U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN AFRICA

by

Marc Baas
Department of State

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U.S. interests in sub-Saharan Africa are relatively less vital than in any other world area, but they are not unimportant. Our main interests in Africa are economic and political, but we also have strategic and cultural/ideological interests. There are a number of policies that we can follow to promote our interests, but my basic conclusion is that we need to work as closely as possible with the government in power. We are trying to do this in South Africa, where constructive engagement has had some success in resolving the regional issues, but considerably less on the more visible internal South African situation. While constructive engagement appears to be the only policy with a chance of succeeding relatively peacefully, we must find a way to translate that policy into progress on the internal South African issue, especially since lack of success on this issue affects perceptions concerning the administration's
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African policy in both black Africa and the U.S.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES IN AFRICA

When looking at sub-Saharan Africa, one is continually struck by the apparent schizophrenia in the approach of analysts and policy makers concerning U.S. interests and policies. In both cases, there appear to be two views of what our interests are and what our policies should be, views that are diametrically opposed. On the interests side, the division is between what I will refer to as globalists and regionalists, while on the policy side it is between pragmatists and idealists.

Globalists see Africa as being important only for its relationship to events and issues in other more important areas of the world, while regionalists see African issues as arising from African events, and being important in and of themselves. Globalists often look at Africa as part of a zero-sum game, with a gain for the Soviets in a country viewed as a loss for the U.S. Regionalists would argue that Africa will not permanently adopt Western political systems and so any gains for one or the other superpower will be temporary, for African countries will always remain African.

Globalists and regionalists would generally agree that of all the areas of the world, Africa is the least vital to our interests. While I agree with this assessment, this does not mean that our interests in Africa are unimportant. Globalists and regionalists would also generally agree on the broad definition of our interests in Africa; it is only the emphasis that would be different.

There are generally four broad categories of U.S. interests. The first is political, where we have an interest in stability in order to keep outside powers out of Africa and in order not to undermine economic development; a favorable world order (in other words, governments that are friendly to our interests); and African support at the U.N. and other international fora. The second broad area is economic, where our prime interest is in economic development in order to foster self-sufficiency and stability. Other economic interests are to maintain and increase our already substantial trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa, and to insure access to Africa's resources, mainly Nigerian oil and southern African minerals.

The third area is strategic, and here our main interest is in the Horn of Africa, where we desire access to military facilities to support the responsibilities of the Central Commander in southwest Asia (an extra-African, globalist interest). We also have an interest in access to facilities in other parts of Africa because of their proximity to the North Atlantic or Indian Ocean. Our strategic interest in South Africa is a negative one of denying the Soviets access to military facilities that could be used to interdict traffic around the Cape of Good Hope. The final area of interest is cultural/ideological, where our concerns center on encouraging democracies and free enterprise economic systems in Africa.

Of these interests, globalists would generally emphasize stability, friendly governments, and access to resources and military facilities. Regionalists would emphasize democracy and majority rule, economic development, and the maintenance of

stability by keeping foreign influences out of Africa. My conclusion is that our political and economic interests are the most important in Africa, while our ideological/cultural interests are, and should be, the least important.

Turning now to U.S. policy in Africa, the split is between idealists and pragmatists. Idealists give the most weight to our cultural and ideological interests, to what is right and moral, while pragmatists believe we should maximize our influence with whatever government is in power to advance our economic, political and strategic interests, giving more importance to friendly rather than democratic governments. In spite of this split, U.S. policy toward Africa has been relatively consistent since World War II, containing elements of both views and differing only in emphasis.

What political policies should we adopt in order to advance our interests? First, there are some policies we should avoid. We should avoid rigid guidelines as to which governments are friendly and which are unfriendly, since labels change rapidly in Africa. We should avoid a tendency to get involved in every little problem in Africa, as many have nothing to do with us or our interests. And we should avoid making most votes at the U.N. crucial to our bilateral relationship with African countries. Secondly, there are some positive policies we can adopt. We should maintain diplomatic relations with any government that desires to have relations with us, and we should develop as close relations as possible with the government in power in order to advance our interests. We cannot dictate the kinds or government that others choose, but at the same time we need to avoid getting

too closely identified with a specific leader; it should be clear that are interest is in good relations with the country, regardless of the specific leader in power. We should also strongly support the OAU in order to enable African problems to be resolved by Africans, and, when necessary, we should be ready to assist our friends.

Economic policy is our strength vis-a-vis the Soviets, and we need to encourage development by taking a long-term view of development in both the appropriation and policy processes; by providing more funds; by making better use of those funds; and by encouraging African governments to move towards more reliance on the private sector. If economic development works, we will have gone a long way toward achieving our other interests in Africa. Strategically, we need to consider the provision of arms on a case-by-case basis, and make sure that any arms we provide are to meet a specific and real external threat. We should resist establishing any permanent U.S. bases in Africa, which would not further our interests there. To promote our ideological interests, we should express our opinions honestly, privately and sensibly, taking care not to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. And we should use our vote at the U.N. to take a public stand on moral issues.

South Africa is perhaps the key African issue for U.S. policy as perceived both in Africa and the U.S. The current policy of constructive engagement appears to be working well in three areas: promoting regional security, moving toward Namibian independence, and reducing Soviet influence in the area. Where it has had less success is on the most visible

southern African issue, that of apartheid and majority rule in South Africa. Perhaps this is inevitable, as this problem is clearly the most difficult, but it creates political difficulties for the U.S. both in this country and in Africa, and colors the rest of our African policy. While I believe that disinvestment or a boycott would be counter-productive, I do believe that we should put some teeth into our constructive engagement policy in order to better deal with the internal situation in South Africa. Thus we should increase our economic assistance to South Africa's non-white population, make it clear publicly that we will not assist the South African government militarily in resolving its internal problems, introduce legislation to strengthen and make the Sullivan principles mandatory for U.S. firms with investments in South Africa, and adopt limited and selective sanctions tied to a specific violation of human rights, which would be lifted when the abuse was corrected. Finally, we should begin to cash in some of the chips that four years of constructive engagement have earned us in order to push the government to move more quickly toward meaningful changes in apartheid and black political rights.

While our interests in Africa are not vital, they are important, and while I generally agree with the regionalists that African issues usually arise from African events, Africa is part of a larger world, and what goes on in Africa affects and is affected by events in the rest of the world. On the policy side, I generally agree with the pragmatists that we need to work with the government in power, and believe that we should develop affirmative policies to deal with issues of mutual interest to

African countries and the U.S. such as economic development, stability, and limiting outside intervention. We should not simply react to Soviet or Libyan policies, but rather seek to resolve the problems that create the opportunities for foreign intervention. And, while South Africa is extremely important, we must remember that our policies there color our policies in the rest of Africa where our interests are even greater.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although sub-Saharan Africa is home to around forty independent nations, strategically located near Europe, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, depository of a number of important raw materials, and ancestral home of about 17 percent of the U.S. population, it has played only a peripheral role in U.S. foreign policy. While there are good reasons for the relative position of Africa in terms of U.S. interests and policy, U.S. interests there are not negligible, nor is U.S. policy in Africa unimportant. My goal in this paper is to look first at U.S. interests in Africa in general and then to discuss U.S. policies that have been tried or might be tried to further those interests. Along the way, I hope to make it clear how I believe that we can best support our interests in Africa. (In this paper, I will use Africa to mean sub-Saharan or black Africa, which essentially includes all the nations on the African continent except those bordering on the Mediterranean.) Because of the large number of African countries, I will not be looking at most countries specifically, but rather at U.S. interests and policies for Africa as a whole. The sole exception is South Africa, which I will discuss at the end of the paper in view of its importance both in terms of size and as the focus (to both Africans and Americans) of current and future U.S. policy in Africa.

There is a sort of schizophrenia or two-track approach prevalent among American policy makers and analysts when examining U.S. interests and policies toward Africa. Regarding U.S. interests, most analysts see Africa either as an important region unto itself or as a small part of broader U.S. global interests. On the policy side, policy tends to be formed or proposed either from an idealistic, even ideological view or from a more pragmatic, realpolitik view. It is my view that in each case, both approaches have relevance and elements of truth. At the same time, it is this schizophrenic way of looking at both interests and policy, this view of interests and policy as being at either one of two poles, that makes understanding U.S. interests in Africa and the formulation of U.S. African policy so difficult. These two opposing views of both U.S. interests and policy in Africa will serve as the backdrop for my general analysis.

CHAPTER II

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

Globalists and Regionalists. Before looking at specific U.S. interests in Africa, a brief word should be said about each of the two general ways of looking at them. In the view of the globalists, Africa is seen as a pawn in a global struggle with the Soviet Union; as part of a zero-sum game, where a gain for the Soviets is a loss for us, and vice versa. Thus Soviet gains in Ethiopia and the former Portuguese territories, particularly Angola and Mozambique, are viewed as part of a Soviet drive to make all of Africa its area of influence. Africa is seen as having importance or being worthy of concern not so much for itself but rather for its relationship to events in other parts of the world (or to use the Soviet term, to the worldwide "correlation of forces"). Africa is important as a playing field for competition between West and East, and because of its proximity and relation to other areas of greater concern such as Europe, the Middle East or the Indian Ocean.

The opposing view is that of the regionalists, who argue that Africa is important for itself and must not be considered simply as a pawn in an East-West struggle. Regionalists point out that Africa is a non-Western society, and that both capitalism and Marxism are Western systems that may have no lasting relevance for Africa. Thus, while a country may become an ally of the Soviet Union in the short term because it is in its interests to do so, we need not worry that the country will become a satellite of the Soviets, because African governments

have essentially African interests that in the long-term will prove incompatable with a Marxist system (and perhaps a democratic, capitalistic one as well). Thus we need not be overly concerned if the Soviet Union becomes the predominant foreign power in an African country, for eventually the country will reassert its "Africaness" and the Soviets will have achieved no long-term gains. In other words, nationalism in Africa is strong, and Africans are not going to substitute Soviet masters for European ones [1]. There are a number of examples that seem to prove the truth of this assessment: Guinea under Tourre, who eventually grew disenchanted with the Soviets; Ghana under Nkrumah and Mali under Kieta, both of whom were eventually overthrown; and even present day Angola and Mozambique, where a movement toward the West is apparent.

The Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and the main formulator of the Reagan administration's African policy, Chester Crocker, believes that both the globalist and regionalist approaches to Africa are flawed. While most African events can obviously be explained in local terms, events in Africa also affect and are affected by events on the world stage [2]. Or put another way, most events in Africa contain elements of both views.

It is interesting that while critics of the globalist approach to U.S. African interests, including regionalists, often criticize it as simply reactive to Soviet actions, the Soviets themselves follow a generally globalist approach to Africa. The Soviets seem also to have had a split in their policy between those favoring policies that are consistent with Marxist ideology

and those who favor more pragmatic ones based on the Soviet Union's position as a great power, a split not dissimilar to that in U.S. policy. While it is not the purpose of this paper to examine Soviet relations with Africa, suffice it to say that while both approaches have been evident in Soviet policy, and still are, it is the pragmatic, great power approach that appears to be the main force behind Soviet policy today. Thus, the Soviets are not waiting for Communist revolutions in Africa but rather are trying to achieve good relations with African states, particularly those that are important or in a key geographic location, and if the ideology should follow, so much the better.

One thing on which most analysts and policy makers (including both globalists and regionalists) would agree is that when compared to the other major regions of the world (Europe, Asia, South America and the Middle East) U.S. interests in Africa are the smallest and least vital. This conclusion is normally arrived at by default: most everyone is aware of the important U.S. interests in the other areas, but the question has not been given much thought in relation to Africa. However, Africa cannot simply be ignored, so it is often just tacked on at the end of the list. In addition, the concerns we have in Africa are mainly negative. While we may have no vital interests there, our vital interests would suffer if Africa fell under the control of a hostile power [3]. It is only a fairly small band of Africanists who look seriously at the actual situation in Africa, and they too would probably agree that Africa should be at the end of the list of U.S. foreign policy interests. The unfortunate fact is that the majority of analysts never actually consider what U.S.

interests in Africa are in reaching their conclusion, and thus any understanding of what our real interests are -- even granting they are small -- is generally lacking in the United States.

What are the specific U.S. interests in sub-Saharan Africa? Both regionalists and globalists would probably agree that these interests fall into four broad areas: political, economic, strategic and cultural/ideological. However, regionalists and globalists would emphasize different interests as important. For the globalist, the most important U.S. interests include access to resources, deterring the expansion of Soviet influence, cementing special relationships with African leaders, and achieving access to ports and other facilities that support the U.S. military in its global mission [4]. Regionalists, however, see American interests in Africa as primarily including economic development and trade, increased stability through development, the ending of superpower rivalry in Africa [5], as well as the promotion of democracy and majority rule.

Political Interests. Taking a closer look at specific U.S. interests, on the political side I believe there are three that would generally be accepted by the majority of analysts. The first and most important is our interest in stability. The U.S. has an obvious interest in helping Africa avoid destabalizing crises that might subvert African progress toward economic development, and perhaps draw the U.S. into a conflict [6]. Secondly, the U.S. has an interest in a favorable world order. We, as any other country, would rather have other governments be friendly than unfriendly. These first two interests include a desire to see Africa free of destabilizing and unfriendly (to

both Africa and the U.S.) outside influences, such as Libya (which, being located in north Africa, is considered to be "outside" of Africa) and the Soviet Union. (It is interesting and a little surprising that when discussing this U.S. interest, most of the officials I talked to in Washington emphasized the destabilizing aspects of Libyan activities much more than Soviet activities.) Finally, the U.S. has an interest in obtaining African support at the U.N. and other international bodies. This is particularly true of West Africa, where, as Chester Crocker has pointed out, most countries are Western-oriented and generally moderate, and make up an important bloc of votes in the U.N. and OAU [7].

Economic Interests. I see four inter-related economic interests: economic development in Africa, trade, investment, and access to resources. As one analyst has pointed out, if there is one issue where the Reagan administration and its critics agree, it is that in the long-term, economic development is the most important concern for Africa as a whole [8]. For many sub-Saharan countries, well over 50% of the people live in absolute poverty with income insufficient to provide basic nutrition, and 26 out of the 35 countries the U.N. classifies as the least developed countries in the world are located in black Africa [9]. The current highly publicized famines in Africa are only the latest in a series and will surely make the situation even worse.

The United States as a nation clearly has an interest in turning this situation around. It is in the long humanitarian tradition of the U.S. to aid those less well off than ourselves (a regionalist view). A world permanently divided into haves and

have-nots would be difficult to accept for a country that prides itself on its morality. But it is also in our geopolitical interests to encourage development (a globalist view). For as the gap between the haves and have-nots continues to widen, increased instability can only be the result. There are many linguistic, tribal, cultural and religious differences in most African countries, and these differences are emphasized and may cause internal turmoil if there is a shrinking economic pie to divide up among the various groups (or if the growth of the pie fails to keep pace with the growth in population) [10]. In addition, countries with severe economic problems may be more susceptible to the blandishments of the Soviet Union, figuring that they have little to lose, while the leaders may see the Soviet system as a way to maintain their power in the face of economic disappointments (which the Soviets have demonstrated at home their system can do successfully). If we aid these countries to move toward economic self-sufficiency, they will be better able to ward off external domination [11].

In addition to its political benefits, economic development in Africa also serves broader U.S. economic interests. The U.S. continues to be one of the world's foremost supporters of a free and open international world trading system. We believe in the basic economic theory that free trade and freedom of investment opportunity will make the overall world economic pie bigger and thus make everyone better off. By helping the economic development of Africa and raising the income of its people, we are contributing to our own economic well-being and that of the world trading system. Richer African countries and individuals

will buy more goods, many of which inevitably will come from us. And as African economies develop, we can expect them to play a more constructive role in the world economy. Though in relative terms the size of the total African economy is small, it can contribute to the international system -- and it has immense room for growth.

Current U.S. trade and investment in Africa is not insignificant [12]. Total U.S. trade with Africa in 1984 was about $14.9 billion, of which $4.4 billion were U.S. exports to Africa, and $10.5 billion U.S. imports from Africa. Almost exactly one half of U.S. exports to Africa went to South Africa ($2.26 billion) and while South Africa provided a similar amount of U.S. imports ($2.49 billion) the percentage of total imports was necessarily lower. The trade imbalance that we have in Africa can largely be explained by Africa's importance as a supplier of raw materials, especially oil. U.S. imports from Nigeria, almost all of it oil, amounted to $2.5 billion, just slightly more than our imports from South Africa, and about one fourth of our total imports from Africa. U.S. investment in Africa in 1983 (the latest figures available) was estimated to be around $4.4 billion, of which $2.3 billion was in South Africa, and $2.1 billion in black Africa. These are not small numbers in absolute terms, and it is clearly in our interest to see that investment and trade continues to be profitable and to grow.

An issue directly related to trade is access to resources. Africa is the source for a number of important raw materials necessary to the U.S. economy. Nigeria is the second largest supplier of oil to the U.S. market. In 1979, 44% of our

manganese, 76% of our cobalt, 48% of our chromium and 93% of the platinum group metals came from Africa, and imports accounted for virtually all U.S. consumption of these items [13]. While many people have talked about the possibility of a resource war if these minerals should fall under the control of the wrong people (eg. the Soviets), I do not see this as a major concern. One of the strengths of the world trading system is in the interdependencies that it fosters. African nations need to sell their resources (no matter what type of government is in power) in order to buy the machinery, consumer and military goods that they desire as much as we need to purchase their resources to produce those goods. (While it might be argued that these desires and needs were imposed by the West, few if any African nations would choose to forego them and return to a pre-modern African society.) In 1980, Nigerian President Shagari announced that Nigeria would use any weapon at its disposal, including oil, to encourage the U.S. to employ its economic power to discourage and ultimately destroy apartheid [14]. But nothing has happened, precisely because the Nigerians need to sell their oil in order to finance their development program at least as much as we need to buy it to run our industries. Likewise, in spite of a government with which we do not maintain diplomatic relations and which at one time we were actively trying to overthrow, Angola has not interfered with the operations of Gulf Oil in Cabinda, again because they need the revenues to finance their military efforts. In fact, the biggest danger to U.S. access to African minerals is instability and violence, which could threaten everyone's ability to purchase these resources, which again

everyone's ability to purchase these resources, which again underlines the importance of economic development to our overall interests in Africa, and also the importance of a relatively peaceful transition of power in South Africa as most of these resources are found in southern Africa.

Strategic Interests. Since World War II there has been little change in the U.S. view of its strategic interests in Africa. We basically look at these interests as an appendage of U.S. security interests in Europe, the Middle East and Asia [15] (a globalist view). Thus in April an official in the Office of International Security Affairs of the Department of Defense told me that the only real security interests that the U.S. had in Africa were not in South Africa but in the Horn, resulting from the responsibility of the U.S. Central Commander for the Persian Gulf area and the potential importance of the Horn as a staging area [16]. (It is interesting to note one analyst's view, with which I agree, that the Horn of Africa is also more important strategically to the Soviets than South Africa is [17].)

Because of its geograpical position on the approaches to the Suez Canal and near both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, the Horn is undoubtedly the prime area of strategic importance to the United States in Africa. However, we do have other strategic interests. Formerly, South Africa was considered crucial strategically, and while it is certainly not without importance, the current general assessment seems to be that it is not crucial. One reason is that previously resources were considered to be a strategic concern, and while they remain important to our defense, it is clear that economic necessity

will in most cases insure that they are marketed, no matter which government controls the various resources of southern Africa. In addition, we have found it politically easier to function without using South African military facilities, and have found that our forces have been able to function in the area in peacetime with no major difficulty. The advent of nuclear powered ships has of course been helpful in this regard. Thus, most experts now seem to agree that it is not as important for the U.S. to possess military facilities in South Africa as it is for us to deny them to the Soviets. For although the Cape of Good Hope is a choke point on the routes from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, it would be extremely difficult for the Soviets to interdict traffic in any permanent manner without an actual base in the area given the long lines of communication [18]. It also is often pointed out that should the Soviets wish to interdict oil going from the Gulf to Europe, the chances of success would be much better at either the points of loading or unloading [19].

Using the same line of argument, one could say that almost any of the African coastal areas have a potential strategic importance. Military facilities on the bulge of West Africa or in East Africa could be important during any conflict in the North Atlantic or Persian Gulf [20]. This points out another strategic interest for the U.S. in Africa: access to facilities for possible use by our military, and the corollary of the denial of these facilities to the Soviets. However, Clinton Knox argues that this interest can be easily overstated, that it is hard to imagine such necessary facilities being denied to the U.S. even in a war, and if they were, alternative arrangements could be

made fairly easily [21]. The main alternative would presumably be other facilities in neighboring countries, but this only underlines the importance of enjoying access to facilities in a number of countries, whether used on a regular basis or not.

Cultural/Ideological Interests. The cultural/ideological interests of the United States in Africa are somewhat more nebulous but fairly straightforward. In general, we favor democracy, majority rule and the free enterprise system, and we oppose colonialism and the rule of the many by a few. One African analyst has argued that these interests include insuring the safety of the American way of life in Africa, which is why,in his view, we have opposed "premature" independence in South Africa since we could not guarantee that an independent South Africa would remain within the Western cultural mileau [22]. I disagree strongly with this analysis. The U.S. in fact has shown a remarkable facility for getting along with leaders who rule in one-party states or who have taken over following a military coup, neither of which are examples of the American way of life. Much more common is the criticism that we are too close to these non-democratic governments. In short, while the U.S. cultural interest is an important one, I believe it is secondary to the political, economic and strategic interests that we have in Africa.

Conclusions on U.S. Interests. To briefly summarize, it is obvious that while the U.S. has important interests in Africa, they are unlikely to be vital to the survival of the United States or of our political or economic system. Thus Africa as a

region is correctly placed at the bottom of the U.S. policy maker's list. However, this does not mean that we can by any means adopt a laissez-faire attitude toward developments in Africa (as some regionalists would propose) or that events in Africa make no difference to the United States. We have important interests in Africa, and events in Africa affect both those interests and our interests in other parts of the world. (The globalists correctly see that we live in a small world and that events in one area are often -- if not always -- interdependent with events in other areas.)

In my view, the key U.S. interests in Africa are economic and political. On the economic side, we already have substantial investments in Africa, and we thus have a substantial interest in seeing that these investments remain active, and that further economically viable investments can be made by the private sector. We also have a large volume of two-way trade with Africa, and both the United States and African countries will benefit if this trade expands. It is through investment and trade that the private sector can make a contribution to what is perhaps the most important U.S. economic interest in Africa -- economic development -- which we should encourage and support for both humanitarian and selfish interest-based reasons.

On the political side, our most important goals are a favorable world order and stability in Africa. It is a very difficult question whether these goals can best be achieved by working with the one-party governments that are the main form of government in Africa, or by identifying ourselves with the (presumably democratic) opposition. On the strategic side, our

interest is globalist and largely negative: trying to insure that the Soviets do not have permanent access to military facilities on the continent. At the same time we seek access as needed in order to support our strategic interests in other parts of the world. And while we do have ideological and cultural interests, in my view these are less important than our other interests and are often riskier to promote since they are less likely to be shared by African governments and may open us up to charges of interfering in internal matters.

CHAPTER III

U.S. POLICIES IN AFRICA

Idealists and Pragmatists. Once U.S. interests have been determined, the problem of course becomes that of developing policies which will have the best chance of furthering those interests. Here again the U.S. is afflicted with a sort of schizophrenia, with two different philosophies about how our general policy should be formed and carried out. On the one hand, there is the idealistic view that harks back to our own founding as a nation when many people came to the United States to escape the evils of Europe and to have a chance to start a new life in freedom in a new land. This idealistic view gives more weight to our ideology, to morality, to what is "right", to what the majority wants. It tends to identify more with U.S. cultural interests and less with political, economic or strategic interests. And, following the advice of Washington (also a part of U.S. ideology), this view still generally holds that non-involvement in the affairs of other countries is the best policy. Should involvement ever prove necessary, it can only be justified when some greater moral principle is involved, as when the U.S. has fought to end all wars or to make the world safe for democracy.

The second track of our approach to policy making is the pragmatic approach. This approach generally tries to maximize U.S. influence with whatever government happens to be in power in a specific country in order to further U.S. interests. It also borrows from the ideology of the United States in arguing that we

have a duty to help other countries discover the glories of democracy and the free-enterprise system. Nevertheless, the pragmatic approach tends to see U.S. interests in the more practical terms of economics, political influence, and strategic advantage. And while of course this view would like to see governments that are democratic and representative, this is decidedly less important than having "friendly" governments in power. The pragmatists recognize that the U.S. is a superpower, and that events anywhere may affect our interests, and thus favor U.S. involvement in seeking resolution of almost any problem in the world.

I have exaggerated the differences between these two views of policy-making to highlight the comparison. It is also true that the distinction between policy made on idealistic and pragmatic grounds is not unique to the formulation of African policy, but rather exists in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy generally. However, the problems caused by these differrent views seem somehow more crucial to the formulation of our African policy, the distinctions more stark. Perhaps this is because we have had less experience with Africa and thus the problems there seem different and more difficult. Perhaps it is because the nations of modern independent Africa are generally not more than 25 years old, and thus institutions are still developing, the situation is unsettled, and changes often occur rapidly and violently. Or perhaps it is because the issues in Africa really do seem to be (excusing the pun) black and white. Should we support a narrowly-based military dictatorship or the country's oppressed majority? Should we support majority rule or

try to further our economic, political and strategic interests with the government in power? Of course, the emotional issue of South Africa encapsulates all of these feelings and beliefs.

An Historical Overview of U.S. Policy. As pointed out in Chapter II, U.S. interests in Africa have been (correctly) perceived as being of less importance than U.S. interests in other parts of the world, which has not unnaturally led to less attention being given to Africa by U.S. policy makers. What is remarkable is that in spite of relatively less attention and the very different approaches to policy in Africa, U.S. policy has in fact been quite consistent since World War II. Generally, U.S. policy has fallen between the idealistic and pragmatic views, containing elements of both, while emphasizing one or the other approach.

The historical links between the U.S. and Africa were those of a maritime nation to a region without a maritime tradition as the United States sent ships, missionaries, explorers, and of course traders, who handled the imports and exports (gold and slaves being the largest). Africa was basically a passive recipient and interaction was limited [1]. After World War II, the United States instinctively supported decolonization (a regionalist and idealistic position) but after resistance from the European countries and the rise of the Communist threat in Europe, the United States modified its anti-colonial stance in hope that control of the colonies would help Europe rebuild itself [2] (globalist and pragmatic). This policy did, however, play into the hands of the Soviets as they were able to become the unswerving champions of decolonization in the U.N., which

promoted their policy of weakening Western Europe while scoring them important propaganda points with the emerging countries in Africa. It is rather ironic given the past histories of the U.S. and USSR that it was the Soviets who were often perceived as the country most in favor of decolonization.

Thus in the immediate post-War years, U.S. policy toward Africa was already exhibiting a split between the regionalism and idealism of decolonialism on the one hand and the globalism and pragmatic realpolitik of supporting our European allies on the other. Even though decolonization was not the sole U.S. policy at this time, it still achieved some successes. For example, because they were concerned with their relations with the U.S., the British adjusted their colonial administration in the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts in part in response to U.S. criticism [3]. The United States was also able to satisfy the idealistic streak of its policy by speaking out from time to time against Portuguese colonialism or South African racial policies with little fear that this would weaken the anti-Soviet defense, since these countries were not on the front line [4].

As it became obvious in the late fifties that independence for the European colonial possessions in Africa was inevitable, the pragmatic and idealistic tracks of U.S. policy joined, and U.S. economic assistance to Africa increased rapidly from 1958 to 1960 [5]. This continued through the Kennedy years, when the combination of the pragmatic struggle with the Soviets and the idealistic hope that democracies would flourish in Africa led to an active U.S. policy and assistance as exhibited by the U.S. decision to open Embassies in virtually every new country, the

establishment of the Peace Corps, and the pronouncements of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennon Williams about "Africa for the Africans" [6]. However, even in the Kennedy years, pragmatic policies sometimes overcame idealism, as when the U.S. moderated its criticism of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in order to retain access to stratically necessary Portuguese bases in the Azores [7].

By the mid-sixties it was obvious that the idealistic hopes of the U.S. for Africa had not been realized as there were a rash of military coups and democracy (at least as understood in the U.S.) had largely been replaced by one-party states. As a result, Africa was largely ignored by top-level policy makers who saw Africa as a group of poor authoritarian states with little importance for the United States [8]. The U.S. was generally content to let the former European colonizers of Africa take the lead on African issues [9]. On the face of it this was hardly surprising, as U.S. interests were not great, and there appeared to be no major threat to those interests, certainly not a general continent-wide threat. Any importance that Africa had to U.S. policy was because of its relation to broader issues (globalism). Thus, the "famous" Nixon Administration tilt toward South Africa was undertaken largely because of concerns over South Africa's strategic position, the presence of key minerals in the region, and U.S. concerns in the Middle East [10].

The 1974 Portuguese coup and subsequent Soviet intervention in Angola changed things, although U.S. African policy retained its global cast. Now, however, instead of Africa having some importance to U.S. global policies in the Middle East or Europe,

Africa was seen as directly involved, as a focus of those global policies. The Soviet "threat" in Africa marked the end of the view that U.S. interests in Africa would more or less take care of themselves, and the Ford administration became active in trying to maximize U.S. influence in black Africa and limit the Soviet role. Thus, the U.S. took a much firmer stand on majority rule and the end of the South African racial policies [11], while at the same time (unsuccessfully) trying to support forces perceived as pro-Western in Angola. The Ford administration was therefore a return to a combination of the two tracks of globalism and regionalism, of idealism and pragmatism.

Although the Carter administration saw a pull back from direct involvement in Africa in line with the prevailing regionalist views, they still remained extremely interested in idealistic African issues. During the first three years or so, it was definitely the idealistic and regional tracks that dominated U.S. African policy (best exemplified by the role played by Ambassador to the U.N. Andrew Young) and the U.S. "tilted" toward black Africa. In summing up the major thrusts of the Carter administration's policy toward Africa, Senator George McGovern said that there were four: majority rule, economic development, the security of African states and racial justice [12]. These four concerns would be shared by almost any recent administration or policy, any differences being only in emphasis. The Carter administration's emphasis was on the first and fourth of these concerns. The U.S. strongly supported majority rule in South Africa, and identified itself with the black majority. The sanctions on military shipments to South

Africa were tightened, and economic sanctions were considered, although never adopted. In black Africa, the idealistic approach resisted involvement in African internal affairs, and thus an end to any attempts to assist the UNITA rebels in Angola. It also led to a unilateral policy of not shipping arms to Africa in the hopes that the Soviets would see that it was in their interests to do likewise [13]. However, in the last year of the Carter administration, the policy began to shift more to a global and pragmatic one (as exemplified by NSC advisor Brezezinski) as a result of Soviet military assistance to Ethiopia and especially the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The Reagan years have strengthened the tendencies of Carter's last year and there has been a definite shift back toward the globalist, pragmatic track of foreign policy. The administration has basically accepted the view expressed by Senator James McClure during the Carter years that we have simply been fortunate that the Soviets have not been able to exploit their temporary gains in Africa, and that we must be ready to respond to the threat they pose, thus rejecting the regionalist view that things will automatically work out in our favor [14]. The administration has tried to convince Africans that it is the Soviets and their Cuban proxies who are the real threat to peace in Africa while at the same time rejecting Carter's refusal to supply arms by trying to improve the security situation of U.S. friends [15]. This shift is perhaps most evident in the administration's policy of constructive engagement toward southern Africa. The threat there is seen as a globalist one of

Soviet attempts to exploit the instability and mutual distrust in the region, and the method of dealing with that threat is a pragmatic one of encouraging change in the region (including within South Africa) by working with the governments in power. As a result, the Reagan policy in both black and white Africa, has been a much more activist policy than that of his immediate predecessors, and in that regard bears most resemblance to the policies of the Kennedy administration, although the general approach to Africa is different.

What is our current policy in Africa? The Reagan Administration has based its African policy on the twin goals of stability and a reduction of outside influence in Africa. These goals are interrelated, for it is assumed that instability will lead to one side or another looking toward an outside power (say the Soviet Union) for support and thus to an increase in Soviet influence. As one analyst points out, the U.S. goal is not to "win" the East/West conflict in Africa, but to resolve it, and thereby reduce Soviet influence [16]. Assistant Secretary Crocker has given one of the best statements of this view. At the end of 1982 he said that while even minimal conditions of security in Africa will be elusive unless the African countries can stabilize and develop their economies, any efforts toward these goals are frustrated by instability and insecurity. And when such instability is fueled by external forces, the U.S. promotes both African and its own interests in helping its friends overcome it [17].

Political Policies. So what should the United States do to achieve its political goals of friendly, stable countries in

Africa that will resist outside influence and might even vote with us on occasion in the U.N.? First, there are several actions we should try to avoid. We need to avoid setting up rigid guidelines on who are the good and the bad nations or leaders in Africa; on who are our proven friends and who are our anti-Western non-friends. Labels in Africa change quickly [18]. Examples of African nations "switching sides" abound, but perhaps the most striking was the essentially simultaneous switch made by Ethiopia and Somalia, with the former replacing a pro-Western regime with a pro-Soviet (some would even say Marxist) regime, and with the latter keeping the same government but switching its orientation from the Soviets to the West. The fact that Ethiopia and Somalia were and are engaged in a border conflict of course goes a long way toward explaining these switches, but it also underlines the fact that local or regional events will often have much more to do with a regime's friendliness or unfriendliness than will allegiance to a particular Western ideology. It also underlines the importance of basing our relations with African countries on hard and mutual interests and not simply on an ideology which may be only temporarily shared by an African nation.

We should also avoid that typically American tendency to become involved in every little issue or problem. There are in fact problems in Africa that have little or nothing to do with the United States or our interests. That does not mean that we should not be interested, or that we should not keep our eyes open, but it does mean that we should carefully weigh whether or not a diplomatic intervention by the U.S. is necessary, or

whether it might do more harm than good. There is no point in making a mountain out of a molehill. As a corollary, we should be especially careful of what we say about African issues, for our rhetoric may get us politically involved in areas where we either cannot or do not wish to back up that rhetoric [19]. In sum, a little less talk and a little less visibility, particularly on internal political questions, might serve U.S. interests better.

We also need to be selective in deciding which votes at the U.N. are crucial and which are not. I believe that we can put too much weight on a country's votes in international fora, especially the U.N. These votes pose a dilemma for both us and the African countries. On the one hand, there is very little that many of these countries can "do" for the U.S. in return for our support or assistance, or indeed to attract that support and assistance. Votes in the U.N. General Assembly are one area where they can do something; it is an area where an African vote counts just as much as the U.S. vote. Thus there is a tendency to give these votes a great deal of weight in judging the quality of our bilateral relationship. On the other hand, the U.N. is nothing if not an institution where rhetoric flourishes, and although its usefulness in promoting world peace or other goals is often questioned, there is no question that it is an excellent forum for taking rhetorical positions. As most African countries are part of the "non-aligned" movement, they often seek to use their voting in the U.N. to polish up those non-aligned credentials, which often means voting against the U.S. position.

There is no harm in informing African governments of our position on almost any issue that comes up for a vote at the U.N., nor for suggesting that we hope their analysis might lead to similar conclusions. However, we should not give the impression that every issue is of such importance that our bilateral relations might be affected by the country's vote. What we should do is be very clear and selective about our priorities and when there is an issue that really is important, tell the country so. We should also recognize that voting the way we ask may cost African countries some political pain with some of their fellow non-aligned or African countries. Clearly, while U.N. votes are important, and some extremely so, we must be wary of making them (especially the less important ones) the sole yardstick of our bilateral relationship, especially when we have other interests that are at least equally important, for blind pursuit of this interest could easily affect our broader political and economic interests in African states.

Positive Recommendations. Are there positive things we can do that will help contribute to the achievement of our political objectives and interests in Africa? First, I believe that we should maintain diplomatic relations with each and every state in Africa that desires to have them with the United States. There is much to be gained by simply living in a country and seeing its people and officials on a regular basis. The obvious case in Africa is of course Angola, where unfortunately, diplomatic recognition has become a chip in the broader negotiation about Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. But nevertheless, it is hard to understand why we do not have

diplomatic relations with Angola when we have them with the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries, Nicaragua and (although we do not have formal relations) U.S. diplomats are even present in Havana. And most of these countries have foreign troops stationed there. One obvious response is that historically we have had diplomatic relations with some of these countries, and that it is a more serious matter to break relations with say Nicaragua than it is to refuse to begin them with Angola. While that is true, it only argues for keeping our relations with Nicaragua, not for withholding them from Angola.

Second, we should attempt to maintain as close contact as possible with all African governments. This does not mean that we need to agree with them all the time, nor they with us; it doesn't even mean that we need to agree with them at all. But we should at a minimum keep contacts established so that we know not only their views on major issues, but also what lies behind those views, and so that we can give them the benefit of our views as appropriate (keeping in mind that we don't want to continually become involved in their business if it is not of importance to our interests).

This raises the question of just how close we should get to the leader of a one-man or one-party, non-democratic government, many of which are military governments that often have taken power through violent means. Unfortunately from our point of view this type of government seems to be the most common form in Africa. One count in 1984 found that 24 of Africa's 51 independent countries (including North Africa) were led by the military [20]. This question immediately raises a dilemma for

the U.S., for while we are generally most comfortable in dealing with liberal democratic regimes, liberal democratic regimes are very scarce in Africa while the perceived anti-Communism and greater stability of conservative or reactionary regimes makes them attractive [21]. In answering this question we also find the familiar split between pragmatists and idealists. The pragmatists on one side argue that we need to work closely with whomever is in power in order to further U.S. interests and that in fact the military may best do this, since they are more able to hold their countries together. The idealists counter that this causes the U.S. to be identified with reactionary military regimes intead of liberal democracies, and that given our ideological interests in democracy and human rights, we should not be identified too closely with (almost by definition) a minority government since inevitably the majority will overthrow it and our long-term interests will be adversely affected.

In this case, I believe that the idealists are too quick to assume that our values and ideas of the normal order of things are also valid in Africa. The majority in an African nation may accept and even welcome an unelected government that to us appears to be narrowly based and undemocratic. (This was probably the case in at least the early years of the Mobutu regime in Zaire which provided stability and some certainty after years of unrest and civil war.) Anthropologists and sociologists point out that since the tribe is the traditional form of government and organization in Africa, nations may be seen by its citizens as simply large supra-tribes combining the

many traditional tribes, and the leader as a sort of overall tribal chief, who they might expect to be the strongest or the smartest. Secondly, we need to recognize that force is the most common mechanism of political change in Africa, perhaps because in a one-party state it is the only real way to have change (although force has also been used in multi-party democracies like Nigeria), and naturally the military is in the best position to use force [22]. Thus we should not look at a government that has come to power in Africa through force with the same disgust with which we would look at such a government in a Western democracy. Force is the normal, often only, means of political change in Africa.

Thus, in my view, we should maintain at least correct relations with almost any regime that appears to have control of the country and the acceptance of a significant part of the population (although correct relations can be both cool and distant) and in most cases attempt to develop as good relations with the government as possible. We do not have to agree with the form of government nor with all of its actions. We may even find it desirable to condemn actions of the government. But as long as a government is in power we will not be able to advance our interests in that country unless we are able to work with that government. This being said, we should also attempt to maintain contacts as broadly as possible throughout the society while being extremely careful that contacts with those outside of government do not take on a political nature that could lead to accusations that we have been engaging in coup plotting, or lead to the death or exile of our interlocutors. Our best policy in

Africa is to try to keep our ear to the ground in order to be as aware as possible of what is happening, not worry too much about how the country decides who will rule and when, and try to get on as best we can with the current government.

Third, we should make it clear that our real interest is in good relations with the people of the country, dealing through whatever government is in power. While we desire as a practical matter to have close relations with the government or leader in power because he is in power and we must deal with him to further our interests, we would have similar desires with any successor government that should take power. Naturally, whether we are able to achieve our desire of close relations will depend a great deal on the policies that the government follows. Although we have our own opinions on the best way to choose a government and run an economy, and hope that African governments would move toward democratically elected civilian governments and free enterprise economies, a corollary of the above is that it is not our business how the country acquires its leader, and that we will accept the choice however it is made.

In other words, while we should adopt the pragmatic policy of working closely with the government in power to advance our interests, the idealists are correct in pointing out that we must avoid too close of a personal identification with any leader. In the words of Tanzanian President Nyerere, Africans "must reject the principle that external powers have the right to maintain in power African governments which are universally recognized to be corrupt, or incompetent, or a bunch of murderers, when their

peoples try to make a change" [23]. Nyerere agrees that the difficulty is in separating real desire for change by a majority from the activities of a few unhappy citizens, perhaps acting with foreign encouragement. However, when the same government constantly needs to seek external assistance to stay in power, at that point Nyerere believes that most would question whether it has the backing of its people [24].

Fourth, we should continue to strongly support the OAU. As Assistant Secretary Crocker has pointed out, our strong support is based on the dedication of the OAU to support Africa's territoral integrity and defend the continent from external aggression [25]. The beauty of the OAU is that it keeps disputes in African channels and is thus insulated from East/West disputes. Although like the U.N., the OAU has had some difficulties in resolving disputes among its members, it has maintained the two underlying principles of the organization: that colonial borders are inviolable, and that the OAU will not condone subversive attempts or interference in the affairs of one state by another. And it has done so fairly successfully, as no state has been broken-up nor has any territory been lost by one state to another. As Helen Kitchen has written, we should look at the OAU as a half-full glass, not as a half-empty one [26], and we should do what we can to strengthen the organization so it can better settle intra-African disputes.

Finally, when all else, including diplomatic contacts and the OAU, fails, we need to be prepared to show our resolve in the face of externally caused disruption in friendly states. We do not need a security system for Africa or even formal defense

treaties, but rather the determination to prove on an ad hoc basis that there are limits to aggression and that we will stand by our friends [27]. This does not mean that we need to send in U.S. troops. There are many things that we can do far short of sending troops that will signal our resolve. We can make diplomatic representations to the aggressor or his patron. We can take the issue to the U.N. and attempt to get world opinion on our side. We can provide appropriate military assistance. And we can encourage the OAU or another ally with more direct interests, such as France, to send a force (both of which were done in Chad).

How has the Reagan administration measured up against this yardstick? Actually, not badly. They are carrying out an activist policy, not tilting toward either white or black Africa but trying to deal with the problems of both [28]. They have for the most part avoided empty rhetoric and tried to conduct a quieter diplomacy, yet used rhetoric effectively on major moral issues such as South Africa's racial policies. The administration has attempted to maintain good relations with most countries in Africa, even those which have proclaimed Marxists as leaders (Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and even Angola in spite of an absence of diplomatic relations). They have attempted to combat outside influences in Africa, whether it be Libya, Cuba or the Soviet Union. Of course, the one part of their political policy in Africa on which Crocker and the Reagan administration will most be judged is the success of constructive engagement in southern Africa, which I shall discuss in Chapter IV.

Economic Policies. On the economic side, there is no doubt

that the economic situation in Africa is generally very tenuous. After about twenty-five years of independence and large absolute amounts of economic assistance, most African countries are not economically self-sufficient. Some are no better off now than they were at independence and many are even worse off. While external factors such as the increased costs of energy, inflation, slow growth in the developed countries and falling real prices for many major African export commodities have certainly played a role, it is still remarkable (and depressing) that after twenty-five years of foreign economic assistance and African efforts more progress toward development has not been achieved. As one author has said, many roads to development have been tried in Africa, including both capitalist and socialist, but the nagging question is whether there is any road to development in Africa that will work [29]. Looked at from the U.S. point of view, according to two other authors it is also impossible, despite enormous efforts to justify U.S. aid to African countries, to discover any correlation between our assistance and our interests and objectives in Africa such as political stability, economic development, democracy or support for U.S. foreign policy positions [30]. While I have no doubt that a direct correlation between aid and U.S. interests is difficult to draw, I also believe that most U.S. Ambassadors who have served in Africa would agree that aid (or the lack of it) played an important role in shaping the host country's attitude toward the U.S. and thus the Ambassador's ability to further U.S. interests.

Nevertheless, economic development remains one of the main concerns of virtually all African governments, and as pointed out above, it should also be a major U.S. concern. It not only affects our political interests in stability, our other economic interests in trade, investment and access to resources, and our strategic and cultural concerns. Economic development is also the U.S. ace-in-the-hole in Africa. No matter what African governments may think about U.S. policies, they still need what our economy can offer. While most African leaders view the Reagan administration's policies in Africa with varying degrees of mistrust, bilateral relations have progressed smoothly because of the economic and technological needs of the African countries [31]. The U.S. is the strongest economic power in the world, and significantly, this contrasts sharply with the Soviet Union. Although their economy is large, the Soviets have not been able to resolve even their own problems, and certainly are not seen as being a promising source of capital or new technology. The U.S. can play a serious role in economic development, the Soviets cannot, and it is only through economic development that African countries can hope to become self-reliant [32]. When combined with the economic strength of other OECD countries such as France, Great Britain and Japan, the West's superiority is even more remarkable.

Problems With Development Programs. Why has there not been more progress toward economic development in spite of the large amounts of money that have been given and the efforts of both Western and African governments? The first reason is the obvious one that the problems simply are extremely large, and thus not

susceptible to quick or easy solutions. Secondly, general political instability and short-term problems such as drought and famine also make long-term solutions difficult. In the third place, the understandable desire of African leaders to retain control of the economy (since economic performance may go a long way to determining their length of rule) has often led to a large degree of government control and the existence of many state industries, with the obvious problems of inefficiency and the potential for corruption. In a statement to the General Assembly on Nov. 6, 1984, U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said that government control was the main reason why African development was lagging, as state controlled programs designed to provide a short-cut to development had already led to a decline in agricultural output; that many areas that were former food exporters were now net food importers, and that coercion had clearly failed where market measures might have worked [33].

Finally, Western aid programs have often been short-term oriented due to the yearly budget process [34], and have often worked at cross-purposes with each other. They also are often much too affected by short-term political or strategic interests or events. Such interests might have a positive effect on aid flows, as when for example a donor decides to increase aid because of a threat to a friendly country (eg. Sudan faced with a Libyan threat) or because a country's cooperation is desired in another area (eg. Somalia, where we desired access to military facilities). It might also have a negative effect due to pique at an African country's stand on one or more important issues

(eg. the reduction in U.S. aid to Zimbabwe following its abstention on the KL-007 resolution at the U.N.). In either case, effective long-term planning is impossible. In summary, although vast sums have been given to Africa, the whole is often less than the sum of the parts due to a proliferation of projects (making control by either donor or host government more difficult), competitive donors with short historical memories, shifting donor strategies, and the motivation of some African governments [35].

Making Economic Development More Effective. What can be done to improve the situation? First, it seems to me that we need to overcome our short-term outlook, and begin to take a long-term view of development in Africa. This will not be easy given the essentially one-year view of the Congressional budget process and the relatively short time between Presidential and Congressional elections, which leads to pressure to show results before the next election. And if control of the White House or Congress shifts, our whole policy or emphasis might also shift. At a minimum, however, Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for at least two and preferably three years so that projects can be planned with full knowledge as to the amount of resources available.

Taking the long-term view also requires that administration policy makers resist attempts to use aid flows to achieve short-term non-economic goals or to express displeasure with specific actions of African governments. I am not so naive as to hope that this would never happen, nor would I argue that aid should never be used for short-term reasons. Cases will arise when

short-term adjustments in our aid programs will be desirable to achieve non-economic goals. My point is simply that this should be a last resort; our preference should be to find other ways of meeting such short-term non-economic goals.

Secondly, we need to provide more funds for economic assistance. I do not believe that throwing money at problems will resolve them, but it is clear that the problems of African development are so great that larger amounts of money will be necessary. One African writer states that development assistance should be doubled in real terms by the end of the 80's, with special attention to the least developed countries [36]. In fact, the Reagan administration has managed to increase our levels of assistance to Africa. During the first four years of the Reagan administration, U.S. bilateral assistance for economic development in Africa increased by 35% to average nearly $1 billion per year, not counting emergency food assistance, which increased by 175% in 1984 [37]. Nevertheless, even $1 billion divided by 40 countries averages only $25 million per country, which while not insignificant is not a huge sum considering the problems. And averages being what they are, many countries get a good deal less.

Third, better use of available funds is required. This is by no means an easy task. It requires close coordination and cooperation with other donor countries to insure that our assistance programs are not working at cross-purposes and that we are not choosing projects solely to compete for the host government's favor. It requires follow-up on projects undertaken

to insure that the money goes where it is supposed to, and to judge whether or not it is successful. Conversely, and somewhat paradoxically, it does not require an increase in the number of American AID officials in Africa, since their local costs are often paid for by the host government and this will reduce the availability of funds for actual development. Finally, given the increasing debts of a number of African countries it requires that more consideration be given to aid for budget support as opposed to project aid.

Fourth, we need to encourage African governments to adopt economic policies that we believe will work, in other words, freer and more open economic systems that will reward individual initiative and achievement. While it is not our role to tell African governments what type of economic system they should have, there is no reason for us not to encourage African governments to adopt an economic system that has worked in the U.S. and that we believe will work elsewhere. Not only is it in our economic interest to do so, it is also in our cultural and ideological interest. Most Republicans and Democrats accept that the free enterprise system has been an important cause of the success of the United States, and any differences are generally about how the fruits should be distributed, not about how they have been earned. All recent administrations have encouraged other countries to move toward less-controlled economic systems, and the Reagan administration has developed an incentive to encourage the institution of free enterprise economic policies. The administration sought authorization from the Congress for a five year, $500 million program of additional aid to be given to

governments that are undertaking policy reforms compatible with the U.S. view of economic development [38], in other words, which are moving toward giving the private sector a bigger role in the local economy. This program, the Economic Policy Initiative (EPI) has the principle of self-help at its heart. In October, 1984, the Congress approved $75 million in additional fiscal year 1985 aid for countries whose policies "encourage the initiative and enterprise of their people" [39].

Will such a program work? I believe that it will. First, it has worked in the United States and other OECD countries, countries that are the most developed in the world today. Second, although the U.S. is obviously very different from Africa, it has worked in Africa as well. Kenneth Adelman points out that the success stories in Africa, such as Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, the Gambia and Malawi are developing not because of aid, but rather because of "moderate leadership, political stability, free enterprise, the encouragement of foreign investment and cooperation with entrepeneurs" whereas Tanzania (in spite of the highest per capita aid totals in Africa) and others have failed due to "ideologically enticing but economically disastrous government policies" [40]. Third, this is not simply U.S. or Reagan administration rhetoric gone wild. African economic experts also believe that it can work. A joint report of the Economic Commission for Africa and the African Development Bank quoted by Ambassador Kirkpatrick says that "what is necessary at this stage is for governments to act to remove obstacles in the way of individual initiative, eliminate

inappropriate prices and subsidies which discourage production, and effectively control waste and mismanagement in the private sector" [41].

There is of course no guarantee that such a program will work, but based on my own African experience, it certainly would appear to have a good chance. Africans have a long tradition of free enterprise and capitalist-like economic activity. Vibrant markets are a feature in most African countries, and a number of the participants (generally women) have become rich as a result. When I was in Gabon in the mid-seventies, a large modern supermarket was opened. Once when I was there for the afternoon opening, I was surprised to see a number of African women (mainly from Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria) slide under the gate as it was being raised and race to the poultry section where they loaded up their shopping carts with whole chickens. After some inquires I was told that this always occurred whenever the supermarket got a shipment of chickens from France, Nigeria or South Africa and that the ladies took the chickens to the African market where they cooked them and sold them by the piece, no doubt at a handsome profit. While this is only a small story, it does show an African penchant for free-enterprise. It is exactly these kinds of people that we should be encouraging in Africa.

Multilateral vs. Bilateral Assistance. Another issue in the economic area concerns whether development assistance is more effective if given multilaterally or bilaterally. There is generally a split between idealists and pragmatists on this issue, too. The idealists start from the point that our interest is the economic development of Africa, which is true. However,

they continue by assuming that this is our only interest, which it is not. Pragmatists on the other hand see economic assistance as a lever that can be used to promote other U.S. interests beyond economic development, which also is true. Unfortunately, they often forget that the main purpose of the assistance is in fact economic development, and thus often advocate short-term policies that are harmful to the long-term development of the country.

I believe that the truth is somewhere in between. In theory, multilateral assistance should be more effective in obtaining the actual economic development of the country since it can be provided without any political strings attached, and it can take money from many sources and put it together in a well-planned overall program, avoiding the problems of donor coordination and cooperation present with bilateral aid. However, in practice, multilateral organizations do not have any natural advantage in choosing the best projects or the best path to development over individual countries (in other words, they too can make poor decisions on money use). There also is the possible problem that, since the money does not come from a government to which the multilateral organization's officials are directly responsible, there is less incentive to control the funds closely, and thus the possibility for waste seems greater than with bilateral assistance. There also may be a tendency on the part of the recipient country to treat the aid in a more cavalier fashion since it comes from a sort of nebulous international organization and not from a specific country that

might someday seek some favor (such as a vote at the U.N.) in "payment" for the assistance offered. Nations like people sometimes give more attention to something for which they have had to pay or may have to pay than to something that they simply get for free.

Bilateral assistance on the other hand is administered by people whose taxes presumably are a part of the assistance, and thus the officials may exercise more control. Although the ideas of a bilaterial donor may be no better than a multilateral one, bilateral assistance can be used in ways the donor believes will best contribute to the country's economic development (such as the EPI program). As identifiable aid, bilateral assistance also promotes other donor interests in the country, which we do in fact have. One group of American Ambassadors to African countries in the late 1960's strongly resisted the recommendations of the Korry report for more U.S. aid through multilateral organizations, saying that this would cause them a great loss of leverage with which to influence bilateral relations [42]. I have no doubt that a similar group of Ambassadors today would say the same, but then Ambassadors are on the front lines dealing with a wide range of problems and therefore pragmatists almost by definition. The problem, as mentioned above, is when the goal of economic development is lost in the concern for political or strategic interests. One other factor is that bilateral assistance also may serve a political purpose at home in obtaining further assistance from the budgetary process. Hopefully we would be able to point to the specific benefits obtained by our assistance and how it supported

U.S. interests, rather than simply saying that we gave some money to a multilateral organization which we presume used it well.

Thus my conclusion on this issue is that while we need both types of aid, bilateral aid correctly utilized (ie. with a long-range look to the development of the country, somewhat insulated from temporary events in the bilateral relationship) is the most useful. Multilateral aid is of course particularly well-suited for regional problems such as the advance of the desert, drought, famine, or the use of the waters of a river passing through a number of countries. It also probably is best in the least well-off countries where our interests tend to be less since it can combine presumably smaller amounts of aid from a number of donors. But in general, as a practicing diplomat, I too am a pragmatist on this issue, leaning towards bilateral rather than multilateral assistance.

I do not plan to discuss strategies for promoting trade, investment or access to resources in Africa in any great detail, as basically I believe there are few strategies that we can adopt that would support those specific interests better than the policies already discussed for promoting economic development and political stability. In other words, if we are successful in promoting stability and economic development, increased trade, investment and access to resources will follow. This is particularly true of the Reagan administration's Economic Policy Initiative, which by supporting free market institutions will in most cases directly foster trade and foreign investment. As mentioned in the discussion of our interests, Africa's resources

will most likely continue to be sold on the international market no matter who controls them, although there could be exceptions during a prolonged armed conflict. Thus the goals of stability and at least decent working relations with governments in power, no matter what their politics, would directly support access to Africa's resources.

Obviously, we should also encourage African governments as appropriate to move toward generally freer trading and investment regimes, and a major task of any U.S. Embassy is to promote U.S. commercial interests. These objectives are and will continue to be part of our broader cultural/ideological interests.

Strategic Policies. As the world has become smaller through advances in transportation and communication, and the capability of the Soviet Union to project power has grown, the United States has become much more concerned with the strategic importance of all areas of the world, including Africa. In the sixties for example, in spite of the Congo crisis, which certainly had Cold War implications, our African policy really had no broad strategic urgency. Rather, it reflected the view that as the world's strongest power we somehow needed to have an effective policy for every part of the world [43]. This changed following events in Angola and Ethiopia in the late seventies, and policy makers began to be more concerned about our strategic interests in Africa.

As discussed above, while it is in our interest to have access to facilities in Africa that can be used by our military forces, it is more important that the Soviet Union not have permanent control of such facilities. This fact leads one writer

to two conclusions. First, we should avoid developing too close relations with countries not vital to U.S. interests (presumably to avoid becoming entangled in problems where our interests are not really involved and which could then give an excuse to the Soviets to become involved, with possible adverse consequences). Second, that neither ideology nor inter-African conflicts should be used as an excuse for avoiding good relations with an African country (again, to avoid forcing the country into the Soviet orbit by closing the option of relations with us). In other words, we should concentrate on our interests, not on obligations or alliances [43]. I wholeheartedly agree with his second conclusion, and I also agree with the first, if what he means is that we should not promise anyone something on which we are not prepared to deliver, and certainly not to countries where our direct interests are not involved. However, this should not preclude an attempt to develop close relations with these countries on a political and economic level.

In general, I would argue that the best way for us to promote our strategic interests in Africa is through sound economic and political policies, as discussed above. These are our strengths, particularly when compared with the Soviet Union. Conversely, the Soviet strength is its willingness to supply arms to virtually anyone in Africa in the belief that at best, they will gain influence, and that even in the worst case instability will increase in the region, thereby frustrating attempts by the West to benefit from its strength in economics, while perhaps creating future opportunities for an increase in Soviet influence.

Arms Supply. Inevitably, however, when strategic interests are discussed with African states, the question of arms supply is sure to arise. Here I believe that we face a real dilemma. I agree with Geoffrey Kemp that the two biggest strategic issues for the U.S. in Africa are how to deal with South Africa, and how to respond to requests for arms by black African states [45]. Leaving South Africa for Chapter IV, it is true that the U.S. has generally exercised restraint in dispensing military largesse in Africa [46]. Yet requests for arms from African states continue at an increasing rate. The problem is particularly difficult because the problems causing African conflicts are often complex and because the Soviet Union provides arms fairly widely in Africa.

What are the advantages of meeting these requests? If we supply arms to requesting countries we will presumably increase our influence in the country. Arms and military training can be used to cultivate and support moderate pro-Western governments, especially those which face threats from potentially anti-Western forces, either internal or external. Another advantage of arms sales is that often only small amounts will be necessary to provide friendly governments with sufficient resources to increase their military security, and at the same time greatly increase U.S. influence with the government [47]. Disadvantages include the fact that sales contribute to greater militarization in Africa, are likely to increase instability in the area, and use scarce financial and manpower resources which might better be used for economic development and thus will not contribute to

resolution of the country's basic problems. In addition, few African governments are democratic in the U.S. sense, which could lead to human rights' questions, particularly if the arms are used for internal control. And arms supply will also increase the possibilities of U.S. involvement or even intervention in problems that do not directly affect our interests [48]. Arms sales also tend to identify us much more closely with the regime in power, which could have negative effects if that regime falls from power. A further problem is that if we do not supply the requested arms, the country can probably obtain them elsewhere anyway, thereby reducing our influence in the country (including any influence for moderate action) and perhaps leading the country to turn to the largest arms merchant in Africa, the Soviet Union.

The dilemma raised by arms sales also mirrors the split between pragmatists and idealists. Pragmatists largely see arms sales as a way to increase our influence and help our friends; idealists see arms sales as increasing instability, detracting from development, and identifying the U.S. with non-democratic, military, and perhaps repressive regimes. So what is the answer? There is no one answer. Each case needs to be considered on its own merits, based on the situation at the time. In my view, it is foolish to have a policy of either refusing to sell arms (as the Carter administration did toward the Third World) or to sell arms to almost anyone who asks for them (esesentially the Soviet view). This whole area is a genuine gray zone, and the advantages and disadvantages of arms sales are real ones. Thus any pre-set policy can not possibly meet our interests in all

cases. Policy makers need to decide in each case whether our overall interests are better served by selling arms (and what type) or whether it is in our interests to refuse the request.

There are however some guidelines that I believe policy makers should keep in mind when reaching these decisions. First, I agree with the view (that clearly was behind the Carter policy of refusing arms requests) that the world would be a better place if arms were not availabel. In other words, the supply of arms is a serious business, and decisions to sell arms to African countries should not be taken lightly. We should first carefully examine other ways to resolving the identified problem. Arms supply should also generally be used to meet specific needs or threats; they should not be used simply to curry favor with the government in power. While we should supply sufficient arms to meet the need or threat, they should only rarely be the most technologically advanced weapons in our arsenal. The best weapons are usually the most expensive and often require more highly trained manpower to operate. Thus they use scarce financial and manpower resources that might better be employed elsewhere. And as a practical matter, given the shortages of trained manpower and the climate in many parts of Africa, higher technology items might be operational less often than less sophisticated weapons.

We should also avoid supplying weapons to a narrowly-based government facing an internal uprising. Such methods are one of the main ways for the majority to change a non-democratic government, and supplying weapons to the government in such a

case will identify us too closely with a minority government that has perhaps lost the support or acceptance of the majority. The most obvious, but not the only example, is South Africa. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we should be extremely careful about providing any offensive weapons, since we should not wish to be in the position of having U.S. arms used for offensive actions in Africa in direct contravention of the most basic policy of the OAU. Again, this is not always an easy distintion to make (an anti-tank weapon, which is generally considered defensive, can be used by an offensive force to knock out a defender's tanks). While we may make mistakes, it is a distinction that must be attempted. The obvious example is Somalia, where we have important interests, where there is a threat from Ethiopia, thus a good reason for defensive arms, but where Somalia also has offensive territorial claims in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Despite requests by the government, the administration has resisted selling offensive arms to Somalia, a position supported by a Congressional mission that visited Africa and recommended against supplying offensive military equipment to Somalia [49].

I believe that the present administration is well aware of the problems involved in arms sales to Africa, and that the policy they are following is generally correct. Assistant Secretary Crocker has stated that we will help our friends, but that we will not support threatening forces and that we continue to give full weight to the OAU charter on borders. We will support diplomatic efforts to end tensions, and intend neither to ignore nor provoke an East/West arms race in Africa. Crocker

believes the answer to the dilemma of arms supply is to consult with our friends in Africa, and to provide just the right amount of security assistance to threatened African countries needed to achieve both their and our security goals [50].

Military Bases. As additional question concerning our strategic interests in Africa that has recently come to the fore is the question of bases. As late as 1982, we had no bases or agreements to use bases in Africa, but now we have stand-by agreements with Somalia and Kenya to use military facilities and pre-position equipment in those countries in connection with contingencies in Southwest Asia [51]. In return, the U.S. is spending millions of dollars to upgrade these facilities [52]. Although these are not traditional American bases, such as exist in Europe or Japan (which no one in the area desires), the existence of agreements to use these bases does raise a number of important questions. How far do we go in protecting these bases from either an external or internal threat? Do our broader interests in Southwest Asia override our interests in Africa and in the specific countries where we have access to military bases? Would we side with the current government in the face of any internal threat for fear of losing access to the facilities? Will we become so identified with the current governments that a change might threaten our interests, including access to the facilities? These are not easy questions to answer, and like the questions about arms sales, are probably impossible to answer in a general sense. But they are questions that need to be considered. The Congressional mission that visited Africa

recommended that we should be careful that our military presence in Kenya does not become a domestic liability for the Kenyan government, and that it does not develop into a permanent base with large numbers of U.S. forces. The Congressmen also recommended that we be cautious in increasing military assistance, since Kenya's problems are mainly economic and social, not military and security related [53].

While these recommendations were directed only at Kenya, I believe that they have applicability continent-wide. We must not forget that our main interests in Africa are economic and political, nor that our strongest policies are economic and diplomatic. We face a very real danger in being sucked into a situation in Africa (because of our admittedly important concerns and interests in Southwest Asia) that will not promote our interests in Africa. It is clearly in our interest to have access to military facilities in the Horn of Africa (and other areas as well). It is probably in the mutual interest of the U.S. and the country providing the military facilities to upgrade their quality, since both countries may use them. But I do not believe that it is in the interests of either the U.S. or African countries to have a permanent U.S. military presence established in Africa (beyond a few necessary liason personnel working from the Embassy under the Ambassador's control). The Soviets have done so, and generally their position has deteriorated as a result. A permanent base simply exposes the United States more than necessary or desirable, could disrupt the often fragile economic, social and political balances in the host country, and will not promote our long-term interests in Africa.

Cultural/Ideological Policies. The promotion of U.S. cultural/ideological interests is more difficult than the promotion of our political, economic or strategic interests, largely because the concepts involved are themselves fairly nebulous, and also because of the risk of appearing arrogant and desirous of interfering in another country's internal affairs. Again we see the split between idealists and pragmatists. The former wish to make these interests the sina qua non of our relations with specific countries, while the latter would prefer to ignore ideology and just talk about interests. And again the answer is somewhere in between, although it is a very narrow line that we are required to walk. While we might make suggestions or express our opinion as friends about particular policies or the desirability of certain changes, this kind of activity can quickly be perceived as interference in the affairs of the country, and lead to a rapid worsening of our relations, loss of U.S. influence and damage to our interests. The United States was founded because our ancestors did not like a group of people across the ocean telling them how to run their country, and I suspect that even today we would quickly take offense if the British Ambassador for example began making speeches around the United States about the benefits of a parliamentary system and the importance of us adopting such a system if we desired continued good relations with the United Kingdom. It sounds ridiculous, but there are some who would have us do the same in Africa, in countries with a history much shorter than even ours, and with governments that are much less secure than ours.

So what can we do? First, we can express our opinions. There are a large number of issues where we can do so without seeming to threaten the government's existance or appearing to interfere in the country's internal affairs. For example, we can encourage a free market economy and the free enterprise system, as we are doing with the carrot of the EPI program. We also can use our votes in the U.N. to make it very clear where we stand on "moral" or ideological issues such as democracy and majority rule. There is no reason why we should be the only country in the world to take the U.N. more seriously than it deserves. There are votes in the U.N. that matter and have a direct effect on events, but there are many more that are simply used for posturing. Just as I have argued that we should not hold African countries responsible for every vote they make at the U.N., so we should not be overly concerned that our vote on an issue of ideological importance to us will sour our relations with one or more African countries. If our relations our based on mutual interests, they will survive posturing by either or both sides. Another thing we can do is simply be ourselves, and let Africans draw their own conclusions, and is probably the best reason to have established Embassies in virtually all African countries. It is also a good reason for the Peace Corps, for the volunteers often live in villages far from the capital city. Not only are they often a powerful force assisting economic development, but they also bring Africans into contact with (extra)ordinary Americans. As one writer said, the Peace Corps is probably the biggest success of American foriegn policy since the war [54]. A further tool is USIA, which informs the local country about the

United States and also arranges visits to the U.S. for key foreign nationals.

Key States vs. an All-inclusive Policy. An additional question that often comes up concerning U.S. African policy is whether we should concentrate our efforts in Africa on a small number of key states, or whether we should have an all-inclusive policy that attempts to deal effectively with every African nation. (This debate has an interesting parallel with the containment debate after World War II, where Kennan argued for emphasis on a number of strong points around the borders of the Soviet Union, and Truman and Eisenhower adopted a policy of containment everywhere.) While the idealists would generally hold the view that we should try to help everybody to develop viable economies and political democracy, the pragmatists are split on the issue. Some argue that since our resources are limited, we should concentrate them in countries where they might do some good, and where we have important interests. On the economic side, if we can achieve development in a number of countries, their development may subsequently assist the development of other African nations [55]. The 1966 Korry report adopted a similar view, expressing concern about "scattering" U.S. resources where we had no interests, and as a result USAID operations were closed in twenty-five African countries [56]. However, a perhaps more cynical group of pragmatists would argue that we should not only deal with every African nation, but in fact concentrate on the weakest ones, since they can be "bought off" most cheaply, and encouraged to undertake actions in line

with our interests, such as voting at the U.N. or providing military facilities.

I believe that these views are not in fact mutually exclusive. What we need to recognize is that neither our interests nor our influence are identical in each African state. Thus we have to calibrate our efforts and resource allocation with the level of our interests and likely success in advancing those interests. This will inevitably lead to more attention being given to key-states, since it is there that our interests are the largest. However, since we do have interests in all African states (at the cynical minimum their U.N. vote) we should also exert some effort, even if minimal, in all African nations. Another factor that we should not forget is that we do have allies and that they, particularly the French, often have both larger interests and more influence in many African countries. Although U.S. and French interests are by no means identical, even in Africa, they are generally compatable, and while there is no reason why we should not compete with the French in certain areas such as commercial contracts, in general our interests are best served by allowing them to take the lead in francophone Africa. This allows us to concentrate more of our resources on the other African states than would otherwise be possible. As many of the francophone states are among the poorest and least likely to develop, this fits nicely with the point above on the desirability of concentrating our economic resources in the countries that are most likely to develop economically.

Another point we need to remember is that while we have interests in developing close relations with African governments,

those governments may also have an interest in developing close relations with us, and they are very likely to seek the advancement of their interests in political (eg. U.S. policy toward South Africa), economic (eg. assistance) or security (eg. arms or protection) areas. In other words, good relations and the promotion of U.S. interests are not cost-free, although the cost will be less if we attempt to identify areas of mutual interest, for example economic development.

CHAPTER IV

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Idealists and Pragmatists. Finally we come to the question that in my view is the key issue for Africa, and the litmus test for U.S. policy in Africa as a whole: southern Africa in general and South Africa specifically. While again there is a split between idealists and pragmatists, what is perhaps more amazing is how much apparent agreement there is between the two sides on this most difficult issue. Generally, proponents of both camps would agree that apartheid is evil, wrong, immoral and in the word of President Reagan, "repugnant" [1]. Another generally agreed fact is that the white government currently has overwelming military force in the area, and is unlikely to be disloged via military might, certainly in the short-term, unless it should decide not to fight. There would also be general agreement that the black majority will eventually achieve political power and run the country, as the weight of numbers and history are overwelmingly on their side, although there are many views on just how long this might take, ranging from a year or so to centuries. Most would also agree that the issue of South Africa is extremely important at least emotionally and politically to other African nations, and as such U.S. policy toward South Africa must affect U.S. interests in black Africa; and that the southern African situation offers the Soviet Union opportunities to increase its influence and involvement in the area, something that would decidedly not be in U.S. interests. And finally, most would agree that while U.S. interests would

best be served by a relatively peaceful transition (ie. not a full-scale race war in southern Africa) the problem is extremely difficult and a solution will not be easy.

Where the idealists and pragmatists generally disagree is over the policy that best can be expected to achieve an end to apartheid, bring about early majority rule in South Africa as peacefully as possible, and preserve U.S. interests in the region and in black Africa while keeping Soviet involvement to a minimum. The idealists generally believe that the moral issue is so important that it outweighs any other U.S. interests and that we should stop all contact with the white South African government, and use any and every form of pressure to bring about change, including disinvestment, economic sanctions and blockades, political pressure in the U.N. and other fora, and support for the black majority both by word and resources to enable them to achieve power. Not only would this put us on the side of right, it would also further our interests in black Africa (where our trade and investment are equal to or greater than in South Africa, and of course where there are many more U.N. votes). It would also insure that we would not force the eventual black rulers of South Africa into the Soviet orbit, which could be a disaster for our long-range interests in southern Africa. In short, it would prevent the Soviets from taking advantage of U.S. "support" for the white regime in South Africa, both in black Africa and South Africa [2].

The pragmatists on the other hand argue that we are much more likely to be able to bring about non-violent change if we

can work with the government in power and use our influence with them to promote change. They also argue that sanctions rarely if ever work (particularly when it is very difficult to make them airtight because there are countries and individuals ready to break them for a price) and that disinvestment and sanctions will most hurt the economically weakest part of the society -- the blacks. In addition, the white South Africans have a long history of circling the wagons and fighting to the end against great odds when they are isolated, and with their military and economic power, they could hang-on for a long time and make any triumph by the majority extremely costly. Moreover, if we remove ourselves from the scene, we will have no influence on the white government and the inevitable violence and instability will provide a perfect opportunity for the Soviets to increase their influence in the area. Our interests and strengths are in diplomacy and peaceful change, not weapons and violent change, and to have any chance at peaceful change, we need the cooperation of the current government.

No past U.S. administration has really completely adopted one or the other of these views, and our policy toward South Africa has shifted as an administration emphasized one or the other. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations sided in a half-hearted manner with black Africa against South Africa, while Nixon shifted toward trying to work with the South African government. Ford's policy exhibited some ambivalence, working with South Africa to achieve majority rule in Zimbabwe, but hectoring them on Namibia, which proved unsuccessful. Carter sided with the black majority at the beginning, and considered

economic pressure, but concerns over Soviet intentions led to less emphasis on this at the end of his administration [3].

Constructive Engagement. The Reagan administration is clearly on the side of the pragmatists. The center piece of its African policy is "constructive engagement", a policy that is essentially focused on southern Africa. Constructive engagement has four main features: independence for Namibia based on U.N. resolution 435; a reduction in cross-border violence and an increase in the possibilities of coexistence between all states in the region; the removal of foreign forces and influence from the region; and, a continued and accelerated movement away from apartheid within South Africa [4]. This policy is based on the fundamental view that the South African government believes itself to be a part of the West, does not wish to be isolated internationally, cares about its relationship with the U.S. and other Western nations, and recognizes that this relationship depends on continued internal change and regional security [5].

How has this policy of constructive engagement worked? In the administration's view, there have been a number of important achievements [6]. On Namibian independence, South Africa has recommitted itself to U.N. resolution 435, an arrangement that has been accepted by the other regional states and SWAPO, and progress has been made within Namibia on agreement on basic constitutional principles that would be adopted after U.N. supervised elections. On a reduction in cross-border violence, the administration has perhaps achieved its biggest success with the signature of the Nkomati agreement between South Africa and

Mozambique ending both governments' support for liberation movements in the other's country. The Lusaka agreement brought together South Africa and Angola on a plan to end South Africa's occupation of Angolan territory and hostilities between the two. On the removal of foreign influence, the governments of Angola and Mozambique now look to the U.S., not the Soviets, as the country best able to resolve their security problems, and the Angolans have agreed to accept a Cuban troop withdrawal as part of a Namibian settlement. In short, the initiative has shifted from the military to the diplomatic and economic.

Progress on apartheid has been less obvious, although one author maintains that this is of less importance to African nations than achieving Namibian independence and curbing Pretoria's destabilization policy [7]. We have spoken out publicly at the highest level condemning apartheid and calling for its end, maintained our arms embargo and rejected the homelands' concept and the new Constitution as solutions to the problem. We have condemned basic violations of human rights both privately and publicly, and have encouraged U.S. business to adopt the Sullivan principles, which essentially require American firms to treat their black and white workers equally in terms of wages, opportunities for advancement and working conditions. The administration has also developed a program giving $10 million annually to black groups within South Africa. But serious problems remain, including political repression, black removals, and the lack of black political rights [8].

There have, however, been numerous criticisms of constructive engagement from outside the administration. Pauline

Baker says that "constructive engagement lends respectability to a system totally unworthy of respect, makes a mockery of our protestations of abhorance of apartheid and gives license to South Africa to proceed as it wishes" [9]. Jennifer Whitaker says that a Namibian settlement is no closer and African frustrations have increased because of the insistence on linking Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola to independence; that the borders of South Africa are not calmer; that continued South African militancy risks an escalation with its neighbors; and that, by excluding blacks and only blacks from any political role, the new South African constitution is actually a movement away from full black political participation there [10]. Whitaker adds that the new constitution is also the first time that the apartheid system has been constitutionally entrenched in South Africa [11]. Richard Leonard says that by emphasizing stability rather than black freedom, the U.S. has allowed South Africa to be the arbitrator of change and has entered into a de facto alliance with Pretoria, deepening the crisis [12]. The Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe said in August, 1983, that the U.S. policy was encouraging South Africa to be more aggressive against its neighbors [13].

After visiting South Africa, Congressional staffer Stephen Weissman wrote that virtually all anti-apartheid activists he met criticized the Reagan policy and believed that the U.S. was propping up the Botha government, and many supported disinvestment [14]. The Congressional study mission said that Reagan's policy may be encouraging South Africa to resist change,

and, while changes are occurring, they are not the fundamental changes that will lead to power sharing between whites and blacks. They added that a Namibian settlement appears no closer, and that while constructive engagement has won friends for the U.S. within the government in South Africa, we have lost friends among both whites and blacks who support racial equality, and among black African states as well [15]. Robert Manning points out that constructive engagement has led to a backlash in Congress, even among some moderate and conservative Republicans and increased support for legislation that would institute economic sanctions [16]. Leonard concludes that South Africa does not respond to an agenda set by the U.S. Their priority is white survival through domination, and they will likely accept the carrots of the Reagan policy and ask for more without any fundamental changes being made [17].

The South African problem is clearly both important and difficult. It is also easy to understand why the South African government is so insecure and resists change. Looked at from their perspective, they believe that they have as much right to the country as the blacks, since they both arrived in the area at approximately the same time. They were thus not colonialists in the same sense as the Europeans in other parts of Africa. They are surrounded by less than friendly states, a number of them with leaders professing to be Marxists, and all of them desiring a black South Africa. They are also surrounded internally by a black population on which their economy and way of life depends, which far outnumbers the white population and whose calls for political rights are becoming more insistent, and often violent.

There is even a black South African group, the African National Congress (ANC) seeking the government's overthrow through military measures directed from both outside and within South Africa. And South Africa is an international pariah, and at the same time, they believe that they are virtually alone in trying to limit the expansion of Soviet Communism in southern Africa, a goal of the Soviets that they accept as absolutely clear. For example, the South African State President Marais Viljoen stated that the Soviets were stockpiling arms in neighboring countries to increase regional instability and Soviet opportunities for expansion [18].

The problem for the U.S. is that while we might like to promote change within South Africa, since that will promote U.S. interests in every country of Africa, our influence is limited. Senator McGovern recognized this when he said that while many changes need to be made in South Africa neither the U.S. nor American firms can dictate these changes, which will have to evolve from the concern of the people inside the country [19]. One of the goals of constructive engagement has been to reduce the seige mentality and increase the confidence of the South African government and thus its ability to deal through diplomatic measures with its neighbors in order to improve their mutual security. Crocker argues that some measures suggested to express our displeasure with apartheid such as stopping the sale of Krugerrands in the U.S. or withdrawing landing rights for South African airways would just be "pinpricks" that would change nothing in South Africa, but would erode our influence with those

we seek to persuade to accept change [20]. Hopefully, increased confidence and quiet diplomacy will also lead to accelerating changes in the apartheid system. Some progress has been made internally in a reduction in measures of "petty apartheid", in legalizing the presence of blacks in urban areas, and in recognizing black trade unions. Bannings and arbitrary detentions have also declined in the last few years, although they again began to increase in 1984 as strikes and agitation increased [21]. Clearly, more needs to be done.

The new 1983 constitution, in giving limited political rights to Asians and "coloreds" is the first break with the main tenet of apartheid that political power is reserved exclusively for whites. The problem for the government is that while the Asians and the coloreds do not appear to expect any real internal changes from this document (since less that 30% of the registered Asian and colored voters voted in the election approving the constitution) the conservative right wing of the ruling party sees this as the first step down the slippery road to majority rule [22]. As a result, the ruling party lost the support of about one-third of its core Afrikaaner constituency. However, we have told the government that we view the fact that the Constitution does not deal with the rights of blacks to be a fundamental flaw, and that we oppose attempts to denationalize blacks by declaring them citizens of various homelands [23]. Crocker adds that the exclusion of blacks in the new constitution has ironically pushed that issue to the top of the political agenda in South Africa, and that the burden is now on the

government to recognize and invite valid black interlocutors to the negotiating table [24].

A further area where the U.S. can promote change is through direct assistance to blacks in South Africa. Not only does this policy recognize that good relations in the long-term with South Africa will depend on developing links with the black majority, but as Francis Kornegay points out, it is a good example of how constructive engagement could gain credibility for the U.S. in its dealings with Pretoria [25]. Robert Manning adds that both Congress and the administration agree on the importance of this assistance, and that funds have been approved for educational aid, legal centers and advanced study in the United States [26].

Economic Sanctions? But the biggest question regarding U.S. actions in encouraging change in South Africa involves the large U.S. economic presence in South Africa. The debate essentially revolves around whether U.S. investment assists blacks economically and is a force for change within South Africa or whether it serves to prop up the current government and if removed would force the government to change its racial policies. Those who argue in favor of the benefits of U.S. investment point to the Sullivan principles. The Congressional study mission found that the black employees of U.S. subsidiaries make up about 5% of the total urban black work force, and concluded that U.S. industry can play a significant role, especially since most people believe that the actions have a ripple effect on other multinational firms and South African firms that must compete for the same workers [27]. On the other hand there are a number of critics including Randall Robinson of Transafrica who

argue that although they are well meaning, the Sullivan principles can not bring about real change since workers in U.S. firms are a small percentage of the total work-force in South Africa, and since they do not force the companies to address political issues within the country, only social issues within the plant [28].

The broader question is what effect foreign investment and trade have on South Africa as a whole, and what the effect of disinvestment and economic sanctions would be. It is clear that investment and trade provide important benefits to the South African economy. Trade in oil is particularly crucial, for although South Africa produces a significant amount of synfuel, they are still dependent on imported oil. South Africa's exports of resources and food also are clearly important for the economy. So given a choice, it is obvious that the South African government would prefer not to see any form of disinvestment, trade embargo or boycott.

The question on the other side of the coin is whether disinvestment or trade sanctions would be effective, and there I believe that the answer is no. Sanctions in the past have generally not proven to be effective. Even the much weaker economy of Rhodesia was able to withstand many years of embargo, and indeed prosper during many of these years. To have any chance at being effective, sanctions would have to be virtually airtight, something that simply cannot be done. For example, many African countries, perhaps a majority, carry on trade with South Africa (often hidden, but trade nonetheless) in spite of

OAU sanctions. If there were U.N. sanctions, it is certain that some countries would continue to trade with South Africa, and if not there are always individuals who for a price will sell anything to anyone. This is particularly true of items like arms. Given the current depressed oil market, South Africa would undoubtedly have no trouble buying oil on the spot market. Plus, South Africa has a developed economy, and can produce almost anything (or an acceptable substitute) if forced to do so. This is not to say that sanctions would not have an economic effect -- they would -- for the costs to the economy of either obtaining or producing items now freely imported would be significant. But it could be done, and unfortunately the costs to the economy would first likely be borne by the weakest sector -- the blacks. As the economy inevitably contracted, jobs would be lost, and it is certain that black jobs would go first.

However, while the economic effects of sanctions might not cause great economic difficulties, especially not to the white rulers, it certainly would send a political signal that the West was serious and was not going to accept South Africa as a part of the West until a true democracy with political rights for the majority was established. This would not be unimportant, but the effect would likely be a natural lessening of dissent among whites as the government dealt with this external threat. And as the government hunkered down in the face of the threat, the position of the most reactionary Africaaners would be strengthened and repression would undoubtedly increase.

What Should We Do? The dilemma that the U.S. faces in South Africa is a particularly cruel one. Apartheid as a system is

horrible, and the rule by a minority without the consent of the majority goes against our traditions and most basic beliefs. These concerns argue strongly for doing all that we can to end the South African system immediately. But to do so will probably result in unthinkable violence that will cause tremendous suffering to all the people in the region, including those in the black states surrounding South Africa, many of whose economies are closely linked to that in South Africa. It will also harm U.S. interests in stability, access to resources, and economic development, as well as providing opportunities for an increase in Soviet influence. On the other hand, to try to work with the government and encourage change cannot, almost by definition, be a rapid process, and even if we were successful in bringing about relatively peaceful change, we would be condemning the black majority to remaining subjected and degraded with little obvious hope of a change for five, ten or even twenty years. And should we be unsuccessful in achieving the government's acceptance of peaceful change, we would be faced with a violent solution anyway.

Although I do not relish the thought that apartheid and minority rule might continue for years in South Africa, in my opinion, constructive engagement is generally the appropriate approach. Our influence is limited, and our only hope of effecting peaceful change in South Africa is to work through the government in power. Economic sanctions or disinvestment, while making us feel good as a nation (and presumably, once done we, like Pontius Pilot, could wash our hands and no longer have to

deal with either a distasteful situation, or the consequences of our action), would not achieve the desired result. They would increase the likelihood of a civil war and make majority rule even more difficult to achieve. George Ball has written that those in the U.S. who promote disinvestment have abandoned hope of a peaceful solution in South Africa and want to hasten the day when social change will occur through violent means [29]. Sanctions would most hurt the people we most want to help -- the blacks. Although I do not agree with the idea because of the inappropriate political signal that it would send (and the political storm it would raise in the U.S.), Duignan and Gann in fact argue that we should rapidly expand our investment in South Africa in order to accelerate change [30]. For increased investment will cause economic expansion and more skilled workers will be required than whites can supply. As Senator Hayakawa points out, political and social change generally occur in times of prosperity, not poverty [31].

In addition, a negotiated settlement worked in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The transition to majority rule there was basically peaceful, and whites continue to play an important economic role. The problem with constructive engagement as currently implemented is that it gives everyone the impression that the U.S. is allied with the white South African regime. While this may be largely unintentional, the fact is that blacks in South Africa, the governments in black Africa, U.S. citizens, and probably even the South African government believe that we are on the side of the white government. We can help to end this unfortunate perception by increasing our assistance to black

South Africans, and giving that part of the program more publicity. We can continue to speak out publicly against the apartheid system and gross abuses of civilized behavior by the South African government. We should make it clear both privately and publicly that the U.S. will not defend the present South African government or assist it militarily in resolving its internal problems. We should also support legislation to make application of the Sullivan principles mandatory for all U.S. firms in South Africa.

Such actions would not only be useful as additions to our present constructive engagement policy but they would also help improve the public perception of constructive engagement in South Africa, black Africa, and the United States. As such it would help meet a number of our interests in Africa and could also buy some time politically for constructive engagement to show more results in encouraging internal change in South Africa. For I believe that the administration faces a real and growing political problem on constructive engagement. There is a sense that the administration was given free rein during the first term, but that not much was achieved, so maybe its time for a switch in policy. Even the moderate Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Lugar, has said that the administration "needs to do more" to change South Africa's policies toward blacks, and in December, 1984, thirty-five Republican Senators told the South African Ambassador to the U.S. that they would support sanctions against South Africa unless rapid progres was made in ending apartheid [32].

In fact, quite a bit has been achieved. The region is more stable and South Africa is at least talking to its neighbors about security issues. Namibian independence still appears to be just around the corner (perhaps one of the problems is that the administration has been predicting imminent success for the last two years or so). Some changes have taken place within South Africa, and Soviet influence has been reduced while ours has increased. We are the only nation that all players believe can bring about a solution. The problem is that apartheid continues, and apartheid is the most visible, the most reprehensible "thing" in the area. It rightly outrages our morality, and morality has political importance in the U.S. Apartheid and minority rule are much more politically understandable than regional security or mutual confidence. The recent confrontations between police and blacks in South Africa have only made matters worse. Thus some form of sanctions by the Congress appears increasingly likely. Such sanctions would effectively end the more than four years of effort that has gone into building confidence in the region and within the South African government just at the point when that effort might be ready to pay dividends.

Achievement of Namibian independence would certainly give a powerful boost to constructive engagement's credibility [33]. One other policy that deserves consideration and which I believe could be helpful is some form of limited and selective sanctions. Constructive engagement is viewed as being all carrot, and this would add some sticks to our arsenal. We could choose some particularly reprehensible action of the South African government such as bannings or forced removals, and inform them that if a

change has not been made by a certain time, we would undertake a specific sanction (such as ending the export of high technology goods), which would stay in place until the practice is changed. This would give us a little more leverage over government actions that we find particularly offensive yet, precisely because the sanctions were limited, would not have a major effect on the confidence that our overall policy is trying to foster.

Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. But the importance of southern Africa is not limited to South Africa, although that is clearly the biggest issue. Namibia, Angola and Mozambique are all important players in the region, and what happens in these countries will affect U.S. interests. The U.S. has invested a lot of effort and money in supporting a multi-racial democracy in Zimbabwe, but Zimbabwe will suffer if there is instability in the region. Even Zaire, one of the key states for U.S. African policy, can be affected, for Zaire has already exhibited tendencies to split apart, and in a post-Mobutu Zaire these tendencies could be even stronger. The role of Angola in any crisis in Zaire could be crucial, and thus is another reason for quickly resolving the problems of southern Africa [34]. And all the issues in southern Africa seem to be tied closely together. All the countries in the region want secure borders in order to limit the possibilities of various insurgent groups. Namibian independence depends on the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and Cuban troops from Angola. A resolution between the government and UNITA in Angola is unlikely while Cuban troops remain, and South Africa will likely be less willing to move

toward a meaningful political role for its blacks while it believes itself surrounded by aggressive states.

On the issue of Namibian independence, there is some question about how and when the issue became linked with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. A number of writers argue that Namibian independence could have been achieved long ago if the U.S. had not, for its own geopolitical reasons, linked it with withdrawal of the Cuban troops [35]. The administration, however, argues that it was clear after the Geneva conference in January 1981 that the previous agreement was coming unstuck: South Africa was going to resist independence for Namibia if it would put a possibly Marxist SWAPO in power while large numbers of Cubans remained in Angola who might directly assist SWAPO and the ANC. Thus the linkage was a political necessity for the South Africans [36]. That it also fit nicely with our broader goals was a happy coincidence.

I certainly am in no position to judge the merits of this argument, but since Angola has now agreed to the linkage, I believe the argument has importance only for historical, not policy, reasons. What is important now is to insure that momentum is not lost, that we do not let South Africa drag its feet through fear that SWAPO will win a post-independence election. An independent Namibia will remain heavily dependent on South Africa economically, and will require Western assistance to deal with its economic problems. Without independence, SWAPO will remain dependent on the Soviets and Cubans.

In Angola the question is what happens with the MPLA/UNITA conflict when and if the Cubans leave. The best assessment of

U.S. government sources is that neither side can win militarily, and that some type of political accommodation is thus both necessary and likely. We should definitely support such an outcome, but in the meantime we should recognize the Luanda government as soon as possible in order to increase our influence there (which means doing away with this chip in the Namibian independence package).

In Mozambique we are in the rather strange position of needing success for a professed Marxist regime against a presumably pro-Western insurgency formerly supported by South Africa. Since the Nkomati agreement, South Africa has stopped supporting this insurgency and, according to the State Department, is in fact taking a number of steps to insure that no assistance flows to the insurgents from South Africa. But the government in Mozambique is concerned because the insurgents continue to fight, distracting them from the more important task of economic reconstruction. The problem for the U.S. is that if the insurgency continues, it shakes the whole delicate house of cards of regional security and confidence, which is a basic part of our constructive engagement policy, and its biggest success so far. It also would threaten the slow but perceptible movement of the government away from the Soviets and toward the West. (We are currently even considering the supply of some non-lethal military assistance to Mozambique.) If the Machel government is overthrown, we are in a no-win situation, for it means either that we have no influence in South Africa or that we support Pretoria's goals. In either case, it demonstrates that the black states can gain nothing from cooperating with us [37].

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, our interests in Africa are relatively small, yet nevertheless important. I would basically side with the regionalists in that I believe that we are best off to consider African issues and our interests there on their own merits. However, Africa and the U.S. are both part of a larger world, and there will often be interconnections between issues in different geographic areas, especially when the Soviet Union has an essentially globalist view. In terms of policy, I agree with Cyrus Vance that the most productive policies toward Africa are affirmative; we should not simply react to a crisis or to what others do, but rather should seek to resolve the problems that create opportunities for undesirable foreign intervention [1].

In developing affirmative policies, we should look for areas where we share mutual interests with the Africans, for our policy will be most successful if it identifies with African aspirations and offers a shared hope for the future [2]. Former Nigerian President Obasanjo writes that all African nations want to be free from foreign rule and intervention and to achieve sustained economic and social development [3]. The United States shares these goals. In the words of Chester Crocker, "our interests are best served by political and economic stability, which foster the peaceful development of African economic and political institutions that can interact with our own to mutual advantage" [4]. We can further these goals through policies that promote economic development, trade and investment, and stability. The

development of good relations with African governments in power, relations that are based on our mutual interests, will encourage such stability. Because there are many African governments with many different problems, we will need more than one policy, but our general policy should aim at flexibility, realism and an avoidance of a blind ideological approach. We must be prepared to accept the African governments that are in power even if they are non-democratic, and headed by a Marxist or a conservative military official. We must not forget our own ideology, but we will make a mistake if we try to force it on countries that are not ready for it or not interested. Thus I side mainly with the pragmatist view of policy: we must work with the governments in power to promote our mutual interests.

This pragmatic approach should extend to Africa's most difficult problem as well -- southern Africa. We should recognize the Angolan government and continue our efforts to achieve independence for Namibia as quickly as possible. We need to work with the South African government and use what carrots we have, but we also need to use some (small, selective) sticks and seek to put a little more public distance between us and the regime. Constructive engagement can work and we are correct to try to make it work, but once engaged in such a process, we become in a sense a prisoner of the process, and if it does not work, we will be blamed in Africa for the likely violent result. Thus it is crucial that we now begin to cash in some of the chips we have earned with the South African government over the last four years in order to achieve more meaningful changes on the

questions of apartheid and black political rights. For we must never forget that even though we have great interests in South Africa, our interests in black Africa are at least as great, and I believe in total even greater.

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