COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE
The Quest For Unity Of Command

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by

THOMAS A. CARDWELL III
Colonel, USAF

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

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To Jill and Mark

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FOREWORD

This monograph is recommended reading for officers in all branches of the armed forces who are responsible for joint operations and planning for theater warfare. It is of particular importance to officers assigned to joint or combined headquarters.

The importance of designing a command structure for warfighting cannot be stressed enough. History has shown misapplication of sound organizational principles can cause needless loss of life and equipment. Wars in the future will not allow time to experiment with command structures; we must organize today to insure success on the modern battlefield tomorrow.

This monograph tells the story of how the US and allied military establishments experimented with command arrangements in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. It briefly describes the outcomes and outlines the pitfalls to avoid in future conflicts. The contemporary view of US service doctrine for warfighting is of particular value to military planners. It is service doctrine for, and perceptions of, warfighting that shape our joint and combined command structure. It is essential that all military people understand the services' points of view for warfighting.

The final chapter of this monograph proposes a command structure for theater warfare. This structure is based upon historical experience, services' doctrinal statements, combined doctrine, and contemporary thinking. I commend this command structure for your careful consideration.

The author is eminently qualified to write this study. He spent over 4 years on the Air Staff working joint doctrinal issues and command arrangements with the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and our allies. Additionally, Colonel Cardwell served as the principal Air Force and US member to numerous NATO working groups dealing with combined warfare (1977-81). His extensive operational and staff experience provide a unique insight into problems of command and control of US and allied forces for theater warfare. Colonel Cardwell was also directly involved in the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussions on command and control of tactical air during sustained operations ashore and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force command arrangements. He brings that experience into focus in this book.

Comments in this monograph may appear controversial at times and may not necessarily reflect individual service doctrine and positions, but the comments are worthy of your considerations as the study was written from a joint perspective and not from a single service view. It is this joint doctrinal perspective that makes the monograph valuable for military planners and operators.

I highly recommend that this monograph be used in the professional military reading program and suggest it be included in senior officer schools' reference material.

William W Momyer

WILLIAM W MOMYER
General, USAF, Retired

THE AUTHOR

Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III (BBA, Texas A & M University; MS, University of Southern California) has served in numerous operational and staff positions since his assignment to active duty in 1965. After a tour in Vietnam flying the F-4C, he was assigned to the Aerospace Defense Command from 1967 to 1972. During this tour of duty, he flew the F-106. His other duties included instructor pilot, weapons training officer, chief of standardization and evaluation, and flight examiner. He was selected as the outstanding junior officer in North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), 1969–70. In 1973, he served 1 year on the Air Staff under the Air Staff Training (ASTRA) Program in the Foreign Military Training Division. During this ASTRA tour, he managed several allied technician, pilot, and navigator training programs. In 1974, he was assigned to the USAF Interceptor Weapons School as the Director of Academic Training and Publications. Colonel Cardwell was responsible for curriculum development of the F-106, F-4, and weapons controller air defense training. Additionally, he participated in the development of Project Worldwide Air Defense Enhancement (WWADE), a project adopted by Headquarters Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) in 1975 to integrate flying and controller training. In addition to his director duties, he was an academic instructor and F-106 instructor pilot.

In 1977, Colonel Cardwell was assigned to the Air Staff as a planning and programming officer in the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Directorate of Plans, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, HQ USAF. During this tour, he served as the principal member of the US team to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) Tri-Service Group on Air Defence and to the Inter-Service Tactical Air Working Party. Additionally, he served as the USAF representative to NATO's Land Force Tactical Doctrine Working Party and to the Helicopter Inter-Service Working Party. He was also chairman of the tri-nation drafting committee that developed NATO's Allied Tactical Publication on "Offensive Air Support Operations," a doctrine manual. While assigned to the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Colonel Cardwell developed the Air Force's basic doctrine on theater nuclear operations and participated in the development of air defense and tactical air operation doctrines. Additionally, he worked on doctrinal issues with the other services and helped to develop the USAF position on the single manager for air concept.

Colonel Cardwell holds the Distinguished Flying Cross, Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters), Air Medal (with 15 Oak Leaf Clusters), Presidential Unit Citation, Air Force Outstanding Unit Award (with Valor and one Oak Leaf Cluster), and the Combat Readiness Medal. Colonel Cardwell is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College, class of 1982, and is currently the Deputy Commander for Operations, 323d Flying Training Wing (ATC), Mather AFB, California.

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Major Generals Perry M. Smith, USAF, and Harley A. Hughes, USAF, contributed more to the undertaking of this labor of love than they realize. General Smith said, to paraphrase, "Don't talk about it, write it down." So I did. General Hughes provided the needed encouragement to write it and, more importantly, insights into the *how* of working joint issues. I am deeply indebted to both. I would like to express sincere appreciation to Lieutenant Colonel Craig Mandeville of the Department of the Army's Firepower Requirements Division; to Lieutenant Commander Cort Wagner of the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division; to Lieutenant Colonel Lowell Bittrich of the USA's Training and Doctrine Command; and to Colonel Billy McCoy and Majors Ken Hall and Brad Bradley of the Air Staff's Doctrine and Concepts Division. They provided invaluable research assistance in the preparation of the manuscript. *(Gratitude is the [illegible] of memory—unknown.)*

A few people have had profound influence in shaping my views of theater warfare. To them, I am most grateful. They include General William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired; Lieutenant General James H. Ahmann, USAF, Retired; Lieutenant General James R. Brickle, USAF; Lieutenant General John F. Chain, USAF; Major General Carl D[illegible]eterson, USAF, Retired; Major General William J. Breckner, USAF; Brigadier General Roger Tardieu, French Air Force, Retired; Brigadier General Robert A. Norman, USAF; Colonel David McNabb, USAF; Colonel Bruce Brown, USAF; Colonel Larry Keith, USAF; Group Captain Brian R. A[illegible]

Cox, RAF, Retired; Colonel Rolf Hallerback, German Army; Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Alberts, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel Willard Naslund, USAF, Retired; and Squadron Leader Brian Allchin, RAF. *(The essence of knowledge is, having it, to apply it—Confucius.)*

To all who gave so willingly of their time to prepare the appendices, thank you. A special thanks to General Momyer. His contribution to the monograph is especially appreciated. I am also indebted to General Donn A. Starry, USA; General P. X. Kelley, USMC; General David C. Jones, USAF, Retired; General Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF; Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, USA; Lieutenant General John H. Miller, USMC; Rear Admiral Robert E. Kirksey, USN; and Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired, for taking time out of busy schedules to be interviewed. Their candid views were of incalculable value to my effort.

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Finally, I gratefully acknowledge the contribution my children, Jill and Mark, made in the long process of preparing this monograph. Without their patience, understanding, and help, I never would have started nor completed it. It is to them I lovingly dedicate this effort. *(Absence sharpens love, presence strengthens it—unknown. SMW)*

THOMAS A. CARDWELL III
Colonel, USAF

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although the services claim to accept a similar doctrine of unity of command in joint and combined operations, the United States has been unable to develop a structure and policy that permits effective implementation of a unified command. The services moved from a concept of voluntary cooperation in World War II to a form of unified command in Vietnam. Since 1967, they have tended to revert to the earlier form of voluntary cooperation. But voluntary cooperation is not the doctrine specified in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, which outlines the doctrine and principles formally accepted by all the services.

This study develops a recommended command structure. It examines United States Army, United States Navy, United States Marine Corps, United States Air Force, and joint and combined doctrinal statements concerning the employment of theater-assigned assets. The purpose is to establish the organization to employ these assets. The central question this monograph will attempt to answer is: "What organization should the United States use to employ land, naval, and air force assets in a theater of operations?"[1]

This monograph develops an organizational structure that is designed to provide unified command of land, naval, and air assets assigned to a theater of operations as prescribed in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2. It begins with a historical examination of the organization for the command and control of theater-assigned assets employed by the United States and its allies during World War II, the Korean war, and the Vietnam conflict. Next, it reviews the current Army, Navy,[2] Marine Corps, and Air Force views on theater warfare and discusses joint and combined doctrine for a theater warfare organization. Finally, it describes the organization I believe the United States should use to employ land, naval, and air forces in a theater of operations. It should be noted the proposed organization is designed to handle the employment of chemical, conventional, and nuclear weapons on the battlefield.[3]

In reading this discussion of the US military's quest for unity of command, one must understand the fundamental principles that undergird doctrinal pronouncements about the subject. The basic organizational principle for joint and combined operations is that one commander should control the assigned forces, and these forces should act as a joint team of land, naval, and air forces. This tenet, which we call the principle of unity of command, is derived from history and should be the basis for organizational arrangements.

Another basic principle is centralized direction and decentralized execution. A joint or combined organization must have a central control node for coordinating efforts of the forces' command and have subordinate nodes for the execution of operation. Decentralized execution is based upon the theater commander's guidance. Since no one commander can control the detailed action of the service forces, component commanders execute the operations.

A third basic principle, closely related to the first, is unity of effort. This tenet states that forces must be applied so as to permit integrated, responsive, and decisive application of military power. The organization must be capable of supporting this principle of unity of effort. The key to an effective warfighting organization is integrated effort.

These three principles are by no means all that apply to a warfighting organization. Chapter 4 contains a more detailed listing of such principles.

Nine appendices are included to help the reader understand joint and combined doctrines and service perceptions and doctrine. Appendices A and H contain information on joint and combined warfare doctrine. Appendices B through E are reports of interviews with the service Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Operations. Appendices F and G contain views on an organization for theater operations from the commander's perspective. Appendix I contains additional reference material in support of this monograph.

One problem military planners must overcome is the tendency to use the words Army, Navy, Marine, or Air Force when developing joint organizational tenets for the employment of service forces in a theater of operations. This tendency leads to the development of joint organizations that only work in single, or uniservice, operations.[4] Using this perspective is correct when developing service organizations to support single service operations; but when applied in the joint or combined arena,[5] use of such descriptive service tags creates confusion and unmanageable systems, and it does not contribute to the joint or combined organization for warfighting. Defective organizations lose wars. When we violate sound principles of organizing our forces for the most efficient and effective[6] command structure, we court defeat.

The importance of theater assets in meeting the Soviet threat demands a realistic resolution of the issues surrounding unity of command. We can ill afford the luxury of duplication of effort, inefficient and ineffective command structure, and parochial positions when developing a theater command structure for winning wars.[7] We must resolve the issues of a joint or combined command structure during peace before the structure is subjected to the stress of war. By using service joint and combined doctrines, applying historical examples as reference points, and then testing these against the threat, the military services will arrive at the best organization to accomplish the mission of winning wars. It should be noted that warfighting organizations are, by their very nature, the subject of varying views. The process of questioning, probing, analyzing, and proposing produces the structure to employ US forces in a theater of operations. Intellectual debates on how to employ US forces should be the cornerstone of our military education system. It is in this spirit that Chapter 4 was written. Professional military officers

should challenge the conclusions presented in an attempt to find a better system for employing forces on the modern battlefield. It is hoped that this monograph will stimulate that debate and provide the catalyst for further study on this important topic.

A final wish is that this monograph will inspire students of warfighting to write monographs on questions posed but unanswered by this study—questions such as: How will our warfighting organization affect weapon systems procurement? Do we have the proper command and control linkages to support this organization? Do we have a strategy for warfighting based upon the theater command structure?[8]

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. In the question, the phrase United States was deliberately selected to show that a single service problem is not being addressed but an issue that deals with all the armed forces of the United States. No single service has won a war by itself; it is a joint effort of all branches of the military. By looking at the crucial question of force employment from a joint perspective, a clearer picture emerges of how to organize for warfighting. It is from this perspective that this monograph is written.

2. The Navy and Marine Corps views deal with naval aviation in support of land operations and not with maritime operations. It is interesting to note that Navy air-land operations are conducted in an in-support-of role and, therefore, fall under the jointly agreed operational procedures for conducting naval air-land operations. In-support-of is defined as "assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control" (JCS Publication 1, p. 197).

3. The "how" of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons employment is beyond the purview of this monograph. The "how" is tactics, and this monograph does not address the question of tactics and procedures.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 1 June 1979, defines uniservice command as "a command comprised of forces of a single service" (p. 362). The term uniservice is used to mean single service operation.

5. The term joint "connotes activities, operations, etc., in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (When all services are not involved, the participating services shall be identified—e.g., joint Army-Navy)" (JCS Publication 1, p. 187). The term combined connotes operations "between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified—e.g., combined navies)" (JCS Publication 1, p. 73).

6. An organization may be effective but not efficient, and it may be efficient but not effective. A balance must be struck where the command structure is effective and efficient. (See note 8, Chapter 1.)

7. Bud Andrews, "Jones: Tone Down Bickering, Spruce Up Managing," *Air Force Times*, Vol. 42, No. 32, 1 March 1982, p. 3. General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is quoted as saying "America would be defended better if the four services spent more time preparing to fight and less time fighting among themselves over money. We need to spend more time on our warfighting capabilities and less on intramural scrambles for resources." Representative G. William Whitehurst (Republican—Virginia) said of Jones' effort to reorganize and refocus the JCS: "A number of us in Congress have felt for some time that the current Joint Chiefs' system has encouraged parochialism rather than harmony." As quoted in an article entitled "Overhaul," *Air Force Times*, Vol. 42, No. 31, 22 February 1982, p. 2.

8. As a postscript to Chapter 1, the following is provided for the reader's consideration as this monograph is read.

A measure of merit needs to be developed to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization. No attempt has been made in this monograph to develop such a measure of merit. Perhaps a future monograph could be written to address this subject. I chose to use a methodology that compares existing doctrinal statements, historical experiences, and contemporary thinking to arrive at a solution to the question posed in this chapter - that is, What command structure should the United States use when employing forces in a theater of operations?

A question one might ask is: Does this monograph propose a new organization, a new command structure? The answer is no, it does not propose a new command structure. What is proposed is a command structure based upon historical examples and an interpretation of the command structure that is outlined in JCS Publication 2. Chapter 4 contains the proposal, and Figure 9 graphically depicts that command structure.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN THREE WARS—WORLD WAR II, KOREA, AND VIETNAM

"Military men have long recognized that . . . the best chance to win proceeds from giving one man the command together with the tools placed at his disposal, and full responsibility for the results."[1] Military people may have recognized this, but history has shown that the United States has not always applied these beliefs.[2]

Prologue

At the time of entry by the United States in World War II, there was no single command structure. In the event of war, the services were expected to cooperate. This was known as the doctrine of mutual cooperation.[3] Thus, the United States had, in effect, two separate command structures in 1940- one for naval forces and one for land forces. However, by 1950 the United States was moving towards a unified command organization in Korea, and thus initiating a process that would only be complete by 1967.[4] In the late 1970s and early 1980s, we had slipped backward towards a mutual cooperation method for joint command organizations. So let's review the major feature of our command organizations between 1940 and 1984.

World War II

Prior to World War II, command structure discussions were between the two services - the US Army and the US Navy. All debates centered around command doctrines espoused by these two services. By early 1941, it became apparent to many military leaders that the United States would be involved in the war in Europe. The debate began on what type of structure we should adopt in the event US forces were employed.

Within the Army there was a drive to reorganize, a drive initiated by the Army Air Corps. The US Air Force, not a separate service yet, was having its beginnings in the Army Air Corps in the early forties and felt its views on a command structure should also be heard in any Army reorganization and Army-Navy discussions.

The Army Air Corps proposed it be given a separate role in any command structure. The War Department was opposed to any reorganizing of the existing Army command structure. However, most senior Army generals recognized a need to provide a more realistic staff organization to manage the war effort. The Army Air Corps saw an opportunity to open the issue of employing airpower in a wider role in a theater of operations. The impetus for reorganizing the Army staff came from Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Staff, General Headquarters.[5] For several months in 1941 the issue was discussed without reaching a decision.

General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold of the Army Air Corps finally broke the logjam in mid-November 1941 when he wrote to General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff, asking for a complete reorganization that would allow the air forces to play their proper roles.[6] General Marshall was not ready to separate the Army Air Force from the Army. He based this decision upon his desire to keep the Air Force "in the existing command structure in order to promote the collaboration between ground and air operation."[7]

General Arnold was not satisfied with this response. He and General McNair approached General Marshall to request that a group study the current command structure. General Marshall agreed and directed a study be done under the chairmanship of Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney. Based upon General Arnold's proposal, General McNarney recommended three separate commanders—one for ground, one for air, and one for a service command. The War Department agreed in principle with this plan for three separate commands. "By General Arnold's persistence, the Air Force was the champion of the War Department reorganization."[8]

The War Department was reorganized by executive order in 1942.[9] The reorganization became effective on 9 March 1942 and created the Ground Command, the Service Command, and the Air Command. The new commanding general of the Army Ground Command forces was responsible for organizing and training all ground combat troops. The commanding general of the Army Service Command assumed responsibility for logistical and other support functions for the Army.[10]

The commanding general of the new Army Air Forces would train and equip air units for independent airstrikes and for joint and combined combat operations with ground forces.[11] Additionally, the "Air Force would be responsible for design, research, development, and procurement of all items peculiar to air operations."[12] With the Army reorganized, the War Department turned its attention to discussions with the Navy Department on a joint command organization for theater warfare.

Prior to Pearl Harbor, the agreed structure was based upon the doctrine of mutual cooperation. This doctrine stated that no single commander would be in charge of the service forces; the services were expected to cooperate in any joint effort.

However, if mutual cooperation appeared inadequate, a single command could be organized under the doctrine of unity of command.[13]

This doctrine of unity of command could be placed, in effect, by agreement between the Secretaries of War and Navy, by an agreement between commanders of the Army and Navy service forces, or by the President. The doctrine of unity of command stated:

> . . . the commander [single commander] has the authority to direct the operations of the Army and Navy elements of his command by assigning them missions and giving them objectives. During operations, he could exercise and control as would insure success of the common mission. He could also organize task forces. He could not issue instructions to the other services on tactics, nor could he control its administration or discipline, nor issue any instructions beyond those necessary for effective coordination.[14]

The American command doctrine of mutual cooperation proved inadequate for the joint operations in Europe and the Pacific. On 27 November 1941, unity of command was vested in the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.[15] Six months later, in the European theater, the British Chiefs of Staff recommended command arrangements along the lines of the US unity of command doctrine. The combined chiefs approved the unity of command doctrine, and the principle of unified command was adopted in 1942. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was designated the Supreme Commander. Thus, unity of command served as the basis for command of allied operations for the remainder of World War II. It is interesting to note, however, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve the doctrine of unified command until April 1943.[16]

Within this unified framework, the command structure used during World War II was as follows: The combined armies and navies were under a single commander. (Figure 1 depicts the command structure used by the allied force in 1943.) Within the combined armies structure in Europe, General Eisenhower had two sections—one for land forces and one for air forces. This structure underwent changes as new forces were added. For example, in 1944 with the establishment of the 12th Army Group, General Eisenhower attempted to create a land component command to control the newly acquired US 12th Army Group and British 21st Army Group.[17] However, political considerations prevented the creation of this land component command.[18] When General Eisenhower decided not to create the land component, the American air force saw no reason to have an air component command—the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces. The argument was that there was no need to coordinate tactical bombers and fighters since the US Ninth Air Force was already working closely with the 12th US Army Group.[19] Also, since the deputy to General Eisenhower had the responsibility for coordinating the US Ninth Air Force and the British Second Tactical Air Force with the US Strategic Air Force and British Bomber Command, the air component command was really unnecessary. General Eisenhower agreed and dissolved the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces in October 1944.[20] "Thus, Eisenhower's decision to sidestep the problem of choosing either an



Figure 1. World War II Command Organization (1944--OVERLORD, Invasion of Europe)

American or British ground force component commander resulted indirectly in the unfortunate lack of a single air component command."[1]

This brief review of command structures used during World War II shows this war to be a turning point in developing a unified organization to fight a theater war; it was the first time the United States used the unified approach to warfighting. This war provided the foundation for three important developments in the US command structure for theater warfare. World War II provided the doctrine for a unified command structure, and it laid the groundwork for a separate air force and the component command structure.

Period Between World War II and the Korean Conflict

The period following World War II provided the United States with the opportunity to reflect upon achievements and failures of the World War II command structure. This, in turn, led to a reorganization of US military forces.

One must keep in mind that the US Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being early in World War II as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee. The two together became the supreme military body responsible for strategic direction, known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff.[2] Also, the concept of a unified command in a theater of operations was established during World War II. However, neither the JCS nor the unified command structure was recognized or authorized by US law. In his 1945 message to Congress, President Harry S. Truman stated that "had we not early in the war adopted this principle of a unified command for operation, our efforts, no matter how heroic, might have failed."[3] The President and the senior leadership of the military recognized the need for centralized direction of American armed forces.

After the war, the JCS elected to continue the unified command structure. This was embodied in the Outline Command Plan—the first unified command plan. The Outline Command Plan defined missions and geographic areas of responsibility for seven unified commands—Far East, Pacific, Alaskan, Northeast, Atlantic, Caribbean, and European.[4] President Truman approved the Outline Command Plan on 14 December 1946 and with the exception of the Northeast Command, commands were phased in during 1947.

The year 1947 was a milestone in restructuring the US military forces. The JCS proposed the reorganization of the military; and with strong support by President Harry S. Truman, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, which became effective on 17 September 1947.

In Section 2, Declaration of Policy, the National Security Act of 1947 states, "It is the intent of Congress to provide . . . for [the armed forces'] authoritative coordination and unified direction . . . but not to merge them . . . and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." This act created a National Military Establishment with three departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), authorized a secretary of defense, created the JCS, recognized the unified and specified command structure, and authorized the JCS to establish such commands.

This act accomplished three things. First, it formally established the unified command structure and, thus, the doctrine of unity of command. Second, it established the framework for a three-component command organization—land, sea, and air—under the unified command structure. Third, it established the Department of the Air Force, established the Air Force as a separate service, and retained the Marine Corps under the Navy as part of the Department of the Navy. In summary, this act was the start of a movement toward centralized authority over the armed forces that culminated in the Reorganization Act of 1958.[5]

In 1949, the National Security Act of 1947 was amended to give the Secretary of Defense direct authority and control over the services. The amendment redesignated the National Military Establishment as the Department of Defense. This amendment took executive department status away from the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and designated them military departments under the Secretary of Defense.[26]

The services' views of the unified command structure in the late forties, according to one observer, were as follows. The Army fully supported the unity of command structure. Army officers believed in the right of the theater commander to organize his forces as he saw fit. The Navy believed in the unity of command structure as long as naval forces were always under Navy command. The Air Force believed that air assets should be under the theater commander and did not believe air assets should be placed directly under the command of a land commander.[27] The services were beginning to develop doctrine to support this new unified command structure. However, the three services viewed unity of command differently.

The Army fully supported the unity of command doctrine. However, the Army viewed it as extending from theater commander to the lowest echelon. "A simple but excellent example of this type of unified command is found in the case of an A[illegible] aboard a navy combat transport [where] everyone aboard is under the command of the ship's captain who commands the Army troops [illegible]."[28] The application of unity of command by the Army was really the principal of component command where the theater commander exercises operational command through the component commander. In the case cited, it was operational command the naval component commander was exercising over the Army units.

The Navy also supported the doctrine of unity of command but applied it differently. As stated in Navy doctrine, "there is only one proper place for [unified command] in the command organization and that is directly under the joint amphibious assault task force commander [a naval officer]."[29] As applied to naval aviation, this meant all Navy tactical air was under Navy control to support amphibious operations.[30] The Navy did support having three component commanders under the single unified commander where naval, land, and air forces were operating jointly—as long as naval aviation remained under the naval component. If it were purely an amphibious operation, the unified commander was to be a naval officer and the components would be naval.

The Air Force also supported unity of command and the component system. This period in history for the Air Force was one of a continual struggle for airmen to insure limited air assets were applied in an effective manner. The Air Force viewed the most effective means of control to be from a theater perspective where all air forces, including naval aviation, were employed from the air component command level. However, even within the Air Force, there were differing views. Some believed that strategic bombers should be employed separately from tactical air; thus, there would be two subordinate air components—one for tactical air in support of land operations and one for strategic bombing.[31] The debate continues today. Air

Force doctrine supported then, as it does today, the single unified command with three components as the most effective means to employ theater-assigned assets.

The historic events that occurred between 1940 and 1950 were bound to cause discussions. The newly created military departments were trying to come up with a workable command arrangement for warfighting, and the services were providing their views on how to make the command organization work. Against this backdrop, the United States entered the Korean conflict in 1950.

Korean War

In Korea, the command structure became a major problem again and presented a new and complex problem to solve. In 1950, the United Nations did not have a staff structure capable of directing military operations.[12]

On 8 July 1950, President Truman appointed General Douglas MacArthur commander of military forces assisting the Republic of Korea. These forces were placed under the unified command of the United States by members of the United Nations.[13] General MacArthur, as the United Nations commander, controlled all allied forces including US forces; as commander of US forces, his title was Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE). The Far East Command was a unified command which reported directly to the JCS.[14]

At the outbreak of the Korean war, the US Army combat units nearest the scene were the four infantry divisions performing occupation duties in Korea.[15] There were few naval and air forces in the general area. It appeared that the United States was not prepared to fight a war in Korea — neither from a command structure nor from forces in place.

On 24 July, General MacArthur established the United Nations Command (UNC) and he became Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC). The line of authority for the United States ran from General MacArthur to the President through the JCS. United Nation troops were allotted to the appropriate US military organization for operational control.[16]

The Korean hostilities provided a combat test of the armed force's unification which the United States had adopted in 1947.[17] In essence, the National Security Act of 1947 provided for a theater commander, separate from his service, who would provide command authority over theater land, naval, and air forces.[18]

When the United States entered the war, the major commands of the Far East Command were the Far East Air Forces, the Naval Forces Far East, and the Army Forces Far East. General MacArthur did not organize a land component headquarters. Instead of having an Army Forces Far East headquarters, which would have been the land component headquarters, he personally commanded the Army elements of the Army Forces Far East Command, with his General Headquarters, Far East Command, doubling as the joint headquarters staff and the land component headquarters. The General Headquarters was almost wholly

manned by Army personnel and concerned itself with Army matters.[39] The air component of the unified command, the Far East Air Forces, generally operated in an independent manner.[40] Figure 2 shows the command structure used in Korea.



Figure 2. Korea Command Organization (1950)

General MacArthur recognized that the command arrangements he had established were not operating as he desired. On 7 July 1950, he established the land component command, US Army Forces in Korea. MacArthur directed the commander of the US Army Forces in Korea to communicate directly with the other two component commanders—Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces Far East—to secure the air and naval support which he required.[41] The concept of unification was there, but practical realities kept the concept from being applied. This was due to the time lag in request and execution of support caused by the physical separation of the three headquarters.

Two events occurred in July which brought to focus the problem of unified actions of land, naval, and air forces. The first was the introduction of bomber aircraft into the Pacific theater. The US Air Force Chief of Staff placed two medium bombardment groups—the 22d and 92d—under temporary duty with Far East Air Forces. These two groups, organized as the Far East Air Force Bomber Command in conjunction with the tactical aircraft of the Fifth Air Force, would provide strategic bombardment and tactical air support for the Far East Command. On 11 July, the air component commander directed the Bomber Command to handle deep interdiction and strategic targets, and the Fifth Air Force to provide tactical air operations in support of the land battle.[42]

The second event was the massive effort to coordinate land-based and carrier-based air operations over Korea. The first two weeks in July 1950 presented a new challenge to the joint effort of coordinating air in support of theater objectives. The commander of Naval Forces Far East had secured an exclusive use of airpower in northern Korea for air operations from 2 through 4 July 1950. Due to limited communications and the Navy's practice of radio silence while at sea, US Air Force air operations were hampered.[43]

These two events led the Commander of the Far East Air Forces, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, to conclude that to be effective, some form of centralized control was required to control the mass of Air Force and Navy air. He requested that the air component commander be given operational control over all naval land-based and carrier-based aviation operating over Korea—except for aviation used in amphibious or naval tasks of mining and antisubmarine warfare. General Stratemeyer did not want to control naval aircraft when they were engaged in Navy air tasks at sea. He stated that operational control meant only the authority to designate the type of mission and to specify the targets to strike, within the capabilities of the forces involved.[44]

Not surprisingly, the Navy did not agree with General Stratemeyer. The Navy did not want the Air Force to have operational control of naval forces. A compromise was worked out on 11 July where the air component commander would have coordination authority. "When both Navy Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces are assigned missions in Korea, coordination control, a commander in chief prerogative, is delegated to Commanding General, Far East Air Forces," read the directive drafted by the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group, General Headquarters, Far East Command.[45]

Since there was no official definition for coordination control, each component assigned its own definition to the term. The problem of coordination control was never resolved. As a result, many hours were spent in attempting to coordinate activities of naval and air forces during the Korean hostilities.

Another problem facing General MacArthur in trying to integrate the efforts of these services occurred in the summer of 1950. It concerned the appropriate level to select targets for airstrikes.

A General Headquarters Target Group had been established at the Far East Command headquarters level. This group was composed of three senior officers—one from the G-2 section (Army), and one Air Force officer and one Navy officer assigned to the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group. They were charged with providing advice on the employment of Navy and Air Force offensive airpower, and with recommending targets and target areas. Additionally, this group was to analyze the targets. On 16 July, at a meeting of the group, a recommendation was made that the Target Group select all targets from the frontlines to deep into enemy territory. This did not sit well with the Air Force. The commanding general of the Far East Air Forces called upon General MacArthur on 18 July 1950 to discuss the matter and to recommend an alternative course of action. The commander of the Far East Air Forces recommended that tactical air targets be selected at the air-land component level—that is, the tactical air force, army group level. General MacArthur approved the plan with some modification. The final plan allowed the tactical air force, army group level, to select the close air support targets, and the air component commander to select the other targets based upon CINCFE command directives. The Target Group still retained its authority to designate medium bomber targets and the priorities for these targets. In summary, the plan set up a coordinated effort between the tactical air force and army group headquarters for support of the land army, and it provided the authority for the air component commander to employ the medium bomber effort against general air support strategic targets—that is, for air interdiction.[46]

To overcome some of the problems encountered by the General Headquarters Target Group—to integrate all Air Force and Navy airpower—a general officer target selection committee was appointed on 22 July 1950. This senior officer group was tasked to devise a sound interdiction program to stem the flow of Communist-supplied reinforcements into South Korea. The Navy chose not to provide a member since they would only provide close air support strikes in Korea under Far East Air Forces' coordination control. The fleet's primary mission would be to defend Formosa. Any decision to commit the fleet's airpower, according to the Navy, was up to General MacArthur, and he should make that decision personally.[47] General MacArthur agreed with this approach.

Although not a true joint committee, it did not have naval representation, the target selection committee did accomplish its purpose to study the interdiction program. The committee was short-lived, as it was disbanded six weeks after its inception. However, it did mark the beginning of a workable relationship for the control of the theater air forces. The bulk of the target selection activities went to the Far East Air Forces' target committee. This committee selected the air targets in

accordance with target lists approved by the commander in chief and the air component Far East Air Forces commander.

Robert F. Futrell, a noted historian, summed up the target selection process as follows:

> Belatedly, at the end of July, improvised procedures brought some order to the fantastically confused command situation in the Far East. Certainly, at the outset of the Korean war, the defective theater command system prevented the fullest employment of airpower, delayed the beginning of a comprehensive air interdiction program for more than a month [and] caused confusion and a loss of effectiveness at the very time every single aircraft sortie was vital to the survival of the Eighth Army in Korea. Had he possessed a joint headquarters staff, General MacArthur might never have encountered those mischievous problems.[48]

A similar conclusion was reached by General Otto P. Weyland when he wrote on 10 October 1950, "Whenever combinations of Air Force, Army, and Navy are in a joint command, it is essential that the commander in chief have a joint staff with proportionate representation of the services involved."[49]

The first full-scale experiment with a unified command structure, with three components, was tried in Korea. There were some false starts and heated discussions, but, on the whole, the system proved an effective means to control theater-assigned assets. One can argue that it was not always the most efficient, but it was effective.

The Korean war provided the foundation for service cooperation in a theater of operations which would be the basis for the command structure used in Vietnam. In summary, there would be one commander with three components. However, not totally solved was the question of what to do with airpower in support of the land battle. Vietnam provided an arena to test a new method. But before looking at the command arrangements in Vietnam, a brief review of events from 1953 to 1962 is in order.

Period Between Korea and Vietnam

In 1953, the Joint Chiefs of Staff lost their authority to appoint one of its members as the executive agent[50] for a unified command. This authority would now rest with the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the JCS who would appoint a military department as the executive agent. The chain of command ran from the President through the Secretary of Defense, to the service secretary, then to the unified commander. This chain of command proved to be unworkable. "President Eisenhower called this arrangement cumbersome and unreliable in time of peace and not usable in time of war."[51]

Not until 1958 did the Department of Defense change that arrangement. The Reorganization Act of 1958 took the military departments and services out of the command chain. The chain of command, as it stands today, runs from the

President, to the Secretary of Defense, through the JCS, to the unified commanders. It is important to note that none of the senior staff officers of the armed forces—that is, for example, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force—have command authority over US combatant forces. This authority is vested in the unified commander.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, outlines the changes brought about by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.[52] Briefly, these acts established the three separate services—with the US Marine Corps coming under the Department of the Navy—and the unified command structure. The experiences of World War II and Korea formed the US command structure for the Vietnam conflict.[53]

Vietnam War

The Vietnam experience provided another opportunity to organize US military forces for the most efficient application of firepower.[54] Yet, we were to experiment again with different methods. With a clear set of instructions—Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2—the United States should have had no difficulty, but once again we had to face some tough organizational questions.

The initial command structure used in Vietnam came from the Military Advisory Group that was established on 17 September 1950. In the beginning, the role of the US Military Advisory Group was very limited. After the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, however, that role dramatically changed. On 1 November 1955, the Military Advisory Group was redesignated the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam. From 1955 to the early 1960s, the US military was involved only in organizing and training Vietnamese units.

On 8 February 1962, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam—known as MACV—was formed. MACV was an operational headquarters and had the staff elements needed if direct military operations were required. The Army and Air Force argued that MACV should be a theater unified command with a land, naval, and air component. The Navy opposed such an arrangement and recommended Pacific Command function as the unified command structure for Vietnam where the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC)—a naval officer—would control all forces assigned to Vietnam.[55] CINCPAC won and military operations in Vietnam came under the Pacific Command with MACV as a subunified command under CINCPAC.[56] However, the debate continued about the future structure of such a subunified command.

The command structure used in 1962 in Vietnam was as follows. Pacific Command, the unified command—under the Joint Chiefs of Staff—had three components: the air component, Pacific Air Forces; the naval component, Pacific Fleet; and the land component, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam which

was also the subunified command, MACV. Under the air component—Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)—there was the Thirteenth Air Force with the 2d Air Division advanced echelon at Tan Son Nhut. Under the naval component—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet—there were the 7th Fleet, Fleet Marine Force, and Task Force 77. Under the land component and subunified command, MACV, were the III Marine Amphibious Force, US Army Support Group, Vietnam, and the assigned Army combat units. Figure 3 depicts the command arrangement used in Vietnam.

As the war expanded into Laos, new questions arose over command relations. On 12 May 1962, the President sent a joint task force—Joint Tas Force–116—composed of Army, Air Force, and Marine units to Thailand.[57] Joint Task Force–116 was deployed to show the US resolve about Laos.

This new arrangement presented a problem for the Air Force and Army. For the Air Force, its forces were fragmented among three commands: Joint Task Force–116, air units from the USAF's Tactical Air Command; South Vietnam air units under the 2d Air Division advanced element; and air units in Thailand under Thirteenth Air Force. For the Army, the question of command relationships between Joint Task Force–116 and MACV was particularly difficult.[58]

The Army recommended that all forces in Vietnam and Thailand be placed under MACV.[59] The Navy disagreed with the idea of a single command under the Army in Vietnam. The Navy preferred separate headquarters in Vietnam and Thailand.[60] CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that MACV have two deputies—one for Vietnam and for Thailand—with the Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) commanding both MACV and Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI). The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, and Joint Task Force–116 was deactivated and replaced by MACTHAI.

The Air Force likewise had to face up to its organization for supporting the war in Southeast Asia. In 1962, Air Force units in Thailand and South Vietnam were placed under the control of the 2d Air Division advanced echelon. The 2d Air Division commander was expected to act as the air component commander for MACV and forward commander for Thirteenth Air Force (Thailand).[61]

The debate was not over yet. In 1963 and 1964, the services continued to discuss the complicated command structure in the Pacific, and in particular Southeast Asia. The Air Force Chief of Staff proposed that an airman should be the deputy commander of MACV. COMUSMACV disagreed with the proposal as he was satisfied with his deputy being an Army officer. The Air Force also proposed that MACV be organized along the lines of a theater of operations with MACV being a unified command with an army and air component.[62]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to discuss the issue in 1964. They were divided on the issue. The debate centered around making MACV a unified command. To break the deadlock, COMUSMACV proposed that MACV be a specified command reporting directly to the JCS. It is important to point out that there is a fundamental difference between a unified and specified command. "A specified command recognizes the dominance of one service in military



Figure 3 Vietnam Command Organization

operations. . . . [On] the other hand, a unified command represents a multiservice activity."[63] COMUSMACV's proposal would make the US Army the executive agency for the specified command. CINCPAC[64] opposed this idea and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. The issue of MACV's being a specified command never came up again, but the issue of a unified command for MACV continued. Thus, by the end of 1964 the command organization was still not settled.[65]

In 1964, CINCPAC was opposed to command arrangement changes in the Pacific theater. He believed that the war in North Vietnam should be fought by his two components, Pacific Air Forces and Pacific Fleet; while the war in South Vietnam and Laos should be fought by forces assigned to MACV and supported by Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces. In 1965, the Air Force again raised the issue of having an airman as the deputy commander for MACV. These two issues were discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and on 25 June 1965, the position of air deputy for MACV was approved. The command structure was not changed. MACV was a subunified command under Pacific Command and the deputy commander for MACV was a soldier, but a new position—deputy commander for air operations—was created. The air deputy position was then, in effect, the air component under the subunified command MACV. The air deputy exercised operational control over Air Force assets, but specifically excluded Army helicopters and Marine aviation.[66]

The command arrangements issue was dormant from 1965 through 1967. However, the Air Force did raise the issue of a single manager for air with MACV numerous time during this period. In January 1968, the fragmentation of the air effort reached an all-time high with the battle for Khe Sanh.[67] This issue came to the forefront.

MACV Directive 95-4, 6 May 1965, excluded Marine aviation from control of the MACV air deputy. Marine forces were employed in I Corps under the III Marine Amphibious Force command. "Under this directive [and arrangement], airpower was further fragmented by the establishment of all elements of two separate tactical air forces in the theater, one controlled by the theater air component commander and the other by the equivalent of a corps commander [III MAF]."[68]

The Army and Air Force supported a single manager for air for all tactical air in Vietnam.[69] The Navy and Marine Corps objected. The issue was debated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1968. Unable to reach a decision, the issue was elevated to the Secretary of Defense. On 15 May 1968, the Deputy Secretary of Defense decided in favor of the Army and the Air Force. US Air Force and US Marine Corps air assets in South Vietnam came under the control of the Air Deputy, MACV.[70] The debate was not ended, but the creation of a single manager for air did function as proposed until the end of the Vietnam war.[71]

The Vietnam conflict officially ended in 1973, drawing to a close a war that challenged our military in many ways—not the least of which was deciding command arrangement. General Westmoreland, Commander of MACV from 1964 to 1968, summed up the command arrangements when he stated

> In view of this [Vietnam] command arrangement, seeds of friction not unlike those that had plagued MacArthur . . . during World War II were present. As I took command of MACV, the CINCPAC . . . was succeeded by one who was as determined as I to make the command arrangement work. . . . What many failed to realize was that not I but Sharp [CINCPAC] was the theater commander. . . . My responsibilities and prerogatives were basically confined within the borders of South Vietnam. Admiral Sharp commanded the Navy's Seventh Fleet, over which I had no control [and] when the bombing of North Vietnam began in . . . 1965, Admiral Sharpe controlled that too. . . . My task would have been easy had I headed a "Southeast Asia Command" [unified command].
>
> As American commander in Vietnam, I underwent many frustrations, endured much interference, lived with countless irritations, swallowed many disappointments, bore considerable criticism. . . . I realized that air operations against North Vietnam were outside my jurisdiction, however much I might have thought they should have been part of it. . . . A commander must learn to live with frustrations, interference, irritation, disappointment, and criticism. . . .
>
> Creating a unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have gone a long way toward mitigating the unprecedented centralization of authority in Washington. . . . Instead of five "commanders"—CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and the American ambassadors to Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam—there would have been one man directly answerable to the President on everything. . . . Such an arrangement would have eliminated the problem of coordination between the air and ground wars that was inevitable with CINCPAC managing one, MACV the other.[72]

Link to the Present—Prospects for the Future

George Santayana once remarked that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.[73] If the United States is to arrive at a logical command structure to accomplish military objectives, we must avoid mistakes we have made in the past when setting up command arrangements.

The period after the Vietnam war provided the military services another opportunity to profit by past experience when designing command structures to fight wars. The most recent example is the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force command discussions. On 24 April 1981, the Secretary of Defense announced that "over a period of 3 to 5 years, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) should evolve into a separate unified command—with its own geographic responsibilities, service components, forces, intelligence, communications, logistics facilities, and other support elements."[74] In setting up this new unified command, the military has an opportunity to set up a command structure with clear and direct lines of authority and responsibility.[75]

The unified command structure in existence today has evolved over the past 40 years. Presently the United States has six unified commands. They are the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), US European Command (USEUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), US Readiness Command (USREDCOM), US Central Command (USCENTCOM), and US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Additionally, there are three specified commands—Aerospace Defense Command (AIDCOM), Military Airlift Command (MAC), and Strategic Air Command (SAC).

It is interesting to note that all specified commands are Air Force related. Three of the unified commands are headed by Army officers; the other two are commanded by Navy officers.

In summary, the lesson we should learn from our experiences with command structures over the past 40 years is this: When developing a command structure, we should place all theater-assigned assets under a single unified commander. The forces should be subdivided under this commander into three components—generically called land, naval, and air components. All forces should operate as a coherent team under this unified command structure which must have clear and direct lines of authority and responsibility. The review of the command structures used over the past four decades tends to show that we have strived for this unity of command but never fully realized it.

The next chapter discusses current service doctrine for the employment of forces in a theater of operation, and it shows why we have never fully achieved the unity of command principle because of service doctrine and perspectives for theater warfare. Chapter 3 develops the background information for the final chapter, which outlines a proposed command structure for theater warfare.

NOTES

CHAPTER 2

1. *Command and Employment of Military Forces*, USAF Extension Course Institute, Vol. II, Part C (Maxwell AFB AL: Air War College, 1952), p. 5.

2. "If we are to prosecute our next war successfully, firm doctrine based upon common sense must be arrived at, agreed upon, and taught . . . now." So wrote a former US Army infantry instructor at the US Army Command and General Staff College in 1949. This was true in 1949 and is true even today. Reference: Edward M. Postlethwait, Lieutenant Colonel, USA, "Unified Command in Theaters of Operations," *Military Review*, November 1949, p. 23.

3. Ibid., p. 5. See also John L. Frisbee, "New Life for JCS at Forty," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1982, p. 86. Frisbee states that from the late 1700s until the early 1940s, the direction of US forces in wartime has been through a loose process called mutual cooperation. The direction of US forces was under a Joint Army-Navy Board following the Spanish-American War. In 1919, the Joint Chiefs of Staff was established. From 1903 until 1942, the Joint Army-Navy Board operated under the doctrine of mutual cooperation.

4. Subunified command structure (MACV) in Vietnam. See section entitled Vietnam War.

5. John D. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954), p. 23.

6. Ibid., p. 25.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. Ibid., p. 25.

9. Executive Order 9028, 28 February 1942.

10. Millett, *The Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces*, p. 23.

11. Ibid., p. 37.

12. Ibid.

13. *Command and Employment of Military Forces*, p. 5.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.

17. General W. W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, *Air Power in Three Wars* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 50

18. Eisenhower was under considerable pressure to have all American ground forces placed under Montgomery's command and to have a single air component command by the British. The American forces opposed this. To appease both the British and the Americans, Eisenhower elected to retain ground forces under his authority and to keep tactical air under the British and strategic bombardment under the Americans. Thus, bowing to political pressures, he compromised the command structure. (See Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, pp. 46–52.)

19. Momyer, *Airpower in Three Wars*, p. 51.

20. Ibid., pp. 50–51, for a detailed discussion.

21. Ibid., p. 51.

22. John L. Frisbee, "Command Lines for Combat Force," *Defense 81*, August 1981, p. 10. See also Frisbee, "New Life for JCS at Forty," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1982, p. 86. The Joint Chiefs of Staff first met on 9 February 1942. The JCS was established by President Roosevelt following the Arcadia Conference of December 1941–January 1942. The US President and UK Prime Minister

Churchill agreed to form the US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff as the military organization to provide strategic direction for American and British forces. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff was the counterpart of the British Chiefs of Staff Committee which was organized in 1923.

23. Frisbee, "Command Lines for Combat Force," *Defense 81*, p. 10.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid., p. 11.

27. Postlethwait, "Unified Command in Theaters of Operations," *Military Review*, p. 26. The doctrinal views expressed by Lieutenant Colonel Postlethwait, reprinted in full in Appendix I, Section 5, may not be as accurate as they are indicative of the perception many held in 1947-50 about service doctrine.

28. Ibid.

29. Admiral W. H. P. Blandy, USN, Retired, "Command Relations in Amphibious Warfare," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 77 (June 1951), p. 573.

30. Ibid.

31. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, pp. 50, 53, and 56.

32. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce), p. 38. Futrell gives an excellent review of the events leading up to the Korean war. See pages 38 through 55.

33. Message, JCS 85743 to CINCFE, 12 July 1950.

34. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, p. 52.

35. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea*, p. 39.

36. Roy E. Appleman, *United States Army in the Korean War. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. vii.

37. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea*, p. 43.

38. Ibid., p. 44. It is interesting to note that as early as 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued a directive (JCS 1259/27, 11 December 1946) to all theater commanders which required unified commanders to establish a joint staff to provide the specialized knowledge and advice that was needed to employ land, naval, and air forces. It took 3 years for MacArthur to acknowledge this directive. He established a Joint Strategic Plans and Operation Group of the General Headquarters, Far East Command, on 20 August 1949. However, in reality, the unification principle never reached the highest level of his command. Even in June 1950, the General Headquarters, Far East Command, "demonstrated an absence of any vestige of unification principles."

39. Ibid. (Conclusion taken from Far East Air Forces Report 1, pp. 24-25, and reported in Futrell's book *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 44.)

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Stratemeyer to CG FEAF Bomber Command, Mission Directive, 11 July 1950; Stratemeyer to CG FEAF, Mission Directive, 12 July 1950, as quoted in Futrell's book *The United States Air Forces in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 45.

43. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 48.

44. Ibid.

45. Almond to Commander, US Naval Forces Far East and CG FEAF, Coordination of Air Effort of Far East Air Forces and United States Naval Forces Far East, 15 July 1950, as quoted in Futrell's book *The United States Air Forces in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 50.

46. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 54.

47. Message, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 230736Z July 1950, as quoted in Futrell's book *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 54.

48. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, p. 54.

49. Ibid., p. 55.

50. Executive Agent. The JCS may designate one of its members to act as their agent to execute functions or activities for which they are responsible and for which they have been assigned a specific responsibility. (JCS Pub 2, paragraph 30291.)

51. Frisbee, "Command Lines for Combat Forces," *Defense 81*, p. 11.

52. See Appendix A for a review of the provisions of JCS Publication 2.

53. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, p. 65.

54. There is an interesting book that provides an insight into military theory and strategy used in Vietnam. The book, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context*, by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 1981), places the Clausewitzian theory and principles of war in context of domestic problems and helps explain the Vietnam war in hopes of preparing the US Army to serve more effectively in future conflicts. Additionally, this book takes a critical look at how the principle of unity of command was used by the United States and North Vietnam. See pages 87–93 and 101–111 of his book, and note 13, Chapter 4, of this study.

55. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, pp. 66–68.

56. Ibid., p. 69.

57. Ibid., p. 71.

58. Ibid.

59. General Paul D. Harkins, USA, COMUSMACV, argued the point. (See note 60 below.)

60. Admiral Harry D. Felt, USN, CINCPAC, expressed this view. (See Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, pp. 68–78.)

61. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, p. 73.

62. Ibid., p. 74.

63. Ibid., p. 76.

64. Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp replaced Admiral Felt on 1 July 1964 as CINCPAC.

65. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, p. 77.

66. MACV Directive 95-4, 6 May 1965.

67. "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968" (Washington, DC: JCS Historical Division, July 1976), pp. 1–25. Previously classified. Declassified by SM-197-81, 20 March 1981. (See Appendix I, Section 3, for a discussion on the JCS paper.)

68. Momyer, *Air Power in Three Wars*, p. 82. Major General Norman J. Anderson, USMC, Retired, provides a different view in his review essay of General Momyer's book. The review essay entitled "Short Shrift for Marine Air" appeared in the May 1981 issue of *Marine Corps Gazette* (pp. 86–88). General Anderson states: "It was my contention then as Commanding General, 1st Marine Air Wing, and it remains my conviction today that the root reason for 'single management' was years of Air Force neglect of Army requirements, neglect which could only be overcome by putting Marine Corps resources to work for the Army as a stop gap" (p. 87). Commenting upon the single manager for air concept in MACV and air component commander (Commander, Seventh Air Force), he states: "Others looked at the Seventh Air Force performance quite differently. To them, it simply revived and reaffirmed the conviction that when, in 1947, the United States set up an independent Air Force, it went a step too far by including tactical aviation in the newly established department. By thus separating tactical aviation in doctrine and objectives from the ground forces it is charged with supporting, our country committed a ghastly mistake. As evidenced in Korea and Vietnam, the Army relinquished capabilities which were to be regained only after long and bitter machinations in the war theater, whereas in both instances, the Marine Corps functioned as a team from the outset" (p. 88).

69. General William C. Westmoreland, USA, COMUSMACV, raised the issue—supported by General William W. Momyer, USAF, Air Deputy MACV—with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1968. See note 67, Chapter 2, and Section 3, Appendix I.

70. "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968." Previously classified. Declassified by SM-197-81, 20 March 1981. (See Appendix I, Section 3, for a discussion on the JCS paper.) See also General Westmoreland's book *A Soldier Reports*, Chapter XVIII, "The Battle for Khe Sanh," p. 335, and General Anderson's comments in note 68 of this chapter.

71. Ibid. The US Marine Corps does not agree with the conclusion reached by the JCS historical paper (see note 68 above). They believe that the single manager for air used in Vietnam did not work. See

Appendix D and note 68 above. Momyer, Westmoreland, and the JCS Historical Division paper conclude that the single manager for air used in Vietnam after 1967 did, in fact, work.

72. General William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 76, 261–262, and 411.

73. Phillip A. Crowl in his article "The Strategist's Short Catchist: Six Questions Without Answers," *The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History*, No. 20 (USAF Academy CO, 1978), p. 1, stated this same thought when he said, "History is simply recorded memory. People without memory are mentally sick. So, too, are nations or societies or institutions that reject or deny the relevance of the collective past."

74. *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Government Printing Office, August 1981), p. 7.

75. General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed these same thoughts during an address to the class of 1982, Air War College, Maxwell AFB AL, 29 January 1982. In brief, his remarks were: "History has shown that span of control becomes a limiting factor in designing an effective command structure. For example, when General Marshall was Chief of the Army Staff, he reorganized his staff because too many people—some 61—reported directly to him. His span of control was too great. Today, we seem to have slipped back to Marshall's days, our span of control is too great. As applied to the recent discussions on unified commands, we tend to overly complicate our command structures with an excessive span of control. We need to insure this command structure is a true joint command, with representation from each service, with clear and direct lines of communications." (Used with permission of General Jones.) (See also JCS Publication 2, pp. 3–4.) General Jones, in an interview at the Pentagon on 17 February 1982, and reported in *The Montgomery Advertiser*, 155th Year, No. 35, 18 February 1982, p. 49, in an article entitled "General Seeks Changes in Joint Chiefs System," stated that "changes need to be made in the joint system." He stated the aim of his proposed changes was to "improve planning . . . in military readiness matters. The current system . . . puts emphasis on budget matters and on . . . peacetime management of the services. Changes in strategy tend to threaten traditional service roles or a redistribution of money . . ."

CHAPTER 3

SERVICE DOCTRINE FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THEATER-ASSIGNED ASSETS

In the last chapter, selected historical examples of command arrangements used in World War II and the Korean and Vietnam conflicts were presented. With these perspectives in mind, let's review current service doctrine for the employment of theater-assigned assets.

Overview

The services articulate fundamental doctrine in different ways. For example, the US Army calls its fundamental doctrine CAPSTONE doctrine, while the Air Force uses the term BASIC doctrine. The tag used is not important. What is important is how the capstone, or basic, or fundamental doctrine is interpreted to justify command arrangements in the joint and combined arena.

One problem in analyzing service doctrine is understanding the terminology. A common word may have different meanings to each service. An example I recall caused 6 months of discussion between the Army and the Air Force before someone realized both were using the same word—"control"—but with different meanings. The Air Force uses control in its strictest sense, while the Army uses it more loosely. It may sound insignificant, but an understanding of how the services use a term is most important. Numerous doctrinal issues have arisen—both here and with our allies—over a misunderstanding of terminology. The message is this: Be cautious when reading service doctrine; make sure you do not interject your service perspective into the reading of other services' doctrine. To help overcome this problem, two publications are most useful in the review process. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* (UNAAF), should be consulted for terms. For ease of reading, common terms for the services' doctrine, as defined by these JCS publications, are explained in the Notes sections of this monograph.

The term doctrine,[1] as used here, refers to "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national

objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[2] In short, doctrine is what we believe about the employment of military forces. There are three categories of doctrine—service, joint, and combined. Service doctrine is binding only upon that service, while joint and combined doctrines are binding upon all the services that have agreed to it.[3] Joint doctrine is doctrine between two or more services, while combined doctrine is between two or more nations—to include the services of that nation. Service doctrine should be in line with the agreed joint and combined doctrines, but it does not have to be. However, and this point is important, when a service employs forces in a joint or combined operation, it must be in line with the accepted joint and combined doctrines.

Chapter 4 presents the underpinning for joint and combined doctrines for a theater of operation and sets the stage for the proposed command structure for theater warfare. However, before discussing joint and command doctrines, it is necessary to review service doctrine in support of theater operations.

In the next four sections, the US Army, US Navy, US Marine Corps, and US Air Force service doctrines for employing forces in a joint or combined operation are presented. The focus is on doctrinal pronouncements dealing with the joint and combined aspects of warfighting.[4] As will be shown, the services' doctrines and practices still preclude effective unity of command. The final section analyzes the services' doctrines to arrive at a US command structure for theater joint and combined warfare—a unified command structure.

US Army Doctrine[5]

Two primary sources—Field Manual 100-1, *The Army*, and Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*—were used in the discussion on how the US Army doctrine is developed for employing Army forces in theater warfare. These sources provide the capstone doctrine, which is called "AirLand Battle" doctrine.

AirLand Battle doctrine stresses mobility, flexibility, and staying power so that the Army will be prepared to win the first battle of any war.[6] "The success of Army forces in supporting national policy throughout the spectrum of conflict is, in large measure, dependent on the coordinated development of the land, sea, and air forces of the United States and on their employment as an integrated team."[7] This integrated team provides the basis for the organization and command structure of the national security system. The Army's role in this system is the prosecution of the land war.[8] The land forces of the Army include organic land combat and service forces, and organic aviation and water transport assets.[9]

The Army believes that the value of the principles of war (objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, unity of command, security, surprise, maneuver, and simplicity) lies in their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic and tactical issues.[10] The principle of war that most directly applies to the theater

command structure is unity of command. The Army defines and discusses this principle as follows:

> Unity of Command. *For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander.*
>
> This principle insures that all efforts are focused on a common goal. At the *strategic level*, this common goal equates to the political purpose of the United States and the broad strategic objectives which flow therefrom. It is the common goal which, at the national level, determines the military forces necessary for its achievement. The coordination of these forces requires unity of effort. At the national level, the Constitution provides for unity of command by appointing the President as the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The President is assisted in this role by the national security organization, which includes the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the highest level, and the unified and specified commands and joint task forces at the operational levels.
>
> In the *tactical dimension*, it is axiomatic that the employment of military forces in a manner that develops their full combat power requires unity of command. Unity of command means directing and coordinating the action of all forces toward a common goal or objective. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, however, best achieved by vesting a single tactical commander with the requisite authority to direct and coordinate all forces employed in pursuit of a common goal.[11]

The Army recognizes the need for a single commander to direct and coordinate all forces employed in the pursuit of a common goal in a theater of operations. Additionally, Army doctrine recognizes that, to be effective, the command organization must be an integrated team of land, sea,[12] and air forces.

The Army force requirements to meet the needs of war and to prosecute a land campaign in support of national objectives stem from the nation's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Korea, the Middle East, and other areas of treaty obligations and other interests. "In the contemporary world, it is also necessary that Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force requirements be coordinated so as to exploit unique characteristics of each service, and so as to avoid unnecessary duplication among the services."[13] The requirements for the Army's forces—corps, divisions, brigades, battalions—and their support are drawn up in response to three primary factors: national military strategy, military capabilities of the nation's potential enemies, and allies with whom we expect to fight.[14]

The above reflects the Army's fundamental doctrine for force employment. The key element is a land force prepared to fight worldwide against a varied threat while integrated, under a single commander, in an effective team of land, naval, and air forces.

These basic concepts with regard to the purpose and organization of the Army, as outlined in Field Manual 100-1, are translated into Army doctrine for operations in Field Manual 100-5. This document states what the Army must do to win campaigns and battles in today's warfare, with guidance on how it may be accomplished.[15]

The Army operational doctrine states that to *win*, the Army will be required to fight battles which coordinate the actions of all military forces in the

accomplishment of national objectives. The force that seizes the initiative and disrupts the "opponent's fighting capability in depth with deep attack, effective firepower, and decisive maneuver" will win.[16] According to the US Army, if the doctrine outlined in Field Manual 100-5 is followed, the full potential of US forces will be developed. Fighting this way—integrating conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means—will allow the US Army to attack deep and "begin offensive action by air and land forces to conclude the battle on its terms."[17] According to the Army, the concept of depth, or attacking deep, is important to all Army operations. Field Manual 100-5 states that the dimensions of depth are time, distance, and resources. By employing men, weapon systems, and material deep, the commander will have the flexibility needed to fight and extend his influence over greater distances. Commanders will be required to look forward in enough depth to permit time "to execute appropriate countermoves, to battle the forces in contact, and to attack enemy rear forces."[18]

To insure successful operations on the battlefield requires an understanding of the imperatives of modern combat. Included in the Army's discussion on the imperatives of modern combat is unity of effort.[19] Army operational doctrine defines unity of effort as being derived from the principles of objective, unity of command, and simplicity. To insure unity of effort, effective leadership and an effective command and control system are required.[20] This means the commander must see the battlefield all the way from the unit's rear boundary to the forward edge of its area of interest, with a command and control system to support the battlefield.[21]

The command and control arrangements espoused in Army doctrine are as follows. Normally, Army units are committed as part of a joint or combined force.[22] The Army seldom fights alone since the military operations of US forces normally will involve the employment of more than one service; thus, joint and combined operations will be the rule rather than the exception. The command and control of joint forces will conform to the provisions of joint doctrine publications, while tactical employment will be as prescribed by each service's doctrine.[23] The organizational structure to accomplish joint and combined operations follows the guidance in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2.[24] This organization provides for the centralized direction and decentralized execution, while at the same time maintaining the identity of the separate components.

To support the objectives of the theater commander and to prosecute the land battle, the Army employs the deep battle or extended battlefield concept. The deep battle is designed to support the commander's basic scheme of maneuver by disrupting enemy forces in depth. As detailed in Field Manual 100-5 in the discussion on tactical intelligence, the commander must consider the battlefield in terms of time and space.[25] The commander should view the battlefield as two distinct areas: an area of influence and an area of interest.[26] The area of influence is that area within the commander's area of responsibility where he must be able to locate enemy formations which can affect his current operation and attack them with organic or supporting means. For the corps commander, this translates, in time, up to 72 hours beyond the forward line of his troops; for the commander of the

echelon above corps—theater army or army group—this is up to 96 hours in time.[27] The area of interest is that area that extends beyond the area of influence. This includes adjacent territory where enemy forces are located who could affect a commander's operation. Translated into time, the area of interest for the corps commander is up to 96 hours beyond the forward line of his troops; for the theater army or army group commander, it is beyond 96 hours.[28] In terms of distance, generally the area of influence lies between 75 and 150 kilometers and the area of interest lies beyond 150 kilometers. The exact dimensions of a unit's area of interest and area of influence depend upon many factors. However, it must be large enough to give the corps 96 hours' notice of the approach of enemy divisions or armies.[29]

Normally, the areas of influence and interest will be irregular in shape and overlap adjacent unit areas. The echelon above is responsible for assigning primary responsibility for these overlapping areas and must provide intelligence on areas of interest to the unit commander concerned.[30] To fight the extended or deep battle requires resources not organic to the Army.[31] Hence, Army doctrine stresses unity of effort to achieve national objectives.

The Army is organized into maneuver battalions, brigades, divisions, corps, and echelons above corps (theater army or army group) to support the joint or combined command structure. The exact structure of the Army organization is scenario dependent. The theater army is the land component in a theater of operation. The organization of the theater army must be structured to insure success on the battlefield in either a conventional, nuclear, or chemical environment or any combination of these. The "principal force in a theater of operations [is] the corps [which] has both tactical and administrative responsibilities."[32] Normally, the combat service support elements report to the corps support command while combat and combat support units report directly to the corps commander. The corps is the highest tactical command; however, "there may be unusual wartime operational circumstances that require an Army echelon between the corps and the unified headquarters [but this is] an exception to the normal operational command relationship."[33]

This brief review of Army doctrine for joint and combined operations provides an insight into how the US Army views joint and combined warfighting. In summary, the Army believes in the principle of unity of command and the land, naval, and air component command structure. To support the theater command, current Army doctrine stresses the corps as the highest tactical command and only under exceptional conditions would an echelon above the corps be employed.[34]

US Navy Doctrine[35]

The Navy, unlike the Army and Air Force, does not articulate fundamental doctrine for joint and combined operations in its separate doctrinal naval warfare publications. Instead, the Navy uses the appropriate combined and joint

publications on their fundamental doctrine for joint and combined operations. The Navy subscribes to the full range of joint and combined arms doctrine, including those associated with the North Atlantic Alliance. However, there are doctrinal pronouncements in naval warfare publications that illuminate Navy views for joint and combined warfare.

Since the US Navy has concurred in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 and allied publications on combined warfare, such as Allied Tactical Publication 8, *Amphibious Warfare Doctrine*, the principles and doctrine outlined in these publications form the fundamental doctrine for the Navy. Briefly, the Navy believes in the principle of unity of effort where forces of separate nations and their services are integrated under a single unified or combined commander into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.[36] The naval contribution to unified and combined operations is to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea.

The Navy works closely with the other services and allies in discharging their primary functions.[37] "Given the narrow margin of the US Navy advantage, every effort must be made to integrate relevant capabilities of the other US services and US allies into the campaign to defeat navies."[38] By using allied naval forces, US forces would be freed to conduct naval campaigns against enemy naval forces and tactical air support of land campaigns.

The mission of the US Navy is to organize, train, and equip forces for the conduct of combat operations at sea. This includes operations of sea-based and land-based naval air for naval operations. Also, the Department of the Navy is responsible for maintaining the Marine Corps.[39] Navy combat operations involve two basic functions—sea control and power projection.[40] Sea control is achieved by the engagement and destruction of, or by deterrence through, the threat of destruction of hostile aircraft, ships, and submarines at sea. Power projection is a means of supporting land or air campaigns using naval capabilities.[41]

The part of the Navy charged with carrying out these naval operations is the operating forces. The operating forces include the fleets, seagoing forces, naval destruct forces, sea frontier forces, Fleet Marine Forces, the Military Sealift Command, Navy shore activities, and other forces as assigned by the Department of the Navy.[42]

When naval forces are assigned to unified commanders, they are "discharged in a manner consistent with full operational command vested in the unified . . . combatant commanders."[43] This means that all naval combatant ships, combat support ships, and naval aviation units are assigned under operational control of the naval component commander of a unified or combined command. Forces not assigned to a unified operation are under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations.[44]

By law,[45] naval forces are composed of Marine land combat, naval combat, service forces, and organic aviation elements—US Navy and US Marine Corps aviation elements—for the "purpose of controlling the seas and littoral [shore or coastal] areas while defending the fleet against all threats the enemy may bring to bear."[46] Naval air provides an element of flexibility for employment in a theater of

operations, either in support of naval or land operations. Naval aviation, when supporting joint naval or amphibious operations, is under the operational command of the unified commander. Naval aviation that supports land operations is flown in an in-support-of role.[47] If naval aviation is required by the land or air component of the unified command or is directed by the unified commander, it is flown in support of the land operation, but operational control does not pass to the land or air component commander. The naval component commander retains operational control. This method of employing naval aviation is temporary in nature. It is employed when the land battle requires additional air to accomplish a specific mission of limited duration.[48] The rationale is that naval aviation is for fleet defense and is required to primarily support naval and amphibious operations. However, naval aviation can be used to support land operations.

In summary, Navy fundamental doctrine for employment of forces in joint and combined doctrine, although not enunciated in naval warfare publications, supports the principles of unity of effort[49] which states that to utilize the armed forces of the United States effectively, they should be integrated closely into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. However, naval aviation flown in support of land operations remains under operational control of the naval component commander.

US Marine Corps Doctrine[50]

The Marine Corps—like the Navy and unlike the Army and Air Force—does not repeat or amplify fundamental principles for joint and combined operations that are found in Joint Chiefs of Staff publications or combined doctrine publications.[51] However, unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps does publish "white letters" by the Commandant of the Marine Corps which provide guidance for the employment of Marine forces in support of joint and combined operations.

The Marine Corps comes under the Department of the Navy where there are two separate services—the Navy and Marine Corps.[52] To a large degree, each of these services is separate and distinct with respect to its administrative function. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is a chief of service and a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Briefly stated:

> The Commandant of the Marine Corps is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for administration, discipline, internal organization, training, requirements, efficiency, readiness of the Marine Corps, for the operation of the Marine Corps material support system, and for the total performance of the Marine Corps.[53]

With regard to its mission and functions,[54] the Marine Corps is organized, trained, and equipped to

> provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the United States Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.[55]

The Marine Corps has the capability to respond to operations not associated with naval campaigns. "For example, the utilization of Marines in Korea and later in South Vietnam is typical of the type mission which may be assigned to the Corps at the direction of the President."[56]

The combat portion of the Marines is called the operating forces of the Marine Corps and is composed of the Marine complement aboard naval vessels, the security forces on duty with naval shore activities, Marine combat forces not otherwise assigned, special activity forces, and the Fleet Marine Forces—of which there are currently two: Fleet Marine Force, Pacific and Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Operational control of the Fleet Marine Forces resides with the respective US Navy fleet commanders,[57] while administrative control is exercised by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Marine Corps doctrine emphasizes close integration of air and ground operations. The Marine forces are normally organized into a Marine air-ground task force. This task force is composed of a command element with three subordinate elements—ground combat, aviation combat, and combat service support.[58] There are three types of marine air-ground task forces provided by the Fleet Marine Forces. The Marine amphibious unit is the smallest of the three and is used primarily for operations of limited scope and duration. The Marine amphibious brigade, which is capable of conducting sustained air-ground operations on a limited scale, is the second type of task force. The Marine amphibious force is the type of Marine air-ground task force appropriate to the majority of situations involving Marines in sustained combat.[59]

When Marine forces are employed in joint or combined operations, Marine Corps doctrine states that operational command by the unified or joint commander will be "exercised through the service component commander and commanders of other subordinate commands."[60] Marine doctrine goes on to state the Marine air-ground task force—the combat element of Marine forces—can be employed in the following ways: as a service component of the naval component of a unified command, as an element of a joint task force under a unified command, as a uniservice force under a unified or subordinate unified command, as a joint task force under a specified command, or as a service component of the naval component of a specified command.[61] The above relationship of the Marine air-ground task force to the joint or combined command deals with its primary function of amphibious operations and "will be employed as a uniservice force under the unified command."[62] Marine doctrine also states that when Marine forces are operating as an element of a combined force, those Marine forces employed will be used in accordance with the agreed doctrine of the military alliances participating in the operation. For example, in NATO, Marine forces will be "guided by NATO standardization agreements[63] and by major NATO commanders' exercise directive[s]."[64]

Marine doctrine states that when the Marine air-ground task force is employed, it generally functions as a separate component of a naval task force, joint task force, or combined force, with operational control passing to an operational commander as directed.[65] "The MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] operates as an integral

component under the command authority of the designated operational commander [and the] MAGTF commander retains operational control of all organic assets to include Marine aviation, with priority of tasking aircraft in support of his ground forces."[66]

According to the Commandant, in a recent white letter, to achieve flexibility in the Marine air-ground task force, "it is the Marine Corps policy that Fleet Marine Forces normally will be employed as integrated air-ground teams. The organization of Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs), with integrated combined arms forces capable of performing across the spectrum of combat situations, is unique to our corps."[67] Additionally, this white letter outlines policy and amplification to Marine doctrine on the Marine air-ground task force contained in Fleet Marine Force Manual 0-1. In brief, the white letter provides the following as examples of recent evidence of the flexibility of Marine Corps doctrine to support amphibious and sustained operations ashore:

> Operational control of aviation assets will normally remain with the MAGTF commander and priority of tasking air support will go to the MAGTF ground forces; however, we must accept the necessity of committing our air assets alone when they arrive in theater prior to the ground forces, which is often the case.
>
> While continuing to stress the optimum utility of MAGTF integrity, we must recognize the necessity for centralized control but decentralized execution of tasks. . . . I [reaffirm] my policy that, when operating in a nonamphibious environment, OPCON (operational control) of MAGTFs may be exercised by subunified commanders down through corps-equivalent commanders.[68]

In another white letter, the Commandant provided amplification on Marine doctrine for the employment of the Marine air-ground task force during nonamphibious operations.[69] The Commandant stated the Marine Corps is prepared to operate in any battlefield scenario, and its ability to contribute to the success of the theater mission is inherent in the Marine air and ground combat elements working together as a tightly integrated entity.[70] This white letter provides guidance during sustained operations ashore. As viewed by the Marine Corps, this employment will be as follows:

> The integrity of the MAGTF as an air-ground team [will be maintained with] operational control of organic Marine TACAIR* retained by the MAGTF during joint land operations. The MAGTF will provide sorties to the joint force commander in the areas of air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance [and] Marine TACAIR sorties available in excess of MAGTF requirements will be made available to the joint force commander."[71]

Finally, the white letter states the "MAGTF commander is a 'uniservice commander' [which] establishes the basis for the integrity of the MAGTF as an entity."[72]

In summary, the Marine Corps believes in the principles of unity of command and effort wherein a single commander exercises operational command through component or subordinate commands. Through its policy statements, the Marine Corps states its belief that the Marine air-ground task force, when employed in nonamphibious operations, will be used as a uniservice force reporting directly to the joint or unified commander.

US Air Force Doctrine

The Air Force, like the Army, articulates its fundamental doctrine in basic—or capstone—publications. The basic doctrine of the Air Force is found in Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force*. However, unlike the Army, the Air Force has a family of basic doctrines. Air Force Manual 1-1 is the umbrella doctrine for the family of basic doctrines, which is published in the 1-series manuals. Operational doctrine is published in the 2-series manuals, and each major command publishes mission-oriented doctrine in the major command series. For example, Tactical Air Command (TAC) publishes doctrine for tactical air operations in its Tactical Air Command Manual 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations*. Major command doctrine is in line with Air Force basic and operational doctrine.

The primary source used to develop this section is Air Force Manual 1-1. The Preface in this manual states:

> This manual is an authoritative statement for the employment of Air Force resources. As such, the terms used here are descriptive in nature and should be viewed from a philosophical, not a legal, context. . . . Doctrine for joint operations describes service responsibilities for force employment by two or more U.S military services. . . . Doctrine for combined operations is coordinated among the services of member nations of defense alliances . . .[71]

Air Force basic doctrine begins with a discussion of national power and the military instrument. It describes the role the Air Force plays in securing and preserving the freedom of the people of the United States. The Air Force must maintain a force that is capable of carrying out its assigned mission. "This posture is sustained by the Air Force and supported through the teamwork of our nation's armed services."[72] "For the nation to have an effective military instrument, the military services must be an efficient team of land, naval, and aerospace."[73]

Air Force basic doctrine stresses that air forces "must be effective in supporting the other services in their roles and missions. The Air Force can do this because of [its] unique capability to deliver material, transport people, and project firepower rapidly."[74] To be effective, the Air Force has primary functions for which it is solely responsible and other functions that it performs in coordination with the other services."

Aerospace forces are applied in combat through the organizational arrangements outlined in JCS Publication 2. "Air Force warfare systems[78] are employed by an Air Force component commander working within a joint force, and the strength of a joint force comes from the unique service contribution by the land, naval, and aerospace forces working as a unified team."[79]

The Air Force accomplishes its assigned functions through its basic operational missions. These are: strategic aerospace offense, strategic aerospace defense, space operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift, close air support, counterair operations, air interdiction, and special operations.[80] The Air Force is organized into major commands based upon these missions: strategic offensive, strategic defense, strategic and tactical airlift, tactical support of surface forces, and training to support these functions.[81] These major commands are further subdivided into numbered air forces, air divisions, groups, wings, and squadrons, as required to accomplish the Air Force mission.

The mission of the Air Force is the prosecution of the air war. Air Force "missions during theater air operations are not isolated from land and naval operations. The missions of the services are coordinated to provide the joint force with the proper balance of available airpower."[82]

According to Air Force doctrine, mutual support of the other services is an important function of aerospace forces. The Air Force is structured so that in "training, supporting, and employing forces [the Air Force] consider[s] carefully the extent to which [each service] can augment the capabilities of the other services."[83] With regard to the control of military forces, the Air Force supports the principle of unity of command. Air Force basic doctrine discusses this principle as follows:

> Successful military operations depend on a unity of command to achieve the integrated effort and precise control needed to attain military objectives. The organization and the procedures it applies must be designated to achieve unity of command.
>
> Unity of command requires a clear statement of command arrangements and responsibilities. Each command must be structured to insure rapid decisionmaking and implementation. There must be a single commander at each level in the chain of command—and each commander must know what is expected of his command. Guidance should also be more precise at each echelon down the chain of command. Commanders must also work with each other to coordinate their coverage of overlapping areas.
>
> The commander must have a clear understanding of the developing battle. The commander must be able to direct the command's forces through subordinate commanders who also understand the objective. This requires teamwork within and between services. Unity of command is especially critical during periods of crisis and confusion.[84]

To support the theater battle, the Air Force provides airlift for strategic and tactical operations. To support the AirLand Battle, the Air Force provides the theater commander close air support for land forces, battlefield air interdiction, tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance, air defense, offensive counterair, air interdiction, and special air operations. For effective employment of aerospace forces in a theater of operation, Air Force doctrine states that the principles of

centralized control, decentralized execution, coordinated effort, common doctrine, and cooperation are essential elements and are fundamental to the success of Air Force operations.[85] The principle of centralized control[86] and decentralized execution is a key element of Air Force's employment doctrine which allows air forces to be directed towards a common objective and allows a more flexible use of aerospace forces. Decentralized execution allows the lower echelon commander "wider use of judgment in employing the capabilities and characteristics of warfare systems."[87] Air Force doctrine states that centralized control of air forces must be established under a single air commander.[88] The principle of coordinated effort, common doctrine, and cooperation is a vital step towards a coordinated effort to attain common objectives and is fundamental to establishing teamwork.

> Air Force strategic and tactical weapons must be targeted and applied together with those of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied services. . . . Success in battle depends on cooperation within an alliance, to integrate and coordinate plans and strategy for combined operations to achieve a common objective.[89]

The Air Force believes that the principles of war—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, surprise, security, unity of effort, maneuver, simplicity, timing and tempo, and defensive[90]—provide guidance for the most efficient employment of aerospace power. They provide a basis for Air Force planning, directing, and controlling actions of forces. "This proven use enhances the opportunity for success."[91] The principle of war that most directly applies to the theater command structure is unity of effort. The Air Force defines and discusses this principle of war as follows:

> Unity of effort permits integrated, responsive, and decisive application of aerospace power. It focuses power on the objective. Aerospace forces can be employed in diverse and multiple tasks. These tasks are interdependent and must be executed in a coordinated and complementary manner to fulfill task objectives.
>
> To realize the full potential and effectiveness of aerospace forces, they must be employed as an entity under command arrangements that preclude dissipation of resources and fragmentation of effort.
>
> Unity of effort for aerospace forces is best achieved when allocation of resources, assignment of priorities, overall planning, and control of operations are centralized at the highest level under the authority of a single air commander, usually the Air Force component commander.[92]

In summary, the Air Force believes in the principles of unity of command and effort where a single commander exercises operational command through the component command system; where forces are integrated under a single commander into an effective team of land, naval, and air forces. The Air Force states that air forces must be prepared to prosecute an air campaign worldwide against varied threats.

Comparative Analysis of Service Doctrine

To fully understand the services' views on a theater command structure, one must go beyond the written doctrinal statements made by the individual services. The doctrine espoused by each service provides the backdrop to compare the service doctrine; however, one must compare how the services use their doctrine in arriving at a command structure. This section compares and analyzes the doctrinal statements to provide an insight into the services' actual employment of their forces in a theater of operations. By analyzing the services' doctrine, the following general statements can be made.

The Navy and Air Force view warfighting from a theater perspective. The Army sees the battle from the corps' perspective where the corps is the highest tactical fighting unit, although they fully support the concept of an echelon above the corps. The Marines view warfighting from a single mission, uniservice perspective; that is, from the perspective of an integrated, combined arms force—the Marine air-ground task force—which is task-organized to perform a specific mission. These views tend to drive the services to differing opinions on how forces should be organized for theater warfare. The services' written doctrines support these views. Naval forces are structured to conduct sea control and power projection. Air Force forces are structured to support surface (land or sea/water environment) operations and to carry out the air campaign. Army forces are structured to support the concept of the corps as the highest tactical combat command in theater warfare. The Army recognizes that a tactical command could be required above the corps. Marine Corps forces are structured to support the concept of an integrated Marine air-ground team in support of theater objectives.

Each of the services formally acknowledges the principle of unity of effort which states that military forces should be integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. However, each applies this principle in varying ways. Army, Navy, and Air Force agree that one single commander, the theater or joint force commander, should exercise operational control of theater-assigned assets through his land, naval, and air component commanders. The Marine Corps believes that Marine combat forces should come directly under the joint or theater commander and be employed by a Marine component commander. The Army and Air Force believe in the functional component—air, land, and naval; the Navy and Marine Corps believe in the service component—US Navy component, US Marine component, US Air Force component, and US Army component.

The Army and Air Force agree that land forces should come under the land component, air forces should come under the air component, and naval forces should come under the naval component. Both the Army and the Air Force agree that US Marine forces should come under the naval component when assigned amphibious operations or other operations in support of naval campaigns. They agree that Marine combat forces should be assigned to the operational control of the land component during sustained operations ashore.

The Navy believes that all naval assets, including Navy aviation, should come under the naval component commander. If naval aviation assets are employed over the land in support of the AirLand Battle, naval aviation should remain under the operational control of the naval component commander and should operate in an in-support-of role. They believe in the principle of a single manager for air.

The Marine Corps supports the principle of unity of effort but applies it differently. They believe that the Marine forces are a fourth component—land, naval, air, and marine force components—during sustained operations ashore.[93] When operating in amphibious or naval operations, the Marines come under the naval unified or naval component commander. During sustained operations ashore, the Marine Corps believes its forces should come directly under the theater or joint task force commander. Thus, the Marine Corps would operate as an uniservice command. The Marine Corps does not believe in the principle of a single commander for air concept unless that commander is the Marine air-ground task force commander. The principle must maintain the integrity of the Marine air-ground task force.

All four services believe that the theater or joint task force commander should organize his forces the best way he sees fit. In general, the Army and Air Force believe there are three generic components composed of land forces, naval forces, and air forces. The Navy and Marines believe that for sustained operations ashore, a fourth component should be added. If the theater or joint force commander organizes his forces with only three components, then the Navy and Marine Corps would support this arrangement as long as Marine aviation remained integral to the Marine air-ground task force. They do not support placing ground combat forces under the land component and aviation forces under the air component.

To compare how the services actually employ these doctrinal statements, the following analysis is provided. This comparison is based upon actual experience in working doctrinal issues in the joint arena, discussions with service staff officers, and interviews with senior service officers.

The US Army has employed its forces under the unified command structure since the beginning of the concept. Army forces are normally divided into an army group or field army with the corps under this echelon above corps. Recent decisions by the Army staff and doctrinal statements by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command have tended to imply a drift from this principle of unified command. For example, the extended battlefield concept[94] tends to portray the battle from a corps, and below, perspective. Additionally, the 1973 Abrams agreement[95] changed Army doctrine by placing emphasis on the corps, thus in effect eliminating the echelon above corps.[96] The US Army has recognized that an echelon above corps is needed and is working to provide the interface for joint coordination of organic army assets and air force tactical air assets.[97] Recent discussions by the Army staff and Air Staff, and the dialogue between the Army's Training and Doctrine Command and the Air Force's Tactical Air Command, have centered on working out procedures to effect the needed coordination between Army and Air Force units in a theater of operations.[98]

Like the Army, the US Navy has employed its forces under the unified command principle since the beginning of the concept. The unified commander is a naval officer if the mission of the unified command—for example, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM)—is prompt and sustained sea operations. The Navy believes in the unified command structure to fight a theater war; however, if naval forces are assigned to unified commands not associated with naval operations, then these naval forces operate in support of the air-land operation.[99] Operational control remains with the fleet commander. This means that naval forces supporting the theater or joint task force commander may not be diverted, withdrawn, or used in other tasks without the approval of the fleet commander. Under the component command system, this presents no problems for the theater command organization as the fleet commander would be the naval component commander.

In the case of naval aviation supporting a land campaign, a problem exists. In effect, there would be two air component commanders operating in the same area.[100] The argument presented by the Navy is that naval air assets are limited, must be available as required to maintain sea control, and must be responsive to the needs of the fleet in defense of the fleet and in maintaining the sea lines of communications.[101] The Navy points out that naval air assets supporting the land commander will be provided to the theater or joint task force commander as determined by the fleet commander.[102] Discussions between the Navy and Air Force over this issue have resulted in an agreement that naval air assets provided for support of land operation will be in an in-support-of role.[103] It is interesting to note that several senior officers of the Air Force and Army have argued for naval air assets to be placed under the air component commander.[104] However, it appears that the position of the Navy will not change—that is, naval air assets will remain under the operational control of the fleet commander and operate in an in-support-of role.

Historically, the Marine Corps has operated under the operational control of the naval component or naval unified commander when conducting amphibious operations. In recent history, Marine forces have been employed in sustained operations ashore. When employed in this role, the question of command and control is raised. The Marine Corps argues that when operating in support of the land campaign—a sustained operation ashore—these forces should be placed under the theater or joint force commander and operate as a uniservice command.[105] The Marine Corps also argues for the integrity of the MAGTF. Recent discussion in the Joint Chiefs of Staff arena on this issue led to the services' agreement that the MAGTF normally would not be split—that is, aviation would remain integral to land combat forces, but the final command organization would rest with the theater or joint force commander.[106] If Marine forces are employed as suggested by the Marine Corps, it creates two land armies and two air component commanders.[107] Several Army and Air Force senior officers have raised this point.[108] In their view, all aviation assets should come under the air component commander and all ground forces should come under the land component commander. There is historical precedent for Marine Corps forces to come under the land component commander for sustained operation ashore.[109] However, it appears that the position of the US

Marine Corps will remain the same—that is, MAGTF integrity will be maintained by placing the MAGTF directly under the theater or joint force commander.

When US Marine Corps forces were introduced into NATO in 1977, the question of command and control of Marine forces was raised again. The issue revolved around who had operational control of Marine forces—the land component, the air component, or the theater commander.[110] The issue is still being debated in NATO; but, based upon the Joint Chiefs' 1980 decision, it is up to the theater commander to organize his forces as he sees fit.

Since its inception in 1947, the US Air Force has supported the unified command principle. The Air Force also supports the three component command structure. For theater operations, all air assets should come under the operational control of the air component commander. With the exception of strategic airpower,[111] all tactical bomber and tactical support aircraft, including theater airlift, come under the operational control of the theater air component commander. Several senior officers have argued that all air assets, including strategic bombers, should come under the operational control of the air component commander.[112] For national security reasons, however, the US Air Force has separated strategic airpower from tactical airpower in a theater of operations.[113] Although this does not create two air components, in the same sense as in the case of naval aviation and Marine air, it does tend to complicate the coordination process for airpower employment in a theater of operations. The US Air Force provides the theater air component commander with a Strategic Air Command Advanced Operational Nucleus (SACADVON) to support theater strategic bombardment operations. The rationale is that these strategic forces are a national asset and may be required in other contingencies. Therefore, operational control is retained by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command,[114] with tactical control passed to the theater air component commander. Tactical control is defined as the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is one level of control below operational command, operational control.[115]

In summary, the four services have formally agreed with the principles of warfighting and theater organization as specified in Joint Chief of Staff publications but have applied the principles in differing manners. It is these differing views that have created the lack of a coherent command structure based upon the principle of unity of command. Figure 4 depicts the services' views on the principles of warfighting and organization.

	ORIENTATION	PRINCIPLE OF UNITY OF EFFORT	NO. OF THEATER COMPONENTS	THEATER OR COMMANDER JTF ORGANIZES HIS FORCES	OPERATIONAL CONTROL EXERCISED BY	SINGLE MANAGER FOR AIR, LAND AND NAVAL FORCES
USA	Corps (highest tactical command) (land)	Agree	3 (naval, land, and air)	Agree	Theater or JTF* commander through land component commander (normally)	Believes in single manager for air, land, and naval forces
USN	Theater (sea and land)	Agree (as long as naval forces are commanded by a naval officer)	3 (naval, land, and air)	Agree	Theater or JTF* commander through naval component commander (always)	Believes in single manager for air—but naval forces are under naval component
USAF	Theater (air and support of surface operations)	Agree	3 (naval, land, and air)	Agree	Theater or JTF* commander through air component commander (always)	Believes in single manager for air, land, and naval forces
USMC	Mission directed (amphibious and other directed operations)	Agree (marine aviation remains under OPCON of MAGTF)*	4 (add the Marines as the fourth)	Agree (However, prefer not to split the MAGTF)*	Theater or JTF* commander, or by Marine component commander (uni-service or service component)	Do not believe in single manager for air, land, and naval forces; Marine air and land forces are under one manager, the MAGTF commander

*Notes: JTF—Joint Task Force; OPCON—Operational Control; MAGTF—Marine Air Ground Task Force

Figure 4. Comparative Analysis of Service Doctrine

The next chapter discusses joint and combined principles of warfighting and shows the application of these principles in setting up a command structure for theater warfare.

NOTES

CHAPTER 3

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1 has two definitions of doctrine. I have used the DOD version as opposed to the NATO definition. They are essentially the same, however. (See JCS Pub 1, p. 113.)

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 June 1979), p. 113.

3. Only all-service-agreed joint and combined doctrine was used in this monograph in the development of the command structure for theater warfare. See Appendix, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for background on joint doctrine; and Appendix H, "Combined Doctrine for Theater Warfare," for background on combined doctrine.

4. To understand the services' doctrines for employment of forces, one must not only have an understanding of fundamental doctrine but also of employment or operational doctrine.

5. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance for accuracy provided by the Army Advisory Group at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; in particular Colonel John Kennedy and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Lynch of the US Army, Lieutenant Colonel Craig Mandeville of the Department of Army's Firepower Requirements Division, Washington DC, and Lieutenant Colonel Lowell Bittrick of the USA Training and Dotrine Command, Ft. Monroe, Virginia.

6. *US Army Forces*, AU-8 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, September 1981), p. 2. (See also Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, 20 August 1982, p. 1-1; and *Department of the Army Manual*, December 1980, pp. 1-11, for discussion.)

7. Field Manual 100-1, *The Army* (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 14 August 1981), p. 3.

General E. C. Meyer, the US Army Chief of Staff, states in the Foreword to Field Manual 100-1, "The keystone of our [US Army] contribution toward peace is total competence in waging war. It is also my persuasion that each of us can profit by sober reflection on its [FM 100-1] contents—those fundamentals which drive our profession and which mark us individually as unique contributors to the nation and its security."

The Preface to Field Manual 100-1 states: "In this document are expressed the fundamental principles governing employment of United States Army forces in support of national objectives. . . . Tactical doctrine . . . can be found in appropriate field manuals. The basic operational concepts for . . . tactical doctrine are set forth in FM 100-5, *Operations*. Doctrines for joint operations . . . can be found in JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*."

8. See Appendix A, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for a discussion on the primary functions of the US Army.

9. Field Manual 100-1, p. 3.

10. Ibid., p. 13.

11. Ibid., p. 16.

12. The term "sea" is used interchangeably with the term "naval" in this monograph. The meanings are the same when used in this context.

13. Field Manual 100-1, p. 22.

14. Ibid.

15. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 20 August 1982), p. 1.

16. Ibid., p. 1-1.

17. Ibid., p. 1-5. For a contemporary view of the Army concept of fighting the extended battle, see the March 1981 issue of *Military Review*, "Extending the Battlefield," by General Donn A. Starry, USA, former Commanding General of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, pages 31-50. The thesis of General Starry's article is the corps commander must assume a greater role in fighting the battle. According to the concept, the corps and division commanders must see and attack targets deep in the enemy's second echelon area. In terms of time, the corps commander must have a flexible plan 72 hours into the future. As envisioned by the Army, the corps commander assumes the role of collapsing the enemy's ability to fight which drives the corps commander to employ a wide range of systems and organizations on a battlefield. For the corps and division, this is much deeper than foreseen by current doctrine (p. 32). To fight this extended battle, Army organic and Air Force tactical air assets are required (p. 37). For an alternative view of the extended battlefield, see the March-April 1983 issue of *Air University Review*, "Extending the Battlefield—An Airman's Point of View," by Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF (pp. 86-93). The thesis of this article on the extended battle, as viewed by the Air Force, is really a theater war and focus should not be on a corps battle. The Army concept, as currently articulated, overemphasizes the corps commander's responsibility for the battle, describes only one corps on line, and fails to indicate where the joint interface to coordinate Army organic and USAF tactical air occurs. The problem the Army concept presents the Air Force is a tendency to drive down the allocation of battlefield air interdiction and air interdiction to the corps and below level. The Air Force position is that airpower must be controlled centrally at the air component level. Colonel Corless W. Mitchell, USA, in an unpublished strategy employment assessment paper, AY 1981-82, for the Air War College, entitled "The Extended Battlefield Concept: A Potential Problem for the Command and Control of Air Power," states that "the new defensive doctrine of the extended battlefield and the concept of 'depth' is a violent departure from traditional doctrine" (p. 9). "FM 100-5 and influential Army leaders and writers of Army doctrine profess that the interdiction battle will be fought at the corps and division level. But the Army, through omission, has failed to address the 'sticky problem' of procedural command and control and its interface with the Air Force" (p. 11). "Indeed, there appears to be a gap in the formulation, coordination, and approval of joint command and control doctrine concerning this new defined Army area of responsibility [the extended battlefield]. The solution lies in a joint agreement as to the procedures that will be used for the planning, command and control, and the command relationships to be established for this new innovative doctrine" (p. 13).

18. Ibid., p. 2-2.

19. Unity of effort is defined by JCS Pub 2 as "the concept of the US military establishment as an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces . . . based on the principle that effective utilization of the military power of the nation requires that the efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated. Unity of effort among service forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives, and by sound operational and administrative command organizations" (p. 6).

20. Field Manual 100-5, pp. 2-6 and 2-7.

21. Ibid., p. 2-7.

22. Ibid., p. 15-1.

23. Ibid., p. 15-2.

24. Ibid. (See Chapters 15 and 17 for detailed discussion of employment of Army forces in joint and combined operations.)

25. Ibid. (See Chapter 6 for discussion on tactical intelligence for the modern battlefield.)

26. Ibid., p. 6-1.

27. Ibid., p. 6-2.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 7-15.

30. Ibid.

31. See note 17 above for discussion on resources required to fight the extended battle.

32. AU-8, p. 8.

33. Ibid.

34. It is interesting to note that today in Europe and the Pacific, the Army has an echelon above corps.

35. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance for accuracy provided by the Naval Advisory Group at Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama; in particular Captain Tom Kirtland, USN, and Lieutenant Commander C. D. Wagner, USN, of the Chief of Naval Operations' Strategy, Plans and Policy Division, Washington DC.

36. Interview with Captain Thomas J. Kirtland II, USN, Chief of Naval Advisory Group, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, on 9 November 1981. See also Appendix C for the Navy's view on unity of command.

37. See Appendix A, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for discussion on the Navy's primary functions.

38. *Employment of Naval and Marine Forces*, AU-16 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University, June 1980), p. v.

39. See this chapter, section entitled "US Marine Corps Doctrine"; and Appendix I, Sections 3 and 4, for the mission of the USMC.

40. AU-16, p. 3.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., p. 7.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., p. 8. (Operational control reverts back to the numbered fleet commander. The CNO retains administrative command.)

45. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, p. 8; and Title 10, US Code, as amended.

46. AU-16, p. 11.

47. In support of is defined as "assisting or protecting another formation, unit, or organization while remaining under original control" (JCS Pub 1, p. 176). The Navy uses this term to discuss the employment of naval aviation when supporting air-land operations.

48. The Air Force also employs air for naval operations—called tactical air support of maritime operations—in the same in-support-of arrangement.

49. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, p. 7; and Chapter 4, section entitled "Joint and Combined Doctrine."

50. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance for accuracy provided by the Naval Advisory Group, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

51. See Chapter 4, section entitled "Joint and Combined Doctrine."

52. AU-16, p. 61.

53. *Marine Corps Manual* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, HQ USMC, 1980), p. 1-4.

54. See Appendix A, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for primary missions of the USMC.

55. Marine Corps Manual, p. 1-3.

56. AU-16, p. 61. See also "US Marine Corps Aviation at a Glance," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1982, p. 51. This article states, in part, "To the uninitiated, the US Marine Corps – and Marine Corps Aviation – are simple adjuncts of the US Navy. But there is a clear delineation that gives USMC and Marine Aviation their special independence and autonomy. Reflecting this [independence and autonomy] is that the traditional primary mission of the USMC has been amphibious assault . . . its prominent role in the Joint Rapid Deployment Force [will be] . . . to engage in sustained ground combat. In the Southeast Asian conflict, USMC fought throughout the war on the ground. . . ."

57. Ibid., p. 63.

58. Ibid., p. 72.

59. Ibid., pp. 73, 75.

60. Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-1, *Command and Staff Action* (Washington, DC: HQ USMC, 21 May 1979), p. 237.

61. Ibid., p. 238.

62. Ibid.

63. See Appendix H for discussion on the term "standardization agreement."

64. Fleet Marine Force Manual 3-1, p. 241.

65. Fleet Marine Manual 0-1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine* (Washington, DC: HQ USMC, 31 August 1979), p. 1-8.

66. Ibid. (See also Landing Force Manual 0-1, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington, DC: HQ USMC, August 1967). Landing Force Manual 0-1, a joint manual—FM 31-11, NWP 22(B), and AFM 2-53—outlines the doctrine for the employment of amphibious forces.

67. White Letter No. 1-80, *Flexibility in MAGTF Operations* (Washington, DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQ USMC, 17 January 1980), p. 1.

68. Ibid., pp. 2 and 3.

69. White Letter No. 7-81, *Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore* (Washington, DC: Commandant of the Marine Corps, HQ USMC, 29 June 1981). This letter defends the integrity of the MAGTF and provides guidance to all Marines that the MAGTF will always be employed as a uniservice component—a separate, or fourth, component command when operating in sustained operations ashore.

70. Ibid., p. 1.

71. White Letter, Enclosure 2, p. 2.

72. Ibid., p. 3.

73. Air Force Manual 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force* (Washington, DC: HQ USAF, 14 February 1979), p. vii.

74. Ibid., p. v. Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen, Jr., stated in the Foreword to AFM 1-1: "Although the Air Force is now barely more than 30 years old, our ideas on the uses of airpower have been developing for more than 60 years—since before World War I. During these 60 years, our doctrine has grown from advocating limited observation and 'dogfight' roles to prescribing strategic, tactical, and mobility air operations throughout the world and in space."

75. Ibid., p. 1-4. Aerospace is defined by AFM 1-1 as "the total expanse beyond the Earth's surface; it is the multidimensional operating environment of the United States Air Force within which atmospheric, suborbital, orbital, and deep space systems are operated" (p. 2-4). For the purpose of this monograph, the term "air" and "aerospace" are interchangeable. (Colonel Dave McNabb, USAF; Colonel M. D. "Hock" Smith, USAF (deceased); Lieutenant Colonel Bill Naslund, USAF, Retired; and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Cardwell, USAF, began the revision of AFM 1-1, dated 1975, in 1977. As the primary action officer, Colonel McNabb had the responsibility to coordinate the draft with the field commands and the Air Staff. Several significant changes occurred from the 1975 manual and the 1976 version of AF basic doctrine. The most significant change was the shift in emphasis towards the unified command structure with forces integrated into an efficient and effective land, naval, and air team. Although Air Force doctrine has stressed this concept since 1947, it was not until 1979 that the theme of unified operations was so explicitly articulated. Another change in the 1979 version was the shift in focus of how Air Force forces contribute to joint and combined operations. Colonel McNabb provided the following analysis of AFM 1-1: The 14 February 1979 edition of AFM 1-1, *Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, was developed as a lead document for Air Force doctrine as well as to outline the tasks for joint and combined operations. AFM 1-1 emphasizes that the primary purpose of services is to develop—organize, train, and equip—and sustain forces for employment in a unified environment. In summary, services train forces—unified commands fight. To develop this theme, the manual covers the authority of national leadership, the supporting obligations of the four services, and the leadership responsibilities of joint and combined commanders. It was written from an aerospace power perspective—global, strategic, or theater wide—that looks at warfare from space and minimizes earth and battlefield boundaries. The manual highlights the Jeffersonian checks and balances as applied to our military system. These checks are the two chains of command—an operational chain for force employment and an administrative command for force development and sustainment. Forces are deployed and employed by the operational chain by Supreme Allied Commanders, joint commanders, or commander in chiefs. Within this system, this leaves each service with responsibilities for logistics, administration, force structuring, training, and preparedness. Operationally, the manual was written to emphasize the basic organizational tenet of force employment through joint and combined commands. This tenet holds one commander per theater or subtheater with authority to control force employment in that command's area of tactical responsibility. The underlying concept for this tenet—the principle of

centralized control under a single commander—has been derived from the history of successful military operations. Under this command and control concept, the joint, or combined, team is integrated by organization and operational plans to insure employment as a coherent force. In this warfighting system, components support each other operationally with all forces directing their power towards theater objectives.) (Source: Personal correspondence with Colonel David R. McNabb.)

76. Ibid., p. 1-12.

77. See Appendix A, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for a discussion on the functions of the US Air Force.

78. AFM 1-1 defines warfare systems as "weapon systems and their support elements in a single coherent and flexible fighting system, organized to meet specific military demands" (p. viii).

79. AFM 1-1, p. 2-5.

80. Ibid., p. 2-6.

81. Ibid., p. 4-1.

82. Ibid., p. 2-21.

83. Ibid., p. 3-12.

84. Ibid., p. 4-2.

85. Ibid., p. 5-2.

86. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 uses the term "centralized direction." Centralized direction is essential for coordinating the efforts of the forces commanded (p. 39) which is, for all practical purposes, the same as centralized control.

87. AFM 1-1, p. 5-3.

88. Ibid., p. 5-2. The Air Force view on single managership of airpower under the air component commander is derived from practical experience and history. In North Africa in 1942 to 1943, American airmen learned that centralized control of airpower was essential. The Army Air Corps doctrine of the time tied airpower to individual corps, with the ground force commander directing his own air. This splintering of airpower allowed the Germans to gain control of the air as the corps were using tactical air in the close air support role, thus ignoring air superiority. During World War II, the invasion of Europe would have been successful had ground units conducted its own air campaign. The foundation of centralized control had its beginning in North Africa.

89. Ibid., p. 5-3.

90. The Air Force has two additional principles of war (timing and tempo, and defensive) than does the Army and uses the term "unity of effort" rather than "unity of command." However, the principle of unity of command is used by the Air Force.

91. AFM 1-1, p. 5-4.

92. Ibid., p. 5-6.

93. The Marine Corps uses the term "component" to mean service component, not in the sense of a functional component. See Appendix I, Section 7, for discussion.

94. See Appendix G.

95. In 1973, General Abrams, US Army Chief of Staff, approved a change in Army doctrine which deleted the army group and merged functions of the field army and corps into a single echelon called the corps. See Appendix B for details.

96. Interview with Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, USA, on 15 October 1981, at the Pentagon, Washington DC. General Richardson, the US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, stated that the US Army was forced to change its emphasis from this echelon above corps to a corps orientation. However, the US Army recognizes the need to provide a joint interface above corps to work out the coordination problems between the corps and the Air Force forces. Currently, the Army is working this problem. A battlefield coordination element, under study by the USA Training and Doctrine Command, will help to eliminate this lack of an echelon above corps. (Complete interview is contained in Appendix B.)

97. Ibid. See interview with General Starry, former Commanding General, USA Training and Doctrine Command, contained in Appendix G. General Starry states that forces must be organized into three components—one for naval forces, one for land forces, and one for Air Force forces. Thus, by having a land component, there is in effect a need for an echelon above corps.

98. This author, while assigned to the Air Staff in 1977–81, worked the offensive air support agreement on apportionment and allocation of tactical air (TACAIR) assets. In effect, the agreement provides TACAIR for support of the land battle based upon the allocation decision made at the echelon above corps level. Lieutenant Colonel Craig Mandeville of the Department of the Army's Firepower Requirements Division, Lieutenant Colonel Homer Lewis of the USA Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Lieutenant Colonel Doug Spencer of the US Air Force's Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Alberts and Major Ken Hall, both in the Air Staff's Doctrine and Concepts Division, participated in the development of this landmark agreement. Lieutenant Colonels Lewis and Spencer worked the issue between TAC and TRADOC and developed the strawman agreement which was forwarded to HQ USAF and the Department of the Army in October 1980. Lieutenant Colonels Mandeville and Cardwell worked the final agreement at the headquarters level. After initial headquarters' coordination, the agreement was forwarded to HQ TAC, USAFE, PACAF, and TRADOC, for formal approval in January 1981. (See Appendix B for discussion.) This agreement marked the first tacit acknowledgement by the US Army since 1973 that an echelon above corps was needed to provide the required coordination of TACAIR in support of the land battle. The agreement was approved by General Starry, Commanding General of TRADOC, and General Creech, Commander of TAC, and was signed by Lieutenant General Otis, US Army, and Lieutenant General O'Malley, US Air Force (the two services' Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Operations), in 1981. (Source: Personal diary and HQ Air Force, Directorate of Plans History, Vol. I, 1 January–30 June 1981. Information presented in this note is unclassified.)

99. See Appendix C, "Command Structure for Theater Warfare, US Navy View," by Rear Admiral Robert E. Kirksey, USN.

100. As was the case in Vietnam where the Navy air component for Route Packages II, III, IV, and VIB in North Vietnam was the Pacific Fleet, and Air Force air component for South Vietnam and Route Packages I, V, and VIA in North Vietnam was the Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV.

101. See Appendix C by Kirksey. (During the period October to December 1981, discussions with Lieutenant Commander C. D. Wagner, Chief of Naval Operations' Strategy, Plans and Operations Division, USN, confirms this analysis.)

102. Ibid.

103. While assigned to the Air Staff during 1977–81, the author participated in headquarters staff level discussion with the US Navy over the issue of in-support-of verses operational control of naval assets passing to the air component or land component commander. At the staff level, a consensus could not be reached, and the issue was not passed to the service chiefs for resolution. Therefore, the agreement stands that naval assets operating in support of land operations and air force assets operating in support of naval operations will be conducted in a support of role.

104. Interview with General Starry, USA, on 3 December 1981, at MacDill AFB, Florida. (See Appendix G for interview.) See also Appendix F, "An Organization for Theater Operations From a Commander's Perspective," by General Momyer, USAF, Retired. Both Generals agree that naval air assets should be placed under the operational control of the air component commander when participating in a land operation.

105. Interview with Lieutenant General Miller, USMC, on 15 October 1981 at Washington DC. (See Appendix D for interview.) General Miller stresses the point that the unique nature of the Marine forces dictates that they must be employed as an integrated team of land, air, and support forces under the MAGTF commander who reports directly to the theater or joint force commander. However, if the theater or joint force commander splits the MAGTF, the USMC would honor the decision. FMFM 3-1, *Command and Staff Action*, states that the Marine forces will be employed under the unified, specified naval component or joint task force commander when operating in its primary function of amphibious operations, and when operating in combined operations, the Marine forces will be employed as directed by agreed combined doctrine (pp. 238, 241). No mention is made of how Marine forces will be employed in sustained operations in current Marine Corps doctrine publications. One has to consult the Commandant's white letters for guidance on this aspect of force employment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance on employment of USMC tactical air during sustained operations ashore is: (1) Under most circumstances, the theater or joint commander will organize his command to

retain the unique capabilities of Marine forces to pose to an enemy the threat of amphibious operations; (2) under sustained combat operations ashore, the theater commander should place the MAGTF forces under the land component commander—applies also to placing Army forces subordinate to a land component command by a Marine; (3) normally, Marine air assets would remain organic to the MAGTF; however, under certain circumstances these air assets could be placed under an air component commander as directed by the theater commander; and (4) it is important for field commanders to organize their forces for wartime operations and peacetime exercises in ways that minimize the difficulty of transitioning from peace to war. (Source: JCS meeting, 4 December 1981, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the command and control of USMC tactical air during sustained operations ashore and command relationships in operational plan development as quoted in DIP No. 11, Draft, "Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task Force, and What They Mean to an Airman!" (Washington, DC: HQ USAF, Doctrine and Concepts Division, 1982), p. 31.)

106. While assigned to the Air Staff, 1977–81, the author participated in discussions on command and control of USMC tactical air assets during sustained operations ashore. The author presented the Air Force's position to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 December 1980. The Marine Corps' position was presented by Lieutenant Colonel James W. "Jay" Bierman, USMC. After deliberations by the Joint Chiefs, a decision was reached whereby the MAGTF's integrity would be maintained but the theater or joint force commander would make the final determination of how forces assigned to his command would be organized. (Source: Personal diary.)

Reprinted below is that agreement reached by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and sent to all unified commanders in December 1980.

OMNIBUS AGREEMENT ON COMMAND AND CONTROL
OF USMC TACAIR DURING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS ASHORE

The Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) commander will retain operational control of his organic air assets. The primary mission of the MAGTF air combat element is the support of the MAGTF ground element. During joint operations, the MAGTF air assets will normally be in support of the MAGTF mission. The MAGTF commander will make sorties available to the joint force commander, for tasking through his air component commander, for air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance. Sorties in excess of MAGTF direct support requirements will be provided to the joint force commander for tasking through the air component commander for the support of other components of the JTF, or of the JTF as a whole. Nothing herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater or joint force commander, in the exercise of operational control, to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among his subordinate commanders to insure unity of effort prescribed in JCS Pub 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*. (Source: DIP No. 11, Draft, "Command Relationships, The Marine Air/Ground Task Force and What They Mean to an Airman!" (Washington, DC: HQ USAF, Doctrine and Concepts Division, 1982), p. 27, and USMC White Letter No. 7–81, *Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore*, 29 June 1981.)

* * *

It should be noted that the issue of command and control of Marine aviation assets first came up in 1965 during the Vietnam conflict. The issue continued through the 1970s. In 1977, Colonel Robert C. Clark, USAF, Colonel Merlin D. "Buck" Smith, USAF (deceased), Lieutenant Colonel Willard F. Naslund, USAF, Retired Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Alberts, USAF, and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas V. Cardwell III, USAF, of the Doctrine and Concepts Division, HQ USAF, began developing the USAF position on single manager for air concept. In 1978, Colonel David R. McNabb joined the Air Force team when Colonels Smith, Clark, and Naslund left the division. The years 1978 to 1979 saw many discussions between the USAF and USMC over the issue of who should have control of USMC aviation assets—the USAF arguing for the single manager approach and the USMC arguing for retention of operational control by the MAGTF commander. In 1980, the issue came to a head when USMC forces

were introduced into NATO. The issue was debated in the joint arena by Lieutenant General Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF, DCS/Plans and Operations, and Colonel (brigadier general selectee) Robert A. Norman, USAF, Director of Joint and NSC Matters, HQ USAF, for the USAF; and by Lieutenant General John H. Miller, USMC, DCS/Plans, Policies and Operations, and Colonel D. E. "Dep" Miller, USMC, for the USMC. The joint staff decided to elevate the issue up to the Joint Chiefs in December 1980. Lieutenant Colonels Cardwell and Bierman presented the service views to the Joint Chiefs on 12 December. The compromise reached by the Joint Chiefs whereby the integrity of the MAGTF was maintained, but the CINC (theater) or joint force commander would decide how to organize his forces, is the current guidance on employment of USMC forces during sustained operation ashore. (Source: Personal diary. See also article entitled "Joint Chiefs to Resolve Dispute on Air Strategy" in the *Los Angeles Times* by Robert C. Toth, 12 December 1980, p. 1.)

A personal observation to this note: Having been directly involved in the JCS discussions over the employment of USMC tactical air during sustained operations ashore since 1977, I believe that the agreement reached (the so-called Omnibus Agreement) by the Joint Chiefs on Command and Control of USMC TACAIR During Sustained Operations Ashore was the best agreement the JCS could make given the requirement for an unanimous decision by the service chiefs. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated he wanted full agreement—no split decisions. With that guidance, the Omnibus Agreement was a compromise between the USMC and USAF position. The first part of the agreement is essentially the Marine Corps position, and the second part is essentially the Air Force position. To clarify the Omnibus Agreement, the guidance in the note above was issued in 1981. It is interesting to note that the Army and Air Force interpret this agreement and the guidance along the lines of tacit approval for the placing of all TACAIR under the air component commander, —not the Air Force, but the air component. The Marine Corps interprets it as tacit approval to function either as an unisservice force, fourth component, or as a MAGTF with no "splitting" of land and aviation assets. In the author's opinion, the guidance is quite clear, it is up to the theater commander to organize his forces as he sees fit. It is, indeed, important for field commanders to organize their forces in peace as they will fight in war. The USMC, USA, USAF, and USN have agreed to the provisions of both the agreement and the guidance. In my view, the still unresolved issue is how should we organize our peacetime forces for warfighting. It is the aim of this monograph to propose a way to do just that.

107. As was the case initially in Vietnam prior to 1968. (See Appendix I, Sections 3 and 4, for discussion.)

108. General Momyer, USAF, Retired, General Starry, USA, Lieutenant General Richardson, USA; and Lieutenant General O'Malley, USAF, raised this question. See Appendices B, E, F, and G for discussion.

109. See Appendix I, Section 4, "Background Information on USMC Command and Control Relationships During Sustained Operations Ashore, 1977 to 1970," by Major Clayton R. Fruhkorn, USAF.

110. See Appendix I, Section 2, for an interview with Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired, former Air Deputy Commander in AFNORTH. His comments point out some of the command and control issues associated with the introduction of USMC forces in AFNORTH.

111. That is, bomber and tanker aircraft assigned to the specified command, Strategic Air Command (SAC).

112. General Momyer, USAF, Retired, General Starry, USA, and Lieutenant General Richardson, USA, have raised this point. See Appendices B, F, and G for discussion. See also *Air Power in Three Wars* by General William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 99-107.

113. This was true in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam.

114. In his role as a specified commander, CINCSAC.

115. Joint Chief of Staff Publication 1, p. 141.

CHAPTER 4

A COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE

This chapter provides one answer to the question posed in Chapter 1: What organization should the United States use to employ land, naval, and air forces in a theater of operation?[1]

Introduction

In Chapter 2, we saw a gradual change in the method of setting up US command structures from a doctrine of cooperation to the doctrine of unified operations. Each of the three wars reviewed—World War II, Korea, and Vietnam—showed an experiment with various methods of employing US military forces. The successes and failures of these experiments provide insights into a method to provide clear lines of authority for a command structure for theater warfare. Additionally, the experiences of past wars have led to joint and combined doctrines for the employment of military forces in a theater of operations. In Chapter 3, the services' doctrinal statements concerning employment of forces were presented. By analyzing these pronouncements, a general statement can be made: The services all formally agree with the employment of theater-assigned assets in a coherent team to accomplish combat missions in a theater of operations; however, the services interpret the broad principles found in JCS Publication 2 in different manners. Chapter 3 presented these different views on the command structure for theater warfare. Keeping these views in mind when studying joint and combined doctrines will help one understand the difficulty service planners have in designing a command structure for theater warfighting. Before discussing the proposed command structure, it will be useful to review joint and combined doctrine for theater warfare.

The principles and doctrines for joint and combined warfare are presented in the following sections. After this brief review and analysis, a command structure is proposed that will provide for the integrated employment of military forces in a theater of operations.

Joint and Combined Doctrine

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 establishes principles and doctrine that govern the activities of the armed forces when two or more services are acting together.[2] Doctrine for combined operations is contained in allied publications.[3] For example, in NATO, combined doctrine is prescribed and set forth in allied administrative and tactical publications; in the Pacific theater, it is contained in air standards under the auspices of the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee.

The principles and doctrines for joint and combined operations provide military guidance for use by the services and military commanders. These principles are to be applied to accomplish the intent and will of the Congress of the United States as specified in the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958.[4] In amending the National Security Act of 1947 by the 1958 Act, Congress intended that the armed forces of the United States would have unified strategic direction under a single unified commander, and these forces would be integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces.[5]

The establishment of the US military departments, services, and the combatant commands sets up two distinct chains of command. The first chain of command is the operational channel of authority assigned to combatant commands. The second chain of command is the service channel of authority for purposes other than operational direction of combatant forces.

Figure 5 depicts the operational chain of command. Operational authority comes from the national command authorities[6] through the Joint Chiefs of Staff[7]—who act as the principal military advisors to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense—to the unified, specified, and joint task force commanders[8] (see Figure 5). Unified and specified commands are established by the President. A unified command has a broad continuing mission and is composed of forces from two or more services, while a specified command has a broad continuing mission but is composed of forces from a single service.[9] Joint task forces or joint forces are designated by the Secretary of Defense or by a commander of a unified or existing joint task force and are composed of assigned or attached elements of two or more services.[10]

The military departments and services provide forces to unified, specified, and joint task force commands, and they do not have operational direction over these assigned combatant forces. They do have service authority for purposes other than operational direction. This service authority includes the preparation of military forces and their administration and support.

Figure 6 depicts the service chain of command. The authority runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the service secretaries to the service chiefs—for example, the Chief of Naval Operations.[11]

The integration of forces provided by the military departments for combatant commands is known as the unified command structure. Figure 7 depicts this



Figure 5 Operational Chain of Command

command structure When US forces function in this manner, it is referred to as unified operations

The underlying principle of unified operations is the principle of unity of effort Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 defines unity of effort in the following manner

This concept of the US military establishment as an [illegible] land, naval, and air forces is based on the principle that effective utilization of the military power of the nation requires that the efforts of the separate military services be closely integrated Unity of effort among the services at



Figure 6. Service Chain of Command

the national level is obtained by the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, exercised through the secretaries of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the strategic planning and direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by common, joint, and cross-servicing by the military departments. Unity of effort among service forces assigned to unified or specified commands is achieved by exercise of operational command, by adherence to common strategic plans and directives, and by sound operational and administrative command organization. This concept is the basis for a sound working relationship between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands in the overall strategic direction of the armed forces on the one hand and, on the other, the military departments and services

charged with preparing and providing forces for the unified and specified commands and administering and supporting the forces so provided.[14]

The principle of unity of effort generates certain requirements for unified joint and combined actions. Unified operations and combined actions by the armed forces require the following: integrated effort and joint actions by the armed forces in the attainment of a common objective; planning and conducting operations and exercises under unified direction; developing doctrine and preparing and training forces for specific types of operations related to combatant functions of the services; delineating responsibilities for unified joint and combined operations; and developing and preparing of doctrines for unified operations, training, and joint and combined operations.[15]

There are two principles that must be applied to achieve the full potential of the unified combatant structure. These are the principles of maximum integration and the principle of full utilization of forces. Maximum integration refers to the



Figure 7. Operational and Service Chain of Command

practicable integration of policies and procedures to "produce an effective, economical, and harmonious organization which will insure the security of the United States."[16] This does not mean a merging of the services into a single service. The principle of full utilization of forces states that each service's unique capabilities must be exploited to their full potential to achieve the effective attainment of overall unified objectives.[17] The services are assigned primary and collateral functions to achieve success under this principle (see Appendix A). The Army is charged with land combat; the Navy, including the Marine Corps, with naval combat; and the Air Force with air combat—not in isolation but as part of a unified team composed of land, naval, and air forces to accomplish overall military objectives.

The broad functions that are assigned to the military departments, the services, and Joint Chiefs of Staff contribute to the overall security of the United States by placing effective strategic direction under a unified command. This is achieved by integrating the armed forces into an efficient land, naval, and air force team to prevent unnecessary duplication or overlapping among the services. This integration should enable the armed forces to achieve a high degree of cooperation by coordinating the operations of the team, to promote efficiency and economy, and to prevent gaps in responsibility.[18]

The principles and doctrine outlined in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 provide the framework to set up a command structure to support the unified operations of the armed forces of the United States when two or more services are employed (see Figure 7). This structure must be designed to insure the effective coordination of the forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

> In determining the most effective method, . . . consideration shall be given first to the mission to be accomplished, and then to the capabilities and functions of the services involved, the geographic location and nature of the contemplated operations . . . and capabilities of US and enemy forces.[19]

Once these factors have been considered, the command structure can be designed.

The United States has developed three methods to exercise command in unified operations—unified command, specified command,[20] and joint task force.[21] At the top of each method of command structure is a single commander who exercises command and control[22] over assigned forces. The term command means:

> The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces; an order given by a commander ... that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action; [and] a unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual.[23]

The functions of command, such as the composition of subordinate forces, the designation of objectives and assignment of tasks, and the authoritative direction to accomplish an assigned mission, are called operational command.[24] For use within the US command structure, the terms operational command and operational control are synonymous. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided specific guidance on the

exercise of operational command and operational control within the unified operations structure. The commander of a unified command is authorized to plan, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of assigned forces. Additionally, the commander exercises direct authority over all elements of his command. In short, he exercises operational command and control over his assigned forces.[25]

The overall commander personally exercises operational command, and he exercises operational control through the commanders of subordinate commands or component commanders.[26] Forces are assigned to the unified command as subordinate or component commands reporting directly to the unified commander. These subordinate or component commanders exercise operational control over the respective forces and report or "communicate directly with their respective chiefs of services on matters which are the responsibility of the military departments and services."[27]

The unified commander is given the responsibility for setting up the command and control structure for his command. The unified commander will not act as the commander of any subordinate or component command unless specifically authorized by the establishing authority.[28] He has the authority to set up joint task forces, subordinate unified commands, component commands, or uniservice commands.[29] When a uniservice command structure is used, the uniservice forces will be assigned to the component command of that service.[30] However, the establishment of a separate uniservice command is under exceptional circumstances and must have the specific approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[31] Use of uniservice or single service forces is not the normal method of setting up command arrangements for theater-wide operations.

The subordinate unified or service component command[32] is commanded by the senior officer of that service assigned to the unified command. However, the commander of the unified command or members of his joint command staff will not serve as the component commander.[33] A component command consists of the commander, staff, and units or organizations under his command which have been provided by the military departments or services.[34] The component commander has the responsibility for employing his forces based upon the unified commander's guidance. Additionally, he has the responsibility to make recommendations to the unified commander on the proper employment of this component, internal administration and discipline, liaison in service doctrines, tactics and techniques, component logistics support for tactical employment of his component, and service intelligence.[35]

It is important to note the unique nature of dual authority that focuses on the component commander of the unified command. The component commander derives his authority from the National Command Authorities (NCA) and has both service administrative and unified operational authority. The service component commander is the expert in applying the tactical strength of his service; he becomes

the exemplar of the principle of unity of command by bringing both service administrative and unified operational authority into focus on the battlefield.

The use of a joint task force—which is composed of "assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these services" as a method of establishing a command organization—is not meant to be a permanent command arrangement.[36] A joint task force is established when the mission has a specific limited objective and "is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved."[37] Like a component command, the commander of a joint task force exercises operational control over his entire force.[38]

To support the unified theater commander—or joint task force commander—a joint staff is created. "The commander should organize his staff as he considers necessary to carry out the duties and responsibilities with which he is charged, but the staff organization should conform to the principles [outlined in JCS Publication 2]."[39] Figure 8 depicts a typical joint staff organization.

Combined doctrine,[40] which the United States has ratified, closely parallels the doctrine and principles found in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2.[41] The basic difference between doctrinal pronouncements found in Joint Chiefs of Staff publications and allied doctrine is in the area of command. Command is defined by allied publications as "the authority invested in an individual of the armed forces for direction, coordination, and control of military forces."[42] The command exercised by an allied commander does not include full command[43] of the forces assigned to him. An allied commander has the authority to exercise command over assigned forces in the form of operational command and operational control. The reason for this is that no nation gives up its inherent right to withdraw forces when withdrawal is deemed to be in the national interest. Therefore, an allied commander has the authority to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational or tactical control.[44] The commander may delegate operational control, which is the authority a commander has to direct assigned forces, so that he may accomplish specific missions. Usually, these are limited by function, time, or location. The commander may deploy units and retain or assign tactical control of those units.[45] Tactical control is defined as "the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned."[46] It is interesting to note that in NATO, the terms operational command and operational control are applied uniquely to a command arrangement. The overall commander—supreme allied commander or commander in chief—has operational command of assigned forces and can delegate operational control to his subordinate commanders. These subordinate commands delegate tactical control to subordinate unit commanders, such as the corps commander.

The doctrinal principle of unity of effort found in allied publications concerning command structures parallels the Joint Chiefs of Staff's principle of unity of effort.[47] In NATO, agreed doctrine states that there shall be only one overall commander who organizes the forces into naval, land, and air components, each



Figure 8. Typical Joint Staff Organization

with a component commander.[45] The structure is organized according to the terms of the mission and area of responsibility.

Combined doctrine is easy to understand if one has a clear understanding of the Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine for joint and combined warfare, as the principles are the same.

An Analysis

Analysis of doctrine can lead to several statements about a theater command structure. First, the service forces assigned to a unified or joint task force command are commanded by a single commander who has operational command over the provided forces. Second, this single commander—the theater commander—organizes his forces within the guidance provided by combined and joint doctrines. In general, this guidance states that forces will be integrated into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces. Third, the theater commander exercises operational control through three components—land, naval, and air, or through a subordinate unified command which could have components of land, naval, and air. A uniservice command is another method to exercise operational control.[49] Finally, the theater commander organizes his staff to perform the planning and execution of the theater-assigned mission.

The principles found in Joint Chiefs of Staff and allied publications provide broad guidance for setting up unified and combined command structures. What appears to be clear guidance gets cloudy when the services interpret this guidance. Each service views the guidance according to its perspective of warfighting. Chapter 3 outlined the services' doctrines for joint and combined theater operations. It can be stated that all four services formally support the broad guidance contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff publications. However, to apply these principles, there is not always general agreement. Normally, Air Force and Army are in agreement on a command structure for theater warfare. The Navy and Marine Corps usually agree upon the structure for theater warfare. This is caused partially by force orientation. Army and Air Force forces are oriented towards air-land operations, while Navy and Marine forces are oriented toward naval or amphibious operations. Not surprisingly, interservice discussions on command structures break down along these lines.

Each service carefully guards its functions as prescribed by DOD Directive 5100.1, known as the "functions paper."[50] It is on this functional basis that command and control discussions are created. However, the command and control structure must be based upon common service, joint, and combined doctrines. The next section provides a recommended command structure based upon the capabilities of the individual service forces, service doctrine, and joint and combined doctrinal guidance.

A Command Structure—The Proposal

The theater command structure must be organized to accomplish assigned military missions. The US theater commander is responsible to the national

command authorities,[51] through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for accomplishing military-assigned missions. The theater commander has full operational command over the service-assigned forces. At the top, the operational chain of command starts with the national command authorities through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the single theater commander.[52]

To support the theater commander, a joint staff is required.[53] The elements of this staff are as follows: personal staff (for example, executive officer, aides, public relations), personnel division, intelligence division, operations division, plans division, logistics division, and communications-electronics division. The composition of the staff should include representation from the services assigned to the theater command. The staff officers must be able to advise the commander on service tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations. "Positions on the staff should be divided so that service representation and influence generally reflect the service composition of the force."[54] The success of any joint system is the staff which is composed of people who are selected from the field with current field experience. "People who have demonstrated their ability to provide expert advice to the theater commander is what is required for the joint staff to be effective. What is needed is demonstrated leadership, not professional staffers."[55]

A former commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force listed what he considered as prerequisites for assignment to a joint operational headquarters: select each officer carefully to insure that his background and operational experience match the requirements of the specific billet to which assigned; insure that each officer is completely knowledgeable regarding the peculiarities of his parent service; and establish a completely responsive liaison network with higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.[56]

The composition of the senior staff positions should be based upon the assigned mission.[57] Each of the services should be represented on the staff. If the theater commander is a soldier, then his deputy should be either an airman or sailor—depending upon the theater. If it is primarily a land theater, then the deputy should be an airman and the chief of staff should be a naval officer. The other senior staff positions should be balanced between the services.[58] This allows for harmonious relations among the services and provides the needed expertise for the joint staff. (See Figure 8 for a typical joint staff organization.)

Below the theater commander and his staff are three components.[59] These components are labeled land, naval, and air. It is important to note that the division is *not* based upon a service but upon the missions they are to perform. The services provide forces to the unified command, and these forces are under the operational command of the theater commander. To employ these forces effectively, the commander exercises operational control through the component commander.[60] Figure 9 shows this command relationship.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force generally agree in the three component system for force employment. However, the Navy agrees with the Marine Corps that for sustained operations ashore, a fourth component—a Marine component—should be added. The Marine Corps agrees, in general, with this method of force employment except they believe that for sustained operations ashore, there should be a fourth



Figure 9. Theater Command Structure

component—the Marine force component.[61] However, given the theater-assigned missions of a unified, combined, or joint command structure where two or more services, or two or more nations are assigned to the command, a fourth component may not be needed. The Marine forces should be assigned to either the land, naval, or air component command depending upon their assigned mission. The rationale is

that the assignment of Marine land combat forces directly under the theater commander and not under the land component commander would create, in effect, a second land army and a second air component command.[62] This is not to state that the US Marine Corps could not be a separate component of the theater command.[63] The key is that the service with the predominance of forces should head the component. If the Marine Corps has the predominance of forces, then the land component commander should be a Marine officer. If the predominance of air forces were Marine aviation assets, then the air component commander should be a Marine officer.

The forces assigned to a theater command are assigned to a component based upon their orientation. All land combat forces should be assigned to the land component, all naval and amphibious forces to the naval component, and all air assets assigned to the air component.[64] History has shown that this is the best method to employ national armed forces in a theater of operation.[65] Past experiences have shown that the assignment of Marine combat elements to the land component for sustained operations is an excellent assignment method.[66]

The commander of the component command should be the senior officer of the service with the majority of theater-assigned forces.[67] The theater commander and the component commander should never be the same person.[68] The component commander should have a staff to support his assigned mission. Composition of this staff is dependent upon the mission; but in general it should contain liaison elements, plans and operations divisions, intelligence, and other staff elements deemed appropriate by the component commander. The deputy component commander should be an officer of the minority service when two services are assigned to that component command. For example, if Army and Marine Corps forces are assigned to the land component and the Army has the predominance of forces, the senior Army officer would be the land component commander and the senior Marine officer would be the deputy commander. Figure 10 depicts a notional component command structure. It should be noted that the staff structure has no specific fixed organization but is staffed to meet the varied theater-assigned missions, the theater of operations, the forces assigned, and the desires of the component commander. Looking at each of the components, certain statements can be made concerning the organization of the component command structure.[69]

Land Component Command

The Land Component Command comprises the land forces assigned to a theater of operation. Its mission is to employ combat forces to support the unified command structure.[70] The commander exercises operational control of assigned forces and is responsible for plans and forces to support the unified command plans and operations. In general, these functions include land combat, intelligence, psychological operations, civil affairs, unconventional warfare, air defense, combat service support, cover, deception, and electronic warfare operations.[71] The combat



Figure 10. Notional Component Command Structure

unit is normally the army corps and marine land combat units. (See Figure 11 for a notional land component structure.)

Naval Component Command

The Naval Component Command comprises the naval forces assigned to a theater of operations. Its mission is to employ combat forces to support the unified command structure. The commander exercises operational control of assigned forces to support the unified command plans and operations. In general, the function of the command includes gaining sea control of sea lines of



Figure 11. Notional Land Component Structure

communications and the sea approaches to the land mass, as well as amphibious operations and support of the land battle. This last function, support of the land battle, implies support in the area of resupply and reinforcement of ground and air elements. During land battle ashore, this includes naval air assets in support of the air-land battle." When naval aviation units are assigned to support the land battle, these aviation units should be assigned to the air component commander. The combat elements depend upon the assigned mission. Figure 12 contains a notional naval component structure.



Figure 12. Notional Naval Component Structure

Air Component Command[73]

The Air Component Command comprises the air forces assigned to a theater of operations. Its mission is to employ combat forces to support the unified command structure. The commander exercises operational control of assigned forces to support the unified command plans and operations. In general, these functions include counterair, air interdiction, close air support, tactical airlift, air reconnaissance, and special air operations.[74] All theater-assigned air assets should be assigned to the air component commander—this includes the strategic, tactical, and airlift systems employed in a theater of operation. The combat element depends upon the assigned mission. (See Figure 13 for a notional air component structure.)



Figure 13. Notional Air Component Structure

Summary

To accomplish the military objectives assigned by political authorities to a theater command requires a coherent approach to warfighting. This approach demands a detailed knowledge of warfare, history, service doctrine, tactics, one's own forces and their capabilities, and an understanding of enemy forces and their capabilities. US doctrine to support the military objectives and the command structures for theater warfare must be oriented toward a unified approach for warfare.

Doctrine is what we believe about the employment of military force. Doctrine must be based upon experience, history, deductive and inductive reasoning, simulations, exercises, and common sense. Doctrine should be the bridge between the past and the future. We must use historical experiences to predict future outcomes—doctrine must be developed and stated in the context of the past to achieve a desired future event. As this relates to a command structure for future warfare, we must consider what has gone before.

History has shown that the most efficient method to organize combat forces is through a unified command structure wherein one single commander has command of all assigned theater assets.[75] To control these forces effectively, an integrated team—land, naval, and air—is employed to carry out the combat function of the theater-assigned mission. Forces are assigned to the theater command to accomplish combat missions based upon their ability to contribute to the overall effort.

When discussing organizational structures for theater warfare, we tend to focus on systems to fight a war and service orientation instead of the structure itself and the delegation of responsibility by functional area. By focusing on the command structure—joint and combined—and by using a theater perspective, many of the roles and missions issues would never surface. A theater perspective is simply a joint and combined view of warfighting. It drives us towards a unified command structure where all land combat forces are employed under a single land component commander, all naval combat forces are employed under a single naval component commander, and all air combat forces are employed under a single air component commander.

Based upon our perspective of history and pragmatic observation, joint and combined doctrines have evolved to state that combat forces are employed more effectively and efficiently by centralized control and through decentralized execution. Centralized control permits combat power to be directed towards an objective and redirected in response to contingency requirements. This approach affords a more flexible use of the principles of war in directing US combat forces. On the other hand, decentralized execution permits the higher command echelons to establish objective priorities and to implement strategy while placing the responsibility for planning and execution at the lower level. Centralized control and decentralized execution are the most economical utilization of limited resources.

To employ combat power effectively and efficiently, a single component commander for land, naval, and air forces must be given the authority and

responsibility for employing theater-assigned assets.[76] What organization should the United States use to employ land, naval, and air force assets in a theater of operations? The unified command structure.[77]

In conclusion, the command structure must be simple and have clear and direct lines of authority. The structure for theater warfare is the unified command with three components—land, naval, and air. Future conflicts will not allow time to experiment with command arrangements. We must organize in peace as we will fight in war—the time is now. We must end the quest for unity of command.[78]

NOTES

CHAPTER 4

1. See Appendix I and note 77, this chapter, for further discussion.
2. See Appendix A for background information on joint doctrine.
3. See Appendix H for background information on combined doctrine.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1974), p. 3.
5. The following is quoted from Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 3:

> In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense including the three military departments of the Army, the Navy (including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps), and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary and shall function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide for their unified direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense but not to merge these departments or services; . . . to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces, but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces nor an overall armed forces general staff. (Section 2, 1958 Reorganization Act.)

6. President and Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors—known as the national command authorities.
7. Composed of Chiefs of Staff of the US Army and US Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
8. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 11.
9. Ibid., pp. 45 and 50.
10. Ibid., p. 51.
11. Ibid., p. 7.
12. A broad generic term descriptive of the wide scope of actions taking place within unified combatant commands under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands (JCS Pub 2, p. 4). Unified command is to be used for joint and combined operations.
13. For those readers who are interested in an excellent appraisal of unity of command as it relates to Vietnam and Korea, see *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., USA (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 1981), p. 87–92. Colonel Summers states that the evolution of the term unity of command was first codified in the term cooperation. "By 1939, this principle had changed to 'unity of effort.' While the words changed, one common thread runs through all of these definitions: the reason for this principle is to facilitate attainment of the objective. While at the tactical level, this is best achieved by vesting authority in a single commander; at the strategic level, it involves political and military coordination" (p. 87). As this relates to Vietnam, Colonel Summer states: "In retrospect, it would appear that such a headquarters (that is, a

unified command suggested by General Westmoreland) would have greatly improved unity of command. But rather than establish a strategic headquarters in-country (e.g., Southeast Asia Command) as General Westmoreland envisioned, it should have been established outside of the immediate war zone. This would have avoided involvement in South Vietnamese internal affairs and would have facilitated perspective on the theater as a whole, which included operations not only in Vietnam but in Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand as well" (p. 91). "Although we did not obtain unity of command in the Vietnam war, this failing was not the cause of our defeat but rather the symptom of a larger deficiency/failure to fix a military attainable political objective . . . without unity of command we could never have decisive application of full combat power" (p. 92). Colonel Summers reached the same conclusion I did: We attempted to apply the principle of unity of effort and command in Vietnam, but we never reached that objective. Like Eisenhower and MacArthur before him, General Westmoreland argued for unity of command, but we never quite reached the full implementation of unity of command in any of the past three wars.

14. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 6.

15. Ibid., p. 7.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., p. 8. This same thought was expressed by General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during an interview on 29 January 1982, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; by General Donn A. Starry, USA, Commander in Chief of Readiness Command, during an interview on 6 November 1981, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; and by Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired, former Air Deputy, Allied Forces Northern Europe, during an interview on 6 February 1982, at Panama City, Florida. General Peterson stated that history has shown the best method to exercise command and control is through the unified command structure with three components of land, sea, and air. He recalled his experiences in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Northern Command Europe. In the cases he cited from personal experiences, centralized direction of air made the mission easier to accomplish. As he stated, "How could anything but centralized control be used to coordinate the massive air raids in World War II. I recall one mission in November 1944 where we had a total of 12,250 aircraft in one raid. Can you imagine the problem of command if we had several component commanders trying to coordinate the air effort?"

19. Ibid., p. 9.

20. Since the specified command method is composed of only one service, this method is not discussed; however, the principles and doctrines specified in JCS Publication 2 apply equally to the specified command arrangement.

21. Ibid., p. 13.

22. Command and control is defined as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission" (JCS Publication 1, p. 74).

23. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 36.

24. Operational command is defined as "those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through the commanders of subordinate forces exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance."

In the United States, the "term is synonymous with operational control and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified . . . commands over assigned forces. . . ." (JCS Publication 1, p. 245).

25. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 37. The commander is authorized to "plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of assigned forces; conduct joint training exercises, as may be required to achieve effective employment of the forces of his command as a whole, in accordance with

doctrine for unified operations and training as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; establish such training policies for joint operations as are required to accomplish the mission. Exercise directive authority within his command in the field of logistics. . . . Establish such personnel policies as are required to insure uniform standards of military conduct. Exercise directive authority over all elements of his command, in accordance with policies and procedures established by higher authority, in relationships with foreign governments, including the armed forces thereof, and other agencies of the US Government. Establish plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of his command. Review the recommendations bearing on the budget from the component commanders to their parent military departments to verify that the recommendations are in agreement with his plans and programs. Participate in the development and acquisition of his command and control system, and direct the system's operation. . . ."

26. Ibid., p. 37.

27. Ibid., p. 46.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 44. Uniservice command is defined as a "command comprised of forces of a single service" (JCS Publication 1, p. 362).

30. Ibid., p. 47.

31. Ibid.

32. Herein referred to as component command. A subordinate unified command "has functions, authorities, and responsibilities similar to those of the commander of a unified command . . . (except) commanders of service components of subordinate unified commands will not communicate directly with the commander of the service components . . . on matters which are the responsibility of the military departments and services, or as directed by their chief of services" (JCS Pub 2, p.50). See also Appendix I, Section 7, for discussion on the term "component."

33. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 48.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., p. 49.

36. Ibid., p. 51.

37. Ibid., p. 52.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid., p. 64

40. See Appendix H for discussion on combined doctrine. Since combined doctrine closely parallels US doctrine for unified operations, it has not been repeated.

41. Currently, the United States has combined doctrine arrangements with NATO and members of the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC)—the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. ASCC combined doctrine is published in Air Standards. The ASCC nations have agreed to doctrine on tactical air, land, and naval operations similar to the doctrine found in NATO's Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs). Along with Lieutenant Colonel D. J. Alberts, USAF, and Major Derwin Bradley, USAF, this author participated in the development of Air Standards on tactical air operations. Air Standards 45/5, *Tactical Air Procedures Offensive Air Support Operations*, and 45/3, *Tactical Air Doctrine*. These Air Standards closely parallel ATP 27(B) and ATP 33(A), which outline tactical air doctrine for combined operations, and detail the command and control structure for a Pacific theater of operations. (Source: *History of the Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF*, Vol. 1, 1 January–31 December 1980, 1 March 1981 (Secret, Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals), Washington DC, p. 90. The information presented in the note above is unclassified.)

42. Allied Administrative Publication 6(0), *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions* (Brussels, Belgium Military Agency for Standardization, April 1977), p. 2-38

43. Allied Administrative Publication 6(0) defines full command as the "military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates . . . and exists only within national services . . . No NATO commander has full command over the forces . . . assigned . . . because nations in assigning forces to NATO assign only operational command or operational control" (p. 2-70). The main difference between operational command and operational control in NATO is: With operational command, you can assign missions, with operational control, you cannot

44. Ibid., p. 2-114

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p. 2–154.

47. Allied Tactical Publication 33(A), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine* (Brussels, Belgium: Military Agency for Standardization, May 1980), p. 3–2.

48. See Appendix H for discussion on NATO command arrangements.

49. This method is used when only one service is utilized. See JCS Publication 2, page 43. Normally, this method is not used when two or more services are assigned to a unified, subunified, or joint task force.

50. See Appendix A, "Unified Action Armed Forces," for discussion on service functions.

51. National Command Authorities (NCA)—the President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors (JCS Publication 2, p. 6).

52. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 6.

53. Ibid., pp. 67–68.

54. Ibid., p. 63.

55. Interview with General P. X. Kelley, USMC, Assistant Commandant, USMC, at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, on 1 December 1981; and at the Navy Annex in Washington DC on 30 March 1982. (General Kelley was the first commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.)

56. Ibid. General Kelley expressed these views when asked what he felt was required to be a staff officer on a joint operational staff and what the requirements would be to start a joint operational staff. His comments are:

> When I founded the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, I recognized the many difficulties involved in the creation of such an organization. With this in mind, I made a fundamental decision that this could well be terminal rank and terminal assignment, but regardless of the consequences, I was going to do what was right for my country. After finding this kind of peace with myself, I found that every decision thereafter was relatively simple.
>
> Second, each individual must be carefully selected to insure that his background and operational experience match, as closely as possible, the requirements of a specific billet. Majors and lieutenant colonels are the backbone of a joint operational headquarters, and they tend to be ecumenical. Colonels, on the other hand, recognize that it is their parent service which promotes them and, therefore, tend to be more parochial. Once you recognize this, however, this can be a big plus, as they have contacts within their parent service which are of inestimable value. In short, what you really need are officers who have vast experience within their parent service. You don't need professional "purple suited" staff officers who are masters at gobbledygook and compromise.
>
> And, third, establish an extensive and effective liaison net with all higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. We live in a fast-moving world and must communicate rapidly and effectively to survive.
>
> Perhaps the most important element for a successful joint operational headquarters is for all members to be confident that the commander has the best interests of the country first and foremost in his mind. If they are convinced that he is mission-oriented and ecumenical, their own service parochialisms quickly subside.

57. See Appendices B, C, D, and E. All of the services agree upon the composition of the joint staff.

58. See Appendix F for discussion.

59. See Appendices B, C, D, and E for service views on three component command structures.

60. See Appendix I for discussion and rationale for use of the term component vice service component.

61. See Appendix D and Chapter 3, the section entitled "Marine Corps Doctrine," for USMC view on component command structure.

62. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 and DOD Directive 5100.1, in the discussion of the functions of the USMC, state that "these functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army" (JCS Publication 2, p. 22, and DOD Directive 5100.1, p. 91.

63. This would depend upon the mission assigned to the Marine forces. There are scenarios where a Marine component could be required. If the Marines are the only service assigned to the theater of operations, or the Marine combined forces are the initial combat unit in a theater of operations, a Marine component would be required. However, upon arrival of other service forces, the Marine component would be integrated into the land, naval, and air component as appropriate.

64. See Appendices B, C, D, E, and G.

65. See Chapter 2; note 74 in Chapter 3; note 109 in Chapter 3; and Appendix I, Sections 3 and 4, for historical perspective of assigning forces under a land, naval, or air component. Major General Norman J. Anderson, USMC, Retired, former Commanding General of the 1st Marine Air Wing, and Deputy Commander for Air III MAF in Vietnam in 1967, does not believe in placing Marine air under a single air component commander. He states, in reference to Marine Corps maintaining air assets in I Corps and the contention that the 1st MAW divided its air assets between the two Marine divisions regardless of the ground situation: "Nothing could be further from the truth than this spurious charge of inflexibility. Marine Corps sorties were applied where needed most and frequently to other than Marine Corps units." He further states: "It was of such poppycock, however, that the infamous 'single management' was born and adopted." (See his article "Short Shrift for Marine Air," *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1981, p. 87.) General Anderson believes that history has shown that the best way to apply tactical airpower is from the corps (or MAGTF, in the case of the Marines) level, not from the air component level (see page 88 of his article). (See also note 68 in Chapter 2 for additional information.)

66. See note 109 in Chapter 3 for background information on command and control arrangements for USMC during sustained operations ashore—nonamphibious operations.

67. See Appendices B, C, D, and E; and Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 48.

68. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, p. 46.

69. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 provides specific guidance on command responsibilities for components. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, pp. 45–50.

70. Unified as used here and in the other component commands refers to combined command structure also.

71. Field Manual 100-15 (Test), *Larger Unit Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 1974), pp. 3-1 thru 3-3.

72. Interview with Captain Thomas J. Kirtland III, Chief of Naval Advisory Group, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, on 14 December 1981.

73. Correspondence with General William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, during the period September 1981 to January 1982. The essence of the correspondence, and subsequent telephone conversations with General Momyer, on the subject of rationale for placing all air under the air component commander is as follows: Within the theater, there should be an air, ground, and sea component. These are generic commands which control all combat operations in the media of the air, ground, and sea. There must be an overall component command structure to assure that those forces are directed in a coherent, coordinated, and positive manner. There is no place for two similar forces operating outside of a single authority for that type of mission. (See Appendix I, Section b, for further discussion.)

74. Tactical Air Command Manual 2-1, *Tactical Air Operations* (Langley AFB, VA: HQ Tactical Air Command, 15 April 1978), pp. 11-1 thru 11-7 and 3-1 thru 3-19.

75. See Chapter 2 plus Westmoreland's *A Soldier Reports*, Momyer's *Air Power in Three Wars*, Ridgeway's *The Korean War*, and Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe* (listed in the Bibliography) for discussion. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 and allied doctrine publications recommend this command structure.

76. Interview with General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, held at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, on 29 January 1982. When asked his view on the unified component command structure in light of the ongoing JCS discussion over command and control of USMC forces during sustained operations ashore, General Jones responded by saying:

> JCS Pub 2 provides clear guidance on establishing these command relationships. It is a unified structure with land, sea, and air components to carry out the assigned mission. As to the discussions over Marine forces during sustained operations ashore, it would depend upon where

these forces are employed. I could see where they might be employed separately and where they might be employed under one of the other components. You must remember that the components are not service oriented but are generic terms to describe a function to be performed—land operations, sea operations, or air operations. The Marine forces could be the land component if they have the majority of the forces. As you are well aware, having worked this issue while on the Air Staff, that the discussions boil down to doctrinal issues. The separate services guard their roles and missions very closely. This is what causes the discussions. Anyway, we must take a more joint view when debating these type issues to arrive at a command structure for the theater war.

See also Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, paragraphs 10101, 30214, and 30256 to include paragraph 30201c.

77. In developing the proposed command structure, some 20 different models were studied before arriving at the single unified command structure outlined in Chapter 4. Command structure variations are possible depending upon the scenario played. For example, a case could be made for placing all close combat air assets—both fixed and rotary wing—under a theater commander with no land or air component; that is, a subordinate command. This would be used only in a limited—both in time and effort—war scenario. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 accounts for this in its discussion on joint task forces. Another case could be made for placing close air support air assets directly under the land component or ground commander—like the USMC does with its MAGTF arrangement. However, given the constraints in purchasing assets to accomplish not only the close combat functions but other air missions of the USAF, USN, USA, and USMC, the services cannot afford to place unlimited assets in this single role. For example, dual capable aircraft have been developed for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps—the F-4 being the best example—to accomplish not only close air support but also to provide fleet defense, battlefield air interdiction, air defense, and air interdiction. Specialized aircraft, such as the AV-8 or A-10 although limited in number, have been developed to accomplish the close air support role for ground combat forces. However, not enough specialized close combat air assets exist to dedicate to each individual corps. Therefore, we cannot afford this option or model. One could argue that the Marine Corps' force package is structured in this matter and, therefore, provides a model for a theater command structure. True, but the close air support aviation assets are dedicated to the Marine Corps to make up for its light firepower. Since the primary mission of the USMC is amphibious operations where a highly mobile, light firepower force is required, the Marine Corps needs aircraft assigned to the MAGTF to perform this function. The point is: Given the subject of the monograph—theater warfare—it is my view that only one model will work, and that model is the unified command structure with three components—land, naval, and air. This is the best method to employ US forces in a theater of operations.

Another question one might ask is: Is this another attempt to take Marine air away from the US Marine Corps? The answer is no. I hope the reader will objectively read the monograph and judge it based upon the merits of the analysis provided and not summarily dismiss the monograph as an attempt to "rehash" the issue of should the US Air Force control all airpower. The purpose is not to do this but to provide the reader a rationale for a command structure based upon historical experiences and experiments with different command structures, service doctrine, and contemporary thinking. There will be those who will strongly agree and those who will strongly disagree with the proposed command structure. To those who strongly disagree, I hope they will challenge the conclusions and write a monograph to support their view. As I stated in the closing part of Chapter 1: "Professional military officers should challenge the conclusions presented in an attempt to find a better system for employing forces on the modern battlefield. It is hoped this monograph will stimulate that debate and provide the catalyst for further study on this important topic." If this occurs, then this effort will have been worthwhile.

78. A final note to this monograph. It is my hope that the catalyst for further debate and study on this important topic has been this monograph. If this is the case, then I feel confident I have accomplished at least one of my objectives. In my view, the next step is to address the subjects on "how our warfighting organizations affect weapons systems procurement" and "developing a warfighting strategy based upon our command structure."

I believe it is important again to point out that the terms air, land, and naval do not refer to a specific service but are generic terms to describe a function to be performed. As an example, the air component

commander may or may not be a USAF officer. The air component commander should be a Marine aviator if the predominance of the air is Marine air, or a Royal Air Force (RAF) officer should be the air component commander if the RAF has the majority of air in the theater of operations. The key is: The commander of the component—land, naval, or air—should be the senior officer of the service with the predominance of forces. (See Appendix I, Section 7, for discussion on component.)

Finally, whether or not the reader agrees with the conclusions presented in Chapter 4, it is hoped that the doctrinal statements in Chapter 3 will provide a sound foundation to understand how the services employ forces and how they view the employment of forces in a theater of operations. It is from this perspective that we can better understand the why behind service discussions on a joint or combined structure for theater warfare. In the author's view, it is time to end the quest for unity of command

At a dinner for Joseph Collins, Chief of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander Allied Forces, greets General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, USAF, upon his arrival at Haneda AB, Tokyo, January 1951.

(USAF Official Photo)

General Henry H Arnold turns over Army Air Forces to General Carl A Spaatz
(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)



General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (left) is greeted by Maj General Earle F Partridge Commanding General of Fifth Air Force on arrival at an advanced airbase in Korea December 1950

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)

General Carl A Spaatz General George Patton, General Jimmy Doolittle, Lt General Hoyt S Vandenberg and Maj General O P Weyland at Advanced Headquarters somewhere in Europe

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)



D day Invasion One of the many B 26 Martin Marauders of the Ninth Air Force is shown over the coast of France during the early morning giving a cover to the landing craft shown on the sandy beaches below These hard-hitting medium bombers with their fighter escort roared out of the early morning to give cover for the greatest airborne troop carrying armada ever assembled their bombs and an umbrella for the landing craft as the final phase of the battle for the beachhead of Europe got underway June 1944

(Official USAF Photo)

On the flightline at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, General Jacob E. Smart (left), Commander in Chief of Pacific Air Forces, exchanges views with Army Lt General William C. Westmoreland, Deputy Commander of US Military Assistance Command-Vietnam following a tour of Vietnamese armed forces installations. 1964

(Photo Credit: Official USAF Photo)

Lt General William C. Westmoreland, new Deputy Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam (left), and Maj General Joseph H. Moore, new Commander of 2d Air Division, attend a war briefing at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, 31 January 1964.

(Photo Credit: Official USAF Photo)

General William C Westmoreland, US Army, shown on the flightline with other military personnel following mortar attack at Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam, on 13 April 1966

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)



Lt General William W Momyer Commander of Seventh Air Force sits in the cockpit of a USAF A-37 prior to a combat mission with Detachment 1, 3d Tactical Fighter Wing, Bien Hoa AB, Vietnam This was the second mission for General Momyer October 1967

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)

President Lyndon B Johnson General William C Westmoreland, and General Walker, Commander of the 3d Brigade, 25th Division, review troops during the President's visit to Cam Ranh Bay AB South Vietnam, 1966

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)

Air Force Chief of Staff General John P McConnell arrived on 11 February 1967 at Tan Son Nhut AB Vietnam for a 4 day tour of military installations At this meeting he confers with (left to right) General William C Westmoreland Commander of US Military Assistance Command Vietnam Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Lt General William W Momyer, Seventh Air Force Commander

(Photo Credit Official USAF Photo)

APPENDIX A

UNIFIED ACTION ARMED FORCES

by

Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF*

Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, October 1974, sets forth "principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the armed forces of the United States when two or more services or elements thereof are acting together" (JCS Pub 2, "Purpose," p. 3). This publication provides guidance governing the exercise of command by unified, specified, and joint force commanders. JCS Publication 2 provides military guidance for use by the military departments and armed forces in the preparation of their detailed plans.

JCS Publication 2 is based upon the provisions of law as outlined in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; Titles 10 and 32 of the US Code, as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, *Functions Paper;* and the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. In enacting these laws, Congress intended:

> To provide a comprehensive program for the security of the US; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the government relating to national security; to provide a Department of Defense, including the three military departments of the Army, the Navy including naval aviation and the United States Marine Corps, and the Air Force under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense; to provide that each military department shall be separately organized under its own secretary . . . to provide for their unified direction under civilian control . . . but not to merge the departments or services; to provide for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands, with a clear and direct line of command to such command; . . . to provide for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, and for their operation under unified command, and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces, but not to establish a single chief of staff over the armed forces nor an overall general staff. (JCS Pub 2, pp. 3 and 4.)

*Portions of the material contained in this appendix were originally published as Decision Information Publication 1, So You Want To Know About JCS Pub 2, prepared by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, and distributed by the Assistant Deputy Directorate for Strategic Doctrine and Long Range Planning, Headquarters USAF, Washington DC, 29 August 1978. The Decision Information Publication has not been reprinted in its entirety, but the more important parts have been presented here to underscore the salient points of how to organize for joint and combined warfare. This appendix was updated by additional material written on 4 September 1981.

The military departments and services provide forces for assignment to unified and specified commands (service line of authority). Commanders of unified and specified commands exercise operational command over these assigned forces. The service component commanders are responsible to the unified or specified commander, in the operation chain of command, for the composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. (JCS Pub 2, para 30201.)

Authority to Establish Unified and Specified Commands

Chapter 1 defines the principles governing functions of the Department of Defense. This chapter establishes the unified and specified combatant commands, which are accomplished with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President through the Secretary of Defense.

A key element of Chapter 1 is the fact that commanders of unified and specified commands are responsible to the President and Secretary of Defense for the accomplishment of the military mission assigned to them. The chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the commander. This is operational direction or operational command and not service line of authority. For purposes other than operational direction, the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and hence to the service chiefs. The services have responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing forces to fulfill certain specific combatant functions. (JCS Pub 2, paras 10102 and 10103.)

Chapter 1 describes the responsibilities of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense is composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, military departments, military services, unified and specified commands, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to include the joint staff.

The JCS is subject to the authority and direction of the President and Secretary of Defense, serves as the advisor and military staff in the chain of operational command (with respect to unified and specified commands), and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the commanders of the unified and specified commands (JCS Pub 2, para 10302). Of interest is the fact that the joint staff "shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority" (JCS Pub 2, para 10303c). The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of the Chairman of the JCS, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (JCS Pub 2, para 10301).

Functions of the Services

Chapter 2 outlines the functions of the services and responsibilities by law of each service.

Common Functions of the Army, Navy, and Air Force (JCS Pub 2, para 20101):

Common functions of the military departments and services include the requirement to:

a. Prepare forces and establish reserves of supplies and equipment to meet the needs of war.

b. Maintain mobile Reserve forces for emergencies.

c. Provide departmental intelligence for DOD use.

d. Prepare and submit budgets and justify before Congress DOD-approved programs. Administer funds provided for maintaining, equipping, and training forces.

e. Conduct research and development, develop tactics and techniques, and develop and procure weapons and equipment essential to the fulfillment of assigned functions.

f. Garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases.

g. Assist in the training and equipping of military forces of foreign nations.

h. Provide such administrative and logistic support to headquarters of unified and specified commands.

i. Assist the other services in their assigned functions.

j. Organize, train, and equip forces for assignment to unified and specified commands.

Functions of the Army (JCS Pub 2, para 20202):

The Department of the Army is responsible for preparing land forces to meet the needs of war. The Army includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic to the Army.

The primary functions of the Army are to:

a. Organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land—specifically, forces to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy, and defend land areas.

b. Organize, train, and equip Army air defense units for the defense of the United States against air attack.

c. Formulate doctrine for land force employment.

d. Administer the Panama Canal. (This is still in JCS Pub 2—has not been changed.)

e. Provide civil works to include beach erosion control.

f. Provide an organization capable of furnishing intelligence for the Army.

The collateral functions of the Army are to train forces to interdict enemy sea and airpower and communications through operations on or from land (JCS Pub 2, para 20203).

One should note that the Army functions (primary and collateral) are oriented to terrain—conduct operations on land, seize and occupy land areas, among others. A few key points on Army responsibilities for the conduct of land operations are: determining Army force requirements; planning; procuring; organizing; equipping; training; developing doctrines, procedures, tactics, and techniques; providing logistic support; and administering forces for the Army.

Functions of the Navy—Include the Marine Corps (JCS Pub 2, para 20302):

The Department of the Navy is responsible for preparing Navy and Marine Corps forces to meet the needs of war. The Navy includes naval combat and service forces including organic land and aviation units.

The primary functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to:

a. Organize, train, and equip Navy and Marine Corps forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, to establish and maintain vital sea lines of communication, and to gain and maintain general naval supremacy.

b. Maintain the Marine Corps.

c. Formulate doctrine for naval forces' employment.

d. Provide an organization capable of furnishing intelligence for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The collateral functions of the Navy and Marine Corps are to train forces to interdict enemy land and airpower through operations at sea, conduct close air and naval support for land operations, furnish aerial cartographic photography, and prepare to participate in the overall air effort (JCS Pub 2, para 20303).

The naval functions are oriented to the sea—the key is the medium in which naval forces operate. The naval air function is to support the "prosecution of a naval campaign" (JCS Pub 2, paras 20302 and 20304).

A few key points on naval responsibilities for the support of naval operations include: determining Navy and Marine Corps force requirements; planning; procuring; organizing; equipping; developing doctrine, procedures, tactics and

techniques; providing logistic support; and administering forces for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Functions of the Air Force (JCS Pub 2, para 20402):

The Department of the Air Force is responsible for preparing air forces necessary to meet the needs of war. The Air Force includes aviation forces, both combat and service.

The primary functions of the Air Force are to:

a. Organize, train, and equip Air Force forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations in the air—specifically forces to defend the United States against air attack, to gain and maintain air general supremacy, to defeat enemy air forces, to control vital air areas, and to establish local air superiority.

b. Formulate doctrine for Air Force forces' employment.

c. Provide an organization capable of furnishing intelligence for the Air Force.

d. Furnish close air support and logistic air support for the Army.

e. Provide air transport for the armed forces.

f. Provide strategic air warfare.

g. Provide aerial cartographic photography.

The collateral functions of the Air Force are to train forces to interdict enemy seapower through air operations, conduct antisubmarine warfare and protect shipping, and conduct aerial mine laying operations (JCS Pub 2, para 20403).

A few key points on Air Force responsibilities for the conduct of air operations include: determining Air Force force requirements; planning; procuring; organizing; equipping; developing doctrine, procedures, tactics, and techniques; providing logistic support; and administering forces for the Air Force.

Unified Command Structure

Perhaps the most important part of JCS Publication 2, Chapter 3 outlines and describes the unified command structure. This chapter provides guidance for commanders who employ the forces that are organized, equipped, trained, and provided by the military departments. Chapter 3 discusses command, organization, operations, intelligence, logistics, and administration of service-provided forces in a unified and specified command structure.

Command is defined in these terms—direction, coordination, and control; an order; a unit under the command of one individual (JCS Pub 2, para 30201).

Command given an individual in the unified structure is called operational command.

Specific guidance is provided on the exercise of operational command. According to JCS Publication 2, para 30201, the commander of the unified command is authorized to:

a. Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of assigned forces.

b. Conduct joint exercises.

c. Exercise direct authority for logistics within his command. (Note: The military departments and services continue to have responsibility under the Secretary of Defense for logistic and administrative support of component commands. See paragraph 30203.)

d. Exercise direct authority over all elements of his command.

e. Establish plans, policy, and overall intelligence activities of his command.

f. Participate in the development and acquisition of his command and control system and direct its operation.

g. Review respective military department budgets bearing on his command to verify they are in agreement with his plans and programs. Operational command is exercised through the service component commanders—land, naval, and air components (JCS Pub 2, para 30202b).

Chapter 3 discusses unified and specified commands; joint task forces; and support, coordinating authority, and executive agent for the JCS. A unified command is a command established by the President with a broad continuing mission under a single commander. It is composed of assigned components of two or more services (e.g., USEUCOM is a US unified command with USAFE as the air component). A commander of a unified command may direct the attachment of elements of any of his service components to a subordinate unified command, joint task force, or uniservice force.

A specified command is a command established by the President which has a broad continuing mission and is composed normally of forces from one service. There are only three specified commands: AIDCOM, MAC, and SAC.

A joint task force is a force composed of assigned or attached elements of the USA, USAF, USMC, and the USN, or two or more of these services, which is constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by a unified or specified commander. A joint task force, unlike a subordinate unified command, is not a permanent command arrangement.

Special Operations of the Armed Forces

The final chapter of JCS Publication 2 is the "cats and dogs" chapter that outlines the principles and doctrines governing joint aspects of special operations of the armed forces

Such areas, as listed below, are discussed in Chapter 4:

a. Base defense operations.
b. Measures to prevent or minimize mutual interference in operations.
c. Search and rescue operations.
d. Military support of domestic emergencies.
e. Support by transient forces under emergency conditions.
f. Civil affairs operations.
g. Tactical testing and evaluation.
h. Mapping, charting, and geodesy.
i. Weapon systems integration.
j. Foreign internal defense in selected countries.

The term special operations as used in Chapter 4 is defined as "secondary or supporting operations which may be adjunct to various other operations and for which no one service is assigned primary responsibility" (JCS Pub 2, para 40102).

Concluding Remarks on Command and Control

JCS Publication 2, para 30214c(1), defines the methods of exercising command by a unified commander. One method is the use of the service component commanders. Others are: establishing a uniservice force that reports directly to the commander of the unified command (may be established with JCS approval only under exceptional circumstances) (JCS Pub 2, para 30228), establishing a joint task force, and attaching elements of one force to another. At times, the unified command just issues orders directly to specific operational forces. Due to the mission and urgency of the situation, this special force must remain immediately responsive to the commander. The commander must identify these specific forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense must approve them. The service component commander or the commanders of subordinate commands will exercise operational command within a unified command.

Chains of Command

There are two chains of command provided by JCS Publication 2. The first, called operational direction, begins with the President and continues through the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified combatant commands. The second, called operational command, is achieved by adherence to common strategic plans and directives as well as sound operational and administrative command organization. (JCS Pub 2.)

Requirements of Unified Operations and Joint Actions

Unified operations and joint actions generate certain requirements. These include integrating efforts toward common objectives, planning and conducting operations under unified direction, developing doctrine for preparing and training specific types of combat operations, and delineating responsibilities and developing doctrine for unified operations. (JCS Pub 2, para 10104.)

Principle of Full Utilization of Forces

Full utilization and exploitation of weapons, techniques, and capabilities of each department and service in attaining the overall objective of a military situation are essential. The principle of full utilization of forces assigns primary and collateral functions to the services. The broad objectives of this principle include strategic direction of the armed forces; unified command operation of forces when in the best interest of national security; integration of the armed forces into an efficient land, naval, and air team; prevention of unnecessary duplication and overlapping among services; and coordination of operations for efficiency, economy, and prevention of responsibility gaps. (JCS Pub 2, para 10106.)

Principle of Support

The principle of support is extremely important in conducting joint or unified operations. This principle states that the forces developed and trained to perform the primary function assigned to one service shall be employed to support and supplement the other services in carrying out their function. This cooperation should result in increased mission effectiveness. (JCS Pub 2, para 10190.)

Factors Determining Coordination

To determine the most effective method to coordinate the forces of two or more services for accomplishing a mission in a single operation or a campaign, consider first the mission to be accomplished and then the capabilities and functions of the services involved, the geographic location and nature of the contemplated

operations; and the character, strength, and capabilities of the United States and the enemy forces. This consideration will determine the nature and size of the forces to be furnished by each service and the type of command required. (JCS Pub 2, para 10113.)

Command Organizations

The functions involved in a military operation determine the service identity of the overall commander. Because the exact role of each service and weapon in future wars cannot be delineated, the assignments of primary functions are not intended to be rigidly prescriptive in time of war with respect to command structure or relationships. However, due consideration must be given to each service function. The command organization should integrate components of two or more services into efficient teams while preserving the uniservice (primary) responsibilities of each service and the organizational integrity of service components insofar as practicable. (JCS Pub 2, para 30213.)

Unified Command Commander's Authority

Normally, missions requiring operations of a uniservice force will be assigned the component commander of that service. Under exceptional circumstances and with approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified commander may establish a separate uniservice force with a commander that operates directly under him.

In the event of a major emergency in his area of responsibility necessitating the use of all available forces, the unified commander is authorized to assume temporary operational control of all such forces except those forces scheduled for or engaged in the execution (under war plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff) of specific operational missions which would be interfered with by the contemplated use of such forces. (It should be noted that a transient force commander is required to support the commanders within whose area of responsibility the transient force is located as far as his mission and capabilities will allow. This requirement becomes effective when the area commander declares that there is an emergency in all or part of his area of responsibility which he cannot meet with the force regularly assigned him. This requirement becomes effective as well if there is a surprise enemy attack which the commander cannot meet with his regularly assigned forces.) (JCS Pub 2, para 30228.)

Summary

JCS Publication 2, a joint doctrine agreed to by all the services, was created years ago by a very dedicated and brilliant group of military men who understood the foundations, the legal aspects, and the logical thinking that went into the design of the United States armed forces' unified structure. It is the only document that carries out the provisions in the law which established the unified structure. When two or more services are employed to accomplish a specific military objective, they are employed as a team under the direction of a single commander. The commander has operational command of those service-assigned forces and exercises this command through his component commanders. This is the key aspect of JCS Publication 2. This publication provides for an integrated team of components of land, naval, and air forces.

APPENDIX B

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE

US Army View

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The following interview was conducted on 15 October 1981 by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A Cardwell III, USAF, with Lieutenant General William R. Richardson, USA

General Richardson is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington DC. He entered the Army after graduation from the US Military Academy in June 1951. General Richardson is a graduate of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and holds the Silver Star with Oak Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross, Bronze Star Medal with V (Valor) device and three Oak Leaf Clusters, Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman Badge (2d Award), and the Parachutist Badge. General Richardson served in Korea and Vietnam. He has served in numerous command positions including command of the 198th Infantry Brigade (Americal) during the Vietnam conflict and later the 193d Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone). After many operational and staff assignments, including more recently Deputy Commanding General, United States Training and Doctrine Command, he assumed his current position on 1 August 1981

* * * *

Cardwell: Sir, I want to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to give me your views on the command structure for theater warfare

Richardson: Colonel Cardwell, I look forward to our discussion and the opportunity to share my thoughts with you

Cardwell: General Richardson, how do you see the command structure to fight a theater war?

Richardson: To answer your question will require three responses Europe and the Pacific the RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force], and nonallied operations

First, in NATO and Korea, we have a structure in place. Integration has been built into the system over time; however, once out of these areas, the interface is not as clearly defined.

Second, the RDJTF has highlighted the need for a better command structure, especially when dealing with multicorps operations. With no EAC [echelon above corps] operational headquarters, this problem is increased. The staffing for functions within the land component structure in the RDJTF to perform the required interface is ongoing.

And third, the introduction of the battlefield coordination element, or BCE, at the tactical air control center level in nonallied operations will help solve the coordination problem; however, the BCE manning and functions are still under study by TRADOC [US Army Training and Doctrine Command].

As you know, the Army deleted the EAC and transferred these field Army functions to the corps. However, in NATO and the Pacific we have an EAC when operating with our allies. For example, in Central Europe the EAC is called Central Army Group. We are trying to solve this problem when operating outside of NATO or the Pacific by introducing the BCE.

Cardwell: This presents a problem for the Air Force when there is no Army echelon above the corps level. Assuming that the BCE will solve this problem, how do you see the Army fitting into a command structure with the three components—naval, land, and air?

Richardson: Of course, the US Army would be the land component if we have the preponderance of ground forces. Extending the battlefield and successful integration of conventional, nuclear, chemical, and electronic means are keyed to the successful interface between the services at all levels. This is particularly true for the Army and the Air Force. The Army must provide an interface at all levels. For example, to fight the air-land battle requires a significant influx of data and resources available to the corps commander. Also to target effectively, joint targeting elements, or BCE, may well be needed at all levels from brigade through EAC and the air component level.

The composition of the joint headquarters must be able to resolve such problems as how to coordinate and deconflict air and land forces' battlefield operations; in particular, nuclear operations

General Starry, while he was Commander of TRADOC, published the extended battlefield concept in the *Military Review*,[1] which is a good source to better understand the Army's view of the battlefield. This article provides current Army thinking on this subject.

Cardwell: As you know, accepting the extended battlefield concept presents some organizational problems for the Air Force.

Richardson: Yes, I am aware of the problems. However, by working the problems together, we can solve our differences.

Cardwell: Then it is a question of resolving the conflict between supporting the component command system and Army doctrine of the corps being the highest tactical headquarters?

Richardson: Yes, but we are working that problem. In NATO, we have the Army group such as CENTAG [Central Army Group]. In a contingency situation, our Corps comes under the JFC [joint force commander]. We fully support the component command system.

Cardwell: Using the last conflict as an example, did the US command structure in Vietnam accomplish the joint warfighting objectives?

Richardson: Yes, it accomplished its mission. However, the United States will not likely have the luxury to set up the same structure again. In Vietnam, we had relatively unimpeded air and sea movements and fixed command and control installations. Over time, we were able to man and train the operators and establish the command and control structure. Operations went fairly well when working with the Seventh Air Force, which served as the single manager for air. However, when the Army began to operate in I Corps during Tet '68, there were some problems since Air Force support was delayed due to the Marines operating as a separate uniservice command; thus creating, in effect, two managers.[2] This was resolved as a result of Khe Sanh and action by the Joint Chiefs in 1968. This is a good example of why we should organize in peace the way we fight in war.

Cardwell: In your view what were the strong and weak points of the command structure, and if you could have changed the structure, what changes would you have made?

Richardson: It is difficult to point out strong points other than the working relationship between the Army and Air Force. It was superb. The weak point might be the idea of two separate wars—I Corps with the Marines, and the Army and Air Force in II, III, and IV Corps.

If I were able to change the command and control structure, it would be minimal, but the single manager for air should have extended over all of RVN [Republic of Vietnam]. Responsiveness of immediate air sorties might have been improved, and this is still a concern today.

Cardwell: I agree. When you assumed your present duty this past August [1981], you became deeply involved with the command and control issue that is still being discussed in the JCS arena.

Richardson: You have that right.

Cardwell: Can you discuss, in an unclassified discussion, your views on that issue?

Richardson: Yes, I'd be glad to. The Army has supported the JCS guidance[1] covering employing forces through the three component command structure. We are in line with the Air Force view on this. My own personal view is that for sustained ground operations, we need a single commander for land forces, a single

commander for air forces, and a single commander for naval forces. The issue has revolved around the matter of unity of effort. We cannot afford to have two land armies and two air forces operating in the same theater of operations. The Army position is to support the command arrangements we find in JCS Publication 2 and DOD Directive 5100.1—that is, service-assigned forces fall under the theater commander who exercises operational control through his land, air, and naval component commander. When the Marines conduct amphibious operations, they should report directly to the joint force commander. But when their operations on land become lengthy and sustained, they should be placed under the land component commander.

Cardwell: Sir, given a non-NATO confrontation, what do you see as the appropriate command organization to handle limited war contingencies?

Richardson: The RDJTF command structure is currently under study. Training and manning the ARFOR [Army Forces, the land component] headquarters remains to be fully resolved. Both Forces Command and TRADOC are working this issue.

Cardwell: Changing the subject, what are your views on having a single manager for air to coordinate airpower in a theater of operations—that is, at what level should this coordination occur?

Richardson: To answer that question, let me give you some background. In 1973, General Abrams approved a change in Army doctrine which deleted the army group and merged functions of the field army and corps into a single echelon called corps, thereby creating new Army doctrine. This change in Army doctrine has led some to assume that the US Army does not support the single manager for air concept. That is, it appears that we have driven the coordination level down to a level below the air component — thus, in effect, causing airpower to be split between corps. Let me assure you that the Army continues to support the single manager for air in a theater of operations as witnessed by the OAS[4] [offensive air support] agreement. Per this recent agreement, management of battlefield air interdiction is at the ATAF[5]—Army Group level. While at corps-air support operations center level, close air support and initial battlefield air interdiction planning occur. Regional, or theater, management of battlefield air interdiction occurs at the ATAF-Army Group level. The Army recognizes that at times the responsibility for critical decisions with regard to offensive air support will have to be made above the corps level—at the command structure which has been established at EAC—while Air Force air interdiction, long-range reconnaissance, offensive counterair, and air defense are based upon theater-wide objectives.

As to battlefield air interdiction, it must be provided based upon the corps commander's request and the EAC prioritized target listing—that is, the ground commander's prioritized requirements must always be provided the air component commander. I believe that while on the Headquarters Air Force staff, you worked that OAS agreement with Lieutenant Colonel Craig Mandeville of my staff, so you are quite familiar with its provisions. My view is that we need to expand the

agreement, which is based primarily on NATO operations, to cover offensive air support operations worldwide. The present agreement is a good starting point.[6]

Cardwell: Yes sir. Craig and I, among others, worked the final agreement which was signed by General Otis and General O'Malley. As you know, the initial effort was started and worked in great detail by the Tactical Air Command and TRADOC and was considered critical to the development of several ongoing joint concepts.

Richardson: That's right. I want to continue the dialogue with the Air Force both between the Air Staff and Army Staff and between the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations and Plans and the joint interface down at the Air-Land Forces Application Agency.

Cardwell: What are your views on the joint headquarters staff composition?

Richardson: At this time, it may be too early to see if the joint counterair, air defense, joint suppression of enemy air defenses, joint second echelon attack, and air-land forces interface concept can help determine the required staff composition. The issue of Army staffing to do the various jobs is under serious consideration in the TRADOC community.

The real issue remains unresolved—recognition that currently there is no US Army operational decisionmaking authority that resides at the EAC except in NATO and Korea. We must come to grips with the problem and solve it. We are working on it now. The folks down at TRADOC and Tactical Air Command are looking into solving the joint interface at the tactical air control center level.[7]

Cardwell: What service programs, projects, or plans are currently being looked at to increase our joint warfighting capability?

Richardson: There are many new items of C[4]I [command, control, communications, and intelligence] equipment coming into the inventory to improve the needed interface. Information on these systems can be provided at all levels of the joint interface.

Concepts being developed between TAC and TRADOC—such as J-SEAD, J-SAK, J-CAAD, and AirLand Battle—will uncover shortfalls and serve to expand and improve our capabilities and joint interface.

As mentioned earlier, the Army is looking to the BCE to formalize Army liaison above Corps. However, to ask an O-6 to prioritize targets, coordinate the Army air defense and other matters, may be asking too much.

Cardwell: Your last comment about a colonel being the BCE chief. It would present a problem. You are working this aspect now?

Richardson: That's right. TRADOC is looking into that now. We fully recognize the need to match coordination levels with the Air Force. For example, the operation, functions, and staffing for the BCE are to be evaluated by TRADOC during the upcoming REDCOM joint training exercise, BOLD EAGLE 82.

Cardwell: To sum up our discussion, would it be a fair assessment to state that the US Army supports the component command system—that is, three components: land, naval, and air to exercise operational command over theater-assigned Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force assets? The prob m facing us today is how to integrate our forces into a coherent team to accomplish theater objectives. The Army, due to a doctrinal change, eliminated the field army headquarters which, in effect, removed the lateral coordinating headquarters for the naval and air component side. However, recognizing the need to have an element for coordination at the land-air component level, the Army has developed the battlefield coordination element, and the BCE concept is still under review as to exact manning and composition.

Richardson: That is a fair assessment. I might point out that the Army is concerned that we have the proper command structure to accomplish theater or joint task force missions. My personal view is that we must have an element above the corps level to accomplish the joint coordination. We must make sure our forces are assigned to the proper commanders so we can insure success on the battlefield. The assets must be given to the corps commander to fight the battle. His desire for air assets must be considered at the ATAF level.

Cardwell: Your last comment prompts me to ask how you see Marine forces in this organization?

Richardson: That would depend upon the scenario and size of the force. The Marine element the MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force] or whatever element the Marines provide would come under the land component commander. In NATO, this would be the Army group; in the RDJTF, it would be the ARFOR. On the other hand, if Marine forces are the predominant force, then they would constitute the land component.

Cardwell: Is this the US Army position taken in the JCS arena?

Richardson: Yes it is.

Cardwell: General Richardson, thank you again for providing your views. I appreciate this opportunity. Your views have been most valuable and will help as we try to come to grips with a command structure for warfighting. We must organize in peace as we will fight in war.

Richardson: Tom, it was my pleasure. I have asked my staff to provide you any additional information you might require as you develop your monograph. Good luck, and please keep the dialogue open. Warfighting is a joint effort. We must solve the problem together—the Army, Navy, Marines, and the Air Force.

NOTES

Appendix B

1. Donn A. Starry, General, USA, "Extending the Battlefield," *Military Review*, March 1981, pp. 32–50.

2. See Appendix I, Section 3, "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968."

3. As specified in JCS Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, October 1974.

4. USA and USAF agreement on Apportionment and Allocation of OAS, 23 May 1981, signed by the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Operations.

5. ATAF—In NATO, it is the Allied Tactical Air Force or the air component level.

6. See note 98, Chapter 3, for additional information.

7. That is the air component level

8. TAC–USAF Tactical Air Command. Concepts are: J-SEAD (joint-suppression of enemy air defense), J-SAK (joint-second echelon attack), J-CAAD (joint-counterair, air defense), and ALFI (air-land forces interface).

APPENDIX C

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE

US Navy View

by

Rear Admiral Robert E. Kirksey, USN*

The US Navy's view on a joint operations command structure for theater warfare is the unified command structure as specified in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.

The command structure to fight a theater war will be the appropriate unified commands. In limited area conflicts, a subunified command or joint task force operating under the appropriate unified command is the appropriate command structure.

US Navy Support of Joint Operations

Since the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, the US armed forces have been assigned primarily to the three unified commands with the greatest continuing need for them—LANTCOM (Atlantic Command), PACOM (Pacific Command), and USEUCOM (US European Command). The basis for this assignment has been the positioning of our limited resources for timely response to contingencies in any part of the world in support of national foreign policy. From the Navy's viewpoint, this assignment has resulted in naval forces operating primarily under three permanent staffs—CINCLANTFLT (Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet), CINCPACFLT

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(Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet), and CINCUSNAVEUR (Commander in Chief, US Navy Europe)—which also provide the training and logistics support for assigned naval forces.

From the historical perspective, it has been proved preferable for naval forces to operate in support of land-oriented commanders of unified or joint commands. By operating in support, the fleet commander is free to draw upon his total resources as necessary to provide maximum naval support. This provides the desired flexibility to meet changing or escalating situations without being limited to specific or predetermined force units. In the long run, naval operations in support allow the fleet CINC (commander in chief) to meet the competing requirements for scarce naval resources and to use most effectively the inherent mobility and multiple capabilities of naval forces.

Command Organization for Limited War

The command organization for a limited war scenario should not differ substantially from that organization for any war situation except that a subunified command or joint task force may be required. Under circumstances of limited war, operational control (OPCON) of naval forces should remain with the fleet CINC. This OPCON assignment results in certain advantages:

a. Tasking a fleet commander to do a certain job, or provide a given level or degree of support, rather than providing fixed or specific forces for a supported commander allows him to meet contingency requirements while maintaining a balanced capability to meet other requirements not under the cognizance of that particular supported commander.

b. Joint force commanders do not require naval component commanders with additional staff assets to accomplish necessary operational and support tasks.

c. Since available naval forces are limited, the fleet CINC can best accomplish the potentially conflicting tasks of supporting the land campaign, keeping sea and air lines of communication open, carrying out fleet defense and rotation of units. Similarly, the supported commander is relieved of the responsibility for naval associated tasks not ordinarily connected with the land campaign such as ASW (antisubmarine war fare), mine countermeasures, providing logistics support, and protection of logistics shipping.

In summary, naval forces should operate under the operational control of the fleet CINC and in support of the joint task force commander. Naval forces may not be diverted, withdrawn, or otherwise involved in other tasks when operating in support. Therefore, tasking of naval forces in support of a joint operations is just as binding as assignment of other forces under the OPCON of the joint task force commander. The fleet CINC, however, is in the best position to determine the most

effective employment of the scarce naval resources to achieve those tasks assigned to his forces.

Consideration of Airspace Control for Joint Operations

Since each service operates its own aircraft, there is a requirement for procedures to minimize mutual interference when those aircraft are integrated in joint operations. Accordingly, it is essential that all services operate under an airspace control system. The Navy fully supports the assignment of the USAF component commander as airspace control authority during a land campaign. The airspace control authority, in this context, is empowered to organize, plan, and oversee the operation of those services which the airspace control system provides. This airspace control is understood to be designed primarily to avoid mutual interference and not to control combat operations or air defense operations.

Consistent with the provisions of JCS Publication 2, as amplified by the establishing authority, commanders of the joint forces organize their resources to best accomplish their assigned mission. However, the single manager for air concept has significant vulnerabilities in a wartime environment due to its heavy dependence on extensive, reliable, and secure communications.

Composition of the Joint Headquarters Staff

Composition of the joint headquarters staff should be governed by the mission or missions assigned to the joint commander and the forces expected to be assigned. In that Navy forces generally operate in support, requirements for a Navy element will normally be minimal.

APPENDIX D

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE

US Marine Corps View

The following is an interview conducted on 15 October 1981 by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, with Lieutenant General John H. Miller, USMC.

Lieutenant General Miller is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington DC. He entered the Marine Corps in June 1950 after graduating from Texas A & M College in 1949. General Miller served in the Korean conflict as a company officer in the 1st Marine Division and in Vietnam as the Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Service Battalion, Force Logistics Command. General Miller has extensive operational and staff experience. He was promoted to lieutenant general on 13 June 1979 and assumed his current position on 1 October 1980. General Miller is a graduate of the US Army War College and holds the Legion of Merit with Valor and Gold Star, Bronze Star Medal with Gold Star, Purple Heart Medal with two Gold Stars, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, and the Presidential Unit Citation with two Bronze Stars.

* * * *

Cardwell: General Miller, it is a personal pleasure to have this opportunity to discuss with you the Marine Corps' views on the command structure for theater warfare. Thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to provide your views.

Miller: Tom, as you know, the subject is very timely, and I commend your effort to try to come to grips with this important topic. We welcome the opportunity to provide the Marine Corps' view on the command structure. This issue has been, and will continue to be, debated in the joint arena. The issue will only be solved when we take into account the services' views on the structure and fold the service doctrine for employment of forces into the organization. I know you are aware of the issues involved and the problem of trying to integrate the services into a theater or joint task force command structure.

The Marine Corps is a unique force—unlike the other services. It is important that you understand the organization of the Marine Corps when you try to develop this command structure for theater warfare.[1] Having worked the issue while you were on the Air Staff, you are aware of the concerns that we have in trying to integrate the Marine Corps in continental warfare.

Cardwell: Yes sir, I am aware of your concerns.[2] It is from this vantage point that I structured my questions. My first question is: How do you see the command structure to fight a theater war—that is, how do you see the integration of service forces for theater warfare?

Miller: I believe the JCS Publication 2[3] guidance on this subject is entirely adequate to cover the integration of service forces. Pub 2 stipulates the commander—CINC or joint task force commander—determines how he will organize his assigned forces. He can do this several ways—either through his service components, subunified commands, or joint task forces. Pub 2 is quite clear on this point. The Marine Corps supports the commander's organization for warfighting.

I came across a very interesting article you should read if you have not. It focuses on the command structure. The article appeared in, I believe, the August issue of *Defense 81*. It was written by a retired Air Force officer, a Colonel John L. Frisbee. The title of the article is "Command Lines for Combat." I agree with what he has to say about the command structure.

Cardwell: Off hand, I don't recall seeing that article. I will read it.

Miller: You will appreciate what he has to say.

Cardwell: How does the US Marine Corps fit into the command structure?

Miller: As the CINC directs. One must keep in mind the fact that the Marine Corps is unique. It is, in reality, a joint task force, if you will. Our service organization, the MAGTF[4] is an integrated team of air and ground forces which cannot be split up. It must be employed as a team.

Cardwell: Amphibious operations aside, how would this integrated team—the MAGTF—be employed for sustained operations ashore?

Miller: I prefer to use the term continental warfare instead of sustained operations ashore.

Cardwell: Yes sir. How would the MAGTF be employed in continental warfare? Would the MAGTF come under the control of the land component commander?

Miller: We have a basic philosophical difference in the employment of forces. I don't see the CINC or JTF [joint task force] commander running a separate naval, land, or air war—that is, he uses all his assigned forces to fight a war. It is a continuum instead of a separate action.

Cardwell: I agree that it is not separate wars but an integrated effort of all the services. However, for command and control purposes, we draw organizational boxes with lines of responsibility. Which box would the MAGTF fall within?

Miller: There is no one answer. How the MAGTF fits in is scenario-dependent. It ranges from a separate task force reporting directly to the CINC as the MARFOR [Marine forces] component commander to being subordinate to another service component commander.

Cardwell: The land component commander?

Miller: The Army component commander, in most cases; however, it depends upon the size of the MAGTF, the geographical disposition of forces, and the mission assigned. In the case of MAGTF working for, or being subordinate to, the Army component commander, I would have no problem with this.

Cardwell: Given the case where Navy, Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps forces are employed in a theater of operation, and the CINC has organized the forces under the three components of naval, land and air, where does the MAGTF fit? I am assuming that there are three US Army Corps on-line, and the MAGTF is approximately Army Corps size. Would the MAGTF be on-line with the corps reporting directly to the land component commander?

Miller: As I stated earlier, it is scenario-dependent. Given the case you cited, yes, the MAGTF would come under the Army component commander. It is also possible that the MAGTF would come under the Army component commander if the MAGTF was not Army Corps size. It is up to the CINC or JTF commander to organize his forces.

Cardwell: Sir, I would like to focus the rest of the discussion on, as you called it, the continental war. There is no issue on amphibious operation; the issue centers on employing Marine forces other than in amphibious operations.

Miller: That's correct. As you know we are a naval force. A key point to remember is that we are an amphibious force and are not structured to fight sustained operations on shore. By law, we are a naval force, to do naval things. Our mission is amphibious operations in support of a naval campaign. However, we certainly have the capability to contribute to the continental war.

Cardwell: In your view then, what has caused the issue? If the Marine Corps is structured to do amphibious things in support of naval campaigns, then it would appear, on the surface, that we should employ the Marines in amphibious operations only.

Miller: The cause, if you will, is that the MAGTF is also being employed in other than amphibious operations. As I said before, the CINC determines how he employs his forces. If he determines that our forces will be employed in support of land operations, the issue is then raised on how to employ the Marine forces. The point of contention comes when we discuss employment of Marine forces in a continental

war or, as you call it, sustained operations ashore. Since we have the capability to contribute to the continental war, it makes sense to consider employment of Marine forces in this nonamphibious mode. The Marine Corps anticipated this, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps published his white letter[5] outlining the employment of Marine forces in sustained operations ashore. Briefly, the white letter states that the integrity of the MAGTF will be maintained in amphibious and nonamphibious operations. Operational control of the MAGTF will be exercised by the CINC or JTF commander through service component, uniservice, or subordinate joint task force commanders. In land operations where Marine aviation will be required to support not only Marine ground forces but also the joint effort, certain functions such as air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and long-range interdiction are the responsibility of the joint force commander.

Cardwell: Will these functions be tasked by the air component commander?

Miller: Probably the Air Force component commander if that's the decision of the CINC or JTF commander. Marine assets would be added to Air Force assets to accomplish theater air defense and long-range reconnaissance and interdiction missions. The MAGTF commander determines the aircraft for these functions and reports them to the CINC or JTF commander. Likewise, shortfalls must be identified so Army or Air Force assets can be used to support the Marine operation. It is a two-way street.

Cardwell: Are these excess and shortfalls reported directly to the CINC or joint task force commander?

Miller: Depends. How did the commander organize his forces? Normally, the CINC or JTF commander will assign a mission or an area of responsibility to the MAGTF. If the MAGTF commander cannot accomplish his assigned mission, then he must let the CINC or JTF commander know. He must have communications with the commander.

Cardwell: In my view, the MAGTF works for the land component commander. Otherwise, when Marine forces are used in nonamphibious operations—sustained operations ashore—it would appear that we have created a second land army. It would seem to me that if the Marine forces are employed separately from the land component—that is, as a separate component—there is a question on the creation of a second land army. DOD Directive 5100.1, the functions paper, prohibits the creation of a second land army.[6]

Miller: I'm glad you raised that point. There has been some discussion that the employment of the Marine Corps in continental war has, in effect, created a second land army. It is contrary to DOD guidance and the intent of Congress to have the Marine Corps structured as a second land army. Let me state most emphatically that the U.S. Marine Corps is in no way trying to be a second land army. We have never attempted to create a second land army. We have no plans whatsoever to compete with the U.S. Army for land operations.

Cardwell: Sir, I'm not suggesting that the Marine Corps is trying to create a second land army. My point in asking is that if the MAGTF is employed as a separate entity with co-equal status with the land component commander, it appears that there would be two land armies. I can see where the MAGTF would report directly to the CINC or joint task force commander—in this case, it would be where the Marines were the only force assigned or where the Marines were the predominant force with Army and Air Force forces in support of the MAGTF. I'm not referring to this case, but to the case where the predominant land force is the US Army and the MAGTF is in support of the land component.

Miller: That's my point. As I said, the MAGTF can be employed in a variety of ways—depending upon what the CINC wants. The functions prescribed to the services by DOD Directive 5100.1 insure that all required warfighting areas are included in the defense structure. The functions provide stability, continuity, and economy, and facilitate planning by assigning each service responsibilities for organizing, training, and equipping forces designed primarily to fulfill specified portions of the total defense task. The functions are not rigidly prescriptive with respect to employment of force. The CINC employs his forces, recognizing the capabilities they provide, to meet his requirements. If the MAGTF is employed in the case you cited earlier, with US Army forces, then the MAGTF could come under the operational control of the Army component commander. This would not create a second land army, nor would it if the MAGTF were employed separately under the MARFOR commander. We would be supporting the CINC's requirements.

Cardwell: A good example where Marine forces were employed in other than amphibious operations was Vietnam. Using the last conflict as an example, did our command structure in Vietnam accomplish this joint warfighting objective?

Miller: The air issue in Vietnam aside; yes, to a degree it did. MACV did organize his forces to best fit the Vietnam scenario. You will recall that the III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force] was given a geographic area of responsibility. However, as the situation changed and as other service forces were used in the III MAF area of responsibility, the command arrangement changed. Part of the Marine forces began to work with the 24th US Army Corps as it became the predominant force. This is what I see as the best example to show the flexibility of the commander to organize his forces as he sees fit.

Cardwell: The Air Force and the Marine Corps hold differing views on how to employ airpower. The issue was debated in 1967 and again in 1980–81. What are your views on the single manager for air concept?

Miller: I believe in it. The MAGTF is a good example of how we employ Marine aviation under the single manager for air concept. However, it is a matter of level—that is, the MAGTF commander is in control. He has control not only of Marine air but also the ground and support elements. It is an integrated team. The Air Force, on the other hand, believes in the single manager for air concept but at a

much higher level. As I understand the Air Force position, they believe all air must be centralized at the air component level. If we were to subscribe to this, it would mean splitting up the MAGTF.

Cardwell: Agree. To do that would split the MAGTF. My own personal view is that all air should be centralized under one component—the air component. However, that issue was resolved in the tank.[7] All the services have agreed to the integrity of the MAGTF.

Miller: You are entirely correct. That issue has been resolved. You mentioned the single manager for air issue was discussed in 1967. I just want to add to that. Without bringing up all the pros and cons, I believe the decision during the Vietnam issue to have a single manager for air was an unnecessary burden. It was not necessary to manage air at the centralized point in Saigon. My belief is that it was too centralized and did not accomplish the flexibility as it was designed to do. That aside, the Marine Corps does believe that certain air functions are best accomplished by the air component commander. I believe I mentioned earlier that air defense, long-range interdiction, and long-range reconnaissance are best managed by the air component commander. In fact, the Commandant has stated that the MAGTF commander would identify air assets to the joint force commander for tasking through his air component commander that could be used for theater campaign air defense, interdiction, and reconnaissance operations. However, Marine close air support assets would be controlled by the MAGTF commander. Air space management is another function best managed at the air component level. We have no problem with this at all.

Cardwell: Then the issue is really over as to who controls air assets that can be used as close combat support.

Miller: That's right. It is Marine Corps doctrine that you don't separate air from the ground force—the close air support.

Cardwell: Leaving this area, I have a two-part question. First, given a non-NATO confrontation, what do you see as the appropriate command organization to handle limited war contingencies? Second, what are your views on the composition of the headquarters staff to handle limited war?

Miller: First, it depends upon the scenario and the desires of the commander. JCS Publication 2 gives us ample examples to use. As to the composition of the headquarters, it would also depend upon the scenario and the joint task force mission. Of course, you would need target cells, liaison functions, and a command and control system to handle it. The MAGTF is structured to deal with any command structure or staff composition.

Cardwell: One final question sir. What service programs, projects, or plans are currently being looked at by the Marine Corps to increase our joint warfighting capability?

Miller: We are looking at interoperability of communications—a big problem we need to solve. We have, as I think you know, worked very successfully with the Air Force in integrating our MAGTF command and control system with the Air Force system. We have routinely tied into the AWACS [airborne warning and control systems],[8] for example.

We are also exercising our forces to increase and enhance our joint warfighting capability. We are working not only with US forces but also with our allies. We also are working with the RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force] in training our forces.

Of course, all our programs, plans, and joint exercising are accomplished in accordance with Marine Corps doctrine.

Cardwell: Again sir, it is a pleasure to have this opportunity to interview you today on the Marine Corps' views for a command structure for theater warfare. Thank you.

Miller: Good luck on your effort.



NOTES

Appendix D

1. See Fleet Manual 0-1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine*, 31 August 1979, for discussion.

2. The author participated in the discussions over command and control of USMC tactical air assets during sustained operations while assigned to the Air Staff during 1977-81.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, October 1974.

4. MAGTF (Marine air-ground task force) is composed of three elements - aviation, ground, and support forces.

5. White Letter No. 7-81, *Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore*, 29 June 1981.

6. DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, 26 January 1980, p. 9. This directive states, in reference to the functions of the USMC, that "these functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army."

7. Tank - Term to describe the "room" where the Joint Chiefs of Staff discuss and decide on issues. Often used when the Joint Chiefs decide on an issue.

8. US Air Force F-4A aircraft.

APPENDIX E

COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR THEATER WARFARE

Air Force View

The following is a composite of interviews, discussions, personal memorandums, and staff papers between Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, and Lieutenant General Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF, during the time frame September 1980 and 13 October 1981.

General O'Malley is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters United States Air Force, Washington DC. He assumed this position in August 1980. General O'Malley entered the Air Force in 1953 and attended pilot training at Bryan AFB, Texas. He has flown the F-86, B-47, SR-71, F-4D, and RF-4C. General O'Malley served in Vietnam as Vice Commander, and later as Commander, of the 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. He flew 116 combat missions in Vietnam. General O'Malley is a graduate of the Naval War College and holds the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Distinguished Flying Cross with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with nine Oak Leaf Clusters, and the Air Force Commendation Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters. He served in numerous operational and staff jobs prior to assuming his current duty at Headquarters United States Air Force.

* * *

Cardwell: General O'Malley, how do you see the command structure to fight a theater war?

O'Malley: The Air Force views the command structure to support a theater war from a theater perspective—that is, a single commander who directs the effort of assigned forces through the component commanders.

Cardwell: Then the integration of service forces is accomplished through the component system?

O'Malley: That's correct. The integration is at the component level—land, naval, and air forces component level.

I view this structure from the top down. The theater commander—commander in chief or joint commander—exercises operational control of theater-assigned assets through his component commander in support of theater objectives. The theater or joint force commander will, in consultation with his component commanders, determine how the theater assets will be employed. The commander will apportion, direct, and task, as well as reapportion, redirect, or retask assigned assets to accomplish those theater objectives assigned by the NCA [National Command Authorities].

Cardwell: With this structure in mind, how does the Air Force fit into the component command organization?

O'Malley: Of course, the Air Force would fall within the air component command level. The Air Force provides forces to the theater CINC. These forces are employed through the air component commander. Take NATO for an example. Our forces, US Air Forces Europe, a major command in peacetime, are employed through an air component commander during war. In the Central Region, the air component is Allied Air Forces Central Europe.

Cardwell: Are all US Air Force forces employed through an air component commander?

O'Malley: Yes, when two or more services are working together to accomplish the theater-assigned mission.

Cardwell: Using the last conflict as an example, did our command structure in Vietnam accomplish the joint warfighting objectives?

O'Malley: The entire conflict period or do you have a specific time in mind? The structure changed several times.

Cardwell: In general, the entire conflict. We did have excursions. If you want to focus in on a specific period, let's say after 1967 and up to 1970.

O'Malley: The question is, did our command structure accomplish the joint warfighting objectives after 1967?

Cardwell: Yes sir.

O'Malley: Only after we sorted out the command arrangements. In 1968, we established the air component level at MACV with General "Spike" Momyer as the Deputy for Air Operations under General Westmoreland. This was not a very easy decision. The Navy and Marine Corps viewed single managership of air assets differently than the Army and the Air Force. We made some false starts, but I believe we finally worked out an arrangement that provided for responsive tactical air for our land forces.

Cardwell: In your view, what were the strong and weak points of this command structure we finally decided upon in Vietnam?

O'Malley: From the Air Force point of view, the strength was that it provided a mechanism to effectively apply scarce tactical air assets on the battlefield. I was surprised that it took so long to get the organization in line with the principles of unified action as laid out in JCS Publication 2.[1] However, with differing service views, I guess we did as well as could be expected. As to the weakness of the structure, I would think that not having all airpower centralized under the single air component level would be the biggest weakness of the system. As you know, in reality, there were three separate air campaigns in Vietnam—two in the South and one in the North.

Cardwell: Then there were three separate air components in the theater?

O'Malley: Actually there were two—of sorts. All Air Force tactical air forces came under the Deputy for Air Operations in Saigon. Naval aviation was under the fleet. This, in effect, created two air components. The point is that tactical air in support of land operations--whether USAF, USN, or USMC—should have been centralized under one component.

If you remember, by the end of 1967 we had three air teams in Vietnam. In I Corps, the Marine air was organic to the III MAF [Marine Amphibious Force], all USAF air was under operational control of Seventh Air Force in Saigon, and Navy tactical air was outside of COMUSMACV jurisdiction.

Discussion ensued in 1968 to place all air under one commander.[2] By the end of 1968, we had two air components- naval tactical air still under the fleet and USAF and Marine air under the Deputy Commander for Air Operations. This is why I said we actually had two air components.

Cardwell: Sir, what changes would you have made in the command structure.

O'Malley: Other than what I have already mentioned, I cannot think of any other changes. I believe that our command arrangements must be in line with guidance provided by JCS Publication 2.

Cardwell: Leaving Vietnam now, given a non-NATO confrontation, what do you see as the appropriate command organization to handle a limited war contingency?

O'Malley: It would depend upon what forces are assigned and the threat. Generally speaking, I would recommend a joint task force composed of the commander and his staff, and three components -naval, land, and air. Naval forces, to include USMC forces for amphibious operations, would come under the naval component commander. Army forces, to include USMC forces for sustained operations ashore, would come under the land component commander; and air forces would be assigned under the air component commander.

Cardwell: I feel I know the answer to my next question, but I'll ask it anyway. What are your views on having a single manager for air?

O'Malley: I hope you know the answer, Tom. If not, we'll have to send you back to school. I have provided you my thoughts on the single manager for air. As you are

well aware, the Air Force strongly believes in this concept. Our doctrine, in fact, directs employment of airpower from a centralized control, decentralized execution concept of operations. We have structured our forces to support the theater campaign. The air component level provides the centralized control, and the tactical air control system—or TACS—provides the decentralized execution. Elements of the TACS are at each level—from the air component down through the army corps to the division.

The air component commander normally is designated as the airspace control manager and integrates air defense, reconnaissance, special air operations, and tactical air support operations.

Cardwell: In a way, you have anticipated and answered my next question. Other than what you have already stated, what are your views on the joint headquarters composition—for example, target cells, liaison functions, etc.?

O'Malley: Well, other than service liaison personnel and USAF TACS people, the joint headquarters must have functions manned to accomplish the assigned mission. Again, the exact manning depends upon the mission of the joint headquarters. I would say, at a minimum, a representative from each service would be required to perform liaison-type functions; a targeting cell is necessary; and, of course, the normal intelligence, planning, current operations, and so on, would be needed. I cannot be more specific without knowing the assigned mission. I believe the key point is that we must man the headquarters with experienced people to perform the assigned duties.

Cardwell: Sir, you have been personally involved in the ongoing discussions with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps on command arrangements. Would you share your views on command and control of USMC tactical air in sustained operations ashore, and the command structure for the RDJTF [Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force]?

O'Malley: First, my view on the TACAIR [tactical air, fixed wing assets] issue. The composition of the Army, Navy, USMC, and USAF forces is determined by the response to theater requirements. Once determined, these assets are assigned to the theater commander for operational command. The theater or joint commander apportions the assets. Operational control is then exercised through the land, air, and naval components commanders. USAF air assets are assigned to the air component commander, and the Marine air-ground task force—or MAGTF—is assigned to the land component for sustained operations ashore or to the naval component for amphibious operations.

Based upon the theater commander's guidance—the apportionment process—the air component commander allocates and tasks Marine and Air Force fixed wing air assets to accomplish theater objectives. I should point out here that we have acknowledged the integrity of the MAGTF. Therefore, the Marine aviation element, through the MAGTF commander, reports to the land component commander the total fixed wing air assets available for the planning period by aircraft type and expected sortie generation rate. The information is also passed by

the Marine and Air Force tactical air control system to the TACS serving the air component commander.

For close air support, battlefield air interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance, the land component commander requests air support from the air component commander. As for the Marine requests for air, they will be filled first from Marine aviation assets. Shortfalls will be filled from USAF air assets, and excess sorties will be distributed by the air component commander to other ground forces.

Air defense, long-range reconnaissance, and long-range interdiction will be tasked by the air component commander as is directed by the theater commander. On this point, the Marine Corps and the Air Force agree. The Commandant has stated this in his white letter published this year.[1]

The advantage of this command structure is that it allows a single manager to manage all air assets in support of theater requirements—the integration of all air operations.

To your second question on the RDJTF, I must speak in generalities. We are currently discussing different scenarios in the JCS. In the RDJTF, we have three components—called the ARFOR, NAVFOR, and AFFOR—for land, naval, and air forces. The Marine Corps is on record favoring a fourth component, the MARFOR. The Air Force does not agree with this view. If the Marines are the predominant force, then the land component commander should be a Marine. However, if the Army has the predominance of ground forces, then the land forces component commander should be Army. In either case, the MAGTF should be under the land component.

Cardwell: If the Marine Corps were, in fact, employed separately from the land component, would this not constitute a second land army?

O'Malley: In my view, yes it would if there are both Army and Marine units employed together in the same area of operation.

Cardwell: One final question, General O'Malley. What Air Force programs, projects, or plans are currently being looked at to increase our joint warfighting capability?

O'Malley: We are always looking at ways to improve our capability to respond to any contingency. In the joint warfighting arena, we have numerous projects underway with the other services. For example, we are working with the Army to increase our air defense capability. As you know, our joint interface to work these problems with the Army is at Headquarters TAC and TRADOC.[2] They are working plans and programs to increase our joint warfighting capability. The Air Force strongly endorses and supports all efforts along these lines.

Cardwell: Sir, I appreciate you taking time out of your busy schedule to share your views on command structures for warfighting. Thank you very much.

O'Malley: It was my pleasure, Tom. Thank you. I wish you the best in writing your monograph on command arrangements. If you need additional material, please feel free to call upon the staff.

NOTES

Appendix E

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, October 1974.

2. See note 58, Chapter 2; and Appendix 1, Section 3 entitled "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968."

3. USMC White Letter No. 7-81, *Command and Control of USMC TACAIR in Sustained Operations Ashore*, 29 June 1981.

4. USAF's Tactical Air Command is at Langley AFB, Virginia; USA's Training and Doctrine Command is at Fort Monroe, Virginia, through the Joint Air-Land Forces Agency.

APPENDIX F

AN ORGANIZATION FOR THEATER OPERATIONS

From a Commander's Perspective

by

William W. Momyer, General, USAF, Retired*

I have felt since the early days of World War II that a unified command should be established for the conduct of theater air, ground, and sea operations. The commander of the unified command should have operational command and control of all forces assigned to the theater for continuous operations. Forces that are in transit, such as airlift and particular naval forces, would come under the operational control of the theater commander only while in his assigned area. However, these forces could not be diverted from their mission except by authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or a higher military body if there were forces of a different nationality involved.

The theater command should consist of a joint staff with appropriate representation from all of the forces assigned. Key positions on the joint staff should be rotated among the services according to the mission of the theater. The size of a force assigned should not be the determinant of what service should have what position. The mission of the theater and the strategy should be the basis for assignment with rotation according to the change in strategy as the war progresses. Thus, during the early phases of the campaign when air superiority is the dominant consideration in the theater strategy, the J-3[1] should be an airman. Once air superiority has been achieved and the strategy shifted to the defeat of the opposing ground forces, the J-3 should be a soldier. I wouldn't extend this basis of assignment to the other positions since balance among the services is mandatory for harmonious relations, service pride, and availability of the specialized knowledge possessed by each of the services. The key positions of commander, vice

* [illegible] was commissioned [illegible] and served in [illegible] Command of the 5th Fighter Command Wing and 10th Air Division [illegible] Commander of the Seventh Air Force and Deputy Commander for Operations, MACV. [illegible] Commander of the USAF Tactical Air Command.

commander, and chief of staff should be held by officers of the three services—Army, Navy, and Air Force. I do not believe one service should hold two of these positions. A theater organization must not be allowed to be dominated by one particular service since it destroys the basis of teamwork and stifles the surfacing of expert knowledge about the proper employment, capabilities, and limitations of the forces of a particular service.

The theater command should consist of three components: air, ground, and sea. Each of these components are equal and have operational control of the forces assigned the theater. The air component has operational control of all the air elements to include those of allies, US Marine, and US Navy. The ground component has similar authority with respect to all ground forces, and the naval component has the same responsibilities with respect to all Navy forces with the exception of sea-based air. It is under the operational control of the air component when engaged in furtherance of the air campaign and the support of ground operations. For all missions in support of naval operations in securing the sea lines of communication and protecting naval forces, sea-based air should be under the operational control of the theater naval component command.

Marine forces when assigned a theater should be placed under the operational command of the theater commander. The air element of the Marines should be assigned to the operational control of the theater air component command and the ground force element placed under the operational command of the ground force component. To do otherwise creates two ground forces and two air forces with no direction short of the theater commander. Thus, these elements of the Marines must be integrated into the theater command structure to assure maximum economy of force, coherency of employment, and concentration of force on the primary objective set forth in the theater strategy. Obviously, special consideration must be given to the organic capability of Marine forces and policies established that will assure they have the needed firepower as other theater forces engaged in similar tactical missions. For example: By mission assignment, Marine ground forces are not constituted for sustained operations ashore. Consequently, when used in the same role as an Army unit, they need equivalent artillery, tanks, and so forth. Under some conditions, they may require more air support than a similar Army unit, but this would constitute a specific circumstance and not a continuing requirement day-in and day-out. When a Marine ground unit had the same priority as any Army unit, it would get all the air support needed to accomplish the task.

The naval component should have operational command of all the naval elements except as discussed above. I don't believe there can be two airmen in a theater of operations simultaneously and independently conducting air operations whether it be counterair, interdiction, close air support, reconnaissance, or airlift. There must be a single component responsible for all air operations in order to have a single air strategy with all the air elements united as a balanced team in carrying out that strategy. It is not enough to coordinate separate air elements from two different services. Direction is required that eliminates any doubt about the job to be done, how much force is required, when it is required, and what is expected of the effort. These goals cannot be satisfied by coordination since there is no leverage for

compliance. Only through control by a single commander of the air resources can the full capability of the forces be realized.

In the case of a naval engagement or actions to secure the sea lines of communication, the naval component commander should have operational control of the forces engaged. The air component commander would make available to the operational control of the naval component commander whatever forces the theater commander approved for those operations. For the most part, a naval engagement is relatively short. Therefore, air elements of the air component command would pass to the operational control of the navy component for a specified period. This is considerably different than an air campaign of significant duration where naval air would be employed on a sustained basis, requiring a continuing assignment to the operational control of the air component command.

I would expect where there is a conflict on mission requirements, the theater commander would decide which mission would receive priority. It would be the theater commander, for example, who would make the decision to withdraw naval air from the operations control of the air component for support of a naval engagement. Probably with that decision would be a decision to place certain air elements under the operational control of the naval component to reinforce the naval air elements. In any event, the overall decision as to where the theater resources would be applied would be that of the theater commander and not that of a component command. There is no way to assign a theater commander the responsibility for the conduct of all operations in furtherance of his assigned mission, and then not give him the complete authority to control the forces. In other words, the theater commander must have the authority to determine what forces would be shifted from one mission to another and not the component commands since they are limited to only a part of the total theater mission.

One final note on the organization for theater warfare. The theater commander should not simultaneously command one of the components. He should be concerned with the overall strategy and the allocation of forces as needed to carry out that strategy. He doesn't have the time to get down to the details of fighting the battle. Furthermore, he must keep himself above the tactical battles and let his field commanders do the job they are best qualified to do. The political problems associated with a theater of war are so extensive as to consume a great deal of the time of the theater commander. Hence, he doesn't have the time, energy, and detailed knowledge to serve as both the theater commander and a component commander.

As to planning considerations for the theater battle, I offer the following. There is a fundamental consideration that drives theater warfare planning: No one force in a theater is self-sufficient for all missions. A theater of operations involves the actions of joint forces, and each component is organized, trained, and employed to accomplish specific missions. Consequently, specific forces are dependent upon other forces to accomplish tasks which the specific forces are not optimized to perform. Eisenhower expressed this view at the conclusion of World War II when he said there are no longer single force operations in a theater—theater operations involve joint force with each force trained to accomplish specific missions. It seems

to me that if there isn't acceptance of this fact of life, there is confusion, duplication, and, most importantly, ineffective employment in the accomplishment of the theater mission.

The corps is seeking to be self-sufficient for any target array that has an influence on the corps commander's strategy and tactical operations. If carried to its logical conclusion, this means the corps commander is directly concerned with any enemy formation no matter how far away if it could eventually impact the operations of his corps—an absurd idea, I think one would agree. Yet, an airman could argue that his area of interest involves enemy ground forces on the forward edge of the battle area since these forces could be a direct threat to his airfields if they should break through. As a consequence, rather than depend upon the corps commanders for such protection, he should have critical sectors of the front for which his forces would be responsible. Again, this is an absurd position for an airman to take. However, it does illustrate why forces in a theater are dependent upon each other for specific mission. Thus I would argue that there must be clean lines of authority in accordance with primary mission responsibilities. We have that in close air support in which ground force commanders nominate targets and the air commander directs and controls the strike. The same logic applies to interdiction of targets of interest to a corps commander.

Certainly, a corps commander is interested in enemy forces that can influence the battle within a few days. This doesn't mean he should have organic weapons that can reach these targets. I think this is where the ground force commander must rely on the air commander to take these targets under attack in the same manner that the air commander depends upon the ground commander to defend and protect air facilities with weapons that the ground commander possesses that are optimized for fighting direct engagements with other ground forces. Since targets to the front of the FEBA (forward edge of the battle area) are both combat and logistical forces, they constitute a highly fluid target system. By their very nature, they are more vulnerable to the flexibility of airpower to handle such target systems. Those targets beyond the FEBA recognize no friendly corps boundaries. They cut across corps boundaries since their deployment is determined by the enemy and where he wants to thrust these forces into the battle. Hence, the firepower brought to bear against such forces must have freedom of employment and not be restrained by geographically controlled authority such as a corps. It is philosophically irrelevant whether the weapon employed against such targets is a Pershing, a GLCM (ground launched cruise missile), or a fighter-bomber. The principle is the same—the destruction of the target is of concern to all corps commanders but beyond the authority of a specific corps commander since it cuts across the total area of combat. It is one of the reasons that the air commander has traditionally had responsibility for targets beyond the FSCL (fire support coordination line).

There is some concern with the discussion on the FSCL. The FSCL came into our language after the Korean war. Up until that time, it was called a bomb line in which the air commander could attack targets beyond the line without coordination with the ground force commander. There has always been a difference of view between US air and ground commanders on the location of the bomb line or FSCL.

The air commander has sought to get this line as close to friendly ground forces as the CEPs (circular error probabilities)[2] of his weapons would permit. He wanted this close proximity to friendly ground forces since this was where the enemy forces were. On the other hand, US ground commanders have taken a very conservative view on location of the bomb line, or FSCL, because they didn't have precise locations of their troops during an engagement and were concerned with air attacks against their own troops. On the other hand, the British in World War II were more inclined to put the bomb line closer to friendly forces, believing they had better knowledge of where their troops were and wanted airpower to hit the enemy where he was. I believe the location of the bomb line, or FSCL, rests more on the proposition of not knowing the precise location of friendly forces rather than the range of organic ground weapons.

Targets beyond the FEBA should be brought under attack by a single component commander since there is no arbitrary geographical boundary. The air component commander should be the responsible commander for the location, identification, and attack of such targets. The ground force commander provides information from his sources and his interest in the target, but the air commander makes the decisions to attack, keeps the ground force commander informed, and reports results. In a theater, regardless of where one postulates a major action, it is beyond the capability of a single force. This establishes the need for a theater command structure that provides for an air, ground, and sea component capable of coordinating their efforts in accomplishing the mission of the theater commander. The Army doctrine is deficient in not having a headquarters field army above a multiple corps deployment. These corps cannot be directed out of the theater headquarters which has a full-time job of planning and directing the theater campaign as well as the day-to-day activities of coordinating the efforts of all the major forces.

No matter whether the Army has a weapon that can reach beyond the FEBA, control of such a weapon system would have to be higher than a corps for the simple reason that more than one corps is involved and aircraft of the tactical air force would be intensely engaged throughout the arena. As a consequence, there would have to be detailed coordination on the selection of the target since the tactical air force could strike the target as well. A determination must be made as to the most efficient weapon to employ. This process is automatically above the corps. Furthermore, the tactical air force may have ongoing operations in the area that transcends the target of interest to the corps commander. From a practical point of view, these types of issues are inappropriate for a theater headquarters and normally are resolved at the tactical air force-field army level. To further complicate the problem, there could be allied air working the same area which would require control by the tactical air commander to be sure there are no conflicts in missions. Hence, there are many considerations that come into play on such targets that far exceed the sphere of interest and responsibility of a corps commander. To make the problem even more complex, who would make the decision about the use of weapons in an adjacent corps under a different command? It seems to me the only command level that cuts across the entire front is the air component commander and

for that reason, if for no other, he must have operational control (however one wishes to define it) for weapons that are employed beyond the FSCL.

In summary, my views on a command structure for theater warfare haven't changed since I wrote my book *Air Power in Three Wars* (World War II, Korea, Vietnam).[3] If anything, my views have sharpened as a result of the ongoing argument about the RDF (rapid deployment force). We have the same problems on command in a theater of war that existed in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. We don't seem to be any closer to an agreement. If we can't solve them in peacetime, we won't solve them in war.

NOTES

Appendix F

1. J-3. Operations division of a joint staff responsible for planning, coordinating, and integrating the operations of a theater command.

2. Circular error probability (CEP) is an indicator of a weapon system's delivery accuracy.

3. William W. Momyer, General, USAF, Retired, *Air Power in Three Wars* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978).

APPENDIX G

AN ORGANIZATION FOR THEATER OPERATIONS

From a Commander's Perspective

The following is an interview conducted on 3 December 1981 by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell III, USAF, with General Donn A. Starry, Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command.

General Starry enlisted in the Army in 1943 prior to attending the US Military Academy in 1944. He served in Korea as an intelligence staff officer on the 8th US Army Staff and served two tours in Vietnam, first as a member of the Department of the Army team analyzing mechanized and armor combat operations and later as the head of the task force designated to draw up plans for the Vietnamization of the war. Then he commanded the famous 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. General Starry has extensive overseas and US staff and command experience. He was the Commander of the US V Corps in Germany and the Commanding General of the US Army's Armor Center and the Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. General Starry is a graduate of the Army War College and holds the Silver Star, the Soldier's Medal, the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Purple Heart, and the Distinguished Service Medal. He assumed his current position as Commander in Chief, United States Readiness Command, and Director of the Joint Deployment Agency on 1 August 1981.

* * * *

Cardwell: General Starry, first let me express my sincere appreciation to you for taking time out of your busy schedule to discuss your views on a command structure and organization for theater operations.

Starry: It is my pleasure since I do feel strongly about this subject. As you know I have dedicated many years of my career to teaching Army officers how to organize our forces for warfighting. I became particularly concerned while Commander of TRADOC. While there we worked many of the joint command and control procedural issues with TAC at Langley. We have resolved some of the doctrinal issues over command and control of service forces; however, others remain to be solved. We have addressed, and in my view come to grips with, the question of

tactical air support of the land battle and the integration of Army and Air Force assets on the battlefield. Your research project should help to refocus the question of whether we should organize our service forces in peace the way they will fight in war.

Cardwell: Yes sir. We did resolve the question of how to integrate tactical air and Army organic assets on the battlefield. The question of apportionment and allocation of offensive air support—which includes close air support of surface forces, battlefield air interdiction, and tactical air reconnaissance in direct support of the land battle—was worked by TAC and TRADOC, and then formalized by the Army and Air Force Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Plans and Operations.[3] The work started by you, when you were Commanding General of TRADOC, and General Creech[4] laid the foundation for the joint interface to solve these command and control problems. In my view, issues will only be resolved when the services establish the mechanism to jointly discuss the issues.

Starry: I couldn't agree more. The issue of a joint or combined structure for warfighting must be solved by the services. It is a joint effort.

Cardwell: Sir, in your view, how do you see the command structure to fight a theater war—that is, how should we integrate services' forces for theater war?

Starry: I believe in the principle of unity of effort, unity in that the service forces are integrated into a land, naval, and air team under a single commander. As I have said before, once political authorities commit military forces in pursuit of a political aim, those forces must win something or else there will be no basis from which political authorities can bargain. The purpose of military operations cannot be simple to avert defeat, but rather it must be to win. To win, we must organize our forces to insure optimum utilization of our combined warfighting capability. This means one commander with three component commanders—land, naval, and air. I firmly believe that all land combat forces must come under the land component commander; likewise, all naval forces should be under the naval commander, while all air assets should come under the air component commander.

Cardwell: This brings up several questions. First, are you in favor of all fixed wing aviation assets—no matter the service—coming under the air components? Second, how does the Marine ground combat force fit into the joint structure? And, finally, should one service be dual-hatted to command not only, say, the theater command but also the service component? For example, should a soldier be the land component commander and the joint force or theater commander?

Starry: Well, I do favor the fixed wing assets being under a single air component commander. That is to say, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps fixed wing aviation should be under the operational control of the air component commander, whomever he may be. It is the only effective way to employ air assets for, during, and in support of the air-land battle. To do otherwise fragments our overall effort. I cannot envision a situation where we would want two air components anymore than I can envision two land components fighting in the same theater. One commander

must control the air assets to insure the effective use of our limited tactical air assets. Tactical air assets are much too critical to split up into separate air wars. I am a firm supporter of the single manager for air concept espoused by the Air Force, as it allows the centralized control and decentralized execution essential for successful prosecution of the battle.

Cardwell: Would you include airlift and strategic air assets employed in a theater of operation under the single manager for air?

Starry: Yes, theater airlift should come under the theater commander and be managed by the air component commander. Likewise, strategic air assets that are employed in a theater of operations should be controlled by the theater air component commander.

Cardwell: You anticipated another question I was going to ask—that of a single manager for air to coordinate all airpower in a theater of operation. Your support of this single manager for air is shared by the Air Force and not by the Navy or Marine Corps. The Navy prefers to operate in an in support of role, and the Marine Corps prefers to keep Marine aviation integral to the Marine air-ground task force reporting directly to the joint task force or theater commander;[5] thus, they would be employed as a separate component. What are your views on this?

Starry: Let me state that I have no intention of trying to run the naval war. However, when naval air assets, and this includes Marine aviation, are used to project power into the land environment, it must be under the operational control of the overall component commander. I am not talking about a naval campaign or amphibious operations. I refer to protracted interdiction outside the scope of naval or marine amphibious warfare. When they are used in sustained operations ashore, as they were during air campaigns over Vietnam, they should be coordinated by the air component commander.

Cardwell: I personally agree with your view. It only makes sense to have a single manager to coordinate and control the theater air effort. Do your comments also apply to allied air assets?

Starry: Yes, without question. I believe our allies support this view also.

Cardwell: Yes sir, they do. In NATO, this has been agreed to in Allied Tactical Air Publications. My second question dealt with Marine ground combat forces.

Starry: To answer that question, we should remember that forces are employed as a team under the three components--land, naval, and air. The employment of Marine ground forces depends upon the situation. In amphibious operations, they must come under the naval component. In nonamphibious or sustained land operations ashore, they should come under the land component commander. Remember, it is up to the theater commander in Europe, the combined force commander in Korea, and the joint force commander in contingency operations to organize their forces. If I were the commander, I would place Marine ground combat forces under the land component commander; and, as I said earlier, I would

place Marine aviation supporting the air-land battle under the air component commander.

Cardwell: That is my view also, but as you know the services have agreed to the integrity of the MAGTF [Marine air-ground task force]—that is, Marine aviation, combat, and support forces come under the MAGTF commander. If we employ Marine forces as you suggest, then the Marine Corps would say we are splitting up the MAGTF.

Starry: Be that as it may, I would employ the Marine forces in the manner I described. It only makes sense to employ Marine, Navy, Army, and Air Force assets as a team under the land, naval, and air components. It has to be up to the theater or joint force commander to organize his forces. If he decides to place ground forces under the land component and aviation assets under the air component, then I guess he must split up the MAGTF.

Cardwell: A follow-up to that comment. Do you see the Marines being employed as a separate component—a MARFOR [Marine forces] if you will?

Starry: That depends upon the scenario. If the Marines are the only or predominate land force, then they would be the land component. But, in most cases, they would be one of the land forces and, as such, I do not believe they should be a MARFOR as this could lead to two land armies. If we have an operation involving NAVFOR [Naval forces], ARFOR [Army forces], and AFFOR [Air forces] under the joint task force, I would assign Marine ground combat forces under the land component commander—the ARFOR.

Cardwell: The final part of my three-part question, the question of dual-hatting.

Starry: I don't believe one person should be dual-hatted. That is to say, if the theater commander or the JTF commander is an Army officer, then he should not also command the land component. They should be two people.

Cardwell: Changing to another subject. While you were Commanding General of TRADOC, you developed the US Army concept of the extended battlefield.[6] This concept has created some discussion on part of the Air Force as to how the Air Force would fit into this concept. How do you see the Air Force working in this extended battlefield concept?

Starry: I don't see any change in the way we currently do business. The interface for Army and Air Force coordination occurs at all levels from division to the army group. The final coordination level in Europe is AFCENT [Allied Forces Central Europe]; in Korea, it is the Combined Forces Command; and the coordination in the JTF arena is through the ARFOR and the AFFOR with the commander, JTF overseeing the process.

Cardwell: With the concept of a single manager for air in mind, at what level should the coordination for tactical air in support of the land battle—the air-land interface—occur?

Starry: At the air and land component level. In Europe, for example, this is the Central Army Group, or CENTAG, and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force.

Cardwell: As you know, the Air Force is concerned that there is no echelon above corps level in current Army doctrine and concepts. It appears that the US Army is developing concepts for employment of organic assets from the corps and below level. For example, the proposed corps weapon system would have the capability to hit targets in an area where the Air Force conducts air interdiction. If this is a correct perception, it creates problems for the Air Force since they are structured to conduct warfare from a theater perspective, not from a corps perspective. Would you provide your comments on this?

Starry: There is a misconception that the Army does not support an echelon above the corps. Part of this problem goes back to the Fort Leavenworth days when we were writing manuals on a theater level for an organization that did not exist. As you recall, in 1973 General Abrams approved a change in our doctrine which, for all practical purposes, eliminated the army group or theater army. We focused our attention on a single echelon called the corps. Our doctrinal manuals addressed the matter of warfighting from this corps perspective. This, in turn, created the impression that we were focusing on a corps war and not a theater war. Admittedly, this has caused problems for the Air Force; however, the Army is also structured to fight with a theater perspective. The problem stems from our operations through one of the combined headquarters in Europe and Korea. You are correct in saying there is no service echelon above corps, but the echelon—the command, control, and the coordination—is in being in the joint or combined headquarters. In the past, we have produced manuals that dealt primarily with the corps and below. We have not, however, ignored the echelon above corps and, in fact, Field Manual 100-15[7] has been published in draft and says something to the effect that a unified, specified, combined, or joint task force is set above the corps in the operational chain.

Cardwell: It appears that my monograph on a command and control organization for theater warfare is timely then?

Starry: Yes, assuming it deals with the current concepts, it should be valuable. We need to make sure everyone understands the structure as it now stands—before we go to war.

Cardwell: Part of the misperception was created by the Army concept for extending the battlefield.

Starry: You may be correct, but I don't really believe the problem is in the concept. Rather, the problem may be in the portrayal. Given, the corps is our largest tactical unit, with the command, control, and coordination resting in the group or JTF. As such, briefings and articles tend to emphasize the tactical operations and focus on the corps and below. There is no intent to exclude multiple corps operations but, since their interaction is handled at the joint or combined level and covered in, for example, NATO publications, there is no reason to duplicate it in service

documents. Along this line, I understand you are preparing an article on extending the battlefield from an airman's point of view.[8]

Cardwell: Yes sir, I am. I believe it is important to set down how airmen view the extended battlefield, and also how we view the Army concept. There may be some misconceptions of what the Army concept does or doesn't do.

Starry: It should be useful to record how the Air Force views the Army concept of the extended battlefield. I would like to state that the Army concept of the extended battlefield was written to force the corps to think about the enemy second echelon forces. The corps must pay attention to the second echelon. To do this, the corps commander needs to have a well-laid out, flexible plan extended 72 hours into the future. The corps commander must assume a greater role in selecting those targets in the second echelon area. Interdiction is the key to battlefield success. It is interdiction that allows us to focus our attacks on those enemy targets whose damage, destruction, or disruption would help us fight the battle to our advantage. The extended battlefield concept may require some changes in command and control. However, to execute the concept, we must recognize the need to use resources far beyond those organic to corps and division and to plan their application over a greatly expanded battlefield. The Army must establish a working relationship with the Air Force for both target acquisition and attack. The interdiction battle will be fought at the corps and division level.

Cardwell: Part of the problem comes when airmen hear statements that the interdiction battle is fought at the corps and below level. Our theater orientation forces us to think in terms of an interdiction campaign from the air-land component level. We look for the interface at this level, not at the corps level.

Starry: The interface occurs at the air-land component as well as the corps and division levels. The apportionment of air interdiction assets occurs at the theater level. Once the allocation decision is made by the air component commander, tactical air must be applied in response to corps identified targets. That's all I'm saying. The corps commander must have a greater say in what targets are hit by air assets.

Cardwell: I will provide you my views on the extended battlefield concept. Maybe we can dispel many of the misconceptions both the Army and the Air Force have concerning this concept.

Starry: I'm sure it would be most useful. I look forward to your views. I will provide you my thoughts on your concerns.

Cardwell: I appreciate that and your interest in setting the record straight. The services must work together to solve our command and control problems. General Starry, again, thank you for taking this time to provide me your views on a command and control structure for theater warfare. I appreciate it very much.

Starry: It has been my pleasure, Tom. The best to you as you develop your research project. I look forward to seeing the results of your effort. Good Luck.

NOTES

APPENDIX G

1. TRADOC is the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command located at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

2. TAC is the US Air Force's Tactical Air Command located at Langley AFB, Virginia.

3. USAF and USA letter of agreement signed by Lieutenant General Glen K. Otis, USA, DCS/Operations and Plans; and Lieutenant General Jerome F. O'Malley, USAF, DCS/Plans and Operations, Subject: USA and USAF Agreement on Appointment and Allocation of Offensive Air Support (OAS), 23 May 1981.

4. General W. L. Creech, USAF, Commander of Tactical Air Command, Langley AFB, Virginia.

5. See Appendices C and D for Navy and Marine Corps views.

6. See General Donn A. Starry's article entitled "Extending the Battlefield," *Military Review*, March 1981, pp. 32–50.

7. Field Manual 100-15, *Corps Operations* (Draft), November 1981.

8. Thomas A. Cardwell III, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "Extending the Battlefield—From an Airman's Point of View," *Air University Review*, March–April 1983, pp. 86–92.

APPENDIX H

COMBINED DOCTRINE FOR THEATER WARFARE IN NATO

by

Thomas A. Cardwell III, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF*

Combined doctrine[1] (doctrine of two or more nations) for theater warfare is embodied in NATO's Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs). When an ATP is promulgated, all nations have agreed to abide by the provisions of that doctrine. The agreement is called a STANAG (Standardization Agreement). STANAGs are ratified by nations after the services have concurred and agreed to implement the provisions of the ATP.

The United States has ratified STANAGs covering ATPs on maritime operations, land force tactical operations, airmobile operations, offensive air support operations, counterair operations, electronic warfare operations, and tactical air operations. These are the only ones that deal with air-naval-land doctrine, operations, and tactical procedures.

It is important to note that once a nation has ratified a STANAG—or the doctrine specified in the ATP—the services are expected to implement the doctrine when operating in combined warfare. It is interesting to note that the doctrine found in ATPs closely parallel the doctrine found in JCS Publication 2,[2] which outlines how two or more services are expected to conduct joint warfare.

The umbrella doctrine for combined naval warfare is found in ATP 8, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*, while combined land warfare doctrine is found in ATP 35, *Land Forces Tactical Doctrine*. Combined air warfare doctrine is found in ATP 33(A), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*, and is amplified in ATP 27(B), *Offensive Air*

[illegible]

Support Operations; ATP 42, *Counter Air Doctrine;* ATP 44, *Electronic Warfare (EW) in Air Operations;* and ATP 34, *Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations*. The underlying theme in each of these ATPs is that warfighting is a combined effort of the national forces under a single commander.

At the highest level of a military force, there should be only one overall commander who is responsible for all operational matters to the authority that established the force, subject to any special government agreements and military force arrangements pertaining to the employment of that force.[3] His responsibility should be defined in terms of his mission and his area of responsibility.

Adherence to the principle of unity of command allows effective decisionmaking. The arrangement of a command and control organization at levels of command below that of the overall commander should be based upon this principle as well. This permits effective decisionmaking, and provides single points of contact for lateral and subordinate commanders. The principle should be reflected in an organization whether it is geographically or functionally arranged. For example, a military force may be arranged geographically into regions, each with a regional commander and functionally arranged into naval, land, and air components, with a component commander for each. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, part of a military force may be organized for a specific mission—normally limited by time and space—and placed under a single commander, such as a task force or an amphibious task force.

Throughout the structure, all commanders should make recommendations to their superior commander regarding the employment of their respective resources. Any disagreement between lateral commanders should be referred to their common superior commander for resolution.[3] This commander has operational command[4] of his assigned forces. Normally, he exercises operational command through his components—naval, land, and air. It is important to note that operational command does not include full command.[5] Each nation reserves the right to recall forces assigned; hence, nations give commanders the authority to direct, coordinate, and control military forces; less full command to the single commander of combined forces.

Figure A-1[6] shows the command structure for combined warfare in NATO. Using Allied Command Europe (ACE) as an example of how command is exercised, Figure A-2[7] illustrates the doctrine for combined operations on the European land mass. To further breakdown the command structure, a look at the organization for Central Europe, Figure A-3, will focus on the single commander and the component command structure.[8]



Figure A-1. Command Structure Based Upon Geography (NATO)



Figure A-2. Doctrine for Combined Operations on the European Land Mass



Figure A-3 Central Europe Component Command Structure

In the case of Central Europe, the commander—Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT)—exercises operational command through his land components—Northern and Central Army Group—and his air component commanders—Allied Air Forces Central Europe. The other major NATO commands are organized similarly with a single commander and with land, sea, and air components, as appropriate, to the specified mission.

> Generally, the forces of member countries remain under national command in peacetime; however, some are placed under operational command or control of NATO, some are assigned to NATO commands, and others are earmarked for these commands. . . . The organization of these commands is flexible enough and the liaison between them close enough to allow for mutual support in the event of war, and the rapid shifting of the necessary land, sea, and air forces to meet any situation likely to confront the North Atlantic community . . . [the commander] would, in time of war, control all land, sea, and air operation in [his] area [of responsibility].[9]

The specifics of exercising command is detailed in the aforementioned ATPs. However, the doctrinal underpinnings are a joint and combined effort of national military forces joined together by a single commander who exercises operational command through his component commanders—land, naval, and air.

The degree of effectiveness of military forces is a function of the command, control, and organizational arrangements of the combined headquarters. Certain principles are used when setting up the command arrangements. These principles include unity of command, unity of effort, centralized control and decentralized execution, and concentration of force.

To realize their full potential and effectiveness, theater-assigned assets must be employed under command arrangements to preclude undue dissipation and fragmentation of effort and to permit their integrated, responsible, and decisive application to tasks in this overall effort. Unity of effort is best achieved when authority for command and control is established at the highest practical level, under a designated component commander. At these component levels—land, sea, and air force—the relative priority of combined and joint demands on resources can be assessed for allotment, apportionment, and allocation of these resources. The optimum level for operational control of the effort would be wherever the best assessment of the overall air, land, or naval situation can be made. Centralized control is necessary for effective application of force in an area of responsibility and promotes an integrated effort in the execution of plans. Additionally, it allows for adjustments to the tactical situation according to the overall theater commander's established priorities and objectives. Centralized control at the land, sea, and air component level provides the necessary authority to direct employment of tactical resources and to concentrate power at the critical place and time to achieve decisive results. Centralized control is achieved through a designated component commander who directs the total effort by exercising operational control of tactical forces assigned or attached.[10]

Since no single commander, at any level, can personally direct all of the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals, decentralized execution of tasks is

necessary and is accomplished by delegating appropriate authority for mission execution.

In the central region of Europe, the commander of all assigned forces in that area of responsibility is the commander of AFCENT. To accomplish his objectives, CINCENT exercises operational control through his two assigned component commanders—land forces under the Army groups and air forces under the Allied Air Forces Central Europe commander. Decentralized execution of land forces is accomplished by the army corps, through the Army Group. Decentralized execution of air forces is accomplished by the Allied Tactical Air Forces. (See Figure A–3.)

The combined command structure in NATO may appear complicated at first. However, once it is broken down into its elements, a clear picture of direct lines of authority and control emerges. The key is that there is one commander designated to exercise command—less full command—of assigned national forces within a theater of operation. This commander exercises operational command and control through one of three subordinate commanders, or components—either a land, naval (sea), or air component.

Certain NATO recognized terms are used when describing types of command and control and, for convenience, are listed below with their definitions.[1]

- *Command.* Command is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces.
- *Full Command.* Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. As used internationally, the term command implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. In assigning forces to NATO, the nations delegate only operational command or operational control.
- *Operational Command.* The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. It may be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
- *Control.* Control is the authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations.
- *Operational Control.* Operational control is the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of the assigned units.
- *Tactical Control.* Tactical control is the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
- *Coordinating Authority.* The authority granted to a commander, or individual assigned responsibility, for coordinating specific functions or activities involving

forces of two or more countries, of two or more services, or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority.

- *Combined.* Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies (when all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies).
- *Joint.* The term joint connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate.

NOTES

APPENDIX H

1. As a matter of interest, the United States has combined doctrine in the Pacific theater. This combined doctrine is embodied in Air Standards which closely parallel the doctrine contained in the ATPs. The principles and doctrine contained in the ATPs and the discussion on theater warfare apply to combined doctrine for the Pacific theater.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, October 1974. (See Appendix A for a discussion on this publication.)

3. ATP 33(A), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*, May 1980, p. 3–2.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 1 June 1979; and NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6(0), *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, April 1977, define operational command as "the authority granted a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics."

5. Allied Administrative Publication 6 defines full command as "the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to insure orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term command, as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over the forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control" (p. 2–70).

6. *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978), p. 53.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid. (In time of war, the ACE commander—SACEUR—would command and control all land, sea, and air forces within his area of responsibility.)

9. Ibid., pp. 42–43.

10. This principle has been agreed upon by the United States which includes the USAF, USN, USA, and USMC. The services, through the US ratification process, agreed to employ forces in NATO through the component command structure. See ATP 33(A) for air force employment, ATP 35 for land force employment, and ATP 8 for naval and amphibious force employment under the land, naval (or sea), and air component structure.

11. These are command and control definitions which are NATO-agreed and may be found in Allied Administrative Publication 6, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, April 1977.

APPENDIX I

ADDITIONAL REFERENCE MATERIAL

Section 1. Introduction

This appendix presents additional reference material to support the monograph. Section 2 contains an interview with Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired, former Air Deputy, Allied Forces Northern Europe. General Peterson discusses the problem of introducing US forces into NATO counter to agreed NATO doctrine. Section 3 contains the highlights of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Historical Division study entitled "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968." Section 4 contains a study by Major Clayton R. Frishkorn, Jr., USAF, entitled "Background Information on USMC Command and Control Relationships During Sustained Operations Ashore, 1776 to 1970." Section 5 contains service doctrine on unified operations which was written in the 1947–50 period. Section 6 is additional information on the rationale for a single manager for air. This section was prepared by General William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired. Section 7 contains a discussion on the term component.

Section 2. Interview with Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired

The following is a synopsis of an interview with Major General Carl D. Peterson, USAF, Retired. This interview took place in Panama City, Florida, on 6 February 1982. The author requested General Peterson to record his thoughts on the introduction of US forces and, in particular, USMC forces into NATO during his tour of duty. History may well record this period, as will be shown, as a turning point in NATO doctrine.

General Peterson served as the Air Deputy, Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), NATO, from 1977 to 1979. As Air Deputy, he participated in the development of allied plans for the introduction of US Marine forces in Northern Command Europe" or AFNORTH as it is more commonly known. The Northern

European Command (NEC), one of three major subordinate commands of Allied Command Europe (ACE), is composed of the seas, land, and airspace surrounding Norway, Denmark, and that portion of Northern Germany known as Schleswig-Holstein. This includes the Baltic Sea and those waters adjacent to Denmark and Norway that are not under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). The NEC dominates the sea routes from the Barents Sea and the Baltic to the Atlantic, thereby making the command's strategic importance directly proportional to Soviet naval strength. It represents a significant barrier to the Atlantic for other Warsaw Pact countries. With the exception of Federal Republic of Germany forces, the area's standing forces are small in number. The nations of Norway and Denmark must rely on mobilization to meet their defense commitments.

* * * *

Cardwell: General Peterson, would you share your perspectives as Air Deputy in AFNORTH on the problems associated with the introduction of forces into a theater of operations when those forces are introduced counter to current NATO doctrine?

Peterson: Tom, I would be more than happy to give you my views. Before I do, let me give you some background information. I recall that in 1977, the US force commitments to NATO were so small that SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] had a variety of options for each available unit designed to meet a number of contingencies in the Allied Command Europe area wherever it could occur. These options were for land and air force forces. At one time, I can recall that forces in SACEUR's strategic reserve, both land and air, that could be used as reinforcements in AFNORTH region had a total of 102 options, 56 of which were in the AFNORTH area of responsibility. Hence, the concern within the command for dedicated forces and the alliance's intent to reinforce.

This changed with SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan and the major commitment of US land and air forces to ACE in the 1978 time frame. Along with this came the US Marine Corps.

The USMC, looking for a NATO mission, concentrated on the flanks. Following what I believe to be a correct story in that CINCUSAFE/COMAAFCE [Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces in Europe/Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe] told the USMC that when they arrived in Central Europe, command and control of USMC aviation forces would be in consonance with current NATO procedures and doctrine. Disagreeing with this philosophy, the USMC looked to the flanks, with AFNORTH as the most fruitful ground to perform their NATO mission in consonance with their own doctrine. While the AFNORTH air forces—commanded by Norwegians, Danes, and Germans—were opposed to the USMC doctrine, the fact that a force was to be dedicated to the area and today are prepositioning equipment in central Norway to backup this commitment, is perhaps an overriding factor in which political decisions overrode military concepts, doctrine, and command and control procedures. How did they get there?

When I arrived at Headquarters AFNORTH in June 1977, the USMC representation consisted of two staff officers with the expansion to four already approved by my predecessor, Major General Pierce Hodnette. My first 4 months as Air Deputy found me totally involved in trying to retain some semblance to the US peacetime establishment in AFNORTH. My predecessor died 2 weeks after he left his AFNORTH post; my executive officer was assigned to SACEUR's staff 10 days after my arrival; and my senior staff officer, a USAF colonel, retired 15 days after my arrival, thereby making me all things to all people. I was my own action officer with no corporate memory. From the first day I arrived, 15 June 1977, I was hit with 15 proposed changes to the US peacetime establishment. This included a proposed increase of five additional USMC officers by the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The Commander in Chief of AFNORTH, at that time a UK Royal Marine general officer, was a good friend of the USMC's commandant. The commandant wrote direct to our CINC requesting spaces in lieu of USAF officers. He asked for positions in one of our primary subordinate commands, BALTAP [Baltic Approaches]; its Corps, LANDJUT [Land Forces Jutland]; and in Headquarters AFNORTH. I found it amazing that the commandant could come up with so many options for USMC representation, including my deputy, and tie these requests with other ongoing actions with which I was confronted. With no corporate memory and no staff to help, I personally did all my research through records dating back to 1963.

After putting together a position paper covering all aspects of the 15 proposed changes to the US peacetime establishment, including the USMC proposed changes, I went to Headquarters SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] and discussed my proposed stand with General James Allen, SHAPE Chief of Staff. His guidance: "No more Marines, four only." With that and other policy guidance which I will discuss later, I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFNORTH, a copy of which is provided in my end-of-tour report. It spelled out my position. I won on all counts; the CINC wrote to the commandant saying no more US Marines, and if the commandant wanted more positions he would have to go through JCS channels. He never went through JCS channels during my tenure. However, all four positions were gained.

In discussing problems associated with the command and control of USMC forces in a NATO environment, I have to base my information on command post exercises, primarily, and on live exercises which took place in the AFNORTH area of responsibility during my tenure as Air Deputy.

Before I barely had my feet on the ground in June 1977, I was advised by the Chief of Staff, AFNORTH (a major general in the UK Army) of the alleged chaos that occurred during SACEUR's exercise WINTEX 77, a NATO command post exercise which covers the period of transition from peace to war. A USMC Marine amphibious brigade [MAB] was put ashore in Denmark in an amphibious assault mode without STRIKEFLEET [Strike Fleet, Atlantic Command] putting out an initiating directive. This total lack of coordination caused no end of problems in AFNORTH and its subordinate command BALTAP. STRIKEFLEET established

an amphibious operating area, which encompassed all of Denmark, northern East Germany, western Poland, and a major portion of the Baltic Sea, and calmly told appropriate military headquarters that all air activities would have to be approved by STRIKEFLEET in the designated area. This ruffled the feathers of the air component commanders of BALTAP, AIRBALTAP [Air Force Baltic Approaches], and Danish national authorities whose control of the sovereign airspace of Denmark was usurped by STRIKEFLEET. Once this was resolved, the MAB was put ashore and moved into the line in the LANDJUT corps area [Schleswig-Holstein].

Command and control arrangements to accommodate USMC doctrine placed the MAB under COMLANDJUT [Commander, Land Forces Jutland], including air. Air operations by the USMC were to be coordinated with AIRBALTAP. I was told by the chief of staff that not a single NATO general or flag officer agreed with this approach insofar as AFNORTH was concerned, but reluctantly gave in so as to avoid an embarrassing political confrontation in the exercise with the nation who provides the major portion of reinforcements—the United States.

One can only realize how bad this arrangement was and still is if they understand the airspace management problem in the BALTAP region. BALTAP follows normal command functional arrangements and has an air component commander—AIRBALTAP. Here the similarity ends with any other air component commander. Why, primarily because the Bonn Treaty Convention gave the peacetime air surveillance responsibility in northern Germany to the United Kingdom, and RAF Germany carries out this function. No problem! Wrong! Because of the political sensitivities of the Bonn Treaty, no change has been made in the air defense mission even in war; therefore, air defense of Schleswig-Holstein [LANDJUT area] is conducted by 2ATAF, while offensive air, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and so on, is conducted by AIRBALTAP. Workable? It has never been tested. Now add an MAB, its air units located on AIRBALTAP bases, with its own command and control system to the picture; put it under LANDJUT and say, "We will coordinate our air operations with AIRBALTAP" and you can understand how ludicrous this arrangement will be in war. I haven't even mentioned the air defense problem, but imagine three separate air defense systems operating in an area the size of Denmark.

I took this problem to the Chief of Staff of SHAPE, along with the manpower problem, and went over it in its entirety. I wasn't bringing up anything new. The politically sensitive Bonn Treaty couldn't be touched, and we would have to work around that problem. Both he and SACEUR were well aware of the USMC situation, and I was advised to avoid introducing US military doctrinal problems into NATO and to do the best we could under the circumstances. I stuck with this policy during the time I was Air Deputy and advised my American staff, USA, USN, USMC, and USAF to do the same.

You would think the learning process would have brought improvement. It did, but not until another exercise had taken place. This was Able Archer 77, a nuclear procedures exercise with a conventional war play to enhance the scenario. The

scenario, in fact, picked up where WINTEX-77 left off. Forces were in place and the "war continued." It was now November 1977.

Since this was a nuclear procedures exercise, USMC play was largely controlled by USMC officers on the control group. There were improvements. The establishment of another AOA [area of operations], in this case South Norway, was reasonable; but, once again, no initiating directive was provided to coordinate military operations in south Norway with the NATO area commander or with Headquarters AFNORTH. An amphibious assault was conducted in south Norway with complete success.

On 22 December 1977, Brigadier General Crist, USMC, from FMFLANT [Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic] arrived at AFNORTH and made considerable effort to reach an accommodation with AFNORTH. An explanation of the capabilities of the MAF, its limitations when an MAB is broken out of an MAF and moved off to another location, and how the AOA could be made to mate with other airspace managers went a long way toward alleviating critical military planning problems.

The command and control problem remained an issue that was unsolved. I followed my guidance and we did not have a confrontation, much to the disappointment of my fellow NATO officers. It wasn't the forum for such an effort.

The next episode occurred during the massive SACEUR exercise Boldguard. This exercise was conducted in the fall of 1978. Once again to the consternation of the COMBALTAP [Commander, Baltic Approaches], a three-star Danish general, and the COMAIRBALTAP [Commander, Air Force Baltic Approaches], a two-star German general, NATO command and control arrangements had to be compromised and artificial arrangements made to satisfy USMC participation in the field exercise. It was not that they agreed to their concepts and doctrine but more to reinsure the presence of badly needed forces in an exercise with high hopes that these same forces would be available in war. At one time, the message traffic got highly volatile between BALTAP and AFNORTH over command and control arrangements involving the USMC. At one point, it became apparent that certain elements in BALTAP would like to have seen the USMC units withdrawn from the exercise, but saner heads prevailed and a jerry-rigged command arrangement was incorporated into the exercise to accommodate the Marines. In true fashion, they were gung ho—did their job so well that when authorized to take the offensive, they rolled over the opposition including the exercise umpires in their quest for victory. Even a couple of stray helicopter flights over East Germany failed to deter this terrific attitude and esprit de corps.

The last exercise I participated in was WINTEX 79. These philosophical changes made by Brigadier General Crist were apparently abandoned and the AOA, command relations, and allocation of all assets were once again the problem. In fairness to the USMC, they recognized the air defense problem and allocated their air defense assets to AIRBALTAP, agreed to make available excess sorties, CAS [close air support], and reconnaissance to AIRBALTAP, and generally the climate was more favorable.

The last 2 years that I spent in AFNORTH were one continuous hassle over the USMC forces—particularly air. The question often asked was, Why, of all the

branches of the armed forces of each NATO nation contributing military forces to the defense of the alliance, is the US Marines the only one which will not accept NATO command and control doctrine and procedures?

While member nations of the alliance in AFNORTH accepted accommodation as an expediency to command and control arrangements with the USMC, their senior military field commanders resented the adamancy of the USMC position; the sometimes overbearing and sometimes bullying attitude of their junior officers in negotiations; and had the feeling that the USMC had little concern for their national sensitivities or the alliance's military organization, command and control system, or NATO doctrine and procedures. These officers would never say anything publicly, but privately I heard it often, sometimes pleading with me to make them understand.

These words won't change anything. I would be happy if it makes someone understand there are problems on the flanks in NATO which the USAF should become more involved in if we intend to reinforce NATO's allies in areas other than the central region. While my comments cover USMC actions, we in the USAF were guilty of some gross errors in judgment, but never to the degree that we walked over the national sovereignty and sensitivities of a nation, at least within the military structure.

Cardwell: Thank you, General Peterson, for taking time to discuss your views on this subject. As you know, I firmly believe that we must get our warfighting organization in line with approved doctrine; but, more importantly, we must have an organization that has clear and logical lines of authority. If we don't, we are doomed to failure before we even begin.

Peterson: I couldn't agree with you more, Tom.

Cardwell: Again, sir, thank you for providing me your perspective. It has been of great value.

Section 3. The Single Manager Problem—The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968

This section briefly outlines, in point paper format, the highlights of the JCS Historical Division paper on the single manager for air approach in I Corps. The paper is entitled "The Single Manager Problem: The Creation of an Operational Control System for US Tactical Air in I Corps of South Vietnam During 1968" and was published by the JCS Historical Division, Washington DC, in July 1976. Previously, it was classified but has been declassified by SM-197-81, 20 March 1981. It was published first in Doctrine Information Publication 10, *Background Information on Air Force Perspectives for Coherent Plans (Command and Control*

of TACAIR), April 1981, by the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF, Washington DC. The point paper was prepared by the author on 31 March 1981.

* * * *

1. OVERVIEW.

- In 1968, General Westmoreland, Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), introduced a single manager for tactical air in I Corps under his Deputy Commander for Air Operations (General Momyer, USAF).

  -- Gave him operational control (OPCON) of all fixed wing aircraft—USAF and USMC. USMC took issue. Commandant brought the problem to Joint Chiefs of Staff.

    --- Unable to resolve; SECDEF was asked to resolve. (DOD supported COMUSMACV.)

      ---- Did not end the matter as the controversy dragged on throughout 1968 (and continued throughout the conflict).

2. SPECIFICS.

- In 1966, USMC deployed forces (III Marine Amphibious force—MAF) under COMUSMACV as a separate uniservice command.

- USMC forces were under the "service chain of command" under operational command—less OPCON—of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, with OPCON given to COMUSMACV. (USA and USAF forces were under the OPCOM/OPCON of COMUSMACV—as required by JCS Pub 2.)

- In 1967, the III MAF was joined in I Corps by the Americal Division plus two additional USA divisions (USA outnumbered USMC by 2-to-1).

  -- By the end of 1967, there were three separate air teams.

    --- 1st Marine Air Wing (MAW)—organic to III MAF and which only supported III MAF.

    --- USAF Seventh Air Force under OPCON of Seventh Air Force (AF) Tactical Control Center (Saigon).

    --- Navy tactical air—TACAIR (carrier-based)—outside of COMUSMACV jurisdiction.

- Commander, Seventh Air Force/Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV, proposed single manager concept on 18 January 1968.

-- Concept based upon COMUSMACV conviction that only by centralized management of TACAIR could the US concentrate air firepower effectively, exploit tactical flexibility, and provide balanced air support.

-- Commanding General, III MAF; Commandant, USMC (CMC); and CINCPAC opposed.

--- USMC stated the proposed single manager concept was not doctrinally or functionally suited to Marine requirements.

- 1968 Tet offensive (Khe Sanh defense) reinforced COMUSMACV view that airpower must come under a single manager.

-- 19 February 1968, COMUSMACV directed I Corps air (less USN) be placed under the air component commander (Deputy Commander for Air Operations, MACV).

-- CINCPAC agreed.

-- USMC objected.

--- Commandant informed Chairman of JCS of his "increasing concern."

---- Stated the single manager concept was a "flagrant violation of both the UNAAF (JCS Pub 2) and the . . . 1966 JCS decision fixing command relations in Vietnam."

- February to March 1968, General Momyer developed the implementing plan. USAF, USMC, and USA officers participated.

-- Throughout this planning session, the Marines consistently expressed "grave concern" over the plan and possible long-range effects on their "air/ground team" (quotes are from JCS paper).

-- CINCPAC approved COMUSMACV plan on 2 March, and on 8 March 1968 the implementing directive was signed.

--- The first mission under the single manager system was flown on 22 March 1968.

- The Commandant again went to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), with his concerns.

-- Recommended the plan be submitted to JCS for review.

--- Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) "immediately disagreed."

---- "Westy has now done something he should have done a long time ago. He should also, in my opinion, place Navy air into the same structure. Also, I consider that Westy has the authority to do what he has done." (Memo—handwritten—CSAF to CJCS, 4 March 1968.)

-- USMC continued the attack on the single manager plan.

--- During month of April 1968, JCS considered the CMC concern but were unable to reach any agreement.

--- CJCS forwarded the split decision (CSA/CNO/CMC vs. CJCS/CSAF/COMUSMACV) to SECDEF for resolution.

-- On 15 May 1968, Deputy SECDEF decided the single manager issue in favor of COMUSMACV/CJCS/CSAF position.

- USMC was not "convinced" by the Deputy SECDEF decision nor by modifications to the original concept (although the modifications gradually shifted more control back to USMC).

-- In June, CMC complained to JCS that the single manager plan was not acceptable.

--- JCS discussed, but no decision was reached. Requested further evaluation by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.

- By September 1968, all "evaluations" were concluded.

-- CJCS reported to SECDEF that the single manager system was providing the best overall use of TACAIR and the system would continue to be refined and improved. He further recommended the single management system be permitted to continue as long as COMUSMACV deemed it necessary.

--- CMC did not concur.

---- CJCS forwarded the CMC concern to SECDEF on 22 November 1968 and again recommended that it was inappropriate to change the system or require additional tests.

---- Deputy SECDEF agreed, and no further action was taken.

- The COMUSMACV single manager for TACAIR, as modified in May 1968, continued in operation throughout the remainder of 1968 and into 1970.

3. SUMMARY.

- The last paragraph of the JCS Historical Division paper sums up the issue.

-- "Despite the strenuous Marine Corps resistance to control of its air assets in I Corps by a US Air Force commander, the single manager system worked well and provided improved coordination and control of air elements there" (page 25).

- "There is no doubt whether single management was an overall improvement as far as MACV as a whole was concerned. It was." (Lieutenant General K. B. McCutcheon, USMC, in his article for the *US Naval Institute*

Proceedings, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962–1970," May 1971, page 137, as quoted in the JCS Historical Division paper.)

Section 4. Background Information on USMC Command and Control Relationships During Sustained Operations Ashore, 1776 to 1970

by

Clayton R. Frishkorn, Jr., Major, USAF

Major Frishkorn is assigned to the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Directorate of Plans, Headquarters USAF, Washington DC, as a planning and programming officer. He prepared this section for my monograph.

* * * * * * *

The following is a historical perspective, in outline form, of USMC command relationships from 1776 to 1970:

1. 1776—Three companies of continental Marines assigned to Washington's army for the Trenton-Princeton campaign.

2. 1798—John Adams signed an act for establishing and organizing a Marine Corps.

a. Section 6. "That the Marine Corps established by this act shall, at any time, be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States. . . ."

3. 1834—Congress by the "Act for the Better Organization of the United States Marine Corps" recognized that the Marines could be "detached for service with the Army."

4. 1836– Marine Commandant, Colonel Archibald Henderson, offered a Marine regiment to President Jackson for detachment with the Army during the Creek and Seminole wars.

5. 1847—During the Mexican War, Marine Commandant, General Henderson, stated: "I have written an order to the Secretary of the Navy to transfer them (six Marine companies) to the land forces under the immediate command of General Scott." The Marines participated in the capture of Mexico City.

6. 1908—Executive Order 969, signed and then reflected in Navy Regulation 1909, stated: "The Marine Corps shall be liable to do duty in the forts and garrisons of the United States on the seacoast or any other duty on shore. . . ."

7. 1917—Major General Barnett, Commandant, dispatched four regiments to France for duty with the Army as part of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF).

a. Brigadier General Chester A. Doyen, USMC, was Commander of the 4th Brigade, which was part of the Army's 2d Division.

b. General Doyen became ill, and General Pershing replaced him with Brigadier General James G. Harbord, USA. (Letter, Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces, to Adjutant General, 30 April 1918.)

c. Pershing moved Harbord to AEF Services of Supplies and replaced him with Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC.

(1) Lejeune had commanded two brigades in Army divisions.

(2) Took over 4th Brigade, then 2d Division.

d. USMC, as part of the American Expeditionary Force, operated entirely under the operational control of the land component commander and never as a separate component. (Millet, *Semper Fidelis, The History of the United States Marine Corps*, pages 287–319.)

8. 1941—War Department decided that the Army would have responsibility for amphibious operations in the Atlantic and the USMC would have that responsibility in the Pacific.

a. Joint training operations had been an organizational nightmare.

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to avoid the issue that Army and USMC could not develop joint doctrine. (Operations Division's memo, "Amphibious Training," 3–10 April 1942, OPD 353; and Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, *United States Army in World War II: The Army Ground Combat Troops*, pages 85–92.)

9. 1941—In the Philippine Island, General MacArthur took operational control of the 4th Marine Regiment during the Bataan-Corregidor operation.

10. 1942—Operation WATCHTOWER was a three-phased invasion coordination between General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.

a. Neither Nimitz nor MacArthur had complete authority and all final decisions on force commitments, objectives, and timing remained with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Morton, *The War in the Pacific*, pages 298-304; and King and Whitehill, *Fleet Admiral King*, pages 381–389.)

b. Nimitz appointed his subordinate, Vice Admiral Ghormley, CINC South Pacific, to command the first phase, attacking Guadalcanal.

c. The command system for WATCHTOWER was complicated by interservice sensitivities and shortages of air cover.

d. Ghormley was never confident of his authority over Army air and ground units in theater, and he was never given operational control of the carrier task force (under Admiral Fletcher) which abandoned the Marines on Guadalcanal 2 days after the invasion. (Morrison, *History of the US Naval Operations in World War II: The Struggle for Guadalcanal*, pages 3–16; and Dyer, *The Amphibians Come to Conquer: The Story of Richmond Turner*, 1, pages 329–352.)

e. The incident emphasized the need for a clear understanding of command and control relationships and unity of effort. Major General Vandergrift enlisted help of Commandant Holcomb, who visited Guadalcanal, to persuade Admirals Nimitz and King to change FTP–167, the doctrinal manual for amphibious operations. (Vandergrift and Asprey, *Once a Marine*, pages 182–185; and Dyer, *The Amphibians*, pages 448–452.)

f. Major General Vandergrift, USMC, Commander of 1st Division, was replaced by Major General Patch, USA, with the Americal Division, 25th Infantry Division, and 2d Marine Division.

11. 1944—Invasion of Saipan demonstrated impact of doctrinal differences.

a. Major General Holland Smith, USMC, command invasion with two Marine divisions and the 27th Infantry Division under Major General Ralph Smith, USA.

b. Holland Smith used atoll warfare of unremitting attack on Saipan where its assumptions were questionable. (General Vandergrift's papers on Holland Smith.)

c. When the 27th Infantry Division did not keep up with the Marines, Holland Smith removed Ralph Smith from command and replaced him with General Jarmon, then General Griner, having accused Major General R. Smith of lacking aggressive spirit.

d. The "Smith versus Smith" controversy highlighted the impact of not developing joint doctrine, understanding it, and applying the concept of "train like you're going to fight."

12. 1945—Invasion of Okinawa demonstrated the importance of placing combined forces under land and air component commanders.

a. Component commanders were used because sustained operations ashore were anticipated versus only amphibious operations.

b. Landing force placed under Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner, USA.

c. Army Air Forces and Marine Tactical Air Forces organized as one Tactical Air Force (TAF) under Major General Mulcahy, USMC. (Frank and Shaw, *Victory and Occupation*, pages 57–89.)

d. Although Marine aviation was conceived for close air support of amphibious operations, only in Okinawa and Peleliu did they support that role. The remainder of their effort was fought in its own war as part of the Navy land-based air force supporting the Navy. (Millet, *Semper Fidelis*, page 440.)

e. An important point here is that the Marines actively supported commitment of their air assets (and the Army Air Forces assets) under an air component commander. (Millet, *Semper Fidelis*, page 437.)

f. Current joint doctrine for amphibious operations supports air component commander's concept: AFM 2-53/LFM 01 states that, "When the preponderance of tactical aviation is provided by the Air Force for amphibious operations, an Air Force officer will be designated by the Air Force commander of the participating Air Force forces to direct the total air effort in the amphibious objective area."

13. 1950—USMC entered the Korean war with the 1st Brigade under the operational control of General Walter H. Walker (8th Army). The 1st Marine Division was assigned to the Army's I, IX, and X Corps.

a. Throughout most of the war, the land component commander controlled the Marine ground forces. (Millet, *Semper Fidelis*, pages 475–518.)

b. In 1951, the Marine air wing was placed under the central control of Fifth Air Force in support of the 8th Army. (Futrell, *United States Air Forces in Korea*, pages 426–434.)

c. The doctrinal differences between the Air Force and Marine Corps seemed irreconcilable, but the Air Force position prevailed.

d. The Marines saw the role of Marine air as primarily close air support for their ground forces; the Air Force was committed to interdiction and the concept of centralized control and decentralized execution.

14. 1965–1970, Vietnam:

a. Marine Corps units came under the operational control of Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV).

b. The battle for control of all fixed wing assets became a fierce doctrinal issue, peaking in March 1968.

(1) The Air Force contended that preplanned strikes were more economical than on-station sorties and that direct strikes would determine ground operations.

(2) The Marine Corps contended that the ground war should determine the airstrikes and that single managership would force them to increase their staff, delay preplanned strikes, and reduce its quick response air attacks.

(3) Two tactical developments created the single managership crisis: the rise in Air Force strikes along the demilitarized zone and the introduction of Army units into the battle for Quang Tri (I Corps).

(4) General Momyer, USAF, convinced General Westmoreland, USA, that the 1st Marine Amphibious Wing did not provide adequate support for the US Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

(5) Previous attempts to sell the single theater of war air commander concept to CINCPAC, MACV had failed.

(6) But in this instance, Westmoreland pushed the issue all the way to the Secretary of Defense and the President, who finally ruled in MACV's favor. (Westmoreland, *A Soldier's Reports*, pages 342–345; and Millet, *Semper Fidelis*, page 587.)

(7) 1970 saw a revision of MACV's guidance on air operations but retained commanding general at Seventh Air Force for coordinating authority over Marine air. (Millet, *Semper Fidelis*, page 587.)

15. CONCLUSION With only brief exceptions, the Marines have operated since their inception under the land component commander during sustained operations ashore (nonamphibious operations).

Section 5. Service Doctrine, 1947–1950, Unified Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Edward M. Postlethwait, USA, in his article, "Unified Command in Theaters of Operations," *Military Review*, November 1949, page 26,

describes the service doctrinal views on unified operations. Reprinted below are views of the USA, USN, and USAF held in the 1947–50 time frame.

Army Doctrine

Army doctrine on the employment of its type units does not restrict a theater commander in any way. He may organize Army units into unified commands of any size without conflicting with Army doctrine. He may attach Army units to commands of either of the other two services at any time, also without conflict with Army doctrine. Unfortunately, this is only partly true with respect to Navy doctrine and under no conditions true with respect to Air Force doctrine.

Navy Doctrine

Navy doctrine on the employment of its type units (i.e., combat ships and shipping) requires that they be under Navy command at all times. This doctrine is based upon the fact that considerable specialized knowledge and experience in the employment of naval forces are required in order to employ naval forces promptly, and that such experience lies only in the Navy. In practice, this doctrine has a certain amount of flexibility in its application in line with requirements for unified command. However, this flexibility is not indicated except by implication in Department of the Navy manuals. For example, "Amphibious Instructions for Naval Forces," USF–6, states flatly that the Joint Expeditionary Force commander will be a naval officer. Further, it says that the Joint Expeditionary Troops commander assumes command ashore when the troops are firmly established. It does not state that command of naval forces remaining in the area will normally pass to the Joint Expeditionary Troops commander, although such was usually the case in World War II.

Air Force Doctrine

Air Force doctrine on the employment of its type units has been mentioned previously. The idea that a weapon having theater-wide range should be retained under theater command is basically sound. Here again, however, there is a lack of flexibility in the application of the doctrine.

During any period of a theater campaign in which the air battle for air superiority is being conducted, or during which the major effort of theater air units is employed on theaterwide target systems, the Air Force doctrine of centralized command is in line with the needs of the theater commander because he is conducting an air battle. Once air superiority has been gained and the major strategic target systems have been neutralized, then the bulk of the theater air efforts is no longer required to maintain the conditions established. Then the principal mission of tactical air becomes to assist and support directly the land battle.

Closely coordinated air participation in the land battle requires careful integration of the plans and orders of Army and Air Force units. This necessity is exemplified in the methods employed in the air-ground system described in Field Manual 31–35 in which a tactical air force and a field army are "associated" in conducting the battle. It is in this situation that the theater commander needs a certain amount of doctrinal flexibility in the use of his theater tactical air. Depending upon the air and land situations, he may well desire to commit some portion of his tactical air to the single mission of supporting his main land effort. This may involve attaching tactical air units to a field army or an army group, or placing tactical air under a joint command with Army units. Air Force doctrine, however, does not contemplate that tactical air and Army commands will ever operate under a unified command, either as a joint task force or by placing command of one under the commander of the other.

Air Force doctrine holds that a unified command at that level would restrict theaterwide concentration of tactical air effort. This is partly true in that concentration might take longer. However, once the demand for theaterwide tactical air effort has diminished, the need for unified command allows for no exceptions. This inflexibility of doctrine limits the theater commander in providing for the unity of command in creating joint forces. He must accept the idea of integrating the efforts of two units on a cooperative or "associated" basis regardless of the situation.

Section 6. Single Manager for Air Concept

General William W. Momyer, USAF, Retired, prepared the following rationale for the single manager for air concept. This information was collected from correspondence, interviews, and telephone conversations with General Momyer during the period September 1977 to January 1982.

The air component should comprise all of those elements that are engaged in sustained operations on a daily basis. Thus, Marine and Naval air, when directed to sustained operations in a theater, and Air Force strategic and tactical air assets assigned to a theater of operation should be under the operational control of that air component commander. That is the only sure means of applying these forces in a

coordinated manner against the objectives set forth in the theater strategy. The decisions that have to be made on a daily basis demand detailed planning in order to get the most out of the assigned air elements. This means that the air effort must be articulated carefully and that all of the elements are working together. There should not be any cross purposes or different interpretations of what the job of these elements are. The air component should consist of a variety of capabilities to handle all of the air missions that may evolve in the course of theater operations. The pace of the air war is such that there isn't time to go through a long and tedious process of coordination and arguments about what should be done and when. The decisions must be made, and the forces must execute in accordance with a plan of action. This principle of operation is not only applicable to the air elements of a given country but also to the air elements of a number of countries assigned to a theater of operations.

The argument about the control of air operations at lower levels of command is directed toward the concern about the ground commander's lack of control of a weapon system that has a tremendous impact upon the capabilities of his forces. Since the air weapon system is the only system that can be directed to such a wide variety of targets, there is a desire on the part of some ground commanders to have it under their direct control. By being under such control, this firepower can be employed exclusively to the area of responsibility assigned that ground commander. If the air weapon system is assigned to the air component, the ground commander has to compete with the air commander for the use of the airpower and must be able to persuade the theater or joint force commander that the use of airpower in his area is more important to the theater mission than the proposed employment by the air component commander.

If we had not been through the experience of three wars on refining the command and control of airpower, these arguments would be pertinent today. The fact is we started World War II with tactical air units under the control of divisions and corps in North Africa. The result of that early experience demonstrated the folly of parceling out airpower. The initial employment of airpower was in support of the ground battle when the enemy air force dominated the sky. The priority employment of airpower should have been to gain air superiority so that it could provide air support to the divisions and corps. The absence of a theater structure during these early days encouraged this splitup of airpower and the near disaster that resulted.

Those who advocate significant parts of tactical airpower to the control of corps commanders not only fail to digest the facts of history but also fail to understand that, in fact, the corps commander will get more support if airpower isn't under his control. The support he will get will be in the form of air superiority to keep the enemy air off of his back and a reduced fighting strength of forces facing him by virtue of the centralized control of airpower that permits concentration of effort against decision elements of the enemy strength. There is no way to achieve this application of strength and results if each corps commander is given control of a portion of the tactical airpower.

Section 7. The Component

There is discussion within the services over the term component as used in Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2. There exists some confusion on interpreting and applying this concept to the command arrangements in our unified command structure. The confusion focuses on the ambiguity of the terms component and service component. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 states: "A component command is also called a 'component' or a 'service component' " (page 4). Discussions of command relationships in the joint arena have centered around whether Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 is to be interpreted to mean a "component" is either a service term that is US Navy or US Air Force component—or a functional term—like *air*, *land*, or *naval* component. The USMC and USN favor the service descriptive tag—Marine component or Navy component—while the USA and USAF favor the generic tag—air component or land component.

Use of the term service component, such as US Air Force component, does not consider those military situations when a member of another service, other than the USAF, has operational control of air assets. The issue is more than one of terminology. It is one of doctrine. Use of parallel terminology and doctrine facilitates a smooth transition from unified-joint to unified-combined operations. Our allies manifest clearly this philosophy in agreed upon doctrine. For example, Allied Tactical Publication 33(A), *NATO Tactical Air Doctrine*, states military forces are "functionally arranged into naval, land, and air components, each with a component commander" (page 3-2). Our combined doctrine in the Pacific region, Air Standard 45/3, *Tactical Air Doctrine*, expresses this same thought.

Endorsement of the term service component vice component implies an endorsement of the term US Navy component, for example. Use of this descriptive tag implies the acceptance of a multicommander concept in which two or more generic theater-assigned assets are operating in the same theater. The use of two land armies is a good example.

Endorsement of the term component, vice service component, implies an endorsement of the term air, land, or naval component which supports the doctrinal concept of having a single manager for all generic theater-assigned assets, regardless of service affiliation. As an example, the importance of having a single air commander was affirmed in JCS Memorandum 2502 645-1 which states:

> To realize their full potential and effectiveness, air forces must be employed as an entity under command arrangements that preclude dissipation and fragmentation of effort and permit the integrated, responsive, and decisive application of available air assets to tasks in the overall air effort that best achieve designated objectives. Unity of effort is best achieved when planning and control of the air effort are centralized at the highest level practicable under the unified authority of a single air commander.

For reasons stated above, I have chosen to use the term *component command* in the functional—or generic—sense; that is, three components of land, naval, and air vice USN, USMC, USA, or USAF component.

UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE



GLOSSARY

AAFCE	Allied Air Forces, Central Europe
AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
ABCCC	airborne battlefield command and control center
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ADCOM	Aerospace Defense Command
ADVON	advanced operational nucleus; advanced echelon
AEF	Allied Expeditionary Force
AFB	Air Force base
AFCC	Air Force component commander
AFCENT	Allied Forces Central Europe
AFFOR	Air Force forces, Air Force component command/commander
AFM	Air Force manual
AFNORTH	Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFR	Air Force regulation
AIRBALTAP	Air Force Baltic Approaches
ALCC	airlift control center
ALCE	airlift control element
ALFI	air-land forces interface
ALO	air liaison officer
AOA	area of operations
AOC	air operations center
ARFOR	Army forces, Army force component/commander
ARVN	Army of Vietnam
AS	Air Standard
ASCC	Air Standardization Coordinating Committee
ASOC	air or allied operations center (centre)
ASTRA	Air Staff Training
ATAF	Allied Tactical Air Force (e.g., 2 ATAF)
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
AWACS	airborne warning and control system
BALTAP	Baltic Approaches
BCE	battlefield coordination element
CAS	close air support
CENTAG	Central Army Group
C²	command and control
C³	command, control, and communications
C³I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
CG	commanding general

CINC	commander in chief
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSAFE	Commander in Chief, United States Air Force Europe
COC	combat operations center
COMAAFCE	Commander, Allied Air Force Central Europe
COMALF	Commander of Airlift Forces
COMBALTAP	Commander, Baltic Approaches
COMLANDJUT	Commander, Land Forces Jutland
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CTF	carri[illegible]ask force
CTOC	corp[illegible] tactical operations center
DCS	deputy chief of staff
DOD	Department of Defense
FAC	forward air controller
FACP	forward air controller post
FEAF	Far East Air Forces
FEBA	forward edge of the battle area
FECOM	Far East Command
FM	Field Manual
FMFLANT	Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FSCL	fire support coordination line
GLCM	ground launched cruise missile
HQ	headquarters
J-CAAD	Joint-Counter Air, Air Defense
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCS Pub	Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication
J-SAK	Joint-Second Echelon Attack
J-SEAD	Joint-Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
JTF	joint task force
LANDJUT	Land Forces Jutland
LOC	line of communications
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB	Marine amphibious brigade
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF	Marine amphibious force
MAG	Military Advisory Group
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR	Marine forces, Marine Corps component commander

MAS	Military Agency for Standardization, NATO
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFE	Naval Forces Far East
NAVFOR	Naval forces, Naval force component/commander
NAVLO	Navy liaison officer
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEC	Northern European Command
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NORTHAG	Northern Army Group
OAS	offensive air support
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
RAF	Royal Air Force
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
REDCOM	Readiness Command
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
STRICOM	Strike Command
STRIKEFLEET	Strike Fleet, Atlantic Command
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACAIR	tactical air (fixed wing air assets)
TACC	tactical air control center
TACP	tactical air control party
TACS	tactical air control system
TALO	tactical airlift liaison officer
TF	task force
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command (USA)
UK	United Kingdom
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
UNC	United Nations Command
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	United States Air Force, Europe
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
WWADE	Worldwide Air Defense Enhancement

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