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represents well coordinated offensive efforts utilizing good combined arms techniques. As usual, massive supply problems and extensive engineering efforts complicated matters for division operation planners. (author)

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 Capt. Warren E. Miller, MAJ
 Capt. Dennis W. Morin, MAJ
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 Capt. Timothy J. Wilcox, MAJ

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OPERATION JOSS

AMPHIBIOUS/DELIBERATE ASSAULT/OFFENSIVE

Allied:

3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced)

Axis:

207th Coastal Division (Italian)

26th Assietta Division (Italian)

4th Livorno Division (Italian)

28th Acosta Division (Italian)

54th Napoli Division (Italian)

15th Panzer Grenadier Division (German)

10 - 16 July 1943

Prepared by: Staff Group B/Section 3

Staff Group Leader: MAJ (P) Richard M. Colbert, MP
MAJ Joseph W. Bowab, TC MAJ Martha G. James, AG
MAJ Zale E. Cook, FA MAJ Warren E. Mills, AR
MAJ Deli L. Dailey, IN MAJ Dennis W. Morin, AD
MAJ Jerry A. DeMoney, MI MAJ (P) David L. Wheeler, IN
Lt. Col. Abbass Tawfik Fouad, MAJ Timothy J. Wilcox, QM
Egyptian Rangers

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Fort Leavenworth

May 1984

ABSTRACT

COMMON REFERENCE: Operation JOSS (part of Operation HUSKEY)
10-16 July 1943

TYPE OPERATION: Amphibious/Deliberate Assault/Offensive

OPPOSING FORCES: Allied : 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced)

Axis : 207th Coastal Division (Italian)
26th Assietta Division (Italian)
4th Livorno Division (Italian)
28th Acosta Division (Italian)
54th Napoli Division (Italian)
15th Panzer Grenadier Division (German)

SYNOPSIS: The 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced) with the 3rd Ranger Battalion and CCA, 2nd Armd Division, conducted an amphibious assault to capture the port city of Licata, Sicily, and an adjoining airfield on 10 July 1943. This action was part of a larger campaign to capture Sicily (HUSKEY) in order to conduct further operations against the Italian mainland. The initial assault was conducted by one battalion from each of the Infantry Regiments plus the 3rd Ranger Battalion. By evening, D-Day, the Division was in possession of an eight by fifteen mile beachhead and nearly 3,000 prisoners. While this was primarily an infantryman's campaign, JOSS represents well coordinated offensive efforts utilizing good combined arms techniques. As usual, massive joint supply problems and extensive engineering efforts complicated matters for division operation planners.

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Command Missions , by Lucien K. Truscott.

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CONTENTS

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
	TITLE PAGE	i
	ABSTRACT	ii
	CONTENTS	iii
I	OPERATION JOSS	1
	A. Background	1
	B. Sources	3
II	THE STRATEGIC SETTING	5
	A. The Causes of the Conflict	5
	B. The Principal Antagonists	7
III	THE TACTICAL SITUATION	29
	A. Area of Operations	29
	1. The Climate and Weather	29
	2. The Terrain (OCOKA)	30
	B. The Combat Effectiveness of the Opposing Forces	34
	1. Strength and Composition of the Opposing Forces	34
	2. Technology	41
	3. Logistical and Administrative Systems	44
	4. Command, Control, and Communications Systems	55
	5. Intelligence	60
	6. Doctrine/Training	62
	7. Leadership	65
	8. Condition and Morale	67
	C. Immediate Military Objectives of the Antagonists	68
	D. Courses of Action	72
IV	THE ACTION	76
	RED BEACH (7TH RCT)	79
	GREEN BEACH (2/15 INF AND 3RD RANGER BN)	81
	YELLOW BEACH (15TH RCT (-))	82
	BLUE BEACH (30TH RCT)	83
	D-DAY SUMMARY	84
	ENEMY ACTIONS	85
	3RD DIVISION'S ACTIONS	88
	MOVE TO AGRIGENTO AND PORTO EMPEDOCLE	94

SECTION	TITLE	PAGE
✓	THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION	99
	A. Immediate Significance	99
	B. Long Term Significance	100
	C. Military Lessons Learned	102
	1. Command and Control	103
	2. Intelligence	108
	3. Deception	109
	4. Training	110
	5. Logistics and Administration	113
	6. Naval	114
	7. Equipment	116
	8. Army Air Force	118
	9. Tactics	119
	 BIBLIOGRAPHY	 121
	APPENDIX A - 207TH COASTAL DIVISION	A-1
	APPENDIX B - AREA OF OPNS, 207TH COASTAL DIV	B-1
	APPENDIX C - ASSAULT BEACHES, OPERATION JOSS	C-1
	APPENDIX D - JOSS ADVANCE, 10 JULY 1943	D-1
	APPENDIX E - JOSS ADVANCE 11-12 JULY 1943	E-1
	APPENDIX F - JOSS INVASION OBJECTIVES	F-1
	APPENDIX G - THE SEIZURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORT EMPEDOCLE 14-18 JULY 1943	G-1

I OPERATION JOSS.

A. Background. At 0245 hours, 10 July 1942, the JOSS Assault of Operation "HUSKY" kicked off. The reinforced 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Major General L. K. Truscott, Jr., landed on the southwestern coast of Sicily near LICATA to begin a drive that carried through to PALERMO. The forces directly opposing the 3rd Infantry Division were five Italian divisions (207th Coastal Division, 26th Assietta Division, 4th Livorno Division, 28th Acosta Division, and the 54th Napoli Division) and the German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (-). The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division was the only German force identified as directly opposing the JOSS Force. The planning for this operation started at the Casablanca Conference. During the Casablanca Conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff planned for securing the Allied sea lanes through the Mediterranean and for knocking Italy out of the war. Once Italy fell, the Germans would be required to meet the Allied pressure from the south by diverting forces from the Russian front. An Allied invasion anywhere in the Mediterranean would serve this purpose. However, the invasion of Sicily was particularly important to securing the sea lines of communication (SLOC's) and insuring the fall of Italy. [1]

The airfields of Sicily had been key in control of the

1. Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, US Army in World War II, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Sicily, and the Surrender of Italy (Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 52.

SLOC's. The Axis powers were able to interdict all attempts to use the routes in the Mediterranean for resupply. The Allied powers needed to test the strength of resistance in Sicily. The feeling was that Italy would fall without question once a major combat offensive was launched against Sicily. The planning to control the Mediterranean continued from the Casablanca conference to the Trident Conference. A decision was then made to invade Italy with the operation on Sicily being the first step in the plan. The overall operation was named "HUSKY." This included the entire Mediterranean invasion force. Sicily was to be the first part of operation HUSKY and the 3rd Infantry Division's roll was named Operation "JOSS." The 3rd Infantry Division was under control of the 7th Army, commanded by LT GEN G. S. Patton, Jr., for the operation. General Patton assigned the II Corps the bulk of the assault forces and kept the 3rd Division under his control. The terrain and beach conditions caused General Patton to use the II Corps to seize the key terrain and airfields. The 3rd Division, which was reinforced with combat and combat service support units, would attack LICATA and establish the beachhead in the west. [2]

The 3rd Division had two general missions. The capture of LICATA and its port and airfield was to be accomplished by nightfall. The next mission was to establish the planned

2. Ibid., p. 97.

beachhead and maintain contact with Lt. General Bradley's II Corps. [3]

The reinforced 3d Division was a force of 45,000 men. This force was to land on a front of more than 12 miles with the objective being to take LICATA, the port facilities, and the road network. The next step was to move inland about 3 miles and take the airfield. [4]

B. Sources. The sources of information came from operational histories, battle journals, after action reports, and biographies. The bibliography was developed by researching the 3rd Infantry Division History and the code name "JOSS." No oral historical interviews were available or conducted.

The biography, Command Missions, by Lieutenant General L. K. Truscott, JR., is an account of GEN Truscott's personal experiences and was written entirely by himself. It is a frank record of his impressions and reactions to other military leaders he had served with. The book provides an accurate account of the planning and conduct of JOSS. It serves as an excellent source to tie together all of the other sources and gives the reader a central focus as seen by the commander.

The Operations Report of the Third Infantry Division Sicilian Operation was written by Lieutenant Colonel A. O. Connor and is another excellent source that provides the reader

3. Ibid., p. 98.

4. Ibid., p. 99.

with an understanding of the magnitude of the operation along with the enormous logistical and training requirements. The remaining sources listed in the bibliography serve to provide the researcher the details needed to analyze JOSS.

II THE STRATEGIC SETTING.

A. The Causes of the Conflict. To understand Germany's war aims in World War II, one has to go back to post World War I and the treaty of Versailles signed with Germany on 28 June 1919. "Germany lost Alsace and Lorraine to France, Eupen and Malmedy to Belgium, Posen and West Prussia to Poland, the ports of Memel and Danzig to the allies. Plebiscites were to decide the future of Upper Silesia, Schleswig and the Saar. The Saar was placed for fifteen years under international administration. Germany lost all her colonies and was disarmed, her army was limited to 100,000 men and the east bank of the Rhine was demilitarised to a depth of 50 miles. The Rhineland was placed under allied administration for fifteen years. Occupation costs were to be borne by Germany. Of the economic clauses the most contentious was Article 231, the War Guilt clause, covering the payment of reparations. Germany had to accept 'responsibility ... for causing all the loss and damage ... as a consequence of the war imposed ... by the aggression of Germany and her allies.'" [5] There were more terms in the treaty which stunned the Germans as they began to comprehend the magnitude of their defeat. The Germans denounced the Treaty of Versailles. It was a humiliating defeat which many German Officers and citizens would not accept. The Germans were further humiliated in 1923 when

5. Anthony P. Adamthwaite, The Making of the Second World War (Great Britain: Devonshire Press, 1977), p. 27.

France, assisted by Belgium, occupied the Ruhr to enforce payment of reparations. "The military occupation increased the internal stresses in German democracy. Germany recovered her prosperity, but the memory of the 1923 episode - hyperinflation, middle-class impoverishment, the humiliation of having French colonial troops on German soil - contributed to the collapse of Weimar after 1929."⁶ In particular, the Germans were galled by the section of the Treaty of Versailles concerning the Rhineland, and in 1936 Hitler, in effect, tore up the treaty when he marched into the Rhineland. The German people were determined to recover the territory taken from them after World War I; they were determined to reestablish Germany as the leading power in Europe; they were determined to ensure the security of the Germanic race by the conquest of bordering territories; and they were determined to obtain more agriculturally useful land. These were Germany's war aims.

In contrast, Italy was on the side of the victors after World War I but Italy was disappointed in her hopes of spoils and thus had no loyalty to the settlement. Mussolini felt that despite the Italians' sacrifices as allies in World War I, at the peace table they had been "left only the crumbs from the sumptuous colonial booty of others." Mussolini wanted to establish Italy as a leading power in Europe. He wanted control of Africa's major independent country, Ethiopia, and he

6. Ibid., p. 38.

wanted control of the Mediterranean. These were Italy's war aims.

"The Western allies entered the war with a two-fold object. The immediate purpose was to fulfill their promise to preserve the independence of Poland. The ultimate purpose was to remove a potential menace to themselves, and thus ensure their own security." [7] The United States entered the war against Germany when Germany declared war on the United States. The United States aim was to defeat Germany first, then Japan. Their basic strategy was the unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany.

B. The Principal Antagonists. The First World War did not destroy German power. The German government's rearmament ventures prior to 1933 were slight, but they took place nonetheless in disregard of the Treaty of Versailles and they were important in "supplying the blueprint and actual framework without which the rise of the Nazi Wehrmacht would have been significantly retarded." [8] In June 1933, Germany stopped payment of all foreign debts. In March 1935, Hitler announced the reintroduction of conscription and an army of thirty-six divisions. In 1936, Hitler proceeded with the remilitarization of Germany's western Rhineland frontier. In February 1938, Hitler reorganized the military leadership and

7. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: Capricorn Books, 1971), p. 3.

8. Hans W. Gatzke, Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1954), p. 3.

assumed personal command of the armed forces. Germany's pre-1939 war effort was much greater than that of Britain, France, or the United States. In 1938, Germany was spending a quarter of her national income on armaments, an increase of 470% from 1934. During the war, Germany maintained a military establishment of 9,835,000, or 10.9% of its population.

The German military was not ready for war. They were very short of artillery and other weapons, and only had a six weeks supply of munitions. Their fortifications were unfinished, they had a shortage of trained reserves, and they lacked raw materials, especially oil. "Apart from coal-derivatives Germany obtained about half a million tons of oil from her own wells, and a trifling amount from Austria and Czecho-Slovakia. To make up her peacetime needs she had to import nearly five million tons, the main sources being Venezuela, Mexico, the Dutch Indies, the United States, Russia, and Rumania. Access to any of the first four would be impossible in wartime, and to the last two only by conquest." [9] Germany needed to capture Rumania's oil-wells in an undamaged state. "Germany had no home production of cotton, rubber, tin, platinum, bauxite, mercury, and mica, while her supplies of iron-ore, copper, antimony, manganese, nickel, sulphur, wool, and petroleum were quite inadequate." [10] These were all

9. Hart, p. 24.

10. Ibid., p. 23 & 24.

materials needed for war production. Seizure of Czecho-Slovakia reduced her deficiency of iron ore. It also increased her amount of military equipment and her ability to produce munitions by seizure of Czecho-Slovakia's munitions factories.

"Germany mobilised ninety-eight divisions, of which fifty-two were active divisions (including six Austrian). Of the remaining forty-six divisions, only ten were fit for action on mobilisation and even in these the bulk of the men were recruits who had only been serving about a month. The other thirty-six divisions consisted mainly of veterans of World War I, forty-year-olds who had little acquaintance with modern weapons and tactics." [11] Germany's air force consisted of 3,356 planes, a tactical air force designed for close support of ground forces. They did not have any heavy bombers, and the reserves were low. The navy had been neglected because Hitler was not interested in it and because he never believed there would be a fight to the finish with Great Britain. The German surface fleet consisted of antiquated and inadequate numbers of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, and E-boats. The submarine fleet was also quite inadequate, consisting of fifty-seven submarines.

"Germany's military traditions were a legacy of its Prussian origins ... These traditions included the social

11. Ibid., p. 18.

exclusiveness of its officers as an aristocratic caste, the military virtues of rectitude and obedience, and a somewhat vague and unspecified position as the guardians of the state's wellbeing as well as its frontiers." [12] The officers were trained in the expertise of individual judgment, they were well educated, and service in the military was considered an honorable duty. The German military was well led, and had proven its ability to wage war successfully in the past. Even though it was defeated in World War I, the German Military had almost defeated four world powers. It was a force to be reckoned with. The German people were led by a man who used fear and persuasion to convince the people that what he was doing was right for Germany. The people were filled with a sense of destiny, so they supported Hitler's grand schemes and thus the army that would make the schemes reality.

In a secret memorandum of 30 May 1939, Mussolini confirmed in writing that Italy would not be ready for war for four years. Between 1860 and 1939, nearly half of Italy's total state expenditure had been used for military purposes, but much of this was squandered and inefficiently used. Italy had no native resources; she had to import the bulk of her needs to include coal.

At the outset of war, Italy had 73 divisions (of which only 10 were ready to fight), 1,500+ planes (only 900+ were

12. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), p.31.

effective), six battleships, a significant number of cruisers and destroyers, and the largest submarine fleet in the world. The military was poorly trained, equipped, and led. Mussolini appointed people into military positions who were loyal to him, whether they had any skill or not. Italy was worse equipped for war, in every way, than she had been when she entered World War I. "Italian artillery in 1940 was still mostly of 1918 vintage and included guns captured from Austria in that year. The rifle issued was that of 1891. There was a serious shortage of anti-aircraft ammunition... A project for making air torpedos and torpedo bombers had been turned down by the chiefs of staff in 1938, and Italy had no aircraft carriers because Mussolini had persuaded himself by one of his slogans that the country was itself one big aircraft carrier and needed no more. There was no naval air arm and there was a complete absence of co-operation at first between navy and air force..." [13]

In 1940, the War Ministry decided to have 2,500,000 men under arms. They began calling up classes of reservists to reinforce the army which had been allowed to stand at only 868,000 men during the winter. Mussolini had let 300,000 reservists go home on furloughs for economic reasons. He could not pay, feed, arm or clothe them. Italy was a poor country and was poorly managed; it could not afford another war.

13. Denis Mack Smith, Italy, A Modern History (Michigan: The U. of Michigan Press, 1959), p. 460.

Italy's unpreparedness was also apparent in industry and administration. Mussolini was relying on the war being so short that there would be no need to convert factories to the large scale production of armaments. Production capacity was seriously under-utilized, and the rich looked for profits rather than converting their factories to the mass production of arms. Mussolini did not encourage mass production because he feared alarming the public by a full-scale mobilization of resources and a policy of austerity. The general population was not supportive of war: Italy was just beginning to recover from the effects of World War I. Another war would only undo what had been accomplished in 20 years. Also, there was widespread anti-German sentiment. The Italians detested their ally, and this was due in part to the German's contempt for the Italians.

As in World War I, the Italian military was catapulted into war totally unprepared, and even though the Italians fought well, they suffered disastrous military defeats which lowered morale and support for the war. Mussolini's military forces were sent everywhere. About 1,200,000 of Italy's best trained soldiers and best equipped units were on foreign soil, with only about 800,000 in Italy (including replacements and troops of the Territorial Defense). By the summer of 1942, Mussolini's personal popularity started to diminish and by early 1943 defeatism became widespread. The Italian people were war-weary, military units had lost confidence in

themselves, and their commanders were without hope of victory.

Before Operation JOSS, eight divisions, including most of Rommel's veterans and the pick of the Italian Army, had been captured in Tunisia. Italy was almost without defensive covering. The Sicily Coastal Division, manned by Sicilian reservists, had the best Italian fighters but they were not good fascists, they dislike the war, and they hated Germans. Italy had no mobile mechanized forces left, and her military chiefs besought the Germans to provide a strong reinforcement of Panzer type divisions. Hitler offered Mussolini five divisions, but Mussolini replied that he only wanted three. Mussolini wanted Italy to be defended by Italians and he did not want the Germans to acquire a dominating position in Italy. As a result, "the Italian garrison of Sicily consisted of only four field divisions and six static coast defense divisions that were poor in equipment and morale. The German drafts in transit to Africa when the collapse occurred were formed into a division and given the title of the '15th Panzergrenadier Division,' but it had only one tank unit. The similarly rebuilt 'Hermann Goering' panzer division was sent to Sicily near the end of June." [14] These units were placed directly under the Italian Army Commander because Mussolini would not allow these two divisions to be constituted as a corps under a German commander. This then was the situation of

14. Hart, p. 436.

the Axis powers in Sicily just prior to Operation JOSS.

"The First World War eroded British power and created a new sense of insecurity. Sea power was no longer sufficient. The development of air power placed Britain's frontiers on the Rhine." [15] Rearmament was not considered until the early 1930's. Economic changes contributed to Britain's loss of power and revolt against colonial rule drained the energy and resources of the country. It wasn't until the months following the Munich settlement that Britain began to devote energy to rearmament. In 1935, rearmament became an official policy. Leading civil servants had drafted a White Paper which depreciated collective security and explained that German rearmament made British rearmament necessary. This paper was approved by the Prime Minister. By 1936, the policy was translated into practice. "Between the beginning of 1936 and the end of 1938, the main progress made was in the enlargement and re-equipment of the R.A.F." [16] New types of aircraft began to appear, and, in February 1936, the Cabinet provided for the construction of 8,000 planes in three years as compared with 3,800 which the previous programs would have produced in two years. By 1938, the Cabinet provided for

15. Adanthwaite, p. 31.

16. Charles Lock Morvat, Britain Between the Wars: 1918-1940 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 626.

12,000 new planes in two years, which was raised to 17,500 just before the war began. The potential of the aircraft industry was so increased that in 1939 deliveries exceeded expectations.

Progress was slower in the other services. The navy began a modest program of expansion in 1935 which was slightly accelerated in 1936. This program was designed to supplement their existing fleet with cruisers and destroyers to provide protection against German attacks on commerce. By 1939, the Navy's main addition was in the construction of trawlers and escort vessels for protection against mines and submarines. "The army had been the most neglected of the services. The regular army consisted of five divisions, of which one (divided into two in 1938) was mobile; but only two were fully equipped by October 1938. Mechanisation was more of a theory than a practice: it was not until 1938 that the army possessed its peacetime complement of wheeled vehicles and half the needed number of tracked vehicles." [17] The Territorial Army was increased from 131,617 in 1935, to 186,421 in 1938 which increased the efficiency of the Regular Army.

The arms industry was expanded after 1936 and stockpiling of strategic materials was begun. "...in October 1938, only two army divisions were fully equipped; by September 1939 there was equipment for five." [18] In 1938, Britain was

17. Ibid., p. 627.

18. Ibid., p. 630.

spending 7% of her national income on rearmament, an increase of 250% from 1934. Yet, these measures still fell short of a full mobilization of the country's resources. Britain was preparing for war in 1940. Even though Britain lacked many of the natural resources needed for war, she could get them through shipping. Carrying capacity, not shipping, proved to be the grave shortage unforeseen before the war. But, even though the Ministry of Shipping could bring in only 30.5 million tons of imports in the second year of the war, this proved to be enough.

By early 1939, British strategy changed and the defense of Britain was understood to involve the defense of France. To defend France, British Expeditionary Forces were to be prepared consisting of 19 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions. Four divisions were ready by September 1939 and six by January 1940. In March 1939, the decision was made to raise the Army to 32 divisions (six regular divisions and 26 territorial divisions) by bringing the Territorial Army to full strength and doubling its size. Conscription was announced in April, limited to men of 20 and 21. Britain would maintain a military of 3,885,000 or 8.2% of its population.

Britain's civil defenses were put in order after Munich. Air raid precautions began in 1935, workers were recruited, and handbooks were prepared. "In January 1939, the government's Guide to National Service was distributed to every household in the kingdom, and everyone was urged to volunteer for service

of some sort." [19] Evacuation plans were finalized.

The country was ill-prepared for war, despite all the previous work. But the British people accepted the decision of Parliament and government without complaint. As Churchill said: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat. You ask, what is our policy? I will say: It is to wage war, by sea, land, and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us ... You ask, What is our aim? I can answer in one word: Victory - victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be." The people of Great Britain had waged war successfully in the past; their citizen-soldiers had risen to the test of battle even though ill-equipped and lacking training. In World War I, there was an extraordinary enthusiasm to enlist, a time of intense, almost mystical patriotism. In World War II, the people's spirit was unshaken by the Blitz. Even though the raids caused much suffering and hardship, in the long term they cemented national unity. The British had supported their government in the past, and they would do it again.

Even though the French were not involved in Operation JOSS, they were one of the important Allied nations involved at the start of the war. France had 110 divisions (65 active to include 5 cavalry divisions, 2 mechanized division and one

19. Ibid., p. 632.

armored division) which were supposedly highly trained and well equipped. However, this force was badly defeated and France collapsed in 1940. Why? The French forces were badly equipped, badly trained, and badly led. Most importantly, their military ideas were out of date. The French high command still regarded tanks through 1918 eyes, and thus they had delayed organizing their tanks into armored divisions. "The French commanders, trained in the slow-motion methods of 1918, were mentally unfit to cope with the panzer pace, and it produced a spreading paralysis among them." [20] The French war doctrine emphasized the defensive, and they placed little or no faith on the value of the offense. The French leadership had developed a fatal degree of self-satisfaction fostered by their victory in World War I. When the German attack in the west opened on 10 May, the French had no strategic reserve. They were reduced to utter inferiority in the air. Gamelin had allowed men to go on leave from 7 May in spite of accurate warnings of the date and place of the German attack. French soldiers hurrying to rejoin their units three days later failed to find them before they were overwhelmed. The defenders of the Maginot Line surrendered on the 17th of June and France sued for an armistice the same day.

There were other problems which contributed to France's downfall. The French had compulsory military service after

20. Hart, p. 73-74.

World War I, and the length of service was doubled in 1935 because of the growing difference between the size of the French and German annual contingents. However, their mobilization system was out of date because they relied on a conscript army. The conscript army could not be effective until the mass of trained reserves had been called up from their civil jobs, and this took too long. French military expenditures were reduced in 1932-3 as a gesture of goodwill in the disarmament talks with Germany, and French rearmament did not begin until the autumn of 1936. The French refused to put their laws for national organization into operation until the actual outbreak of war because military and political authorities were convinced it would be a long war, and there would be time. In the vital sectors of tanks and aircraft, industry was producing too many types and too few machines. French tanks were too lightly armored to survive and their tactics were obsolete. The air force had adopted a modernization plan in 1934 but four years later, when the Czech crisis came, its first line strength was below 1400. Transport, clothing, and light weapons were in short supply. Financial and economic constraints imperiled rearmament as in August 1938 the French foreign minister warned that "if France should continue to arm at the present rate it would be necessary to regiment the entire country, placing the civilian population on soldiers' wages and soldiers' rations." [21]

21. Adamthwaite, p. 65.

After World War I, the U.S. held itself aloof from the world and dedicated itself to a nationalistic foreign policy. By the 1930's, isolationism had come into being and there was indifference on the part of many Americans towards affairs in other parts of the world. In August of 1935, February of 1936, and May of 1937, Congress passed a series of Neutrality Acts. These acts prohibited the export of arms and ammunition to belligerents. Strategic materials designated as such by the President had to be paid for in cash before leaving the U.S., and they had to be carried in foreign ships, rather than U.S. flag vessels. All other materials had to be paid for in cash. No American citizen was to take passage on the ship of a belligerent, and there were to be no American loans to any state at war.

The U.S. had no intention of being dragged into another war. In 1938, the Americans led the other Western Hemisphere states in reaffirming their opposition to foreign intervention. But affairs overseas could not be totally ignored. In January 1939, Congress voted \$552,000,000.00 for defense measures. Also, the U.S. permitted the French and British to place large orders for aircraft with American manufacturers. French government contracts, to a very large extent, enabled the American aerospace industry to dominate the world from 1941 on. On June 22, as the French government was surrendering to the Germans, Congress passed a National Defense Tax Bill; they raised the ceiling on the national debt to what was then an

unprecedented \$49 billion and introduced taxes to produce almost \$1 billion a year. A month later Congress voted \$37 billion to produce a 'two ocean navy,' guns and tanks for the Army, and planes for the army air force and the navy. It was more money than the entire American cost of World War I."

[22] In September 1940, Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act, the first peacetime draft in the history of the United States. "The act called for the registration of all men between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, and the training, for one year, of 1,200,000 soldiers plus 800,000 reserves. In October, 16,000,000 men registered, and at the end of the month the first draftees were inducted." [23]

In July 1939, the Army had about 174,000 enlisted men scattered among 130 posts and stations. Equipment was obsolete. Army organization was a mere framework and funds for training were inadequate. The Army Air Force did not have training facilities and resorted to civilian flying schools on a temporary basis. In September 1939, President Roosevelt authorized the expansion of the Active Army to 227,000 and the National Guard to 235,000. By May 1940, Congress approved an appropriation of about one billion dollars to increase the Army

22. James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War II (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1988), p. 118.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

by 28,000 men and supplementary appropriations were designed to bring the Army to a total authorized strength of 375,000. As stated before, the Selective Training & Service Act was approved in 1940 and in 1941 the act was revised to extend the one year term of enlistment to 18 months. In January 1942, a new draft law was passed which made men between the ages of 20 and 44 eligible for duty.

By 1941, the Office of Scientific Research and Development had been created from the 1915 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. Scientists aided the war in many ways, only one of which was the development of the atomic bomb. In August 1939, the War Resources Board began a study of War Department plans for mobilizing the national resources for war. By 1942 this office became the War Production Board. Between 1940 and 1944, the labor force rose about 36% and the average work week rose from 37.7 to 46.6 hours. In the peak year of production, 1944, the U.S. produced over 50% more combat munitions than did the enemy and had 45% of the total armament output of all the Axis powers. In 1939, 2,100 military planes were made; in 1942, 48,000 were made; in 1943, 86,000 were made; in 1944, 96,359 were made including 16,078 heavy bombers. It took 244 days to build the first Liberty Ship; by the end of the war it took only 42 days. These are but a few examples of the war production ability of the U.S., which never did reach its peak production ability before the war ended. The allies agreed that the single greatest tangible asset the U.S. brought to the

war effort was production.

Just prior to U.S. entry into the war, the armed forces consisted of about a million and a half men, over a million of whom were but partially trained and poorly armed. The Army Air Force had 1,200 combat aircraft, including 150 four-engine bombers. The Navy consisted of 347 warships, including seventeen battleships and seven aircraft carriers. During the war, the U.S. had 10,500,000 men and women in uniform, or 7.8% of the population.

Americans had been involved in numerous conflicts in the past, and they had always won even though their military was in many cases poorly equipped and trained. The military was only popular during war. Between wars they suffered from a lack of funds, interest, and soldiers. Prior to World War II, the attitude of the civilian population toward the military was no different than in the past. But the military had time to prepare as the war in Europe raged on and it became more and more evident that the U.S. would be involved in the war.

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor so influenced the American public that there was never any problem with public morale and support for the war. The U.S. national purpose was to defend the country and to preserve freedom, democracy, and peace. The people would support that purpose until the war was over.

The Allied and Axis powers had many treaties, agreements, and pacts from the end of World War I through World War II;

too many to write about in this analysis. Many of these commitments failed or were overtaken by events. Some of the more important commitments are as follows:

1. Treaty of Rapallo, 1922. Treaty between Russia and Germany that let Germany's officially nonexistent airman train in Russia, among other things.

2. The Locarno Pact. The formal basis for Western European security for eleven years (1925-36). The pact included a treaty of mutual guarantee of Germany's western frontiers and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Germany, Belgium, and France undertook not to make war on each other and promised to settle disputes by arbitration. Britain and Italy promised to come to the aid of any party which was the victim of a violation of these premises. Arbitration treaties were concluded between Germany, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia. France entered into separate treaties with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia.

3. Disarmament Conference, Feb 1932. Several proposals were made but in the end (October 1933) Hitler gave notice of Germany's withdrawal from the conference and of his intended resignation from the League of Nations. German rearmament was begun.

4. Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 18 June 1935. Britain allowed German naval rearmament to up to 35% of British tonnage and 45% of British submarine strength or up to 100% in exceptional circumstances. This treaty violated the Treaty of Versailles and was made without France receiving any prior

notice, helping to divide Britain and France.

5. Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936. Between Germany and Japan. Italy joined this pact in 1937 and withdrew from the League of Nations. This was not a military alliance but there were grounds for supposing that the three would act together.

6. 19 March 1936. The four Locarno powers, Britain, France, Belgium, and Italy, renewed their obligations. It was also agreed that in the event of an unprovoked German attack on France, and subject to the decision of the government of the day, two infantry divisions would be sent to France. This offer of two divisions was Britain's first permanent military commitment since World War I.

7. Non-Intervention Agreement, 2 August 1936. France, seconded by Britain, proposed a Non-Intervention Agreement after the Spanish government asked for help and received a promise of assistance. Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union also signed the agreement which proved a complete farce. Britain alone respected it.

8. Pact of Steel, May 1939. Italy pledged to support Germany with all her military forces.

9. Non-Aggression Pact, 23 August 1939. Pact between Russia and Germany accompanied by a secret agreement under which Poland was to be partitioned between Germany and Russia.

10. Anglo-Polish Treaty of Alliance, 25 August 1939. Britain pledged to support Poland.

11. Tripartite Pact, 27 September 1940. Italy, Japan, and Germany agreed to come to the aid of each other in the event of an attack by any state not yet at war.

12. ABC-1 Report, January 1941. Agreement between U.S. and Britain that Germany was the main enemy and their first objective.

13. Arcadia Conference, December 1941. Anglo-Americans reaffirmed decision to defeat Germany first.

14. Casablanca Conference, January 1943. U.S. and Britain agreed to General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander in the Mediterranean theater and the invasion of Sicily.

A number of events took place prior to the invasion of Sicily of which Operation JOSS was a part. The most important event was the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 where President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met with the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff. By this time the strategic initiative had passed to the Allies. The Russians had broken through behind Stalingrad, the British had achieved victory at El Alamein, and the Anglo-Americans had occupied French northwest Africa. The Allies finally had a degree of freedom in selecting their next move or objective.

The purposes of the invasion of Sicily were to secure the Mediterranean sea lanes, to divert pressure from the Russian front (Germany would probably move 4 to 6 divisions into Italy against the threat), and to intensify pressure on Italy which might force it to withdraw from the war. Also considered was

inducement of Turkey to support the Allies (grant to Allies air bases from which to launch attacks against the German oil supply in Rumania), and maintaining the momentum of the North African campaign. Allied possession of Sicily would insure a sheltered corridor between the island and the African north coast, the Allied line of seaborne supply which stretched from Gibraltar past Sicily to Suez and the Far East. The great economy in shipping tonnage to be obtained was a major consideration.

The Americans and the British were in disagreement about the invasion of Sicily. The Americans held that Germany was the prime enemy and the quickest way to end the war was to assemble a massive force in England and send it across the English Channel, through France, and into the Third Reich. A compromise was finally agreed upon when it became clear that they still didn't have enough strength to launch the cross-channel invasion. "Therefore, to maintain their momentum and give employment to their battle-trained troops in Africa, they would attack and occupy Sicily - but not necessarily as a prelude to further campaigns on the Italian mainland." [24]

Hitler thought the Allies were more likely to land in Sardinia rather than Sicily, and in Greece. Therefore, on Hitler's order, the 1st Panzer Division was sent from France to Greece (to support the three German infantry divisions and the

24. Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1978), p.19.

Italian 11th Army), and General Student's 11th Air Corps (consisting of two parachute divisions) was sent to the south of France to deliver an airborne counterattack against a landing in Sardinia. The newly formed 90th Panzergrenadier Division was sent to Sardinia to reinforce four Italian divisions on that island.

The Sicilian conquest broke the power of Mussolini. Opposition had begun to develop prior to the invasion of Sicily, but when the forces on Sicily collapsed, the King of Italy notified Mussolini of his dismissal. High military officers and certain Fascist leaders took the actual steps leading to Mussolini's downfall when they engineered a vote against him at a session of the Fascist Grand Council. In August 1943, General Guiseppe Castellano secretly met British and American military representatives and offered to switch sides and become an ally against Germany. On September 3, Marshal Badoglio, new Head of the Italian government, notified the Italian people of the surrender and ordered the Italian armies to cease fighting the British and American forces, and to oppose attack from any quarter. On this same day, the invasion of Italy was begun.

III THE TACTICAL SITUATION.

A. The Area of Operations.

1. The Climate and Weather. The climate and weather in Sicily at this time of year generally facilitates combat operations. Although an unseasonable storm did move through the area just prior to the landings, the storm abated by the time the landings were made and the weather remained clear. As such the weather, because of clear visibility and the ability to adjust long range fires accurately, favored the enemy.

The month of July was and is the dry season for this area with temperatures averaging between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The visibility is generally good during the day with better than 6 miles visibility more than 27 days out of the month. Thunderstorms occur between .33 and 2.3 days per month (island-wide). However, these brief episodes of moisture are quickly absorbed by the SCIROCCO winds. These same winds often bring dust during the dry season, especially along unsurfaced roads and trails.

Although fog is not uncommon along the coast and on the open sea, it is generally patchy at worst during the summer season. An early morning fog is not unusual along the northern coastline on the Tyrrhenian Sea, but this is well removed from the operational area. Haze is not unusual in the LICATA area and can be expected on days with the dry SCIROCCO wind. However, on D-Day, the visibility was crystal clear due to the

recent rains.

Sicilian rivers are relatively short and their courses generally steep, running from the hills directly into the sea. None of the rivers in the southwestern part of Sicily are considered perennial and therefore are passable in summer except after a heavy rain.

Air movement was also facilitated by the good weather. The absence of heavy clouds, strong winds, and storms made flying conditions excellent. Night operations were likewise enhanced with the good weather.

Only three special considerations had to be planned for due to the weather. First, dust from the Scirocco wind and dry terrain in conjunction with the sand from the beaches required prompt and frequent cleaning of all machinery and weapons. Second, the dry weather required more attention to potable water resupply. And finally, special smoke munitions and generators were required to protect the amphibious operation and subsequent troop movements.

Therefore, weather and climate had only a negligible effect on D-Day and subsequent operations with the sole exception of giving the enemy the advantage of long range visibility.

2. The Terrain (COCKA). Since Operation JOSS was an amphibious landing, the terrain played a significant part in the operation. Air photographs of the area were

obtained during the planning stage. These photographs were used to develop the tactical plans for each unit. The photographs proved to be extremely accurate and provided detailed analysis of the area. Detailed topographical information and data on enemy defenses were provided for essential planning actions. [25]

The enemy forces had a clear advantage for observation and fire on the battlefield. The low rolling ground around the port city of LICATA is dominated to the west by a long steep ridge. The rolling ground around LICATA extends for a radius of six miles. A ring of hills which rise from 1200 to 1600 feet surround the rolling land as you exit LICATA. These hills have steep walled ravines and rocky ridges which favor the defender. Observation and fields of fire over the area surrounding LICATA and the beaches are good. [26]

Cover and concealment were to the advantage of the enemy. The landing over open beaches offered little or no natural cover or concealment. Operation JOSS was a beach assault in five areas as listed below:

Beach No: 70-A-JOSS Color: Blue

Beach No: 70-B-JOSS Color: Yellow

25. HQS, Third Infantry Division, Ltr, Subject: Report of Operation
(APO #3, 10 Sep 43), p. 21.

26. Third Infantry Division (Reinf), "In Which We Carve Our Name," Troop List - Operation JOSS,
p. 52-53.

Beach No: 71-JOSS Color: Green-East

Beach No: 72-JOSS Color: Green-West

Beach No: 73-JOSS Color: Red

The Blue beach was composed of fine sand with low dunes in the west and firmer sand in the east. Approaches to Blue beach were clear with rock patches to each flank. The length of the beach was between 1500 and 1600 yards with a width of 30 to 50 yards. Obstacles were located to the west of Blue beach. The obstacles consisted of an antitank ditch/road block and many machine gun pill boxes. [27]

Yellow beach consisted of fine sand with low dunes in the west. For one mile east of the beach, the area was dominated by swamps and lagoons. Yellow beach was also flanked by rocks on both sides. The beach was 20 to 60 yards wide and 2000 yards long. Obstacles consisted of flanking machinegun pill boxes, an anti-tank ditch/road block to the east, and considerable amounts of barbed wire.

The Green (east) beach was 40 yards wide and 400 yards long. It was very soft on the eastern end which was composed of fine sand. There were rock-bound, narrow entrances to the beach which required lighting for night use. The Green (west) beach was 20 yards wide and 200 yards long with an open approach flanked by rocks. Both Green beaches were completely backed by wire with supporting anti-tank ditches.

27. "Information and Intelligence Annex No 118-43" (Annex item to JOSS Attack Force), Operation Plan No. 109-43, pp. 3,4,5.

The Red beach was 3000 yards long and 5 to 20 yards wide. The beach was composed of fine sand and was backed by a natural barrier. There were a series of low cliffs approximately 30 feet high. Approaches were clear with enemy defenses centered on the beach. The enemy fields of fire were good. The enemy had also established strong points along Highway 115 as it led inland.

Key terrain for Operation JOSS can be broken into phases. Initially, the seizure of beaches would be key terrain. The enemy strong points to defend the beaches could result in a failure of the mission. Holding the beaches with good observation and fields of fire was an enemy advantage. The enemy defense of the beaches was not significant and as a result the first phase of the key terrain fell easily to the 3rd Infantry Division.

The SALSO River also created key terrain since it could only be crossed by road and railway bridges at LICATA. The western beaches of LICATA were poor and the eastern beaches were more suitable for operations. Units landed on the eastern beaches would be forced to cross the SALSO River using the bridges of LICATA. [28] Key land terrain consisted of the long, steep ridge to the east and the ring of hills that dominated the rolling plains of LICATA. Again, this terrain was not used to the advantage of the defending enemy forces.

28. Garland and Smyth, p. 99.

[29] Understanding the impact of the SALSO River and the chance of the enemy destroying the bridges in LICATA, General Truscott decided that his best avenue of approach was to use all the beaches available and land on both sides of the river. As stated previously, the beaches were favorable to the enemy defense in every respect. A strong enemy defense could have had a serious impact on how successfully Operation JOSS was completed. [30] The tactical operation was in jeopardy because of the severe weather prior to the actual beach assault. As a result of heavy sea swells, many soldiers became seasick. At the very last minute, the storm subsided and allowed the amphibious operation to take place as scheduled. [31]

B. The Combat Effectiveness of the Opposing Forces.

1. Strength and Composition of the Opposing Forces. On 10 July 1943, the 3rd Infantry Division was heavily reinforced to a strength of roughly 45,000 men. Principal combat units included the 7th Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Ranger Battalion, the 15th Infantry Regiment, the 30th Infantry Regiment, and Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division. Artillery units included the 10th, 41st, 39th, and

29. Third Infantry Division (Reinf), Troop List - Operation JOSS, p. 52-53.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

14th Field Artillery Battalions. Unit designations, strengths, and major weapons systems are shown in figures 1 through 5.

[32]

Supporting units included the 36th Combat Engineer Regiment and the 3d Chemical Battalion. Ground reconnaissance support was provided by Company B of the 82d Reconnaissance Squadron. Tactical air support was not assigned to a specific unit; General Truscott indicated that "...when we sailed for the operation, we had no information as to what, if any, air support we could expect on D-Day. We had no knowledge of the extent of fighter protection we would have." [33] Some fighter support was planned with the spreading of "available aircraft over as many of the assault beaches as possible while maintaining a complete fighter wing in reserve." [34] The large reserve was apparently tied to Allied fears that the Axis would direct its maximum effort against Allied shipping and the beaches early in the battle. [35]

The general nature of air planning is probably best characterized by a British observer who described the Air Plan as "the most masterful piece of uninformative prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan, which

32. 3rd Inf Div (Reinf)(JOSS), "Annex No 3," Field Order No 5, 26 Jun 1943, pp. 88-93.

33. Lucian K. Truscott, Command Missions (New York: Dutton, 1954), p. 285.

34. Garland and Seyth, p. 129.

35. Garland and Seyth, p. 119.

could possible have been published." [36] Naval gunfire support was provided by Admiral Conolly's Naval Task Force 86.

Initial assaults were to be carried out by landing on all four assigned beaches: Red, Green, Yellow, and Blue. The Red Beach was assigned to the 7th Infantry Regimental Combat Team; Green to the 3rd Ranger Battalion, the 2d Battalion, 15th Infantry, a company of 4.2" mortars, a battery of 105mm howitzers, and a platoon of 75mm howitzers; Yellow to the remainder of the 15th Infantry; and Blue to the 30th Infantry Regimental Combat Team. The reserve was to be maintained afloat and consisted of Combat Command A of the 2d Armored Division. Landings on all four beaches were to be carried out simultaneously.

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ORDER OF BATTLE DATA
(Major Units)

BEACH RED

36. A Military Observer, "Notes on the Planning and Assault Phases of the Sicilian Campaign," C.O.H.Q. Bulletin No. Y/1, (Oct, 1943), p. 6.

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
7th Infantry	3288	2 105mm How, SP, M-7 6 75mm How, SP, T-30 15 37mm AT Gun 6 57mm AT Gun
Engr Beach Group	1132	
10th FA Battalion	522	12 105mm How, SP, M-7 3 57mm AT Gun 3 105mm How, Towed
62d FA Battalion	407	12 105mm How, SP, M-7 2 Lt Tank
155 How Btry, 9th FA	112	4 155mm How, Towed
Med Tank Company	136	17 Tank, Med, M-4

Figure 1

#####

ORDER OF BATTLE DATA
(Major Units)

BEACH GREEN

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
3d Ranger Battalion	476	
2d Bn, 15th Infantry	873	3 37mm Guns
75mm How Plt, Cannon Co, 15th Infantry	34	3 75mm How, SP, T-30
Plt, 3rd Bn, 36th Engr Regt (Shore Engr)	66	1 37mm Gun
Btry B, 39th FA Bn (HSP)	110	4 105mm How, SP, M-7 1 105mm How, Towed

Figure 2

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ORDER OF BATTLE
(Major Units)

BEACH YELLOW

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
15th Infantry (-)	2260	2 105mm How, SP, M-7 6 75mm How, SP, T-30 155mm How 105mm, Towed 6 57mm AT Gun 9 37mm AT Gun 20 Tank, Med, M-4 Bofors, 40mm
Engr Beach Group	149	
9th FA Bn (-) (Med 155mm How)	432	8 105mm How, SP, M-7 2 75mm How, SP, T-30 2 105mm How, Towed 3 57mm AT Gun 6 37mm AT Gun 8 155mm How
436 CA (- 2 Btry) Btry (SP Armd Arty)	323	16 Bofors, 40mm 6 Tank, Med, M-4

Figure 3

**ORDER OF BATTLE
(Major Units)**

BEACH BLUE

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
30th Infantry	3124	2 105mm How, SP, M-7 6 75mm How, SP, T-30 6 37mm AT Gun 6 57mm AT Gun
Engr Beach Battalion	1002	
41st FA Battalion	527	12 105mm How, SP, M-7 3 105mm How, Towed 3 57mm AT Gun
Bn, 77th FA Regiment	276	8 155mm How
155mm Gun Btry	128	4 Gun, 155mm
Med Tank Company	136	17 Tank, Med, M-4

Figure 4

ORDER OF BATTLE
(Major Units)

COMBAT COMMAND ABL (CCA)

	<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>WEAPONS</u>
<u>Team 1</u>		
41st Armd Inf Regt (-)	773	3 75mm How, SP, T-30 10 37mm AT Gun
14th Armd FA Bn	373	12 105mm How, SP, M-7
66th Armd Regt	574	3 75mm How, SP, T-30 30 Tank, Lt, M-5 17 Tank, Med, M-4
<u>Team 2</u>		
41st Inf Regiment (-)	775	3 75mm How, SP, T-30 10 37mm AT Gun
14th Armd FA Bn	145	6 105mm How, SP, M-7
66th Armd Regt	728	6 75mm How, SP, T-30 19 Tank, Lt, M-5 37 Tank, Med, M-4 6 37mm AT Gun

Figure 5

The final estimate of enemy strength in Sicily that could be mustered against the 3rd Division at H-Hour or thereafter included:

207th Coastal Division in the LICATA Area

26th (Assietta) Division in the vicinity of SCIACCA,
65 miles west of LICATA
4th (Livorno) Division at CALTAGIRONE
54th (Napoli) Division, believed near CATANIA
28th (Aosta) Division, in the MARSALA-TRAPANI area
Army and Corps troops, mainly manning heavy guns
around CALTANISSETTA, CAMPOBELLO, AGRIGENTO,
and PORTO EMPEDOCLE
About 34,000 German troops known to be in the
vicinity of PALERMO and on the major airfields

Enemy air strength in Sicily and Italy was estimated at 945 modern-type combat planes, of which in late June only 552 were believed serviceable. In addition, there were several hundred obsolete German and Italian planes of various designs.

[37] As developed in the invasion, the 54th Napoli Division was committed against the British 8th Army and the 4th Livorno Division was committed in the 1st Infantry Division's zone of action. The only German troops to be committed against the "JOSS" Force were elements of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (-)(-1 regiment, 1 light artillery battalion, and 1 Tiger Company). [38] The 207th Coastal Division (Italian) had poor combat effectiveness, had antiquated or deficient armament and virtually no transportation, were badly commanded, and their indigenous personnel, as much as 75%, reflected the low morale of the Sicilian population. [39]

37. Donald G. Taggart, ed., History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 53.
38. Foreign Military Study, 15th Panzer Grenadier Div in Sicily (Historical Div, European Command, 18 Jun 51), p. 4.
39. Garland and Smyth, p. 80.

The 28th (Aosta) Division (Italian Mobile Division) was largely composed of Sicilians and poorly trained. The 26th (Assietta) Division (Italian Mobile Division) was somewhat better but both operated under reduced Tables of Organization and their artillery and other equipment were for the most part antiquated. [40] The 15th Panzer Grenadier Division (-)(German) was ready for commitment with 20 days of supply on hand. Though not completely mobile, the division could move relatively quickly with its organic equipment. [41]

2. Technology. In general, technology did not play a major role in the success of the JOSS operation after the landing. The landing itself, however, saw the first combat use of a new series of landing craft and ships. Designed for use in operations where shore-to-shore operations were feasible because of relatively moderate distances between embarkation and debarkation point, the new specialized amphibious craft included the landing ship, tank (LST), the landing craft, infantry (LCI), the landing craft, tank (LCT), and the landing craft, vehicle or personnel (LCVP). Prior to JOSS, considerable uncertainty surrounded the new craft, including their seaworthiness in rough seas, their actual as opposed to theoretical capacity, and their ability to operate under conditions of various beach gradients. The use of the newly

40. Ibid., p. 81.

41. Ibid., p. 81.

developed amphibious vehicles, as well as the use of fabricated pontoon "causeways" and field expedient modifications to the new equipment, expedited the movement of troops and supplies across the beaches, but in the absence of sustained resistance cannot be claimed to have carried the day. The landings did serve as a testing ground; both to prove the worth of the equipment and to suggest improvements in equipment and operations. [42]

The Axis partners presented completely opposite pictures such as:

- The Italian troops on Sicily were armed and equipped with generally obsolescent, inferior materiel. The technological state of the art was at least 10 years ahead of the Italians.

- The German troops were a good match for the American Army at this time with the exceptions being:

- < German aircraft were already behind the technological power curve and the Allies maintained air superiority.

- < The typical German infantryman was armed with a bolt action, 5 shot Mauser rifle designed in 1898. Thus, the firepower of an American platoon (armed with an 8

42. For a further discussion of the new landing craft see DNI 226, Allied Landing Craft and Ships ; and Samuel Eliot Morison, "History of United States Naval Operations in WWII," Vol II, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942-June 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1947) pp. 266-71.

shot Garand semi-automatic rifle) greatly exceeded that of their opponents.

- The Italian armor consisted of:

< Renault R35 (captured French); 13 tons, 47mm Gun, 1 LMG.

< Fiat 3000; 5 tons, 37mm gun, 1 LMG.

< L3-35; 3 1/2 tons, tankettes (tracked MG carrier).

< Probably three battalions of 50 tanks (mixed) each in country, all obsolete.

- The German armor consisted of:

< Mark III; 24.5 tons, long barrel 50mm or short barrel 75mm gun (low velocity).

< Mark IV; 26 tons, high velocity 75mm gun.

< Mark VI (Tiger); 68 tons, 88mm gun.

The 3rd Infantry Division faced very few tanks in this operation, the majority of which were Italian, this was fortunate due to the low quality of AT capability possessed by American infantry. The German armor was good and the Mark VI (Tiger) unexcelled. When tanks did appear on the scene, artillery and naval gunfire were often employed as well as self-propelled artillery in a direct fire role.

Italian artillery was generally obsolescent and ineffectual in this campaign, due in part to the shortage of ammunition but primarily to the inability to mass fires. This

inability stemmed from an organizational shortcoming rather than a technical shortcoming. German organic artillery was effective, however Allied counterbattery activities gave short shrift to all Axis artillery.

In summation, the Axis possessed no anti-naval guns, were deficient in all other types of artillery, and had but one antitank gun for each five miles of coast line.

Axis air support consisted mainly of attacks against the ships offshore and the immediate beachhead personnel and equipment. After 11 July, there is little mention of air attack and none in concert with ground action. [43] The Allied air command concentrated on the role of air interdiction/superiority apparently with great effect.

3. **Logistical and Administrative Systems.** The tactical planning for Operation JOSS was not considered to be overly difficult. By now, amphibious operations had been practiced. The tough planning would be in the logistical field. The 3rd Division followed a similar plan to that of the other operational forces in the campaign. Logistics was measured in maintenance days and days of fire. The 3rd Division would carry seven days maintenance plus one and one-sixth units of fire for the assault convoy, seven days of

43. Garland and Smyth, pp. 89-177.

maintenance and one and one-sixth units of fire for follow-up convoys. [44]

Supply reserves were to be held off shore. These reserves consisted of twenty days of maintenance and four units of fire. As with all other supplies, the reserves were scheduled to be unloaded over the shore any time after D+14. The Third Infantry Division was operating in an area with little or no port capacity. The responsibility for the supply reserves rested with the division commander. Movement of supplies was to be accomplished by whatever means that could be found and if a port facility did exist, it was only a benefit. [45]

The logistics personnel of operation HUSKY-JOSS were confronted with a very difficult problem. Balancing the Army requirements for landing combat troops and the requirement to move supplies with the availability of Navy vessels was extremely difficult. There was a shortage of landing craft for this operation as there had been in previous operations. The combat units wanted priority for movement over the service units yet they still wanted the supplies and ammunition when they got on shore. The engineers, who were preparing the beaches for both combat force movement and logistics operations, wanted more heavy equipment and priority over everyone. [46]

44. Garland and Smyth, p. 102.

45. Ibid., p. 102.

46. Ibid., p. 103.

The 3rd Division was particularly plagued with the problem of a shortage of landing craft compared to what had to be moved. The 3rd Division was reinforced with a far greater amount of supply and service units required to support the entire operation. General Truscott formed an administrative organization which was abnormally large in order to handle the problem. [47]

An improvement in landing craft over those used in North Africa was a bright spot for the operation. The capabilities of the new craft had not yet been fully explored. Of particular importance was the new "DUKW" which was a vehicle capable of swimming and rolling onto the beach as a wheeled vehicle. The DUKW was an amphibious 2 1/2 ton truck that easily carried troops and cargo. It's capacity included twenty-five combat ready troops with equipment, or 12 loaded litters. Innovative uses of other equipment for transfer of cargo also enhanced the over the shore operations and allowed both combat and service support operations to be accomplished. [48]

Major General Truscott commented on the success of the operation by stating that the cooperation between the Army and Navy elements was excellent. The willingness for each service to help each other meant success. [49] The commanders

47. Ibid., p. 103.

48. Ibid., p. 103-104.

49. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward, para 8.

report on Operation JOSS divides the supply portion into three phases: training, planning, and operations. Training for the 3rd Division in Operation JOSS actually began in 1939 when experiments were conducted involving landing from transports. The key to this training in the supply effort involved operating a division-sized force from a ship-based supply source. New and real problems existed in getting the supplies off the ships and over the beaches in the right quantities. The invasion of North Africa provided valuable lessons in this specific area. [50]

In February 1943, an Invasion Training Center was established at ARZEN, Algeria. A Transport Quartermaster School was included as part of the supply training for an amphibious landing. At the Invasion Training Center, training in embarkation, supply, and evacuation was conducted. This training was not totally successful because the people who were trained were not the people who participated in Operation HUSKY. Also, the interactions of the S-3 and the S-4 for developing priorities for discharge and loading diagrams were not taught. Any practice that was conducted wasn't totally useful because of the limited scope. Only a few vehicles were put on board the landing craft to see how they fit. Total load plans were never developed. Through trial and error, experience was gained and the units did become proficient.

50. Ibid., p. 29.

[51]

Prior training did allow the value of the DUKW 2 1/2 ton amphibious truck to be realized. The increase of supply personnel with the initial engineer shore party also allowed for better beach exits and operating supply dumps to be established. The training center also solved a major problem by training for the use of an asbestos fiber grease method of waterproofing vehicles. The vehicles were able to be used immediately upon landing after using this method of waterproofing. [52]

"COPY BOOK" was the code name given to the rehearsal training that would take place for the actual landings by the 3rd Division in Operation JOSS. COPY BOOK was to be as close to the actual operation as possible. The dispersion of units used by the 3rd Division prevented COPY BOOK from being an actual loading exercise as planned. However, valuable experience was gained. A complicating factor for the actual loading was that the waterproofing material didn't arrive until three days prior to the loading. This required extensive management hours to ensure that all vehicles were properly waterproofed. Units worked day and night to accomplish the mission. [53]

51. Ibid., p. 29.

52. Ibid., p. 29.

53. Ibid., p. 30.

Supply operations were never fully exercised for COPY BOOK. However, the limited loading of three LCT's did prove to be very valuable. A standard plan of loading each LCT with three equal sections of supplies (rations, gasoline, and water) from the bow to the stern configured to the width of a 2 1/2 ton truck was accomplished. Each section had a single type of supply, which enabled three trucks to pick up three types of supplies simultaneously. [54]

The supply planning phase for Operation JOSS identified several problems and provided solutions. A special supply planning board was developed to handle the large requirement. The 3rd Division was heavily reinforced which caused added burdens in planning and operations. The special board was made up of the G4, the Assistant G4, and the heads of the division supply staff and other specialists as needed. [55] The special planning board was faced with several problems. Solutions to the problems came after the division set up a special organization to handle the JOSS force which was three times larger than a normal division. The three special levels that were set up to control supply and services were: Force Depot, Near Shore Control, and Beach Group. The Force Depot was to provide all supplies and services normally given to a division. The Near Shore Control was set up to plan, control,

54. Ibid., p. 30.

55. Ibid., p. 32.

and supervise embarkation of all organizations. It also was responsible for loading all supply ships. The Beach Group was set up to help in landing the force, to unload supplies, establish supply dumps, and to repair and operate any captured port or rail facilities. [56] The G4 had the responsibility of equipping, loading, embarkation, supply, and evacuation. These responsibilities were covered by the three special groups set up during the planning phase for supply operations. The Force Depot was located in an area between FERRYVILLE and MATEUR, south of BEZERTE (North Africa). The Force Depot was set up and operational on schedule and was able to provide for 95 percent equipping for all units in the assault force. The Force Depot moved from its African base and took over the Beach Group operations on D+3 and D+4. On 19 July, the Force Depot was dissolved and as a result extreme difficulties were created. The 3rd Division lost access to its planned supply and service organization. The 3rd Division now had to rely upon its own internal assets to control the supply functions [57]

The Near Shore Control Group functioned very well even though it got off to a slow start. Personnel fill was slow in coming but the effective communications with Division Headquarters allowed for last minute changes to get the

56. Ibid., p. 33.

57. Ibid., p. 38.

required supplies to the right place at the right time.
[58]

The Beach Group landed with the combat force. The Beach Group was operational at beaches Yellow and Blue shortly after sun rise. They were capable of off-loading any craft to include the LST's which could not be beached and had to rely upon 300 foot sections of pontoon bridges. By noon the supplies and water were being unloaded easily despite enemy low-level bombing and strafing attacks. RED beach proved to be a poor beach for supply operations and it was abandoned in favor of Yellow and Blue. The 2d Bn, 540th Engineers worked on the port LICATA and by 1500 hours on D-Day, had it operational. In three days, the Beach Group had accomplished a major task.. There had been 168 landing craft unloaded and 7,000 tons of supplies of all classes unloaded. The Yellow and Blue beaches had been improved to the point that they could handle six LST's at one time. On D+7 Beach Group entered PORTO EMPEDOCLE and had the port operating within 24 hours. This port shortened the division supply base by 40 miles. [59]

The units of the Third Infantry Division were well supplied during the conduct of Operation JOSS. The 200,000 men of the Italian units were not as fortunate. There was employment of obsolete and deficient weapons and equipment.

58. Ibid., p. 39.

59. Ibid., p. 39.

The Italian units were short of artillery ammunition or did not have any. Also, communications equipment was extremely poor. The German divisions were in direct contrast to the Italian units. The German elements were supplied to sustain operations for twenty days. The German units were also mobile enough to be able to move their supplies with minor difficulty whereas the Italian units had no transportation. [60]

Prior to Operation JOSS, the Third Infantry Division had been used as a source of personnel to replace troops in front line units. In February 1943, a total of 3006 individuals were taken from the Third Infantry Division to fill the vacancies created by this program. Replacements that were provided prior to Operation JOSS required extensive training to integrate them into the division. Major elements of the 7th and 15th Infantry Regiments were lost which required half of each unit to be rebuilt to include the officers and noncommissioned officers and men. The turbulence in the division is demonstrated by the following replacement figures:

<u>OFFICERS</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DATE</u>
108	1501	Feb 1943
0	200	Mar 1943
21	1966	Apr 1943
0	201	Apr 1943
21	1264	Jun 1943
4	0	Jun 1943
<u>50</u>	<u>590</u>	Jul/Aug 1943

60. Garland and Sayth, p. 81.

The operational strength of the division as of D-Day was as follows:

	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
OFFICERS	717	730
WARRANT OFFICERS	43	38
ENLISTED	14,763	14,939

The final personnel strength of the Third Infantry Division was good. [61]

Graves registration and burial plans for the Third Infantry Division were to be the function of the 48th Quartermaster Company (GR). Two platoons of the 48th QM Co were detached on D+5 and D+8. Burial operations were not interrupted because provisions were made to organically organize burial sections in each regiment and battalion. Plans were made to use cemetery sites behind each beach to bury the dead if a main cemetery could not be opened. The use of the beach cemeteries was never required. [62]

Prisoner of war evacuation plans were established from regiment to division and from division to the Beach Group Commander. The Beach Group Commander employed his MP Company to initially control the prisoners. Later on D-Day, the 2641st PW Processing Detachment and the 379th MP Escort Guard Company took over responsibility for the prisoners. During the period

61. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, p. 41.

62. Ibid., p. 42.

from D-Day to D+8, there were 12,322 prisoners processed. Of these, about 1200 were German. During Operation JOSS, the 379th MP Escort Guard Company was under division control. This company was a recently formed unit with little indoctrination on the theater. This resulted in inefficiency in operations of prisoner processing at LICATA. After three days, the G-1 and Provost Marshal made changes which corrected poor guard discipline, fraternization with prisoners, and provided for segregation. The prisoner evacuation plan was rewritten as the operation progressed. Passage of information on collection sites became too difficult as units moved. At the end of Operation JOSS, the battalions were evacuating prisoners directly to the division's sites which had been moved to the rear of the regimental CP's. Each of the three collection points had one MP officer and 25 enlisted men who worked closely with the regiments to maintain control. Each time the regimental CP moved, a MP Liaison NCO notified the MP detail. The MP's used captured transportation assets and as a result streamlined prisoner processing. [63]

Casualties were evacuated during D-Day to D+8 for Operation JOSS as follows:

	<u>ALLIED</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
Killed	145	57
Wounded	395	455
Missing	138	-

63. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

Captured	<u>6</u>	<u>12,322</u>
Totals:	676	12,824

Replacement for the period covered by Operation JOSS were not planned for or received.[64]

Administrative operations did not receive any special training efforts. An administration center was formed by attaching personnel sections of all attached units to the division administration center. This organization totaled approximately 600 enlisted men and 70 officers. An Advanced Admin Control Group, which consisted of the Adjutant General, the Assistant Adjutant General, one warrant officer, and six enlisted men, was formed to accompany the advanced CP. The Admin Control Section accompanied the assault forces and landed on the beaches after the assault had been completed. An effective system of reports was established with input from unit First Sergeants, hospital Commanders, and the Division Graves Registration Officer. The reports were consolidated at this center and reported by radio to Headquarters, Seventh Army, aboard the USS Monrovia.[65]

4. Command, Control, and Communications Systems.

During a series of meetings in CASABLANCA, Morocco, during January, 1943, which became known as the CASABLANCA Conference,

64. Ibid., p. 44.

65. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

the United States and Great Britain decided to attack Sicily. The military chain of command extended from the national political level to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to Allied Force Headquarters, a committee command composed of General Dwight Eisenhower as commander, General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander as deputy commander in chief and commander of ground warfare, Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham as commander of naval forces, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder as air forces commander. Subordinate to Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) were a British task force under General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and an American task force under Major General George S. Patton, Jr. Patton's force was known as Force 343 during the planning phase and would become the Seventh U.S. Army on commencement of the assault. Under Seventh Army was a corps headquarters and six divisions; the corps headquarters was II Corps, commanded by Major General Omar N. Bradley. The 3rd Infantry Division, commanded by Major General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., remained under the direct control of Seventh Army.

Having suffered command and control problems during the Tunisian Campaign, the 3rd Infantry Division was well aware of the potential for apparently minor command and control difficulties to blossom into major operational problems. Potential problems between Army and Navy elements were reduced by a solid working relationship between Admiral Connolly and General Truscott; Truscott has indicated that Connolly was

even willing to place his units under Truscott's command while at sea. [66] The relationship between ground and air units, however, was abysmal. Truscott tried, without success, to secure the attachment of an air liaison officer to his planning staff, had great difficulty in acquiring air photo reconnaissance of the proposed landing areas and, as mentioned previously, had virtually no information on what air support to expect during or subsequent to the landings. Special command and control measures planned for the landing included the attachment of a special liaison officer to each assault battalion to provide status reports and the fabrication of a "runway" on an LST from which to launch Cub aircraft for command and control, intelligence, and spotting for naval gunfire. [67]

The lessons of North Africa also convinced both Truscott and his staff of the need for both training and practice. The opportunity to undertake both in detail contributed to the effectiveness and organization of staffs at all levels and played a central role in confidence building. In general, missions assigned were appropriate to the capabilities of units. Battlefield communications were primarily by radio with messengers as an alternative. Some ground-air marker signals were designated prior to the assault. The limited scope of

66. Truscott, p. 200.

67. Ibid., p. 202.

serious opposition during the operation did not challenge the command and control system but the relative absence of confusion on the beaches implied a high degree of organization. Truscott describes an incident of coming across a column halted "awaiting orders" for some time after having taken light fire but such incidents are likely to be due more to inexperience on the part of junior leaders than to serious command and control weaknesses. [68]

Operations security was apparently excellent as both Italian and German units were slow to react. The extent of operations security is reflected in the repeated refusal of AFHQ G-2 to authorize photographic missions in the area of the landings for fear of disclosing Allied intentions. [69]

While the actual extent of transmission security is difficult to determine, signal instructions called for Army radio silence prior to H-Hour and for rigid procedures to limit lucrative Allied signal intelligence targets after the assault commenced. [70]

Armed Forces Command, Sicily (AFCS) (Italian 6th Army), a new degree of command similar to that of a unified command, had responsibility for the tactical commitment of the Italian Army,

68. Ibid., p. 216.

69. Ibid., p. 200.

70. US Army, HQ 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced)(JOSS), "Signal Annex," Field Order Number 5 (29 Jun 43), pp. 3-5.

Navy, Air, and Militia elements, plus the German ground troops in Sicily and in Southern Calabria. Through a high commissioner for civilian affairs, AFCS exercised control of the civilian administration of the nine provincial prefects. The relatively small German air and naval elements remained under autonomous German control. AFCS was initially commanded by Generale di Corpo d'Armata Commandante Designato d'Armata Mario Roatta, later and during the invasion by Generale d'Armata Alfredo Guzzoni. [71]

The Italian Command structure was not rigid but rather relied on cooperation and coordination among commanders. Similarly, unit organization was flexible. Commanders formed small groups of varied composition to meet various situations without formal reassignment or reorganization, designating them by location, the name of the commander, or by letters of the alphabet. When the need disappeared, the task force was informally dissolved and its elements returned to the original units. [72]

Despite his unified command, General Guzzoni exercised real control in great part only through liaison and mere recommendations. The coordination of German and Italian units on Sicily varied with the result that the German elements were partially under German and partially under Italian control. In

71. Garland and Sayth, pp. 76-77.

72. Ibid., p. 78.

due course, parallel channels of communication and command developed. This situation brought about considerable vagueness, not to mention confusion, in the command and organization of the Axis partners. [73]

5. Intelligence. Truscott has described intelligence available prior to the landing as "scanty." [74] His characterization is probably not unfair. Much of the general information and intelligence was obtained from British ISIS reports and suffered from a lack of detail and from being inaccurate and dated. Order of battle data were generally substantially complete and reasonably accurate but detail did not extend to other critical intelligence areas. The "Beach and Terrain Appreciation" of the JOSS Force Intelligence File contained less than five pages of text, few details, and no maps or specific graphic or pictorial representations. Reasonable information was available relative to defensive positions on the beaches, including overlays, but intelligence on inland defenses was limited.

Strategic Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) was apparently good. Group Commander Winterbotham alleges that "much of the planning for Sicily and Italy was based on Ultra." [75] Ultra provided a substantial amount of information on order of

73. Ibid.

74. Truscott, p. 197.

75. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p. 184.

battle, including the strength and disposition of all major units. [76] Because of the location of Axis troops on the island, Winterbotham indicates "it was evident that the landing areas were only lightly guarded by Italian Coast Brigades, and that, in view of the mountainous country, if the few roads to the coast could be denied to the German Panzers, the landing operations should meet with little resistance. [77] He goes on to say, "It was evident too that both Kesselring and Guzzoni were unsure as to when and where the attack would come. Thus Ultra not only gave the full strength and disposition of the enemy, it also showed that the Allied [sic] could achieve tactical surprise ..." [78]

Tactical SIGINT was less successful, largely due to American inexperience and lack of trained personnel. Although augmented by members of the British "Y" Service, US tactical SIGINT did not begin to fulfill its promise until the invasion of the mainland. [79]

As indicated earlier, aerial photographic intelligence was limited, probably both by the initial desire to avoid

76. Ibid., p. 107.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid.

79. For a detailed discussion of tactical SIGINT in the Mediterranean Theater, see US Army, 849th Signal Intelligence Service, Operational History of the 849th Signal Intelligence Service, dated 27 July 1945.

compromising the location of the landings on the part of AFHQ and later by the poor coordination and planning between ground and air elements.

Little is known about the contributions of human intelligence to the operation; a thorough discussion of the subject must await further declassification of WWII reports and histories.

Since the available intelligence indicated an invasion, with Sicily as the most likely target, the Axis commanders believed they had several more weeks to complete final preparations. The attack was predicted to occur in the middle of July. [88] It would appear that whatever intelligence factors were examined, the Axis were very accurate in their estimates. Although the Allied attack occurred one week earlier than predicted, the Axis should have been in a higher state of readiness and able to present a more forceful display on the beaches.

6. Doctrine/Training. Training for the invasion was intensive and varied. The initial phase, that of amphibious training, began with the 15th Regimental Combat Team in the last week of March, 1943, at ARZEW BEACH, Algeria. The 7th and 30th Regimental Combat Teams followed the 15th at two-week intervals. Training at the ARZEW site stressed physical conditioning, combat infantry-artillery problems, mine

88. Garland and Smyth, p. 87.

laying and removal, booby traps, and actual experiments and exercises in amphibious operations. A new standard rate of march was established - five miles in one hour or four miles per hour for longer marches and men who could not meet the standard were eliminated. The two-week training period was capped with a two-day landing exercise at the PONT DU CHELIFF, a site where beach and inland topography were similar to those of the LICATA area in Sicily.

Mountain training was scheduled for all teams but only the 15th completed the training before the division moved to JEMMAPES, Algeria, on 15 May 1943, for training in maneuver and reducing beach fortifications. Mountain training consisted of "range estimation, hill climbing, compass and map training, occupation of defensive positions, offensive actions in the mountains, scouting and patrolling, night raids and firing of all arms except that artillery fire was restricted ..."

[81]

Consolidated training at JEMMAPES was focused on preparing for a forced landing on a defended beach followed by an advance inland for about five miles. Physical conditioning continued with each unit required to complete five miles in one hour, eight miles in two hours, and twenty miles in five hours, on a twice-weekly basis. At this stage specialized training and organization began for the units assigned to clear the beaches:

81. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, s.l, p.l.

1st Battalion, 7th Infantry; 3rd Battalion, 15th Infantry; and 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry (the 3rd Ranger Battalion was assigned to clear the fourth beach).

Training continued in the area of BIZERTE, Tunisia, from 1-10 June and culminated in a full dress rehearsal for the landing on 20-26 June. That exercise, "COPYBOOK," was similar to the real operation in tactical plan and scheme of maneuver, on similar terrain, involved all elements of the JOSS Force, and used identical craft assignment and force organization. The operation was so realistic that troops believed they were participating in the actual invasion until they recognized the North African shore. [82] Following "COPYBOOK" hours were shortened and troops were permitted more recreation time. Discrepancies revealed by the exercise were corrected and final preparations for the assault were made.

The JOSS assault followed existing Army doctrine; there were no major deviations from established principles. Lack of serious opposition did not encourage innovation.

The Axis troop elements consisted of the following:

- Italian: six coastal divisions, two coastal brigades, one coastal regiment, and four mobile divisions. The coastal units tended to be badly commanded, dependent on antiquated or deficient armament, and their preponderance of indigenous personnel reflected the low morale of the Sicilian

82. Truscott, p. 207.

population. These units adhered to a doctrine of defensive fighting only and, as was shown, were very inefficient in the attack. The mobile divisions and special groups were considerably better but operated under greatly reduced tables of organization, and their artillery and other equipment were for the most part antiquated. These units were the counterattack forces counted upon by General Guzzoni. The fact was, the Italian units just weren't mobile enough.

- German: two mobile divisions. One division, the 15th Panzer Grenadier, had been in Sicily for some time, was well trained and equipped, and considerably more mobile than any Italian unit. The other division, the Herman Goering Division, moved into Sicily during June and was somewhat deficient in infantry. Nevertheless, the unit was well-equipped and trained although the process of combined training did not begin until the arrival of the unit in Sicily. The German units were to be utilized in the exploitation role, if possible. As the battle developed, the Herman Goering Division participated in the counterattack at GELA in the 1st Infantry Division zone. The 1st Panzer Grenadier Division (-), during this operation, fought little more than delaying actions against the 3rd Infantry Division.

7. Leadership. American leadership in JOSS was markedly improved over that demonstrated in the Tunisian Campaign. Truscott was experienced, calm, level-headed, and

generally competent; he inspired confidence. That example tended to be representative of the entire division. Despite confusion in the early stages of the landing induced by the difficult weather and equipment problems, leaders generally demonstrated initiative and aggressiveness in the face of limited Italian resistance. Such leadership extended to Navy as well as Army personnel. Fire support on Red Beach was limited by a collision between the two destroyers assigned to Red Beach. In the early hours of the landing at Red Beach as the LCT's carrying the RCT's armor and artillery approached the beach, the commander of the beach naval force ordered the landing force to stand to until heavy enemy fire on the beach subsided. Four of the LCT's, however, ignoring the order (or failing to receive it) kept going and landed the 10th Field Artillery Battalion which began firing in support of the infantry. [83]

The Italian Sixth Army (also Armed Forces Command, Sicily) initially commanded by Generale di Corpo d'Armata Commandante Designato d'Armata Mario Roatta and later by Generale d'Armata Alfredo Guzzoni, was probably never destined to be a workable practitioner of the military arts. General Guzzoni had been in retirement for two years prior to his appointment (May 1943) and had never been to Sicily nor had his Chief of Staff Colonel Emilio Faldella. Colonel Faldella had never served with

83. Garland and Smyth, p. 129.

General Guzzoni. The Italian units and especially the coastal units had poor combat effectiveness, indicative of low quality leadership. There is nothing, however, to suggest that General Guzzoni was anything but a first class General Officer.

The German units, under overall command of Field Marshall Albert Kesselring (along with General Guzzoni), were very much up to the quality of their senior-in-command. Field Marshall Kesselring, at the time and subsequently, was one of Germany's most able field commanders. Likewise, the commander of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, General-Major Eberhard Rodt, was a first class field commander and his division was trained and ready for commitment.

8. Condition and Morale. Morale of the Third Infantry Division was good. Not heavily committed in North Africa, the landing was an opportunity to prove the division's mettle. The division was probably also motivated by the generally poor showing of American units in the Tunisian Campaign. Weather was a factor as well. Heavy weather dogged the flotilla for the entire crossing; by the time troops reached sight of the beaches, Italian guns were to be preferred over heaving, pitching ships and the stench of seasick men. Widespread knowledge of Italian ineptitude generated confidence as did the opportunity for thorough training and repeated practice. The 3rd Division believed it was ready.

Axis morale and condition presented a picture diametrically opposed to that of the US troops. Italian morale

and condition represented that of obsolete equipment and poor combat effectiveness. German conditions and morale represented that of well-trained, equipped, and disciplined units.

C. Immediate Military Objectives of the Antagonists.

The 3rd Infantry Division's mission was established by Headquarters Force 343 "Outline Plan" of 18 May 1943:

- (1) Under cover of darkness on the morning of D Day to land in the FIBULA (LICATA) area (beaches 70 to 74 inclusive available) capture and secure the port and the airfield at FIBULA by dark on D Day.
- (2) Extend the beachhead to Yellow, protecting the left flank of the operation against interference from the Northwest (sic).
- (3) Contact II Corps. [84]

That general mission was translated into a division field order (# 5) on 26 June 1943 as follows:

2. JOSS force lands on D Day, H Hour on Beaches RED, GREEN, YELLOW and BLUE, seizes and secures a beach head (opns overlay), seizes the LICATA airfield and port, and prepares for further operations to the NORTH and WEST.

3. a . 30th Inf (Reinf)
atcd: 41st FA Bn (SFCP
atcd)(initially)
Co I, 66th Armd Regt
Co C, 3d Med Bn (Coll)
Co C, 3d Cml Bn
Det 10th Engr Bn
Det 3d Sig Co
P/W Det
Beach: BLUE

84. HQ, Force 343. "Outline Plan," 18 May 1943, p. 1.

(1) Land 2d Bn (Beach Assault Bn) to reduce beach defenses and facilitate subsequent landings.

(2) Land remainder of Force in accordance with landing schedule, advance with utmost speed and seize objectives A, B, and C. Hold enemy NORTH and EAST of line RS.

(3) Occupy high ground M, relieving elements of 15th Inf thereon, and protect the rear and right flank of 15th Inf.

(4) Destroy enemy forces within zone of action.

(5) Establish contact with II Corps on right.

(6) Coordinate the landing of all elements scheduled to land on Beach BLUE.

b. 15th Inf (less one Bn and one Plat, Cn Co)(Reinf) :

Atchd: 39th FA Bn (less one
(Btry)(atcd)
(Initially)
Co A, 3d Cml Bn
Engr Co (Composite)
Plat Co B, 10th Engr Bn
Co B, 3d Med Bn (Coll)
(less one Plat)
Co H, 66th Armd Regt
Det 3d Sig Co
P/W Det

Beach: YELLOW

(1) Land 3d Bn (Beach Assault Bn) to reduce beach defenses and facilitate subsequent landings.

(2) Land remainder of Force in accordance with landing schedule, advance with utmost speed, seize objective M.

(3) Capture town and port of LICATA and the landing field to the NORTHWEST.

(4) Destroy enemy forces within zone of action.

(5) Assume command of Green Force on JOSS Order.

(6) Construct crossing for AFVs over SALSQ.

(7) Coordinate the landing of all elements scheduled to land on Beach YELLOW.

c. Green Force :

Comdr: EX O, 15th Inf
Troops: 2nd Bn, 15th Inf
3d Ranger Bn (Follow-up
lands on Beach Red)

Plat, Co B, 3d Med Bn
(Coll)
Co B, 3d Cml Bn

(Follow-

up lands on Beach
RED)

Plat, Cn Co, 15th Inf
(75mm How)

Btry B, 39th FA Bn
(SFCP Atchd)
(Initially)

Det Regtl Hq, 15th Inf

Beach: GREEN

(1) Land 3d Ranger Bn to reduce beach defenses, facilitate subsequent landings and seize heights F and G, NORTH and EAST of Beach GREEN.

(2) Land remainder of Force in accordance with landing schedule.

(3) Advance with utmost speed and maximum force, destroy batteries at E, occupy heights overlooking town of LICATA.

(4) Assist 15th Inf in capture of town and port of LICATA.

(5) Destroy enemy in zone of action.

(6) Pass to command of CO, 15th Inf on JOSS Order.

(7) Coordinate the landing of all elements scheduled to land on Beach GREEN.

d. 7th Inf (Reinf) :

Atchds: 10th FA Bn (SFCP atchd)
(Initially)

Co G, 66th Armd Regt

Co D, 3d Cml Bn

Co A, 10th Engr Bn

Co A, 3d Med Bn

Det 3d Sig Co

Air Support Party

P/W Det

Beach: RED

(1) Land 1st Bn (Beach Assault Bn) to reduce beach defenses and facilitate subsequent landings.

(2) Land remainder of Force in accordance with landing schedule, advance with utmost speed, seize objectives K and L and hold enemy NORTH and WEST of line OP.

(3) Destroy enemy forces within zone of action.

(4) Occupy high ground F, relieving elements of Green Force thereon, and protect

left flank and rear of GREEN Force.

- (5) Destroy railroad at T.
- (6) Coordinate the landing of all elements scheduled to land on Beach RED.

e . Force Reserve :

Comdr - CG, CC "A".

(1) Land 20th Engrs (less one Co) on JOSS Order prepared for combat missions.

(2) CC "A", 2nd Armd Div (less 3rd Bn, 66th Armd Regt):

(a) Land 41st Armd Inf (less 1 Bn) on JOSS Order prepared for combat missions.

(b) Land Teams 1 and 2 on Beach areas on JOSS Order.

(c) Assemble and reorganize in Areas X and Y prepared to execute following missions:

(1) Advance NORTH on CAMPOBELLO.

(2) Advance WEST on AGRIGENTO.

(3) Advance EAST to reinforce US II CORPS.

(4) Counter-attack enemy reserves moving from NORTH or WEST against JOSS FORCE.

(d) Land reconnaissance elements on JOSS Order prepared to reconnoiter to the NORTH and WEST. [85]

Objectives selected by 3rd Division were effectively dictated by the nature of the terrain and mission guidance from higher headquarters.

General Guzzoni, the Axis commander, upon learning of the Allied landings, directed the reinforce 207th Coastal Division to strike (counterattack) the American beachhead at LICATA. Similar instructions were given to units in the vicinity of the

85. US Army, HQ 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced)(JOSS), "Field Order Number 5," pp. 1-2.

other beachheads. This was in concert with the German doctrine of defeating the enemy as near to the water's edge as possible. Field Marshall Kesselring, lacking communications with General Guzzoni, issued orders for the Herman Goering Division to counterattack toward GELA (1st Division zone). Amazingly, this was what General Guzzoni intended in conjunction with the 4th Livorno Division. [86] By 12 July, General Guzzoni had no choice but to shift to the defensive.

Lacking the manpower to erect a solid line around the Allied beachheads, General Guzzoni planned to shorten his front to a line across the Northeastern corner of Sicily - from the east coast south of the CATANIA plain to SANTO STEFANO di CAMASTRA on the North Coast. [87]

D. Courses of Action. Feasible courses of action available to Truscott and the 3rd Division were constrained by the Headquarters Force 343 "Outline Plan" of 18 May 1943. Shortly after receipt of the Headquarters Force 343 plan Truscott issued his first "Appreciation" or estimate to members of his staff with a brief, general directive. The directive read:

I may land on any one, or all of these four beaches; but in any event my first consideration is the very rapid capture of these three key areas, all from 5 - 10 miles

86. Garland and Smyth, p. 163.

87. Ibid., p. 202.

inland of the beaches. The keynote is therefore speed and momentum, and the key to speed is simplicity - particularly in the Naval Plan. I want all the Infantry of my Division ashore within 60 - 76 minutes of the assault, I shall want some tanks landed at the same time but I shall retain (in floating reserve) a powerful armoured reserve including armoured infantry who must be prepared to fight on their feet without armour or vehicles. This reserve will be landed as rapidly as possible to exploit success wherever it is obtained by the initial assault, and as soon as it is apparent. Provided I can do this, I may have to accept the complete failure of one, or even more, of my landings.

In each RECT one infantry battalion with engineer elements incorporated is being trained to assault, and fight till daylight, in the actual detachments in which they are put ashore from landing craft. Their job will be the engagement of beach defences: each detachment, comprising the infantry and engineers carried in a single LCV, will work like a hound, one of a pack of hounds, hunting out beach defences and keeping them occupied whilst the remaining infantry battalions, bypassing resistance, penetrate inland to seize and consolidate the key areas I have indicated. RECTs will retain no reserves afloat: their job is to get inland with the utmost speed and thereafter to patrol forward with vigour in readiness to continue their advance.

All Infantry are being trained, and will be prepared, to fight their way inland during the greater part of D-day with no transport except the few vehicles essential for radio communications. They will be supported at the earliest possible moment by all the Artillery - Divisional and Army - which can be put ashore. The general priority of landing vehicles throughout the force will be:-

(a) A Company of medium tanks with each RECT, and at the same time, the vehicles of the beach and shore parties.

(b) Guns - both A.A. and field Artillery.

(c) Medium Artillery.

(d) Infantry vehicles, particularly those required to carry heavy weapons.

Despite Truscott's reference to "any one, or all ... beaches" his emphasis on speed in the landings and the fact that current amphibious landing doctrine emphasized the desirability of multiple landing points, the planning staff probably did not seriously consider alternatives to landings on all four beaches. [88]

The first opportunity for the development of differing courses of action occurred after the initial assault on the beaches was completed and lead elements of the landing force were free to move to seize the port and airfield at LICATA. Given severe limitations in the number and detail of maps available and similar limitations in quality and scope of aerial photographs, detailed planning for the attack on the initial division objectives was probably difficult. Beach defenses were analyzed, combat forces organized appropriately to neutralize those defenses and logical follow-on objectives assigned. It does not appear that different courses of action were formally presented to Truscott, rather that a single course of action evolved through the planning process.

88. Actual staff estimates or written analyses of courses of action considered in the planning phase have not been located by this team.

General Guzzoni realized that if resolutely committed, his forces might hold back the initial Allied landings but could not check successive attacks. [89] His choices were to ask for more tanks, artillery, and German units which he did. The course of action settled upon was to fight at the water's edge using small tactical reserves close behind the coastal defense forces; and mobile reserve in centrally located positions farther to the rear, were to be available for counterattack. The drawback was the lack of sufficient mobility, thus the German units could form the only effective reserve. [90]

Given the fact that no naval presence could be effected and air superiority was possibly out of the question, this was probably the best plan that could be devised. The secret would lie in timely counterattacks as well as early discovery of Allied beachheads. In the instance of the 3rd Infantry Division, the "breaks" went the way of the Americans.

89. Earland, p. 79.

90. Ibid., p. 93.

IV THE ACTION.

The 3rd Infantry Division (reinforced) conducted an amphibious assault to capture the port city of LICATA, Sicily, and an adjoining airfield on 10 July 1943. The Division was opposed by the 207th Coastal Division (Italian), reinforced with some units from the 12th Corps (see Appendix A).

The 207th Coastal Division consisted of approximately 11,500 personnel, comprised of second-class soldiers, with the vast majority being older male Sicilians. The Division was static in nature with no means of transportation except for a handful of bicycles and trucks. The majority of its artillery was emplaced and incapable of movement - two to three batteries of 100mm guns were animal drawn. [91]

Although the 207th was headquartered at AGRIGENTO, its area of responsibility extended from north of AGRIGENTO to south of LICATA (see Map, Appendix B). In its initial amphibious assault, the 3rd Infantry Division was opposed by only two battalions from the 139th Regiment of the 207th Coastal Division.

Admiral Connolly's Naval Task Force 86 brought the 3rd Division to the Seventh Army's westernmost assault area in four attack groups, one group for each of the landing beaches on

91. Mages E. Bauer, "Axis Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943," Part II, Chapter V, A Study Undertaken in Support of the Volturno: Surrender of Italy (Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C., April 1959), p. 9.

both sides of LICATA. the winds had made it extremely difficult for the LST's, LCI's, and LCT's of his task force to maintain proper speed and Connolly ordered all vessels to proceed at maximum speed so the 3rd Division could begin its amphibious assault at H-hour. Connolly had instructed that radio silence only be broken in case of an emergency. At 0135, 10 July 1943, Admiral Connolly's flagship arrived at the amphibious assault location and assumed that all the rest of the vessels were in position since he had not heard to the contrary. This, however, was not altogether correct. Particularly in the West, the landing ships and craft carrying the 7th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) had had considerable difficulty making headway in the heavy Mediterranean Sea. All were late in reaching the ^{764 NS PORT} assault area, but no one had reported that fact to Admiral Connolly. [92]

General Truscott, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, chose to land his assault force on four different beaches - two to the east of LICATA and two to the west. The beaches east of the port city were far superior than the ones to the west, but Truscott believed that if he landed his entire force to the east of the the city and opposition was effective, there was danger that the enemy could delay the capture of the port and airfield as well as the 3rd Division's advance toward

92. Garland and Smyth, p. 125.

CAMPOBELLO and PALMA di MONTECHIARO. Therefore, the plan was to land two RCT's on the good beaches east of the city; one RCT and the 3rd Ranger battalion west of LICATA. [93]

By using all four of his assigned beaches, General Truscott had adopted two axes of advance for his assault units - axes that formed an outer and inner claw of a deep pincer movement against LICATA. The left outer claw consisted of the 7th RCT landing on Red Beach. The left inner claw, consisting of a special force comprised of the 3rd Ranger Battalion, 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, artillery, mortars, and howitzers landing on two Green beaches. The right inner claw contained the remainder of the 15th Infantry RCT landing on Yellow Beach. The right outer claw was composed of the 30th Infantry RCT which was to land on Blue Beach. Each assault was to move in columns of battalions. Combat Command Alpha (CCA) constituted the 3rd Division's floating reserve, prepared to land in support, if needed (See Map, Appendix ()).

The division's assault plan, involving two distinct pincer movements one inside the other, was somewhat complicated. Its execution was aided by the intensive training program undertaken after the North African campaign; by Truscott's extensive knowledge of amphibious and combined operations learned in North Africa; and, by the excellent working conditions between Truscott and Admiral Connolly's naval task

93. Truscott, p. 210.

force. [94]

The amphibious assault by the 3rd Division at LICATA was conducted on four different beaches simultaneously. At this time each assault force will be discussed separately.

RED BEACH (7TH RCT)

Red Beach lay in a shallow cove, the seaward approach clear of rocks and shoals. It was the most heavily fortified of all the beaches. Artillery pieces dominated the exits and most of the beach; numerous machine gun positions near the center and western end provided the defenders with ample fire power to contest an assault landing; an extensive defensive position contained three coastal artillery pieces and another ten machine gun emplacements. The bluff line gave defenders excellent observation posts and fields of fire.

The 1st Battalion of the 7th RCT was the initial assault force and touched down on Red Beach at 0430 hours. The 1st Battalion was scheduled to land at 0330 hrs, but it was delayed partly by a late start, partly by the longer run to the beach than was originally contemplated because of the faulty disposition of the LST's in the transport area. The latter error caused the LCVP's to land at the far right end of the beach rather than at the center as planned. The assault force met no fire on the way in, and only light and ineffective

94. Garland and Smyth, p. 125.

artillery fire on the beach after the landings were made.

Once ashore, the 1st Battalion promptly set to work. While one company turned to the west and began clearing out beach defenses, a second swept the center of the landing area and set up a covering position on some low hills just inland from the beach. The third company moved to the east and occupied SAN NICOLA RUCK and POINT SAN NICOLA, completing both tasks an hour and a half after landing (see Map, Appendix D).

The six LCI's comprised of the 2nd Battalion, 7th RCT, had assembled just east of the LST anchorage, more than two miles farther offshore than planned. Unaware of this, the vessels started for shore at 0240 hrs, exactly on the schedule planned for the second wave. Because the 1st Battalion's landing craft had veered to the right, the LCI's carrying the 2d Battalion saw no signs of activity. Assuming that the assault had not yet started, the flotilla commander turned his craft back to the anchorage area to find out whether H-hour had been postponed.

After ascertaining that H-hour had not been delayed, the vessels once again proceeded shoreward. The LCI's were approximately 450 yards from the beach when enemy artillery batteries opened with heavy fire. The LCI's increased their speed and beached at 0440 in the face of heavy small arms fire on the beach.

Five of the LCI's beached successfully. One struck a sand bar and tried repeatedly without success to ride over the bar.

The heavy surf added to the difficulties of the five craft who beached successfully - one lost both ramps after they were lowered due to the rough waters.

Almost constant enemy fire harassed the landing craft. Soldiers in some instances became casualties before off-loading; others were hit while trying to disembark. By 0500, the majority of the 2nd Battalion was ashore. Two companies moved inland and seized MONTE MAROTTA, while the third company turned northeast after landing, cut the railroad, and established a roadblock at STATION SAN OLIVA where the railroad crossed Highway 123 three and a half miles northwest of LICATA (see Map, Appendix D). By 1000 hrs, after bypassing most of the enemy resistance along the beach, the 2d Battalion was on its objectives and successfully drove off a counterattack launched against STATION SAN OLIVA by an Italian Coastal Battalion.

GREEN BEACH (2/15 INF AND 3RD RANGER BN)

At 0255 hours on 10 July, the 3rd Ranger Battalion landed on Green Beach. The Ranger's mission was to land on Green Beach and move inland and attack LICATA from the west. The 2nd Battalion, 15th Infantry, would follow the Rangers onto Green Beach. The Ranger plan called for landing all six Ranger companies abreast on the beach, with their initial objective being the securing of the beach itself. In spite of machine gun and 47mm cannon fire from ROCCA MOLLERELLA, the Rangers

were able to operate according to plan.

Troops moved rapidly from LCA's and crossed the beach. A company breached the wire at the base of MOUNT PILISCIA and moved directly up the steep slopes. Meanwhile, two machine guns and a 47mm cannon opened fire from the slopes of ROCCA MOLLERELLA. At that moment, the LCS from the Princess Charlotte opened fire on the machine guns. One of the guns was silenced. This action enabled B Company to breach the wire and clear the beach. D, E, and F companies landed and quickly cleared the beach while the enemy concentrated his efforts on the left. [95]

At 0342, the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Infantry landed on Green Beach, passed through the Rangers at MOUNT SOLE, and attacked LICATA. At 0730, E Company reached the castle on a hill overlooking LICATA and hoisted the American flag above it. Several attempts were made to enter the town but naval shelling prevented it. At 1030, assault troops succeeded in entering the town which was completely occupied by 1130. [96] (see Map, Appendix D)

YELLOW BEACH (15TH RCT(-))

The 3rd Battalion, 15th RCT, assault waves landed on Beach Yellow between 0340 and 0400 hours. The landing was made

95. 3rd Ranger Battalion After Action Report for period 10-18 July 1943.
96. 15th Infantry Regiment After Action Report for period 8-18 July 1943.

without mishap, although far to the right of the designated beach. This necessitated moving west as well as inland. The mission of clearing the beach area was completed at 0600. The rapid progress of RCT 30 on the night enabled the Battalion to move from the beachhead toward LICATA.

The beach positions were all machine gun pits built with sand bags. The defense as indicated by intelligence summaries, were very accurate as far as pill boxes and machine gun pits were concerned, but artillery positions were over estimated. There were no more than two artillery pieces firing on Yellow Beach during the landing. Over 100 prisoners were captured, all Italians from the 207th Coastal Division. The 3rd Battalion proceeded down route 115, meeting very little opposition and entered LICATA at 1100.

The 1st Battalion landed on Yellow Beach on the extreme right of the beach at 0445, abreast of the 3rd Battalion. 1st Battalion then moved towards its assembly area, clearing out beach and inland defenses as they moved. The resistance was slight, only amounting to a couple of machine gun pits and a pill box. The Battalion then launched the attack inland toward the big bend in the SALSO River (see Map, Appendix D).

BLUE BEACH (30TH RCT)

At Blue Beach, farthest to the southeast (right), the Italian defenses put up a somewhat larger show of resistance, though not as strong as that offered at Red Beach. With the

30th RCT forming the right outer claw of the pincer, the naval task force had been delayed in reaching its transport area. The LST's leading the convoy moved into position and began to anchor at 0115. But the anchorage later proved to be well south of the correct position, thus forcing the LCVP's carrying the assault battalion to make a much longer run to the beaches than planned. Despite this, the first landing craft beached only a half-hour behind schedule. The first wave met some rifle and machine gun fire from pillboxes on the beach, and some artillery fire from guns on POGGIO LUNGO, high ground to the southeast. Like its counterpart on the far left, the 7th RCT, the 30th RCT before noon occupied its three primary objectives - three hill masses bordering the eastern side of the LICATA plain (see Map, Appendix D).

D-DAY SUMMARY

The 10 July amphibious assault of General Truscott's 3rd Infantry Division was a complete tactical success. The success of the assault was facilitated by the weakness of the enemy's defenses in the LICATA area, probably the weakest of all the Seventh Army's assault areas. General Truscott commented on the amphibious assault's success as follows:

With the exception of the slight delay in the hour of landing occasioned by bad weather, the JOSS assault had gone almost exactly as we had planned it. Careful planning and preparation,

rigorous and thorough training, determination and speed in execution, had paid dividends in success. In spite of searchlights and all the activity along the coast, our assault battalions had landed before they were discovered and had quickly cleared the beaches of all resistance. In little more than an hour, ten Infantry battalions including the Rangers with supporting tanks had landed and were about their business. In seven hours, these ten battalions with their supporting tanks and artillery had seized their first day's objectives and were pushing reconnaissance far out to the front. In seven hours, the airfield, town, and port were in our hands, beaches and port were organized, and additional troops and supplies were flowing ashore in steady streams. All beach resistance had been smothered by the speed and violence of the assault and more than 2,000 prisoners were taken. Our own casualties were little more than a hundred. [97]

ENEMY ACTIONS *

On the west flank of the Seventh Army, the 3rd Division, heavily reinforced by armor and reconnaissance units, highly mobile and readily employable in the terrain ahead, had gained an ideal position from which to exploit inland. Such an advance would cut the Sixth Army in two at ENNA, the important

97. Truscott, p. 214.

* The actions of the enemy as well as the 3rd Infantry Division were taken from the Garland and Smyth book, and the After Action Reports of the 15th, 7th, and 38th Regiments, the CAA, and the 3rd Ranger Battalion.

hilltop town almost in the geographical center of Sicily.

General Alfredo Guzzoni, commander of the Sixth Army, was concerned by the deep penetration of the 3rd Division toward CAMPOBELLO, fourteen miles north of LICATA, for continued advance would cut off the Axis forces in the western part of the island and would threaten the Herman Goering Division's right flank. To counter this movement, Guzzoni gathered together what forces he could.

During the night of 10 July, Colonel Venturi, commander of the 177th Bersaglieri Regiment, had arrived with one of his battalions at FAVAROTTA, where a makeshift force of Italian artillerymen and motorcyclists had managed to halt the 3rd Division's progress along Highway 123. Taking over the Italian units then on the ground, Venturi created a provisional tactical group, Group Venturi, and ordered a counterattack the next morning to recapture the town of LICATA.

West of LICATA, along Highway 115, the Italian 207th Coastal Division organized a tactical group near the NARO River bridge with the mission of advancing eastward toward LICATA. Other Italian units arriving during the night and going into defensive positions at AGRIGENTO and CANICATTI were alerted to the possibility that at least one might move through NARO to PALMA di MONTECHIARO in order to assist the attack on LICATA from the west.

Meanwhile, the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, commanded by General Rodt, was moving toward the central part of the

island. Like other Italian and German units, the 15th Division had received no specific orders on 10 July on its possible future operations. General Rodt decided that his best approach would be to try to stop the movement of Truscott's 3rd Division moving inland on the roads emanating from LICATA. The result of this decision was to embroil elements of Rodt's division during its movement from west to east in numerous small actions, generally of battalion strength.

General Rodt established his command post twenty miles northeast of CAMPOBELLO. Faced with thrusts by the Americans from GELA as well as LICATA, he decided to attack the closer one, the advance of the 3rd Division from LICATA. He sent the reinforced 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Group Ens) to screen against his east flank from the GELA region. The reinforced reconnaissance battalion of the division (Group Neapel) was to block the main roads north and east from CANICATTI and delay the Americans as long as possible. The reinforced 129th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Group Fullreide) would deploy along a line from CANICATTI through DELIA to SOMMATINO to halt advances inland along the roads leading from LICATA, PALMA di MONTECHIARO, and AGRIGENTO to CALTANISSETTA. His plan was to disrupt the 3rd Division's advance by attacking its deep eastern flank with a battalion attack from the town of RIESI. [98]

98. Garland and Smyth, p. 193.

3RD DIVISION'S ACTIONS

On the evening of 10 July, General Truscott met with his senior commanders and staff to issue his orders for the next day's operation. The 7th RCT was to thrust to the west to take PALMA di MONTECHIARO and the high ground just beyond the city; the 15th RCT was to continue north along Highway 123 to seize CAMPOBELLO; the CCA, commanded by General Rose, was to seize NARO, then assemble on the high ground to the north and east and prepare for further action; the 30th Infantry, guarding the division's right flank, was to send one battalion cross-country to seize RIESI, thereby blocking an important avenue of approach into the division's eastern flank (see Map, Appendix E).

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, led the advance on PALMA di MONTECHIARO early on 11 July. After crossing the PALMA River bridge, the battalion encountered heavy fire from Italian troops who occupied strong positions along a line of low hills just south of the town. The battalion pushed the Italian troops into the town and the Americans pursued the enemy into the town. The PALMA defenders had been reinforced by a task force that had moved down from the NARO River, and heavy fighting erupted inside the town. For two hours the battle raged from house to house. Around 1300 hours, the surviving Italians began pulling out westward along Highway 115. [99]

99. Nathan W. White, From Fedala to Berchtesgaden: A History of the 7th

General Rose's CCA, to the right of the 7th Inf, moved against NARO. With a reconnaissance company forming a screen and the 3/41 Armored Infantry, reinforced by a company of medium tanks as an advanced guard, the combat command proceeded slowly along the narrow, secondary roads and trails northwest of LICATA. The terrain was difficult, the roads were poor, but the only opposition came from snipers, scattered machine gun fire, and a strafing attack by two German aircraft. The town, unoccupied and the population being friendly, was in the possession of the CCA by mid-morning 11 July.

Meanwhile, the 15th RCT was advancing north along Highway 123 from FAVAROTTA to CAMPOCELLO, while the 1st Battalion made a wide envelopment of the enemy left flank. With the 2d battalion in reserve and the 39th FA battalion and a battery of the 9th FA Battalion in support, the attack started at 0445.

At STATION FAVAROTTA the leading elements of the 3rd Battalion ran into Group Venturi, which was moving down Highway 123 to attack LICATA. For four hours, Americans and Italians battled for the commanding terrain around FAVOROTTA. Having lost three artillery pieces and more than half its automatic weapons, and with the infantry battalion seriously reduced in strength, Group Venturi withdrew to CAMPOBELLO.

In the meantime, the 1st Battalion, advancing with minimal

US Infantry in WWII (Germany, 1947), pp. 26-27.

resistance or its envelopment movement, reached the high ground east of CAMPOBELLO at 1300 hours, just as the 3rd Battalion, following Group Venturi from FAVOROTTA, gained high ground west of town.

That morning, XII Corps had ordered General Schreiber, Commander of the 207th Coastal Division, to leave his headquarters at AGRIGENTO and proceed to CANICATTI and assume command of a counterattack force aimed at retaking LICATA. He was to take over all the Italian and German forces already at CANICATTI and those who would arrive during the day. Then Colonel Laurentiis, stationed in PALERMO, assumed command of the 207th Coastal Division.

In CANICATTI, Schreiber planned to attack south along Highway 123 with Group Venturi, already engaged, and group Neapel, dispatched by Rodt. Schreiber sent Group Neapel to CAMPOBELLO to reinforce Group Venturi, both to be supported by Italian artillery stationed two miles south of CANICATTI.

Schreiber's counterattack plans never materialized. Group Venturi had been severely attrited, Group Neapel became involved in defending CAMPOBELLO, and US artillery fire and the threat to his right flank posed by the CCA advance into NARO prompted Schreiber to withdraw to CASA SAN SILVESTRO, two miles south of CANICATTI.

At 1500 hours, supported by massive artillery fire from the 39th FA battalion, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 15th Infantry advanced on CAMPOBELLO. At 1600 hours, the 3rd

Battalion entered CAMPOBELLO behind the withdrawing German units.

Also, on the same day the 3rd Battalion, 36th Infantry, marched over fourteen miles of rugged mountains, overcoming scattered enemy resistance, and occupied RIESI. After making contact with the 1st Division on its right, the 3rd Division at nightfall 11 July, was in possession of its invasion objectives (see Map, Appendix F).

Once Truscott's 3rd Division achieved its objective of controlling the land out to the Yellow line so as to protect the Army Group left flank, he found himself with no further mission - nor had General Patton been instructed on how to develop the situation beyond the Yellow Line. Not willing to sit, Truscott ordered General Rose to reconnoiter toward CANICATTI in case of a possible follow-on mission. Since CALTANISSETTA and ENNA appeared to be logical objectives, Truscott decided to seize CANICATTI as a necessary preliminary first step.

At this time General Schreiber received orders from XII Corps to counterattack the next morning with several new units being sent to him - an infantry battalion from the Assietta Division, an anti-tank gun company from the Aosta Division, and two Italian artillery battalions. Apprehensive over the developments on the LICATA sector, Guzzoni apparently hoped that Schreiber's counterattack on 12 July would not only delay further American advances inland but would also block the major

avenues of approach into central Sicily. But Guzzoni changed his mind early on 12 July and told Schreiber to limit his actions to local thrusts only, those that would not seriously deplete manpower and materiel.

General Keyes, Deputy Commander of Seventh Army, visited General Truscott on the morning of 12 July. He agreed with Truscott that CANICATTI should be seized as a prelude to further advances into central Sicily, yet it should be noted that at this time Keyes had no information on further missions for the 3rd Division.

Truscott immediately told General Rose to seize CANICATTI. At the same time he ordered the 30th Infantry to move to NARO, leaving its 3rd Battalion in RIESI. He told the 15th Infantry to move forward on the right of the armored command to seize DELIA and SOMMATINO and then swing to the west to aid the armor in taking CANICATTI. The 7th Infantry was to guard the division left flank. After taking CANICATTI, Truscott planned to place the CCA in division reserve as a mobile force for exploitation north or west (see Map, Appendix E).

At 1330 hours, 12 July, CCA began movement toward CANICATTI. A tank-infantry team, after an artillery preparation from the 14th and 62d Armored FA Battalions, entered CANICATTI at 1500 hours unopposed. When the company of tanks proceeded out the northern exit of the town they ran right into the main battle position of Group Fullreide. After expending all its ammunition and losing one tank, the company

pulled back to await reinforcements. A tank-infantry team swung to the right and secured the eastern edge of a ridge line a mile north of the town. Though the Germans fought well, they were driven off the ridge line by 2000 hours. By darkness, CCA occupied CANICATTI, but Group Fullreide held the bulk of the hill mass northwest of the town.

The enemy was in poor shape at this time. American counterbattery fire had destroyed most of the supporting Italian artillery. The German battalion holding the ridge line had been severely attrited. Other small German detachments east of CANICATTI - on the road to DELIA and SOMMATINO - suffered heavy losses from American tank-infantry teams that overran their positions. Believing his forces too small to hold their positions, Colonel Fullreide pulled back that evening to a line along the railroad running from SERRADIFALCO to SAN CATALDO.

The 15th Infantry's success no doubt contributed to the decision made by Fullreide to pull back. By dark that evening (12 July), the 15th Infantry was in control of both DELIA and SUMMATINO. With the entire important secondary east-west road from CANICATTI east to RIESI in 3rd Division control, General Truscott once again faced the problem of having no mission but to sit. CANICATTI had been seized with the approval of General Keyes, but to move either toward AGRIGENTO to the west or ENNA to the south would require, Truscott believed, an "OK" from General Patton.

General Keyes, who had observed the capture of CANICATTI with Truscott, phoned Patton of the success that evening. Keyes believed, as did Truscott, that the 3rd Division should continue movement toward AGRIGENTO or CALTANISSETTA and told Patton that conditions were favorable for such an advance. Patton could give no such order because he had received no instructions from General Alexander, Commander of the 15th Army Group.

Still, Keyes did not want the 3rd Division to just sit, so before leaving Truscott's headquarters, he verbally approved a reconnaissance in force of battalion size toward AGRIGENTO. At the same time, the 3rd Division was to gain the high terrain northwest of CANICATTI and eliminate the troublesome enemy roadblock southeast of RIESI. Beyond this, Keyes would not go, though on the following afternoon, apparently after consultation with General Patton, Keyes restated his approval in writing.

MOVE TO AGRIGENTO AND PORTO EMPEDOCLE *

On 14 July General Patton visited the headquarters of General Truscott. Patton told Truscott that he wanted to take

The actions of the enemy as well as the Third Infantry Division were taken from the Garland and Snyl. book, and the After Action Reports of the 15th, 7th, and 38th Regiments, the CCA, and the 3rd Ranger Battalion.

PALERMO and said he would need PORTO EMPEDOCLE to support such a plan. But, because of General Alexander's fear of exposing the left flank of the Eighth Army by having the 3rd Division involved in a costly battle for the port, he would not give Patton the go-ahead.

Truscott, who had already conducted one small reconnaissance in force mission on 13 July, felt that his division could take AGRIGENTO and PORTO EMPEDOCLE without much trouble. General Patton could not approve such a mission, but he did approve another reconnaissance in force mission larger than the one battalion size operation conducted the day earlier.

For Patton's Seventh Army, AGRIGENTO was key - it provided the roadway network that was the key to western Sicily. The seizure of AGRIGENTO was essential for any move on PALERMO, while PORTO EMPEDOCLE would give Patton a port twenty-five miles closer to the front. [100]

The reconnaissance in force mission conducted on 13 July by the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, reported that there was considerable artillery defending the town of AGRIGENTO along its eastern perimeter covering the approach to the town along Highway 115. Due to the numerous artillery guarding any type of direct approach to the town (frontal), Truscott believed that a flanking movement from the northeast by way of FAVARA on

100. Garland and Smyth, p. 11.

Highway 122 would be the best plan to strike AGRIGENTO. Truscott selected the 7th Infantry Regiment, the 10th FA Battalion, and one battalion from the 77th FA Regiment for the mission. The 3rd Ranger Battalion, which was division reserve at this time, was to move to FAVARA and reconnoiter to the west of AGRIGENTO.

On 15 July, Truscott attached the Ranger Battalion to the 7th Infantry and ordered the force to conduct a reconnaissance in force mission against the town of AGRIGENTO. That evening the Rangers would move from FAVARA to the town of MONTAPERTO, situated on high ground to the northwest of AGRIGENTO. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, would move from FAVARA to seize high ground which commanded the northern approaches into AGRIGENTO. The Rangers and 2/7 Infantry would therefore block the northern and western exits from the town. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, would move along Highway 115 and move on AGRIGENTO. A follow-on mission given to the Rangers - after taking the town of MONTAPERTO - would move the Rangers to the south to take PORTO EMPEDOCLE (see Map, Appendix G).

The 3rd Rangers moved out of the town of FAVARA on the evening of 15 July. Shortly after midnight on 16 July, the Rangers ran into an Italian roadblock just to the east of the road junction of Highways 122 and 118. Within an hour the Rangers had captured 165 Italians. The morning of 16 July saw the Rangers moving westward toward the town of MONTAPERTO. After a brief battle with an enemy column of Italians, just to

the west of Highway 118, they moved into MONTAPERTO. From the hilltop town they had a commanding view of the valley below. The Rangers discovered four batteries of Italian artillery in the valley and opened fire with their 60mm mortars and individual weapons. Although a few did escape to the south, the majority of the Italians surrendered to the Rangers.

Meanwhile the 2nd Battalion was advancing westward from FAVARA along Highway 122 with little resistance encountered. But the 1st Battalion, advancing along Highway 115, was having extreme difficulty trying to enter the town of AGRIGENTO. The evening of 15 July saw the 1st Battalion engaged by almost two battalions of Italian Infantry just to the northwest of the NARO River. By early afternoon of 16 July, the 1st Battalion was still not able to move forward. At this time, Truscott ordered the 3rd Battalion, which had been in reserve, to move south of Highway 115 to assist the 1st Battalion. With the addition of this battalion, Italian resistance slowly waned. Together, the two battalions moved toward AGRIGENTO (see Map, Appendix G).

Due to the heavy naval and artillery bombardments of the town of AGRIGENTO, by the afternoon of 16 July the enemy was in sad shape. The town was completely enveloped by Truscott's forces and when the 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry entered the town, Colonel de Laurentiis, Commander of the 207th Coastal Division, his staff, and troops surrendered to the Commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Moore. Also by this time,

PORTO EMPEDOCLE had fallen to the Rangers.

V THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ACTION.

A. Immediate Significance. The immediate significance of Operation JOSS is visible in three phases, each of which builds upon the other. First and foremost, JOSS's mission to secure the leftmost (western) flank of the 7th Army and hence the entire British 8th Army as well, was successfully accomplished. [101] This mission was accomplished so well and so quickly in the operation that the 3rd Division literally had nothing remaining to do early in the overall operation. As a result, the 3rd Division received the "informal" mission of conducting a reconnaissance in force to secure the town of AGRIGENTO in addition to maintaining continued control of LICATA. [102] This reconnaissance in force, which was not formally authorized by General Alexander, allowed the US force to "flex" its muscles and to maintain continued contact with the enemy. The reconnaissance in force was also so successful that the entire Allied chain of command decided to change the concept of the Sicilian operation. The resulting change in mission for the 7th Army, endorsed by General Alexander, directed the 7th Army to proceed west and then turn north to seize PALERMO. [103] After securing PALERMO, the US 7th Army and British 8th Army would simultaneously converge on the

101. Truscott, p. 195.

102. Ibid., p. 214.

103. Ibid., p. 218.

port of MESSINA. This is in fact exactly what occurred.

The significance of Operation JOSS, in the immediate sense was, therefore, that its total success enabled the ground force commander to adjust his concept of the overall Sicilian campaign. This adjustment in concept hastened the defeat of Axis forces on Sicily.

B. Long Term Significance. The long term impacts of Operation JOSS are very significant. It is important to remember that JOSS must be viewed as an integral part of the overall Operation HUSKY, and therefore the long term significance of JOSS must be viewed as a part of the larger HUSKY operation. The success of JOSS as integral in the seizure of Sicily. The seizure of Sicily from the Axis was more than simple seizure of enemy territory. Throughout history Sicily has been the traditional stepping stone from Africa to Europe. The seizure of Sicily insured that the Allies controlled the Mediterranean. It prevented the previously constant harassment of Allied shipping by Italian and German surface vessels and submarines. A second general impact of the success of JOSS and ultimately HUSKEY was economic. Sicily, despite many square miles of badlands, is fertile agriculturally. The Axis powers lost valuable agricultural resources when they lost the island. In addition, some mineral and industrial resources provided to the Axis powers were also lost. Another aspect of the significance of JOSS and HUSKEY is that only three miles separate the island

from mainland Italy. The capture of Sicily meant that the Allies had gained a foothold on the Italian peninsula. Such a strategic location with Sicilian airfields allowed the Allies to increase bombing in southern Europe. Sicilian airfields also significantly extended Allied fighter ranges and enabled more complete fighter escort of bombers. [104]

General Eisenhower stated four long term objectives for HUSKY (of which JOSS was an integral part). The first of these was to secure the lines of communication in the Mediterranean. The second was to divert the German military strength from the Russian front. The third objective was to intensify pressure on Italy. The last was to induce Turkey to join the Allies as an active member. [105] Although the last objective was not achieved, the other three goals were fully accomplished. The single most significant long term objective achieved by the Sicilian operation was the resignation of Benito Mussolini and the immediate elimination of Italy from the Axis coalition. This objective had not been anticipated by military and political planners, but certainly was vital and well received. [106] Operation JOSS itself resulted in the improvement of

104. Donald Taggart, ed., History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), p. 52.

105. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sicilian Campaign, Commander and Chiefs' Dispatch (Armed Forces Headquarters, 1943), p. 21.

106. Eisenhower, p. 32.

equipment for Allied amphibious operations. Employment of shore-to-shore naval vessels during JOSS proved their value and capability. Their use during JOSS was a prelude to their use in NORMANDY. During JOSS these shore-to-shore vessels and techniques were successful in discharging the maximum number of Allied troops with the minimum amount of confusion. This new equipment required new planning and execution techniques and resulted in the expansion of the Allied data base and doctrine for amphibious landings. [107]

The final long term significance of Operation JOSS was the improved US Army and US Navy operational skills in conducting joint amphibious landings on hostile shores. This joint planning, coordination, and execution established solid working principles which, although not new, were certainly reinforced. Such cooperation immensely assisted joint planning for the later NORMANDY operation.

In conclusion, the American soldier, as a seasoned combat veteran, gained immense self-confidence and esteem in successfully meeting and defeating the combined Axis forces on the island of Sicily.

C. Military Lessons Learned. The military lessons learned in JOSS were minimal. Major General Lucien Truscott, Commander of the Third Infantry Division, made the following statement: "No new or profound insight was obtained. We

107. Truscott, p. 106.

merely reavowed time proven principles and techniques."

[108] Operation JOSS emphasized well known principles rather than developing major new lessons learned. The operation did, however, result in new, often unique, approaches and techniques to solving problems that developed. These new and unique solutions to problems did provide a few new lessons. These new lessons, along with those "relearned" lessons, will be addressed in the following paragraphs.

1. Command and Control.

a. The principle of war "Unity of Command" was adhered to throughout JOSS. General Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander with numerous subordinate British and American officers. [109] This system insured a distinct chain command from the very top down to the smallest unit, even though joint Allied army, air force, and naval units were involved in the operation. Such a system ensured absolute minimum confusion concerning the ultimate goal of the operation. It also ensured that General Eisenhower had, within his force, total access to all air force, navy, army, and Allied forces necessary to accomplish his assigned task.

b. Operation JOSS was an excellent example of combined operations. Cooperation between General Eisenhower and the British General, Sir Alan Brooke, was excellent. An

108. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operations, forward.

109. Truscott, p. 174.

example of the total cooperation that existed during HUSKY-JOSS was the selection of the actual date the operation was to begin. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had insisted the operation begin on 10 June. The British had wanted to delay the operation until 10 August, and the US had wanted to begin on 10 July. A compromise date of 10 July was finally agreed to by all parties. [110]

c. General Eisenhower said that the Army and Navy worked together throughout the Sicilian campaign with intricate planning and harmony. Such cooperation, however, did not exist with the Army Air Force. Because of a continuing air battle to gain and maintain air superiority in the vicinity of Sicily, the Army Air Force failed to send the necessary senior Air Force commanders to planning sessions for Operation HUSKY. The Air Force also failed to send subordinates with the authority to decide important issues. The result was a poorly coordinated air support plan for the ground forces during Operation JOSS. [111]

d. An excellent working relationship between the Army and Navy existed throughout Operation JOSS. Admiral Connolly, the Naval Force Commander, was one hundred percent supportive of all Army training requirements. There was never an incident of non-cooperation. The total cooperation between

110. Eisenhower, p. 2.

111. Ibid., p. 14.

Army and Navy during HUSKY-JOSS served as an ideal example for future joint operations. This cooperation was obtained through maximum coordination and communication by the staffs of both services. [112] General Truscott stated, "The outstanding factor in the success of JOSS was the cooperation between Army and Navy." [113]

e. For Operation JOSS, centralized planning had many advantages. It insured full cooperation, mutual assistance, relieved subordinate elements of many details, and improved speed and quality of planning. [114]

f. Major General Truscott established a "planning board" which operated in the "War Room." This board was composed of the assistant primary staff officers and any special staff officers necessary for the operation. This "planning board" was detached from the routine operations of the Division and devoted all their time to planning JOSS. The organization proved to be a sound decision in that the "board" did substantial work in ensuring that a thorough, logical, and professional operation was planned and ultimately executed. [115] Because of the expertise which existed within the "planning board," General Truscott had them conducting detailed

112. Ibid., p. 288.

113. Truscott, p. 197.

114. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward.

115. Eisenhower, p. 199.

planning which doctrinally would have been the responsibility of the subordinate units. Therefore, instead of saddling the regiments and battalions with preparation of detailed landing and loading plans, the "planning board," with advice from the regiments and battalions, made all detailed plans. This centralized planning freed key unit leaders to continue training and preparation for the assault. [116]

g. However complex tactical planning may be, it is essential that it can be simply executed. The success of JOSS can be largely attributed to the adherence to this rule. [117]

h. General Truscott was very familiar with, and had intimate knowledge of, plans and personalities involved in the conduct of the war in Europe. His experience and previous training were critical to the success of JOSS. General Truscott was immensely familiar with amphibious operational techniques, probably more so than any subordinate. As an expert, he was a readily available source who could and did make critically important decisions in a relatively short time. [118]

i. A leadership technique employed by Major General Truscott was to personally brief the officers of each

116. Ibid., p. 261.

117. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward.

118. Truscott, p. 196.

Infantry Regiment and the Division Artillery. He used these briefings to describe to his officers the actions and reactions of American troops in their first combat with Germans in North Africa. He spoke honestly of inferior US weapons, training, leadership, and will to fight. These personal briefings conducted in the months prior to JOSS proved invaluable in preparing the Division's officers for the realities of combat. They also afforded General Truscott the opportunity to become familiar with the officers of his command. [119]

j. Planning for Operation JOSS was done well in advance, and was done in such a way that actual forces to be used for the operation did not need to be identified in advance. This procedure insured flexibility of plans and prevented the need to continually modify operation plans as the date of execution grew closer and actual available forces could be selected. [120]

k. Inherent within the concept "command" is the basic nature of the unit itself. The nature, spirit, and tradition of the 3rd Infantry Division was recognized throughout the Mediterranean Theater. It is for this reason that the 3rd Infantry Division was selected to participate in both the Tunisian operation and as a part of the assault force for the very next operation, JOSS. [121]

119. Ibid., p. 179.

120. Ibid., p. 181.

121. Ibid., p. 227.

2. Intelligence.

a. Intelligence for amphibious operations is very important. A change in the intended objectives selected for JOSS caused many difficulties. The Third Infantry Division found itself without adequate maps or aerial photographs of beach landing sites and inland positions. Intelligence gathering agencies normally within the 3rd Infantry Division's influence would not assist in solving this problems because of the possibility of revealing future landing sites. Therefore, Major General Truscott requested assistance from the 8th Bomber Command, commanded by Jimmy Doolittle. This source was outside the normal intelligence channels. Henceforth, excellent aerial reconnaissance support was provided in a timely manner. Additionally, Doolittle detailed a staff officer to the 3rd Infantry Division to coordinate all subsequent reconnaissance operations. To plan for such an operation and yet be denied essential intelligence was an unexcusable and potentially dangerous situation. Fortunately, Major General Truscott's perseverance and resourcefulness and Jimmy Doolittle's cooperation prevented unnecessary combat casualties from occurring as a direct result of this issue. [122]

b. During Operation JOSS the actual capture of enemy documents facilitated Naval operations in and around

122. Ibid., p. 200.

Sicily and ensured safe passage of friendly vessels through the Straits of Messina and along the northern coast of Italy.

[123]

3. Deception.

a. Several deception plans were utilized to protect Operation HUSKY and JOSS, and they proved to be very effective. A strategic deception plan utilized a fleet of trawling and fishing vessels that departed the Mediterranean for Norway to draw enemy attention away from southern Italy. This fleet actually went dangerously close to the Norwegian shore in an effort to distract and draw out the German fleet.

[124] Additional deceptions were conducted on a more tactical level. For example, phony objectives were assigned units. The 5th and 58th Divisions (BR) appeared to be headed toward MOREA but were actually going to AVOLA. Canadian, Highland and Maltese troops appeared as though they were headed toward CRETE, but their real objective was PACHINO. US forces were directed toward SARDINIA, but in actuality landed in SICILY. [125]

b. Operation HUSKY, of which JOSS was a part, had a deception plan that was conducted by the entire Allied

123. US Navy Department, The Sicilian Campaign, 10 July - 17 August 1943, (Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, US Navy, 1945) p. 99.

124. Ibid., p. 8.

125. Ibid.

force in the Mediterranean. The plan required extensive assets and was designed to divert German and Italian strengths all over the Mediterranean except in Sicily. The numerous diversions were successful because the actual Operation JOSS landings achieved both strategic and tactical surprise. The plan's effectiveness was evidenced by the fact that enemy shore batteries were found unmanned and only sporadic rifle and machine gun fire were encountered by JOSS landing forces. In fact, the overall landing encountered no serious opposition. [126]

4. Training.

a. The extensive training conducted by the 3rd Infantry Division and naval support forces was a critical element in the overall success of JOSS. Major General Truscott had an overall training philosophy which emphasized objective and realistic training. He insured that both individual and unit training was directed toward specific objectives. Truscott believed that the importance of physical training could not be overemphasized, and that the development of tough physical conditioning requirements eliminated the unfit and instilled confidence in those who met the standards. [127] Major General Truscott emphasized the importance of speed marches, obstacle courses, log tossing, calisthenics, rope

126. Eisenhower, p. 76.

127. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward.

climbing, bayonet and battle course training, and individual hand-to-hand combat. Such training was designed specifically to get the soldier into proper physical condition for the rigorous combat to follow. The training was instrumental in developing "elan" and "esprit" in that the physical standards of the 3rd Infantry Division equalled the standards of the elite Ranger and Commando units. [128]

b. The initial training area for the 3rd Infantry Division was collocated near the Invasion Training Center. At this location, the Division had access to all the facilities necessary for realistic training (i.e., all types of beaches, locations inland that were good for road marches and maneuvers, obstacle courses, street fighting, and mountain training). The Navy forces for the operation were also close by (20 Miles). Through the consolidation of training at the Invasion Training Center, the Division was able to reach a high degree of combat readiness. [129]

c. The Division was later directed to move to another training area. This area, JEMAPES, proved totally inadequate. It did not have good areas for maneuver, it was 600 miles from the next Army Headquarters, and 250 miles from Navy Headquarters. It was an extremely poor location to prepare a division for an amphibious operation and proved a

128. Truscott, p. 185.

129. Ibid., p. 182.

hard lesson as the 3rd Infantry Division lost some of its combat edge while located there. [130]

d. A very important aspect of preparing the 3rd Infantry Division for Operation JOSS was Exercise RAINBOW. It was a regimental level "graduation" landing exercise designed to test every detail of the upcoming invasion plan. It proved to be an excellent final culmination of all combat skills learned and allowed the unit soldiers to enter combat with a sound positive feeling. [131]

e. The entire JOSS force conducted a final full-scale dress rehearsal called "COPYBOOK." This exercise was so real that the troops thought it was the actual operation. It served to gain the full confidence of all soldiers and proved to them that the Navy could land them on the proper beaches. It was also critical in allowing both Navy and Army units to make required last minute changes that prevented problems which could ultimately have had a negative impact on the success of the operation. [132] Operation COPYBOOK and its importance to the success of JOSS reinforced the lesson that no large scale amphibious operation should be undertaken without a full scale rehearsal. [133]

130. Ibid., p. 193.

131. Ibid., p. 186.

132. Ibid., p. 207.

133. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward.

5. Logistics and Administration.

a. At every port and beach, both US and British forces experienced a shortage of labor resources (laborers) impaired their ability to unload supplies. This scarcity of labor proved to be the chief logistical bottleneck experienced during JOSS. [134]

b. Prior to the operation, personnel shortages hampered the training of the JOSS force. The undersirability of stripping one combat division to provide replacements for another was a critical lesson learned during JOSS. [135]

The loss of many trained men (from the 3rd ID) as replacements for divisions fighting in Tunisia, together with the relatively early inactivity of duty in Morocco, resulted in a "rear area" feeling among 3rd Infantry Division soldiers left behind. This was to prove to be a serious problem in preparing the 3rd Infantry Division for operation JOSS as it negatively affected discipline and attitudes toward training. [136]

c. When replacements to fill 3rd Infantry Division personnel shortages were transferred to the Division from other units who had seen heavy combat in North Africa, new morale problems were experienced. Self-maiming became a problem among young soldiers who were intimidated with the

134. Eisenhower, p. 27.

135. Truscott, p. 286.

136. Ibid., p. 285.

thought of going into combat again. Major General Truscott solved the problem by quickly administering accelerated court-martials to those guilty of self-maiming. Heavy punishments (50 years hard labor) were imposed and highly publicized. Self-maiming became a quickly forgotten issue. [137]

6. Naval.

a. The importance of a flexible naval assault plan became apparent on the night preceding the invasion. Weather conditions deteriorated unexpectedly. The bad weather caused the LCI's (slowest vessel) to be overtaken by the LST's and LCT's. The requirement for radio silence precluded last minute coordination prior to the assault. As it occurred, the faster vessels were delayed due to the awareness of the naval assault commander. His ability to make a last minute adjustments in course and speed prevented the second echelon of the assault force from arriving first on the beaches. [138]

b. In general, navigation of the landing vessels was excellent during JOSS. The use of three vessels to mark limits of route was employed. These scout boats, immediately visible to the assault boats via lights, ensured that final navigational requirements were met. [139] Some

137. Ibid., p. 286.

138. Ibid., p. 38.

139. US Navy Department, The Sicilian Campaign, 10 July - 17 August 1943, p. 77.

of the scouts did incorrectly position themselves and caused some individual assault boats to land in the wrong location. However, no assault wave or follow-on wave landed at the improper beach. [140]

c. A major lesson learned during JOSS preparation was that the Navy should only be responsible for training when it concerned Naval matters. This policy for amphibious training was adopted and used throughout later operations in the Mediterranean Theater. [141]

d. One of the few truly new naval lessons learned during JOSS concerned the new amphibious vessels used for shore-to-shore movements. Similar vessels were to be employed at NORMANDY.

(1) JOSS involved landing of troops directly from LCI's (Landing Craft, Infantry) and showed that such operations were feasible on beaches with gradients no shallower than 1 to 70 and where bars or false beaches did not exist. [142]

(2) LCVP's (Landing Craft, Vehicles & Personnel) launched from LST's (Landing Ship, Tank) proved to be suitable for landing assault troops, however, their noise proved to be a disadvantage. [143]

140. Garland and Smyth, p. 125.

141. Truscott, p. 197.

142. 3rd Infantry Division, Report of Operation, p. 6.

143. Ibid., forward.

(3) LST's modified to carry 6 LCVP's were found ideal for the assault and also proved suitable for handling supplies. [144]

(4) LCI's were proved to be satisfactory for landing personnel where beach gradients permit. LCI's equipped with an LCVP proved to be satisfactory as headquarters ships. [145]

7. Equipment.

a. The most critical improvement in equipment employed in Operation JOSS was, as mentioned earlier, the use of shore-to-shore naval vessels. The use of these type of vessels facilitated the assault phases and subsequent resupply efforts for JOSS. Compared to previously utilized ship-to-shore equipment, these new vessels and techniques lessened confusion, time requirements, and vulnerabilities of assaulting troops. [146]

b. A second lesson learned was that the American fighting man, and public in general, had a misguided concept that American weapons and materiel were superior to the enemy's. In fact, it became quickly apparent during JOSS that we had no weapons in the Mediterranean that were comparable to the German '88.' The Germans also had several weapons superior

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Truscott, p. 196.

in caliber and range. German tanks were better armored and better armed. [147] This situation persisted throughout the JOSS Operation. Subsequent improved armaments did not reach the field until after JOSS.

c. There were several other less significant lessons learned about equipment during Operation JOSS. Some of these were:

(1) Only fully tracked vehicles should be landed prior to construction of beach roadways and exits. Division Artillery M-7's proved to be extremely satisfactory in the assault phase. Medium tanks also landed with assault echelons and provided close support and substitute artillery and were very successful. [148]

(2) JOSS's quick movement proved that in future operations of comparable speed of movement complete reliance for rapid communications must be placed on radio so that the effort and material of wire teams could be conserved. By doing so, wire assets would then be available when the situation required. [149]

(3) Radio equipment within infantry regiments lacked sufficient range for amphibious operations. [150]

147. Ibid., p. 181.

148. Third Infantry Division, Report of Operation, forward.

149. Ibid., p. 49.

150. Ibid., forward.

(4) Two piper cubs ("Jeep Planes") flown from an improvised flight deck of an LST during the assault phase were extremely valuable in directly artillery fire and providing information on troop locations. The use of an LST for this purpose was initially considered to be misguided. Later, during the initial phases of the landing, it was deemed "inspirational." [151]

(5) The chemical mortar, although an excellent weapon, proved to be heavy and lacked sufficient mobility for assault landings. They could not keep up with infantry battalions. [152]

8. Army Air Force.

a. Air support was poorly coordinated. No liaison officers were sent to the 3rd Infantry Division until the day of the assault. No Close Air Support was scheduled at all until all counter-air and air interdiction missions were completed. This resulted in no coordination of air/ground operations and increased reliance on naval gunfire. [153]

b. Despite the daily submission of a bomb safety line (5 to 10 miles) ahead of friendly troops, the rapid movement of JOSS forces resulted in friendly planes attacking friendly ground forces and vice versa. It was soon learned

151. Ibid.

152. Ibid.

153. Truscott, p. 204.

that pilots were being briefed on bomb lines at least one day old. In general, firing on friendly aircraft was due to the low standard of anti-aircraft training and the discipline of unseasoned units. [154]

c. The Army Air Force during JOSS placed an unrealistic administrative requirement on the Army by requiring 12 hours lead time on the submission of close air support (CAS) requests. [155]

d. As has been noted earlier in this report, the lack of Army Air Force participation in the planning of JOSS precluded good air/ground operations from occurring. Major General Truscott later said, "... Lack of air participation was inexcusable." [156]

9. Tactics.

a. Assault vessels were loaded so that they could employ all available direct and indirect fire weapon systems as they approached the shore. Of particular importance was use of the tank to engage targets while approaching the beach. [157]

b. Aggressive actions by the 3rd Infantry Division insured early and successful attainment of all goals.

154. Third Infantry Division, Report of Operation, p. 57.

155. Truscott, p. 205.

156. Ibid.

157. Ibid., p. 212.

In particular, the capture of AGRIGENTO and its port was singularly meaningful because higher command had directed that the 7th Army not become decisively engaged on the left most flank. This situation (decisive engagement) did not occur and the port was rapidly secured. The operation yielded 6,000 prisoners, 100 vehicles and tanks, and 50 artillery pieces larger than 75mm. [158]

c. The early landing of the 10th Field Artillery Battalion (M-7 self-propelled artillery) provided required fire support to the infantry. Use of self-propelled artillery in the assault assisted the speed of artillery positioning and increased mobility on the sandy beaches. [159]

d. As a result of JOSS it was learned that in any future operations the whole division signal company should be loaded on the D-Day convoy since the services of the entire company are immediately required. [160]

e. Smoke was effectively employed by destroyers to conceal the landing of LCT's which had been fired upon by Axis Forces on Red Beach. [161]

158. Ibid., p. 221.

159. Garland and Smyth, p. 129.

160. Third Infantry Division, Report of Operation, p. 49.

161. Truscott, p. 214.

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APPENDIX A

207TH COASTAL DIVISION

HQ: Agrigento
CG: MG Ottorino Schreiber (until 12 July 1943)
BG Augusto de Laurentiis (after 12Jul43)

INFANTRY

138th Regiment
420th Brig
109th MG Bn
388th Bn
388th Bn

139th Regiment
419th Bn
390th Bn
538th Bn

ARTILLERY

12th Arty Regiment
160th Bn
Btry 485 (149mm/35 cal)
Btry 487 (149mm/35 cal)
Btry 158 (105mm/27 cal)

35th Bn
Btry 151 (105mm/27 cal)
Btry 158 (105mm/27 cal)
Btry 159 (105mm/27 cal)

233rd Bn
Btry 1 (100mm/22 cal)
Btry 2 (100mm/22 cal)

145th Bn
Btry 152 (105mm/27 cal)
Btry 198 (105mm/27 cal)
Btry 79 (75mm/34 cal)
Btry 486 (149mm/35 cal)

REINFORCEMENTS

177th Bersaglieri Regiment
from Corps (3 Bns)

104th AT Bn from Corps
(47mm/32 cal)
(minus 2d Company)


Armored train of Royal
Navy with four 120mm/
45 cal guns

Armored train of Royal
Navy with four 76mm/
40 cal guns

1st MG Company, on
motorcycles from
Corps


Source: Axis Tactical Operations in Sicily, July-August 1943, Part II, Chapter V, USACGSC N-17500-1028-815.

APPENDIX B




AREA OF OPERATIONS, 207TH COASTAL DIVISION

APPENDIX C




ASSAULT BEACHES, OPERATION JOSS

APPENDIX D



JOSS ADVANCE, 10 JULY 1943


APPENDIX E



JOSS ADVANCE 11-12 JULY 1943


JOSS ADVANCE 11-12 JULY 1943

APPENDIX F



JOSS INVASION OBJECTIVES


APPENDIX G



THE SEIZURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORT EMPEDOCLE 14-18 July 1943.

THE SEIZURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORT EMPEDOCLE 14-18 JULY 1943

APPENDIX G



THE SEIZURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORT EMPEDOCLE 14-19 July 1943

THE SEIZURE OF AGRIGENTO AND PORT EMPEDOCLE 14-18 JULY 1943

134 Pages Total

25,241 WORDS

not including Title,
Abstract, contents,
bibliography, or
appendixes.