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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY HEADQUARTERS COMBINED ARMS CENTER AND FORT LEAVENWORTH FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027

ATZL-SWU-E

2 5 JAN 1984

SUBJECT: TRADOC After Action Report - Joint Training Exercise (JTX) REFORGER 83 and BOLD EAGLE 84

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Enclosed is the TRADOC After Action Report from REFORGER 83 and BOLD EAGLE 84.

2. This is one in a series of reports published by the Combined Arms Center, reflecting concerns of field commanders and TRADOC observers in regard to TRADOC products. The widest possible dissemination is made in an effort to stimulate thought and action on current training and doctrinal issues as well as to keep field units informed.

3. TRADOC agencies are requested to review this report for proponent assignments upon receipt. Proponents are additionally requested to notify this headquarters of their point of contact for followup action once their review is complete. The suspense for proponent followup action is 30 April 84. While this is a TRADOC After Action Report designed to resolve doctrinal issues by the TRADOC proponents, comments from the field are encouraged but not required.

4. Points of Contact at this headquarters are MAJ(P) Cliff Reed and MAJ Mark Spitler, AirLand Battle Training Division, Unit Training Support Directorate, CGSC, AV 552-3839/4317.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

F. D WINTER MAJ, GS Secretary General Staff

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84-USTD-0801

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PART ONE TRADOC PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR EXERCISES BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, AND CONCEPTS

1. References:

a. Message, CDR, USACAC and Fort Leavenworth, ATZL-CO, 261620Z Aug 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.

b. Message, HQDA, DAMO, 151307Z Sep 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.

c. Message, CDR TRADOC, ATTG, 191945Z Sep 80, subject: TRADOC Participation in Joint Readiness Exercises.

d. USAREUR/FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 11-11, 1 May 1981.

e. FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 350-20, 1 December 1981.

f. Army Regulation 350-28, effective 15 January 1984.

2. General Background: TRADOC participation in Joint Training Exercises (JTX) was directed by the Chief of Staff, Army, in August 1980. CAC was tasked to assume proponency for the program management. Since its inception, TRADOC subject matter experts (SME) have participated in all USREDCOM JTX.

3. Program Objectives:

a. To improve the TRADOC-FORSCOM interface as established by USAREUR/FORSCOM/TRADOC Regulation 11-11.

b. TO allow TRADOC SME to evaluate the existence, soundness, and application of doctrine.

c. To assist REDCOM and FORSCOM in scenario development.

d. To assist FORSCOM and the ARRED action agent in the development of Army objectives for each exercise.

e. The focus of TRADOC participation is the evaluation of TRADOC products. TRADOC participants have viewed this program as an excellent means of providing support to the exercising headquarters, as well as providing insight to the doctrinal development process. Any reluctance to participation stems from personnel and appropriate subject matter expert shortages. Additionally, this program provides an opportunity to discuss ongoing TRADOC projects with field commanders and to solicit input for these projects.

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4. Report Organization:

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a. The intent of this report is the identification, followup, and reso'ution of TRADOC issues surfaced during the exercise.

b. Part Two of this report contains TRADOC observations noted during REFORGER 83.

c. Part Three of this report contains TRADOC observations noted during JTX BOLD EAGLE 84.

d. The term "observation" is intentionally used to enable field concerns to be informally addressed. As such, "observations" do not necessarily represent command positions, but provide a sensing of field perceptions.

e. This report has been edited to eliminate redundancy and establish a proponent for actions that fall within TRADOC's area of responsibility.

5. Program Management: A management program has been developed to track issues from identification to resolution. Following each exercise, the Combined Arms Center will publish a report providing an update on observations associated with that exercise. Approximately six months later, a followup report will be issued which will provide an update on all observations. This will be repeated at six month intervals until all identified issues are resolved. PART TWO SECTION I EXERCISE SUMMARY REFORGER 83 12-28 SEP 83

1. <u>General</u>: The Command and general Staff College provided nine Subject Matter Experts (SME) to evaluate the sufficiency of Army doctrine during the deployment and employment phase of REFORGER 83.

2. TRADOC SME Support:

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COL Jon C. Stillman	Director, Unit Training Support Directorate
LTC John A. Hixson	Combat Studies Institute
LTC Wallace Johnson	Department of Combat Support
LTC Edmund F. Kedzierski	Department of Command
LTC John E. Martin	Department of Joint and Combined Operations
LTC David L. Runnells	Department of Tactics
LTC Richard H. Wright	Department of Tactics
MAJ(P) David A. Rajala	Department of Tactics
MAJ Henry L. Thompson	Department of Command

PART TWO SECTION II

OBSERVATION: REFORGER 83-1

SOURCE: CGSC

Long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) were employed which provided a human intelligence (HUMINT) collection source not currently available to the corps or division commander.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: The use of long range reconnaissance units provided by allied forces demonstrated the usefulness of such forces in the US force structure at division and corps level. The commander needs these HUMINT collection resources to look deep and get timely intelligence information so that he can strike follow-on forces quickly.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: N/A, this action is already under review by DA and is a repeat observation from REFORGER 82, Observation 82-48.

c. Proponent: N/A

Second And Children Statements

SOURCE: CGSC

Attempts to apply AirLand Battle Doctrine were evident.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Discussion with staff members revealed acceptance of AirLand Battle doctrine. The spirit of the offense was evident in all tactical planning. For example, when reconnaissance elements of the Orange force crossed the notional international boundary, the Blue force initiated an attack with a squadron from the ACR into the flank of the enemy. As a result of this operation, two battalion task force CPs were overrun and significant losses were inflicted on a reserve battalion task force.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That lessons learned from training exercises continue to be disseminated to field units and TRADOC schools.

SOURCE: CGSC

V Corps conducted a map evaluation of the 1/100,000 scale map.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Based on their use during CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE, the V Corps staff indicated that the 1/100,000 scale map was preferable over the other scale maps available for operations.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: N/A, Observation provided for information only. This project is currently under study.

c. Proponent: N/A

SOURCE: CGSC

Rear Area Protection (RAP) operations were emphasized during CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE. Day and night insertions of Ranger units into rear areas gave corps HQ the opportunity to evaluate their RAP concept.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: The Level II and Level III situations created by the insertion of Ranger units into the rear areas provided the reserve component Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) an opportunity to exercise their concept of RAP. Some safety flying restrictions during the hours of darkness limited the speed of reaction to the threats; however, it was a valuable learning experience for the RAOC staff and tactical commander of the RAP force.

V. Corps operational concept for RAP provides rapid reaction forces, ground maneuver forces, and fire support assets. A provisional 105mm Howitzer battery was formed from war reserve stocks to provide the fire support for the RAP mission. The unit was composed of a battery HQ, a fire direction center, and six 105mm Howitzers with a four man crew. Mobility was provided by truck and/or helicopters.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That consideration be given to inclusion of V Corps lessons learned in FM 90-14.

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SOURCE: CGSC

There appears to be a lack of indepth understanding/knowledge of the deployment system, i.e., from CONUS installation through the tactical assembly area.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: In discussing deployment with personnel that had deployed from CONUS, it was apparent they understood their role in the system. However, they were not fully knowledgeable of what the requirements were of the units that were receiving them. Conversely, the European units understood their role in the system but were not fully knowledgeable of the requirements of CONUS based units prior to arrival in country, e.g., what the CONUS unit had to accomplish during pre-deployment movement to the port of embarkation.

It is essential that both deploying and receiving forces have a clear understanding of the deployment system, so that resolution of emergency-type situations can be more effectively accomplished.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That a pocket-sized, doctrinal handbook be developed that describes the deployment system, both POMCUS and NON-POMCUS.

SOURCE: CGSC

No doctrinal guidelines for the development of efficient and effective interoperability in a non-established theater currently exists in US Army doctrinal publications.

Discussion: The results of the USAREUR interoperability initiatives a. begun in the mid-1970's time frame are readily apparent. Unit partnership activities, FSOP's developed from GDP relationships/mission, MTOE changes, language training programs, combined training and exercises, etc, are now in being and are pursued on a regular basis. Many problem areas remain, but these, in the main, are equipment related or have to do with logistical matters. Intelligence information dissemination among allied units remains the one major operational (software) issue to be addressed and resolved. All of the above, however, pertains to combined operations within an established theater. The US Army currently has no doctrinal guidance in being for planners/commanders who must establish a new theater of operations and conduct combined operations with an ally or allies still to be designated at some future date. Much valuable experience has been accrued in V and VII Corps in achieving their present level of effectiveness in interoperability. This experience should be reviewed and the fundamental and exportable lessons learned incorporated in FM 101-5.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That TRADOC and major commands review current interoperability programs and methodology, determine those factors which have application in any foreseeable combined operation and recommend appropriate supplements and changes in current US Army doctrinal literature.

SOURCE: CGSC

US officers, in general, have little knowledge as to the organization and operation of NATO; the supporting Integrated Military Structure, the US role in the alliance and how NATO serves US interests.

a. Discussion: All officers interviewed who had reason to deal with matters connected with NATO, either because of assignment to a NATO headquarters or because of their duties in a US national command, expressed concern as to a lack of knowledge about the military side of the alliance. The officers/NCO's in the armed forces of the NATO countries, with the exception of the US, serve repetitive tours within the Integrated Military Structure. As a result, they are more knowledgeable concerning NATO military matters/operations, how the alliance serves their national interests, and what their national positions are in regard to both major and minor issues. The US officer has, in general, never served in a NATO or NATO related position, does not understand the alliance military machinery or the US national position on almost any issue. The West German Army, for example, conducts a two-week course (in many cases a refresher) for officers being assigned to NATO positions (see Encl 1). A similar course for US officers. (senior NCO's) being assigned to positions within the Integrated Military Structure, would be of great value. This course, to be effective, must be conducted on a US only basis for officers of rank 0-3 through 0-6. An abbreviated course for general officers might also be worthwhile.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That TRADOC and USAREUR review the requirements for such a course and recommend what the curriculum should be, who should attend, who should teach, where the course should be taught, and what priority it should be assigned in competition for resources.

c. Proponent: CGSC

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Encl. 1 to OBSERVATION: REFORGER 83-7

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Encl.	1 to OBSERVAT	ION: REFORGER 83-7		
DAY	TIME	SUBJECT		
1	0800-1635	Registration		
2	0800-0845 0855-1035	Opening remarks, delineation of goals and course conduct. The power potential of the Warsaw Pact and the danger to Europe.		
	1115-1250	Defense political guidelines and the concept of military strategy, as a base for the security policy of West Germany, in the framework of the military strategy of NATO.		
	1400-1635	Continued.		
3	0800-0940	The political and military leadership of NATO, as well as, military organization and the command structure.		
	1020-1200	The contribution of the German Army to the NATO Alliance.		
	1205-1250 1400-1445	The role of NATO in the American security policy. The role of NATO in the British security policy.		
	1455-1635	The contribution of the German Air Force to the NATO Alliance.		
4	0800-0940	The contribution of the German Navy to the NATO Alliance.		
	1020-1200	The operational plans for the defense of West Germany.		
	1205-1250	Reinforcement potential for NATO Central RegionEurope in case of defense.		
	1400-1445	The role of NATO in the French security policy.		
	1455-1635	The contribution of the remaining NATO partners to the Alliance.		
5	0800-0940	The problems of Host Nation Support.		
	1020-1200	Experience talks by NATO officials/commanders.		
	1205 - 1255	Experience of allied officers gained through teamwork with German officers in integrated staff positions.		
	1400-1635	Self orientation on information provided in the NATO Handbook on Leadership, Objectives and the Organization of NATO.		
6	0800 - 1035	Language practice in preparation for practice in integrated staff work, and in order to gain experience in NATO English. Conversational language practice.		
	1115-1250	Administrative guidelines for use with integrated staff		
	1400-1635	outside West Germany. Continued.		
7	0800-1635	Applied practice in integrated staff workMessage, Point Paper, Background Paper, Initial Reaction Report, Agenda and Program Briefing.		
8	0800-1635	Applied practice in integrated staff work continued.		

Applied practice in integrated staff work continued. 9 0800-1255 1400-1635 Customs and courtesies towards allied nation members, the private sector, parties, role of the wife, children, school, etc. 10 0800-0845 Experience talks with NATO officials and commanders. Information exchange with national staff officials, consideration 0855-0940 of national interests. 0950-1035 Discussion period. 1045-1130 Closing comments. 1135-1220 Administrative requirements.

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SOURCE: CGSC

The FIST cannot keep up with the M-1.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: During REFORGER the FIST 113 was not able to keep pace with the M-1. Thus the commander would either have to hold back or move forward without his fire support coordinator. This deficiency is well recognized and is currently being addressed in the M1, M2, M3 study and the Hi/Lo Mix study.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: Combat developers and doctrine writers continue to consider this problem in future developments and doctrine writing. Options may need to be developed to deal with this mismatch in the near term.

c. Proponent: USAARMS and the USAFAS

SOURCE: CGSC

Reference material for planning and conducting the counterattack is scarce and not definitive.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: This feedback is a recurring comment and was provided by a brigade S-3 who reviewed doctrinal literature in an attempt to assist with his counterattack planning.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That brigade doctrinal proponents review counterattack doctrinal literature and initiate corrective action as appropriate.

c. Proponent: USAIS, USAARMS and the USAFAS

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SOURCE: CGSC

There is an apparent void in ADM doctrine.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Concern was expressed by a brigade S-3 that there was insufficient ADM employment doctrine.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That proponent review issue and initiate appropriate corrective action.

c. Proponent: USAENGS

SOURCE: CGSC

TM 38-750 has no line for chemical equipment as a reportable item.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: This could result in the commander not knowing when an item is on deadline.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: This observation be reviewed and corrective action deemed appropriate be initiated.

c. Proponent: LOGCEN

SOURCE: CGSC

Mixed mobility characteristics for units which had M-ls attached presented special challenges which need to be addressed in doctrinal manuals.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: This observation was the result of an interview with a commander who had a battalion of M-ls attached to his organization. The significantly increased mobility of the M-l unit posed new challenges when mixed with slower units. Doctrinal literature needs to address how to employ enhanced mobility when mixed with slower mobility units.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That brigade doctrinal proponents review this issue and provide an update on the status of current studies and new doctrinal literature that addresses this problem.

c. Proponent: USAIS and the USAARMS

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PART THREE SECTION I EXERCISE SUMMARY JTX BOLD EAGLE 84 2-19 OCT 83

1. <u>GENERAL</u>: JTX BOLD EAGLE 84 was a Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinated Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a Field Training Exercise (FTX) sponsored by United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM). The exercise was conducted at Eglin AFB, FL, from 2-19 October 1983.

2. <u>PURPOSE</u>: Exercise the United States Readiness Command and its components in a low intensity conflict.

3. <u>EVALUATION AREAS</u>: Within the framework of the exercise, TRADOC SME conducted a formal doctrinal evaluation of the following areas:

- a. Transportation
- b. Logistics Plans
- c. Supply

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- d. Air Defense
- e. Attack Helicopter Operations
- f. Field Artillery, Ground/FIST
- 4. TRADOC SME SUPPORT FOR JTX BOLD EAGLE 84:

USA Command and General Staff College

MAJ John W. Smith	TRADOC Program Manager
MAJ Oliver R. Johnson	Observer, DJCO, CGSC
MAJ James W. Allman	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT George Camp	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT Max Mears	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT Douglas S. Phillips	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT Paul G. Schmitt	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT Herman T. Sheppard	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
CPT Laszlo Taborosi	FIRST BATTLE Instructor
GS12 Darrell Holland	FIRST BATTLE Instructor

LTC Jerry D. Foster	Supply Evaluator
MAJ Heiko W. Pein	Transportation Evaluator
GS12 John J. Cecelic	Logistic Plans Evaluator
US Army Air Defense School	
CPT Charles A. Timme	ADA Evaluator
US Army Aviation School	
CPT George A. Heneveld	Attack Helicopter Operations Evaluator
US Army Field Artillery School	
CPT Henry J. Rhodes	Ground/FIST Evaluator
TCATA	
13 Personnel	TACSIM Controllers
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center	
Six Personnel	Civil Affairs, Host Country Cell

PART THREE SECTION II TRADOC OBSERVATIONS BE 84

OBSERVATION: BE 84-1

SOURCE: CGSC

Army lighterage used during Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) operations were not adequately equipped with fenders for discharge operations in rough seas.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Transferring cargo from ocean going ships to Army lighterage requires the lighterage to be positioned next to the ship. In order to avoid metal-to-metal contact and possible damage to either the lighterage or to the ship, there must be cushioning between the two vessels. Army lighterage is equipped with rope fenders. These rope fenders provide some cushioning but are inadequate for LOTS oerations in rough seas.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That the Army purchase inflatable fenders for use in LOTS operations. This is an observation only and not a TRADOC responsibility.

c. Proponent: N/A

SOURCE: CGSC

There is no beachmaster unit in the Army force structure. A terminal commander who is charged with Logistics-Over-The-Shore (LOTS) operations may not have personnel assigned who are specialists in selecting, organizing and operating a beach during LOTS operations.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: In order to conduct a successful LOTS operation, the beach must be organized to receive lighterage/cargo and controlled to permit efficient beach clearance. A beachmaster unit is necessary to select and organize the beach, control lighterage entering and exiting the beach area, establishing discharge points, marking the beach and ensuring that material and container handling equipment have room to operate. The beachmaster unit would keep beach entrance and exit routes serviceable and control access to the beach. In summary, the beachmaster unit would assist the terminal commander in his mission of conducting efficient and successful LOTS operations.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That the Army add beachmaster units to its force structure.

c. Proponent: CACDA

SOURCE: CGSC

The relationship and role of a Joint Movements Management Center (JMMC) to Army Movement Control Agencies, i.e., Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA) and the Corps Movements Control Center (MCC) is not clearly defined in Army doctrinal field manuals.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: The relationship and role of Army Transportation Movements Control Agenneies to Joint Transportation Movements Control Agencies must be clearly defined in Army doctrinal manuals to ensure successful joint operations. USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-X (Final Draft) titled <u>Operational Concept for Joint Movements Center (JMC)</u> is the only publication in existence that describes the relationship of the JMC to Army Transportation Movements Control Agencies.

b. Recommendations:

(1) That Army doctrinal manuals be updated to include doctrine on the relationship and the role of Army Transportation Control Agencies to Joint Transportation Agencies.

(2) That the draft USREDCOM Pamphlet 525-X be used as a guide in updating Army doctrinal manuals.

c. Proponent: USALOGCEN in conjunction with USATRANS

SOURCE: CGSC

There seems to be a shortage of camouflage nets in CSS units inhibiting adequate concealment of logistics facilities.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: CSS units in the Brigade Support Area (BSA), Division Support Area (DSA) and Corps Support Area (CSA) lack the mobility required to frequently relocate material storage facilities. They must remain in position for extended periods of time (primarily in the DSA and the CSA). Currently, camouflage netting is provided for tentage and some vehicles. CSS units in the Logistics Support Area (LSA) should have all stocks, vehicles, tentage and other facilities covered with camouflage nets to increase their survivability in consideration of their limited mobility.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That authorization for camouflage nets in CSS units be determined to include consideration of stockages and not solely on tentage and vehicles.

c. Proponent: USAQMSCH in conjunction with USALOGCEN and CACDA

SOURCE: CGSC

Host Nation support procedures, both requesting and providing, were not established prior to entering the contingency theater of operations.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: The commander was not provided information as to what could be expected from or could be provided to Host Nation forces. By not having this established prior to the exercise, it appeared that the US was reluctant to support Host Nation forces or use Host Nation support when available. Prior to entering a contingency theater of operations the Unified Command should resolve these issues.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That FM 100-16 <u>Support Operations</u>: <u>Echelons Above</u> <u>Corps</u> (Final Draft, dtd: Jun 83) be expanded to include an appendix that provides the logistics commander a check list so that logistical support can be requested from or provided to Host Nation forces.

c. Proponent: USALOGCEN in conjunction with CGSC

SOURCE: CGSC

Varied opinions exist on where, in relation to the FLOT, JAAT operations can and should be conducted. During BOLD EAGLE 84 JAAT operations were conducted as a subset of close-air support (CAS). Questions were raised about the applicability of JAAT operations in battlefield air interdiction (BAI) and interdiction missions.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Discussions with senior officers visiting the exercise revealed divergent opinions regarding the proper areas for JAAT employment. A visiting Army general officer view was that JAAT operations are appropriate for interdiction and BAI missions in conducting deep attack. Review of the current draft JAAT operations text did not support or refute this position. Discussion with Army and Air Force participants, however, raised serious question about the advisability of routinely employing attack helicopter and A-10 aircraft for deep strikes in a high-intensity air defense environment. In the judgment of many, such JAAT deep attacks would result in excessive attrition and wasteful expenditure of scarce resources needed to support the ground commander in the close-in fight. These professional differences of opinion are due, in part, to a lack of specific guidance in emerging JAAT concepts on the area appropriate for JAAT operations in a high threat air defense scenario.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That TRADOC ensure the area of employment appropriate for JAAT operations in high intensity conflict be understood and agreed upon in the joint doctrinal community and in units which will conduct JAAT operations. The draft JAAT operations concept should be revised accordingly.



SOURCE: CGSC

Applicability of current JAAT operations in low- and mid-intensity conflict is not clear.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Current doctrine states that JAAT operations are normally conducted only against high value targets such as a tank battalion gaining a penetration. This anticipates a high intensity scenario against Warsaw Pact tactics using massed armor coupled with sophisticated air defense. It is very probable that A-10 aircraft and helicopters will be employed in low- and mid-intensity operations. Since JAAT operations are highly effective in target identification, target destruction, and reducing friendly attrition, it seems reasonable that they could and will be employed in the full range of conflict. The commander will not hold back important resources for strictly doctrinal reasons if they are available and will accomplish the mission better with fewer casualties.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That the TAC/TRADOC/USREDCOM draft JAAT operations training text be revised to include possible scenarios other than high-intensity.

SOURCE: CGSC

JAAT doctrinal publications were not available in Army or Air Force units during BOLD EAGLE 84. JAAT procedures are found only in a 1979 TAC/TRADOC training text and Draft JFM 17-50-3 dated Nov 81 which are not readily available in units.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: A survey of key Army and Air Force units indicated an awareness of JAAT operations, principally because it was identified as an area of special interest for BOLD EAGLE 84. A literature search confirmed a void, with the exception of a TAC/TRADOC joint training text and Draft JFM 17-50-3, which are under revision. The lack of published JAAT JTTP for maneuver forces was cited as a key problem in training for and executing JAAT operations.

b. Recommendation:

(1) That the Army and Air Force jointly develop JAAT tactics, techniques and procedures and provide wide dissemination for Army and Air Force forces.

(2) That JAAT continue to be a joint exercise evaluation objective/special area of interest, especially in high-intensity scenarios.

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SOURCE: CGSC

JAAT training guidance is not widely available. It is not contained in the ARTEP for maneuver units.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Since JAAT training is not a training task in the various ARTEPs, it is not a training event habitually conducted in support of maneuver units. It appears that JAAT training for maneuver units (infantry, armor, cavalry and attack helicopter) is conducted only when they are preparing to participate in exercises where "JAAT is an area of special interest."

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That the conduct of a JAAT mission be a training task contained in maneuver unit ARTEPs.

c. Proponent: USAIS, USAARMS and the USAAVNS

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SOURCE: CGSC

Army units seldom do JAAT training. When conducted, it is often done independently.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: During the conduct of initial JAAT missions, Army and Air Force units had difficulty coordinating with each other. In one instance, a mission was cancelled because the attack helicopters and A-10s could not coordinate properly. As a result, the attack helicopters ran low on fuel and had to leave the area. Discussion with air battle captains revealed that problems of coordination were due to a lack of training. If more opportunities for the conduct of joint training were made available, JAAT missions would go more smoothly.

b. <u>Recommendation</u>: That TRADOC incorporate JTTP for JAAT in both the "How To Fight" manuals and appropriate Army Training and Evaluation Programs (ARTEP).

SOURCE: CGSC

The field artillery community does not place emphasis on support of JAAT. It is not included in "How To Fight" manuals, such as FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations (How To Fight). As a result, no priority is placed on J-SEAD mission training in support of JAAT operations.

a. <u>Discussion</u>: Field artillery (FA) units, as well as the supported maneuver units, do not appear to be familiar with their role and responsibilities, and related joint procedures for the support of JAAT missions. J-SEAD was not given priority during JAAT missions. J-SEAD targets were not passed to firing units on a priority basis for targeting or scheduling during JAAT operations. Information was available to artillery units concerning JAAT operations, i.e., school handouts and reference notes. Draft FM 6-20-2J does include J-SEAD operations in support of JAAT but was not available in units.

b. Recommendation: That JAAT operations be included in FM 6-20.

c. Proponent: USAFAS and the USAADS

ARMY STAFF

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DAMP-TRF (2), DAMO-ODE (2), DAMO-ZO (2), DAMO-SSM (2), DAMO-SSW (2), DAMO-C4C (2), DALO-PLO (2), DAEN-CWO-E (2), DAAG-PLM-P (2), DASG-HCO (2), DAAR-OTR (2), DAPE-PSC (2), DAMI-ISI (2), DAMO-ODO (2), DAMA-PPM-P (2), NGB-ARO-T (2), DAMO-RQS (5), WASH DC 20310

MACOM and DA Agencies

CINCUSAREUR	AEAGC-EX (5) Aeagc-tradoc (5) Aeagc-atc (5)	APO New York 09403
USCINCRED	J5, RCJ5-E (10)	Mac Dill AFB, FL 33068
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		Alexandria, VA 22333
CDR MILPERCEN	DAPC-MOC (5)	200 Stovall Street,
		Alexandria, VA 22332
CDR MTMC	MT-PLO (5)	WASH DC 20315
CDR RCPAC	AGUZ-RO (5)	9700 Page Blvd,
		St Louis, MO 63132
CDR TRADOC COMB ARMS	ATCT-BA-SPS (5)	Fort Hood, TX 76544
TEST ACTV		
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CDR USACIDC	CIPP-TS (5)	5611 Columbia Pike,
		Falls Church, VA 22041
CDR USACSC	ACSC-POP (5)	Ft Belvoir, VA 22060
CDR USACE	DAEN-CWO-E (5)	Pulaski Bldg, WASH DC 20314
CDR USAAVC	MOAV-MO (5)	Rm 5A462, Pentagon, WASH DC 20310
CDR MDW	ANOPS-OP (5)	
CDR HDW	ANOFS-OF (5)	Bldg 46, Ft McNair, WASH DC 20319
CDR USARJ	AJGC-OT (5)	APO San Francisco 96343
CDR USAFAC	FINCA-I (5)	Bldg #1, Ft Benjamin Harrison,
		IN 46249
CDR USALEA	DALO-LEP (5)	New Cumberland Army Depot,
	2	New Cumberland, PA 17070
CDR MEPCOM	MEACRM-FM (5)	Ft Sheridan, IL 60037
		to shot Luan, Lu oooji

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CDR USATHIRD	AFRD-DT (5) AFRD-DTO (5)	Ft McPherson, GA 30330
		Ft Clayton, PN, APO Miami 34004
CDR I CORPS	(2) (5)	Ft Louis WA 08133
CDR I WARS	G3 (5)	Ft Lewis, WA 98433 Ft Hood, TX 76544
CDR I CORPS	G3 (5) G3 (5)	ADO New Yerris 00070
	G3 (5)	APO New York 09079
CDR VII CORPS	G3 (5)	APO New York 09107
CDR XVIII ABN CORPS		Ft Bragg, NC 28307
CDR 1ST ARM DIV	G3 (5)	APO New York 09326
CDR 2D ARM DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Hood, TX 76544 APO New York 09039
CDR 3D ARM DIV	G3 (5)	APO New York 09039
CDR IST INF DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Rilev. KS 66442
CDR 2D INF DIV	G3 (5)	APO San Francisco 96224
CDR 3D INF DIV	G3 (5)	APO New York 09036
		Ft Carson CO = 80913
CDR 41H INF DIV		Ft Palk [A 7]/[50]
CDR JIH INF DIV		F = C + C + C + C + C + C + C + C + C + C
CDR /IH INF DIV		ADO Nees Versio 00111
CDR 8TH INF DIV	G3 (5)	APU NEW IOPK U9111
CDR 9TH INF DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Lewis, WA 90433
CDR 24TH INF DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Stewart, GA 31313
CDR 25TH INF DIV	G3 (5)	Schofield Barracks, HI 96857
CDR 1ST AIR CAV DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Hood, TX 76544
CDR 82D ABN DIV	G3 (5)	Ft Bragg, NC 28307
CDR 101ST ABN DIV	G3 (5)	APO New York 09039 Ft Riley, KS 66442 APO San Francisco 96224 APO New York 09036 Ft Carson, CO 80913 Ft Polk, LA 71459 Ft Ord, CA 93941 APO New York 09111 Ft Lewis, WA 98433 Ft Stewart, GA 31313 Schofield Barracks, HI 96857 Ft Hood, TX 76544 Ft Bragg, NC 28307 Ft Campbell, KY 42223
CENTERS AND SCHOOLS		
	ATZL-SWU-E (100)	
CDR USALOGC	ATCL-LPE (25)	Ft Lee, VA 23801 Ft Benjamin Harrison, IN 46249 Ft Belvoir, VA 22060
CDR USASSC	ATZI-DCD-CD (25)	Ft Benjamin Harrison, IN 46249
CMDT USAENS	ATZA-DTL (25)	Ft Belvoir, VA 22060
CMDT USATS	ATSH-B-TD (25)	Ft Benning, GA 31905
CMDT USAADS		
CHDI USAIRANS	$\begin{array}{c} \text{ATSI} = DI = DL (25) \\ \text{ATSI} DTO (25) \end{array}$	Ft Eustis, VA 23604 Et Cordon CA 30005
CMDT USASIGS	ATZT CSD D (25)	$\mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} \mathbf{F} $
CMDT USAARMS	ATZK=CSD=D(25)	Ft Gordon, GA 30905 Ft Knox, KY 40121 Ft Lee, VA 23801
	ATSM-TD (25)	Ft Lee, VA 23001
CMDT USAMPS	ATSM-MP-C (25)	Ft McCLellan, AL 36205
CMDT USAAVNS	ATZQ-CS-0 (25)	Ft Rucker, AL 36362
CMDT USAFAS	ATSF-T-D (25)	Ft Sill, OK 73508
CMDT USACMLS	ATSN-CM-A (25)	Ft McClellan, AL 36205
CMDT USAIMA	ATSU-CDD-CSD (25)	Ft Bragg, NC 28307
CMDT USAICS	ATSI-TP-AD (25)	Ft Huachuca, AZ 85613
CMDT USAISD	ATSI-ETD-PM (25)	Ft Devens, MA 01433
CMDT USAOCS	ATSL-RM-P (25)	Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
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		MD 21005
CMDT USAMMCC	ATSK_CC (25)	MD 21005 Redetone Argenzi AL 35897
CMDT USAMMCS CMDT USAAHS	ATSK-CC (25) HSHA-TLD (25)	MD 21005 Redstone Arsenal, AL 35897 Ft Sam Houston, TX 78234

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