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
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AIR WAR COLLEGE

RESEARCH REPORT

No. AU-AWC-85-031

SOUTH AFRICA: A UNITED STATES POLICY DILEMMA

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL NICHOLAS J. BURNS

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AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
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
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
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


AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: South African Policy and the Department of Defense

AUTHOR: Nicholas J. Burns, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Industrial Western economies depend on the continued access to the minerals of South Africa and the free passage of ships through the waters around South Africa. The Soviet Union has increased its influence in the area. This study examines United States' policy toward the region, some of the developments in South Africa and the possible participation of the Department of Defense within the framework of the policy. Consideration is given to the actors in the region and the possible effect they will have on increased United States involvement.



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Burns has been interested in international relations since he was stationed in the Directorate of Plans, Headquarters United States Air Force. He has been stationed in both the Far East and Europe, and has traveled extensively in these areas. He is a fighter pilot and served as Squadron Operations Officer of a fighter squadron and Commander of an Air Support Operations Center squadron in Europe before being assigned to the Air War College. He is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1985.





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minerals should be exploited to undermine its war making capability. Soviet moves in Africa and Afganistan could be interpreted as the initial moves in the implementation of this theory. At least Soviet behavior and statements indicate an interest in obtaining access to southern Africa's mineral resources. Soviet Premier Brezhnev said to the President of Somalia in 1973, that Soviet aims were to gain control of the "two great treasure houses on which the West depends: the energy treasure house of the Persian Gulf and the mineral treasure house of central and southern Africa."¹¹ Although not likely in the foreseeable future, if a Soviet sponsored or supported government came to power in South Africa, would that government deny the West access to necessary minerals? The Soviet Union and its friends have historically not stopped the flow of goods to the West for political reasons. Communist countries maintain a heavy dependence on the West for capital and technology. Any denial of goods would have a direct impact on their ability to import and this would create severe economic problems in the communist states. Any government in South Africa will be dependent on foreign exchange earnings to survive and avoid an economic collapse. The Soviets have shown little enthusiasm to subsidize its Third World clients in Africa. With its own serious economic problems, the Soviets are unlikely to do so in the future. The best interest of the Soviet Union and a pro

If access to South Africa's minerals is denied, the United States has small stockpiles of both chromium and manganese that could be used to offset the short term effects. Domestic reserves of vanadium are sufficient to satisfy demands for many years. An interruption in platinum would probably not be critical, even considering the high level of import dependence. A large portion of the platinum is used as a catalyst and could be recovered and recycled. Substitution of other metals is possible for some uses. In the long term, the United States is clearly import dependent, however, short term dependence is a matter of cost. Alternate sources would cost more, could be less reliable, or be of lower quality.

The problem of resource dependence becomes more complicated when other industrialized countries are considered. Western Europe and Japan do not have the reserves, either stockpiled or the potential resources as has the United States. A short break in supply from South Africa would lead to intense competition for available alternate suppliers with an attendant large price increase. It can be concluded that a suspension of South Africa's supply of minerals, especially chromium and manganese, could have a disastrous effect on industrial production of all Western industrial nations.¹⁰

The Lagovsky theory, named after Soviet strategist A. N. Lagovsky, states that the West's reliance on imported

sources. While South Africa and Zimbabwe together have about 95 percent of the world's reserves, they account for only a third of production. The United States has reduced its strategic stockpile of chromium that was accumulated during the Korean War. In 1979, the strategic stockpile consisted of about a three year supply.⁶

Manganese is also used in production of stainless steel and tool steel. In most of its applications, there are no known substitutes for this hardening agent. While South Africa has about one third of the world's known reserves, Gabon, Brazil, and Australia have the majority of the remaining reserves. United States stockpiles contain slightly more than a two year supply.⁷

Vanadium is particularly important in the production of high strength, light weight steels. It is also used in the production of titanium alloys. Domestic ore is used for roughly 60 percent of consumption and imports from South Africa account for approximately another 15 percent.⁸

Platinum is used mainly as a catalyst in automobile emission control, petroleum refining, and the chemical industry. South Africa contains the majority of the world's known reserves, the Soviet Union contains the remaining reserves except for the one percent found in the United States and Canada.⁹

MINERALS

United States' dependence on import of strategic minerals has continued to increase. In 1960, the United States depended on foreign sources for an average of 54 percent of the top 25 commodities. In 1980, dependency for these same items had grown to an average of 70 percent.³

South Africa is the principal supplier of four minerals, chromium, manganese, platinum and vanadium, that are considered essential to industrial countries. It possesses two thirds of the world's known reserves of chromium and vanadium, one third of the manganese, and four fifths of the platinum.⁴ In 1981, the United States relied on imports for 90 percent of the chromium, 98 percent of the manganese, 42 percent of the vanadium and 90 percent of the platinum needed for industry.⁵ To appreciate the importance of these minerals for industry and defense it is necessary to be familiar with their use in manufacturing.

Chromium provides resistance to corrosion and oxidation over a wide range of temperatures. It is essential in production of stainless steel and of other speciality steels. There are large chrome bearing deposits in the United States. Because of their low grade and high transportation costs, they can not currently be mined at prices competitive with foreign

Although the importance of very large crude carriers has decreased with the recent decline in world oil prices and a temporary excess of oil supplies, the number of ships that are too large to use the Suez Canal will probably continue to increase. Because of the sometimes extremely difficult maritime conditions, these ships usually navigate within a close proximity of the Cape. A prolonged interdiction of the sea traffic that travels the Cape route would seriously cripple Western economies. If a government friendly to the Soviets were to come to power in South Africa, there are excellent facilities in South Africa from which the interdiction of Western shipping around the Cape could be easily accomplished. It can be argued that the real chokepoints for petroleum resources are at their source or destination. For example, the Strait of Hormuz and the approaches to European ports. Additionally, any Soviet move to blockade Western oil supplies would be an act of belligerency and would likely lead to a direct confrontation. If a confrontation were to occur, the Soviets would likely retain major naval forces nearer the Soviet Union.² Therefore, Soviet use of South African facilities may not be of great importance to the continued use of the Cape route by the west. However, Soviet access to facilities in South Africa would pose a potential threat to western shipping and would be extremely undesirable.

CHAPTER III

THE VALUE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

Southern Africa's geographic location and its mineral wealth constitute a high degree of inherent importance. Historically, a major link between East and West has been the sea routes around the Republic of South Africa. The October 1973 Arab and Israel war, which closed the Suez Canal, emphasized again, the extreme importance of the Cape sea route. Southern Africa has numerous minerals that are of vital importance to the industrial development of large manufacturing economies. It is the major source for four of these minerals--chromium, manganese, platinum, and vanadium. The United States has made a substantial commercial investment in the region and enjoys a significant amount of annual trade. This chapter will examine the importance of the region to the West, possible Soviet intentions, and the continued access of the West to both the Cape route and the minerals if the Soviets do increase their influence in the area.

THE CAPE ROUTE

More than three thousand ships pass through the Cape route each month. If the United Kingdom is excluded, these ships carry approximately eighty percent of western Europe's oil and twenty percent of the oil imported by the United States.¹

economic, cultural and political activities.¹²

The United States has maintained a working relationship with the government of South Africa while at the same time supporting black Africans to gain the background, education and influence to participate effectively in the process of change in South Africa. This apparent contradiction is recognized and unavoidable, considering the black-white conflict. It is also recognized that the American public will not support close ties with a government that denies its black majority basic human and democratic rights. The United States has a direct interest in a negotiated solution to the black-white political conflict in South Africa. If conflict should break out between blacks and whites in South Africa, especially if the Soviets choose to support a black war of liberation, the United States would have difficulty in deciding how to act. The debate could divide along racial lines creating a degeneration in race relations in the United States.

collective bargaining, desegregated working areas, started training programs, and some even promoted Africans upward in the corporate structure. Voluntary adherence to the Sullivan code of fair employment practices has been called one of the best ways to go beyond rhetoric about apartheid.¹¹

The United States has initiated programs to support the positive aspects of change in South Africa. A scholarship program, which brings black South African students to the United States for graduate and undergraduate degrees, is expected to have 400 black South Africans enrolled in 1985. To enhance dialogue between United States and South African labor unions and improve South African labor bargaining ability, programs are being initiated with the cooperation of the AFL-CIO to train labor leaders of South Africa. The United States is funding, in cooperation with the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce, a project to support small business development in the black community. In cooperation with black community groups, the United States is supporting a tutorial program to assist students in preparation for examinations to increase the number of black students eligible for university admission. These programs themselves will not directly foster change away from the policy of apartheid, but will strengthen the ability of black South Africans to participate more equally with the white South Africans in

South Africa to move away from its apartheid policies.

APARTHEID

Past actions reflect the sharp polarization of opinions in the United States on policy toward southern Africa. The left was focused on the issue of racism, and the right viewed events in the context of east-west competition. In the absence of bipartisan consensus on United States policy toward South Africa, opinion will likely be galvanized by events that bring strong public sympathy or dislike. For example, media reports on the death of Steve Biko at the hands of the South African police aroused the call for punitive action. Some universities sold some or all of their South African related holdings possibly believing that the government of South Africa could be pressured to make changes with the disinvestment, or threat of disinvestment. South Africa apparently was not pressured, as it recinded monetary exchange controls for non residents in February 1983. Even then, there was not a move to disinvest by the companies operating in South Africa.¹⁰ The policy debate has moved away from disinvestment and escape to the use of United States' corporations' role in promoting peaceful change in South Africa. American corporations have become a force for change. They have promoted equal employment opportunities, facilitated organization of trade unions and

than confrontation with South Africa and the other states in the region. The fundamental principle of United States constructive engagement policy is to do whatever is possible to ease tensions and work toward peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region. Mr. Lyman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs stated that the policy objectives toward South Africa include:

Fostering movement toward a system of government by consent of the governed and away from the racial policy of apartheid both as a form of racial discrimination and national political disenfranchisement of blacks.

Continued access to four strategic nonfuel minerals where the United States and OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries are either import or price dependent on South Africa, assuring the strategic security of the cape sea routes through which pass vital U.S. oil supplies from the Middle East; and

Regional security in southern Africa.⁸

Implicit in the objective of regional security in southern Africa is the United States' desire to curb communist influence in the region and to see Cuban troop presence in Angola terminated. Vice President Bush explicitly stated that the United States "...is not ashamed to state the U.S. interest in seeing an end to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola."⁹ South Africa considers the presence of Cuban troops in the region a threat to their security and if South Africa feels threatened by external forces it may be more difficult for

the only way that constructive change can come about is through them."⁴ Another conclusion of the study was that United States interests in southern Africa were not vital but were important.⁵ Public opposition to South Africa's racial policies continued, but diplomatic isolation eased and businesses operating in South Africa were encouraged to adopt progressive policies toward their employees.

Official relations between the United States and South Africa deteriorated in the late 1970s. The Carter administration placed less importance on east-west conflict and emphasized human rights as a prime factor in foreign policy. It considered nationalism as the dominant political force in Africa and gave increased importance to the political and economic power of Third World countries. It used harsh language in condemning South Africa and endorsed Reverend Leo Sullivan's code of fair employment practices for businesses.⁶ United States foreign policy shifted after the 1980 elections. The Reagan administration viewed Soviet expansionism as a major concern and was far more tolerant of violations of human rights. The United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have imposed sanctions against South Africa and in May 1981, President Reagan received South Africa's Prime Minister Botha in Washington.⁷ The United States entered into a policy of constructive engagement rather

CHAPTER II

UNITED STATES POLICY

United States' policy toward South Africa has generally responded to changes within United States society and the associated political realities generated by public opinion. As a nation, the United States involvement had been superficial with little understanding of the issues of the region. During the Eisenhower administration, the United States verbally criticized South Africa's racial policies, but cooperated with South Africa, even in military matters. The Supreme Court decision in the Brown case that rejected the concept of "separate but equal" significantly influenced United States policy toward South Africa.¹ In 1958, the United States voted for, instead of abstaining as it had previously, a United Nations resolution expressing concern with South Africa's racial policies.² In 1962, the Kennedy administration placed an embargo on arms sales to South Africa and supported the United Nations resolution for a voluntary embargo. In 1964, the United States even voted for a Security Council resolution to examine the feasibility of sanctions against South Africa.³ Official disapproval of South Africa decreased slightly with the Nixon administration. In a review of United States policy, a National Security Council Study Memorandum predicted that whites were in Southern Africa to stay, "...and

indicate a supportive policy toward South Africa. However, black African nations would view this policy as continued support for white supremacy of a predominately black nation, and the populace in the United States would not support a strong pro-South African policy.

The United States has initiated a policy of constructive engagement with all actors in the region that are willing to participate. This policy encourages dialogue between involved parties to develop peaceful ways to end conflict in the region and to promote regional economic development. The activities of the Department of State in pursuing the policy of constructive engagement have had some encouraging results. Progress has been achieved in negotiations for Namibian independence. Mozambique and South Africa have agreed to try to end cross border violence.

The purposes of this study are to examine United States policy toward southern Africa, developments in South Africa and the region and possible participation of the Department of Defense within the framework of the policy of constructive engagement.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The United States depends on non petroleum minerals from South Africa for industrial production. Some of the oil imported to the United States and the majority of oil imported to Europe travels the Cape route around South Africa. Continued access to the minerals and the free passage of ships through the Cape route is essential to the industrial economies of the West. The Soviets have seized the opportunity to gain influence in southern Africa by supporting black nationalist liberation groups. Now South Africa, except for Namibia, is surrounded by black regimes that promote a socialist philosophy, or were directly supported by the Soviets to achieve power. Increasing Soviet influence and instability in the region pose a potential threat to continued Western access to essential minerals. South Africa is the economic and military powerhouse in the region and has a strong anti-communist, pro-west outlook. However, South Africa's racial policies have made it an outcast in the international community, the enemy of all black regimes in Africa, and the object of hatred by civil rights groups in the United States. This creates a dilemma for the United States. Continued access to minerals, free passage of ships around the Cape, and efforts to decrease Soviet influence in the region would seem to

Soviet South Africa would seem to argue strongly against denial of essential minerals to the west.¹² This argument depends on Soviet intentions and it is certainly not in the best interest of the West to depend on Soviet intentions for its continued prosperity.

COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT

The region of southern Africa is an area where the United States has made substantial commercial investments. The United States has \$4.5 billion in direct investment in the region and experiences an annual trade of \$13.7 billion. With the Republic of South Africa, the United States has \$2 billion of direct investment and annual trade of \$3.4 billion. In 1978, the United States became the single largest importer of goods from South Africa. Approximately 300 United States corporations are active in South Africa. There are some 600 corporations that buy and sell in South Africa through agencies and perhaps a dozen other companies which play a major role in the South African economy, yet hold no significant assets there.¹³ Britain, the United States, Germany, and Japan together supplied South Africa with the majority of its imports. Although trade with the developed nations is much more important to South Africa than trade with the nations of black Africa, trade with black Africa is more extensive than is usually expected. In

1978, South Africa said it was trading with 49 African states. Thirteen of these states admit such trade. The others refuse to acknowledge this trade, or obscure it by use of intermediaries.¹⁴

South Africa is the economic powerhouse in the region. In 1978, South Africa produced approximately 20 percent of all Africa's goods and services and nearly 80 percent of that produced in southern Africa. South Africa accounted for nearly 86 percent of the continent's steel production, greater than 50 percent of its electrical production, 60 percent of all rail traffic and 40 percent of all industrial production.¹⁵

CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL SECURITY

The next policy objective is regional security in southern Africa. The Reagan administration has made it clear that it considers peace and stability in the region essential to promotion of change away from the apartheid policy of South Africa. Peace and stability will not be easily attained. Conflicts in southern Africa reflect social, political, and ethnic tensions and these conflicts have multiple actors. During the Carter administration, the United States with France, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany formed a contact group to negotiate the transition to independence of Namibia under United Nations authority.¹

After World War I, South Africa administered Namibia, a former German colony, under a League of Nations mandate. After World War II, South Africa refused to place the territory into the United Nations trusteeship system and edged toward incorporation of the territory into South Africa. The United Nations has not recognized South Africa's claim to the territory and in 1966 declared the mandate terminated. Additionally, the International Court of Justice has called South Africa's control of the territory illegal.² The South West African People's

Organization (SWAPO), which is supported by the Soviets, is the organization that the United Nations General Assembly has recognized as the sole authentic representative of the Namibian people. To reduce the strength of this group, South Africa has conducted military operations against SWAPO base camps in Angola. Additionally, South Africa provides support to the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the rebel group operating against the Angolan government.

The United States has taken the lead, along with our allies, in quiet negotiations with all actors to arrive at a point where the transition to Namibian independence can begin as soon as the political decisions are made to continue.³ Some commentators say that the real issue delaying Namibian independence is that South African leaders are not prepared to see a SWAPO dominated country appear. They are unwilling to appear, at least to the conservative right, as appeasers of black, communist inspired nationalism.⁴ Officially, South Africa considers the presence of Cuban troops in Angola a fundamental aspect of their security, and security a prerequisite for Namibian independence.⁵

The United States has unilaterally engaged in discussions with Angola attempting to reach a formula for the withdrawal of foreign forces from both Angola and Namibia. Angola has valid security concerns, and needs assurance that it can control the

currently South African supported UNITA group without the help of Cuban troops. It appears that patience, restraint, and a prolonged period of demonstrated responsible action by all involved is needed before further progress can be accomplished.

The United States has also pressed South Africa and Mozambique to end across border violence and develop a dialogue to resolve disputes. Mozambique has permitted the African National Congress, the South African outlawed anti-apartheid group, a base for operation against South Africa. South Africa has sponsored the insurgent Mozambique National Resistance group, which conducts guerrilla activities that are destabilizing to the government of Mozambique. A series of ministerial meetings between the two governments was initiated and on 16 March 1984, they reached an agreement that would uproot the African National Congress from Mozambique. In return, South Africa would halt aid to the Mozambique National Resistance, whose activities inside Mozambique pose a threat to that government. South Africa would also provide some economic assistance to Mozambique. Recent activity of the Mozambique National Resistance group raised the accusation that South Africa had not stopped its support, a charge that South Africa denied.⁶

Further progress in Namibian independence as well as long term security for the entire region may well depend on how well

South Africa is perceived to comply with the agreement with Mozambique and whether the Mozambique National Resistance activities decrease.

CHAPTER V

SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY

South Africa had a long association with the West as a member of the British commonwealth. Its military activities, until the mid-1950s, were conducted within this context. South Africa provided manpower resources to serve under British command whenever and wherever it was needed and converted its economy to the production of war materials for use by the Allies during WWII. South Africans also participated in the Berlin air lift and the Korean conflict. Under the strategic protection of Britain, South Africa, during peacetime, maintained a small armed force and kept its defense expenditures at a modest level while maintaining access to military advice, training, and equipment. During the period 1955-1964 the military cooperation with South Africa began to erode. The colonial powers in Africa became convinced that the forces of self determination and independence made their continued colonial control tenuous and became increasingly concerned with being associated with the apartheid doctrine of South Africa. White South Africa focused its attention increasingly on internal security and suppressed black nationalist and protest movements. South Africa's apartheid policy and suppression of the black population led to the 1963

United Nation voluntary arms embargo that was adhered to by both the United States and the United Kingdom. It was clear to South Africa that politically there remained little support in the West for continued security ties. This led to a gradual evolution of South African military and economy toward self sufficiency that has resulted in development of the most powerful military force on the African continent.¹

South Africa's military is much stronger than the total of the military capability of other nations in the region. In 1983, South Africa had a military force of 82,400 and could mobilize a total of 404,500 men. The other nations in the region could raise only a total of 172,000 men. South Africa has 313 combat aircraft which would be opposed by a total of 230 combat aircraft. South Africa has 48 Mirage III and 45 F-1 aircraft, which are more advanced aircraft than any of the aircraft possessed by the other states in the region. In major naval ships, South Africa has 26 ships compared to only eight for the other nations. The only area that South Africa is outnumbered is in tanks. South Africa has 250 tanks, while the black nations possess a total of 722. The comparative strength in tanks does not reflect South Africa's substantial number of armored cars and personnel carriers, or the fact that the tanks of the black African nations are divided between Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zaire.²

EFFECTS OF ISOLATION ON THE MILITARY

Changes in South African military doctrine and equipment did not occur rapidly. In the period from 1963 to 1977, South Africa continued to make overtures for military cooperation and political acceptance to the West. Pretoria emphasized common anti-communist policies, domestic stability, mineral resources, and the Soviet threat to the area. Western defense participated in communication and intelligence cooperation, space tracking stations, overflight rights, and port access. There was even an increase in joint naval exercises.³ But, it was clear that Western democracies would not accept the political liability of being publically associated with South Africa. In 1975, the British unilaterally terminated the Simonstown Naval agreement, France began to comply with the United Nations voluntary arms embargo, after having supplied the majority of South Africa's defense needs after its imposition, and the diplomatic isolation during the Angolan civil war confirmed this sentiment.⁴ These feelings were culminated with the United Nations mandatory arms embargo in 1977.

This gradual restriction in the flow of arms to South Africa and the increased concern with the threat to white South Africa forced a reassessment of the force structure and mission

of the armed forces. Because Western countries refused to provide ships and aircraft suitable for long range maritime patrol, South Africa announced in April 1974 that it could no longer provide protection for shipping around the Cape route. South Africa placed more attention to the maritime defense of its own coasts.⁵

The first combat experience of the South Africa Defense Force since Korea was in the Namibian and Angolan conflicts and these forces gained experience in low intensity conflict. The South Africa Defense Force now gives priority to counterinsurgency rather than conventional operations. South Africa has focused its arms production effort toward self-sufficiency in sustained low intensity conflict.⁶

THE EMBARGO AND ITS EFFECT

The United States established an embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa in 1962, observed the United Nations voluntary embargo established in 1963, and supported the 1977 United Nations Security Council establishment of a mandatory restriction on the export of arms to South Africa. In 1978, the United States went beyond these restrictions and banned export of all goods and technical data to South African police and military. Exceptions to this policy have been made on a case to case basis.⁷ While the United States and Britian

observed the voluntary embargos, other countries did not. France and Italy assumed the role of principal arms suppliers, with Jordan, Israel, India and others also selling arms quite openly to South Africa. In addition, coproduction and licensing arrangements were made, principally with France and Italy, providing South Africa with a base for future arms production self sufficiency.⁸ Equally important, controls were not extended to a large number of "dual use" items that would have an obvious military application.⁹

In 1966, South Africa formed the Armaments Development Corporation (ARMSCOR) to implement increased local assembly and production of equipment built under licensing agreements. By 1977, local industry was deeply involved in the drive to become self-sufficient in the production of telecommunications equipment, armored vehicles, missiles and patrol boats. Some one thousand firms are reported to have received locally spent procurement funds. Arms imports have declined since 1977, but ARMSCOR's production and employment have been growing at approximately 25 to 30 percent annually.¹⁰ South Africa has the ability to produce locally, with little outside assistance, a long list of items.

There is evidence that South Africa maintains access to Western technology and equipment. It is reported that the South African produced 155 millimeter artillery gun and a

mobile communications system contain West German technology from Magirus Deutz and Seimens. Naval craft contain Israeli electronics and guns from Italian and Swiss companies.¹¹ The arms embargo and increased media exposure of arms traffic to South Africa will undoubtedly make it more difficult and costly for them to obtain needed components. South Africa possesses the economy and expertise to become more self-sufficient if the cost of components becomes too high or access to them too difficult. As it is, South Africa ranks along with Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Taiwan as leading Third World arms producers and has grown to be the tenth largest arms producer in the world.¹²

CHAPTER VI

THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICA

The Afrikaner people of South Africa have long been obsessed with a fear of being overwhelmed by the black majority. After adopting the official policy of apartheid, they have faced the growing fear of outside interference to their internal racial policies. They have tended to blame communism as the force behind the black African nationalist movement and have seen governments supported by the Soviets or China come to power on their borders. They also have witnessed a withdrawal of Western support and the initiation of a United Nations arms embargo and the discussion of a general embargo of all goods to South Africa. Following is a discussion of some of the threats to South Africa, some of its vulnerabilities and some of its capabilities to resist these threats.

With the rise of black nationalist, anticolonialist movements in Africa, the Soviets and China seized the opportunity to strengthen their influence in the area at the expense of the West. By 1981, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe had come under the control of black African regimes that express a socialist philosophy or had been supplied by the communists in their fight for liberation. While all these regimes are socialist leaning, it is not clear how much influence the communist states will continue to have with these

regimes. In Zimbabwe, the Soviets backed Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union with large quantities of arms, but the relatively peaceful election of Robert Mugabe left the Soviets with little influence in the government, a government that owed them nothing. The Zimbabwe government quickly established links with the West and when it eventually agreed to establish links with the Soviet Union, the agreement stipulated that relations were to be state to state only and that neither would interfere in the other's internal affairs. It appears that the Soviets were not included by those they sponsored either in the negotiations for independence of Zimbabwe or of Namibia. Angola, while equipped by the Soviets and supported by Cuban troops, played a positive and independent role in the Namibian independence negotiations in spite of Soviet hostility to the initiative.¹ Mozambique officials claim they went to the East only for arms and training that was not available to them elsewhere. A Cuban offer to increase its training and advisory role in Mozambique has been declined.²

While Soviet influence may wane, the Soviets will probably continue to exploit instability and conflicts in the region for their own ends. The Soviets do provide weapons to the guerilla movements opposing the government of South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) and the Southwest Africa

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10. Ibid., p. 83-87, 100.
11. Thomas Conrad, "Legal Arms for South Africa", The Nation, 21 January 1984. Mr. Conrad is a researcher with the National Action/Research on the Military-Industrial Complex, a program of the American Friends Service Committee.
12. Bissell, p. 71; Conrad.

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1. Jaster, p. 7.
2. Ibid., p. 19
3. Ibid., p. 12.
4. Suzanne Cronje, "Africa and the World," Africa Guide, 1984.
5. Robert I. Rotberg, Suffer the Future (Massachusetts and London: Yale University Press. 1980) p. 118-119.
6. Ibid., p. 120-121.
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1. Conrad, p. 44.
2. Reed, p. 235.
3. Mufson, p. 37.

1. Eagleburger, p. 9.
2. Thompson and Prior, p. 231.
3. Eagleburger, p. 10.
4. Thomas Callaghy, South Africa in Southern Africa, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 121.
5. Crocker, p. 52.
6. Steve Mufson, "South Africa's Dispute With Neighbor Casts Shadow Over Regional Peace Plan," The Wall Street Journal, 29 January 1985, p. 37.

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1. Chester A. Crocker, South Africa's Defense Posture: Coping with Vulnerability (Washington: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1981), P. 8-11. Hereafter called, "South Africa's Defense Posture".
2. "The Military Balance 1983-1984," (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983).
3. Richard E. Bissell and Chester A. Crocker, South Africa into the 1980s (Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), p. 76-77; South Africa's Defense Posture, p. 11.
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5. Gibbs, George. "The Value of South Africa to NATO," Naval Forces, No 11, July 1982. p 13.
6. Reed; "South Africa's Defense Posture", p. 15; Bissell, p. 87.
7. Princeton Lyman, "U.S. Export Policy Toward South Africa", Department of State Bulletin, (May 1983), p. 27-28. Statement before the Subcommittees on Africa and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 2 December 1982. Mr. Lyman is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
8. "South Africa's Defense Posture", p. 42.
9. Bissell, p. 75.

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1. See John Reed, "Defending the South Atlantic--A Quandary for the West?" Armed Forces, July 1982 ; Gann and Duigan, "The Cape Remains a Potential NATO Chokepoint," Defense Systems Review, June 1983.
2. Robert Jaster, South Africa in Conflict (Washington and London: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982) p. 21.
3. James Hansen, "High Strategic Stakes in Southern Africa", National Defense, (May/June 1982), p. 44.
4. Jaster, p. 23.
5. James D. Santini, Sea Power, (January 1983), p. 26.
6. Leonard D. Eischman, Mineral Trends and U. S. Supply Problems (Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1980), p. 483-484.
7. Jaster, p. 43-44 and Hansen, p. 43.
8. See Hansen, p. 43; Jaster, p. 44; and Santini, p. 26.
9. Jaster, p. 44.
10. L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, p. 286; Jaster, p. 23.
11. Hansen, p. 46.
12. Jaster, p. 25-26.
13. Rotberg, p. 128.
14. Rotberg, p. 97; Study Commission, South Africa: Time Running Out, (London: University of California Press, 1981), p. xxiii.
15. Kenneth W. Grundy, "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa," in Carter and O'Meara, "International Politics of Southern Africa," p. 148; Study Commission, p. 128-129.

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1. Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, South African Politics (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 224.
2. Gann and Duignan, Why South Africa Will Survive (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 270.
3. Ibid., p. 271.
4. Thompson and Prior, p. 225. The source cited is the U.S. State Department, "The South African Program of Grouping Independent Bantu States," July 20, 1963(declassified 2/16/79), appended to Scott Delman, "The Subtle Sanction," Yale University history essay, December 12, 1980.
5. Garrick Uttley, Globalism or Regionalism? United States Policy Towards Southern Africa (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1979/1980) p. 3.
6. Thompson and Prior, p. 235-236. Reverend Leon Sullivan, a member of the board of General Motors, proposed a code of fair employment practices. The code calls for American companies to desegregate all facilities, provide color blind wage scales, train substantial numbers of blacks for increased responsibilities, promote without regard to color and improve the lives of employees outside the work place.
7. Ibid., p. 237.
8. Princeton Lyman, "U.S. Export Policy Toward South Africa," Department of State Bulletin, August 1983. p. 25-26.
9. Chester Crocker, "The Search for Regional Security in Southern Africa," Department of State Bulletin, April 1983. p. 52. Vice President Bush said this in Nairobi on November 19, 1982.
10. John Kane-Berman, "South Africa," Africa Guide, 1984; Jaster, p. 32.
11. Laurence Eagleburger, "Southern Africa: America's Responsibility for Peace and Change," Department of State Bulletin, August 1983. p. 13; Robert I. Rotberg, Suffer the Future (Massachusetts and London: Yale University Press, 1981) p. 133-136.
12. Eagleburger, p. 9-10.

ready to provide those items which we do well. Requests for dual use items of equipment, training for security or military personnel and military education should be acted on quickly. Providing dual use equipment offers the opportunity to get advisors and technicians increased contact with black national security and military personnel. Any comparison of United States with Soviet and Cuban assistance should be positive and lead to increased requests for assistance. If these requests are acted on in a timely and positive manner, there is the possibility to increase the United States' influence in the region.

African facilities while participating in offshore rescue operations.² Rescue operations have a valid humanitarian appeal and are relatively immune to criticism. However, the visit of the South African police officer drew criticism from various black organizations in the United States. In all United States' affairs with South Africa, it is important not to become associated, in the view of other southern African states, with perpetuating the current South African policies.

There may be a greater role for the Department of Defense to play with other states in the region. It was reported that the United States would send one million dollars in nonlethal aid to Mozambique and would also provide training for Mozambique troops.³ This appears to be unusual and an excellent opportunity to promote United States' interests, as Mozambique has been supported by Cuban and Soviet advisors. Although currently undefined, there may also be a role for the Department of Defense to play in responding to the security concern of both Angola and South Africa in resolution of Namibian independence.

Participation of the Department of Defense within the framework of the constructive engagement policy appears to be somewhat limited in the short term. The United States cannot compete with the Soviets in making military equipment available to countries. Therefore, the Defense Department should stand

Isolation of South Africa, both diplomatic and military isolation, has a risk to regional stability. Diplomatic interchange can have a moderating influence on the conduct of South Africa by providing them with indications of probable world and regional reactions to policies. The dangers of military isolation are more difficult to define. South Africa has developed a high degree of self-sufficiency in arms production. However, in an era of continued sophistication in weapons available from the east, South Africa's technological base does have its limits. Over time, and with help from outside sources, the visible superiority of South African forces could erode, reducing the reluctance of neighboring states to openly challenge South Africa militarily, thus reducing regional stability. Therefore, it is important to maintain contact with South Africa's security forces. There has been more contact with South African security forces under the Reagan administration than under the previous administration. The Coast Guard has trained three South African naval officers in search and rescue techniques, and a South African police officer participated in a Chicago Police Department training course.¹ There may be further opportunities for the Department of Defense to participate in further activities with South Africa in the search and rescue arena. The United States has operated aircraft from South

development of transportation lines indicate a need for regional cooperation. Support of the SADCC initiatives with economic aid and training programs will continue to foster the trust of the regional states and are the types of programs that will have widespread acceptance in the United States. How willing the West is to be constructive and generous in helping to develop the economies of these countries, may well determine the rate that Soviet influence will decline in the region. United States' policy in the region must remain pragmatic and even handed, as it is very unlikely there is enough public support for any extreme moves by the United States in the region.

There are events, although not highly likely, that could cause a more active role by the United States. A violent repression of blacks by South African security forces, well publicized by the media, could generate public demand for the imposition of some form of economic sanctions against South Africa, even though these sanctions may well only be of symbolic value. Conversely, a slaughter of whites by blacks could generate support for a quick and short rescue mission. A major indiscreet move by Soviet or Cuban military in the region, either into Namibia or clear Soviet military presence with rebel Zimbabwe elements, could probably generate support for limited, indirect United States military involvement.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

United States' interests in the region of southern Africa are best fulfilled in an atmosphere of political stability and economic growth. The policy of constructive engagement seeks to strengthen relations with all states in the region to enable the United States to facilitate regional security and development. The lead of the United States in the negotiations for Namibian independence apparently gained the United States the trust of black African states in the region, a trust which was denied the Soviets. This trust that the United States has gained should be nurtured and carefully protected, and it should be a factor in determining future actions in the region.

The relatively peaceful establishment of a black regime in the state of Zimbabwe has allowed the opportunity for states in the region to focus attention on the problems of economic development. Soviet influence in the region may be temporary, having been initially gained through military aid to guerilla groups. These groups that have come to power and have consolidated their positions, will have to deal with the very difficult economic problems of their states. The Soviets have historically not been very helpful in alleviating the economic problems of client states. The geography and

estimated to have stored reserves of between two and three years. The South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation had constructed a small coal to liquid fuel conversion plant in 1955, had begun a second plant in 1977 and with the loss of oil from Iran in 1979 began construction of a third conversion plant. It is estimated that these plants will provide about 47 percent of South Africa's liquid fuel requirements.⁶ Withholding petroleum products from South Africa would disrupt its economy, primarily in the transportation sector.

Black ruled states have come to power around South Africa, and their leaders are committed to the end of South Africa's apartheid policy, but even collectively they are no match for South Africa's military power. In addition, their economic dependence on South Africa will serve to limit their activities for some time. Despite the rhetoric, southern African leaders are aware of the dangers in the disruption of South African society and economy. They have expressed the attitude that their commitment toward majority rule is not incompatible with incremental, but positive, movement toward that goal.⁷

the region. South Africa's integral economic role is likely to remain an important moderating constraint on the activities of its black neighbors in the future.

While South Africa does have a strong economy, it does depend on the international community for petroleum, investment capital, and markets for its exports. South Africa has faced the threat of sanctions by the international community since the early 1960s, and the reality of voluntary and mandatory arms embargos. South Africa has taken some expensive steps to decrease its dependence on outside sources of supply, but remains vulnerable to an embargo on petroleum. South Africa has an ample supply of coal for much of its energy needs, however, the transportation sector depends on petroleum products. South Africa has no known petroleum reserves. The state owned oil research corporation, the French petroleum company Total, a partnership of Standard Oil of California and Texaco, and Exxon have searched for reserves with no results. An Arab oil boycott of South Africa has been in effect since 1973, and South Africa obtained 90 percent of its needs from Iran, which did not observe the embargo. Since the fall of the Shah, South Africa has had to purchase petroleum on the spot market at premium prices.⁵ To alleviate the effects of a possible total embargo, South Africa has been stockpiling petroleum in unused coal mines since 1958 and in 1979 was

People's Organization. They have increased the training provided to the ANG and improved the sophistication of their weapons. While the ANC has had some success in conducting terrorist acts in South Africa, a traditional guerilla war seems a long way off. South Africa has a strong security force and has many repressive powers available to defend the country against subversion.³

Of prime concern to these new governments in southern Africa is to create a viable economy. They have come to realize that their economic interests are tied to those of South Africa. The colonial heritage of communications lines make Zimbabwe and Mozambique dependent economically on South Africa. Many Mozambique citizens work in South Africa, and South Africa provides skilled manpower to manage power, engineering and railroad programs in Mozambique. Zimbabwe is largely dependent on South African facilities for foreign trade. Nine black ruled states formed the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) with the goal to reduce their trade dependence on South Africa's railways and harbors. It has attracted some aid and investment, mostly from the European Economic Community. Attacks by insurgent groups on the lines of communication in Angola and Mozambique have limited the effectiveness of the SADCC projects.⁴ South Africa is clearly the dominant military and economic power in

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