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
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STUDENT ESSAY

THE POTENTIAL OF ASEAN
AS A VIABLE DEFENSE ALLIANCE

BY

COLONEL JAMES E. METELKO, FA

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE POTENTIAL OF ASEAN AS A VIABLE DEFENSE ALLIANCE

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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ABSTRACT

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The question of whether or not the members of ASEAN are capable of forging an effective military alliance in order to successfully protect individual and regional security interests was addressed. Data was gathered utilizing a literature search and conducting in depth conversations with regional experts. The current balance of power in Southeast Asia is at best tenuous and recent Vietnamese activities in Kampuchea and the remainder of Indochina have been a matter of grave concern for the members of ASEAN. The ASEAN nations founded their organization on the basis of economic and social cooperation, and later hoped that a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality would prevail in the region. With the pullout of the United States from South Vietnam and South Vietnam's ultimate collapse in 1975, the threat of communism against the noncommunist aligned nations appeared imminent. ASEAN has developed into a strong political voice in the region and is trying to resolve the Kampuchea issue and take the pressure off Thailand. The ASEAN nations have quickly come to realize that with Soviet backing and a large well equipped army Vietnam may eventually have to be dealt with militarily. Although the ASEAN nations have made great strides in regional cooperation, resolving internal problems, and becoming a world trade factor, they do not possess the strong economic base and stability to join together in a strong military alliance that could modernize and project its power over the vast distances in the region. ASEAN's most viable option is to continue to grow stronger economically, use the security umbrella of the US presence in Asia, continue to modernize their forces, and to conduct joint exercises and clandestinely plan for contingencies that would threaten the member nations security.

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THE POTENTIAL OF ASEAN AS A VIABLE DEFENSE ALLIANCE

The Genesis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) organization traces its roots back to the post colonial period roughly beginning after the end of World War II. The decline of the colonial powers signaled the need for the new nations of Asia to fill the vacuum and to insure individual states survival. Also, coincidentally, the spread of the Red Menace, Communism, began to manifest itself in the region. Communism in each of the fledgling states was fueled by many factors, however internal strife, poverty, and the rise of the Asian communist giant—China in 1949 provided the major catalysts for the red wave.

I. NATIONAL BACKGROUNDS

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the motivating forces for uniting the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and now Brunei into a cooperative venture, one must look first into their historical backgrounds and relate them to the present day situation. Political heterogeneity, cultural and ethnic cleavages and a variety of historical experiences and responses are all factors which produced commonality among the six states. The Indonesian historian Soedjatmoko aptly describes the events that brought Southeast Asia to what it is today. The states are depositories of Chinese and Indian cultures that flourished in the area from the fourth to the fourteenth centuries. When the sea routes were opened, trading empires grew and Islam and Christianity was spread throughout the region, each culture left its mark, albeit unevenly, and each was adopted and modified so that none retained its originality. Indigenous popular belief systems closely tied to a system of

wet rice cultivation, were reformulated to adapt the higher religions, however they were also changed in the process. This adaption then influenced social organizations, concepts of power, kinship and state. An uneven layer of cultural-religious sediments was produced by these early historical influences. The peoples of the region's marked flexibility can be traced back to this acculturation process. Colonization also brought about other changes such as new territorial boundaries which cut across ethnic groups, redistributing peoples and developing new areas. The peoples values were changed by colonial rule thus reducing the influence of the past great religions. New problems arose on how to regard the new institutions and their values, each country still had cultural and ethnic problems that can be traced to these past experiences. Finally Soedjatmoko said that,

old tensions and new conflicts brought about by independence inevitably produced crises that strained the resources of the societies in each Southeast Asian country. There was a need to create stable communities out of the economic and political chaos which was, to compound matters, aggravated by foreign ideologies sweeping the region and promising social, economic, and political reforms. Clearly, every country desired economic development and political stability but each country found it difficult to find the direction necessary for guidance. Today's problems in the Southeast Asian states are not easy to quantify because they are undoubtedly direct or indirect spin off's from varied emotional reactions from last adaptations.¹

Since gaining their Independence, the ASEAN states have all attempted to identify their common problems, and many similarities of these problems have been found in the past 20 years. These problems of security from external threat, internal stability and economic development have lent themselves to solution through common effort. Their similar backgrounds have highlighted the need for harmony of efforts and pushing biased views into the background to realize the individual success to be gained from Regional Cooperation. One doesn't have to look very hard to find binding similarities; high population

densities, large territories, low economic status, slow social development and basic language roots. Two of the countries, Malaysia and Singapore did have a higher economic rate of growth than the others. Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia have a basic homogeneity of their languages and those three with Thailand have many other cultural similarities arising from the wet rice culture and from traditional kinship. Historically the peoples of these four states came under common influences of the various empires that controlled them. The Philippines and Indonesia are insular countries consisting of many big and small island scattered over a wide area. They have a land surface area of 115,708 and 736,469 square miles. Singapore, an island State has an area of 224 square miles. Thailand 198,454, and Malaysia 128,570 square miles. The Philippines and Indonesia have great bodies of water separating them, Thailand is bordered by countries undergoing communist insurgencies, including the communist activities on its Malaysian border. Malaysia has had problems with Thailand (fishing rights) political, ethnic and economic problems, with Singapore, and it has not had a relationship based of strong trust and confidence with Indonesia. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand have higher literacy rates than Malaysia and Singapore—in spite of a lower per capita GNP. The Indonesia population breakout shows it having 158.3 million 80% of which are Muslims and the remainder Christian and Hinduists. Approximately three million Chinese (3%) live in Indonesia. The Philippines with a population of 53 and 1/2 million have the great majority of their population (87%) as Christian Fillippino's of the lowland Mayla's type, 5% are Muslims, 6% are Animists living in the hills of Mindanao and Luzon. The Chinese comprise 1.25% of the population. In Thailand, virtually a great majority of the 50.7 million population belongs to the Thai ethnic group who are Theravada Buddhists. There are 700,000 Muslim Maylays in the south, some Cambodians on the eastern border, 300,000 scattered hill people (Lai, Meo, Laco, Yao, Karen)

and approximately 3.73 million of the population are Chinese. Malaysia's population of 16 million is 45% Malays, 36% Chinese, 10% Indians, and 8% Borneo indigenes. Singapore with a 2 and 1/2 million plus population have 76% ethnic Chinese, 14% Malays, 8% Indians and 2% of other nationalities. All six of the states are virtually authoritarian in nature, and their foreign policies are diversified. Malaysia is more independent in outlook, the Philippines pro Western, Thailand, although a SEATO member in the past and bilaterally tied to the United States is still considered independent. Singapore is pursuing an independent policy while Indonesia has a policy of "active neutralism." Brunei, a tiny kingdom with a population of 200,000 spread over 6,000 square kilometers has a vast oil and natural gas wealth and a population mix of Malay's, Chinese and Indians. They gained their independence from Great Britain on 1 January 1984 and joined ASEAN in January 1985.

II. ATTEMPTS AT REGIONAL COOPERATION

The earliest attempts at regional cooperation after World War II had their genesis at the Asian relations conference, held in New Delhi, India in March and April 1947. The meeting was called and sponsored by the Indian Council of World Affairs and had participants from the following 18 countries; Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, Ceylon, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaya, Nepal, Mongolia, Iran, Philippines, Thailand, Tibet, Turkey, Vietnam, and Egypt. Representatives from Azerbaijan, Kaghakistan, Kirgizra, Takigistan, Urbekistan, Palestinian Arabs and Jews and observers from Australia and New Zealand. Prime Minister Nehru addressed the gathering stressing the need for Asian unity and for greater regional cooperation. The aim of the conference was to promote Asian studies and greater cooperation among Asian countries and between the Asian countries and the remainder of the world. The rivalry

between India and China surfaced during the conference as these two giants vied for leadership, and caused the smaller nations severe apprehension of their two neighbors. Neither of the two giants were prepared to concede leadership and a fear among the other countries that they most certainly could lose their freedoms almost before it had been won pervaded the conference. The important gain at this time was that the conference was held at all and that some of the impediments to regional cooperation were bared. A second meeting was held in January 1949 at New Delhi to consider the Dutch invasion of Indonesia on 18 December 1948. This official meeting of the Asian governments was political in nature and its significance was derived from the fact that the countries agreed to consult among themselves to find ways to establish suitable mechanisms for promoting consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations. This same year, 1949, was significant because the Peoples Republic of China emerged as the victor of the revolution on the Chinese Mainland. The spectre of Communism was to evermore pervade the political thought of the small states of Asia. The dilemma of taking sides with either the West or with China was now a reality to be dealt with. A realignment was to take place, establishing the camps of neutralists, anti-communists and pro-communists. Events began to accelerate at a rapid pace now, with the Korean War in progress in 1950, the Indonesian/Dutch War in progress, the French War in Indochina and the Question of Communism in the region. Conferences were held in Manila, Colombo Ceylon, the SEATO treaty formation, the Bandung Conference of April 1955 and the Colombo Plan States Meeting in Simla, India in May of 1955. The US at this time was proffering aid and looking for friends/allies in Southeast Asia, to help stem the perceived communist aggression. Again the fear that a large regional organization might well dominate national interests was one of the driving factors precipitating the failure to unify the participants.

For all the Southeast Asian states which in one way or another participated in the above conferences, these were experiences which had implications for their present regional activities. While the notion of regional cooperation was acceptable in the abstract, specific cases of cooperation were obstructed by national differences, subsequent discussions of the idea of cooperation helped to clarify just what kind of cooperation could be feasible among states of diverse political orientations. The most important point made clear is that cooperation for the present can be implemented in many spheres with the possible exception of the political and military.²

The conferences held during the fifties illuminated many of the problems associated with cooperation stoppers, i.e., differences in foreign policy orientation and rivalry for leadership. The Southeast Asian States were just not disposed to transpose their political loyalty from their state to some supra-national authority. These lessons were to become building blocks for the cooperative attempts of the sixties. The next attempt at regional cooperation came at the Bangkok Declaration of 31 July 1961 which created the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), with membership by Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The ASA objectives included the promotion, thru joint endeavor, of well being, economic, social, and cultural progress of the region-- with no connection to any outside power bloc nor direction against any other country. ASA was organized with standing committees, an annual meeting of foreign ministers and national secretariats. ASA had its ups and downs as the pendulum of conflict and disagreement spread among its members. ASA became inactive in 1963 when the Philippines and Malaysia suspended diplomatic relations over the Sabah dispute. ASA activities were revived in 1966 when relations between the two adversaries improved and a third meeting of foreign ministers was held in Bangkok in August of that year. ASA was gradually phased out when ASEAN was created in 1967 and was able to carry out the ASA projects.³ A meeting of the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines at Bangsaen, Thailand on 8 August 1967 led

to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN. The five foreign ministers issued the ASEAN Declaration forming the organization with the same organizational structure as the ASA formerly had.

III. THE FORMATION OF ASEAN

The formation of ASEAN was the outgrowth of initial meetings between General Suharto of Indonesia and Malaysian Prime Minister Tan Sri Shafie. Malaysia and Indonesia were the kingpins to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The original thought behind ASEAN was to consider an association of countries of Southeast Asia to live as good neighbors and friends so that they wouldn't be pitted to fight against one another by foreign powers. The timing was also ripe to draw closer together by the shift in support of Russia and China in the region. Russia helped Vietnam and China was against Vietnam. The overall ASEAN objective was to stop regional communist parties aided by Russia, China or Vietnam. The tide of Communism was pushed back in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and held in check in Thailand. It was not by military strength alone that this occurred, nor by complete denial of personal liberties. The concepts of free enterprise as they are applied in the ASEAN region are in fact the philosophical basis of ASEAN. The appreciation of this point is paramount to the understanding of ASEAN and its sense of direction. The ASEAN countries had come together to protect the system of free enterprise as a counterpoise to communism, with monopolistic capitalism playing a key role. The Preamble of the ASEAN Declaration states;

To establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in SEA in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region.

This desire was to be pursued with the full realization that: The cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well being are best attained by

fostering good understanding, good neighborliness and meaningful cooperation among countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture.

Also,

That the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their natural identities in appearance with the ideas and aspirations of their peoples. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations charter. . . .⁴

The Bangkok declaration also established the machinery to carry out these aims and purposes. In the circumstances of the mid 1960's these declarations by nations which only two years earlier, except for Thailand, were in a state of confrontation with one another—certainly this undertaking was considered a near miracle. This growing trust and confidence among nations enabling them to harness their national and collective potentials was a giant stride in safeguarding their well being against the communist threat. After the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975 the so called domino theory in Southeast Asia did not unfold, and this may well be attributed to the far sightedness displayed by the ASEAN countries as they came together collectively seven years earlier.

Two important ASEAN summit meetings took place after the fall of South Vietnam. In 1976 the First ASEAN Summit was held in Bali, Indonesia to assess the changing situation in the region and to consolidate ASEAN cooperative efforts. This meeting was a critical cornerstone in the development of ASEAN as a foundation for regional stability and development. The ASEAN concord had a confidential side to it in which the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia was analyzed and how the vacuum created thereby could be handled. The Cambodian situation was a top priority especially relative to the China/Russia power

struggle in the area. A wait and see attitude was taken, and a subsequent meeting/summit was held by the heads of government in 1977. In a Joint Communique following the 1977 meeting the concord stressed, "The continued work for the promotion of peace, stability, and progress in Southeast Asia, contributing towards a world peace and international harmony." To this end they were ready to "develop fruitful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation with other countries in the region."⁵

Peace and stability in the general region of the six ASEAN countries has ensued primarily because of the cooperation achieved in promoting economic developments and in the process eliminating many duplications and old regional bilateral approaches. Dialogue has replaced fear, mistrust, and competition in achieving each nations national aims. Perhaps even more important ASEAN has recognized the need to include the United States and Japan in their sphere of dialogue, as very important economic trading partners, and sources of financial and technical assistance. However, one important factor/consideration in the workings of ASEAN is their own self reliance for maneuver outside the shadow of any super power domination.

Political cooperation in ASEAN began in earnest after the Kuala Lumpur declaration in 1971, which expounded a zone of peace and freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). They stated that they would determine to quickly set aside their differences in favor of the common purpose. Achieving this under the Aegis of ASEAN could indeed they believed bring about a new international order in Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and coexistence, with all following the same ground rules. The major spin-off from this declaration and meeting was to be the continuing dialogue among the ASEAN leaders on each and every critical political issue which had a direct bearing on ASEAN. Another spin-off of this declaration was the Treaty of Amity and cooperation signed by the heads of government in 1976. Article I of this treaty states:

"The purpose is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among the peoples of the signatories."⁶

IV. SECURITY ISSUES IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION

The Indochina conflict has been a very unsettling experience that has taken significant turns in the past decade in relation to the ASEAN nations. First of all the withdrawal of United States forces from Vietnam in 1974 coupled with South Vietnam's rapid fall to the communists from the north. Secondly, the Vietnam attack of Kampuchea in December of 1978, which has turned into a protracted war which now threatens the borders of ASEAN member, Thailand. Coupled with this event was the Vietnam/Russian treaty of 1978, and the massive soviet aid to and later presence in Vietnam. Finally, the Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 added to the turmoil of the area, and has had debilitating effects on the six non-communist states in Southeast Asia. Enter now the overt struggle for influence in the region between the two big powers, the Soviet Union and China. The Peoples Republic of China began supplying arms to the Kampuchean Army factions fighting the Vietnamese while simultaneously using their influence and cutting back material aid to the communist parties in Thailand and Malaysia to 20 year lows, to significantly cutback on the communist insurgent activities in the Southeast Asian countries. The less visible big power player in Southeast Asia is of course the United States. The US still has treaty commitments to Thailand and the Philippines, and as the ASEAN nations compose one-fifth of all US trade, they certainly have more than just a passing interest from the US. How then can ASEAN begin to deal with these security issues? Security in ASEAN has been stated to be nonmilitary in nature. Affirmation of this stance was and continually is reinforced during association meetings, so as to leave no doubt to the world where they

stand. President Suharto expressed it quite cogently at the Bali Meetings of Heads of State in 1976, stating that;

It must be clear to us and the world that we have no intention of establishing a military pact, as it was misinterpreted by some people. Cooperation among us in the realm of security is neither designed against other nor certain parties. We have neither the capabilities nor the intention to have it. Our concept of security is inward looking, namely to establish an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each individual territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltrators, wherever their origins might be.

President Suharto's rhetoric sounds excellent and exhudes the neutralism that characterizes the basic ASEAN philosophies, however ongoing current events keep the pressure of decision on the ASEAN leaders as the big power giants haunt the Southeast Asia area. There are differences of opinion pertaining to the Indochina issue however unity within ASEAN has continued to be preserved. Because of the power struggle between China and the Soviet Union in Indochina, the ASEAN community is confronted with the prospects of a long lived, close by and potentially dangerous major power confrontation within its region. Indonesia and Malaysia continue to regard China as the long-term threat to the area, reflective in part of their Chinese domestic problems. They have shown some interest in accommodation with Hanoi, as a buffer against Chinese hegemony. Thailand and Singapore see Vietnam as an immediate threat and one that must be countered with firm resistance. Although the ASEAN community propagates the ZOPFAN, they most likely would prefer a minimal military and political presence of the major powers in the area, a virtual impossibility at this time. Tilting toward Japan and the West, economically, politically and strategically in reality destroys ASEAN's true neutrality. However, this relationship can be accurately defined as one of alignment vs. alliance. This alignment will most likely continue, and could quite possibly be strengthened as long as China and the Soviet Union continue their role

playing in the region. It would seem to appear then that the real threats to the security of Southeast Asia would come from Russia, China and Vietnam.

The Soviet Threat

There appears to be many reasons why the Soviet Union has encroached into Southeast Asia and is increasing its power projection in the area. A global power with definite ideas of international commitments, it perceives the United States and China (PRC) as natural competitors in Asia and by extending their presence, they hope to contain both powers influence in the region and at the same time neutralize US forces in the Pacific. The Soviets procured bases in Vietnam to provide more regional access for their naval and air protection and to obtain greater access to the open sea. They have increased their ship presence at Cam Ranh from 7 ships in 1980 to more than 20 ships currently. Naval air reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia are also benefits received from this arrangement. Soviet submarines are also serviced out of Cam Ranh Bay, increasing the range for routine patrol activity.⁷ Vietnams dependence on the Soviets for continued aid to fight in Kampuchea has had and will continue to have a high price tag. The Soviets are already eyeing the use of the Port of Kompeng Son which would allow them to dominate not only the Gulf of Thailand, but also the approaches from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. A significant Soviet naval reserve could be accommodated here. The implications of the larger Soviet presence become obvious. A combination of Soviet-Vietnamese power in the region presents a formidable combination which the Soviets can use to exert political leverage and psychological pressures on the ASEAN nations. Add to this the fact that as China views the increasing level of Soviet presence and activity they would naturally be expected to increase their diplomatic pace in dealing in the region. Again, the expected resulting

struggle for influence will exert great political pressure on ASEAN, who could then be caught in the middle. This type of situation would be totally counter-productive to ASEAN's hopes for keeping the region free of these type of great power struggles. There appears to be no doubt that the overall Soviet strategy calls for the eventual encirclement of China and to surpass the United States naval presence in the entire Asia-Pacific region. The Soviets have left no doubt as to their intentions as they began a massive naval build-up under Admiral Gorshkov in the 70's and at the same time thru the spread of fear, intimidation and their communistic influence, proceeded to attempt to obtain basing rights all throughout the area. The Soviet military threat to Asia was increased by the deployment of the SS-20 missiles in the region. Launched from their Central Asia bases these SS-20 missiles could take under attack, Korea, Japan, China, the Northern Philippines, most parts of Thailand and the US bases in Guam. With its missiles as a back-up force, the Soviets are attempting to blackmail Japan, the ASEAN countries and China. They are trying to drive a wedge into these countries relations with the US and prevent the formation of an Asian anti-Soviet coalition. A typical, though restrained official assessment of the Soviet position in the region was given by Ghazali bin Shafie of Malaysia in a speech in Singapore:

The Soviet Union . . . appears to be moving in the Pacific region with a design and purpose. This may be because she has never really played a role in the Pacific or because there is a clear and undivided focus of attention and interest brought about by Sino-Soviet dispute. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, however Soviet interest and activities are invariably analyzed with that perspective. It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the dispute is not likely to gain the support of countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region.

So strong are some suspicions of the Soviet position in Southeast Asia that Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew once went so far as to make a public suggestion

for a joint naval task force comprising ships from the US, Japan, Australia, and Western Europe fleets to counter the Soviet presence in Asian waters.⁸

The Chinese Threat

Of all the big powers China worries Southeast Asia the most because of its potential interest, reinforced by links of history and migration. It is obvious that whatever happens in the next decade or two, it will result in a greater/closer Chinese-Southeast relationship. China is the sleeping giant that will end up with the greatest interest of all the super powers in the region. The apprehensions about China's attitude toward Southeast Asia can be found in taking a look at; China's past actions, China's present irritations and lastly the future potential of any Chinese intervention in the region. ASEAN leader comments about China's intentions can best be synthesized by President Suharto of Indonesia; "It has been proved that China lent its support to the attempted left wing coup in Jakarta in 1965," and he further states that his government considered China's attitude at the end of 1972 as "an interference in the internal affairs of Indonesia." Chiang Hai Ding, former Singapore high commissioner observed that "while China seems to have matured as a power vis a vis the great powers, it nevertheless continues to serve as a source of inspiration for revolutionary communist forces in our region."⁹ Although the fallout of China and Vietnam has had a debillitating effect on the communist insurgent activities in Southeast Asia, the Chinese do back and control them through ideological and military aid and support, and could release whenever they wanted, this insurgent energy throughout many of the ASEAN countries. China elicits feelings of suspicion because of historical circumstances and its espousal of a revolutionary ideology although Beijing claims that it doesn't export revolutions—a claim that provides little solace for the regional nations.

A perception that most likely could be applied across the board in the ASEAN governments appraisal of China's intentions would be that they are not frightened of Chinese aggression at this time. China has turned inward in trying to develop some type of Commu-Capitalist economy while at the same time attempting to modernize her army, with hopefully, help from the US and other Western nations. China's preoccupation with internal reforms and changes, coupled with the bitter lesson they learned in 1979 during their "punative" excursion into Vietnam would seem to predict a period lacking any type of Chinese power projection. There are two factors however that might tempt the Chinese to become involved in Southeast Asia in the future. One relates to Sino-Soviet competition and the other is the most worrisome to most ASEAN nations, that of the presence in Southeast Asia of some 15 million overseas Chinese.

China has a real dilemma in trying to reconcile its ideological actions on the one hand, that of supporting revolutionaries overseas, and that of reconciling its need for normal diplomatic relations with the governments of Southeast Asia on the other hand. China could hardly disassociate itself from the revolutionary movements, as they most likely would cause them to turn to Russia for support. So long as the Sino-Soviet dispute continues, it is likely that Peking will want to continue support for these movements.

The overseas Chinese factor is also a key issue. The position of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has been one of controversy and difficulty. China has vacillated on the official status of these people, as to whether they held dual citizenship or not. There have been numerous instances thru history when the pendulum has swung both ways to the yes and no side. Chou En-lai devoted considerable energy to a policy of encouraging the Chinese in Southeast Asia to become citizens of the states where they resided, abandoning the traditional claim of allegiance to the Peking government. During the

cultural revolution China changed its mind, and encouraged the overseas Chinese to rebel against their host governments and introduce Maoist revolutionary communism. Another factor in the equation is the rivalry between China and Taiwan. As long as Taiwan offers an alternate Chinese government, Peking is reluctant to drop its support for the overseas Chinese. So, just as the Chinese (PRC) are obliged to continue support to the Southeast Asian Revolutionaries because of a fear of Russian competition, they also feel obligated to support in some degree the overseas Chinese communities in order to block a Taiwan initiative in this area. During diplomatic activity during 1973 between the Chinese Director of Southeast Asian affairs in the foreign ministry and the Thai Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Chenji-Sheng stated that,

China welcomed the ASEAN Declaration of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality for the region. He further stated that this concept was in harmony with Pekings view that China didn't wish to see any power dominating Southeast Asia, but rather wished to see the region free of interference.¹⁰

China's national interests in Southeast Asia center around, (1) minimization of hostility to China by the Southeast Asian states, (2) prevent an increase of Soviet or American influence in the region, (3) prevent the overseas Chinese in the region from swinging to Taiwan's side, and (4) to promote a useful trade relationship for China. None of the aims of China's policy for SEA would require a Chinese domination of the region or an exclusion of other power interests in the region. Neutralization of the region has a certain appeal to Peking, at least for the near future. Internal problems, continued tensions with the Soviets, and a large but basically immobile army make China less of a threat to the region. China's lack of a means to project her power really makes her stay within the confines of a second rate power. Her military power, although still growing must be categorized as defensive in nature, projected against the Soviet Union of the northern borders and Vietnam on the

southern border. Possibly one scholars assessment of China's Southeast Asia strategy fits best, "To promote fragmentation in order to preserve domination of the region."

The Vietnamese Threat

One of the major trends that started in the last decade was the emergence of Vietnam as the First Communist Regime in Southeast Asia. The catastrophic end of the Vietnam War in 1975 brought significant change to the SEA scene. A new pattern of international relations was to begin after the Vietnamese "defeated" the strongest nation in the world. The optimists in the region were hopeful that after 1975, the area would settle down to a lifestyle of peaceful and cooperative coexistence. For three years, 1975-1978, all seemed serene until the December 1978 invasion of Cambodia by the Vietnamese. Destabilization was once again introduced into the region, and the domino theorists seemed to have been vindicated. The Vietnamese security interests in Southeast Asia appear to be these: First there is an overriding concern to secure a pliant, non-threatening region; above all this applies to the Indochina Peninsula. Second, the Vietnamese seek to prevent the development of an anti-communist front, either a militant ASEAN, a revised SEATO, or some other regional grouping hostile to Vietnam. Thirdly, they want to eliminate the US military presence from the area and to diminish general US influence. Fourth, they seek to limit superpower activity in the region, including the PRC and the USSR.¹¹ The greatest danger to ASEAN with respect to Vietnam would be if the Vietnamese were finally able to consolidate their victory in Kampuchea, then to turn southeast and threaten Thailand. ASEAN must remain strong to prevent this occurrence, lest Vietnam perceive weakness, disunity or a breakdown of control authority in individual countries. The scenario which would allow a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand would certainly be dependent upon many

factors at the time, not the least being the Big Power Relations--US-China-Soviets. Would the Russians finance such a hiatus, when it already is costing them millions a day just to keep Vietnam afloat. What would China do? She already is supporting the anti-Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea, and may feel threatened enough to begin another military operation into Vietnam. How about the US, it has a mutual defense pact with Thailand, and would be forced to become involved in the conflict to some degree. Would the superpowers permit Vietnam to provide the ground for a major power confrontation--and would a situation such as this solidify all of Asia against the combined allies of Russia and Vietnam. There are as many scenarios as there are players in the drama, but ASEAN remains concerned about the length's that Russia will let her pet fighting dog off the leash. The optimum solution for ASEAN would be a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea and some sort of stable government installed there. Further, for Vietnam to stand down part of her 1.2 million man war machine, and turn to solving her horrendous internal economic problems. Vietnam it is said is in worse economic shape than it was during the height of the Vietnam War, and add to that their own internal insurgency problem. ASEAN, it must be noted, had taken diplomatic and political initiatives to help resolve the crises in Kampuchea, but up to this time Vietnam has not responded with any alternatives that would be valid to a reasonable man. The Vietnam-Kampuchea situation will remain a thorn in the side of ASEAN and pose a serious security threat until its resolution.

V. THE UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE IMPACT UPON ASEAN

The United States has shown deliberate reluctance to have any overt involvement in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam War. American naval presence continues and relations with Asian countries have continued to improve or at least have remained status quo. The apparent key US objectives in Asia are:

1. To remain a Pacific power.
2. Cooperation of regional friends and allies.
3. Trade—continue expanding the US trade—the US now does more trade with Asia than it does with Europe.
4. Have favorable stability and peace throughout the region.
5. Assist the continued Asian community development.
6. To maintain access to the Indian Ocean region.
7. Maintain access to sea and air lines of communication.
8. Maintain US basing rights in the region.
9. Continue mutual cooperation through treaties and agreements.

In particular the US is very much interested in the maintenance of the political and economic vitality of ASEAN. A strong ASEAN is a key to stability in Southeast Asia. The US has found that it must however, walk quietly in its dealings with ASEAN. The ASEAN countries have vowed not to become a cockpit for big power struggles in Asia, and have necessarily shied away from any more basing commitments to the US or to bilateral agreements or ties. They do however want continued economic cooperation with the US and the open US markets for exploitation of their exports. The ASEAN nations have used the US nuclear umbrella, to their advantage, albeit not to the extent that Europe has, but nevertheless, it is cognizant of continued favorable and friendly relations with the US. In its attempts to establish an enduring relationship with China, the US has aroused some suspicion among the ASEAN nations about its intent to help China modernize its armed forces, and awaken the sleeping giant. As previously mentioned, China is one of the three major powers in Asia, and any change to the status quo of her military capabilities does indeed have repercussions in all of Asia.

The US insistence that Japan share more of the burden for Asian security by increasing its military spending and being responsible for 1,000 miles of the SLOC and ALOC's has had divided reactions in ASEAN and within Asia. Old wounds heal slowly and much suspicion of Japanese intentions over the long run certainly exists. There is some concern in ASEAN over the US preoccupation to counter the Soviets every move in the region. There is much consternation of the Vietnam-Soviet relationship and Soviet activities at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay by the US and the ASEAN nations and perhaps this concern will cause ASEAN to lean heavier on the US to provide a counterbalance in the area. Of the six ASEAN countries, the US has bilateral defense agreements with Thailand and the Philippines. This arrangement does not appear to concern the other ASEAN members, as some of them also have agreements with Western nations. With its hands off, neutrality, (ZOPFAN) attitude ASEAN wants to make sure that the world can see that it is doing its best not to become the pawn of any super power, and to not get entangled with any pacts such as the old SEATO agreements.

In its drive for peace and stability in the region, ASEAN would like to see the US take a more flexible position in relation to Vietnam, thereby helping to reduce tensions in the area and possibly help end the Kampuchean conflict. However, this position doesn't seem practical until Vietnam gets out of Kampuchea and makes some efforts to negotiate a political settlement of the issue along the lines adopted by the ASEAN proposals on the matter. The US has repeatedly stated that its interests in Southeast Asia parallel those of ASEAN and it is cognizant of the fact that it must take no political or economic steps to upset the delicate balance in the region. An indication of the US interest in ASEAN is the fact that the US Secretary of State has attended and addressed the ASEAN ministers meetings in Djakarta.

The Japanese have generally walked softly in their quest for improving their relationships with the ASEAN nations. In Southeast Asia, there is still anti-Japanese feeling, rendered by the harsh experiences many suffered at their hands during World War II. There is also a fear of a Japanese attempt at economic domination. However during the past ten years there have been many positive warming indications that bode well for ASEAN relations with Japan. The warming trend started with Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan setting forth a three point Japanese Doctrine: (1) Japan wishes to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in Southeast Asia but will refrain from developing any military role; (2) Japan seeks to intensify its economic cooperation with the ASEAN states and; (3) The Japanese will work toward a "heart to heart understanding" with the Peoples of Southeast Asia. Fukuda pledged one billion dollars in and for industrial development projects in each of the five ASEAN countries, to be decided on by ASEAN. This is a significant step toward enhancing their economic bases. The Japanese have also made efforts to become more visible in the political arena by proposing at various times to act as ASEAN's spokesman in both Hanoi and Washington. Continued insistence by Japan of their nonmilitary intentions has been closely scrutinized by the ASEAN nations.¹² To sum it up, Japan's attractiveness as a security partner of ASEAN is and most likely will continue to be received with mixed feelings. ASEAN wants the best it can get from Japan, economic aid, loans, markets for their products, and a sometimes intermediary between/with the big powers in the region. However, there is still too much perceived mistrust of the Japanese intentions for the future. The extension of Japan's security role beyond its borders to encompass the ASEAN area can only be accomplished over a period of time, and possibly acceptable only under the very watchful eye of the US. Exchanges of information, joint consultations, shared training and open joint/bilateral exercises are all possibilities that could be expanded upon, to

increase trust and confidence. Exchanges of officers to defense colleges, and staff officer reciprocal visits etc, are conducive to expanding relationships and creating greater understandings and trust. Lastly, and very important to regional stability, ASEAN fears the reactions of China and Russia if Japan takes any type of a more active role in the region. To upset the delicate balance that exists within the region may be a risk that ASEAN is not prepared to take.

VI. THE QUESTION OF AN ASEAN SECURITY PACT

Controversy abounds when the issue of a military pact being integrated into the ASEAN agreement is discussed. A pact such as ASEAN has, aimed at economic and regional cooperation has led to much important and necessary intercourse between countries. ASEAN has now come to the point of realization that it may not be possible in this age to bury ones head in the sand as far as security relationships go, and still survive in an environment of communist internal and external threat without some sort of mutual defense pact. However, most ASEAN observers would concede that to form a hard defense alliance within ASEAN, the first and foremost necessity would be to have a shared notion of a common adversary. The closest that they could currently come to finding that adversary would be the actions of Vietnam in the region. One could quite possibly add the Soviets to the Vietnam threat thus proffering a combined significant threat that is slowly changing the face of the security stability in the region. The ASEAN leaders have presently opted for the route of military cooperation, in the form of joint bilateral and trilateral exercises, police cooperation and exchanges of intelligence. Thailand, of course, has a very real threat on its borders and is quite concerned about the Vietnamese long-range intentions in Kampuchea. There are bilateral agreements

within ASEAN, i.e., between Malaysia and Thailand and between Indonesia and Malaysia. Two members of ASEAN, Malaysia and Singapore, are in the five power defense agreement, with Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. This defense agreement, effective in 1971, was in fact made to confirm the continuing presence of Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand air and naval forces in the Malaysia-Singapore area on a relatively small scale.

Interestingly, the western powers have not put overt pressure on the ASEAN nations in recent times to either form their own defense alliance nor to enter into additional ties with the West. At the present time there are six security pacts existing among western and western aligned nations in East Asia and the Pacific.

1. The US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty.
2. ANZUS.
3. The US-Japan Security Treaty.
4. US-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.
5. Manila Pact-Thailand.
6. The Five Power Defense Arrangement.

Future attempts to form defense alliances, it would appear, would be directed toward a collective defense posture within the ASEAN nations themselves. There has been a significant increase in the number of military exercises especially combined air and naval exercises between ASEAN nations and in conjunction with other nations. Some examples of these cooperative efforts are:

- o Nov 1979—Joint naval exercise between Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
- o Apr 1980—Joint naval drill between Singapore and the US 7th fleet.
- o Sep 1980—Joint naval exercise, Singapore and Indonesia.

- o Jan 1981—Joint air/sea exercise, Thailand-Indonesia.
- o Spring 1982—Joint search and destroy (actual) against guerillas operating on their border, Thailand-Malaysia.
- o March 1982—Joint exercise in Malaysia, New Zealand-Malaysia.
- o May 1982—Joint Marine police exercise (SEAEX Thamal) Thailand-Malaysia.
- o June 1982—Joint naval/air exercise, Thailand-US.
- o June 1982—Five Power Defense exercise in South China Sea.
- o Aug 1982—Joint Indonesia-Malaysia exercise in No. Sumatra.
- o 1979-1983—Joint exercise series, air thamal, several exercises between Thailand-Malaysia to destroy communist guerillas in Betong Salient.
- o Feb 1983—Joint Thailand-Malaysia exercise along border.
- o Mar 1983—Joint integrated air defense exercise, Singapore, Australia and Malaysia.
- o Aug 1983—Joint Malaysia-Indonesia exercise.
- o Sep 1983—Integrated air defense exercise in Malaysia and Singapore with Australia, New Zealand.
- o Nov 1983—Joint Indonesia-Malaysia exercise.
- o Jan 1984—Joint air exercise Cope Thunder, Thailand, US, NZ, Australia.
- o Apr 1984—Joint exercise-Thailand and Malaysia (Ex Air Thamal 3).
- o Apr 1984—Joint Thailand-Malaysia operation against the CPM on the border.
- o May 1984—Joint exercise Hari Cari 8, Australia-Malaysia.
- o Jul 1984—Joint Thailand-US logistic exercise.
- o Oct 1984—Thai government offers training facilities to Brunei Armed Forces.

o Nov 1984--Brunei soldiers train in jungle warfare in Australia.

Besides these exercises the ASEAN countries have offered member countries basic and advanced training in their own military schools.

All of the operations have not gone well, one exception that is indicitive of some of the problems that have arisen from time to time in the area of security cooperation between ASEAN members was operation Dayai Musnah in 1977. The operation was originally aimed at communist organizations along the Thai-Malaysian border, however, the Thai's managed to drag Malaysian troops into operations against the Malay Muslim separatists in southern Thailand. Malaysia has since resisted attempts to review the terms of the Geneva Border Committee (GBC) agreement of 1949, however there still is, out of necessity a fair amount of cooperation between the two countries armed forces and police forces.

All of the previously stated military ventures illuminate the fact that the absence of a formal ASEAN military pact has not discouraged the nations from creating in effect an informal defense infrastructure network to facilitate defense cooperation. Technology transfer and regular exchanges of information and intelligence on communist activities also take place on a regular basis. These exercises/operations go a long way in strengthening the ties and trust between the member armed forces and their states.

The time does seem right then for a new collective security system for the Southeast Asia/Pacific theater as ties have grown stronger among the Western aligned nations of the region. Possible alternatives to such a regional collective security system could include establishment of a West Pacific Treaty Organization (WEPTO), similiar to Europes' NATO. Another alternative could be a general transition from the existing bilateral/multilateral and multinational defense pacts to a multinational defense organization. Possibly the most appropriate option and the most saleable would be the second one

first, and in time hope it would evolve into something like a WEPTO. Not to be ruled out, as the regions continue to move closer would be a NATO-WEPTO lash-up, creating a completely new and powerful international institution for the maintenance of peace which could possibly function more effectively than the present United Nations.

However, before we can cast any judgements on possible options for ASEAN an analysis of the capabilities of the ASEAN countries in their actual war making potential, based upon current military strengths and capabilities is in order. Another important factor to be considered will be each country's economic strength to support an increase in military expenditures. The following is the latest available information (Asian Defense Journal, Jan 85) on the ASEAN nations pertinent armed forces strengths, defense budgeting and GDP information.

BRUNEI¹³

Population	210,000
Total Armed Forces	3,900
Est GDP* (1982)	4.136 B
Est Defense Expenditure (1982)	195M
GDP growth (1982)	-12%
Inflation (1982&1983)	6%-4%

ARMY: (3,500)

FORMATION

DETAILS

Infantry	2 bns (1 more forming)
Armour	1 armd recce sqn.
Air Defense	1 bty (Rapier)
Support Units	1 engr. 1 sigs sqn

Equipment: 16 Scorpion light tks, 2 Sultan armed cars,
24 AT-104 APC, 16 81mm mor,
12 Rapier/Blindfire SAM

Para-Military: Royal Brunei Police elements 1,750
Gurkha Reserve Unit (900)

NAVY: (350)

TYPE

DETAILS

FAC (G)	3 Waspada (2 Exocet MM-38)
Patrol Craft	3 Perwira coastal 3 Rotork river patrol
Landing Craft	2 Loadmaster L. C.
Special Boat Service	1 squadron 24 assault boats

AIR FORCE: (100)

TYPE

DETAILS

Counter-insurgency	1 sqn—6SAAB 105CB
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Helicopter	1 sqn--10 Bell 212
Composite Sqn	1 sqn with 2 SF-260 ac, 3 Bell 206a/B hel.
V.I.P. Flt	1 BO-105, 1 Bell 212, 1 S-76 hel
Misc Helicopters	2 Bell 212, 1 206A
ON ORDER: 1 AH-76 (S-76) armed hel.	
*Gross Domestic Product	

INDONESIA¹⁴

Population	158,300,000
Total Armed Forces	281,000
Est GDP (1983)	73.331 B
Est Defense Expenditure (1983)	2.527 B
GDP growth (1983)	4.5%
Inflation (1983)	12%
Debt (1982)	23.6 B

ARMY: 210,000

FORMATION	DETAILS
Infantry (4 Regional, 16 Military Area Commands)	4 divisions 2 ind. bdes, 11 ind. regts, 33 ind. bns.
Infantry AB	2 bdes, 4 ind bns.
Armour	1 cav. bde.
Artillery	2 fd regts, 1 AA regt, 7 ind AA bns, 2 ind (AA) btys.
Special Warfare	4 para/cdo gps (4,000 men).
Army Aviation	1 composite sqn (14 ac) 1 hel sqn (18 hel).
Support Troops	2 constr. engr. regts, 4 ind bns. 1 fd engr regt, 6 ind bns, 10 ind det.
Marine Transport	1 LST, 20 LCU, 14 small tpt ships.

EQUIPMENT

AFV: 93 AMX-13, 47 PT-76 light tks, 75 Saladin
armd, 60 Ferret scout cars, 200 AMX-VCI
MICV, 60 Saracen, 60 V-150 Commando,
BTR-40/-152 APC.

Guns/How: 30 76mm, M-1938 pack how, 170 105mm.

MOR: 480 81/82mm, 120mm M-43.

RCL: 480 90mm M-67, 106mm M-40.

ON ORDER: 50 AMX L-30 105mm SPH; 2 NC-212-200
tpt ac; 6 Bell 212, 26 Super Puma hel.

NAVY: 42,000 (incl. Naval Air/Marines)

TYPE	DETAILS
3 submarines	2 Type 209 1 Sov Whiskey-class (trg)
9 Frigates	3 Fatahillah, 4 US Jones, 2 Sov. Riga
4 FAC (G)	4 Dagger with Exocet MM-38
2 FAC (T)	2 Lurssen TNC-4
19 FAC (P)	3 Sov. Kronshtadt, 4 Yug Kraljevica, 2 Kelabang, 2 Attack, 1 Komar, 1 US PGM-39, 6 Carpentaria (coastal).
2 Minesweepers	2 Sov. T-43
29 Spt & Other Ships.	1 comd/spt, 12 LST, 4 LCU, 2 control craft, 4 cargo, 4 tankers, 2 tpts.

ON ORDER: 1 Type 209 sub, 3 Tribal-class frigates,
2 PB-57 FAC*, 2 minehunters, 4 jet-foil
patrol craft*.

*(Patrol craft probably for Coast Guard)

NAVAL AIR	17 combat ac, 10 combat hel. (1,000).
ASW	10 Wasp hel.
Maritime Recce	11 Nomad N-22B, 6N-22L
Others	6 C-47, 3 Aero Commander, 1 Alouette II, 4 BO-105

ON ORDER: 2 Nomad, 4 NC-212, 18 NC-235, ac:
26 AS-332F Super Puma hel. (prob for
Coast Guard).

MARINES (12,000)

Infantry	2 regt. amph. assault
Spt. Formations	1 combat spt, 1 admin spt, 1 trg spt.

EQUIPMENT

AFV/Amph: 30 PT-76 light tks, 40 AMX-10 PAC 90
MICV, 57 APC incl. 25 AMX-10P

Guns/How: 40 122mm M-38 how, 40,mm AA guns

AIR FORCE: (29,000)

TYPE	DETAILS
6 Air Regions, 83 combat ac.	
Ground Attack— 34 ac.	30 A-4E, 4 TA-4H SkyHawk
Interceptor—15 ac	11 F-5E, 4F-5F
Counter-insurgency —15 ac.	15 OV-10F
Maritime Recce— 9 ac.	1 C-130H-MP, 3 Boeing 737-200, 5 HU-16.
Transport—4 Sqn. With 65 ac.	21 C-130B/H/HS 1 L-100-30 2 sqn. 1 C-140 Jetstar 7 C-47, 8 F-28 1 SC-7 Skyvan 2 sqn. 13 NC-212A4 1 Boeing 707 12 Cessna 207/401/402.
Helicopters—51 hel.	9 Sikorsky UH-34T— 1 sqn. 5 Bell 204B 12 47G, 9 SA-330L, 6 SA-332 Super Puma 2 sqn. 1 SA-332L (VIP) 12 Hughes 500 6 NBO-105*
Training—55 ac.	13 Hawk T-53, 15 T-34Cl (OCU), 7 T-41D, 20 AS 202 Bravo.
Quick Reaction Troop	5 bns.
ON ORDER:	8 NC-212-200, 32 NC-235 tpt ac; 9 T-34Cl, 3 Hawk trg ac, NBO-105, SA-332 Super Puma Bell U-412, Bk-117 hel.

PARA-
MILITARY 12,000 Police Mobile bde org in coy.
FORCES: About 70,000 militia.

RESERVES: KOSTRAD (Strategic Reserve Command).
About 16,500 to 19,000 men. (3 inf., 2 AB
bdes, Spt arms and services.

MALAYSIA¹⁵

Population	15,850,000
Total Armed Forces	124,500
GDP (1983)	29.070 B
Defense Expenditures (1983)	2.361 B
GDP Growth (1983)	5.5%
Inflation (1983)	3.7%
Debt (1982)	9.5 B

ARMY: 100,500

FORMATION

DETAILS

1 Corps, 4 Div HQ

Infantry	12 inf bde (36 inf bns) (1 with APC)
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Armour	4 cav. regt.
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Artillery	4 fd arty, 1 AA arty
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Signals	5 regts.
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Special Service	1 bde gp.
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Reserves	Malaysia Territorial Army—45,000 Local Defence Corps—15,000
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EQUIPMENT

AFVs: 25 Scorpion, 138 SIBMAS AFV,
140 AML armd, 93 Ferret, AT-105,
200 V100/-150 Commando, 10 Stormer,
around 320 Condor APC.

Guns/How: 12 5.5in (140mm) guns, 114 Mod. 56
105mm pack how, 81mm mor,
M-20 89mm RL, 150 106mm, 5 120mm
RCL, SS-11 ATGW, 70 12.7mm & 25
40mm AA guns.

ON ORDER: 25 Scorpions, 10 Stormer, 140 Condor APC
(being delivered)

NAVY: 11,000

TYPE	DETAILS
2 Frigates	1 Yarrow, 1 Type 41 2 FS-1500 FFG with Exocet.
8 FAC (G)	4 Handalan (Spica-M), 4 Perdana Combattante-class All armed with Exocet MM-38
6 FAC	6 Jerong
21 FAC (P)	3 Kedah-class, 4 Sabah-class, 14 Kris-class.
2 Minesweepers	2 British Ton-class
2 LSTs	2 US 511-1152
Other Vessels	1 spt, 1 ammo ship, 29 small amphibious vessels.
Reserves	About 600
ON ORDER:	2 1,300 ton patrol vessels, 4-Spica-M FAC (G) with Exocet MM-40, 4 Lerici-class minehunters (to be delivered soon) 2 LST.

AIR FORCE: 13,000 (being expanded)

TYPE	DETAILS
	2 Air Regions, (5 bns), 1 Spt Comd.
Ground Attack, (1 sqn)—21 ac	13 F-SE, 4 F-5F, 2 RF-SE
Counter-insurgency —12 ac	2 sqn.—12 MBB-339 (also doubles as trg sqn).
Marine Recce—3 ac	2 PC—130H
Transport/Liaison (3 sqn/1 sqn) —30 ac.	6C-130H —1 sqn 14 DHC-4A —2 sqn 2 HS-125 2 F-28 —1 sqn 12 Cessna 402B

Tpt. Hel. 36 ac/24 hel.	36 S-61A-4 —2 sqn 24 SA-316B Alouette III 2 liaison sqn.
Training—5 ac/9 hel.	11 Bulldog 102, 40 PC-7 ac; 7 Bell 47, 2 Alouette hel.
AAM	Sidewinder
Reserves	600; 10 CL-41G6 Tebuans.
ON ORDER:	34 A-4S FGA, 6 TA-4 trg (20 more for spares), 4 NC-212 tpt ac; Super Sidewinder AAM.

PHILIPPINES¹⁶

Population	53,400,000
Total Armed Forces	104,800
GDP (1983)	34.268 B
Est. Defense Expenditures (1983)	666.247 M
GDP Growth (1983)	1.0%
Inflation (1983)	10%
Debt (1982)	24.5 B
Foreign Military Assistance (1981)	1.75 B

ARMY: 60,000

FORMATION

DETAILS

Infantry	4 divisions
Special Warfare	1 brigade
Special Security	1 armd, 2 inf, 2 COIN bns with spt units.
Armour	1/t armd regt.
Artillery	4 arty regts.
Units To Be Reactivated	1 Ranger Regt (2 ranger, 1 mountain bns; 5 scout coys)
Reserves	20,000 in 18 bns. Some 70,000 plus have reserve commitments.

EQUIPMENT

AFVs:	28 Scorpion It tks, 45 MICV, 80 M-113, 20 Chaimite APC.
How:	200 105mm (incl pack how), 12 155mm M-114 how
Mor:	81mm & 107mm
RCL:	75mm M-20, 90mm M-67, 106mm M-40
ON ORDER:	24 M-167A1 towed Vulcan AD systems

NAVY: 28,000 (incl. Marines/CG)

TYPE	DETAILS
7 Frigates (US)	4 Casco, 1 Savage, 2 Cannon.
10 Corvettes (US)	2 Auk, 7 PCE-827, 1 Admirable.
3 FAC (G)	3 PSMM-5 (4 Exocet each)
16 FAC (P)	1 comd ship, 4 Katapangan, 5 PGM-39/-71, 2 PC-461
62 Coastal Patrol Craft	Type n/k
31 Landing Ships(US)	3 Spt, 24 LST, 4 LSM
71 Landing Craft	61 LCM, 7 LCVP, 3 LCU.
SAR—1 Sqn.	9 Islander ac, 5 BO-105 hel.
Reserves	12,000
MARINES	
3 Marine Bdes	9 bns—9,600 marines [30 LVTP-5, 5S LVTP-7 APC; 105mm how; 4.2in (107mm) mor.]

ON ORDER: 2 US Destroyers, 3 PSMM-5 FAC (G),
50 patrol boats, 12 LST, 1 trg. ship.

AIR FORCE: 16,700

TYPE	DETAILS
	82 combat ac.
Ground Attack —24 ac.	24 F-8H FGA sqn.
Air Defence—22 ac.	19 F-5A, 3F-5B.
Counter-insurgency —36 ac.	16 SF-260 WP —1 sqn 20 T-28D —2 sqn
Helicopters—50 hel.	50 UH-1H (see tpt hel)
Transport—44 ac.	4 C-130H —1 sqn 5 C-47 8 F-27 3 F-27MR 12 Nomad —1 sqn 12 Islander —1 sqn

-21 hel.	7 H(S)-76 att. to hel wing	
	2 S-70 AS	
	12 BO-105	-1 sqn
Presidential Tpt Sqn (3 ac/4 hel)	1 Boeing 707, 1 BAC-111	
	1 YS-11 ac	
	1 S-62A, 2 UH-1N, 1 Puma, hel.	
Liaison-1 sqn.	01E, 1 Cessna U-17 A/B	
	8 Beaver (being withdrawn).	
Weather-3 ac.	3 Cessna 210	
Training	10 T/RT-33A	-1 sqn
	12 T-41D	-1 sqn
	30 SF-260MP	-1 sqn
	10 T-34A	-1 sqn
AAM	Sidewinder	
Reserves	16,000	
ON ORDER: 16 Bell 412; 10 S-76; 12 UH-1H hel;.		

SINGAPORE¹⁷

Population	2,550,000
Total Armed Forces	55,500
Estimated GDP (1983)	15.125 B
Est. Defense Expenditures (1983)	1.081 B
GDP Growth (1983)	7.9%
Inflation (1983)	1.1%
Debt (1982)	2.0 B

ARMY: 45,000

FORMATION

DETAILS

(30,000 tps are conscripts)
1 div HQ.

Infantry	3 bdes (9 bns)
Armour	1 armd bde (1 recce, 1 tk, 2 APC bns).
Special Services	1 cdo bn
Artillery	6 arty bns
Spt & Other Formation.	6 engr bns, 3 sig bn
Reserve	150,000 2 armd div, 6 inf bde HQ; 18 inf, 1 cdo, 9 arty, 6 engr, 2 sig bns.

EQUIPMENT

AFVs: 350 AMX-13 lt tks, 720 M-113, 280 V-100/
-150/-200 Commando APC.

Guns/How: 60 155mm how, 20mm, 35mm, L-70
40mm AA Guns.

Mor: 60mm, 81mm, and 50 120mm
(some SP in M-113s).

RL: 89mm

RCL: 84mm Carl Gustav, 90 106mm

NAVY: 4,500

TYPE	DETAILS
FAC(G)	6 TNC-45
FAC	6 Vosper A/B
FAC (P)	2 trg ships
Coastal Patrol	12 Swift.
Coastal Minesweepers	2 US Redwing
LST	6 US 511-1152 (1 in reserve)
Others	6 Landing craft.
SSM	Gabriel II 5 per FAC (G)
ON ORDER: 3 FPB-57 FAC	

AIR FORCE: 6,000

TYPE	DETAILS
	167 combat ac.
Ground Attack	41 A-4S/ST, 6 TA-4S 21 Hunter FGA-74
Air Defence --27 ac	24 F-5E, 3 F-5F
4 SAM Sqn.	28 Bloodhound 3 --1 sqn 10 Rapier --1 sqn 61-HAWK --1 sqn Bofors RBS-70 --1 sqn
Reconnaissance --11 ac	7 Hunter FR-74S, 4T-75S
COIN/Trg	18 BAC-167 --1 sqn 11 SF-260W 12 SF-260MS --1 sqn 20 T-33A --1 sqn
Tpt/SAR	8 C-130B/H
Helicopters	36 UH-1B/H, 3 AB-212, 6 AS-350B Ecureuil
AAM.	Sidewinder--9 J/P

ON ORDER: 70 A-4SI (being rebuilt), 30 SIAI S-211 ac;
22 AS-332 Super Puma hel.;
Rapier/Blindfire SAM; 200 Maverick ASM.

PARA

MILITARY: Police/Marine Police—7,500 & 49 Patrol
craft. Gurkha Guard units: 30,000
People's Defence Force.

THAILAND¹⁸

Population	50,700,000
Total Armed Forces	235,300
GDP (1983)	40.372 B
Defense Expenditures (1983)	1.652 B
GDP Growth (1983)	3.8%
Inflation (1983)	4.0%
Debt (1982)	11.7 B
Foreign Military Assistance (1982/1983)	142M/70M

ARMY: 160,000

FORMATION

DETAILS

	4 Regions, 4 army HQs.
Infantry	7 div. (1 with 1 tk bn) 8 indep. inf. bns.
Cavalry	2 cav. 1 arty regt. 4 recce coys.
Armour	1 arm'd div. (1tk., 1 cav. 1 mech. regt.)
Artillery	1 arty div., 1 AA div. (2 arty AA regts.)
Support Units	11 engr. bns.
Army Aviation	3 airmobile coys; some hel. flts.; 5 tpt ac; 94 lt ac; 23 trg ac; 109 hel.
Reserves	500,000—4 div. HQ

EQUIPMENT

AFVs:	150 M-48A5 MBT, 200 M-41 (most in reserve), 144 Scorpion & M-24 1t tks; 32 Shorland MK 3 Recce; 340 M-113 & M-3A1 half-tracks; 120 V-150 Commando, 20 Saracen APC.
Guns/How:	300 75mm M-116 pack how, M-101/-101 mod 105mm; 80 M-114, some 24 M-198 155mm how.
Mor:	81mm & 120mm
RL:	M-72 LAW
TOW:	Dragon ATGW

RCL: 57mm, M-20 75mm & 215 106mm.

AA: 24 M-163 20mm Vulcan; 80 M-1/L-70,
M-42 SP 40mm AA guns: Redeye SAM.

ON ORDER: 40 M-48A5, 16 M-60A3 MBT; 56 Cascavel
armd cars; 148 M-113 (incl. variants); 164 V-150 APC; 34 M-114
& 38 M-198 155mm how; 105mm MRL; Blowpipe SAM; 2 Bell
214 ST; 4 UH-60A hel.

NAVY: 32,200 (incl. Naval Air/Marines)

TYPE	DETAILS
6 Frigates	1 Yarrow-type, 2 PF-103, 2 US Tacoma, 1 Cannon.
6 FAC (G)	2 Breda BMB-230, 3 TNC-45.
3 FAC	3 MV-400
19 Large Patrol Craft	6 PC-461, 10 PGM-71, 3 Cape.
71 Patrol Craft	31 Coastal patrol, 40 River Patrol.
9 Minesweepers	4 US Bluebird, 5 minesweeping boats.
10 Landing Ships	5 LST, 3 LSM, 2 LSIL-351
53 Landing Craft	1 LCG, 10 LCU, 26 LCM, 4 LCA, 12 LCVP.
3 Training Ships	1 Algerine, 1 Flower, 1 Maeklong.
ON ORDER: 1 Descubierta frigate, 4 PSMM-5 FAC (G), 2 Corvettes, 4 large patrol craft, 3 coastal patrol craft, HARPOON SSM, 10 Exocet MM-39 coast defence msls.	

NAVAL AIR

MR/SAR (17 ac)	—1 sqn	4 F-27 MPA, 4 Searchmaster, 2 HU-16B, 2 CL-215, 5 C-47.
MR/ASW (10 ac)	—1 sqn	10 S-2F
Observation (32 ac)	—1 sqn	13 U-17, 10 0-14, 7 0-2, 2 LA-4 ac.

MARINES: 13,000

Infantry	2 regiments
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Artillery 1 regiment

Amphibious Assault 1 battalion

EQUIPMENT: 40 LVTP-7 amph APC, 24 GC-45 155mm
guns/how Support wpons.

AIR FORCE: 43,100; 188 combat ac.

TYPE	DETAILS
Ground Attack	— 13 ac. 13 F-5A/B —1 sqn.
Air Defence	— 39 ac. 34 F-5E, 5 F-5F —1 sqn.
Counter-Insurgency	— 118 ac. 22 T-28D —1 sqn. 25 OV-10C —2 sqn. 15 A-37B —1 sqn. 25 AU-23A —1 sqn. 14 AC-47 —1 sqn. 14 TR-33A, 3 RT-33 —1 sqn.
Reconnaissance	— 14 ac. 4 RF-5A, 6 RC-47D, 3 Arava 201, 1 Queen Air 65, 1 Cessna 340.
Transport (inc. Royal Flt)	10 C-47, 2 Merlin IVA —1 sqn. 16C-123B, 3 C-130H —2 sqn. — 60 ac. 8 HS-748; 1 Boeing 737-200, 15 N-22B Nomad, 5 NC-212 Aviocar.
Liaison	— 27 ac. 4 U-10, 23 0-1 —3 sqn.
Helicopters	— 47 ac. 18 CH-34C, 27 UH-1H —2 sqn. 2 Bell 412
Training	— 71 ac. 10 T-37B, 60-1A, 9 T-41A, 16 SF-260MT, 23 CT-4, 7 Fantrainer.
AAM	AIM-9 Sidewinder
Airfield Defence	4 bns tps; Blowpipe SAM.

ON ORDER: 8 F-5E, 2 RF-5E ac., 6 RC-47, 2 Merlin IVA,
5 Nomad, 6 HS-748, 1 C-130H-30 tpt ac., 47 Fantrainer trg ac.,
4 UH-60 hel., AIM-9P AAM BLOWPIPE SAM.

PARA MILITARY FORCES:

Volunteer Def. Corps	33,000
Marine Police	1,700
Police Aviation	500
Border Patrol Police	20,000
Special Action Force	3,800
Rangers	13,000
Village Scouts & National Def. Volunteers	?

VIETNAM¹⁹

Population	58,840,000
Total Armed Forces	1,227,000
GNP (1982/1983)	Est. 6.0-16.0 B
FMA (1982)	Est. 1.0 B
Debt (1982)	5.3 B

ARMY: 1,000,000

FORMATION

DETAILS

16 Corps HQ

Infantry

56 div. (incl. forces abroad)

Armour

1 div. plus 10 indep. arm'd. regts.

Marine

10 brigades

Artillery

5 fd arty div. (some 10 regts.)

Support Troops

7 engr. div., 4 indep. engr. bdes,
15 economic constr. div. (See Note.)

EQUIPMENT

AFV: 1,500 T-34/-54/-55/-62, Type 59 MBT
400 M-48 MBT 450 PT-76 & Type-
60/63 & 150 M-41 lt tks. M-8, M-20 scout
cars BRDM-2 recce; 1,500 BTR-50/-60,
Ch Type-55/-56, Type-531,
APC 1,200 M-113, V-100 Commando
APC.

Guns/How: 300-76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm guns.
200-130mm, 175 mm M-107 guns.
75mm pack, M-101/-102 105mm &
122mm how (qty n/k). 100-152mm,
155mm M-114 how. 90-SU-76, SU-100 &
ISU-122 SP. 200-155mm M-109 & 203mm
M-110 SP how.

MRL: Type-63 107mm. BM-21 122mm,
BM-14-16 140mm.

Mor: 60mm, 81mm, 82mm, 107mm, 120mm,
160mm (qty n/k)

: 57mm Type-36, 75mm, 82mm,
88mm Type-51, 107mm (qty n/k)

Air Defence: 3,000-23mm, 300mm, 37mm, 40mm, 57mm,
37mm Type-63, 40mm M-42, ZSU-23-4,
ZSU-57-2 SP AA guns. SA-6, SA-7, SA-9
SAM.

NAVY: 12,000

TYPE	DETAILS
6 Frigates	4 Sov Petya 1 US Barnegat 1 US Savage
10 FAC (G)	8 Sov Osa II, 2 Komar (All with Styx SSM)
17 FAC (T)	8 Shershen, 3 P-4, 6 P-6 (incl. vessels of less than 100t displ.)
22 FAC	8 Shanghai, 14 Swatow
25 Large Patrol Craft	6 Sov SO-1, 19 US FGM-59/-71
9 Coastal Patrol Craft	6 Zhuk, 3 PO-2
6 LSTs	3 US 510-1152, 3 Sov Polnocny
SAR Hel.	10 Mi-4

AIR FORCE: 15,000

TYPE	DETAILS
4 Air Divisions	
Ground Attack —110 ac.	70 MiG-17 40 Su-7/-20 3 regts (SU-22 reported)
Air Defence —180 ac.	180 MiG-21 bis/F/PF & MiG-15 — 4 regts.
Air Defence Force	(60,000) 4 AA div. (30,000) 1000 85mm, 100mm, 130mm towed guns. 20 SAM Regts (20,000). Some 60 sites with SA-2 and SA-3. 6 radar bdes (10,000) 100 sites.

Transport	—350 ac.	Incl. 20 An-12, 20 Li-2, 9 An-24, 50 An-26, 2 An-30, 6 Tu-35, 11 Yak-40, 7 II-14, 2 II-18, 2 C-130, 1 DC-3, 4 DC-4, 2 DC-6, 2 Boeing 707, 7 U-17.
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Helicopters	—150 ac.	25 Mi-6, 40 Mi-8, 25 Mi-24, 15 Ka-25, 45 UH-1.
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Training	— 60 ac.	incl. L-29, L-39, MiG-17, MiG-21.
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AAM		AA-2 Atoll.
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RESERVES

Tactical Rear Force		500,000 semi-mobilized first line quick reinforcement org.
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Strategic Rear Force		2,500,000
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PARA MILITARY FORCES

Border Defence Forces		60,000.
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People's Regional Force (Militia)		500,000; 1 regt HQ at each capital.
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People's Defence Force.		1,000,000. Two components—Urban/ Rural.
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Armed Youth Assault Force.		1,500,000 (South Vietnam) Young people only.
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FORCES ABROAD

(1) Laos	— (3 Inf div & Spt tps)
(2) Kampuchea	— 160,000 (2 Front HQ, 12 army div plus spt tps, naval base incl. fighter ac incl. MiG-21.)

NOTES

(1) Economic construction divisions incl men beyond normal military age. Each unit is about 3,000 strong and fully armed. This force has a military and economic role.

(2) Much of US equipment is inoperable.

VII. MILITARY CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS

As one can quickly ascertain from the information provided there is a great disparity in ASEAN armed forces strengths and capabilities, along with differing financial capacities of the nations to increase spending in the defense arena. We go from the tiny Brunei, with an armed force of 3,950 to the largest partner Indonesia with 281,000 armed service personnel. Defense expenditures range from \$195 million spent by Brunei to the \$2.5 billion spent by Indonesia. The Gross Domestic Product growth, a good indicator of a nations ability to support defense spending increases, has a variance of -12% to +7.9%. The vagaries in all areas are indeed great. Let's now take a look at some ASEAN combined figures, then compare them for analytical purposes only, to Vietnam, The Federal Republic of Germany, China, and the United States.

	FRG*	ASEAN	Vietnam	China	USA
Population	61.4M	281.1M	58.8M	1.039B	236.7M
Total Armed Forces	495,000	805,050	1.227M	4.0M	2.13M
Estimated GDP (GNP)	652.6B	32.717B	6.0-16.0B	260-600B (82)	3,264.8B (83)
Est. Def. Expenditure	18.3B	1.413B	Not Avail	8.959B	239.4B (83)
GDP Growth	1.3% (83)	4.5% (83) (excl. Brunei)	Not Avail	11.7%	3.3% (83)
Inflation	3.2% (83)	5.8%	Not Avail	Not Avail	3.2% (83)
Foreign Mil. Aid	-0-	2.45B	1.0B (82)	-0-	-0-
Debt	120B	71.3B	5.3B (82)	4.7B (82)	252 B (83)

*Federal Republic of Germany

The above analogy is for comparative purposes only, to shed some light on the war making capacities of different nations—under different political systems. The intent is not to dwarf ASEAN but rather just to offer bases of comparison for talking purposes.

It is interesting to note that ASEAN has a greater combined population than the USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany, has the highest inflation rate, a high GDP growth, and a low defense expenditure. ASEAN's low estimated GDP would seem to indicate that in comparison to European Nations and the USA, a lack of a great industrial capacity would hold it to a disadvantage. A high inflation rate would also indicate some economic instability among the nations, and severe problems for gearing up to a war oriented economy.

All in all the indicators would lead one to predict that the ASEAN nations capacity for conducting any type of combined defense operations going it strictly alone, would hinge on the duration of the conflict and the level of intensity with which it was fought. ASEAN could best support a local low intensity war of a short duration.

Another method that merits scrutinization is the analysis of the relative material combat power by counting tanks, planes, and boats etc. Most would agree that the most logical common enemy in Southeast Asia at this time is the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. An analytical tool for comparison would have to assume for purposes of a SEA scenario that in the event of an ASEAN-Vietnam conflict, say over a Vietnamese attack into Thailand, that the Soviets would continue their aid to Vietnam. China, we'll assume, will stay partially neutral, and at least discourage any local ASEAN communist party activities and thus would provide only support in the forms of ammunition and hardware. Here then is an analysis of how the two sides would stack up on paper.

VIETNAM****ASEAN*****ARMY**

<u>Personnel</u>	1,000,000	579,000
<u>Divisions</u>		
Inf	56	15
Arm	1	1
<u>Brigades (Separate)</u>		
Inf	—	44
Arm	10	11
Arty	15	21
Eng	25	8
Marine	10	7
ABN	—	3
Spcl Warfare	—	4
<u>Equipment</u>		
Armored Fighting Vehicles		
Tanks	2,500	1,010
APC	2,700	2,351
Howitzers/Guns	890	1,134
Rocket Launchers	Incl. in 890	500+
Mortars	Incl. in 890	902+
Air Defense Wpns	4,000	365+

***NAVY**

<u>Personnel</u>	12,000	118,050
<u>Equipment</u>		
Frigates	6	24
Fast Atk Craft	49	105
Patrol Craft	15	170
LST	6	182
Misc Vessels	1,300 (all types, barges, etc.)	102
Subs	0	3
Minesweepers	0	15
Corvettes	0	10
<u>Naval Air</u>		
Combat Aircraft	0	34
Combat Helo	0	10
ASW Helo	0	20
Maritime Recce	0	30
Others	10 (SAR)	47
<u>Marines</u>		
Tanks	0	70
APC	0	242+

How	0	64+
*AIR FORCE		
<u>Personnel</u>	15,000+	107,900
	60,000 Air Def	
<u>Equipment</u>		
Combat Aircraft	290	525
Armed Helo	40	65
Transport Acft	350	207
Transport Helo	150	261
Recce Acft	0	46
Training Helo	?	207

***RESERVES**

Tactical Rear Force	500,000	1,012,800
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* All figures used throughout are based on 1984-1985 The Military Balance and many items such as howitzers, mortars and AAA weapons are not fully quantified.

** It must also be considered that much of Vietnams US made equipment is inoperable for lack of parts and maintenance.

VIII. TOWARDS AN ASEAN MILITARY PACT

There are many interrelated areas which all have a profound impact on the issue of an ASEAN Military Pact. One cannot discount the regional differences that exist in culture, religion, sociological, political, ethnological areas, not to mention joint territorial claims and ancient animosities. This analysis although recognizing these debilitating factors, will attempt to base its conclusions on a strictly military perspective of the problem, utilizing the information at hand. First of all the vast distances and expanse of SEA that lies between the nations is a consideration. For instance, it is approximately 2,000 miles straight line distance from the western tip of Indonesia to the eastern tip of the Philippines. The air distance between Manila and Jakarta is over 1,600 miles. Now those are not staggering factors in themselves, however, when you analyze the long distance sea-air lift capabilities within

ASEAN. The distances then become rather significant. The ASEAN nations have a total of 207 transport aircraft, however, further scrutiny reveals that long-range aircraft we find a total of 42 C-130, max capacity 90 combat soldiers each and equipment, 22 C-47, max 70 combat loaded soldiers each, one Boeing 707, and one Boeing 737. These are strictly military aircraft and do not include each nations civil air fleet. In the way of ocean going troop transport vessels, we find a grand total of 4 cargo ships of unknown capacity. A lift capability of this size will not support over a brigade size force operation, and it would be taxed to do that. For a comparison, a light infantry brigade would require in the neighborhood of 400+ C-130 Sorties just to get the men and equipment to the battle sight. Then the problem of resupply begins, and the logistical sustainment of such a force in battle would more than try the lift assets available. For short duration/local operations, each nation has a fleet of LST's, LVTP's etc. that could move troops rapidly between islands—for short distances. So in summary, the assets to move and sustain any sizeable force are not at present in the ASEAN arsenal.

The ASEAN ability to conduct combat air operations is rather significant, on a local basis as they have available over 525 combat aircraft. These aircraft range from Types, F-4, F-5's, A-4's and Hunter FGA-74's. A potent capability for both air-to-ground, Recce and air-to-air exists here. This capability could be enhanced with Singapore's purchase of an E-2C Hawkeye Airborne Warning System Aircraft. For a short duration conflict, the combined ASEAN Air Force could hold its own in an engagement against Vietnam.

In the area of ground fighting capability, the combined ASEAN strength of 600,000 regular troops could be a formidable force. These forces are relatively well armed with some of the latest equipment; AMX, M-113, AML and MICV armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles. The various countries also have M-48 tanks, M-41's, Scorpions and PT-76 tanks. The totals of over 1,000 tanks

and 2,300 APC's are not singularly impressive to a European observer, but considering the terrain where they may be called upon to fight, and the ATGM augmentation of the Dragon, TOW, SS-11 and 106mm recoilless rifles they do have some anti-tank capabilities. In air defense, they have the Redeye, Vulcan, Duster, 20mmAA guns, Bloodhound, Rapier, Blowpipe, Hawk and Bofors weapons systems, most of which are of the latest technology.

Much more state of the art equipment is on order and being received all of the time. As far as field artillery goes, there is available 75mm, 105mm, 155mm, Howitzers along with mortars of calibre's 60mm on up to 120mm. The estimated numbers of artillery pieces are in excess 1,700 weapons.

The Naval capabilities are mainly effective for local defense, with a plethora of fast attack craft, frigates, and patrol craft. There are Corvettes, minesweepers and three subs in the amalgamated inventory. The navies are generally good for each nations defense, but generally they lack a blue water capability.

IX. CONCLUSION


Many problems in the various areas of ASEAN interrelationships exist that mitigate against an ASEAN Defense Pact. A common framework for regional defense must mesh the defense plans of each nation into a common collective plan that will concede that the common good of the region must be agreed upon from the outset and pursued, with reason, by all of the members. The lines are pretty much drawn on who the common enemy is for ASEAN, and as they are all noncommunist states, communist hegemony would then be the most likely opponent. There must be complete cooperation to make a mutual defense system work, and all assets must be pooled to insure success and ally suspicion among members. Make no mistake about it, if ASEAN desired to have a capability of

projecting her forces over the vast distances, ASEAN will have to either purchase the necessary lift capability or to enter into some sort of agreement with an outside power for assistance. The first option is too expensive at this time, and to exercise option two would require a complete change of ASEAN philosophy in promulgating ZOPFAN and regional neutrality. The reactions of Vietnam, China and Russia naturally would have to be considered. ASEAN has opted at present to cope with Vietnam being in Kampuchea through political and diplomatic channels. I do not believe that ASEAN, although they want to portray a united front on the issue, is ready to embark on a military path that would disturb the current balance/stability in the region. It appears that it would be in ASEAN's best interest to continue in the overt manner that they now participate in in diplomatic and political areas, but to clandestinely continue to work on mutual defense issues and develop alternative strategies and plans to deal with aggression against their members. Certainly ASEAN has as Aces in The Hole, the various bilateral agreements with the super power, the United States, with the Philippines and Thailand, and with Australia and New Zealand in the Five Nation Defense Agreement. So there is an umbrella of protection of sorts for ASEAN which does not let them stand alone. One cannot eschew all of the other economic factors that play in the equation, i.e., ASEAN is the US's fifth largest trading partner, coupled with the abundance of oil and raw materials in the ASEAN area. One cannot discount the strategic importance of the ASEAN nations to all of the super powers vis a vis the air and sea lines of communications that pass through the region. The timing is not right at this time for an ASEAN Defense Pact per se. They should strive for greater unity and internal understanding, make no large waves vis a vis the super powers, and attempt, with help, to hold Vietnam in check. Walking the middle of the road and keeping the status quo is in the best interest of ASEAN at this time until the partners can get economically

stronger and gain still more political respect as a cohesive entity in the international community.

ENDNOTES

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11. Douglas Pike, "Hanoi Looks To The Southeast," Institute of Asian Studies, U. of Calif. Berkley, 1983, pp. 84-85.
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14. Ibid., pp. 42-43.
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18. Ibid., pp. 46-47.
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