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Aiding Our Neighbors

Captain John W. Athanson, U. S. Navy

This little Indian girl and the Guatemalan adults with her are not likely to ever forget the dungaree-clad doctor from the U. S. Navy who helped her. U. S. assistance to the Caribbean region improves the socioeconomic conditions of the region and improves the U. S. image there.

The underdeveloped nations of the Central America-Caribbean Basin region are faced with varying degrees of poverty, illiteracy, hunger, ill health, inflation, political corruption, and economic backwardness. Most of the people in the region are living near the bare subsistence level, with sanitation and public health facilities practically nonexistent.

Regional instability has resulted from decades of repression by corrupt military and landowning elites. These right-wing oligarchs and the minority "democratic" centralists have historically been unresponsive to the needs of the general population. Consequently, the people have progressively turned toward Marxist-oriented, radical regimes that offer them hope of improving their futures.

Traditionally, U. S. response has been to provide military aid and economic assistance to the established pro-Western regimes in the hopes of averting the emergence of left-wing governments. This type of response has often been described by foreign policy critics as "flexing American might and expanding local armies while giving just enough economic aid to keep the region afloat." They claim that a new policy that emphasizes political and economic reform, rather than militarism, will better contribute to long-term internal stability and encourage a greater receptivity to U. S. presence in the region.

One course of action in this direction is a long-range and multifaceted program of economic assistance. Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Thomas Moorer, U. S. Navy (Retired), stated the following in a 1984 regional study report:

"U. S. policy needs for the 1980's require a highly discriminating approach that is capable of responding to a mix of socioeconomic and political-military problems.... A broad based, comprehensive, and ongoing policy must initially be aimed at promoting economic progress and social stability in the Caribbean area."

"The U. S. naval presence in the region, which the United States long neglected, should continue to bolster other efforts to maintain regional stability. When all missions are combined, they can present a dramatic symbol of U. S. commitment to the Caribbean Basin's peace and security.".

In establishing the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, President Ronald Reagan sought advice on determining appropriate elements of long-range policy that would best respond to the socioeconomic needs of the region, and to both internal and external threats to its security and stability. The resulting "Kissinger Report on Central America" emphasized that the United States can play an important role in supporting Central American efforts to achieve adequate and comprehensive health care and "human development." The immediate priorities of such an effort are the eradication of malnutrition, the provision of primary health care, the prevention of disease, and the improvement of sanitation facilities.

The report further proposes:

"The United States government and other donors have already expended considerable resources to promote the development and expansion of health resources in Central America.... We endorse this approach and urge its expansion.... The Commission believes that effective relief efforts which would assist these people would not only serve a humanitarian purpose, but would have a positive effect on the political, social and economic future of the countries involved.".

Two days after the publication of the "Kissinger Report," Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger dispatched a memorandum to the service secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other key DoD officials. He wrote, "Legislative constraints, inadequate budgetary authority, and organizational impediments tend to limit severely or delay what the Defense Department can contribute." The Secretary directed the establish-
ment of a DoD task force on humanitarian assistance. This task force was instructed to address means of allowing greater DoD participation in civic action programs, including required changes to government regulations and restrictions, funding and budgetary considerations, and determination of existing capabilities.

General Paul Gorman, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, voiced these same concerns in April 1984, while lecturing at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. According to the general:

"We don't have much capability in this area. To the extent that we do, we have good results. Our best assets we have in this area [are the U.S. Navy's] Project Handclasp and a Navy reserve outfit from Florida. . . . Handclasp was able to come up with crucially needed medical supplies to enable us to innoculate every child in Honduras. This is the only officially sanctioned and supportive program of its nature in the Armed Forces. . . . Humanitarian assistance in this very impoverished area of the world is . . . morally essential."

The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps has the capability to actively participate in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs. Navy and Marine efforts would involve all echelons of the chain of command, as well as specific fleet assets, while carrying out low-cost, immediate-impact social and economic development projects in the Central American-Caribbean Basin region.

**Humanitarian Assistance and Civic Action Programs:**

Military humanitarian assistance and civic action can generally be defined as the use of military forces on projects useful to the local population in such areas as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, emergency food and clothing assistance, medical assistance, and health sanitation. These efforts contribute to economic and social development, while simultaneously serving to improve the relationship between those military forces and the population.

Military humanitarian assistance and civic action are not new ideas. In the early 1960s, the U.S. Government employed them to counter the influence of left-wing insurgents in the Third World. Use of military civic action in this mode was a new phenomenon, particularly emphasized in Southeast Asia and Latin America, and it achieved only uncertain and mixed results. It was believed that civic action programs would facilitate the development process and demonstrate to disaffected populations that both the United States and the host government were concerned with their problems; the appeal of left-wing insurgencies would correspondingly decline.

Unfortunately, however, the civic action programs of the 1960s could not, by themselves, bring about long-term solutions to the problems which fomented insurgency. Social and political reforms were also needed to correct the structural inequities that were at the root of poverty and economic stagnation within these regions. The United States can learn from its experiences of the 1960s, the most important lesson being the realization of what humanitarian assistance and civic action can, and cannot, accomplish.

To maximize and promote U.S. image overseas, humanitarian assistance and civic action programs must project a cooperative image between U.S. naval forces and the host government/local community inhabitants. The programs should clearly dispel the perception of a free, one-time handout. Participating elements should project a working-level, low profile, instead of a public affairs show. The effort should strive to create a spirit of participation and self-help among the local population, a spirit that can be a basis for continuing social and economic progress once U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participants have departed; this would create a sense of local pride and accomplishment and provide the basis for responsible ownership and maintenance.

*When U.S. Coast Guard lieutenants hand out toys to Panamanian children, and U.S. SeaBees, Marines, and Navy men build bridges over jungle rivers, who benefits? The receiving populations, of course. But so, too, does the United States benefit diplomatically and the servicemen morally.*
In-country, direct participation by U. S. naval personnel will accomplish two primary objectives of the humanitarian assistance and civic action process. First, it will identify the U. S. Government with the country concerned at the local community level and emphasize U. S. interest in the welfare of the people. Second, this level of participation would overcome one of the frequent criticisms of the U. S. economic assistance program; that is, the local population often does not feel the effect of aid directly and thus seldom realizes the magnitude of U. S. contributions to the nation's welfare. Above all, it would ensure that services and supplies reach the intended recipients and are not redirected by corrupt government officials or become black market commodities.

Of perhaps equal importance, U. S. Navy involvement in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs would also provide valuable training opportunities for participating personnel, including construction battalions (Seabees), U. S. Marine Corps engineers, and medical and dental teams, both regular and reserve. These types of units often have difficulty obtaining realistic training opportunities within the United States because of budgetary limitations and conflicts with the competing civilian construction industry and medical/dental facilities. Consequently, the construction units have had to confine their activities to limited on-base construction and maintenance projects, often of limited training value. The medical dental personnel have been exposed only to practice under ideal conditions.

In addition, overseas projects would provide an excellent opportunity to refine forward deployment and embarkation planning and to test U. S. forces' ability to live, operate, and maintain equipment under adverse tropical conditions in remote areas. Embarkation, movement, and support of these forces could simultaneously provide realistic training for participating fleet units. Finally, civic action projects would allow the U. S. Navy to maintain a low-cost, active military presence in the region while ostensibly carrying out a humanitarian, nonmilitary mission—shifting the emphasis from gunboats to diplomacy.

**Project Handclasp.** The heart of the U. S. Navy's humanitarian assistance program today is Project Handclasp. In fact, it is the Navy's only official source of humanitarian material for overseas shore-based and ship-sponsored people-to-people programs worldwide. As a low-level, basically unfunded operation, Project Handclasp accepts voluntary material donations from U. S. citizens and private and public organizations. This material comprises three general categories: (1) humanitarian assistance items such as food, clothing, and medical supplies and equipment, (2) educational items such as school and library books, school supplies, and training aids; and (3) goodwill items such as toys, playground equipment, and sports gear.

These materials are sorted, inspected, and packaged, then provided to deploying ships for direct distribution by volunteer crewmembers to needy individuals or organizations during overseas port visits, usually in conjunction with other planned community assistance activities. Materials are also distributed to major overseas shore-based commands by U. S. service personnel in conjunction with ongoing community relations programs.

Direct distribution of materials by Navy personnel to recipients is an important aspect of the program; not only are the people most in need assured of receiving the materials, but the servicemen involved in the distribution gain a keen insight into, and a greater appreciation for, the problems and life styles of people of different cultures. Such activity has had a significant positive impact on the morale
Amphibious ships, like these landing craft conducting a beach assault exercise in Puerto Rico, would be ideal for carrying humanitarian assistance material. Such embarkation and support are part of their designed mission, and distribution of the material would provide excellent training to the ships and embarked units.

of participating U. S. Navy personnel

Project Handclasp has provided support to U. S. Navy and joint-service humanitarian assistance activities in Asia, Africa, Central and South America, the Caribbean Basin, and the Indian Ocean in coordination with various military commanders. During 1983, 60 ships carried and distributed Project Handclasp material to at least 50 countries and islands worldwide.

A typical example of a highly successful Project Handclasp humanitarian assistance program is the support provided to Commander in Chief, South and Commander, Joint Task Force-11 during joint, combined Exercise Ahusas Tara II in Central America during November 1983. (Ahusas Tara means “Big Pine” in the language of the Miskito Indians of Central America.) The CinCSouth civic action effort called for the support of Honduran National Vaccination Week, 7–12 November, sponsored by the Honduran Ministry of Health. This project was nationwide and was directed at immunization of all Honduran children at every level of society. Particular emphasis was placed on supporting previously unreachable remote locations. The U. S. Navy’s Project Handclasp office was approached regarding the requirement for vital needed medical and vaccination supplies. These were obtained through donations from various corporate donors, and with the use of space available airlift. 45,000 pounds of essential supplies were shipped from Naval Air Station North Island to their eventual destination.

Although proven highly successful in recent years, Project Handclasp has not been used to its full potential, nor is it properly and fully supported within the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps. In fact, the East Coast Project Handclasp office in Norfolk, Virginia, has closed because of lack of command emphasis on and support of the program. The West Coast office, on the other hand, has not only sustained operations, but has achieved extraordinary success, primarily as a result of the dedication, tenacity, and dynamic management of its director, who has been extended in the billet during recent years.

Proposed for Increased U. S. Navy-Marine Corps Participation: The Central America-Caribbean Basin region is a prime area for the United States to reap benefits associated with humanitarian assistance and civic action projects. At the same time, heightened U. S. concern and strategic interest in the area requires added U. S. Navy presence. In the future, the frequency of carrier battle group and amphibious task group exercises off Central America will most likely increase. In addition, the region may draw more fleet presence through special operational requirements, type training exercises, and scheduled port visits. This increased presence will provide greater opportunities to engage in humanitarian assistance and civic action projects.

Between deployments, fleet units are engaged in a fairly structured maintenance and training schedule in preparation for the next deployment. Toward the end of this cycle, the units will participate in mid-intensity, squadron-level underway training operations, usually in conjunction with an out-of-area port visit. For example, a San Diego-based amphibious squadron might have a two- to three-week scheduled type training period a few months prior to a western Pacific deployment. Squadron ships would conduct internship training en route to various port visits along the west coast of Mexico. This type of training presents a unique, low-cost opportunity to conduct assistance projects in the Central America-Caribbean Basin region. This is particularly true for amphibious and service force ships, which would not yet have a full deployment load-out. These ships could load significant quantities of Project Handclasp material in San Diego—along with designated civic action teams (construction, medical, etc.) and their equipment—for eventual off-load during the scheduled port visit.

Amphibious ships are ideal platforms for humanitarian assistance and civic action projects because they have the space and accommodations to embark, transport, off-load, and support the other U. S. assets—such as SeaBee units, U. S. Marine Corps engineering groups, and U. S. Navy
medical and dental teams. In addition, such embarkation and support is part of their designed mission. This would simultaneously provide invaluable training to both the participating amphibious ships, as well as the embarked units.

Amphibious ships are frequently required to engage in exactly this type of operation during forward deployments. For example, as commanding officer of USS Schenectady (LST-1185), I participated in an extensive civic action project at Dangalan Bay, Republic of the Philippines, in 1983, which involved the embarkation, movement, off-load (by LST beaching), and support of both medical/dental teams and engineering and construction units. Later, during the same deployment, the Schenectady similarly transported a U. S. Marine Corps engineering group from Okinawa to Tinian Island for a three-month training and civic action program.

Depending on beach suitability, area accessibility, and host government concurrence and cooperation, amphibious ships could also deliver material, personnel, and support equipment over-the-beach in remote regions, via tank landing ship (LST) and utility landing craft (LCU) operations. Such operations could be conducted concurrently with training and exercise objectives.

The predeployment exercise or type training period could be extended if afloat units were required to remain in the area to support the civic action team or to back-load the team and equipment upon completion of the project. The ships could also return for back-loading following a local port visit. If the civic action team’s in-country time covered an extended period of several weeks or months, then subsequent training units could be scheduled to conduct reembarkation at a later date.

To be most effective, humanitarian assistance and civic action projects conducted in this manner would be tailored to contribute to the special needs of the local community. Basic projects such as the construction or improvement of feeder roads connected to highways would receive priority because they will contribute significantly to the development of the agricultural economy of the region. Priority would also be given to the provision of medical and dental care, the provision of potable drinking water, the construction of sanitation facilities and drainage systems, and the distribution of food.

Secondary priorities would include the construction, maintenance, and remodeling of schools and other civic buildings in the community. These efforts could be supplemented by the delivery and distribution of food, clothing, good will, and medical and educational supplies made available through government-sponsored economic aid programs, the U. S. Navy’s Project Handclasp office, and other voluntary aid organizations.

In short, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps has an opportunity to greatly expand its humanitarian assistance and civic action programs within the Central America-Caribbean Basin region by thinking in terms of full-ship loadouts, by employing SeaBees, U. S. Marine Corps engineering groups, and U. S. Navy medical and dental teams, and by coordinating humanitarian assistance and civic action efforts with scheduled type training and exercise plans. Such efforts would significantly increase U. S. participation in these programs at minimal cost, while simultaneously maximizing training opportunities.

Requests for this type of humanitarian assistance should originate within the foreign country concerned and must have the support and concurrence of the local U. S. embassy, U. S. military commander, and the host government. The project should necessarily be closely coordinated with the local U. S. military assistance advisory group, mission or military representative, and local civilian community officials. For projects requiring materials that fall outside the established scope (i.e., humanitarian, educational, and goodwill materials) of Project Handclasp, the appropriate unified commander should coordinate humanitarian assistance and civic action programs with other U. S. Navy and Marine Corps organizations, the State Department, DoD, and other agencies.

Depending on the nature and magnitude of the project, it might be advisable for an advance party from the participating units to visit the local area and to participate in the local planning effort well in advance of actual deployment. In the case of LST or LCU over-the-beach off-load operations, an advance beach survey team should survey and report on beach conditions at the desired landing site. In this way, supporting elements and materials can be effectively programmed, and the best size and type of equipment needed for the project could be predetermined. The training value of even this advance planning function is obvious.

Problems and Opposition: In spite of the advantages that can be derived from effective humanitarian assistance and civic action programs, such efforts are not without their critics. Some senior military officers and government officials harbor an inherent reluctance to engage in projects that are not directly linked to the U. S. Navy’s and Marine Corp’s primary missions. The biggest problem the military services currently face in conducting civic action projects in Central America is congressional opposition arising from three basic issues.

First, some legislators claim such activities are in conflict with regulatory statutes, such as U. S. Code Title 10: Armed Forces and Title 22: Foreign Relations and Intercourse. These codes place specific regulatory restrictions on the use of military forces, U. S. assets, and funds for nonappropriated activities. These legislators are also concerned that engagement in such activities could lead to proposed increases in the defense budget.

Second, certain congressional committees believe that the sponsorship and control of humanitarian assistance and civic action aid in this region are within their special purview, not that of the military. Third, there is significant political opposition to a U. S. policy of involvement, in any form, in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.

Opposition is also voiced from the private sector. Many complain that the military transportation of aid material and equipment is competing with a depressed U. S. maritime industry, which could otherwise transport the aid cargo into the region. Civic action projects may also generate complaints within the host country that such activity
is interfering with the operation of private industry.

Although humanitarian assistance and civic action projects could be accomplished at minimal cost, some additional funding would be required. Special legislative action would be needed to enable the military forces to use exercise and operations and maintenance funds, or to separately allocate funds for these types of projects.

While fleet units are engaged in humanitarian assistance and civic action projects, with aid personnel, material, and equipment embarked, their readiness for immediate forward deployment in case of national emergency may be significantly reduced.

Finally, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian assistance and civic action programs are not as widely promoted nor used as they could be with existing assets and facilities. With the exception of the Project Handclasp office in San Diego operating under the sponsorship of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-61), there is no other functional office, staff component, or agency within the Navy Department with primary responsibility for the development, implementation, and execution of humanitarian assistance and civic action programs. Improved participation in these programs will undoubtedly require a greater personal commitment and involvement—such as policy, organizational, and scheduling initiatives—by higher authority.

Despite some inherent problems and opposition, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps participation in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs in the Central America-Caribbean Basin region holds great promise. At a time when more and more people are advocating socioeconomic aid and assistance rather than militarism, humanitarian assistance demonstrates that U.S. Navy and Marine Corps presence can simultaneously promote national development and goodwill. Once committed to the region, the United States must be prepared to sustain the program to realize the long-term benefits.

The U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps have the personnel, equipment, material, and opportunity necessary to support a meaningful humanitarian assistance and civic action program in the Central America-Caribbean Basin region. As exemplified by the Honduran Innocation Program, the Navy's and the Corps' active participation in such activity can significantly contribute to regional development and, at the same time, improve long-term stability and favorable U.S. relations. These efforts can deter subversive aggression by helping to provide improved social and economic conditions within the local population.

In view of the potential of such programs for meeting the political objectives of the 1983 Caribbean Basin Initiative, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps should review current authority for military involvement in humanitarian activities and civic action programs. The Navy and Marine Corps should also examine the status of such programs and ensure that available resources are getting the maximum use possible. Additional support could be obtained if other U.S. economic aid and assistance programs were permitted to fund U.S. Navy and Marine Corps humanitarian assistance and civic action projects.

In addition, congressional committee support, regulatory changes, and special authorization could be sought to facilitate a wider range of activities. Legislative and budgetary strategy should be developed for required program authorization and appropriated funding, in particular, special exclusionary provisions, clauses, and modifications to the U.S. Code. Currently, there are legislative restrictions on the use of appropriated funds. For example, using appropriated funds for nonappropriated activities is prohibited. Current statutes regulating security assistance also prohibit funding of programs which fall into the category of "strictly" civic action, though not those which have civic action "side effects."

Finally, liaison, coordination, and mutual support should be sought with a wide range of other military activities, government agencies, and civilian organizations (such as Navy and Marine Corps Reserve and National Guard units, the Agency for International Development, American Red Cross, Military Airlift Command, etc.) in implementing expanded humanitarian assistance and civic action program. In transporting supplies and materials, the space-available concept can be extended to other DoD transportation resources, such as Military Airlift Command, Military Sealift Command, and government-chartered vessels. Too, the Navy and the Corps could seek cooperation from U.S. commercial steamship companies. However, there could be some reaction from domestic and international commercial carriers if the movement of humanitarian cargo and economic aid material is shipped via DoD transportation assets.

Greater U.S. Navy and Marine Corps involvement in humanitarian assistance and civic action programs within the Central America-Caribbean Basin region would greatly enhance U.S. policy objectives by promoting improvements of socioeconomic conditions in the region, improving the U.S. image abroad, and providing valuable training opportunities for participating forces.

4Interview with General Paul Gorman, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, on 3 April 1984.

After graduating from the California Maritime Academy in 1963, Captain Adanson served in the USS Ashland (LSD-11), USS Morton (DD-948), USS Crozwell (DD-651), USS Paul Revere (LPA-248), USS Frederick (LST-1184), and as commanding officer of the USS Schenectady (LST-1185). His staff duty has included tours as Officer-in-Charge, Team 12, Beach Jumper Unit One; as Material Officer to Commander, Destroyer Squadron 75; and as the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op-63). He has a BA and MA in international relations from the Naval Postgraduate School and Salve Regina College, respectively, and is currently a student at the Naval War College. Captain Adanson's next assignment is ACOS for Operations, Plans and Readiness to Commander, Amphibious Group Three.

Proceedings / February 1985
Military Medicine's Role in Low-Intensity Conflict

Lieutenant Colonel James A. Taylor, US Army

With increasing pressure in the low-intensity conflict arena, a new operational role for military medicine exists which, if employed appropriately, may not only greatly limit the growth potential of the conflict but also reverse the process.

Background

One of the common strategies of our adversaries when extending their influence into the power vacuums of destabilized nations is to deploy civic action teams. The primary role of these teams is to mobilize the values of the target population in favor of an insurgency movement and against the government in power. When Caribbean and US forces landed on Grenada in 1983, several "civic action" activities, such as medical, engineer, teaching and propaganda, were under way. Our adversaries are not novices at using this strategy. Mao Tse-tung found that his revolution would be far more difficult if he could not neutralize opposition among the population and earn the people's commitment to his cause. Soviet surrogates effectively use coercion alone to promote their causes, both in Latin America and Africa.

Most US citizens know little of the history of Central America and the role that the United States has played over the past 90 years in that part of the world. Not entirely without some justification, the Latin American countries view the record of past US involvement and numerous military interventions with a jaundiced eye and suspect that the motives for our involvement may not always have been in their best interests. For the most part, Latin America has evolved from a colonial status through complete and incomplete revolutions, oligarchic controls, military dictatorships and a struggling democracy. Traces of such may be found in many of the Latin American nations, but the general trend is toward representative democracy.

Meeting Human Needs:
The Opportunity and Challenge

The realities of economic life in the developing Latin American nations paint a stark picture of the disparities between the wealthy and the poor, between the few who are well off and the many for whom grinding poverty makes existence a day-to-day affair and for whom despair is a way of life. Field Manual (FM) 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, states that these general conditions must be present in some degree for insurgency to take hold and prosper:

- A vulnerable population.
- Direction and leadership (among the insurgents).
- Lack of government control.

Certainly, when large segments of a population remain at the bottom of Abraham H. Maslow's hierarchy of human needs food, shelter and safety), there is little hope of improvement without some kind of outside assistance. For now, the existing governments in developing nations may be able to only assist in small bits and pieces because of pressing economic matters. However, our adversaries are more than willing and able to provide both leadership and direction for furthering their economic and political ends.
Latin America is complex, changing and potentially explosive to the long-range interests of the United States. It will most assuredly be a chaotic situation if Latin America slips completely into Cuban and Soviet spheres of influence. It is, therefore, critical that struggling democracies throughout Latin America have the best possible chance to succeed and that subversive efforts be thwarted both economically and militarily. This would be in the best interest of the people of the nations involved and, ultimately, of the United States. Military medicine has a new, exciting role in supporting that national interest.

**The Changing Role of Military Medicine**

The ultimate reason for medical involvement in what is commonly called low-intensity conflict is to assist host countries in creating 'nourishing a quality of life for their people that provides a viable alternative to the situation being developed by the Soviets and the Cubans. By doing so, we nourish hope for the future, as well as a just and supportive environment for today by focusing on those baseline needs that sustain human life and health. Basically, if the quality of life is not improved in the areas targeted by the Soviets and the values of the people are not positively influenced toward democratic values, then the strategy for dealing with insurgency at the grass-roots level is in a very difficult time.

Low-intensity conflict has been defined as those activities short of two or more organized forces meeting on the field of combat. In lay terms, it is that activity short of actual open warfare between large groups of organized troops and includes latent and incoherent insurgency, terrorism, economic and industrial sabotage, subversion, extortion and urban guerrilla activity. It often also includes an active and well-supported element that is dedicated to the destabilization of the target government, as well as the mobilization of public opinion for the guerrilla cause. It is further characterized by the employment of military capabilities—rather than military force—in concert with other aspects of national power to achieve political, economic and social goals.

A preclusive and proactive US approach to those challenges at the lower end of the conflict continuum would minimize both human and material costs which would balloon almost exponentially if the problems are not addressed until conflict intensifies. A nation's economy is often the target of insurgents who try to destabilize the government's ability to provide assistance to the people. This demonstrates the government's impotence and makes 'liberation' the only alternative. Without economic strength, the nation becomes more and more vulnerable. Economic recovery and health matters are inexorably intertwined.

The health section of Henry A. Kissinger's report on Central America contained this statement:

*If Dirsch's view that the economic health of the nation depends first on the health of its people is true, then it is vital that health conditions in Central America be improved as a precondition for economic recovery.*

Programs for addressing conflict require resources. Some need huge amounts of dollars; there is no free lunch. Everything has a cost. In a world of infinite demands and finite resources, priorities must be established to address the most pressing problems and to establish a semblance of order in the never-ending battle for limited resources. In the past, substantial portions of the US defense budget have been geared to a large war in Europe. Literally, next to nothing has been spent to develop effective approaches for dealing with low-intensity conflict on the north-south axis of the Americas.

Somehow, after Vietnam, it became fashionable to denigrate the value of such activity, while dollars were spent on refitting US forces in Europe to meet the Soviet threat. The US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commissioned the Kupperman study which produced a rather intriguing finding. In effect, it states that the war we most expect and are coincidentally spending the lion's share of resources in preparing to fight is probably the one least likely to occur. Looking at Latin America, we find low-intensity conflict already occurring in several countries, and the results are, indeed, very critical to US interests.

Despite this fact, resources spent on the exigent insurgency problem are but a pitance when compared to the major weapons systems that are being procured to defend against the 'big war.'

Major General William P. Winkler, the commandant of the Academy of Health Sciences, concluded in a study for the Surgeon General that:

*...military medicine is the least controversial, most cost-effective means of employing military forces in support of US national interest in low intensity conflict situations.*

Winkler also determined that the most appropriate role for military medicine in low-intensity conflict lies in nationbuilding rather than in the traditional combat role that has been so well-developed and played by the Army Medical Department since Jonathan Letterman created the concept of field medical support during the Civil War.
Operational versus Combat Service Support Missions

Military medicine's new and emerging role in low-intensity conflict assumes a practive and prudential stance. This means entering potential preselected target population areas in conjunction with engineering, signal, civil affairs, psychological operations and intelligence personnel before the tactical situation can deteriorate to open conflict and casualties are produced. As such the medics assume an operational mission for the first time and, with the exception of providing health services to the ground US forces, cease to function in the combat service support role. Doctrine to support this new concept is now being developed by the Academy of Health Sciences.

From a medical standpoint, there are a number of ways to influence the situation even when the expenditure of Department of Defense (DOD)-bundled humanitarian assistance is prohibited. As is currently the case with Title 10, US Code, Section 124, strategies for addressing the existing medical infrastructure of friendly nations include:

- The use of mobile training teams to train domestic medical services in El Salvador.
- Joint and international exercises conducted by US and friendly forces.
- Emergency deployment readiness exercises conducted by US forces for long periods of time as training exercises.
- Technology to reduce people-intensive functions to a minimum.

In the development of an expanded role for medicine in a low-intensity conflict, the needs of the population must be identified. Then, a determination must be made of the needs which can be handled by the local authorities with only coordination from US medical personnel, those that need to be addressed by both US and host nation medical personnel, those that require only US medical interest and, finally, those that require host nation, US military medical and Department of State consideration.

It is important to remember that nation-building is a Department of State function that is normally performed with the Agency for International Development (AID). Only recently, has the military begun to recognize the need for involvement in such a coordinated and organized effort that supports legitimate military objectives.

Priorities of Medical Needs

In areas such as Central and South America where basic human needs are unmet and humanitarian assistance is prohibited, the situation is about to be the case with Title 10, US Code, Section 124. Strategies for addressing the existing medical infrastructure of friendly nations include:

- Providing potable water to the population.
- Human waste disposal.
- Vector control (both insect and rodent).
- Garbage disposal.
- Immunizations.
- The safe use of pesticides.
- Personal hygiene, sanitation and basic education.
- Training for primary care health providers.
- The development of a medical logistics and evacuation system.

- Family planning.
- Care must be taken not to duplicate the efforts of the host country or to interfere with existing long-range AID programs. Those programs must be supported whenever feasible. The achievement of the AID's ultimate goal of upgrading the host nation's capability to meet its own needs where the AID and the host nation have agreed to work may appear to take too long and be inefficient to military planners who are using short-term, measurable outcomes. Care must be taken to ensure that commanders who demand immediate, measurable results do not supplant the AID's long-term nation-building efforts.

On the other hand, the US medical activity can adopt short-term objectives that support the AID's long-range goals. For example, massive, country-wide immunization programs, the use of military resources to reach sites, the construction of water wells and canals, and the airlift of construction equipment and supplies to locations where they are needed can do much to assist the AID.

Efforts between the US military medical community and the AID should be mutually supportive and demonstrated by mutual goal-setting and operational planning. This should involve not only the AID and US participants but also the host nation's ministry of health and sanitation and the military medical establishment.

Potential Medical Activities

- When viewing the low-intensity conflict spectrum, a number of potential medical activities appear which could be used as needed to assist host country military medical activities in meeting their various needs. These activities are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3. Each succeeding level incorporates the activities of lower levels.

Majors' Hurdles

Efforts to address the expanding role of military medicine in low-intensity conflict are not without problems. Several obstacles stand in the way, not the least of which is the legal system of the United States. Title 10, US Code, Section 124, prohibits the use of DOD-appropriated funds for humanitarian assistance. Until that law is changed, humanitarian assistance is recognized as a legitimate and direct military mission apart from the ability to respond to Department of State and AID requests. Particularly in a low-intensity conflict, efforts to make real and tangible change will not have adequate resources. There are three possible solutions:

- Change the law to reflect the reality of the times.
- Expand the role DOD should play under Department of State authority and in close cooperation with the AID.
- General, but not totally pervasive, reasoning exists among some uniformed services that this type of assistance somehow detracts from the "pure" mission of warfighting and that resources spent on "soft" items somehow degrade DOD's overall preparedness. Such reasoning is faulty because it fails to recognize that success in this area contributes to the US defense posture. An open conflict can be prevented through the early use of a limited
US Military Medical Support

Level 1: Light US Involvement

Medical force structure assessment
Training of medical personnel
Development of medical logistics system
Medical equipment appraisal
Utilization of military medical personnel
Medical evacuation system
Primary, secondary and tertiary health care facilities evaluation
Medical maintenance management
Basic Agency for International Development and host country ministry of health liaison
Public health assessment
Preventive medicine assessment of host country military installations or camps

Figure 1

Level 2: Moderate US Involvement

Integrated Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP) (US)
Humanitarian medical training teams
Tropical medicine orientation teams
Detailed permanent change of station liaison to specific country
Multinational integrated MEDCAP
Medical emergency deployment readiness exercises
Extended temporary duty relocation of medical table of organization and equipment medical units to host country.
Reserve component augmentation of active duty personnel
Integrated Agency for International Development/US military project planning
Ministry of health liaison
World Health Organization (WHO), Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Project Hope, Catholic Relief Services liaison.

Figure 2

Level 3: Heavy US Involvement

 Permanent change of station of US medical units to host country
 Direct patient care to host country nationals
 Civilian War Casualty Program
 Military Public Health Assistance Program
 Totally integrated Agency for International Development/US (such as Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Figure 3

amount of resources, many lives would be saved, and the vast expenditures that are normally associated with full-scale war would be avoided. Humanitarian assistance in a low-intensity conflict is as defense-oriented as the providing of training and technology to host nation defense personnel. It is in no way soft, but it plays a major role in the winning of such a conflict.

Unfortunately, there has been some anxiety expressed about getting into this area. There are those who contend that this kind of effort did not work in Vietnam and will not work elsewhere. The concept actually worked quite well in Vietnam, but it was not seen that way by those who were so busy with quantifiable activities that they failed to notice who controlled the countryside once the sun went down. By the time Civil Operations Revolutionary Development Support/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, became a single entity, the fighting had long since ceased to be a low-intensity conflict. It was indeed difficult to modify and shape the value systems of a population that could be controlled only during the daylight.

Another hurdle is the reluctance of some military managers to enthusiastically support programs for which the outcome is not quickly attainable. An impatience with any activity that does not produce immediately measurable and timely results somehow overshadows the potential for less visible and dramatic nation-building and securing of the peace. This desire for immediacy may explain the reluctance of some to cooperate more actively with military medical humanitarian assistance. Once again, the AID’s long-range goals may not always be achievable in the short time that is available for military assistance although “chinks” of those goals may certainly be enhanced when appropriate assistance is judiciously applied.

The traditional Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP) which has been carried on officially or unofficially by US military personnel for decades is a classic example of such impatience mixed with good will. Emphasis was often placed on production factors (number of patients seen, numbers of animals vaccinated, number of teeth extracted, and the like) rather than on the overall improvement of the health of the population that was being treated. In fact, the traditional MEDCAP activity may be counterproductive to the overall goal of creating confidence in the local government. It may foster a false impression about the local government’s ability to meet the population’s needs by building expectations which cannot be met after US personnel depart.

MEDCAP, as part of an overall low-intensity conflict task force master plan, can, however, be invaluable for a myriad of reasons. But hit-or-miss, uncoordinated activity can actually do more harm than good in the long run. As stated by Major Don Bruns:

"MEDCAPs in Vietnam were not unlike creating a hole in a glass of water with your finger. Once you remove your finger, the hole is gone and things return to normal. The MEDCAPS, for all their ‘good’ were in composite, little more than cosmetic efforts."

Summary

The conflict spectrum is continuous and varied. It begins with one person’s attempt at illegitimate change. At the other end is thermonuclear war. Along the way, numerous tactics and strategies are employed. In low-intensity conflict, the
A dramatic progress toward demobilization in Latin America has occurred during the last decade, with major accomplishments significantly decreasing and being replaced by interregional troubles. The current state of the region's developing nations, as of the start of 1980, led to the U.S. Central America Assistance Program (CAP). 3700 W. Trull, Washington, D.C. 20501, on June 17, 1980.

The program was designed to support the countries of Central America, especially those that have experienced a recent period of war. As a result, the program has been successful in providing assistance to the countries of Central America. 3700 W. Trull, Washington, D.C. 20501, on June 17, 1980.

This statement reflects the perspective of the author, as presented to the Latin American 2000 Conference. The author is President of Latin America, United States, and President of the Central America Assistance Program. 3700 W. Trull, Washington, D.C. 20501, on June 17, 1980.

NOTES

What Is Your Question? There is a 24-hour toll-free telephone number that people can call for information on Army programs, according to a recent Department of the Army (DA) publication. The number is 1-800-336-5467. Inquiries on DA-wide policies get a response directly from DA. But questions which can be better answered at the post level are referred to the post commander. Staff members answer calls from 0800 to 1600, Monday through Friday. Calls received at any other time are automatically recorded and answered as soon as possible the next workday.

The author believes that the military, as a profession, should have a written code of ethics to guide its members' moral behavior. It points out that no such code exists although many services believe that military ethical standards are collectively embodied in several documents and in the services' customs and traditions.
Principles of War and Low-Intensity Conflict
the traditional concept that the purpose of the Army was to defeat the enemy's armed forces on the battlefield to break his will to resist. Instead, they favored the more fashionable notion that:

"The fundamental purpose of US military forces is to preserve, restore, or create an environment of order or stability within which the instrumentilities of government can function effectively under a code of laws."1

Unfortunately, when these theories were put to the test in Vietnam, we came up against an adversary that was playing by the old rules. "The basic law of the war," wrote North Vietnamese General Van Tien Dung, "was to destroy the enemy's armed forces."

One of the positive reactions to the Vietnam debacle has been the Army's rediscovery of the importance of military history and the criticality of traditional military theories and doctrines. Among these rediscoveries were the principles of war: Evolving from the battlefields of World War II, the Korean War, and the war in Vietnam, current Army doctrine stresses that the value of these principles:

lies in their utility as a frame of reference ... which provide a set of questions that should be considered if military strategy is to best serve the national interest in war.

Used in this context, the principles of war pose three fundamental questions: "What am I trying to do?" "How are we going to do it?" "Who is going to command and control it?"

These questions apply at all levels of conflict, especially low-intensity conflicts. The application of most of these principles—the objective, the offensive, the mass, economy of force, maneuver, security, surprise, unity of command and simplicity—and can be readily understood from the general discussion contained in basic Army doctrine. This application is discussed specifically in Chapter 3 of Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army, and requires no further elaboration here. However, there are certain low-intensity conflict dimensions to several of these principles that do require further explanation.

What Are We Trying to Do?

Posing the question, "What are we trying to do?" the objective is the first principle of war. It is first in order because it is first in importance, for all of the other principles flow from it. Since war by definition is an act of force to compel an adversary to do one's political will, the ultimate objective in warfare is always political. Thus, the often-repeated misconception that there is a such a thing as warfare as a purely "military solution" is absurd. An appreciation of this fact is particularly important in low-intensity conflict since it promotes an understanding that, in many cases, diplomatic, economic or psychological power may be more important than military power. Further, it makes clear that battlefield victories only have meaning to the degree that they contribute to the ultimate political objective. Vignettes that do not contribute to this overall political objective are meaningless and, in some cases, may indeed prove to be counterproductive.

At the strategic level, the principle of the objective does not provide the focus for all military activity. But, equally important perhaps, it determines the "value" of the war. This value determines the sacrifices that will be made both in magnitude and in duration. It is the value of this objective against which the costs both in material terms and in terms of the lives of US soldiers will be weighed. In a major conflict, such as World War II, the value—the very survival of the US nation—was self-evident and, therefore, the price that US citizens were willing to pay was enormous, including more than a million battlefield casualties.

In the Vietnam War, the value was never clearly articulated and, a decade after the war, it is still a matter of dispute. It should not have been surprising, therefore, that the costs soon were perceived to be exorbitant. The Vietnam example provides a warning for us. Unlike major conflicts in which the objectives and here the value were self-evident in less clear-cut and more ambiguous conflicts of low intensity, special effort must be made to ensure that the objectives and the value of what is to be accomplished are clearly articulated and well-understood by the American people and their representatives in Congress.

The Vietnam example also provides another major lesson. Our doctrine at that time promoted the mistaken idea that counterinsurgency was a task for the United States. The truth of the matter was that counterinsurgency was a South Vietnamese task; the US task was to assist an ally under attack. The problem facing the United States was, therefore, not to mobilize counterinsurgency as it was coalition warfare in a counterinsurgency environment.

Thus, the United States was faced with all of the problems attendant to a coalition, including the primary consideration that the objectives of coalition partners are never the same. This divergence of objectives creates vulnerabilities which an enemy can find and exploit. Such a clash of objectives among coalition partners was not peculiar to Vietnam, for it

was even more pronounced in Western Europe since the coalition partners were relatively equal. This inherent dissension is intensified when the coalition is unequal, as normally would be the case in low-intensity conflicts.

In Vietnam, for example, the objectives of the United States, among other things, was the containment of communist expansion by China and the Soviet Union. The objective of the Republic of Vietnam was national survival. As South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu bitterly complained in 1972:

"... compared to the United States, South Vietnam was no more than a dot, its loss would mean little to America which had its strategies to pursue with Moscow and Peking. But for South Vietnam [it] was a matter of survival."

A century and a half earlier, in On War, Karl von Clausewitz had pointed out that:

"... among alliances [the center of gravity] lies in the community of interest." Destroying or disrupting this center of gravity can be as decisive as the destruction of an enemy's army or the occupation of his homeland. In words that could have been written about Vietnam, Clausewitz went on to prophesy what would happen when the community of interest among allies is weakened or destroyed:

"One country may support another's cause, but it will never take it so seriously as it takes its own. A moderately-sized force will be sent to its help; but if things go wrong the operation is pretty well written off, and one tries to withdraw at the smallest possible cost."

How Are We Going to Do It?

In overall terms, this question is addressed by the second principle of war, the
offensive. This principle could be better
enunciated the principle of the initiative, for.
its essence has to do with maintaining ini-
tiative and freedom of action on the bat-
tlefield. The simplest way to accomplish
this is through both the strategic and tac-
tical offensive, by carrying the war to the
enemy and destroying his army to break
his will to resist. This is the way the
United States fought the Mexican War,
the Spanish-American War and the two
world wars.

But, in early 1951, a major change oc-
curred in US national policy and in the
military strategies that support that
policy. This change grew out of the con-
tainment theories which were articulated
by Ambassador George Kennan in 1947
and first applied on the battlefield in 1951
during the Korean War. Here, after the in-
tervention of Chinese communist forces,
the deliberations decision was made not to
attack the Chinese homeland. Thus, US
national policy dictated that, in any con-
ict with the Soviet Union or its sur-
grates, the United States would not pur-
se the strategic offensive (rollback or liber-
ation) but would, instead, pursue the
strategic defensive (containment).

This policy did not only govern the con-
duct and resolution of the latter stages of
the war in Korea. It was also the basis for
US nonintervention in the Hungarian up-
rising in 1957 and for the lack guarantees
of the Kennedy administration not to in-
vade Cuba in the aftermath of the 1962
missile crisis. And, finally, it was the
basis for the later decision during the sec-
ted Indochina war not to invade North
Vietnam or to strike at its Chinese and
Soviet sources of support. It continues in
force today where in Lebanon and Central
America policies have ruled out moving
against the source of the aggression.

Thus, the national policy of containment
dictates that, while tactical offen-
sive operations are not ruled out, the
strategic offensive is not an option for US
forces in any confrontation with Soviet or
Soviet surrogate forces. Similarly, in low-
intensity conflicts involving Soviet or
Soviet surrogate-supported insurgent
forces, US forces do not have the strategic
option of striking at the source of in-
surgent support.

The constraint thus imposed by na-
tonial policy has major implications for
the battlefield. It results in a lack of
polarity where US objectives are not in
balance with the objectives of the oppo-
sary. As General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur complained in 1951:

It seems to me the worst possible con-
cept, militarily, that we would simply
stay there, resisting aggression, as called
It seems to me that [the way to resist
aggression is to] destroy the poten-
tialities of the aggressor to continually hit
you.... When you say, merely, 'we are go-
ing to continue to fight aggression,' that
is not what the enemy is fighting for. The
enemy is fighting for a very definite pur-
pose—to destroy our forces...

MacArthur's frustrations—which could
have been repeated verbatim during the
Vietnam War—revealed the truth of the
formulations of Colmar, Baron von der
Goltz, laid out in the latter part of the 19th
century. He pointed out that the best
one could hope to attain from the
strategic defensive was "victory on the
battlefield without general results for the
campaign or war." In other words, the
best the military could hope to attain with
the strategic defensive was a stalemate on
the battlefield where other elements of na-
tional power—diplomatic power, for ex-
ample—would have to be used to achieve
the political objective. MacArthur's com-
plaints notwithstanding, this is precisely
what happened during the Korean War
where, after a two-year battlefield stale-
mate, an armistice was achieved through
diplomatic negotiations. This is also what
happened during the war in Vietnam
where a battlefield stalemate led to the il-

Historically, this constraint posed by
US national policy has not only severely
limited US military operations but has
also had a major impact on US allies. Not
only did the United States constrain itself
from assuming the strategic offensive
during both the war in Korea and in Viet-
nam, it also constrained both the military
strategies and the objectives of our South
Korean and South Vietnamese allies. By
conscious US actions, both were barred
from driving north, and thus both were
denied the political objective of the un-
ification of their countries. This gave a
major political and psychological advan-
tage to their enemies. While there may be
legitimate reasons why the United States
should not pursue the strategic offensive,
care should be taken not to cripple our
allies in the pursuit of their own vital
political goals.

The question, "What are we trying to
do?", is also addressed in more specific
forms by the principles of mass and
economy of force which are best under-
stood in their relational aspects. As FM
100-5 states:

In the strategic context, Mass sug-
jects that the nation should commit, or be
prepared to commit, a predominance of
national power in those regions or areas of
the world where the threat to vital secu-
rites is greatest.

As a reciprocal of the principle of Mass,
economy of force in the strategic dimen-
sion suggests that, in the absence of
unlimited resources, a nation may have to
accept some risk in areas where vital na-
tional interests are not immediately
It

Using "vital national interests" as the
definition for where to mass and when to
use economy of force has profound im-
plications for low-intensity conflict. The
highest priority vital national interest
is the defense of the US homeland and
especially ensuring national survival
through the deterrence of strategic
nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The
next highest priority, because of the
cultural and economic stakes involved,
is the deterrence of conventional war
with the Soviet Union in Western Europe.
These primary interests limit the United
States' ability to apply force in other
areas of the world, and the question of
where to mass and where to use economy
of force has plagued the United States for
many years. Deciding the wars in Korea
and Vietnam, former Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger commented that:

The paradox we never saw was that we
had entered the Korean war because we
were afraid that if we could not produce
a greater threat to Europe in the
future. But then the very reliance to
face an all-out onslaught on Eu-

Teneur severely circumscribed the risks we
were prepared to run to prevail in Korea...

Ten years later we encountered the
same dilemma in Vietnam. Once more we
became involved because we considered
the warfare in Indochina the manifesta-
tion of a coordinated global communist
strategy. Again, we sought to limit our
risks because the very global challenge of
which Indochina seemed to be a part also
made Vietnam appear as an unprofitable
place for a showdown.

In short, our perception of the global
challenge at the same time tempted us to
commit to distant enterprises and procured
us from meeting them conclusively. This
dilemma posed by the principles of
mass and economy of force is still with us. As former Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer has written:

"The most demanding challenge confronting the US military in the decade of the 1980's is to develop and demonstrate the capability to successfully meet threats to vital US interests outside of Europe, without compromising the decisive theater in Central Europe." This is a challenge which those concerned with low-intensity conflict must specifically address.

Who Is Going to Command and Control It?

"For every objective," states the principle of unity of command, "there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander." The official definition of this principle goes on to say that:

This principle ensures that all efforts are focused on the common goal. As the strategic level this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States, and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom.

This very definition highlights a problem for the application of unity of command to low-intensity conflict. As was noted earlier, one of the characteristics of low-intensity conflict for the United States is that it is acting as a coalition partner to assist an ally faced with an internal insurgency. Therefore, the objectives of the United States are not exactly the same as the objectives of the threatened nation. Because "common goals" thus tend to be dissimilar, unity of command and hence unity of effort becomes difficult to achieve.

This is true even when US forces are committed in the area. For example, in the Korean War, South Korean President Syngman Rhee made the decision to subordinate South Korean forces to US control. But, in the Vietnam War, such a decision was never made, and the lack of unity of command remained a problem throughout that war. It is even more true in respect to US efforts in a low-intensity conflict environment. Here, the insurgent orchestrates the application of diplomatic, economic, sociological, psychological, political and military power against the established government to achieve its political objectives. Not only must the United States as a coalition partner work through the host government to counter such efforts, but its ability to orchestrate the application of its own power is also limited.

In theory, the ambassador, as head of the US country team, orchestrates the application of US power. But, too often, the ambassador is hampered by his lack of command authority over the various elements of national power by the vertical controls on such power. These controls are exercised by the various executive departments in Washington and by the restrictions imposed by the Congress on the very use of US power.

Further, even though most low-intensity conflicts have regional dimensions, the United States is singularly unqualified to orchestrate the regional application of US power. Although military unified command headquarters may pull together Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine elements and given the constrained command relationships in many areas of the world, even this is by no means certain. There are no equivalent regional agencies to coordinate and control diplomatic, economic, sociological or psychological power. The deficiency is even greater at the national level.

The National Security Council can consider and decide on actions to be taken. Even so, there exists no supranational command authority short of the president himself to control operations on a day-to-day basis and thus coordinate the efforts of the Department of State (including the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency), the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency and the other activities involved in support of low-intensity conflict.

This lack of unity of command almost ensures there will be no unity of effort. As Ambassador Robert Roper has pointed out, this was a major deficiency in the Vietnam War. It is a shortcoming that remains to be corrected.

Conclusion

As we have seen, low-intensity conflict has its own peculiarities. But, because it is indeed a form of conflict, it shares many of the characteristics of other types of warfare. Among these characteristics is the need to address the fundamental questions posed by the principles of war: "What are we trying to do?" "How are we going to do it?" "Who is going to command and control it?" It is the responsibility of all those involved in the plans, strategies and execution of low-intensity conflict operations to ensure that these questions are answered correctly.

NOTES

Missouri guardsman brings second Xmas

By Capt. Ken MacNevin
GATO SOLO (70th PAD, MO ARNG) -- "It was like Christmas," is how SSgt. Larry Huff describes the scene at houses along the Blazing Trail road after he had brought the children a surprise gift, coloring books he had obtained from a publishing house in his hometown of Jefferson City, Mo.

"I have two girls," said Huff, "and they like to color. It's kind of neat to watch because you can see they're happy. I've been in other parts of the world like this (Huff is a 1st Cavalry, Vietnam veteran) and I knew the daddies here also might not be able to buy coloring books for their kids, so I thought I would try."

A member of the Missouri Guard's 70th Public Affairs Detachment, Jefferson City, Huff started his project by calling a printing plant operated by Scholastic Inc. In addition to their widely known "Weekly Reader" magazine, the company also prints coloring books at its Jefferson City plant.

Huff's call was routed around in Scholastic's offices and he ended up talking with a woman who said she'd see what could be done.

"Twenty minutes later she called me," Huff said. "She told me they had a case of coloring books to donate for me to take to Panama."

Huff lugged the case of books to Panama and made his first distribution at the Loma deQuebro school near the south base camp. The children were on holiday and the teacher accepted the books on their behalf, Huff stated.

Later more books were given out to children along the road south of Llano de Mariato, along with some crayons Huff had purchased at his own expense. "One little girl was coloring an airplane," Huff recalled, "and she was coloring each section a different color. One part was green, another was blue. You could see by her eyes she liked it. It was just like Christmas to her."

SSgt. Larry Huff hands out coloring books he had brought from home to school children near the north base camp. He is a member of the 70th Public Affairs Detachment, Jefferson City, Missouri.
Louisiana National Guard
Hammer Down Company
pounds across Panama

By SSG. Dave Cobb, 133d Public Affairs Detachment, KYARNG

"We are known as the 'Hammer Down Company' in the Louisiana National Guard," said SSG. Roland LaRorde, "because when the job must be done, we put the 'hammer down.'"

LaRorde is a member of Company B of the 527th Engineer Battalion, Marksville, LA., working on the road project south of Camp Gato Solo during Exercise Blazing Trails. "Our unit's performance as a team is a direct result of our high retention rate," LaRorde added.

"It is critical that we retain our experienced heavy equipment operators if we are to maintain our high performance level," remarked Sgt. 1st Class Dale Lonider. "This type of project helps the experienced operators maintain their proficiency and gives our people valuable training. In addition, a project of this magnitude has given our company its first opportunity to train as a total entity in almost five years.

"Big projects are actually good for both recruiting and retention of heavy equipment operators," said Lonider.

Sgt. David Bordelon is a prime example. "I left the National Guard last year just before our unit left for Panama. When the unit returned all my friends encouraged me to join again since we were returning to Panama this year. I'm glad I did."

Bordelon is recognized by his peers and superiors as one of the company's finest operators. "Bordelon is like an artist; only he paints his picture with an 8,000-pound bulldozer rather than a brush," said Lonider.

The closeness of the company can be seen reviewing the unit's history. "We are known as the Hammer Down Company. The closeness of the company can be seen reviewing the unit's history. We are known as the Hammer Down Company."

SSG Charles Jenkins (rear) and Sp5 Felton Sampson, of the 527th Engineer Bn., build a retaining wall over a culvert during Exercise Blazing Trails 85. (Photo by SSG Ron Hayes, 133d PAAD, KYARNG)

A better way of life

Civil Affairs concentrates on local projects

By Capt. Gordon Nichols, 133d Public Affairs Detachment, KYARNG

During Exercise Blazing Trails, Army National Guard units have been building roads in remote areas of Panama, besides road work, one of the key areas of accomplishment has been in civil affairs.

The 47th Civil Affairs Company, an Army Reserve unit from Metairie, La., has had teams in Panama since the road building began two years ago. They have been trying to help local villagers improve their way of life.

Capt. John Peter, a Miami resident, explained that during their first visit in Panama, their studies were conducted to determine where their efforts should be concentrated. This year, a number of projects have been initiated to provide some of the basics these people need.

"The first two villages we worked in were La Boma and Morillo," he said. "We visited two schools and saw that the furniture was in pretty bad shape, so we got the engineers to give us some nails, hammers and materials to repair them. In addition, we observed that the teachers didn't have enough desks and instructional boards, so we made some. At one of the schools we made a flag pole to put out in front of the building," he continued.

"There are so many things we take for granted that these people have never had, like basic medical and dental checkups. We have worked with medical teams from the Alabama Guard to try and get some assistance in the people in these villages. Sometimes the Panama's school teachers have to walk eight to ten miles just to see us," Peter said.

Lt. Robert Lombard, also a member of the Civil Affairs unit, explained that the next group of soldiers from Florida to participate in Exercise Blazing Trails will include an elementary school teacher from Miami. "He's going to try to teach the Spanish text to the children, because he is being trained to become a Peace Corps volunteer."

SSG Timmy Bordelon, the closeness of the company can be seen reviewing the unit's history. We are known as the Hammer Down Company."

Another 47th Civil Affairs member, Sp5 Bernadus Smiley, said, "Helping these people is an opportunity; to actually see how our military feel more fulfilled than ever before in total life."
March 13, 1985

Blazing Trails

AZUERO PENINSULA, REPUBLIC OF PANAMA

By Sgt. John Sullivan

GATO SOLO (241st PAD, LA ARNG) -- A lot of patients who come to the 109th Medical Evacuation Hospital here are not wearing jungle fatigues and they don't know much about the Army.

But the doctors, nurses and medics who are part of the Alabama Army National Guard's 109th Hospital are not bothered. Their special patients are Panamanian civilians who live in a remote part of the Azuero Peninsula where Guard members are participating in Exercise Blazing Trails.

Personnel from the 109th are on duty to care for Guard members involved in the road building project, but when they're not busy with sick call, they help local civilians.

"The number of civilians coming in varies from day to day," explained SFC Thad Sears, of Birmingham, Ala. "Some days we won't have any civilians show up, and other days we'll have as many as 10." The language barrier between the Spanish-speaking Panamanians and the Alabama Guard members is quickly broken down thanks to interpreters and what Sears called, "universal language -- smiles."

You smile and let someone know you're going to help them and everything just works out," Sears said. "A smile works wonders out here."

The majority of civilians seeking aid are looking for dental help, according to Sears. And, the physicians from the 109th have been seeing a lot of children.

"Because of the diet and the way the food is cooked here, we see a lot of kids with worms," Sears continued. "We've been explaining to the ones we find how they can change this by doing some things while they're cooking that they are not doing now."

Youngsters who have intestinal parasites are given medicine while their parents receive a demonstration on how to cook food differently.

"All-in-all," Sears added, "the people here at Gato Solo are very healthy and very, very clean."

But sometimes, the 109th's resources can't help.

One man from a small village near the southern part of the exercise walked into the tent and asked if the dentists could put in a gold tooth.

"There's some things we just can't do," explained the dental technician through the interpreter. With a polite, "gracias," the Panamanian got up and started his long walk home.

"We try to help them any way we can," Sears concluded. "But a gold tooth is a little out of our league."

SPC Thad Sears with the Alabama National Guard's 109th Medical Evacuation Hospital gets a smile from one of the civilians who have made use of the Guard hospital at Gato Solo.
Pablo Panda opens doors for Kentucky Guard unit

By ZL. Sparky Goodman, 133d Public Affairs Detachment, KYARNG

A common sight along a dirt road in southwestern Panama is Pablo the panda. Pablo spends his day putting smiles on the faces of children and entertaining Guard members participating in Exercise Blazing Trails. Pablo is not a real panda, however, Pablo is a puppet and a useful tool to Sp4 Steve Collier, a broadcast specialist for the 133d Public Affairs Detachment, Kentucky Army National Guard.

"About all the Spanish I know, I picked up watching Sesame Street with my daughter, Pablo, however, crosses cultural and language barriers. He helps me because he speaks a universal language," Collier said. Collier took puppetry classes at Pikeville, Ky., College and he uses Pablo to entertain children while he videotapes their reactions. Each day Collier climbs in back of a truck with Pablo in his pocket and the video camera on his shoulder. As he rides down the road, he dons Pablo and waves to everyone he sees. The children scream with delight at the fluffy, black and white panda waving hello.

When the truck stops, the children congregate around Pablo while Collier expertly manipulates the puppet to make the children laugh. He then shows the children how to use Pablo and lets them take a turn at making Pablo talk. Adults often join the crowd, too.

"I love children and the puppet helps me to gain their interest, trust and confidence. From there, it's easy for me to videotape them. They are having fun and so am I," said Collier.

Collier tells the story of how he lost Pablo one day. "I was videotaping something and I thought I had Pablo stuck in a side pocket. When I reached for him I disco-

Sp4 Steve Collier and Pablo the Panda were a familiar sight around Camp Gato Solo during the 133d Public Affairs Detachment's stay. (Photo by Sp4 Hugh Smith, 133d PAD, KYARNG)

vered he was missing. I looked all over for him and then I noticed a little girl running down the street after me with Pablo cradled in her arms."

It's not only children who seem to enjoy Pablo. He is a hit with local adults and Guard members, too. "The guys out there digging, packing sand bags and building bridges get a big kick out of Pablo. They can't help but laugh when they see a panda bear riding on the top of an Army truck and waving. It's so out of the ordinary," Collier said.

When Collier goes home to Kentucky, he has plans for Pablo there, too. "He'll become part of my daughter Stephanie's collection of stuffed animals. She'll never know how much happiness he has brought to the people here. Pablo was probably the best 12 dollars I've ever spent.

Stolen tent peg hammer becomes the unit trophy

By Maj. Tom Little, 133d Public Affairs Detachment, KYARNG

The commander once had a tent peg hammer, but his troops stole the head. He gave them the handle, of course, as a trophy.

"Sounds strange? Perhaps, but according to Lt. Col. Andrew J. Hager, Jr., the commander of the Missouri Army National Guard's 21st Engineer Battalion, the theft showed ingenuity and an appreciation for the priority of the road construction project.

It seems that the troops needed something to serve as a buffer between two pistons of a pile driver. They saw the solid end of the commander's hammer would do the job if split in half, so they cut it off the handle, leaving the remains.

The culprits, part of Capt. Nils Ramm's crew, successfully used the hammer head to put the pile driver back in service.

"They really understand the road has priority above everything else," said Hager.

As a reward, he cleaned the handle and inscribed it as a trophy for the unit.

"My tent's falling down," he said, laughing, "but it's certainly for a good cause."
SP4 Michael P. McCord

In a sense, it was a miracle descending from the skies.

And it happened whenever a U.S. Army helicopter landed in a schoolyard playing field in Los Llanos during the Exercise Kindle Liberty '85.

Hundreds of villagers scurried at the first sounds of the rotor blades to watch the copter land with Army doctors carrying medical supplies.

Most, if not all, of these people had never seen such a sight and stood in amazement whispering to each other, perhaps wondering how this was all possible.

The three-day Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE) clinic was held in the local school. Units from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Army National Guard worked together during the event.

Coordination of travel and convoy escorts was handled by the Panama Defense Forces (PDF). Red Cross volunteers from Chitre were trucked two hours through narrow dusty roads to the Los Llanos school.

Upon arrival the school was quickly made ready for the incoming villagers. Army truck drivers were sent, along with interpreters, up into the highlands surrounding the town to pick up people for treatment.

People seemed eager for a ride to the temporary health clinic.

School Principal Juan B. Mitre said, "This area was a strategic place for people coming from the highlands, an area where many could come for help.

"The American sirit is magnificent. Some of them traveled three days to get here and it was the only way some would ever receive treatment and drugs."

As hundreds stood patiently in line for their turn, one of the hardest working of the medical group, Capt. Glenn Greene, a dentist of the 44th Medical Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C., shook his head:

"This is my first time working with something like this," he said, adding: "Because some of the teeth are so infested with decay and because of the limited facilities we have here, we have had to remove teeth instead of saving them."

"People waiting for dental work were placed in straight back chairs close to the light of a window to receive shots to deaden the nerves. As soon as they were numb, the doctors pulled teeth, sometimes two or three from each patient.

An important part of the health care was the medication given for removal of intestinal parasites present in many of the children.

"Overall these people are pretty healthy. But they need further development in environmental sanitation education," Greene said.

"Many of the complaints we received were from low back pain, due probably from swinging a machete in the field."

Different sections of the clinic handled a PAP smear test for women and urine samples. Powdered milk, clothing, rice, beans, and fruit were distributed to the people.

As the long day, which started before the sun rose, was winding down, the people who had worked almost non-stop all day helping their neighbors had to have a satisfied feeling.

"The feeling of cooperation among different branches of the armed forces, with the closeness that they worked with the PDF and, most of all, the feeling that this was truly a real-world mission, a mission to help people."

The officer in charge of the Navy Medical Research and Training Unit at Gorgas Memorial Laboratory, Panama City, Commander Steve Wignall, examined a child at Los Llanos during a Kindle Liberty '85 medical training exercise. (Photo by Sp5 Diane Alire, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)

Navy Commander Michael Golembieski, of Orlando, Fla., examines a child's ear during the Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE) in Los Llanos. (Photo by Sp5 Diane Alire, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)
High country "campesinos" (farmers) on horseback lead their children along a rocky trail to the temporary health clinic in Los Llanos school. (Photo by SP4 Michael McCord, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)

Navy Commander Joe Schenk, from Camp Pendleton, Calif., examines a resident of Los Llanos during a combined medical training exercise held as part of Kindle Liberty '85. (Photo by Sp5 Diane Alire, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)

Navy Commander Ira Weiss dispenses advice to a young woman patient during the Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MEDRETE) clinic held in Los Lla-
Alabama dental team takes to the field

Story and photo by Sp5 Billie Misko
(107th PAD, FLARNG)

Community relations is one mission of Blazing Trails '85. One type of involvement which doesn't immediately come to mind is dental education and service.

"Our first mission is to support the engineers building the road and all personnel giving support. Our second is training. Then we do what we can for the local people, to promote goodwill between Panama and the United States," said Dr. (Maj.) William C. Hoswell, dentist with the 650th Medical Detachment, Montgomery, Ala.

The dental section of the 650th weekly treat 20 to 25 local civilians that are experiencing dental problems.

"The services we perform are emergency extractions, temporary fillings and some preventive dentistry for the children," said Hoswell.

"The local people are really good patients and they really appreciate anything you do for them. One man came in and tried to give us a dollar for what we did, we refused to take it, but said we could use some fruit."

The working conditions in the field are slightly different, according to Hoswell. "We don't have air conditioning, and we are limited as to what we can do because of the heat. Maintenance of the equipment is a problem because the dust gets into everything."

SSgt. Dwight Brown, a dental assistant, commented, "Sterilization is a problem. We keep everything covered, but the dust still gets in."

Members of the dental section said this annual training is an invaluable experience.

Brown, alias "Pockets," is a clown with the Zamora Shriners, Montgomery, Ala. "He is able to relate to the children in a unique way. "I blow up balloons and I get an enjoyment out of being with the kids."

"I am very happy to work on the local people; they are a bit timid and shy," said Hoswell, "for some, this is the first time they've seen a dentist. I'm surprised at what we've accomplished."

Dr. (Maj.) Wm. Boswell teaches Ernello Batista dental hygiene.

Sp4 John Bohonek (left) and PFC Steve Wolf, both of the 229th Combat Support Engineer Company from Platteville, Wis., treat an injured village boy during Exercise Blazing Trails. (Photo by SSgt. Ron Bayes, 133d PAD, KYARNG)

From Blazing Trails Crier
Dtd Mar 85
PRANG doctor teams up for health care

By Staff Sgt Roman Martyniuk
(444th PAD, NJARNG)

The 119th Evacuation Hospital, 4ARNG, has had the responsibility for providing medical support to Blazing Trails throughout the duration of this year's exercise. Under the direction of Lt. Col. Anibal Dominguez, 291st Evacuation Hospital, PRARNG, medical facilities, aid stations, hospitals and clinics have been established at Gato Solo (north base camp) Gallo Loco (south base camp) the Logistical Support Element, and the town of Torio.

Dominguez is no stranger to Panama, having served here between 1943 and 1946 as an artilleryman at Fort Clayton. He is currently attached to the 29th Infantry Battalion in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico as a battalion surgeon.

In addition to being responsible for all four field hospitals, Dominguez has also become involved in treating the local villagers. Accompanied by Lt. Col. Brook Barton, dentist, and chief nurse Capt. Liz Jordan, villagers are examined primarily for intestinal parasites, eye infections and tooth decay.

The village of Llano de Mariato is without a full-time doctor at the local hospital — only a nurse. In Panama, all doctors and nurses must spend time in the inland areas performing community service before they can be licensed.

Capt. Lopez of the Panama Defense Forces is also a physician who recently spent two weeks in Llano de Mariato. "Nutrition is a problem in the remote areas. The diet here is heavy in carbohydrates and low in protein," said Lopez. "Their basic food is rice, bananas, sugar cane, guava supplemented by fish, fowl and occasionally pork."

Barton noted that tooth decay is quite advanced even in young children. "Many of the older people suffer from gum infections resulting from advanced decay. We've started a program of dental education and distributed toothbrushes and toothpaste."

"The people appreciate and respect us for our efforts," observed Dominguez. "They know that the road will improve their lives. Units from different parts of the country have joined together here in Panama in a common cause: doing something meaningful; something necessary."

Dominguez and his staff provide 24 hour service at the base camps. They usually treat cases of heat exhaustion, sunburn, diarrhea. "With the cooperation of the respective commanders, we have kept problems to a minimum, he added proudly.

WITH SKILL AND COMPASSION - Lt. Col. Dominguez checks the symptoms of a young local resident. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Roman Martyniuk, 444th PAD, NJARNG)
"River Rats" help bring water to local villagers

By Spec. 5 Martin Murray and Staff Sgt. Roman Martyniuk
(444th PAD, NJARNG)

"Never have so many owed so much to so few." Winston Churchill never met the members of the 205th Engineer Company, but his quotation was never more appropriate. The 205th water Purification Unit, nicknamed the "River Rats," purifies and delivers water to all units participating in Blazing Trails.

As part of the Forward Area Supply Team (FAST) the 205th provides potable water to all aspects of the engineering project from the north base camp, Gato Solo, to the south base camp, Gallo Loco, and the Landing Craft Utilities (LCU) that service the ships that bring supplies to the exercise.

The water is used to fill lister bags and five gallon drinking cans used by the troops to fill their canteens; by the mess section for food preparation; by the bakery and additionally, by the local residents who live great distances from wells or usable water supplies. Because many local wells are sparse and many villagers live far from the local river, the Rio Negro, the 205th hauls some 3,000 gallons per day to Llano de Mariato, the local village, in addition to its support to the base camps. The villagers line the road and we fill up their containers ranging from 5 to 55 gallons," added Maj. William Durham, FAST OIC.

Spec. 4 Paul Hutchins of Wetumpka, Ala. said, "We really enjoy helping where we can. The people are cheerful and proud and most, we are told, make less than $400 per year. Despite their poverty, they are hard working and keep themselves clean despite the lack of water."

THE RITES OF PURIFICATION - Pvt. Ricardo Carrillo of the Panama Defense Forces (foreground) performs water purification duties with Spec. 4 Hutchins of the Alabama Army National Guard. (Photo by Spec. 4 Scott Jones, 444th PAD, NJARNG)
Project Sandman helps to bring a dream

By Sgt. 1st Class Michael A. Sopko
(444th PAD, NJARNG)

"Mister Sandman, bring me a dream." So goes the popular song line. But members of the 769th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) headquartered in Baton Rouge, La. are making a dream come true for a small school at the village of Llano de Mariato.

Inspired by Capt. Howell Champagne, the Battalion Chaplain, Project Sandman gives new meaning to the phrase "friends helping friends." The project is a fund raising effort to raise $400 which would buy desperately needed mattresses for the school. They are more than halfway there with a deadline date of April 7, 1985 (the departure date for the battalion).

"Our battalion is known as Task Force 225 here at Camp Gato Solo," explained Sgt. Maj. Clarence Thibodeaux. "While doing reconstruction work at the village school during our off-duty time, (desk repair, windows, etc.), we noticed that they had very few usable mattresses. With the money from the fund, the children have something to sleep on besides springs."

The school year starts in April and extends to December. The village children that live too far to go home must stay at school. New mattresses would be their dream come true.

"We thank everyone who helped," said Reyes. "I personally want to thank everyone for the children."
Helping hands

Army veterinarians aid ranchers during joint training exercise

By SSgt. David Cornwell

Cowpunchers in Panama's mountainous interior made a new friend last week during Kindle Liberty '85. Their new friend happens to be Capt. Kasmin D. Biddle, an Army veterinarian from Fort Bragg.

Biddle, from the 248th Medical Detachment of the 44th Medical Brigade, was in Panama for two weeks, helping farmers in remote areas maintain the health of their livestock.

"Working with the Panamanian veterinarians and cattle ranchers has been a positive sharing experience for all of us," Biddle said. "They are a very warm and grateful people."

The captain and other members of the detachment treated the livestock for cachera, a disease that affects the horns of cattle, and they also administered vitamins and deworming medication.

The detachment's involvement was part of an assistance program sponsored by both the Panamanian and U.S. governments.

"We go to the farmers and let them know what we can do for them, and they in turn give us permission to see their livestock," Biddle said.

The job has not been strictly a romp in the country, though. "The animals don't know that we're helping them, so they're not usually too receptive to our needles and such."

"As a result, we've been kicked, stomped, and bitten throughout it all, but that's just part of the job," the captain said. "In spite of any hardships, the experience has been a great one."

Veterinarians treated livestock, such as these pigs, during Kindle Liberty '85. (Army National Guard photo by Sp5 Diane Alire, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)
Nurse travels world, helps at every stop

By Maj. Tom Little, 133d Public Affairs Detachment, KYARNG

Nadja Ewen is seeing the world, thanks to the National Guard, and she's providing an important service everywhere she goes.

Ewen is a captain -- a nurse -- with the California Army National Guard's 146th Combat Support Hospital, headquartered at Ft. Funston. As a civilian, she works at the Contra Costa Medical Center in Martinez, where she coordinates activities between the emergency room and the ICUs.

She has recently spent a 17-day tour working at Camp Gato Solo, far south in the Azuero Peninsula of Panama, where National Guard troops have been working to build the first road in the area. She is attached to the Alabama National Guard's 109th Evacuation Hospital.

"I saw a message seeking volunteers for this mission," Ewen said, "and it looked like an adventure."

It was that, and Ewen said there have been many highlights. One of her favorite experiences was traveling into the local community with a National Guard doctor to offer treatment to some of the residents of the remote, poverty-stricken region.

"It's just a tremendous experience," she said. "When the treatment is over, they hug us."

Traveling to the remote off-duty time to get fresh loaves was another of many memorable experiences.

Before Exercise Liberty, Trials in Panama, the registered nurse pulled a tour of duty during the Los Angeles Summer Olympics. She was among a group of 15 who served three weeks at Camp San Luis Gonzalez to provide backup support in the event of a mass emergency. Aviation support was available to move them to any Olympic site.

Her next major stop will be in West Germany, where she'll take part in an active Army exercise in June. She's set to support active forces in an emergency from a trauma nurse. She wants to have a chance to see some of Europe during her 21-day tour.

Ewen has been in the Guard since 1977, when she was commissioned as a second lieutenant. She hopes to see much more of the world through the Guard "wherever opportunities open up."

"I think it's great that we're bringing in the Guard and Reserves to actually work as part of the total force," Ewen said. "This is letting us know how things will really be."

Obviously, she's a believer in the Guard because she encourages some sons to join the Guard when they have the opportunity. Both are now cadets at the Guard college.

Capt. Nadja Ewen, of the 146th Support Hospital, Fort Funston, Calif., checks the throat of Sp5 Jose Orellano, 109th Evacuation Hospital, Birmingham, Ala. Photo by SSG Ron Bayes, 133d PAD, KYARNG)
They call it Interstate 1140....

Story by Capt. William Lockhart and photos by SFC Tom Tucker

It's a two-lane gravel roadway which winds 14 miles north from Arenas to Rio Morillo in western Panama.

The road was so named by the Missouri National Guard's 1140th Engineer Battalion. Two hundred eighty-five guardsmen from the Battalion's Headquarters Company, Company A, and Company D are winding down from 17 days of construction on the roadway during "Blazing Trails '85" a joint American/Panamanian training exercise on Panama's remote Azuero Peninsula.

In mid-February one-half of the Battalion's Headquarters Company and its Companies B and C arrived in Panama to finish transporting 179 pieces of heavy road construction equipment from Fort Clavton near the Panama Canal 115 miles overland to the Arenas area. The equipment, all from Missouri, had been moved by 91 railroad flatcars from St. Louis to Norfolk, Va, where it was loaded on a ship for transport to the canal.

Missouri's 880th Engineer Battalion off-loaded the equipment in mid-January and began the transport operation. Missouri's 113th Engineer Battalion partially completed delivery of the equipment in early February and began construction of a temporary camp mid-way between Arenas and Rio Morillo.

Due to the remoteness of the area the entire exercise has been a giant logistical task in itself.

Supporting the Missouri engineers at the South Base Camp during the past two weeks were units from Alabama, Florida, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico. As well as elements of the 193rd Infantry Brigade. There are 472 soldiers presently at the South Base Camp.

Most of the Missouri guardsmen in Panama have never been out of the United States. Their reaction was almost uniformly the same:

Sgt. Maj. Thurman Davenport, Army Advisor to the 135th Engineer Group makes friends with young villager.

Senora Lucia Cano (center) prepares "Pig with Rice," a delicious treat for Company D, 1140th Eng Bn, Missouri Army National Guard.

SFC Eugenio Toro, 480th MP Co, PRNG, assists.
Wisconsin rock crushers work to make kids happy

By Capt. D. Gordon Nichols
(133rd PAD, KYARNG)

The Wisconsin Flag has flown for nearly five months at a small camp on the Rio Negro River, near the village of Llano de Mariato, during Exercise Blazing Trails in southwestern Panama.

Eighteen troops from the 229th Combat Support Engineer Company from Platteville, volunteered to stay in Panama for the entire exercise, instead of the normal 17-day rotation.

Their main mission was to crush 12,000 cubic yards of rock but by March, they had crushed more than 12,000 cubic yards. Other rock crushing units from North Carolina and Missouri have also worked in the exercise.

The crusher itself, named "Captain Crunch," has been used almost constantly and has had its jaws replaced two times. Sp4 John Mohonek, a truck driver, said the rock near the north camp is very hard — much harder than what the Guard unit uses at annual training in Wisconsin.

The unit set up on the riverbank and scooped up rock with a dozer. Then the stones, which average the size of a football, are loaded onto a dump truck and taken to the crusher. Later, road crews will pick up the crushed rock for use on the road.

The person in charge is SSgt. Charles Morshead of Potosi, Wis. He came to Panama Jan. 11 and will remain until May 26.

"Panama was not exactly what I had expected," said Morshead. "It takes a while to get used to the climate."

The support services were the only problems he encountered at first. "The showers were cold, the mail was late and there were no rations at times," he added. But after a few weeks, those things were righted and the work began in earnest.

After the project is completed, part of the clean-up will include restoring the land, which is located on a farm back to its original condition. Morshead said that he promised the landowner that an inspection would be made and the land would look better than when they arrived.

"Our most enjoyment has been a project for the kids of the village," said Morshead. The Rio Negro is only 3-4 foot deep but, after the unit scooped the rock, they had developed a 7-8 foot deep swimming hole. The children, who are on a three-month summer vacation, will return to school next week, but the last part of their vacation has been more fun because of the new swimming area.

"We even put ropes from the trees so they could swing out into the water and used a small dam to make some rapids. The swimming hole is now like a jacuzzi," Morshead said.

Local children play in the swimming hole built for them by the 229th Combat Support Engineer Company. The swimming hole was built on the Rio Negro during Exercise Blazing Trails. (Photo by SSgt. Ron Bayes, 133rd PAD, KYARNG)
Combined forces assist villagers

By SSgt. David A. Cornwell

EL CEDRO, Azuero Peninsula (USAFSO PAO) -- For the novice, ice cream cones can be pretty slippery to handle. Children and parents in the village of El Cedro in the mountainous interior of Panama, Azuero Peninsula, made that discovery when they were introduced to ice cream cones.

In addition, they were treated to medical and engineering support from a joint U.S. and Panamanian humanitarian assistance group in conjunction with Exercise Kindle Liberty. El Cedro was one of several villages visited by the group.

"We want to provide humanitarian assistance," said Lt. Col. Juan Montes, of the 193d Inf. Bde. (Pan). Montes co-directed the program with Maj. Moines Del Rio, commander of Panama’s 4th Military Zone in Herrera Province.

As children licked their fingers covered with ice cream, other villagers were receiving medical attention for ailments ranging from backaches to toothaches.

Dr. Alcides DuCruex, one of six Panamanian doctors who traveled to El Cedro, saw over 90 patients in the course of the day. "The people here are mainly farmers, so their backaches and common colds are due to the fact that they labor in their fields all day.

"And many of them have decaying teeth caused by chewing on the sugar cane that they grow," he said. "They dressed in their Sunday best clothes today, because this is a great occasion for them," he added.

Normally, a villager would have to travel 3 hours by car, if one was available, to see the nearest doctor.

Out in the fields, veterinarians inspected and treated livestock. "The people here are so warm and grateful," said Capt. Kasmin D. Bittle, a veterinarian from the 44th Med. Bde. at Fort Bragg, N.C.

Last week, Exercise Kindle Liberty came to a close, but that will not mean the end of support for villages like El Cedro as continued followup support has been initiated by the Panamanian government.

And nearby, the government is building a hydroelectric plant to provide electricity to the mountain villages.

The children, as well as the adults of El Cedro, are looking forward to the coming of electricity, and the possibility of a little refrigeration -- and ice cream.
Helping hands

PFC Tony Travis, a medic with the 205th Engineer Battalion's Headquarters Company, came to the aid of a Panamanian youngster who had been injured when she fell from her horse. Travis, a Louisiana Guardsman, was on duty at a Bailey bridge construction site when the girl was brought to him by her parents. She had been injured the night before. Travis provided first aid and then helped arrange ambulance transportation for her to the north base camp. (Photo by Capt. Daniel B. Miles Jr.)

From: Blazing Trails Crier

Dtd: Feb 85

SSgt Gary Farley and Lt. Col. William Aruma, are assisted by Lt. Col. Anibal Dominguez, in pulling four badly infected teeth of a woman living in the area around Camp Gato Solo.
Los Llanos family receives medical care

SP5 Diane Alire (131st PAD, AL ARNG)

This was the first time the Chavez family of the small village of Los Llanos in Panama had ever met Americans. Less than 300 yards from their two-room adobe home, a Medical Readiness Training Exercise (MED-ETEX) was being conducted at the village school as part of Exercise Kindle Liberty '85.

Born in the Los Llanos community, the father of the family is a "campesino" or farmer. Senor Chavez has five boys and five girls ranging in age from one to 19 years old. The oldest child, Zoila, attends a school in the nearby town of Ocu.

There she studies math, physics, English and Spanish, along with history, biology, and a study of relations between Panama and the United States. The other school-age children attend the Los Llanos school.

As part of the exercise, United States Army doctors and a dentist brought medical care to this rural part of Panama.

"It is important what the Americans are doing for the people here. It will benefit the people. It is very good," said Chavez as interpreted by a school teacher, Temistocles Tejeira.

Several of the Chavez children received dental care and the wife and other family members were treated by the doctors. They were also given medicine to combat parasitical diseases.

The Chavez family home consists of a small room for storage of clothes and other personal items and a larger room, 12 feet by 25 feet, where all 12 members of the family sleep. The rooms are dark with dirt floors. The only light comes through the open doors of the front room and the windows on either side of the sleeping room. The family sleeps on cots covered with grass mats.

Water for cooking and drinking is supplied by a small pipeline built by the government. They take their baths and wash their clothes in a small stream near the house.

Meals are prepared outside by the mother and older children. During the rainy season, they are cooked under a thatched roof open area. All meals are eaten at a large handmade table with benches where the family gathers.

The Chavizes are a very kind and friendly people. They are relatively healthy and seem happy with their lives.

Proudly inviting the American strangers to their home, they showed their appreciation for the soldiers' efforts with their smiles and gestures. The thankfulness in their eyes broke all communication barriers.

February 20, 1985
Exercise provides training to many units

By Sp4 Robert Pasutti
CHITRE, Azuero Peninsula, Republic of Panama --

Hundreds of U.S. and Panamanian military and civilian professionals got together over an eight-day period in the Azuero Peninsula, Republic of Panama, to bring medical assistance to more than 12,000 inhabitants of isolated villages and to provide engineering and veterinary assistance in Herrera and Los Santos provinces.

Teams from the U.S. Army, Air Force and Navy, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF), along with Panamanian health officials, were dispatched daily throughout these mountainous, rural provinces.

The U.S. was represented by the 193d Infantry Brigade's 601st Medical Company; the 193d Support Battalion; the U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, Panama; the 44th Medical Brigade, Fort Bragg, N.C.; the Naval Medical Research Training Unit, Gorgas Memorial Laboratory; the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, Pensacola, Fla.; the U.S. Air Force Southern Air Division; and the 5th Infantry Brigade, Florida Army National Guard.

"Coming to Panama and performing these MEDRETEs (Medical Readiness Training Exercises) gave my soldiers an excellent opportunity to train and become better at their skills," said Maj. Elwood Stephens, commander of Medical Task Force 36, from Fort Bragg, N.C., adding:

"Having all these medical units participating in Kindle Liberty 85 also gave us an opportunity to establish great working relations."

During Kindle Liberty 85, this team of medical personnel performed nearly 7,600 general medical examinations, more than 850 obstetric-gynecology analyses, nearly 3,700 blood pressure checkups, more than 4,300 tooth extractions, nearly 1,000 immunizations and vaccinations provided veterinary treatments to more than 5,000 animals, and filled nearly 5,000 pharmaceutical prescriptions.

"More than 12,000 Panamanians were treated during Kindle Liberty 85, but the final figures may push that closer to 13,000," said Lt. Col. Juan Montes, U-5, 193d Infantry Brigade (Panama), adding: "This doesn't really tell the whole story of the past eight days."

"This combined humanitarian assistance action was designed not just for a short period of time, but also to produce high impact and to cause long-lasting effect."

"My medics loved performing their services during the MEDRETES," said 2nd Lt. Hector Diaz, MEJOETE Operations Officer for the 601st Medical Company. "The MEDRETES gave them excellent opportunities to put their medical skills to use."

It took more than the 300 physicians and assistants to make the program successful. Transportation played a very large and important role for the MEDRETES.

Soldiers from the 210th Combat Aviation Battalion, 193d Inf. Bde (Pan); 5th CAB, Fort Bragg, N.C.; and the 475th Transportation Company, 193d Inf. Bde. (Pan), excelled in fulfilling the often grueling task of transporting the teams to the remote villages.

U.S. and Panamanian aviators moved the medical teams by UH-60 Black Hawk and UH-1 Huey helicopters to the more remote mountain positions.

Truckers from the 475th transported the medical supplies to the village service areas, then maneuvered their two and a half ton trucks up and around the remote mountain passes to bring villagers to the medical facilities.
Capt. Glenn Greene, of the 44th Medical Brigade, from Fort Bragg, N.C., and an assistant, provide medical treatment to a resident of Los Llanos during the Kindle Liberty '85 medical exercise. For more see pages 4 and 5. (Photo by Sp5 Diane Allre, 131st PAD, AL ARNG)
601st medics save villagers life

CHITRE, Azuero Peninsula, Republic of Panama - Performing a MEDRETE of their own, two soldiers assigned to the 601st Med. Co. 193d Inf. Bde. (Pan), ceremoniously saved a Panamanian villager's life last week during Exercise Kindle Liberty 85.

The 193d medics, Sp4 Jaime Guzman and Sp4 Aurelio Carvajal, were taking an ambulance on a routine trip to a refueling point when they were startled by a little girl who was hysterically crying in the middle of the street.

When they stopped to see what problem was, the girl's eyes could have told the whole story. The girl screamed: "My daddy has heart disease, he's dying."

The girl pointed to her house and said: "Help him, please."

After running to the house, the medics found the man unconscious and lying on the floor, surrounded by crying relatives.

Realizing the man was going to die unless they reacted quickly, the medics began doing what they do best -- providing medical treatment.

Carvajal ran to the ambulance to get a medical kit while Guzman began performing first aid.

"I gave the man a quick examination and determined that he wasn't breathing, but he did have a pulse," said Guzman. "A split-second later, I was giving him mouth to mouth resuscitation and slapping his face to keep him from going to sleep."

"Keeping the man awake and alert was very important," said Carvajal. "Because once a person having a heart attack goes to sleep, he is usually going to die."

After restoring the man's breathing, the medics carried him to their ambulance. Once the man's condition was stable inside the ambulance, the 601st soldiers notified a Panama Defense Forces (PDF) soldier of their situation.

The PDF soldier escorted the ambulance to the nearby Viquia Hospital where Panamanian doctors resumed treating the man. Later the next day, the man was reported as making an excellent recovery.

For these two 601st Med. Co. soldiers, that afternoon turned out to be a little more than the old cliche, "All in a day's work."

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