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STUDENT REPORT

ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE
IDEAS AND LATER INFLUENCES OF
HENRI JOMINI AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

MAJOR FRANCIS S. JONES 85-1370
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TITLE  ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE IDEAS AND LATER INFLUENCES OF HENRI JOMINI AND CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

AUTHOR(S)  MAJOR FRANCIS S. JONES, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR  DR. DONALD D. CHIPMAN, SOS/CAE

SPONSOR  LT COL BERNARD D. CLAXTON, ACSC/EDCJ

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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
This paper reviews the lives of Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. It also covers the main concepts contained in their greatest works and the influence they had on subsequent warfare and military thinking. Jomini’s influence is traced through the American Civil War to current military doctrine. Clausewitz’ influence is traced from the post Napoleonic period, through the two world wars, to current military doctrine.
This paper is written in order to give the reader a flavor for the many contributions of both Jomini and Clausewitz to the art of warfare. It is intended to be an introduction to the subject and not an in-depth study.

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Major Francis S. Jones wrote this article while a course officer at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Before attending this school, he served four years as a B-52 Standardization/Evaluation Radar Navigator, Castle Air Force Base, California. Prior to that assignment, he served two years as a B-52 Instructor Radar Navigator, also at Castle Air Force Base, California, and four years as a B-52 Radar Navigator, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia. Major Jones holds a B.S. Degree in Mathematics from the Citadel and a M.S.A. Degree in Management from Georgia College. He has completed some post graduate work in mathematics at the University of South Carolina.
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were very turbulent years in Europe. The Napoleonic Wars raged between France and a series of three coalitions of European countries from 1792 to 1815. These bloody conflicts not only revolutionized warfare, but also produced one of the greatest military geniuses of all time. Napoleon Bonaparte was one of the new generals to emerge from the 1789 French Revolution. Historians acclaimed him as a great strategist, not so much for his inventiveness as for his development and application of existing theories. (2:136) But Napoleon left no written record of his concepts and philosophies except for 115 maxims which are merely military cliches. (4:xxi) The world primarily owes a debt to two men for recording and interpreting his contributions to strategy and the art of war: Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869) and Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). The purpose of this paper is to introduce the reader to these two great thinkers: their lives, their ideas, and the main influences of their work on subsequent warfare. But first, a brief synopsis of the violence that rocked Europe during their lifetimes is necessary.
The French Revolution, which marked an end to feudal oppression and despotism in France, began with the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789. The people organized a constitutional government with a National Assembly in control. Louis XVI, the French King, retained an extensive appointing power and a royal veto much like that of an American President. (1:114) But in June of 1791, the King lost these powers and was, in effect, a prisoner of the Assembly. Neighboring countries, with close ties to the French throne, sympathized with Louis XVI and tensions rose. On April 20, 1792, France declared war on Austria and Prussia for not accepting the principles of the French Revolution. (1:167) Enraged over the execution of the French King in January of 1793, England, Spain, Holland, and Sardinia joined Austria and Prussia in what became known as the First Coalition. (1:192) Thus, the stage was set for a series of wars which would rage in Europe for the next 23 years.

France appeared doomed to defeat until, in August of 1793, the French government instituted the "levée en masse," which permanently requisitioned all Frenchmen for service in the army. Within a year, the French took the offensive. By 1795, the Coalition was broken and Spain, Holland, and Prussia signed peace treaties with France. (7:77) In 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte arrived on the scene receiving his first command at the age of only 26. He led his army through the Maritime Alps into Northern Italy where, with speed and precision of movements, he split the Sardinians from the Austrians. After crushing the Sardinian
army, he turned his attention to the Austrians. In 1797, he forced them into signing the treaty of Campo Formio. (7:77) Later that same year, Napoleon launched an expedition to Egypt and Syria. He defeated the Egyptians at the Battle of the Pyramids (July 1798) but lost to the Turks in Syria (June 1799) and to the British at the naval Battle of the Nile (August 1798). (1:252)

In Europe, the French Empire was deteriorating. Britain, Austria, and Russia joined to form the Second Coalition against France. (7:77) A Russo-Austrian army drove the French out of Italy and Germany and an Anglo-Russian army landed in Northern Holland. The Austrians remained in Italy while the Russians moved north into Switzerland. There, in September 1799, they fell prey to the French. Shortly after, the French defeated the Russians and British in Holland at Bergen. The following January, Russia withdrew from the coalition. (2:257) Napoleon returned to France, gathered his armies, and moved south, defeating the Austrians at the Battle of Marengo. (1:262) The French victory at the Battle of Hohenlinder (December 1800) and further advances in Italy brought about peace with the Austrians in February of 1801. (2:302) The British finally agreed to peace with the signing of the Treaty of Amiens. This peace was only to last about one year, 1802 to 1803. (7:78)

In 1805, Napoleon, now Emperor of France, went to war with a Third Coalition consisting of England, Austria, Russia, and later Prussia. Napoleon assembled his army quickly and moved so rapidly
that he cut off the Austrian advanced troops and captured 30,000 men at Ulm. He then moved on Vienna, which he entered without resistance. He encountered the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz where he won the battle which ended the war with those two countries.

At this point, Napoleon would have turned his attention to an invasion of England, but, on the day before Ulm was captured, Admiral Nelson and the English fleet destroyed the French fleet at Trafalgar. Napoleon met his remaining enemies in quick succession, destroying Prussia at the Battle of Jena (1806) and persuading Russia to accept an alliance after the Battle of Friedland (1807). The resulting Treaty of Tilsit marked the height of Napoleon's power. (7:78)

In an effort to diminish England's control of the seas, Napoleon set about acquiring a superior navy. Combining the French, Russian, and Dutch fleets gave him 129 ships. To gain a three-to-two advantage over the British, he needed either the Danish or Portuguese fleet. After Britain destroyed the Danish fleet, Napoleon sent an army toward Portugal. The result was a seven-year war in Spain against Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army. (9:24) Austria rebelled in 1809 but was quickly defeated at Wagram in the same year. (7:78)

In 1812, Napoleon plunged into the disastrous campaign against Russia who had turned pro-British and anti-French. The results of this campaign are well known: a crushing defeat and loss of most of the French armies. Napoleon returned to Paris and raised another army. In the 1813 campaign, he attempted to hold Germany
and destroy the advancing allied forces consisting of Russian and British troops. This proved to be one of the longest, most expensive struggles of the Napoleonic Wars. Napoleon won victories at Lützen and Bautzen which resulted in a three-month armistice. But this peace was broken when Austria joined forces with Napoleon's enemies. The French won the Battle of Dresden but, in October of 1813, the allies defeated them at the Battle of the Nations around Leipzig, thus settling Napoleon's fate. After a one year exile to Elba in the spring of 1814, Napoleon returned to France, raised another French army, and again made war on the other great European powers in what came to be known as the Campaign of the Hundred Days. He was finally defeated at Waterloo and exiled to Corsica where he remained until his death. Thus ended the Napoleonic Wars and Napoleon's great influence on Jomini and Clausewitz.
Baron Henri Antoine Jomini was the first great military thinker to analyze the Napoleonic way of war. A staff officer for his entire military career in both the French and Russian armies, he never attained a command of his own and his participation in military action was limited to his normal staff duties. Historians claim that he once remarked that he had never actually witnessed a charge with the bayonet, let alone taken part in one. (7:82) Jomini was an ambitious, yet frustrated, soldier whose forte was his ability to analyze and record the basic concepts of war. He sought to devise a theoretical system for winning battles using his understanding of both Napoleon's failures and successes. (11:10) As pointed out so astutely in Edward Mead Earle's Makers of Modern Strategy:

In his attempt to explain Napoleon's career, General Jomini made his own contribution to the innovations of the age. He began, not indeed the study of war, but the characteristically modern, systematic study of the subject in the form it has retained ever since. With Clausewitz, whom he antedates a bit, Jomini may be said to have done for the study of war something akin to that which Adam Smith did for the study of economics. . . . The work Jomini did was in effect scientific pioneering - not the first daring penetrations of an unknown country, but the first really good map making. (7:79,85)
Before reviewing Jomini's greatest work, *Summary of the Art of War*, and its influence of subsequent warfare, a short biographical sketch will prove helpful.

**BIOGRAPHY**

Jomini was born in 1779 in the small town of Payerne in the Canton of Vaud, French Switzerland. (11:4) He was the son of a good, middle class family that had emigrated from Italy several generations earlier. He received a conventional bourgeois education and completed an apprenticeship in banking before taking employment in Paris in 1796. Inspired by Napoleon's Italian campaign of that same year, Jomini entered a Swiss mercenary regiment under French pay. (5:726) Because of his young age (17 years old), he was assigned to a minor unpaid staff position dealing with routine supply matters. In 1802, he was a lieutenant colonel in the Canton of Vaud militia. It was here that he first met his mentor, Marshal Ney. Jomini returned to commercial life after the Treaty of Amiens and, with the help of Ney, wrote parts of his first significant military work, *Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires* (Principles of Large Military Operations). This great treatise on the campaigns of Frederick the Great contains certain generalizations in military thought and comparisons between Frederick's generalship and that of Napoleon. Jomini returned to service as a major in the French Army in 1805 and served on Ney's staff, fighting the Third Coalition in the Ulm and Austerlitz campaigns. (5:727)
Sent to Vienna with dispatches for Napoleon, Jomini managed to get a presentation copy of his writing to the emperor. During the lull following the French victory at Austerlitz, Napoleon found time to read a couple of chapters. He was so impressed with the way the author had captured the true nature of the Napoleonic military method that he made the 27 year old Jomini a regular colonel in the French army and a member of his personal staff. In September of 1806, Jomini reported to Napoleon at Mainz and began his new duties.

Jomini was a brilliant staff officer who claimed to be a diviner of Napoleon's intentions. In one story, he recollected that at the end of a planning conference for the 1806 Jena campaign against Prussia, he asked if he might join Napoleon later at Bamberg. The emperor, believing his destination was secret, snapped: "Who told you that I am going to Bamberg?" "The map of Germany, sire, and your campaigns of Marengo (1800) and Ulm (1805)," Jomini replied. Whether this account is true or not, the facts remain that Jomini possessed a clear understanding of Napoleon's strategic thought and that Napoleon appreciated the value of Jomini's writing. The emperor's appreciation, together with Jomini's great ambition for a seat among the French high command, started a bitter feud with his rival, Berthier, Napoleon's chief of staff. The great animosity between the two officers would eventually frustrate Jomini's career.

In July of 1808, Napoleon made Jomini a Baron of the Empire and appointed him Marshal Ney's chief of staff. In late 1808, he
accompanied Ney to Spain. (5:728) Shaken by the savagery of the growing guerilla warfare, Jomini was relieved of duty shortly after the Battle of Wagram (1809). He subsequently tendered his resignation rather than accept reassignment to work under Berthier on Napoleon's staff. In lieu of losing this great military mind, Napoleon promoted Jomini to general de brigade and assigned him to special duty in Paris for the purpose of writing a history of the Italian campaigns. It was there that he received a Russian commission as a brigadier general which he held in reserve.

In early 1812, Jomini was assigned to the imperial headquarters as the Official Historian of the Grande Armée. Later that year, he refused to take part in the invasion of Russia and Napoleon appointed him governor of Vilna and later Smolensk. (7:82) Jomini rejoined the Grande Armée during its retreat from Moscow. Napoleon sent him ahead to scout for supplies and road conditions. He fell ill during the Berezina river crossing and was unable to serve again until May 1813.

Jomini finally joined Marshal Ney shortly before the Battle of Lutzen (1813). At the Battle of Bautzen (1813), Napoleon's orders to Ney were held up at a critical moment of the battle. Understanding Napoleonic strategy, Jomini advised a course of action which Ney executed. This course of action eventually proved to be in accord with Napoleon's orders when they finally arrived. In recognition of his successes, Ney recommended Jomini for promotion to general de division. Berthier effectively blocked the promotion by countering it with an order for Jomini's
arrest for an alleged failure to submit certain reports on time. This was all that Jomini could bear. He tendered his resignation several times and finally, against Ney's advice, defected to the allies taking up his commission in the Russian Army. (7:82)

Although he refused to assist in the invasion of Switzerland and France in 1814, Jomini remained in the Czar's service for the rest of his life. After the Battle of the Nations (Leipzig 1813), Jomini devoted himself to his writings. He published Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaire (Principles of Large Military Operations), Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution (Critical and Military History of the Wars of the Revolution), and Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon (Political and Military Life of Napoleon). From 1823 to 1829 he was military tutor to the Tzaravich (later Czar Nicholas I). This teaching position influenced his writing Introduction a l'Étude des Grandes Combinations de la Stratégie et de la Tactique (Introduction to the Study of Large Combinations of Strategy and Tactics) in 1829. During the Western intervention into the 1828 Greek revolt against Turkey, Jomini served as military advisor to the Czar. In 1832, Jomini established the Russian Staff College. While his primary residence after 1829 was Brussels, between 1853 and 1856 he returned to St. Petersburg to advise the Czar during the Crimean War.

Through his works, Jomini gained a reputation as one of Europe's leading strategists. Even Napoleon III consulted Jomini before the Italian campaign of 1859. In 1869, Jomini died in Paris at the age of 90.
This great master's works can be classified into two categories: historical and theoretical. During his years in Brussels, he wrote his last two treatises: a history, *Précis Politique et Militaire de la Campagne de 1815* (Political and Military Summary of the Campaign of 1815) in 1839 and his greatest theoretical work, *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre* (Summary of the Art of War) in 1838. Like many of his later works, Jomini wrote this latter treatise as a "book most suitable for the instruction of a prince or statesman." (11:44) For this reason, together with the fact that it was in many ways the final consolidation of his doctrine and theory, *Summary of the Art of War* provides an excellent framework for analyzing his main ideas on warfare.

**MAIN IDEAS AND CONCEPTS**

Jomini's major contributions to the art of war concern the tangible aspects of warfare. Underlying all of his theories on this subject is a fundamental principle which he propounds in four maxims:

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.
2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces.
3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy. (13:70)
The art of war, according to Jomini, consists of five parts: "Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics, Tactics of the Different Arms, and the Art of the Engineer." (13:66) "Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops." (13:69) Tactics of the different arms deals with integrating the infantry, artillery, and cavalry while the art of the engineer concerns the attack and defense of fortifications.

Jomini also stresses the importance of the offensive system of operation. Since the art of war consists of throwing the bulk of one's army upon the decisive points, Jomini felt it necessary for one to take the initiative. Therefore, he believed that it was almost always advantageous to take the offensive. He claimed that the offensive has moral and political advantages:

... it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the morale of his army, and generally depresses the adversary. (13:72)

As a grand strategy, the offensive is risky because an invasion leads to long lines of operation not to mention the hostility of the inhabitants and geography of the invaded country. The military advantage is that the enemy will be struck in a vital area. Deprived of his resources, he will be compelled to seek a speedy termination to hostilities. (13:72)

Jomini condemned the defensive strategy despite its advantage of draining an opponent's strength and resources. Jomini wrote: "... to bury an army in entrenchments where it may be outflanked
and surrounded, or forced in front even if secure from a flank attack, is manifest folly; and it is hoped that we shall never see another instance of it." (13:154) But, he believed that, if one's forces are inferior to the enemy's, then a defensive-offensive strategy can be used to restore equality. Jomini explained that this active type of defense (taking the offensive at times), "promises many chances for success . . . [and] combines the advantages of both systems." (13:74) Jomini is also a proponent of the element of surprise. He states that "it is sufficient to attack [an enemy] in force at the point intended before preparations can be made to meet the attack." (13:209) He further cites confusion of the enemy as an advantage.

Jomini described military objectives in war as geographic places. Lines of communication, the capitals of warring countries and the decisive points in an enemy's lines of operation are just a few examples. He also defined the theater of operation as the general area "upon which the parties may assail each other" (13:74), a zone of operation as a battlefield, and the base of operation as a point from which an army operates. (13:74, 77, 66) His rule for the location of this base of operation is to place it "where it can be sustained by all the resources of the country, and at the same time, insure a safe retreat." (13:84)

The basic tenet in Jomini's concept of war is the emphasis on the use of interior and simple lines of operation. A line of
operation he defined as that part of the whole zone of operations which an army covers in carrying out its mission. A simple line exists when the army acts as a single unit and a double line when it is split into two groups. Interior lines of operation are obtained when an army whose lines are closer together than those of its enemy can, by a strategic movement, split and overwhelm the enemy forces one after the other, by reuniting alternately the mass of its forces. (7:86)

Jomini also addressed the parts played by the different branches of the Army. He noted the practice of using the artillery to soften the decisive point of an enemy's lines prior to attacking it. He also explained "the principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and mobility." (11:19) Considering his idea of territory or places as the objectives of war, it's not surprising that Jomini wrote: "The infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm. . . ." (13:290)

Another of Jomini's great contributions to the art of war was the attention he focused on supply. He believed that this function of war was closely tied to war fighting and definitely limited both strategic and tactical operations. He further believed that the placement of supply installations greatly influenced the outcome of these operations.

In his teachings concerning the functions of a military staff, Jomini explained several specific duties as well as probing deeply into the question of command and staff relationships. He felt that a staff existed to assist the commander in
executing his duties thus giving him additional time for problem solving. On the harmonious relationship between a commander and his staff, Jomini warned, "...woe to an army where these authorities cease to act in concert!" (13:257)

Jomini also touched briefly on the intangible aspects of war in the first two chapters of his *Summary of the Art of War*: "Statesmanship in its Relation to War" and "Military Policy." (13:9) In the first chapter, he defines, in political terms, the kinds of war in which a country can engage: ideological, economic, popular, defense of the balance of power, ally assistance, and assertion of national rights. Remembering his own experiences fighting in Spain, Jomini warns of the dangers of guerilla warfare stating:

No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself. (13:32)

As a soldier, preferring loyal and chivalrous warfare to organized assassination, if it be necessary to make a choice, I acknowledge that my prejudices are in favor of the good old times when the French and English Guards courteously invited each other to fire first, ...as at Fontenoy ...preferring them to the frightful epoch when priests, women, and children throughout Spain plotted the murder of isolated soldiers. (13:34-35)

He also addresses the use of alliances to help banish "wars of extermination [total war] from the code of nations." (13:34)

In the second chapter, Jomini discusses the domestic aspects of military policy: preserving army morale in peacetime, ensuring adequate defense expenditures, organizing and recruiting reserves,
making arrangements for military command, and the qualities of a good general. He also discusses the effects of technology on warfare citing the need of "governments... to combine in a congress to proscribe... inventions of destruction." (13:48)

Referring to his diagrams and maxims concerning strategy, many academics, including his contemporary, Clausewitz, fault Jomini for thinking of war in geometric terms and absolute rules. But Jomini refutes his critics stating that the diagrams in his work were "not to be understood precisely as the geometrical figures indicate them. A general who would expect to arrange his line of battle as regularly as upon paper or on a drill-ground would be greatly mistaken, and would be likely to suffer defeat." (13:95) He also wrote that "theories cannot teach men with mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case, but it is certain that they will always point out errors which should be avoided." (13:323)

Jomini felt that "correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals... they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take rank next after the natural masters of the art of war." (13:325) This belief was shared by a majority of military minds of the nineteenth century and many of Jomini's principles have survived the test of time. This paper will now look at the part Jominian theory ultimately played in subsequent military thinking.

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INFLUENCES

Jomini's greatest work, Summary of the Art of War, was first published in 1838. Translated into all the major languages, it remained the world's foremost textbook on warfare until the easy Prussian victories of 1870 and 1871 had European military minds clamoring for books written by German generals. But Jominian thought survived in the United States.

Jomini's teachings were first introduced in America with the rebirth of the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1817. The few textbooks available at that time were written in French. In fact, Captain O'Connor's translation of Gay de Vernon's A Treatise on the Science of War and Fortifications was, for years, the standard text on the science and art of war. Although this work primarily emphasized the engineering aspects of war, Captain O'Connor also included a summary of Jomini's strategic precepts. (8:32)

Cadets also encountered Jomini's teachings in the classes of Professor Dennis Mahan, a protege of Alfred Thayer (the father of West Point). An 1824 graduate of the Academy, Dennis Mahan joined the faculty in 1832 after three years of study and travel abroad. He attended the French Military School of Engineers and Artillerists at Metz, the premier school of its kind in Europe. (8:73) He completed courses in artillery tactics, field fortifications, permanent fortifications, and the art of war. On his return to the Academy, he rose to become chairman of the academic board and principal instructor in warfare as well as in engineering.
Through his teachings, he became an intellectual father and mentor to generations of American military leaders. He integrated the Jominian principles he had learned in Europe into a nine-hour course for seniors on the art of war. (19:84; 25:109) In 1848, he published his own short volume of Jominian theories: a pocket-size book that is usually referred to by its short title Outpost. (19:87)

The first English translation of Jomini's *Summary of the Art of War* appeared in the early 1850's. Dennis Mahan incorporated this treatise into the academy's curriculum around 1860 but subsequently dropped it in favor of abridgements by other authors. (20:41,89) But Jominian influence prevailed at the Academy and, by the outbreak of the American Civil War, had quite a following.

Historians place West Point graduates in command of both armies in 56 of the 60 major battles of the Civil War and in command of one army in the remaining four. (20:36) In total, 997 officers (359 confederate and 638 union), who participated in the war, graduated from West Point between 1833 and 1861. (25:108) Most notable for the South were Lee, Jackson, Stuart, Pickett, Beauregard, Bragg, Longstreet, J.E. Johnston, and the President of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. For the North, there were McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, Custer, Meade, Buell, Hallek, Grant, Sheridan, Sherman, Thomas, Hancock, and Rosecrans. All studied under Dennis Mahan and were exposed to Jominian strategies and tactics; but none of these men had, before 1861, any actual experience in directing large numbers of troops. Except for a
handful of these officers who had visited Europe, none had ever seen an army larger than the 14,000 men of Winfield Scott or Zachary Taylor in the Mexican War. (20:37) Thus, the picture painted by some historians of Civil War generals riding into battle with "a sword in one hand and Jomini's *Summary of the Art of War* in the other" is not so far fetched. (11:2)

Early in the fighting, commanders on both sides subscribed directly to Jomini's principles of war. The North's generals professed Jomini's ideas of places as objectives and concentration of force. In one instance shortly after taking command of the Union's Eastern army, McClellan stubbornly refused to move his army away from Washington DC and against the Confederates until he felt it was strong enough to undertake any Jominian movements. (20:46) He, as most Northern generals, held that the principle of concentration of force meant one big effort at a time in one theater. The South, on the other hand, was even more Jominian in its strategies. It had adopted Jomini's strategy of offensive-defensive. Not only did the Confederates believe in places as military objectives and economy of force, but also in mass, interior lines, and unity of command. Outnumbered and often outgunned, such commanders as Robert E. Lee, Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and James Longstreet, translated these Jominian tactics into a series of frustrations to Union invasion plans. They saw no reason to ever change their way of war. Their minds were unreceptive to new ideas and, therefore, they ignored several important technological changes which outdated some of Jomini's rules on warfare.
Rifled muskets reversed an earlier advantage enjoyed by field artillery and gave infantrymen an edge in range and accuracy. Gettysburg and Cold Harbor are grim reminders of the power of this new weaponry. What the rifle did to Jomini's tactics, the railroad and telegraph did to his strategy. (6:97) The introduction of the railroad and telegraph meant that the superiority of interior lines of communication, which Jomini so stressed and upon which the Confederates so securely relied, was no longer valid. Thus, technology compelled both sides to modify their strategies. (6:99)

During the latter half of the war, the South made only minor modifications in its strategy. Changes included entrenchment and the use of artillery as a defensive weapon. The North, on the other hand, abandoned Jominian theory for a new kind of war; that according to Grant and Sherman.

Grant was "an officer who ranked low in his class at West Point and who claimed little knowledge of the literature of war." (19:139) Once asked his opinion of Jomini, he remarked that he'd never read the master. Grant believed that strategic concepts were nothing more than common sense. (17:7) He claimed "the art of war is simple enough. Find out where the enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on." (20:51)

Sherman was a typical Jominian at the beginning of the war but later became a great proponent of the economic and psychological aspects of war. B. H. Liddell Hart depicts him as the
greatest general of the Civil War claiming Sherman realized the true object of strategy is to minimize fighting. (20:52) In his famous march to the sea, Sherman put this principle to use. By using a campaign of terror and destruction aimed at the enemy people, he attempted to destroy their zest for war.

Some historians believe Jomini's influence on the Civil War is overexaggerated citing lessons leaders on both sides learned during the Mexican-American War. All that can be said, with certainty, is that Jomini's principles had some influence on some Civil War leaders. But Jomini's influence on naval warfare after 1890 is another story.

Alfred Thayer Mahan, son of Dennis Mahan of West Point, was perhaps America's first legitimate theoretical strategist. An 1859 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, his naval career, up to 1880, was less than outstanding. Then, while preparing lectures on naval history, Alfred Mahan turned to Jomini's strategies and tactics. Like Jomini, Alfred Mahan believed that "correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of war" (13:325) were the keys to naval doctrine. He possessed "a good working knowledge of most all the important naval campaigns of the years 1660 to 1815 and the tactics of the various battles." (18:77) Using this history and the principles he extracted from Jomini's *History of the Campaigns of the Revolution and Empire* and *Summary of the Art of War*, Alfred Mahan developed an analogy between land and naval warfare. He found that many of Jomini's principles could be
adapted to naval warfare with only a change from army to navy terminology, while others required slight modifications.

As Louis Hacker indicates, Mahan left an indelible impression.

Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* at once circled the globe, for it was translated into all the important languages; it was read eagerly and studied closely by every great chancellory and admiralty; it shaped the imperial policies of Germany and Japan; it supported the position of Britain that its greatness lay in farflung empire; and it once more turned America toward those seas where it had been a power up to 1860, but which it had abandoned to seek its destiny in the conquest of its own continent. (10:V)

No other book has exerted greater weight with regard to naval strategy. This treatise truly won Alfred Mahan an international reputation as the Jomini of naval strategy.

Many of Jomini's principles became obsolete over the years, while others found a permanent place in the American way of war.

The first list of the American principles of war was published in the 1921 War Department Training Regulation No. 10-5 and included:

a. The Principle of the Objective  
b. The Principle of the Offensive  
c. The Principle of Mass  
d. The Principle of Economy of Force  
e. The Principle of Movement  
f. The Principle of Surprise  
g. The Principle of Security  
h. The Principle of Simplicity  
i. The Principle of Cooperation (19:213)

Jomini defined each of these principles in his writings. U. S. military minds adopted them making only minor modifications. For instance, Jomini saw geographic points as objectives for operations. After the Civil War, however, the U. S. military adopted
the concept of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight as the objectives of war. Many of Jomini's other definitions also continued to hold prominent places in the American art of warfare. An examination of the U. S. Army's Field Service Regulations—Operations (FM 100-5, 15 June 1944), reveals striking similarities to Jomini's concepts. An example is the Field Service Regulation's definition of the theater of war which contains important Jominian thoughts: "that the 'theater of war' includes the areas which are involved in the war as well as the areas which might be involved." (11:11) The Field Service Regulation's explanation of the capabilities and employment of the different arms is also quite similar to the approach used by Jomini in his *Summary of the Art of War*. (11:12) Today, United States Air Force Basic Aerospace Doctrine, Air Force Manual 1-1, still contains striking similarities to the Jominian concepts discussed earlier [emphasis added]:

1. Unless **offensive action** is initiated, military victory is seldom possible. (27:2-6)

2. Commanders seek to **maneuver** their **strengths** selectively **against** an enemy's weakness while avoiding engagement with forces of superior strength. (27:2-7)

3. **Surprise** is the attack of an enemy at a time, place, and manner for which the enemy is neither prepared nor expecting an attack. The principle of **surprise** is achieved when an enemy is unable to react effectively to an attack. (27:2-6)

4. The **basic objective of land forces** is to win the land battle—to gain and/or maintain control of vital territories. (27:1-3)
Jomini appears to have met the goals that he set out to achieve when he wrote his *Summary of the Art of War*. He succeeded in logically clarifying and systematizing the study of the art of war. As Napoleon once wrote, Jomini "is not worth much as a soldier; however as a writer, he has gotten hold of some sound ideas." (14:14) This perception may have been an understatement, to say the least. Jomini's influence carried on long and strong after his death, and his ideas are still worthy of study today.
Chapter Three

CLAUSEWITZ: PHILOSOPHER OF WARFARE

Carl von Clausewitz is probably the best known, most quoted, and least understood of all military theorists read or studied in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and possibly twentieth centuries. A combat and staff officer in both the Prussian and Russian armies during the Napoleonic era, he was the first great thinker to delve into the philosophy of war. His greatest desire was to understand the true nature of war and "... to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen ... and at least to show the real point to be considered in War." (14:22)

This goal was echoed when he wrote of his greatest work, On War:

But it was in my wish also in this to avoid everything common, everything that is self-evident, that has been said a hundred times, and is commonly accepted; for my ambition was to write a book that would not be forgotten in two or three years, and which anyone interested in the subject would be sure to read more than once. (3:63)

Several historians paint the picture of an intellectual whose literature was dominated by the legend of a disappointed and frustrated soldier. (4:17) However, a close examination of this great strategist's distinguished combat record as a junior officer as well as his profound theoretical, historical, and political writings show the fallacy of such a misperception and explain the
general and lasting value of his ideas. (14:23) Therefore, this paper will review Clausewitz's life and analyze the concepts he presented in his great treatise, *On War*. It will also examine the influence this great military philosopher had on subsequent warfare.

**BIOGRAPHY**

Carl von Clausewitz was born at Burg, a small town 70 miles southwest of Berlin, Prussia, in the summer of 1780. (19:14) His family had emigrated from Poland near the beginning of that century and his father served as a lieutenant in the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great. At the end of the Seven Years' War, Carl's father, being a middle class volunteer and not of the nobility, was retired from the service and made a tax collector. Due to low wages, his family lived on the edge of poverty. To allow Carl and his brothers the opportunity of seeking military careers (normally reserved only for nobles), the family claimed to be of nobility (hence the "von" in their name); but this title did not rest on the firmest of foundations. Little is known of Carl's first 12 years except that he attended an inferior school and learned the fundamentals of grammar and arithmetic, together with a smattering of Latin and French. (16:18) In the spring of 1792, the 12-year-old Clausewitz entered the Prussian army as a cadet. His regiment remained garrisoned despite Prussia's involvement in the First Coalition against France. In January 1793, his unit finally marched into action near the Rhine. Clausewitz got
his first taste of war at the Siege of Mainz in June of that year. Following that bloody victory, his regiment was ordered to cantonments to act as a reserve. Clausewitz used this time to further his education by reading. Just prior to the Peace of Basle, he was promoted to Second-Lieutenant. No longer able to gain promotion on the battlefield, Clausewitz enrolled in a local school and learned mathematics, history and French. (16:29) In the autumn of 1801, he took leave from his regiment and managed to pass the entrance exam for The Institution for the Young Officers in Berlin. There, he not only received an education in science, tactics, and strategy, but also met his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst. The father-son relationship that developed guaranteed Clausewitz's career and led to his appointment as aide-de-camp to Prince August of Prussia. He held this post while he continued his studies in Berlin and in 1804, graduated at the head of his class. In 1805, Clausewitz advanced to the rank of Captain. Prussia had remained neutral during the war of the Second Coalition and had entered a servile partnership with Napoleon. This did not last long as King Friedrich Wilhelm III ordered Prussian mobilization; thus, Prussia entered the War of the Third Coalition allied with Austria, Russia, and Britain. As Prince August's aide-de-camp, Clausewitz was able to observe the reaction of the Prussian High Command to Napoleon's Ulm-Austerlitz campaign as well as their clumsy military and diplomatic efforts to prepare Prussia for war.
Clausewitz experienced the results of these chaotic conditions in the Prussian High Command at Auerstadt, where Davout's outnumbered French corps out-maneuvered and out-fought the proud Prussian Army. Thereafter, he was part of Hohenlohe's disintegrating command, struggling northward until intercepted and captured by Murat at Prenzlau. (14:19) Reportedly, he showed considerable bravery and determination as a combat officer in this campaign. Now, as a prisoner, he had time to analyze the Prussian mistakes.

After his release in 1807, Clausewitz accepted a commission as a major in the Scharnhorst-designed Prussian general staff. In this position, he played an active role in the secret reform and moral regeneration of the Prussian army and state. In August of 1809, he accepted instructor duties at his old school in Berlin and was appointed military instructor to Crown Prince Frederick William. In 1810, Clausewitz married the Countess Marie von Bruhl. The following year, he and his fellow Prussian army reformers began pushing for guerilla warfare against France should Napoleon begin hostilities with Russia. (16:131)

When Napoleon forced Prussia into a military "collaboration" in 1812, Clausewitz, upset with his country's leadership, defected to the Russian army. He held the rank of lieutenant colonel and served as staff officer with several Russian commands. His ignorance of the language limited him to the role of observer until, at the end of that year, he took part in talks between Russian authorities and the commander of the Prussian corps in
the Grande Armee. These talks (Convention of Tauroggen) led to the strategically and politically important separation of the Prussian forces from French control. (16:20) Clausewitz was active in organizing militia units in Russian-occupied East Prussia and otherwise preparing for war against France. He remained in the Russian army until the Allied victory in 1814.

Clausewitz distinguished himself at Bautzen serving as chief of staff to the Allied army. He rejoined the Prussian army in the grade of Colonel after the First Peace of Paris. In 1815, he was chief of staff to Thielmann's corps during the Waterloo campaign. (14:20) With the demise of Napoleon, Prussia, like the rest of Europe, sank back into reactionary apathy.

After three years of duty with the troops on the Rhine frontier, Clausewitz was promoted to general (1818) and made director of the Berlin War Academy. His assignment was strictly administrative which gave him time to pursue his academic endeavors. He used his wife's drawing room as a study to work through the notes which he had accumulated during his service.

In August 1830, Clausewitz was made chief of the second artillery district, with headquarters at Breslau. On the outbreak of hostilities during a Polish revolt, Clausewitz became chief of staff under Gneisenau. A cholera epidemic broke out in the rebellion area and both Clausewitz and his superior succumbed; Clausewitz on 16 November 1831, after his return to Breslau. (14:21)
Clausewitz's works can be categorized into two classifications: historical and philosophical. A prolific writer, he published very little during his lifetime. His greatest work, Zum Kriege (On War), was only partially completed before his death. In an unfinished note, presumably written in 1830, Clausewitz stated:

The manuscript on the conduct of major operations that will be found after my death can, in its present state, be regarded as nothing but a collection of materials from which a theory of war was to have been distilled. I am still dissatisfied with most of it and can call Book Six only a sketch... Book Seven... was meant to deal with "Attack" and Book Eight with "War Plans," in which I intended to concern myself particularly with war in its political and human aspects... The first chapter of Book One alone I regard as finished. (3:70)

His wife and brother-in-law, the Count Friedrich von Bruhl, collected Clausewitz's notes and assembled the manuscript into the best order they could for publication. To add congruency, editors and translators have found it necessary to sprinkle the resulting dull and ponderous work with comments and modifications, some of which Clausewitz probably would disapprove. (14:23) Despite all of this, On War provides an exceptional medium for a study of Clausewitz's important concepts concerning warfare.

**MAIN IDEAS AND CONCEPTS**

Clausewitz primarily dealt with the nature and essential spirit of war. Although he recognized certain principles, he did not attempt to develop any system for waging war. The basic premise underlying his great treatise, On War, is that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means." (3:69) He further explained that "war is not a mere act of policy, but a
true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means." (3:87) In a note written on 10 July 1827, he explained: "If this is kept in mind throughout, it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject [war] and the whole will be easier to analyze." (3:69) He wrote: "If it [war] is all a calculation of probabilities based on given individuals and conditions, the political object, which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation." (3:80) He believed war was just one of the many means a state could employ to achieve a particular end and, therefore, it belonged to the province of social life. This thought brings unity to many of Clausewitz's ideas and concepts, the more important of which will be reviewed in this paper.

Clausewitz saw two inseparable factors which should be considered when making war: the total means at your enemy's disposal and the strength of his will. (3:77) As for the military objective of war, Clausewitz returned to his basic premise stating that it is determined by the political objective. He added:

Sometimes the political objective is the same—for example, the conquest of a province. In other cases the political object will not provide a suitable military objective. In that event, another military objective must be adopted that will serve the political purpose and symbolize it in the peace negotiations. (3:81)

Clausewitz, therefore, saw this military objective changing proportionally to changes in the political objectives. This, he claimed, leads to the conclusion that "wars have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination [absolute war] down to simple armed observation." (3:81) In his
notes to *On War*, Clausewitz clarified this concept stating:

> War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to overthrow the enemy—to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. (3:69)

This concept of two kinds of war did not really become clear to Clausewitz until he was writing his chapters on the defense. By his notes, we know that he planned to edit his work differentiating between the two kinds of war throughout. Since he died after only completing the rewrite on chapter one, the remainder of his work deals primarily with what he referred to as absolute or total war.

Clausewitz defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." (3:75) To accomplish this, he believed that the enemy must be disarmed. This, he said, "is the true aim of warfare." (3:75) But later in his work, Clausewitz states that, "destruction of the enemy is the overriding principle of war." (3:258) Here again we see reference to his concept of total war. "The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy's center of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one." (3:617) Clausewitz's center of gravity was merely the enemy's center of power. He gave three examples: the enemy's army, capital, or allies. (3:596) The second task is to ensure that the main forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive. (3:617) "The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then
at the decisive point . . . there is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one's forces concentrated." (3:204)

Clausewitz defined the relationship between strategy and tactics as follows: "... tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy the use of engagements for the object of the war." (3:127) "In tactics as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common element of victory." (3:194) One of the principles that Clausewitz believed necessary for victory was that of economy of force. He wrote: "When the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all parts must act; even the least appropriate task will occupy some of the enemy's forces and reduce his overall strength, while completely inactive troops are neutralized for the time being." (3:213)

Clausewitz was also a strong proponent of the defensive form of strategy. He referred to the defense as "the parrying of a blow." (3:357) But Clausewitz did not believe in a passive defense. He stated: "... a war in which victories were used only defensively without the intention of counterattacking would be as absurd as a battle in which the principle of absolute defense--passivity, that is--were to dictate every action." (3:358) His concept of the defense was, as he claimed, "a means to win a victory that enables one to take the offensive after superiority has been gained; that is to proceed to the active object of the war." (3:370) He went on to explain: "A sudden powerful transition to the offensive--the flashing sword of vengeance--is the greatest moment for the defense." (3:370) But...
he later states: "As soon as the objective has been attained the
attack ends and the defensive takes over." (3:526)

One of the most popular of Clausewitz's ideas was that of
friction in war. He described this term by stating:

Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really
foresee--combine to lower the general level of perform-
ance so that one always falls far short of the intended
goal. . . . Friction is the only concept that more or
less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real
war from war on paper. (3:119)

Examples of Clausewitz's friction would include the weather,
mechanical breakdown, or any other unknown factors of war.

Many passages from On War can be taken out of context to
connote an entirely different meaning. The following are just a
few examples:

We are not interested in generals who win victories
without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horri-
fying spectacle must make us take war more seriously,
but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our
swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone
will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our
arms. (3:260)

Battle is the bloodiest solution. While it should not
be considered as mutual murder--its effect . . . is
rather a killing of the enemy's spirit than of his men--
it is always true that the character of battle, like its
name, is slaughter, and its price is blood. (3:260)

These quotes exemplify the passion Clausewitz felt towards the
horrors of war. His real intent was to convey the message that
war is not merely a pastime, but a serious means to a serious
end. However, as he had feared, such passages proved "liable to
endless misinterpretation." (3:70) The resulting misunderstand-
ings had a dramatic impact on subsequent warfare.
The first edition of *On War* was published in 1832. Twenty years later, with the 1500 copies of the first edition still not exhausted, a second edition was published in which the Count von Bruhl clarified many of the obscurities of the original text. (3:27) But this really did not help, for even Clausewitz considered his unfinished work a "formless mass" of ideas. (3:69) Wilhelm Rustow summed up Clausewitz's early influence on warfare in his 1867 work, *The Art of War in the Nineteenth Century*, writing that Clausewitz was "well-known but little read." (3:27)

Famous German military leaders and writers were responsible for focusing world attention on Clausewitz around 1870-71. Helmuth von Moltke, Colmar von der Goltz, Von Blume, Meckel, and many others declared themselves to be pupils of Clausewitz and claimed that Germany owed to him her success on the battlefield. (24:61) Moltke, as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, not only used Clausewitzian principles during his successful campaigns against the Austrians at Sadowa and the French at Sedan, but also echoed them in his own writings. (21:99) Moltke did not, however, agree with Clausewitz on the relationship of politics to war. Moltke's views dominated German military thinking until the end of the nineteenth century.

In 1880, a fourth edition of *On War* was published and gained much attention. Goltz described Clausewitz's influence at that time when he wrote:

A military writer who after Clausewitz, writes upon war, runs the risk of being likened to the poet who, after
Goethe, attempts Faust, or, after Shakespeare, a Hamlet. Everything of any importance to be said about the nature of war can be found stereotyped in the words left behind by that greatest of military thinkers. (3:31)

By the early 1900's, Clausewitz's theory had really taken hold of German military thinking. Their textbooks on warfare echoed the great master's teaching stressing: the object of strategy was the destruction of the enemy armed forces by battle; and the greater the battle, the more effectively could that object be achieved. Annihilation of the enemy was the ultimate goal of war. Battle must be bloody to be successful. (3:35) In his introduction to the 1905 edition of *On War*, Count von Schlieffen, then Chief of the German General Staff, wrote that Clausewitz "... kept alive the conception of 'true war' within the Prussian officers' corps ... the entire German army owes the great thinker everlasting thanks." (3:34; 21:97) But, as mentioned earlier, Clausewitz's theory was also becoming popular elsewhere in the world.

A French translation of *On War* was published as early as 1849 but gained little attention until 1870. In 1884, Lucien Cardot, an instructor at the École de Guerre, lectured on Clausewitz after reading the writings of von de Goltz. (3:37) This was to influence a generation of French officers, including Ferdinand Foch, author of the book, *Principles of War*, and the man who would later lead the allies to victory over the Germans in World War I. Clausewitz's influence also inspired a complete reorganization of the French General Staff. (21:99)

The Japanese learned Clausewitz's principles from General von Neckel and a Japanese translation of *On War*. They used these
principles effectively during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Von der Goltz trained the Turkish General Staff. (24:61)

In 1874, Colonel J. J. Graham produced the first English translation of *On War*. The British scorned Clausewitz and his theories until their humiliation during the Boer Wars, 1899-1902. (3:38) In 1909, T. M. Maguire published a new, condensed translation. That same year, Colonel Graham republished his translation with a new introduction which stressed the importance of learning German strategy.

Clausewitz's theory was introduced to British maritime strategy by the leading naval historian, Sir Julian Corbett. (3:38) American interest in Clausewitz's writings grew very slowly after the Franco-Prussian War and, like the British, did not really catch hold until World War I.

The greatest influence that Clausewitz's works had on actual warfare occurred during World War I, in which his disciples carried his teachings to an extreme. The distortions and misinterpretations of Clausewitz's philosophy of tactics and strategy led to what Michael Howard termed the "Bloodthirsty Prussianism." (3:39) He summarized some of the misunderstandings stating:

The skepticism for strategic maneuver force at the decisive point in order to defeat the enemy main force in battle; the conduct of operations so as to inflict the greatest possible number of losses on the enemy and compel him to use up his reserves at a greater rate than one was expending one's own; the dogged refusal to be put off by heavy casualties; all those familiar Clausewitzian principles were deployed to justify the continuation of attacks on the Western Front by British commanders who almost self-consciously embodied those qualities of calm, determination and perseverance which Clausewitz had praised so highly. (3:39)
When the German's Schlieffen Plan and French Gallipoli campaign failed to yield decisive results, a war aimed at logistical attrition developed. (23:978) This led to a defensive type of war which dragged out the bloodshed resulting in senseless loss of life.

After the war, reliance on the defense resulted in creation of the ill-fated French Maginot Line. In Britain, Captain B. H. Liddel Hart became the greatest critic of Clausewitz's theory utilized during World War I. Hart blamed the obscurity of Clausewitz's writings for most of the tragedy that unfolded in that war. In his book The Ghost of Napoleon, Hart explained:

He was the source of the doctrine of "absolute war," the fight to a finish theory which, beginning with the argument that "war is only a continuation of state policy by other means," ended by making policy the slave of strategy. . . . Clausewitz looked only to the end of war, not beyond war to the subsequent peace. (3:40)

Hart's writing on The Strategy of the Indirect Approach and The British Way in Warfare finally shut the door on most of Clausewitz's teachings in Britain.

Clausewitz's theory continued, however, to dominate military thinking in Germany between the wars. The commander-in-chief of the new German army, General von Blomberg, at a 1933 celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of Schlieffen's birth, stated: "In spite of the fundamental transformation of all technical modalities, Clausewitz's book On War remains for all time the basis for any rational development in the Art of War." (3:41) In 1936, the German Academy for Aerial Warfare found Clausewitz applicable to modern aerial warfare. (22:138) It was also during
this time that Clausewitz's doctrine finally found its way across the Atlantic.

The American army had adopted some of Clausewitz's ideas that it had witnessed during World War I. The 1923 Army Field Service Regulation bears witness to this fact stating: "The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace." (3:42) But this shift to Clausewitzian principles was very slow and limited.

Now, before discussing World War II, a brief review of Clausewitz's influence on Russia and Lenin is necessary. Prior to World War I, Clausewitz had little influence on the Communist movement in Russia. In 1857, Engels wrote Marx:

Among other things, I am now reading Clausewitz's On War. A strange way of philosophizing, but very good on his subject. To the question whether war should be called an art or a science, the answer given is that war is most like trade. Fighting is to war what cash payment is to trade, for it actually to occur, everything is directed toward it, and eventually, it must take place all the same and must be decisive. (21:99)

When Lenin became the interpreter of Marxist policy, the Communists adopted Clausewitz's doctrine about the relationship of war to policy as the foundation for their own military thinking. In 1933, referring to Clausewitz's famous statement that "war is politics continued by other means," Lenin wrote: "The Marxists have always considered this axiom as the foundation for the meaning of every war." (21:99) Lenin also claimed that:
Politics determines the social character, the historical significance of war—progressive or reactionary . . . the nature of political aim is of decisive influence on the conduct of war . . . ; War is an instrument of politics . . . ; Every war is a continuation of politics. (6:27)

The Communists successfully employed several of Clausewitz's principles against their enemies in the civil war following the Bolshevik Revolution and in World War II. (21:99)

The Second World War was typically Clausewitzian. The strategy decisions of all sides, save Japan, were completely under political control. (12:69) Hitler's concept of "total war" and his use of his armed forces as instruments of his policy also derived from Clausewitz's theory. The part public opinion played in the formulation of Allied strategy and the advent of the policy of "unconditional surrender" are also examples of Clausewitz's influence during that war.

Clausewitz's concept of "limited warfare" was finally realized during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. But it was not until writers such as Robert Osgood and Bernard Brodie began generously acknowledging Clausewitz's contributions that Americans began studying this great thinker seriously.

Today, Clausewitz's influence is very much alive. Soviet military thinking is still founded on Clausewitz's principles. In America, one needs only to open a copy of the Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force to find principles conforming to this master's teachings. Because of the continuing relevance of much of his writings, Clausewitz is still studied all over the world.
Chapter Four

COMPARISON AND CONTRAST

This paper has now completed an examination of the lives, major concepts, and influences of Baron Henri Antoine Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, perhaps the two greatest military writers of the Napoleonic era. By now, it should be apparent to the reader that there are many striking similarities and very subtle differences between these two 19th century strategists.

Inspired by 19th century warfare, both of these great writers devoted their lives to interpreting Napoleon's strategic contributions to the art of war. Considering their backgrounds, it's not surprising that their concepts are very similar in nature. The fundamental difference is that while Jomini explored the physical aspects of war as it exists, Clausewitz concentrated on the psychological and philosophical side. This tends to make Jomini easy to read and understand and Clausewitz almost boring and confusing to the average person. Jomini did touch on the intangible side of war when he talked of the great importance of morale and the forever changing character of battle. Clausewitz, likewise, wrote a little on the tangible aspects of war examining strategic and tactical methods. On these issues, these two great thinkers, again, appear to agree. Their ideas on the kinds of
war only differ slightly: Jomini using the different reasons for
war as a basis for his categorization and Clausewitz using the
intensity level of warfare. They both used similar definitions
of strategy and tactics and stressed the necessity for simplicity
in battle planning. Also, both frequently referred to war as a
"drama." (11:15)

But in some ways these two individuals were quite different.
To begin with, their personalities were almost opposites.
Clausewitz was very quiet and retiring, almost to the point of
being shy. (11:14) Jomini, on the other hand, tended to be a
very vain person who recognized himself as an expert. This fact
is evidenced in several quotations from his Summary of the Art of
War. Writing of Clausewitz's work, On War, Jomini stated: "This
work made a great sensation in Germany and, for my part, I regret
that it was written before the author was acquainted with my
Summary of the Art of War, persuaded that he would have rendered
to it some justice." (11:42) Later he wrote:

If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this
book and carefully studying the detailed and correct
history of the campaigns of the masters of the art of
war, still contend that it has neither principles nor
rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous
words of Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty
campaigns under Prince Eugene would not be a better
tactician than at the beginning." (13:325)

Jomini also possessed a violent temper as evidenced by his con-
frontations with his archrival, Berthier.

Clausewitz and Jomini also disagreed on several issues in
their writings. Clausewitz was a strong proponent of the
defensive strategy, whereas Jomini favored the offensive approach in battle. They also disagreed on the object of war: Jomini saw acquisition of territory (strategic decisive points) as the primary aim and Clausewitz believed the goal of warfare was the disarmament of one's enemy so as to force him to do one's will.

They both used their writings to attack each other's ideas. In his book, On War, Clausewitz subtly refuted several of Jomini's theories stating: "... to accept superiority of numbers as the one and only rule, and to reduce the whole secret of the art of war to the formula of numerical superiority at a certain time in a certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life." (3:135) He went on to write:

As a reaction to that fallacy, another geometrical principle was then exalted: that of so-called interior lines. Even though this tenet rests on solid ground--on the fact that the engagement is the only effective means of war--its purely geometrical character, still makes it another lopsided principle that could never govern a real situation. (3:136)

But Jomini directly attacked Clausewitz's ideas when he wrote in his Summary of the Art of War:

One cannot deny to General Clausewitz great learning and a facile pen. But this pen, at times a little vagrant, is above all, too pretentious for a didactic discussion, in which simplicity and clearness ought to come first. Besides that, the author shows himself, by far, too skeptical in point of military science. (11:42)

In conclusion, some historians erroneously claim that Jomini's teachings became outdated and that those of Clausewitz are timeless. Such is not the case. In fact, many of Jomini's concepts
are still relevant to today's warfare and can be found in the principles of war professed by many nations. Also, the reader should note, much of what Clausewitz wrote is also outdated. The works of these two great theorists complement one another and, together, provide students of war with a comprehensive look at its tangible, as well as intangible, aspects. Together, they reinforce the notion that there really is an art to war.
A. REFERENCES CITED

Books


**Articles and Periodicals**


Official Documents


B. RELATED SOURCES

Books


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Articles and Periodicals


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