more appropriate, more productive, for serious students of leadership to think of and speak of "the leadership of an organization," rather than "the leader."

We can get a partial handle on the functioning of this process of organizational leadership if we think of a "good" battalion commander, in the middle of a heavy enemy contact, who is a master "orchestrator" in applying all available combat power. Don't look at this illustration as the ultimate, or total, or essence of "leadership." The battalion commander is working fine, at any point in time, with part of the unit -- with some of its subsystems and some of its processes. But because he is human, and because the battalion is a complex system operating in a chaotic environment, he can't "orchestrate" each and every part all of the time.

He needs help.

While he is succeeding masterfully with certain parts of the battalion, he may be failing miserably with others. He could be on the verge of losing a major victory because he hasn't synchronized or even activated the support platoon with its precious load of ammo. He could also be failing miserably as a standard bearer, if his personal code of values -- which condones lying, cheating, stealing, and whatever -- causes young officers representing hundreds of thousands of dollars in acquisition, development, and sustainment costs to resign.

If we look at this "orchestrator" doing his thing on a hapless enemy and say, "Now, that's leadership," or if we dredge up from memory similar examples to define or explain or teach "leadership", then we do a disservice to our Army by offering an incomplete, out-of-context concept of "leadership" which focuses on traditional short-term outputs and does not reach out along the track of time necessary to develop and implement complex programs. It also assumes that "leadership" exists solely within a single person, and that this single person is the commander. How many leadership homilies constrain towards this heroic assumption? This individual concept of "leadership" is incomplete because it lacks the total organization perspective, with all its components and dimensions.

"Orchestration" occurs because two or more people are making the "music" ... sharing the tasks. It may be that the operations officer, without any guidance or orders from the commander, is looking ahead, then activating and synchronizing the combat power generating subsystems that are going to be required. If the commander gives orders to execute, but the required resources are not on hand or not ready, nothing happens ... at least nothing good. Ever seen this happen? But if you have an operations officer, or chief of staff, or assistant staff officer, or even a radio operator who is part of the real "leadership," and they are setting up the airstrikes, repositioning the reserve, or calling in a critical resupply long before the "old man" has time to think about it, you have organizational leadership. Ever seen symbiotic leadership? Or, aggregate leadership? It is a function of trust, confidence, and disciplined initiative ... all operating within understood intent.

Ever see a unit produce its intended end result at a level exceeding expectations without visible individual leadership?

Go watch and listen to an unled, heterogeneous, everchanging wad of New Orleans musicians play Dixieland jazz, and then, even if you're

only dimly aware of the desired end result, answer the question, "How the hell do they do that with no one in charge?" In the beginning, the drummer or the piano player hits a few licks, and off they go.

Now, transition from music to battle. Go into history and find the Algonquin Indian nation at the height of its power. Look at its war parties who whipped the living bejesus out of any and all comers. On their battlefield, it was taboo ... bad form ... a faux pas ... to tell anyone to do anything, or give an order, or be an individual leader. Yet, these high-performing organizations ... chucked spears, swung hatchets, split heads, strangled windpipes, opened bellies, kneed groins, and generally made things uncomfortable for their enemies ... in a beautiful symphony.

They orchestrated.

Jazz musicians and Algonquin Indians ... leadership ... shared and existing within the organization, rather than within the oldest and loudest musician or the biggest and meanest Indian.

When we look at leadership as a phenomenon occurring as and within the organization, rather than within an individual, we can become aware of subsystems displacing traits, processes displacing behaviors, and "leadership" shifting from one person to the team ... an aggregate ... a whole ... a "we" or "us." This displacement and shifting varies as a function of ...

- SIZE of the organization.
- COMPLEXITY of its end product criteria.
- Variety of internal EXPERTISE.
- LEVEL at which the organization is viewed ... strategic, operational, or tactical.
- TOTALITY with which the organization is viewed ... systemic integration.
- TEMPORAL PERSPECTIVE for turning concepts into reality ... short, middle, and long term.

Roll all these dimensions together, and call it "macroleadership." Maybe it's the antithesis of "micromanagement."

But, we've said nothing about "process." This model of "macroleadership" just sits there, unmoving, static. It ain't doing nothing. It's not running, not operating, not winning battles. We have to turn it on and watch it function.

Time turns on the model. Let's flip the switch and turn on the model. Get time moving ...

Picture one of those full-sized, clear plastic, fully functioning mock-ups of an automobile engine ... turned on ...

Parts are functioning. Processes are occurring. Some of these we can see, others we can't. Liquid flows through a fuel line, urged on and metered by a small subsystem which changes pressure to produce movement. The liquid is transformed, by a subprocess, into a vapor, then brought together at a specific place, at a specific point in time -- both determined by another subsystem -- with the product of other and unseeable subsystems and subprocesses ... an electric pulse that is transformed into fire at precisely the right place at precisely

the right time. The vapor and the fire flow together, and produce an explosion ... a product that bears little resemblance to, and is far more powerful than the parts and processes responsible.

The explosion ... as loud, powerful, and attention-getting as it may be ... is not the be-all and end-all of the engine. We've just scratched the surface, touching upon only a minute portion of the total engine whose ultimate output is power ... existing for the moment as revolution, torque, and speed ... all given to a cylindrical piece of steel rod.

Make the steel rod the ability to organize, train, and equip forces for airland battle. Make the engine our Army. Make the sum total of all the processes and interactions existing among the systems a concept called "macroleadership" ... in operation ... producing power.

Someone has to turn on the switch and press the gas pedal. Otherwise, nothing happens. And when the engine is running, this person can watch just a few gauges, and feel for vibrations, and maybe listen for noise.

While someone controls the switch and the gas pedal, that doesn't mean that the engine will function efficiently, effectively, or at all. There are too many other people crucial to the macroprocess ... people who design all the pieces ... people who produce them ... people who put the systems and subsystems together ... people who move pieces to assembly and delivery points ... people who lubricate the system and pump the gas.

That man with his hand on the switch and his foot on the gas pedal is aware of all those systems, and processes, and people, but only dimly so. He may have once worked on the fuel pump when it broke down. He may know the gas pumpers. He controls the engine, but he's more concerned with the engine as a part of a larger system ... the whole damn vehicle ... with component systems not part of, but connected by processes, to the engine.

If the vehicle is very expensive, belongs to someone else, serves a critical purpose, and the driver is responsible for the vehicle and how it performs, the driver, if he's prudent, will carry the maintenance a bit beyond the gas gauge and dip-stick level. Every now and then, he'll check the whole damn engine.

There was a time when the driver could do most all the checking himself. But, the imperatives of progress demanded more torque, more speed, more power. And the price was complexity, and size, and expense ... eventually reaching the point where maintenance checks exceeded the ken, much less the ability, of the driver.

Enter "macroleadership."

The man at the steering wheel can't control all the subsystems and processes, but he can hook into the major ones. Despite good gas gauge and dip-stick work, the whole damn engine can blow all to hell if the driver doesn't rely on subsystems to meter and control the subprocesses.

We don't have to, nor do we want to, start ignoring individual leadership ... we don't even need to set it aside, even temporarily. Make it the supporting attack. Let's start concentrating our conceptual, research, and analogic "combat power" on organizational leadership ... macroleadership. Make it the main attack.

And there's a way to get that started ...

*

"MACROLEADERSHIP" MEANS "BATTLE STAFF" ...

Military leadership involves more than the capacity to generate favorable attitudes among soldiers, although that is an essential element. Leadership is also more than routinely steering our units by the solution of everyday problems and challenges, although this, too, is essential. As unit performance required on the battlefield becomes less programmed and more adaptive, leadership becomes increasingly complex. A different orientation is needed.

Today, and in the future, leaders at all levels must be concerned with building and guiding responsive systems ... systems of decision and action. Individual leadership, in and of itself, won't be sufficient. This realm of building and guiding responsive systems will require the distinctive quality of organizational leadership. What appears to be needed is recognition that the role of organizational leadership transcends the more traditional interpersonal approach.

Why?

Out there on the battlefield, individual leadership doesn't work ... at least not on the scale at which we fight and win battles. Units fight and win battles ... crews, squads, platoons, companies, and battalions ... aggregates ... not individuals. Units that live by individual leadership -- with all the power and energy focused in a single leader -- have problems. They get overloaded, or rather the commander gets overloaded.

Then things come unhinged.

Why?

For one, individual leadership is perishable ... it dies as soon as personnel turnover has a chance to work its wizardry on the stability, cohesion, and long-term readiness of our units. Sure, the trained and seasoned leaders get transferred to other organizations, but what is the real cost to the losing unit?

Second, individual leadership doesn't understand the complexities of modern warfare. We know, from the science of cybernetics, that control in complex systems ... organizations, human beings, big computers ... is dispersed ... spread throughout the system. And individual leadership is not designed or equipped to handle a complex system in a complex situation.

Third, leadership is a delicate subject to coach ... and it doesn't lend itself to the public review process. That's because we've been conditioned to think that leadership is an individual thing ... a personal thing. But it's not. Leadership on the battlefield is a function of the whole ... the leadership infrastructure ... an aggregate ... hopefully, an "us" or a "we."

The effectiveness of unit leadership rests upon our collective ability to sense the constantly changing currents in our unit; to recognize particularly sensitive areas; to plan, initiate, and carry through changes in the environment ... garrison or battlefield; and, most importantly, to lead and direct our units in such a manner that serious problems do not arise in the course of accomplishing missions. All of these call for a constant awareness of the human and organizational factors in day-to-day operations, and skill in successfully adapting to a variety of situations.

The key difference between overloaded commanders and successful units is the commanders' leadership philosophy. Effective units understand and practice leadership, not as "me" but as "we" ... an aggregate. Responsive units rely upon the communication and thinking skills and decision-making abilities of leaders at all echelons. "We" leadership is airland battlefield leadership on the organizational scale ... the battalion commander, the battalion staff, and the company commanders ... welded together ... cohesive ... flexible and adaptive ... able to cope with the fluid, non-linear airland battlefield through ...

Battle
Staff
Tenets

- Clear understanding of commander's intent ...
- Effective information sharing (vertically, and horizontally) ...
- Simplicity of concepts, orders, and instructions ...
- Reciprocal trust, respect, and confidence ...
- Maximum delegation of authority ...
- Disciplined initiative ...
- Flexibility ...
- Risk-taking ...
- Innovation ...
- Absence of fear and abuse ... and ...
- Teaching.

Airland
Battlefield
Leadership
Doctrine

How can you tell if your unit has "we" leadership?
Simple.

In the heat of battle ... when your unit is up to its hips in the swirling maelstrom ... and the commander doesn't personally have time to give critical orders and instructions, other members of the battle staff are already doing just that. When it's time to fire the FASCAM, and the commander is busy committing the reserve in a counterattack, the S2 and FSO have gotten their heads together, figured out that the parameters for firing FASCAM that were issued as part of the commander's operational concept ... his intent ... have been met, and have given the order to fire. Or, while the task force commander is busy directing an airstrike, a team commander has decided on and is executing the repositioning of his unit ... based upon the intent of the commander's operations order and the current battlefield situation. At its extreme, "we" leadership" might be when the task force commander is dead, but his RTO is able to call in a critical airstrike or give a critical order at the critical time because even he understands his commander's intent.

Battlefields will require leaders not only able to rely upon

themselves, but committed to reliance on other leaders. Leaders must be tightly bound to one another, be able to create new bonds, and be able to maintain those bonds during disruptive and destructive times. Unit performance depends on the activities of all its members ... especially its leaders and staffers. If the unit is to achieve its objectives, each member of the battle staff must perform his duties, and his activities must fit in with those of other battle staff members.

Grab hold of those Battle Staff Tenets. They are the behavioral manifestations of our airland battle leadership doctrine. And they constitute ... when aggregated ... a profile of organizational leadership ... "we" leadership.

*

A FINAL WORD ...

Successful leaders operate effectively because they have knowledge of organizational leadership and of the human, interpersonal elements in their units. And they know how to combine, balance, and direct the two toward the objective. This knowledge is accompanied by recognition that the problems and challenges of leadership have infinite variety and no two can be solved or addressed in the same way. Each leadership situation is new. Each new situation will require imagination, understanding, and skillful action. Therefore, what is needed for the leadership infrastructures of responsive units is not a set of rules or techniques ... or some mythical Golden Screw of leadership attributes, traits, competencies, or individual behaviors. What is needed is ...

- Knowledge of factors that influence unit performance.
- An attitude that emphasizes the relatedness of the unit's subparts and the factors that influence unit performance.
- Good skills in assessing situations and in providing appropriate actions based on the prediction of potential consequences.

Leadership will have to be more than a matter of "human" or native ability, backed by some elementary concepts and reinforced through trial and error. Instead, it must rest on systematic knowledge and a rational and conscious integration of sound organizational principles and processes.

Like jazz musicians and Algonquin Indians.

If we think of macroleadership and Battle Staffs in those terms, we put airland battle leadership in proper perspective.

And we make it doable.

* * *

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* * *

Battle Staff Integration

by Major M.L. McGee

Symptoms
Of A Problem

"There's something wrong with the way my unit is functioning. Don't know what it is. It has to do with how the whole damned headquarters operates. I have good people, but the command group just doesn't function smoothly. What can we do about that?"

Ever heard that? Probably.

Why?

We've been looking for it for more than 200 years, and we still haven't found the Golden Screw of Leadership. Hell, we may never find it. That's because we've been looking in the wrong places, and at the wrong things. We've been concentrating on "me" leadership ... the individual. We've chased attributes, characteristics, competencies, behaviors, traits ... you name it ... we've chased it ... like it was the Holy Grail.

Our Army's
Historical
Perspective
on Leadership

The
Problem

Our Army has been leaning too heavily on interpersonal leadership, and not heavily enough on organizational leadership.

It's time we elevated our thinking ...

Yesterday's
Answers Are
Not Suitable
For Today's
Questions.

Military leadership involves more than the capacity to generate favorable attitudes among soldiers, although that is an essential element. Leadership is also more than routinely steering our units by the solution of everyday problems and challenges, although this, too, is essential. As unit performance required on the battlefield become less programmed and more adaptive, leadership becomes increasingly complex. A different orientation is needed. Today, and in the future, leaders at all levels must be concerned with building and guiding responsive systems ... systems of decision and action. Individual leadership, in and of itself, won't be sufficient. This realm of building and guiding responsive systems will require the distinctive quality of organizational leadership.

Today's and
Tomorrow's
Leadership
Must Be
Different.

The development of leadership infrastructures that possess the needed capabilities may be a difficult task, but not an impossible one. What appears to be needed is recognition that the organizational role of leadership transcends the more traditional interpersonal approach. The design of educational and training programs specifically attuned to this need must be attended to now, at the expense of interpersonal leadership, if need be.


Why?

Individual Leadership Is Not The Best Way To Lead Units, Or At Least Battalions

Out there on the battlefield, or at least the closest thing our Army has to the battlefield ... the National Training Center, individual leadership doesn't work ... at least not on the scale at which we fight and win battles. Units fight and win battles ... crews, squads, platoons, companies, and battalions ... aggregates ... not individuals. Units that live by "me" leadership ... with all the power and energy focused in the leader, say the battalion commander ... have problems. They get overloaded, or rather the commander gets overloaded. Then things come unhinged. Here's what "me" leadership looks like on the NTC battlefield, not empirically, but based on some seasoned observations ...

Leadership As A Function Of "Me" ... The Individual

"I was in total overload!"



There Are Some Other Things Wrong With "Me" Leadership

Perishability

Overly Simple In A Very Complex World

It's Not Our Fault ... We've Been Conditioned

Not a pretty sight. In fact, it's downright appalling ... and not too effective. There are some other things wrong with the individual approach to applying and teaching leadership. For one, it's perishable ... it dies as soon as personnel turnover has a chance to work its wizardry on the stability, cohesion, and long-term readiness of our units. Sure, the trained and seasoned leaders get transferred to other units and organizations, and the net loss to our Army appears to be small. But things like leadership, and leadership turnover, don't show up in our readiness reporting system. That's because Unit Status Reports focus on units. And our leader development process focuses on the individual. Second, "me" leadership doesn't understand the complexities of modern warfare. We know, from the science of cybernetics, that control in complex systems ... organizations, human beings, big computers ... is dispersed ... spread throughout the system. And "me" leadership is not designed or equipped to handle a complex system in a complex situation. Third, leadership is a delicate subject to coach ... and it doesn't lend itself to the public NTC after-action review process. That's because we've been conditioned to think that leadership is an

individual thing ... a personal thing. But it's not. Leadership on the battlefield is a function of the whole ... the leadership infrastructure ... an aggregate ... hopefully, an "us" or a "we."


Unit Effectiveness Is A Function Of Leadership.

The effectiveness of unit leadership rests upon our collective ability to sense the constantly changing currents in our unit; to recognize particularly sensitive areas; to plan, initiate, and carry through changes in the environment ... garrison or battlefield; and, most importantly, to lead and direct our unit in such a manner that serious problems do not arise in the course of accomplishing missions. All of these call for a constant awareness of the human and organizational factors in day-to-day operations, and skill in successfully adapting to a variety of situations.

Leadership As A Function Of "We" ... The Aggregate

Now, there are some battalions that go to the National Training Center and do well. Here's what they look like ... again, unempirically, but based on sound observations at the National Training Center ...

"We did it!"



Why?

The Key Difference

The key difference between the overloaded commander and the successful unit is the commander's leadership philosophy. Effective units understand and practice leadership, not as "me" but as "we" ... an aggregate. Responsive units rely upon the communication and thinking skills and decision-making abilities of leaders at all echelons. And it shows up as a consistently positive learning curve. High-performing units learn better and faster than low-performing units.

Timeout 'o
Kill Warm
And Fuzzies.

Now, before we go any further, let's get something straight. "We" leadership is not voting, consensus, or necessarily warm and fuzzy. It's not management by committee or some bleeding heart, liberal attempt at participative management. "We" leadership, and as it will evolve ... as Battle Staff Integration ... is a killing tool ... like a rifle, a knife, or a tank. It's airland battlefield leadership on the organizational scale. Don't lose sight of that.

Organizational
Leadership ...
The Battle
Staff

Units that do well on the battlefield have "we" leadership. That "we" is the Battle Staff ... the battalion commander, the battalion staff, and the company commanders ... welded together ... cohesive ... flexible and adaptive ... able to cope with the fluid, non-linear airland battlefield through ...

Battle
Staff
Tenets

- Clear understanding of commander's intent ...
- Effective information sharing (vertically, and horizontally) ...
- Simplicity of concepts, orders, and instructions ...
- Reciprocal trust, respect, and confidence ...
- Maximum delegation of authority ...
- Disciplined initiative ...
- Flexibility ...
- Risk-taking ...
- Innovation ...
- Absence of fear and abuse ... and ...
- Teaching.

Airland
Battlefield
Leadership
Doctrine

What It Looks
Like When
You've Got It.

How can you tell if your unit has "we" leadership? Simple. In the heat of battle ... when your unit is up to its hips in the swirling maelstrom ... and the commander doesn't personally have time to give critical orders and instructions, other members of the battle staff are already doing just that. When it's time to fire the FASCAM, and the commander is busy committing the reserve in a counterattack, the S2 and FSO have gotten their heads together, figured out that the parameters for firing FASCAM that were issued as part of the commander's operational concept ... his intent ... have been met, and have given the order to fire. Or, while the task force commander is busy directing an airstrike, a team commander has decided on and is

executing the repositioning of his unit ... based upon the intent of the commander's operations order and the current battlefield situation. At its extreme, "we" leadership might be when the task force commander is dead, but his RTO is able to call in a critical airstrike or give a critical order at the critical time because even he understands his commander's intent.

Proof?

If you can't stomach this non-empirical, qualitative explanation of why organizational leadership is better than individual leadership, let's look at some real research ...

Foundation,
Research, &
Theory

Several years ago, a soldier named Gorman had some researchers gather some data, then analyze it, and explain it using an organizational theory known as the "Adaptive-Coping Cycle." This research, commonly known as the FORGE Research, demonstrated that the leadership infrastructure of a unit ... that Battle Staff ... goes through a predictable cycle in dealing with internal and external events on the battlefield. These researchers proved ... scientifically ... that the better a Battle Staff processed through this Adaptive-Coping Cycle, the better they functioned on the battlefield ... in terms of ...

Adaptive-
Coping Cycle


Productivity

- Handling combat events ...
- Withstanding stress ... and ...
- Achieving acceptable exchange ratios.

Victories

That means productivity ... in terms of burning enemy tanks and piles of enemy dead. Battlefield victories. That's a desirable end-state for combat units. Empirically, here's what the high-performing units looked like, compared to the low-performing units ...

The FORGE
Research In
A Nutshell



The Critical
Element ...
Time

Time represents the most critical dimensional change projected for modern and future war. In the past, leaders, even nations, and time to err. Today, and in the future, there will not be any time for error, nor any margin for error. With "me" leadership, units have to wait for the leader to make each decision. And because of information overload, some decisions are too late getting made, or worse, never get made at all.

What Were The
H-P Units
Doing That The
L-P Units
Weren't?

Again, the key difference with the high-performing unit was that the unit leadership functioned as an aggregate ... a "we" ... a Battle Staff. And they functioned better on the battlefield, in terms of productivity, because they processed through this Adaptive-Coping Cycle better than units that functioned with "me" leadership. Battlefields will require leaders not only able to rely upon themselves but committed to reliance on other leaders. Leaders must be tightly bound to one another, be able to create new bonds, and be able to maintain those bonds during disruptive and destructive times.

Here's what the Adaptive-Coping Cycle looks like ...

And How Does
It Correlate
Battlefield
Performance?

PROCESSES	CORRELATION TO PERFORMANCE
SENSING the event (intelligence/orders/SITREPS).	.92
COMMUNICATING THE SENSING (without changing its meaning).	.79
DECIDING how to deal with it (translating, digesting, storing, and retrieving information).	.78
INTERNALLY STABILIZING (contingency reactions).	.22
COMMUNICATING DECISIONS (preparing and distributing orders and instructions).	.75
COPING with the event (executing/going into action).	.70
FEEDBACK (adjusting during and right after coping).	.18

What?

Statistical
Significance

Processes with a correlation of .63 or higher have a confidence level of $P=.05$. That is very significant. And don't let the low levels of correlation between STABILIZING and FEEDBACK fool you. When each of the processes was separately correlated to the others, ALL were statistically significant. The entire process is important, and so is each individual process.

Requirements
For Battle
Staff
Integration.

Unit performance depends on the activities of all its members ... especially its leaders and staffers. If the unit is to achieve its objectives, each member of the battle staff must perform his duties, and his activities must fit in with those of other battle staff members.

Now, how does all of that apply today at the NTC?

Relevance ...
How Does It
Work On
Today's
Battlefield?

Remember those non-empirical graphs way back at the beginning ... the ones based on seasoned observations of units training at the National Training Center? The "proof" of effective processing is readily observable at the National Training Center ... today. You can also observe ineffective processing. The latter, according to NTC Observer/Controllers, is the current state of affairs in many of the units that come to fight in the desert.

NTC
Operating
Systems

When units fight at NTC, they also go through some grueling, painful, introspective after-action reviews. The feedback that the Observer/Controllers give to units is structured in seven battlefield operating systems. This

Feedback
Structure
Isn't Flawed.

feedback structure is excellent ... there aren't any flaws in the way it's put together ...

It's Just
Incomplete.

except that it's incomplete. It doesn't address leadership. That's incongruent with our war-fighting doctrine, not to mention the fact that this year's Army theme is Leadership.

But, We Can
Fix That.

When we talk about leadership on the battlefield ... and how we can make it better ... let's talk in terms of the aggregate ... about Battle Staff

Integration ... the eighth operating system for training feedback ... at the NTC and everywhere else.

NTC OPERATING SYSTEMS


1. Intelligence
2. Maneuver
3. Fire Support
4. Air Defense
5. Mobility/Counter mobility
6. Combat Service Support
7. Command and Control
- >8. BATTLE STAFF INTEGRATION

How?

How can the Observer/Controllers ... some of the most overworked, underappreciated soldiers in our Army ... coach the original seven operating systems plus one called Battlefield Staff Integration?


First, Some Slight Modifications To The Adaptive-Coping Cycle.

We'll need to take the Adaptive-Coping Cycle out of scientific terms, and make it understandable to all. That's easy ...



Second, Some Measurables, Or At Least Observables.

Next, grab hold of those Battle Staff Tenets. They are the behavioral manifestations of our airland battle leadership doctrine. They'll be what we're actually looking for during each one of those separate processes in Battle Staff Integration. And they constitute ... when aggregated ... a profile of organizational leadership ... the "we" leadership.



Identification and evaluative criteria for these behaviors already exist in the original FORGE research. A "greened" version is enclosed in Appendix A, and is coupled with the "greened" version of the Adaptive-Coping Cycle.

Third, There
Are No Free
Lunches.

Now, there's a cost for doing this right. If we want to do this thing the way it needs to be done, our Army will need to provide the National Training Center at least two combat arms majors who have formal behavioral science educations and field grade experience at the battalion level. Anything short of that will add to the burdensome workload that the Observer/Controllers are already carrying. Are we serious about leadership? Are we serious about the 1985 Army Theme -- Leadership?

Finally,
The Fow To.

Lastly, during after-action reviews, take a minimum of two and a maximum of four critical battle events (i.e. firing FASCAM, repositioning, committing the reserve) and run them through the Battle Staff Integration process ... the Adaptive-Coping Cycle. We can do this for each operation that a unit conducts, and build a profile of their learning curve ... their leadership learning curve. That means a couple of more charts and a few more minutes ... but it will create teaching, coaching, and mentoring of leadership, not in a threatening, personalized sense, but in a team-building modality ... creating aggregates ... "we's" and "us's."

What This
Means.

Successful leaders operate effectively because they have knowledge of organizational leadership and of the human, interpersonal elements in their units. And they know how to combine, balance, and direct the two toward the objective. This knowledge is accompanied by recognition that the problems and challenges of leadership have infinite variety and no two can be solved or addressed in the same way. Each leadership situation is new. Each new situation will require imagination, understanding, and skillful action. Therefore, what is needed for the leadership infrastructures of responsive units is not a set of rules or techniques ... or some mythical Golden Screw of leadership attributes, traits, competencies, or individual behaviors. What is needed is ...

- Knowledge of factors that influence unit performance.
- An attitude that emphasizes the relatedness of the unit's subparts and the factors that influence unit performance.
- Good skills in assessing situations and in providing appropriate actions based on the prediction of potential consequences.

What This
Doesn't Mean.

Now, before you run off half-cocked, screaming "Heresy!", let's talk about what this alternative approach doesn't mean. It doesn't mean totally forsaking our research and teaching of individual leadership attributes, traits, competencies, behaviors, or values. Those are important. Very

Footlocker
Counselling

important. But they have their place. On the footlocker ... during mentoring and counselling. When we're on the footlocker, we need the skills and tools for teaching our subordinates ... for coaching and mentoring young leaders. Effectiveness will require sophisticated individuals who are well-versed in the fundamentals of leadership and thoroughly schooled in the human factors that influence unit performance. But, leadership will have to be more than a matter of "human" or native ability, backed by some elementary concepts and reinforced through trial and error. Instead, it must rest on systematic knowledge and a rational and conscious integration of sound organizational principles and processes.

On The
Battlefield

When we're on the battlefield, locked in mortal combat and fighting for our national interests and survival, we'll need killing tools ... finely honed razors that peel away the enemy's ability and will to fight. The key to understanding and making Battle Staff Integration happen is to think of it as a integrated killing tool. Battle Staff Integration is like a rifle, or knife, or tank, except that it is wielded by the leadership of an entire unit. If we think of Battle Staff Integration in those terms, and in terms of preserving the force for follow-on missions, we put airland battle leadership in proper perspective.

Recommendation


Make Battle Staff Integration the eighth operating system for training feedback during after-action reviews ... at NTC and everywhere else.

* * *

Appendix A

BATTLE STAFF INTEGRATION

Battle Staff Integration



PROCESS # 1: Acquire Information

DEFINITION: Anticipating need for, seeking, and interpreting info.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Any act of receiving, obtaining, or attempting to obtain orders, instructions, or recommendations. May involve passive receipt of information without initiative to obtain it, or may be active attempt to obtain information.

2. Acquiring information from the battlefield as a function of physical location, terrain walking, IPB, personal recons, etc.

3. May involve player-OC interaction, i.e. CAS, arty, CBR, FASCAM strikes.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Accurate detection of all available information.

2. Correct interpretation of all detected information, to include appropriate weighting of importance.

3. Accurate discrimination between relevant and irrelevant info.

4. Attempts to obtain info are relevant to mission/situation.

5. Activities are timely in relation to information requirements and the tactical situation.

PROCESS # 2: Communicate Information

DEFINITION: Vertical and horizontal sharing of information (inside and outside of the unit).

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Transmission and discussion of information after it has been acquired but before a decision has been made. Info may pass through several links before reaching decision makers.

2. Involves ...

- a. Initial transmittal of information by acquiring individual.
- b. Passing on info by linking personnel (staff, RTOs, etc).
- c. Dissemination of info throughout organization.
- d. Discussion and interpretation for clarification and/or implication.

3. Includes communication of recommendations from subordinate and adjacent units.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

- 1. Accuracy of transmission.
- 2. Sufficiently complete to transmit full and adequate meaning to the receiver.
- 3. Timeliness appropriate to unit requirements.
- 4. Correct choice of recipients.
- 5. Whether info should have been communicated.
- 6. Organization of information, i.e. posting maps, tracking critical events, reporting FLT.

PROCESS # 3: Decision Making

DEFINITION: Deliberative activities of one or more persons leading to some action that will/should be taken (info acquiring, execution, contingency actions, or follow-up). Not limited to the commander.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Communication of some sort reflecting the intention to take some action.
2. Often, first evidence that a decision has been made will be a command, order, or instruction issued by the decision maker.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Adequacy - was the decision correct in view of the circumstances and info available to the decision maker?
2. Appropriateness - was the decision timely in view of the info available to the decision maker (1/3-2/3 rule)?
3. Completeness - did the decision take into account all or most contingencies, alternatives, and possibilities?
4. Was decision made by appropriate individual?
5. Were there any non-decisions (ones that should have been made)?

PROCESS # 4: Communicate Decisions

DEFINITION: Activities through which decisions and requirements resulting from decisions are communicated to those who implement the decisions. Includes .,.

- transmission of orders and instructions, and
- discussion/interpretation of those communications through which clarification is achieved.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Occurs after decision and before action.
2. Includes orders, instructions, and discussion of same and implications, including clarification and attempts to gain clarity.
3. Limited to communications about ACTIONS to be taken.
4. May pass through several links between decision maker and executor of action.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Accuracy of transmission of instructions.
2. Sufficient completeness to transmit adequate/full understanding of required actions.
3. Timely transmission in view of both available information and action requirements.
4. Transmission to appropriate recipients (horizontally and vertically).
5. Whether message should have been communicated.

PROCESS # 5: Execute Decisions.

DEFINITION: Supervise implementation of orders and instructions. Primarily concerned with execution and how actions are carried out.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Leader at main point of contact.
2. Staff officers or subordinate leaders are supervising at secondary points of contact.
3. Actions focused on "doing something to" the enemy.
4. Does not include actions to acquire information.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Doctrinal correctness of action in view of operational circumstances and the decision or order from which the action was derived.
2. Timeliness of action in view of operational situation.
3. Correctness of target choice for the action.
4. Adequacy of execution of action.

PROCESS # 6: Contingency Actions

DEFINITION: Actions intended to adjust current operations, maintain unit integrity, or prevent disruptions. All actions taken during operations that are intended to prevent potential negative effects.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA: Limited to orders and actions specifically intended to moderate the effects of enemy actions or potential enemy actions, including adjusting internal task organization and/or operations during an operation.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Adequacy - action is correct in view of operational situation and decision or order from which the action is derived.
2. Appropriateness - timing is appropriate in view of the operational circumstances.
3. Completeness - actions fully implement the decision from which derived and meet the requirements of the situation.
4. Choice of recipients is appropriate.

PROCESS # 7: Follow-up.

DEFINITION: Activities that assist the unit to evaluate its effectiveness and that provide info upon which adjustments and future actions can be based.

IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA:

1. Actions taken to obtain info about the results or effects of operations.

2. Should be preceded by an organizational decision or SOP to initiate the follow-up.

EVALUATION CRITERIA:

1. Correctness of action in view of both operational circumstances and the decision or order from which the action was derived.

2. Timeliness of the follow-up action in view of the operational situation.

3. Correctness of assignment of the follow-up action.

4. Adequacy of execution of the follow-up action (compliance with intent).

Appendix B

BATTLE STAFF INTEGRATION ASSESSMENT FORM

Unit _____ Date _____ Locale _____

Critical Battle Event _____

Type of Operation (Hasty Attack, Prepared Defense, etc) _____

SUMMARY PROCESS ASSESSMENT FORM

This form should be completed at the end of each operation for each CRITICAL BATTLE EVENT (i.e. firing FASCAM, repositioning, committing reserve). Use the scale shown below to rate the battle staff's overall performance for each process and indicate why the rating was assessed.

- SCALE: 4 - Excellent
3 - Adequate
2 - Marginal
1 - Poor

PROCESS	RATING	WHY
Acquiring Info	_____	_____
Communicating Info	_____	_____
Decision Making	_____	_____
Communicating Decision	_____	_____
Executing Decision	_____	_____
Contingency Actions	_____	_____
Follow-up	_____	_____

Appendix C

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* * *

WHY DO LEADERS RESIST IMPLEMENTING POWER DOWN?

Although no formal study of the issue has been done, information gathered at leadership conferences and by questioning leaders indicates that the list which follows accurately pinpoints reasons "power down" is resisted.

1. Junior leader inexperience or incompetence. (No trust in junior leaders or perception that some junior leaders avoid responsibility.)
2. Mission or task complexity.
3. A failure to understand "power down." It must extend to all junior NCO leaders.
4. Personal leadership style is in conflict with "power down."
5. Time, personnel, or resource constraints.
6. "Power down" appears to be in conflict with leader/military image of being-in-charge. It is seen as a threat to senior leader authority.
7. Belief that "power down" promotes low standards and productivity. Belief that it promotes misconduct, negligence, or dumb errors.
8. "Power down" is hard to implement. Results are slow. Personnel turnover makes it more difficult to achieve. It conflicts with priorities.
9. Pervasiveness of Vietnam syndrome where senior leaders were involved in great detail down to platoon level.
10. Fear of career failure. Avoidance of risk.
11. Failure to follow-up verbal support for "power down" with supporting deeds.
12. Failure to see "power down" as an inherent part of leadership.
13. Failure to see "power down" as a long range effort with long range outcomes. Leaders are preoccupied with short range outcomes.
14. Junior leaders lack perspective and information/awareness of the "big picture" which is necessary to apply "power down."
15. "Power down" conflicts with the adage "the organization does best those things the boss checks." The leader's boss doesn't support "power down."
16. The words "power down" convey a symbolic connotation different than what's meant. (When "power down" is implemented, the chain of command is "powered-up.")

17. Inadequate feedback from subordinates. (Senior leader doesn't know "power down" is not working.)

The evidence is unmistakable. "Power down" has a positive impact on junior leader development. Junior officers and non-commissioned officers operating in command climates which have implemented "power down" show initiative, responsibility, and risk taking beyond that which is necessary to merely "get by" and progress through the system. They have a positive self-image about themselves, their soldiers, their unit, and the Army. They feel challenged and good about the contribution they are making. They display caring leadership toward soldiers. They understand the commander's intent and know what's going on. They seek to stay in or return to units with "power down" command climates. They perform tasks and make decisions routinely retained by senior leaders in non-"power down" command climates. They routinely practice or follow the Army values of courage, candor, competence, and commitment. They have the respect and loyalty of their soldiers.

Where or how is this evidence found?

The evidence can be found by observing units and their junior leaders at NTC or in the field during ARTEP and exercises. The evidence can be found by questioning leaders and soldiers. The evidence can be found by measuring, subjectively and objectively, small unit performance. The major clue is consistent good performance over time rather than peaking for a major event.

Why is "power down" so necessary?

It is necessary because it is basic to developing the junior leaders our Army needs on the AirLand Battlefield. The concept is neither new or revolutionary. The question of junior leader development is as old as the Army. What's new is the need to close the gap between our capabilities and those of any potential enemy on the AirLand Battlefield.

Junior leadership development is the key to closing that gap.

* * *

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AUTHORITY

Does command or the leadership position give a leader the authority needed to carry out responsibilities? Some people will adamantly answer yes or no. Others will say the answer depends on the situation, the leader, and the leadership position. Who is right? It doesn't matter! The argument can be endless.

The important thing is understanding authority and the context in which the leader operates. The Random House College Dictionary, First Edition (Revised), 1982 (Government Issue) defines authority in several ways.

1. The power to judge, act, or command.
2. A power or right delegated or given; authorization.
3. A person or body of persons in whom authority is vested.
4. A warrant for action.
5. An accepted source of information, advice, etc.
6. An expert on a subject.
7. Persuasive force, conviction.
8. Right to respect or acceptance of one's word, command, thought, etc.; commanding influence.
9. Masters in execution or performance.

Notice that some authority is acquired as an instrument of the office or leadership position (Items 1-4) and some may be acquired from the persona of the leader (Items 5-9).

Leaders holding formal positions such as commanders of battalions, brigades, and divisions should have little problem understanding his or her authority and its parameters. Certainly these leaders have staff officers such as SJA, IG, etc. to assist in defining authority parameters.

For other leaders such as company commanders, staff officers, platoon leaders, and non-commissioned officers the authority parameters are ambiguous. It is the responsibility of each leader to seek clarity from the boss; and, the responsibility of the boss to define authority parameters. The leader who fails to seek clarity often attempts to define authority parameters through

"trial and error", or does nothing. A battalion commander once told me "You don't know what you can't do until you try it!" This attitude and manner of operating involves risks to one's career which many leaders aren't always willing to take. To do nothing is an unacceptable option too. Although the best solution is for the leader to request clarity, senior leaders at all levels need to be aware that many subordinate leaders face an authority dilemma. Senior leaders can be proactive in resolving the dilemma. Senior leaders can establish the appropriate command climate which fosters communication and will prevent much of the authority dilemma.

The other part of authority is acquired from leader persona. If the leader is knowledgeable, skillful, competent, ethical, credible, and professional, then authority accrues. In fact, the best leaders I've seen were those who acquired the majority of their authority in this manner. Such leaders use formal authority instruments infrequently or as appropriate to get things done. They command or lead from persona. This aspect of authority is observable in junior and senior leaders.

In summary, let me say again that, although opinions vary as to how a leader gets authority, the important thing is understanding authority and the context in which the leader operates. Both the leader and the boss have responsibilities to determine what the context is.

* * *

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Basic "Soldier-Machine Interface"

You guys have spent God only knows how much time, energy, bucks and poopsheet footage on physical fitness. And that's good. But . . . the underlying reason for that fitness, at least for the soldier, is so that soldier can fight. The "natural state" of the soldier, it seems to me, occurs only when he or she gets hooked up with a weapon and becomes the fundamental Army system . . . the rock-bottom "soldier-machine interface."

So I'm wondering, Army folks, how come you're not as all fired up about getting every soldier to meet minimum standards with their individual weapon as you are with getting them to meet minimum standards on the PT tests? You throw folks out of the Army, with a discharge that will cause them shame for the rest of their lives, when they weigh too much or can't pass the pinch test. How come you don't do the same with all them damn "bolos?" Which is more "unsuitable?" A soldier who can't hit nothing with the assigned individual weapon he will carry in combat, or a soldier who can shoot but can't shed that last 15 pounds? Would you rather have, on that airland battlefield, an overweight soldier who can plug a pocket patch at 100 meters, or some trim dude who couldn't hit a bull, in any part of its anatomy, with a bass fiddle? And . . . how long since you fired your own individual weapon for QUALIFICATION?

The lack of attention and excitement about the very damn essence of "soldier-machine interfacing" may just be due to that leadership principle called "set the example." I see brand new soldiers, just out of basic, in the Atlanta air-port, just proud as hell of those marksmanship badges. But, I'm afraid I've never seen one on a general. And I can't recall more than a dozen hanging on the 1500 COLs and LTCs I watched go through the Army War College. Take a 20 minute walk in the halls of the Pentagon and tell me how many you see. Wonder how many there are on the students at Leavenworth? Walk the halls at the coffee break and count. And how about the officer advanced courses?

Company, battalion, AND brigade commanders take such great pride in leading the troops on the road run . . . do they ever take the lead in qualifying with their individual weapon? I hear a lot of talk about "role-modeling" and the warrior ethic. How come the line commanders don't "model" the fundamental soldier-machine interface? When you get right down to fundamentals of definition, can there really be such a thing as "soldier" without a weapon in his hands? If I was a trooper, the lessons from those above me would be a pretty good message about how important weapons qualification really is. Yep . . . all that horse manure about the "warrior spirit" . . . he's got a hummingbird mouth and an alligator rectum.

I don't like to say it, but I think maybe the officer corps feels its "tacky" to wear their marksmanship badges. If that's so, how come? And does it get "tackier" the higher up you go? Is annual qualification required for all soldiers? And if so, who looks at that statistic? Is it on the ORB? Is it on the OER? Does each post, camp, station budget for annual qualification of all personnel with their individual weapon? If you come up "No" on any of these, how the hell

can you talk meaningfully, to soldiers, about "the warrior ethic?"

The fundamental concept of warrior and soldier must include a weapon, the primary killing piece, whether it be M16 or 105mm main gun. Competence with a personal personnel killing weapon is a vehicle that conveys leaders' competence, courage, commitment, and confidence to soldiers.

* * *

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WHAT'S HAPPENING...IN 2/32 LIGHT COHORT RUCKSACK INF BN

PRODUCT: The fire, spirit, enthusiasm, and...innocence...of youngsters right at the end of basic, coupled with the well-rubbed, smoothed-out efficiency of combat-ready troopers...six months beyond basic.

THE GOLDEN SCREW: The motive force, the all-powerful catalyst for this combat readiness-enhancing process and human chemistry, is one thing: the powerful and positive expectations of bright-eyed youngsters. (Think of the expectations of your kids, and how they drove you to try to do all things right, the first time you took 'em fishing, or camping...)

THE CHEMISTRY: (See sketch)

(1) Basic training, COHORTed and turned on the youngsters, as it always has, but additional factors were operative: greater equity in one's "reputation" because of impending three years together; training cadre to be evaluated, face-to-face by their brother NCO's (from COHORT bn) on how well they did their jobs; some degree of regional culture and expectations.


(2) Prior to picking up troops, COHORT battalion cadre started becoming a single thing, "The Leadership" of the battalion...an "us." Stress of tough, pre-pick-up training at Ft Ord and Ft Benning (Light Leaders Course) actually COHORTed the leadership infrastructure.

(3) At link-up, the strong and positive expectations of the youngsters created even more stress for the leadership. As this occurred, strong informal norms developed within the leadership to meet the stress, i.e., "do the right things, and do things right," and, the leaders began to learn the dynamics of leading a long-term "us," rather than the usual aggregate of itinerant "eaches," i.e., you don't turn just one soldier on (or off)...you turn off (or on) whole bunches, because they're all stuck together. Also, there is a sense of responsibility, and of potential achievement, enhanced by tabla rosa of troopers, plus two-three year time span of discretion, for individual leaders and "the leadership" as a whole.

(4) Fired-up, trained-up, full-strength, long-term leaders, working together (as "the leadership") validated troopers' BCT-generated expectations as link-up was completed. Expectations coalesced and focused on the central theme (and US Army promise!) of recruitment and basic training..."Be all you can be"...and this became a shared sense of purpose.

(5) Immediately after link-up, a period of hard training (Hunter-Liggett, Coronado amphibious exercise, rites of passage) coupled with a heavy infusion of history, ceremonies and sensible, soldierly rituals, fused together the two COHORT's (the troopers, the leadership) into a single thing with a shared sense of purpose: the 2/32 Light COHORT Rucksack Infantry battalion. The process continues and will continue, only as long as progress toward the purpose continues.

All that looks something like this: ↗



*MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR, EXTERNAL TO 2/32:

2/32 was the "point" COHORT light infantry battalion. Countless new or unforeseen problems enabled the leadership to operate on "the intent of the commander." Expect a decrement in all good things as 2/32's "free energy" is absorbed by "higher."

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Routinizing Success

The positive aspects of what is happening in our Army's first light infantry battalion has been explained in terms the positive, powerful expectations of subordinates . . . constructive, functional stress delivered from below (See ExcelNet Concept Paper #2-85). The success of 2-32 Inf also can be explained in terms of a modified version of Living Systems Theory (BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE magazine, Jan 85).

First, the PEOPLE are cohesive. They have been bonded together through the COHORT experience and vigorous training for the leadership infrastructure. The troopers came out of OSUT as always . . . full of skill and will. When the leadership infrastructure went to Benning to get their soldiers, they found themselves confronted with the powerful expectations of an aggregate. This stressed the leaders, forcing them to get up to speed and norm to standards that didn't previously exist -- tough standards, generated from below. The unit training was physically and mentally demanding, bonding the COHORT troopers to the leadership infrastructure . . . creating a cohesive unit.

The STRUCTURE of the organization underwent significant change, and the MATERIAL with which the soldiers work changed. It got simpler.

Finally, there was a paucity of INFORMATION on "how to do it," necessitating a pioneer spirit that was exhibited by the entire bonded, empowered leadership infrastructure. The leaders also had plenty of room to operate, and the energy to make things happen -- energy that was focused on the CSA's INTENT to create the best light infantry division in the world.

All this amounts to PROCESS, defined as all change over time. The process, by definition, resulted in conflict and disorder, out of which arose a new Gestalt -- a lean, mean, PURPOSED organizational and individual self-image. (See "Creating Soldier Power," COMMANDERS CALL magazine, Mar-Apr 85.)

Now . . . how can our Army institutionalize the LEADER TRAINING/DEVELOPMENT that insures this experience for ALL units? COHORT and non-COHORT? Combat arms, combat support, and combat service support?

First, let's look at the life cycle of cohesion building . . .

* During OSUT . . .

FORMING: testing limits; accepting standards; establishing dependency relationships (w/ each other & drill sgts).

STORMING: conflict -- interpersonal issues & individual cognitive maps vs. task requirements.

NORMING: overcoming resistance; genesis of cohesion; in-grouping; new roles . . . soldiers.

PERFORMING: group energy focused on tasks.

* In TRANSITION . . .

ABSORBING: arrival of permanent leaders; conflict -- new attitudes & standards (lower?); slower pace of life.

* At HOME STATION . . .

RENORMING: dealing with threats to horizontal cohesions and creating vertical bonding.

PERFORMING: realigned values (w/ leaders' goals); energy again focused; max social psychological development to full cohesion potential.

Now, let's build a framework, an empty matrix, that crosses Living Systems Theory with the life cycle of cohesion building . . .

	A	B	C	D	E
	Leaders	Troopers	Structure	Material	Information

1. Forming
2. Storming
3. Norming
4. Performing
-
5. Absorbing
-
6. Renorming
7. Performing

Now, rotate each column heading down through the matrix, asking yourself "What should be occurring in this block vis-a-vis what happened in the block above?" Fill in each block, and we'll have a program for routinizing success. If we are smart, we'll figure out a way to avoid having to mess with RENORMING, which is by definition, an inefficiency, a systemic failure that occurs during NORMING. The NORMING of troopers AND leaders should be consistent and not necessitate RENORMING. This can be done in several ways . . .

First, STRUCTURE should be consistent for the organization (leaders and troopers) from jump street. OSUT should be designed to put teams/crews/platoons together early (maybe based on some personality/temperament assessments). That Structure should be carried right through all training for the troopers and leaders, whether at home station or at the OSUT station.

Second, INFORMATION should be predicated on SOPs and battle drills that are early-on developed by the leaders and passed to OSUT trainers for transfer to the troopers. Everything the troopers do should be an analog of home station/war mission.

Third, whatever EQUIPMENT, by TO&E, that the unit will use in combat should be put in the hands of the troopers from jump street. From LBE to pistols to rifles to tanks.

Finally, if the leaders are not up to the standards and expectations of the troopers (and those standards and expectations can be pre-engineered during NORMING, we have a built-in fatal flaw. Professional competence and human understanding are the keys here. The leader who embarrasses himself and the rest of the leadership

infrastructure the first time he stands in front of his troopers will create more STORMING, necessitate more RENORMING, and delay the advent PERFORMING at the collective level. The battalion commander has got to train that infrastructure.

To get a feel for how it works on the ground, see the article in INFANTRY magazine, Nov-Dec 84, pg 26, "Training a COHORT Battalion," co-authored by LTC Joe Windle, Commander, 2-32 Inf. It takes this framework, and in a simple, effective way, tells us how to do it.

* * *

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DISCIPLINE

The culture of the United States has always included natural distrust of standing armies. From the earliest days of our history, we have clung to the traditions that the citizen soldier was an effective response to those that would challenge our way of life and that military professionalism was hazardous to our existence. The only exceptions to the rule have been in time of national crisis. Even today, a time of relative peace, these rules still apply. Our national security continues to rest on the citizen soldier-- National Guard and Army Reserve.

Given a heritage of rugged individualism, the question our military leadership is wrestling with is how to develop the oneness of body, mind, and spirit so necessary to the professional military during an emergency without eroding the confidence of the nation from whom it draws support. The Army Chief of Staff has expressed this concern in terms of leading, caring, training, and maintaining the force by its leaders. But, the foundation that supports these pillars of commandship is DISCIPLINE.

Throughout the history of warfare, the successful armies have been those that were highly disciplined in the arts of soldiering. In the early days of the American Revolution, the Congress of the United States felt that order and discipline were so important to General Washington's Army that they commissioned Prussian Baron von Steuben to set forth a regulation for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. Baron von Steuben's keen professional eye recognized that among the half-trained and ill-clad men of the American Army were the makings of a great force, if properly instructed and trained. So he set forth to put into being a guide for the officers and enlisted men that established the boundaries within which they would train and operate to become a single entity. Thus, the first regulation of the United States Army was created.

The single thread that Baron von Steuben wove through his regulation was that having been entrusted by the nation with the care of soldiers, the leader's greatest mission was at all times and in every respect to have his soldiers as prepared as possible. Order and discipline of soldiers were of the greatest importance and were dependent upon the behavior of their leaders. While Baron von Steuben was very specific in the duties of each rank within the regiment, all leaders, from corporal to commandant of a regiment, were charged with the preservation of the strictest discipline and order of subordinates, obliging all to a strict performance of their duty, never yielding on even the smallest infraction. Leading by example, caring for the welfare of the men; training to instill order; and maintaining your organization as complete as possible were the rubrics of all leaders.

What is significant is that the mission of the present day military leader is the same as envisioned by von Steuben in 1779. Baron von Steuben furnished today's leaders with a detailed recipe that transforms confusion into confidence, and potential defeat into ultimate victory. Discipline through caring for one's men; discipline through training; discipline by example; discipline in keeping one's powder are the precepts of leadership that make great armies.

* * *

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A VIEW FROM THE TOP

A few years ago, about halfway through the Carter Presidency, one of today's senior DOD leaders wrote a magazine article giving a candid assessment of the relationships between the Chief Executive, the DOD, and the Pentagon. Specifically, he said ...

"Choosing only team players for the JCS will probably prevent the most competent military officers from rising to the top and could undermine the military professionalism of those who do. The most capable officers are the ones most likely to refuse to support policies which are contrary to their judgements, while the pressure to be a team player will make it difficult for officers to live up to the code of their profession which demands that expert advice be presented openly and without reservation."

The author still agrees with the above quote. In fact, he recently said that he would reinforce it by adding "even if it goes against service position" after "without reservation." This senior DOD leader is a person who has a high regard for knowledgeable mavericks who feel secure enough to advocate what is right, rather than who is right. He ascribes to the notion of supporting the decision once made, IF there was informed and honest debate (rather than pro forma defense) beforehand.

But, life in the Pentagon appears to be one giant kabuki play, with each of a thousand chiefs taking a predictable stance. All the lesser generals fall over themselves to be seen as agreeing with their boss. Either nothing or a meaningless compromise results. There are times when one of the services or staff directorates is more right, and we should be able to live with that. But, there is a hunkered down mentality; even to advocate a position that is not in line with the perceived common wisdom can stamp one as a non-team player. Results are predictable.

Today, I perceive that "team player" -- a trendy and corrosive descriptor -- is in use right now ... today ... among the four-stars and most three-stars, in rhetoric and behavior. The result is cultural schizophrenia ... disparity between what we say and what we do ... from the strategic level to the platoon level. Our path to success, which is not always the path to service, is littered with the ambiguity of disparate values and policies. And, our Army is beset with systemic indicators of team players (ie. source of commission on ORB).

How does this cultural schizophrenia behaviorally manifest itself? One key is the way bad news is received. From several sources, I have discovered that the disparity is revealed through these reactions ...

1. Messenger is shot.
2. It was them not us.
3. Our 32 acquisition initiatives solved that.
4. It was unpatriotic to bring it to our attention.

Saying "We screwed up, but we'll solve the problem" and the management of accountability or responsibility seldom occurs. Ever see a commander who starts briefings with, "What is higher

headquarter's position?" So much for creativity, innovation, initiative, and risk-taking.

Because "team player" is more valued than constructive disagreement, initiative, creativity, risk-taking, and loyalty to something greater than our Army, we may all be on the bus to Abilene, agreeing to cultural change that is unnecessary, unfocused, or even dysfunctional. Could it be that our ticket-punching system is producing neither warriors or managers (because both are disdained in a pure sense), but some hybrid who is unable to be either effectively?

Now, it seems that if we're going to move in the direction that our war fighting doctrine dictates, and with the types of mitigating perspectives this senior leader offers, we've got to get the attention of our Army's top leaders, and tell them, "Hey, guys, the system you grew up in ain't producing the senior military leaders our nation needs. Here's what we need ... psycho-socially and technocratically. Now, find these guys, even though they aren't in your image."

How do we make that kind of change?

How do we, the inheritors of this cultural change that is being engineered largely without our input or approval, affect the psychosclerosis (hardening of attitudes) that results in shot messengers, lack of innovation, intramural bickering between the services, and a bloated, ticket-punching officer corps?

Pray for a few real leaders to get into key positions to make THE change.

* * *

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Command Group Behaviors

In my spare time (0200-0400 on Sunday mornings), I had a chance to read ARI Research Note 84-111, "Command Group Behaviors: Their Identification, Quantification, and Impact on Collective Output in Automated and Non-Automated Environments (DTIC AD# A144 071). The report summarizes a year-long bit of research at CAC's Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulator (CATTS). Focal points of the research:

- Command and Control
- Command Group Behavior (Commander & Staff)
- Individual Behavior
- Team Behavior
- Non-Procedural Behavior
- Command Group Effectiveness
- Combat Effectiveness
- Behavior Evaluation

After toiling through all 153 pages (not including appendices), here's what I found in terms of high-performing staff behaviors:

High-performing staffs . . .

- Consist of COMPETENT individuals who know their jobs and the jobs of their subordinates.
- Are EMPOWERED to fulfill the COMMANDER'S INTENT, are RELIABLE and CONSISTENT producers of high-quality, and are DISCIPLINED to adhere to established SOPs and DRILLS.
- Have good AFFECTIVE SKILLS. The context of what they do is just as important as the content of what they do.
- Key on QUALITATIVE INFORMATION FLOW. Keep it short, sweet, and to the point, whether on the radio, telephone, or face-to-face. Information = readiness . . . up, down, and sideways (which is toughest).

Nothing revolutionary there, I guess, but it may make for a pretty good philosophy for a battalion XO.

* * *

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Command Climate Model

by Major Mike McGee

ORGANIZATIONAL DIMENSION

	Non Unit	Unit	Competent Unit	HP Unit
Leadership Focus	Fault-Finding	Problem-Solving	Performance Oriented	Systems Integration
Focus of Operations	Survival	Goals	Mission	Team Building
Group Needs	None	Achieve Norms	Set Norms	Exceed Norms
Priorities	Unknown	Vague	Clear	Understood
Purpose of Work	Stay Busy	Complete Tasks	Achieve Results	Develop Potential
Change Mode	Punitive-Corrective	Planned-Evaluated	Controlled-Self Correcting	Programmed Constructive
Competition	Can't Win	Might Win	Must Win	Team Wins
Personnel Turnover	Overwhelming	Very Distracting	Mildly Annoying	Barely Noticeable
Purpose of Planning	Protection	Work Scheduling	Strategy Setting	Visionary
Leader Skills	Technical(T)	T+ Functional	T + F + Affective	T + F + A + Inspirational

INTERPERSONAL DIMENSION

	Non Unit	Unit	Competent Unit	HP Unit
Leaders' Style	Ass-Kicking	Directive Centralized	Structured Guiding	Participative Open
Individual Needs	Unknown	Existence	Belonging	Growth & Development
Leaders' Motivation	None	Avoid Failures	Achieve	Take Risks
Leaders' Behavior	Destructive	Identity-Oriented	Influence-Oriented	Involvement-Oriented
Feedback	None	Mostly Negative	Negative & Positive	Always Constructive
Our Attitude	Unassociated	Dependent	Independent	Inter-dependent
Self-Concept	I am insignificant.	I have worth.	I am competent.	I am significant.
Our Use of Conflict	Destructive	Avoid	Disallow	Use
Attitude Towards Initiative	Forbidden	Discouraged	Receptive	Encouraged
Focus of Development	Self-Centered	The Individual	Individual & Group	Team

Based on the Burns-Nelson High-Performance Programming Model, 2AD Command Climate Survey, and some stuff from the Pre-Command Course.

* * *

The Parable of the Military Sinners

Once a Great Commander decided that selfless service and loyalty were the greatest of all military values. And when he asked his officers if their colleagues and commanders were living up to this standard, 78% said, "No, we care for ourselves more than for our units." Not surprisingly, this news produced outrageous headlines, and the Great Commander was most troubled.

He called in The Last Living Survivor of The Old Army and asked him if the officers of The Old Army were selfish. "Oh, yes, we were selfish, just as all men are. That is part of the Human Condition. We were asked only to curb our selfishness with a Sense of Duty."

"You mean what we now call commitment?" "No," said the Last Living, "I mean Duty -- a task, an end product, a job that must be performed. Commitment and loyalty, like selflessness, are means to that end. They are motives that cannot be seen or measured, and are given by soldiers only if their commanders earn them. For us, duty transcended these personal desires, and said, 'Complete your missions, Take Care of your people, and Decide Correctly which of conflicting duties have priority.' The most humiliating confession was not one of selfishness, but of failure to do your duty."

The Great Commander thought for a night and then put out a new edict. Henceforth, soldiers would be judged not by their motives, but by their deeds. Whether or not a soldier is sufficiently selfless, committed, and loyal will be confined to introspection and gossip. We will ask instead whether we are meeting the demands of Duty.

In time, the Great Commander was less troubled. Young soldiers and old soldiers admitted grudgingly that the other guys were probably doing their duty, or at least trying to. This sudden cohesiveness was not news, of course, but it did shift the debate from the sins of mankind to the nature of military duty and the standards by which its performance should be judged.

Moral: If you want to make the front page of the NEW YORK TIMES, ask your folks if their boss is committing the human sins that run rampant in any respectable Ladies Aid Society. Otherwise, just ask how well they are doing their jobs.

* * *

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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEADERSHIP GOAL AT III CORPS AND FORT HOOD: A SUMMARY

In late 1981, CSA and SA approved and published the list of the total Army's seven goals. That list is the official "purposing mechanism" of the US Army. The third goal on that list is the Army's Leadership Goal...

A total Army whose leaders at all levels possess the highest ethical and professional standards committed to mission accomplishment and the well-being of subordinates.

In an organization whose ultimate purpose is to fight and win the land battle, the leadership goal will be realized when it produces the type of leadership required by the Army's fundamental fighting doctrine. That fundamental fighting doctrine, represented in its essence by FM 100-5, lays out the criteria for the kind of leadership needed to fight and win the land battle. The criteria are inherent in certain terms and phrases extracted from US Army fighting doctrine...

- o "Subordinate leaders are to be given freedom and responsibility..."
- o "Initiative..."
- o "Independence of action..."
- o "Mission-type orders will be required at every echelon of command..."
- o "Improvisation..."
- o "Risk-taking and an atmosphere that supports it..."
- o "Quick-minded and flexible..."
- o "Imagination, audacity, and willingness to take the risk..."
- o "Resolute and independent..."
- o "Refuse to permit the battle to be decided by automatic and guaranteed processes that inevitably work their way to a given conclusion..."
- o "As battles become more complex and unpredictable, decisionmaking must become more and more decentralized..."
- o "Risks must be taken independently by all leaders..."
- o "Commanders must trust their subordinates' ability to make on-the-spot decisions..."

Given the nature of the future battlefield envisioned by Army fighting

doctrine, the conditions under which these criteria apply are those of "The Distributed Battlefield" where 1000 leaders, scattered across 1000 hills, must be prepared to make critical combat decisions on their own, doing what they think is right, based on what they perceive is the intent of their commander. These will be the leaders of the "Airland Battle." They are not Generals. On the distributed battlefield, out on those 1000 hills, they are small unit leaders. Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants.

In the late Spring of 1982, CSA directed CG III Corps to consider his organization a "Leadership Test Bed"... a real-world, living laboratory for practical implementation of the Leadership Goal in such a way as to produce the kind of leader required by the Airland Battle.

Sometime after that, CG III Corps met for several days with the top handful of III Corps' senior leaders to teach, and explain, and discuss his command philosophy and the fundamental assumption that would drive not just the implementation of the Leadership Goal, but also "the normal way we will do business" at Ft Hood...

"IF WE BUILD A CLIMATE WHICH IS RATIONAL AND SUPPORTIVE;
IF WE CLEARLY STATE PRIORITIES AND STANDARDS;
AND IF WE GIVE AUTHORITY COMMENSURATE WITH RESPONSIBILITY,
THE ORGANIZATION WILL GROW IN PRODUCTIVITY..."

In October 1982, the corps staff and major subordinate commands (about 150 officers, NCO's, civilians) met at a 3-day conference at North Fort Hood, and they laid out the groundwork for putting the above assumption to work. Within several months, and with the increasing involvement of subordinates at all levels and across all functional areas, certain principles governing "How we do things" began to evolve. Initially, they were not written down but they were understood, and explained, and taught, and applied...

Build a Climate Wherein Leaders Can Lead. In general terms, staffs worked to build a climate directly supportive of the efforts of the chain of command; and the chain of command focused on the development of subordinate leaders, aiming ultimately toward the criteria of the Airland Battle Leader.

In practical terms, "climate" is the sum total of what an experienced soldier feels or senses when he goes into a new unit, listens and looks around awhile, and then judges whether the unit is worth a damn, and can do its job, and will take care of its people. In scientific terms, "climate" within an organization is determined by the interaction of several scientifically-derived and measurable factors which determine "How the Organization Runs" Internally...

- o Leadership
- o Motivation
- o Communication
- o Decisionmaking
- o Goals and Objectives
- o Control

In the simplest sense, development of subordinate leaders who can meet the criteria of the Airland Battle depends on teaching them how to lead, and, at the same time, making a concerted effort to "get the system off their backs," so they have the opportunity to do what they've been taught and to be what they can be. In essence, the III Corps' operational concept for the development of subordinate leaders required the "leader-teacher" to do (not talk about) 5 things...

- Consistent with "Empowering Leaders?"
- Consistent with "Command Trust?"
- Any RBI threats or implications?
- Does it acknowledge that only commanders will decide what "Commanders will..." do?
- Reasonable and rational?

Integrate "Implementation of the Army's Leadership Goal" Mission into Normal Daily Activities. No special programs, buzzwords, slogans, bumper stickers, study groups, and staff offices were formed. For certain, becoming the Army's "Leadership Test Bed" and implementing the Army's Leadership Goal required much effort and much energy on the part of many people. However, except perhaps for the initial startup period, the task required virtually no extra effort and energy. Quite surely, the effort and energy required already existed within the organization and was "freed up," more and more, for leaders to use, as the first and second principles began to have their effect. It was freed up as more and more leaders began to demonstrate "imagination, audacity, and willingness to take the risk" with regard to questioning and challenging and revising and eliminating and reducing the energy-consuming characteristics of various main components of "The System"...

- | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------|
| ◦ Regulations | ◦ Requirements |
| ◦ Rules | ◦ Dictates |
| ◦ SOP's | ◦ Precedents |
| ◦ Traditions | ◦ Statistical Criteria |
| ◦ Practices | ◦ Prescriptions |
| ◦ Step-By-Step Sequences | ◦ Proscriptions |
| ◦ Procedures | ◦ Checklists |
| ◦ Reports | ◦ Meetings |
| ◦ RBI's | ◦ Telephone Calls |

The application of the three principles (and the derivation of several more) continued over the next two years through follow-on conferences, teaching, tasking, and planned integration of effort, both vertically and horizontally. There was no PR push or "hype" about implementing the leadership goal. A simple and straightforward Report of Progress was published in November 1983; and at each major conference, members of the Army leadership community from all over the Army were invited to attend the conference, and, additionally, to go out and look, unannounced, at any aspect of the Leadership Base implementation effort.

On 1 Feb 84, senior leaders and staff from III Corps and major subordinate commands participated in a conference on the concept of "Measurement"...what we measure and why we measure it. That conference was the essence of all the "how to's" of implementing the Army Leadership Goal. And the essence of that conference was a single page, written by GC, III Corps (he used both sides). It is attached to this report because of its significance within the context of a three-year effort by 40,000 people. In one sense, it is the essence of all that effort, it is the formula for mixing together Leadership and Management. It is, on a single page, the "how to" for implementing the Army's Leadership Goal. (Annex A)

On 12 Sep 84, the senior leaders and staff met again for a 1-day conference. The 150 people in the room, however, were not the same "senior leaders and staff" who had begun the effort some two and a half years before. CG, III Corps was there, but when he asked for a show of hands of how many had been present when the implementation effort first began, less than a third raised their hands. And that was why this conference was held. It was designed specifically to meet the challenge posed by personnel turnover. It was part of a carefully designed transition plan done as part of the regular way of doing business to ensure that the new division commander and new brigade commander and new staff officers knew why it was that the "feel" of III Corps was right. Progress in implementing the Leadership Goal continued, and as of this date, the focus is on sustaining the best of what has been done, transitioning in the new leaders and staff, and beginning an all-out full-bore effort to make those Airland Battle leader criteria appear throughout the Corps at small unit level.

The final question to be answered in this summary relates to assessing the effectiveness of the Ft Hood effort.

Leadership lies in the domain of affect, and is thus not as readily "measurable" as specific skills or specific physical things. You could go to Fort Hood and just listen and watch and get the "feel" of the place, like an old soldier would do. It would feel right. Or, you can go and just hang around, and listen to talk in the messhall or motor pool. If you're listening to leaders, what you will hear pretty soon is, "I wish the whole Army was like this." Or, you can look at the many different surveys that are used, freely and naturally and with no excuses, throughout the Corps, by the chain of command and the staffs. Or, you could round up the branch chiefs from MILPERCEN, who come quarterly to Ft Hood to talk with their officers, and ask

them what their folks are telling them about Ft Hood as a place to learn, and lead, and live. Or, combat readiness-wise, and whole organization-wise, you can look at the historically best performance by III Corps on the last REFORGER exercise. If these "intangible and intuitive" measures aren't enough to assess whether or not the implementation is effective, then there's some research and hard data available.

The fundamental assumption which has driven the implementation effort was stated earlier: "If we can build a climate wherein leaders can lead, the organization will grow in productivity." Climate, leadership, productivity. There are research findings, not part of the Ft Hood effort and done by "outsiders," which can serve as an objective basis for assessing how well the climate-leadership-productivity hypothesis above has worked.

"If We Can Build a Climate..." In the Spring of 1984, a research team from the US Army War College administered a carefully-designed survey to a stratified random sample of about 300 Army Officers from across the Army. The research team was assessing the current state of military professionalism in the Army, operationally defining that term with 35 factors relating to moral/ethical values, professional competence, leadership, decision-making, and similar "professionalism" factors. The research project director, knowing of Ft Hood's "leadership test bed" mission, had the same survey administered to a 129-man stratified random sample of officers at Ft Hood.

On 21 June 1984, the US Army - Ft Hood comparison rattled out of the USAWC computer. On the 35 factors of the climate of military professionalism, as assessed by Army leaders, Ft Hood stood higher than the US Army average on 33. On 14 of these factors, the difference was statistically significant at the .05 level or higher. A review of these 14 factors indicates the salient characteristics of the "climate" at Ft Hood, built through the integrated effort of the chain of command, NCO support channel, and staffs. These climate factors are the things leaders see happening around them.

- o Loyalty to Organization
- o Responsibility to Organization
- o Keeping Superiors and Subordinates Informed
- o Encouraging Ideas from Subordinates
- o Setting Moral Standards
- o Giving Explanations
- o Individual Concern with Military Appearance
- o Subordinating Personal Interests
- o Taking Responsibility for Own Actions

- Evaluating Subordinates' Work
- Assisting Subordinates
- Setting Good Examples
- Applying Non-biased Judgement
- Property and Materiel Responsibility

"Wherein Leaders Can Lead..." Whether the climate just described is one wherein leaders can lead, logically could best be determined by leaders who lead within the context of that climate. Again, there is evidence, which is empirical, and which was done by "outsiders," that describes what it's like to lead in the climate just discussed.

In the Fall of 1984, three US Army graduate students at the Naval Post Graduate School did their masters' thesis research on Excellence in the Combat Arms, focusing their efforts on battalion-sized units. Two of the battalions they selected for in-depth research are at Ft Hood. At Annex B are extracts from their interviews with approximately 100 leaders, at all levels, within the two battalions. The comments are organized under eight headings, designated by the researchers as "attributes of excellence in combat units," and developed through non-quantitative analytical procedures. These comments are offered in evidence of what it's like to lead in an organization where the climate is "right."

"...The Organization Will Grow in Productivity." Productivity, from the perspective of CG, Ft Hood and III Corps, means readiness to deploy and fight. At the second level of detail, the meaning of productivity lies in Ft Hood's 4 major goals, and whether the organization "grows in productivity" can be judged, at least to a degree, by what it achieves in terms of the goals it sets out to achieve.

Early in the Spring of 1985, a week or so before the deadline for submission of reports and evidence, the staff at Ft Hood decided to compete in the Commander-in-Chief's Award for Installation Excellence. The CG gave his approval. This incident--this "walk-on" late entry--is indicative of the climate and leadership previously discussed. Ft Hood, when the competition was announced a year previously, had not been pointed and "peaked" toward winning a program of inter-installation competition. It had, instead, kept its energy focused on its mission of combat readiness.

In four days, around-the-clock (so the story goes), the Ft Hood staff listed the achievements which described Ft Hood's "productivity" with respect to its four goals. Most were expressed in quantitative, management-oriented terms. These achievements, offered in evidence what happened to Ft Hood's productivity when the leaders began to build a climate wherein leaders could lead, are listed in Annex C. The staff got the report and evidence in just before the deadline. Ft Hood was selected as the FORSCOM winner. The DA

Verification Team of the Installation Excellence Committee--outsiders--came to Ft Hood to validate the facts and figures. Ft Hood is a finalist in the Army competition, and whether they win that, and the DOD "manage-off" that follows, isn't really a big thing. Combat readiness is.

At present, at least from this observer's (that of services) perspective, the fundamental assumption, or "hypothesis," is supported by the evidence at hand. And only now has all this effort, by all those people, over these last three years, begun to produce the Airland Battle leaders at the small-unit level. "Power-down" is just beginning to arrive at company, battery, troop level. It is evident in the attitudes and the values underlying the words of the leaders in the comments in Annex B. Whether this continues to spread, and to then become characteristic of Ft Hood leadership, and to then become characteristic of Army Leadership, remains to be seen. Only if that occurs will those criteria for the Airland Battle leader actually become...doctrine.

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ANNEXES

- A - Measurement
- B - Attributes of Excellence in Combat Units
- C - Justification Statement, Commander-in-Chief's Award for Installation Excellence



CONSIDERATIONS IN MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY, EFFICIENCY, AND EFFECTIVENESS IN CERTAIN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS

◆ General

- o Measuring things accurately and reliably is both an art and a science.
- o Measurement techniques themselves have a powerful influence on operations, and are de facto promulgators of priority.
- o Measurement techniques have enormous impact on the command climate -- and are closely related to concepts of mutual trust and to expectations regarding competence.
- o Measurement techniques and the production of associated statistics can generate both useful insights and dysfunctional side effects.
- o The commander's skill in measuring things is a major component of his effectiveness as a manager and his reputation as a credible leader.
- o Measurement techniques and systems are closely related to communications within the organization, particularly to feedback concepts.
- o Inappropriate or poorly designed measurement systems are major sources of leader frustration and ethical dilemmas in our Army. (This has been true for many years.)
- o Measurement techniques can be used to educate, motivate, sensitize, or act as a deterrent.

◆ Basic Purposes of Measurement

- o The first step in designing a system to measure something within an organization is to define clearly the purposes of the measurement.
- o Purposes vary, but mostly fall into one of these categories:
 - To evaluate overall progress toward one or more organizational goals. (Ex: EDRE)
 - To evaluate the efficiency of a system. (Ex: Late SEER's)
 - To evaluate the effectiveness of a system. (Ex: Tank gunnery scores)
 - To compare the relative efficiency or effectiveness of one segment of an organization with other segments. (Ex: SIDPERS timeliness rates of comparable units)
 - To compare the behavior of individuals in the organization with prescribed standards. (Ex: PT test scores)
 - To evaluate the adequacy of systems supporting the organization. (Ex: CIF lines at zero balance)

ANNEX A

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◆ Costs Associated with Measurement

- o Any decision to measure something should assess thoroughly the associated costs, both short and long term, direct and indirect.
- o Objective costs include: manpower to design, administer, collect, analyze, display, and report the data; machine data processing time; and expenses for communicating the data or analysis to interested parties.
- o Subjective costs include: possible confusion regarding organizational priorities and philosophies; misperceptions regarding trust and decentralization; fears regarding unfair or irrational use of collected data; and inordinate expenditure of energy in collecting, refining, and manipulating the data.

◆ Types of Measurement

Direct observation of process or system (receipt processing time)
Direct observation of outcome (M16 score)
Subjective evaluation by individual (morale of my unit)
Subjective evaluation by groups (ARTEP evaluation)
Indirect or inferential (graffiti)
Self-evaluation (OER support form)
Perception (questionnaire)

◆ Some Parameters of Measurement

Interval (daily; quarterly; etc.)
Duration (for 1 year; forever; etc.)
Level at which consolidated (Indiv; unit; bn; etc.)
Obtrusiveness (electronic counter of autos; IG team; etc.)
Source of data (direct; files; recollection; etc.)
Method of collection (reports; computer; oral; etc.)
Visibility of data at various levels
Confidentiality or exclusivity of data at various levels
Costs of collection

◆ Basic Characteristics of Data In Measurement

- Accuracy - short and long term
- Reliability - short and long term
- Misinterpretation potential
- Threat or misuse potential
- Bloat (unplanned growth) potential
- Perishability
- Relevance or utility to other organizations
- Improper manipulation potential

★ ATTRIBUTES OF COMBAT UNITS OF EXCELLENCE ★

- o Leadership by Example
- o Focus on Combat: A Shared Value
- o Power Down
- o Strong Unit Identity
- o Caring with a Capital C
- o High Standards and Discipline
- o Teamwork, A Way of Life
- o Consistent Excellent Performance

What follows are some of the responses we heard in two tank battalions at Fort Hood.

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

CO CDR: "The command climate from Corps level down lets commanders command. Our commander tells us what he expects..."

CSM: "His style is to be more persuasive, but he can also be directive. He basically tells you what to do and lets you do your job. But he can take charge if the situation necessitates. He spends a lot of time out with the commanders or in the motor pool. He does everything everyone else does in the battalion..."

BN XO: "The commander understands people better than anyone I've ever known. His soldiers must have the best of everything. He isn't afraid to discipline soldiers and NCO's. He's fair..."

CO CDR: "You can tell him anything. You can always tell him bad news..."

ISG: "As a First Sergeant, I can talk to him; he listens to you. I've never seen him excited. He never raises his voice..."

BN S4: "He doesn't micromanage, but he gives guidance, and gives people the chance to make mistakes. He is straightforward, and chews you out if needed. He's not interested in eyewash..."

CO CDR: "LTC _____'s style is to give me the mission, then let me go. He is not a micromanager. He is very good at giving us the commander's intent before the operation. He gives us a "bottom line". For example: My intent is to take the hill. He keeps it clear and simple for us. He gets up in front of the troops often. Esprit is based upon our excellent performance. We're professional. We're not into the eyewash stuff, but the quality of training..."

CO CDR: "He treats all the company commanders equally. He's always blowing his horn about the battalion. He's very competitive. He's open, he listens. Some guys he puts the fear of God in. But he is respected. He makes you do the basic things right..."

BN S1: "Our commanders are not afraid to fail; we freely admit our mistakes and learn from them. But the colonel will flat carve up a dud. He tries to develop soldiers and leaders..."

FOCUS ON COMBAT: A SHARED VALUE

CO CDR: "All the commanders above me at Fort Hood allow me to train my unit for war. Power down works..."

ISG: "We don't put on dog and pony shows -- just realistic, demanding, and innovative training..."

ISG: "Both the command and NCO channels of communication work. We give "power down" to the platoon sergeants, who pass it to the tank commanders, and then to the soldiers. We plan in advance and stick to our training schedules. But, most importantly, we practice to go to war and survive..."

CO CDR: "On the tactical side of the house, the leaders know what the hell they're doing..."

BN S2: "As the S2, I was responsible for my area of technical expertise. The troops now understand a lot more about the threat tactics they'll have to face..."

ANNEX B

BN S3: "What we do around here is prepare to go to war. The machts-nichts crap takes a backseat. We examine requirements when they come down. Is it important? Does it help us go to war? We meet and discuss such things during our training meetings once a week..."

CO CDR: LTC _____ always tells us to ask ourselves -- would we feel guilty if we went to war tomorrow? We are allowed to take risks.

POWER DOWN

BN CDR: "Power Down" means decentralization. There are too many tasks for one man. I give subordinates mission orders and resources and let them do it. We have freedom to make mistakes here..."

1SG: "There's a whole lot of leadership in this outfit. They let NCO's do NCO business. They have power down here. They let us do that. I was shocked when I first got here. I thought it was relaxed, but it's not really. It's just that they're not standing over you..."

1SG: "Power down - the old way was the platoon sergeants would teach the class. Now that's the tank commander's job. He's responsible for SGT. It's working. It makes them learn it before they teach it..."

PLT SGT: "Power down in this battalion means pushing power down to the lowest level. In my tank platoon, I instruct my tank commanders. Then the tank commander is responsible for his crew. However, we tend to be oversupervised by the officers. But most of us feel that we have the authority and the power to do our jobs..."

1SG: "I'm the First Sergeant and I'm doing the training schedule. That's an example of power down. It works in C Company. There are two views by the NCO's: We don't make enough, let the officers do it. The other view is that we want to run the battalion. This one works, and it's effective. It works if you've got the consent of everyone above you. We have the confidence and trust of the company commander. There will be mistakes made, but there's no anvil over our heads..."

BN XO: "NCO's run all small arms ranges in the battalion. Officers just qualify and inspect. The CSM sets up and runs all SQT training with other NCO's. NCO's also run all tank gunnery ranges -- the Master Gunner is key..."

TANK CDR: "We can tell people when things are not important. The training schedule is followed pretty tight. Soldiers get to input too. They get to say what type training they want..."

CSM: "Plan it out. Tell them what you want, give them the time, and you'll get results..."

STRONG UNIT IDENTITY

BN CDR: "I don't want personal loyalty. I want loyalty to the battalion..."

PLT SGT: "People are begging to come here because we are the best Armor battalion in the Army. We spend a lot of time training, but we love it..."

BN XO: "We have a lot of pride. We get that from our daily contact with each other. The chain of command talks to soldiers..."

BN CSM: "Our command climate surveys come back -- we only had 4 questions below the average (out of 51). The attitude around here is to be positive and to be flexible..."

PLT SGT: "We really have esprit de corps and unit pride here. We can bad mouth the battalion, but no one outside the battalion can. We keep our dirty laundry inside the unit..."

S1: "This battalion would be respectable anywhere we went. We'd kick the _____ out of anybody's Armor battalion anywhere in the world..."

CARING

TANKER: "I'd say 95 percent of the chain of command cares about people. If people have problems, they help you out as much as they possibly can. I've always had the feeling that they care about my family. They try to help the wives. The Wives' Club is good.

They go to meetings, bake cakes, go to fund raisings. I know that if I go to the field for 15 days that there's someone my wife can go to. You feel a lot better knowing that someone will take care of her..."

ISG: "The Company Commander and I go to the houses and greet the wives. We bring them a plant. We always have a once a month program. That's a real key. We take the wives into the motor pool, etc. We've got good participation with the wives. I'd say two of every three come..."

TANKER: "We get monthly counseling statements that let us know how we're doing. That's a big push around here..."

CO CDR: "Our wives are involved in the battalion. They hold monthly meetings, observe us on ranges, attend battalion formations..."

ISG: "We believe in professional development; we send NCO's to schools for the long term gain..."

BN CSM: "We just had two events that showed the people are cared for around here. One guy had his baby die. We put together a lot of money for him, and sent him and his wife back to West Virginia for the burial..."

ISG: "We have a good sponsorship program. For example, the CSM personally met me at the Replacement Battalion and introduced me to all other First Sergeants. He also helped me get my feet on the ground. All First Sergeants cooperate - no one cuts another's throat. On REFORGER, C and A Company First Sergeants shared fuel trucks because one broke down. That doesn't happen everywhere..."

BN CDR: "My legacy to the battalion will be the trained officers I leave behind..."

HIGH STANDARDS AND DISCIPLINE

CO CDR: "The peer pressure is unbelievable around here..."

TANKER: "As for punishments, you get what's coming to you. It's fair and swift around here. The attitude is, don't try to get away with it. Discipline here is better than in most battalions..."

CO CDR: "Our standards aren't high, we just enforce them more..."

BN CSM: "The power down philosophy is to give the task, condition, and standard, then let the guy accomplish it. But we have pretty high standards. We have refrigerators in the rooms for the guys. Their living areas are a little better, a little cleaner. We set standards for them but they take care of their living areas. Once you have a unit with high standards, you're a solid unit. It has to be at Bn Cdr or CSM level. The standards then take off and it gets engrained, and the soldiers then take a lot of pride in the unit. We maintain the standards..."

ISG: "We have only average NCO's. It's the power down that's key. The NCO's either perform or are identified and go away. Now, I can afford to be tough on people. And when the soldiers see the discipline in the company, they see it! The message gets across..."

BN CSM: "We don't have standards in this Battalion. The Army has standards. We enforce those standards..."

ISG: "He's tough on discipline - hard but fair. He's out a lot, he's visible. He's not a desk commander. He told the commanders he's not getting involved in the AGI. That makes us more committed to doing well. There's a good command climate here. Commanders can make decisions and act on their own..."

PLT SGT: "The NCO's make the standards in this battalion. We make sure it happens, though it's not always by the book..."

ISG: "The battalion commander is one of the fairest people I've ever seen. His punishment is swift and to the point. He talks to the soldiers about their mission, his expectations, and where their families fit..."

PLT LDR: "We do unorthodox things - sometimes we don't go by the book. Discipline is when everyone knows when to do something and how to do it..."

TEAMWORK

BMO: "We have the best cooperation between staff and commander I've ever seen. We don't have backstabbing competition..."

ISG: "The key to our success is that the MCO's work together. We also identify hard chargers and make sure they advance..."

CO CDR: "We say we're not competing against each other. There's teamwork among us. We did away with the honor company because the company commanders didn't like it. I think it fosters cutthroat competition. The teamwork is good among the companies and the staff also. It gets done. They help us..."

S1: "Individual versus individual, we're no better than any other unit, but we excel when it gets all put together. I don't know how -- it just works. Everyone knows what he's supposed to be doing. We don't shoot bullets at each other. We don't hold too many meetings either. The Executive Officer, S3, or company commander provide guidance whenever needed..."

ISG: "The Lieutenants are tight here. We have friendly competition. There's tremendous peer pressure against back stabbers..."

CO CDR: "The colonel stresses teamwork. He doesn't reinforce competition. Company commanders share ideas about key events like the AGI, gunnery, and field problems. We don't have a high company award for gunner. I don't measure platoons against one another..."

PLT LDR: "How do we keep it going? The information network is good. Everybody understands what they're doing. There's a lot of informal communication. Our relationship with the company commanders is that of a team, not commander-subordinate. We work as a team. It's easier to support something once we've had our say in it. LTC's philosophy is to let the soldiers, the people at the lowest level, have a say in how you do things..."

BN XO: "We have very little competition between companies. They don't try to outshine each other. The commander doesn't force them to compete; we all cooperate to beat other battalions. The boss doesn't allow unit signs of achievement outside the barracks, etc..."

PLT LDR: "There's great comradery and friendship here. It's loose, but not too loose. Somebody really cares. You need to treat people professionally, value their opinion, and you'll get higher quality work..."

CONSISTENT EXCELLENT PERFORMANCE

TANK CDR: "We do good training here, and that's why we can do our jobs. We don't have peaks and valleys here like in other units. We are consistent here. But we need more NBC training..."

BN CSM: "We don't peak. We are consistently good..."

BN CSM: "If you're going to do something, do it right. But that takes time. Sometimes we have to let people know we can't do everything..."

ISG: "We execute missions violently. We can move one minute after we get the order over the radio..."

BN S3: "This really is the best unit I've ever been in, including Germany. We were down for awhile, but we're doing better now. We're getting better all the time. It's fun now..."

PLT SGT: "I've been in 8 battalions, and this is the best one yet, especially during the last year and a half. What we stress, is that what we do in training, is what we'll do in combat..."

BN CDR: "We focused on Warsaw Pact capabilities and European news items. We don't just peak for one event -- we continually build toward combat readiness..."

PLT SGT: "The bottom line is this is a good battalion. The training schedules don't get changed very much..."

★ JUSTIFICATION STATEMENT ★

Fort Hood, the most populous and diverse military installation in the free world, stands alone in imaginative management and leadership innovations which have resulted in substantial, measurable improvements in mission accomplishment, and in the quality of life for its 38,826 soldiers, their 48,770 family members, and 9,065 civilian employees.

The command environment, with its emphasis on developing trust and confidence with strengthens commanders' authority and responsibility, coupled with a unique system of productivity measurement, has fostered unit pride and installation excellence. This atmosphere has emphasized individual soldier importance and increased the freedom for commanders to be bold and innovative in developing the skills necessary to win The Airland Battle.

Successes within the six specific criteria provided for the Commander-in-Chief's Award for Installation Excellence are addressed under Fort Hood's four major goals:

- To prepare soldiers, leaders, and organizations for prompt deployment and successful sustained combat.
- To select, train, and motivate leaders for today and tomorrow.
- To provide a healthy, supportive, friendly, and efficient community for soldiers, their families, and the civilian work force.
- To plan adequately for transition to wartime mobilization and for the effective incorporation of reserve component elements into III Corps and Fort Hood operations.

The first goal, the cornerstone of mission accomplishment, includes these specifics which, along with efficient management of resources, produced the climate conducive to the physical, mental, and spiritual readiness of soldiers and leaders to deploy, fight, and win anywhere in the world:

*** Fielded successfully 54 new tactical systems at a cost of nearly \$1 billion and conducted over 20% of all Army and 50% of all FORSCOM new equipment field testing, including the M1 Tank, Remotely Piloted Vehicle, and the Multiple Launch Rocket System.

*** Reduced the number of soldiers performing individual installation support (Special Duty) missions to 187, the lowest number in Fort Hood history, culminating in 465 soldiers (the equivalent of a combat battalion) returning to their parent units for training.

*** Became a leading and early proponent of the systemic analysis method of conducting inspections, an approach which seeks to determine root cause of deficiencies.

*** Designed training to support contingency requirements in light of personnel turbulence and new weapons systems, incorporating short-notice tank gunnery exercises for year-round readiness instead of annual peaking for a single high visibility proficiency test.

*** Conducted practical Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises which included soldier swim and marksmanship tests and use of the Fort Hood Vehicular Chemical Chamber--unique in FORSCOM--for crew operation in an NBC environment.

*** Saved \$2.4 million in FY 84 by using Heavy Equipment Transports to carry tracked vehicles to training locations.

*** Instituted an installation-wide computer network for land and range scheduling which reduced by 50% the time needed to coordinate land usage for training exercises.

*** Participated in realistic training exercises which enhanced combat readiness of the III Corps active and reserve component units. Exercise regions included Europe, Central America, the Middle East, East Asia, and the Army's National Training Center.

*** Developed two Army Air Defense Battle simulation models presently being adopted by the Army Air Defense School (which saved \$400,000 in research, development, and fielding costs); designed the Army's Blackbuster and WAR EAGLE/First Battle Simulation System for Army-wide application.

Our second goal, which has attracted Army-wide interest because of its success in enhancing junior leaders' creative participation in all aspects of training and readiness, has led to the institutionalization of many practical techniques necessary for building habits that will produce battlefield success. (National Training Center, REFORGER, Sinai, and Honduran operations are solid indicators of results.):

*** Provided, through publication of the III Corps Commanders Handbook, an articulation of the rationale which is the bedrock for local leadership practices.

*** Enhanced the confidence and "battleproofing" of combat vehicle crews with a program to provide emergency medical training to selected units designated as "Unit Lifesavers."

*** Achieved, through awareness programs and leader interest, the highest percentage of soldier voting participation in Fort Hood history during the 1984 national election.

*** Received commendation by the Army Audit Agency for a Property Accountability Test (PAT) which produced an annual cost avoidance of at least \$353,000. In addition, the PAT dramatically reduced the time spent by commanders in accounting for lost tools. These procedures were approved for Army-wide implementation.

*** Initiated Quality Circles which trained over 1,000 employees in productivity techniques, resulting in documented greater efficiencies by Fort Hood and shared regularly local innovations through productivity newsletters.

*** Instituted feedback mechanisms on inefficient management practices, safety issues, consumer protection, legal assistance, energy conservation and housing problems, through phone-in systems known locally as 7-DUMB, 7-LAWS, 7-SAFE, and 7-CITY.

*** Simplified the administrative workload of unit commanders by reducing by half the number of documents to be typed or to be signed exclusively by the unit commander.

*** Attained a level of professional satisfaction among officers significantly higher than the Army average, as shown by Army War College study results.

The third goal, encompassing the following programs and achievements, reflects Fort Hood's commitment to the reality that mission accomplishment is best achieved by soldiers, leaders, and civilian employees working and living in a healthy, supportive, safe, friendly, and efficient community of families:

*** Expanded the electoral mayoral system for on-post housing areas as an effective method for communications, problem identification, and solving. "Helping Hand", "Neighborhood Crime Watch", and other programs created an atmosphere of mutual concern and cooperation between soldiers, their families, and the installation, as evidenced by a 20% reduction in larcenies, a 46% reduction in drug-related crimes, and a 29% reduction in violent crimes.

*** Recognized as leader in Army safety: Flew 62,918 hours without an accident; received the 1984 Army Aviation Association of America award for Safety Officer of the Year; won the 1984 Commander's Aviation Accident Prevention Award (Installation Level); achieved a 26% reduction in fatalities in FY84, which included a 32% reduction in privately owned vehicle fatalities and a fatality free Brigade-size REFORGER 1984 Exercise; implemented a Motorcycle Safety Training Program which included an hands-on operator skill test; instituted the mandatory wearing of motorcycle helmets both on and off post; made mandatory the wearing of seatbelts on the installation, both in government and privately owned vehicles; made available to commanders a "seat belt convincer" permitting soldiers to experience safely what it is like to be involved in an accident.

*** Recovered \$430,575.00 in expenses for medical care provided to soldiers and their family members injured by the accidental acts of non-military personnel.

*** Organized unique archeological and historical preservation programs which were not only important to the national heritage, but also were conducted in harmony with Fort Hood's massive training and construction program.

*** Extended the "Hood to You" and "Health on Wheels" programs. "Hood to You", an outreach program designed to make contact with the over 9,000 junior enlisted and family members living off-post, uses volunteers and two paid staff personnel with a modified 29-passenger bus to visit the off-post housing areas and mobile home parks with information packets on classes, facilities, and services available at Fort Hood. "Health on Wheels", operated by the Army Community Hospital, provides health service and referrals for appointments. Both provide physical and emotional links between the installation and off-post families.

*** Expanded the Reynolds House, an outreach program located on post in a junior enlisted housing area, where over 1,100 family members participate in 110 programs each month ranging from exercise classes, crafts, and consumer affairs to English as Second Language. Limited no-fee child care is provided through Army Family Advocacy funds.

*** Recognized as the Employer of the Year in 1984 by the Texas State Commission for the Blind, and commended for exceeding Army and FORSCOM goals for hiring handicapped civilian employees and disabled veterans. Thirteen percent of new hires were handicapped, as compared to Army goal of 4%.

*** Ranked by FORSCOM as the best installation in TDY and travel cost avoidance for training civilian employees, saving \$1,068,431.25 in FY 84.

*** Oriented more than 1,100 spouses of NCO Academy students during comprehensive two-day seminars aligned with NCOA classes.

*** Produced a vigorous intramural sports program in which 1,025 company-level teams participated in 14 major sports. Thirty-five soldiers were selected for 7 different interservice sports competitions. Post baseball, men's and women's basketball, and rugby teams had outstanding seasons, and the boxing team is world class.

*** Opened a neonatal intensive care clinic which enabled critically ill infants to be treated at Fort Hood, rather than being evacuated to other hospitals. This initiative saved money, but more importantly provided great benefit to families at crucial times.

*** Expanded Consumer Affairs Office to assist soldiers and families in becoming better informed consumers, and to mediate disputes on services and products between the soldier and local merchants. This function, unique to Fort Hood, served more than 2,000 soldiers and their family members in 1984, favorably resolving 86% of all complaints.

*** Arranged with local utility and telephone companies to connect gas, telephones, and electricity for soldiers living off-post with either no deposit or at a nominal charge.

*** Secured, in cooperation with the Texas Insurance Commission, a reduction of premiums for household goods insurance for soldiers living on Fort Hood from \$1.00 per \$1,000 to 16 cents per \$1,000 of insurance.

*** Requested and secured the passage of a new law by the Texas Legislature permitting children from overseas schools to enter first grade on post at a younger age.

*** Completed the Fort Hood Child Development Center, the first in the Army to be built with appropriated fund monies. As a model for other installations, it provides a variety of child care options to answer the many needs of patrons living both on and off post. Programs have been implemented for extending hourly care services to handicapped children.

*** Developed the most stringent local regulation governing sales and consumption of alcoholic beverages to include no alcohol on breath or in system during duty hours. With both daytime and nighttime roadside breathalyzer checks, the duty hours compliance checks found fewer than 0.1% of the soldiers had consumed alcohol in significant amounts. Although on and off-post surveillance for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI) was greatly intensified, there was an overall 15% decrease in DWI arrests during FY 84.

*** Worked with off-post Killeen Chemical Project to combat alcohol and drug abuse by the youth of our community and established a Youth Against Drugs group and two on-post parent support groups.

*** Enhanced healthy lifestyles of soldiers and their families: Made mandatory referral to counseling of individuals involved in spouse or child abuse cases, with consideration (under an experimental program) of separation from the Army of soldiers involved in two incidents; prohibited smoking in any government aircraft by crew or passengers with anti-smoking gum available for aviators; used low fat milk in all dining facilities; included one-stop inprocessing 100% dental check for all soldiers; swim tested all incoming soldiers; achieved soldier hospitalization rate 35% lower than Army average; equipped gyms and many units with state-of-the-art weight training equipment which may account in part for higher Army Physical Readiness Test scores.

*** Fostered local community relations through participation in Central Texas Council of Governments programs such as crime prevention council and anti-drunk driving campaign.

*** Expanded Family Support: Provided strong "chain of concern" for families of absent soldiers on REFORGER, at the National Training Center, Honduras, and Sinai exercises; published Chaplains booklet in six languages on family assistance; integrated all community related religious assistance in one Family Life Center; and supported local Families in Crisis Shelter with voluntary soldier participation.

*** Published local regulations in a new structured writing format for clarity and ease of understanding; DOD Productivity Office is considering this technique for use as the format for new DOD regulations.

*** Developed cost-effective on-line query system adopted by 13 other major Army installations, a prototype installation management system which supports the Army's DA's Standard Installation Organization and its Command Management System, and a microcomputer based resource planning and management system which was, by invitation, show-cased at all levels of the Army financial community and shared with other FORSCOM installations.

*** Developed 24 Quick-Return-on-Investment-Program projects which produced a savings in FY 84 of \$4,003,988, along with two Secretary of Defense Productivity Investment Funding projects with \$6.8 million annual savings.

*** Was the only FORSCOM installation with Value Engineering Savings in FY 84, resulting in a one-time savings of \$137,000 and recurring savings of \$4,573,000.

*** Established the Army's first installation level Directorate of Contracting and Commercial Activities to provide coordination and quality control of over \$100 million of contracts annually; created an installation-level Directorate of Program Integration to overwatch and coordinate planning, systems integration, and information needs.

*** Saved \$50,800 in FY 84 by recycling waste oil and paper.

*** Realized \$170,000 annually by leasing land for local cattle grazing and saved about \$50,000 by using sand and gravel from the installation instead of locally procuring these supplies. Saved grass-mowing costs by pasturing goats in the Ammunition Supply Point.

*** Provided Department of the Army leadership in facility planning and programming by pioneering one-stop tactical engineering service, developing an improved tactical motor park design, and increasing the amount of leased housing which will add 300 quarters to the Fort Hood family community while minimizing its capital investment.

*** Reduced the usage of the Federal Telecommunications System (FTS) by 83% with savings projected of \$601,000 by limiting numbers and access to FTS.

*** Eliminated unnecessary repair and replacement of the external telephone on replaced M60/M48 series tanks with a tangible savings Army-wide of \$640,226.

*** Simplified the bookkeeping procedures used in the Army Oil Analysis Program. In addition, saved money by a suggestion adopted Army-wide of not bringing engines to operating temperature prior to routine oil sampling.

*** Used stockpiled asphalt waste on tank trails to enhance safety through dust reduction, saving \$500,000 over conventional covering materials.

*** Surfaced the issue of improper coding of Essentiality Codes and Recoverability Codes on the Army Master Data File, prompting a scrub of those codes by the Army Materiel Command and an attendant increase in the recoverability of re-useable parts.

*** Developed a prototype auxiliary engine for the M1 tank which can save millions each year as the main engine hours of the fleet will be dramatically reduced.

*** Reduced repair costs for combat and tactical vehicle components by providing Technical Inspectors to perform on-site inspection in unit locations on a 24-hour 7-day a week basis prior to removal of major components, resulting in a savings of 1,488 hours of labor and \$493,153 overhaul costs while also improving combat equipment readiness.

*** Determined that there was no policy governing maintenance of the U.S. Army's millions of dollars worth of nonappropriated fund vehicles and worked with the Department of the Army to develop such a policy.

Our fourth goal provides the framework for the Fort Hood programs designed for efficient transition to wartime mobilization and the integration of all of our activities into the one-Army concept:

*** Conducted two GOLDEN SABER (command post) exercises with realistic, fully integrated European scenarios - 11,000 active Army, Air Force,, NATO Allied, and Reserve component participants. (The only regularly scheduled joint and combined command post exercises where divisions from Forts Polk, Riley, and Carson, as well as reserve component major tactical units interact with U.S. Allies using operational-level war plans.)

*** Provided response cells to simulate Corps and higher headquarters for nine Division Command Post Exercises at other posts in CONUS.

*** Participated in four major personnel and mobilization exercises during FY 84, in which Fort Hood led Army installations in developing and refining extensive mobilization plans and procedures which included: Integrated automated personnel, logistics, billeting, training, and range scheduling systems; establishment and operation of a Mobilization and Deployment Control Center for processing deploying Reserve Components and active units; and identification and preassignment of retirees.

*** Recognized in 1984 by the National Safety Council for Best Performance by a Military Installation in Defensive Driving Course II.

*** Selected as the best overall Southwest Region Installation in the Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System.

The innovative programs devised and implemented at Fort Hood have combined to create an environment where energies are directed toward leader development, realistic training, maintenance of facilities and equipment, and support for families. As a consequence, there has been a clear improvement in mission performance. Further, command initiatives have generated efficiencies totaling \$27.1 million in FY 84 which are conserving precious resources while developing the habits of independent responsibility essential to winning on the battlefields of tomorrow.

SLEEP PLANNING IN COMBAT

It is a universally accepted fact that machines must be maintained. Without preventive maintenance, they tend to break down with little or no warning. Humans are also machines, and, like their metallic brothers, also require daily maintenance. Unfortunately, this fact is often overlooked or ignored, especially in combat and training for combat.

When asked if their unit has an effective sleep plan, most soldiers will reply, "No." When asked why, most will reply, "There isn't enough time - there is always too much to do." The "obvious" time constraints and multiple requirements are facts of life. We cannot escape them. But we can learn to work and plan around them if specific concepts are kept in mind by leaders at all levels.

1. Subordinates must be developed to assume maximum responsibility and to assume the leader's position in his absence.
2. Leaders must participate in sleep plans and enforce them if the plans are to be effective.
3. The hurry-up and wait syndrome must be broken so time can be efficiently managed.
4. Cross training, task sharing and overtraining are essential in preparing units so they can remain combat effective for extended periods.
5. Sleep planning must be conducted and implemented in training exactly as intended in combat.
6. Eradicate the gung-ho, superman, I-don't-need-to-sleep attitude. Everyone needs to sleep.
7. Try to establish shift work where feasible (when leader is up, assistant sleeps, etc.).
8. Leaders must analyze their time and look for predetermined "best" windows to sleep (i.e., after the OPORD is published; prior to initial movement).

The bottom line in combat is - if you are not fighting or maintaining, you should be sleeping.

It is unlikely everyone will get all the sleep they want. Proper planning and implementation will usually allow soldiers to get four solid hours of sleep every 24 hours. That is the minimum necessary for sustained operations. An effective sleep plan is a product of command emphasis and discipline, and must be an essential part of the training and preparation for

battle. If neglected, disregarded or unenforced, even the best trained, best equipped, most highly inspired unit is doomed to failure. It is only a matter of time!

* * *

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Changing Our Army's Culture

Major M.L. McGee

A great challenge exists for our Army ... one with far-reaching implications ... one that may change the way we think about ourselves ... one that can give us a new perspective on where we came from, and a new orientation on where we are going.

We need to change the culture of our Army.

Why?

Simple.

We must change ... move into the future. We cannot accomplish our mission and achieve our goals with the Army of our past. Today's complexities, and those of the future, outstrip our current understanding of applied leadership.

What Is "Culture?"

Culture is the integrated pattern of human behavior. It is how we do business around here. Culture includes thought, speech, action, and artifacts and depends on human capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations. A strong culture is a system of informal rules and mores. These spell out how people and organizations are supposed to behave ... most of the time.

Because of this informality, our culture is not specified from the top. The highest levels of leadership affect culture, but our senior leaders do not define or control it ... at least not completely. Our Army's most senior leaders do not have the longevity to affect long-term change in our culture. Remember ... fads start at the top ... trends start at the bottom.

Proof?

Run back down the line of short, half-lived policies, doctrine, philosophies, and conceptual anchoring that has changed each time we get a new Chief of Staff. Remember our fascination with heavy divisions? How about the once famous Total Army Goals? Organizational Effectiveness? (The author is not an OE type.) Can you think of others?

Culture is deeply ingrained. If we try to make cultural change only from the top, the effect will be superficial. Cultural change, if it is to be valid and longlasting, must come from values and mores that are commonly understood and shared from the top to the bottom of our Army.

The Dimensions of Culture -- Inputs, Process, and Outputs


There are several dimensions to "culture." We, as individuals and organizations, rely on these dimensions to adapt and cope with our environment. They can help us integrate ourselves into a purposed, cohesive aggregate -- a whole -- a single, focused entity -- a system -- aimed at winning on the battlefield.

There are four pivotal dimensions of Army culture ...

- * Our core mission -- an output.
- * Our organizational goals -- more output.
- * The tools we use to achieve our goals and accomplish our mission (and how we measure those tools) -- inputs.
- * How we go about turning inputs into outputs -- process.

To plan and affect cultural change, we need a balanced processing of inputs and outputs. Remember ... "If you don't know where you are going (output), any road (input) will get you there." That's what happens with well-defined inputs and ill-defined outputs. Now, if we switch the emphasis, well-defining our outputs, but ill-defining our inputs, we get, "Toto, I don't think we're in Kansas anymore."

All that looks something like this ...



We must control inputs and outputs if we are to achieve cultural change. If we specify where we are going, and we balance the inputs, we can achieve purposed change.

An Output -- Our Mission

Our mission, as an Army, is to prosecute the land battle when and where directed, and to conclude the hostilities in such a way that our national interests are protected and our national survival is assured.

Simple.

We are soldiers.

We fight when and where we are told to fight.

And we win.

More Output -- Our Goals

Our Army had, and in some places still does, seven or eight major goals that served to focus all our efforts. For a while, those goals gave us a clear vision of where our Army was going. The articulation of such goals, derived from a clear mission, is the initial task for systems leadership. Peter Vaill best expressed the importance of this concept ...

The definition and classification of purpose is both a fundamental step in effective strategic management and a prominent feature of every high-performing system I have ever investigated.

Systems leadership -- leadership at the strategic level -- is the creation of a Gestalt ... setting the vision (specifying the desired organizational end-state), creating climate (values based, behaviorally manifested expression of the individual level of leadership), and designing of interdependencies/establishing information systems (the process of organizational leadership).

Paradoxically, in 1985 --the Year of Army Leadership -- the pivotal and most prominent first step of systems leadership was never taken by leaders at the strategic level. The desired end-state was never specified. Instead of accelerating pursuit of the Leadership Goal, we were ordered to make "the most sweeping and pervasive review of leadership ever undertaken by any army" and to cause soldiers and leaders to "talk about, develop, and exercise" good leadership. Those are processes ... functions of organizational leadership ... the realm of colonels, majors, and captains, not generals.

If you don't know where you are going, ...

Inputs -- Means for Achieving Our Goals

A unit of 100 soldiers who can work together as a team will defeat a unit of 1000 soldiers who cannot. The complexity of modern warfare, and the skills required to win battles, continue to increase at an alarming rate. Pacing this demand for change in our Army's culture are demands for inputs ... 1) values, 2) leaders, and 3) warriors. This is the realm of individual leadership ... the

day-to-day operating arena of lieutenants and sergeants, but the point of origin for all Army leaders.

1) Values

As we make this cultural change, we should align the values of our Army with our mission and goals, making the values support the day-to-day functioning of our units and organizations. When the values of our Army are known by all the people who are our Army -- officers, NCOs, soldiers, civilians, families, and retirees -- and when the recognized importance of these values is shared, our culture will have a built-in, human, internal control mechanism. With this common, believed-in, shared set of values about the things that are important, the people who are our Army will try, on our own, to do things right. And more importantly, we will try to do the right things.

Our Army's institutional values -- our professional ethic -- are loyalty to our nation's ideals, loyalty to our Army, selfless service, and personal responsibility. Operating with the context of these institutional values, and aimed in precisely the same direction, are the four soldierly qualities -- the heart of our Army -- springing from our Army's natural state -- the battlefield. These soldierly values were born in the hearts and souls of soldiers who have stood and will stand on the battlefield ... suffering and withstanding the rigors of war ... to victory.

Competence is the oldest and central battlefield requirement. Competence is the basis for skill and confidence ... in self and others. The patterns and strength of trust, respect, and mutual support are forged on the basis of where competence lies, and to what extent.

Candor means openness, plus honesty, plus simplicity, plus accuracy. On the battlefield, candor is the prime rule governing communications, because the battlefield is the most honest place in the world. Candor operates to ensure the best possible transfer of meaning -- commander's intent -- among soldiers. Battlefield candor serves to develop and support trust.

Commitment is mainly to soldiers and groups of soldiers rather than to things. Commitment is first to buddy, followed closely by commitment to the squad or crew. Interwoven into commitment is caring -- the catalyst for transforming commitment from words to actions. It is the value that welds soldiers into cohesive, committed units that survive and win on the battlefield.

Courage is taking a risk even though the choice not to do so is open. On the battlefield, the risk can be a total loss risk. It is the soldier himself who decides that the total loss risk is his best choice ... ultimately defining "soldier." Action cannot start without courage. This is what leaders do, and why "setting the example" is so important. Courage spreads like a contagion ... and sways battles.

In an Army striving to train in peace as we intend to fight in war, these four soldierly values can set our climate and be the basis for the development of leaders. To do that, the values must be built into the soldiers who are our Army. The best way to do that is by the personal example of leaders, and consistency between their thoughts, words, and deeds. Role-modeling and teaching are individual leadership functions.

2) Leaders

In a leader of this future culture, competence is a function of knowledge, attitudes, skills, and behaviors. Only skills and behaviors are truly measurable, but all four parts of competence are important. Remember ... competence occupies the central role in the fundamental soldier values.

A leader ...

- ... is technically proficient,
- ... is concerned about developing subordinates,
- ... plans,
- ... exercises initiative,
- ... is concerned about standards,
- ... is concerned about clarity,
- ... is self-confident,
- ... influences others,
- ... is willing to confront others,
- ... is concerned about the example he sets,
- ... has a realistic, positive regard for subordinates,
- ... is deeply involved in the job, and
- ... is concerned about efficiency.

These are measures of leader competence, and describe competence in terms of getting the job done ... the bottom line.

3) Warriors

The warriors who constitute our Army must be unique. The facets of this uniqueness will be traditional in some aspects and untraditional in others. Their nature is preceded by warriors of the past ...

- ... total devotion to national survival,
- ... total commitment to mission accomplishment,
- ... prone to success against overwhelming odds,
- ... opportunistic initiative and mental agility,
- ... devoted to the lives and welfare of all other warriors,
- ... never encumbered by personal injury,

... prepared to assume command under any circumstance,
... total disregard for own life.

Process -- Turning the Crank

Before we can turn the inputs into outputs, we need a process. This is the realm of organizational leadership. This is the level where colonels, majors, and captains add to their individual leadership responsibilities, focusing on mission and goals and maximizing the inputs. The keys to the process are 4) teamwork and 5) information metabolism.

4) Teamwork

The most complex kind of teamwork, and the one demanded on complex battlefields, is based on relationships of reciprocal interdependence. Each individual and unit is dependent on everyone else. This complex, interdependent kind of teamwork is the teamwork of combined arms operations ... on today's battlefields and tomorrow's battlespaces.

Leaders of this most complex type of teamwork face critical and enormous challenges in command and control. We must coordinate and control the actions of individuals and teams so that all pieces fit together through built-in internal controls. We can do this by thoroughly communicating the intent of our operations ... providing and overall context for understanding what must be done ... and by allowing freedom to deviate and adjust while fighting. This will allow subordinates to figure out what is tactically right and correct for the situations they will confront. If we include our subordinates in the planning process, we can virtually double the efficiency of this internal control.

The second way to build in internal control is to train, practice, and drill ... not only in individual and collective skills, but also in the way we communicate our intent and give context to our tactical operations. The key is the mission-oriented order. We must train, drill, and practice to the reflex level. Skills must become natural, normal, and habitual ... and so must the integrating command and control techniques.

5) Information Metabolism

How we create and use information will be key to our new culture. That is because we, as individuals, are biological units, and we, as a system, are nothing more than matter and energy organized by information. Without the right information, and perhaps even with the wrong information, we are doing nothing, or worse, and unpurposed.

The thing that does not concern us is our information flow ... our information metabolism ... that process which searches for, finds, organizes, and uses information.

It looks like this:

... Input Transducing -- gathering information.

... Internal Transducing -- maintaining and reporting information.

... Channeling -- relaying information without changing meaning.

... Decoding -- translating information for use within the unit.

... Memory -- storing and retrieving information.

... Deciding -- using information to develop instructions.

... Encoding -- preparing information for transducing.

... Output Transducing -- sending information.

The better we can control this information process ... this metabolism ... the better we will be able to translate inputs into outputs.

Measuring the Inputs

How do we know when we have effectively changed our culture ... the way we behave, think, communicate, lead, train, maintain, and care?

In our new culture, we will understand that superiors are not the best equipped or positioned to judge leadership. Sure, commanders can judge whether or not a subordinate unit accomplishes its mission and what resources are utilized. But superiors are not the only, or best, way to judge values, leaders, or warriors. Subordinates do that. We just need to ask them.

How?

What is the yardstick?

Figure 2 is a list of forty important leader behaviors ... each tied to a soldierly value ... set up for use by warriors ...

What if each of us routinely asked our subordinates to place a letter grade in the blank next to each behavior, thereby evaluating us, as leaders, from the bottom? We would have a pretty good feel for how we, as individuals, stack up as leaders. And it would come from those who feel the effects of our individual leadership. The assessment would be based on behaviors that are directly related to competence, candor, commitment, and courage ... the fundamental values of our Army ... the soldierly qualities required on the battlefield ... the heart of our Army.

Integrating the Process

Remember that part about how our culture adapts and copes with the environment? There is an organizational theory known as "the Adaptive-Coping Cycle" that puts our information metabolism and teamwork together. The theory says that organizations go through a predictive, observable cycle in dealing with critical events in the

MOST IMPORTANT LEADER BEHAVIORS*

I. TASK/MISSION ORIENTED . . .

- ___ 1. Makes sure subordinates obey rules and regulations. (Candor)
- ___ 2. Counsels people who violate rules, regulations, or orders. (Candor)
- ___ 3. Encourages use of standardized procedures. (Competence)
- ___ 4. Makes on the spot corrections. (Courage)
- ___ 5. Helps subordinates improve an ongoing task/mission. (Commitment)
- ___ 6. Makes sure work is organized. (Competence)
- ___ 7. Explains how a task/mission can be done. (Competence)
- ___ 8. Makes sure subordinates have necessary training. (Commitment)
- ___ 9. Teaches subordinates how to improve performance. (Competence)
- ___ 10. Uses "hands on" training. (Competence)
- ___ 11. Plans ahead. (Competence)
- ___ 12. Counsels subordinates who don't do their share. (Courage)
- ___ 13. Trains subordinates as a team. (Commitment)
- ___ 14. Tells subordinates what the finished task/mission should look like. (Candor)
- ___ 15. Tells subordinates what is expected of them. (Candor)
- ___ 16. Seeks responsibility. (Commitment)
- ___ 17. Maintains high standards. (Competence)
- ___ 18. Checks task/mission progress. (Competence)
- ___ 19. Sets the example. (Courage)
- ___ 20. Has good job knowledge. (Competence)

- ___ 21. Is able to apply knowledge in the field. (Competence)
- ___ 22. Sets a time for tasks/missions to be done. (Candor)
- ___ 23. Provides resources to do the task/mission. (Commitment)
- ___ 24. Lets subordinates know where they stand concerning their performance. (Candor)
- ___ 25. Develops subordinates. (Competence)

II. PEOPLE ORIENTED

- ___ 1. Listens to people. (Candor)
- ___ 2. Treats people with respect. (Commitment)
- ___ 3. Is easy to talk to. (Commitment)
- ___ 4. Takes care of subordinates and shows personal concern. (Commitment)
- ___ 5. Helps people take care of personal problems. (Commitment)
- ___ 6. Gives praise. Rewards good performance. (Commitment)
- ___ 7. Has a sense of humor. (Commitment)
- ___ 8. Maintains good morals among subordinates. (Commitment)
- ___ 9. Uses subordinates' suggestions. (Candor)
- ___ 10. Stands up for subordinates when they receive unreasonable demands or blame. (Courage)
- ___ 11. Goes to bat for subordinates to get things they deserve. (Courage)
- ___ 12. Is willing to make changes. (Courage)
- ___ 13. Asks for suggestions/ideas from subordinates. (Candor)
- ___ 14. Helps settle disagreements between subordinates. (Courage)
- ___ 15. Shares hardships. (Courage)

*From AMI Technical Report 623 (Mar 84).

Figure 2

environment ...

- ... Sensing the external event.
- ... Communicating that sensing throughout the unit.
- ... Making a decision about how to deal with the event.
- ... Stabilizing internally to get ready to handle the event.
- ... Communicating the decision to all parts of the unit.
- ... Coping with the event -- going into action.
- ... Feedback on how the action is going.

Now, if we rate how well we execute each of these steps, we will have a good feel for how well we are adapting to, coping with, and accomplishing missions and achieving goals in terms of teamwork and information metabolism.

The Keys to Changing the Culture of Our Army

First, get on the right level ...

* If you're assigned to a company, battery, or detachment, concentrate on the individual level of leadership. As you know, you're in direct contact with soldiers who expect you to eat, sleep, and breath soldierly values -- competence, candor, commitment, and courage.

* If you're assigned to a brigade or battalion, don't totally forget about individual leadership, but start operating at the organizational level of leadership. Concentrate on building interdependencies and forging teamwork. Make information flow. Up. Down. And sideways.

* If you're a general, start operating on the systems level of leadership. Do that by giving your subordinates a clear understanding of your intent ... the desired end-state that you are after. Do it once. Do it right. Try not to muddy things up with a continuous flow of additional guidance. That just says that you didn't know what you wanted to begin with. Then get out of the way and let your people handle the details. And don't totally forget about your individual leadership behaviors.

Second, act like it has already happened. Behave in such a way that our subordinates are compelled from within to give us maximum ratings on each leader behavior. And energize your organization's information metabolism through teamwork.

The task is so great that many will treat it as absurd and ridiculous. Once we begin to penetrate the old culture and create the new, we will be perceived as dangerous and subversive.

And we will be.

Cultural change subverts the context on which thousands of "successful" Army people have built their careers and entrenched their organizations. We will be navigating against the cognitive maps of thousands who have gone before us.

That's OK.

When we start to behave in the way we envision our changed culture, then all the people who make up our Army will know that our values are being upheld, and our mission and goals are being accomplished ... each and every moment. Each task, every mission, each meeting, every decision, and each activity will be a confirmation that the new culture "is." It will already exist. Our leadership, our very behaviors, and the way we metabolize information will be concrete proof that the future is here.

And we will have changed the culture of our Army ...

* * *

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EXCELNET CONCEPT PAPERS VOLUME 1(U) ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF 2/2
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
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GAS AND A SLICK FOREHEAD

Almost everyone recognizes the desirability of doctrinally sanctioned, decentralized leadership and management programs. But, few are willing to suffer the gas, criticism, and occasional verbal punishment which sometimes accompany a decentralized operation. Gas is created because decentralized operations, by definition, mean that control of the organization is vested in many leaders -- not just the head man. With many people responsible for the operation of the organization, mistakes will inevitably happen. Leaders will not always know all the answers or have all the data concerning specific aspects of their operation. The individual responsible for that aspect of the operation will know all the answers. This makes some people uncomfortable. In fact, if the head man is concentrating on the important stuff, he does not have the time or the mental capacity to know everything there is to know about his organization. It is important that he have a system for getting the information he needs and to periodically review the programs of the organization from time-to-time.

Gas is also produced by superiors who regard decisions made under decentralized conditions to be of poor quality, even though subordinates who are involved in such decisions think that kind of process (and hence the operation of the entire organization) is better.

The advantage of a decentralized system is that people have the opportunity to participate in the planning and decision processes to such an extent that they develop a vested interest in its success ... a deep and pervading interest. Everyone wants to be in a successful unit and everyone wants to have a say in how his environment (job) will be managed.

The basis for this philosophy is that officers are planners, coordinators, thinkers and teachers of collective skills and leadership. NCO's are operators, enforcers of standards, SOP's, and discipline and are the primary teachers of individual and crew skills. The underlying requirement for any decentralized program is that every individual must do his job equal to or above the desired standard. To make that happen, every soldier must be given the responsibility for doing his job, and at the same time, he must be held accountable for doing it correctly. Herein lies the problem. If even one soldier in the organization fails to do his job, the impact on others can be devastating, at least temporarily.

Mistakes and failures are a necessary component of a decentralized system. It is by mistakes that learning takes place. The secret is to minimize the occurrence of catastrophic mistakes and to minimize the impact of all mistakes.

How?

First recognize that some mistakes are going to occur no matter who is involved or how much planning has been done. Accept that. Secondly, very few mistakes occur because soldiers are grossly incompetent (although this area

generates most catastrophic mistakes and all slick foreheads). Most mistakes occur because soldiers don't really know what they are expected to do.

The solution is relatively simple. Plan well and make sure everyone knows what the overall theme or concept is ... the commander's intent.

Each of us in a leadership position must be willing to endure a little gas over mistakes. None of us need endure incompetence and must move quickly to eliminate the source. Enduring a little gas in practical terms means forming a heat shield between an individual (or the whole organization) and those external sources who do not understand decentralization and who seek to weaken or destroy the process. But, no heat shield is expected or desired for incompetence.

The price for a good organization is frequent gas and an occasional slick forehead. But either is a small price for a cohesive outfit that can perform splendidly in combat, face hardship and adversity and win ... no matter what.

* * *

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ON LEADER DEVELOPMENT
&
THE MENTOR

IN SEARCH OF THE AIRLAND BATTLE LEADER

What does he/she look like? What behaviors, competencies, and attributes does the airland battle leader manifest? Is there a specific temperament -- a template that can be trained to -- suited to leading soldiers to victory on the airland battlefield?

Our warfighting doctrine says "Yes, there is an ALB leader." Innovation, creativity, stamina, professional values, soldierly qualities, perseverance, empathy, and studiousness are some of his/her hallmarks. Especially noteworthy is the airland battle leader's ability to function in the affective dimension -- leading soldiers -- motivating human beings -- creating battlefield victories by personal presence and intervention -- giving context to content . . . because "leadership is the crucial element of combat power."

Twenty-three members of ExcelOps, one of our Army's computer-based teleconferences, got together electronically, and figured out what this dude looks like, or at least what sort of personality temperament he/she manifests. This leader . . .

-- Is an Extrovert who more easily relates to people than to ideas. (The opposite is Introvert, someone who prefers ideas over people.)

-- Is iNtuitive, and would rather look for possibilities and relationships than work with known facts. (The opposite is Sensing, a preference for facts over possibilities and relationships.)

-- Has Feeling, and bases judgements on personal values rather than on impersonal analysis and logic. (The opposite is Thinking, preferring impersonal analysis and logic over personal/professional values.)

-- Has a Perceptive attitude that prefers flexibility and spontaneity over the planned and orderly. (The opposite is Judgemental, someone who prefers order over spontaneity.)

In the jargon of personality and temperament assessments, the airland battle leader, if he/she exists, is an ENFP . . . someone who is . . .

"Warmly enthusiastic, high-spirited, ingenious, imaginative. Able to do almost anything that interests them. Quick with a solution for any difficulty and ready to help anyone with a problem. Often rely on their ability to improvise instead of preparing in advance. Can usually find compelling reasons for whatever they want."

This personality/temperament profile is based on the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator, and nobody said this guy was perfect. Of course, basing personality/temperament profiles on a single assessment modality may not be totally reliable, even in the case of such a widely-accepted and statistically valid and reliable instrument as the M-BTI. (There are many personality attributes that are not addressed by the M-BTI, such as courage, physical energy, relative intelligence,

and mental tenacity.)

Now, here's the disconnect. In a sample of 144 new infantry second lieutenants, only 3.5% were ENFPs, that is, suitable ALB leaders. When each one of the four Meyers-Briggs polar determinants were varied (screening for INFPs, ESFPs, ENTPs, ENFJs) and we included those variations as "near-misses," only 16% of the sample approximated the expected airland battle leader profile. 27% were exact opposites (ISTJ) of the expected profile. If Extroversion/Introversion is discarded, 47% of the new lieutenants were totally opposite of the expected airland battle leader profile.

In a recent Naval War College class, 3.4% were ENFP. 10.3% were ENFP or one of the "near-misses." 44.8% of the class were opposite of the desired profile. Controlling for Extroversion/Introversion resulted in 58.6% of the class being totally opposite of the expected airland battle leader profile.

That's not surprising, because 0% of the brigadier generals profiled by the Center for Creative Leadership manifested the expected airland battle leader profile, and only 2% fell into the four "near-miss" temperaments. 51% of the generals were exact opposites of the expected profile (ISTJ = 23%; ESTJ = 28%). The demonstrated path to success, assuming being a general defines success, is along a personality growth and development path that is demonstrably different from what may probably be required for success on the airland battlefields of the future.

Now, all this boils down to one thing . . . our Army is not selecting, accessing, training/educating, developing, and promoting the type of leader our warfighting doctrine says we need for the airland battlefield. If ENFP is what describes the airland battle leader, our training and personnel management environments are out of synch with our doctrine. If ISTJ is the desired Army leader profile, then our warfighting doctrine is out of synch with the way we grow leaders. Projected reality and doctrine don't match. At this rate, we aren't going to find the airland battle leader. Sure, this ain't a truly scientific study, but it indicates that something is wrong. Our doctrine? And/or our leader selection/development process? And/or our personnel management system? How are we gonna fix it? Are we promoting the wrong people? Reinforcing the wrong behaviors? Chasing out young leaders with ENFP and "near-miss" profiles?

We probably don't need an Army of ENFPs. A mix may be the desirable organizational end-state. Maybe the leaders should be ENFPs, and the surrounding support structure -- the staff -- can be ISTJs. Is this evidence that we need a command track . . . a system that lets the best commanders command, instead of the best officers?

Perhaps we can take hope in the old adage "Wars are not fought by the existing leadership . . . warriors will come to the forefront, bypassing the bureaucrats." Maybe the same will hold true for ISTJs and ENFPs.

* * *

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Airland Battle Leadership and the Mental Gymnast

ALB IS
NOT NEW

The current edition of FM 100-5, Operations, contains many substantive changes over previous editions, including the introduction of "Airland Battle." ALB emphasizes offensive operations, deep attack, maneuver-based tactics and the integration of air and ground forces into a single battle concept. ALB seems to call for an entirely new approach to tactical doctrine, and in how to train those who must execute it.

HISTORICAL
BEHAVIORS

It is interesting to note from historical readings that great leaders -- Patton during the operations between Normandy and the West Wall and Rommel in North Africa and on the European continent -- clearly sought information about follow on echelons, integrated and coordinated battle resources, and understood the decisive consequences of maneuver based doctrine.

OLD
LIMITATIONS

Great leaders were not limited by doctrine or the absence of innovative thought. They were limited by resources they had to execute plans that their tactical minds had invented. We have always had doctrine -- the Principles of War. Now we have some of the resources. The price for the resources, however, is an increase in the knowledge that leaders must have about technology.

NEW
PRICE

In this regard, the considerable debate today concerning attributes of Airland Battle leaders and how they are identified and trained can be reduced to a single point. The only substantive difference between Airland Battle leadership requirements today and in the past are the capabilities of the sophisticated weapon systems, vehicle electronics, and automated information flow. Current discussions on leadership versus management fall into the category of mental gymnastics given this small difference. In fact, leaders must possess both skills to be successful. Balance is the key. Balance here means on the larger scale of understanding when each skill should be applied. Significant but equal attention to all missions and responsibilities is required.

DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN
OLD AND NEW

BALANCE

IMPORTANCE
OF
MANAGEMENT
SKILLS

During peace, certain management skills allow the leader to develop policies, objectives, and programs and are the leader's responsibility to monitor and keep the unit focused and motivated toward climate and motivation for attack. In war, this same individual must apply the same skills to overcome obstacles, accomplish the mission, and take care of the soldiers. Leadership and management skills in assessing, obtaining, and allocating the commodities with which to fight.

READINESS AS
A FUNCTION OF
INFORMATION

Delta Force is an excellent example of a unit available from HQ FORSCOM leadership. The unit is a single resource for teaching and training in management skills for success on the battlefield. The unit is called EXCELLENCE IN COMBAT and is a model of EXCELLENCE.

"X=H" deals with concepts and behaviors for handling the technology and automation of information flow, and achieving the end state that all units seek -- high performance.

HOW NOT TO
DEFINE
LEADERSHIP

HOW TO MOLD
LEADERSHIP

CRITICAL
LINK

Dr. T.O. Jacobs and Dr. Elliot Jacques of the Army Research Institute point out in "Leadership in Complex Systems" that we probably cannot define the ideal leader through research efforts focused on behaviors, attributes, and/or characteristics of the individual leader. Rather, we must use desired outcomes and goals to mold leader behavior and styles. The battalion commander is the critical link, as he is the last leader in the system who can directly influence soldiers and at the same time have the experience and wisdom to develop programs which include a purpose, missions, goals, objectives, tasks and standards. For these same reasons, he is also best qualified to teach new leaders how to think about tactics and doctrine, how to apply balance in approaching numerous tasks and most importantly, how to develop the zest, emotion, and spirit that separate leaders from managers at the critical time. He is the one person in the system who can realistically evaluate and decide upon the capabilities of leaders who go into combat. And he can prevent the inept from ever reaching the battlefield.

SUMMARY

We need not spend much time attempting to define special AirLand Battle skills. Those are described in existing publications and manuals. We do need to be cognizant of technology's impact and the significance of goal setting and visualizing end states or outcomes in units. We need to create high performing systems and operationalize the role of the battalion commander as teacher of skills necessary to cope with today's doctrine, tactics and technology. The fact is we know and understand the leadership skills that are necessary to fight the AirLand Battle. What we must be able to do is define the desired organizational end states that will insure battlefield victories and demand adherence in achieving those end states.

* * *

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BattleNet

I know there are squad, platoon, and company ARTEPs. And battalion. Do you have 'em for brigade?

Actually, I think you had one for the whole Army, and it was evaluative, and the Army failed. I think that ARTEP ended after about the first fifty rotations at the National Training Center. Those battalions, at least to me, were the essence of the output of your whole great big system, and all those components like training, and doctrine, and career development, and evaluation, and PPBES, and all that, and on, and on, and on. Those battalions and what they could do were the "final squeezins". And you put 'em up as close to real Russians and real bullets as you could get 'em, and, from what I gather, 'ole Army failed the ARTEP, except for a few, too few, battalions.

What you going to do about that?

Again, from what I gather, NTC teaches you to learn right there on the spot, then move out, right there on the spot, and make the changes, and do the learning, and then fight right. How can a whole Army, one that failed its ARTEP do that? Certainly not with all the time and energy that is expended at TRADOC in the production and promulgation of "doctrine."

How do you change doctrine . . . FAST?

One way might be to make it "living doctrine," and think of it in terms of the Age of Information. I think that ExcelOpers, part of the Army's computer-based teleconferencing system, ought to give birth to a son. Called "BattleNet". It's a teaching net. One that talks about fighting. Not Viet Nam. Not yesterday. Russians. Tomorrow.

For this net, the best teachers are not the schools, on the faculties. Not at Leavenworth, or the War College. The best teachers for what I've got in mind are the Observer-Controllers at the NTC. Those guys who watch at all levels, as battalions fight. Time, after time, after time. Those guys with the "god-guns". Those guys, and the OPFOR leaders. Think about what kind of teachers they could be. On BattleNet. We also need on there, as teachers, two kinds of battalion commander NTC veterans: those who did well, and maybe more importantly, those who LEARNED well.

Who would be the students on this net? I don't know . . . maybe BattleNet would be an electronic extension of the Pre-Command Course, and maybe the content of BattleNet would serve for a new and different kind of "Officers' Call" there on the footlocker(s).

Who knows?

Maybe there is such a thing as "living doctrine". Maybe all those offices, and poopsheets and publications, and field manuals are already of the past. Maybe the doctrine of battle, ten years from now, will be a living thing, living up in the ether, and wherever it is that "memory" is, here in these damn machines, and in the minds of all the teleconference participants.

Will you think about that?

In time, BattleNet could become an "expert system." Maybe it ought to be the FIRST damn expert system the Army tries to develop! Tough . . . but think about having a "living doctrine" that is, in reality, the accessible and manipulatable experience of every commander who fought and learned at NTC, fighting Russians (almost). BattleNet might become just that . . .

* * *

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NCO'S ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

Our Army may have a problem on the next battlefield. Experiences like the 1973 Arab-Israeli war tell us that we will see extensive officer battle casualties, especially at battalion and company levels.

Is our Army prepared for massive officer casualties? What happens when battalion commanders and entire staffs are eliminated? Can our E7's and E8's operate, even temporarily, at the Command and General Staff College level? The answer, unfortunately, is "No," and that's why our noncommissioned officers, through no fault of their own, may not be true members of the Profession of Arms. Our NCO's are journeymen, because that's what our Officer Corps has expected of them for so long. Officer expectations are misintentioned for the type battles we need to prepare for -- swirling maelstroms ... series of disparate pocket battles. It follows that we don't need journeymen. We need senior NCO's capable of thinking beyond platoon and company level. We must expect them to cognitively operate at least two levels higher than their current level. That means a platoon sergeant must be capable of performing his company commander's job.

Now, cool off. Unquestionably, our noncommissioned officers are professionals. They are capable, spirited leaders. Many can perform the role of battle captain now, without further training. However, many more cannot, because we haven't trained them. Officers, by and large, don't expect NCO's to perform officer functions during battle. Our noncommissioned officers have to be able to do all they used to, plus more.

How do we create this capability? Training is one way. Our Sergeants Major Academy can devote increasing classroom time to operational and strategic issues. Command Sergeants Major, be it battalion, brigade, or division, have to be able to think and advise tactically, operationally, and strategically. Our First Sergeants Course must expand its thinking. Instead of devoting so much time to administration, we should devote time to tactics and how to think tactically at company and battalion levels. That's what first sergeants will be required to do, so why not train them that way?

The Officer Corps can help by changing its expectations. "Power down" is alive and working in many commands and has had a positive impact on NCO development. NCO's operating in "power down" environments show initiative, responsibility, and risk taking -- necessary traits for fighting and winning on the next battlefield. Yet, officer expectations remain partially to blame for our predicament. Our NCO Corps can help itself by recognizing the problem of officer attrition and taking steps to change the way our Army thinks about them.

Make no mistake about it. NCO's are members of the Profession of Arms. Their role has changed, but they are still pros. It's time the Officer Corps began acting like we understand that. Let's get started ...

* * *

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WHO HAS THE INITIATIVE

Talk to soldiers. Ask them why they think we can beat the Soviets. Sooner or later, one of them will tell you something like this ...

The Russians are rigid and inflexible. Their commander gives them a plan, and they have to follow it no matter what. We're supposed to show initiative, to do something different if the situation changes. That's why we'll beat them, because they can't think for themselves.

Initiative is a popular word in our Army. It is a cornerstone of our operational concept ... Airland Battle. It connotes flexibility, pragmatism, and good old Yankee ingenuity. We like to think initiative is a quality uniquely ours, and that our potential enemies don't have it. We think they are rigid, doctrinally and intellectually, and because they are, we will be able to out-think and out-fight them. We'll get "inside their decision loop." We'll fragment their command and control processes, and destroy their command structures. We'll "float like a butterfly and sting like a bee." And the Russian bear will fall of its own ponderousness. We hope ...

That could be a fatal assumption.

Certainly, the Soviets emphasize detailed planning and adherence to "norms" far more than we do. But, we are wrong to equate this with a lack of initiative among Soviet commanders. The Soviets place great emphasis on the correct display of initiative among junior leaders. Perhaps initiative means something different to them.

Talk to a Russian, and he might say something like this ...

In the Soviet Army, we regard initiative as that quality which a subordinate displays in the course of executing the mission assigned to him. He must at all times keep in mind the intention of his superior commander, both in general terms -- to impose his will on the enemy -- and in terms of the present situation. Within those parameters, he is free to carry out his mission using the best possible method and means.

The subordinate is expected to insure that his initiative conforms to the situation as it exists. This is especially true when the situation has changed drastically from what was initially envisioned, and it isn't possible to get new orders. But in every case, the subordinate must remember his ultimate aim ... to accomplish his mission within the time specified.

You say that our definition of initiative sounds more restrictive than yours does. Perhaps. If so,

it is that way for a reason. Junior commanders need guidance to help them form correct decisions. The mission, the time fixed for accomplishment, the actual situation, the correlation of forces, scientifically derived norms -- these things provide a framework for decision-making. They are a palette, if you will, on which the subordinate commander can exercise his creativity as he practices his art.

Compare that with this passage from a recent US Army field circular ...

Initiative is the spontaneous action of subordinates to solve unanticipated problems and overcome obstacles in such a manner as to further the aims of the commander. Initiative requires that subordinate leaders ...

- o Be thoroughly knowledgeable of the commander's intent and the actions of adjacent and following units.
- o Be proficient in their duties.
- o Use drills and standardized procedures to guide their actions.

Only masters of the military art are capable of creative and innovative contributions. Creativity exercised in the hands of a novice produces chaos. Novices don't have the understanding, knowledge, or expertise to innovate. Junior leaders must master military science and art through long study and practice. Only then is the military professional qualified to employ creativity in the furtherance of tactical operations.

They sound a lot alike, don't they?

We must understand that the Soviets see initiative in much the same terms that we do. They aren't going to roll over and die because we want them to. They will do everything they can to beat us. We have to be tough enough to see that they don't. Wishful thinking won't do it; but, thorough knowledge of how they think, and how they fight, will take us a lot closer to beating them.

* * *

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THE COVENANT

I am a soldier. I will go through hell for you, and come back only a little singed. I'll train hard and play hard. I'll bitch, moan, and get in a little trouble now and then. But, my loyalty to you, my leader, to my fellow soldiers and my country is legendary. I'll willingly, although not always knowingly, give up some rights to do something I really love -- be a soldier. I'm a little unfree in a free society. That's OK. However, I do have some needs I expect you to help me fulfill. You and I have a covenant. Here's what it looks like...

- I need to know you need me. Don't assume I know this. Tell me. You are going to lead me. Do it right. I'm going to fight. I'll win for you. Just let me know from time to time how important I am.
- I want to understand you and what it is I'm supposed to accomplish. I'll hold this doggone hill -- just tell me why, when you can, and what for and how I fit in. I'll do the rest. Miracles can happen when everyone knows what they're supposed to do. How many times have I -- the American soldier -- made that difference?
- I want to be involved -- in everything. When you're going to do something, ask me about it once in a while -- especially when it directly affects me. My input is necessary and important, and should be a normal part of doing business. It'll help us both learn from each other and do our jobs better.
- I share your commitment to our ideals, values and goals. I believe in what we're doing. I may not say it the way you do. Sometimes I don't know how to say it. But there is a patriotic heart in my chest that believes wildly and passionately in my country and our Army.
- I want to affect my own destiny -- to have some control over my own life. I do in a sense sign my commitment or lack of commitment to my work. Beyond that I need you to coach me -- to help me set a vision of where I can go.
- I want you to hold me accountable for what you ask me to do -- for my responsibilities. It is a double-edged sword -- hold me accountable, but give me the space I need to do the job. Remember, I can give two "accounts" of myself...good and bad. Recognize both.
- Finally, I want to be able to appeal in two ways. First, I'm gonna screw-up from time to time. Sometimes, permanent. You must apply justice. Just be sure you really listen to my side first...in fact insist that I speak. It's easy to assume I've done wrong before you see me. Please be sure its justice you apply and not prejudice. The second appeal is to be able to tell you that you're off target on something. Listen -- then do what you have to do.

Maybe this is an overstatement of the obvious. But in the rush of day to day business we sometimes forget these things. We do have a very important covenant ...

THE COVENANT

To be needed

To understand

To be involved

To affect one's destiny

To be a accountable

To be able to appeal

To share commitment

* * *

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Small Unit Cohesion, Emerging Leaders, and Leaders' Reaction Courses

A NEED Our Army could sure use a method to: 1) evaluate potential leadership, 2) teach leadership principles, 3) bond individuals into groups, 4) evaluate cohesion of a group, and 5) build esprit. The method we want must be: 1) easy to work, 2) inexpensive to build and maintain, 3) able to work in a variety of climates and locations, 4) easy to change, 5) capable of capturing interest of participants, and 6) able to provide quick and simple feedback to observers and participants.

HISTORICAL SOLUTION How many of you are familiar with the Leaders' Reaction Course? Benning, Knox, and Riley each have one, maybe other places. LRCs were originally developed by the Germans before WWII, and today, usually consist of about 17 separate and distinct, abstract, complex, time-constrained, physically demanding tasks. The leader of a ten man team (usually OCS, OBC, or OAC students) must analyze, organize, deputize, and supervise through to task completion. How well the leader does indicates his/her understanding and use of leadership dimensions . . . or leadership ability. The end result is teaching folks that, as a leader, you must weigh the options, consider your time, make a decision, and carry it out, modifying actions as required.

DESCRIBED

RESULT

NEW APPLICATION What if we used LRCs to IDENTIFY emerging leaders, say in COHORT OSUT training units, and ASSESS/TRAIN existing unit leadership infrastructures?

DOCTRINE The leadership criteria laid out in FM100-5, OPERATIONS, says, at least to me, that one hell of a lot of small unit leader training should be of the LRC variety . . . concentrating on the critical thinking and decision skills that will give us the edge on the next battlefield. An LRC might be one super diagnostic tool for assessing, demonstrating to people what they don't know about leadership, and then training-in those skills. Instructors can show why people must work together to accomplish even simple tasks, and why loners can't make it.

COHESION How effective might LRCs be in enhancing small unit cohesion, say within crews, squads, or entire unit leadership infrastructures?

A simple, easy measure of the cohesion effects of LRC training would be a count of the number of times the trainer hears "we," "us," and "out," especially during the after-task critique. Another might be the decline of barracks thefts.

THE ITERATION PROBLEM How difficult would it be to design an LRC that could withstand iterative sessions by a given group? How about letting one team observe the solutions (successful and unsuccessful), and then spend some time devising ways to block that solution the next time out, rules being equipment and basic scenerio/cast remain the same. That gives everyone a chance to THINK about what went on and why. Let

AND SOLUTION

them play Monday morning quarterback with tactics and strategy. We're supposed to be teaching folks to be flexible and adaptive in their thinking. Using the same basic situation while changing variables that allow success would seem to have some value. This would seem to have the major advantage of reinforcing the idea of "What was it that went right" in the lesson, and the fact that there is more than one "right" answer to the problem.

FUTURE
LRCs

How about the LRC of the future? What will it look like? Will it be a fixed struture like today's LRCs, or will it be more of a mental construct(s)? How about combining the features of arcade games such as "Dragon's Lair" or "Space Ace," and the realism of wrap-around flight simulators? A group of such machines, linked with outcomes based on an individual or group effort, would be easy to program with changes, would excite the interest of our young soldiers, and could be used just about anyplace.

TODAY'S
REALITY

But, back to today's reality. Out there, the LRC is a neat, fun diversion that has the potential to identify and train leaders and to build and measure cohesion. Amid high-tech soldier-machine training requirements, time sensitive #1 priorities, maintenance demands, and piles of admin red-tape, time for this "diversion" is minimal. We can use LRCs to build cohesion around our machines and weapons systems. We can use LRCs to evolve leaders and leadership infrastructures around these systems. All we need do is answer the question "How important are carefully selected, trained leaders and cohesion?"

A
QUESTION

* * *

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Training Leaders for Army 21

THE FUTURE Picture the battlefields of the future we're going to be outnumbered . . . the battlefield will be "dirty" . . . and replete with high technology weaponry . . .

DEATH & lots of dead and wounded, including significant numbers of
DESTRUCTION neuropsychiatric casualties . . . desant forces and conventional RACO threats compounding a 360 degree orientation that will blur lines and create isolated pocket battles in a swirling maelstrom . . . independent operations demanding reliance on aggressive, creative

LEADERS leaders who have the initiative and mental agility to execute their commanders' intent . . . greater lethality, meaning greater attrition and a demand for interchangeable leaders. Leaders at the same functional level (i.e. platoon leader and platoon sergeant) will have a common and mutually supportive competency need. When one becomes a

REDUNDANCY casualty, the other will have to rapidly fill the vacuum, and someone else must slide up into the ready position. We will need an unprecedented vertical and horizontal

THINKING redundancy of people. These people are going to have to be
SKILLS mentally and physically tough, creative and non-linear in their approach to tactical dilemmas, technically and tactically proficient at multiple functional levels, and teambuilders. The technological sophistication of our equipment, organizations and procedures will require more than just "Machoman, the Axe Wielder" out there.

TODAY'S The reality in the field may not meet the projected
REALITY need. We have made great efforts to clarify the separate duties, responsibilities, and authorities (DRA) of commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers, so good that we have lost an understanding that some DRA are mutually shared and are common training needs. (The problem transcends leadership.) There is little or no purposed overlap of leader training and development. Couple that with a wide disparity in experience and education and it is understandable why the people

NEED redundancy does not already exist. Leaders on the same functional level -- PSG/PLD, 1SG/CO -- should be grounded in identical, mutually supportive leadership training because they need similar leadership competencies.

PARTIAL CAC's Center for Leadership and Ethics (CLE), the
PLAN alledged nexus of leadership doctrine, training, and development, is driving to close the gap. We now have a common "bible" - FM 22-100, MILITARY LEADERSHIP, core curricula for OBC and OAC, and a soon-to-be leadership instructor training course. ATSC is conducting a task commonality review that should ultimately tell us what are the mutually supportive tasks at each level.

MORE * Identify critical leadership skills that must be
FIXES available, then train that particular leader (squad, crew, platoon, company) to execute to a standard. Risk-taking

must be encouraged and mistakes met with training, not scorn.

* Hasten ATSC's task commonality review and revise common task manuals. Include leadership tasks.

* (Continue to) develop leadership POIs with built in commonality:

- ** Thoughts --> FM 22-100 --> Be
- ** Words --> Integrated LCCs --> Know
- ** Deeds --> Task Commonality --> Do

* Conduct joint training/education sessions.

** OBC/ANCOC and OAC/ISG students in the same classroom for leadership training. PSGs and PLDs should be educated together.

** Joint OPD/NCOPD in the field. PSGs and PLDs should learn together (and teach each other).

* Synchronize the OER and EER system with each other and with war-fighting doctrine. Build in measures of tactical and technical proficiency.

* Capture the successes and failures of current field leaders for use in experiential (performance oriented) training in the schoolhouse.

* Increase the use of historical examples that reinforce national values and principles.

* Don't make the mistake of reducing the number of leadership instruction hours taught in the schoolhouse.

PATH

When we have achieved a common philosophy (FM 22-100), an understanding of mutually supportive tasks (ATSC's task commonality review), AND a common curriculum (integrated LCC for all schools, POI and MOI), we will have achieved an identical message being carried by identical messagers and presented in identical forums. That's how we start to build horizontal and vertical leader redundancy.

* * *

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The Code

Somewhere back in the mid-70's, our Army faced an extremely difficult task. From a pool of 2000-3000 colonels, each highly experienced, heavily trained and schooled, previously assessed numerous times by dozens of different rating officers and by six or seven DA selection boards, our Army had to pick the fifty best qualified to become brigadier generals.

The board was selected and instructed, the 2000-3000 files were pulled and piled, and the narrowing down process began. It continued until only the 100 most highly qualified colonels in the whole US Army remained. Fifty of those would become generals, and fifty wouldn't. The "Final Cut". An extremely difficult bit of discriminating to have to do.

About that time, at the Army War College, there was a piece of research done that you probably never heard about. The hypothesis was that the positions that an officer had held during his career was the driving factor in BG selection . . . more important than all those "measures" of performance, and of potential, indicated by a couple inches of OERs and letters and six or eight selection board decisions.

To test the theory, the researchers went back to just before the "final cut" and got the names of those last 100 best-qualified colonels. A number was substituted for each name. Each number was written at the top of a single page, and on that page was written one thing: a simple chronological list of each position title the officer had held since commissioning (like the ORB). 100 pages. A number and a job list on each page.

Six LTCs who had previously served as personnel action officers (desk officers) at OPD (MILPERCEN) were each given a set of the 100 pages, and asked to score, independently, the jobs on each page . . . from 5 (good) to 1 (not good). The scores from the six judges were then pooled together with the "Q-sort technique" or some other statistical magic, so that a total "job value score" was obtained for each of the 100 best qualified, last cut colonels. When the numbers on the pages were turned back into names, the job value scores predicted which 50 out of the 100 had made BG . . . with 87% accuracy.

I suppose this research doesn't surprise anybody, but it might be worthwhile to think about. The former MILPERCEN desk officers predicted selection to BG, with 87 percent accuracy, in an extremely difficult discrimination task, using nothing more than a list of 25-30 position titles . . . NO DATA ON PERFORMANCE in any of those jobs, NO DATA ON POTENTIAL for the next higher jobs, NO DATA ON ADMINISTRATIVE "RELIEFS" (except, maybe another "good" job), NO DATA ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT, and NONE ON HOW WELL OR HOW POORLY SUBORDINATES AND TROOPERS WERE TREATED AND TRAINED AND DEVELOPED. Just the job title. The "tickets". And a hundred million assumptions.

There is a Code. Those folks who work the assignment desks at MILPERCEN know it best. It's not written down, and I doubt that they talk about it much among themselves, but it's there, in their minds, commonly understood and shared knowledge among the folks in

the daily business of watching what happens to whom over time. Theoretically, with a refinement of this research, or perhaps some computer-supported "policy-capture" techniques, you could determine a rather accurate "promotion potential weight" for every job there is. There is a Code, and, quite possibly, getting selected/promoted depends maybe more on knowing the Code and making it happen than on performance and potential, and courage/candor/commitment/competence, and doing one's . . . duty.

Is this piece of research important? What are the implications? Should you try to bust the Code? De-fang it? How would you do that? Can you do that?

And one more thing to think about. General Creighton Abrams, the warrior, left us all a lot of wisdom. One piece, in particular, fits here . . . "For Chrissakes, doesn't anybody out there just want to do a good job?"

* * *

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Champion Boxers Don't Have Wimps for Sparring Partners

Back during the Professional Development of Officers Study, I was among the guys who argued vehemently against "excepted-for-quality" units. ("Excepted-for-quality" is a MILPERCEN management category which insures that very high quality soldiers are assigned to an organization ... like West Point and some Army Staff positions.) And I meant it. Our Army needs to spread our wealth of talent and energy, so that the whole damn institution can learn and grow from our finest leaders and teachers. Many people say that doing away with "excepted-for-quality" is a gameplan for mediocrity ... but that's just smoke and fear ... generated by people more worried about their own careers than about our Army and our nation. The people who say that are afraid that they'll have to discharge their mentoring responsibilities ... teaching and developing their subordinates, rather than simply relying on them.

So, we were wrong. But ... just a little bit.

Not with the answer ... that was right.

It was the question we had wrong.

There is one group ... just one ... that needs to be "excepted-for-quality." That's because our Army, as a whole, benefits from this group's efforts. This group comprises our preeminent teaching modality ... the battlefield ... they live on the battlefield, day in and day out, 262 days a year ... they are a resource that is purposing our entire Army ... scaring us into training for the real thing ... battle.

It's not the West Point Cadre.

It's not the Army Staff.

This group lives in the high Mojave Desert at the National Training Center. They, and their families, live in isolation, on the edge of civilization, yet with all the necessary amenities ... almost ... and with the desert heat, the wind, the sand, the snakes, and the scorpions. They are a close-knit bunch of consummate specialists dedicated to making our Army better. They are the Observer/Controllers (the NTC's teaching corps), the OPFOR (the Opposing Force ... those damn Russians), and the guys running the Atari building (the Tactical Automation Facility) where every success and failure is graphically, sometimes painfully, captured and played back for teaching and learning purposes. The officers, NCO's, and soldiers at the National Training Center are already good ... very good ... professionals of the first magnitude. It's paradoxical, but traditional, that our Army "exiled" many of them to the desert because they ran counter to the stereotypical, Pentagon-bound, political and bureaucratic office toadie characteristically groomed by our Army for greater things ... paradoxical because these soldiers epitomize everything that our doctrinal design specifications say make up airland battle leaders ... and "successful", desk-bound, risk-averse office toadies are the antithesis of the airland battle leader.

Our Army needs to reward the officers and NCO's at the NTC with schools, promotions, and less arduous assignments.

And we can make them BETTER.

For two days, I had the great good fortune of riding with the awesome OPFOR ... Captain Isenberg's company ... acting very realistically, quite effectively, and for the benefit of our entire Army as the Fourth Motorized Rifle Battalion of the 32nd Guards

Motorized Rifle Regiment. The ease with which they kicked the snot out of US forces petrified me ... stone cold. And I thought, "What if these guys were all ... each commander and staff officer and senior NCO ... were all already proven before they got to the NTC ... previously tested all-stars in their jobs? And we sent them back to do it again. At the NTC. As Russians. As teachers."

They would be BETTER.

The OPFOR commander was obviously an airland battle leader. Anyone could see that, just by the way he operates. He, and because of his role-modeling and mentoring, his staff and commanders, epitomize the airland battle leader criteria ...

Decentralization ...

Commander's intent ...

Disciplined initiative ...

Innovation ...

Flexibility ...

Risk taking ...

ATTACK!

And they love what they are doing. Deeply. Because they are there, living with soldiers, on the battlefield, day in, day out. I saw LTC Sneeberger's staff officers and commanders molded, taught, and aimed by a leader who understands and lives positive leadership. This positive leadership absolutely permeated the Russian regimental command post, not to mention the OPFOR's operations ...

Competence ...

Courage ...

Commitment ...

Candor ...

I knew before we ever crossed the LD that the US forces were in it ... deep ... up to their hips ... maybe deeper. Sadly, yet satisfyingly, I was right.

Then, for two days, I rode with an OC ... an Observer/Controller ... a Scorpion, assigned to teach a US company ... a young captain ... a successful commander ... who had volunteered for the OC job. When I joined up with him, I thought "Nothing special." Man, was I wrong. Swenson knew more about tactics and teaching than I could learn in three CGSC rotations. But what was really neat was the quiet, non-threatening, positive-minded way that he and his NCO's were transferring that knowledge to the soldiers, NCO's, lieutenants, and captain of that US company. I guess that means "teaching." He damn sure taught me. Yeah ... "Scorpion 18" understands training, maintaining, caring, and leading ... in spades.

So, what all this boils down to is this ... the people who man the NTC ... NOT THE NTC ... are our Army's greatest training asset. The Sneebergers, Swensons, and Isenbergs of our Army are the lean, hard boiled, sunburnt, wind-whipped, dehydrated essence of "teacher." They understand that the beauty of any task is in the doing of it. We must accelerate how we capitalize on their contribution to our Army.

And, as long as we can "except-for-quality" ... either by design or accident ... as we have already done ... the human factor at NTC -- that battlefield analog that is purposing our entire Army -- we will be able to deliver quality training to our soldiers, leaders, and units.

That means we'll be better equipped to kick ass on the next battlefield.

Our Army deserves that. America deserves that.

So, Army ... I guess I screwed up. We do need at least ONE organization excepted-for-quality.

The National Training Center.

Keep our office toadies in the city. Put a leash on them.

Send our warriors to the desert. And, unleash them.

You see ... champion boxers don't have wimps for sparring partners, and they don't have marshmallows for trainers. We don't now, and neither should our Army ... ever. We need to make damn sure of that.

The question we should have asked ourselves back during the Professional Development of Officers Study is "What organizations/activities touch our entire Army, giving it a sense of purpose, a sense of the battlefield, and a sense of direction ... and at the same time, mentors the warrior-leaders of our future?"

Answer that, and we'll know which organizations should be "excepted-for-quality."

And, we'll also find out where a bulk of our professional development and assignment rewards ought to go ... routinely ... to the warriors who are DOING IT ... in the desert ... every screaming hot, hard calloused, gritty, bloody, damn day. The warriors at the National Training Center ...

* * *

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Trouble in the Forest

And the great oaks told the smaller maples, "If you will spend time growing in our shadow, letting your roots spread far and wide, securing the soil for us, we will allow enough sunlight through to give you the chance to grow big and strong ... like us."

All know that the soil is everything.

The maples, knowing the importance of the precious soil to all trees, consented, saying, "We will gladly do this thing, and do it well. Just do not forget us when the sun shines."

And the maples let their roots spread, and held the soil firmly in place for the whole forest, giving purpose and foundation to all that the forest did.

But the oaks forgot the maples.

Then there was trouble in the forest ... there was unrest in the trees ... for the maples wanted sunlight. But, the oaks ignored their pleas.

The sunlight barely trickled through to the shorter, more isolated trees. The maples began to wither ... and die. Soon, their leaves mingled with their rotting trunks, and their roots decayed.

And the soil became loose.

Then came the rains.

And the soil washed away.

The trees that remained, including the great oaks, lost contact with their foundation ... their very reason for existence.

And the great oaks withered, too.

Then came the woodsman ... he who makes all trees equal ... by hatchet, axe, and sword.

MORAL: If you assign people to help you maintain contact with the very purpose of your organization, you'd better let the sun shine on them enough to keep them alive.

*

The selection rate to 1985 promotion-to-major list was approximately 65%. For those eligible maples stationed at the NTC, the rate was 32%. A stubby pencil ran the numbers thru an analysis. The difference came out statistically significant at the .05 level.

And this ain't the first time.

Now ... let's ask ourselves some questions about causality ...

Are the numbers skewed because our Army sends discards to the NTC?

If the answer is "Yes," then is what we do there important?

If the answer is "No," then what is it about NTC that causes soldiers to be passed over?

Now ... couple all that with a TRADOC manpower survey that allegedly recommends a major reduction in staffing of the NTC Operations Group ... another effort to pay the bill for light divisions of questionable utility.

What's it all mean?

Those guys out at the NTC are, by and large, the best warriors in our Army. They know more about the doctrine, they know what works and what don't, and they really give a damn about our Army. They're training soldiers to fight smarter and meaner, and to stay alive in

the process. They're soldiering, day in and day out, more than a lot of guys ever get to do ... or want to.

But, let's face it, those AIN'T the skills that promotion boards reflect on. How many NTC guys were generals' aides? West Pointers? How many held brigade or higher staff jobs? How many are cocktail party hotshots, adroit politicians, or have pretty, popular wives? We just don't seem to be looking for fighters or risk-takers.

This looks like a classic case of our Army rewarding "A" behavior (holding the right job), while hoping for "B" behavior (warriors). Officers can see the handwriting on the wall. They know what gets them promoted. Until some tangible reward at the NTC is seen or felt, we'll continue to have this systemic problem.

Why not send all the aides to the President, SecArmy, SecDef, White House Fellows, AWC Research Associates, etc. out there for a month? If those guys are our fastburners, let them do some fastburning in the field. That would be the single loudest statement of the NTC's importance. No single piece of our Army touches all parts of our Army in its natural state -- the field -- the way the NTC does.

One more thing ...

German Forestmeisters are fabulous tree sculptors. Their job is to cut those big old oaks that have gotten too big and the ones that are too young to have a damn about the maples anymore. When they find one, they make something useful out of it ... firewood. Do you know any forestmeisters?

* * *

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NTC Logistics

AN OPPORTUNITY

The National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California represents a resource of great potential, not only for evaluating the tactical skills of our armor and infantry battalions, but other units as well. There is now an opportunity to teach, train, and evaluate a wider range of tactical operating systems than was possible in the past because of the NTC. We therefore should devote some of our skill and energy toward identifying and disseminating information about those areas which impact most on successful tactical operations.

A PROPOSAL

Logistics is a critical area that is rarely evaluated under actual conditions. Why not use the NTC as a test bed to stress and test current and proposed logistical systems, procedures, and equipment?

HOW?

NTC has the terrain available to stress time-distance aspects of logistical operations from the brigade support area (BSA) to fighting platoons. By forcing doctrinal positioning of logistical bases and then frequently displacing them, time-distance problems could be studied under controlled conditions for the first time. In the process, logisticians will be subjected to air, artillery, and NBC strikes just as maneuver forces are. In addition, ground interdiction of supply routes, support areas, and headquarters will add necessary realism to make logisticians a part of the battle for the first time since Viet Nam. Under these conditions, logisticians will have to look at alternate routes; contingency resupply; aerial resupply; self-defense, protection from air; artillery and NBC; rear area security; and security of logistics stocks, among other things. Commanders and logisticians alike will now have to think about and use all the tools available to them to insure resupply of the force.

USE DOCTRINE

REALISM

FULL SPECTRUM

COME AS YOU ARE

Units participating in NTC training will not be allowed to beef up logistically before they arrive. Normal PLL and ASL will be enforced just as the limits on TO&E equipment are for maneuver units. Commanders will be critiqued on the adequacy of their logistics plans as evidenced by instructions to the S4, sufficiency of all classes of supply and equipment maintenance.

EVALUATION

The logistical aspects of the operation could be evaluated by a special observer/controller (O/C) group of from three to four people. These O/C's will input comments directly to the senior O/C for the After Action Review. Areas of interest could include:

- Task force consumption data.
- Weapons system replacement operations (WSRO).

- Mass casualties.
- Line haul of ammo equal to weight, cube and number of rounds.
- Operations in an NBC environment.
- Time distance constraints on ammo not found in the ATP (ammo not on hand in the ATP that requires movement from the rear).

TESTING

Finally, the NTC can be the testing ground for new systems or innovative approaches using existing equipment. The Palletized Loading System (PLS) to speed up transloading of supplies, Positions Locating and Reporting System (PLRS) to assist in map reading and movement, and unit level information processing systems (computers) are examples. These may be tested on or off line with participating units.

REALISTIC CONDITIONS

The real value of using NTC as a mechanism to evaluate the logistical system rests in the duplication of the conditions expected on the modern battlefield. Since these conditions cannot be duplicated elsewhere, it makes sense to use this special national resource to help sort out some of our most difficult and perplexing problems, and to promote a more responsive, highly trained logistical base. As a minimum, NTC will make commanders more aware of the real problems associated with logistics, and will force them to think, plan and execute operations with an eye toward the implications of logistics. This approach will also insure that logisticians learn how to resupply under actual, not simulated conditions.

QUESTIONS TO ANSWER

To make all of this a reality, our Army must first agree that this proposal has merit, and that resources will be made available to support such an operation at NTC. Secondly, our Army must decide what critical logistics areas need to be studied, evaluated, and tested routinely during each rotation, and what areas need to be handled as exceptions. Both must be scheduled and previously coordinated with rotational units. Finally, our Army must decide how to achieve the quickest and widest distribution in order to impact on the Total Army. Currently, no agency is actively doing this for any tactical subject.

THE PAYOFF

If our Army takes the chance on making logistics as important as tactics, then the result can only be an Army better capable of defeating the enemy -- today and in the future.

* * *

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Leader Development Reading List

The professional knowledge of leaders is essential to sound teaching and to the proficiency as well as readiness of units.

General John Wickham, Jr.

*

CRAIG, William. Enemy at the Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad. New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1973. 433 pages.

Craig recreates the details of the Battle of Stalingrad ... from the hot summer of August 1942, when the German armies smashed their way across southern Russia toward the Volga River through the struggle for Stalingrad -- a city Hitler never meant to capture and Stalin never meant to defend -- on to the destruction of the supposedly invincible German Sixth Army and the terror of the Russian prison camps in frozen Siberia. The resulting mosaic reveals a vivid picture of human tragedy and triumph in war.

*

ELLIS, John. The Sharp End. New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1980. 319 pages.

Ellis describes World War II through human experiences. The book gives a detailed account of what war was like for the common fighting man. Ellis also comments on training and discipline, the moments of relaxation between battles, and the soldiers' opinions about what they were actually fighting for. He supplies convincing evidence that it was not so much a sense of duty or loyalty to country that kept men going as it was their comradely love for one another.

*

FERGUSON, Marilyn. The Aquarian Conspiracy: Personal and Social Transformation in the 1980's. Los Angeles: J.P. Tarcher, Inc., 1980. 428 pages.

Ferguson believes a network exists which enlists the minds, hearts, and resources of some of America's most advanced thinkers. She calls this network the Aquarian Conspiracy. The basic theme of this book deals with how the conspiracy will affect the transformation of social consciousness in our time -- a mental turnabout in individuals and organizations -- focusing on societal and individual values, thinking, and practices in the future.

*

FLESCH, Rudolf. The Art of Clear Thinking. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973. 212 pages.

This book is a unique psychological self-help book that summarizes for the general reader the relation of scientific findings between thinking and problem-solving. Drawing from psychology, linguistics, anthropology, and mathematics, the author has produced an expert guide to clear and constructive thinking. The book is packed with useful suggestions, including shortcuts to mathematics, a system for speedy note-taking, and tips on how to solve problems.

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GUEVARA, Che. On Guerilla Warfare. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961. 85 pages.

This is a brief manual for guerillas on guerilla warfare. Guevara's comprehensive, emotional, do-it-yourself guide to guerilla action, based on experiences of Cuban forces, was intended as a primer for potential guerilla forces in Latin America. This book may be especially timely. Guevara treats a wide range of topics ... equipment, terrain, morale, troop behavior, indoctrination, sabotage, land reform, and propoganda.

*

HEINLEIN, Robert. Starship Troopers. New York: Berkely Press, 1959. 208 pages.

Heinlein has written what may be described as the future history of today's Army of Excellence. The book is a social and ethical commentary on leadership, soldiering, and war and deals with personal responsibility, teamwork, cohesion, values, and hard training. Heinlein uses futuristic military life, training, and combat experiences to convey many of the concepts that may come to pass as Army 21.

*

INGRAHAM, Larry. The Boys in the Barracks. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1984. 282 pages.

LTC Ingraham, psychologist and soldier, takes the reader inside the enlisted soldiers' world to hear, in their own words, what they think of Army life, their leaders, and each other. Ingraham weaves his findings into a fascinating account of a universe in miniature, complete with official and tacit rules, in-groups and outsiders, and a remarkable range of leisure activities. The soldier's life "after-hours" is Ingraham's chief interest, and he sheds new light on a shadow world of drug use, drinking, and thrillseeking.

*

JANOWITZ, Morris. Sociology and the Military Establishment. Beverly Hills: 1974. 159 pages.

This book represents a perspective on the sociology of military institutions under conscription and in the context of Western advanced industrialism. Janowitz also addresses the issue of emergence of military forces as crucial ingredients in political realities of Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America.

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KAHALANI, Avigdor. The Heights of Courage: A Leader's War on the Golan. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. 195 pages.

Kahalani, a former tank battalion commander, describes his experiences beginning with the initial Syrian offensive of the Yom Kippur War. He recounts the personal endeavors of his soldiers, their fears and ambitions, as well as their emotional and physical hardships. He traces the efforts of the Israeli forces as they struggle to overcome extreme difficulties and setbacks. The author concludes with Israel's ultimate into Syria and their approach to within forty kilometers of Damascus.

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KARSTEN, Peter. Law, Soldiers, and Combat. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978. 205 pages.

This book begins with an analytical account of the development of the laws of warfare. It offers an analysis of the types and the causes of war crimes, and deals with examples from military experience in ancient, medieval, and modern times. Karsten is concerned with the behavior of heavily armed belligerents and guerrilla troops. He considers character deficiencies, ethnocentricity, combat conditions, and leadership. Karsten also recommends steps that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of violations of the laws of war.

*

KEEGAN, John. The Face of Battle. New York: The Viking Press, 1976. 354 pages.

This book is a thoroughly researched analysis of human conduct in war based on compelling accounts of three battles fought within 100 years of each other ... Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815), the Somme (1916). The author proposes that a study of what moves men to fight will provide the most useful lessons for the conduct of future wars.

*

KELLETT, Anthony. Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle. Hingham, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982. 362 pages.

This is a contemporary and practical assessment of the factors that influence soldiers' morale, commitment, and willingness to fight. Kellett examines how our defense policy of using nuclear deterrents has led to a revival of more conventional means of warfare and a return to the environment in which soldiers actually engage in battle. The book focuses on the attitudes and behaviors of participants in a variety of historical settings, and examines organizational and institutional aspects of the military, what influences impel a soldier in battle, and the roles of leadership and administration.

*

LAKEIN, Alan. How to Get Control of Your Time and Your Life. New York: Signet Books, 1973. 160 pages.

Lakein has written a practical, no-nonsense guide to managing your personal and professional time through short and long range goal setting, prioritization, and scheduling. He provides tips for building willpower, creating quiet time, defeating unpleasant tasks, and staying on target.

*

MALONE, Dandridge M. Small Unit Leadership: A Commonsense Approach. Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983. 164 pages.

An absolute must for all leaders, this book is a practical, performance-oriented manual designed for use by leaders in all kinds of units. The book is easy to read, understandable, and highly informative. It's true value is in the explanations of how to apply leadership skills and how to know when the skills have been applied correctly.

*

MALONE, Mike COL(R). The Trailwatcher. Available from HQ FORSCOM, Leadership Branch, 1985. 306 pages.

This anthology of Malone's short writings is designed to provide the Army with references that represent a foundation of thought for future generations. The book generates self-criticism and institutional assessment. Readers may not be able to agree with every line of reasoning, but they will be caused to think and form their own opinions about critical issues facing the Army.

*

PURYEAR, Edgar F., Jr. Nineteen Stars. Washington: Coiner Publication, Ltd., 1971. 458 pages.

This book is an excellent comparative study of the military leadership and character of four very successful World War II generals: Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Patton. Puryear examines their careers, from pre-commissioning to the conclusion of the war, showing how they achieved their positions. The author concludes that there is a pattern of leadership qualities that spells success for all officers willing to dedicate themselves to their profession.

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SIMMONSEN, Jerry A., Major; Frandsen, Herbert L.,; Hoopengardner, David A. Excellence in Combat Units. Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, CA, 1984. 54 pages.

The authors set out to find excellent combat units, asking: What makes certain battalions stand above others? What makes such battalions not only good, but the best in the Army? How do you identify these battalions? What do you see and hear when you belong to these units? What makes them different, or better?

*

SUMMERS, Harry G., Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982. 137 pages.

Why did we win all the battles and lose the war? Summers explores the war using Clausewitz's trinity -- the People, the Government, and the Army. Special emphasis is placed on the roles of public support and strategic thought. Summers' main theme is that a lack of understanding between military strategy and national policy caused the US to exhaust its will and endurance.

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SUN, Tzu Wu. The Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 82 pages.

This short military treatise written in the 6th century BC lays down a set of basic military principles dealing with strategy, tactics, communications, supply, etc. The basic nature of these tenets give them lasting relevance.

*

TETLOW, Edwin. The Engima of Hastings. New York: St Martin's Press, inc., 1974. 207 pages.

This is a combined arms interpretation of the events preceding Hastings and the battle itself. The author casts new light on the incidents and personalities involved, providing a full analysis, little-known facts, and insights into the leadership of both sides.

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Each of us is led, some of us are leaders. The competence we demand in our leaders must be our model when we lead. Where are you?

General Glen K. Otis

* * *

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Origin of Species

Yesterday, I had one of those "significant emotional events." And now that I've thought about it, its meaning has become clear. Maybe for you it's a blinding flash of the obvious, but this old south Texas country boy had to struggle with it.

Let me start at the beginning.

Two days from now (on the 4th of July), the Peachtree Road Race, America's premier 10K run, will take place here in Atlanta. I'll run in it, along with 30 or 35 thousand others. I even registered, not for the run, but for the t-shirt that everyone gets at the end of the race. And, like everyone else, I got my official number ... the one that's pinned to the front of your shirt during the race ... #12652. Don't laugh ... I'm in the front half of the starting grid.

Now, the good old boys at our Morale Support Activity thought that it would be neat if our Army got some publicity out of this thing. So, they decided to pass out racing singlets (fancy word for shirt-with-no-sleeves) to all us Army-types running in the race. These red, white, and blue shirts-without-sleeves have "US Army" on the front, and our Army gets the publicity when we wear the singlets during the race. But, they tricked me ... I had to bring my official race number with me when I came to pick up my singlet, so they could make sure I was really registered for the race.

Now, being the procrastinator that I am, I waited until there were only two extra large shirts-without-sleeves left before trying to get mine. And, I forgot to bring my number with me when I tried to get one of those shirts that would help advertise our Army.

And I hit the wall.

No number, no singlet.

They didn't care about my word as an officer. The fact that Uncle Sam has done a special background investigation on me and cleared me for access to Top Secret compartmented information was totally meaningless. The fact that the President has special trust and confidence in me was also totally meaningless.

No number, no singlet.

Maybe these guys lost track of the purpose -- publicity for our Army. Instead, because of mindless controls, the whole thing was perverted into an exercise in property accountability.

I guess when those guys read those fancy words about "special trust and confidence" at my commissioning, and subsequent promotions, they were just fooling. Either that or lying ... them, the guy who wrote 'em, and the President.

Now, about this origin of species thing ...

Charles Darwin had it all wrong. Species don't evolve over eons of time ... at least not all of them. Some are just plain born. Or hatched. Boom. Not down the conventional birth canal, but out of other orifices. New mutants, with weird genes. Different from Homo Sapiens. Different than anything else. Here's a list of the ones I've run across ...

Homo Amorphous -- the "organizational man," who lacks, does not personally desire, and will not allow or acknowledge individuality.

Homo Idioticus -- the "dip-shit man," incapable of autonomous, self-generated, and/or creative thought. A biological analog of the robot.

Homo Bureaucraticus -- the "red tape man," who always looks for reasons why we can't do something, writes declarifying supplements to clear policies and regulations, and puts procedural stumbling blocks in our paths.

Homo Redundus -- the "paperwork man." Distant relative of Homo Bureaucraticus. Likes to cause duplication of effort, mostly because he's too lazy to figure out how not to.

Homo Dubious -- the "unbelieving man," who only believes half of what you show him and none of what you tell him. Does believe in the "not invented here" syndrome.

Homo Psychoscleratic -- the "unchanging man," dead from the neck up because of hardening of the attitude.

Homo Brown Pants -- the "scared shitless man," who won't make a decision that is not governed by procedures, policies, or regulations written and supplemented by someone else.

Homo Poultry -- the "chicken man," also known as the "turkey man." Incapable of flights of imagination. Bird-brained and chicken-hearted. Too busy scratching in the dirt to look up and notice larger, systemic issues or new ways of doing things.

Homo Mathematicus -- the "numbers man." Counts beans, but never eats chili. Can't relate to his environment, except in terms of abstract statistics and other numbers.

Homo Vegetatus -- the "plant man." Aquatic version is the "barnacle man." Mobile only during the adolescent phase. Finds a spot at maturity, sits, and roots firmly. Becomes brittle, grows thick, hard bark. Never moves, never grows. Never tries or learns anything new.

Homo Securitus -- the "no-risk man." Skull is connected to the spine directly between the shoulder blades, so there is no neck to stick out. Small chest cavity indicates no heart. Prefers small enclosed spaces, and never ventures beyond territorial limits. Often hides behind thick, obscure regulations, and uses rubber bands, paper clips, and coffee stains for camouflage.

Homo Digitus -- the "booger man," who has his finger up his nose, waiting for something to happen.

Homo Commandus -- the "macho man," who believes that if it isn't from the field or a commander, it doesn't count.

Homo Suspensus -- the "administrivia man," who graciously assigns to you an action and wants your voluminous response in 24 hours (including the twelve hours it takes to get to you through distribution). Assumes you have been waiting idly to devote all your

energy to this action.

Homo Pompous -- the "holier-than-thou man." Believes that an individual's position on the organizational chart conveys relative importance, intelligence, and clairvoyance.

Want a sure fire way to recognize these bozos? Imbued with the evangelism of "scientific management," these homos are the ones trying to establish predictability, control, and stability; cover their buttocks; and, insure personal survival through ...

- Regulations
- Rules
- Standardization
- SOPs
- Traditions (we've always done it that way)
- Step-by-step procedures
- Reports
- Requirements
- Routines
- Precedents
- Statistical criteria
- Prescriptions
- Proscriptions
- Checklists

Ya'll seen any others?

Let's declare an open season with no bag limit.

* * *

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E-4 PROMOTION BOARDS

- DA SYSTEM:** Presently, we have a system that automatically identifies soldiers for promotion to E4 after two years of service. This system is perceived as ignoring performance criteria in favor of longevity. What does that do to the outstanding soldier who deserves early promotion?
- CONCEPT:** Promotions should not be automatic. There is a better system for promoting soldiers to E4. This system would be fair and cause the new CPL/SP4 to feel as though the rank had been earned. The answer is E4 promotion boards.
- SYSTEM COMPONENTS:** The E-4 promotion system should be formal, requiring squad leaders to recommend privates first class for promotion. A point system, based on time in grade, time in service, platoon sergeant's evaluation, first sergeant's evaluation, and board appearance would be used to help differentiate between the soldier deserving accelerated promotion and the average soldier. Finally, a standing promotion list (similar to that used for E5/E6) would be published.
- DISADVANTAGES:** Certain questions arise. Are E4 promotion boards worth the effort? Will they tie up too much of the NCO's time? What is the probability of E4 promotion boards becoming an administrative nightmare. Worse yet, will they take promotion responsibility from the chain of command?
- ADVANTAGES:** If our Army adopted such a system, we would destroy the perception of unfair advancements in the unit, prepare soldiers for the tougher E5 boards to come, and make E4 an earned rank. E4 promotion boards would involve the chain of command at all levels.
- Somehow, the E4 promotion system must be designed to empower sergeants to do things FOR their soldiers, not just TO them.

* * *

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The Secret Passion

... the most secret of all passions, ambition ...

Herman Melville

AMBITION DEFINED

Ambition. The word brings to mind many pictures ... most of them not good. Ambition can be a strong drive for rank, success, fame, power, and wealth. Joseph Epstein, in his book Ambition, defines it as the "fuel for achievement." Somewhere in between these extremes, maybe there's a happy medium.

With that in mind, should ambition be an attribute of the Airland Battle Leader? Of any leader? What are the ramifications behind ambition? Does it have a place in the military?

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

History has shown us a wide range of different kinds of ambition. Perhaps we can say that ambition is desirable to the extent that it drives us to seek success.

* Benjamin Franklin -- one who channeled his ambition in the direction of worthy goals.

* Joseph P. Kennedy -- whose ambitions were directed at promoting himself and his family.

* Henry Adams -- whose natural advantages (i.e., great grandson of one of the principal founders of the Republic, John Adams) ultimately were his downfall.

* Edith Wharton -- whose natural advantages (born into money and a secure place in the inner circle of New York City) allowed her to succeed in life.

* John P. Rockefeller -- whose ambition for money and power were less than one might believe.

* Adolph Hitler -- whose initial ambition to improve the existing German state -- was worthy. However, it turned into an insatiable desire for power, authority, and dominance.

The question is, what do we in the Army consider success? For most of us, success = rank. The higher the rank, the greater the success. Does ambition equate to desire for promotion?

THE DARK

Unfortunately, ambition has gotten a bad label. When one is labeled ambitious, it's not always perceived as a compliment. Instead, ambition connotes a desire for glory, personal gain, or power over people. It's using one's subordinates for personal achievement -- making a name at the expense of others.

And, many people can't handle it ... ambition often becomes insatiable ... an unending, unquenchable thirst for power. One becomes driven ... purposed in the wrong direction.

THE LIGHT

Replace ambition with the word "self-starter." Different perception entirely. A compliment. One who uses initiative. Seeks out ways for self-improvement. Always looking for a better way. A go-getter. A buzz word in our efficiency reporting system ... and a desirable trait.

We can argue that ambition has brought us to great affluence. Ambition has spurred us on to newer, bigger, and better. Ambition has brought us continued progress ... continued hope for a brighter future.

The Chief of Staff of our Army stated that ambition is healthy, as long as it is outwardly directed ... by "creating an opportunity by promotion and assignments for positions of responsibility which enables you to give of yourself ... to the institution. Positive ambition is what we want to encourage ... give of yourself in a quiet way." Can ambition be channeled and focused in such a manner? Or is this more rhetoric about being ambitious "for the good of the Army?"

SUMMING UP

What to make of it all?

Is this purely semantics?

First, we must recognize that ambition exists in us all. Motivation exists in us all. It's impossible to have zero motivation. We're either positively or negatively motivated. We have light or dark ambition. Light ambition is necessary for our development. Without it we don't grow ... there is no more progress.

Next, our ambition must be purposed. In our Army, that doesn't mean everyone has to be a general officer. To serve ... to want to do a good job ... to see our Army progress ... that's the good ambition. As the National Training Center has purposed Army training, so should ambition purpose our motivations. Success, if one accepts rank as an acceptable definition, is simply a by-product of service. Ambition is the means, not an end.

Finally, if ambition is the fuel of achievement, then we should be careful not to hamper it. It is necessary to control ambition, keep it in proportion, and purpose it, but it would be very dangerous if our leaders tried to confine it.

Is it an outwardly desired trait?
Probably not.
Even so, let's recognize that we have it, and it's brought
us to where we are today.

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Desk-Side SOPs

Scenario: You take over a new job and the person you are replacing says, "Hi ... there is the desk ... see ya!" Usually you end up gathering documents, regulations, points of contact, SOPs, and memos on your own as you go about scrambling through the first few months of that new job.

What if these information tools were collated into a functional file -- a desk-side SOP -- that gives your replacement a better opportunity to hit the ground running and be useful throughout his tour?

This SOP would be a useful tool for those with the foresight to utilize it. The contents are totally dependent on the job and environment. Perhaps the organizing theme might be, "What Does My Replacement Need to Know Right Now?!" Think about the following items for your own Desk-Side SOP:

- List of current projects, how they got to be the way they are.
- Points of contact and phone numbers.
- Who the "action-folks" are ... the ones who make things move.
- Recurring reports.
- Any promises made to the organization/individuals which have not yet been fulfilled.
- Organization rating scheme.
- Most recent correspondence for which your replacement will receive an answer early on in his/her tenure.
- Training schedules and training needs assessments.
- Units SOPs.
- Last IG report.
- Things to do (but haven't been done).

Your file should focus on information -- not philosophy. New guys can be resentful of old guys who try totell them what to do or how to do it.

A desk-side SOP is the kind of thing everybody would like to have but few are willing to take the time to do it right. Would you believe that although the military has been supporting Presidential Inaugurations since George Washington, there was not a PLAN or SOP or useful continuity file?! Somebody figured out that one of the biggest contributions the latest Armed Forces Inagural Committee could make would be to correct that. So from Day 1,

they kept track of how to do things, who to contact, what decisions had to be made early, late, etc. They wanted to help the next guys. The end result was a first ever OPLAN and an Executive Planning Guide which are safely bedded down and ready for the next crew. Keep track of what you are doing as you do it and realize that somebody else is going to be doing it after you ... whether that's tomorrow, next month or four years hence.

So take an hour or two out of your busy schedule and start putting together a desk-side SOP. Your successor will appreciate it; so will you when you walk into your next job and hear "I have a transition book for you, and I think it will help."

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BRAIN DEATH

Brain death can affect the leadership of an entire unit or organization. Extreme weather, poor logistical support, a rapidly changing tactical environment, unclear instructions from the boss, and fatigue are major contributors to brain death.

The symptoms are easy to recognize: lethargy, lack of motivation, vacant stares, long periods of listlessness, confusing orders, difficulty in understanding information and executing simple instructions, failure to coordinate tasks, and a failure to take charge.

The cure for brain death is action ... any action. The reaction to brain death can range from putting an arm around a shoulder to putting a size 12 into a backside. The point is, the victim of brain death must be put into motion with clear, easy to understand instructions.

Leaders must recognize the symptoms of brain death and correct it before it becomes a generalized condition. This is impossible if the leader himself is suffering from the malaise. The first order of business then is for every leader to make sure he does not fall victim to this killer of unit spirit.

How do leaders prevent brain death?

The Germans had an expression during the Second World War which captures the essence ... "tough as leather and strong as steel." Leaders must be mentally and physically strong enough to overcome adverse conditions. Leaders simply must not become victims of fatigue, cold, hunger, and confusion. Leaders do not fold up when it gets tough. They rise above personal discomfort to be tough as leather and hard as steel. If you don't agree, then you need to find a job as a civilian.

Secondly, the minute a leader complains about being scared, tired, hungry, or cold, all of his soldiers will also be tired, cold, hungry, etc. The resentment of leaders is transmitted to the soldiers and the seeds of brain death thus sewn. In this regard we can be defeated before we ever get started. Leaders must not be victimized by adverse conditions. They also can't allow their soldiers to think they are suffering.

The tragedy of brain death is that it is highly contagious. It only takes a short period of time for large segments of a unit to be infected. The danger is that it will spread to all leaders so quickly that none will be aware of it until it is too late and no one will be able to affect a cure.

Anyone can jump in and provide leadership to correct the ailment. It is easy to lead when everyone is comfortable. It is difficult to lead when soldiers are cold, tired, and scared. But it is just when everyone is most miserable that brain death sets in. The cure for brain death is positive leadership.

* * *

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ABOUT THE FUTURE

AMERICA DOESN'T NEED A TOTAL ARMY
A Vision of the Future Force

Change drives national policy and strategy, and impacts on tactics. Commanders can never overlook how new developments and innovation can drive strategy and tactics. Success will go to those commanders who adapt and incorporate change. The military stresses conformity and uniformity -- the status quo. Consequently, the system can easily rebuff or squelch what appears to be dissent or non-conformity. It is important we not view new ideas as dissent. All too frequently they are. Rigidity, inflexibility, and excessive parochialism can be the pariah of the would-be military commander.

John O. Marsh
Secretary of the Army

The American people have historically supported and maintained a traditional military force without fully understanding and appreciating, at the voter level, the many threats to national interests and security. In past ages, the world was much larger and less dangerous. But today, that unquestioning faith and trust has resulted in an armed force that cannot be totally and simultaneously projected to more than one crisis point and is therefore not currently capable of accomplishing all assigned missions. These critical strategic vulnerabilities can be overcome by innovative forward-thinking about the future force.

Soon, the American people will reach a point where their spending for defense has peaked. They will give no more, and rightfully so. War is once again changing, evolving beyond the scope of great nations standing toe-to-toe, managing conflict until attrition or lack of interest and commitment result in a cessation of armed hostilities. No longer will the massed resources of a single first world nation or group of allies be brought to bear in protracted conventional conflict. Changes. And the American defense establishment has not kept pace. Sure, technology is moving fast. But, the professional ethic, organization, and doctrine - the constructs by which the technology is applied - is stagnant and has been for decades. The defense establishment remains a segmented, ever-bickering amalgam of parochialists, beset by the basest of political intrigues. The services, each imbued with evangelistic ardor, infight for ever-larger pieces of the defense budget. And it must come to a stop if the American system of government and way of life are to survive and continue as examples of justice and freedom.

Though it served the nation well and honorably in the past, the Total Army, indeed the Total Force, is a bankrupt strategy -- now and in the future.

- The Army must desist thinking about having to hold territory. That mentality makes the Army reliable on big organizations, big tanks, big guns, huge amounts of material and dollars, and managers.

- The era of the citizen-soldier, rising from his home in

masses to be managed into battle with other great armies, is gone. A hero of past American wars, the citizen-soldier will not be able to provide America with suitable victories in this ever-changing, complex, expensive, and specialized world.

- The Army is using a command and staff decision-making process that was excellent for the wars of the mid-twentieth century and earlier; but, a paper-based decision process, restricted by how fast information physically moves from one desk to another, will not keep pace with war at the turn of this century and certainly will be inadequate for war in the twenty-first century and beyond. Such an archaic process will not be able to turn inside the decision-making process of future enemies.

Some people say that the defense establishment exists to support the American industrial base, and that is why the Army is so equipment heavy. Other people say that armed services of the future will exist to manage the life-support systems of our environment. But make no mistake. The armed force of the future will exist to kill people and break things, getting in to hurt the other guy with a minimum of damage, taking what the American people need, and letting the enemy have the ashes. Violence will be applied with reasonable control and considered purpose and will be devastating. These non linear, 360 degree-oriented wars will be a longitudinal series of independent, surgical strikes - geographically isolated, yet ubiquitous.

The battlefields of the future will be characterized and surrounded by dimensions that transcend today's thinking. Units and individuals will be very highly dispersed. Individual soldiers will not be within range of physical contact, but will be within range of techno-contact. Long range sensors and satellites will provide connectivity between individuals and units, plus real-time tactical and strategic intelligence. Highly lethal weaponry like electromagnetic guns, directed energy weapons, and fire and-forget munitions will cause staggering losses, including many leaders at all echelons. There will be no place to hide because of sophisticated, electronic, omnipresent sensors. Protection will largely be a function of tactical mobility. Higher levels of continuous stress and growing percentages of neuro-psychiatric casualties will add to the needs for a higher leader-led ratio and redundancy in leadership and technical skills.

To fight on the battlefields of the 21st century, the future force must consist of warriors - not simply soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen - who are reciprocally interdependent and linked by philosophy, organization, and technology. Warriors of the future will be both inputs and products of a weapons system engineering and utilization process that intimately involves human technology. They will be consummate specialists of heroic stature.

WHY IS TODAY'S FORCE NOT ADEQUATE?

TODAY'S ARMY -- FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES

The Total Army exists to cope with myriad threats to national interests in innumerable places. A number of active component (AC) forces are prepositioned in historically important areas such as western Europe and Korea. Other AC forces and the reserve component

(RC) forces are based in the United States for contingency deployment as reinforcements or as primary combat forces for commitment into areas of relatively new strategic importance such as the oil-rich mideast, mineral-rich southern Africa, and Central America.

American forces dedicated to NATO are the classic examples of forward deployed forces. The alliance is overwhelmingly outnumbered in virtually every category of conventional combat power. Senior American Army managers have long since stopped talking of battlefield victory. They now speak of "giving a good accounting of ourselves."

Logistical support will be tenuous because sufficient supplies are not currently on the ground in Europe. For example, ammunition supplies currently in the theater are far short of the requirements for the planned thirty day scenario. There are not sufficient aircraft to move supplies and people into the theater should a war start. Most of the in-theater supplies are on the wrong side of the Rhine River. The trucks and drivers who are supposed to move the supplies do not exist in adequate numbers. The costs associated with rectifying these shortcomings are astronomical.

Next, the big command and control nodes and logistics bases are ripe for preemptive strikes. The bases that are supposed to receive supplies and reinforcements from North America do not currently exist in adequate numbers or capacity and probably will not exist after the first twenty-four hours of the fight. Warsaw Pact targeting specialists know where the nodes and bases are.

America's allies do not share a single command and control system/philosophy, nor is there agreement on a war-fighting philosophy. In Europe, the flexible American concept of a fluid battlefield is opposed by the politically expedient West German philosophy of "never-give-an-inch."

Finally, socio-political-economic pressures prevent strengthening of the alliance on an equitable basis. Currently, the U.S. supplies approximately \$90 billion to NATO. All the other nations combined contribute approximately \$110 billion. Two nations recently decreased defense spending. In summary, not only can NATO not win a thirty-day war, but the member nations are exhibiting a weakening resolve even to fight.

TODAY'S ARMY -- CONTINGENCY FORCES

American contingency forces, as a whole, are adequate for continental defense - only. Oddly enough, that is why the citizen-soldier originally existed. The defense establishment lacks the strategic air and sea lift capacity to project sizable forces anywhere in reasonable response time, especially if more than one crisis should occur at any given moment. The Army's current preoccupation with the light infantry division and high technology motorized division is evidence of the scandalous lack of strategic transport. But, the Navy wants more carriers and other fighting ships, not seagoing transports, and the Air Force wants more fighters and bombers. The civilian air fleet will not be a factor in adequate time. The critical factor in weapon system design is whether or not it will fit in existing transport aircraft and not if it will move, shoot, and communicate. And one must consider the attrition of air and sea transport that will surely occur.

If adequate strategic transport existed, the Army would not have

adequate forces to move. Most US-based AC divisions are undermanned, largely equipped with outdated and/or ineffective weaponry, communications gear, and vehicles, and are too low on the resource priority lists to get well soon. The RC forces also have these problems and will take weeks, maybe months, to mobilize, train, and move to the ports and airfields before those imaginary ships and airplanes take them to the hotspots. This is especially true of the maneuver units which will require time to train on the complex, integrated collective tasks that cannot be exercised during once-a-month-weekend-drills. The obvious argument here is "Look at Grenada!" RC forces did mobilize and deploy, quickly. But they were a very small percentage of the few thousand soldiers that actually deployed. No RC combat forces deployed. Has anyone asked how many support soldiers/sailors/airmen, vis-a-vis fighters, it took to project the Grenada rescue force? Does anyone really believe the Russian threat analyzers seriously consider having to face reserve component combat formations? RC forces are not incompetent and unable to help fight the airland battle. Many RC units are famous for their combat preparedness, within reasonable expectations. It is just that the Russians, or any other antagonist, will not have to fight against those units. Anywhere. US-based contingency forces are a hollow club that is too heavy to carry.

TODAY'S ARMY -- THE SOLDIERS

Today's soldiers are the best the Army has had in years. If you do not believe that, go down to the trenches and watch them. They are good, especially the COHORT soldiers who operate in an environment that demonstrates the Army has begun to understand cohesion and reciprocal interdependence. But, a majority of the Army still consists of conventionally-raised units that are continuously disintegrated by the bureaucratic personnel management policies of a corporate-minded system. Army manpower is managed, no, driven by end-strengths, POMs, and COBs. But even the best of today's conventional soldiers are not the warriors of the future force. Not yet.

TODAY'S ARMY -- THE OVERHEAD

Remember the lean corporate staffs in In Search of Excellence? Obviously not. There are individual staff agencies in major command headquarters that are larger than entire division staffs. And the size of the Pentagon staff, with all the associated ancillaries like MILPERCEN, stagger the imagination.

The Army has too many generals, each building, then managing his own empire in the quest for elevating some minor function to heights that will ensure visibility. Some people say that the number of generals currently on the rolls is not appreciably different than the number we had during the Second World War because the nature of war has changed. More complicated. More sophisticated. But can anyone believe that the same number of generals required for an Army of millions is necessary for an Army of 780,000? And when you think about the number of generals, multiply that number by some minimum support staff figure to get a true appreciation for the load. Maybe

it takes an inordinate number of generals to oversee the serpentine array of byzantine management systems like PPBES, JOPPS, etc.

WHY HASN'T AN ANTAGONIST SERIOUSLY TESTED US?

Why haven't the Russians pressed the issue? One reason, just one. Thermonuclear war. On Moscow, Kiev and Leningrad. Right in their backyard. The current Russian leadership remembers the holocaust of the Great Patriotic War -- twenty million dead -- almost twice the number of people living in metropolitan New York City. They rightfully are determined never to let that catastrophe replicate itself on the Russian people. But, someday those vivid memories may fade. Before that happens, the nuclear threat must be disengaged through arms reduction, or the planet will go BOOM! That argues for an increase in conventional force capability for America and her allies. Increased capability and decreased budgets point to a future force of which some have only dreamed.

THE FUTURE

CHANGES -- NOW -- The 20th CENTURY

What can the Army do? Certainly nothing today or next month. But the senior leadership can start to change the way defense is planned and war is conducted. The Army must deter the threat, be responsive to the unexpected, and spend fewer dollars in the process. That does not mean a decreasing rate of growth. It means a faster, harder-hitting, leaner, cheaper, systemically integrated force that costs less -- a decreasing budget.

Cut active Army manpower in half. Start cutting in the Pentagon. Reduce every three-star general staff and above by half. The savings in manpower alone would be staggering. Of course this means fewer general officers; ergo, narrower career pyramids. But that would easily be accepted by a force of warriors. What is left should be organized into large COHORT units, whether light infantry, armor, or military intelligence. Think about COHORT divisions. The Army did it in the Second World War. Read the Office of the Secretary of Defense study on the 88th Infantry Division, the fourth most combat effective division in the war. (There were three German divisions ranked ahead of the 88th.) Double the training budget of every remaining division. Eliminate all training distractors by making all divisions tenet activities on their respective posts. Create post staffs and facilities that are suited to quality support of the force.

Next, the Army's leaders must convince the Commander-in-Chief to drastically reduce the number of conventional ground forces currently consuming tax dollars in forward-deployed locations, because those forces are not postured to win, through no fault of their own. Use part of the savings to change and enhance theater nuclear forces. Do not threaten the Russian homeland. That only threatens the American people. Restrict forward-deployed American nuclear forces to weapons systems that can only range the nations immediately surrounding the alliances. And give them big warheads. Then have the nations directly threatened pick up the slack in conventional forces.

Significantly reduce the number of CONUS-based contingency forces to a size that is easily maintainable at a 125% level of resourcing. Create high technology light forces now. They are smaller, cheaper to man, fund, train, and move. And they can hit just as hard if given the right weapons and tactical mobility. If US-based contingency forces can not be strategically moved, America does not need them. The Army could also take the very best in quality accessions and assure a trained stream of mentally agile, physically superior replacements.

The armed forces must agree on and be held to an integrated approach to strategic lift. The Army can not get to and fight the airland battle without the Air Force nor sustain one without the Navy. The commitment of the Army's sister services to priorities other than lift needs modification.

Terminate federal funding of the reserve component, except for an individual ready reserve-type manpower pool. America cannot project AC forces, so it follows that RC forces cannot be projected. Let the individual states maintain the National Guard, if they want to. The massive savings in equipment, basing, manning, training, etc. can be partially used to better equip active component forces. Some would say drastically cut back the AC forces and increase the RC. But, the idea is to reduce the entire force to a lean, hard-hitting, already-trained-and-in-the-barrel force. One-for-one AC/RC tradeoffs will not maintain the highest possible training readiness nor solve the transportability problems that hobble us now. Some RC combat support and combat service support forces would have to be placed on the active rolls, or at least the manpower allocations for those units would. The current AC force structure lacks sufficient combat support and combat service support units to prosecute war.

Drastically overhaul the command and staff process, heavily integrating computer-based teleconferencing. Eliminate the paper process. The Army already has the on-line technology, but has yet to apply the process beyond the think-tank level.

Get serious about Quality of Life. The Army should sit down and prioritize quality of life services into a list that pinpoints which services are most necessary. Then, Congress must provide first class funding to each service in order of priority rather than equally spreading resources so that all services are provided at a paltry level.

Finally, increase pay and allowances by 50%. America would only be keeping the best half of the force, so pay them what they are worth. Service members are paid to sacrifice, but duty and honor can fall short when American soldiers can not buy a new pair of shoes for their children. Skew the pay hikes to the fighters, not the supporters. A risk premium is warranted.

BETTER YET -- MEGA-CHANGE -- The 21st CENTURY

The parochial backstabbing for funds between the services wastes the defense establishment's limited resources, complicates interoperability, and reduces combat preparedness. America does not have a single, forward-thinking, systemic approach to war. America does have four separate, apparently disparate paths to defense.

For the Army, how about all-purpose separate brigades to replace combat divisions?

But even yet, how about regionally based uni-service commands of land, sea, and air contingents, each tailored to specific mission areas? Unified commands with specified missions. The few forward deployed forces that exist would be directly subordinate to the regional command corresponding to that contingency mission. These uni-service commands would recruit from their respective regions, automatically creating a racially ethnically homogenous reserve manpower pool to support the units, and individual, ready-reserve type replacements would already be familiar with their units. Think of the services in the training base.

Long ago, soldiers were drilled by the Secretary of Defense from combatting forces; but, if that is the way American armed force are going to fight, and that is the way it has been done for decades, that is the way the future force will be structured, resourced, and trained. It will be a highly developed esprit, unity of command, cohesion, and area of influence.

But who is going to sell Congress? American political and military leaders are paralyzed and too foreshortened to understand, or to even realize, that the force of the future will be a unified force that will be a more effective and more belligerent nation-states at the direct request of the American people. This small, uni-service armed force will be a total away from the traditional military ethic to a warrior ethic. It will be warriors who preserve the nation-state and its people, and who will sometimes, when necessary and after consultation with the government, operate outside its fundamental precepts. The force will be a total away from the traditional, and deadly. That is the way.

Warrior

The warrior will be a small, integrated future force that will be a total away from the traditional military ethic to a warrior ethic. The statute of the warrior will be traditional in the sense that it will be a total away from the traditional, and deadly.

- Total dedication to personal survival.
- Intense desire to achieve an accomplishment.
- Ability to operate against overwhelming odds.
- Loyalty to the warrior's people.
- Operates with initiative and mental agility.
- Devoted to the best and the fare of all other warriors.
- Never wounded, by personal injury.
- Prepared to remain standing under any circumstance
- Total dedication to own life.

Defense "manpower" requirements will ultimately be totally independent. The government technologies to start that process already exist, and the commitment pool larger than current social requirements will be a total away from the traditional, and deadly.

The warrior will be a small, integrated future force that will be a total away from the traditional military ethic to a warrior ethic. The statute of the warrior will be traditional in the sense that it will be a total away from the traditional, and deadly. These warriors will

have inculcated all the fundamental values of American society, but will paradoxically and consciously operate outside those precepts, when necessary, as they do battle with warriors from societies grounded in different, less altruistic value systems. The fourth-estate will not be necessary as a surrogate conscience because the nature of war will transcend individual value systems. This may require that active duty warriors forfeit the franchise and other selected constitutional rights when actively engaged in the protection of the nation-state. Once the decision is made to go to war, the future force will not be constricted in the application of violence to other warriors, and indeed, against the people and economic/environmental systems of nation-states that threaten our national interests.

Each warrior will have a clear sense of her individual self, but will be bonded in myth and ritual to other warriors. The rifleman and the pilot each will know his part, understand it within the larger context, and accept it. This clear sense of self will transcend the physical, preparing each warrior for the inevitability of her own death.

Warriors will interoperate on cooperative instinct -- trained in, hypnotized in, ultimately inbred. And the interactive concepts of leadership-followership will synchronize the acts of individuals and units, making the intent of the commander a battlefield reality. Advanced communications technology will facilitate this process with self-contained, helmet-to-helmet audio-visual displays.

Individual warriors will carry into battle the destructive power of entire twentieth-century formations. Individual mobility will be mechanically enhanced, allowing platoon-sized formations to cover what a brigade may cover today.

The traditional lines between commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers will be blurred as people redundancy in leadership and technical skills becomes increasingly paramount. There will not be commissioned officers, warrant officers, and non-commissioned officers. There will be The Officer Corps -- a leadership infrastructure with a single set of responsibilities and individually differentiated tasks to accomplish that set of responsibilities. For individual warriors, entry into the future force will occur at one place - the bottom. The leadership infrastructure will rise from the levels where conflict is prosecuted.

THE FUTURE COMMAND AND STAFF PROCESS

The tiny staffs of the future force will have some of the vestiges of today's staffs. There will be operators, logisticians, and personnel managers; however, many of these staff functions will be "dual-hats" worn by commanders, sub-commanders, and junior leaders of combat formations. Only the peaks of the sub-pyramids will have standing staffs, and these must be very small. The staff process will be a combination of several systemically integrated sub-processes:

* Fusion Teams - Ad hoc, task-oriented network groupings that meet, plan, coordinate, and then disband for execution. Innovation and creativity will be the hallmarks of the fusion team. Traditional organizational lines will be meaningless. Fusion teams will identify and channel organizational energy rather than administering a task in the conventional modern day sense.

* Talent Banks - Members of fusion teams will be selected based on expertise profiles stored, in a universally accessible computer, as an index to the living library of warrior commanders/staff experts.

* Command Track - The pyramid will consist only of command positions. The warrior mentality will accept this, understanding that service is not a function of position, but of effort and sacrifice. Remember, virtually every officer will be leading a combat formation. Advancements will slow to the rate of attrition.

* Teleconferencing - Computer-based, interactive, real-time audio and video. This will be the linchpin between the regionally-based uni-forces and their sub-units. Staff processes will be virtually instantaneous.

* Visitors - The talent bank of expertise will extend beyond the future force, including all society. As needed, experts will be called on for temporary contributions.

WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE US?

America has a Total Force, or at least a Total Army, that can not be used to protect national interests and safely insure national survival. The diminishing resolve of her allies compromises the safety of the planet. Reliance on nuclear deterrence is far greater than the American people realize. The American people have a conventional boulder they can not throw. The nuclear threat must be defused, and the American people must have a smaller rock and a sling with which to throw it.

Second, to change the way armed forces do business will require de-politicalization of the defense establishment over the next twenty years. War is far too important to be left in the hands of politicians, even the ones who wear uniforms; but, the defense mechanism must retain and respect ultimate civilian command for the sake of legitimacy. This means a unified approach to defense: a single, solid establishment that is more concerned about doing the right things than doing things right.

Third, the defense establishment, especially the Army, must begin to openly conceptualize the future force - including the warriors that will comprise that force and the command and staff system that will move it - closely followed by the creation of that force. This will require restructuring some fundamental civilian and military thinking.

Fourth, the era of the professional armed force (note singular) is upon us.

We can do it, but the men who hold high places must be the ones who start to mold the new reality.

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

Abraham Lincoln

* * *

Contributors, by thought, word, or deed; some for, some against; some knowingly, some unknowingly:

Jeff Anderson, Tina Anderson, George Beitzel, Charlie Card, Jim Channon, Sharon Connelly, Larry Dietz, Stephen Dill, Al Finnell, Bob Fox, Linda Franklin, Lee Gragg, Norm Grunstad, Arthur Hadley, Robert Heinlein, Bubba Hopkins, Jacky Hungerland, Larry Ingraham, Dave Jarrell, Herm Keizer, Konrad Kellen, Bill Landgraf, John LeBourgeois, Geddy Lee, Roderick Lenahan, Abe Lincoln, Mike Malone, John O. Marsh, Dan McGee, Mike Maum, Winn McDougal, John Miller, Neal Peart, Woody Tauscher, Steve Whitworth. Thanx.

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Networking Army Schools

CHALLENGE The Army should have schools and resident students, but only at the entry level. Virtually all continuing military education in the Army should be offered electronically through computer-based teleconferencing.

WHY? Each year, our Army temporarily loses the talents of thousands of soldiers who reenter the Army school system. They are losses in the sense that students do not directly contribute to unit readiness.

BETTER WAY Now, add that schoolhouse instruction is arguably not the most effective teaching modality. Most adults learn best through concrete experience. Learning by doing is the most effective teaching technique and results in the longer retention.

Think about technology. How can we put it to use to enhance manpower readiness and effective resource management?

SCHOOL WITHOUT WALLS How about an electronic school system -- a school without walls -- run as a series of computer-based teleconferences emanating from each of the major service schools and integrating centers?

SELF Soldiers could remain in units, and soldier. Teaching electronically would put the classroom on line twenty-four hours a day. Courses could be taken at any time during a career. Self-selected. Self-initiated. Self-paced. Self-scheduled. Based on unit mission and training requirements. Each school teleconference would have an electronic mail capability to allow students to submit questions, papers, or test answers to instructional departments. No need to PCS or go TDY simply for education. More time to train in units and lead soldiers.

UNIT Think about the savings in TDA overhead (staff, faculty, support facilities, construction, maintenance). Think about decreasing the size of the TTHS manpower account and subsequently increasing the assigned strength and manpower readiness on field units.

SAVINGS "Quotas" in these electronic schools without walls would be made available on an equal basis to active and reserve component soldiers.

AC/RC The existing FTS or Autovon systems could support the telecommunications requirements. Simple, inexpensive, desk top computers (dumb terminals) would be part of an officer's or NCO's basic issue. OBC and BNCOC curricula would have a block on instruction on basic soldier-computer interface.

EQUIPMENT Think about technology . . .

DOCTRINE Take the same teleconference school system and apply it to doctrine writing. Each service school would have "Doctrine" as part of its curriculum menu. Students in one "schoolhouse" could access the "Doctrine" segment of other service schools, eliminating short-circuiting cross-talk about who is responsible for what doctrine

ACCESSING

that has been over-interpreted and locally modified in a thousand different ways, making it non-doctrine. To receive current doctrinal guidance, students would simply enter a series of codes for type unit, operation, geographic area of operation, etc. and instantaneously receive the latest doctrine -- written, coordinated, approved, and distributed electronically. And instantly retrievable. The students would comment on, help develop and write, and apply doctrine, making them a "schoolhouse" resource currently working in the field, trying to make it happen.

WRITING

And there is more . . .

PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT

Branches could post appropriate personnel management bulletins on this electronic system, keeping everyone informed on the latest developments, results of selection boards, assignments information, etc. The "schoolhouses" would electronically update MILPERCEN records with the latest professional development information on each officer and NCO.

Think about technology . . . and how it can increase readiness.

READINESS

Creating electronic schools without walls will save money and keep leaders in units longer . . . training, teaching, and caring for soldiers . . . preparing units for battle. Teleconference exchanges between students and doctrine writers will create a better dialog between the field and the schoolhouse, creating constantly updated, living doctrine, and overcoming the obsolescence of the current system. Now is the time to move our information, doctrine, communications, and teaching systems into the future. Bring the school to the student, electronically, for less cost and greater readiness.

THE FUTURE

* * *

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Professional Commandership

ASSUMPTION Our Army is a system that actively supports the notion that success -- promotion & upward mobility -- is a result of successfully commanding. The assumption appears innocuous. Doesn't seem to be a problem, much less an enlightening revelation. Maybe that's because it's true and generally accepted. So, why should we be concerned about it? Is inordinate emphasis placed on the importance and position of command? What problems does that cause in training, developing, and retaining officers for assignments other than command? A brain drain?

THE PROBLEM

EFFECTS There are three main effects to the current system:

* Only a small fraction of officer assignments are command slots (particularly a battalion level and above). Many officers compete for few opportunities to command. Command selection boards are more selective than promotion boards. The more selective board becomes more important, more stressful. Do selection boards select the best commanders? Many say, "Yes, selection boards are a good technique." But selection boards select officers with the best paper files, not necessarily officers best suited to command. So, inordinate emphasis on command selection boards can result in the best all-around officers being selected for command, when command may not be their strength. Officers will accept the selection, however, because command = success. Conversely, officers that may be outstanding commanders may not have an excellent all-around file, and not be selected.

STRESS

GOOD SYSTEM?

MAYBE NOT

* The military education system and typical assignment patterns do not fully train commanders. Generally, officers develop "expertise" at command by a series of general assignments which may vary from staff to instructor to action officer in a high-level headquarters. None of these assignments are bad, but they are not hands-on command-specific assignments. Thus, when an officer takes command, he's had a year as a platoon leader and 18 months of company command over an 18 year career. Not a wealth of experience. He is the product of three main schools: OBC, which introduced the branch; OAC, which introduced him the idea of command; and CGSC, which taught him how to be a good staff officer. Not a wealth of education either. So, commanders go out and apply what they learned as company commanders ten years earlier, with the aid of a generalized, non-specific education. And they learn battalion command through OJT, while commanding.

DEVELOPMENT

EXPERIENCE

EDUCATION

OJT

* Disappointment. Frustration. Big words that affect the other 75% of the command competitors when the list is released. By placing mega-emphasis on command, we alienate the majority who are not selected. We have implicitly told them they are failures in the Army's race. And so the non-selectees check out. Either they quit

EFFECTS OF NON-SELECTION

working and competing as hard because they've been relegated to second class status, or they physically check out and retire. Our Army loses either way.

DIAGNOSIS

The system isn't broken. It is better than what existed before, but it can be improved.

HOW?

Do away with CGSC, especially since a quality course like CAS3 on-board. We don't need both. Then the pre-command course should be lengthened, to maybe a year, for future commanders to study, reflect and learn before they take command. Teach them history lessons, force modernization lessons, NTC lessons, cohesion and teambuilding strategies. Make them smart about commanding units and leading soldiers. Real smart.

NO CGSC

LONG PCC

COMMAND
MOS

De-mystify command selection. Make "commander" a skill identifier or MOS that can be tracked. If an officer is good at commanding, train him, use him, and track him for command. If command is deglamourized, it will greatly support the idea that all assignments are meaningful.

FEEDBACK

Tell those who do not receive the command ASI "Why." The current system provides little feedback to the officer -- just success or failure. Also, not qualifying for an ASI early in a career seems less damaging than non-selection for command at the 18 year mark.

ASSESSMENT
TECHNOLOGY

Assessment technology has sufficiently advanced to be able to identify future commanders. This could be some form of test, battery, screening technique, or combination which, when coupled with OERs from company command would identify those officers who should receive the command ASI or MOS. This could be done much earlier in the career pattern than the current selection board system uses, and valuable feedback could be provided to each officer. Maybe this could happen before officers select other specialties, in order to guide them in their selection.

SUMMARY

Yes, our current system is working, but we may not be producing the best commanders. To really produce professional commanders, our Army should revamp its view on commanding, the education and assignment processes, and the aura around the idea of command. Each element should be redesigned to support producing the best possible commanders, those who have the benefit of detailed preparation program. This can be accomplished while non-selectees move to other fields where their talents are most useful, and without the stigma of non-selection. The tools are available. Our Army, our soldiers, and our units would be the ones who benefit.

* * *

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In Search of the AirLand Battle Leader II

Back in ExcelNet Concept Paper 3-85, we talked about what the prototypical airland battle leader might look like in terms of the Meyers-Briggs Temperament Indicator (M-BTI). Recall that the desired ALB leader profiled psychometrically ... that is, qualitatively ... as an ENFP -- Extroverted, Intuitive, Feeling, and Perceptive. Also recall that ENFP is the antithesis of current senior Army leadership.

Now, that's all well and good, but the M-BTI is a psychometric instrument -- it measures intellectual and perceptual variables, and doesn't measure a whole lot of what might be called "battlefield variables" ... courage, physical and mental toughness, etc. And a psychometric measurement must have willing, unbiased cooperation from a subject who is willing to accurately frame reality; ergo, there are built-in validity and reliability questions.

What if we had a system for personnel assessment and selection that was totally objective? One that could, with a statistically high probability of accuracy, facilitate selecting the right person for the right position, and help preclude improperly and/or prematurely placing the wrong person in the wrong position?

What if we could predict who will be able to cope with intense stress on the airland battlefield? And make correct decisions?

And who will not?

Can we identify relevant psychological and perceptual attributes that identify impulsiveness? Incorrect decision-making under pressure? Initiative? Innovation?

Enter neurometrics.

Recent studies of human information processing have identified components of "Event Related Potentials (ERPs)" that emanate from the brain and can be associated on a one to one basis with performance on complex cognitive tasks. These brain functions (ERPs) can be monitored by electroencephalograms charted ... identified ... analyzed. ERPs are quantified information about "brain activity related to anatomical integrity, developmental maturation, and mediation of sensory, perceptual, and cognitive processes."

Neurometrics could support standard measures. Or, neurometrics could totally displace traditional measures of intellectual and perceptual variables by measuring physical, electrical brain events associated with sensory, perceptual, and cognitive functioning. Once norms for each leadership and staff position are determined, results of neurometric tests can be compared to the norms, and a decision regarding the likelihood that a particular individual will be a success in that can be made.

We can find airland battle leaders.

Once we have found them, how do we get prototypical ALB leaders into places of leadership and influence? If we believe the indicators, that is not happening ... not now. Will current leaders be willing to pick replacements that are psychogenically, perhaps even phylogenetically different than themselves? Can they?

How about those of us who don't currently fit the mold? Can we be trained to develop a broader thinking pattern that would allow more

behavioral options in a given situation? Or, should we be support/staff types?

When we consider that ...

... the step from peacetime assessment to battle application is a rather big one,

... and that our Army gets a rainbow of people,

perhaps the role of neurometrics, and psychometrics, as a training tool vis-a-vis a selection tool demands prime consideration.

Can we grow airland battle leaders?

Rather than determining whether a soldier fits a neuro/psychometric profile, let's assume that prototypical leaders can be molded ... built ... and assessment technology can help with that building. Who is going to do that? When? If we further assume that most officers have a modicum of intelligence, can we expect that role-modeling by key leaders, coupled with reinforcement by our selection systems, will advertise what the mold looks like? Will potential leaders then start trying to fit the mold?

Is that being done now? With what results? Is that enough?

The bottom line is that assessment technology ... psychometrics and/or neurometrics ... can and should help screen leaders at the pre-commissioning/accession point. After that, the technology should be used to train, develop, and direct career progression. If one of us decides to make a mid-career course correction based on assessment, then reinforcement, not recrimination should be the institutionalized feedback.

We can screen for, select, and train ALB leaders ... and the staff/support structure that surrounds them. The technology exists ... NOW!

Let's stop taking counsel of our personal fears and aspirations, trash the demands for more study, and get on with the business of finding/growing airland battle leaders ...

* * *

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TALENT BANKING - A Concept

There are two kinds of knowledge . . .

1. What you know . . .
2. What you know about how to find out about what you don't know.

We know about the first type. Each of us is a "book" on the shelves of a "living library" -- the sum of our instincts, heritage, education, training, experiences, hobbies, and geographical wanderings. This "living library" is the ultimate Expert System -- an unharnessed amalgam of information that encapsulates the skill and reasoning power of all human experts.

What we do not know is about how to INDEX, ACCESS, UTILIZE, and UPDATE the "books" in this Expert System. In this Age of Information, what is the result of this information deficiency in terms of resource expenditures by the Department of Defense?

* The separate services continue to rely on a command and staff process that, while good for wars of the twentieth century, will not be able to keep pace with the information demands of war in the twenty-first century and beyond. We cannot, with any consistency, turn inside the decision-making process of our enemies.

* The relative efficiency and effectiveness of our decision-making process remains a function of organizational design, not information management. Traditionally, a staff action, at any level, is routed through an organization based on a staff directory, organizations and functions manual, organizational "wire diagram," or, worst of all, the uninformed whim of the person doing the tasking.

The fundamental, driving assumption behind retention of an outdated command and staff process and these organizational coping techniques is that "functional responsibility equals functional expertise." The reality of the world, or at least throughout the Department of Defense, is that "functional responsibility for . . ." does not necessarily equate to "functional expertise in . . ."

The result is that resources, especially time, are expended outside the organization for expertise that is already in the organization. Why do we expend resources outside the organization for research, answers, or expertise that is imbedded in the guy three doors down the hall or a woman two buildings over? Because we do not know that the expertise exists or where. Because we don't have an index to the Expert System. If we knew how to find extant experts, people already in the system and on the payroll, we could maximize the knowledge base of the Department of Defense, saving precious resources for more pressing requirements.

How do we do that?

Why doesn't the Department of Defense create the first "living library" of subject matter experts? A Talent Bank. Every individual working for the Department of Defense can be a "book" on the shelves of that library . . . a piece of the Expert System. Each "book" can be abstracted for EXPERTISE -- technological, sociological, psychological, physiological, geographical, ad infinitum. Each of us has an "expertise profile" -- the focused sum of our instincts, heritage, training, education, hobbies, and geographical wanderings. But, these profiles have never been written down, collected, automated, and collated. If these profiles existed, the collective knowledge base for the Department of Defense would be defined and could be indexed for access, utilization, and updating.

* INDEXING -- Library Science people are experts at filtering the "key words in context" from individual expertise profiles. These "search words are the keys to indexing. Everyone's name goes into the computer and is linked to their own unique string of "search words."

* ACCESSING -- Eventually, each of us will be able to ask a computer for "expertise: (area under study/search word)" and get a printout of all the walking-talking experts in the Department of Defense, cross-indexed by current assignment/geographical locale, current state of knowledge, and availability for work. We could tell who the experts were right there in our own organization. Then instead of hit-and-miss taskings and coordination, a staff action can be directed to and looked at by people in the know. Better, or at least better informed, decisions. And quicker.

* UPDATING -- Members of the Talent Bank could be automatically kept abreast of developments in their field(s) of expertise through monthly "Current Awareness Bibliographies (CAB)." CAB's are annotated bibliographies that contain the essence of all studies and reports related to the key words listed in each individual's expertise profile. CAB's come from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), an information sub-system that is already on-line. After an individual looks at the monthly CAB, he/she can ask the local base/post library to order copies of reports that fit his/her specific information needs. The library is funded to pay for the reports, which come in microfiche (cheap) or "hard-copy" (expensive). Eventually, each expert could, by computer link, directly ask DTIC for the desired reports.

STEADY STATE -- THE FUTURE

On Monday morning, you get out of bed, shower, and put on your uniform. While taking breakfast, you turn on your home-computer and check-in with the Department of Defense's worldwide computer-based teleconferencing system, just to see if you received any messages or taskings during the weekend. Sure enough, the Chief had a brainstorm on the golf course Saturday morning, and he wants you to solve "X." It, "X," is in your functional area. But, you don't

know diddly about "X." (The Organization and Functions Manual has not been updated, or tossed out, yet.) So, you query the computer for "expertise: X." Ten nanoseconds later, a list of fifteen names, with addresses, phone numbers, and date of last DTIC update, appears on the screen. Two each are active duty Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel stationed right here in the continental United States. One is active duty Air Force stationed in Korea. One is active duty Navy serving with the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Two are retired (one ex-Marine in California and one ex-Coast Guard captain living on Cape Cod). The others are civilians who have done various part-time contract work for the government. All have access to the teleconferencing system, so you compose a short message describing the problem, "X," and send it to all fifteen. Then you slosh down your coffee, hop in your car, and head for the office. When you get there, you again check in with the computer, and find that eight of the fifteen experts, including the gal in Korea, the guy on the ship at sea, and the retired old salt on Cape Cod, have responded and are willing to help bust "X." And informed problem solving begins.

Talent Banking is currently being used, in a primitive form, on ExcelOpers, one of the Army's computer-based teleconference subnets. Each participant has submitted an expertise profile into the DTIC system. Many have already received CAB's and copies of research reports. The expertise profiles are on permanent display for consultation by all members of the subnet. Automating the system for indexing and accessing has not yet been accomplished.

The Department of Defense, or any one of the services, can create the Expert System by harnessing the collective knowledge of its members -- creating a Talent Bank.

* * *

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Absolutum Obsoletum

Absolutum obsoletum ... if it works, it's out of date.

That, in a nutshell, is the Officer Corps.

Want proof?

After World War II, our nation sought to preclude the personnel nutroll associated with mass mobilization by maintaining a large Officer Corps ... a skeleton on which to hang the masses after mobilization. We moved through the 50's, 60's and 70's with that construct, never seriously questioning its evolving applicability ... probably because it left a lot of room for us to grow in to.

Here's what happened (from Luttwak's The Pentagon and the Art of War ...

	Company Grade Officers (per 100 troops)	Field Grade Officers (per 100 troops)	General Officers (per 10000 troops)
WW II	1	1.3	1.9
Korea	1	2.9	6.9
Vietnam	1	5.8	5.2
Today	1	5.3	6.4

In World War II, with 12 million people in uniform, there were 101 three-star officers and above. Navy captains commanded aircraft carriers. Lieutenant colonels commanded Army battalions.

Today, aircraft carriers are still commanded by Navy captains.

Last time I checked, Army battalions were still commanded by lieutenant colonels.

And there are 118 three star and four star generals for an armed force totaling approximately 2.1 million.

We may be a little top heavy ... in rank and age. It seems that the mass mobilization criteria of post-WWII has a solid lock on how we plan on fighting wars in the very late twentieth century.

How valid is that?

Consider that we, as a nation, lack the industrial base to mass mobilize. To heat up the production lines that would mass produce the very sophisticated weaponry of our era will take months, maybe even years. That means, if we raise the armed force that would flesh out this large officer corps skeleton, we still wouldn't have the modern equipment with which to send it to war.

And there are neat things that come from or can be attributed to this uncontrolled bloat ...

-- Ever wonder why down at the action officer level, we see so much micro-management? The amount of time we spend stepping on ants while elephants run ovr us is incredible.

-- Ever hear complaints about how we overload the poor company commander? Think about it. All those requests for research

and tests and details all come together at one place ... the company commander's desk. Talk about the inverted pyramid. And the point of the pyramid is stuck squarely in the butt of the company commander.

-- When you are looking at bloated number, look at the number of folks in the Military District of Washington. When Congress said, "Reduce the size of the Army staff," we said, "Okay," then created Field Operating Agencies. Could it be that we have more people in Washington and its environs now that during the WW II?

-- Has anyone told the CSA that he could generate several light infantry divisions worth of spaces by reducing the officer corps ... vice whacking away at whole programs?

-- I bet you're saying, "Great idea, as long as I'm not the one who gets cut out when they start swinging the axe." That's a big block to getting on with the job. People are scared. Not of doing their jobs, but of suffering the consequences when they don't. If you've been doing the job, don't sweat it.

So, we don't need the Officer Corps ... at least not in the bloated numbers we have now ... sitting out there fractioning reasonable problems to the nth degree, so that each of us will have gainful employment during peace ... perpetuating the bureaucracy that is virtually strangling our Army with its own guts, and costing the American public untold millions of dollars in pay, allowances, and retirement benefits.

So much for the theory of "If it's worth doing, it's worth overdoing."

We worked well during World War II, maybe even in Korea, and were worth the cost to the American taxpayer ... then. Are we now?

Absolutum obsoletum.

* * *

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Computerized Evaluation Report

The following is the text of an HQDA letter dated 22 February 1998,
Subject: Computerized Evaluation Report System . . .

1. This letter announces implementation of the new Computerized Evaluation Report (CER) System. Effective 1 October, the CER System will apply to ALL, repeat ALL, Department of the Army personnel.

2. The new system consists of three interrelated documents:

a. Rated Individual's Support Form (DA Form 67-8-1) - This is a feedback mechanism designed to provide rated individuals with a profile of how they are meeting the design attributes and competencies of ARI Research Report 92-1404 (Attributional and Competency Based Efficiency Rating Systems). The essence of this form is what the individual needs to improve upon in order to maximize the BE, KNOW, DO of Army leadership requirements.

b. Rater's Support Form (DA Form 67-8-2) - This is a derivative of past OER Support Forms and specifies the mutually agreed upon goals and objectives for the rater and ratee. This document is the essence of what the organization must BE, KNOW, DO.

c. Computerized Evaluation Report (DA Form 67-8) - This document precludes, by its very nature, the need for all selection boards. In the past, boards have not had sufficient time to screen each file in detail. This new form facilitates an automated merit list based upon rater input, senior rater input, peer input, subordinate input, and the rated individual's rating profile for his/her subordinates. Henceforth, promotions and all other selections will become a function of vacancies which will be filled based upon a standing order of merit list.

3. Inclosed is a copy of the CER (DA Form 67-8). Copies will be available through normal channels as of 1 April 1998.

4. Note: 1/3 of C1 and 1/3 of D1 on the CER are based upon the results of the rater's and senior rater's ARTEP (or ARTEP-equivalent) scores. This will insure reciprocal interdependence between rated individual, rater, and senior rater.

5. Every five years, each individual's two highest and two lowest ratings will be discarded for statistical smoothing purposes.

6. POC is Maj Gonzo, AV 588-3091/2441/3297.

COMPUTERIZED EVALUATION REPORT

Hi

Lo

A. Subordinates' Rating
(Average rating from those rated by this individual. If rated individual does not rate anyone, enter 5.)

A1. Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

A2. Potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

A1 + A2 = A _____

B. Peers' Rating
(Average rating from not more than 5 individuals in adjacent positions, i.e. other company/battalion commanders. If none, enter 5.)

B1. Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B2. Potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

B1 + B2 = B _____

C. Rater

C1. Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

C2. Potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

C1 + C2 = C _____

D. Senior Rater

D1. Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

D2. Potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

D1 + D2 = D _____

E. Military Education Level

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

F. Civilian Education Level

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

G. APRT Score 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

H. Marksmanship Score 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

I. Troop Duty (Division level or lower)? Yes _____ (1) No _____ (2)

J. Rating Profile (provided by MILPERCEN, ARPERCEN, or CIVPERCEN) = _____
(Note: This is a mathematically derived index of how closely the rated individual's ratings of all others fits a classic bell curve. The more discrete an individual rater is in rating others, the less he/she penalizes him/herself.)

Calculations:

$$A + B + 2(C) + D + E + F + G + H = \text{Raw Score}$$

$$\underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} + \underline{\quad} = \underline{\quad}$$

$$\text{Raw Score} \times \text{Troop Duty (1 or 2)} \times \text{Rating Profile} = \text{Final Rating}$$

$\underline{\quad} \times \underline{\quad} \times \underline{\quad} = \underline{\quad}$ >> This, averaged with previous ratings, determines an individual's standing on all Order of Merit Lists.

* * *

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ExcelNet Concept Papers

- 1-85 Help Wanted: Fools, Wits, and Navigators
- 2-85 What's Happening...in 2/32 Light COHORT Rucksack Inf Bn
- 3-85 In Search of the AirLand Battle Leader
- 4-85 Networking Army Schools
- 5-85 The Code
- 6-85 Small Unit Cohesion, Emerging Leaders, & Leaders' Reaction Courses
- 7-85 BattleNet
- 8-85 Training Leaders for Army 21
- 9-85 Basic "Soldier-Machine Interface"
- 10-85 Talent Banking
- 11-85 Professional Commandership
- 12-85 America Doesn't Need a Total Army
- 13-85 NTC Logistics
- 14-85 Computerized Evaluation Report
- 15-85 Leader Development Reading List
- 16-85 Command Group Behaviors
- 17-85 E4 Promotion Boards
- 18-85 Routinizing Success
- 19-85 AirLand Battle Leadership and the Mental Gymnast
- 20-85 Command Climate Model
- 21-85 Resistance to Power Down
- 22-85 In Search of the AirLand Battle Leader II
- 23-85 Discipline
- 24-85 Authority
- 25-85 Champion Boxers Don't Have Wimps for Sparring Partners
- 26-85 NCO's Are Not Members of the Profession of Arms
- 27-85 The Parable of the Military Sinners
- 28-85 Battle Staff Integration
- 29-85 Absolutum Obsoletum
- 30-85 The Covenant
- 31-85 A View from the Top
- 32-85 Origin of Species
- 33-85 Who Has the Initiative?
- 34-85 Jazz Musicians and Algonquin Indians
- 35-85 Implementation of the Leadership Goal at III Corps & Ft Hood
- 36-85 Trouble in the Forest
- 37-85 Sleep Planning in Combat
- 38-85 Ambition
- 1-86 Changing Our Army's Culture
- 2-86 Gas and a Slick Forehead
- 3-86 Desk-Side SOPs
- 4-86 Brain Death

Forum: Think Tank Without Walls

Computer Network Links Army's Best to Study Service Problems

By P.J. BUDAHN
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The Army Forum, a think tank without walls, is changing the way the Army studies and solves high-level problems that links many of the service's best minds.

Backers say the far-flung computerized network eventually may replace the traditional study group, in which members convene periodically at the same location.

"A lot of study groups will get to the experts — the two-star general or the expert in the field — but they won't check with them periodically during the study. There's no continual feedback," said Lt. Col. Michael Rodier, director of the Army Forum.

Instead of using "telephone tag" or exchanging letters and reports through the mail, Forum members are in immediate contact electronically. All they need are a personal computer and a telephone to link

by activities — have an indefinite duration.

"It unleashes some creative juices in a lot of people. It gives them the opportunity to try out ideas on people who have the same problems," said Brig. Gen. Fred E. Elam, the Army's director of management.

"They all contribute to a consensus solution," said retired Col. Bill Landgraf, a former Forum director. "Because they have a consensus, they own it. Because they own it, implementation becomes easy."

The electronic heart of the Army Forum is "Confer II," one of about a dozen computer "teleconferencing" networks that have sprung up across the country since 1970 for industries, researchers, academicians and government officials.

Unlike electronic mail, which sends a computer message from one terminal to another, the Forum's computer lets every participant in one of the 19 sub-networks read everything written by everyone else in that sub-network. The end-product is a discussion via computer chips.

But it's a discussion free of the hassles of getting two people, with two often-conflicting schedules and sets of priorities, into the same room or on the same telephone line at the same time.

Participants say the nature of computerized communication allows most people to be more candid than they would be in face-to-face talks. One person or group can't dominate a computer discussion the way they can take over a meeting.

"It requires computer literacy to a degree, but it doesn't require an ADP-type person," said Capt. Jim Coggin.

Coggin was the "net organizer," or resident expert on the Forum computer for the 51 people linked electronically for the Professional Development of Officers Study.

The study group, headed by Lt. Gen. Charles W. Bagnal, looked at the Army's entire system for training and educating officers. Not everyone taking part in the study was linked by computer, but those who were part of the net logged 240 hours at Forum terminals during seven months.

The Army Forum has two "fathers" — Dr. Robert Parnes, who developed the software, and Col. Dandridge M. (Mike) Malone (USA-Ret.), who founded a group in 1978 that later became the Forum.

Parnes was at the University of Michigan in the mid-1970s when he began studying ways of harnessing the computer to improve decision-making, using the latest insights into small group dynamics.

"A lot of times, you need to get people together in a room and have a go at it," Parnes said. "But now people could operate (in decision-making) in periods of hours, when days or weeks were needed for previous written media."

“The best thing, all in all, was to show the whole Army the age of (computer) communications is here”

Dandridge M. Malone
Col. (USA, Ret.)
Former Director
Delta Task Force

“A lot of times, you need to get people together in a room and have a go at it. But now people could operate (in decision-making) in periods of hours, when days or weeks were needed for previous written media.”

Dr. Robert Parnes
Software Developer

“What would have taken action officers (using telephones and mail) four or five days to resolve, we can do in an afternoon”

Lt. Col. Michael Rodier
Director, Army Forum

them with the master computer at Wayne State University in Detroit, Mich.

Topics studied have included the organization of the light division, changes in the Army documentation system, leadership philosophy and professional education for officers.

“What would have taken action officers using telephones and mail four or five days to resolve, we can do in an afternoon,” Rodier said.

Currently, the Army Forum has about 600 participants — including a few civilians and retirees — working within 19 computerized sub-networks. Each sub-network is largely independent, with membership drawn from throughout the Army, regardless of traditional line-and-block organizations.

Informality is the key to joining Forum. Sometimes current members recruit others and some meet people with special interests who seek their services. Usually, the final decision on membership is left to the person known as an “organizer,” who oversees each of the 19 sub-nets.

Most members use a variety of Army-owned personal computers, although a few have their own PCs at home. Rodier said the only hitch for some would be contributors using a “modem,” which connects a computer to a telephone receiver.

Some of the 19 sub-nets, like the light infantry network, consist largely of field-grade and staff officers. The one for the Professional Development of Officers Study Group is heavy in generals.

Most panels have a lifespan of six to 18 months but a handful — like the channel for deputy post commanders for communi-

The Army adopted Parnes' system in December 1980. The yearly cost is \$200,000, all for computer time. Parnes has since left the academic world and founded Advertel Communications to market his idea and its software.

"It's a tool, and it depends on the person wielding the tool," Parnes said.

While Parnes was perfecting his communications package, a group of young officers within the Army's Training and Doctrine Command were trying to perfect their understanding of what made a good unit good.

The missing factor was dubbed "delta." And the overall effort took on the name Delta Task Force — not to be confused with the antiterrorist Delta Force unit of the 1st Special Forces.

"We had the freedom to question the established order," said Malone, the first Delta Task Force director and now a retiree in Florida.

Under the overall direction of Gen. Donn Starry (USA-Ret.), then the TRADOC commander, Malone drew together a unique mixture of military philosophers, combat veterans and behavioral scientists.

"One rule we always had was — maintain a mix of facts and feelings. You've got to have both, the two dimensions of communications, the affective and the cognitive," Malone said.

The free-wheeling group's contributions ranged from improving reception centers for soldiers at airports to stimulating interest in the regimental system and early air-land battle doctrine.

"The best thing, all in all, was to show the whole Army the age of (computer) communications is here," said Malone.

When Malone's Delta Task Force and Parnes' software came together, the Army Forum was born. The merger brought a change of emphasis. While Delta largely mulled over Army-sized problems, the Forum handles a mixture of "big picture" issues like leadership philosophy, with a sprinkling of nuts-and-bolts problems.

For example, the Organizational Effectiveness School at Fort Ord, Calif., began operating its own Forum sub-network in February.

About 50 OE officers in Europe, Hawaii and the states belong. Much of the traffic deals with common problems. (The OE assignments officer is a member.) But a philosophical discussion about the future of the program also is on the wires.

"You're not only exchanging ideas. You develop a consensus. And you see individuals start taking action," said Col. Don Grimm, commandant of the OE School.

Grimm, who was a member of the pre-computer Delta Task Force, is enthusiastic about having the ability to communicate instantaneously with people "shifted across the entire Army."

But officials with the Defense Communi-

cations Agency and Army Information Systems Command say the Forum's software no longer represents the "cutting edge" technology. Many computerized systems now connect Defense Department officials and some do it faster and better than Forum's computers.

To Forum members, however, technical sophistication isn't the point.

Hewlett-Packard Co., a major computer manufacturer, bought a license in August 1984 to operate "Confer II" — the software used by the Army Forum. With employment among about 100 major corporate divisions, company officials conclude it was the best thing on the market "distributed meetings."

"It's the only system of its type that I

“It unleashes some creative juices in a lot of people. It gives them the opportunity to try out ideas on people who have the same problems”

Brig. Gen. Fred E. Elam
Director of Management

large main-frame (computer). You can have a large community of users," said Bruce Prael, manager of R&D Information sources for Hewlett-Packard.

"I've seen nothing on the streets (merchandise) like this," Rodier added.

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