



# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## RESEARCH REPORT

No. AU-AWC-85-058

AD-A159 276

ASSESSING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE MILITARY

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARL H. FOSTER

DTIC FILE COPY

DTIC  
ELECTE  
SEP 17 1985

S D A

85 09 17 112  
AIR UNIVERSITY  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC  
RELEASE: DISTRIBUTION  
UNLIMITED

**Block 7.b.** Enter the address of the monitoring organization. Include city, state and ZIP code.

**Block 8.a.** Funding (Sponsoring) Organization — Name: Enter the full official name of the organization under whose immediate funding the document was generated, whether the work was one in-house or by contract. If the Monitoring Organization is the same as the Funding Organization, leave Block 8.a. blank.

**Block 8.b.** Enter the office symbol of the Funding (Sponsoring) Organization.

**Block 8.c.** Enter the address of the Funding (Sponsoring) Organization. Include city, state and ZIP code.

**Block 9.** Procurement Instrument Identification Number (Contract, Grant, or other Funding Instrument): For a contractor or grantee report, enter the complete contract or grant number(s) under which the work was accomplished. Leave this block blank for in-house reports.

**Block 10.** Source of Funding (Program Element, Project, Task Area, and Work Unit Number(s)): These four data elements relate to the DoD budget structure and provide program and/or administrative identification of the source of support for the work being carried on. Enter the program element, project, task area, work unit number, or their equivalents that identify the principal source of funding for the work required. These codes may be obtained from the applicable DoD forms such as the DD Form 1498 (Research and Technology Work Unit Summary) or from the fund citation of the funding instrument. If this information is not available to the authoring activity, these blocks should be filled in by the responsible DoD Official designated in Block 22. If the report is funded from multiple sources, identify only the Program Element and the Project, Task Area and Work Unit Numbers of the principal contributor.

**Block 11.** Title and Its Security Classification: Enter the title in Block 11 in initial capital letters exactly as it appears on the report. Titles on all classified reports, whether classified or unclassified, must be immediately followed by the security classification of the title enclosed in parentheses. A report with a classified title should be provided with an unclassified version if it is possible to do so without changing the meaning or obscuring the contents of the report. Use specific, meaningful words that describe the content of the report so that when the title is machine-indexed, the words will contribute useful retrieval terms.

If the report is in a foreign language and the title is given in both English and a foreign language, list the foreign language title first, followed by the English title enclosed in parentheses. If part of the text is in English, list the English title first followed by the foreign language title enclosed in parentheses. If the title is given in more than one foreign language, use a title that reflects the language of the text. If both the text and titles are in a foreign language, the title should be translated, if possible, unless the title is also the name of a foreign periodical. Transliterations of often used foreign alphabets (see Appendix A of MIL-STD-847B) are available from DTIC in document AD-A080 800.

**Block 12.** Personal Author(s): Give the complete name(s) of the author(s) in this order: last name, first name and middle name. In addition, list the affiliation of the authors if it differs from that of the performing organization.

List all authors. If the document is a compilation of papers, it may be more useful to list the authors with the titles of their papers as a contents note in the abstract in Block 19. If appropriate, the names of editors and compilers may be entered in this block.

**Block 13.a.** Type of Report: Indicate whether the report is summary, final, initial, progress, interim, etc.

**Block 13.b.** Period of Time Covered: Enter the inclusive dates (year, month, day) of the period covered, such as the life of a contract in a final contractor report.

**Block 14.** Date of Report: Enter the year, month, and day, or the year and the month the report was issued as shown on the cover.

**Block 15.** Page Count: Enter the total number of pages in the report that contain information, including cover, preface, table of contents, distribution lists, partial pages, etc. A chart in the body of the report is counted even if it is unnumbered.

**Block 16.** Supplementary Notation: Enter useful information about the report in hand, such as: "Prepared in cooperation with . . ." "Translation of (or by) . . ." "Symposium . . ." If there are report numbers for the report which are not noted elsewhere on the form (such as internal series numbers or participating organization report numbers) enter in this block.

**Block 17.** COSATI Codes: This block provides the subject coverage of the report for announcement and distribution purposes. The categories are to be taken from the "COSATI Subject Category List" (DoD Modified), Oct 65, AD-624 000. A copy is available on request to any organization generating reports for the DoD. At least one entry is required as follows:

Field — to indicate subject coverage of report.

Group — to indicate greater subject specificity of information in the report.

Sub-Group — if specificity greater than that shown by Group is required, use further designation as the numbers after the period (.) in the Group breakdown. Use only the designation provided by AD-624 000.

Example: The subject "Solid Rocket Motors" is Field 21, Group 08, Subgroup 2 page 32, AD-624 000).

**Block 18.** Subject Terms: These may be descriptors, keywords, posting terms, identifiers, open-ended terms, subject headings, acronyms, code words, or any words or phrases that identify the principal subjects covered in the report, that conform to standard terminology and exact enough to be used as subject index entries. Certain acronyms or "buzz words" may be used if they are recognized by specialists in the field and have a potential for becoming accepted terms. "Laser" and "Reverse Osmosis" were once such terms.

If possible, this set of terms should be selected so that the terms individually and as a group will remain UNCLASSIFIED without losing meaning. However, priority must be given to specifying proper subject terms rather than making the set of terms appear "UNCLASSIFIED". Each term on classified reports must be immediately followed by its security classification, enclosed in parentheses.

For reference on standard terminology the "DTIC Retrieval and Indexing Terminology" DRIT-1979, AD-A068 500, and the DoD "Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) 1968, AD-672 000, may be useful.

**Block 19. Abstract:** The abstract should be a pithy, brief (*preferably not to exceed 300 words*) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report. However, since the abstract may be machine-searched, all specific and meaningful words and phrases which express the subject content of the report should be included, even if the word limit is exceeded.

If possible the abstract of a classified report should be unclassified and consist of publicly releasable information (*Unlimited*); but in no instance should the report content description be sacrificed for the security classification.

**NOTE:** AN UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT DESCRIBING A CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT MAY APPEAR SEPARATELY FROM THE DOCUMENT IN AN UNCLASSIFIED CONTEXT, E.G., IN DTIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR BIBLIOGRAPHIC PRODUCTS OR BY ACCESS IN AN UNCLASSIFIED MODE TO THE DEFENSE RDT&E ON-LINE SYSTEM. THIS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE PREPARATION AND MARKING OF UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACTS.

For further information on preparing abstracts, employing scientific symbols, verbalizing, etc., see paragraph 2.1(n) and 2.3(b) in MIL-STD-847B.

**Block 20. Distribution/Availability of Abstract:** This block must be completed for all reports. Check the applicable statement either "unclassified/unlimited" or "same as report," or if the report is available to DTIC registered users "Abstract available to DTIC users."

**Block 21. Abstract Security Classification:** To ensure proper safeguarding of information, this block must be completed for all reports to designate the classification level of the entire abstract. For CLASSIFIED abstracts, each paragraph must be preceded by its security classification code in parentheses.

**Blocks 22.a,b,c.** Give name, telephone number and office symbol respectively of DoD person responsible for the accuracy of the completion of this form.

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

### GENERAL INFORMATION

The accuracy and completeness of all information provided in the DD Form 1473, especially classification and distribution limitation markings, are the responsibility of the authoring or monitoring DoD activity.

Because the data input on this form will be what others will retrieve from DTIC's bibliographic data base or may determine how the document can be accessed by future users, care should be taken to have the form completed by knowledgeable personnel. For better communication and to facilitate more complete and accurate input from the origination of the form to those processing the data, space has been provided for the name, telephone number and office symbol of the DoD person responsible for the input cited on the form. These are to be noted in Block 22.

All information on the DD Form 1473 should be typed.

Only information appearing on or in the report, or applying specifically to the report in hand should be reported. If there is any doubt, the block should be left blank.

Some of the information on the forms (e.g., title, abstract) will be machine-indexed. The terminology used should describe the content of the report or identify it as precisely as possible for future identification and retrieval.

**SPECIAL NOTE: UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACTS AND TITLES DESCRIBING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS MAY APPEAR SEPARATELY FROM THE DOCUMENTS IN AN UNCLASSIFIED CONTEXT, E.G., IN DTIC ANNOUNCEMENT BULLETINS AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES OR BY ACCESS IN AN UNCLASSIFIED MODE TO THE RDT/E ON-LINE SYSTEM. THIS MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE PREPARATION AND MARKING OF UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACTS AND TITLES.**

The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) is ready to offer assistance to anyone who needs and requests it. Call Data Base Input Division (AUTOVON) 284-7044; Com 202-274-7044.

### SPECIFIC BLOCKS

#### SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THE FORM:

In accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program Regulation, Chapter V1 Section 2, paragraph 4-200, classification markings are to be stamped, printed, or written at the tops and bottom of the form in capital letters that are larger than those used in the text of the document. See also DoD 5220.22-M, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, Section II, paragraph 11a(2). This form should be nonclassified, if possible.

**Block 1.a. Report Security Classification:** Designate the highest security classification of the report. (See DoD 5200.00.1-R, Chapters, I, IV, VII, XI, Appendix A).

**Block 1.b.** Enter the restricted marking or warning notice of the report (e.g., CNWDI, RD, NATO).

**Block 2.a. Security Classification Authority:** Enter the commonly used markings in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, Chapter IV, Section 4, paragraph 4-400 and 4-402. Indicate classification authority.

**Block 2.b. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:** Indicate specific date or event for declassification or the notation "Originating Agency Determination Required" or "OADR." Also insert (when applicable) downgrade to: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_, (e.g., "Downgrade to Confidential on 6 July 1983). (See also DoD 5220.22-M, Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information, Appendix II).

**NOTE:** Entry must be made in Blocks 2.a. and 2.b. except when the original report is unclassified and has never been upgraded.

**Block 3. Distribution/Availability Statement of Report:** Insert the statement as it appears on the report. If a limited distribution statement is used, the reason must be one of those given by DoD Directive 5200.20, Distribution Statements on Technical Documents. The Distribution Statement should provide for the broadest distribution possible within limits of security and controlling office limitations.

**Block 4. Performing Organization Report Number(s):** Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization originating or generating the report from its research and whose name appears in Block 6. These numbers should be in accordance with ANSI STD 239.23-74 "American National Standard Technical Report Number." If the Performing Organization is also the Monitoring Agency, enter the report number in Block 4.

**Block 5. Monitoring Organization Report Number(s):** Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the Monitoring Agency. This should be a number assigned by a Department of Defense or other government agency and should be in accordance with ANSI STD 239.23-74 "American National Standard Technical Report Number." If the Monitoring Agency is the same as the Performing Organization enter the report number in Block 4 and leave Block 5 blank.

**Block 6.a. Performing Organization:** For in-house reports, enter the name of the performing activity. For reports prepared under contract or grant, enter the contractor or the grantee who generated the report and identify the appropriate corporate division, school, laboratory, etc., of the author.

**Block 6.b.** Enter the office symbol of the performing organization.

**Block 6.c.** Enter the address of the performing organization, list city, state and ZIP code.

**Block 7.a. Monitoring Organization — Name:** This is the agency responsible for administering or monitoring a project, contract, or grant. If the monitor is also the performing organization, leave Block 7.a. blank. In the case of joint sponsorship, the monitoring organization is determined by advanced agreement. It can be either an office, a group, or a committee representing more than one activity, service or agency.

AD A159276

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION <b>Unclassified</b>			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)  <b>AU-AWC-85-058</b>			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION <b>Air War College</b>		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) <b>DFR</b>	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)  <b>Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-5522</b>			7b. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS.	
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
			TASK NO.	WORK UNIT NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) <b>Assessing Public Opinion Toward the Military</b>				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)  <b>Lt Col Carl H. Foster</b>				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT <b>Research</b>		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Yr., Mo., Day) <b>March 1985</b>
15. PAGE COUNT <b>54</b>				
15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB. GR.		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) <b>Opinions and attitudes of the US public toward its military have shifted over the years from strong admiration to fear and contempt. A number of historical and cultural events have helped shape public opinion. Although public opinion is not predicated solely on what happens in an historical and cultural sense, it should be analyzed and documented on the premise that public opinion affects national power, and these things which affect national power are within the realm of interest of the military and national government. A perhaps frightening aspect of the dynamics of shifting public opinion is the uncontrolled nature of the shifts and the resultant impact on national power. Also influencing public opinion are developments in weapons and military technology, the massive Soviet propaganda effort, and the mass communications media. This paper is written with the purpose of raising the level of awareness of military and national leaders to the threat to national power which, although lying subtly out of view because it does not pose an immediate threat to our security, nonetheless offers a formidable challenge now. A broad proposal would lay the foundation for proper research and development.</b>				
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT  UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  <b>Unclassified</b>	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL  <b>Dr. Robert Bogard</b>			22b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) <b>(205) 293-7074</b>	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL  <b>AWC/DFR</b>

AIR WAR COLLEGE  
AIR UNIVERSITY

ASSESSING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE MILITARY

by

CARL H. FOSTER  
Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH

REQUIREMENT

Research Advisor: Dr. Caroline Westerhof

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA  
March 1985

### DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER

This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

This document is the property of the United States government and is not to be reproduced in whole or in part without permission of the commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Avail and/or	
Special	
A1	

## ABSTRACT

TITLE: ASSESSING PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD THE MILITARY

AUTHOR: Carl H. Foster, Lieutenant Colonel, USAFR

Opinions and attitudes of the U.S. public toward its military have shifted over the years back and forth between a strong admiration for men in uniform to fear and contempt. A number of historical and cultural events have influenced these shifts and helped shaped public opinion. These events, unfolding as a matter of historical course, often cannot be predicted nor controlled.

Although public opinion is not predicated solely on what happens in an historical and cultural sense, it should be analyzed and documented based on the premise that public opinion affects national power, and those things which affect national power are within the realm of interest of the military and national government.

Perhaps a frightening aspect of the dynamics of shifting public opinion is the uncontrolled nature of the shifts and the resultant impact on national power. Also influencing public opinion are developments in weapons and military technology, the massive Soviet propaganda effort, and the mass communications media.

This paper is written with the purpose of raising the level of awareness of military and national leaders to the threat to national power which, although lying subtly out of view because it does not pose an immediate threat to our security, none-the-less offers a formidable challenge now. A broad proposal is suggested which would lay the foundation for proper research and development with a sufficient follow-on program based upon findings.



### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Carl H. Foster is an Air Force Reservist on a leave of absence from the Farm Credit Banks of Sacramento, California, while attending Air War College. He is a graduate of the University of the Pacific, Stockton, California, where he earned a Master's of Arts degree in psychology. Lieutenant Colonel Foster has worked as a civilian in the area of human learning for 15 years and has maintained an active interest in public opinion and its shaping. With twenty years experience in the Air Force, he has served as a unit commander and a navigator. During his career in the military he has traveled throughout Europe, South America, the Pacific region, and the United States.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the paper.....	1
Factors influencing public opinion.....	1

### CHANGING IMAGES OF THE WARRIOR AND WAR

Warriors as crusaders.....	2
Impact of WW II and the Vietnam Conflict.....	2
The problem of image-making for the warrior.....	4
Changing weapons cause changing images.....	6

### THE SHAPING OF OUR SOCIETY: AN AVERSION TO WAR

Past-future linkages.....	7
Trends and the shape of the future.....	8
Power of persuasion.....	9 & 10
Politics and the shaping of images.....	11
"Old" vs "New" Politics.....	11
Detente.....	12
U.S. - Soviet power competition.....	12 & 13
Alarmists vs Complacents.....	14
Soviet intentions?.....	15

### WEAPONS, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT WAR

Historical view toward weapons.....	15
Trends in attitudes toward nuclear weapons.....	16
Costs.....	16
Opinion as a function of public reliance on technology.....	17

### SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Soviet vs U.S. view of propaganda.....	19
Soviet Active Measures.....	19 & 20
Assessing Soviet intentions by assessing Soviet propaganda.....	23

### THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

News in the U.S. is a commodity.....	25
The role mass media plays in influencing national security.....	26 & 27
The need for checks and balances.....	27
The "middle man" in making news.....	28
Television and the communications revolution.....	29
Public opinion is a fluid concept.....	30

### PUBLIC OPINION: DOES IT REFLECT THE MILITARY AS YOU KNOW IT?

The swing in public opinion.....	32
----------------------------------	----

What does the public know about the military?.....	32
What does "Star Wars" mean to the public?.....	34
What does the public know about the Soviet space program?.....	34 & 35
Nuclear: threat or not?.....	35
Public knowledge of chemical warfare.....	36
Negotiations for peace: what does the public know about the actors and negotiating styles?...	36

#### PUBLIC OPINION, NATIONAL WILL, STRATEGY

The public's need to know.....	37 & 38
National will is shaped through public opinion..	38 & 39
What the public is told.....	40
Comparison of U.S. public opinion and Soviet public opinion.....	43

#### A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION

Minimum steps.....	43
A central office.....	44
Research and educational activities.....	45
Person-to-person contacts.....	46
Training.....	46

## INTRODUCTION

For a number of years I have noticed that the image of the Air Force held by my friends and business acquaintances is different from my image of it. Being a member of the Air Force Reserve perhaps my view is somewhat parochial. Nonetheless, it is often surprising to hear what people outside of the military and government think about issues of military importance and national defense. This paper is shaped around the idea that what the public thinks about the Air Force --and the military in general-- is not in fact what the Air Force is really like. It is a paper about the cultural and historical factors that may have influenced public thinking on the military. By tracing the changing public images of the warrior and war, by analyzing the impact of our public's historic "fear" of big government on its image of the military, and by examining the impact that technology and weapons of mass destruction have had on the public's image of the military, we can draw conclusions about public opinion, national will, and national power, and how these interrelate. To a large extent this image--perhaps it can be called a faulty image--is due to a lack of knowledge. As the major institution in our nation for disseminating facts (knowledge), the mass communications media has had a dramatic impact on shaping the image of the military. In a very real way, the media has had a dramatic impact in shaping national will and national power.

## CHANGING IMAGES OF THE WARRIOR AND WAR

Historically Americans have exhibited ambivalent feelings towards its military. The colonists did not follow the British method of fighting wars by frontal, orderly assault. They perceived themselves as natural fighters, more effective fighters, unbound by the rules of the British army that seemed to contribute to its defeat. On the other hand, America's national origins sprang out of many military battles. During the founding years and until recently American wars have had a crusade spirit behind them. Even the beginnings of the Vietnam conflict were rooted in an honorable campaign to halt Communist expansionism. Consider the image of the Minuteman of our nation's early years. They weren't warriors; they were American boys who by chance of fate wound up with guns in their hands, and even though they weren't warriors, they still won their battles. This same image emerged again during World War II.(1)

But the image of hero did not always hold up during the last years of World War II. TIME magazine reported that "one out of four American soldiers tacitly admitted that his primary concern was not to secure surrender, but to kill as many Japanese as possible." Thus emerged an image of the warrior who almost resembled an executioner, for

whom killing was an end in itself, not to unlike what murder is all about.(2)

This kind of image again emerged in Vietnam where the public watched executions on television, read about massacres in the news media, and were told to think of the war in terms of bodies counted dead. It became impossible for the public to reconcile what they saw and heard with any crusading ideal which might have otherwise galvanized our society into continuing the effort. The damage to the image of the American soldier was immense. From every perspective the American soldier did not have what it took to bring that war to an honorable end; such a prospect did not fit the historical image of the warrior-hero.(3)

Whether soldiers are scorned or honored depends largely on how badly they are needed and how successful they are. After suffering the large number of casualties of World War I, generals and military officers were widely regarded as blundering butchers; in World War II Allied commanders seemed true heroes; those from Vietnam were branded amoral and vicious.(4)

Consider the setting today; we all view the world through our own "lenses" shaped by what we read, see, and hear. The public, those who do not work in any type of

government job, view the Air Force, the military, through lenses shaped by experiences that seems to give them an inaccurate view. In fact perceptions are often shaped by dimly held images that originate from many sources. Novels, films, plays, songs, all are popular avenues through which we gather our own "dimly held images". Taken in the aggregate, if these images are predominantly negative, then the overall impression will be negative.

There are a number of contradictions which exacerbate the problem of image making. For example, consider the profession-of-arms in comparison with other professions. Those in the profession-of-arms are expected to have qualities that are both the highest and the lowest at the same time: courage, self-sacrifice, as well as utter ruthlessness and savagery. Even though all societies sanction killing under certain conditions, those who professionally employ extreme violence on society's behalf (and with society's support) are often regarded as strange and dangerous creatures.

General George S. Patton, Jr., once described professional men-at-arms as "killers". It is that last word that creates the ultimate gulf between soldier and civilian, and raises the question of whether or not soldiers are civilized.(5)

Casual remarks, printed stories, televised newscasts, entertaining films where soldiers are heard saying "killing people never bothers me" and/or "I do like to see arms and legs fly" leave a question in the minds of the public about the basic character and honor of the officer or soldier; such comments, made for whatever reasons, violate the image our society holds for itself. And once so violated, the historical image of the warrior-hero erodes ever so slightly. The cumulative effect throughout society is not slight and hurts the image of the military in general.

Another factor that exists as a part of military life that runs counter to life in the civilian community is the adherence to rules and strict obedience of orders. This behavior suggests that military people cannot think for themselves, something our society holds to be a virtue. The old joke about the soldier's head being situated in such a position so as to inform him of the height to which his salute should be brought is alive. At the same time the public recognizes-at least in some distant memory-that no society can come into being nor maintain itself as a social order free from engulfment by outside forces without nurturing the warrior amongst its midst. So the warrior, who possesses the skill and weapons to control, is juxtaposed in second position behind his civilian



masters who have little absolute power. What image does this factor bring into the perceptions of society about the military?(6)

With the emergence of atomic weapons and high tech weapons a subtle but prominent change in image has taken place. In the minds of many in our society, and in the world at large, total war has become a harsh, frightening reality. Push button war is not seen as something happening between heroic men defending a cause, but something accidental and under the control of a body of operatives who are not necessarily to be trusted -- the military. Gone is the "American boy who by chance of fate wound up with a gun in his hand". In his place is the self-serving bureaucrat -- the American military officer and his war making machine.

As weapons become more powerful, and as technology continues to modernize and revolutionize systems for making war, the warrior appears less powerful. He no longer seems to be in control, nor is he the central actor in the drama of making war. Writers of all kind began to reflect a new view of the military and its function. No longer is it the defender of our freedoms, principles, beliefs, and way of life, but now it is a consolidation of absurd contradictions, driven by self-serving members of

the military-industrial, money-making few, another image inconsistent with what the public holds of itself.(7)

#### THE SHAPING OF OUR SOCIETY: AN AVERSION TO WAR

Apart from the discussion of the evolving attitudes toward war and the warrior, certain historical factors about our society have left strong cultural patterns which influence today's public impressions about the military. It may be easier to agree upon the historical factors than to agree upon their contemporary application to the shaping of our society and attitudes toward war. A starting point for discussion is the premise that the present generation is the sum product of past generations. The past continues to influence the present, and unless our society experiences a radical and permanent change(such as being conquered in war), the national outlook is not likely to change significantly. Frederick Hartmann calls this phenomenon the "'cardinal principle of past-future linkages'. This principle warns us to look to the past in judging the future." Hartmann further cautions that the "failure of the leaders of one nation to grasp how another looks at life, and is likely to react, often leads to calculations very wide of the intended mark." (8) Cannot this same principle be applied by the leaders of our own nation in examining how our public will grasp issues and react to them? Is it not mandatory that

the leaders of this nation consider how our public views war and the warrior, thoroughly understand the psychological and sociological dimensions, and establish and manage any shortfalls which might effect national security?

How then has our past developed factors which may shape our future thinking toward war? First we can look at the type people who settled this continent from Europe and can trace emerging cultural trends. The American Colonists successfully separated from their past through a popular revolution. After winning independence, our founding fathers followed a policy of refraining from alignments with European powers. "Entangling alliances" were to be avoided because such would cause un-sought after trouble. Our early leaders correctly guessed that European powers might well check each other's ambitions, leaving the United States in peace. Perhaps this was the begining of the concept of a balance of power; it seemed to work. Power struggles in Europe kept England, France, and Spain jockeying for positions, and, with the exception of the Civil War, the United States achieved peace and security without much positive effort on its own part.(9)

During this period the United States concentrated its energies on continental expansion. This process was carried out with great success. Exploiting its vast

natural resources, the U.S. caught up with and then outpaced Europe, rapidly expanding its industrial power in relative peace. Although this experience and condition was unique in history, the American public had no cause to pause and reflect that this golden age of peace was anything more than normal. Thus the American public learned that by avoiding entangling alliances and concentrating on individual growth and prosperity, the good life could be had.(10) To the American public the cardinal principle was to mind your own business. The public came to rely on a few tried and proven principles: unilateralism, isolationism, fair and equal trade, freedom of the seas, and neutrality. It was not until after World War II that these principles were changed or abandoned.

Another fundamental factor which shapes our cultural attitudes toward war is the form of our government structure. It is a structure with deliberate built-in friction. It is well known that the three branches of our government were given powers to balance each other. No one branch(faction, special interest group, etc.) could gain dominance over another if each functioned as initially designed. Thus the real power in government shifted toward those actors who had the ability to persuade.

Over the years the power of persuasion took on a very important role. It was not by force that any principle of government would prevail, but it was by the ability of persuasion that laws and rules governing our society would prevail. Advocacy became a fundamental skill for influencing government and remains so today. Within this arena the military seems to have few of the necessary skills and training to persuade either the public or Congress. Nonetheless this is not an arena in which the professional military officer can relinquish interest.

The easy approach is to reflect on the fact that our civilian bosses in the Pentagon are there to do this task. True. However with the kind of change in leadership that occurs every four or so years, where is the corporate memory so necessary to a powerful advocacy role? Likewise military leaders have little experience functioning as advocates. There appears to be a shortage of Air Force officers, trained in human resource management, who have the skills of persuasion, public speaking, and advocacy which are necessary to function successfully within this model of government.

Like it or not America was thrust into a leadership role following World War II, and our leaders abandoned many of the concepts of isolationism held during our first 200 years of growth. Forces driving this change have been

mentioned: nuclear weapons, high technology, etc. Other forces have influenced and fragmented domestic American political cohesion, altering the nation's priorities, and undermining more traditional thinking. One such force has been the ascendancy of single-issue political causes. Each of these causes generated its own passionate countermovement, drawing new and bitter lines in national politics, and escalating the involvement in partisan politics of organized ideological extremism of the right and left.(11) Advocacy at its extreme!

Much of the turbulence in American politics in the late 1960's and early 1970's was aggravated by continued American involvement in the Vietnam conflict. Regardless of how well we in the military might feel that we have been exonerated finally by historians reporting on the involvement of our senior political leaders, the vast majority of our public holds the military directly responsible for all of the ills of that era. Vietnam became the axis around which the "old politics" could be distinguished from the "new", the right from the left. That war, that era, has permanently altered the cultural perceptions of war and the warrior in the view of the public. Current writers on military strategy, reacting to public outcrys of that era, pronounce "the public will not support a drawn out conflict" "the nation must clearly

know it's objectives before entering another war", and so on. While there may be some value in these observations, military planners should exercise caution in applying absolute value to them.(12)

Another factor in our culture which probably has vast implications for understanding the current American view of the military and war is detente. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba, U.S. policy turned to detente, arms control, and a unilateral ceiling on the deployment of American ICBMs. This course of action seems to fit very well into our cultural heritage and views toward war. To the guy on the street, we were going to be able to co-exist with the Soviet Bear. To the guy on the street we were going to sign agreements which would curtail future military buildups. However, no one seems to have fully understood the Soviet pronouncement after their withdrawal from Cuba that the "Americans will never be able to do this to us again." (Soviet diplomat Vasily V. Kuznetsov) While the American public, and our leaders, worked to build down our forces, the Soviets successfully launched a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power.(13)

The recurring ambiguities in the perceptions of both the American public and our leadership regarding the terms and requirements of the continuing U.S.-Soviet power

competition plus the agonizing Vietnam experience help explain the inadequate U.S. response to the sustained Soviet build-up of military power. It was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that jolted the American public, and caused an assessment of our position which lead to rejuvenated efforts to upgrade our military preparedness.

Even with upgrading our military, how strong is public confidence in the wisdom of our military defense policy? Are there potential problems that will substantially weaken our position over the next decade? The answers to these questions require research, not into written articles, but into the minds and thoughts of the public. Fundamental to answering these questions is setting aside the proposition that public confidence will be difficult to generate in times when the fighting starts. The more serious problem is how to generate and maintain public confidence in the absence of immediate danger of war. There has not been a war between East and West for well over a generation, and the existence of nuclear weapons seems to render war unlikely. Thus war is largely a memory. Without a war to fight, or to remember, it becomes increasingly difficult for the public to justify spending scarce money to upgrade a military whose value as an institution is coming under question.



Two contradictory voices have appeared as advocates confusing rather than resolving the faltering public confidence about national security affairs. These voices represent alarmists and complacents. For the alarmist nuclear war is inevitable. According to those who hold this view, the mindless accumulation of nuclear weaponry is bound to lead to a world catastrophe sooner or later. The opposite view - the emergence of complacency - asserts there is no need to worry about military imbalances because deterrence works. Our efforts, particularly in times of scarce resources, should be towards maintaining our effective deterrence. Don't spend money on conventional weapons because our nuclear capability has successfully warded off any real threat.(14)

Public confidence in the wisdom of our military defense policy relying on nuclear weaponry is currently in a deep crisis precisely because of the combined effects of alarmism and complacency. The doomsday argument and the "it won't be so bad" argument create in the public mind a deep sense of uneasiness. To dismiss the anti-nuclear sentiments as those of a minority is to misunderstand the uneasiness which is so wide-spread. This problem will not automatically go away; it is going to have to be handled skillfully through public debate. Without skilled advocates providing the public a balanced education on not

only nuclear issues, but also on national security affairs in general, public confidence will continue to wax and wane in unpredictable ways.

Finally there is the long standing debate among American politicians regarding Soviet "intentions". The debate questions whether Soviet aims are necessarily hostile to the interests of the United States or whether Soviet leadership can be convinced to accept common and binding rules for peaceful competition. America's defense policies have reflected the inconclusiveness of this debate in the periodic swinging toward one point or the other of public attitudes.(15)

#### WEAPONS, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT WAR

What have weapons to do with public opinion and war and vice versa? Over the centuries as new weapons were invented and used the public often described them as the ultimate weapon to win all wars, etc. The introduction of the bow and arrow, the musket, the repeating rifle, the machine gun, the tank, and lately the nuclear weapon, all have been characterized as the ultimate weapon. However, nuclear weapons are so dramatic in their ability to destroy life and property that their proliferation among many nations has created substantial controversy in the United States and the Western world. Along with the

development of these weapons has been the development of missile systems, both land and sea, capable of delivering tremendous destruction in a matter of minutes. Novels, television documentaries, films, and personal appearances by well known people, repeatedly document for the public the reality of total war, made every place and upon all people, soldier and civilian alike. Nuclear weapons, rightly or not, are viewed by a substantial portion of the public as the ultimate absurdity, blasting us all off the face of the earth. Consider Joseph Heller's CATCH - 22 in which the main character, Yossarian, is the model of the absurd hero. For Yossarian, the warrior, to defend freedom and civilization is absurd when to defend them amounts to destroying them.(16) To many of the public the acronym that describes our strategic nuclear thinking - MAD for Mutual Assured Destruction - says it all; they totally reject the thought. This public rejection of an ill defined nuclear strategy in MAD may have had deleterious consequences in several ways: rejection of funding for a follow-on defense program to the Minuteman III, rejection of many projects that are nuclear related, and rejection of passive defenses for survival.

Another and prominent characteristic of weapons technology is the huge ascending costs and the fact that modern weapons systems have to be selected well before

they exist. Public opinion impacts this process in several ways. Primary of course is through funding. Once again the MX Peacekeeper missile is a good example of how public opinion and debate may have exerted sufficient pressure to bring that program to a halt. Secondary methods are through boycotts and demonstrations against certain suppliers branded as part of the "military-industrial complex".(17)

Paradoxically with the advent of modern weaponry both our military and civilian populations appear to be depending on the technological dimension of strategy, to the detriment of its operational requirements, while we ignore its societal implications altogether. Our potential adversaries expend vast resources to insure that their strategy drives their use of weaponry, the production of weaponry, and the socialization process necessary to gain public support.

Military technology and power in our country is highly dependent upon the private sector industrial capability. The relationship between industrial capability and national security is practically unknown to the public. But the public should know and should know the consequences of the loss of industrial capability, manufacturing skills, and the infrastructure to support the production of war fighting materials.(18)

Interestingly, maybe frighteningly enough, weapons development does not necessarily follow along to fill voids in our defense strategy. Probably the greatest instigation of new weapon development has come from public and industrial pressure. Profit and money seem to be the driving factor. Even Congressmen have been accused of funding programs, not on their merit, but on the benefit that their local districts will obtain. But this condition is not satisfactory for the defense of the United States. Genuine strategic requirements driven by the threat must act to determine the weapons systems required. The military must be ruthless in discarding the old for the new, and forward thinking in the adoption of new means of violence.

However within our public and political environment there are a number of obstacles to changing weapons development and procurement: faith in standing weapons systems impedes forward thinking about newer, possibly better systems, the need for standardization slows down any thrust for change, and finally change is costly, raising the question, is something new worth the price. Whatever the obstacle to incorporating new technology, public opinion plays a vital role in the success or failure of efforts to initiate and sustain a program of development through to the deployment of the weapon.(19)

## SOVIET PROPAGANDA

The Soviets have committed resources over a long period of time to influencing the attitudes of not only their public but also the Western public, particularly the United States public.(20)

Studying the Soviet propaganda effort can give us important clues to their intentions and valuable lessons on the shaping of public opinion. The Soviets have accepted the adage attributed to Thomas Paine, "The pen is mightier than the sword" with the complete understanding that their purpose is to influence and shape the attitudes and interests of the public. The term psychological warfare aptly describes one of the keys to Soviet strategy, yet it is both a term and an idea given little emphasis by our government as it may apply within the borders of our country. Perhaps the avoidance reflects a deep-seated tradition within the American mind-set that "nobody's going to mess with my mind". Regardless of what the process is called, to avoid any organized attempt to quantify and understand public opinion is to fail to recognize its place in strategy, is to fail to recognize a phenomenon which has provided the Soviets many advantages and successes.(21)

### Soviet Active Measures

As the Soviets use the concept, active measures encompass a wide range of activities: manipulating the media in foreign countries, the use of front groups and local communist parties for personal efforts, disinformation, and any operation which potentially can expand Soviet political influence. The Soviets are not shy about employing deception and clandestine means to mask Moscow's involvement. They have been successful over a wide geographic area, over time, and over a wide spectrum of activities. As a policy tool, active measures can be traced back into early Soviet history. After World War II the Soviets institutionalized these activities within the KGB, and in 1960 the term "active measures" first appeared. Our best information about the Soviet active measures comes from defectors. Two particularly excellent sources have been Ladislav Bittman, the one-time chief of the disinformation section of Czechoslovak intelligence, and Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB major and active measures specialist.(22)

While the specifics of active measures vary widely, Levchenko stresses that all are designed to reinforce Soviet policy objectives, with the United States and NATO as the principal targets. Operatives pose in many roles: residents of foreign stations under diplomatic cover, most official representatives abroad, Soviet scholars,

journalists, and representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church also often engage in active measures. Activities include: agents abroad to sow dissent among emigre and/or special interest groups, spreading rumors, forgeries, newspaper stories planted in either willing or duped papers abroad and reprinted in Soviet papers quoting the "source" from the foreign paper, fake telegrams, information booklets developed to look like official American literature, etc.(23)

Soviet propaganda has the capacity to reach into our homes on TV, radio, books, magazines, and newspapers. Much of the success of the Soviet efforts can be attributed to legitimate American sources with only part of a story, the part the Soviets want them to have. One example was a recent NBC television show where a handful of German soldiers were televised demonstrating against the deployment of the Pershing missiles. The impression was that the German military is against that program. Meanwhile the thousands of West German soldiers who want the Pershings deployed were not seen. You may recognize that the Soviets have been very successful with their active measures against the deployment of the Pershings - from their viewpoint. To date only half of the 108 Pershing II missiles planned for West Germany are operational, and the controversy that surrounds them is



not gone yet. The five year old dispute over the installation has caused the biggest upheaval in postwar Germany since the historic debates about rearmament in the 1950s.(24)

There is a summary of impressive Soviet active measures in the Officer Review, December 1984, edition. This summary gives details of front groups, media manipulation, disinformation, forgeries, and agents of influence on world-wide missions to promote Soviet foreign policy goals and to undercut the position of Soviet opponents. The activities described are bold and intense, and they appear to reflect an increased use of psychological warfare against the Western world.(25)

Patrick Moynihan introduced into the Congressional Record - Senate, May 11, 1984, a finding on the use of Soviet active measures to undermine the relations between India and the U.S. by falsifying State Department cables and publishing a so-called Kirkpatrick Plan which was offensive to the Indians. Moynihan's assessment of the impact of the operation is that overall it was a very "clever piece of work and will inevitably persuade a certain number of persons in India, Central America and elsewhere that the United States is indeed out to set nations against one another and establish political and military dominance over key strategic zones." He

continues and points out that Soviet activity of this sort must be challenged. Such activities will be in vain as long as all concerned recognize the provocations for what they are, and "acknowledge that this is neither an isolated nor even a rare event." (26)

Assessing the impact of Soviet active measures is difficult, and at the least, according to Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, "active measures have a corrosive effect on open political systems." In dealing with these events common sense requires that we counter them through effective counterintelligence and by "keeping our citizens as fully informed as possible of the deceptive practices to which they are exposed." (27)

It is interesting to note that while we must be concerned with the psychological warfare operations the Soviets conduct outside their territory, we can also learn something about their intentions by following what they tell their own people. There are several developments that require careful review and analysis.

Since 1980 official Soviet domestic information media have conveyed a new, alarming assessment of the dangers of nuclear war and of the possibility of the Soviet Union's involvement in such a destructive conflict. This marks a sharp shift from the sense of confidence in the

possibility of avoiding such a conflict that has been fostered in the years since Stalin's death.

Why have the Soviets taken this step? Does this step portend a direction of Soviet foreign policy for the near future and the Soviet leaders want to psychologically prepare their public for it? Such a drastic shift in the official line on the prospects of peace or war are relatively rare in recent Soviet history. The action also seems too fast and out of character: usually attempts to modify public opinion are made gradually. Without a serious effort to analyze this event all that can be concluded is that the Soviet public is currently experiencing a serious "war scare". It seems fair to state that the Soviet population now perceives the world situation in a more threatening way than they have in the recent past.(28)

Soviet propaganda and psychological warfare is a real factor in influencing public opinion in the West and in particular in the United States and must be dealt with in a positive, aggressive manner. Their efforts are against the attitudes and traditions which compile the American way of life; their efforts are against the public. According to Gary Hartel, a native of Silesia, East Germany, and a writer on Soviet psychological warfare, the United States can fail to meet this challenge only if we

fail to instruct Americans of Kremlin strategy. "We can win once their methods are exposed." (29)

## THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

News in the U.S. is treated as a commodity. It is marketed, and trade is competitive. Competition demands that it be "hot" and exciting. Contrast our democracy, where news-information-is bought and sold, with a totalitarian state where news is rationed and monopolized. Within the U.S. competition for readers and consumers of information helps determine how and what information reaches the public; business organization and practices are shaped through competition. Within a totalitarian state there is no competition for readers and consumers of information; the public gets what the state wants to give.

There is an ironic twist to the state of health of the American mass media: with so much information, none of which is governmentally controlled, why do American consumers complain that they do not know what the facts are? Is it because the media takes too many liberties editorializing, sometimes ignoring relevant facts? "stacking" their case? These questions and others must become part of a rigorous debate within the profession and

within the public. Answers which improve the quality of information reporting are imperative. Other questions which might stimulate such a debate are: Are the organizational and business demands such that news consumed by our public fairly represents the conditions and events generating the news? Are the major news media controlled by special interest groups so that what the public consumes is no less controlled than that news consumed in a totalitarian state? Are there professional and ethical preparations which impose discipline to present news honestly and in a fully adequate manner? Are there continuing efforts on the part of the news industry to promote minimum standards of conduct, education, etc. for those in the field? In reviewing the literature on these topics there does not seem to be a consensus. With no clear voice leading the way toward resolving these issues, the role of the media in influencing the public, perhaps should be held up to scrutiny itself.

Why? Because the mass media--television, newspapers, radio, popular magazines and journals, etc.--do, as a matter of their prominence in our society, play several important roles that affect the conduct of American foreign policy affairs. They serve to inform the public about decisions made by our government. They are the primary source of information about world happenings.

They can play the role of supporter or adversary. They can conduct and support investigations independent of others and use their findings to trigger action from high placed leaders. They can publish documents or not publish documents which support (or do not support) a favored action. They can mobilize or de-moblize. By the application or withholding of services, the mass media helps mold public opinion, directly affecting national will and national power. Such power requires checks and balances to prevent corruption.(30)

There is a history of attempts to develop adequate checks and balances. For example, the Mayflower Decision in 1941, the Fairness Doctrine in 1949, and various laws and Supreme Court rulings on protection of news reporters under the First Amendment to the Constitution.(31) But have these laws and rulings worked to provide proper checks and balances for the good of the public or for the institutional good of the news industry?

Whatever the answer to this latter question, the industry itself might profit by taking note and examining why their status as an American institution has fallen to such a low level of respect with the public over the past few years. It has become clear that the news media does not have total say in setting the agenda or controlling

what the public learns. One thing the public may have learned is that they can not trust what they read, see, or hear from common news sources. Less common, and less understood, avenues by which the public learns are found in corporate communication channels, social, professional, and religious organizations, novels, films, etc.(32)

There is also a group of "middle level" men and women who are strategically close enough to the public consumers of information and at the same time close to those makers of news so as to be able to influence both groups. These middle level people are crucial to the communications link between the public to be influenced and the decision makers, whether in industry or the government. In the military these are the colonels; in government, perhaps the permanent senior civil servants; in industry the general managers or the district representatives; in mass communications, the managing editors and news anchor persons, and so on. These people are not known to the public, but they are the ones who make things happen within their own industry.(33)

A basic question may be what (if anything) should be done in regard to the few whose impact upon the many is so much greater than that of the many upon the few? Part of the American culture is to distrust any attempt to control the majority by an unidentifiable few, especially if the

few represent a well-to-do elite. Because the American consumer of information is becoming smarter and more sophisticated, it is becoming increasingly difficult to shape public opinion through the middle level group as described. To shape public opinion--to educate--means taking the information to the grass roots level and trusting that the public can make decisions about its own requirements when given all the relevant facts.(34)

There has been a communications revolution in the world since World War II, and it has been led by television. A lot of people around the world show themselves to be "hungry" for news, or in a broader sense, information. Private industry in the United States has responded providing a wide range of television shows, motion pictures, novels, biographies, radio, popular songs, and other means for the "hungry" to get what they want. Meanwhile there is so much information, so many senders of information, that even those who do not actively seek information can not help being bombarded daily with it. The statistics describing the extent of information transmissions is staggering: virtually 100% of all American households have at least one television set compared to 96% of all American households with indoor plumbing; a newspaper is sold to one in three adults; popular music records and albums are sold to millions and



aired to additional millions; and the list goes on and on in such other forms as public speeches, posters, leaflets, journals, annual reports, and political cartoons.(35)

In short public opinion is a fluid concept constantly under pressure to change by one interest group after another. This is not a "bad" phenomenon; but it must be recognized, and given the proper attention necessary to balance inaccurate preconceptions held by the public about the Air Force, the military, and our government's business. There are many compelling reasons for this last statement, but one example should serve to reinforce the idea. Consider the Vietnamese war.

Consensus on the real reasons for the defeat of the South Vietnamese may never be reached. However there is evidence that flagging U.S. public resolve sped that process along. One lesson learned from that conflict seems clear: a limited war of long duration against an aggressive, determined foe who is fighting a total war incurs special problems for public support. There can be no doubt about the role of the media (television, novels, songs, films, etc.) in the shaping of American attitudes toward that conflict.(36)

To what extent have the problems of public support been investigated, quantified, and analyzed for future considerations? Regardless, the U.S. must aggressively conduct fact-finding into the issue of public support, if for no other reason than to insure a credible handling of public support should our vital interests be challenged in another Vietnam-like conflict. The merits of this may be argued, but the point remains that some form of limited conflict may be the only viable alternative to annihilation or capitulation. Hence the case for learning more about gaining public support through the mass communication's media seems justified.(37)

PUBLIC OPINION: DOES IT REFLECT THE MILITARY AS YOU KNOW IT?

Experience with observing the attitudes and moods of the public shows that public opinion towards its institutions seems to swing from time to time between extremes. History shows this to be true of the way the public views its military. Probably at no time over the last twenty years has public opinion and support been more positive toward the military than the present. The quick analysis of why the military is enjoying such support attributes the positive public image as a result of the strong support by a popular President. This is only part of the total, and a more thorough analysis is needed. Several "stories" about public opinion and its diversity should underscore this point and help in the analysis.

A recent guest speaker at the Air War College spoke of being surprised at what he saw and heard upon entering Maxwell Air Force Base and throughout his visit. He talked of his lack of understanding about the true nature of the Air Force and its people, and he pointed out that his circle of professional acquaintances and friends might likewise be amazed at the high degree of capability, technology, and talent existing within our organization.(38)\*\* The speaker? Dr. Terry Deal, author of the book Corporate Culture. Here is a man who has served on the faculties of Vanderbilt, Harvard, and Stanford

\*\* Used with permission

Universities, who did the research necessary to write an authoritative work on the subject of corporate cultures of several large, medium, and small corporations, and he exclaims that he does not have a very good understanding of the Air Force, its people, its technology, and its mission. The question this short story raises is: to what extent does Dr. Deal's experience reflect the experience of our educated professionals, our public, corporate America?

An excellent article, "Armed Forces Underestimate Role of Public Attitudes", makes the statement that the public will vote on issues affecting the military just as they do on any issue: as they perceive them. Seems self-evident. However, in spite of this critical fact, the public often is left believing what they read in publications and what they see and hear on television. Thus while the public needs facts and figures about the nature of its military, its personnel, and its mission, they often receive only the most sensationalized information, and often there is little or no balance in the report. Public opinion is shaped in a haphazard way, and when asked to vote on issues affecting the military, they, the voting public, act not out of knowledge, but out of an emotional, gut-level feeling. The results are not due to a shortfall in intellectual ability within the

public, they are due to a shortfall in a balanced, straight forward presentation of facts about the military and national security.(39)

Another story should quickly illustrate the dichotomy between fact and fiction about military affairs as viewed as a function of public opinion. In a televised press conference on January 9, 1985, President Reagan made the observation, saying, "I wish whoever coined the words 'Star Wars' would take it back, because it doesn't accurately reflect what the strategic defense initiative(SDI) is all about." Think about it for a moment: what does the term 'Star Wars' suggest to you? Darth Vader shooting it out with fancy (and expensive) weapons all over the universe? Whether by accident or by design, the person who coined the term 'Star Wars' may have done more to scuttle a very important military program than almost any other effort.

One of the saddest (and perhaps most dangerous) aspects of the controversy surrounding SDI is that the public has yet to hear of the major reasons for such a program: the Soviets are roughly 15 years ahead of the U.S. in developing space technology which can shoot down or in some way neutralize satellites and ballistic missiles, and the program SDI is a defensive initiative, not any offensive one.(40)

One additional word on the Soviet space program. Two recently issued, authoritative assessments of their space plans emphasize both the accelerating pace and the increasing militarization of their efforts. These reports provide information the public needs to know for sound decision making. Yet the publication in which they are printed, although within public domain, is not generally read by the public--the Congressional Record.(41)

What impression does the public have of the nuclear issue? Is the public so afraid of nuclear issues, that it might vote to unilaterally disarm, dismantle nuclear power plants, etc? Again there is no effort that is highly visible that is making an attempt at informing the public of the issues in a balanced, well-informed manner. Instead the public is left to form opinions based upon viewing the television program "The Day After" or reading the novel Warday. Both treat the issue of nuclear war in chilling terms. Both leave the impression that nuclear war must be avoided regardless of the cost. Neither inform the American public with a balanced story. Without that the American public cannot make reasonable decisions on the issues of nuclear weapons, energy, or war.

While military personnel do not want a nuclear war, it is none-the-less a function of military leadership to demand a complete airing of all the issues. What level of

understanding exists in the public concerning the status of Soviet nuclear weapons programs? of Soviet nuclear war defense programs? of Soviet civil defense education? The answers to these questions may be shocking to a large portion of the public, but the public needs to know because knowledge helps shape values and ideas, helps determine courses of action, and effects how political issues are solved at the voting place.

On the subject of chemical warfare, it seems that the public is rarely exposed to any of the compelling issues. But they can not be ignored in a world where the Soviets have shown a willingness to use chemical weapons. There is overwhelming evidence that in its war with Iran, Iraq has been using "yellow rain" -- a deadly poison supplied by the Soviets. Reports indicate that the Soviets use the same chemical weapon against the Afghanistans, and, in cooperation with the Vietnamese, against Cambodia and Laos. Some writers have suggested that there is a greater threat to the U.S. from chemical weapons than from nuclear. Yet the American public hasn't become excited about these developments. Is it because of the little or no press coverage which chemical warfare receives? Can this be a dangerous failure?(42, 43)

Each of the issues enumerated needs the military professional as a champion. Likewise, arms control, a

very emotional issue with our public, must be championed by the knowledgeable military leader.(44) Without input from the military, the public may not hear all sides of the issue. In what has become an unfortunate development within our political system, the public seems to demand that every president make a deal with the Soviets without considering the costs to us in terms of national security. It's obvious that the Soviets know the American negotiator is under pressure to obtain an agreement, so their strategy at the table is to be patient, don't give up anything, attack the Americans for not making progress, etc. When we look at the record, ie., the "bottom line" of whether or not we actually limited the arms race or checked the activities of the Soviet tests and developments of weapons, it is embarrassing. The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, a bi-partisan Congressional committee, reported late last year that the Soviets had demonstrated "....a pattern of pursuing military advantage through selective disregard for (Moscow's) arms-control duties and commitments" during the period 1958-1983.(45) To what extent does the American public know about this? Is there a public debate going on? Can we take the pressure off our negotiators, so that they can negotiate a fair reciprocal treaty?

PUBLIC OPINION, NATIONAL WILL, STRATEGY



We have a tough problem to work. It is a problem of properly and adequately keeping the American people informed, and at the same time, not undermining legitimate national security issues. It is a problem of procedure--how to accomplish the task without projecting the image of a propaganda machine. It is a problem of overcoming resistance within the Services to the idea of keeping the public informed and trusting that the public does have the sense to make sound, fundamentally correct decisions about their own security. It is a problem of who, what, where, when, and how to get this done with limited resources. It is a long term problem and is not going to be "cured" with one application of "medicine".

In order to grasp why we should be concerned with public opinion, we first have to accept the premise that: a military force is shaped (in democracies, at least) as much by non-military forces as by strategies and weapons and possible foes.(46) Many writers have written on the subject of public opinion and national will--Clauzewitz, Summers, and Weinberger to name a few of the more prominent. In a major address to the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., 28 November 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger stated that before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance they will have the support of the

destroy things, we "neutralized targets".

By concealing in our words and statements the realities of war, we sounded as though we were hiding something. However the American public could watch the war on television and see reality. The military lost a lot of credibility by not talking straight and opening up a dialogue with the public. And we lost emotional commitment from the public.(48)

This same time mistake must not be repeated. To "win the hearts and minds of people" the military must tell the public its story. This is not a problem to be addressed in the future when and if we go to war again. It is a problem to be addressed now. Many of the public, many Congressman, many uniformed military people themselves are un-informed or mis-informed.

An example of the depth of mis-information can be easily seen by the student of history. Our leaders have instigated strategies since the 1960s which have been based upon a near-total misreading of the Soviet phenomena. Soviet leaders are opportunists with a war-waging doctrine. Because such a doctrine is abominable in the concepts of Americans, our strategy failed to respond to the changing and rapidly improving power structure of the Soviet military. We adopted a "sophisticated self-restraint" strategy with the high

minded philosophy that the Soviets would follow our "good" example. Today, looking at the Soviet's powerful military, there can be legitimate argument over Soviet intentions, but no one seems to be arguing the contention that the Soviets are seeking to position themselves within world power politics to insure the survival of their societal assets (assured survival, not mutual assured destruction) and to pose the maximum pressure on American interests world-wide. (49)

On the issue of assured survival, the Soviets have a large-scale educational and training effort to teach their people survival techniques. They have a widely dispersed military industry and infra-structure to support survival and rapid rehabilitation in a military conflict. It's ironic. While the U.S. is openly sensitive to the well-being of human life, and the Soviets do not seem to place value on the individual, it is the Soviets who have a serious civil defense program.

Another very important consideration for public debate is the massive, and effective, Soviet propaganda effort. In New Lies for Old, Anatoliy Golitsyn, a former KGB intelligence agent, describes the world-wide communist use of strategic disinformation and how it influences public opinion. Their two primary targets: the United States and NATO. He does not chide the American public,

but he does stress that the Western world must come to know and understand the Soviet objectives for world domination, understand the ruthlessness with which they have gone about establishing their dominance, and look for the signs of weaknesses within Western culture that point to potential disaster. Many of those weaknesses can be traced to the inability of the Western public to act cohesively in order to regain momentum already lost to the Communists. Whether or not Golitsyn's analysis is correct, who is going to tell his story to the person on the street? After all, the "ability of a people to act cohesively and to comply is partially derived from their mutual understanding of issues and compatibility with alternative solutions." (50)

#### A PROPOSAL FOR ACTION

Based upon the premise that public opinion is a function of national will and national power and that those things which affect national power are within the interest of the military and national government, then certain minimum steps should be taken to understand its dynamics and shaping. In addition to the activities which focus on public relations, at a minimum, a comprehensive effort should be initiated to counter all untrue, biased, and misleading statements, documents, publications.

broadcasts, etc., which are in the public domain. To accomplish this would require Air Force, or military/government, personnel to be actively responsive to what they see and what they hear. Responses would necessarily have to be more than just letters to the editor, although such would be a start. To be effective a program spanning a broad range of activities should be undertaken. This is not a proposal to turn every military member loose to write letter, make speeches, etc.; this proposal is based upon careful planning, organizing, controlling, and coordinating a program for an effective response.

Overcoming the discrepancy between the public's image of the military--the Air Force in particular--and the real nature of the military will be challenging. The evidence seems overwhelming that, at a minimum, a central office for research and coordination should be established. Such an office might not have operational control over the activities and those who engage in presenting the Air Force story to the public, but the office would direct surveys, research, analysis of effort, and report findings and trends to public officials. Such an office would act as a clearinghouse for developing, coordinating, and disseminating educational activities and concepts of

operations to military organizations world-wide for use at the local level.

The actual organization of such an effort would depend upon its goals and objectives. Within the broader parameters enunciated above, several specific activities will provide the greatest return on effort. One specific activity would entail working with the mass communications media-radio, television, papers, novels, films, etc.-to reach the public with facts. Another specific activity would work through person-to-person contacts. This latter activity would encompass the informal communications channels that exist within special interest groups, some which are familiar to Air Force members who participate in local speaker's bureaus, for example, churches, Rotary and other community clubs, corporate communication's networks, etc. Within this latter activity, although facts are important they would not overshadow the affect of personal charisma and the personal power which accrues to the articulate spokesperson for the Air Force. The Air Force as an institution would gain in reputation where such a spokesperson went.

The Air Force should not unleash untrained, poor public speakers with the idea that they can tell the story. Persons without the skills and personality to make effective public presentations would not enhance the

image. Developing the skills takes time and a specific effort. As an adjunct to developing public speaking skills, selected persons should be developed as advocates of the Air Force story. Identification and training should start early in a person's career, perhaps at the eight to ten year point. Training and developing the needed skills in Air Force personnel could be accomplished at the Air War College. Currently there is a briefing team which makes public presentations of the Air Force story, and the officers on the team have gained the experience needed to instruct and guide others.

One of the premises of this paper is that the public if properly informed can and will make the proper decisions providing for their security. Information about the Air Force can come from many sources, some of which are currently available. An example of an effective educational tool available to the Air Force is the film series "Air Force NOW". This series is excellent and, although aimed at a military audience, it has potential for providing the public information about the Air Force. This is just one of the many creative activities which could be used to educate, to pass on to the public correct information about the nature and business of the Air Force.

In concluding, to understand public opinion, its forming and shaping, and its role in developing national strategy and security will be a long term effort. To be effective it must be based upon research and experimentation, and the Air Force, the military, as an institution needs the corporate experience and track record upon which to call in any future national conflict where understanding, and perhaps shaping, public opinion is vital to national power.



## Notes

1. Linenthal, Edward Tabor, Changing Images of the Warrior Hero in America: A History of Popular Symbolism, (New York and Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1982) pp. 51-58.
2. Ibid.
3. Summers, Col Harry G., Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (Dell Publishing Co., Inc., New York, New York, 1984).
4. "View From the Fourth Estate," Parameters 14: 88-90, Number 2, Summer, 1984, C 1984 M Magazine, Reprinted by permission.
5. Ibid.
6. Linenthal, Changing Images.... pp. 113-136.
7. Ibid.
8. Hartmann, Frederick H., The Relations of Nations, (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. Fifth Edition, 1978), pp 56-59.
9. Ibid., pp. 328-346.
10. Ibid., pp. 417-442.
11. Van Slyck, Philip, Strategies for the 1980s, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 22-30.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. pp. 31-42.
14. Bertram, Christoph, "Public Confidence and Western Defence in the 1980s," Atlantic Quarterly 2: 133-142, Summer, 1984.
15. Slocombe, Walter, "The United States and Nuclear War," from Rethinking the U.S. Strategic Posture, Ed. by Barry M. Blechman, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1982), pp. 17-23.
16. Linenthal, Changing Images...., pp. 137-143.
17. Brodie, Bernard, Strategy and National Interests, (New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1971).
18. Howard, Michael, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1979, pp. 975-986.
19. Katzenbach, Edward L., "Tradition and Technological Change," from American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition, Ed. by Reichart, John F., and Steven R. Sturn, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 638-649.

20. Roberts, Major General J. Milnor, "Soviets Have Been Waging Cold War Since 1962", The Officer, September 1984, pp. 7-8 in special section ROA National Security Report.
21. Hartel, Gary, "Psychological Warfare is a Key Part of Soviet Strategy", The Officer, September 1984, pp. 13-16 in special section ROA National Security Report.
22. Knepper, William E., "Soviet Active Measures", Department of State Bulletin, August 1984, pp. 53-57.
23. Ibid.
24. Koza, Patricia, "Pershing Missiles Still Divide West Germany", The Alabama Journal and Advertiser, January 5, 1985.
25. "Soviet Active Measures", Article by U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Officer Review, December, 1983, pp. 1-5.
26. "Soviet Tactic of 'Dezinformatsia'," Congressional Record, Vol. 130, May 11, 1984, pp. S5639-S5645.
27. Ibid. Officer Review.
28. Shlapentokh, Vladimir, "Moscow's War Propaganda and Soviet Public Opinion," Problems of Communism 33:, pp. 88-94, Sept.-Oct., 1984.
29. Ibid. Hartel, Gary, "Psychological Warfare....".
30. Trice, Robert H., "The Policymaking Process: Actors and Their Impact," American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition, Ed. by Reichart, John F. and Steven R. Sturn, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 504-507.
31. Fang, Irving E., Television News, Radio News, (St. Paul: RADA Press, 1980), pp. 223-241.
32. Robinson, Michael, and Maura Clancey, "Teflon Politics", Public Opinion, April/May 1984, p 18.
33. Deutsch, Karl W., The Nerves of Government, (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 150-167.
34. Print, Radio, and Film In A Democracy, Ed. by Douglas Waples, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
35. Bettinghaus, Erwin P., Persuasive Communication, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980).
36. Vaughn, Colonel Thomas B., "Morale: The 10th Principle of War?", Military Review, December, 1983.
37. Ibid.
38. Deal, Dr. Torry, Author of Corporate Culture, Informal remarks following lecture at the Air War College, January 22, 1985.

39. Chlaventone, Captain Frederick J., "Armed Forces Underestimate Role of Public Attitudes," The Officer, September, 1983, pp. 28-30.
40. Reagan, President Ronald, Remarks made during a televised press conference, January 9, 1985.
41. Katz, James E., "The Winds of Star Wars," Current News, Vol. 21, Number 2, January/February 1984, pp. 8-14.
42. Ibid. Several articles reprinted in Current News: "Critics Launch New Attack on 'Star Wars' Defense" by Storer Rowley and reported in the Chicago Tribune; "U.S. Space Weapons Research Effort Shifts into Higher Gear" by Brad Knickerbocker and reported in the Christian Science Monitor; "The Star Wars Mirage" by Jonathan B. Stein and reported in the Baltimore Sun; "A New Domsday Book" reported in Newsweek.
43. Ibid. Several articles reprinted in Current News: "Liberated by Yellow Rain" reported in Detroit News; "Spreading Poison" reported in the Dallas Morning News.
44. Ulsamer, Edgar, "In Focus...", Air Force Magazine, Vol. 67, Number 12, December 1984, pp. 20-24.
45. Ibid.
46. Gold, Philip, "What the Reserves Can - and Can't Do", The Public Interest, Number 75, Spring 1984, pp. 47-61.
47. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, From the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, December, 1984.
48. Ibid. Summers, On Strategy.
49. Gray, Colin S., "What Deters? The Ability to Wage Nuclear War", American Defense Policy, Fifth Edition, Ed. by Reichart, John F. and Steven R. Sturn, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 171-183.
50. Ibid. Deutsch, Nerves of Government.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Brodie, Bernard, War and Politics, (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973).
2. Cialdini, Robert, Influence: How and Why People Agree to Things, (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1984).
3. Cimballa, Stephen J., "War-Fighting Deterrence and Alliance Cohesiveness", Air University Review, Vol. 35, Number 6, September/October 1984, pp. 69-73.
4. Eldridge, John, "War and Peace News on British Television", Current Research on Peace and Violence, January 1983, pp. 24-26.
5. Golitsyn, Anatoliy, New Lies For Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1984).
6. Hearings and Report to House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Soviet Active Measures, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Edition, July 13-14, 1982.
7. Karlins, Marvin, and Herbert I. Abelson, Persuasion: How Opinions and Attitudes Are Changed, (New York: Springer Publishing Co., Inc., 1970).
8. Mitchell, Malcolm G., Propaganda, Polls, and Public Opinion: Are the People Manipulated? (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977).
9. Shultz, Richard, and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy, (Washington: Pergamon and Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1984).
10. Soviet Aerospace 41: October 1, 1984, "Poll Finds Americans Think U.S. Has Military Superiority".
11. Weissberg, Robert, Public Opinion and Popular Government, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1976).