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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAM
(U) FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON DC
OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY 12 APR 85

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
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U.S. Department
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Federal Aviation
Administration

Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of The Civil Aviation Security Program

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AD-A159 511

July 1 - December 31, 1984

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April 1985

Report of the Administrator
of the Federal Aviation Administration
to the United States Congress
pursuant to Section 315(a)
of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958

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15. Supplementary Notes This report is required by Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.												
16. Abstract This report provides details on the effectiveness of security screening of passengers and all property intended to be carried in the aircraft cabin in air transportation or intrastate air transportation. It also provides a statistical summary of aircraft hijackings and alleged violations of Federal Aviation regulations pertaining to security screening.												
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US Department
of Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

APR 12 1985

The Honorable George Bush
President of the Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to forward the Federal Aviation Administration's Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period July 1 through December 31, 1984, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

During this reporting period, there were two U.S. air carrier hijackings. This low number of hijackings clearly attests to the success of the air-line passenger screening system in the United States. In contrast, there were 14 foreign air carrier aircraft hijacked outside the United States during this same period. Most of these hijackings can be attributed to weak or non-existent passenger screening procedures. These foreign hijackings are of particular concern because the majority were committed by dissident political elements, thus meeting the criteria for terrorist incidents.

A report has also been sent to the Speaker of the House.

Sincerely,


Donald D. Engen
Administrator

Enclosure

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I. EXECUTIVE HIGHLIGHTS

1. THIS REPORT COVERS THE PERIOD JULY - DECEMBER 1984.
2. OVER 408.2 MILLION PERSONS WERE PROCESSED THROUGH U.S. PASSENGER CHECKPOINTS. THERE WERE 1,632 FIREARMS DETECTED WITH 720 RELATED ARRESTS.
3. WORLDWIDE, 16 HIJACKINGS OCCURRED (12 SUCCESSFUL) AGAINST SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS. TWO WERE AGAINST U.S. AIRLINES (1 SUCCESSFUL).
4. ONE SUCCESSFUL FOREIGN GENERAL AVIATION HIJACKING OCCURRED BUT NO U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT WERE HIJACKED DURING THE PERIOD.
5. ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS BY AIR CARRIERS, AIRPORTS, AND INDIVIDUALS TOTALED 1,719.
6. OF THE 1,719 ALLEGED SECURITY VIOLATIONS, 182 RESULTED IN CIVIL PENALTIES TOTALING \$74,545.

II. INTRODUCTION

This is the 21st Semiannual Report to Congress on the Effectiveness of the Civil Aviation Security Program. It covers the period July 1 - December 31, 1984, and is submitted in accordance with section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act. This report presents a concise picture of the national situation with regard to the effectiveness of the procedures utilized to screen passengers and visitors and their carryon items prior to boarding scheduled and public charter flights.

III. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

A certificate holder is defined in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Part 105 as a person holding a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operating certificate when that person engages in scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operations or both. To differentiate between air carrier and general aviation hijackings, all hijackings of certificate holder aircraft are designated as air carrier hijackings.

There were two U.S. scheduled air carrier hijackings during this reporting period, one of which was successful and ended in Cuba. Of the 5 air carrier hijackings during 1984, 3 were successful to Cuba, 1 to New York, and 1 to Atlanta, Georgia. On a positive note, only 1 of the hijackings to Cuba in 1984, perpetrated by a Spanish-speaking male, used an alleged bottle of flammable liquid compared to 5 hijackings during 1983. There were no U.S. general aviation aircraft hijacked during this reporting period; however, there were 2 U.S. general aviation hijackings during the first half of 1984.

During the 6-month reporting period, 14 foreign air carrier aircraft were hijacked, 11 of these hijackings were successful. There was also 1 successful hijacking of a foreign general aviation aircraft.

(See Exhibits 1, 2, and 3)

The number of hijacking attempts or other crimes against civil aviation prevented or deterred by airline and airport security procedures cannot be determined with certainty. However, the number of firearms detected at passenger screening points under suspicious circumstances and the number of individuals apprehended while attempting to gain unauthorized access to aircraft indicate that some of these individuals were intent on committing a crime. The FAA has attempted to identify, record, and report incidents in which it appeared that individuals intended to hijack an aircraft or commit other crimes against civil aviation but were prevented from doing so by airline and airport security measures. As noted elsewhere in this report, 1,632 firearms were detected at screening points during this reporting period. While the number of incidents in which an aircraft hijacking or related criminal act against civil aviation was prevented cannot be determined with certainty, in one specific incident during the

last half of 1984, the circumstances tend to support that likelihood. This raises the estimated total number of hijackings or related crimes against civil aviation believed prevented since 1973 to a total of 112.

(See Exhibit 4)

IV. BASIC POLICIES - SCOPE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The overall success of the U.S. Civil Aviation Security Program can be largely attributed to the cooperative attitude and mutually supportive efforts of the airlines, airports, local communities, the Federal Government, and the passengers. Basic policies guiding the program recognize airline responsibilities for the safety of passengers, baggage, cargo, and aircraft. Airport operators are responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing necessary law enforcement support for airline and airport security measures. Finally, with the inclusion of security costs in airline ticket prices, the passengers, who are the principal beneficiaries of the security program, pay the costs via the domestic airline fares. Since the initiation of strengthened security measures in 1973, almost 6 billion persons have been screened and over 7.4 billion carryon items have been inspected. This screening and inspection activity has resulted in the detection of over 31,000 firearms with almost 13,000 associated arrests.

(See Exhibits 5 and 6)

V. PASSENGER SCREENING

Airline passenger screening procedures which include 100 percent inspection of all passengers and their carryon items have been in effect since 1973. During the 12 years these screening procedures have been used, there has been a dramatic overall decrease in the number of hijackings of U.S. air carrier aircraft. Since the initiation of these procedures, there have been 96 air carrier aircraft hijackings. This amounts to an average of 8 hijackings per year. The 2 hijackings during this reporting period, 1 of which ended in Cuba, represents a small decrease from the 3 hijackings which occurred during the first half of 1984. The 5 hijackings that occurred during 1984 are a dramatic decrease from the 18 hijackings which occurred in 1983, and are the least number of hijackings in any year since 1976.

Detection of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices is the primary objective of passenger screening activities. These items are of particular concern and pose the greatest security threat to civil aviation. The FAA's analysis of screening checkpoint activity includes the recording

and study of the number of firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices detected and false threats received, as well as related information received concerning arrests of individuals. Results of U.S. screening activities for the last 6 months of 1984 are detailed as follows:

During the last half of 1984, over 408.2 million persons were processed through screening checkpoints at 392 airports. A total of 1,632 firearms were detected. X-ray inspection accounted for 1,519 (93 percent) of the firearms detected, 43 (3 percent) were detected by use of the metal detector, and 65 (4 percent) were detected as the result of physical search. The total number of firearms detected is 23 percent higher than the average of 1,258 firearms detected during the preceding 8 reporting periods and 19 percent higher than the 1,325 firearms detected during the first half of 1984. During the current period, there were 2 military explosive/incendiary devices detected by X-ray inspection of carryon items.

There were 720 persons arrested at screening points for carrying firearms. This represents an increase of 113 (16 percent) over the average of 607 arrests for the preceding 8 reporting periods and an increase of 155 (22 percent) from the 565 which occurred during the first 6 months of 1984.

The 720 arrests were made at screening points at 84 airports through the United States. Screening activities are analyzed within airport categories according to the number of persons screened per year as follows: Category I - 2 million or more; Category II - 500,000 to 2 million; and Categories III and IV - under 500,000. Passenger screening is conducted at Category IV airports only when deplanement into a sterile area at another airport is desired. Of the 720 arrests, 608 (84 percent) occurred at 50 Category I airports (e.g., Los Angeles, California; and Chicago, Illinois); 79 (11 percent) occurred at 20 Category II airports (e.g., Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina; and Colorado Springs, Colorado); and the remaining 33 (5 percent) occurred at 14 Categories III and IV airports (e.g., Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and Roanoke, Virginia). In addition to criminal prosecutive actions by Federal and local jurisdictions, the FAA may take civil action against individuals who, without proper authorization, attempt to carry a firearm or explosive/incendiary device through screening checkpoints.

The equipment primarily used to conduct screening operations consists of walk-through weapon detectors for the screening of passengers and, at high-volume screening checkpoints, X-ray inspection systems for carryon articles. At most stations, hand-held metal detection devices are used as backup support for the walk-through weapon detection devices. The FAA, in conjunction with the airline industry, has ongoing research and developmental projects geared toward producing new screening equipment which will improve detection capabilities and minimize passenger inconvenience.

(See Exhibit 7)

VI. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT

The FAA is responsible for ensuring compliance by airlines, airports, and individuals with the various security requirements imposed by pertinent regulations. The basic purpose of these requirements is to assure safety and security for airline passengers and crewmembers. Alleged or apparent violations of regulatory requirements are investigated and appropriate administrative or legal actions taken.

Success in achieving compliance by all concerned is primarily dependent upon the degree of cooperation between industry personnel and the persons responsible for enforcement of the regulations. Air carriers and airport operators generally take prompt corrective action on their own when a potential problem is recognized, thus reducing the need for more extensive enforcement action. In instances where an investigation of an alleged violation of the regulations indicates lack of compliance, administrative or legal action may be necessary. These actions take the form of warnings, letter of correction, or assessment of civil penalties. During the last half of 1984, 1,719 investigations of alleged security violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 182 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$74,545 were collected, and in 1,406 cases, administrative corrective action was taken. In the remaining 131 cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated. The total number of investigations closed during the second half of 1984 represents a 50 percent increase over the number of investigations closed during the first half of 1984.

During the calendar year 1984, 2,863 investigations of alleged violations by air carriers, foreign air carriers, airports, and individuals were completed. In 317 of the cases, civil penalties totaling \$154,479 were collected, and in 2,321 cases, administrative corrective action was taken. In the remaining 225 cases, the alleged violations were not substantiated.

(See Exhibit 8)

VII. OUTLOOK

The effectiveness of civil aviation security measures will continue to improve throughout the world; however, despite a decrease in the number of hijackings during the past year, the hijack threat persists indicating that continuing civil aviation security measures remain necessary.

During the past year, acts of sabotage and an increase in terrorist hijackings overseas have become of increased concern. Two detonations occurred aboard foreign air carriers inflight, injuring 24 people, and five explosions occurred at foreign airports, killing 67 people and injuring 251 others. In addition, a number of incidents occurred overseas

in which hidden explosives were detected in so called "suitcase bombs." These explosives were detected at airports prior to boarding or at the completion of a flight. The increase in the number of explosions and the number of explosive detections indicate that sabotage may become the primary threat to civil aviation as opposed to hijacking.


Another concern is the increase in the number of foreign air carrier hijackings during June through December 1984 that were committed by groups of politically-motivated hijackers. These groups could be labeled terrorist. This trend increased world concerns when the December 4 hijacking of a Kuwait Airways aircraft to Tehran, Iran resulted in the torturing and beating of passengers and the murder of two U.S. citizens.

Despite the preventive measures taken, it is believed that civil aviation, because it is a dramatic target, will remain tempting and vulnerable to the mentally disturbed, and criminal and terrorist elements. There is, however, an effective security system in place and with the continued cooperation of representatives of airlines and airports as well as the flying public, the United States will continue to be successful in keeping the U.S. air transportation system safe from criminal acts.



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Hijacking Attempts on U.S. Scheduled Air Carrier Aircraft



-Hijacking Successful (S) - Includes all carrier letters as defined in Code of Federal Regulations Title 14 Part 105.

-Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended during landing or a result of that person.

U.S. Aircraft Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1968

Date	Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination
211	AA-680B-777	152	Port Au Prince, Haiti	New York, N.Y. LFO
327	PA-618-731	98	Charleston, S.C.	Cuba
378	DL-367-8777	28	New Orleans, LA	Cuba
1129	EA-1082-HP-13	13	Augusta, GA	Atlanta, GA
1231	AA-608-DC-10	198	St. Croix, Virgin Islands	Cuba


EXHIBIT 1

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Hijacking Attempts on U.S. And Foreign Aircraft*



*Includes General Aviation Aircraft


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EXHIBIT 2



U.S. Department
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Hijacking Attempts on U.S. General Aviation Aircraft



* Hijacking in which hijacker is apprehended during hijacking or as a result of "hot pursuit."

General Aviation Aircraft Hijacking Attempts Since Jan. 1, 1968


Date	Aircraft	Number Aboard	Hijacker's Boarding Point	Hijacker's Destination
1/11	Piper-35	2	Palmer, MT	Escape Attempt
2/10	Piper-Horshipp	10	Evansville, IN	Escape Attempt

As of: 1/1/85



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Actual Hijackings & Prevented Hijacking Attempts — 1974 to Present (U.S. Air Carrier Aircraft)



Calendar Year

PREVENTED ATTEMPTS: Incidents in which it appeared the individuals involved intended to hijack an aircraft but were prevented from doing so by security procedures.

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Civil Aviation Security Basic Policies

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>RESPONSIBILITY</u>	<u>ACTIONS</u>
AIR CARRIERS	SECURE TRAVEL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS • SCREEN PASSENGERS, CARRY-ON ITEMS • SECURE BAGGAGE, CARGO PROCEDURES • PROTECT AIRCRAFT
AIRPORTS	SECURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MAINTAIN RESPONSIVE SECURITY PROGRAMS • PROTECT AIR OPERATIONS AREA • PROVIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT
FAA	LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IDENTIFY AND ANALYZE THREAT • PRESCRIBE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS • COORDINATE SECURITY OPERATIONS • PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE • ENFORCE REGULATIONS
USERS	PROGRAM COSTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SECURITY FUNDED AS OPERATING COST OF SYSTEM



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Civil Aviation Security Scope and Effectiveness 1973-1984

- Almost 6 Billion Persons Screened
- Over 7.4 Billion Pieces of Carry-on Items Inspected
- Over 31,000 Firearms Detected
- Almost 13,000 Related Arrests
- 112 Hijackings or Related Crimes May Have Been Prevented
by Airline and Airport Security Measures

EXHIBIT 6

As of: 1/1/85



US Department
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Civil Aviation Security Airline Passenger Screening Results January 1979-December 1984

	1979		1980		1981		1982		1983		1984	
	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec	Jan-June	July-Dec
Persons Screened (Millions)	265.7	306.8	269.9	255.1	294.4	304.1	319.5	310.7	313.9	355.2	367.4	408.2
Weapons Detected												
Firearms	988	1171	1002	1020	971	1204	1266	1308	1363	1421	1325	1632
(1) Handguns	902	1060	940	938	915	1209	1243	1316	1303	1331	1265	1501
(2) Long Guns	29	26	17	19	7	37	16	41	22	45	31	69
(3) Other	58	85	45	63	49	38	27	33	38	45	29	62
Explosive/Incendiary Devices	3	0	1	7	8	3	0	1	4	0	4	?
Persons Arrested												
For Carriage of Firearms/Explosives	488	591	528	511	534	653	651	663	633	649	585	720
For Giving False Information	21	26	11	21	34	15	21	6	7	27	6	21

Source: Reports of Passenger Screening Activities at U.S. Airports

EXHIBIT 7

As of: 1/1/85



U.S. Department
of Transportation
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Civil Aviation Security Compliance and Enforcement Actions

	1973 through 1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
U.S. AIR CARRIERS									
Warnings	599	276	266	283	154	465	164	231	191
Letters of Correction	514	109	145	102	100	57	98	51	104
Non Enforcement Actions	273	61	65	49	55	38	44	57	33
Civil Penalties (Amount)	241 (\$210,700)	43 (\$66,700)	30 (\$23,300)	26 (\$18,075)	48 (\$42,875)	35 (\$72,547)	28 (\$10,508)	31 (\$76,861)	56 (\$67,308)
Investigations Closed	1,677	489	506	460	347	910	334	371	364
Investigations Pending		61	48	80	117	115	91	163	88
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS									
Warnings	0	0	0	14	4	3	2	3	5
Letters of Correction	12	11	11	6	4	0	2	1	0
Non Enforcement Actions	5	2	3	3	15	1	2	2	3
Civil Penalties (Amount)	0	0	0	0	0	2 (\$25,000)	0	0	3 (\$6,000)
Investigations Closed	17	13	14	23	23	6	6	6	11
Investigations Pending		2	12	15	5	2	4	4	1
AIRPORTS									
Warnings Issued	268	137	168	80	83	63	59	57	43
Letters of Correction	259	53	65	53	91	14	21	9	14
Non Enforcement Actions	50	23	20	12	23	19	9	18	16
Civil Penalties (Amount)	50 (\$32,800)	12 (\$3,500)	11 (\$7,500)	19 (\$15,150)	13 (\$15,600)	23 (\$21,675)	8 (\$ 6,300)	8 (\$7,750)	7 (\$8,750)
Investigations Closed	825	225	264	164	210	119	97	92	88
Investigations Pending		23	29	69	48	25	18	14	12
GENERAL									
Administrative Corrections	28	81	88	617	1,469	2,168	2,267	2,074	1,984
Non Enforcement Actions	43	24	18	87	162	209	161	207	173
Civil Penalties (Amount)	2 (\$375)	4 (\$2,050)	9 (\$1,925)	70 (\$11,300)	155 (\$27,210)	231 (\$49,410)	114 (\$28,095)	278 (\$64,198)	251 (\$78,428)
Investigations Closed	73	108	95	774	1,786	2,608	2,542	2,951	2,388
Investigations Pending		14	45	382	475	398	483	569	682

EXHIBIT 6

As of: 1/1/85

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