AD-A156 295 US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ARE THEY SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES?(U) AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLL MAXWELL AFB AL R D GRISWELL APR 85 1/1

UNCLASSIFIED ACSC-85-0985 F/G 5/4 NL





(2)

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ARE THEY SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES?

MAJOR ROBERT D. GRISWELL 85-0985

"insights into tomorrow"



DISCLAIMER

The views and conclusions expressed in this document are those of the author. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of any agency of the United States Government. The author has not had special access to official information or ideas and has employed only open-source material available to any writer on this subject.

This document is the property of the United States Government. It is available for distribution to the general public. A loan copy of the document may be obtained from the Air University Interlibrary Loan Service (AUL/LDEX, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 36112) or the Defense Technical Information Center. Request must include the author's name and complete title of the study.

This document may be reproduced for use in other research reports or educational pursuits contingent upon the following stipulations:

-- Reproduction rights do not extend to any copyrighted material that may be contained in the research report.

-- All reproduced copies must contain the following credit line: "Reprinted by permission of the Air Command and Staff College."

-- All reproduced copies must contain the name(s) of the report's author(s).

-- If format modification is necessary to better serve the user's needs, adjustments may be made to this report--this authorization does not extend to copyrighted information or material. The following statement must accompany the modified document: "Adapted from Air Command and Staff Research Report (number) entitled (title) by (author) ."

-- This notice must be included with any reproduced or adapted portions of this document.

REPORT NUMBER 85-0985

TITLE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ARE THEY SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES?

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROBERT D. GRISWELL, USAF

FACULTY ADVISOR DR. DAVID E. ALBRIGHT, AWC/EDRN

SPONSOR LTC JOHN T. BEASLEY, HQ USAF/XOXXM

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 85-0985	5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION / 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code) MAXWELL AFB AL 36112	7b. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION / 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State and ZIP Code)	10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NOS. PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. / PROJECT NO. / TASK NO. / WORK UNIT NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE	
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Griswell, Robert D., Major, USAF	
13a. TYPE OF REPORT / 13b. TIME COVERED FROM ____ TO ____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Yr., Mo., Day) 1985 April / 15. PAGE COUNT 52
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION ITEM 11: PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ARE THEY SUPPORTING ~~U.S.~~ NATIONAL OBJECTIVES?	

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB. GR.	

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The U.S. is using security assistance programs in southern Africa to achieve national objectives. This study reviews the national objectives, examines U.S. interests in the region, compares U.S. and U.S.S.R. security assistance, looks at the Country Team method and changes in the method, and concludes with an evaluation of the U.S. programs. The study concludes that U.S. support of regional development should continue and appropriate military assistance should be provided.

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT ☒ DTIC USERS ☐	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACSC/EDCC Maxwell AFB AL 36112	22b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (205) 293-2483 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL

PREFACE

Are U.S. security assistance programs supporting national objectives in southern Africa? The author chose this subject from a list of research projects sent to Air University's Air Command and Staff College by HQ USAF/XOXXM. This paper will be forwarded to HQ USAF/XOXXM, where it will be used as part of their continuing evaluation of security assistance programs in Africa. The author is deeply indebted to the late Dr. Thurlow Tibbs for his thought provoking advice at the start of the research. The author is also indebted to Dr. David Albright of Air War College who assumed advisor responsibilities in the middle of the research and enthusiastically provided a spirited intellectual challenge. The author would also like to thank LTC Ron Tatus, ACSC, for his careful and friendly approach to the administration preparation of this report. A final note of thanks goes to LTC Jack Beasley, HQ USAF, who provided expert professional guidance and courteously guided the paper through numerous Air Staff offices for critical review.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major Griswell's primary background is in aircraft maintenance. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1967 and served with the Strategic Air Command and Electronic Security Command. A Distinguished Graduate from Officer Training School in 1975, he began his maintenance career at Craig AFB in Selma, Alabama. He transferred to Reese AFB in Lubbock, Texas, in 1977; and in 1979, he was selected for the Air Training Command Inspector General Team. His next assignment was an Air Staff Training Assignment (ASTRA) in Washington DC., where he was the HQ USAF program manager for the $2.1 billion F-15 Foreign Military Sales program to Israel. In his last assignment, he was the Maintenance Control Officer at Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota.

His educational background includes a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science from Florida Atlantic University in Boca Raton, Florida, in 1967, and a Master's Degree in International Relations from the University of Arkansas in 1973.

His professional military education includes Squadron Officer School in residence, 1977, and Air Command and Staff College by seminar, 1983. He is presently attending Air Command and Staff College in residence and is enrolled in the Naval War College by correspondence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Part of our College mission is distribution of the students' problem solving products to DoD sponsors and other interested agencies to enhance insight into contemporary, defense related issues. While the College has accepted this product as meeting academic requirements for graduation, the views and opinions expressed or implied are solely those of the author and should not be construed as carrying official sanction.

"insights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER 85-0985

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR ROBERT D. GRISWELL, USAF

TITLE U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: ARE THEY SUPPORTING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES?

I. Purpose: To answer the question, are U.S. security assistance programs in southern Africa supporting national objectives?

II. Problem: Southern Africa provides the Western world with critical minerals and is a region in which the superpowers compete for influence. The region is suffering from drought, debt, and political strife, all of which could potentially destabilize the area. The U.S. wants to ensure a stable region for economic and political reasons. This paper examines the U.S. security assistance programs in southern Africa and whether the U.S. programs are effectively supporting U.S. objectives.

CONTINUED

The question will be answered by reviewing the effect of the programs in the region.

III. Data: The U.S. is committed to using economic aid in southern Africa. However, small but important amounts of military aid are being offered by the Administration to selected countries. The Soviets' failure to provide economic aid has caused their client states to begin looking to the West for help. This action has created a potential for the U.S. to increase its influence and contribute to stability in the region. A review of the programs reveal the U.S. is willing to use its economic strength to achieve its objectives in the region.

IV. Conclusions: The Reagan Administration is using U.S. security assistance programs to achieve U.S. national objectives. Clearly, progress is not as rapid in some areas as in others, but progress is being made. The support given the South Africa Development Coordination Conference is an extremely important development for the black-ruled states.

V. Recommendation: The U.S. should continue to support programs which promote development of a regional economic infrastructure. The Country Teams should continue to carefully evaluate the military needs and balance those requests against the economic impact in the country.

Chapter One

U.S. Interests in Southern Africa

The purpose of this paper is to determine if U.S. security assistance programs support U.S. objectives in southern Africa. This chapter begins that task by defining those objectives and the role security assistance programs have as instruments of foreign policy. A secondary tasking for this paper is to determine if U.S. objectives in southern Africa have been sufficiently defined. A review of current statements by senior U.S. officials leaves little doubt about that question.

U.S. national leaders have stated purposefully that the U.S. has vital strategic and national interests in southern Africa. Vice President George Bush, in remarks delivered in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1982, said: "A top priority in our diplomacy is southern Africa, where the choices between regional strife and regional cooperation are stark." (18:39) Secretary of State, George Shultz, speaking to the Boston World Affairs Council, made several general points about U.S. interests in Africa:

> First, we have a significant geopolitical stake in the security of the continent and the seas surrounding it. Off its shores lie important trade routes, including those carrying most of the energy resources needed by our European allies. . . .
>
> Second, Africa is part of the global economic system. If Africa's economies are in trouble, the reverberations are felt here. Our exports to Africa have

dropped by 50% in the last 3 years; . . . And Africa is a major source of raw materials crucial to the world economy.

Third, Africa is important to us politically because the nations of Africa are now major players in world diplomacy. . . .

Finally, Africa is important to us, most of all, in human terms. . . . (36:9)

From these general interests, the Reagan Administration has outlined more specific goals for southern Africa. Although international and domestic constraints continue to impact these goals, their importance has remained constant.

> Primary US objectives in Southern Africa include: protecting US and Western interests through peaceful resolution of Namibia's independence and sovereignty, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and encouraging South African evolution away from apartheid and toward improved relations with black Africa. (8:p. 1-36)

The Administration's latest refinement of its objectives was outlined by Secretary Shultz:

> Our strategy in southern Africa is to work with the parties concerned to promote fundamental and far-reaching change in three areas:
>
> * To build an overall framework for regional security;
>
> * To bring about an independent Namibia; and
>
> * To encourage positive change in the apartheid policy of South Africa itself. (36:11)

Clearly, senior U.S. policy makers are concerned about southern Africa and want to maintain access and influence in this region. The question, then, becomes how to best accomplish this objective. One effective tool for the Administration is security assistance:

> International security assistance programs are vital instruments of US national security and foreign policy,

serving to strengthen allied and friendly countries where the United States has special security concerns. (34:28)

President Reagan recently underscored the importance of security assistance in his 1985 State of the Union message by saying: "Congress should understand that dollar for dollar security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budgets." (31:13) Additionally, four major U.S. interests served by assistance programs were recently listed by Secretary Shultz:

* Our interest in a growing world economy which enhances the well-being of citizens in both the developing and the industrialized world;

* Our interest in security -- protecting our vital interests abroad, strengthening our friends, contributing to regional stability, and backstopping our diplomatic efforts for peaceful solutions to regional problems;

* Our interest in building democracy and promoting adherence to human rights and the rule of law; and

* Our humanitarian interest in alleviating suffering and easing the immediate consequences of catastrophe on the very poor. (32:18)

Security assistance programs encompass the whole range of foreign aid, to include economic and military programs under the direction of the State Department. In February 1984, Secretary of State Shultz told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that two recent committee reports, The Commission on Security and Economic Assistance and the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, had concluded " . . . that economic and military assistance are equally servants of our national interests." (32:17) This confidence in security assistance as an effective national instrument is shared by the legislative branch, although

with some reservation. For example, one major conclusion of a March 1981 House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff report was:

> . . . its role as a specialized foreign policy instrument must be harnessed to a broad set of foreign policy objectives which take into account not only base rights, short-term threats, and the desire to make bilateral relations more cordial but also long-term stability, . . . (41:16)

The Reagan Administration's approach reflects these Congressional staff concerns. Broad foreign policy objectives have been outlined, and an effort to support them with security assistance programs is being made. The principal objectives of U.S. foreign policy in southern Africa have been purposefully and clearly stated. The achievement of these objectives will not be easily or quickly realized since political and economic instability will continue to present strong challenges for the U.S. and regional governments. The economic problems are exacerbated by inefficiency, drought, debt, and dependence of economies on one major export. The political process is compounded by newly emerging governments, often facing the problem of establishing the governmental infrastructure while simultaneously trying to deal with the myriad problems of economic development.

The economic strength of the U.S. provides the potential to develop security assistance programs which will further U.S. interests and provide benefits to the recipient countries. Improving the economic strength of southern Africa is important to the United States. The following chapter discusses the strategic importance of the region.

Chapter Two

Southern Africa: Strategically Important?

Southern Africa is critically important to the U.S. Why? Because it's an area of superpower competition based on certain important geologic, geographic, and political considerations. Southern Africa contains important strategic minerals and metals. Furthermore, the sea lanes around the continent hold strategic importance for the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but for different reasons. The U.S. wants to ensure safe passage, while the U.S.S.R. is interested in the potential for disrupting supplies to the West. Finally, the Soviet Union seeks to confirm its global status by expanding its influence in this region. This chapter will review these political, geologic, and geographic interests in light of the U.S. effort to deny the Soviets an opportunity to expand their influence in the region.

Much has been written in the last few years about the importance of Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European influence in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa. For example, Bruce Palmer, writing in AEI Defense Review, said:

> . . . In strategic terms, the multiple-pronged Soviet-Cuban intervention in Africa south of the Sahara has changed the ground rules. The military balance has been upset; where previously neither of the two world superpowers was a principal supplier of arms, the Soviet Union has suddenly become the major arms supplier. (28:35)

This presence is demonstrated graphically by reviewing the buildup of troop forces, basing arrangements, and increased Soviet naval activity. In 1984, the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans were present in Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique. The Soviets have access to major air and naval facilities in Angola and can make port calls in Mozambique naval facilities. The Soviet Navy regularly operates 5-8 ships in the South Atlantic-Western Africa area and has 20-25 ships in the Indian Ocean between the Horn of Africa and India. (11:114-115)

Some experts (19:--; 24:--) also argue that the Soviets will continue to attempt to expand their influence in the region. The desire of the Soviet leaders to make the U.S.S.R. a global power may be the single most important reason for them to continue their efforts in the region: "For the U.S.S.R., for example, presences in as many individual African states as possible serve to reinforce its claims to global-power status, for they confirm Moscow's reach." (2:26) An associated goal is the Soviets' desire to " . . . weaken, though not to eradicate, the Western position in sub-Saharan Africa." (1:36)

Clearly, Soviet ambition in southern Africa remains strong. The desire of the U.S.S.R. to be recognized as a world power will not disappear, and the Soviets will work to limit U.S. influence in the region. For example, the Soviets might attempt to thwart U.S. access to strategic minerals by taking advantage of the inherent instability in the region.

> Instability in the Third World, a critical military and political situation in Southern Africa and the

> expansion of the Soviet Navy have combined to generate fears of a resource war. Shortages of strategic metals could not only undermine military preparations but potentially bring the industrial economies of the West to a standstill. NATO countries are dependent on imported raw materials, while the Soviet Bloc generally is not. (25:Introduction page, not numbered)

This dependency has long been recognized by leaders of the Soviet Union and should not surprise U.S. military strategists.

> Twenty years ago, a Soviet specialist in economic warfare, Major General Lagovsky, is said to have propounded a theory of what he called the "weak link principle." Since modern armaments are dependent upon certain raw materials such as chrome, cobalt, and platinum, Lagovsky pointed out that the U.S. was vulnerable to imports of these. He argued that the Soviet Union should therefore exploit this and other weak links in the West. (6:8)

The dependency of the U.S. on southern Africa can be clearly demonstrated by the following chart showing the U.S. import percentage of critical minerals: (3:60)

MINERAL	% IMPORTED	S. AFRICAN %
CHROMIUM	90	S. AFRICA(35)
CHROMITE ORE		S. AFRICA(38)
FERROCHROME		ZIMBABWE(20)
VANADIUM	36	S. AFRICA(57)
ANTIMONY	52	S. AFRICA(44)
PLATINUM	89	S. AFRICA(42)
COBALT	97	ZAIRE/ZAMBIA(49)

These particular minerals have a special significance. Their scarcity makes them very critical to the Western world, and their importance in manufacturing processes makes continued access to them a vital interest.

> . . . These minerals have four features in common: they are essential in a core industrial activity . . . ; they are found in insufficient quantity, or not at all, in the industrial countries; there are no known feasible substitutes for them; and the only major reserves of them outside of Southern Africa are found in the USSR, with the exception of antimony, which is found in substantial quantities in China. Thus if the United States and its allies were to be cut off from access to Southern African minerals their only alternative source for these vital industrial raw materials would be two Communist countries. (3:61)

This dependency requires the development of a rational U.S. policy concerning southern Africa. That leaves two basic options for the U.S. It can abandon the region and develop alternative sources, or it can continue to maintain access to the region and its minerals through constructive relations with the region and its countries.

The dependency can be moderated, it is argued, by using substitute materials, new technology based on synthetics, or by stockpiling. It can also be argued that none of these measures, except stockpiling, is very close to maturing as a realistic alternative. Stockpiling has not proven to be as successful as its champions once hoped it would be. For example, by 1983, of the five minerals listed, only antimony had reached 100 percent of the stockpile goal, while vanadium was 0 percent, chromium 18 percent, platinum 34 percent, and cobalt 53 percent. (39:4-30) Clearly, the U.S. cannot afford to abandon the region.

A credible security assistance program in southern Africa will help ensure continued access to critical minerals and, just as importantly, the manufacturers of ferrochrome alloys.

> . . . the United States now has only one remaining processing plant, . . . with a production capacity of 300,000 tons, compared to U.S. requirements of 700,000 tons a year. Zimbabwe can provide us with chrome ore, but can only produce a total of 100,000 tons of ferro-chrome a year (as compared to a 600,000 ton capacity in South Africa). (45:5)

While the strategic mineral issue and Soviet expansionism are fairly straightforward topics, there are strong arguments for and against the strategic importance of the sea lanes. However, the Administration clearly believes the sea lanes are an important issue, and that belief deserves a further look.

The strategic sea lanes surrounding the African continent constitute a major U.S. interest in this region. (36:9) The importance of the cape route was also underscored by Chester Crocker when he was the Director of African Studies at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies:

> . . . we have a very serious interest, I believe, in the commercial maritime cape route, as it is sometimes called. To me there is no debate that the security of the cape route is by far the most important Western interest in the African region.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> . . . Were the Soviets to be in a position, from a variety of African bases, to project overwhelming power against the cape route, it would have political effects on our decision making process, in the NATO context, that simply cannot be overlooked. (43:128-129)

This interest does not imply an immediate threat to U.S. and NATO interests. But certainly, the potential to block access to the cape route exists and will increase as the Soviet Navy continues to expand. For example, in 1964, the Soviet Navy did not have any continuous naval presence outside the North Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Sea of Japan. (11:124) In 1984,

it had submarines deployed in the Indian, Pacific, and Atlantic oceans. (11:124) If the Soviets continue to increase their naval capability, the increase will require changes in U.S. strategic planning.

Crocker suggests it would be difficult for the Soviets to project power into this part of the world because of the anti-communist regime in South Africa. (43:132) He also maintains that the larger threat is posed by sporadic interdiction by increasingly well-armed littoral states or in the context of local conflicts. (43:132) Considering the Soviet willingness to provide arms to this region, this scenario becomes a credible problem for strategic planners. A disruption of these sea lanes would block not only the mineral shipments but the economic lifeline of oil to Western Europe.

Furthermore, the strategic importance of the Cape would be dramatically re-emphasized by the closure of the Suez. Smaller oil tankers can easily pass through the Suez, but really large supertankers must transit the cape route to the U.S. and Western Europe. The cutoff of oil shipments would not seriously impact the U.S., but it would dramatically affect our allies. For example, "The U.S. gets only about 5% of its total oil needs from the region, but nearly two-thirds of Japan's oil and over one-third of Western Europe's come from the Persian Gulf." (17:175) The percentages of Persian Gulf oil imports for individual Western European countries are: France, 35 percent; Spain, 39 percent; and Italy, 46 percent. (37:51)

The strategic importance of the sea lanes is a complex issue for the U.S. It is complicated by the scenario in which the sea lanes would be threatened. For the Soviets to interdict shipping would mean an act of war against the West or that a general war had already started. Robert M. Price (3:54-59) argues strongly against that possibility by saying it is a scenario without a great deal of credibility. In the near future, the Price argument seems unassailable. The long term prospect, given further Soviet naval buildup, may yield a different conclusion.

It cannot be credibly argued that southern Africa represents the first priority in U.S. global interests, but it is clear that the U.S. has, nevertheless, important interests in the region. "It is essential for the United States and its Western Allies to maintain some rough equivalence of power projection in the African area." (43:129)

The increase in Soviet, Cuban, and East German presence and the increase in arms shipped to Angola and Mozambique create a present and future military challenge to U.S. interests in the region, even with the apparent decline of Soviet influence in Mozambique. The dependency of the U.S. and its allies on certain irreplaceable minerals requires continued access to the region. The sea lanes around the continent represent a concern for U.S. strategic planners, if not now, certainly in the future as the Soviet naval capability continues to expand.

The U.S. must respond to these challenges with a carefully planned regional policy. Security assistance programs must be

devised to ensure that U.S. vital interests are secured. The overwhelming preponderance of U.S. economic strength, if applied with the proper mix of military assistance, should allow the U.S. to balance the achievement of its objectives with the needs of the countries in the region.

Chapter Three

The Challenges

The southern African region presents the U.S. with unique challenges in political, military, and economic terms. One reason for this uniqueness is the overwhelming dominance in these aspects by the Republic of South Africa. The black-ruled nations of southern Africa face increasing political stress, economic problems, and military uncertainty. South Africa has the most secure economic base, the most developed political infrastructure, and unquestionably the most powerful military force in the region. For example, South Africa possesses 304 combat aircraft arrayed against 246 in the black-ruled nations in southern Africa. (7:75-85)

South Africa, ruled by a white minority, poses one of the strongest challenges to this region. In many ways it stands as an example of what can be done politically, economically, and militarily in an African country, but its apartheid policy makes it a difficult neighbor. Two important facts distinguish it from its neighbors:

a. South Africa has a long history of development, not the 20-25 year period that the black-ruled states have experienced since independence.

b. South Africa's independence wasn't followed by an exodus of skilled political and economic managers as happened in the black-ruled states, Zimbabwe being the exception.

The black-ruled states in southern Africa have been independent for a very short period. Moreover, the Conference of Berlin, in 1884, arbitrarily divided the continent into colonial states and did not take natural boundaries, tribal loyalties, or religious divisions into consideration when the states were configured. Consequently, in many regions families, tribes, and religious loyalties were split without regard for the impacts. This was politically disastrous for the Africans.

During the colonial period European representatives created and imposed European political, economic, and military practices. Africa, unlike many other areas of the world, did not have the opportunity to naturally develop an indigenous infrastructure, and artificial boundaries exacerbated the problem. European powers did not displace natural governments as much as they prevented their development. Africans were never truly integrated into the power structure, either politically or economically. Little opportunity was provided to gain the skills necessary for self-government or management of the economic sector.

The transfer of power in southern Africa after independence was, for the most part, chaotic. Only in Zimbabwe, which had a relatively gradual transfer of power, was the transition not traumatic. Zimbabwe's independence was not complete until 1980.

even though Rhodesia was technically independent from Britain after 1965. Thus, the political situation in this region is extremely fragile.

This lingering political and economic immaturity is an important cosideration when security assistance measures are proposed. Achievement of U.S. objectives through assistance programs is constrained by the region's fragile economic and political capabilities. Therefore, U.S. policy makers must fully understand the complexity of the situation in the region.

As an article from Great Decisions '83 points out, southern Africa, like Africa in general, is suffering economically:

> The list of Africa's problems is long and familiar. But what adds urgency today is that the number and scope of crises seem to be growing. . . .
> In almost half the black African nations south of the Sahara desert, life expectancy is lower today than it was in the 1930's. . . . Almost every single country produces less food per person than it did ten years ago. . . . (5:37)

The specifics continue: " . . . Africa has the lowest per capita income growth rates in the world for the past 20 years--and especially the last ten years. Almost two thirds of the world's 36 poorest nations are in Africa." (5:37)

Underlying causes of these economic problems have been debated for years. The issue for this paper, however, is not the why but how the severe economic problems of this region relate to security assistance programs. The economic needs and the financial condition of each country are important factors in the development of security assistance programs designed to further U.S. interests in this region.

The cost of maintaining military forces has often been cited as one cause of the region's economic problems. For example, in 1980, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Zaire had military expenditures of $1.1 billion yet spent less than $.7 billion on education. (9:35)

Still, military forces are important and necessary to this region. The countries see not only external threats, such as South Africa, but internal threats from guerrillas and opposing political factions. For the newly independent countries, the military is often the key to remaining in power. It is often the only "national" element in the emerging governments of black-ruled southern Africa. For example, leaders in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe came to power by opposing colonial rule. While the military provided a method of opposing the colonial powers, the development of internal economic and political machinery necessary to provide effective government was more difficult. It's no surprise, then, that a preponderance of military expenditures and presence is evident in most of the countries.

While the military is a primary tool for remaining in power, its unrestrained use to maintain power can be a detriment to the development of a pluralistic society in which competing interests have free access to the political process. This factor often conflicts with the U.S. objective of fostering democratic processes and should also be considered in the security assistance process.

This short review of the political, economic, and military

features of southern Africa serves to set the framework within which U.S. security assistance programs are managed. While the region is strategically and economically important to the U.S., the factors discussed in this chapter complicate the achievement of U.S. objectives in the region. Despite the obstacles, the region holds important interests for the United States.

Chapter Four

The U.S. Versus U.S.S.R.: Which Has Realistic Approach?

To achieve its objectives in southern Africa, the U.S. must use the foreign policy instruments which promise the best results. The Reagan Administration is committed to the use of security assistance programs, with a strong emphasis on economic aid, to achieve its goals. "Five of every six dollars of aid we give to Africa is economic rather than military." (26:44)

One reason for this commitment to security assistance is that, of the two superpowers, only the U.S. has the economic strength to positively affect the development of the region. This chapter focuses on the security assistance programs offered by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and discusses how the U.S. responds to countries which support U.S. objectives.

U.S. programs in southern Africa are designed with the recognition that political and economic security are interdependent sides of the same coin. (44:270) The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, has primarily limited its assistance to the sale of military weapons. In January 1984, U.S. News and World Report noted:

> Soviet prestige is declining steadily across much of Africa, as one country after another discovers that

> Russia is able to provide little help beyond weapons. At the same time, opportunities are opening for the U.S. and other Western nations to forge trade, investment and political ties that seemed impossible a short time ago. (30:32)

Additionally, Dr. Seth Singleton, a prominent expert on Soviet policy in southern Africa, testified to Congress in 1982 that: "The Soviets and their allies cannot provide effective help to economic development. This has become brutally obvious to the Mozambicans and the Angolans as well as everyone else, . . ." (42:74)

The Soviets totally dominate the arms market in southern Africa. For example, in April 1984, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) published figures which show that in 1972-1982, the Soviets supplied 68 percent of the arms imported into southern Africa, while the U.S. supplied just 1 percent. (40:95) This Soviet dominance is further demonstrated by reviewing the amounts and suppliers of significant arms imported into the region. For example, in 1975-1980, the Soviets shipped 285 tanks and 38 MiGs to Angola. (2:46) In 1977-1980, the Soviets shipped 340 tanks, 47 MiGs (including 4 MiG-23s) and 300 SA-7 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) to Mozambique. (12:273; 13:329; 14:271; 15:228; 16:153) In 1975-1980, the only significant U.S. arms shipped were four C-130s to Zaire. (12:274; 14:279)

More recently, SA-13s, SA-9s, or SA-6s were reported being introduced into the Cahana region of Angola. (38:10) Additionally, according to the September 1984 Defense & Foreign Affairs:

> New military hardware introduced into FAPLA [Angolan government forces] includes SA-8 and SA-9 SAM systems from the USSR, Mi-24 combat helicopters (flown by Soviet bloc pilots), and MiG-23 fighters (flown by Cuban and other Soviet bloc pilots). (38:11)

The Cuban presence in Angola is another example of Soviet effort in the region. "The main motive behind Cuba's involvement in Angola is Castro's commitment to the international Communist cause. Cuba is furthermore committed to implementation of Soviet strategy, especially in the third world." (21:1018)

The Soviets and their allies have clearly dominated arms transfers and military assistance in southern Africa. Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration, while emphasizing the economic side of security assistance, still intends to offer limited military aid to selected countries. Military commitments to Zimbabwe, Zaire, and Botswana afford clear illustrations of that policy.

Zimbabwe provides an example of the Administration's willingness to provide military aid when a country responds to U.S. interests. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the FY83 Aid Levels for Africa clearly revealed this principle:

> We also feel it important, as a clear reflection of the balance in our southern African policies and our commitment to the frontline states that are engaged in the negotiations over Namibia, to demonstrate that we are prepared to play a role, albeit modest, in the security field in selective cases. Zimbabwe is one of those cases. . . . (44:293)

Another example of the Administration's effort is the assistance program for Zaire. During a 1983 Senate Foreign

Relations Committee hearing, Senator Nancy Kassebaum asked Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, why we were seeking to double military assistance to Zaire. Mr. Crocker used the opportunity to make several specific comments on Zaire:

> [Zaire] . . . is the keystone of stability in central and southern Africa.
>
> Zaire plays an important role in terms of our southern African diplomacy which is not all that often recognized. . . .
>
> . . . . . .
>
> We also think it is worth pointing out that, for example, in Zaire's contribution to the Chad peacekeeping force, Zaire was the first to step forward. It was a courageous decision. . . .
>
> So obviously, the potential is there, and we are seeking to improve it at all times. . . . (44:294-295)

Botswana also provides a good example of current U.S. security assistance policy in southern Africa. Despite its clearly democratic government, its market economy, and its honest and honorable human rights record, Botswana did not receive any military assistance from the U.S. prior to FY81. (46:4-5, 28-29, 52-53, 60-61, 76-77; 47:266-267) In FY81-83, the Reagan team sponsored $6 million in military aid. (48:268; 49:227) Finally, in FY84-85, the total rose to $38.525 million. (49:227) These funds were in addition to an FY84-85 economic assistance request of $28.4 million. (49:227)

Despite a willingness to provide military aid, however, the administration clearly favors economic over military assistance. In FY84, for example, of the $234.5 million in aid proposed for southern Africa, just $25.3 million was in Foreign Military Sales Guarantees and Grant Military Assistance, less than 11 percent of

the total. (35:16) The Administration has determined that economic growth is the key to a stable southern Africa region.

Secretary Shultz, in 1984, reminded Congress that developing countries, suffering from the slowdown in the world economy, could be tempted to use repressive strategies or adopt radical solutions, or they could be threatened by external aggression. He suggested:

> The only lasting solution is the buttressing of political and economic stability and a renewal of economic growth, without renewed inflation. . . . This also means that countries must have the capability to defend themselves from internal or external aggression and to join with us in the defense of common interests. (33:2)

The Administration is committed to helping nations which restructure their economies and internal political methods along free market and democratic lines respectively. While providing justification for the President's FY85 New Economic Policy Initiative of $500 million for Africa, Secretary Shultz said:

> The program will offer tangible support for those countries prepared to undertake the policy reforms needed to improve productivity. We will not allocate these funds in advance, but rather we will respond to constructive reforms where and when they are undertaken. (36:10)

This policy line could be seen developing early in the Reagan Administration's offer of $5.5 million to Uganda in FY83. Mr. Ruddy, Assistant Administrator for Africa, Agency for International Development, responded to a Senator's question this way:

> [President Obote] . . . is faced with an incredibly difficult situation, but he has taken the kinds of economic measures which we are always telling countries they must take to survive. He has taken the really tough steps. He has devalued 1,000 per cent. I think it is the kind of economic bravery and political bravery that

we ought to back. . . . (44:296)

Other examples of the economic emphasis include the Reagan Administration's budget requests of $30 million each in economic aid for Zambia and Zimbabwe in FY85, $17.489 million for Lesotho, and $8.342 million for Swaziland. (49:317,321; 35:16) Support for these states represents the Reagan Administration's effort to develop self-sufficient governments in southern Africa.

One of the most important U.S. objectives in southern Africa is promoting regional stability. The U.S. is emphasizing economic development over military aid as a method to strengthen the region. One very clear message in this regard is the FY85 request for $37 million in economic funds to support the Southern Africa Regional program. (49:220) However, as documented in this chapter, the Administration is willing to respond with military aid when necessary. The most current example is the $1 million in non lethal military aid to Mozambique recently authorized by Congress. (23:4E)

The Reagan Administration is clearly aware of the important potential of security assistance programs as instruments of foreign policy. The Reagan concept is clearly defined: Use security programs in southern Africa which capitalize upon the U.S.S.R.'s inability to respond to the region's economic needs.

The key to this concept is an accurate evaluation of legitimate needs within the region. The success of the U.S. effort in countering the Soviets' presence in the region, promoting regional stability to ensure continued access to scarce minerals,

and achieving other national objectives will depend on accurate assessments of regional needs as well as the development of realistic aid programs. The next chapter examines the process of translating the concept into workable programs.

Chapter Five

The Country Team: Its Role

Security assistance programs, in and of themselves, do not support the national interests of the United States. The previous chapter has examined the Reagan concept of using security assistance both to influence and help other countries. This chapter will look at the method of translating the concept into specific programs for individual countries, recent changes made in the process, and specific changes with respect to the southern African region.

The developing of sophisticated security assistance arrangements in today's highly interdependent and technical world requires teamwork. It's critical to the development of successful security assistance programs that all involved understand their role and the ultimate goal of the program. The usefulness of security assistance could be impaired without a well organized effort to identify specific needs and coordinate U.S. policy.

> . . . If the United States has a legitimate and significant interest in a specific African nation and wants to improve its standing and influence with that nation, one should understand that the synergistic effort of the American presence--diplomatic, political, economic, financial, commercial, social, and military--is greater than the sum of the composite, provided they are all properly orchestrated and subordinated to the overall policy objectives of the United States. (78:41)

The key element which orchestrates these interests and develops specific programs for individual countries is the Country Team. "The Country Team is a U.S. Diplomatic Mission management tool whereby the chiefs and directors of all in-country agencies and the Mission's substantive officers meet regularly under the aegis of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission to coordinate USG activities and policies." (8:p. 6-16) The Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) or Security Assistance Organization (SAO) is responsible to two authorities, the Ambassador and the Commander of the Unified Command, but streamlined procedures have reduced duplication of effort.

This duplication has on occasion caused the left hand not to know what the right hand was doing. Procedures have now been introduced which have substantially reduced that problem. In fact, according to one DOD specialist, (50:---) the close cooperation between State and DOD has clear advantages in achieving the overall U.S. objectives, especially in developing countries.

One important innovation has been the elimination of dual reporting. This process, which funneled the DOD and STATE reports only through their respective channels, sometimes left the other department, if not in the dark, at least unfamiliar with the proposals. In addition, it created the opportunity to foster very different proposals through each channel, allowing unresolved differences of opinion to rise to very high levels. Recipient countries could then exploit those differences and by doing so could actually harm their chances of having any program

[illegible] Additionally, Congress faced arguments for different programs for the same country.

Two significant reports have improved this process: the Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance (AIASA) and the Congressional Presentation Document (CPD). "Since 1978, the AIASA is the primary document through which U.S. Missions abroad present and justify a country's acquisition of defense articles and services from the United States." (8:p. 6-9) The CPD is sometimes referred to as the Consolidated Data Report and is basically an update of the AIASA.

The heart of the AIASA is the justification for each projected program. This analysis represents the Country Team's best judgment on why the country needs the program and also on the intended use of the funds or weapons. The justification is also employed during Congressional hearings on individual programs.

Normally, a country will request assistance through the U.S. Embassy, the MAAG representative, or, in the United States, a member of the Ministry of Defense. In any case, the request is formally and thoroughly assessed by the Departments of State and Defense. The Country Team recommendations carry significant weight with the final decision makers in the executive branch.

This close cooperation within the Country Team is very important to the developing countries. With increased emphasis on economic development, the SAO evaluation of how military requests would impact that development increases in importance. For example, in FY85, the Zairian Country Team reported: "Given

the serious drag on Zairian economic recovery exerted by the country's heavy debt service burden, it is essential that our security assistance be in grant form." (49:313)

Just as important, the security interests of the region require close attention from the State Department so that both economic and military development are responsive to the needs of the countries. For example, in Zaire, one part of the program justification reviewed the role Zaire played in regional issues, such as the sending of troops to Chad to support the Habre government. (49:313)

The recent changes in the team concept reflect the increased importance the Administration attaches to southern Africa. For example, prior to 1984, the security assistance program in Botswana was managed by the DAO in South Africa. In 1984, a small Office of Military Cooperation was established to manage the projected security assistance program. The separation of the program management from South Africa indicates the State Department has assigned greater importance to the Botswana effort.

Another indication of the importance of regional development is the establishment of the FY85 Civic Action Programs for Africa. While not designed especially for southern Africa, the program provides the opportunity for the U.S. to "enhance the capabilities of African military forces to contribute to economic and social development in their countries." (49:322)

The importance of this program is evident by the review level of the initiative. The Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of

African Affairs, Department of State, and the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, are charged with the responsibility to monitor this initiative. Within the program:

> The goals of the Civic Action Program initiative -- to help African armed forces meet the needs of the population as a whole -- will be in marked contrast with the policy of the Soviet Union and other Bloc nations -- a policy which seeks to exploit Africa's regional tensions to Soviet advantage. (49:322)

This program ties in well with the Southern Africa Regional (SAR) program. This program consists solely of Economic Support Funds and is designed to promote U.S. "constructive engagement" in southern Africa:

> As a complement to these intense diplomatic efforts and as a tangible sign of the US commitment to the region, security assistance funds channeled through the Southern Africa Regional account are used to support programs contributing to peaceful regional development. (49:324)

These programs, detailed in the Congressional Presentation Document, support the assertion that the Country Teams are carefully building cohesive security assistance recommendations which balance economic and military requirements. The Country Teams' recommendation to support regional organizations in southern Africa (49:324) is a clear example of how the Country Teams are translating U.S. policy into specific programs. The SAR program will provide economic support to the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). "US assistance will be targeted at helping SADCC programs in agriculture, manpower, and transportation." (49:324)

The effectiveness of the Team concept is mirrored in the

specific programs being recommended for southern Africa. For example, the contribution of economic support to avowed Marxist governments, such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique, must seem strange to the casual observer who might believe that "anti-communism at any cost" is the primary foundation of the Administration's foreign policy. This contribution strengthens regional security by reinforcing the free market policies of Robert Mugabe and the movement toward Western capital and help by the government of Samora Machel.

The Country Team approach has reduced duplication of effort, ensured a better review of programs, and developed strong programs to support U.S. objectives in southern Africa. Skilled Country Teams have constructed aid programs which couple modest military assistance with increased economic support funds. If this patient approach produces sustained regional growth, a reasonable defense capability, and an improvement of the economic security of the black-ruled nations, it may eventually lessen their economic dependency on and military fear of South Africa. The future is uncertain, but the Country Team approach has at least provided a solid foundation for growth.

Chapter Six

Evaluation of U.S. Security Assistance in Southern Africa

This paper began with the purpose of determining if security assistance programs in southern Africa promoted U.S. national objectives. In pursuit of this goal the author chose to identify the objectives; analyze the unique political, military and economic requirements of the region; compare the use and type of security assistance programs in the region; examine the role of the U.S. Country Teams; and, in this chapter, to review the programs in terms of meeting U.S. objectives.

As we saw in the last chapter, Country Teams in the southern Africa region are supporting the policies established by senior U.S. leaders. Security assistance programs in the region are being designed to establish a framework which will further U.S. interests while encouraging the countries to pursue economic policies which will help them become self-sufficient.

The achievement of U.S. objectives in southern Africa is complicated by the apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa. The black-led African nations sometimes have difficulty reconciling the "constructive engagement" policy from what they view as outright U.S. support of the RSA and its policies. The Reagan Administration has refused to adopt a policy of

disinvestment in South Africa, although some critics have urged its adoption. (3:83) This seems to be in line with current policy to encourage rather than discourage economic development in hopes of strengthening regional stability.

Another distracting factor is the American penchant for immediate solutions. Protecting U.S. interests in South Africa will require patience and flexibility. For example, the independence issue in Namibia is a very complex question which has frustrated the U.S. and other Western powers since at least the end of World War II. Yet, on 18 November 1984, a New York Times editorial noted: "The Administration goes a step further. It thinks warm ties to that Government [South Africa] from 'constructive engagement'—will achieve more good in the end. But it has nothing to show inside South Africa for four years of such engagement." (27:24E)

The Administration can argue that it does have something to show for its efforts. In 1980, no agreement at all had been reached on Namibia. But in February 1984, the RSA agreed to pull its troops out of Angola as the first step toward achieving an accord removing Cuban and South African troops from Angola. This agreement has yet to be fulfilled because of disagreements over the reported presence of South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) fighters still in the vacated area. (29:7319) But, it can be argued that at least movement has begun.

This author has concluded that the security assistance policies are promoting the established objectives of the U.S. in

southern Africa. A careful review of the goals and program [illegible] clearly indicates the Administration is using [illegible] assistance not only to further its immediate goals but [illegible] build a foundation for future growth. This is not meant [illegible] imply the Administration's goals enjoy unanimous support. On the contrary, many disagreements exist within the academic [illegible] (229) and political community over the course of events [illegible] southern Africa, as Senator Ted Kennedy's visit to South [illegible] in January 1985 demonstrated. But the purpose of this paper was to examine the support of current U.S. objectives by security assistance programs. And in that regard, it seems clear that the programs and the management of the programs support the objectives.

Usually, evidence of support for U.S. objectives is shown through the amount or kind of aid offered a country. Another way to look at the evidence is the withdrawal of that support.

> . . . In mid-March 1981, the administration cut off U.S. food aid to Mozambique in retaliation for its expulsion of six U.S. diplomats on charges of spying. Washington publicly interpreted these expulsions as the work of Cuban advisors, and thus this practically unprecedented cut in food assistance can be interpreted as an especially firm countermeasure to a display of Soviet/Cuban influence. . . . (3:72)

The continuation of military aid for Zaire, the new initiative in Botswana to provide a small military office to manage the military programs being offered there, economic support for Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and Lesotho all provide evidence that the Administration is seriously attempting to use security assistance to achieve its objectives in southern Africa.

But perhaps the most important evidence is the decision to support SADCC with economic support funds. The primary purpose of SADCC is to lessen the economic dependence of the southern African nations on South Africa by improving regional cooperation among nine southern African countries: Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Angola *and* Malawi. This list of countries includes some of the severest critics of U.S. policy in southern Africa. The U.S. support of SADCC sends a strong signal to the region. Two recent reports on southern Africa contained strong endorsements for U.S. support of SADCC. (4:52-53; 10:444-449)

This support tells the individual countries that the U.S. is committed to interdependence in the region as opposed to South Africa's concept of a "constellation of states." Such a constel-lation *would be dominated by South Africa*, a situation which is opposed by the nine other states. In justification of the SADCC program, the Administration said:

> . . . A two-track strategy allows the US to support those seeking constructive solutions to the problems of southern Africa. First, ESF funds are used to assist the Black-led countries neighboring South Africa in their efforts to cooperate on region-wide development programs. . . . US assistance will be targeted at helping SADCC programs in agriculture, manpower, and transportation. . . .
>
> Second, within the country of South Africa, as in previous years, ESF funds will be used for educational and other assistance to those South Africans who suffer discrimination under the system of apartheid. . . . This program demonstrates in a very visible manner the depth of US concern for the future of South Africa's black population. (49:324)

It seems clear to this writer that, despite strong criticisms

of its foreign policy in southern Africa, the U.S. is achieving its objectives. It has maintained access to critical minerals, has made progress in the effort to secure Namibian independence, and is responding to the Soviet/Cuban military effort with just the right economic approach. The small military assistance package responds to carefully evaluated requirements by Country Teams that are close to the situation and clearly reflects the Administration's policy of favoring economic over military aid.

Finally, the effective use of security assistance programs has reduced the potential for further Soviet gains. Each southern African country has clearly seen the Soviet failure or inability to provide assistance other than military aid. The U.S. security assistance program has opened the door for cooperation with the economically depressed region. New initiatives, such as support of SADCC, (49:324) provide opportunities to build a framework for regional security. The $1 million in non-lethal military aid to Mozambique recently authorized by Congress is thought to be " . . . a way of weaning the former Portuguese colony in East Africa away from the Soviet Union, its main supplier of military and economic aid." (23:4E) Wise, prudent, and patient use of security assistance in southern Africa may very well provide the answers so long sought for this region.

CONTINUED

A. REFERENCES CITED

BOOKS

1. Albright, David E. The USSR and Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980's. The Washington Papers/101. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983.

2. Arlinghaus, Bruce E., ed. Arms for Africa: Military Assistance and Foreign Policy in the Developing World. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1983.

3. Carter, Gwendolen, M. and Patrick O'Meara, eds. International Politics in Southern Africa. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982.

4. Fisher, Scott. Coping With Change. National Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-7. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1982.

5. Great Decisions '83. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1983.

6. Hull, Galen Spencer. Pawns on a Chessboard: The Resource War in Southern Africa. Washington DC: University Press of America, Inc., 1981.

7. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1984-1985. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

8. The Management of Security Assistance. 4th ed. Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1983.

9. Sivard, Ruth Leger. World Military and Social Expenditures 1983. Washington DC: World Priorities, 1983.

10. South Africa: Time Running Out. The Report of the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981.

CONTINUED

11. U.S. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power, 3d ed. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1984.

12. World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1976. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1976.

13. World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977.

14. World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1978. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1978.

15. World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1979. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1979.

16. World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1980. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1980.

Articles and Periodicals

17. Bernstein, Peter W. "How to Worry Less About the Persian Gulf." Fortune, Vol. 109 (30 April 1984): p. 175.

18. Bush, George. "A New Partnership with Africa." Africa Report, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January-February 1983): pp. 39-41.

19. Chiteji, Frank M. "Superpower Diplomacy: Arming Africa." Current History, Vol. 83, No. 491 (March 1984): pp. 125-128, 138.

20. Congressional Quarterly. Vol. 42, No. 42 (20 October 1984): p. 2738.

21. "Cuba Increases Soviet Influence in Africa," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 2, No. 22 (8 December 1984): pp. 1018-1019.

22. El-Khawas, Mohamed A. "Reagan's African Policy: A Turn to the Right." A Current Bibliography on African Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1983-1984): pp. 207-225.

CONTINUED

23. Freudenheim, Milt and Henry Ginger. "Non-Lethal Aid to Mozambique," The New York Times, 20 January 1985, p. 4E.

24. Gersham, Carl and Bayard Rustin. "Africa, Soviet Imperialism, and the Retreat of American Power." AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. I, No. 1 (1979): pp. 8-10.

25. Gutteridge, William. "Mineral Resources and National Security." Conflict Studies, No. 162 (1984): pp.1-24.

26. Lyman, Princeton. "FY 1985 Foreign Assistance Requests for Sub-Sahara Africa." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2086 (May 1984): pp. 43-48.

27. "The Nightsticks in South Africa." The New York Times, 18 November 1984, p. 24E.

28. Palmer, Bruce Jr. "US Security Interests and Africa South of the Sahara." AEI Defense Review, Vol. 2, No. 6 (1978): pp. 1-53.

29. "Political Developments-Non Independent Territories." Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 7 (15 August 1984): pp. 7319-7320.

30. Powell, Stewart. "In Africa, It's the Soviets on the Skids." U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 96, No. 2 (16 January 1984): p. 32.

31. Reagan, Ronald. "State of the Union Address, 1985." The New York Times, 7 February 1985, p. 13.

32. Shultz, George P. "Foreign Aid and U.S. Policy Objectives." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2086 (May 1984): pp. 17-30.

33. -----. "International Security and Development Cooperation Programs." Department of State Special Report, No. 108 (4 April 1984): pp. 1-16.

CONTINUED

34. ———. "Transmittal Letter from Secretary Shultz." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2086 (May 1984): pp. 27-34.

35. ———. "Transmittal Letter to Congress." Department of State Special Report, No. 116 (April 1984): pp. 1-16.

36. ———. "The U.S. and Africa in the 1980's." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2085 (April 1984): pp. 9-12.

37. Smith, William E. "Threatening the Lifeline." Time, Vol. 123, No. 22 (28 May 1984): pp. 50-51.

38. "Where Lion[sic] Roam No More." Defense & Foreign Affairs, (September 1984): pp. 8-11.

Official Documents

39. General Services Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Stockpile Report to the Congress, Statistical Supplement, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 30 September 1983.

40. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1972-1982, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1984.

41. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Security Assistance and Arms Transfer Policies for the 1980's. Staff Report, March 1981. 97th Congress, 1st Session, 1981. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981.

42. U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa. Regional Destabilization in Southern Africa. Hearings. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1983.

CONTINUED

43. ------. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa. U.S. Interests in Africa. Hearings. 96th Congress, 1st Session, 1979. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1980.

44. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Fiscal Year 1983 Security Assistance. Hearings. 2nd Session, 97th Congress, 1982. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.

45. ------. Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.S. Minerals Dependence on South Africa. Hearings. 97th Congress, 2nd Session, 1982. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.

46. U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Assistance Agency. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1983.

47. U.S. Department of State. Security Assistance Programs, Congressional Presentation. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981.

48. ------. Security Assistance Programs, Congressional Presentation. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.

49. ------. Security Assistance Programs, Congressional Presentation. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1985.

Other Sources

50. Beasley, John T., Lt Col, USAF. Branch Chief, African Division, Directorate of Plans, HQ USAF/XOXXM, Washington DC. Telecon Interview with Author, 15 November 1984.

CONTINUED

B. RELATED SOURCES

Books

Africa Guide 1984. 8th ed. Essex, England: World of Information, 1984.

Arms Sales A Useful Foreign Policy Tool? Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1981.

Bertram, Christoph, ed. Third-World and International Security. Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1982.

Bissell, Richard E. Southern Africa in the World: Autonomy or Interdependence? Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1978.

Clough, Michael and Helen Kitchen. The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings. Significant Issues Series, Vol. VI, No. 6. Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984.

Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann. Africa South of the Sahara. Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1981.

Grimmet, Richard F. Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1975-1982. Washington DC: Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, 1983.

Lemarchand, Rene., ed. American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance. 2nd ed. Washington DC: University Press of America, Inc., 1981.

Schandler, Herbert Y. Summary of U.S. Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Programs. Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1976.

Security Assistance Training Management Handbook (Overseas). Wright - Patterson AFB, Ohio: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1982.

CONTINUED

Articles and Periodicals

Ackels, A.D. Major, "African Minerals and American Policy." Parameters, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (1978): pp. 47-54.

Amsalem, Michel A. "Bauxite, Copper and Oil: Bargaining Power and the Economics of Natural Resources." The Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (Spring 1984): pp. 19-25.

Baker, Thomas A. BGen. "Security Assistance: A Visual Overview." Air Force Journal of Logistics, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (Summer 1984): pp. 18-19.

Baoqin, Wang. "Superpower Balance Sheet." World Press Review (November 1984): p. 48.

Clough, Michael. "United States Policy in Southern Africa." Current History, Vol. 83, No. 491 (March 1984): pp. 97-100; 135-137.

Cottrell, Alvin J., Robert Hanks and Michael Moodie. "Arms Transfers and U.S. Foreign and Military Policy." Significant Issues, Vol 1, No. 7 (1980): pp. 1-63.

"Current U.S. Policy in Southern Africa." Africa Report, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March-April 1983): pp. 39-44.

Eagleburger, Lawrence S. "Security Policy and Arms Control." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2086 (May 1984): pp. 49-50.

-------. "Southern Africa: America's Responsibility for Peace and Change." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 83, No. 2077 (August 1983): pp. 8-13.

Gorman, Robert F. "Soviet Perspectives on the Prospects for Socialist Development in Africa." African Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 331 (April 1984): pp. 163-187.

Kitchen, Helen. "Options for U.S. Policy Toward Africa." AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1979): pp. 1-76.

CONTINUED

Klare, Michael T. "Soviet Arms Transfers to the Third World." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 40, No. 5 (May 1984): pp. 26-31.

Knight, Virginia Curtin. "Political Consolidation in Zimbabwe." Current History, Vol. 83, No. 491 (March 1984): pp. 109-113; 135.

Loch, Noel C. "Third World Problems and International Security." Defense/84 (February 1984) pp. 16-23.

Lake, Anthony. "Africa: Do the Doable." Foreign Policy, No. 54 (Spring 1984): pp. 102-121.

Norman, Denis R. "Food Security for Southern Africa." Vol. 29, No. 4 (July-August 1984): pp. 15-18.

MacQueen, Norman. "Mozambique's Widening Foreign Policy." The World Today, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January 1984): pp. 22-27.

O'Meara, Patrick. "South Africa: No New Political Dispensation." Current History, Vol. 83, No. 491 (March 1984): pp. 105-108; 131.

"[illegible] Masire, President of Botswana." Interview. Africa Report, Vol. 29, No. 4 (July-August 1984): pp. 32-34.

[illegible], Michael S. "Mozambique: Nonalignment or New Dependency?" Current History, Vol. 83, No. 491 (March 1984): pp. 101-104; 132-135.

Seiler, John. "Two Views of Namibia's Prospects." Africa Today, Vol. 31, No. 1 (30 July 1984): pp. 61-62.

Semmel, Andrew K. "Helping Others Help Us." Defense/82 (November 1982): pp. 11-20.

Shultz, George P. "U.S. Aid Initiative in Africa." Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 84, No. 2084 (March 1984): pp. 7-8.

Sreedhar. "Impact of Reagan's Arms Transfer Policy." Strategic Analysis, Vol. V, Nos. 5 & 6 (August-September 1981): pp. 188-190.

"U.S. Weapons Exports Headed for Record Level." The Defense Monitor, Vol. XI, No. 3 (1982): pp. 1-12.

Official Documents

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1985. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1984.

U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Secretary of the Interior. Actions Needed to Promote a Stable Supply of Strategic and Critical Minerals and Materials. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 3 June 1982.

Unpublished Materials

Beasley, John T., Lt Col, USAF. "Security Assistance Overseas: Can We Be More Effective?" Paper presented at the Air University *Airpower Symposium*, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 5-7 March 1984.

Brake, Terry A. LCDR, USN. "Soviet/Cuban Influence in Southern Africa: 1990." Unpublished Staff Problem Solving Report No. 82-0375, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1982.

"Effectiveness of U.S. Security Assistance in Acquiring and Retaining Friends and Allies." Unpublished Army War College Report No. ACN 79016, Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 18 April 1980.

Getchell, George L., Colonel, USAF., et al. "U.S. Military Security Assistance: Economic Consideration and Policy Implications." Unpublished Airpower Research Institute Report No. RA0003-81. Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 1981.

Hankee, William R. and Dr. Alwyn H. King. "The Role of Security Assistance in Maintaining Access to Strategic Resources." Unpublished Army War College Report No. ACN 78066, Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 29 September 1978.

CONTINUED

Harrison, James A. Lt Col., USA. "The United States Strategic Stockpile of Critical Minerals and Our National Security." Unpublished Report, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1982.

Linville, Ray F. Lt Col., USAF. "Trends in Arms Trade with the Third World." Paper presented at the Air University Airpower Symposium, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 5-7 March 1984.

Johnson, Jacob Lee, Jr. Lt Cmdr, USN. "Soviet Arms Transfers to Clients During Crisis: 1955-1983." Unpublished Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1983.

Schepens, William E. Major, USAF. "Foreign Military Sales to Southern Africa." Unpublished Staff Problem Solving Report No. 84-2310, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1984.

END

FILMED

8-85

DTIC