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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA PHASE

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
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THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF ISLAM  
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Institute of International Studies  
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The study presented here is an examination of the political status of Islam in Southeast Asia both as a religion and a vital determinant of ethnic identity. We conclude that the two phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic "neomodernism" will be important variables in the evolution of politics in the region.

Although the manifestations differ from country to country, throughout Southeast Asia, the Islamic consciousness of its nearly 160 million Muslims has been raised. This is in part an extension of the global resurgence of the Islamic identity. The dynamics of Islamic politics in the six domestic settings of ASEAN can only partially be explained, however, by externalities of the "Islamic Revolution."

The assertion by fundamentalists of the demand for an orthodoxy in which all institutions of society will conform to Islamic law (shari'a) is rejected by the incumbent elites of Malaysia and Indonesia as incompatible with the demands of modernization. In Malaysia the strategy has been adaptive accommodation and cooptation. In Indonesia the approach has been to legally "depoliticize" Islam. In both cases, the fundamentalist extreme presents some threat of political violence.

In the Philippines and Thailand, the Muslim problem is one of separatism. In neither case does it appear probable that the maximum goals will be realized. In the Philippines, however, the evolution of Muslim autonomy will be closely connected to the outcome of the wider political crisis. In both Thailand and the Philippines there are possible scenarios of separatist alliance with communist insurgents.

The two mini-states of Brunei and Singapore contrast sharply. Brunei is the most thoroughly Islamized state in ASEAN, while the Muslim minority in Singapore is socially and economically disadvantaged.

Nowhere in Southeast Asia do we find any real prospect of Islamic fundamentalist seizure of political power in the sense of a clerical wresting of the state from secular leadership. Yet, throughout the region the political culture is being infused with Islamic values. Islam in its "neomodernist" guise provides an alternative political ideology for the modern state in competition with capitalism and socialism. Great attention should be paid to the linkage between Islam and real social and economic grievances in urban centers in particular.

At this point, the foreign policy implications for the United States of political Islam in Southeast Asia seem limited. There has been some value distancing as the anti-western orientation of the Islamic revitalization proceeds, but this does not seem reflected in state behavior. The most important foreign policy dimension that may be affected will be interactions in ASEAN itself both: instrumentally in terms of support from Muslims in Malaysia and Indonesia for minorities in the Philippines and Thailand. As the Islamicization process at the Malay-Indonesian-Brunei core continues the potential for the disruption of ASEAN concord will increase.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS :

I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. MALAYSIA.....	15
III. INDONESIA.....	38
IV. PHILIPPINES.....	58
V. THAILAND.....	74
VI. SINGAPORE.....	86
VII. BRUNEI.....	95
VIII. CONCLUSIONS.....	101

## ISLAM AND POLITICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

### I INTRODUCTION

#### Statement of the Issue: The Interdependency of Politics and Religion.

Between 155 - 160 million Muslims live in the peninsula and archipelago arc of Southeast Asia, stretching from the southern provinces of Thailand, through West Malaysia, into Indonesia, East Malaysia and Brunei, and up to the southern islands of the Philippines. In addition to tiny Brunei, Muslims are a census majority only in Indonesia where 90 percent of the population of 161 million profess Islam. In racially plural Malaysia, Muslims including South Asian immigrants and Chinese converts are about 53 percent of the population. The Malay Muslims, the politically important Islamic constituency, is the dominant group with 48-50 percent of the population and a 55 percent majority in West (Peninsula) Malaysia. Muslims are small but territorially concentrated minorities in Buddhist Thailand and Christian Philippines. In the 75 percent Chinese majority Singapore city-state, the Muslim minority is dispersed through the multi-racial housing estates.

The Muslim populations of the six member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are the product of a still continuing process of Islamicization of the region that began in the thirteenth century with the appearance of Muslim traders on its coasts. By the end of the eighteenth century the majority of Muslims in Southeast Asia lived in Dar al-Islam ("the Abode of Peace"), that is lands under Muslim authority. With the imposition of western colonial authority, they found themselves again living in Dar al-Harb ("the Abode of War"), that is under non-Islamic rule.

Many Muslims in Southeast Asia today find themselves still living in Dar al-Harb even though indigenous nationalist authority has supplanted the

colonialists. Rather than being able to perfect a moral and just society based on Islamic social, economic, and political institutions in which governmental transactions are based on Islamic law administered by Muslim authority, many Muslims in contemporary Southeast Asia feel, with varying degrees of intensity, Islam, and hence their own relation with God, threatened in the framework of the modern national state.

The Muslim believes that he is to obey the commands of God as revealed in the holy Qur'an and authoritative statements of the Prophet Mohammed as handed down traditionally (hadith). This is the sunna or "way" of the Prophet. The precise rules for a proper Islamic private life and public order are specified by sacred law, the shari'a. Ideally, the state provides the framework within which personal faith can flourish in a social environment regulated by the shari'a. Theoretically then, in Islam there is no separation of "church and state" in a western democratic constitutional sense. The state is a social structure in the service of God. In modern Southeast Asia, however, the state serves other ends that tend to be defined by the requirements of "economic development" and "modernization" in plural societies. A growing Muslim perception is that the process of "modernization" as embraced by the incumbent ruling elites in Southeast Asia is "Westernization" with its ultimate secularizing impact: the antithesis of a perfected, moral Islamic social and legal order in which man, through his faith, can approach God.

Experientially, as well as in theory, then, Islam is a total way of life in which all aspects of human activity -- private, interpersonal, and intergroup -- are regulated by the shari'a. Therefore, politics cannot be separated from religion in Islam. It is in the political domain that the institutions of society are made to conform to Islamic law. Theoretically,



even if the rulers call themselves Muslim, they are lax if they do not make the institutions of the state and its behavior congruent with the demands of the Islamic community. These basically, with varying degrees of extremism and in different structural settings, are the terms of the contemporary political struggle of Islam: to bring the state in greater conformity with Islamic law and institutions so that the believing Muslim can live in Dar al-Islam.

In Dar al-Harb, the political contest is to establish Islamic authority. In the minority communities of Thailand and the Philippines this has taken the form of separatism. In those cases where nominal Muslims do control the state -- Indonesia and Malaysia -- the pressure is to more fully implement Islamic law. The methods adopted vary with the intensity of commitment to fundamentalism of the different Islamic groups from country to country. It ranges from the violence of jihad (holy war), the permanent relationship between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, to the ballot box; from mosque lectures to street demonstrations. Even though the particular national setting may be different, the challenge to the rulers is the same: to replace regime legitimacy which in the modernizing process seems to be based on objective material interest and secular ideology with a legitimacy as strictly measured by the immutable, eternal values of Islam.

#### Unity and Diversity in Cultural and Religious Forms.

The 160 million Muslim population in Southeast Asia is as much a human cultural mosaic as the other populations of the region, cut vertically by the cleavages of ethnicity, language, pre-Islamic cultural patterns, the impact of colonialism, and the decolonization experience. Although as Muslims they are part of the ummat, the global Muslim community, the particularistic qualities of the different groupings sometimes obscures

their common characteristics as Muslims. However, we would argue that in Southeast Asia the universalism of Islam is becoming increasingly visible as the Islamicization process continues to penetrate and deepen Islamic consciousness. This is today hastened by the regional impact of the global phenomenon of revitalized Islam.

The indigenous Muslims of Southeast Asia are orthodox Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i school of shari'a. The orthodoxy is tested by the lasting influence of Sufi mysticism, historically a major vehicle for the propagation of Islam in the region. While Muslims may attend to their many obligations and customs with varying degrees of fidelity and observance, and although traditional accretions may culturally separate them, the Muslims of Southeast Asia, as their coreligionists elsewhere, adhere to the "Five Pillars of Islam:" the Unity of God whose divine apostle was Mohammad; the five obligatory daily prayers; the fasting month of Ramadan, the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj); and the payment of the tithe for the poor (zakat). Some would argue that just the simple profession of the faith as stated in the first "Pillar" is a minimum sufficient requirement affirming that one is a "believer." There is another, important, dimension, however, to the psychological and political definition of Islamic identity. This is an awareness of the non-Muslim world. No matter what the internal differences may be in the ummat, the generalized threat presented by non-Muslims is a unifying force.

Beyond the minimum common structures of belief and practice in Islam in Southeast Asia bridging the vertical ethnic and social cleavages, there are what we might call horizontal strata with respect to the full expression of the ideal Islamic way of life ranging from the nominal profession of faith to strict compliance with all of the demands of the shari'a; from syncretic accommodation to indigenous cultural heritage to the conscious adoption of

the Arab model. These differences of approach and practice within the Southeast Asian extension of the ummat are politically consequential, and although we will look at their workings in the particular national settings, we will briefly discuss them in broad general terms here as the basis for later reference. These are overlapping categories with permeable boundaries on a spectrum from heterodoxy to orthodoxy, and within orthodoxy traditionalism, reformism, and fundamentalism.

Heterodox Islam is represented by syncretic practices and beliefs deviating from the sunna, arising out of persistent pre-Islamic folk-belief and animistic practices, the residuum of Hinduism and Buddhism, the overlapping of Sufi mysticism with indigenously-based gnostic survivals, and other variants from universal Shafi'i sanctioned ritual and behavior. The best-known example in Southeast Asia of this kind of heterodox - orthodox division is the abangan - santri categories in Indonesia heuristically popularized by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. While nominal Muslims (Muslim Statistik), the abangan's worldview strongly reflects a culturally Javanese bias as opposed to the strictly devout, more fully Islamicized santri.

By Islamic traditionalism we mean that stream of orthodox Islam as interpreted in the traditional institutions of the religion and given authoritative interpretation by respected Islamic teachers (ulama). The traditionalists are partially reconciled to the non-Islamic state, but not to being forced to live in a secular environment. Furthermore as secular government functions impinge on social relations traditionally associated with Islamic authority, for example education, the role of the ulama and other Muslim functionaries, for example in the pesantran or pondok schools, is diminished. The intermediate political demand of the traditional Muslim is

for the state to enforce a Muslim way of life and law on all Muslims in the society. The demand is for state-backed application of the interpersonal private law of the shari'a. The strength of the traditionalism is centered in the country-sides of still largely rural Southeast Asia where the relevance and integrity of the Islamic "system" can still be demonstrated by the ulama to correspond to social reality.

The lack of correspondence between the Islamic "system" as traditionally interpreted and the social reality produced by the modern political economy has produced a reformist or modernist Islamic response. Islam modernists in Southeast Asia try to meet the forces of Westernization by adapting Islam to current requirements; unlike the traditionalists recognizing that modernization in terms of new economic structures and roles, for example women in the work-place, cannot be resisted. Through the use (some would say abuse) of ijtihad, the individualistic interpretation of the Qur'an and hadith in light of the times, attempts are made to give new institutions and social relationships sanction that cannot be found in a sterile literal application of the shari'a. Reformist Islam seeks to accommodate science, technology, the demands of an industrializing economy, etc. -- all of the appurtenances of a modern society -- by going back to the source in an original fashion. Reformist Islam seeks to meet the challenge of modernization in all its dimensions, unlike traditionalist Islam increasingly confined to the Mosque and religion narrowly defined. The major social-base of reformist Islam is in the urban centered Muslim entrepreneurial class. This stream of Islam in its criticism of liberal capitalism and Marxist-based political economy, if carried to extremes, carries within it a potential for revolutionary ideology as it deals not only with methods and techniques, but with the human dislocations and inequities inherent in rapid economic and social change.

Fundamentalists also go back directly to the Qur`an and hadith, short-cutting the intermediation of traditionalist ulama. For the Islamic fundamentalist these provide an unchanging blueprint for society that requires the establishment of an Islamic state. Within that state the shari`a would be observed by all --Muslim and non-Muslim. Fundamentalists are not pragmatically reconciled, as traditional ulama are, to secular authority. Within the ranks of fundamentalism, however, we can discern two broad groupings. The first can be seen as the shading of traditionalism into fundamentalism in defense of religion in a society they do not fully comprehend. The second, and sociologically more interesting, is the relatively recent phenomena of younger urban Muslims educated in a modern fashion, sometimes abroad, who have turned to fundamentalism for values they find absent in the nominal Islamic style of leadership. This kind of "neo-fundamentalist" intellectual awareness of the nature of the forces shaping the modern world, has led to a more explicit rejection of foreign cultural borrowings and ideologies. In its political expression, the younger generation of fundamentalists both reinforce and compete with the traditionalists.

The touchstone distinguishing these three streams of Islam is their approach to the shari`a. For the fundamentalist, the shari`a as received is an immutable whole and cannot be cut to meet the times or political contingency. The struggle between Islam and the non-Islamic state is a zero-sum game. The traditionalist has historically made the necessary accommodation to political reality, always pressing the shari`a envelope outwards, but willing, to bring in a Christian metaphor, to render unto Ceasar. The reformist, as he "tinkers" with the shari`a, runs the risk of falling between the stools of new heterodoxy and neo-fundamentalism. The traditionalist really does not understand the modern world and seeks to

conserve what he can of the past. The reformist would shape Islam to suit the modern world in the guise of Islamicizing non-traditional institutions and relationships. The fundamentalist would force the modern world into the eternal revealed Islamic system.

In the current political and intellectual climate, fundamentalism has become the polarizing agent in Southeast Asian Islam with influence far out of proportion to its numbers of followers. But even as Islam is internally polarized in terms of attitudes towards the state, politics, and modernization, the public projection of fundamentalist attitudes has become threatening to non-Muslims as well as nominal Muslims, not just because of the rhetoric based on domestic factors, but also because the fundamentalist polemic is but the most prominent manifestation of a broader Islamic revival that touches the entire ummat. This is more than just, as the jaundiced view of V. S. Naipaul (Among the Believers), would have it, the dead hand of the past reaching out to cripple the promise of the future. It is a conscious rejection of a future in which materialism displaces faith.

#### Elements of the Islamic Revival.

The revitalization of Islam in Southeast Asia must be considered first as part of the global revitalization of Islam. Southeast Asian Muslims are not remote from events in the wider Islamic community. A major element in the continuing Islamicization process in the region has been the stream of students returning from Islamic universities and training schools in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. While cultural differences between Islam in its various national forms in Southeast Asia and the Islam of the Middle East are real -- an Indonesian Muslim obviously is not an Egyptian -- it is in error to assume that cultural discontinuities somehow indicate intellectual discontinuities. This has been historically true whether we

are speaking of the influence of the 19th century reformist ideas of the Egyptian Muhammad `Abduh or 19th century Wahhabi fundamentalism. Today, for example, youthful fundamentalism in Southeast Asia has been greatly influenced by the Islamic idealism of the Pakistani Abdul Ala Maududi who found in the shari`a all that was necessary for social order based on the sovereignty of God. We would also point out that not only are Muslim intellectuals and teachers in touch with events and ideas in the Islamic core, but they are also in touch with events and ideas elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This may become increasingly important as events and ideas in one ASEAN Muslim community influence other ASEAN communities and, in some cases, can have significance for relations between the states themselves.

An intellectual reinvigoration of Islam in Southeast Asia was already underway in the `50s and `60s as Muslims reacted to both the promise and disappointments of existence in independent states. The emergence of Pakistan and its transformation into an Islamic state contrasted sharply with the political role of Islam in Southeast Asia. Pakistan was not threatening to established order in Southeast Asia as it did not seek to externally project its internal arrangements. In the `70s new external stimuli to rising Islamic consciousness were felt. Some of the oil wealth of the conservative Islamic states of the Persian Gulf was put in the service of advancing traditional Islamic causes and institutions in Southeast Asia. Saudi Arabia in particular has been a source of funding for Islamic causes. This has occurred with local governments' blessings.

More threateningly for incumbent regimes, the resources of Libya were deployed to advance the cause, even by force of arms, of a peculiar vision of radical Islamic modernism. Libyan influence was felt in the Islamic separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines. Libyan agents seemed

active wherever there were troubled waters for Muslims. It should be quickly pointed out, however, that it was new-heterodoxies of the Islamic "left" which seemed most amenable to Libyan influence, well outside the indigenous orthodoxies whether traditionalist, modernist, or fundamentalist. Although at times Libya was seen in a limited instrumentally useful role, it was treated with great wariness.

The triumph of fundamentalism in Iran thrilled Muslim fundamentalists through out the ummat. Even nominal Muslims were not indifferent to the impact of the change of regime in Teheran. In terms of the psychological impact on political Islam in Southeast Asia, it can be likened, perhaps, to the vicarious racial thrill of the Japanese defeat of Russia or the sympathetic nationalism of the Chinese revolution of 1912. With respect to the direct impact of the Iranian Islamic revolution on Southeast Asia, two points in particular should be made that sometimes are confused. First, we should not make the error of assuming that because Southeast Asia is a Sunni domain and Iran, Shi'i, that the appeal of the kind of fundamentalism represented by Khomeini is any less to Muslim fundamentalist of any persuasion or sect. While Sunni fundamentalists reject the Imamate, they share the vision of an Islamic state. Secondly, political Islam, fundamentalism, and rising Islamic consciousness existed in Southeast Asia before Khomeini's victory. These are not the fruits of Iranian subversion. The events in Iran in the first instance had psychological and political effect but were not causal. Since then, however, links have been forged between the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries and those groups who would replicate their victory in Southeast Asia. All of the incumbent regimes in Southeast Asia are on guard against Iranian "subversion." It would appear, too, that in some cases, at least, the claim of Iranian connections or penetration have been manipulated for domestic affect rather than based on



fact. would note but it was not an instrumental cause.

A final external stimuli to Islamic consciousness that might be mentioned was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For in some cases the first time, opinion was mobilized against an act of force by the Soviet Union. Muslims in Southeast Asia identified with their coreligionists and in doing so strengthened their own Islamic identity vis a vis the Dar al-Harb. Although this placed the politically active Muslims of Southeast Asia on the same side of the issue with the United States, there would appear to be very little, if any, spillover effect into other issue areas.

Neither the historical assertions and disappointments of Islamic politics nor the impact of the external variables suggested above are enough to explain the vigorous rise of a new Islamic consciousness and its political expression. These have to be placed in their contemporary domestic settings. Although each of the six cases to be examined has its own historical, national, and environmental characteristics, it is useful at the outset to indicate some common structural elements in the national societies that have tended to foster renewed Islamic consciousness.

All of the Southeast Asian Islamic communities exist in societies undergoing social and economic change that is destructive of the traditional social order. Social disorientation results as formerly integrative institutions no longer seem to give either a meaningful individual or group identity. This is paralleled by economic disorientation as the forces of industrialization and the operation of the market place create wider gaps between the rich and the poor. That which is firm, unchanged, a holdfast for the individual, is Islam, which must be furthered to recreate anew moral order. In this context Islam becomes a political ideology in competition with the political economies of "democratic capitalism" or Marxism-Leninism which have unleashed the secular forces of change. The

appeal to Islam is not just a religious expression, but as well a demand for equity and equality. In other words, Islam becomes an alternative vehicle through which social and economic justice can be won.

In each of the Southeast Asian states, Muslims identify non-Muslim groups that seem to have politically and economically profited at the expense of Muslims and who will continue to do so as long as Islam is not regnant: the ethnic Chinese, Christians, foreign multinational corporations, etc. Muslims enjoying power and wealth at the expense of the ummat through corrupt alliance with these elements become by functional extension kafirs (non-believers).

What we are suggesting here is that the same kind of socio-economic grievances that in more secularized societies turn individuals to radical politics including revolutionary activity, can be as well motivators for a greater religious identity in the ummat. This is not to argue a class-based Islamic politics. It is simply to underline the fact that the phenomenon of reinvigorated Islam finds its causes in a complex set of variables that, although interpreted in the verities of the Qur'an and hadith, must be explained by more than simply religious profession.

#### The Nature of the Response.

We have suggested in general terms that the challenge of political Islam is to secular political authority whose legitimacy is based on criteria other than that of strict conformance to Islamic law and institutions. Since to achieve Islamic legitimacy in most cases in Southeast Asia would likely mean the replacement of the incumbent regimes or changes in territorial jurisdictions, there is a natural resistance of the political incumbents to the demands of the "believers."

The governments of the region are committed to development programs

depending on the rational allocations of material and human resources in such a way that real economic interests of the society as a whole and the material welfare of individuals in the societies are optimized. While the ultimate goals of such programs as Malaysia's New Economic Program or Indonesia's Repelitas (Five Year Development Plans) are rhetorically framed in such a way that Islamic values can be symbolically wielded, the style of traditional Islam is viewed as perpetuating "backwardness" while the goals of the fundamentalists are cast as diametrically opposed to the goals and methods of development. Opposition to the implementation of a full Islamic social and political agenda, then, is deemed a prerequisite of economic development. Moreover, in terms of non-Muslim inputs into the developmental dynamic, the insistencies of Islam disrupt both political stability and the investment climate.

In all of the cases, the maximum claims of Islam are psychologically threatening to other population groups in the state -- nominal Muslims and non-Muslims. Therefore, leaderships have pursued nation-building policies that try to embed stable political integration in the cement of an ethnically or religiously neutral state and legal system in which the rights of all communities are recognized. In those cases where the Muslim communities are minorities, governments have resisted the territorially disintegrative impact of Islamic political claims as well as opposed giving them special treatment that would provide the basis for claims by other plural groups in the state.

The tactics adopted by incumbent elites in meeting the challenge of political Islam in Southeast Asia vary depending upon the particular domestic setting. We can, however, indicate, general strategies that will be illuminated in the country studies. One strategy is to try to "de-politicize" Islam by measures to either voluntarily or coercively confine

Islamic expression to the Mosque and personal law. This is an effort, contrary to the all-encompassing Islamic system, to separate "church and state." This is used to curb traditionalist demands but often results in moving traditionalism towards fundamentalism. The Indonesian case is a good example of this strategy. A second strategy is that of adaptive accommodation to raised Islamic consciousness by the adoption by the state of non-vital Islamic demands and the cooptation of Islamic leaders. This can be seen in the Malaysian case. Where Islam is a territorially concentrated minority -- Thailand and the Philippines -- the strategies have ranged from aggressive assimilation to limited autonomy.

In no case have incumbent elites been able to devise strategies other than coercion to prevent the growth of fundamentalism with its destabilizing potential. This would seem to be the most critical variable in the future of political Islam in Southeast Asia.

#### The Country Studies.

In the pages to follow, the issues raised in this general introduction to the problem of political Islam in Southeast Asia will be examined in each of the six ASEAN states. The format will be the same for each study: an introduction to Islam in that state; the political background of Islamic movements and claims; a statement of the current status of Islamic politics; a projection of the future evolution of Islamic politics; and the foreign policy implications. A brief conclusion will again raise the general issues that have been suggested in this introduction with some future projection. We will begin with Malaysia since the struggle of political Islam there exposes the general issues outlined in the introduction with great clarity. Furthermore, it is in Malaysia that political Islam is making the greatest impact on both state administration, political competition, and attitudes.

## II MALAYSIA

### Introduction.

The historical identification of Islam in Southeast Asia with Malay culture has been so close that conversion to Islam was described as masuk melayu -- to become a Malay. Although such a cultural denomination of Islam throughout its Southeast Asian extension is no longer as sharp, in Malaysia itself the profession of Islam is still a major component of the Malay ethnic identity. The sovereigns of the traditional Malay state buttressed their legitimate authority on their roles as protectors of the religion with the common belief-system providing a new link between the rulers and ruled. British imperialism did not challenge that link as the secular prerogatives of the Sultans gave way to colonial administration. The Malay princes retained their traditional positions as the guardians of Islam and Malay custom in their respective territories.

The Islamic quality of the Malay ethnicity was given constitutional underpinning in the 1957 independent Malayan state with the establishment of Islam as the official religion, but the new state, to become in 1962 Malaysia with the inclusion of Sarawak and Sabah, was multi-racial and religiously plural. Nation-wide, Muslims may not even be a majority, and in West (Peninsula) Malaysia, they may be only 55 percent of the population. An immigrant Chinese population is the second largest racial group followed by immigrant Indian populations. Thus, while the constitution elevates Islam to the position of the official religion, making Malaysia a Muslim nation, freedom of religion is guaranteed in a secular, democratic political framework. Malaysia is a Muslim nation but not an Islamic state. The usual analyses of Malaysian politics focus on its communal base and the search for a consensual political framework within which Malays and Chinese

can cooperate in an atmosphere of peaceful change. Without underestimating the potency of communalism, the revitalization of Islam in Malaysia in the last decade has divided the Malay community itself, so that political generalizations beginning with the terms "Malays believe," or "Malays think" may be misleading.

Islam is the established religion for Malay Muslims who on the basis of the Syariah Laws Administration Enactment of 1952 are obliged to observe the shari`a in matters of private law. This is decentralized to the states since the rulers still occupy their traditional positions of guardians of Islam in their territories. Each state has its own shari`a court system and judges (kadi). Each ruler is advised by a Religious Council. Binding religious advice and interpretations (fatwa) are given by a senior official ulama. The king (Yang Dipertuan Agung) serves as the guardian of Islam for the Federal Territory and the non-princely states of Penang and Malacca. There has been an gradual invasion by the federal government of religious "states' rights." New national religious structures have been created uniformly to coordinate religious practice; for example, the National Council for Islamic Religious Affairs and the Department of Religion in the Prime Minister's Office. The theoretical object of centralizing religious administration in Malaysia is ensure the purity of Islam by preventing "deviationism." Technically Muslim preachers and teachers must have official permission for their activities. Only officially approved sermons (khutbah) distributed by the Department of Religion Affairs are allowed to be read at during the obligatory Friday Mosque services.

This structure of religion was championed by the Malay nationalists of the United Malay National Organization (UMNO) who were willing to accept the reality of decolonization in the framework of a secular state in a plural

society but still championed Malay rights in that state. In addition to religion, the constitution enshrines the Malay language and other principles of Malay privilege. In its origins UMNO can be considered a nationalist movement with a traditional ethnic base. It was its acceptance of the legitimacy of the traditional aristocracy rather than religious commitment that set UMNO apart from more radical nationalist groups. At the same time, it was UMNO's willingness to cooperate with non-Muslims in a secular state that led more ardent Malays to establish in 1951 the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), which became in 1973, the Partai Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS).

It has been the rivalry between UMNO and PAS for the Malay voter that has dominated Malay Malaysian politics. This rivalry has entered a new phase as PAS has transformed itself from a communal party focussed on Malay rights to a religious party focussed on the creation of an Islamic state. UMNO has been the party of the Muslim establishment, bureaucracy, and middle class. PAS has drawn its strength from the rural regions, particularly in the four northern states of Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu, and Kelantan which have lagged behind in economic development. While UMNO has been the party of traditional Malay political values, PAS has been the party of the religious authority of the ulamas. The argument has been made, in fact, that PAS reflects persistent class-based antagonisms against a feudal aristocracy.

#### Political Background

UMNO has governed Malaysia since independence as senior partner in a multi-racial coalition: to 1969 in the Alliance, and since 1970 in the Barisan Nasional (National Front). Challenged from the "right" by Malay chauvinism and from the "left" by communist insurgency the governments have sought legitimacy in real economic development in a democratic political

system. A major discontinuity occurred in 1969 when widespread communal disorders led to emergency rule and the emergence of a new-style UMNO leadership committed to a new program of Malay economic rights. This was embodied in the redistributive New Economic Policy which sought to increase the bumiputra's (ethnically native to Malaysia) share of the national wealth. The goal is to eliminate an ethnic basis of economic inequality. Education and language policies consciously hastened Malayization. Reserved spaces in higher education and preferences in hiring and promotion moved Malays along a fast-track as compared with other races. Sensitive to the fears of the other races and religions, UMNO's leadership isolated the religious factor from the other components of Malayization, thus separating out from the policy realm an essential component of Malay ethnicity. Locked into communal coalition and pragmatically aware of the costs of opposition, the Chinese supporters of the BN had no choice but to go along.

While UMNO and its non-Muslim allies had been winning landslides in national elections, PAS had strength in its own constituencies. It governed Trengganu from 1959-1964 and Kelantan, 1959-1978. PAS was a Malay ethnic gadfly, constantly pressing UMNO on Malay economic development and the position of the Malay language. The issue of the status of Islam, while always of concern to PAS ulama, did not dominate the electoral calculations of the party's secular leadership. The direction the government took with the implementation of the NEP and its commitment to economically uplifting the Malays brought PAS itself into the BN fold. PAS contested the 1974 elections as a member of the National Front. After the UMNO-dominated federal government one-sidedly intervened in a bitter PAS internecine party struggle in Kelantan in 1977, PAS either quit or was expelled from the BN. PAS did poorly in federal elections in 1978, and was swept from power in



Kelantan state which it had ruled since independence. It could not compete on a basis of "we can do it better" in terms of Malay economic development.

While UMNO and PAS competed for the Malay vote, a different, and perhaps more influential, phenomenon in Malaysia's Islamic community, was taking place outside of the structure of organized politics. We are speaking here of the appearance in urban centers of the spontaneously generated dakwah movement which embraced younger educated Malays in an Islamic revitalization movement which challenged the modern world and the old power brokers -- including PAS -- in terms of a return to fundamentalism. The galvanization of Islamic social thought in Malaysia in the '70s did not come from the ulamas, but from deeply religious intellectuals in dakwah groups such as ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia), Darul Arqam, and Jama'at Tabligh, to mention but three prominent ones. The term dakwah refers to the evangelization mission of Islam. As it has come to be used in Malaysia today, however, it refers to the urban religious activity centered on the youth. Its practitioners run the gamut from youthful religious pioneers in religious communes to after-hours discussion groups in government offices.

The ideology of the dakwah movements stress the universal values of Islam and criticizes modern capitalist development and the social and economic injustices that flow from it. ABIM's platform, for example, originally tailored to Muslim youths in tertiary educational institutions, explicitly rejects capitalism and socialism, calling for an Islamic economic system governed not by greed but by morality and in which the wealth of the nation is used for the maximum benefit of society, not capitalists or those in power. The dakwah movements too condemn the corruption and hedonism rampant in Westernized Malay society. As an alternative to that society,

the youth of Darul Arqam are organized in model Islamic communes. Unlike the chauvinists of Malay traditional Islam, the dakwah movement condemns racialism, ABIM asserting that in its practice of Islam as a total way of life, it will not act with animosity or injustice towards non-Muslims, but with revived tolerance.

The dakwah movement's approach to Islam in the modern world contrasted sharply with UMNO's. UMNO provided political leadership in a multi-racial government where religion was a matter to be supported and encouraged in its private personal quality. The dakwah participants saw their attachment to Islam in relation to society and government. As the dakwah has penetrated, Mosque attendance has gone up, and there has been a remarkable turning to Arab custom and dress. While non-political in the narrow sense of organized political behavior, the fundamentalism of the dakwah movement has had great political impact. The government's response has been to set up its own dakwah structures and to co-opt dakwah figures. It scored a coup when it brought Anwar Ibrahim of ABIM, the best-known dakwah leader, into the government in 1982. But as the government seeks to channel the dakwah movement to its ends, so too is it being shaped by the dakwah movement itself.

As a result of the rising Islamic consciousness and the need to preempt the government has been forced (or willingly lead?) to cautious state-sponsored reformist Islam in a limited reorganization that rhetorically incorporates the injunctions of Islam in a practical fashion to meet the needs of a modern world and the ummat. The government, spurred by the need to meet the dakwah movement ideologically and politically (if PAS is not to benefit) is committed to make public life more Islamic. The government denies that the systems of early Islam can be recreated; rejecting thereby the fundamentalist ideal. Its goals, however, seem no less ambitious as it

seeks to Islamicize in the domestic context the global secular forces at work materially transforming Malaysian society. The government has created explicitly Islamic institutions such as an Islamic University, an Islamic Bank, an Islamic insurance company, and even a projected Islamic credit card (no interest). A consultative body of Islamic scholars has been set up to assist in the assimilation of Islamic law to national life.

UMNO's leadership while seeking to give "half a loaf" to the forces of rejuvenated Islam must also make their campaign, if not palatable, at least politically acceptable to other elements in the society. There has been an emphasis on a kind of "neo-reformist" ideology through which it is claimed that the infusion of Islamic values into education and administration hastens the modernization process since these foster honesty, efficiency, diligence, moderation, and respect for science and technology. Islam is a living religion in which there is no contradiction between Islam and modernization. Taking a leaf out of the dakwah movement's book, the government today accepts Islam not just as a component of Malay ethnicity, but as a universal value framework for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.

#### Current Status.

PAS went into the 1982 general election determined to reverse its debacle of 1978. Directing its campaign to the same rural constituencies with the same primordial appeals, the election confirmed its waning ballot box strength, PAS winning only five of the 82 National Assembly constituencies it contested and picking up 18 State Assembly seats. It ran strongest in Kelantan where it took 10 of 36 seats. The number of seats, however, do not indicate PAS's real strength. PAS received nationally over 600 thousand votes or 14.6 percent of the total cast. Meanwhile Barisan Nasional candidates received a majority of 60.5 percent. PAS's political

potential obviously is not represented by where it stood with respect to the total BN vote, but by its share of the Malay vote which was more than 30 percent nationally and more 40 percent in Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perlis. PAS can go head-to-head with UMNO, but UMNO has the great advantages of (1) setting the legal parameters of the elections, (2) prohibiting the introduction of race and religion as campaign issues (thus PAS's stock in trade), (3) the full apparatus of the government's patronage and publicity machinery, and (4) non-Malay votes in Malay majority constituencies. Moreover, since 1978, ruling BN governments had shown that Kuala Lumpur would deliver development and welfare goods which would be at risk if PAS were to come to power in a state.

PAS's president for 18 years, Datuk Asri Muda, after being defeated himself in the election, suffered a second blow when the leadership of the disorganized and internally squabbling party was taken over by fundamentalists who, abandoning the last vestiges of any secular image, subordinated the party's executive to its Council of Religious Teachers (Majelis Ulama). Datuk Asri had been part of the Malay political scene for years. He and his cohorts had much in common with their UMNO counterparts, and, in fact, they could move laterally across party lines without cognitive dissonance. Under Datuk Asri, PAS had more or less stayed within the rules of Malaysian politics. Asri, denouncing the new leadership for being "oblivious to the reality" of Malaysia's multi-racial, plural society, left PAS to found the Hizbul Muslimin party to compete with PAS for Malay votes.

The consolidation of power in PAS by the fundamentalists meant greater pressure for more extreme measures of Islamicization. Its leadership calls for the intensification of the struggle for an Islamic state on the model of the Prophet in Medina, denouncing UMNO's program of Islamicization as only

cosmetic. PAS's position is consistent with fundamentalist logic. It is meaningless to try to bring Islamic values without implementing Islamic law. While firmly committed to its goal of establishing an Islamic state, The contemporary PAS leadership has been less unambiguous with respect to the New Economic Program. While PAS campaigned through 1982 on the issue of more to the bumiputra sooner, attacking the government as not doing enough in the NEP, the fundamentalists of PAS, like the fundamentalists of the Dakwah movements, are disturbed by the NEP's materialist basis and its corrupting impact on an Islamic community.

PAS's ability to propagate of its program faces serious obstacles. In the first place, its was constrained by the formal and informal web of governmental political and legal restrictions on its activities. Denied instruments of mass communication -- press, radio, and television -- PAS has sought to maximize face to face settings in ceramahs ( rallies), Mosque sermons illegally departing from the "approved" khutab, weekly prayer sessions, and other religious cum political functions. Its publications and audio cassettes also continue to circulate. Speakers at PAS ceramahs, which were attracting thousands of Malays in PAS's strongholds, bitterly castigate UMNO's leadership, sometimes calling them kafir (unbeliever).

PAS has made Islam the central issue of Malay politics. By the end of 1983, with the most terrific vision of Iran illuminating their fears, UMNO leaders were openly accusing Muslim fundamentalists of plotting a revolution to topple the constitutional monarchy and turn Malaysia into an Islamic republic. The government, increasingly alarmed by the rising public voice of extremism, intervened in August, 1984, by temporarily banning all ceramah in the four northern states as "threatening public order and security." Outward indications of growing support for PAS alarmed the government which saw the ugly possibility of a PAS call for a sabil (crusade) against the

Barisan Nasional "enemies of Islam." The government used its sweeping powers under the Internal Security Act to detain three Pas youth leaders on suspicion of carrying out activities to create disunity among Muslims and using incitement to unlawful means to achieve their aims, posing thus a threat to internal security. Pas ulama have been jailed by the state kadi courts for preaching without the permission of the Religious Affairs Department of the Prime Minister's Office or departing from the approved texts prepared by the Department. The official Islamic hierarchy and bureaucracy, of course, is in the hands of UMNO loyalists.

The harsh, suppressive measures were designed as deterrents to more extreme behavior. To stiffen the deterrent, Parliament in April, 1985, increased the punishments to be imposed on anyone found guilty of committing religious offenses to a minimum two year jail term. While PAS leadership officially condemns revolutionary Islamic violence, there is little doubt on the government side that its activities help prepare the ground, if not for the PAS establishment, for other groups of radicalized Islamic extremists who are arming themselves for a jihad. By Fall, 1984, an atmosphere of crisis reigned when the government alleged that some Pas leaders had set up suicide assassination squads to kill UMNO leaders in a desperate attempt to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic republic. The government's efforts to shift the ground from religion to security culminated in its presentation to parliament in November, 1984, of a "white paper" titled The Threat to Muslim Unity and National Security, which while not accusing PAS itself of violence, charged that the activities of PAS's supporters encouraged extremism and through religious confusion provided openings for the communists.

UMNO's leadership did not confine itself to legal and parliamentary

responses. Stung by the so-called kafir mengkafir controversy which in effect had fundamentalists charging UMNO supporters with apostasy, UMNO agreed to participate in a televised debate on the motion: "PAS charges that UMNO members are kafir and that whoever resists them until death are martyrs." It is difficult to see what UMNO had to gain from such a public exchange. No matter how many debating points they might win, the fact of the debate itself would enhance PAS's status. Prime Minister Mahathir's understandable eagerness to pick up the gauntlet would have given PAS the national platform they have been denied. More importantly, by allowing the UMNO - PAS competition to be structured in terms of "Who is more Islamic -- PAS or UMNO?" and forcing Malays to choose between them on religious terms could have been even more disruptive of the Malay community and, in fact, could have had negative repercussions in UMNO itself, and certainly would have discomfited UMNO partners in the BN. Be that as it may, the Yang Dipertuan Agung stepped in and cancelled it on the constitutional grounds that only the Council of Rulers acting on the advice of the National Fatwa Council can make such a decision (about kafir) since all matters of Islam are in the hands of the rulers. The Council went on to rule that it is haram (religiously prohibited) for a Muslim to call another Muslim kafir, and the government stated that they would introduce laws to that effect.

The intervention of the King to prevent the debate raises the question of the role of royalty in the constitutional setting of the state. While in this case asserting traditional authority, the ruler also clearly established that despite the many circumscriptions in place some degree of political autonomy still existed buttressed by status and states rights. This was significant in the wake of the 1983 constitutional crisis over the ruler's legislative role, in which the government was forced to retreat from its original desire to constitutionally exclude the ruler. That crisis

put a severe strain on the UMNO elite torn between traditional Malay loyalties and party discipline. In the larger Malay framework, the 1983 crisis was part of the ongoing questioning by urban educated Malays of the relevance of the hereditary sultans. However, they still command the loyalty of the Malay peasants. As Malay politics is increasingly defined as Islamic politics the sultans have the potential to play an intermediating role.

The government's decision to make a head-on attack on PAS fundamentalism appears to be based on a number of complementary factors, all of which are still operating. In the first place, it can be seen as a run-up to the next general election. Even though the government does not have to call one before April 1987, it is expected that it will occur earlier rather than later. By attributing subversive goals and violent tactics to PAS, the government apparently hopes to hive off non-hard core PAS sympathizers who might be repelled by its alleged violence or deterred by a show of government determination. UMNO's vigorous counter-offensive also seems designed to reassure its non-Muslim partners in the BN that Malay-chauvinism will not be tolerated, but this with the implicit proviso that non-Muslims must continue to support the Barisan since the Malay alternative to UMNO is so unappealing. At the same time, UMNO's own Islamicization policies become the lesser of evils to the non-Muslim parties of the Barisan. UMNO's problem is that in its accommodation to the dakwah and its preemption of PAS, that it does not cross a political threshold that will compelte undermine the credibility of the Chinese parties -- the MCA and Gerakan -- causing a counterreaction of Chinese oppositional chauvinism. This would probably lead to widespread communal violence.

and Islamicization

Although the government has demonstrated that it is willing and able to



bring the power of the state to bear to contain its Islamic opponents, the UMNO leadership treads a fine line. PAS, after all, still counts on a significant number of Malay voters. Its grass-roots support, even outside of the four northern states, is greater than its numbers of voters would indicate, since many Malays cast their ballot for the Barisan on pragmatic grounds while still sympathetic to PAS's cause. UMNO's leadership in the Barisan government, which is multi-racial, must take care that it not appear to be divisive itself and anti-Malay. This is particularly true since there are PAS members who would be willing to martyr themselves to further polarize the Malay community. This helps to explain why the government's legal attention is turned on PAS grass-roots organizers rather than its big-guns such as its vice-president and Trengganu boss, the charismatic Ustaz Abdul Hadi Awang, whose inflammatory lectures and sermons, circulate nationwide in audio cassettes and exceed by far the legal boundaries of commentary in Malaysia.

The government is extremely sensitive to possible external links of Muslim extremists with particular reference to Iran. Literature extolling the Iranian Islamic revolution has been clandestinely circulated. Occasionally posters of Ayatollah Khomeini will be displayed at PAS meetings. The government tries to monitor the travel of Malaysians to Iran. There have been reports that Malaysian fundamentalists have undergone military training there and that Iranian agents are active in Malaysia. It is possible that the alleged Iranian connection is exaggerated by the government to brand fundamentalism as a foreign, Shi'i intrusion that Malays should reject.

#### Future Projections.

Fundamentalist Islam will not directly triumph in Malaysia through the

ballot-box. The electoral challenge to the Barisan Nasional is not whether it will win, but how large the winning margin will be. For UMNO candidates in Malay constituencies that means how well will PAS do. Datuk Asri's HAMIM party does not really seem to be a factor. Asri took 4 of the 5 PAS MPs with him when he left in 1982, but his party's electoral strength based on by-elections seems miniscule. On the other hand, even though PAS candidates have lost every state by-election they have contested since 1982, they continue to attract significant numbers of voters. The January 1985 by-election in the UMNO stronghold of Padang Terap (Kedah) showed that the relative strength of UMNO and PAS had not changed since the 1982 general election. The level of PAS activity in Kelantan and Trengganu in particular suggests that their support is growing. PAS's potential to create pockets of electoral trouble for UMNO cannot be underestimated.

Another area of potential electoral trouble for the BN is with the Chinese voter. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), UMNO's main Chinese partner in the BN, is in considerable disarray after more than a year of factional struggle. Although the smaller Chinese partner in the BN, Gerakan, may expect some MCA supporters to move to its ranks, it is also not improbable that another electoral benefactor may well be the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP). DAP also stands to gain from Chinese disaffection because of a number of symbolic issues irritating communal relations that have arisen since the last general election as well as always latent Chinese resistance to the Malayanization and Islamicization of the state. The electoral problem for UMNO is that in those Malay constituencies where PAS and UMNO candidates go head-to-head for the Malay voter if the Chinese voter does not get out or votes opposition, the UMNO candidates majority or plurality as the Barisan designated candidate can be significantly reduced.

The outcome of the elections will have considerable effect on the future course of open politics in Malaysia. This will be the first general election fought by fundamentalist PAS and it will provide a number of tests. As Malaysia moves towards the general elections, PAS has sought to moderate its historical chauvinist Malay image somewhat, trying to reach out to non-Malay voters in terms of the moral values of Islam as a universal religion. In an unprecedented day long symposium on "Islam and the Question of National Unity" in a noteworthy fashion held in the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall on February 10, 1985, PAS leaders sought to justify their platform as being in the interest of all Muslims and non Muslims alike. Furthermore PAS has sought to tone down its Malay chauvinist image and to attract Chinese converts to Islam. At its April 1985 annual party assembly, PAS leaders turned away the more militant calls for action against the government. It does not want to frighten away by fanaticism the urban Malays touched more by the dakwah movement than organized Islamic politics. While PAS's change in tactic is derided by UMNO as a mark of electioneering desperation, it does in fact represent a judgement that if PAS is to have influence in the present electoral system dominated by the BN it must broaden its base. The possibility of electoral alliance with non-Malay parties seems remote. The suggestion of such an informal alliance between PAS and DAP in 1982 seemed to be counterproductive for both. If PAS does well -- holds its own or improves its position as compared to 1982 -- UMNO itself then will be pressed to shift to an even more Islamic stance, further straining cohesion in the BN. If PAS does not do well electorally, the urgings of the real extremists for more direct action, even jihad, will become more strident. Either way, elections will exacerbate the religious issue, and as the religious issue becomes inflamed the communal tensions

will be increased.

Both the rhetoric and the actions of the government leave no doubt that the it will uncompromisingly resist the demands of organized Muslim counter-elites. It is convinced that there are two clear threats to Malaysian security: communism and religious extremism. The government has no apologies in wielding its instruments of coercive controls to combat them. The ISA is one of those instruments, and even though the leadership denies that it is used with political motivation, the absence of any kind of independent check on arbitrary arrest and detention will continue to have a chilling effect. It will be used "surgically", however. Even if PAS members take part in illegal rallies and marches, the government is too sophisticated either to break them up by force or to try to make mass arrests. This would be only playing into PAS's hand.

And what of the communists? In its "white paper" the government accused PAS of opening up the Malay community to communist exploitation, linking the PAS security threat to the three decade struggle against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). There is no question but that the CPM would like to mobilize Malays to its cause. Various front groups such as the Islamic Brotherhood Party (PAPERI) and the Malay National Revolutionary Party (MNRP) seek to penetrate the Malay community. It appears very unlikely, however, that a Malay is going to be attracted to these groups on the basis of religion. It is not Malay chauvinism or Islam that is open to temptation. It is secular interests that might see in Marxism-Leninism an alternative the ongoing Islamicizing process. Irrespective of elections, it can be expected that the Malay community will be increasingly stressed by the practical requirements of modern nationalism in a plural society and the images of the ideal Islamic system. The bitterly polarizing impact of this is felt at all levels of social interaction, not just at the

ballot box. Unofficial fatwas (religious advice) from fundamentalist ulamas direct Muslims not to take part in voluntary government sponsored programs in association with kafirs. In the villages fundamentalist ulamas compete with officially approved ulamas for the loyal attention of the Malay masses. By applying the Islamic categories of haram (religiously prohibited) and halal (religious prescribed), fundamentalists set Muslim against Muslim by placing events and activities by UMNO supporters in the status of haram extending even to patterns of village commensality. This is one of the fruits of kafir mengkafir.

In the organized politics of Islam in Malaysia, it is the open and clandestine contests between UMNO and PAS for the political allegiance of the Malay voter that gains attention. At the same time, however, both simultaneously independent of and symbiotic with that contest, the broader urban phenomenon of Islamicization is changing all references for Islamic politics in Malaysia. The spreading stain of the Bumiputra Bank scandal dramatically opposes the Malay politics of money to the vision of Islamic morality. Rather than the electoral "politics" of PAS and UMNO, there is abundant evidence that it is the dakwah movement which from "inside" has unstopped the genie of an urban-based Islamic fundamentalism. Minor signs of this abound. For example, the government recently found it necessary to issue a ban on purdah for female civil servants, that is veiling their faces during working hours. The "mini-teklung," popularized by dakwah circles, covering all parts of the body except the face and hands, is permitted. The same order has gone out to the schools. Prime Minister Mahathir has publically criticized Muslim government doctors who because of religion will not touch patients. These are relatively unimportant examples of the spread of the outward signs of heightened Islamic religiosity.

The carrier of this kind of fundamentalism is the younger generation Malay. To try to control it, the government is settling up student guidance committees in all schools to monitor the "unhealthy and negative influences" of religious extremism; for example, fatwahs that it is haram for female students to talk with male teachers. The Ministry of Information has a committee to prepare and coordinate programs to combat "deviationist" teaching. The government is particularly worried about fundamentalist penetration of the tens of thousands of Malay students abroad and has warned students on scholarship that the government will terminate them if they are engage in anti-government activities or follow "deviationist" teachings.

In his August, 1984, Independence Day address, Prime Minister Mahathir signalled the government's intentions to resist an Islamic state in terms of the preservation of Malaysian democracy. Warning against the "mullah system" as dictatorship, an unsubtle reference to Shi'i Iran, Mahathir called on all Malays "to be wary of those who use democracy for setting up a new system which will kill democracy." To combat this the government has assembled an impressive array of legal backing for its internal security forces. Through the the ISA and ancillary regulations the government has unchecked discretionary power to arrest and hold. The basis for broad censorship was laid in the 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Bill which gives the Home Affairs Minister control over the dissemination of information; this in a political environment in which the Deputy Home Affairs Minister has said Malaysians should "discard publications which are not in accord with the government's vision." A toughened Official Secrets Act is designed to restrict the flow of government information.

Turning Mahathir's message on democracy upside down, it is now PAS that warns against government repression and calls upon the people to resist the

trend towards dictatorship. The fact that PAS's concerns, although less immediate and concrete, are shared by other non-Islamic critics of the government underlines the fragility of civil and political liberties in Malaysia under internal stress. Just as the government can apply and extend laws designed to combat communism to Muslim opponents in the name of "internal security," they could apply the same measures to other political opponents.

In looking to the Malaysia's political future in a discussion confined to Islam and politics, we discern two trends. First, the government's policy of controlled Islamicization combined with the recruitment of younger Malays influenced by fundamentalism will tend to create its own dynamic through creating greater expectations requiring ever more basic institutional change. There is no indication of a convergence of Islamic views in the sense of compromise. The fundamentalists are unmoved in their visions. It is government policy that has been moved to the Islamic "right" in reaction to those visions. Secondly, government policies in defense of democracy in a plural society seem to be eroding the basic underpinnings of freedom of communication and association in a pattern of increasingly arbitrary exercising of coercive authority, in which the only restraint is self-restraint by government. The conclusion seems to be that Malaysia will become more Islamic and less democratic. This leads to a conclusion about politics in the plural society. To the degree that UMNO's preemption of Islamic values is in fact an internalized commitment (which we believe it is) as opposed to merely "pragmatic lip-service" to a Malay constituency seduced by fundamentalism, the elite consensus politics of the Barisan Nasional will be undermined and a serious threat of the disruption of the political order will eventually become manifest.

### Policy Implications.

ABIM asserts that the fate of the Muslim community in Malaysia cannot be separated from the fate of brother-Muslims the world over. Given this, there must be close cooperation and association based on Islamic principles in solving problems encountered by Muslims the world over. An Islamic foreign policy then has as its first dimension the welfare of the ummat. This position is officially represented in Malaysia's foreign policy. In Prime Minister Mahathir's words: "The interest of the Muslim ummah must prevail."

One of the features of Malaysian foreign policy in the 1980's has been the forging of closer bilateral ties with Islamic states elsewhere. There has been a conscious effort to look to the Persian Gulf and North African region for fraternal ties. Most recently (December 1984) Mahathir toured Libya, Egypt, and Mali. A Malaysian-Libyan Joint commission was established to work out areas of functional cooperation, while Malaysia solicited Libyan investment. Malaysia is an active member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and has called for its strengthening as a vehicle for Muslim solidarity. Malaysia is a hardline state in its anti-Zionism and support of the PLO. In mid-1984 Yasser Arafat was a state guest, and the PLO has an office in Kuala Lumpur. UMNO in the same document can denounce Vietnam in Kampuchea, The USSR in Afghanistan, and US support to Israel as essentially equivalent immoralities. The commitment to the PLO cause is not just a concession by the government to internal pressures but principled from the incumbent elite's point of view.

In its relations with Iran, Malaysia has made it very clear in high level exchanges with Teharan that it is concerned about potential external encouragement and support from Iran to "extremists" and a "misinterpretation



and misapplication" of the Iranian experience in the context of Malaysia. It is to the excesses of the Iranian Islamic revolution to which Mahathir refers when he characterizes the "mullah system" as a tyrannical dictatorship. Iran's assurances of non-interference in Malaysia have been ambiguous with apparently a distinction between "private" activity and government sponsored activities. Malaysian intelligence watches very carefully the two-way human traffic between Iran and Malaysia. With respect to the Iran-Iraq war, Malaysia follows the OIC line, in Foreign Minister Rithauddeen's words, a war between "two of our brother Muslim nations," which threatens Muslim solidarity.

The Islamic dimension of Malaysian foreign policy has had the further result of giving Malaysia a more pronounced "third world" and nonaligned orientation, reemphasizing the ideological discontinuity between the Mahathir government and its predecessors. In part this reflects the desire of the new leadership to establish an independent international identity free from the post-colonial ties. It is also a reaction to the perceived asymmetries in its relations with the developed West. On the other hand, while acknowledging Malaysia's careful cultivation of its international Islamic identity, it would seem to us that in the total breadth of its foreign policy, variables other than Islam have greater explanatory potential. The current leadership represents a new Malay nationalism that pragmatically (as opposed to ideologically) recognizes that Malaysia's economic and security interests rest with market interactions, political friendship, and security relations with the West, a stage where Islam is a secondary consideration.

Within ASEAN, Malaysian Muslims cannot remain unconcerned about the status of coreligionists elsewhere in the region. ABIM's international platform, for example, alludes to the tyranny and oppression ("kezaliman dan

penindasan") experienced by Muslim minorities in the Philippines, Singapore, and especially the ummat of South Thailand and expresses full support for their struggles to "achieve justice and the freedom to practice an Islamic way of life." The Malaysian connection has relevance to the problem of Muslim minorities in Thailand and the Philippines. The policy implications of the basic sympathy for the struggles of coreligionists in ASEAN will be addressed in the sections on the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.

The question of Islam in Indonesia presents a different kind of problem for Kuala Lumpur. As can be expected, Muslim orthodoxy in Malaysia can identify with the struggle of Indonesia's santri. On the other hand, Malaysia certainly does not want to irritate its "special relationship" with Jakarta. Thus, as the first action under the new press law, three audio cassette tapes containing anti-Indonesian government Islamic speeches and texts were banned. On the other hand, the government cannot ignore the sympathies of its own Muslim constituents. Thus, for example, when Indonesian Muslim radicals hijacked an Indonesian DC-9 in 1981, rather than holding it when it landed at Penang (as Jakarta requested) Malaysia allowed it to be refueled and sent it along to Bangkok, where Indonesian troops freed the passengers and killed the hijackers.

With respect to the United States and other Western industrialized nations, Malaysian Islamicization, with its anti-Western, anti-capitalist intellectual thread, contributes to a more general attitude of value-distancing that is most apparent in the so-called look-East policies of industrialization adopted by the Mahathir government. While at one level, "Look East" means the adoption of Japanese and Korean managerial and technical skills, at another level it seeks to find the formula for building a modern industrial society while preserving cultural autonomy. There is

the sense that Malaysia has less and less in common with the Western world. The dakwah movement in particular is culturally anti-Western. We do not want to overstate the foreign policy implications of the domestic trends we have identified. There are nuances or policy shadings that are more often rhetorically displayed than matters of real state behavior. We would emphasize that the current leadership is not an "Islamic leadership" in the sense that both PAS and the dakwah movement might have it, but they will give an Islamic tone to their acts where appropriate and where relatively cost free in terms of other interests.

There are potential threats to that kind of leadership on the Malaysian domestic scene. In the forces of political Islam at work in Malaysia today, there are those that would ultimately move Malaysia away from its present close ties with the West. A violent unravelling of the delicately balanced communal framework as a result of Islamic politics would have incalculable results for Malaysia in the ASEAN region and beyond. This does not seem to be a likely scenario, however. More likely, with the camel's nose of the dakwah in the tent and the fundamentalists of PAS trying to tear the tent down, what is now described by UMNO spokesmen as an Islamicization limited to the administration of the country, will become a more throughgoing Islamicization of the state.

### III INDONESIA

#### Introduction.

By its official head count, Indonesia is the largest Muslim nation in the world. Some 90 percent of its 161 million people are nominally Muslim in the registration of their religion. Yet for the forty years since its proclamation of independence, the country has been governed by secularists: first in the multi-party cabinets of representative democracy (to 1957), then in the radical "guided democracy" of Sukarno, and now, since 1966, in the military-technocratic oligarchy of the Suharto regime. This is particularly surprising, given that it was from Islam that the inspiration for modern Indonesian nationalism sprang and was early given organizational form in the Sarekat Islam. The Indonesian awakening, however, found its full florescence in political movements whose value base was informed by modern nationalism and secular social-economic theory.

The ideological foundation of the modern Indonesian state is the Pancasila (the "Five Principles): belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, consensual democracy, and social justice. The contemporary struggle of political Islam in Indonesia is to define its status in the framework of the Pancasila. For the committed Muslim, if the first principle of the Pancasila is interpreted as religiously neutral and tolerant theism (as it tends to be), then Islam is legally and functionally equated with the other religious streams in Indonesia despite its statistical dominance.

The supplanting of Islam by modern secular nationalism as the basis for the independent state occurred in part because of requirement of unity in a plural society where ethnic fissures are reinforced by deep divisions in the ummat itself on the suitable expression of a Muslim way of life. The

majority of Indonesia's nominal Muslims are syncretic Javanese whose heterodoxy has been labeled agama Jawa, the Javanese religion. This group, collectively termed abangan clings to a collection of cultural artifacts from pre-Islamic Indianized Java as colored by the mysticism of the Sufi impulse. For the abangan, Islam is but one, and not necessarily the most vital, element of a way of life that clearly distinguishes them from the "true believers", collectively known as santri. The santri are found in those Indonesian populations most penetrated by orthodox Islam: Muslims of Sumatra and Java's coasts, urban centers, and rural hinterlands. This does not mean that the nominal Muslim eschews the Islamic identity; it is that adherence to the prescriptions of the shari'a does not circumscribe his behavior.

Orthodox or santri Islam, then, is in fact a minority religion in Indonesia. One rough measurement is the size of the electorate supporting explicitly Muslim political parties which in the general elections of 1977 and 1982 approached 30 percent. In a plural setting such numbers could be expected to represent political strength; but only if it spoke with a unified single voice. It does not. The santri consist of both traditionalists and modernists. The politics of traditionalists is to defend the orthodox way of life as much as possible from the demands of the modern state. Modernists, on the otherhand, seek to reshape the state to Islamic ends. The goal of the traditionalists is to conserve a traditional lifestyle. The modernists, part of the urban middle class, seek to infuse Western-derived economic and political institutions with Islamic values. The more radical traditionalists become fundamentalists. The more radical modernists run the risk of secularism.

Modernist Islam in Indonesia, with its Middle East referents, tried to

insitutionally adapt Islam to the requirements of the modern world. Through such social organizations like the Muhammadiyah and its Taman Siswa schools, modernist Islam wished to compete with secular modernism on its own terms. The effort by Muhammadiyah and the Muslim bourgeois to accommodate to change prompted a conservative traditionalist response by traditionalist ulama who founded the Nahdatul Ulama (NU) in 1926. In post-independence multi-party system, the major political vehicle for modernist was the Masjumi Party. The NU, with a Central and East Java rural base, became the traditionalist's political party. And what of the abangan? They provided the grass-roots support for the secularists of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the Marxist-Leninists of the Communist Party (PKI). In both cases, among the interests the abangan sought to further, was the defense of their "world view" from the vision of Islam Fanatiek. This should remind us that despite the differences in their political programs, the modernists and traditionalists are orthodox Muslims and in their fundamental agreement on Islam, are perceived as an undifferentiated threat by heterodoxy and non-Muslims alike

#### Political Background

Muslims thought that the relations between Islam and the state in Indonesia were settled at the eve of independence in the June, 1945 "Jakarta Charter" (Piagam Jakarta) in which Muslim leaders submitted to pluralism for the sake of national unity in return for an understanding that the state would be based upon "belief in one God with Muslims obligated to follow the shari'a." To Muslim dismay, however, this "amendment" to the Pancasila has never been constitutionally incorporated nor achieved the force of law.

In fact, the "Jakarta Charter" was a minimalist traditionalist claim on the political system: that Muslims should live like Muslims -- a status achieved for example in plural Malaysia. An alternative claim was made by

the leaders of the Darul Islam movement, which went into revolt against the the new republic in 1948, to set up an Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia). The DI revolt was centered on West Java (Sundanese) and drew its armed strength from the Muslim Hizbu'llah and Sabili'llah forces that had fought the Dutch in coalition with the Republican army. The DI revolt was loosely linked with regional Islamic uprisings in Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. Beneath the banner of Islam, the DI revolts represented a complex set of motivations including the breakdown during a time of revolution of traditional social structures that had mediated economic inequities. While certainly having some of the aspects of a "peasant revolt," the ideal model of society that inspired the DI followers was the perfect world of Dar al-Islam. The DI revolt was crushed by the military after years of local insecurity. Its leader was captured in 1962, tried, and executed. The DI experience remains the referent for Islamic extremism for the abangan and non-Muslim.

Although not wholly out of sympathy with the DI, the modernists' claim as articulated through Masjumi did not demand an Islamic state, but rather a state based on Islam. The Masjumi Party was compromised by the involvement of some of its leading figures in the PRRI-Permesta regional rebellions of 1957 - 1962, which led to its banning by Sukarno in 1959. The legal political sphere was left to NU as the bearer of Muslim aspiration. NU politicians collaborated with Sukarno and the secular left in "guided democracy." The NU hoped to capitalize on Masjumi's banning by becoming the Muslim party in Indonesia which would allow it to win patronage, followers, and act as a restraint on the PKI.

The strains between the NU and the PKI were turned into local violence when in 1964, the PKI encouraged its rural supporter to unilaterally enforce

land-reform measures. This aksi sepihak ("one-sided action") brought PKI backed abangan into conflict with santri landowners and ulama. Thus the military had willing allies for religious and class reasons when it enlisted the forces of Islam against the PKI in the wake of the 1965 abortive communist coup attempt. Muslims were in the forefront of the coalition of military and civilian political forces that physically crushed the PKI and proceeded to dismantle Sukarno's "guided democracy." Muslim politicians saw for the first time since independence the opportunity for Islam to gain its rightful place in the Indonesian state. They were to be sorely disappointed. The policies of Suharto's government towards the broader demands of Islam differed but little from those of its predecessors.

Indonesia's current leaders are nominal Muslims who would confine Muslim behavior to the non-political areas of religious life. Essentially their policy is one of "depoliticizing" Islam in Indonesia. In this their policies are often characterized by the Muslims as "colonial," replicating in modern-Indonesia the advice of the great Dutch orientalist Snouck Hurgronje, to tolerate the spiritual aspects of the religion but contain its political expression. The goal would be the same in the colonial or the modern state: to prevent Islam and Muslim leaders from becoming the center of opposition to incumbent authority.

Under Suharto, Muslim political parties have chafed under the restrictions that were placed on them organizationally and substantively in terms of the allowable issues. Elections were held in 1971, with Muslim parties garnering 27.2 percent of the votes ( 43.1 percent in 1955). In 1973, the government forced the four Muslim parties --Nahdatul Ulama, Parmusi (a docile ghost of the Masjumi), Syarikat Islam, and Pertii -- to amalgamate in the United Development Party (PPP) which fought the 1977 election (29.3 percent) and the 1982 election (27.8 percent). These results



were achieved despite enormous handicaps. The government intervened at party leadership levels and screened candidates. The government also propounded the idea of the general population as "floating masses" and prohibited party organization and mobilization at the grass-roots level. Political campaigning was to be restricted to the official electoral period of a few weeks every five years. Then there was the government juggernaut --GOLKAR. Golangan Karya was the governments electoral vehicle which with its communications and administrative monopoly, backed by the military, steam-rolled the opposition.

Electoral frustration was only one of the Muslim grievances. The santri, cheated, they think, out of the fruits of victory over the PKI, look on the Suharto government as basically hostile to Islam; encompassing the cultural values of heterodox Javanism, political secularism, corrupt alliance with hated Chinese business men (cukongs), and penetrated by Christians. The santri community is deeply offended by the fact that Javanese mysticism (kebatinan), which while officially still not a religion under the Department of Religion, has since 1978 been recognized as a "belief" (kepercayaan) and, hence, included under the Pancasila. President Suharto (a quintessential abangan) in a message to the Indonesian National Youth Committee (KNPI) on July 19, 1982, (according to shorthand notes) did in fact link the Pancasila to Javanese esoteric knowledge (ilmu kasunyatan) and the kebatinan goal of the "perfect life" (kasampurnan hurip) which is to be sought in man and nature. "Every religion is basically like this," he said, expressing the tolerance of the non-santri. "Javanese know about this and other should study." Understandably, this particular speech, deeply influenced by its author's Javanism (including the mystical hidden meanings of the Javanese alphabet) was not reported in full or published since it

would be so offensive to santri.

Although Muslim political parties may have been limited in articulating Islamic interest, in the dakwah, the propagation of Islam in the Mosque sermons, teaching, and lectures, the "floating masses" are touched by an increasingly social and political message couched in the terms of Qur`anic injunction and the hadith. Some of it is uncompromising. The illegal texts of Abdul Qadir Djaelani, for example, contrast Islam which is the revelation of God with Pancasila which is man-made of kejawaan (Javanese) and kebatinan (mysticism). Djaelani other "fundamentalists" call for the people to die as martyrs in a "struggle until Islam rules." This is the "hard" dakwah, as compared to sermons and texts tightly confined to matters of faith and shari`a.

The government has sought to be sensitive to Muslim concerns in some nonstrategic areas of national life. The Department of Religion supports Muslim institutions and ritual. In 1973, in the face of vigorous Muslim protest, it backed away from a controversial marriage bill that would have created a nationally uniform marriage and divorce law superseding for Muslims shari`a regulations. The government periodically campaigns against gambling, prostitution, pornography, and the other manifestations of what Muslim critics call the moral decay of an Indonesian society contaminated by secular values. Although a plural society, tolerant of all religions, the government has been quick to act to control efforts to convert the faithful by other religious communities. The Muslims have made it very clear that they will not accept the notion of freedom to proselytize among Muslims since that is an invitation to apostasy. The government does try to "buy off" through limited concessions the accomodationist middle of traditionalist Islam. It is not prepared, however, to give way to demands that somehow the state itself should express an Islamic quality.

As the gulf between government and organized political Islam widened, there was a revival of the threat of Muslim extremism, real and alleged. In the later '70s, security officials were warning of the resurrection of the DI in the guise of the Komando Jihad ("Holy War Command"). Credence was given to these alerts when in March, 1981, a police post in West Java was stormed by militant Muslims and 17 days later a Garuda Indonesian Airlines DC-9 was hijacked to Bangkok. The alleged master-mind was a radical Muslim teacher named Imran bin Mohammad Zain. He was arrested, tried, found guilty, and executed.

The repeated warnings about Muslim violence and the exemplary punishment of Imran are concrete expressions of the government's concerns about the threat of Muslim political action. The government is also concerned about the spillover into Indonesia of Islamic politics elsewhere, ever on the alert to external interference. Its extreme sensitivity to what would appear to be very limited operational capabilities by extremists has to be placed in the context of the government's exaggerated perception of the vulnerability of the state to a "extremism of the right" (Islamic fundamentalism) and "extremism of the left" (communism). The perception is the justification for the operation of the state security organization (KOPKAMTIB). The social units of the country are caught up in a web of interlocking intelligence and coercive repressive internal security structures that would make extremely difficulty if not impossible, covert mobilization and organization of a credible armed opposition force. The definitions of "extremism" of either right or left are not rigorous and are lumped in with other "enemies" such as "frustrated democracy groups," and "liberals" by the military oligarchs who man the controls of internal security. The emphasis of the security managers on the threat from

"extremism of the right," that is traditionalism and fundamentalism is in our opinion an imperfect analysis of the dynamics of Islamic political activism in Indonesia. The traditionalists and fundamentalists with their concerns fixed on the shari`a and the memory of the Jakarta Charter, do not articulate an alternative program of political action that will mobilize recruits beyond their established constituencies. We will make the point below, that it will be in the capabilities of radical fundamentalism and neomodernism focussing on the real social and economic ills of Indonesia that a resurgent Islam, perhaps in alliance with a secular "left," might present a different kind of challenge to incumbent authority.

#### Current Status

The Indonesian government seems intent making the vague and general universal values embodied in the Pancasila an operational guideline for all activities in the state. It has become more than just a constitutional basis for unity in a plural society. It is to receive policy effect as the framework within which individual and group interest must give way to the common interest and unity of purpose of the Indonesian people. The problem, of course, is how does opposition and religion fit into this. The government's answer to the problem of opposition has been to force all social and political organizations in the state to accept the Pancasila as their sole ideological and organizing principle. Once this is accomplished, then in implementing it the government retains the right to intervene if there should be deviation. To reject the Pancasila is to reject the basis of the system's legitimacy. To oppose the Pancasila is to oppose the constitutional foundation of the state itself. Thereby, by definition, opposition -- from what ever quarter --becomes "extremism."

The Muslim groupings naturally saw the issue in terms of the

subordination of Islam to a secular state ideology manipulated by a regime inherently biased against Islam. But in the legal constitutional framework of the state buttressed by the real power of the Army, there was little that organized Islam could do to resist the inexorable march of the rubber-stamp parliamentary process and the pressure of the government. In August, 1983, the PPP held its first national congress since its 1973 formation to adopt the Pancasila as its sole ideological principle, a decision subsequently forced on its constituent member parties. The ideological question immediately arises, of course, if the PPP's sole principal is the Pancasila than can it any longer be an Muslim party. This is symbolically expressed in the replacement of the PPP's the electoral emblem of the Ka'abah, the sacred object of the haj with a five-pointed star, a Pancasila symbol.

The PPP has fallen into disarray as it struggles to find a new role. With the interests of religion excluded as a legitimate basis for political activity, it would appear that although Indonesia has not moved to a one-party system, it has create a multi-party mono-ideological system which is to function not to present alternative political programs but to mobilize support for government decisions. The PPP's confusion has been compounded by the defection of its largest constituent member, the Nahdatul Ulama. The NU, always a reluctant partner in the homogenizing politics of the PPP, forced to accept the Pancasila as its sole principle, at its December, 1984, advised its members that political party membership was an individual decision. So that while the NU did not formally withdraw from the PPP, something the government would have found destabilizing, an NU member is not obligated to support the PPP. The implicit withdrawal of NU from organized politics is emphasized by its decisions to return to its original organizational purposes. The NU is now in the hands of a dominant group of ulamas who feel that the NU's mission is in religious, educational, and

social sphere of actions, not electioneering. At the level of the pesantran, the village Muslim school, the Mosque, and the other voluntary associations of Islam, the masses are not floating; they are hearing the dakwah.

Perhaps more damaging to organized Islam than the Political Parties Bill, has been the promulgation of the law on mass social organizations. Up to 1984, groups such as Muhammadiyah had been much less vulnerable to direct government interference than the political parties. But now these too must accept the Pancasila as their sole organizing principle. That which most concerned them was the provision providing for government supervision, intervention, and dissolution. The mass organization bill was for many Muslims the last straw. They had been forced to acquiesce to religious pluralism as the basis of the state itself. Their political parties had been, first, structurally emasculated in the concept of "the floating mass" and then their identities lost in the PPP, and finally made programmatically redundant by the Pancasila as sole principle. Now any voluntary organization with an Islamic base had to become a Pancasila organization. The government's assurance that Muslims were not threatened and that they could freely practice their religion seemed to mock Islam as an expression of a total way of life which is to be reflected in the fullness of human activity and organization. In the Pancasila Indonesian state, Suharto declared (perhaps a kind of Javanese fatwah) that it was haram (religiously prohibited) to create conflict between Pancasila and Islam.

While the organized political party structures of Islam may have been disciplined to the requirements of Pancasila Democracy and the urban-based voluntary organizations of Islamic modernism subjected to the government regulations flowing from the mass organization bill, the traditional structures of Islamic mobilization and communication remain fairly resistant

to government control. Muslim grievances were articulated in the dakwah. The "hard" dakwah, departing from approved texts, preached a polarizing anti-government, anti-Pancasila message. An environment was being created in which the more radical and uncompromising Muslims were prepared for direct action.

A relatively minor incident involving a local security officer and youthful Muslims at a Tanjung Priok (North Jakarta) mosque in September 1984, brought the simmering unrest to a head when a night of rioting and violent clashes between Muslim mobs and the Army ended with more than 20 dead. This was the most destabilizing open confrontation since the anti-Tanaka riots of a decade earlier. The situation became even more tense with a series of bombings and incendiary fires in Jakarta and other cities seemed to presage an embryonic urban guerilla warfare or terrorist campaign under the banner of  Jihad.

The reverberations from the Tanjung Priok riot shocked government-Muslim relations. Clandestine pamphlets and mosque wall-poster were widely circulated denouncing the Army for the "massacre," calling the fallen rioters "Martyrs to God" in a "holy war.". Burning social and economic frustrations were exposed in the crudely anti-Chinese and anti-Christian tone of underground messages. While fundamentalism was inflamed, the government tried to hang on to the Islamic center. Senior military officers met with influential ulamas to assure them that Islam was not at risk, only law-breakers and other subversive elements who would use Islam against the nation. At the same time, the government clamped down on the "hard" dakwah, monitoring mosque services and arresting Islamic teachers whose extremism could lead to public disorder. Although denying any effort to curtail Islamic religious activity, the government in word and deed has made it very clear that such activity must not conflict with either religious or public

law and order -- as interpreted by the security authorities. The trials that have followed the Tanjung Priok and bombing affairs and the harsh sentences been meted out obviously are designed to have a deterrent effect.

#### Future Prospects

Political Islam in Indonesia today is besieged. There is little reason to expect that siege to be lifted. Already we are in the run-up to the 1987 election. It is assumed that the deprivation of the PPP of its religious identity will cut into the 30 Muslim vote. Muslim social organizations are now harnessed in the government's mobilization to the ends of the secular state. There appears to be no central point of Islamic resistance to the steady erosion of its influence on the course of the nation. What to some might seem minor issues such as the weekly television program on Aliran Kepercayaan is criticized as a kebatinan dakwah even though Javanese mysticism does not enjoy the status of a religion. The banning of the traditional Muslim female headcover (jilbab) from state schools roused Islamic emotion. Even the question of idolatry was raised about the school practice of saluting the Indonesian flag. While Muslims fight skirmishes along the front of secularism, the "depoliticization" of Islam will continue apace at least in formal institutions of the political system.

How is it that a force with the political potential of Islam has been so easily eviscerated. In the first place, we would recall that the santri are a minority and that the government's posture versus political Islam enjoys broad support among non-santri Indonesians. Secondly, the political potential of Islam is diluted by lack of Muslim unity. The heuristic division between traditionalists and modernists covers in fact a multitude of attitudes and agendas. There are traditionalists whose political vision does not extend beyond their village. There is no single Islamic political



program to be defended. Many santri have prospered in the the contemporary political economy. The absence of a unified, comprehensive Islamic program is complemented by the absence of any central independent Islamic structures. This is a weakness in part of Sunni Islam in its political dimension. It is fragmented. There is no Imam at the center; no national leader who can speak authoritatively for the ummat. For example, rather than the use the opportunity of their forced almagamation in the PPP to weld political solidarity, it was business as usual for the Islamic political parties. Factionalism inside the constituent parties of the PPP further weakened their influence and made them even more vulnerable to government manipulation. Indonesia's Majelis al-Ulama "Council of Ulamas" is a coopted government advisory group, not a structure for the articulation of Islamic interest. Finally, we can not overestimate the coercive power of the government and its willingness to use it.

The gradual closing of open outlets for the official expression of political Islam does not mean that those interests will not be represented elsewhere. The vision of Dar al-Islam will continue to attract followers to acts of violence against the kafirs. But what about Indonesia's security authorities (and some foreigners) worst case fear for the future -- an Iranian-type Islamic revolution and rampant fundamentalism. This seems extremely unlikely; more an appeal for cautionary vigilance than a real threat. Islam's minority status, internal disunity, lack of a charismatic leader, patterns of traditionalist accommodation, a very efficient Indonesian domestic intelligence service, and the strength of the abangan led armed forces all work against any kind of mass uprising. Although the government's worst-case referent is the Darul Islam revolt at the birth of the republic, this appears to us to have very little real validity. The DI

deployed military units that had already been organized and deployed in the struggle against the Dutch. DI forces were virtually the only armed presence in their territories as the newly independent central government began to consolidate its authority. The political and military structure within which dissident Islam must operate today scarcely resembles that on the morning of Indonesian independence.

We should not underestimate, however, that there is a potential destabilizing factor in even the isolated, random, and non-centrally coordinated attacks of fundamentalism on agents and institutions of the state and its allies. The political danger to the government is that in its response to what objectively seems to be a limited potential for Islamic violence the government will overreact, thereby polarizing the ummat.

It seems to us, that the virtual closing of Muslim political parties as agents of Islamic interests opens up new avenues for Muslim activity. One of the lessons of colonial and now national history is that Muslims cannot be separated from politics as they engage in fullness of their religious activities. NU's decision to return to its original program of reaching out at the grass-roots in social, educational, and religious works will not be without political culture effect. This is part of the continuing process of Islamicization. In terms of more direct impact and political relevance, however, the santri representing modernism might again be influential if it can accomodate to the real changes that have taken place in Indonesia in the past 20 years. We speak here of the effort on the part of a younger generation, often educated abroad, using the spirit of ijtihad (independent judgement) to fashion a new creative intellectual foundation for the relationship of Islam to the state. We find this approach represent in, but not exclusive to, for example, Nurcholish Madjid's Gerakan Pembaharuan (Renewal Movement) which interprets Islam in light of conscience.

Nurcholish argues that there is no "depoliticization" of Islam, only a "deformalization" of its political expression. Outside the formal political institutions, Islamic awareness among the youth and students will grow as Islamicization reaches out to all social layers. Then there is Dawam Rahardjo, the Director of the Institute for Social and Economic Research (LP3ES) who by Qur'anic citation justifies the value of social criticism and alludes to corrupt kings of the past and havoc-wreaking military groups. Dawam argues that Indonesian Muslims should develop their Islamic view based on the social context of Indonesia. What is that context? According to Adi Sasono, Director of the Development Studies Institute, it is marked by sharp social divisions with a vast schism in economic and political power. It is non-Islamic, and a small group of affluent people dominate the poor and uneducated majority.

In the critique of the modernist intellectuals, it is capitalism that leads to the oppression of the weak. Only through Islam can a more equitable social system be structured. Muslim intellectuals, who in the past have been divorced from the people, are now enjoined to identify with the people. Islamicization (or perhaps better re-Islamicization) in this kind of analysis seems to carry with it the sense of rising class consciousness. "Muslim scholars," states Adi Sasono, "have to rethink their presence so that it will have a beneficial social meaning especially to the members of society who are backward, exploited, and suppressed under the existing social system." Adi Sasono's own Institute is actively engaged at the grassroots of Jakarta's poor in the building of cooperative organizations. Such organizations will apparently be subject to the regulations of the Mass Organization Bill. In their attention to the rich-poor gap the new dakwah finds itself in alliance with secular liberal critics of the regime and its

economic strategies. In the long run, this may be more politically potent than the traditionalist ulama in his pesantran.

This new attention to economic and social inequity is not just a phenomena of the intellectuals. It is part of the "hard" dakwah as well. The rioters at Tanjung Priok were drawn from one of the most disadvantaged areas of the urban poor. Adi Sasono's Institute classifies nearly 5 million of Jakarta's population as poor. According to the Gadjah Mada University economist, Mubyarto the rich-poor income gap continues to widen. The prospects for Indonesia's urban poor look bleak. Unemployment and underemployment continues to grow. As many as 2 million a year are added to the unemployment rolls. It is quite likely that in the urban centers an Islamic call for social and economic justice will have greater mobilizing potential than simply an appeal to the Jakarta Charter. Even so, the possibility of energizing an effective Islamic political force based on the urban poor faces the same kinds of obstacles that any Islamic opposition does. The government's awareness of the linkage of Islam to broader socio-economic grievances in the society was demonstrated by its broad net of arrests after the riot and bombings which took in not only Islamic figures but other prominent oppositionists.

If it appears unlikely that an Islamic political program can be put in place in Indonesia from the resources of Islamic organizations, are there other possible institutional bases from which political Islam can proceed. In terms of Indonesian political ecology it would seem that if there were to be an Islamic political revival, it would almost have to come out of the dominant institution the military -- not the ulamas or the intellectuals. As the revolutionary generation of Army leadership, the so-called "45 Generation" is replaced by a younger, better educated and more professionalized officer corps, the question arises as to their attitudes

and values. More precisely given our terms of reference, have they been penetrated by the dakwah?

This is an extremely sensitive question for which no empirical data is available. Nor does the open literature help much in even making educated statements. While the Army insists on the ideological cohesiveness of the officer corps, there do exist stray indicators suggesting santri political attitudes are present, but isolated. In the late '60s and early '70s, some Masjumi-type Muslim politicians looked without success for a military leader who would purify the Indonesian political system. Their speculation centered on General Abdul Harris Nasution, the Hamlet of Indonesian politics. Some of the retired and politically disfavored senior officers who have emerged as critics of the regime, have been polemically associated with Muslim opponents, particularly old Masjumi types. The most prominent military figure to be linked to Islamic extremism is General Dharsono, arrested in complicity with Islamic terrorism. Dharsono and others like him do not seem to have any real constituency in the army.

Possible scenarios can be constructed in which Islamic values might be articulated by the military. We would place this in the context of Islam as a vehicle for social and economic change as opposed to traditional Islam. The collapse of the legitimacy of the regime as a result of persistent economic inequities and corruption might provoke a purifying military coup that would have to ideologically justify its behavior. Islam values could be used. Such a scenario, however, has a very low order of probability, and such a coup would only be galvanized in the direst circumstance. It would presume as well the penetration of the army by the dakwah. Certainly, however, the relationship between the dakwah and the military should be a priority area for investigation.

### Policy Implications.

The United States has developed a close bilateral political, economic, and security relationship with Indonesia under Suharto. We have looked at Indonesia as a key element in a peaceful and stable Southeast Asian international order. This despite the fact that we have little in common in history, culture, religion, or other affective ties. The U.S.- Indonesian link is resisted in extreme nationalist (old PNI types) and extreme Muslim circles. Strangely enough, the antipathy to the U.S. is identical -- the perception of capitalist imperialism and corrupt Western values.

There is nothing in our analysis of political Islam in Indonesia to suggest that this might become a variable leading to any dramatic change in Indonesian policy towards the U.S. in the foreseeable future. Unlike Malaysia, Indonesia has not found it necessary to adopt a high international Islamic image for domestic expediency. If there should be a major political disruption in the Indonesian political system then certainly the question of impact on U.S. interests would have to be raised. The forces other than Islam at work in Indonesia all seem to make for regime continuity. Greater coercive measures may have to be resorted to as the country moves towards the presidential elections in 1988. There is little reason to expect that the political constellation of military, technocrats, and entrepreneurs supporting the regime will be shattered by internal dissidence or protest.

In general Indonesia's foreign relations are but lightly touched by Islam. While aware of and sympathetic to the struggle of Muslim minorities elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the government seems to have had a relatively free hand in essentially ignoring the problem. It has not been an issue used by Muslim activists to discredit the Islamic bonafides of the government. Although Indonesia supports the cause of the PLO

internationally, it has not permitted the opening of a PLO office in Jakarta. Like Malaysia, Indonesian officials attempt to discredit Islamic extremism by linking it to subversive Iranian influences. The Iranian factor in reality seems rather unimportant in influencing political Islam in Indonesia. In general, Indonesia clearly separates religious interest from national interest. Ideologically its foreign policy is a Pancasila foreign policy, a ruberic that can justify almost any state act.

#### IV THE PHILIPPINES

##### Introduction.

The Muslim minority in the Philippines numbers 2.5 million or about five percent of a total population that is largely Catholic Christian. The Muslims are concentrated in the south, being a majority in five provinces in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. While they can be broadly thought of as the northern extension of the Malay Islamic culture, collectively called Moros (once a term of opprobrium but today used proudly), this is not an ethnic definition of the community. Filipino Muslims consist of ten ethno-linguistic groups. Three groups form the great majority: Maguindanao (Cotabato, Sutan Kudarat, and Maguindanao provinces); Maranao (North and South Lanao provinces); and Tausug (Jolo island in Sulu). An Islamic sense of belonging to the ummat has been limited by the fiercely defended separate cultural identities over centuries of ethnic conflict. The ethnic divisions are reinforced by differing degrees of Islamicization among the groups, from the orthodoxy of the Tausug, the first to embrace Islam in the 14th century, to the indigenous syncretism (animism) of the Bajau sea people. Nevertheless, despite the many differences among the groups, they do share a common stock of Islamic cultural, social, and legal institutions. When, as in recent years, pressed by external non-Muslim forces, the commonality of Islam prevails over ethnic distinction.

Historically, it was Filipino Muslim sultanates in Sulu and Mindanao that gave supra-village political structure to pre-colonial Philippines. It was Muslim authority that the Spanish displaced from Manila in the 16th century. The Spanish aggressively spread crusading christianity against the Asian variety of the hated Moors (hence Moro). The bloody frontier between Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam was at the Manguindanao and Sulu sultanates.



Spanish pacification of Mindanao was not accomplished until shortly before the U.S. displaced Spain as sovereign.

American authority was imposed in the course of a guerilla war. The U.S., first directly in occupation, and then through Christian Filipinos, brought a new kind of colonialism to the Muslims. Secular law, education, and administration contradicted the customary law and traditional authority. As the colonial regime developed and moved towards full internal self-government, Muslim leaders argued for a separate Muslim state. When the commitment to Philippines independence was made, Muslim leaders unsuccessfully pressed for a separate independent Muslim state.

Muslim concern about their status in the new Philippines nation was soon translated into fear and hostility towards national policies that exaggerated their vulnerabilities as a small minority out of the mainstream of the Manila-centric political economy. The government actively encouraged the migration of Christian Filipinos to the south. Religious violence, particularly in the Manguindanao regions where Christian penetration was most felt, was a regular feature of intergroup relations. The violence can be easily categorized as Muslim - Christian, but although sectarian strife was rampant in '50s and '60, the underlying structure of social conflict was more complex than simply a matter of religious antagonisms.

Political and economic grievances festered as the local administrations staffed by Christian officials seemed to favor the Christian population. The application of the national cadastral system in what were seen as partisan courts led to large scale alienation of land held in customary ownership by Muslims. Moro discontent was heightened by so-called "development" projects such as large scale lumbering and mining concessions, often held by foreigners, obtained through Manila middle men manipulating the national legal system to Muslims disadvantage.

### Political Background.

As the Muslims seemed less and less capable of defending their interests in the national political system, the always latent appeal of secession became more attractive. The 1968 Corregidor affair was a watershed event. As part of its on and off diplomatic pursuit of a residual claim to sovereignty in the Malaysian state of Sabah, Manila apparently planned clandestine military operations in Sabah itself. Muslims were recruited and given special warfare training. Pay issues led to a Muslim mutiny in March, 1968, after which 28 Muslims were summarily executed. This incensed the Muslims of the south and sparked outrage in Malaysia. A direct political result was the founding of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in May 1968, which had military training links to Malaysia.

The MIM flowed out of old Muslim politics. It was established by the venerable Cotabato traditional leader Datu Udtog Matalam. The MIM gave some systematic form to what had become endemic violence in the name of religion, but its goal was reduced to autonomy in a kind of federal system. Meanwhile a new Muslim elite was emerging whose socialization was not that of tradition but of education in the Middle East and Philippine universities. Their Islamic consciousness and political expectations were fed by their contacts in the wider Muslim world. The political phenomenon that was occurring in the '60s was the transmogrification of religious identity and ethnicity into a modern Islamic nationalism -- that of the Bangsa Moro -- with economic and political goals. This was represented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) for which, in a sense, the MIM had prepared the ground.

The MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, a University of the Philippines political scientist, was not a religious movement. Islam was the cement of an ideology that was self-consciously nationalist, subordinating ethnic

division to the Moro identity. It was radically anti-traditional, committed programatically to social and economic change that would restructure Moro society in the name of Islamic values of justice and equity. The MNLF provided the Moros, for the first time, a unified leadership with a full political program that demanded the creation of an independent state carved out of 25 provinces in Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palawan.

The declaration of martial law in 1972 ended any possibility of moderate Muslim bargaining in an open political system. The political field was left to the MNLF which by 1972 was engaged in a war of secession. At its peak in the mid-70s, the MNLF fielded 20,000 - 30,000 guerillas and controled large stretches of the western Mindanao and Sulu country side, even threatening some cities. At the height of the bleeding war, up to 50,000 Philippine Armed Forces troops were tied down in the south. Casualties were high, particularly among civilians, and tales of atrocities from both sides were often heard. The MNLF's military capabilities were considerably enhanced by the availability of Sabah as a training site, resupply center, and sanctuary. Through Malaysia's Sabah state, material aid was funneled from Libya. This strategic vantage was considerably diminished after Kuala Lumpur forced the resignation of Sabah's Chief Minister Tun Mustafa, whose had cooperated with the MNLF.

From the outset the MNLF internationalized their struggle against Manila in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (IFMC). The MNLF's diplomacy, strongly backed by Libya, sought to wring concessions from the government by threatening through its Middle East supporters to constrain an energy import dependent Philippines' oil supply. The MNLF was only partially successful. The international Islamic forums became gravely concerned about the conditions of Filipino Muslims, and their attention to this did lead to some moderation

in the government's political and military tactics. Importantly for Manila, however, was the fact that the MNLF's secessionist goal was not accepted by the IFMC which instead in 1974 called for direct negotiations between Manila and the MNLF for a "just solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines."

The relative mildness of the IFMC's posture reflects at least in part the mediatory roles of Indonesia and Malaysia. Although both countries, given their Muslim populations, have an interest in the treatment of Filipino Muslims, the prospect of secession raises problems for regional peace and order and the ASEAN system. Furthermore, a successful secessionist movement in the Philippines might have a spillover or demonstration effect in their own political systems. Malaysia - Philippines relations were somewhat improved when President Marcos at the 1977 ASEAN summit renounced any claim to Sabah. This has not been followed up, however, by constitutional action in Manila to implement the renunciation. The continued linkage of the Philippine's Sabah claim and alleged support to the MNLF from Sabah still strains the bilateral relationship and has been a key internal text of ASEAN harmony.

With both Manila and the MNLF being pressed for a peaceful resolution by the external Islamic states, including the now compromising Libya, an agreement was reached in Tripoli in December 1976, providing for a cease-fire and proposed terms of a settlement. The settlement called for "autonomy" for the Muslims in 13 provinces. Autonomy was to include shari'a courts, internal self-government and administration, guaranteed sources of revenue, etc., with foreign policy and national defense left to the central government. The cease-fire went into effect in January 1977, but broke down

later the same year with the collapse of negotiations on the implementation of the autonomy proposals. President Marcos then proceeded to unilaterally implement the Tripoli agreement in a manner that made "autonomy" a symbolic reality but substantively a hollow fiction. In 1979, two regional assemblies were established in Region IX (Zamboanga and Sulu) and Region XII (Lanao and Cotabato provinces) covering 13 provinces. Although boycotted by the MNLF, the 1982 elections to the regional assemblies and a number of Muslim cooptations to official positions on the local, regional, and national level gave the government wider political options in bargaining with the Muslims. In 1981, a Ministry of Muslim Affairs was established. In 1982, the government announced that it would establish shari'a court in Muslim areas. Educational assistance was provided to traditional Muslim schools (madrasahs).

In an ironic fashion the diplomacy of the MNLF back-fired. By forcing the Manila regime to deal with the international ramifications of its policy in the south, it provided the government with the opportunity to fend off the impatience of the OIC by acts trying to show good faith in its strivings for peace in the south. Promises of infrastructure development were designed to promote a vision of economic development. Personal diplomacy by President Marcos and Mrs Marcos --for example the 1982 visit of Marcos to Saudi Arabia -- also helped keep the international initiative away from the MNLF.

The MNLF, checked militarily by the costly deployment of the Philippines Armed Forces and diplomatically constrained by the unwillingness of the OIC to sanction the Philippines, fell upon hard times. By the early '80s the level of fighting had considerably diminished. From the large unit actions of the '70s, the MNLF's tactics turned increasingly to terror bombings, kidnappings, extortion, and other headline grabbing but strategically inconsequential actions. After nearly a decade of bloodshed a

Muslim population brutalized by both sides looked for other alternatives than simply the continuation of violence as presented by the MNLF. Beset by internal divisions its expatriate leadership could not control, the MNLF's cohesion crumbled. Mass defections and well publicized surrenders brought more and more Moro secessionist leaders and followers back to the fold. A number were to assume roles in the new government-sponsored Moro regional structures. By comparative quantitative measures from the south in the mid-70s, it can be asserted that by the end of 1982, the government had the military situation with the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) well in hand. The Moro problem remains. The issues that drove the MNLF into armed opposition persist, and the situation in the south is no more secure for Manila as the war being fought by the Communist Party of the Philippines' New People's Army (NPA) expands across Mindanao.

#### Current Status.

The highest government estimates place BMA forces today at 6-7,000 strong although Misuari from his exile headquarters still claims 30,000 fighters. The government figure is probably more accurate if we take into account the current limited numbers of armed contact with the BMA. Fire fights are sporadic and scattered. From ambush, the BMA can occasionally still hit a patrol, creating new casualties on both sides. The insurgents still carry out kidnappings for ransom, including foreigners. By and large, however, a peaceful Moro front has allowed the government to redeploy its troops in the south to face the more serious insurgent threat presented today by the NPA in Christian populated eastern and northern Mindanao. MNLF commanders continue to come down out of the hill with their followers. For example, Basilan's "Commander Gerry" [Salapuddin] brought out a thousand in June, 1984. He will join other MNLF guerilla leaders who have governmental

posts in autonomous Regions IX and XII like "Commander Ronnie" [Amelil Malaguio] who came out with a thousand men in 1980 to become Chairman of the Region XII Executive Council. The cooptation process continues in the framework of Marcos's one-sided implementation of the Tripoli agreement.

The government's success in containing the Moro insurgency has created a kind of negative peace in Moroland resulting from the military exhaustion of the insurgents, the war weariness of the people, and the failure of the expatriate MNLF leadership to maintain its cohesion. While the OIC continues to recognize the MNLF as the representative of the Philippine Muslims, the government can ask, with justification, which "responsible group" should be dealt with. The inability of the MNLF to give continuity to a single voice for the politics of Islam illustrates again the issues of creating internal Muslim political unity that is apparent elsewhere in Southeast Asia. There are at least four Moro political factions whose division is based on ethnic cleavage and programmatic disagreements.

For the OIC, the MNLF continues to be led by Nur Misuari. Long based in Tripoli, Misuari may have moved his headquarters to Iran. His armed supporters were drawn from the Tausugs and other Suluanos. He adheres to his demand for a Moro state that would encompass most of the Philippines south and which, despite Misuari's inflated claims of the Muslim population, would be one in which Muslims would be a minority ruling a Christian majority. His radical Islamic socialism threatens the power base of traditional Islamic leadership in Moroland. His influence from afar on internal developments in the south has waned corresponding to his diminished ability to deliver material support from external supporters.

A Cotabato Maguindanaon MNLF faction is loyal to fundamentalist Hashim Salamat, a former member of the MNLF Central Committee, who split with Misuari in 1975. Salamat is an Islamic scholar who was educated in Cairo

and maintains his expatriate base there. The MNLF Reform Group is led by Dimos Pundato whose ethnic support comes from the Maranao of North Lanao province. He is reported to be closer to the Mindanao scene from a Sabah base. Pundato advances the more politically realistic goal of real autonomy in areas predominantly Muslim. Finally, there is the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization led by Jeddah-based Rashim Lucman, a Maranao. His brand of Islamic conservatism contrasts sharply with the original MNLF and its international support from radical Arab sources. The BMLO, like Hashim Salamat's MNLF faction, is more sympathetic to traditional Muslim social order in the Philippines.

Efforts to reconcile the expatriate Muslim factions have been unavailing to date. The January, 1983 Karachi "unity" conference was boycotted by all expatriate groups except Rashim Lucman's BMLO group who met then with a self-proclaimed group of Muslim community leaders from the Philippines itself. The shredding of unity at the center has had negative consequences in the field as the less "revolutionary" (as opposed to Islamic consciousness) have been the easiest to tempt out of the field. Salamat's Manguindanaons have provided a number of the defections. The internal divisions in organized Muslim political opposition obviously facilitate Manila's diplomatic and political policies of divide et impera.

Overarching the fissure lines that factionally divide the armed Moro separatists are the fissure lines that divide them from the non-insurgent Muslims in the south. In the first place, there is the traditional Muslim leadership in the datus and village religious leaders. Then there are those Muslims who have new vested political and economic interests in the success of the new regional institutions. And, of course, there is the great bulk of the Muslim population to whom the war was a cruel human and economic



burden. Perhaps indicative of the new passivity in the south is resurgent interest in government supported Muslim activity in Islamic education, Qu`ran study, voluntary self-help organizations, and other non-(overt) political activity.

#### Future Projections.

A discussion of the future of Muslim politics in the Philippines must first be set in the context of the general political and economic crisis that afflicts the society. Although President Marcos still wields the instruments of power, uncertainty abounds about the future. All of the indicators of political instability are magnified by the conjuncture of the maneuverings of succession politics and economic disaster in a psychological environment conditioned by repression and violence. Whether or not Marcos is "toppled" or there is a "constitutional" succession the status quo ante will not be recovered. The political evolution of the Muslim question will be touched by politics at the center and the availability of critically scarce economic resources.

Whatever the political outcome of the current crisis in terms of regime -- palace coup, military intervention, democratic opposition, radical leftist -- we assume that any post-Marcos regime will be resistant to the ultimate Muslim demand of separatism and will seek to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the state. Where they may vary will be in their willingness to accommodate demands for regional autonomy.

The relative peace that has settled over Moroland is instable, depending not on a fundamental reorientation of Muslim consciousness, but on a continued willingness of the government to accomodate "reasonable" demands for substantial autonomy in a national framework of peace and economic development. The government's capabilities will be sorely tested

at both levels. Three factors in particular need to be considered: (1) majority constraints on how much can be done for a minority; (2) the impact of a contemporary national political disorder in the Philippines on the Moros; and (3) the CPP and NPA.

The government continues to implement in its own way the Tripoli agreement. Most recently (April 1985), Marcos finally announced the release of funds for the establishment of the long promised shari'a courts for Muslim personal law. Although severely curtailed in practice by the general economic collapse, the policy commitment to Muslim equal economic opportunity in terms of investment of national resources into Muslim development continues to be wielded as evidence of government sincerity. It should be noted that in the national framework the Muslims are not the only disadvantaged Filipinos. The majority may ask, what is the "fair share."

Most problematic, however, is how far the government can go with respect to the "moderate" Muslims' bottom line demand for substantial political autonomy. The government will move reluctantly -- if at all -- to the melding of the existing two regional into the single Muslim autonomous region envisioned in the Tripoli agreement. Even though the 13 provinces are but 60 percent of the MNLF's claimed Moro "homeland," Christians are a majority. This demographic fact, while perhaps polemically explained by Moro invocation of Christian immigration into Moroland, cannot be politically ignored (leaving democratic theory about one man one vote out of the analysis altogether). The already militantly polarized Christian community would resist politically on the national level, and with guns on the local level, the full imposition of minority Muslim rule. Even in the Muslim community that stayed loyal there is some concern about the way in which the MNLF defectors have been welcomed back with positions of authority and allowed to retain their weapons.

Since the ending of martial law in 1981, the Muslims have sought to use the national political crisis as a lever for their interests. In a highly publicized manner, Senator Aquino tried to mediate personally the breaches in the MNLF and then to draw the MNLF into a united front with the national opposition forces. The threat of renewed separatism has been used as a political lever but without success in forcing democratic accommodation by the government. In the political turmoil after Aquino's killing, leading non-MNLF Muslim politicians associated themselves with Jaime Cardinal Sin's call for "national reconciliation and justice for all," warning in a kind of manifesto (October 7, 1983) that if Marcos did not accede to the demands for human and political rights, "we may be constrained to reassert the historic identity of the Moro Nation."

It is difficult to see how in contemporary Philippines succession politics any deal can be cut by Muslim autonomists with democratic oppositionists that could realistically ignore the constraints that will be in place for any central government in their dealings with the south, let alone giving them the kind of guarantees that would bring the MNLF back into the fold. In fact, only the National Democratic Front, generally considered a CPP umbrella, has accepted (for tactical purposes) the notion of Muslim self-determination. While the democratic opposition may wish to enlist the Muslims for electoral purposes in a peaceful transition to a post-Marcos era, their goal -- power at the center -- only becomes relevant to the autonomists in as much as it moves them in the direction of a contrary goal -- devolution of power from the center. Such a devolution, if substantive in a kind of "federalizing" structure would satisfy the minimal demands of the Muslim moderates but not the radical elements of the MNLF.

From the vantage point of the MNLF, a non-peaceful transition to the

post-Marcos era, marked by either coup or protracted internal war might provide greater opportunities for autonomy or secession, perhaps in alliance with other forces, as a besieged central authority finds itself unable to deploy resources against a resurgent BMA. It is in this aspect of contemporary politics that we find possibly a future link to the the other war in the south: the NPA's.

The principal armed threat in the Philippines comes from the NPA. Its alarming growth in the past two years is well known, in the words of the recent Senate staff report, The Situation in the Philippines (October 1984), "challenging the government in many parts of the country." The challenge is growing in Mindanao. For several years NPA activity in its operational areas in the south has overshadowed the MNLF and has been the Philippine military's major concern. Philippine officials have always worried about potential tactical alliance between the two forces, but to date no joint operations or common strategy can be documented. Naturally, as they tie down the military and erode the legitimacy of Manila's authority, their separate wars are complementary. The Moro's struggle is defined by particularistic Islam and Bangsa Moro nationalism, in contrast to the secular universalism of Marxism-Leninism. We would note, however, at least two possible future developments which might change the relationship between the Moro community and the communists.

The NPA has wooed the MNLF and publicly, through the NDF, has supported self-determination. Furthermore, the Misuari faction of the MNLF does have its own vision of a kind of Islamic socialism. As the MNLF's basis of support in traditional ethnicities erodes and the NPA's strength grows, there may be a temptation for the Moro radicals to become a partner in the struggle against tactically, if not strategically, the common enemy. That

this might be happening is suggested by the January, 1985 report of a new MNLF faction, the Philippine Democratic Revolution (PDR), which plans to join forces with the NPA in Mindanao.

The PDR, if it in fact exists, may, on the other hand, represent a new NPA front organization designed to mobilize elements of the Muslim population to the communist-led revolutionary struggle. We are reminded of the Communist Party of Malaya's various tactics to engage Malay Muslims in their revolution. However that may be, certainly the kinds of socio-economic grievances and excesses of military repression that have mobilized Christians in the south to the NPA exist as well in the Muslim region. Unlike the situation for the CPM, the environment in Mindanao is not racially divided. Christian and Muslim alike are Filipino, and the NPA provides an ethnically neutral structure for both to cooperate on the basis of secular interest and with the promise of confessional equality. Even if large measures of autonomy should be granted to Muslims, the perception of economic exploitation within the Muslim community as economic modernization spreads and the penetration of global capitalism creates new wealth unevenly distributed might lead to a greater number of recruits for the NPA, particularly from those Moros who today are physically or affectively caught up in a losing MNLF struggle. If the one future possibility is an NPA - MNLF alliance, the other is an NPA - MNLF rivalry. In either case, the NPA seems to have more to win in the long run than the MNLF. It is to be doubted that a communist or communist influenced regime in the Philippines would be any less jealous of the integrity of the state than its predecessors.

#### Policy Implications.

The policy problems presented by the problem of Muslims separatism in the Philippines relate both to internal developments in that troubled nation

and its relations with its friends and allies. To the degree to which Muslim insurgency in the south, either autonomously or more worrisome in alliance with the NPA, aggravates general insecurity and contributes to the incremental collapse of the regime, U.S. political and security interests are involved. It is not necessary here to outline the various scenarios with respect to the U.S. bases that might eventuate if an unfriendly government should succeed Marcos.

There is no reason to be sanguine about the situation even if a peaceful transition to a democratic-centrist government can be managed. Such a government will still be faced with the problem of revolutionary insurgency. If resurgent Moslem warriors, even in alliance with the NPA, successfully cast their appeal in terms of self-determination, there will be renewed international pressures on Manila. Furthermore, U.S. assistance to Manila will be opposed by domestic opponents of Manila as aiding the "genocidal" suppression of a minority.

The status of the Muslims in the south will continue to be a factor in the Philippines relations with Malaysia and Indonesia. As previously noted the problems of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia remain on the agenda of Islamic organizations in It is quite possible that as Islamic consciousness continues to be raised in those countries, governments might seek to deflect some of the domestic impact by focussing attention on external Islamic causes. In such a case there would be a negative impact on ASEAN solidarity and harmony. Moreover, the restraining influence which both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur seem to have exercised in international Islamic organizations with respect to the Philippines would be less forthcoming.

Even in the more likely event that the broader framework of Indonesian and Malaysian noninterference remains intact, the Sabah - Moroland connection will continue to plague Philippines - Malaysian bilateral

relations. Kuala Lumpur's restraint in this regard is tested by the inconstancy of the Philippines' position on sovereignty. There has been no constitutional follow-through on the Marcos 1977 renunciatory pledge. Manila's ambivalence in this regard was again demonstrated in 1984, when Philippine Foreign Minister Tolentino said that the government's renunciation did not prejudice any proprietary rights of the Sultan of Sulu to Sabah. Assuming that the issue of Sabah's sovereignty could be put definitively behind them, there still remains the problem of more than 100,000 Muslim Filipino "immigrants" (refugees) in Sabah. The refugee population is a source of support for Muslim insurgency in the Philippines, a burden on the social services of Sabah, a new internal security threat, and an irritant in Sabah - Kuala Lumpur relations. In Sabah itself, Malay Muslims are a domestic minority population advantaged by the Islamicization policies of the federal government. A possible "internationalization" of the refugee issue through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees may take some of the heat out of the domestic and bilateral exchanges.

## V THAILAND

### Introduction.

Thailand is generally understood to be one of the most homogenous nations in Southeast Asia. Its religious-cultural identity is Thai Buddhist. The largest religious minority group is Muslims who compose perhaps five percent of the population. Among the immigrant Muslim populations are ten to twenty thousand South Asians scattered in the towns and cities of the country, and thirty to forty thousand Haw Chinese in the north. Most of Thailand's Muslim population, 1.75 million, are ethnically and culturally Malay -- professing Islam, speaking Malay, dressing in Malay costume, and living in Malay style kampongs. Although the term Thai Muslim is ethnically and culturally neutral, expressing a religious category, it is in common usage a euphemism for Thailand's ethnic Malay minority who are concentrated in Thailand's four southernmost provinces -- Satun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat -- where, about one million, they are a 75 percent majority. Significant Malay populations also are to be found north of the "deep South" in Songkhla, Trang, Krabi, and Phuket provinces. The southern Thai Muslims are economically disadvantaged, being occupied in traditional subsistence agriculture, plantation agriculture, and fisheries.

Historically, the Thai Muslims have been the peninsula extension of Malayan civilization caught in the contest of competitive imperialisms of first, indigenous Malay sultanates and Thailand, and then, British authority and Thailand. The modern legal territorial framework was set in 1909, when Thailand relinquished to British Malaya all claims to the northern Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Trengganu, and Kelantan but leaving intact Thai sovereignty over the Malays of the "deep South." This did not become a



political problem for Thailand until the modern nationalism unleashed by the 1932 Thai revolution threatened the religious and cultural identities of the southern Malay.

The traditional monarchical touch on Thailand's Malay minority was relatively light. The kingdom's Malay subjects had always enjoyed a high degree of internal cultural autonomy as long as the required extractive exactions were met. It was during the process of secularizing the Thai state after the ending of absolute monarchy that a "modernizing" Bangkok elite sought to create a politically and culturally inclusive Thai nation-state -- the "Thai-ness" of which was in the '30s and '40s aggressively defined by the dominant population. This was particularly pronounced in the ultra-nationalism of the Pibul Songkhram regimes after 1938. Legal disabilities were imposed on manifestations of Malay civilization and shari'a marriage and inheritance law was replaced by Buddhist practice. Administration, law, and education was in the hands of Thai Buddhist officials whose arrogance was that of ruler over the "backwards" ruled. The Malay minorities sense of social deprivation, being second class citizens, was balanced by their sense of economic deprivation which was pointed up by the relative wealth of the ethnic Chinese in the region.

The Thai Muslim minority, living in Dar al-Harb, were faced with alternative extremes of surrender of their cultural identity to essentially Central Valley Thai Buddhist civilization or violent defense in the form of political separatism. While most of the inhabitants of the southern region, now with the active participation of the Thai government, have sought solutions in between the extremes, Thailand's southern problem is most visibly represented by Thai Muslim separatist sentiment and insurgency.

#### Political Background

The forceful pressing of assimilationist policies, even as moderated by later governments, had as a consequence the fostering of a Thai Muslim political identity at the same time that Malay Muslim nationalism was enthroned in the newly independent Malayan state. Muslim consciousness was also raised by returning students from Southwest Asia and the Middle East. A growing feeling that the ethnic identity was culturally threatened, particularly through language policy, together with Thai human-rights-violating coercive suppression of a Malay political identity, led to the establishment in the '60s of clandestine Thai Malay movements that provided political umbrellas under which random and uncoordinated Muslim attacks on Thai authority and institutions could be programatically unified in the cause of Muslim separatism and a strategy of armed insurgency.

The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani ([BNPP] National Front for the Liberation of Pattani) has roots going back to the Muslim political activity of the late '40s under the leadership of Haji Sulong. A 1947 Muslim uprising in Narathiwat was crushed by Thai troops and hundreds of refugees fled to Malaya. Haji Sulong himself disappeared under mysterious circumstances in 1954. The BNPP was led to 1977 by Tengku Jalal Nasir, the grandson of the last Pattani Sultan, and expressed a conservative traditionalism with some irridentist tendencies. The BNPP had cross-border ties to the fundamentalist party PAS in Malaysia which ruled the contiguous Kelantan state from 1959 to 1978. With the death of Tengku Jalal Nasir, the BNPP's leadership passed to the younger, Cairo-educated Baril Hamdan. The wresting of political control of Kelantan from the fundamentalists by UMNO in 1978, shortly after the death of the BNPP's leader, further weakened the movement. Its military strength has steadily waned. At its height the BNPP may have fielded between 200 - 300 armed men.

In late 1975, a new, vigorous separatist movement burst on the scene in

the wake of large-scale Muslim demonstrations in Pattani in November protesting the alleged killings of Muslim villagers by Thai troops. The Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), led by Tengku Bira Kotanila, came into existence in 1967. PULO's separatist goals call for an independent Islamic Republic of Pattani carved out of Thailand's south. Like the BNPP, PULO's leadership had roots in traditional Pattani aristocracy, but PULO successfully fashioned external connections beyond Malaya, obtaining material and financial support from the radical Muslim states of Libya and Syria. PULO's energetic public relations campaigns abroad made Muslims world-wide aware of its struggle. PULO's international identity, which became synonymous with Thai Muslim separatism, far outstripped its actual capabilities and influence on the ground in Thailand. Its terror tactics of bombings and ambush murder of Buddhists seemed designed to polarize the Muslim and Buddhist communities. Its need for cash drove it to kidnappings and extortion. The line between political insurgency and self-interested banditry by the early '80s seemed fine indeed. With 600 fighters, PULO fielded the largest separatist force.

The area of Muslim separatist activity overlaps the Thai sanctuaries of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and its Malay People's Liberation Army (MPLA), where for more than a quarter of the century the CPM (now split into three factions) has ineffectually prosecuted its "people's war" against Malaysia. Although the CPM is basically an ethnic Chinese movement, there were initial concerns that the MPLA would be able to recruit from disaffected Thai Muslims, and in fact, the CPM's 10th Regiment, its only "Malay" regiment, has recruited Thai Malays as well as Malaysian Malays. A strategic linkage between the CPM and Thai Muslim separatists represented in the BNPP and PULO was out of the question. In the first place they had

totally different political objectives. Secondly, the Muslim separatists were programatically conservative, representing from the CPM's point of view, an anti-thai, anti-communist instrument of the Malaysian ruling circles. Finally, the CPM and the Muslim separatists found themselves competing for the same resources. In 1981 PULO and the CPM clashed in the CPM fastness of the Betong salient of Narathiwat province, and Muslims caught in the crossfire fled across the border into Malaysia, provoking a minor diplomatic clash between Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok over the status of the border crossers.

A third Muslim separatist organization, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional ([BRN] National Revolution Front), led by Ustaz Karim, may be the structural link between Muslim dissidence and the MCP (as well as the Communist Party of Thailand [CPT]). The BRN has an avowedly socialist political program and a strategy of "people's war" that seems to owe more to Mao than Mohammed. It is the best organized and most tightly controlled of the three factions. Even though its armed force may never have exceeded 150-200 men, it did seem to have greater potential for influence in a region where socio-economic grievances were as compelling as religious.

A fourth, very shadowy group, the Sabil-illah ("Path of God"), unlike the Pattani separatists, appears to be urban-based. Although relatively inactive, it has brought terrorism to Bangkok itself with a bombing at Don Maung Airport. It is not clear whether this group, thought to have some links to Malay fundamentalism, is separatist or conducting a jihad in the Dar al-Harb.

Although acknowledging the fact of indigenous Thai Muslim leadership, the Thai government in the early years of separatist violence tended to view the problem as essentially foreign inspired and supported from Malaysia in particular. Although there is ample documentation for Syrian and Libyan

ties to PULO in the past, as is the case in the Philippines, it has been reduced. Most importantly for Thailand, PULO has been much less successful than the MNLF in mobilizing effective support in the international Islamic community.

Since 1978, and the eclipse of PAS, the Thais accept diplomatically that the Malaysian government does not encourage Muslim separatism in Thailand. This, of course, does not mean that there is not a body of affective support in the Malay population of Malaysia for their coreligionists across the border. This naturally constrains the Malaysian government in terms of demonstrating non-support of separatism to the Thais. Kuala Lumpur has refused to internationalize the problem by joint suppressive measures, insisting that it is an internal Thai question; this while insisting on more active Thai-Malaysian cooperation against the MCP remnants in Thailand. The difference between Malaysian ardor in the battle against the "common enemy" and coolness towards cooperation with Thailand against Muslim separatists, who in fact move freely about in Malaysia, is noted in Bangkok.

#### Current Status.

Muslim separatist insurgency in South Thailand is not a serious security problem for the Thai government. The total number of armed separatists still operating is less than 400 and declining as amnestied defectors come in from the jungle. Even some of those counted as separatists may be more accurately described as bandits. This does not mean that the secessionist struggle is over. Isolated acts of political violence continue to occur. It is claimed that insurgent warriors are still being trained and infiltrated from the radical Arab states. What does seem clear is that the violent proponents of an Islamic Republic of Pattani have

not able to broadly mobilize the Thai Malay population to specific support for their cause. An examination of the reasons for this is instructive, not only for Thailand but for what it might tell us about the somewhat analagous Philippines case. The answers are to be sought both in the capabilities of the separatists and the accomodative responses of the government.

There are at least five reasons why the separatists were quickly shown to be politically and militarily unequal to the task they set for themselves. This is in part, first, because, in the absence of massive external intervention, their stubborn adherence to the goal of complete independence was unrealistic. Second, like the factionalism of the Moros, the Pattani separatists offered different programmatic agendas, unable for ideological as well as personal reasons to operate in any sustained combined and coordinated fashion. Third, an expatriate-based leadership was not in touch with the changing conditions that modified the socio-political environment in the South. Fourth, their tactical emphasis on the survival of small armed units was not accompanied by broader political infrastructure building. Their failure to organize meant that a necessary popular support base was never activated. Fifth, the terrorist tactics adopted were probably counterproductive, alienating potential supporters. In summary, the separatist leadership in assuming popular support seems to have crucially misread either the depth of disaffection or the appeal of the independence idea.

The adaptive response of the Thai government has been as important as the internal weakness of the separatist movement in limiting its appeal. Rather than keeping intransigently to patterns of administrative neglect and aggressive assimilation, since 1977 the Kriangsak and Prem governments have met the Muslim challenge by accepting in policy cultural pluralism in

the framework of the national state. This has been facilitated by the non-aggressive religious interface between Buddhism and Islam. Buddhism does not proselytize and threaten apostasy. The Thai government has sought to create central Muslim institutions based in Bangkok. A gradual but steady effort has been made to recruit Malays to administrative roles at district and provincial levels while at the same time upgrading the Thai Buddhist officialdom in the South. A major element in the overhaul of the civil service in the South was the establishment of the Yala-based Administrative Center for the Southern Border Provinces with direct links to the Ministry of Interior in Bangkok. A major investment has been made in education including new state incentives to enhance the curriculum of the private Muslim pondok schools. A kind of discrete affirmative action program provides reserved places for Thai Muslims in the universities. Infrastructure and economic development projects have been introduced in an effort to improve the level of general welfare in the region. The attention and resources devoted to the South in the '80s can be compared to the crash development programs in the Thai Isan (Northeast) region in the '70s where the insurgent threat was from the CPT.

In its current attack on the problems of the South the Thai government has replaced the earlier and threatening implicit goal of assimilation by one that accepts plural cultural coexistence in a culturally neutral structure of political integration. The legacy of deep distrust and misunderstanding is not easily put to one side, however. The nikon program of land resettlement, even though it is open to poor Malays, is seen as stimulating non-Muslim immigration to the South, thereby diluting the ethnic Malay majority. Although Malay speakers are part of administration and Malay language broadcasts originate from Songkhla's radio, the Thai government has not given way on language policy in education. The vehicle of public

education is Thai. Since 1982, however, the study of Islam has become a compulsory subject in primary and secondary schools' curriculum.

#### Future Projections.

Although empirical data is hard to come by given the sensitivity of the subject, it is fair to assert that most Thai Malays are at least passively reconciled to living in the Thai state. Even though separatism is contained, however, the felt need to preserve the cultural identity is acute. Malay Muslim alienation will continue to be a factor in the politics of the South. It will be most intensely felt in times and locations of perceived economic deprivation. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, progressive Islamicization is sharpening the population's self-identification. The dakwah movement began to spread to South Thailand from Malaysia at the turn of the decade. Government concern over "radical" fundamentalism has led to some press bannings and a closer scrutiny of dakwah leaders.

A vital element in determining the future of "political Islam" in South Thailand will be in the maintenance of Thailand's fragile representative democratic institutions. One aspect of the government's contemporary successes in the struggle against those committed to an independent Pattani has been the operation of open party politics in such a way that local and regional interests are articulated at the national level. This is as true for the Muslim South as any other region of Thailand. While there is no Muslim political party as such, the national parties have to choose candidates who will be responsive to local grievances and concerns if they are to win in the multi-constituency provinces system of individual (as opposed to slate) voting. Any political intervention or coup that would close the system would have as one consequence a restimulation of Muslim autonomism and possibly the transfer of leadership in the Malay community



from political figures to religious. There can be little doubt but that a military intervention or coup would again stimulate revolutionary politics. The CPT, perhaps factionalized between Hanoi and Maoists, would certainly benefit from political instability. Links with the BRN might be refurbished. It should be noted that the CPT's program promises autonomy to the Muslim South. The BRN in this situation might be persuaded to alliance for the sake of the more modest, but more realistic, goal of autonomy. It would still have to demonstrate its Islamic bonafides in an basically conservative constituency.

It can be suggested, therefore, that as a consequence of the emergence of contingent economic and political factors, there will remain for the foreseeable future a latent and occasional manifest threat embodied in demands for greater autonomy. These threats will loom even larger in the event that the welfare gap between the Malays of Malaysia and the Malays of Thailand should widen or the growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia should spillover into Thailand with new, effective appeals for support to coreligionists under the Thai "yoke."

In the longer term, the Malay Muslim identity will be at risk from what seem to be the inexorable pressures of the twin, interdependent dynamics of secularization and "Thai-icization." While the South may be culturally and religiously plural, the modern Thai socio-economic structure is secular and culturally Thai. Malay Muslims of South Thailand who are going to "make it," to become achievers, will have to become less Malay and more Thai. The first desideratum in that category is Thai language acquired in the secular school system. The recruitment of Thai Muslims through education into modern Thai life is a double-edged sword. While it does promote integration and a kind of passive assimilation, if there are not suitable

employment opportunities available, a new pool of potential recruits to separatism may be created. This would be particularly the case if Malaysian economic development outpaces the Thai South.

As Thai-language becomes the vehicle of mobility one of the essential components of culture has changed. Also, the spreading of Thai popular culture, already apparent in the cities of the South, is seen as having a corrosive impact on traditional Muslim values. It remains to be seen whether the dakwah movement will be able to keep its finger in the dike of modernism. This will depend in part on what happens on the other side of the Thai-Malay border. Malaysian television and radio does not recognize the boundary and the neo-Islamicization of Malaysia, let alone fundamentalism, has impact in South Thailand. In terms of acts of political violence in the name of fundamentalism, possible future acts by small terrorist groups like Sabil-Ilah are more worrisome than separatism. They do not, however, constitute a threat to the state.

#### Policy Implications.

The Thai-U.S. relationship is not a factor in developments in the relations between the majority and minority communities in Thailand. There is little reason to expect that Thai political stability, internal security, or territorial integrity will be degraded through Islamic political activity.

In the absence of an abject Thai policy failure in the South, there is no reason to expect any increased international Muslim support of separatism. Even in the event that the situation in the South were to worsen, Thailand would probably continue to receive the support of its ASEAN partners Malaysia and Indonesia in the OIC and the IFMC. Rumours of Muslim terrorists being trained in Vietnam by the PLO notwithstanding, current

strains in Thai-Vietnamese relations do not evidence efforts by Vietnam to destabilize the Thai government outside of clandestine links to revived, Hanoi-oriented, and Lao-based communist insurgents. Limited war between Vietnam and Thailand would have negative consequences for Thai policy in the South in that it would (1) drain resources from development programs, and (2), mean a return to martial law in Thailand.

The principal international ramification of political Islam in Thailand is to be found in the Thai-Malaysian bilateral relation. It would appear now, barring unforeseen political change in Malaysia itself, that any irritant that might exist will be managed so as to avoid open conflict and recrimination. Alternative scenarios can be sketched, but their probability index is extremely low. For example, a triumph of fundamentalism in Malaysia would have spillover effects in South Thailand. The temptation to provide sanctuaries in Malaysia for Islamic "liberationists" would probably not be resisted. This would effectively terminate in terms of action --if not legally -- the Thai-Malaysian border agreement governing security cooperation between the two countries against the common communist enemy. This would take pressure off the CPM which might be viewed by Bangkok as a lever in its dealings with Kuala Lumpur. Conversely, Kuala Lumpur could not remain aloof in the event of mass repressions and refugee flows from South Thailand. The sensitivity of the people flow was illustrated in 1981 when nearly two thousand Thai Malays fleeing the fighting between PULO and the CPM, ended in Malaysian "refugee camps" vowing not to return until their safety was assured. Eventually Malaysia "absorbed" the "refugees" as it had with other border-crossers for years. The Thai-Malaysian common interest in ASEAN harmony will also serve to mediate differences that might arise between them over the status of the Thai Muslims.

## VI SINGAPORE

### Introduction.

The historical setting of the Islamic community in Singapore is quite unlike that of Islamic minorities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Singapore has a population of 2.5 million of whom 425,000 are Muslims. Of the Muslim group, 380,000 or 15.5 percent of the population are Malays. The original inhabitants of Singapore, they today exist in a political economy structured by a non-Muslim immigrant Chinese majority. Singapore is secular state in which religious freedom is constitutionally assured. There are no blatant acts of discrimination or violations of minority civil rights.

If Singapore's Malays simply represented in a developing plural society a minority bounded by its ethno - religious identity there would be less cause for political concern on the part of Singapore's leaders. What gives the Malay Muslims a politically volatile identity is that they have all the characteristics of an underclass lagging far behind the rest of Singapore's population in social and economic achievements. While Malay Muslim's may be reconciled to their religious minority status, they are increasingly less passive about their failure to fully participate in Singapore's material progress. The problem for Islam in Singapore is whether attachment to the Malay identity which is given by the religion perpetuates economic backwardness.

Empirical denominators of the relatively deprived and depressed status of Singapore's Malays are easily available from the government's own statistics. For example, the 1980 census showed the only 5.5 percent of professional, technical, administrative, and managerial jobs were held by

Malays. Only 2.3 percent of the top jobs in the civil service are filled by Malays. Only 2 percent of the Malay population earned more than S \$ 1000 per month compared to the 10.2 percent of the Chinese population. All of the indicators are that of a minority community at the bottom of the social and economic ladder.

Even though depressed (or perhaps because) the Malays are the fastest growing component of the population with a 1983 birth rate of 20.4 per thousand. The Chinese are having fewer babies with their birth rate dropping in 1983 to 14.8 per thousand from 16.1. The higher Malay fertility rates are accentuated by the lower average age of the Malay mothers. While the prime child-bearing age group nationally in 1983 was 25-29 years, 43 percent of Malay mothers were between 15-24 as compared to 23 percent of Chinese mothers. The Malay population, already fairly young, is becoming younger still, and the obstacles that young Malays will have to overcome to be "successful" as measured in Singapore by income and consumption patterns are such that they, like young coreligionists across the causeway, may reject this definition of achievement.

When we consider the congruency of ethnicity --of which Islam as in Malaysia is the vital ingredient -- and socio-economic grievances together with the demographic pattern, it is not surprising that the Singapore government recognizes that the seeds of political instability have been sown and that it must readdress the needs of the Malay community. This is particularly sensitive since there is a kind of double spillover at work in terms of Singapore - Malaysian relations as well as the potential impacts on Singapore's Muslims of Malaysian dakwah activity.

#### Political Background.

Singapore is a parliamentary democracy which has been governed by the

People's Action Party (PAP) and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew since 1959. Although not a one-party state, the PAP's absolute dominance has been such that parliamentary opposition did not exist in the 79 seat chamber between 1962 and the election of a single opposition member in a 1981 by-election. The national elections in December 1984 returned two opposition members. The PAP is a multi-racial party claiming to fully represent the interests of all Singaporeans. The PAP vigorously condemns communal politics as being destructive of stability and democracy. The question then, is how are the interests of the Malay minority as a community to be articulated. The official answer has always been, through the PAP for representation and by a PAP government for implementation.

When Malays look for the signs of representation, they are struck by what appears to be the declining political influence of Malays in the PAP. Of the 79 PAP candidates in the 1984 elections, only four --or five percent -- were Malays. Of the 19 Ministers and Ministers of State, only one is a Malay. Some of the PAP government's inflexible social engineering policies such as educational streaming or school preferences for graduate mothers have created deep insecurities in the Muslim community. The Malay Muslims' social and economic grievances generated by being outside of the Singapore mainstream are aggravated by the sometimes callous approach of the government oriented to rational means-ends decisions to Muslim life styles and institutions. Although one reaction to the growing perception of underrepresentation in planning and decision making might be a feeling of helplessness, another growing response is alienation. It should be pointed out that the PAP's aloof, paternalistic, and bureaucratic style has not worn well with a growing number of the majority community as well. But, what realistic political alternatives are open for Malays outside of the PAP?

Whether substantively or simply for political effect, the Singapore government is extremely wary of Malay ethnic and religious consciousness being expressed through autonomous political structures. The new global manifestations of militant Islam have acted to reinforce the already hypersensitive government reaction to any hint of Muslim plotting. The PAP very early "disarmed" the Malay community by ending their colonial overrepresentation in the armed forces and police. The government is ever alert for clandestine political activity. In 1981, for example, the internal security forces rounded up the so-called Singapore People's Liberation Organization (Organisasi Pembebasan Rakyat Singapura). The SPLO consisted of ten rather hapless "disgruntled Malays and Indian Muslims" who planned to distribute subversive pamphlets on the occasion of the Prophet's Birthday to foster communal unrest as the first step in overthrowing the government. An attempt to discredit the one opposition MP member, Worker Party leader J. B. Jeyaretnam, by establishing a connection between him and the plotters was probably as important to the government as deterring any potential Muslim political activism. The government has sought by statute, and administrative regulation with the everpresent politically chilling existence of a tough Internal Security Act in the background to confine Islam to the non-political domain of Malay life. Practitioners of the dakwah, labeled extremists and fundamentalists, have been detained for anti-national activities.

The ability of the Malay minority to bring political influence to bear in democratic political competition has been diluted in the name of social welfare by government housing policies. The Malay kampongs have been destroyed, with their inhabitants scattered throughout the island in multi-racial public housing blocks. There is no Malay majority constituency. Realistically and legally, Malay political grievances must be pursued by

non-communal alliance with other sectors of the population. The latest general election results are instructive in this respect.

#### Current Status.

The PAP went into the December 1984 general elections telling the voters that future prosperity depended on the return of the PAP to office. If you are doing well and thriving under the system," said Lee Kuan Yew, "and you vote against the PAP candidate, then you are downing the system that supports you." Apparently either a lot of Singaporeans did not feel well and thriving under the system, or were prepared to vote against their own interest, since the voters gave the PAP a stunning surprise. Although only two opposition candidates were elected in the 79 single-member constituencies, it received only 62.9 percent of the votes. In other words more than a third of the voters cast their ballots against the PAP. This is a swing of 12.6 percent from the 1980 general elections when the PAP garnered 75.5 percent of the votes. More striking is the fact that the opposition votes were tallied in only the 49 contested constituencies. PAP candidates were elected without opposition in 30 constituencies.

It will be some time before a full analysis of the electoral data is available but some preliminary observations are apropos. It would seem that the opposition's strength came from minority populations, Malays in particular, and younger Chinese voters unmoved by the PAP's appeal to the past or future dangers of opposition and put off by what they perceived as the PAP's arrogant elitism. One set of statistics in particular is revealing. There were 215,000 new voters in the 21-24 age group (born 1960-1963). 17 percent of these new voters were Malay as compared with Malay's being 12.8 percent of the new voters in 1980. Chinese new voters were down from 1980's 80.4 percent to 1984's 75.6 percent. This establishes



electorally the demographic trends mentioned in the introduction. As the Singapore population becomes younger, more educationally and occupationally differentiated, more attuned to political appeals to real personal economic issues -- in 1984, for example, policies over the Central Provident Fund -- the Malay vote will become increasingly important to any candidate, scattered as it is through the constituencies. That vote, however, is probably going to have an ethnic tag to it. Whether or not this means that a political window of opportunity is opening for the Malays in a competitive electoral system, at the least it indicates that PAP will have to seriously address the needs of the Malay community if it is to prevent more Malay voters from going into opposition.

The government and many members of the Malay community see the structural roots of the Malay problem in education. The Malays cannot become part of the mainstream until they can compete equally in the Singapore meritocracy. In particular, it is the low proportion of working Malays with tertiary education that holds down the number of Malays in professional or managerial jobs. As a secular, communally neutral plural society, the government has emphasized self-help as opposed to direct government intervention. The Council for the Education of Muslim Children (Mendaki) and the Muslim Religious Council (Muis) are two institutions through which voluntary financial and technical assistance is being channeled to upgrade the standards of Muslim students. In the wake of the elections, it has now been suggested that a more direct government role might be warranted. The Malay MPs have formed a task force to examine the economic, social, and cultural problems faced by Muslims. In addition to voluntary Muslim institutions, it has now been proposed that a new statutory board with strong financial resources be set up to coordinate activities for the Malay community. It remains to be seen, however, how sustained the

government commitment will be and how it will be received in religious circles.

#### Future Projections.

The structure of Singapore's economy is changing. The government continues to press the encouragement of capital and skill intensive production in the industrial sectors and the acquisition of high technology as well as its financial and service industries. As the old occupations -- low skill and labor intensive -- are phased out, Singapore's Malays run the risk of being left even further behind unless occupational patterns are radically altered. This will require a major new effort in education. The plight of the younger Malay will become acute in the 1990s unless they are prepared for skill intensive jobs including tertiary training in technology and science. Leadership will have to come from government. It will also probably require an intensification of existing very discrete "affirmative action" programs.

Although there is general agreement on what has to be done between government and official spokesmen for the Muslim Malay community, there is doubt in both circles whether the community has reached the stage of internally carrying out major developmental program. To the degree that the government supplants traditional institutions and voluntary organizations as the structure through which Malay youth are to be inducted into modern society in Singapore, established forms of traditional cultural transmission will be weakened. This includes religion. What is encouraging is that the informed Singaporean is willing to accept that the problem of development in the Malay community is a national problem, not a communal question, affecting future developments in Singapore as a whole.

As the government takes a more active role in Malay economic and social

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
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development, the policies adopted then will become part of the political dialogue between the PAP and the opposition parties and between the Malay community and the non-Malay community. Communal issues, if not communal politics, may become contentious. This will be more likely if the Singapore economic pie becomes constant, or even shrinks. Greater government involvement in the affairs of the Muslim community will be resisted by some. Furthermore, it is doubtful that in the process of the inevitable secularization of the Malay culture implicit in the urgent thrust to educationally upgrade the youth, the government can isolate the Malay youth from the Malaysia-based dakwah.

#### Policy Implications.

Singapore's economic viability and political stability will depend upon the continual need to restructure its economy to the ever changing requirements of the global economy. The government insists that communal peace is a necessary element. If the Malay community in the 1990s becomes an economic burden a more coercive set of government responses may be necessary. Current data already warns of increasing Malay criminality and drug use among the youth. Although U.S. interests are not directly involved, certainly if communal disturbances should act as a drag on Singapore's development, the general level of Singapore's economic activity and the investment climate would be affected.

More critically for longer term U.S. political and security interests in Southeast Asia, Singapore's Malay community while a minority on the island are part of the Malay-Indonesian majority surrounding Singapore's Chinese in the Straits region. One of Singapore's greatest security concerns is that communal unrest or disturbance, regardless of where it might originate, would have international consequences. Any discord between

Singapore and its neighbors over communal issues would have negative impact on regional peace and stability and risk Singapore's independence.

## VII BRUNEI

### Introduction.

Tiny Negara Brunei Darussalam regained its independence on January 1, 1984. In proclaiming this, Brunei's absolute ruler Sultan Sir Muda Hassanal Bolkiah told his 210,000 subjects that the historical character of the Sultanate would remain unchanged -- a Malay Muslim monarchy based on the teachings of Islam. Brunei today, however, is a far cry from the expanse and renown of what in the seventeenth century was the dominant indigenous Malay Moslem state in the western part of archipelago Southeast Asia. Its territory having been whittled away by generations of imperialism, it is now confined to 2,226 square miles, strategically facing the South China Sea and surrounded by the East Malaysian state of Sarawak. It has wealth and political importance far beyond what its size and population might suggest because of its immense deposits of petroleum and natural gas.

The current Sultan is 29th in a dynastic line dating to the fifteenth century. Despite the vicissitudes of empire, the royal family, prideful in the continuity of the regime, views Brunei's monarchy, as the repository of legitimate Islamic Malay religion, custom, tradition, and law that has made possible the survival of a Malay cultural and political identity that is viewed as more pure than that to be found on in peninsula Malaysia. The connection between the monarchy and Islam is more like that of the traditional Muslim Malay state, infused with autochthonous values, in which the role of the ruler, rather than law, is central. This role, however, might be difficult to maintain in the faces of forces of both religious and secular forces of change at play in modern Brunei.

### Political Background.

A British protectorate was extended over Brunei in 1888, and British

control was firmly established by the Anglo-Brunei agreement of 1906 which made the internal political status of the Sultanate similar to the royal states of the peninsula in that the Sultan's authority was limited to matters of Islam and customary law. The discovery of oil in the '20s brought a new form of economic activity to Brunei and the laid the basis for the contemporary dual society. There is a modern sector enlisting the labor of what has been primarily a non-Malay labor force. On the other hand there has been the traditional Malay peasant and fisher community. Bridging these is the royal establishment: enriched by the former and made legitimate by the latter. In Brunei today, however, through education and "Bruneization" hiring policies, more and more Malays are being recruited to the modern sector.

As Britain gave way East of Suez, Brunei was haltingly decolonized. In 1959 a new Anglo-Brunei agreement made Brunei internally self-governing. Tentative steps towards the establishment of a democratic constitutional monarchy came to a halt in December, 1962, when the popular and non-aristocratic Partai Ra'ayat Brunei (Brunei People's Party) rebelled. The PRB, which had swept the 16 elective seats of the new 33 member Legislative Council, was radically nationalist and socialist, sympathetically linked to left-wing parties elsewhere in the archipelago. The PRB not only opposed "feudalism," but it also opposed the proposed incorporation of Brunei into the new Malaysian federation. With the oil fields threatened, the British intervened in force, crushing the rebels. The consequences of the abortive coup have marked Brunei's politics ever since. A "state of emergency" giving the Sultan extraordinary security powers was declared and remains in force today. Efforts to democratize Brunei were ended. Political party activity was banned. In practice the Sultante was governed by royal decree.



The Sultan at that time, Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin abdicated in favor of his son, the present Sultan, in 1967. He remains a powerful figure behind the throne, however, and the new Sultan's style, while perhaps more publicly engaging, is traditionally autocratic.

The PRB's success in mobilizing Malay support to their cause spurred the government to investment of its oil wealth into social and economic development programs and direct welfare services to its citizens. It also was the cause of a new, vigorous reassertion of the symbols of Islam as the symbols of monarchical legitimacy.

Even though the Sultan in 1963 kept Brunei out of Malaysia, British policy, now chivied by a hostile Kuala Lumpur, moved to terminate its final colonial commitment in Southeast Asia. The Sultanate's concern was internal and external security, and it was not until 1978 that a final formula for complete independence after a five year transition was forced on the Sultan. Negotiations continued right to 1983 for the terms of the post-independence garrisoning of British forces -- a Gurkha battalion. During the 1962-1978 period, exile PRB politicians, aided and abetted by Kuala Lumpur, unsuccessfully sought to destabilize the monarchy from a distance. After 1978, numerous initiatives were taken by both Malaysia and Brunei to normalize their relations.

#### Current Status.

Brunei's royal establishment is deeply concerned about the problem of security which is realistically defined as the maintenance of the status, power, privileges, and wealth of the aristocracy and in particular the royal family. Independence has brought no democratization of the Sultan's personal rule and the monopoly of governmental power by traditional aristocratic elites, leavened by the elevation to aristocratic status of

some skilled technocrats. The cement of the system is personal loyalty to the royal family in a patron-client bond that is underpinned by an exaggeration of the Malay Islamic identity.

The royal family sees Islam as buttressing political order in Brunei. Brunei is an Islamic state. This is translated rigorously into the daily life of Brunei's Malay citizens. Great emphasis has been given to official sanctions for Malay Islamic life styles. The Sultan is advised by a Religious Council headed by Brunei's mufti, a Malaysian citizen, but the Sultan is the final religious authority in the state. All laws are examined for their congruency with shari'a law. Details of Islamic life are legally enforced. For example, no Brunei Muslim can eat in an establishment where the food is not halal. Alcoholic beverages are prohibited by law to Malays. Brunei has also quickly confirmed its international Islamic bonafides by joining the Organization of the Islamic Conference and rolling out the red carpet in mid-1984 for a visit by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat.

The dynamic Islamicization campaign together with employment policies of "Bruneization" are not without social strains. One quarter or more -- 50,000 - 60,000 -- of Brunei's residents are Chinese, of whom only ten percent are citizens. As non-citizens, they live a somewhat precarious political and legal life. The new consciousness of the Malay Islamic identity will further restrict citizenship and hence the political assimilation of the Brunei Chinese. All minorities, including the not insubstantial Filipino and Indonesian foreign work force will be affected by pressures to pull all residents of Brunei under the umbrella of shari'a law. The religious model is Saudi Arabia.

#### Future Projections.

Brunei's political structure is unique in Southeast Asia. It is more

akin to the Islamic principalities of the Persian Gulf. Brunei, however, is subjected to the same competitive forces shaping the political cultures of its neighbors: secularizing westernization and fundamentalism. That which is problematic is whether an absolute monarchy can adapt to these forces.

Any future secular internal challenge to Brunei's political stability will have its origins in a new generation of well-educated Bruneians who have acquired abroad not only the skills demanded in a modern society but also social aspirations based on the values of achievement, not the ascriptive status priorities of the traditional system. It is from this emerging Malay strata of young technocrats and managers that pressure for a more liberal regime might emerge. The prospect of radical nationalist middle class unrest becomes more likely if the conspicuously consuming royal family is perceived as self-gratifying, arrogant, and, in their business wheeling and dealing, corrupt. It is unlikely, given the internal security apparatus, that demands for participation and power sharing can be successfully articulated unless in alliance with other forces in or out of the state. On the other hand, the announcement in July 1985, of the formation of the Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) with the backing of the government and recruitment of business and bureaucratic loyalists may be a tactic to preempt non-royal political restlessness.

The more likely source of socially disruptive opposition comes from the Islamicization that the monarchy itself has fostered. There are alternative Islamic models of society. Brunei's Islam is moving in traditionalist directions in which the ulamas' roles are enhanced. It is still, however, a court-centered hierarchy that has maneuvering room to adapt to the forces of change. Fundamentalists, however, the practitioners of the dakwah movement, view the absolute monarchy as a non-Islamic social structure that should be ended. The Malay Sultan is not the imam. The same

forces of Islamic revival impacting the Malaysian youth is at work on the Bruneian youth. This cannot be underestimated when we note that at any one time some 2,000 Brunei students are abroad. Already the Brunei government has found it necessary to recall some bursary students because of their involvement with "deviationist" (i.e. fundamentalist) teachers. Moreover, the business practices and conspicuous consumption of the royals make them vulnerable to charges of moral corruption. On a micro-level, there is some similarity between the Sultan's Brunei and the Shah's Iran.

#### Policy Implications.

There are at least three sources of potential political instability in Brunei: radical nationalism, communal disorder, and Islamic fundamentalism. Regime-threatening instability in this strategic point on the eastern littoral of the South China Sea would have serious consequences given the presence of extraregional powers' interests, ambitions, and activities. The issues involved will be dealt with in depth in the presentation on Topic A-13 on Brunei, Sarawak, and Sabah.

Malaysia could not remain uninvolved in any significant alteration in the status quo that might effect its own strategic presence in the South China Sea zone, which has been heightened with the cession of Labuan as a Federal Territory. Moreover, the domestic impact on the politics of Sarawak and Sabah would have to be taken into account. A fundamentalist orthodox Brunei where the shari'a and Malay custom prevailed despite racial pluralism would be an inspiration to the Malay Muslims of Sabah, for example, whose political control of the state has been effectively challenged by the indigenous non-Muslim majority. On the other hand, non-Muslim and Muslim moderates in Sarawak and Sabah would view a fundamentalist dominated Brunei, particularly one with a pan-Malay proselytizing mission.

## VIII CONCLUSIONS

We have shown in the pages above that the status of Islam, both as a religion and as a vital determinant of ethnic identity, is one of the most dynamic variables to be considered in an analysis of the future course of politics in Southeast Asia as a region and in the six states that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Although the particular manifestations of political Islam differ in each of the cases considered, there are uniformities. In every case the Islamic identity has been sharpened and Islamic consciousness raised as part of the global reinvigoration of Islam. In every case fundamentalist Islam, while engaging only a minority of Muslims in its activities, has influence far beyond its numbers. In every case that influence tends to move the entire ummat towards the fundamentalist end of the religious spectrum.

As we have seen, in its contemporary form in Southeast Asia this continuing process of Islamicization, the deepening and making more pure the individual Muslim's attachment to the values and practices of Islam, draws its inspiration from at least two sources. In the first place, it is a reassertion of the universalistic claims of traditional Islam seeking in its orthodoxy the conformity of all institutions of society with that prescribed by the shari'a. Political demands originating from this stream are understandable, explicable, and predictable. They are those historically of Muslims who try to make the real world more like the ideal of Dar al-Islam. Opponents see this as incompatible with the institutional demands of the modern world.

Then there are the political demands framed by militant Muslims arising out of social discontent and cultural alienation in modernizing societies whose Western-derived economic, technological, and political institutions

are perceived as rooted in materialism and breeding injustice and inequalities of wealth, status, and power. This must be considered as more than just social protest. Islam in this stream becomes an alternative ideology of modernization in which science and knowledge can be deployed for the advancement of the ummat. We do not address the question here of whether it is in fact, as opposed to religious theory, possible to build a non-institutionally Westernized modern state. Domestic opponents see this approach as a radical challenge to the socio-economic status quo.

Nowhere in Southeast Asia do we see any real prospect of Islamic fundamentalist political triumph in the sense of a clerical wresting of control of the machinery of the state from secular leadership. Like mainstream Muslims elsewhere in the world, establishment Muslim leadership in Southeast Asia has settled politically for less than an Islamic state. On the other hand, the rising Islamic consciousness in Malaysia, Brunei, and probably Indonesia is bringing about a change in the political culture; that is the matrix of knowledge, values, and emotions that provide the basis for the members of the political community to approve or disapprove of the institutions and acts of the political systems. Approval, of course, is the grant of legitimacy.

In the ASEAN region, technocratically supported leaderships have sought their legitimacy in ideologies and achievements of secular nationalism often measured empirically in terms of economic development. Even though, as we have concluded, it is unlikely that the Muslim fundamentalist refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of the political systems themselves will be shared by the whole society, nevertheless, it appears certain that increasingly members of the ummat will judge political acts and behavior of political leaders in terms of their understanding of the demands of Islam.

The infusion of Islamic values into the political culture means that it will be increasingly difficult to win political stability with simply concessions to religious institutions.

To the extent that members of the ummat withdraw their conferral of legitimacy from incumbent regimes or the system itself, acts against the regimes or system become sanctioned by religion. Since this type of anti-regime, anti-system Islamic interest can not be advanced through the "legitimate" political system, we can expect an increase in what the regimes tend to call "fanatic" or "extremist" Muslim behavior -- including political violence. Suppressive measures by government generally will be successful in limiting the extent of that behavior, but it will not be able to prevent the cognitive and affective spillover of "extremism" into the ummat's political culture.

The defenders of the established order can only be partially successful in containing communication and mobilization by the fundamentalist leadership. Not only are there the networks and patterns of traditional leadership in face-to-face relationships, teacher-student relationship, and marriage connections, but the technology of the tape-recorder has literally revolutionized the dakwah. Moreover, the instruments of coercion and suppression, the constraints that are placed on civil and political liberties, the free flow of information, and official accountability impact as well on the secular community.

Economically, politically, and culturally, leadership elites in ASEAN are challenged by the multiple global and domestic secular forces of structural and institutional change. Their intellectual approach in managing these challenges place them squarely in the Western tradition. In this respect they have distanced themselves from their own mass society. But at the same time they are challenged by forces from this mass society

which defy rational problem-solving techniques of optimizing real interests. This analysis has examined but one component of that mass society, the ummat, those Southeast Asians whose identity is given by Islam, and the demands that arise from it. It may well be that a requirement of elite-mass integration, and hence political stability, will be for the elite to take on more of the characteristics of the masses identity. This, in our opinion, will be part of the process of leadership regeneration in Malaysia and Indonesia.



**END**

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