



# AIR WAR COLLEGE

## RESEARCH REPORT

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FALKLAND ISLANDS - WAR FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

By COLONEL ROBERT A. KORKIN, USA  
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**AIR WAR COLLEGE  
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**FALKLAND ISLANDS - WAR FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY**

**by**

**Robert A. Korkin  
Colonel, USA**

**and**

**Bruce A. Sanders  
Colonel, USAF**

**A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY**

**IN**

**FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH**

**REQUIREMENT**

**Research Advisor: Gp Capt Colin J. Phillips**

**MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA**

**May 1985**

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: FALKLAND ISLANDS - WAR for NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

AUTHORS: Robert A. Korkin, Colonel, USA

Bruce A. Sanders, Colonel, USAF

In 1982 the first modern North-South conflict was waged when a north, major NATO power was confronted by a south, Third World nation over the possession of over 200 small islands in the South Atlantic--the Falkland Islands. During this conflict, modern, state-of-the-art weapons were employed during a 75 day battle. Lack of political maturity and military experience by the junta leadership resulted in Argentina's domestic and political instability. Key intelligence, logistical, and military mistakes were made to regain the islands by overt, military aggression. Although Britain "won" the battle, both sides suffered numerous combat losses and the outcome of the conflict depended in large part on "lady luck".

This report presents the Argentinian view of the Falkland Island's conflict. It stresses the crucial role of national/military leaders in the execution of national/military strategy with emphasis on the strategic and tactical factors which affected the military outcome of a lethal, "low intensity" conflict. It emphasizes the impact of international politics, military leadership, coalition logistics relationships, and efficacy of conventional weaponry, and the dimension of time as major factors on today's complex battlefield.

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Colonel Robert A. Korkin is a graduate of Alfred University and entered the Army in 1963. He is an Armor officer and has completed two overseas tours in SEA and one assignment in the FRG with Hq, USAEUR. His recent assignments include 3 years command of a cavalry squadron and recruiting battalion. He is a graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air War College Class of '85.

Colonel Bruce A. Sanders (M.A., Troy State University) entered the Air Force in 1964 after graduating from the University of Louisville. He is a rated pilot with over 2000 hours in the F-100, F-101, and F-4. His overseas tours include England, Iran, Taiwan, and Thailand where he completed 100 missions over NVN. His recent assignments include Squadron Commander and Director of Operations of the 475th Weapons Evaluation Group. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and the Air War College Class of '85.

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

No war is begun, or at least no war should be begun if people acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: What is to be attained by and in war?

Clausewitz, On War

### PURPOSE

The purpose of this case study is to present the Falkland Islands conflict from the Argentine viewpoint. The aim of this assessment is to depict how an emotionally derived national policy influenced Argentina's foreign diplomacy, national defense, and military strategy. It stresses the crucial role of national/military leaders in the execution of a military strategy once diplomacy fails to produce a desirable solution. Emphasis is focused on the strategic and tactical factors which affected the military outcome of a lethal, technologically intense conflict between a major NATO power and a Third World country. The effects of international politics, military arms sales, coalition logistics relationships, and the dimension of time are discussed as major points of leverage in the pursuit of military victory.

### BACKGROUND

The Falkland Islands were discovered in 1592 and first explored in 1690 by John Strong who commanded the English ship "Welfare". They are located in the South Atlantic 300 miles east of the tip of South America with

Antarctica 800 miles due south. The Falklands proper totals 4,700 square miles of rocky, treeless, and windswept landscape. The first settlement was French which was later transferred to Spain in 1767. During this period the British again claimed all the islands and in 1766, established a colony. In 1770, this settlement was evicted by a Spanish Fleet. Since both Spain and England were at peace, negotiations ensued over the following years. Eventually the Spaniards returned the settlement although they never officially renounced their claim to the islands. It is from this claim that the current Argentine claim evolves since the Argentinians regard themselves as Spain's inheritors in the South Atlantic. Sporadic English and Spanish settlements coexisted in the Falklands for many years. Numerous problems were experienced by the local governments and in 1833, Britain annexed the islands. Although this is a brief summary of a very complex and poorly documented era, a British community existed for nearly 150 years. (1:2)

#### GEOGRAPHIC IMPORTANCE

The ascendancy of Argentina to its perceived role as the leader of third world nations in Latin America and in the eyes of world community required a demonstration of resolve that clearly displayed its capacity for regional leadership. The geographic location of the Falkland Islands created a unique opportunity for an ambitious Argentina to

project itself in three geopolitical dimensions: commercial marine exploitation, strategic military control of vital sea lanes, and regional politics in Latin America.

The strategic commercial and military geopolitical value of the Falklands eclipses economic advantages as the islands are astride the Beagle Channel, Drake Passage, Straits of Magellan, and air/sea routes to Antarctica. (2:22) Commercially, the climate and topography of the Falkland Islands are ideal for the sheep wool industry which is the primary economic activity. However, since 1974 the gross domestic product of this industry has continued to decline in excess of 25 percent. (3:6) Therefore, other commercial industries with potentially more lucrative financial returns have taken on visibility.

In recent years the discovery of commercial quantities of oil in the Magellan Basin has piqued increased economic interest. "A report, which was attributed to a Shell survey and to computer findings, speculated that there was enough oil between the Falklands and the Patagonian coast to justify the label of 'new Kuwait'." (4:5)

Until a political settlement is reached with Argentina, the oil industry will be unwilling to become involved with any further speculative geophysical exploration, let alone drilling of the Falkland Islands sector of the Malvinas Basin. It is not just a matter of military threat but the fact that the industry requires to have a reasonable stable political and licensing regime to explore in such areas. (3:96)

Although the Falklands have been the focus of political attention, South Georgia may in the long run be of

greater importance to the future development of the potential wealth of the South West Atlantic and the Antarctic than the Falkland Islands. "South of the oceanographic phenomenon known as the Antarctic Convergence, lies the world's largest untapped source of protein--Antarctic krill." (3:13) Development of this resource constitutes a low risk entre into an area of strategic importance for Soviet power expansion in the South Atlantic. For example, global expansion by the Soviet fishing fleet and its concomitant use as a deceptive cover for intelligence gathering operations would provide a legitimate foothold in the South Atlantic for future military exploitation of Antarctica, the Falkland Islands, Beagle Channel, Magellan Basin, et al.

The military significance of the area did not escape the interest of the U.S. Prior to the hostilities in the Falklands, the United States conducted numerous naval exercises (UNITAS) in the area as part of a major effort to cultivate Latin America friendship and secure regional basing agreements for maritime and continental strategic purposes, particularly satellite tracking and the establishment of space, ionospheric, meteorological and oceanographic research stations. The recent volume of Soviet technical, commercial, industrial and military delegations visits to Argentina attest to the validity of U.S. initiatives. (5:2)

In addition to its economic and military importance as a regional leader, Argentina perceived itself as an indispensable element in resolving regional political affairs. Prior to the Falklands conflict, Argentina was actively solicited by the United States to provide a military advisory force to support the El Salvador government in its pursuit of democratic ideals, and Argentina was in fact "advising" El Salvadoran soldiers. Argentina saw this as an opportunity to achieve Latin American and world recognition as the leader within the southern hemisphere.

#### INTERNATIONAL LAW

The body of international law provided Argentina and Great Britain with the logical, reasonable tools to pursue a "legal" end to their respective Falklands policies. In essence, the book has not been written on how International Law would be interpreted to treat vestigial colonialist territory. This work will have a profound global effect upon the shape of political maneuverings in the near future, further embroiling major powers and regional Third World nations and United Nations in complex questions of self-determination.

In the immediate case at hand however, one can not look at existing law for advantage to either Argentina or Britain. Some four hundred years of obacuration of fact, known records, potential secret agreement, true governmental



intent, etc. cloud the question of sovereignty sufficiently to render judgement unreasonable on a strictly legal basis. (6:407)

The Argentine claim to inheritance of Spanish territory and/or claim by the 1880s municipal government of Buenos Aires to the Falklands holds as much water as the British claim to a 1774 occupation res nullius and subsequent revitalization of occupation in 1833. Note the diplomatically dated setting and contested nature of these claims. An equally valid case can therefore be made to disavow both national expressions as diplomatically premature expressions of national right. Allowing the Falklanders to select their destiny through the medium of a duly constituted forum appears to be the eventual solution to promoting the principle of self-determination as a harbinger of international stability.

#### EUROPEAN ARGENTINA (1981-1982)

Argentina's society has labored under the mantle of much promise, with meager results. The recipient of abundant resources, good climate, and educated society descended from European stock has not removed itself from Spanish colonialist influence. This enigma is particularly vexing as a fundamental aspect of modern Argentina's national psychology is its entrenched admiration for and reliance upon Western European models. (7:463) The result has been a fragmented system wherein every interest group is

pitted against all others and a continually declining economic and social spiral has continued since the 1930s. (8:89) Latin neighbors regard them "as being arrogant with an aggressive tendency to bully others." (9:4) The typical pattern of rich/urban, poor/rural dominates the social strata but all are ripe for economic/social reform and a unifying national cause. Argentina has the highest standard of living and highest literacy rate in Latin America with 149% inflation, 1% growth, and a 12% unemployment. (10:33-39) Reform was accelerated by numerous human rights violations and terroristic climate that caused 6,000-20,000 people to disappear in recent years. In early 1982, a more free press, multi-political party and labor group clamor for reform, and outspoken clergy exerted maximum pressure on the government for a unifying act. (11:49) "As increased political problems developed with Argentina, the sovereignty issues of the Falkland Islands were raised as a diversion." (1:5)

Argentina is the most "European" country in South America with almost the entire population of European descent. The European style of living is quite common in the major cities. European commercial firms, including British companies, have and will continue to play a major part in the financial structure of Argentina. Most of the inhabitants have English names and the great majority speak English as their first language. although the Falkland

Islands are ". . . an embarrassing issue for the Anglo-Argentiniens, it is a classical external objective uniting all internally competing factions." (1:5)

## CHAPTER II

### PREPARATIONS FOR SOVEREIGNTY

The roots of the Falkland crisis are historic but in the previous ten years, right until the day of the invasion, it had been building up because of an Intelligence failure, by both the British and the Argentinians. Military and political Intelligence - or the lack of attention paid to it - was lamentable. (4:5)

#### POLITICAL/MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Begin with two distant, downwardly mobile, and internally consumed nations searching for answers to pressing domestic issues. (12:89) Enter: Great Britain and Argentina and the festering issue of sovereignty for the Falkland Islands. This seemingly benign issue lurked as the trigger for a limited war with devastating lethality. On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands. It is apparent that this act was the product of specious reasoning by both sides, exacerbated by Argentine sophomoric in world diplomacy. The two potential adversaries had conducted business as usual: Argentina acquiescing in a 149 year history of peaceful negotiation by dutifully lodging formal notes of protest and the British unconcerned and unsympathetic to a smoldering nationalistic point of honor--one passed down to generations of Argentinian children--loftily ignored. (13:1) Diplomatic initiatives brought the issue tantalizingly close to fruition in the

late 1970's for the Argentines, increasing the general feeling of resentment for things British while the British ceased regarding Argentina as a country worth taking seriously. It was not that any attitude, racist or otherwise was explicit in the British attitude, nothing was that explicit at all. "Argentina simply became a market, a collection of foreigners to whom things, especially arms could be sold, but who otherwise needed no special consideration or relationship; no priority on the part of British leaders . . . ." (12:92). In 1980-81 a sovereignty lease-back proposal was poorly handled and inconclusive negotiation convinced the Argentine junta that "they would never achieve sovereignty by diplomacy." (14:10)

The first inkling that substantial changes in the military action channel were afoot came from a quasi-military agency, the Island Malvinas Institute, whose chairman, Rear Admiral Jorge Fraga, issued a statement requesting that the ". . . endless rounds of negotiations be ended." (13:399) Also, in January 1982, the leading Buenos Aires newspaper, La Prensa, speculated that General Galtieri intended to regain sovereignty by overt action. (4:11) Signals were sent in the media and uttered by Galtieri himself and officials in the government no less than eleven times before the invasion. During a trip to Uruguay, General Galtieri obtained from his fellow dictator, General

Alvany, assurances that in the event of military action Uruguay would remain neutral (13:400) As if all these warnings were not enough, just as before the German invasion of Norway, the invader-to-be tested the airfields.

Strange landing in Port Stanley of an Argentine Air Force Hercules C-130, allegedly due to an emergency. Buenos Aires observers said it was planned . . . rumours of invasion of the islands . . . testing probability of land troops . . . Alejandro Orfila (Argentine career diplomat, presently Secretary General of the Organization of American States, with good connections with the military and with Peronism, rumoured to be the presidential candidate favoured by the military regime) and that 'the Argentine flag will soon fly over the Malvinas'. (13:401)

This open dissatisfaction and demonstration of resolve was designed to secure an early concession of sovereignty, thereby negating military action. The inability to "see" cannot be attributed by Britain to a lack of information. In addition to the 'public signals' the Joint Intelligence Committee of the British Cabinet Office had access to embassy cable traffic, Fleet Ocean Surveillance Satellites, close-up USAF SR-71 reconnaissance flights, and Argentina's electronic diplomatic code as early as 1979. Be it a case of defensive avoidance or "cry wolf" phenomena, the bottom line was a British intelligence failure to predict the invasion. For their part, Argentina's diplomatic intelligence estimated if the Falklands were peacefully occupied, Britain would take no direct military action since they were already heavily committed to NATO and in Northern Ireland and would seize the opportunity to de-colonize the Falklands. This intellectual bent was aided and abetted by

a virtual plethora of actions and non-reactions to Argentina-baiting; for example:

1. A British government representative let it be known that Britain was not interested in the Falklands, that they were a political and military embarrassment, and that the sooner the problem was out of the way, once and for all, the better (15:1)

2. The publication of the British Nationality Bill which included provisions depriving the islanders of full British citizenship

3. The very influential decision to withdraw the HMS Endurance in 1982, terminating the 'flag' presence in the Falklands and Antarctic region

4. The refusal to extend the runway at Port Stanley in order to accommodate international jets

5. The willingness to negotiate the illegal scientific research station in the Sandwich Islands--Thule (7:431)

6. The planned cuts in the Royal Navy, particularly the sale of the HMS Invincible to Australia

7. Continued sale of arms to Argentina and training of its military officers in the U.K.

Consequently it appears that the Argentines never expected to have to fight; misjudged the British response, the American reaction, the sentiments of the UN and OAS, and they never expected international sanctions. (7:461)

#### THE JUNTA

#### POLITICAL/MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Historically Argentina has been governed by military juntas with a pronounced commitment to provide stability and guide economic and political affairs. After years of military rule, most Argentines are deeply cynical about the motivation and morals of their rulers. (16:3) Unfortunately, perhaps no military regime has come so close to losing their legitimacy while destroying the Argentine nation as the Galtieri junta. The sequence of irrelevant, monotonous political developments follows the well worn path of messianic, not overly-humble leaders setting right the process of national reorganization and institutional normalization; this time with unprecedented repressive political violence and economic shock treatment that raised the spectre of an Argentine Nuremberg. (17:576; 18:1) After six years of a strategy of ultra-liberal financial reform and opening up of the economy, all economic indicators point to bankruptcy: GNP declined 10% in two years; 200% inflation in 1982; per capita production 15% lower than 1975; a 50% reduction in average productivity; external debt quadrupled; industrial production and employment fell by one-quarter. (13:398; 17:578-579)

All military services participated in the junta government, however the Army provides the President and exercises leverage from its traditional ranking as the senior service. In order to avoid a true dictatorship they adopted the Brazilian pattern of limiting the Presidential term. (19:2) This is not to say that personality does not



have an inordinate amount of force and a desultory effect upon the level of maturity of decision making.

Since 22 December 1981, Argentina was governed by a three-man junta controlled by Army General Leopoldo Galtieri, Admiral Isaac Anaya and Air Force Brigadier General Arturo Dozo. These officers were highly individualistic, lacked professional military depth, and as time proved, diplomatically and militarily inept. "An exacerbating factor is that the military are very much divided. Sometimes the conflicts are among Army, Navy, Air Force or between different ranks of officers. On other questions, military opinion may cut across all services." (19:2)

General Galtieri, an aging cavalry officer, made a secret trip to Washington in November 1981. After meeting with President Reagan he did not retire as scheduled, but assumed control of the government from General Videla, himself the legacy of a 1976 coup. Galtieri touted himself as the "spoilt son of the U.S."; perceived the U.S. as courting him for staunch anti-communist support in the critical, Central American affair and for regional base leasing rights. In effect, he saw himself as a unifying national hero. The nation was constantly in dire economic and social straits and needed a national hero to galvanize Argentine nationalism, win popular elections, fulfill Argentina's geopolitical destiny, and become an anti-colonial champion in the world eye. (19:6) General

Galtieri was also strongly influenced by the personalities of two personal heroes, General Patton and former Argentine President Juan Peron besides his relations with top U.S. military leaders in a previous Washington assignment. "Patton was an inflexible, insensitive, flamboyant general who resented criticism . . . ." (4:39) Peron was a vain-glorious, chauvinistic and self-centered man who brushed aside all counsel. "In Galtieri's view ordinary politicians often stand in the way of Argentina's ambitions." (4:30) Interesting enough, the Argentine Army generals are possibly the least educated among their Latin American counterparts. In Argentina they have been defined as having little more than cave-man mentality. (20:4)

The image of history may well have touched the other service chiefs, independent personalities in their own right. None of these leaders (or services) had been blooded in 112 years and were hardly trained for modern war intensity. (21:23)

Admiral Anaya's naval service was the hard line in the junta which normally went Anaya's way. (4:10) His independence is amply illustrated by the several occasions he deployed Argentina's only aircraft carrier out to sea without the prior knowledge or concurrence of General Galtieri. (4:10) Furthermore, he was the prime force in ousting President Videla for Galtieri. During the conflict, of 16 flag officers he and one other voted to continue the war and not surrender.

The Air Force professional pique was upheld by the intellectual, detached, and ambitious Brigadier General Arturo Lami Dozo. The official position of the 'soft' service advocated no conflict which had potential to destabilize the government's status quo or would open the doors to political change; yet Dozo attempted a blatant, unsuccessful power play to wrench the Presidency from the Army and Navy as a result of their performance. (22:1)

#### PRE-INVASION PLANS AND STRATEGY

The audit trail of events that triggered the decision to invade will in all likelihood never be clearly and logically fathomed. The Argentinian leadership had certainly constructed a plausible provincial scenario that supported their policy to impose sovereign control and exercise a national determinism in governing the Islands.

Note the historic parallels that face Galtieri: muddling intransigence by the British government with no prospect of resolution; failure or stalemate at best in the Beagle question with no real success proffered by the intercession of the Pope and Vatican mediation; the spectre of an Argentine Nuremberg looming closer and closer as a socially and economically disadvantaged populace searched for a nationalistic beacon upon which to guide.

In retrospect it appears more plausible to assess the decision to press overt action as not driven by the foment of internal labor/power group dissonance to a nationalistic success, but rather a clearly digested

decision that weighed the import of the imminent failures that would be ascribed to the junta and military. Add the paucity of presence and influence accrued in the Antarctic region and the inconclusive review in 1981 of that treaty agreement and multiple failures portend the end before the beginning of Argentina as a regional hemispheric power and Galtieri's place (with Peron) as a national hero.

There was no indication that a wider regional influence was contemplated and it is not at all clear that the ruling junta concurred with the decision to actually invade the Falklands, thereby initiating this policy. It appears that together, General Galtieri and Admiral Anaya were the master minds behind the "surprise" attack on the Falklands. (14:10)

A number of sources indicate that the invasion was something more than a spur of the moment outburst of Latino macho. Following are examples of plausible links to premeditation:

a. Contrary to common knowledge, the Argentine junta made a dry run in 1976 of the 1982 Falkland's action. In retrospect, Admiral Emilio Massera, then Commander of the Navy and junta member looked for a political unity action that would identify the 1976 coup with the country as well as give the Navy advantage over the Army. He unsuccessfully sought a Malvinas conflict in 1976-77 and occupation of the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel.

b. The leading Buenos Aires newspaper, La Prensa,

speculated that General Galtieri had promised to possess the Malvinas before the 150th anniversary of British settlement. In February the British press had been warning of suspicious Argentinian movements. About a month before the invasion, Argentina asked the Defence Ministry if they could buy Vulcan bombers which were being phased out of the RAF. This purchase would have given Argentina the only strategic bomber force in South America capable of attacks on not only the Falkland Islands and South Georgia but the Ascension Island as well. (4:11)

c. "On the day the Argentinians stormed Port Stanley the Argentinian ambassador in Washington, Estaban Takacs, gave a dinner at which the guest of honour was the U.S. Ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick and with her Deputy-Secretary of State Walter Stuessel, the most senior U.S. career diplomat. Timing was no accident: as the CIA was later to discover the Argentinians had been planning the invasion for three months and Takacs knew of it. The dinner was a strategy designed to give the impression that friction between the U.S. and Argentina was unlikely." (14:25)

d. The invasion plan was developed in the strictest secrecy such that Argentina's secret service was not aware of the military operation. In fact, only select members of the junta and high-ranking officials were briefed on the operation. (30:215) The Air Force commander was not aware of the invasion until the day of execution.

The stage was being readied: a political strategy

sketched in Galtieri's mind; a nominal invasion plan (Operation Rosario) on the books; a menacing internal groundswell of labor party opposition and "Madres de la Plaza de Mayo" stridently calling for reform and censure of human rights violations; London newswires telling of three Royal Navy ships to go south in reaction to mounting trouble (one a nuclear sub); and word that the U.S. would not divorce itself from the U.K. for Argentina. (8:263)

Thus, Galtieri who had acted precipitously in closing the Chile border in 1981 without telling President Viola and executing a coup against President Videla to assume the Presidency, was poised to act in kind to preserve his position. He and Admiral Anaya decided that no more propitious time existed for a surprise invasion and Galtieri authorized Anaya to break away from movement to naval maneuvers with Uruguay and began an odyssey of hope that flew in the face of the entire history of British resolve. (14:21; 31:27)

CHAPTER III  
THE PROJECTION OF POWER  
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

THE GEOGRAPHY

The Falkland Islands are located approximately 7,500 miles south of Britain and about 300 miles east of the tip of South America. They are comprised of two large islands and over 200 smaller ones. The highest elevation is 3000 feet with complete absence of trees. There are numerous short landing fields with a 4100 foot hard surface runway outside Port Stanley. There are approximately 15 miles of hard surface roads for vehicle travel. Besides the local radio station, the common means of communication are the local radio telephone with a single party line system. To ring one phone on the island rings all phones. (1:2)

THE CLIMATE

In practice, time became the wedge that stymied Argentine victory. Time, on the other hand, was a relative ally for Great Britain. From the beginning, Britain viewed this conflict from a small window due to a fear of a cease fire resolution by the UN which would have resulted in Argentina's possession of the Islands while peace negotiations were pursued and to increasingly poor weather conditions in the South Atlantic.

The South Atlantic winter conditions are not

conducive to sustained air or sea operations and became a critical factor in the military outcome of the conflict. During April-June, the temperature is very cold with high winds, heavy sea states (60 foot plus), limited daylight (8-9 hours) and low cloud ceilings with reduced visibility. (1:2)

#### Force Structure

Argentina hosts Latin America's second largest military force (behind Cuba). The Navy manpower of 36,000 includes a 3,000 man naval air arm with 130 strike/bomber/ASW/heli aircraft. The ship inventory includes one aircraft carrier, missile destroyers with Exocets and corvettes, 4 submarines, and one cruiser with surface-to-air missiles. Transports and LST's provide amphibious capability for a 10,000 man Marine Corps. The Argentine Marines are equipped with heavy mortars, anti-tank missiles, engineer support, and reconnaissance capability. The 20,000 man Air Force deploys 118 fighters, 11 bombers, and about 100 light/transport aircraft. It has the potential to provide air superiority in the Falklands region. The 130,000 man Army has the potential for overwhelming local superiority. It includes tank/mechanized/infantry/mountain/jungle/airborne units with over 500 tanks, 800 personnel carriers, 500 artillery pieces, plus anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles. The Argentine force structure was dictated by a military style of government and its doctrine. The 130,000 active army force lacked operational experience



and well-trained, combat-toughened officers and NCO's. The Army had two weaknesses: inter-service rivalry and an internal leadership vacuum. In 1982, the Navy's manpower exceeded that of the Air Force (36,000 vs. 19,500). (36:50) Their fleet was one-third the size of the Royal Navy (1 carrier, 9 destroyers, 3 frigates, and 4 submarines) and although vintage, had been retrofitted with radar and Exocet surface-to-surface missiles. The Air Force and naval air components lacked operational experience but were well trained by Israel, France, and the United States. Together they possessed 230 assorted semi-modern aircraft of which only 97 could be used due to combat range of the British fleet. (8:262-267). These operational assets would be further degraded when the arms/spare parts embargo were imposed by the U.S. and EEC countries.

#### THE INVASION

Men from all services would participate but for obvious reasons the Navy would have the greater role. From a purely speculative point of view it is thoroughly plausible that Anaya saw this invasion as a sop to his ambition. If the ploy succeeded his service was the hero, raising his stock in the junta; if the invasion went awry he could slip ultimate responsibility to Galtieri. Isn't it odd that his fleet was sequestered near the mainland and he bears no blame for the Belgrano sinking but takes acclaim for naval air Exocet achievements?

"On the morning of Friday, 2 April 1982, the 1,060

people of the capitol, Port Stanley, were brought to their feet especially early--by the sound of gunfire. In fact there were 2,500 men in all, backed by an aircraft carrier, the British-built Vienticinco de Mayo, three missile-carrying destroyers and other warships." In the early hours of 2 April, Argentine frogmen secured the Cape Pembroke lighthouse and its Royal Marine observation post. Two heliborne forces of marines from the carrier Vienticinco de Mayo assaulted the empty Royal Marine barracks (local warning signals caused the Royal Marines to displace two days prior) and then moved to capture the Governor at Government House. A three hour firefight ensued with one killed and two wounded by Argentine count. With Argentine troops ashore in numbers, the Governor surrendered to save civilian lives. (45:8-9) On 3 April, another Argentinian invasion force appeared at Grytviken, South Georgia, where twenty-two Royal Marines were stationed. The detachment was ready for hostilities after monitoring the radio transmissions of the invasion at Port Stanley. After shooting down two Argentine helicopters and disabling an armed frigate the British surrendered in the face of overwhelming odds.

Brig General Menendez became the governor of the occupied islands only 48 hours before the actual invasion although he had reputedly been informed of the impending assignment in early January; quite possibly at the same time Galtieri had all media publishers together for his 150 year

Malvinas Anniversary declaration. When General Menendez asked for details of this large employment, he was informed that the information was "military junta only" and that he could only talk with the Chief of Staff. (24:1) This appears to contradict and nullify the joint command formed at Comodoro Rivadavia to control all military operations in the South Atlantic. The unified defense command under Brig General Menendez was established because of the distance and isolation factors from the mainland. According to Argentine sources, the general staff was ineffective in the conventional-war sense. It was organized differently for war and peace.

The so-called Estado Mayor de Coordination, or Coordination Staff, was responsible in theory for joint-service operations, but in practice did very little. In military circles, this organization was referred to as "the pantheon" since it served as an elegant burial-place for senior officers . . . . Plans for joint-service operations needed the approval of all three services, and the troops and equipment necessary had to be requested from the respective commanders, making it desperately hard work to get around the time-consuming bureaucracy and inter-service jealousy. (34:136)

Initially, Argentina espoused no strategy beyond a simple occupation action awaiting diplomatic settlement. Predictably, Argentina did not have an articulated doctrine that embraced all services. Single service doctrine can only be surmised for the Army based on existing equipment and force structure. The Navy was dedicated by Admiral Anaya to the coastal defense of the homeland. The Air Force was modern, balanced, and trained in the U.S./Israeli/French style and therefore capable of regional combat. The

independent personalities of the leaders of each military service exerted inordinate influence on the utilization of its military forces. As the senior service, the Army's doctrine was influenced by the militarist nature of the ruling junta and therefore served as the legitimate defender of internal and national security.

Argentina's main enemy up to the Falklands invasions was Chile, and even then, it was more "sabre rattling" than actual military confrontation. Their limited combat experience was a result of protracted, fierce fighting against rural and urban guerrillas within their assigned military region and thus simply a continental Army responsible for internal stability. (43:21) The obsession with internal dissidents resulted in armed forces that were highly compartmented, with each service judiciously guarding its rights and privileges, and "... their compulsory participation in the to and fro of national politics merely aggravated the situation." (24:135)

While joint operations would have generated enough synergistic value to overcome glaring performance shortcomings, not even a professional field exercise was mounted prior to the invasion. The lack of strategic planning and paucity of General Staff direction fragmented the priority of defense, leaving the nation's fate to the vagaries of military personalities. Quite correctly, "... the Chiefs of Staff Joint Command in Buenos Aires were quick to label the post-invasion support of their forces on the

Falklands a shambles . . ." (33:1)

Faced with the overwhelmingly inadequate "support" from higher staff, Brig Menendez was furnished with one first class intelligence brief prepared by General de Alfredo Sotero, Jefe II/Inteligencia. This document had a variety of information to include roles and structures of special and conventional operations was entirely correct. (45:13-14) This information was provided in multiple copies so there is no excuse for company/battalion level commanders being unaware of what was to come. Brig Menendez used this information to good advantage to keep from "defending everything, thereby defending nothing." Unfortunately for Argentina, the SAS destruction of the helicopters for his mobile counterattack force was a key factor in defeating the Menendez defense plan. Results: troops were not and could not be strategically employed to effectively counter the surprise British landing at Port San Carlos and remained over-concentrated in and around Port Stanley creating a troop welfare and command and control problem. (63:30) Likewise, military supplies were concentrated and subject to offensive British actions as the Army had no clear concept of what to transport, or where, thereby curtailing effective power projection. (44:1; 63:30)

a. ARMY. Argentina deployed over 14,500 men to occupy the Falklands. Argentine forces were ample and technologically sophisticated enough to achieve victory in a regional conflict but the Army's combat experience was nil

compared to the British.

The political decision to permit all regions of Argentina's armed forces to participate in the historical reclamation of the Islands was a drastic mistake. Units from all Army Corps participated in the invasion and occupation although they had never previously fought together. More importantly, elements from the northern sub-tropical climates were now introduced into the severe South Atlantic winter with inadequate clothing and without their heavy equipment except for six tracked personnel carriers and four wheeled APCs with 90mm guns that were relocated from the Bolivian frontier. The absence of armor forces--even as mobile pill boxes--in the Island defense scheme is a real puzzle. (34:136-137)

The Argentine ground forces have been maligned for their infantry performance, possibly too much so as British soldier and editorial comments as follows are rife in the extant literature: "witness the cool professionalism of the Argentine invading forces a fortnight ago, who succeeded in capturing the two Islands while obeying their difficult orders not to kill or even wound"; "... enemy who withdrew slowly through fixed positions prepared in depth; chose their ground well, and the trenches had excellent visibility; used their night tripers very effectively . . . ." (46:22; 45:22-27) These factors indicate that approximately one-third of Argentina's regular forces

stationed on the Falklands operated at a high degree of professional efficiency to task the British elite forces to their utmost, to wit: the Battle of Goose Green which took a day and a night to overcome their opposition. (45:22)

But the small cadre of experienced soldiers was not capable of fielding a joint operational effort that would have generated enough synergistic value to overcome glaring performance shortcomings. Typical shortcomings are primarily a reflection of the attitude of the junta: "This attitude was confirmed completely when, after the surrender, the military junta in Argentina showed no interest whatsoever in the fate of the officers and men who were no longer of any use to it. Argentine's soldiers experienced malnutrition, exposure, hypothermia, trench foot, scabies, lack of pure water, adequate clothing, shelter, and sanitation facilities while their officers considered their own careers. (47:1)

The lack of strong military leadership and troop welfare contributed to the dismal performance of the Argentine Army. Young, inexperienced conscripts were deployed without adequate billeting and messing facilities due to a lack of a large infrastructure on the Islands. In contrast, senior Army officers resided in local quarters and were provided hot meals daily. Senior officers have been censured for cowardice, incompetence and trafficking in rations/equipment, and "staff arrogance". (34:136) "The extent of dissatisfaction with senior officers during the

fighting with the British forces on the Islands is indicated by the account of an incident involving an Argentine major. At one point, the Galvi investigation report reveals, the conduct of the Port Stanley defense was so ineffectual that a Major Mohammed Ali Saineldin was considering ordering his regiment to revolt and taking control of operations himself." (24:1) In addition, ". . . hundreds of officers of the V Corps which took part in ground operations on the islands, have been restricted in their commands." (24:1)

The predictable result in a combat operation with poor leadership is typified by commentary such as these:

1. ". . . many of them are in poor condition, suffering not only from cold and foot rot . . . hunger and disease. (48:31)

2. ". . . demoralized Argentine defenders broke and ran." (48:32)

3. ". . . shot an Argentine officer leading his men, the enemy fled. . . ." (49:47)

4. "Captured Argentine conscripts revealed a low level of training and poor indoctrination with false information." (50:1)

5. Quite frequently enlisted weapons were rendered inoperative by rust due to inadequate cleaning. To maintain discipline within the enlisted ranks, officers resorted to propaganda stories of British POW torture. (34:136)

6. ". . . the Argentine garrisons tended to light fires at night . . . on one occasion jumped from their



trenches when the food truck arrived only to be shot down with their breakfast in hand." (51:18)

In sum, "the Argentine forces, apart from questions of personal bravery, were just not of the same combat quality as the British ones." (43:21)

b. NAVY. The prosecution of naval warfare has not been the same since WW II when it became apparent that surface vessel projection relied heavily, almost exclusively, on the control of airspace.

Argentina's naval air arm was too small to achieve decisive control of the area, but coupled with land based forces, certainly a coordinated air-naval action could have carried the day. However, the British were oddly enough allowed to operate unmolested while steaming on the Argentine flank for 900 miles. The two possible targets, the carrier group and amphibious group gave Admiral Anaya two chances to collapse the British. The slightest thrust of offensive action could have tied up virtually all of the British assets in a defensive posture--with winter weather at hand--and delayed an assault indefinitely.

The absence of action allowed the British fleet to remain on balance and position itself to continue its battle plan; the Argentines obviously had no naval plan else they would have positioned themselves and compelled the British to fight on Argentina's terms. There was no attempt to deny sea-lane access or employ attrition tactics although they did mine all entries to the Falklands except for San Carlos

where the land assault occurred. (42:54) Ironically, the British had a detailed survey dating from WW-II with accurate terrain information and location of seaweed choked inlets. (15:1)

Submarine warfare was minimal (after the sinking of the Belgrano) except for isolated engagements. The first occurred on 1 May after Argentina repelled 3 attempted landings by British forces at two different locations. "A torpedo fired by the San Luis hit a frigate but did not explode . . . ." (34:137) On several other occasions the San Luis nipped at the heels of the British fleet and fired three times but its German built SST 4 torpedoes failed to explode. On the other hand, the sophisticated ASW assets of the British Navy were unable to locate and destroy the harassing diesel-electric submarine. (34:139)

The Argentine naval withdrawal and passivity was undoubtedly hastened by the torpedoing of the Belgrano with 750 lost lives. The heavy cruiser General Belgrano, equipped with 15 6-inch and eight 5-inch guns plus two Seacat launchers, was sunk on 2 May by two refurbished MK 8 torpedoes fired from a nuclear submarine. It was participating in a three prong naval offensive against the two Royal Navy carriers. The General Belgrano plus two destroyers armed with Exocet missiles were to attack from the south; the carrier Vienticinco de Mayo plus two destroyers armed with Exocet missiles comprised the north element; and three corvettes armed with Exocet missiles and

torpedos were stationed to the west. When weather precluded the launch of A-4Q Skyhawks from the Vienticinco, the attack was cancelled and the north and west element returned to port. However, the southern element continued to proceed northward and when it approached the 200 mile Total Exclusion Zone, the British War Cabinet approved the destruction of the cruiser. (35:36) Following the sinking of this capital ship, the Argentine's Navy failed to muster any major offensive operation although the courage of the men aboard the supply ships that tried to run the blockage was a bright spot to the navy end.

Both the Navy and Army possessed different versions of the Exocet missile system. After the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano, naval activity decreased dramatically with capital ships remaining in port and not attempting to employ the Exocet. However, ". . . the Navy dismantled one of its AM-38 Exocet systems from a frigate, and the Air Force flew it in a C-130 to the islands . . ." and on 12 June, two Exocet missiles were fired at Royal Navy units engaged in coastal bombardment activities. (39:1) The HMS Glamorgan was hit; however the fragmentation warhead detonated external of the hull and only minor damage was inflicted. (52:2)

Argentina's Navy air component possessed the most sophisticated weapon system employed against the British, the French built Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missile. When the Falklands were invaded, Argentina possessed only 5

of their 12 Super Etendard fighters. The remaining 7 aircraft had been accepted by the Argentine Government but not delivered from France. (53:15) Likewise, only 12 of 24 air-to-surface version of the AM-39 Exocet missiles had been delivered directly to Argentina. (54:657) The remaining 12 Exocet missiles appear to have been withheld by a Panamanian arms dealer for unknown reasons. Given the obvious success the Argentines had with the Exocets which they could and did employ with little training, these limiting factors had a major impact on the outcome of the conflict.

Delivery of the Super Etendard aircraft and aircrew training took place from France during late 1981. Aircrew training consisted of 45 flight hours of basic handling. "No one had flown the aircraft at night nor had there been any tactical training. Neither had the French Navy provided any attack doctrine . . . ." (55:13) During the first three months of 1982, the initial pilot cadre evaluated the fighters inertial navigation system (INS) and air-to-surface radar capabilities while increasing pilot flying experience only 25 hours. Night proficiency was also reaccomplished although night tactical employment of the Exocet missile was never attempted.

On 31 March, notification to prepare the Super Etendard/Exocet weapon system for possible employment from southern land bases was received (another sign of premeditated invasion thinking) and on 1 April, an accelerated, comprehensive aircrew/maintenance training

program was initiated by the Argentina's Navy. Assigned personnel of the Second Naval Fighter-Attack Squadron, together with the engineers and technicians of Naval Air Arsenal Number Two, combined their technical expertise resulting in the successful system integration without French technical assistance. This achievement was accomplished in fifteen days while simultaneously conducting advanced pilot training and validating operational planning factors. (55:13-14)

An intensified 30 day pilot training program encompassing the use the aircraft's radar, development and validation of Exocet launch techniques while evading simulated enemy defenses at high speed/low altitude and maintaining radio silence resulted in an overall enhancement of weapon system effectiveness. An array of ships which replicated the British destroyers and their anti-air defense systems (Sea Dart & Seacat) were used as targets during these simulated tactical employment exercises. (56:1) The Argentine tactics consisted of a two ship tactical formation with either or both aircraft simultaneously employing their weapons against naval vessels. Squadron pilots also validated actual aircraft takeoff/landing data and attack profile performance envelopes in actual combat configuration. Testing revealed that the Super Etandard could takeoff and land from the Port Stanley's short runway during dry conditions but with no margin of safety. Therefore, the decision was made to only use this field for

emergency recovery of battle damaged aircraft. Without this airfield, the planning of extended air operations necessitated the use of air refueling from KC-130 aircraft due to the extensive low altitude/high speed employment scenario. (55:15)

Unable to evaluate the British electromagnetic countermeasures (ECM) effects against this weapon system, the Argentines developed ". . . a nonpermissive emissions control plan wherein only a minimum number of radar sweeps were allowed when within an anticipated range . . ." to counter the effects of jamming. (55:15) Later, the fighter's radar was frequently turned off after launch of the Exocet to negate the effects of shipborne ECM and detection. This degraded mode of operations required the Exocet's INS to place the missile in the general target area which allowed acquisition of the "designated" target.

Rio Grande Air Base was used by the Navy to beddown their A-4Q fighters due to its close location to Port Stanley (437 miles). All A-4Q combat missions were flown from land bases except for 9 intercept missions flown off the Vienticinco de Mayo prior to the sinking of the Belgrano on 2 May. (40:37) On 19-20 April, 4 Super Etendards ". . . flew from Espora to Rio Grande Naval Air Base (Tierra del Fuego). These four Super Etendard aircraft and five Exocet missiles were to constitute the only operational capital that the squadron would have throughout the entire campaign." (55:16) A joint military operation was proposed

by collocated Air Force units employing the Mirage-Dagger fighters loaded with air-to-air missiles in an escort role for the Super Etandard. Although missions were planned, the lack of Air Force operational assets resulted in their cancellation. However, the concept of operations for the Super Etandard required the elements of surprise and deception. A more effective joint operation would have been a coordinated two hemisphere attack against the British fleet. "With the exception of inflight refueling, the only joint operation carried out was with Air Force A-4s during the last attack which was made against the aircraft carrier Invincible." (55:17)

The Naval Aviation Command directed all naval air strikes against the British fleet and were lead either by commanders or lieutenant commanders. Pre-mission and post-mission refueling was routinely conducted. Prior to commencement of their attack profile, target information was updated using the antiquated SP-2H Neptune aircraft. This airborne surveillance (early warning) platform was employed as an integral part of the command and control network using its radar and ECM features through mid-May until the aircraft and its weapon system could no longer be maintained and logistically supported.

On 4 May, two Super Etendaras loaded with one AM-39 Exocet each plus a Super Etandard "mother-ship" attacked the Destroyer Sheffield. When the first mission was fraggged against the British fleet, aircrew experience was very low

(approximately 100 hours per pilot). Pre-strike air refueling and target information by the Neptune went as practised. Although flying through adverse weather conditions, the fighters were able to acquire the target some 115 miles away, and launch their Exocet missiles an average of 30 miles from the targets. Both fighters launched their missiles undetected at two different radar targets without being countered with shipborne ECM or Corvus chaff. (55:18-19) One missile hit the destroyer but the 360-pound warhead failed to detonate. Secondary fires created by the Exocet missile fuel could not be brought under control, and the Sheffield was later destroyed. The other missile missed a more lucrative target, the HMS Hermes. (57:1) After the conflict, the Argentine military confirmed the loss of the Super Etendard which launched the fatal Exocet; it failed to return to base for lack of fuel. (58:2)

The use of the air-to-surface Exocet missile registered total surprise and the inability of the fleet to detect and counteract the air-to-surface missile threat. The Royal Navy's ECM equipment was configured to combat Soviet weapons and not those of friendly nations. This explanation should not detract from the professionally planned and executed effort of the Argentine Naval Command and their pilots. The results of this military operation changed the defensive disposition of British fleet as a result of directives issued from the Minister of Defence. The sinking



of the Sheffield gained further importance when it was reported that ". . . Sheffield was one of a number of British warships which sailed to the South Atlantic carrying nuclear depth-charges." (35:44)

The absence of the Explorer aircraft for follow-on attacks did not negate the requirement for precise tactical information on the British fleet. The Air Force expanded the use of their Westinghouse TPS-43 (tactical 3-D) and TPS-44 (tactical surveillance) radars in conjunction with a Super-Flodermas weapon control system. This combat information system was strategically located on the mountains overlooking Port Stanley to provide critical data. (59:977) These radars had been delivered in 1981 after the U.S. had lifted its ban on arms shipment to Argentina. The limited range of the Sea Harrier precluded a major deception effort in concealing the location of their carriers. Thus by plotting the location where the Harriers appeared and disappeared on radar, the Argentinians were able to transmit the location of the carrier to the Naval Aviation Command. During the strikes on 25 and 30 May against the carriers HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible respectively, ". . . target information position information had vital importance but so did the determination of adequate approach sectors to the target." (55:19) It appeared that the British was unable to jam these modern radars.

The attack on the HMS Hermes commenced on 25 May by two Super Etendard aircraft using a planned pre-mission air

refueling. Target information was acquired from the TPS-43 radar, but unlike other missions, this attack came from the northeast sector and apparently achieved total surprise. Once again both aircraft acquired their target on radar and successfully launched their Exocet missiles with apparently no ECM jamming. (55:20) Conflicting reports state that one missile was steered off course by chaff rockets fired from the frigate Ambuscade with the other one hitting the Atlantic Conveyor after being deflected from the carrier. (43:21) Argentinian sources state both missiles struck their prime target, the Atlantic Conveyor (34:140) Regardless, the Exocet attack successfully destroyed a naval vessel carrying critical replacement assets needed for sustained combat operations.

The 30 May mission was planned as a joint operation against the HMS Invincible using four Air Force A-4C aircraft loaded with two 1000 lb bombs each. In essence, the Super Etendard aircraft was used as a navigation aide for the A-4 to precisely located the target area. To maintain the element of surprise, the A-4 aircraft were required to maintain radio silence and use the same electronic emission restrictions of the Super Etendards. (55:20) Using two pre-mission refuelings, the aircraft proceeded on a profile resulting in a northwest attack vector ". . . which was more than 100 degrees off its anti-air defense axis . . . ." (55:21) After launch of the single Exocet missile at seven miles from the target, the

A-4 fighters deployed in two elements and initiated their attacks. Only two A-4 aircraft survived the initial phase and both reported ". . . they followed the missile's trajectory and arrived at the objective (carrier) which was wrapped in a dense smoke which was a consequence of missile impact only an instant beforehand." (34:136; 55:21) Reports indicate that the HMS Invincible was hit in the port side of the stern but the bombs failed to detonate and rapid damage control team action repaired the damage and kept the ship in operation. (34:140; 38:30) British reports denied the carrier was ever hit and reported that ". . . of the three (Exocets) fired on 30th May, for example, two missed altogether either to chaff or helicopters with jammers or both, and the third was exploded in mid-air by HMS Avenger's 4.5-inch gun." (52:3)

Overall, the Exocet missile and warhead performance was marginal. Five (?) missiles were fired with only two ships being hit. Of those hit, only one warhead detonated, with the ratio of successful AM-39 strikes probably below 30% of those launched. (52:3) To offset the weapon system effectiveness, the Royal Navy fired chaff rockets and used helicopters with ECM pods dangling below them to effectively decoy the missiles.

Although the Argentine Naval Armada expended 5 Exocet missiles, they possessed 12 at the outbreak of hostilities. After the HMS Sheffield was sunk on 4 May 1982, the ". . . U.S. pressured Mrs. Thatcher to resist the

temptations to attack Argentinian Super Etendard bases on the mainland." (54:688) "On 20 May 1982 Chile protested to the U.K. at the presence of three British (SAS/SRE) troops and a burnt-out Sea King helicopter, 18 km south of Punta Arenas . . ." which is approximately 100 miles to the west of the Super Etendard operating base. (60:2457) On 25 May the servicemen made a statement that while on sea patrol they had experienced engine trouble and due to adverse weather had sought refuge in the nearest neutral country. (60:2457) Strangely, no official comments or propaganda claims were made by either England or Argentina. Shortly afterwards, Chile indicated that several Super Etendards had been destroyed at their base in Tierra del Fuego and Britain publicly acknowledged the existence of only three operational Exocet missiles in Argentina! (55:22; 61:7)

c. AIR FORCE. The overall performance of Argentina's Air Force far surpassed that of the other services. Although considered by the junta as the "junior" service, the Air Force was clearly the most modern of the three services. Its genesis originated after post-WW II by ex-Luftwaffe pilots and is reflected in today's advanced training at the Argentina's Air Force Academy. (43:28)

Argentina's military possessed 224 fighter aircraft at the outbreak of hostilities of which only 82 were capable of extended range operation. These aircraft included the French built Mirage IIIs, the Israeli Daggers, the United States A-4s, and the British Canberra bombers, providing an

initial 3:1 fighter advantage to establish air superiority against the British task force. The Air Force deployed these aircraft to three main operating bases in south Argentina which placed an abnormal strain on the technical and logistical services. For example: during the first attack against the British, the Air Force planned 56 sorties (12 A-4Bs, 16 A-4Cs, 12 Daggers, 10 Mirage III-EAs, and 6 Canberras) of which 35 reached their assigned target. (38:28) Canberra bombers operated from Comodoro Rivadavia (596 miles from Port Stanley); the Daggers initially operated from Rio Gallegos (483 miles) and later from Rio Grande; the A-4Cs flew from San Julian with a detachment at Rio Grande; and A-4B Skyhawks assigned to the 4th and 5th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons and Mirage IIIEAs from Rio Gallegos. (30:220) Fearing a possible British attack against the mainland, Mirage fighters equipped with Rafael Shafrir, AIM-9B Sidewinder, or Matra R-530 missiles, were mainly used in the defensive counterair role although limited offensive counterair missions were flown. (35:50; 38:25)

From the onset, the Air Force planners knew that they could not maintain air superiority over the Islands. (62:1) "While the Argentine air force had the range to operate its first line fighter over the islands, it was at the far end of its capability and lacked effective maritime surveillance and reconnaissance systems." (63:29) During the 45 day conflict, the Argentine Air Force planned 505

combat sorties, flew 445, and of these 312 reached the target area. (39:2) A total of 12,454 hours were flown of which 2,781 was actual combat. Transport aircraft (C/KC-130 & Boeing 707/737) flew over 466 missions (2,003 hours) and delivered over 435 tons of cargo to the islands. Other transport and support aircraft flew an additional 2781 hours. (40:37) Weather compounded the complexities of the war even though the Argentine Air Force established additional weather stations to assist in accurate weather projections. The Southern Air Force Command established a mainland weather information center with inputs from weather forecast and metrological stations located in southern Argentina and on the islands plus weather satellite information. The weather observation station at Port Stanley was damaged in a naval bombardment and was moved to an unknown location. Except for two unsuccessful attacks, very accurate, metrological target area forecasts were available for mission planning. (30:217; 38:25)

On many occasions, poor weather prevented target acquisition and/or identification. On the islands . . . between May 1 and June 14, there were 14 days below minimum weather standards. Six were marginal, and 24 were operational. On the Argentine mainland, three days . . . were below minimum, two were marginal, and 39 were operational. (39:1)

The success or failure of numerous military operations/engagements rested primarily on weather conditions. For example: on May 22 when the British Task Force began its assault on San Carlos Bay, the weather on the mainland was below minimums which prohibited air attacks

against the vulnerable landing force. Conversely, the Sheffield was experiencing 60 foot seas when it was hit by an Exocet missile which possibly contributed to its lack of threat detection. During the Falkland's land operations, the mainland weather was also below minimums 10 of 15 days in June, effectively negating critical air support for Argentina's land forces.

Unlike the Navy's Super Entenderd, Air force fighters were generally not equipped with sophisticated radar or highly accurate inertial navigation systems (INS). To offset these operational deficiencies, the Air Force used Lear 35A jets flown by civilian crews and equipped with Omega radar and INS systems to pinpoint the British fleet and actually lead Dagger aircraft to the target area on fourteen occasions. During other occasions, these aircraft were used as radio relay aircraft (27 sorties), decoys to confuse the British fleet (123 sorties), and photo reconnaissance. These assets flew over 164 sorties and 3200 hours in seventy-six days with the loss of one of their four assigned aircraft. (30:224; 40:32-33) Other aircraft such as the Boeing 707, C-130, and Fokker F-27 were used in air recon, surveillance, rescue, and transport roles to offset the operational deficiencies facing the Argentine Air Force.

During the conflict, the Air Force experienced a 41.5 attrition rate of its combat force (7 percent loss rate), losing 69 aircraft of which 32 were Pucaras, one C-130 and a Learjet, and 55 aircrews. (39:1) Over 50

percent of their losses were to the Harrier aircraft with other losses attributed to ship- or ground-based missiles and anti-aircraft batteries. (58:1) An estimated 16 Bell UH-1H, 2 Agusta A.109, 2 Chinook, 2 Bell 212, and 12 Puma helicopters were also lost among all services. Argentina's Navy lost an additional 6 aircraft and 3 pilots. (34:138) Pilot bravery did not go undetected as one of the greatest allied aces of WW-II wrote "the heroic sacrifice of Argentine aviators has just given the world the most fabulous lesson of courage, because they have brilliantly faced adversity under even harder circumstances than those experienced by the RAF in 1940 and the Luftwaffe in 1945." (76:11) In contrast to the devastating losses in the air, the Army lost only 60 out of 11,000 men in the last three day battle leading up to the surrender of Port Stanley. "Although the Argentine commander in the Falklands, Maj. Gen. Mario Benjamin Menendez, talked about 'fighting to the last man,' the Army seems to have been willing to fight only to the last airman." (63:30)

Argentina also demonstrated that quantity not quality can and does have heretofore unrecognized advantages in today's low intensity conflicts. Flying a variety of vintage fighters without ECM systems, the Air Force was able to inflict substantial damage during daylight hours against a highly sophisticated naval force. Following the landing at Port San Carlos, Argentina continued to sustain a high loss rate over land and in three days (May 21, 23, 24) lost



32 combat aircraft.

The following sections will evaluate the employment of operational weapon systems against the British and discuss factors affecting their effectiveness:

1. THE FALKLAND'S FORWARD OPERATING BASES. During the 45 day conflict the runway at Port Stanley was repeatedly attacked by Harrier fighters from HMS Hermes carrying high explosive and cluster bombs and three Vulcan bomber missions carrying twenty-one 1,000 bombs each resulting in only 1 bomb impact on the runway. (51:16; 59:979) However, runway operations remained unobstructed and aircraft operations were conducted up through the end of the conflict as a result of Argentina's deceptive artwork and camouflage "cratering" effect with mud which convinced the British that aircraft operations from Port Stanley were impossible. (62:2) Two additional Vulcan missions were flown against parked aircraft and stores at Port Stanley and one mission against the Westinghouse-built radars using Shrike anti-radiation missile(s). Although the radar antenna was knocked over, the site was operational within a week. (59:979)

Initial operational planning oversights resulted in Port Stanley's runway not being extended for long-range jet fighter/bomber operations although PSP runway matting and aircraft BAK-9/MA-1A barriers were available. However, the PSP runway could only be transported by sea and there were "higher priorities" for sea transport. (30:216) This

single oversight had a dynamic effect on operational concepts/force deployment strategy employed by both sides as it denied the effective projection of Argentina's air power into the naval battle arena and placed the British at a major tactical advantage by default except for eight Mirage III fighters which flew ninety sorties from Port Stanley during the early days of the conflict before being redeployed to the mainland by the high command. (40:35)

Argentina's limited projection of air power from Port Stanley resulted in the destruction of HMS Ardent on D-Day using Naval Aeromacchi MB-339A trainer aircraft loaded with bombs and 68mm rockets. Other successful air-to-surface engagements were made which included the use of the Pucara counter-insurgency aircraft and the T-34C Turbo Mentors. These assets were joined by an assortment of helicopters (Bell UH-1Fs, Boeing CH-47C Chinooks, Pumas and Agusta A-109s) from the Army's air component plus some fixed-wing (e.g., Skyvan) and helicopters from the Coast Guard. (30:218)

Following the unsuccessful runway bombing attempt by the RAF, Pucaras attacked the fleet at wave height and scored hits on the warships using bombs, rockets, guns and a torpedo. (34:137) Over 40 Pucara aircraft were deployed throughout the Falkland's 20 or 30 grass airstrips. Practical considerations such as refueling, re-arming, and maintenance repair capabilities limited the Pucara's deployment to 3 or 4 key airstrips. The destruction of the

Pucara became a key objective of the RAF as 5 were destroyed in the air with another 20 ". . . destroyed or damaged on the ground, or captured intact by British forces." (30:218; 38:27)

The Argentine Army was responsible for air base defense on the Falklands. Following the invasion, the Argentinians set up a moderate air defense network, mainly around Port Stanley, consisting of Roland (no spare parts), Blowpipe, and Tigercat SAMs, and radar-directed 35mm/20mm anti-aircraft guns. (59:977-8) One critical element of a efficacious air defense system was missing--air defense interceptors.

Unprepared, and poorly disciplined and led, Army personnel failed to detect and counter the SAS attack on Pebble Island which destroyed 1 surveillance radar, 6 Pucaracs, one coastguard Skyvan transport and five light aircraft left untouched by previous naval bombardment. (51:18) The lack of these operational assets, especially the portable radar, could have contributed to counter offensive of the British landing at San Carlos.

2. IRON BOMB AND FUZE EFFECTIVENESS. Compared to the meager results of the \$200,000 Exocet missile, Argentine obtained far more impressive results using conventional 500, 1000 and 1,500 pound bombs which sunk 5 ships and damaged 10 others, some seriously. (39:2; 52:3; 63:6) Although denied by the British, Argentina claimed that the HMS Hermes was damaged by conventional weapons

during the May 4th Exocet attack on the Sheffield.

Argentine pilots were very successful in placing their ordnance on target using the British-supplied Ferranti ISIS bombing sights; however, 60-75 percent of those bombs which hit their target failed to detonate because of incorrect fuze settings verses pre-planned release altitude and airspeed. (35:50; 64:223) During two weeks in April, Air Force pilots were trained by Navy A-4 instructors on the fundamentals of attacking and hitting ships with credible results. (40:28) The British air defense network forced the pilots to ingress at very low altitude and high airspeed. Initially the fuze was set with a delayed "land" setting of four to six seconds to provide adequate safe escape distance. When the bombs hit their target, they continued through, and in some cases, over their target without detonating. Once the British press identified this problem to the world, Argentina munitions personnel reduced the number of revolutions needed for fuze function by 50 percent and experienced increased lethal results against 3 Royal Navy ships and plus damaging six other ships. (59:978; 65:28)

"Argentine success in using iron bombs against British ships shows that modern air delivery avionics and training methods have greatly improved the lethality of 'conventional' air ordnance." (63:35) If the number of unexploded, on-target bombs had gone off when intended, sufficient damage would have occurred to delay, if not

interrupt the amphibious operations at Port San Carlos.  
(66:1) An analysis of "what if" the bombs had functioned as advertised reveals the following facts:

The Royal Navy frigate Plymouth was hit by four bombs . . . . None exploded. This was an expensive failure as, during the campaign, Plymouth fired nine Seacats and 900 rounds from her 4.5 in guns, destroying five Argentinian aircraft and severely damaging several others. The Type 22 frigates Brilliant and Broadword which had the major role of protecting the aircraft carriers Hermes and Invincible shot down four and three aircraft respectively . . . . Yet, both ships had narrow escapes: Broadword was hit by a 450kg bomb . . . without exploding, while three bombs bounced right over the Brilliant. The Type 42 destroyer Glasgow . . . was hit by another 450kg bomb that failed to detonate. (59:974)

3. NAPALM. One of the most effective psychological conventional weapons in Argentina's arsenal was never used against the British land forces although vast quantities of napalm were pre-positioned on the islands for close air support missions. The higher headquarter's decision was based on the projected air-land campaign situation and the possibility that British troops might take reprisals against Argentina's prisoners of war.

4. AIR REFUELING. The lack of an adequate number of air refueling assets, limited aircraft external fuel tanks, plus no forward basing facilities degraded the combat effectiveness of Argentina's air armada as "playtime" in the target area was generally limited to a "one pass" scenario. For example, ". . . the Mirages had to refuse air combat on almost all occasions because of the endurance problem." Aircraft electing to "dog fight" against the Harriers were basically committed to ejecting, as documented on two

occasions, rather than landing on the mainland as fuel reserves were critical. With a refueling fleet of two Air Force KC-130 aircraft, the size and composition of a given strike force was limited. To conserve fuel, refueling operations were conducted at high altitude which placed the attack force within radar contact of the British fleet. (62:1-2) The Argentina's Air Force possessed "buddy" refueling equipment for its Skyhawks (A-4B/C) to act as aerial tankers, but this capability was rarely used due to the lack of logistical assets. Likewise, the Super Etendards ". . . had a buddy refueling capacity which was also to prove critical but less flexible than that of the KC-130s." (62:1) However, the Super Etendards were primarily fringed against deep interdiction targets to maximize its extended range capabilities.

5. STRAFE. The A-4's 30mm gun proved to be a valuable close air support and anti-shipping weapon against the soft-skinned British vessels. During numerous A-4 attacks, it appeared that the ships defenses went "blind" shortly after the initial strafing attack, providing the second aircraft to approach with relative impunity. (39:2)

6. TARGETING PHILOSOPHY VS TACTICS. Initially, Argentina's target was the British task force and its two aircraft carriers. Due to severe fuel constraints, attacking fighters penetrated the British air (Harrier/AIM-9L) and sea defense surface-to-air (Sea Dart)

network using low altitude, high speed, straight and level tactics to attack the "largest radar target" using iron bombs, rockets and cannon. Tactics to offset the lethality of the Sea Dart were developed by running mock attacks against Argentina's destroyers equipped with the same weapon system. Instead of conducting surprise mass attacks from different hemispheres, the Argentina's pilots were forced to attack the fleet using sequential elements from the same sectors without ECM/chaff support or escort cover. The failure to conduct a coordinated, combined arms (Air Force and Navy) air campaign against the British fleet detracted from the operational capabilities and resulted in a high loss rate.

Following the British invasion at San Carlos, target selection shifted to battlefield interdiction targets using similar tactics to penetrate the Rapier and Blowpipe SAM and 20MM/40MM AAA umbrellas. (59:977) Although faced with a highly sophisticated, superior enemy force, Argentine pilots displayed exceptional courage and dedication.

7. AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS. When faced with armed conflict, the RAF modified their GR-3 land based Harriers to carry AIM-9L missiles and to conduct sustained operations from aircraft carriers which required rapid modification to the aircraft INS platform and fire control systems. However, the Argentinian modified C-130 transports were used for strategic bombing missions dropping bombs from open cargo bays and off wing pylons meant for drop tanks against

British supply ships. A total of 3 missions were flown against tanker ships outside the Total Exclusion Zone. One bomb hit a British tanker but failed to detonate. The two attacks against an American leased tanker were unsuccessful. (9:21)

8. LACK OF ECM AND CHAFF. Argentina possessed very few ECM/EOCM national assets to combat the British fleet. Except for the Canberra which was equipped with chaff and flares until some basic ECM equipment was installed halfway through the war, the majority of the fighters had to mask their approach to the target area by flying low over the ocean. (40:32) Even the installation of a chaff dispenser might have decreased the lethality of the Sea Wolves, Rapiers, Sea Darts, Seacats and Blowpipes. (35:54)

9. DAY/NIGHT BOMBING. The vast majority of bombing attacks against British land and sea targets were conducted during daylight hours since Argentine aircrews were not proficient in making night high speed, low altitude attacks against moving targets. Argentina failed to maintain consistent pressure on limited operational British assets and personnel and thus permitted the British a 15 hour sanction to conduct night sea operations against Argentine land forces. Argentina's Super Etendard aircrews had limited training in night operations. Even an unsuccessful Exocet night attack would have resulted in 24 hour airborne/5 minute cockpit alert for Harrier aircrews. "Had Argentina had night all-weather capability, it is doubtful that the



U.K. could have adequately countered it." (44:2)

#### INTERNAL/EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE

Throughout the conflict, Argentina denied external intelligence assistance from the USSR or Cuba. (67:48) However, intelligence sources speculated that COMINT, SIGINT, and ELINT information was provided to Argentina through ". . . listening bases in Antarctica, as well as aboard its submarines and (30 East European) trawlers." (68:1)

The Falkland's conflict provided a mecca of information on the latest military hardware and its effectiveness. From the onset, the Soviets launched two new satellites, one of which was a nuclear-powered maritime reconnaissance satellite, to observe the military operation in the South Atlantic. Operating from Luanda, Angola and possible Guinea-Bissau, Soviet-Bear reconnaissance aircraft observed first-hand the wartime operations of the British fleet. (69:1095)

Detailed enemy estimates were not available to the British Task Force Commander upon sailing due to inadequate political/military intelligence information. Britain was confronted with a 14,500 army occupation force with a "large" counterair offensive umbrella. Although small, Argentina's naval force could become a major threat with its extended air capability and submarines.

Through unofficial agreements, Chile supplied Britain from the outbreak of hostilities with daily military

intelligence data gathered through its comprehensive intelligence network, including radar sites overlooking Argentina. "In addition, Britain mounted its own electronic intelligence-gathering operations to monitor and also to interfere with Argentine communications." (70:8) This information was vital to the British as it provided early warning of impending attacks against the fleet. Conflicting reports suggest that the Sea King helicopter which crashed in Chile was either part of ". . . a mobile radar surveillance group from a British spy ship operating in Chilean waters . . ." or involved in clandestine operations resulting in the destruction of several Super Etendards in Argentina. (71:1; 72:2)

One of the best sources of battlefield intelligence was COMINT. From the onset ". . . the sophisticated electronics possessed by the Fleet would be able to jam all messages between the Falklands and the mainland . . . ." (4:35) Like diplomatic messages, British intelligence personnel deciphered encrypted message traffic from General Menendez's Headquarters located at Port Stanley to determine and analyze Argentina's logistics constraints, troop movement, locations, size, and composition of each unit. Because of its impact as a source of intelligence, the British military elected not to destroy his headquarters during the conflict.

Outside of the operational area the British use of media to exploit propaganda targets was fully active.

Britain very artfully deployed deception, threat of possible mainland invasion, and attacked morale influencing targets to enhance their military strategy. (73:36) However, Argentina was able to exploit intelligence information from the British press such as when it reported the numerous, previously undetected, bomb detonation failures.

The use of SAS and SBS troops to collect intelligence data on key Argentine positions on the Islands and mainland around the perimeter of Argentina's air bases was professionally executed, resulting in current, real-time intelligence information on enemy activity. Key installations such as Port Howard and Fox Bay on West Falkland, and Goose Green, Bluff Cove and Port Stanley on East Falkland were observed without detection by unsuspecting Argentines. (51:16)

#### MEDIA IMPACT

Both Britain and Argentina used the news media effectively to sway public support of their military action. The Falklands conflict had the real-time potential to allow the respective British and Argentine homefronts to sample the action in a limited war. Not since Vietnam had the capability for mass communication existed. A striking dissimilarity existed however, that of the urgency each government, one authoritarian and one democratic, had to make its case domestically and to the world to garner the requisite support to initiate and sustain a South Atlantic war.

At bottom, the conflict reaffirmed how a government assures the legitimacy of policy is not subverted by war reporting. The wisdom is as follows: ". . . control access to the fighting; invoke censorship, and rally aid in the form of patriotism at home and in the battle zone." (74:57)

The British approval to telling their side of the story was orchestrated by Prime Minister Thatcher. She personally insisted that the original crew of six journalists and photographers be increased to the 29 that sailed with the fleet. The major shortcoming in the promise of allowing the story to be told minus information temporarily vetted for reasons of operational security was a lack of appreciation that news services are businesses with a need for timely stories to exist. This allowed a modicum of friction to build within the operational, government, and media players, but surprisingly all were reasonably accommodated in spite of themselves. The conservative, independent and liberal press--a vast ideological span--were supportive to the extent home and world opinion condemned Argentina and never wavered. Eighty-three per cent of the British people were in favor of regaining the Falklands with fifty-three per cent preferring the use of force. (4:27)

Were the decision not to deceive or manipulate achieved British objectives, in the short run the Argentine's were equally successful in building nationalistic fervor and Latin American unity against colonialist Britain's aggression.

The Argentine Estado Mayor Conjunto (joint staff) was infinitely more involved with media affairs than strategic plans as witnessed by its exclusive responsibility for war information news releases. The junta, through the joint staff clearly involved itself in misinformation through government owned and operated publications and TV stations. Also, one becomes a publisher or editor of an important newspaper or magazine in Argentina by knowing ". . . the party line better than those in the party." (74:66)

Examples of blatant sophism abound. Unattributed "military sources" continually understated their losses and overstated the British; e.g. the British lost more Harriers by the end of May than it owned! The approximately 700 foreign correspondents in residence in Buenos Aires (to include British (Argentines were allowed to stay in Britain)) were not censored but in general were mouthpieces for the Argentines who effectively sent the message: "You'd better watch yourself, you'd better watch the kind of stories you're doing, you'd better watch who you intimidate and who you are going to insult, because we're very sensitive." (74:67-68)

The effects of the methodology was rather effective in Latin American countries. The 30 million Brazilians who were told on TV that the British machine-gunned Belgrano survivors in the water and a British air-raid killed 11 Islanders at Port Darwin were entirely credible in the absence of countervailing news. Claims echoed by the Cubans

lent increased credence to left-wingers that Argentina could never have managed by junta alone. (75:30) The psychological action plan employed by the joint staff effectively misled a normally divided and passive people for ten weeks. Many (if not most) Argentines ". . . believed until the end that their country was gradually winning the war." (19:7) A gullible public was quick to digest triumphant misstatements and dismiss British news of victories as propaganda and psychological warfare. "They were led to understand that Argentina could achieve a compatible position of superiority quite painlessly." (76:16) The concomitant realization by the public as well as the military was stunned amazement that the British actually landed and Argentina had suffered 250 dead plus 1400 captured at Goose Green, and that the Belgrano was ". . . deliberately sent into an area where it was likely to be attacked in order that a massive loss of life would produce a political backlash against the British." (77:1); that thousands of prisoners were returned through out-of-the-way ports or refused repatriation in order to hide the true extent of the defeat. (78:15) However the return of 8,000 or more from Port Stanley made control of information impossible at the end.

Argentina's manipulation of the war news graphically depicts how lying to your nation can absolutely destroy any long term victory, even from the ashes of a defeat. (74:69) Probably more damaging was the subterfuge perpetrated upon

the military--those dying for Argentina! "Whenever we wanted to find out what happened during the day's fighting we would try to listen to a British radio broadcast, they were usually right and usually very fair . . . . We never wanted to fight the British." (40:33) The cynicism, disillusionment and scant faith in national institutions will be a long time in rebuilding any trust and public confidence--a serious detractor from recovery efforts and/or resolution of the Falklands issue itself. This is doubly reinforced by the British public's current mindset that they now have rescued ". . . kith and kin not only from a fascist dictatorship but from an emotionally immature and unstable people who lived fantasy lives." (79:1)

#### COALITION LOGISTICAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

The junta's decision to invade the islands obviously did not consider the international political or economical repercussions nor a possibility of arms embargo by NATO countries. During the conflict, both Argentina and Britain were faced with modern, highly sophisticated and expensive weapons systems. The land and naval forces possessed an array of surface-to-air and surface-to-surface weapons along with state-of-the-art radar systems. (53:16) Argentina clearly had a logistical home-court advantage due to the close proximity of its support and maintenance centers compared to the British. However, aside from Pucara aircraft, 500 and 1000 lb bombs, bomb fuzes, and small arms ammunition which were locally manufactured, Argentina's

armed forces were heavily dependent on international consortiums or lateral support agreements from Latin America allies for logistical support. Support was acquired either through military arms sales/aid or exchange for commercial products as was the case with Libya. Argentina's logistics efforts, even before the outbreak of hostilities was considered "a shambles". (43:21)

During the 20th Century, the outcome of "low intensity" warfare involving the use of new generation weapons is subject to an international web of strange bed fellows. Detailed, unclassified military logistical support data emanating from Argentina is sketchy at best and provides a brief insight into the complex international support arrangements where one's ally supports the other's enemy in addition to having to defend against its own sophisticated weapon systems.

Despite U.S. intelligence reports on Argentina's military buildup, the U.S. State Department approved the sale to a U.S. commercial firm and subsequent shipment of 80 engines for the Air Force's A-4P and the sale of an additional 32 J-65W turbojet engines for the Navy's A-4Q two weeks prior to the invasion. (80:1) At any one time during the conflict, 30% to 40% of the Mirage IIIs and A-4P Skyhawks were grounded through lack of spares. These spares included engines, drop tanks, and ejection seat actuators. "Efforts to ship . . . Skyhawk engines and drop tanks from the United States were thwarted." (35:50) Other military



items such as the Navy's A-4Q's ejection canisters which were returned to the U.S. for depot maintenance were embargoed. Simple, but critical items, such as fighter external fuel tanks were not manufactured locally nor available from sympathetic international sources such as Israel, Peru, and South Africa which suggests that critical items were also not readily available. (62:1)

Israel continued to honor its previous military support agreements and provided military advisors in addition to the delivery of 22 Mirage III (Daggers) fighters during the conflict despite U.K. protest. (81:4) An additional 24 A-4 Skyhawks were reported delivered in June. (82:16) The extent of advisor support was not clearly defined as Israel builds the ". . . Argentina's Dagger aircraft, Dabur-class patrol boats, Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles, and Shafrir air-to-air missiles . . . ." (83:1) In addition, Israel circumvented international sanctions by routing its weapons including the Gabriel air-launched, sea-skimming missile through European arms dealers. (81:21)

Although Ecuador, one of Argentina's allies, promised to commit 200 crack combat troops and possibly fighter bomber aircraft under "Operation Concor", no personnel, equipment, or supplies were actually employed. Military leaks to British industrialists stationed in-country brought ultimate pressure from the British Foreign Office on the Equadorean Chief of Staff, resulting in the cancellation of the plan. (84:1)

Like other emerging Third World nations, Libya's reputation as a major arms dealer resulted in the transfer of 4 or 5 Boeing 707s loaded with military arms and supplies in exchange for agricultural items. (81:2-4) Part of these shipments included spare parts for the Mirage fighter which explains its increased participation during the later stages of the conflict. (61:21) Speculation also suggests that Exocet missiles were a part of the munitions. (85:1)

Brazil's efforts to resolve the conflict by peaceful means under the auspices of the UN Security Council resulted in failure. While Itamaraty officials sought peace, the Brazilian military was providing arms, munitions and medical supplies during its two weekly military flights. In May 1982, two Embraer EMB-111 Bandeirantes long-range maritime patrol aircraft were delivered and placed into immediate service. (82:16; 86:1) Other arms such as the ". . . Embraer Inhat-35 and -70 air-to-air rockets, Engesa EE-9 Cascavel armored cars, various types of ordnance including small arms, anti-aircraft, and artillery ammunition as well as grenades, plus assorted non-lethal military equipment . . ." were ordered from Brazilian Government. (87:1)

Many governments provided technical support to Argentina, including Britain which had just resolved technical problems with the Sea Dart SAM systems aboard Argentina's (British-designed Type 42) destroyers just one week before the outbreak of hostilities. (80:1) Not only did Argentina possess an assortment of British ships but

most of Argentina's missiles were built in Britain and the Royal Navy felt they could defeat them.

Other governments ostensibly provided military aid to one degree or another, however the extent cannot be conclusively substantiated. The following include that which can be reasonably attributed to a particular country.

a. Venezuela supplied Mirage spare parts in addition to aviation fuel. (88:2) Additionally, the Venezuelan Air Force was placed at the disposal of Argentina awaiting orders from the President. (80:1)

b. "During the war, Peru supplied Argentina with 10 Mirage V fighters. (35:57; 81:4)

c. Bolivia offered planes and munitions.

d. South Africa allegedly delivered Gabriel missiles and Mirage III parts in May 1982 although they denied reports that it was providing arms shipments through Uruguay to Argentina. (82:16)

e. According to one source, Cuba promised the delivery of Soviet ASW equipment but its delivery is doubtful before the cessation of military activities. (68:1)

f. Japan provided moral and as well as logistical support to Argentina during the conflict. On 2 May, a Japanese container ship with unknown contents and under an unknown flag called at Port Stanley. On 4 June, Japan indicated that it, along with 4 other nations of the security council, would abstain on the vote calling for a cease fire in the South Atlantic, in order to preserve its

interests in the southern hemisphere. (89:37)

g. Iraq supposedly shipped 6 Exocet missiles. (82:16)

## CHAPTER IV

### CONCLUSION

#### NATIONAL POLICY & STRATEGY ERRORS

Argentina lost the war because it tried to solve domestic issues using a non-domestic solution. During a national crisis, emotion is no substitute for the ability to apply international diplomacy or objective military power, in real or perceived terms. As a consequence, the Galtieri military junta grossly misinterpreted the political-military signals from Britain and the United States. Argentina under-estimated the resolve of the British people and believed that the British government would not fight or support a war over the Falklands because of domestic economic turmoil, and NATO commitments.

Despite having chosen the time and place of confrontation, Argentina failed to capitalize on proximity to the battlefield. Failure ranged from: the lack of a comprehensive military strategy and integrated support plan; logistical foresight; ability to exploit superior resources; reliance on a defensive rather than an offensive ground campaign; a total lack of naval offensive power; and unplanned Air Force involvement.

Although the invasion fanned a nationalist fury in Argentina, it awakened the spirit of the British warrior

soul. Argentina had only two options when it observed world and British reactions to the invasion: war or negotiations. Reconciliation of the Falkland's sovereignty issue probably could have been resolved in Argentina's favor under negotiations supervised by the UN had Argentina's gaucho legacy not interfered with their diplomatic logic.

#### A LESSON LEARNED

Although the battle in the South Atlantic was won in 75 days against all textbook rules, its effects on future military planners will mandate " . . . the formerly neglected truth that conventional conflict, far from being outdated in the age of nuclear warfare, is deadlier than ever in the age of missiles." (96:19) It demonstrated that a military with inadequate doctrine, logistics, intelligence support, and leadership can be largely offset by an adequately trained air force. Using conventional "dumb bombs" and long-range "smart" weapons, an unsophisticated adversary can inflict serious damage on a "world power" military force with the ultimate winner determined by "acts of God" or "lady luck".

#### SUMMARY

There is little doubt more perspicacious diplomacy could have resolved this issue short of war. Falklandesque anomalies abound and touch every global power. Precedent is newly established for developing nations to pursue solutions to latent 'wrongs' under the guise of nationalistic determinism.

The Falklands message is clear for both world powers and Third World nations : first, emotionally derived policy without a considered military strategy and prosecution with marginally adequate forces portends failure . . . but it just could be an acceptable risk! Secondly, given a Third World climate of less compunction and increasingly capable rudimentary military forces to achieve limited war parity in regional spheres, developed powers have the responsibility to diligently ferret out the complete range of diplomatic/military contingencies and strategy solutions thereto . . . short of hostilities. Third, the outcome of the war has had a negative effect upon the geopolitical stability in the tip of South America, upon Antarctic politics, and upon the U.S. influence in Latin America.

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